new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Apr 21

Toward Robust LLM-Based Judges: Taxonomic Bias Evaluation and Debiasing Optimization

Large language model (LLM)-based judges are widely adopted for automated evaluation and reward modeling, yet their judgments are often affected by judgment biases. Accurately evaluating these biases is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM-based judges. However, existing studies typically investigate limited biases under a single judge formulation, either generative or discriminative, lacking a comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we propose JudgeBiasBench, a benchmark for systematically quantifying biases in LLM-based judges. JudgeBiasBench defines a taxonomy of judgment biases across 4 dimensions, and constructs bias-augmented evaluation instances through a controlled bias injection pipeline, covering 12 representative bias types. We conduct extensive experiments across both generative and discriminative judges, revealing that current judges exhibit significant and diverse bias patterns that often compromise the reliability of automated evaluation. To mitigate judgment bias, we propose bias-aware training that explicitly incorporates bias-related attributes into the training process, encouraging judges to disentangle task-relevant quality from bias-correlated cues. By adopting reinforcement learning for generative judges and contrastive learning for discriminative judges, our methods effectively reduce judgment biases while largely preserving general evaluation capability.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 9

Poison Once, Refuse Forever: Weaponizing Alignment for Injecting Bias in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 27, 2025

Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

  • 15 authors
·
Jul 29, 2024

Cascading Adversarial Bias from Injection to Distillation in Language Models

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

  • 6 authors
·
May 30, 2025 2

Activation Steering for Bias Mitigation: An Interpretable Approach to Safer LLMs

As large language models (LLMs) become more integrated into societal systems, the risk of them perpetuating and amplifying harmful biases becomes a critical safety concern. Traditional methods for mitigating bias often rely on data filtering or post-hoc output moderation, which treat the model as an opaque black box. In this work, we introduce a complete, end-to-end system that uses techniques from mechanistic interpretability to both identify and actively mitigate bias directly within a model's internal workings. Our method involves two primary stages. First, we train linear "probes" on the internal activations of a model to detect the latent representations of various biases (e.g., gender, race, age). Our experiments on gpt2-large demonstrate that these probes can identify biased content with near-perfect accuracy, revealing that bias representations become most salient in the model's later layers. Second, we leverage these findings to compute "steering vectors" by contrasting the model's activation patterns for biased and neutral statements. By adding these vectors during inference, we can actively steer the model's generative process away from producing harmful, stereotypical, or biased content in real-time. We demonstrate the efficacy of this activation steering technique, showing that it successfully alters biased completions toward more neutral alternatives. We present our work as a robust and reproducible system that offers a more direct and interpretable approach to building safer and more accountable LLMs.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 12, 2025

The Mirror Design Pattern: Strict Data Geometry over Model Scale for Prompt Injection Detection

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns control-plane attack mechanics rather than incidental corpus shortcuts. Using 5,000 strictly curated open-source samples -- the largest corpus supportable under our public-data validity contract -- we define a 32-cell mirror topology, fill 31 of those cells with public data, train a sparse character n-gram linear SVM, compile its weights into a static Rust artifact, and obtain 95.97\% recall and 92.07\% F1 on a 524-case holdout at sub-millisecond latency with no external model runtime dependencies. On the same holdout, our next line of defense, a 22-million-parameter Prompt Guard~2 model reaches 44.35\% recall and 59.14\% F1 at 49\,ms median and 324\,ms p95 latency. Linear models still leave residual semantic ambiguities such as use-versus-mention for later pipeline layers, but within that scope our results show that for L1 prompt injection screening, strict data geometry can matter more than model scale.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 12

Virtual Prompt Injection for Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

  • 9 authors
·
Jul 31, 2023 2

Biases in Edge Language Models: Detection, Analysis, and Mitigation

The integration of large language models (LLMs) on low-power edge devices such as Raspberry Pi, known as edge language models (ELMs), has introduced opportunities for more personalized, secure, and low-latency language intelligence that is accessible to all. However, the resource constraints inherent in edge devices and the lack of robust ethical safeguards in language models raise significant concerns about fairness, accountability, and transparency in model output generation. This paper conducts a comparative analysis of text-based bias across language model deployments on edge, cloud, and desktop environments, aiming to evaluate how deployment settings influence model fairness. Specifically, we examined an optimized Llama-2 model running on a Raspberry Pi 4; GPT 4o-mini, Gemini-1.5-flash, and Grok-beta models running on cloud servers; and Gemma2 and Mistral models running on a MacOS desktop machine. Our results demonstrate that Llama-2 running on Raspberry Pi 4 is 43.23% and 21.89% more prone to showing bias over time compared to models running on the desktop and cloud-based environments. We also propose the implementation of a feedback loop, a mechanism that iteratively adjusts model behavior based on previous outputs, where predefined constraint weights are applied layer-by-layer during inference, allowing the model to correct bias patterns, resulting in 79.28% reduction in model bias.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 16, 2025 1

Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFilter

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 21, 2025

Can Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks Be Detected and Removed?

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

  • 7 authors
·
Feb 23, 2025

AEGIS : Automated Co-Evolutionary Framework for Guarding Prompt Injections Schema

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant challenge to the safe deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in real-world applications. While prompt-based detection offers a lightweight and interpretable defense strategy, its effectiveness has been hindered by the need for manual prompt engineering. To address this issue, we propose AEGIS , an Automated co-Evolutionary framework for Guarding prompt Injections Schema. Both attack and defense prompts are iteratively optimized against each other using a gradient-like natural language prompt optimization technique. This framework enables both attackers and defenders to autonomously evolve via a Textual Gradient Optimization (TGO) module, leveraging feedback from an LLM-guided evaluation loop. We evaluate our system on a real-world assignment grading dataset of prompt injection attacks and demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms existing baselines, achieving superior robustness in both attack success and detection. Specifically, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 1.0, representing an improvement of 0.26 over the baseline. For detection, the true positive rate (TPR) improves by 0.23 compared to the previous best work, reaching 0.84, and the true negative rate (TNR) remains comparable at 0.89. Ablation studies confirm the importance of co-evolution, gradient buffering, and multi-objective optimization. We also confirm that this framework is effective in different LLMs. Our results highlight the promise of adversarial training as a scalable and effective approach for guarding prompt injections.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 27, 2025

BiasTestGPT: Using ChatGPT for Social Bias Testing of Language Models

Pretrained Language Models (PLMs) harbor inherent social biases that can result in harmful real-world implications. Such social biases are measured through the probability values that PLMs output for different social groups and attributes appearing in a set of test sentences. However, bias testing is currently cumbersome since the test sentences are generated either from a limited set of manual templates or need expensive crowd-sourcing. We instead propose using ChatGPT for the controllable generation of test sentences, given any arbitrary user-specified combination of social groups and attributes appearing in the test sentences. When compared to template-based methods, our approach using ChatGPT for test sentence generation is superior in detecting social bias, especially in challenging settings such as intersectional biases. We present an open-source comprehensive bias testing framework (BiasTestGPT), hosted on HuggingFace, that can be plugged into any open-source PLM for bias testing. User testing with domain experts from various fields has shown their interest in being able to test modern AI for social biases. Our tool has significantly improved their awareness of such biases in PLMs, proving to be learnable and user-friendly. We thus enable seamless open-ended social bias testing of PLMs by domain experts through an automatic large-scale generation of diverse test sentences for any combination of social categories and attributes.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 14, 2023

Fairness is in the details: Face Dataset Auditing

Auditing involves verifying the proper implementation of a given policy. As such, auditing is essential for ensuring compliance with the principles of fairness, equity, and transparency mandated by the European Union's AI Act. Moreover, biases present during the training phase of a learning system can persist in the modeling process and result in discrimination against certain subgroups of individuals when the model is deployed in production. Assessing bias in image datasets is a particularly complex task, as it first requires a feature extraction step, then to consider the extraction's quality in the statistical tests. This paper proposes a robust methodology for auditing image datasets based on so-called "sensitive" features, such as gender, age, and ethnicity. The proposed methodology consists of both a feature extraction phase and a statistical analysis phase. The first phase introduces a novel convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture specifically designed for extracting sensitive features with a limited number of manual annotations. The second phase compares the distributions of sensitive features across subgroups using a novel statistical test that accounts for the imprecision of the feature extraction model. Our pipeline constitutes a comprehensive and fully automated methodology for dataset auditing. We illustrate our approach using two manually annotated datasets. The code and datasets are available at github.com/ValentinLafargue/FairnessDetails.

A Multi-Dimensional Constraint Framework for Evaluating and Improving Instruction Following in Large Language Models

Instruction following evaluates large language models (LLMs) on their ability to generate outputs that adhere to user-defined constraints. However, existing benchmarks often rely on templated constraint prompts, which lack the diversity of real-world usage and limit fine-grained performance assessment. To fill this gap, we propose a multi-dimensional constraint framework encompassing three constraint patterns, four constraint categories, and four difficulty levels. Building on this framework, we develop an automated instruction generation pipeline that performs constraint expansion, conflict detection, and instruction rewriting, yielding 1,200 code-verifiable instruction-following test samples. We evaluate 19 LLMs across seven model families and uncover substantial variation in performance across constraint forms. For instance, average performance drops from 77.67% at Level I to 32.96% at Level IV. Furthermore, we demonstrate the utility of our approach by using it to generate data for reinforcement learning, achieving substantial gains in instruction following without degrading general performance. In-depth analysis indicates that these gains stem primarily from modifications in the model's attention modules parameters, which enhance constraint recognition and adherence. Code and data are available in https://github.com/Junjie-Ye/MulDimIF.

  • 15 authors
·
May 12, 2025 2

Real-World Image Variation by Aligning Diffusion Inversion Chain

Recent diffusion model advancements have enabled high-fidelity images to be generated using text prompts. However, a domain gap exists between generated images and real-world images, which poses a challenge in generating high-quality variations of real-world images. Our investigation uncovers that this domain gap originates from a latents' distribution gap in different diffusion processes. To address this issue, we propose a novel inference pipeline called Real-world Image Variation by ALignment (RIVAL) that utilizes diffusion models to generate image variations from a single image exemplar. Our pipeline enhances the generation quality of image variations by aligning the image generation process to the source image's inversion chain. Specifically, we demonstrate that step-wise latent distribution alignment is essential for generating high-quality variations. To attain this, we design a cross-image self-attention injection for feature interaction and a step-wise distribution normalization to align the latent features. Incorporating these alignment processes into a diffusion model allows RIVAL to generate high-quality image variations without further parameter optimization. Our experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach outperforms existing methods with respect to semantic-condition similarity and perceptual quality. Furthermore, this generalized inference pipeline can be easily applied to other diffusion-based generation tasks, such as image-conditioned text-to-image generation and example-based image inpainting.

  • 4 authors
·
May 30, 2023 1

Spinning Language Models: Risks of Propaganda-As-A-Service and Countermeasures

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

  • 2 authors
·
Dec 9, 2021

Current state of LLM Risks and AI Guardrails

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 16, 2024

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 23

Language Model Unalignment: Parametric Red-Teaming to Expose Hidden Harms and Biases

Red-teaming has been a widely adopted way to evaluate the harmfulness of Large Language Models (LLMs). It aims to jailbreak a model's safety behavior to make it act as a helpful agent disregarding the harmfulness of the query. Existing methods are primarily based on input text-based red-teaming such as adversarial prompts, low-resource prompts, or contextualized prompts to condition the model in a way to bypass its safe behavior. Bypassing the guardrails uncovers hidden harmful information and biases in the model that are left untreated or newly introduced by its safety training. However, prompt-based attacks fail to provide such a diagnosis owing to their low attack success rate, and applicability to specific models. In this paper, we present a new perspective on LLM safety research i.e., parametric red-teaming through Unalignment. It simply (instruction) tunes the model parameters to break model guardrails that are not deeply rooted in the model's behavior. Unalignment using as few as 100 examples can significantly bypass commonly referred to as CHATGPT, to the point where it responds with an 88% success rate to harmful queries on two safety benchmark datasets. On open-source models such as VICUNA-7B and LLAMA-2-CHAT 7B AND 13B, it shows an attack success rate of more than 91%. On bias evaluations, Unalignment exposes inherent biases in safety-aligned models such as CHATGPT and LLAMA- 2-CHAT where the model's responses are strongly biased and opinionated 64% of the time.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 22, 2023

Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on LLM-Based Code Completion

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 5, 2024

Unraveling Downstream Gender Bias from Large Language Models: A Study on AI Educational Writing Assistance

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in educational tasks such as providing writing suggestions to students. Despite their potential, LLMs are known to harbor inherent biases which may negatively impact learners. Previous studies have investigated bias in models and data representations separately, neglecting the potential impact of LLM bias on human writing. In this paper, we investigate how bias transfers through an AI writing support pipeline. We conduct a large-scale user study with 231 students writing business case peer reviews in German. Students are divided into five groups with different levels of writing support: one classroom group with feature-based suggestions and four groups recruited from Prolific -- a control group with no assistance, two groups with suggestions from fine-tuned GPT-2 and GPT-3 models, and one group with suggestions from pre-trained GPT-3.5. Using GenBit gender bias analysis, Word Embedding Association Tests (WEAT), and Sentence Embedding Association Test (SEAT) we evaluate the gender bias at various stages of the pipeline: in model embeddings, in suggestions generated by the models, and in reviews written by students. Our results demonstrate that there is no significant difference in gender bias between the resulting peer reviews of groups with and without LLM suggestions. Our research is therefore optimistic about the use of AI writing support in the classroom, showcasing a context where bias in LLMs does not transfer to students' responses.

  • 6 authors
·
Nov 6, 2023

Benchmarking Adversarial Robustness to Bias Elicitation in Large Language Models: Scalable Automated Assessment with LLM-as-a-Judge

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence, driving advancements in machine translation, summarization, and conversational agents. However, their increasing integration into critical societal domains has raised concerns about embedded biases, which can perpetuate stereotypes and compromise fairness. These biases stem from various sources, including historical inequalities in training data, linguistic imbalances, and adversarial manipulation. Despite mitigation efforts, recent studies indicate that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks designed to elicit biased responses. This work proposes a scalable benchmarking framework to evaluate LLM robustness against adversarial bias elicitation. Our methodology involves (i) systematically probing models with a multi-task approach targeting biases across various sociocultural dimensions, (ii) quantifying robustness through safety scores using an LLM-as-a-Judge approach for automated assessment of model responses, and (iii) employing jailbreak techniques to investigate vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms. Our analysis examines prevalent biases in both small and large state-of-the-art models and their impact on model safety. Additionally, we assess the safety of domain-specific models fine-tuned for critical fields, such as medicine. Finally, we release a curated dataset of bias-related prompts, CLEAR-Bias, to facilitate systematic vulnerability benchmarking. Our findings reveal critical trade-offs between model size and safety, aiding the development of fairer and more robust future language models.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 10, 2025

Do LLMs Have Political Correctness? Analyzing Ethical Biases and Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in AI Systems

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 17, 2024 2

AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agents

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 12

New Job, New Gender? Measuring the Social Bias in Image Generation Models

Image generation models can generate or edit images from a given text. Recent advancements in image generation technology, exemplified by DALL-E and Midjourney, have been groundbreaking. These advanced models, despite their impressive capabilities, are often trained on massive Internet datasets, making them susceptible to generating content that perpetuates social stereotypes and biases, which can lead to severe consequences. Prior research on assessing bias within image generation models suffers from several shortcomings, including limited accuracy, reliance on extensive human labor, and lack of comprehensive analysis. In this paper, we propose BiasPainter, a novel evaluation framework that can accurately, automatically and comprehensively trigger social bias in image generation models. BiasPainter uses a diverse range of seed images of individuals and prompts the image generation models to edit these images using gender, race, and age-neutral queries. These queries span 62 professions, 39 activities, 57 types of objects, and 70 personality traits. The framework then compares the edited images to the original seed images, focusing on the significant changes related to gender, race, and age. BiasPainter adopts a key insight that these characteristics should not be modified when subjected to neutral prompts. Built upon this design, BiasPainter can trigger the social bias and evaluate the fairness of image generation models. We use BiasPainter to evaluate six widely-used image generation models, such as stable diffusion and Midjourney. Experimental results show that BiasPainter can successfully trigger social bias in image generation models. According to our human evaluation, BiasPainter can achieve 90.8% accuracy on automatic bias detection, which is significantly higher than the results reported in previous work.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 1, 2024

Clone What You Can't Steal: Black-Box LLM Replication via Logit Leakage and Distillation

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 31, 2025

Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidance

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

  • 9 authors
·
Mar 19

Backdoor Activation Attack: Attack Large Language Models using Activation Steering for Safety-Alignment

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 15, 2023

Any Large Language Model Can Be a Reliable Judge: Debiasing with a Reasoning-based Bias Detector

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising tool for automatically evaluating generated outputs, but its reliability is often undermined by potential biases in judgment. Existing efforts to mitigate these biases face key limitations: in-context learning-based methods fail to address rooted biases due to the evaluator's limited capacity for self-reflection, whereas fine-tuning is not applicable to all evaluator types, especially closed-source models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Reasoning-based Bias Detector (RBD), which is a plug-in module that identifies biased evaluations and generates structured reasoning to guide evaluator self-correction. Rather than modifying the evaluator itself, RBD operates externally and engages in an iterative process of bias detection and feedback-driven revision. To support its development, we design a complete pipeline consisting of biased dataset construction, supervision collection, distilled reasoning-based fine-tuning of RBD, and integration with LLM evaluators. We fine-tune four sizes of RBD models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B, and observe consistent performance improvements across all scales. Experimental results on 4 bias types--verbosity, position, bandwagon, and sentiment--evaluated using 8 LLM evaluators demonstrate RBD's strong effectiveness. For example, the RBD-8B model improves evaluation accuracy by an average of 18.5% and consistency by 10.9%, and surpasses prompting-based baselines and fine-tuned judges by 12.8% and 17.2%, respectively. These results highlight RBD's effectiveness and scalability. Additional experiments further demonstrate its strong generalization across biases and domains, as well as its efficiency.

  • 7 authors
·
May 21, 2025

ChainFuzzer: Greybox Fuzzing for Workflow-Level Multi-Tool Vulnerabilities in LLM Agents

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

  • 4 authors
·
Mar 12

PipeMFL-240K: A Large-scale Dataset and Benchmark for Object Detection in Pipeline Magnetic Flux Leakage Imaging

Pipeline integrity is critical to industrial safety and environmental protection, with Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) detection being a primary non-destructive testing technology. Despite the promise of deep learning for automating MFL interpretation, progress toward reliable models has been constrained by the absence of a large-scale public dataset and benchmark, making fair comparison and reproducible evaluation difficult. We introduce PipeMFL-240K, a large-scale, meticulously annotated dataset and benchmark for complex object detection in pipeline MFL pseudo-color images. PipeMFL-240K reflects real-world inspection complexity and poses several unique challenges: (i) an extremely long-tailed distribution over 12 categories, (ii) a high prevalence of tiny objects that often comprise only a handful of pixels, and (iii) substantial intra-class variability. The dataset contains 240,320 images and 191,530 high-quality bounding-box annotations, collected from 11 pipelines spanning approximately 1,480 km. Extensive experiments are conducted with state-of-the-art object detectors to establish baselines. Results show that modern detectors still struggle with the intrinsic properties of MFL data, highlighting considerable headroom for improvement, while PipeMFL-240K provides a reliable and challenging testbed to drive future research. As the first public dataset and the first benchmark of this scale and scope for pipeline MFL inspection, it provides a critical foundation for efficient pipeline diagnostics as well as maintenance planning and is expected to accelerate algorithmic innovation and reproducible research in MFL-based pipeline integrity assessment.

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 3

Multi-Agent Penetration Testing AI for the Web

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 28, 2025

Exposing the Illusion of Fairness: Auditing Vulnerabilities to Distributional Manipulation Attacks

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

RAPTOR: Ridge-Adaptive Logistic Probes

Probing studies what information is encoded in a frozen LLM's layer representations by training a lightweight predictor on top of them. Beyond analysis, probes are often used operationally in probe-then-steer pipelines: a learned concept vector is extracted from a probe and injected via additive activation steering by adding it to a layer representation during the forward pass. The effectiveness of this pipeline hinges on estimating concept vectors that are accurate, directionally stable under ablation, and inexpensive to obtain. Motivated by these desiderata, we propose RAPTOR (Ridge-Adaptive Logistic Probe), a simple L2-regularized logistic probe whose validation-tuned ridge strength yields concept vectors from normalized weights. Across extensive experiments on instruction-tuned LLMs and human-written concept datasets, RAPTOR matches or exceeds strong baselines in accuracy while achieving competitive directional stability and substantially lower training cost; these quantitative results are supported by qualitative downstream steering demonstrations. Finally, using the Convex Gaussian Min-max Theorem (CGMT), we provide a mechanistic characterization of ridge logistic regression in an idealized Gaussian teacher-student model in the high-dimensional few-shot regime, explaining how penalty strength mediates probe accuracy and concept-vector stability and yielding structural predictions that qualitatively align with trends observed on real LLM embeddings.

Faithful Bi-Directional Model Steering via Distribution Matching and Distributed Interchange Interventions

Intervention-based model steering offers a lightweight and interpretable alternative to prompting and fine-tuning. However, by adapting strong optimization objectives from fine-tuning, current methods are susceptible to overfitting and often underperform, sometimes generating unnatural outputs. We hypothesize that this is because effective steering requires the faithful identification of internal model mechanisms, not the enforcement of external preferences. To this end, we build on the principles of distributed alignment search (DAS), the standard for causal variable localization, to propose a new steering method: Concept DAS (CDAS). While we adopt the core mechanism of DAS, distributed interchange intervention (DII), we introduce a novel distribution matching objective tailored for the steering task by aligning intervened output distributions with counterfactual distributions. CDAS differs from prior work in two main ways: first, it learns interventions via weak-supervised distribution matching rather than probability maximization; second, it uses DIIs that naturally enable bi-directional steering and allow steering factors to be derived from data, reducing the effort required for hyperparameter tuning and resulting in more faithful and stable control. On AxBench, a large-scale model steering benchmark, we show that CDAS does not always outperform preference-optimization methods but may benefit more from increased model scale. In two safety-related case studies, overriding refusal behaviors of safety-aligned models and neutralizing a chain-of-thought backdoor, CDAS achieves systematic steering while maintaining general model utility. These results indicate that CDAS is complementary to preference-optimization approaches and conditionally constitutes a robust approach to intervention-based model steering. Our code is available at https://github.com/colored-dye/concept_das.

  • 10 authors
·
Feb 4

Keeping Up with the Language Models: Robustness-Bias Interplay in NLI Data and Models

Auditing unwanted social bias in language models (LMs) is inherently hard due to the multidisciplinary nature of the work. In addition, the rapid evolution of LMs can make benchmarks irrelevant in no time. Bias auditing is further complicated by LM brittleness: when a presumably biased outcome is observed, is it due to model bias or model brittleness? We propose enlisting the models themselves to help construct bias auditing datasets that remain challenging, and introduce bias measures that distinguish between types of model errors. First, we extend an existing bias benchmark for NLI (BBNLI) using a combination of LM-generated lexical variations, adversarial filtering, and human validation. We demonstrate that the newly created dataset (BBNLInext) is more challenging than BBNLI: on average, BBNLI-next reduces the accuracy of state-of-the-art NLI models from 95.3%, as observed by BBNLI, to 58.6%. Second, we employ BBNLI-next to showcase the interplay between robustness and bias, and the subtlety in differentiating between the two. Third, we point out shortcomings in current bias scores used in the literature and propose bias measures that take into account pro-/anti-stereotype bias and model brittleness. We will publicly release the BBNLI-next dataset to inspire research on rapidly expanding benchmarks to keep up with model evolution, along with research on the robustness-bias interplay in bias auditing. Note: This paper contains offensive text examples.

  • 4 authors
·
May 21, 2023

Evaluating the Instruction-Following Robustness of Large Language Models to Prompt Injection

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 17, 2023

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

sureheremarv Gray Swan
·
Mar 16

When Good Sounds Go Adversarial: Jailbreaking Audio-Language Models with Benign Inputs

As large language models become increasingly integrated into daily life, audio has emerged as a key interface for human-AI interaction. However, this convenience also introduces new vulnerabilities, making audio a potential attack surface for adversaries. Our research introduces WhisperInject, a two-stage adversarial audio attack framework that can manipulate state-of-the-art audio language models to generate harmful content. Our method uses imperceptible perturbations in audio inputs that remain benign to human listeners. The first stage uses a novel reward-based optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD), to guide the target model to circumvent its own safety protocols and generate harmful native responses. This native harmful response then serves as the target for Stage 2, Payload Injection, where we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to optimize subtle perturbations that are embedded into benign audio carriers, such as weather queries or greeting messages. Validated under the rigorous StrongREJECT, LlamaGuard, as well as Human Evaluation safety evaluation framework, our experiments demonstrate a success rate exceeding 86% across Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and Phi-4-Multimodal. Our work demonstrates a new class of practical, audio-native threats, moving beyond theoretical exploits to reveal a feasible and covert method for manipulating AI behavior.

AIM-Intelligence AIM Intelligence
·
Aug 5, 2025 2

ED^4: Explicit Data-level Debiasing for Deepfake Detection

Learning intrinsic bias from limited data has been considered the main reason for the failure of deepfake detection with generalizability. Apart from the discovered content and specific-forgery bias, we reveal a novel spatial bias, where detectors inertly anticipate observing structural forgery clues appearing at the image center, also can lead to the poor generalization of existing methods. We present ED^4, a simple and effective strategy, to address aforementioned biases explicitly at the data level in a unified framework rather than implicit disentanglement via network design. In particular, we develop ClockMix to produce facial structure preserved mixtures with arbitrary samples, which allows the detector to learn from an exponentially extended data distribution with much more diverse identities, backgrounds, local manipulation traces, and the co-occurrence of multiple forgery artifacts. We further propose the Adversarial Spatial Consistency Module (AdvSCM) to prevent extracting features with spatial bias, which adversarially generates spatial-inconsistent images and constrains their extracted feature to be consistent. As a model-agnostic debiasing strategy, ED^4 is plug-and-play: it can be integrated with various deepfake detectors to obtain significant benefits. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate its effectiveness and superiority over existing deepfake detection approaches.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 13, 2024

When Models Can't Follow: Testing Instruction Adherence Across 256 LLMs

Despite widespread deployment of Large Language Models, systematic evaluation of instruction-following capabilities remains challenging. While comprehensive benchmarks exist, focused assessments that quickly diagnose specific instruction adherence patterns are valuable. As newer models may be trained on existing benchmarks, novel evaluation approaches are needed to assess genuine capabilities rather than memorized performance. This paper presents a streamlined evaluation framework using twenty carefully designed prompts to assess LLM instruction-following across diverse task categories. We demonstrate this framework through a large-scale empirical study conducted on October 14, 2025, testing 256 verified working models from 331 available via OpenRouter. To ensure methodological rigor and prevent selection bias, we first verified each model's basic functionality before inclusion. Unlike large-scale benchmarks requiring extensive computational resources, our approach offers a practical diagnostic tool researchers and practitioners can readily apply. Our methodology builds upon verifiable instructions while introducing a compact test suite balancing comprehensiveness with efficiency. Each prompt targets distinct aspects of instruction following, including format compliance, content constraints, logical sequencing, and multi-step task execution. We evaluate models from major providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Mistral) and emerging implementations (Qwen, DeepSeek, community models), providing comparative performance analysis. Our findings reveal consistent failure modes and identify specific instruction types posing particular challenges. This work contributes both a practical evaluation tool and one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of instruction-following capabilities across the contemporary LLM landscape.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 18, 2025

InvDiff: Invariant Guidance for Bias Mitigation in Diffusion Models

As one of the most successful generative models, diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable efficacy in synthesizing high-quality images. These models learn the underlying high-dimensional data distribution in an unsupervised manner. Despite their success, diffusion models are highly data-driven and prone to inheriting the imbalances and biases present in real-world data. Some studies have attempted to address these issues by designing text prompts for known biases or using bias labels to construct unbiased data. While these methods have shown improved results, real-world scenarios often contain various unknown biases, and obtaining bias labels is particularly challenging. In this paper, we emphasize the necessity of mitigating bias in pre-trained diffusion models without relying on auxiliary bias annotations. To tackle this problem, we propose a framework, InvDiff, which aims to learn invariant semantic information for diffusion guidance. Specifically, we propose identifying underlying biases in the training data and designing a novel debiasing training objective. Then, we employ a lightweight trainable module that automatically preserves invariant semantic information and uses it to guide the diffusion model's sampling process toward unbiased outcomes simultaneously. Notably, we only need to learn a small number of parameters in the lightweight learnable module without altering the pre-trained diffusion model. Furthermore, we provide a theoretical guarantee that the implementation of InvDiff is equivalent to reducing the error upper bound of generalization. Extensive experimental results on three publicly available benchmarks demonstrate that InvDiff effectively reduces biases while maintaining the quality of image generation. Our code is available at https://github.com/Hundredl/InvDiff.

  • 7 authors
·
Dec 11, 2024

A Systematic Taxonomy of Security Vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 28

CoBia: Constructed Conversations Can Trigger Otherwise Concealed Societal Biases in LLMs

Improvements in model construction, including fortified safety guardrails, allow Large language models (LLMs) to increasingly pass standard safety checks. However, LLMs sometimes slip into revealing harmful behavior, such as expressing racist viewpoints, during conversations. To analyze this systematically, we introduce CoBia, a suite of lightweight adversarial attacks that allow us to refine the scope of conditions under which LLMs depart from normative or ethical behavior in conversations. CoBia creates a constructed conversation where the model utters a biased claim about a social group. We then evaluate whether the model can recover from the fabricated bias claim and reject biased follow-up questions. We evaluate 11 open-source as well as proprietary LLMs for their outputs related to six socio-demographic categories that are relevant to individual safety and fair treatment, i.e., gender, race, religion, nationality, sex orientation, and others. Our evaluation is based on established LLM-based bias metrics, and we compare the results against human judgments to scope out the LLMs' reliability and alignment. The results suggest that purposefully constructed conversations reliably reveal bias amplification and that LLMs often fail to reject biased follow-up questions during dialogue. This form of stress-testing highlights deeply embedded biases that can be surfaced through interaction. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/nafisenik/CoBia.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 10, 2025 2

ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Chung-AngUniversity Chung-Ang University
·
Sep 26, 2025 2