Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Machine learning models frequently experience performance drops under distribution shifts. The underlying cause of such shifts may be multiple simultaneous factors such as changes in data quality, differences in specific covariate distributions, or changes in the relationship between label and features. When a model does fail during deployment, attributing performance change to these factors is critical for the model developer to identify the root cause and take mitigating actions. In this work, we introduce the problem of attributing performance differences between environments to distribution shifts in the underlying data generating mechanisms. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game where the players are distributions. We define the value of a set of distributions to be the change in model performance when only this set of distributions has changed between environments, and derive an importance weighting method for computing the value of an arbitrary set of distributions. The contribution of each distribution to the total performance change is then quantified as its Shapley value. We demonstrate the correctness and utility of our method on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world case studies, showing its effectiveness in attributing performance changes to a wide range of distribution shifts.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

The recent trend towards Personalized Federated Learning (PFL) has garnered significant attention as it allows for the training of models that are tailored to each client while maintaining data privacy. However, current PFL techniques primarily focus on modeling the conditional distribution heterogeneity (i.e. concept shift), which can result in suboptimal performance when the distribution of input data across clients diverges (i.e. covariate shift). Additionally, these techniques often lack the ability to adapt to unseen data, further limiting their effectiveness in real-world scenarios. To address these limitations, we propose a novel approach, FedGMM, which utilizes Gaussian mixture models (GMM) to effectively fit the input data distributions across diverse clients. The model parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation utilizing a federated Expectation-Maximization algorithm, which is solved in closed form and does not assume gradient similarity. Furthermore, FedGMM possesses an additional advantage of adapting to new clients with minimal overhead, and it also enables uncertainty quantification. Empirical evaluations on synthetic and benchmark datasets demonstrate the superior performance of our method in both PFL classification and novel sample detection.

One of the key challenges in deploying RL to real-world applications is to adapt to variations of unknown environment contexts, such as changing terrains in robotic tasks and fluctuated bandwidth in congestion control. Existing works on adaptation to unknown environment contexts either assume the contexts are the same for the whole episode or assume the context variables are Markovian. However, in many real-world applications, the environment context usually stays stable for a stochastic period and then changes in an abrupt and unpredictable manner within an episode, resulting in a segment structure, which existing works fail to address. To leverage the segment structure of piecewise stable context in real-world applications, in this paper, we propose a \textbf{Segmented Context Belief Augmented Deep~(SeCBAD)} RL method. Our method can jointly infer the belief distribution over latent context with the posterior over segment length and perform more accurate belief context inference with observed data within the current context segment. The inferred belief context can be leveraged to augment the state, leading to a policy that can adapt to abrupt variations in context. We demonstrate empirically that SeCBAD can infer context segment length accurately and outperform existing methods on a toy grid world environment and Mujuco tasks with piecewise-stable context.

Large reasoning models enhanced by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards have achieved significant performance gains by extending their chain-of-thought. However, this paradigm incurs substantial deployment costs as models often exhibit excessive verbosity on simple queries. Existing efficient reasoning methods relying on explicit length penalties often introduce optimization conflicts and leave the generative mechanisms driving overthinking largely unexamined. In this paper, we identify a phenomenon termed length shift where models increasingly generate unnecessary reasoning on trivial inputs during training. To address this, we introduce Dynamic Outlier Truncation (DOT), a training-time intervention that selectively suppresses redundant tokens. This method targets only the extreme tail of response lengths within fully correct rollout groups while preserving long-horizon reasoning capabilities for complex problems. To complement this intervention and ensure stable convergence, we further incorporate auxiliary KL regularization and predictive dynamic sampling. Experimental results across multiple model scales demonstrate that our approach significantly pushes the efficiency-performance Pareto frontier outward. Notably, on the AIME-24, our method reduces inference token usage by 78% while simultaneously increasing accuracy compared to the initial policy and surpassing state-of-the-art efficient reasoning methods.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

A distribution shift can have fundamental consequences such as signaling a change in the operating environment or significantly reducing the accuracy of downstream models. Thus, understanding distribution shifts is critical for examining and hopefully mitigating the effect of such a shift. Most prior work focuses on merely detecting if a shift has occurred and assumes any detected shift can be understood and handled appropriately by a human operator. We hope to aid in these manual mitigation tasks by explaining the distribution shift using interpretable transportation maps from the original distribution to the shifted one. We derive our interpretable mappings from a relaxation of optimal transport, where the candidate mappings are restricted to a set of interpretable mappings. We then inspect multiple quintessential use-cases of distribution shift in real-world tabular, text, and image datasets to showcase how our explanatory mappings provide a better balance between detail and interpretability than baseline explanations by both visual inspection and our PercentExplained metric.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Language models (LMs) may lead their users to make suboptimal downstream decisions when they confidently hallucinate. This issue can be mitigated by having the LM verbally convey the probability that its claims are correct, but existing models cannot produce text with calibrated confidence statements. Through the lens of decision-making, we formalize linguistic calibration for long-form generations: an LM is linguistically calibrated if its generations enable its users to make calibrated probabilistic predictions. This definition enables a training framework where a supervised finetuning step bootstraps an LM to emit long-form generations with confidence statements such as "I estimate a 30% chance of..." or "I am certain that...", followed by a reinforcement learning step which rewards generations that enable a user to provide calibrated answers to related questions. We linguistically calibrate Llama 2 7B and find in automated and human evaluations of long-form generations that it is significantly more calibrated than strong finetuned factuality baselines with comparable accuracy. These findings generalize under distribution shift on question-answering and under a significant task shift to person biography generation. Our results demonstrate that long-form generations may be calibrated end-to-end by constructing an objective in the space of the predictions that users make in downstream decision-making.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Prior work has analyzed the robustness of visual encoders to image transformations and corruptions, particularly in cases where such alterations are not seen during training. When this occurs, they introduce a form of distribution shift at test time, often leading to performance degradation. The primary focus has been on severe corruptions that, when applied aggressively, distort useful signals necessary for accurate semantic predictions. We take a different perspective by analyzing parameters of the image acquisition process and transformations that may be subtle or even imperceptible to the human eye. We find that such parameters are systematically encoded in the learned visual representations and can be easily recovered. More strikingly, their presence can have a profound impact, either positively or negatively, on semantic predictions. This effect depends on whether there is a strong correlation or anti-correlation between semantic labels and these acquisition-based or processing-based labels. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ryan-caesar-ramos/visual-encoder-traces

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge. However, conflicts between parametric knowledge and retrieved context pose challenges, particularly when retrieved information is unreliable or the model's internal knowledge is outdated. In such cases, LLMs struggle to determine whether to rely more on their own parameters or the conflicted context. To address this, we propose **CK-PLUG**, a plug-and-play method for controlling LLMs' reliance on parametric and contextual knowledge. We introduce a novel knowledge consistency metric, Confidence Gain, which detects knowledge conflicts by measuring entropy shifts in token probability distributions after context insertion. CK-PLUG then enables fine-grained control over knowledge preference by adjusting the probability distribution of tokens with negative confidence gain through a single tuning parameter. Experiments demonstrate CK-PLUG's ability to significantly regulate knowledge reliance in counterfactual RAG scenarios while maintaining generation fluency and knowledge accuracy. For instance, on Llama3-8B, memory recall (MR) of RAG response can be adjusted within a broad range (9.9%-71.9%), compared to the baseline of 42.1%. Moreover, CK-PLUG supports adaptive control based on the model's confidence in both internal and external knowledge, achieving consistent performance improvements across various general RAG tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/byronBBL/CK-PLUG{this https URL}.

Supervised learning is often affected by a covariate shift in which the marginal distributions of instances (covariates x) of training and testing samples p_tr(x) and p_te(x) are different but the label conditionals coincide. Existing approaches address such covariate shift by either using the ratio p_te(x)/p_tr(x) to weight training samples (reweighted methods) or using the ratio p_tr(x)/p_te(x) to weight testing samples (robust methods). However, the performance of such approaches can be poor under support mismatch or when the above ratios take large values. We propose a minimax risk classification (MRC) approach for covariate shift adaptation that avoids such limitations by weighting both training and testing samples. In addition, we develop effective techniques that obtain both sets of weights and generalize the conventional kernel mean matching method. We provide novel generalization bounds for our method that show a significant increase in the effective sample size compared with reweighted methods. The proposed method also achieves enhanced classification performance in both synthetic and empirical experiments.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

This paper bridges distribution shift and AI safety through a comprehensive analysis of their conceptual and methodological synergies. While prior discussions often focus on narrow cases or informal analogies, we establish two types connections between specific causes of distribution shift and fine-grained AI safety issues: (1) methods addressing a specific shift type can help achieve corresponding safety goals, or (2) certain shifts and safety issues can be formally reduced to each other, enabling mutual adaptation of their methods. Our findings provide a unified perspective that encourages fundamental integration between distribution shift and AI safety research.

Given an algorithmic predictor that is accurate on some source population consisting of strategic human decision subjects, will it remain accurate if the population respond to it? In our setting, an agent or a user corresponds to a sample (X,Y) drawn from a distribution D and will face a model h and its classification result h(X). Agents can modify X to adapt to h, which will incur a distribution shift on (X,Y). Our formulation is motivated by applications where the deployed machine learning models are subjected to human agents, and will ultimately face responsive and interactive data distributions. We formalize the discussions of the transferability of a model by studying how the performance of the model trained on the available source distribution (data) would translate to the performance on its induced domain. We provide both upper bounds for the performance gap due to the induced domain shift, as well as lower bounds for the trade-offs that a classifier has to suffer on either the source training distribution or the induced target distribution. We provide further instantiated analysis for two popular domain adaptation settings, including covariate shift and target shift.

Distribution shifts -- where the training distribution differs from the test distribution -- can substantially degrade the accuracy of machine learning (ML) systems deployed in the wild. Despite their ubiquity in the real-world deployments, these distribution shifts are under-represented in the datasets widely used in the ML community today. To address this gap, we present WILDS, a curated benchmark of 10 datasets reflecting a diverse range of distribution shifts that naturally arise in real-world applications, such as shifts across hospitals for tumor identification; across camera traps for wildlife monitoring; and across time and location in satellite imaging and poverty mapping. On each dataset, we show that standard training yields substantially lower out-of-distribution than in-distribution performance. This gap remains even with models trained by existing methods for tackling distribution shifts, underscoring the need for new methods for training models that are more robust to the types of distribution shifts that arise in practice. To facilitate method development, we provide an open-source package that automates dataset loading, contains default model architectures and hyperparameters, and standardizes evaluations. Code and leaderboards are available at https://wilds.stanford.edu.

In machine learning, generalization against distribution shifts -- where deployment conditions diverge from the training scenarios -- is crucial, particularly in fields like climate modeling, biomedicine, and autonomous driving. The emergence of foundation models, distinguished by their extensive pretraining and task versatility, has led to an increased interest in their adaptability to distribution shifts. GPT-4V(ision) acts as the most advanced publicly accessible multimodal foundation model, with extensive applications across various domains, including anomaly detection, video understanding, image generation, and medical diagnosis. However, its robustness against data distributions remains largely underexplored. Addressing this gap, this study rigorously evaluates GPT-4V's adaptability and generalization capabilities in dynamic environments, benchmarking against prominent models like CLIP and LLaVA. We delve into GPT-4V's zero-shot generalization across 13 diverse datasets spanning natural, medical, and molecular domains. We further investigate its adaptability to controlled data perturbations and examine the efficacy of in-context learning as a tool to enhance its adaptation. Our findings delineate GPT-4V's capability boundaries in distribution shifts, shedding light on its strengths and limitations across various scenarios. Importantly, this investigation contributes to our understanding of how AI foundation models generalize to distribution shifts, offering pivotal insights into their adaptability and robustness. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/jameszhou-gl/gpt-4v-distribution-shift.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Faced with distribution shift between training and test set, we wish to detect and quantify the shift, and to correct our classifiers without test set labels. Motivated by medical diagnosis, where diseases (targets) cause symptoms (observations), we focus on label shift, where the label marginal p(y) changes but the conditional p(x| y) does not. We propose Black Box Shift Estimation (BBSE) to estimate the test distribution p(y). BBSE exploits arbitrary black box predictors to reduce dimensionality prior to shift correction. While better predictors give tighter estimates, BBSE works even when predictors are biased, inaccurate, or uncalibrated, so long as their confusion matrices are invertible. We prove BBSE's consistency, bound its error, and introduce a statistical test that uses BBSE to detect shift. We also leverage BBSE to correct classifiers. Experiments demonstrate accurate estimates and improved prediction, even on high-dimensional datasets of natural images.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Generative policies trained with human demonstrations can autonomously accomplish multimodal, long-horizon tasks. However, during inference, humans are often removed from the policy execution loop, limiting the ability to guide a pre-trained policy towards a specific sub-goal or trajectory shape among multiple predictions. Naive human intervention may inadvertently exacerbate distribution shift, leading to constraint violations or execution failures. To better align policy output with human intent without inducing out-of-distribution errors, we propose an Inference-Time Policy Steering (ITPS) framework that leverages human interactions to bias the generative sampling process, rather than fine-tuning the policy on interaction data. We evaluate ITPS across three simulated and real-world benchmarks, testing three forms of human interaction and associated alignment distance metrics. Among six sampling strategies, our proposed stochastic sampling with diffusion policy achieves the best trade-off between alignment and distribution shift. Videos are available at https://yanweiw.github.io/itps/.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Safe deployment of graph neural networks (GNNs) under distribution shift requires models to provide accurate confidence indicators (CI). However, while it is well-known in computer vision that CI quality diminishes under distribution shift, this behavior remains understudied for GNNs. Hence, we begin with a case study on CI calibration under controlled structural and feature distribution shifts and demonstrate that increased expressivity or model size do not always lead to improved CI performance. Consequently, we instead advocate for the use of epistemic uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods to modulate CIs. To this end, we propose G-DeltaUQ, a new single model UQ method that extends the recently proposed stochastic centering framework to support structured data and partial stochasticity. Evaluated across covariate, concept, and graph size shifts, G-DeltaUQ not only outperforms several popular UQ methods in obtaining calibrated CIs, but also outperforms alternatives when CIs are used for generalization gap prediction or OOD detection. Overall, our work not only introduces a new, flexible GNN UQ method, but also provides novel insights into GNN CIs on safety-critical tasks.

In many real-world settings, agents must learn from an offline dataset gathered by some prior behavior policy. Such a setting naturally leads to distribution shift between the behavior policy and the target policy being trained - requiring policy conservatism to avoid instability and overestimation bias. Autoregressive world models offer a different solution to this by generating synthetic, on-policy experience. However, in practice, model rollouts must be severely truncated to avoid compounding error. As an alternative, we propose policy-guided diffusion. Our method uses diffusion models to generate entire trajectories under the behavior distribution, applying guidance from the target policy to move synthetic experience further on-policy. We show that policy-guided diffusion models a regularized form of the target distribution that balances action likelihood under both the target and behavior policies, leading to plausible trajectories with high target policy probability, while retaining a lower dynamics error than an offline world model baseline. Using synthetic experience from policy-guided diffusion as a drop-in substitute for real data, we demonstrate significant improvements in performance across a range of standard offline reinforcement learning algorithms and environments. Our approach provides an effective alternative to autoregressive offline world models, opening the door to the controllable generation of synthetic training data.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Prediction sets capture uncertainty by predicting sets of labels rather than individual labels, enabling downstream decisions to conservatively account for all plausible outcomes. Conformal inference algorithms construct prediction sets guaranteed to contain the true label with high probability. These guarantees fail to hold in the face of distribution shift, which is precisely when reliable uncertainty quantification can be most useful. We propose a novel algorithm for constructing prediction sets with PAC guarantees in the label shift setting. This method estimates the predicted probabilities of the classes in a target domain, as well as the confusion matrix, then propagates uncertainty in these estimates through a Gaussian elimination algorithm to compute confidence intervals for importance weights. Finally, it uses these intervals to construct prediction sets. We evaluate our approach on five datasets: the CIFAR-10, ChestX-Ray and Entity-13 image datasets, the tabular CDC Heart dataset, and the AGNews text dataset. Our algorithm satisfies the PAC guarantee while producing smaller, more informative, prediction sets compared to several baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

AI agents deployed as persistent assistants must maintain correct beliefs as their information environment evolves. In practice, evidence is scattered across heterogeneous sources that often contradict one another, new information can invalidate earlier conclusions, and user preferences surface through corrections rather than explicit instructions. Existing benchmarks largely assume static, single-authority settings and do not evaluate whether agents can keep up with this complexity. We introduce ClawArena, a benchmark for evaluating AI agents in evolving information environments. Each scenario maintains a complete hidden ground truth while exposing the agent only to noisy, partial, and sometimes contradictory traces across multi-channel sessions, workspace files, and staged updates. Evaluation is organized around three coupled challenges: multi-source conflict reasoning, dynamic belief revision, and implicit personalization, whose interactions yield a 14-category question taxonomy. Two question formats, multi-choice (set-selection) and shell-based executable checks, test both reasoning and workspace grounding. The current release contains 64 scenarios across 8 professional domains, totaling 1{,}879 evaluation rounds and 365 dynamic updates. Experiments on five agent frameworks and five language models show that both model capability (15.4% range) and framework design (9.2%) substantially affect performance, that self-evolving skill frameworks can partially close model-capability gaps, and that belief revision difficulty is determined by update design strategy rather than the mere presence of updates. Code is available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ClawArena.

While previous distribution shift detection approaches can identify if a shift has occurred, these approaches cannot localize which specific features have caused a distribution shift -- a critical step in diagnosing or fixing any underlying issue. For example, in military sensor networks, users will want to detect when one or more of the sensors has been compromised, and critically, they will want to know which specific sensors might be compromised. Thus, we first define a formalization of this problem as multiple conditional distribution hypothesis tests and propose both non-parametric and parametric statistical tests. For both efficiency and flexibility, we then propose to use a test statistic based on the density model score function (i.e. gradient with respect to the input) -- which can easily compute test statistics for all dimensions in a single forward and backward pass. Any density model could be used for computing the necessary statistics including deep density models such as normalizing flows or autoregressive models. We additionally develop methods for identifying when and where a shift occurs in multivariate time-series data and show results for multiple scenarios using realistic attack models on both simulated and real world data.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has significantly improved reasoning in large language models (LLMs), yet the token-level mechanisms underlying these improvements remain unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of RLVR's distributional effects organized around three main analyses: (1) token-level characterization of distributional shifts between base and RL models, (2) the impact of token-level distributional shifts on sequence-level reasoning performance through cross-sampling interventions, and (3) fine-grained mechanics of these shifts at the token level. We find that RL fine-tuning induces highly sparse and targeted changes, with only a small fraction of token distributions exhibiting meaningful divergence between the base and RL policies. We further characterize the structure and evolution of these shifts through analyses of token entropy, positional concentration, and reallocation of probability mass. To assess the functional importance of these sparse changes, we conduct cross-sampling experiments that selectively swap token choices between the base and RL models with varying intervention budgets. We show that inserting only a small fraction of RL-sampled tokens into base generations progressively recovers RL performance gains, while injecting a similarly small number of base token choices into otherwise RL-generated sequences collapses performance to base levels, isolating a small set of token-level decisions directly responsible for RLVR's performance gains. Finally, we explore divergence-weighted variants of the advantage signal as a diagnostic intervention, finding that they can yield improvements over baselines. Together, our results shed light on the distributional changes induced by RLVR and provide a fine-grained, token-level lens for understanding RLVR fine-tuning as a targeted refinement process.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

In open-world scenarios, where both novel classes and domains may exist, an ideal segmentation model should detect anomaly classes for safety and generalize to new domains. However, existing methods often struggle to distinguish between domain-level and semantic-level distribution shifts, leading to poor out-of-distribution (OOD) detection or domain generalization performance. In this work, we aim to equip the model to generalize effectively to covariate-shift regions while precisely identifying semantic-shift regions. To achieve this, we design a novel generative augmentation method to produce coherent images that incorporate both anomaly (or novel) objects and various covariate shifts at both image and object levels. Furthermore, we introduce a training strategy that recalibrates uncertainty specifically for semantic shifts and enhances the feature extractor to align features associated with domain shifts. We validate the effectiveness of our method across benchmarks featuring both semantic and domain shifts. Our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across all benchmarks for both OOD detection and domain generalization. Code is available at https://github.com/gaozhitong/MultiShiftSeg.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

We might hope that when faced with unexpected inputs, well-designed software systems would fire off warnings. Machine learning (ML) systems, however, which depend strongly on properties of their inputs (e.g. the i.i.d. assumption), tend to fail silently. This paper explores the problem of building ML systems that fail loudly, investigating methods for detecting dataset shift, identifying exemplars that most typify the shift, and quantifying shift malignancy. We focus on several datasets and various perturbations to both covariates and label distributions with varying magnitudes and fractions of data affected. Interestingly, we show that across the dataset shifts that we explore, a two-sample-testing-based approach, using pre-trained classifiers for dimensionality reduction, performs best. Moreover, we demonstrate that domain-discriminating approaches tend to be helpful for characterizing shifts qualitatively and determining if they are harmful.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

During the preference optimization of large language models (LLMs), distribution shifts may arise between newly generated model samples and the data used to train the reward model (RM). This shift reduces the efficacy of the RM, which in turn negatively impacts the performance of the policy model (PM). To address this challenge, we propose Mutual-Taught, a self-training method that iteratively improves both the PM and RM without requiring additional human annotation. Our approach mirrors the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In the E-step, the PM is updated using feedback from the current RM, guiding the PM toward a better approximation of the latent optimal preference distribution. In the M-step, we update the RM by constructing training data from the outputs of the PM before and after the E-step update. This process ensures that the RM adapts to the evolving policy distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that this iterative approach leads to consistent improvements in both models. Specifically, our 8B policy model, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct-MT, achieves a length-controlled win rate of 54.1\% on AlpacaEval-2, while our 8B reward model, FsfairX-LLaMA3-RM-MT, performs on par with GPT-4o-2024-08-06 on RewardBench.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

Natural Language Explanations (NLEs) describe how Large Language Models (LLMs) make decisions, drawing on both external Context Knowledge (CK) and Parametric Knowledge (PK) stored in model weights. Understanding their interaction is key to assessing the grounding of NLEs, yet it remains underexplored. Prior work has largely examined only single-step generation, typically the final answer, and has modelled PK and CK interaction only as a binary choice in a rank-1 subspace. This overlooks richer forms of interaction, such as complementary or supportive knowledge. We propose a novel rank-2 projection subspace that disentangles PK and CK contributions more accurately and use it for the first multi-step analysis of knowledge interactions across longer NLE sequences. Experiments on four QA datasets and three open-weight instruction-tuned LLMs show that diverse knowledge interactions are poorly represented in a rank-1 subspace but are effectively captured in our rank-2 formulation. Our multi-step analysis reveals that hallucinated NLEs align strongly with the PK direction, context-faithful ones balance PK and CK, and Chain-of-Thought prompting for NLEs shifts generated NLEs toward CK by reducing PK reliance. This work provides the first framework for systematic studies of multi-step knowledge interactions in LLMs through a richer rank-2 subspace disentanglement. Code and data: https://github.com/copenlu/pk-ck-knowledge-disentanglement.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.