Daily Papers

In multi-task learning (MTL), gradient conflict poses a significant challenge. Effective methods for addressing this problem, including PCGrad, CAGrad, and GradNorm, in their original implementations are computationally demanding, which significantly limits their application in modern large models and transformers. We propose Gradient Conductor (GCond), a method that builds upon PCGrad principles by combining them with gradient accumulation and an adaptive arbitration mechanism. We evaluated GCond on self-supervised learning tasks using MobileNetV3-Small and ConvNeXt architectures on the ImageNet 1K dataset and a combined head and neck CT scan dataset, comparing the proposed method against baseline linear combinations and state-of-the-art gradient conflict resolution methods. The stochastic mode of GCond achieved a two-fold computational speedup while maintaining optimization quality, and demonstrated superior performance across all evaluated metrics, achieving lower L1 and SSIM losses compared to other methods on both datasets. GCond exhibited high scalability, being successfully applied to both compact models (MobileNetV3-Small) and large architectures (ConvNeXt-tiny and ConvNeXt-Base). It also showed compatibility with modern optimizers such as AdamW and Lion/LARS. Therefore, GCond offers a scalable and efficient solution to the problem of gradient conflicts in multi-task learning.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential. However, the high sensitivity to market noise undermines the performance of LLM-based trading systems. To address this limitation, we propose a novel multi-agent system featuring an internal competitive mechanism inspired by modern corporate management structures. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) Data Team - responsible for processing and condensing massive market data into diversified text factors, ensuring they fit the model's constrained context. (2) Research Team - tasked with making parallelized multipath trading decisions based on deep research methods. The core innovation lies in implementing a real-time evaluation and ranking mechanism within each team, driven by authentic market feedback. Each agent's performance undergoes continuous scoring and ranking, with only outputs from top-performing agents being adopted. The design enables the system to adaptively adjust to dynamic environment, enhances robustness against market noise and ultimately delivers superior trading performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed system significantly outperforms prevailing multi-agent systems and traditional quantitative investment methods across diverse evaluation metrics. ContestTrade is open-sourced on GitHub at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/ContestTrade.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Large language models show promise for financial decision-making, yet deploying them as autonomous trading agents raises fundamental challenges: how to adapt instructions when rewards arrive late and obscured by market noise, how to synthesize heterogeneous information streams into coherent decisions, and how to bridge the gap between model outputs and executable market actions. We present ATLAS (Adaptive Trading with LLM AgentS), a unified multi-agent framework that integrates structured information from markets, news, and corporate fundamentals to support robust trading decisions. Within ATLAS, the central trading agent operates in an order-aware action space, ensuring that outputs correspond to executable market orders rather than abstract signals. The agent can incorporate feedback while trading using Adaptive-OPRO, a novel prompt-optimization technique that dynamically adapts the prompt by incorporating real-time, stochastic feedback, leading to increasing performance over time. Across regime-specific equity studies and multiple LLM families, Adaptive-OPRO consistently outperforms fixed prompts, while reflection-based feedback fails to provide systematic gains.

Although Long Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved superior performance on various reasoning scenarios, they often suffer from increased computational costs and inference latency caused by overthinking. To address these limitations, we propose Adaptive Dual Reasoner, which supports two reasoning modes: fast thinking and slow thinking. ADR dynamically alternates between these modes based on the contextual complexity during reasoning. ADR is trained in two stages: (1) A cold-start stage using supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to equip the model with the ability to integrate both fast and slow reasoning modes, in which we construct a hybrid reasoning dataset through a dedicated pipeline to provide large-scale supervision. (2) A reinforcement learning stage for optimizing reasoning effort, where we introduce Entropy-guided Hybrid Policy Optimization EHPO, an RL training framework employing an entropy-guided dynamic rollout strategy for branching at high-entropy units and a difficulty-aware penalty to balance fast and slow reasoning. Across challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ADR achieves an effective balance between reasoning performance and efficiency among state-of-the-art approaches. Specifically, ADR yields a performance gain of up to 6.1%, while reducing the reasoning output length by 49.5% to 59.3%.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently shown promise in solving complex math problems when optimized with Reinforcement Learning (RL). But conventional approaches rely on outcome-only rewards that provide sparse feedback, resulting in inefficient optimization process. In this work, we investigate the function of process reward models (PRMs) to accelerate the RL training for LRMs. We propose a novel intrinsic signal-driven generative process evaluation mechanism operating at the thought level to address major bottlenecks in RL-based training. Specifically, instead of requiring PRMs to know how to solve problems, our method uses intrinsic signals in solutions to judge stepwise correctness and aggregate contiguous correct/incorrect steps into coherent 'thought' units. This structured, thought-level rewards enable more reliable credit assignment by reducing ambiguity in step segmentation and alleviating reward hacking. We further introduce a capability-adaptive reward mechanism that dynamically balances exploration and exploitation based on the LRM's current proficiency, guiding learning without stifling creative trial-and-error. These innovations are integrated into a new off-policy RL algorithm, TP-GRPO, which extends grouped proximal optimization with process-based rewards and improves training efficiency. Experiments on 1.5B and 7B parameter LRMs demonstrate that our method achieves higher problem-solving accuracy with significantly fewer training samples than outcome-only reward baselines. The results validate that well-structured process rewards can substantially accelerate LRM optimization in math reasoning tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/cs-holder/tp_grpo.

The realm of High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is characterized by rapid decision-making processes that capitalize on fleeting market inefficiencies. As the financial markets become increasingly competitive, there is a pressing need for innovative strategies that can adapt and evolve with changing market dynamics. Enter Reinforcement Learning (RL), a branch of machine learning where agents learn by interacting with their environment, making it an intriguing candidate for HFT applications. This paper dives deep into the integration of RL in statistical arbitrage strategies tailored for HFT scenarios. By leveraging the adaptive learning capabilities of RL, we explore its potential to unearth patterns and devise trading strategies that traditional methods might overlook. We delve into the intricate exploration-exploitation trade-offs inherent in RL and how they manifest in the volatile world of HFT. Furthermore, we confront the challenges of applying RL in non-stationary environments, typical of financial markets, and investigate methodologies to mitigate associated risks. Through extensive simulations and backtests, our research reveals that RL not only enhances the adaptability of trading strategies but also shows promise in improving profitability metrics and risk-adjusted returns. This paper, therefore, positions RL as a pivotal tool for the next generation of HFT-based statistical arbitrage, offering insights for both researchers and practitioners in the field.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Increasing the thinking budget of AI models can significantly improve accuracy, but not all questions warrant the same amount of reasoning. Users may prefer to allocate different amounts of reasoning effort depending on how they value output quality versus latency and cost. To leverage this tradeoff effectively, users need fine-grained control over the amount of thinking used for a particular query, but few approaches enable such control. Existing methods require users to specify the absolute number of desired tokens, but this requires knowing the difficulty of the problem beforehand to appropriately set the token budget for a query. To address these issues, we propose Adaptive Effort Control, a self-adaptive reinforcement learning method that trains models to use a user-specified fraction of tokens relative to the current average chain-of-thought length for each query. This approach eliminates dataset- and phase-specific tuning while producing better cost-accuracy tradeoff curves compared to standard methods. Users can dynamically adjust the cost-accuracy trade-off through a continuous effort parameter specified at inference time. We observe that the model automatically learns to allocate resources proportionally to the task difficulty and, across model scales ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, our approach enables a 2-3x reduction in chain-of-thought length while maintaining or improving performance relative to the base model used for RL training.

This work proposes a procedure for designing algorithms for specific adaptive data collection tasks like active learning and pure-exploration multi-armed bandits. Unlike the design of traditional adaptive algorithms that rely on concentration of measure and careful analysis to justify the correctness and sample complexity of the procedure, our adaptive algorithm is learned via adversarial training over equivalence classes of problems derived from information theoretic lower bounds. In particular, a single adaptive learning algorithm is learned that competes with the best adaptive algorithm learned for each equivalence class. Our procedure takes as input just the available queries, set of hypotheses, loss function, and total query budget. This is in contrast to existing meta-learning work that learns an adaptive algorithm relative to an explicit, user-defined subset or prior distribution over problems which can be challenging to define and be mismatched to the instance encountered at test time. This work is particularly focused on the regime when the total query budget is very small, such as a few dozen, which is much smaller than those budgets typically considered by theoretically derived algorithms. We perform synthetic experiments to justify the stability and effectiveness of the training procedure, and then evaluate the method on tasks derived from real data including a noisy 20 Questions game and a joke recommendation task.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) and vision-language model (VLM) debate systems employ specialized roles for complex problem-solving, yet model specializations are not leveraged to decide which model should fill which role. We propose dynamic role assignment, a framework that runs a Meta-Debate to select suitable agents before the actual debate. The meta-debate has two stages: (1) proposal, where candidates provide role-tailored arguments, and (2) peer review, where proposals are scored with data and role-specific criteria to choose the best agent for each position. We evaluate our method on LLM problem solving benchmarks. Applied on top of existing debate systems, our approach consistently outperforms uniform assignments (filling all roles with the same model) by up to 74.8% and random assignments (assigning models to roles without considering their suitability) by up to 29.7%, depending on the task and the specific assignment. This work establishes a new paradigm for multi-agent system design, shifting from static agent deployment to dynamic and capability-aware selection.

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. Recently, researchers have further investigated Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) frameworks, which enhance the reasoning and collaboration capabilities of MAS through information exchange and debate among multiple agents. However, existing approaches often rely on unguided initialization, causing agents to adopt identical reasoning paths that lead to the same errors. As a result, effective debate among agents is hindered, and the final outcome frequently degenerates into simple majority voting. To solve the above problem, in this paper, we introduce Dynamic Multi-Agent Debate (DynaDebate), which enhances the effectiveness of multi-agent debate through three key mechanisms: (1) Dynamic Path Generation and Allocation, which employs a dedicated Path Generation Agent to generate diverse and logical solution paths with adaptive redundancy; (2) Process-Centric Debate, which shifts the focus from surface-level outcome voting to rigorous step-by-step logic critique to ensure process correctness; (3) A Trigger-Based Verification Agent, which is activated upon disagreement and uses external tools to objectively resolve deadlocks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DynaDebate achieves superior performance across various benchmarks, surpassing existing state-of-the-art MAD methods.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

In this work, we propose an Automated Machine Learning (AutoML) system to search for models not only with good prediction accuracy but also fair. We first investigate the necessity and impact of unfairness mitigation in the AutoML context. We establish the FairAutoML framework. The framework provides a novel design based on pragmatic abstractions, which makes it convenient to incorporate existing fairness definitions, unfairness mitigation techniques, and hyperparameter search methods into the model search and evaluation process. Following this framework, we develop a fair AutoML system based on an existing AutoML system. The augmented system includes a resource allocation strategy to dynamically decide when and on which models to conduct unfairness mitigation according to the prediction accuracy, fairness, and resource consumption on the fly. Extensive empirical evaluation shows that our system can achieve a good `fair accuracy' and high resource efficiency.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

AI agents are able to tackle increasingly complex tasks. To achieve more ambitious goals, AI agents need to be able to meaningfully decompose problems into manageable sub-components, and safely delegate their completion across to other AI agents and humans alike. Yet, existing task decomposition and delegation methods rely on simple heuristics, and are not able to dynamically adapt to environmental changes and robustly handle unexpected failures. Here we propose an adaptive framework for intelligent AI delegation - a sequence of decisions involving task allocation, that also incorporates transfer of authority, responsibility, accountability, clear specifications regarding roles and boundaries, clarity of intent, and mechanisms for establishing trust between the two (or more) parties. The proposed framework is applicable to both human and AI delegators and delegatees in complex delegation networks, aiming to inform the development of protocols in the emerging agentic web.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a key approach for enhancing LLM reasoning.However, standard frameworks like Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) typically employ a uniform rollout budget, leading to resource inefficiency. Moreover, existing adaptive methods often rely on instance-level metrics, such as task pass rates, failing to capture the model's dynamic learning state. To address these limitations, we propose CoBA-RL, a reinforcement learning algorithm designed to adaptively allocate rollout budgets based on the model's evolving capability. Specifically, CoBA-RL utilizes a Capability-Oriented Value function to map tasks to their potential training gains and employs a heap-based greedy strategy to efficiently self-calibrate the distribution of computational resources to samples with high training value. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach effectively orchestrates the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, delivering consistent generalization improvements across multiple challenging benchmarks. These findings underscore that quantifying sample training value and optimizing budget allocation are pivotal for advancing LLM post-training efficiency.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) has shown clear effectiveness in coordinating multiple agents across simulated benchmarks and constrained scenarios. However, its deployment in real-world multi-agent systems (MAS) remains limited, primarily due to the complex and dynamic nature of such environments. These challenges arise from multiple interacting sources of variability, including fluctuating agent populations, evolving task goals, and inconsistent execution conditions. Together, these factors demand that MARL algorithms remain effective under continuously changing system configurations and operational demands. To better capture and assess this capacity for adjustment, we introduce the concept of adaptability as a unified and practically grounded lens through which to evaluate the reliability of MARL algorithms under shifting conditions, broadly referring to any changes in the environment dynamics that may occur during learning or execution. Centred on the notion of adaptability, we propose a structured framework comprising three key dimensions: learning adaptability, policy adaptability, and scenario-driven adaptability. By adopting this adaptability perspective, we aim to support more principled assessments of MARL performance beyond narrowly defined benchmarks. Ultimately, this survey contributes to the development of algorithms that are better suited for deployment in dynamic, real-world multi-agent systems.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agents has necessitated robust memory systems to support cohesive long-term interaction and complex reasoning. Benefiting from the strong capabilities of LLMs, recent research focus has shifted from simple context extension to the development of dedicated agentic memory systems. However, existing approaches typically rely on rigid retrieval granularity, accumulation-heavy maintenance strategies, and coarse-grained update mechanisms. These design choices create a persistent mismatch between stored information and task-specific reasoning demands, while leading to the unchecked accumulation of logical inconsistencies over time. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Memory via Multi-Agent Collaboration (AMA), a novel framework that leverages coordinated agents to manage memory across multiple granularities. AMA employs a hierarchical memory design that dynamically aligns retrieval granularity with task complexity. Specifically, the Constructor and Retriever jointly enable multi-granularity memory construction and adaptive query routing. The Judge verifies the relevance and consistency of retrieved content, triggering iterative retrieval when evidence is insufficient or invoking the Refresher upon detecting logical conflicts. The Refresher then enforces memory consistency by performing targeted updates or removing outdated entries. Extensive experiments on challenging long-context benchmarks show that AMA significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines while reducing token consumption by approximately 80% compared to full-context methods, demonstrating its effectiveness in maintaining retrieval precision and long-term memory consistency.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

As agent systems move into increasingly diverse execution settings, trajectory-level safety evaluation and diagnosis require benchmarks that evolve with them. ATBench is a diverse and realistic agent trajectory benchmark for safety evaluation and diagnosis. This report presents ATBench-Claw and ATBench-CodeX, two domain-customized extensions that carry ATBench into the OpenClaw and OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime settings. The key adaptation mechanism is to analyze each new setting, customize the three-dimensional Safety Taxonomy over risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm, and then use that customized taxonomy to define the benchmark specification consumed by the shared ATBench construction pipeline. This extensibility matters because agent frameworks remain relatively stable at the architectural level even as their concrete execution settings, tool ecosystems, and product capabilities evolve quickly. Concretely, ATBench-Claw targets OpenClaw-sensitive execution chains over tools, skills, sessions, and external actions, while ATBench-CodeX targets trajectories in the OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime setting over repositories, shells, patches, dependencies, approvals, and runtime policy boundaries. Our emphasis therefore falls on taxonomy customization, domain-specific risk coverage, and benchmark design under a shared ATBench generation framework.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

In this paper, we present a simulation system called AgentCourt that simulates the entire courtroom process. The judge, plaintiff's lawyer, defense lawyer, and other participants are autonomous agents driven by large language models (LLMs). Our core goal is to enable lawyer agents to learn how to argue a case, as well as improving their overall legal skills, through courtroom process simulation. To achieve this goal, we propose an adversarial evolutionary approach for the lawyer-agent. Since AgentCourt can simulate the occurrence and development of court hearings based on a knowledge base and LLM, the lawyer agents can continuously learn and accumulate experience from real court cases. The simulation experiments show that after two lawyer-agents have engaged in a thousand adversarial legal cases in AgentCourt (which can take a decade for real-world lawyers), compared to their pre-evolutionary state, the evolved lawyer agents exhibit consistent improvement in their ability to handle legal tasks. To enhance the credibility of our experimental results, we enlisted a panel of professional lawyers to evaluate our simulations. The evaluation indicates that the evolved lawyer agents exhibit notable advancements in responsiveness, as well as expertise and logical rigor. This work paves the way for advancing LLM-driven agent technology in legal scenarios. Code is available at https://github.com/relic-yuexi/AgentCourt.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Effective decision-making in the real world depends on memory that is both stable and adaptive: environments change over time, and agents must retain relevant information over long horizons while also updating or overwriting outdated content when circumstances shift. Existing Reinforcement Learning (RL) benchmarks and memory-augmented agents focus primarily on retention, leaving the equally critical ability of memory rewriting largely unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce a benchmark that explicitly tests continual memory updating under partial observability, i.e. the natural setting where an agent must rely on memory rather than current observations, and use it to compare recurrent, transformer-based, and structured memory architectures. Our experiments reveal that classic recurrent models, despite their simplicity, demonstrate greater flexibility and robustness in memory rewriting tasks than modern structured memories, which succeed only under narrow conditions, and transformer-based agents, which often fail beyond trivial retention cases. These findings expose a fundamental limitation of current approaches and emphasize the necessity of memory mechanisms that balance stable retention with adaptive updating. Our work highlights this overlooked challenge, introduces benchmarks to evaluate it, and offers insights for designing future RL agents with explicit and trainable forgetting mechanisms. Code: https://quartz-admirer.github.io/Memory-Rewriting/

Reasoning large language models (LLMs) excel in complex tasks, which has drawn significant attention to reinforcement learning (RL) for LLMs. However, existing approaches allocate an equal number of rollouts to all questions during the RL process, which is inefficient. This inefficiency stems from the fact that training on simple questions yields limited gains, whereas more rollouts are needed for challenging questions to sample correct answers. Furthermore, while RL improves response precision, it limits the model's exploration ability, potentially resulting in a performance cap below that of the base model prior to RL. To address these issues, we propose a mechanism for dynamically allocating rollout budgets based on the difficulty of the problems, enabling more efficient RL training. Additionally, we introduce an adaptive dynamic temperature adjustment strategy to maintain the entropy at a stable level, thereby encouraging sufficient exploration. This enables LLMs to improve response precision while preserving their exploratory ability to uncover potential correct pathways. The code and data is available on: https://github.com/LiaoMengqi/E3-RL4LLMs

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We theoretically explore the relationship between sample-efficiency and adaptivity in reinforcement learning. An algorithm is sample-efficient if it uses a number of queries n to the environment that is polynomial in the dimension d of the problem. Adaptivity refers to the frequency at which queries are sent and feedback is processed to update the querying strategy. To investigate this interplay, we employ a learning framework that allows sending queries in K batches, with feedback being processed and queries updated after each batch. This model encompasses the whole adaptivity spectrum, ranging from non-adaptive 'offline' (K=1) to fully adaptive (K=n) scenarios, and regimes in between. For the problems of policy evaluation and best-policy identification under d-dimensional linear function approximation, we establish Omega(log log d) lower bounds on the number of batches K required for sample-efficient algorithms with n = O(poly(d)) queries. Our results show that just having adaptivity (K>1) does not necessarily guarantee sample-efficiency. Notably, the adaptivity-boundary for sample-efficiency is not between offline reinforcement learning (K=1), where sample-efficiency was known to not be possible, and adaptive settings. Instead, the boundary lies between different regimes of adaptivity and depends on the problem dimension.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

Overlapping calendar invitations force busy professionals to repeatedly decide which meetings to attend, reschedule, or decline. We refer to this preference-driven decision process as calendar conflict resolution. Automating this decision process is crucial yet challenging. Scheduling logistics can drain hours, and human delegation often fails at scale, which motivates us to ask: Can we trust large language models (LLMs) or language agents to manage time? To enable a systematic study of this question, we introduce CalConflictBench, a benchmark for long-horizon calendar conflict resolution. In CalConflictBench, conflicts are presented to agents round-by-round over a calendar year, requiring them to infer and adapt to user preferences progressively. Our experiments show that current LLM agents perform poorly with high error rates, e.g., Qwen-3-30B-Think has an average error rate of 35%. To address this gap, we propose PEARL, a reinforcement-learning framework that (i) augments the language agent with an external preference memory that stores and updates inferred strategies (e.g., attendee priorities, topic importance, time/location preferences), and (ii) optimizes the agent with round-wise rewards that directly supervise decision correctness, ranking quality, and memory usage across rounds. Experiments on CalConflictBench show that PEARL achieves an error reduction rate of 0.76 and a 55% improvement in average error rate compared to the strongest baseline.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced legal intelligence, but the scarcity of scenario data impedes the progress toward interactive legal scenarios. This paper introduces a Multi-agent Legal Simulation Driver (MASER) to scalably generate synthetic data by simulating interactive legal scenarios. Leveraging real-legal case sources, MASER ensures the consistency of legal attributes between participants and introduces a supervisory mechanism to align participants' characters and behaviors as well as addressing distractions. A Multi-stage Interactive Legal Evaluation (MILE) benchmark is further constructed to evaluate LLMs' performance in dynamic legal scenarios. Extensive experiments confirm the effectiveness of our framework.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

General-purpose technologies reshape economies less by improving individual tools than by enabling new ways to organize production and coordination. We believe AI agents are approaching a similar inflection point: as foundation models make broad task execution and tool use increasingly accessible, the binding constraint shifts from raw capability to how work is delegated, verified, and rewarded at scale. We introduce EpochX, a credits-native marketplace infrastructure for human-agent production networks. EpochX treats humans and agents as peer participants who can post tasks or claim them. Claimed tasks can be decomposed into subtasks and executed through an explicit delivery workflow with verification and acceptance. Crucially, EpochX is designed so that each completed transaction can produce reusable ecosystem assets, including skills, workflows, execution traces, and distilled experience. These assets are stored with explicit dependency structure, enabling retrieval, composition, and cumulative improvement over time. EpochX also introduces a native credit mechanism to make participation economically viable under real compute costs. Credits lock task bounties, budget delegation, settle rewards upon acceptance, and compensate creators when verified assets are reused. By formalizing the end-to-end transaction model together with its asset and incentive layers, EpochX reframes agentic AI as an organizational design problem: building infrastructures where verifiable work leaves persistent, reusable artifacts, and where value flows support durable human-agent collaboration.

The surging demand for cloud computing resources, driven by the rapid growth of sophisticated large-scale models and data centers, underscores the critical importance of efficient and adaptive resource allocation. As major tech enterprises deploy massive infrastructures with thousands of GPUs, existing cloud platforms still struggle with low resource utilization due to key challenges: capturing hierarchical indicator structures, modeling non-Gaussian distributions, and decision-making under uncertainty. To address these challenges, we propose HRAMONY, an adaptive Hierarchical Attention-based Resource Modeling and Decision-Making System. HARMONY combines hierarchical multi-indicator distribution forecasting and uncertainty-aware Bayesian decision-making. It introduces a novel hierarchical attention mechanism that comprehensively models complex inter-indicator dependencies, enabling accurate predictions that can adapt to evolving environment states. By transforming Gaussian projections into adaptive non-Gaussian distributions via Normalizing Flows. Crucially, HARMONY leverages the full predictive distributions in an adaptive Bayesian process, proactively incorporating uncertainties to optimize resource allocation while robustly meeting SLA constraints under varying conditions. Extensive evaluations across four large-scale cloud datasets demonstrate HARMONY's state-of-the-art performance, significantly outperforming nine established methods. A month-long real-world deployment validated HARMONY's substantial practical impact, realizing over 35,000 GPU hours in savings and translating to $100K+ in cost reduction, showcasing its remarkable economic value through adaptive, uncertainty-aware scaling. Our code is available at https://github.com/Floating-LY/HARMONY1.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

Adaptive optimization is critical in federated learning, where enabling adaptivity on both the server and client sides has proven essential for achieving optimal performance. However, the scalability of such jointly adaptive systems is often hindered by resource limitations in communication and memory. In this paper, we introduce a class of efficient adaptive algorithms, named FedAda^2 and its enhanced version FedAda^2++, designed specifically for large-scale, cross-device federated environments. FedAda^2 optimizes communication efficiency by avoiding the transfer of preconditioners between the server and clients. Additionally, FedAda^2++ extends this approach by incorporating memory-efficient adaptive optimizers on the client side, further reducing on-device memory usage. Theoretically, we demonstrate that FedAda^2 and FedAda^2++ achieve the same convergence rates for general, non-convex objectives as its more resource-intensive counterparts that directly integrate joint adaptivity. Extensive empirical evaluations on image and text datasets demonstrate both the advantages of joint adaptivity and the effectiveness of FedAda^2/FedAda^2++.

This work presents a proof-of-concept implementation of a distributed, in-network reinforcement learning (IN-RL) framework for adaptive path selection in programmable networks. By combining Stochastic Learning Automata (SLA) with real-time telemetry data collected via In-Band Network Telemetry (INT), the proposed system enables local, data-driven forwarding decisions that adapt dynamically to congestion conditions. The system is evaluated on a Mininet-based testbed using P4-programmable BMv2 switches, demonstrating how our SLA-based mechanism converges to effective path selections and adapts to shifting network conditions at line rate.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

This paper discusses the system architecture design and deployment of non-stationary multi-armed bandit approaches to determine a near-optimal payment routing policy based on the recent history of transactions. We propose a Routing Service architecture using a novel Ray-based implementation for optimally scaling bandit-based payment routing to over 10,000 transactions per second, adhering to the system design requirements and ecosystem constraints with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We first evaluate the effectiveness of multiple bandit-based payment routing algorithms on a custom simulator to benchmark multiple non-stationary bandit approaches and identify the best hyperparameters. We then conducted live experiments on the payment transaction system on a fantasy sports platform Dream11. In the live experiments, we demonstrated that our non-stationary bandit-based algorithm consistently improves the success rate of transactions by 0.92% compared to the traditional rule-based methods over one month.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts-from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

This paper proposes a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework for credit underwriting that tackles ungeneralizable contextual challenges. We adapt RL principles for credit scoring, incorporating action space renewal and multi-choice actions. Our work demonstrates that the traditional underwriting approach aligns with the RL greedy strategy. We introduce two new RL-based credit underwriting algorithms to enable more informed decision-making. Simulations show these new approaches outperform the traditional method in scenarios where the data aligns with the model. However, complex situations highlight model limitations, emphasizing the importance of powerful machine learning models for optimal performance. Future research directions include exploring more sophisticated models alongside efficient exploration mechanisms.

Competitive debate is a complex task of computational argumentation. Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from hallucinations and lack competitiveness in this field. To address these challenges, we introduce Agent for Debate (Agent4Debate), a dynamic multi-agent framework based on LLMs designed to enhance their capabilities in competitive debate. Drawing inspiration from human behavior in debate preparation and execution, Agent4Debate employs a collaborative architecture where four specialized agents, involving Searcher, Analyzer, Writer, and Reviewer, dynamically interact and cooperate. These agents work throughout the debate process, covering multiple stages from initial research and argument formulation to rebuttal and summary. To comprehensively evaluate framework performance, we construct the Competitive Debate Arena, comprising 66 carefully selected Chinese debate motions. We recruit ten experienced human debaters and collect records of 200 debates involving Agent4Debate, baseline models, and humans. The evaluation employs the Debatrix automatic scoring system and professional human reviewers based on the established Debatrix-Elo and Human-Elo ranking. Experimental results indicate that the state-of-the-art Agent4Debate exhibits capabilities comparable to those of humans. Furthermore, ablation studies demonstrate the effectiveness of each component in the agent structure.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

As LLMs evolve on a daily basis, there is an urgent need for a trustworthy evaluation method that can provide robust evaluation results in a timely fashion. Currently, as static benchmarks are prone to contamination concerns, users tend to trust human voting platforms, such as Chatbot Arena. However, human annotations require extensive manual efforts. To provide an automatic, robust, and trustworthy evaluation framework, we innovatively propose the Auto-Arena of LLMs, which automates the entire evaluation process with LLM agents. Firstly, an examiner LLM devises queries. Then, a pair of candidate LLMs engage in a multi-round peer-battle around the query, during which the LLM's true performance gaps become visible. Finally, a committee of LLM judges collectively discuss and determine the winner, which alleviates bias and promotes fairness. In our extensive experiment on the 17 newest LLMs, Auto-Arena shows the highest correlation with human preferences, providing a promising alternative to human evaluation platforms.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in mathematical tasks, often enhanced through reinforcement learning (RL). However, RL-trained models frequently produce unnecessarily long reasoning traces -- even for simple queries -- leading to increased inference costs and latency. While recent approaches attempt to control verbosity by adding length penalties to the reward function, these methods rely on fixed penalty terms that are hard to tune and cannot adapt as the model's reasoning capability evolves, limiting their effectiveness. In this work, we propose an adaptive reward-shaping method that enables LLMs to "think fast and right" -- producing concise outputs without sacrificing correctness. Our method dynamically adjusts the reward trade-off between accuracy and response length based on model performance: when accuracy is high, the length penalty increases to encourage faster length reduction; when accuracy drops, the penalty is relaxed to preserve correctness. This adaptive reward accelerates early-stage length reduction while avoiding over-compression in later stages. Experiments across multiple datasets show that our approach consistently and dramatically reduces reasoning length while largely maintaining accuracy, offering a new direction for cost-efficient adaptive reasoning in large-scale language models.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

LLM-based agents have made significant advancements in interactive environments, such as mobile operations and web browsing, and other domains beyond computer using. Current multi-agent systems universally excel in performance, compared to single agents, but struggle with generalization across environments due to predefined roles and inadequate strategies for generalizing language agents. The challenge of achieving both strong performance and good generalization has hindered the progress of multi-agent systems for interactive environments. To address these issues, we propose CollabUIAgents, a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework with a novel multi-agent credit re-assignment (CR) strategy, assigning process rewards with LLMs rather than environment-specific rewards and learning with synthesized preference data, in order to foster generalizable, collaborative behaviors among the role-free agents' policies. Empirical results show that our framework improves both performance and cross-environment generalizability of multi-agent systems. Moreover, our 7B-parameter system achieves results on par with or exceed strong closed-source models, and the LLM that guides the CR. We also provide insights in using granular CR rewards effectively for environment generalization, and accommodating trained LLMs in multi-agent systems.

Reward models (RMs) are central to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), providing the critical supervision signals that align large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Generative reward models (GRMs) provide greater interpretability than traditional scalar RMs, but they come with a critical trade-off: pairwise methods are hindered by a training-inference mismatch, while pointwise methods require expensive absolute annotations. To bridge this gap, we propose the Preference-aware Task-adaptive Reward Model (PaTaRM). Unlike prior approaches, PaTaRM enables robust pointwise training using readily available pairwise data via a novel Preference-Aware Reward (PAR) mechanism, eliminating the need for explicit rating labels. Furthermore, it incorporates a Task-Adaptive Rubric system that dynamically generates instance-specific criteria for precise evaluation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PATRM achieves a 8.7% average improvement on RewardBench and RMBench across Qwen3-8B/14B models. Crucially, it boosts downstream RLHF performance by an average relative improvement of 13.6% across IFEval and InFoBench, validating its effectiveness for policy alignment. Our code is available at https://github.com/JaneEyre0530/PaTaRM.

Cutting-edge agentic AI systems are built on foundation models that can be adapted to plan, reason, and interact with external tools to perform increasingly complex and specialized tasks. As these systems grow in capability and scope, adaptation becomes a central mechanism for improving performance, reliability, and generalization. In this paper, we unify the rapidly expanding research landscape into a systematic framework that spans both agent adaptations and tool adaptations. We further decompose these into tool-execution-signaled and agent-output-signaled forms of agent adaptation, as well as agent-agnostic and agent-supervised forms of tool adaptation. We demonstrate that this framework helps clarify the design space of adaptation strategies in agentic AI, makes their trade-offs explicit, and provides practical guidance for selecting or switching among strategies during system design. We then review the representative approaches in each category, analyze their strengths and limitations, and highlight key open challenges and future opportunities. Overall, this paper aims to offer a conceptual foundation and practical roadmap for researchers and practitioners seeking to build more capable, efficient, and reliable agentic AI systems.

Large language models split into two families: reasoning-centric LLMs, which strengthen internal chain-of-thought reasoning but cannot invoke external tools, and agentic LLMs, which learn to interact with environments and leverage tools but often lag in deep reasoning. This divide arises from fundamentally different training objectives, leading to mismatched strengths and inefficiency on simple queries, where both families tend to overthink or over-call tools. In this work, we present Adaptive Agent Foundation Model (A^2FM), a unified framework that follows a route-then-align principle: the model first learns task-aware routing and then aligns mode-specific trajectories under a shared backbone. To address the inefficiency gap, we introduce a third mode-instant-that handles simple queries directly, preventing unnecessary reasoning or tool calls while complementing the agentic and reasoning modes. To jointly enhance accuracy and efficiency, we propose Adaptive Policy Optimization (APO), which enforces adaptive sampling across modes and applies a cost-regularized reward. On the 32B scale, A^2FM achieves 13.4% on BrowseComp, 70.4% on AIME25, and 16.7% on HLE, setting new SOTA among comparable models and performing competitively with frontier LLMs across agentic, reasoning, and general benchmarks. Notably, the adaptive execution achieves a cost of pass of only $0.00487 per correct answer-cutting cost by 45.2% relative to reasoning and 33.5% relative to agentic, thus delivering substantially higher cost efficiency while maintaining comparable accuracy.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Large-scale commercial platforms usually involve numerous business domains for diverse business strategies and expect their recommendation systems to provide click-through rate (CTR) predictions for multiple domains simultaneously. Existing promising and widely-used multi-domain models discover domain relationships by explicitly constructing domain-specific networks, but the computation and memory boost significantly with the increase of domains. To reduce computational complexity, manually grouping domains with particular business strategies is common in industrial applications. However, this pre-defined data partitioning way heavily relies on prior knowledge, and it may neglect the underlying data distribution of each domain, hence limiting the model's representation capability. Regarding the above issues, we propose an elegant and flexible multi-distribution modeling paradigm, named Adaptive Distribution Hierarchical Model (AdaptDHM), which is an end-to-end optimization hierarchical structure consisting of a clustering process and classification process. Specifically, we design a distribution adaptation module with a customized dynamic routing mechanism. Instead of introducing prior knowledge for pre-defined data allocation, this routing algorithm adaptively provides a distribution coefficient for each sample to determine which cluster it belongs to. Each cluster corresponds to a particular distribution so that the model can sufficiently capture the commonalities and distinctions between these distinct clusters. Extensive experiments on both public and large-scale Alibaba industrial datasets verify the effectiveness and efficiency of AdaptDHM: Our model achieves impressive prediction accuracy and its time cost during the training stage is more than 50% less than that of other models.

Recently, multi-time-scale agent architectures have extended the ubiquitous single-loop paradigm by introducing temporal hierarchies with distinct cognitive layers. While yielding substantial performance gains, this diversification fundamentally compromises the coordination stability intrinsic to unified agent systems, which causes severe inter-layer conflicts, unbounded error propagation, and restricted scalability. To address these challenges, we propose Constrained Temporal Hierarchical Architecture (CTHA), a general framework that projects the inter-layer communication space onto structured manifolds to restore coordination stability, while incorporating principled arbitration mechanisms to ensure coherent decision-making. Specifically, CTHA enforces three key constraints: (1) Message Contract Constraints that formalize information flow between layers via typed summary, plan, and policy packets; (2) Authority Manifold Constraints that bound each layer's decision space according to its temporal scope; and (3) Arbiter Resolution Constraints that guarantee conflict-free composition of multi-layer decisions. Empirical experiments demonstrate that CTHA is effective for complex task execution at scale, offering 47% reduction in failure cascades, 2.3x improvement in sample efficiency, and superior scalability compared to unconstrained hierarchical baselines. We anticipate that CTHA, as a principled extension of temporal hierarchies, will contribute to a deeper understanding of multi-agent coordination and suggest promising directions for the evolution of robust autonomous systems.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Multi-Agent Debate has emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning quality of large language models through iterative inter-agent communication. However, broadcasting all agent messages at every round introduces noise and redundancy that can degrade debate quality and waste computational resources. Current approaches rely on uncertainty estimation to filter low-confidence responses before broadcasting, but this approach is unreliable due to miscalibrated confidence scores and sensitivity to threshold selection. To address this, we propose Diversity-Aware Retention (DAR), a lightweight debate framework that, at each debate round, selects the subset of agent responses that maximally disagree with each other and with the majority vote before broadcasting. Through an explicit index-based retention mechanism, DAR preserves the original messages without modification, ensuring that retained disagreements remain authentic. Experiments on diverse reasoning and question answering benchmarks demonstrate that our selective message propagation consistently improves debate performance, particularly as the number of agents scales, where noise accumulation is most severe. Our results highlight that what agents hear is as important as what agents say in multi-agent reasoning systems. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/DA2I2-SLM/DAR.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Fast changing states or volatile environments pose a significant challenge to online optimization, which needs to perform rapid adaptation under limited observation. In this paper, we give query and regret optimal bandit algorithms under the strict notion of strongly adaptive regret, which measures the maximum regret over any contiguous interval I. Due to its worst-case nature, there is an almost-linear Omega(|I|^{1-epsilon}) regret lower bound, when only one query per round is allowed [Daniely el al, ICML 2015]. Surprisingly, with just two queries per round, we give Strongly Adaptive Bandit Learner (StABL) that achieves O(n|I|) adaptive regret for multi-armed bandits with n arms. The bound is tight and cannot be improved in general. Our algorithm leverages a multiplicative update scheme of varying stepsizes and a carefully chosen observation distribution to control the variance. Furthermore, we extend our results and provide optimal algorithms in the bandit convex optimization setting. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the superior performance of our algorithms under volatile environments and for downstream tasks, such as algorithm selection for hyperparameter optimization.

We introduce AgenticSimLaw, a role-structured, multi-agent debate framework that provides transparent and controllable test-time reasoning for high-stakes tabular decision-making tasks. Unlike black-box approaches, our courtroom-style orchestration explicitly defines agent roles (prosecutor, defense, judge), interaction protocols (7-turn structured debate), and private reasoning strategies, creating a fully auditable decision-making process. We benchmark this framework on young adult recidivism prediction using the NLSY97 dataset, comparing it against traditional chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting across almost 90 unique combinations of models and strategies. Our results demonstrate that structured multi-agent debate provides more stable and generalizable performance compared to single-agent reasoning, with stronger correlation between accuracy and F1-score metrics. Beyond performance improvements, AgenticSimLaw offers fine-grained control over reasoning steps, generates complete interaction transcripts for explainability, and enables systematic profiling of agent behaviors. While we instantiate this framework in the criminal justice domain to stress-test reasoning under ethical complexity, the approach generalizes to any deliberative, high-stakes decision task requiring transparency and human oversight. This work addresses key LLM-based multi-agent system challenges: organization through structured roles, observability through logged interactions, and responsibility through explicit non-deployment constraints for sensitive domains. Data, results, and code will be available on github.com under the MIT license.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Bargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors. Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation. To bridge this gap, we present an utility feedback centric framework. Our contributions are: (i) AgoraBench, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory. This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning. Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness.

Reinforcement Learning has emerged as the fundamental technique for enhancing reasoning in LLMs. However, existing algorithms apply uniform optimization to all tokens, ignoring their different roles in reasoning process. To address this limitation, we introduce Heterogeneous Adaptive Policy Optimization (HAPO), a comprehensive token-aware algorithm that dynamically adapts optimization based on token entropy. For rollout sampling, we propose Adaptive Temperature Sampling, which adjusts sampling temperature in real time, promoting exploration at high-entropy tokens while preserving coherence at low-entropy ones. For advantage calculation, we introduce Token Level Group Average that normalizes advantages at token level, jointly accounting for sequence-length as in token-mean loss while preserving non-biased treatment. We then develop Differential Advantage Redistribution that leverages entropy and importance ratios to modulate rewards-adjusting updates for tokens with clear signals. For clipping loss, we design Asymmetric Adaptive Clipping, allowing aggressive probability reduction for noisy low-entropy tokens while enabling exploration for high-entropy tokens. Through systematic investigation between entropy and training dynamics, we embedded token-level treatment into every stages to achieve fine-grained control. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HAPO consistently outperforms DAPO across multiple model scales. Our code can be found in https://github.com/starriver030515/HAPO.

Managing agent thought and observation during multi-turn agent-environment interactions is an emerging strategy to improve agent efficiency. However, existing studies treat the entire interaction trajectories equally, overlooking the thought necessity and observation utility varies across turns. To this end, we first conduct quantitative investigations into how thought and observation affect agent effectiveness and efficiency. Based on our findings, we propose Agent-Omit, a unified training framework that empowers LLM agents to adaptively omit redundant thoughts and observations. Specifically, we first synthesize a small amount of cold-start data, including both single-turn and multi-turn omission scenarios, to fine-tune the agent for omission behaviors. Furthermore, we introduce an omit-aware agentic reinforcement learning approach, incorporating a dual sampling mechanism and a tailored omission reward to incentivize the agent's adaptive omission capability. Theoretically, we prove that the deviation of our omission policy is upper-bounded by KL-divergence. Experimental results on five agent benchmarks show that our constructed Agent-Omit-8B could obtain performance comparable to seven frontier LLM agent, and achieve the best effectiveness-efficiency trade-off than seven efficient LLM agents methods. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/Agent-Omit.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Rapid Large Language Model (LLM) advancements are fueling autonomous Multi-Agent System (MAS) development. However, current frameworks often lack flexibility, resource awareness, model diversity, and autonomous tool creation. This paper introduces HASHIRU (Hierarchical Agent System for Hybrid Intelligent Resource Utilization), a novel MAS framework enhancing flexibility, resource efficiency, and adaptability. HASHIRU features a "CEO" agent dynamically managing specialized "employee" agents, instantiated based on task needs and resource constraints (cost, memory). Its hybrid intelligence prioritizes smaller, local LLMs (via Ollama) while flexibly using external APIs and larger models when necessary. An economic model with hiring/firing costs promotes team stability and efficient resource allocation. The system also includes autonomous API tool creation and a memory function. Evaluations on tasks like academic paper review (58% success), safety assessments (100% on a JailbreakBench subset), and complex reasoning (outperforming Gemini 2.0 Flash on GSM8K: 96% vs. 61%; JEEBench: 80% vs. 68.3%; SVAMP: 92% vs. 84%) demonstrate HASHIRU's capabilities. Case studies illustrate its self-improvement via autonomous cost model generation, tool integration, and budget management. HASHIRU offers a promising approach for more robust, efficient, and adaptable MAS through dynamic hierarchical control, resource-aware hybrid intelligence, and autonomous functional extension. Source code and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/HASHIRU and https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/HASHIRUBench respectively, and a live demo is available at https://hashiruagentx-hashiruai.hf.space upon request.

The enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) mechanism is used in current wireless fidelity (WiFi) networks to support priority requirements of heterogeneous applications. However, the EDCA mechanism can not adapt to particular quality-of-service (QoS) objective, network topology, and interference level. In this paper, a novel reinforcement-learning-based scheduling framework is proposed and implemented to optimize the application-layer quality-of-service (QoS) of a WiFi network with commercial adapters and unknown interference. Particularly, application-layer tasks of file delivery and delay-sensitive communication are jointly scheduled by adjusting the contention window sizes and application-layer throughput limitation, such that the throughput of the former and the round trip time of the latter can be optimized. Due to the unknown interference and vendor-dependent implementation of the WiFi adapters, the relation between the scheduling policy and the system QoS is unknown. Hence, a reinforcement learning method is proposed, in which a novel Q-network is trained to map from the historical scheduling parameters and QoS observations to the current scheduling action. It is demonstrated on a testbed that the proposed framework can achieve a significantly better performance than the EDCA mechanism.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in addressing complex, agentic tasks, from generating high-quality presentation slides to even conducting sophisticated scientific research. Meanwhile, RL has been widely recognized for its effectiveness in enhancing agent intelligence, but limited research has investigated the fine-tuning of LaMAS using foundational RL techniques. Moreover, the direct application of MARL methods to LaMAS introduces significant challenges, stemming from the unique characteristics and mechanisms inherent to LaMAS. To address these challenges, this article presents a comprehensive study of LLM-based MARL and proposes a novel paradigm termed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (MARFT). We introduce a brand-new POMDP called Flex-POMDP, which aligns with the LaMAS optimization in real-world applications and a universal algorithmic framework tailored specifically for LaMAS, outlining the conceptual foundations, key distinctions, and practical implementation strategies. We review the evolution from RL to RFT, setting the stage for a parallel analysis in the multi-agent domain. In the context of LaMAS, we elucidate critical differences between MARL and MARFT. These differences motivate a transition toward a LaMAS-oriented formulation of RFT. Central to this work is a robust and scalable MARFT framework. We detail the core algorithm and provide a complete, open-source implementation to facilitate adoption and further research. The latter sections of the paper explore real-world application perspectives and opening challenges in MARFT. By bridging theoretical underpinnings with practical methodologies, this work serves as a roadmap for researchers seeking to advance MARFT toward resilient and adaptive solutions in agentic systems. Our implementation of the proposed framework is publicly available at: https://github.com/jwliao-ai/MARFT.

Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used in financial trading, it remains unclear whether they can reason and adapt in live markets, as most studies test models instead of agents, cover limited periods and assets, and rely on unverified data. To address these gaps, we introduce Agent Market Arena (AMA), the first lifelong, real-time benchmark for evaluating LLM-based trading agents across multiple markets. AMA integrates verified trading data, expert-checked news, and diverse agent architectures within a unified trading framework, enabling fair and continuous comparison under real conditions. It implements four agents, including InvestorAgent as a single-agent baseline, TradeAgent and HedgeFundAgent with different risk styles, and DeepFundAgent with memory-based reasoning, and evaluates them across GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5-haiku, Claude-sonnet-4, and Gemini-2.0-flash. Live experiments on both cryptocurrency and stock markets demonstrate that agent frameworks display markedly distinct behavioral patterns, spanning from aggressive risk-taking to conservative decision-making, whereas model backbones contribute less to outcome variation. AMA thus establishes a foundation for rigorous, reproducible, and continuously evolving evaluation of financial reasoning and trading intelligence in LLM-based agents.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Industrial disruption replanning demands multi-agent coordination under strict latency and communication budgets, where disruptions propagate through tightly coupled physical dependencies and rapidly invalidate baseline schedules and commitments. Existing coordination schemes often treat communication as either effectively free (broadcast-style escalation) or fixed in advance (hand-tuned neighborhoods), both of which are brittle once the disruption footprint extends beyond a local region. We present \CASCADE, a budgeted replanning mechanism that makes communication scope explicit and auditable rather than fixed or implicit. Each agent maintains an explicit knowledge base, solves role-conditioned local decision problems to revise commitments, and coordinates through lightweight contract primitives whose footprint expands only when local validation indicates that the current scope is insufficient. This design separates a unified agent substrate (Knowledge Base / Decision Manager / Communication Manager) from a scoped interaction layer that controls who is contacted, how far coordination propagates, and when escalation is triggered under explicit budgets. We evaluate \CASCADE on disrupted manufacturing and supply-chain settings using unified diagnostics intended to test a mechanism-design claim -- whether explicit scope control yields useful quality-latency-communication trade-offs and improved robustness under uncertainty -- rather than to provide a complete algorithmic ranking.

Modern machine learning models are deployed in diverse, non-stationary environments where they must continually adapt to new tasks and evolving knowledge. Continual fine-tuning and in-context learning are costly and brittle, whereas neural memory methods promise lightweight updates with minimal forgetting. However, existing neural memory models typically assume a single fixed objective and homogeneous information streams, leaving users with no control over what the model remembers or ignores over time. To address this challenge, we propose a generalized neural memory system that performs flexible updates based on learning instructions specified in natural language. Our approach enables adaptive agents to learn selectively from heterogeneous information sources, supporting settings, such as healthcare and customer service, where fixed-objective memory updates are insufficient.

Much of the advancement of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) in imperfect-information games has historically depended on manual iterative refinement of baselines. While foundational families like Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) rest on solid theoretical ground, the design of their most effective variants often relies on human intuition to navigate a vast algorithmic design space. In this work, we propose the use of AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent powered by large language models, to automatically discover new multiagent learning algorithms. We demonstrate the generality of this framework by evolving novel variants for two distinct paradigms of game-theoretic learning. First, in the domain of iterative regret minimization, we evolve the logic governing regret accumulation and policy derivation, discovering a new algorithm, Volatility-Adaptive Discounted (VAD-)CFR. VAD-CFR employs novel, non-intuitive mechanisms-including volatility-sensitive discounting, consistency-enforced optimism, and a hard warm-start policy accumulation schedule-to outperform state-of-the-art baselines like Discounted Predictive CFR+. Second, in the regime of population based training algorithms, we evolve training-time and evaluation-time meta strategy solvers for PSRO, discovering a new variant, Smoothed Hybrid Optimistic Regret (SHOR-)PSRO. SHOR-PSRO introduces a hybrid meta-solver that linearly blends Optimistic Regret Matching with a smoothed, temperature-controlled distribution over best pure strategies. By dynamically annealing this blending factor and diversity bonuses during training, the algorithm automates the transition from population diversity to rigorous equilibrium finding, yielding superior empirical convergence compared to standard static meta-solvers.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have emerged as a promising paradigm for solving complex tasks. However, existing works often rely on manual designs or "one-size-fits-all" automation, lacking dynamic adaptability after deployment. Inspired by how biological systems adapt, we introduce MASFly, a novel multi-agent framework enabling dynamic adaptation at test time. To adapt system generation, MASFly employs a retrieval-augmented SOP instantiation mechanism that leverages a self-constructed repository of successful collaboration patterns, enabling the LLM to assemble customized MASs for new queries. For adaptive execution, MASFly incorporates an experience-guided supervision mechanism, where a dedicated Watcher agent monitors system behaviors with reference to a personalized experience pool and provides real-time interventions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MASFly achieves state-of-the-art performance, most notably a 61.7% success rate on the TravelPlanner benchmark, while exhibiting strong task adaptability and robustness.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

For multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (MARLS), the problem formulation generally involves investing massive reward engineering effort specific to a given problem. However, this effort often cannot be translated to other problems; worse, it gets wasted when system dynamics change drastically. This problem is further exacerbated in sparse reward scenarios, where a meaningful heuristic can assist in the policy convergence task. We propose GOVerned Reward Engineering Kernels (GOV-REK), which dynamically assign reward distributions to agents in MARLS during its learning stage. We also introduce governance kernels, which exploit the underlying structure in either state or joint action space for assigning meaningful agent reward distributions. During the agent learning stage, it iteratively explores different reward distribution configurations with a Hyperband-like algorithm to learn ideal agent reward models in a problem-agnostic manner. Our experiments demonstrate that our meaningful reward priors robustly jumpstart the learning process for effectively learning different MARL problems.

Strategic interaction in adversarial domains such as law, diplomacy, and negotiation is mediated by language, yet most game-theoretic models abstract away the mechanisms of persuasion that operate through discourse. We present the Strategic Courtroom Framework, a multi-agent simulation environment in which prosecution and defense teams composed of trait-conditioned Large Language Model (LLM) agents engage in iterative, round-based legal argumentation. Agents are instantiated using nine interpretable traits organized into four archetypes, enabling systematic control over rhetorical style and strategic orientation. We evaluate the framework across 10 synthetic legal cases and 84 three-trait team configurations, totaling over 7{,}000 simulated trials using DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini~2.5~Pro. Our results show that heterogeneous teams with complementary traits consistently outperform homogeneous configurations, that moderate interaction depth yields more stable verdicts, and that certain traits (notably quantitative and charismatic) contribute disproportionately to persuasive success. We further introduce a reinforcement-learning-based Trait Orchestrator that dynamically generates defense traits conditioned on the case and opposing team, discovering strategies that outperform static, human-designed trait combinations. Together, these findings demonstrate how language can be treated as a first-class strategic action space and provide a foundation for building autonomous agents capable of adaptive persuasion in multi-agent environments.

Game balancing is a longstanding challenge requiring repeated playtesting, expert intuition, and extensive manual tuning. We introduce RuleSmith, the first framework that achieves automated game balancing by leveraging the reasoning capabilities of multi-agent LLMs. It couples a game engine, multi-agent LLMs self-play, and Bayesian optimization operating over a multi-dimensional rule space. As a proof of concept, we instantiate RuleSmith on CivMini, a simplified civilization-style game containing heterogeneous factions, economy systems, production rules, and combat mechanics, all governed by tunable parameters. LLM agents interpret textual rulebooks and game states to generate actions, to conduct fast evaluation of balance metrics such as win-rate disparities. To search the parameter landscape efficiently, we integrate Bayesian optimization with acquisition-based adaptive sampling and discrete projection: promising candidates receive more evaluation games for accurate assessment, while exploratory candidates receive fewer games for efficient exploration. Experiments show that RuleSmith converges to highly balanced configurations and provides interpretable rule adjustments that can be directly applied to downstream game systems. Our results illustrate that LLM simulation can serve as a powerful surrogate for automating design and balancing in complex multi-agent environments.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback usually models preferences using a reward model that does not distinguish between people. We argue that this is unlikely to be a good design choice in contexts with high potential for disagreement, like in the training of large language models. We propose a method to specialise a reward model to a person or group of people. Our approach builds on the observation that individual preferences can be captured as a linear combination of a set of general reward features. We show how to learn such features and subsequently use them to quickly adapt the reward model to a specific individual, even if their preferences are not reflected in the training data. We present experiments with large language models comparing the proposed architecture with a non-adaptive reward model and also adaptive counterparts, including models that do in-context personalisation. Depending on how much disagreement there is in the training data, our model either significantly outperforms the baselines or matches their performance with a simpler architecture and more stable training.

While multiagent systems have shown promise for tackling complex tasks via specialization, finetuning multiple agents simultaneously faces two key challenges: (1) credit assignment across agents, and (2) sample efficiency of expensive multiagent rollouts. In this work, we propose finetuning multiagent systems with per-action process rewards from AI feedback (MAPPA) to address both. Through assigning credit to individual agent actions rather than only at task completion, MAPPA enables fine-grained supervision without ground truth labels while extracting maximal training signal from each rollout. We demonstrate our approach on competition math problems and tool-augmented data analysis tasks. On unseen math problems, MAPPA achieves +5.0--17.5pp on AIME and +7.8--17.2pp on AMC. For data analysis tasks, our method improves success rate by +12.5pp while quality metrics improve by up to 30%, validating that per-action supervision can lead to improvements across different multiagent system on various domains. By addressing these challenges, our work takes a first step toward scaling multiagent systems for complex, long-horizon tasks with minimal human supervision.