Daily Papers

The top-down and bottom-up methods are two mainstreams of referring segmentation, while both methods have their own intrinsic weaknesses. Top-down methods are chiefly disturbed by Polar Negative (PN) errors owing to the lack of fine-grained cross-modal alignment. Bottom-up methods are mainly perturbed by Inferior Positive (IP) errors due to the lack of prior object information. Nevertheless, we discover that two types of methods are highly complementary for restraining respective weaknesses but the direct average combination leads to harmful interference. In this context, we build Win-win Cooperation (WiCo) to exploit complementary nature of two types of methods on both interaction and integration aspects for achieving a win-win improvement. For the interaction aspect, Complementary Feature Interaction (CFI) provides fine-grained information to top-down branch and introduces prior object information to bottom-up branch for complementary feature enhancement. For the integration aspect, Gaussian Scoring Integration (GSI) models the gaussian performance distributions of two branches and weightedly integrates results by sampling confident scores from the distributions. With our WiCo, several prominent top-down and bottom-up combinations achieve remarkable improvements on three common datasets with reasonable extra costs, which justifies effectiveness and generality of our method.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.