Daily Papers

A growing body of work in cognitive science suggests that reportable conscious access is associated with global ignition over distributed memory systems, while such activation is only partially accessible as individuals cannot directly access or enumerate all activated contents. This tension suggests a plausible mechanism that cognition may rely on a compact representation that approximates the global influence of activation on downstream processing. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the concept of Mindscape Activation Signature (MiA-Signature), a compressed representation of the global activation pattern induced by a query. In LLM systems, this is instantiated via submodular-based selection of high-level concepts that cover the activated context space, optionally refined through lightweight iterative updates using working memory. The resulting MiA-Signature serves as a conditioning signal that approximates the effect of the full activation state while remaining computationally tractable. Integrating MiA-Signatures into both RAG and agentic systems yields consistent performance gains across multiple long-context understanding tasks.

Diffusion models have made compelling progress on facilitating high-throughput daily production. Nevertheless, the appealing customized requirements are remain suffered from instance-level finetuning for authentic fidelity. Prior zero-shot customization works achieve the semantic consistence through the condensed injection of identity features, while addressing detailed low-level signatures through complex model configurations and subject-specific fabrications, which significantly break the statistical coherence within the overall system and limit the applicability across various scenarios. To facilitate the generic signature concentration with rectified efficiency, we present AnyLogo, a zero-shot region customizer with remarkable detail consistency, building upon the symbiotic diffusion system with eliminated cumbersome designs. Streamlined as vanilla image generation, we discern that the rigorous signature extraction and creative content generation are promisingly compatible and can be systematically recycled within a single denoising model. In place of the external configurations, the gemini status of the denoising model promote the reinforced subject transmission efficiency and disentangled semantic-signature space with continuous signature decoration. Moreover, the sparse recycling paradigm is adopted to prevent the duplicated risk with compressed transmission quota for diversified signature stimulation. Extensive experiments on constructed logo-level benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness and practicability of our methods.

EEG-based neural networks, pivotal in medical diagnosis and brain-computer interfaces, face significant intellectual property (IP) risks due to their reliance on sensitive neurophysiological data and resource-intensive development. Current watermarking methods, particularly those using abstract trigger sets, lack robust authentication and fail to address the unique challenges of EEG models. This paper introduces a cryptographic wonder filter-based watermarking framework tailored for EEG-based neural networks. Leveraging collision-resistant hashing and public-key encryption, the wonder filter embeds the watermark during training, ensuring minimal distortion (leq 5% drop in EEG task accuracy) and high reliability (100\% watermark detection). The framework is rigorously evaluated against adversarial attacks, including fine-tuning, transfer learning, and neuron pruning. Results demonstrate persistent watermark retention, with classification accuracy for watermarked states remaining above 90\% even after aggressive pruning, while primary task performance degrades faster, deterring removal attempts. Piracy resistance is validated by the inability to embed secondary watermarks without severe accuracy loss ( >10% in EEGNet and CCNN models). Cryptographic hashing ensures authentication, reducing brute-force attack success probabilities. Evaluated on the DEAP dataset across models (CCNN, EEGNet, TSception), the method achieves >99.4% null-embedding accuracy, effectively eliminating false positives. By integrating wonder filters with EEG-specific adaptations, this work bridges a critical gap in IP protection for neurophysiological models, offering a secure, tamper-proof solution for healthcare and biometric applications. The framework's robustness against adversarial modifications underscores its potential to safeguard sensitive EEG models while maintaining diagnostic utility.

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, yet our understanding of their behavior remains limited, particularly in detecting data contamination and hallucinations. While recently proposed probing techniques provide insights through activation analysis, they require "white-box" access to model internals, often unavailable. Current "gray-box" approaches typically analyze only the probability of the actual tokens in the sequence with simple task-specific heuristics. Importantly, these methods overlook the rich information contained in the full token distribution at each processing step. To address these limitations, we propose that gray-box analysis should leverage the complete observable output of LLMs, consisting of both the previously used token probabilities as well as the complete token distribution sequences - a unified data type we term LOS (LLM Output Signature). To this end, we develop a transformer-based approach to process LOS that theoretically guarantees approximation of existing techniques while enabling more nuanced analysis. Our approach achieves superior performance on hallucination and data contamination detection in gray-box settings, significantly outperforming existing baselines. Furthermore, it demonstrates strong transfer capabilities across datasets and LLMs, suggesting that LOS captures fundamental patterns in LLM behavior. Our code is available at: https://github.com/BarSGuy/LLM-Output-Signatures-Network.

This paper explores the application of artificial intelligence techniques in audio and voice processing, focusing on the integration of wake words and speaker recognition for secure access in embedded systems. With the growing prevalence of voice-activated devices such as Amazon Alexa, ensuring secure and user-specific interactions has become paramount. Our study aims to enhance the security framework of these systems by leveraging wake words for initial activation and speaker recognition to validate user permissions. By incorporating these AI-driven methodologies, we propose a robust solution that restricts system usage to authorized individuals, thereby mitigating unauthorized access risks. This research delves into the algorithms and technologies underpinning wake word detection and speaker recognition, evaluates their effectiveness in real-world applications, and discusses the potential for their implementation in various embedded systems, emphasizing security and user convenience. The findings underscore the feasibility and advantages of employing these AI techniques to create secure, user-friendly voice-activated systems.

In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

Personality imbuing customizes LLM behavior, but safety evaluations almost always study prompt-based personas alone. We show this is incomplete: prompting and activation steering expose *different*, architecture-dependent vulnerability profiles, and testing with only one method can miss a model's dominant failure mode. Across 5,568 judged conditions on four standard models from three architecture families, persona danger rankings under system prompting are preserved across all architectures (ρ= 0.71--0.96), but activation-steering vulnerability diverges sharply and cannot be predicted from prompt-side rankings: Llama-3.1-8B is substantially more AS-vulnerable, whereas Gemma-3-27B and Qwen3.5 are more vulnerable to prompting. The most striking illustration of this divergence is the *prosocial persona paradox*: on Llama-3.1-8B, P12 (high conscientiousness + high agreeableness) is among the safest personas under prompting yet becomes the highest-ASR activation-steered persona (ASR ~0.818). This is an inversion robust to coefficient ablation and matched-strength calibration, and replicated on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. A trait refusal alignment framework, in which conscientiousness is strongly anti-aligned with refusal on Llama-3.1-8B, offers a partial geometric account. Reasoning provides only partial protection: two 32B reasoning models reach 15--18% prompt-side ASR, and activation steering separates them sharply in both baseline susceptibility and persona-specific vulnerability. Heuristic trace diagnostics suggest that the safer model retains stronger policy recall and self-correction behavior, not merely longer reasoning.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals have emerged as a promising modality for biometric identification. While previous studies have explored the use of imagined speech with semantically meaningful words for subject identification, most have relied on additional visual or auditory cues. In this study, we introduce a cueless EEG-based imagined speech paradigm, where subjects imagine the pronunciation of semantically meaningful words without any external cues. This innovative approach addresses the limitations of prior methods by requiring subjects to select and imagine words from a predefined list naturally. The dataset comprises over 4,350 trials from 11 subjects across five sessions. We assess a variety of classification methods, including traditional machine learning techniques such as Support Vector Machines (SVM) and XGBoost, as well as time-series foundation models and deep learning architectures specifically designed for EEG classification, such as EEG Conformer and Shallow ConvNet. A session-based hold-out validation strategy was employed to ensure reliable evaluation and prevent data leakage. Our results demonstrate outstanding classification accuracy, reaching 97.93%. These findings highlight the potential of cueless EEG paradigms for secure and reliable subject identification in real-world applications, such as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs).

Assessing the quality of Large Language Model (LLM) outputs presents a critical challenge. Previous methods either rely on text-level information (e.g., reward models, majority voting), which can overfit to superficial cues, or on calibrated confidence from token probabilities, which would fail on less-calibrated models. Yet both of these signals are, in fact, partial projections of a richer source of information: the model's internal hidden states. Early layers, closer to token embeddings, preserve semantic and lexical features that underpin text-based judgments, while later layers increasingly align with output logits, embedding confidence-related information. This paper explores hidden states directly as a unified foundation for verification. We show that the correctness of a solution is encoded as a geometrically separable signature within the trajectory of hidden activations. To validate this, we present Clue (Clustering and Experience-based Verification), a deliberately minimalist, non-parametric verifier. With no trainable parameters, CLUE only summarizes each reasoning trace by an hidden state delta and classifies correctness via nearest-centroid distance to ``success'' and ``failure'' clusters formed from past experience. The simplicity of this method highlights the strength of the underlying signal. Empirically, CLUE consistently outperforms LLM-as-a-judge baselines and matches or exceeds modern confidence-based methods in reranking candidates, improving both top-1 and majority-vote accuracy across AIME 24/25 and GPQA. As a highlight, on AIME 24 with a 1.5B model, CLUE boosts accuracy from 56.7% (majority@64) to 70.0% (top-maj@16).

The rise of AI voice-cloning technology, particularly audio Real-time Deepfakes (RTDFs), has intensified social engineering attacks by enabling real-time voice impersonation that bypasses conventional enrollment-based authentication. To address this, we propose PITCH, a robust challenge-response method to detect and tag interactive deepfake audio calls. We developed a comprehensive taxonomy of audio challenges based on the human auditory system, linguistics, and environmental factors, yielding 20 prospective challenges. These were tested against leading voice-cloning systems using a novel dataset comprising 18,600 original and 1.6 million deepfake samples from 100 users. PITCH's prospective challenges enhanced machine detection capabilities to 88.7% AUROC score on the full unbalanced dataset, enabling us to shortlist 10 functional challenges that balance security and usability. For human evaluation and subsequent analyses, we filtered a challenging, balanced subset. On this subset, human evaluators independently scored 72.6% accuracy, while machines achieved 87.7%. Acknowledging that call environments require higher human control, we aided call receivers in making decisions with them using machines. Our solution uses an early warning system to tag suspicious incoming calls as "Deepfake-likely." Contrary to prior findings, we discovered that integrating human intuition with machine precision offers complementary advantages. Our solution gave users maximum control and boosted detection accuracy to 84.5%. Evidenced by this jump in accuracy, PITCH demonstrated the potential for AI-assisted pre-screening in call verification processes, offering an adaptable and usable approach to combat real-time voice-cloning attacks. Code to reproduce and access data at https://github.com/mittalgovind/PITCH-Deepfakes.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have significantly advanced in producing high-quality images. However, such models have the ability to generate images containing not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, such as pornography, violence, political content, and discrimination. To mitigate the risk of generating NSFW content, refusal mechanisms, i.e., safety checkers, have been developed to check potential NSFW content. Adversarial prompting techniques have been developed to evaluate the robustness of the refusal mechanisms. The key challenge remains to subtly modify the prompt in a way that preserves its sensitive nature while bypassing the refusal mechanisms. In this paper, we introduce TokenProber, a method designed for sensitivity-aware differential testing, aimed at evaluating the robustness of the refusal mechanisms in T2I models by generating adversarial prompts. Our approach is based on the key observation that adversarial prompts often succeed by exploiting discrepancies in how T2I models and safety checkers interpret sensitive content. Thus, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of the impact of specific words within prompts, distinguishing between dirty words that are essential for NSFW content generation and discrepant words that highlight the different sensitivity assessments between T2I models and safety checkers. Through the sensitivity-aware mutation, TokenProber generates adversarial prompts, striking a balance between maintaining NSFW content generation and evading detection. Our evaluation of TokenProber against 5 safety checkers on 3 popular T2I models, using 324 NSFW prompts, demonstrates its superior effectiveness in bypassing safety filters compared to existing methods (e.g., 54%+ increase on average), highlighting TokenProber's ability to uncover robustness issues in the existing refusal mechanisms.

Objective: Target identification in brain-computer interface (BCI) spellers refers to the electroencephalogram (EEG) classification for predicting the target character that the subject intends to spell. When the visual stimulus of each character is tagged with a distinct frequency, the EEG records steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEP) whose spectrum is dominated by the harmonics of the target frequency. In this setting, we address the target identification and propose a novel deep neural network (DNN) architecture. Method: The proposed DNN processes the multi-channel SSVEP with convolutions across the sub-bands of harmonics, channels, time, and classifies at the fully connected layer. We test with two publicly available large scale (the benchmark and BETA) datasets consisting of in total 105 subjects with 40 characters. Our first stage training learns a global model by exploiting the statistical commonalities among all subjects, and the second stage fine tunes to each subject separately by exploiting the individualities. Results: Our DNN achieves impressive information transfer rates (ITRs) on both datasets, 265.23 bits/min and 196.59 bits/min, respectively, with only 0.4 seconds of stimulation. The code is available for reproducibility at https://github.com/osmanberke/Deep-SSVEP-BCI. Conclusion: The presented DNN strongly outperforms the state-of-the-art techniques as our accuracy and ITR rates are the highest ever reported performance results on these datasets. Significance: Due to its unprecedentedly high speller ITRs and flawless applicability to general SSVEP systems, our technique has great potential in various biomedical engineering settings of BCIs such as communication, rehabilitation and control.

Adaptive learning systems optimize content delivery based on performance metrics but ignore the dynamic attention fluctuations that characterize neurodivergent learners. We present AttentionGuard, a framework that detects engagement-attention states from privacy-preserving behavioral signals and adapts interface elements accordingly. Our approach models four attention states derived from ADHD phenomenology and implements five novel UI adaptation patterns including bi-directional scaffolding that responds to both understimulation and overstimulation. We validate our detection model on the OULAD dataset, achieving 87.3% classification accuracy, and demonstrate correlation with clinical ADHD profiles through cross-validation on the HYPERAKTIV dataset. A Wizard-of-Oz study with 11 adults showing ADHD characteristics found significantly reduced cognitive load in the adaptive condition (NASA-TLX: 47.2 vs 62.8, Cohen's d=1.21, p=0.008) and improved comprehension (78.4% vs 61.2%, p=0.009). Concordance analysis showed 84% agreement between wizard decisions and automated classifier predictions, supporting deployment feasibility. The system is presented as an interactive demo where observers can inspect detected attention states, observe real-time UI adaptations, and compare automated decisions with human-in-the-loop overrides. We contribute empirically validated UI patterns for attention-adaptive interfaces and evidence that behavioral attention detection can meaningfully support neurodivergent learning experiences.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Signature synthesis is a computation technique that generates artificial specimens which can support decision making in automatic signature verification. A lot of work has been dedicated to this subject, which centres on synthesizing dynamic and static two-dimensional handwriting on canvas. This paper proposes a framework to generate synthetic 3D on-air signatures exploiting the lognormality principle, which mimics the complex neuromotor control processes at play as the fingertip moves. Addressing the usual cases involving the development of artificial individuals and duplicated samples, this paper contributes to the synthesis of: (1) the trajectory and velocity of entirely 3D new signatures; (2) kinematic information when only the 3D trajectory of the signature is known, and (3) duplicate samples of 3D real signatures. Validation was conducted by generating synthetic 3D signature databases mimicking real ones and showing that automatic signature verifications of genuine and skilled forgeries report performances similar to those of real and synthetic databases. We also observed that training 3D automatic signature verifiers with duplicates can reduce errors. We further demonstrated that our proposal is also valid for synthesizing 3D air writing and gestures. Finally, a perception test confirmed the human likeness of the generated specimens. The databases generated are publicly available, only for research purposes, at .

Although recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for high accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. Our study focuses on a zero-day backdoor vulnerability prevalent in two families of personalization methods, epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth.Compared to traditional backdoor attacks, our proposed method can facilitate more precise, efficient, and easily accessible attacks with a lower barrier to entry. We provide a comprehensive review of personalization in T2I diffusion models, highlighting the operation and exploitation potential of this backdoor vulnerability. To be specific, by studying the prompt processing of Textual Inversion and DreamBooth, we have devised dedicated backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and analyzed the influence of triggers and concept images on the attack effect. Our empirical study has shown that the nouveau-token backdoor attack has better attack performance while legacy-token backdoor attack is potentially harder to defend.

Fine-tuned large language models can exhibit reward-hacking behavior arising from emergent misalignment, which is difficult to detect from final outputs alone. While prior work has studied reward hacking at the level of completed responses, it remains unclear whether such behavior can be identified during generation. We propose an activation-based monitoring approach that detects reward-hacking signals from internal representations as a model generates its response. Our method trains sparse autoencoders on residual stream activations and applies lightweight linear classifiers to produce token-level estimates of reward-hacking activity. Across multiple model families and fine-tuning mixtures, we find that internal activation patterns reliably distinguish reward-hacking from benign behavior, generalize to unseen mixed-policy adapters, and exhibit model-dependent temporal structure during chain-of-thought reasoning. Notably, reward-hacking signals often emerge early, persist throughout reasoning, and can be amplified by increased test-time compute in the form of chain-of-thought prompting under weakly specified reward objectives. These results suggest that internal activation monitoring provides a complementary and earlier signal of emergent misalignment than output-based evaluation, supporting more robust post-deployment safety monitoring for fine-tuned language models.

Deep generative models have emerged as a transformative tool in medical imaging, offering substantial potential for synthetic data generation. However, recent empirical studies highlight a critical vulnerability: these models can memorize sensitive training data, posing significant risks of unauthorized patient information disclosure. Detecting memorization in generative models remains particularly challenging, necessitating scalable methods capable of identifying training data leakage across large sets of generated samples. In this work, we propose DeepSSIM, a novel self-supervised metric for quantifying memorization in generative models. DeepSSIM is trained to: i) project images into a learned embedding space and ii) force the cosine similarity between embeddings to match the ground-truth SSIM (Structural Similarity Index) scores computed in the image space. To capture domain-specific anatomical features, training incorporates structure-preserving augmentations, allowing DeepSSIM to estimate similarity reliably without requiring precise spatial alignment. We evaluate DeepSSIM in a case study involving synthetic brain MRI data generated by a Latent Diffusion Model (LDM) trained under memorization-prone conditions, using 2,195 MRI scans from two publicly available datasets (IXI and CoRR). Compared to state-of-the-art memorization metrics, DeepSSIM achieves superior performance, improving F1 scores by an average of +52.03% over the best existing method. Code and data of our approach are publicly available at the following link: https://github.com/brAIn-science/DeepSSIM.

Synthetic insider threat benchmarks face a consistency problem: corpora generated without an external factual constraint cannot rule out cross-artifact contradictions. The CERT dataset -- the field's canonical benchmark -- is also static, lacks cross-surface correlation scenarios, and predates the LLM era. We present OrgForge-IT, a verifiable synthetic benchmark in which a deterministic simulation engine maintains ground truth and language models generate only surface prose, making cross-artifact consistency an architectural guarantee. The corpus spans 51 simulated days, 2,904 telemetry records at a 96.4% noise rate, and four detection scenarios designed to defeat single-surface and single-day triage strategies across three threat classes and eight injectable behaviors. A ten-model leaderboard reveals several findings: (1) triage and verdict accuracy dissociate - eight models achieve identical triage F1=0.80 yet split between verdict F1=1.0 and 0.80; (2) baseline false-positive rate is a necessary companion to verdict F1, with models at identical verdict accuracy differing by two orders of magnitude on triage noise; (3) victim attribution in the vishing scenario separates tiers - Tier A models exonerate the compromised account holder while Tier B models detect the attack but misclassify the victim; (4) rigid multi-signal thresholds structurally exclude single-surface negligent insiders, demonstrating the necessity of parallel, threat-class-specific triage pipelines; and (5) agentic software-engineering training acts as a force multiplier for multi-day temporal correlation, but only when paired with frontier-level parameter scale. Finally, prompt sensitivity analysis reveals that unstructured prompts induce vocabulary hallucination, motivating a two-track scoring framework separating prompt adherence from reasoning capability. OrgForge-IT is open source under the MIT license.

Recent proposals advocate using keystroke timing signals, specifically the coefficient of variation (δ) of inter-keystroke intervals, to distinguish human-composed text from AI-generated content. We demonstrate that this class of defenses is insecure against two practical attack classes: the copy-type attack, in which a human transcribes LLM-generated text producing authentic motor signals, and timing-forgery attacks, in which automated agents sample inter-keystroke intervals from empirical human distributions. Using 13,000 sessions from the SBU corpus and three timing-forgery variants (histogram sampling, statistical impersonation, and generative LSTM), we show all attacks achieve ge99.8% evasion rates against five classifiers. While detectors achieve AUC=1.000 against fully-automated injection, they classify ge99.8% of attack samples as human with mean confidence ge0.993. We formalize a non-identifiability result: when the detector observes only timing, the mutual information between features and content provenance is zero for copy-type attacks. Although composition and transcription produce statistically distinguishable motor patterns (Cohen's d=1.28), both yield δ values 2-4x above detection thresholds, rendering the distinction security-irrelevant. These systems confirm a human operated the keyboard, but not whether that human originated the text. Securing provenance requires architectures that bind the writing process to semantic content.

Foundation models are reshaping EEG analysis, yet an important problem of EEG tokenization remains a challenge. This paper presents TFM-Tokenizer, a novel tokenization framework that learns a vocabulary of time-frequency motifs from single-channel EEG signals and encodes them into discrete tokens. We propose a dual-path architecture with time-frequency masking to capture robust motif representations, and it is model-agnostic, supporting both lightweight transformers and existing foundation models for downstream tasks. Our study demonstrates three key benefits: Accuracy: Experiments on four diverse EEG benchmarks demonstrate consistent performance gains across both single- and multi-dataset pretraining settings, achieving up to 17% improvement in Cohen's Kappa over strong baselines. Generalization: Moreover, as a plug-and-play component, it consistently boosts the performance of diverse foundation models, including BIOT and LaBraM. Scalability: By operating at the single-channel level rather than relying on the strict 10-20 EEG system, our method has the potential to be device-agnostic. Experiments on ear-EEG sleep staging, which differs from the pretraining data in signal format, channel configuration, recording device, and task, show that our tokenizer outperforms baselines by 14%. A comprehensive token analysis reveals strong class-discriminative, frequency-aware, and consistent structure, enabling improved representation quality and interpretability. Code is available at https://github.com/Jathurshan0330/TFM-Tokenizer.

Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems, which identify speakers based on their voice characteristics, have numerous applications, such as user authentication in financial transactions, exclusive access control in smart devices, and forensic fraud detection. However, the advancement of deep learning algorithms has enabled the generation of synthetic audio through Text-to-Speech (TTS) and Voice Conversion (VC) systems, exposing ASV systems to potential vulnerabilities. To counteract this, we propose a novel architecture named AASIST3. By enhancing the existing AASIST framework with Kolmogorov-Arnold networks, additional layers, encoders, and pre-emphasis techniques, AASIST3 achieves a more than twofold improvement in performance. It demonstrates minDCF results of 0.5357 in the closed condition and 0.1414 in the open condition, significantly enhancing the detection of synthetic voices and improving ASV security.

Recent advances in large-scale text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have enabled a variety of downstream applications, including style customization, subject-driven personalization, and conditional generation. As T2I models require extensive data and computational resources for training, they constitute highly valued intellectual property (IP) for their legitimate owners, yet making them incentive targets for unauthorized fine-tuning by adversaries seeking to leverage these models for customized, usually profitable applications. Existing IP protection methods for diffusion models generally involve embedding watermark patterns and then verifying ownership through generated outputs examination, or inspecting the model's feature space. However, these techniques are inherently ineffective in practical scenarios when the watermarked model undergoes fine-tuning, and the feature space is inaccessible during verification ((i.e., black-box setting). The model is prone to forgetting the previously learned watermark knowledge when it adapts to a new task. To address this challenge, we propose SleeperMark, a novel framework designed to embed resilient watermarks into T2I diffusion models. SleeperMark explicitly guides the model to disentangle the watermark information from the semantic concepts it learns, allowing the model to retain the embedded watermark while continuing to be adapted to new downstream tasks. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SleeperMark across various types of diffusion models, including latent diffusion models (e.g., Stable Diffusion) and pixel diffusion models (e.g., DeepFloyd-IF), showing robustness against downstream fine-tuning and various attacks at both the image and model levels, with minimal impact on the model's generative capability. The code is available at https://github.com/taco-group/SleeperMark.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become integral software components in modern applications, unauthorized model derivations through fine-tuning, merging, and redistribution have emerged as critical software engineering challenges. Unlike traditional software where clone detection and license compliance are well-established, the LLM ecosystem lacks effective mechanisms to detect model lineage and enforce licensing agreements. This gap is particularly problematic when open-source model creators, such as Meta's LLaMA, require derivative works to maintain naming conventions for attribution, yet no technical means exist to verify compliance. To fill this gap, treating LLMs as software artifacts requiring provenance tracking, we present TensorGuard, a gradient-based fingerprinting framework for LLM similarity detection and family classification. Our approach extracts model-intrinsic behavioral signatures by analyzing gradient responses to random input perturbations across tensor layers, operating independently of training data, watermarks, or specific model formats. TensorGuard supports the widely-adopted safetensors format and constructs high-dimensional fingerprints through statistical analysis of gradient features. These fingerprints enable two complementary capabilities: direct pairwise similarity assessment between arbitrary models through distance computation, and systematic family classification of unknown models via the K-Means clustering algorithm with domain-informed centroid initialization using known base models. Experimental evaluation on 58 models comprising 8 base models and 50 derivatives across five model families (Llama, Qwen, Gemma, Phi, Mistral) demonstrates 94% classification accuracy under our centroid-initialized K-Means clustering.

AI applications driven by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations and pose considerable risks to human users. Crucially, such hallucinations are not equally problematic: some hallucination contents could be detected by human users(i.e., obvious hallucinations), while others are often missed or require more verification effort(i.e., elusive hallucinations). This indicates that multimodal AI hallucinations vary significantly in their verifiability. Yet, little research has explored how to control this property for AI applications with diverse security and usability demands. To address this gap, we construct a dataset from 4,470 human responses to AI-generated hallucinations and categorize these hallucinations into obvious and elusive types based on their verifiability by human users. Further, we propose an activation-space intervention method that learns separate probes for obvious and elusive hallucinations. We reveal that obvious and elusive hallucinations elicit different intervention probes, allowing for fine-grained control over the model's verifiability. Empirical results demonstrate the efficacy of this approach and show that targeted interventions yield superior performance in regulating corresponding verifiability. Moreover, simply mixing these interventions enables flexible control over the verifiability required for different scenarios.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

We propose ERA, a new paradigm that constrains the sampling entropy above given thresholds by applying specially designed activations to the outputs of models. Our approach demonstrates broad effectiveness across different domains: 1) for large language models(LLMs), boosting the AIME 2025 score for Qwen2.5-Math-7B by 37.4%; 2) for continuous control reinforcement learning agents, improving performance by more than 30% over strong baselines such as SAC on the challenging HumanoidBench; 3) for image classification, enhancing ImageNet top-1 accuracy by 0.69% for ResNet-50. These gains are achieved with a computational overhead of less than 7%. Our work validates output activation as a powerful tool for entropy control, opening a new direction for designing simpler and more robust algorithms.

This paper proposes a simple method to distill and detect backdoor patterns within an image: Cognitive Distillation (CD). The idea is to extract the "minimal essence" from an input image responsible for the model's prediction. CD optimizes an input mask to extract a small pattern from the input image that can lead to the same model output (i.e., logits or deep features). The extracted pattern can help understand the cognitive mechanism of a model on clean vs. backdoor images and is thus called a Cognitive Pattern (CP). Using CD and the distilled CPs, we uncover an interesting phenomenon of backdoor attacks: despite the various forms and sizes of trigger patterns used by different attacks, the CPs of backdoor samples are all surprisingly and suspiciously small. One thus can leverage the learned mask to detect and remove backdoor examples from poisoned training datasets. We conduct extensive experiments to show that CD can robustly detect a wide range of advanced backdoor attacks. We also show that CD can potentially be applied to help detect potential biases from face datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/CognitiveDistillation.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in generating high-quality images but also raise people's concerns about generating harmful or misleading content. While extensive approaches have been proposed to erase unwanted concepts without requiring retraining from scratch, they inadvertently degrade performance on normal generation tasks. In this work, we propose Interpret then Deactivate (ItD), a novel framework to enable precise concept removal in T2I diffusion models while preserving overall performance. ItD first employs a sparse autoencoder (SAE) to interpret each concept as a combination of multiple features. By permanently deactivating the specific features associated with target concepts, we repurpose SAE as a zero-shot classifier that identifies whether the input prompt includes target concepts, allowing selective concept erasure in diffusion models. Moreover, we demonstrate that ItD can be easily extended to erase multiple concepts without requiring further training. Comprehensive experiments across celebrity identities, artistic styles, and explicit content demonstrate ItD's effectiveness in eliminating targeted concepts without interfering with normal concept generation. Additionally, ItD is also robust against adversarial prompts designed to circumvent content filters. Code is available at: https://github.com/NANSirun/Interpret-then-deactivate.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

The integration of additional modalities increases the susceptibility of large vision-language models (LVLMs) to safety risks, such as jailbreak attacks, compared to their language-only counterparts. While existing research primarily focuses on post-hoc alignment techniques, the underlying safety mechanisms within LVLMs remain largely unexplored. In this work , we investigate whether LVLMs inherently encode safety-relevant signals within their internal activations during inference. Our findings reveal that LVLMs exhibit distinct activation patterns when processing unsafe prompts, which can be leveraged to detect and mitigate adversarial inputs without requiring extensive fine-tuning. Building on this insight, we introduce HiddenDetect, a novel tuning-free framework that harnesses internal model activations to enhance safety. Experimental results show that {HiddenDetect} surpasses state-of-the-art methods in detecting jailbreak attacks against LVLMs. By utilizing intrinsic safety-aware patterns, our method provides an efficient and scalable solution for strengthening LVLM robustness against multimodal threats. Our code will be released publicly at https://github.com/leigest519/HiddenDetect.

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

Foundation models have transformed multimedia analysis by enabling robust and transferable representations across diverse modalities and tasks. However, their static deployment conflicts with growing societal and regulatory demands -- particularly the need to unlearn specific data upon request, as mandated by privacy frameworks such as the GDPR. Traditional unlearning approaches, including retraining, activation editing, or distillation, are often computationally expensive, fragile, and ill-suited for real-time or continuously evolving systems. In this paper, we propose a paradigm shift: rethinking unlearning not as a retroactive intervention but as a built-in capability. We introduce a prompt-based learning framework that unifies knowledge acquisition and removal within a single training phase. Rather than encoding information in model weights, our approach binds class-level semantics to dedicated prompt tokens. This design enables instant unlearning simply by removing the corresponding prompt -- without retraining, model modification, or access to original data. Experiments demonstrate that our framework preserves predictive performance on retained classes while effectively erasing forgotten ones. Beyond utility, our method exhibits strong privacy and security guarantees: it is resistant to membership inference attacks, and prompt removal prevents any residual knowledge extraction, even under adversarial conditions. This ensures compliance with data protection principles and safeguards against unauthorized access to forgotten information, making the framework suitable for deployment in sensitive and regulated environments. Overall, by embedding removability into the architecture itself, this work establishes a new foundation for designing modular, scalable and ethically responsive AI models.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Massive activations are scalar values in transformer hidden states that achieve values orders of magnitude larger than typical activations and have been shown to be critical for model functionality. While prior work has characterized these phenomena in fully trained models, the temporal dynamics of their emergence during training remain poorly understood. We present the first comprehensive analysis of massive activation development throughout transformer training, using the Pythia model family as our testbed. Through systematic analysis of various model sizes across multiple training checkpoints, we demonstrate that massive activation emergence follows predictable mathematical patterns that can be accurately modeled using an exponentially-modulated logarithmic function with five key parameters. We develop a machine learning framework to predict these mathematical parameters from architectural specifications alone, achieving high accuracy for steady-state behavior and moderate accuracy for emergence timing and magnitude. These findings enable architects to predict and potentially control key aspects of massive activation emergence through design choices, with significant implications for model stability, training cycle length, interpretability, and optimization. Our findings demonstrate that the emergence of massive activations is governed by model design and can be anticipated, and potentially controlled, before training begins.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive results in natural language processing but are prone to memorizing portions of their training data, which can compromise evaluation metrics, raise privacy concerns, and limit generalization. Traditional methods for detecting memorization rely on output probabilities or loss functions, often lacking precision due to confounding factors like common language patterns. In this paper, we introduce an analytical method that precisely detects memorization by examining neuron activations within the LLM. By identifying specific activation patterns that differentiate between memorized and not memorized tokens, we train classification probes that achieve near-perfect accuracy. The approach can also be applied to other mechanisms, such as repetition, as demonstrated in this study, highlighting its versatility. Intervening on these activations allows us to suppress memorization without degrading overall performance, enhancing evaluation integrity by ensuring metrics reflect genuine generalization. Additionally, our method supports large-scale labeling of tokens and sequences, crucial for next-generation AI models, improving training efficiency and results. Our findings contribute to model interpretability and offer practical tools for analyzing and controlling internal mechanisms in LLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have transformed text-to-image workflows, allowing designers to create novel visual concepts with unprecedented speed. This progress has given rise to a thriving prompt trading market, where curated prompts that induce trademark styles are bought and sold. Although commercially attractive, prompt trading also introduces a largely unexamined security risk: the prompts themselves can be stolen. In this paper, we expose this vulnerability and present RLStealer, a reinforcement learning based prompt inversion framework that recovers its template from only a small set of example images. RLStealer treats template stealing as a sequential decision making problem and employs multiple similarity based feedback signals as reward functions to effectively explore the prompt space. Comprehensive experiments on publicly available benchmarks demonstrate that RLStealer gets state-of-the-art performance while reducing the total attack cost to under 13% of that required by existing baselines. Our further analysis confirms that RLStealer can effectively generalize across different image styles to efficiently steal unseen prompt templates. Our study highlights an urgent security threat inherent in prompt trading and lays the groundwork for developing protective standards in the emerging MLLMs marketplace.

Task-based behavioral biometric authentication of users interacting in virtual reality (VR) environments enables seamless continuous authentication by using only the motion trajectories of the person's body as a unique signature. Deep learning-based approaches for behavioral biometrics show high accuracy when using complete or near complete portions of the user trajectory, but show lower performance when using smaller segments from the start of the task. Thus, any systems designed with existing techniques are vulnerable while waiting for future segments of motion trajectories to become available. In this work, we present the first approach that predicts future user behavior using Transformer-based forecasting and using the forecasted trajectory to perform user authentication. Our work leverages the notion that given the current trajectory of a user in a task-based environment we can predict the future trajectory of the user as they are unlikely to dramatically shift their behavior since it would preclude the user from successfully completing their task goal. Using the publicly available 41-subject ball throwing dataset of Miller et al. we show improvement in user authentication when using forecasted data. When compared to no forecasting, our approach reduces the authentication equal error rate (EER) by an average of 23.85% and a maximum reduction of 36.14%.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) systems allow users to perform actions by translating their brain activity into commands. Such systems usually need a training phase, consisting in training a classification algorithm to discriminate between mental states using specific features from the recorded signals. This phase of feature selection and training is crucial for BCI performance and presents specific constraints to be met in a clinical context, such as post-stroke rehabilitation. In this paper, we present HappyFeat, a software making Motor Imagery (MI) based BCI experiments easier, by gathering all necessary manipulations and analysis in a single convenient GUI and via automation of experiment or analysis parameters. The resulting workflow allows for effortlessly selecting the best features, helping to achieve good BCI performance in time-constrained environments. Alternative features based on Functional Connectivity can be used and compared or combined with Power Spectral Density, allowing a network-oriented approach. We then give details of HappyFeat's main mechanisms, and a review of its performances in typical use cases. We also show that it can be used as an efficient tool for comparing different metrics extracted from the signals, to train the classification algorithm. To this end, we show a comparison between the commonly-used Power Spectral Density and network metrics based on Functional Connectivity. HappyFeat is available as an open-source project which can be freely downloaded on GitHub.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed a meteoric rise in popularity among the general public users over the past few months, facilitating diverse downstream tasks with human-level accuracy and proficiency. Prompts play an essential role in this success, which efficiently adapt pre-trained LLMs to task-specific applications by simply prepending a sequence of tokens to the query texts. However, designing and selecting an optimal prompt can be both expensive and demanding, leading to the emergence of Prompt-as-a-Service providers who profit by providing well-designed prompts for authorized use. With the growing popularity of prompts and their indispensable role in LLM-based services, there is an urgent need to protect the copyright of prompts against unauthorized use. In this paper, we propose PromptCARE, the first framework for prompt copyright protection through watermark injection and verification. Prompt watermarking presents unique challenges that render existing watermarking techniques developed for model and dataset copyright verification ineffective. PromptCARE overcomes these hurdles by proposing watermark injection and verification schemes tailor-made for prompts and NLP characteristics. Extensive experiments on six well-known benchmark datasets, using three prevalent pre-trained LLMs (BERT, RoBERTa, and Facebook OPT-1.3b), demonstrate the effectiveness, harmlessness, robustness, and stealthiness of PromptCARE.

We examine if frontier chat-based large language models (LLMs) adjust their outputs based on neurodivergence (ND) context in system prompts and describe the nature of these adjustments. Specifically, we propose NDBench, a 576-output benchmark involving two frontier models, three system prompt types (baseline, ND-profile assertion, and ND-profile assertion with explicit instructions for adjustments), four canonical ND profiles, and 24 prompts across four categories, one of which involves an adversarial masking strategy. Four trends emerge consistently from our findings. First, LLMs show significant adaptation under ND context, where fully instructed conditions yield lengthier and more structured outputs, characterized by higher token counts, more headings, and more granular steps (p < 10^-8, Holm-corrected). Second, such adaptation is largely structural in nature: although list density does not change much, there is a marked rise in the frequency of headings and per-step detail. Third, ND persona assertion alone fails to suppress potentially harmful tendencies, as masking-reinforcement decreases only in explicitly instructed cases (36-44% reduction); the reduction rate barely changes in persona assertion conditions. Moreover, reliability analysis of LLM-based harm assessment reveals that only two out of the six dimensions (masking and reinforcement, validation quality) exceed the pre-defined inter-judge agreement criterion (alpha >= 0.67) and thus can be considered primary results. NDBench is made publicly available along with its prompts, outputs, code, and other resources, forming a reproducible framework for auditing future LLMs' adaptation to ND awareness.

Large language models can resist task-misaligned activation steering during inference, sometimes recovering mid-generation to produce improved responses even when steering remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer model activations, we find that Llama-3.3-70B shows substantial ESR, while smaller models from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families exhibit the phenomenon less frequently. We identify 26 SAE latents that activate differentially during off-topic content and are causally linked to ESR in Llama-3.3-70B. Zero-ablating these latents reduces the multi-attempt rate by 25%, providing causal evidence for dedicated internal consistency-checking circuits. We demonstrate that ESR can be deliberately enhanced through both prompting and training: meta-prompts instructing the model to self-monitor increase the multi-attempt rate by 4x for Llama-3.3-70B, and fine-tuning on self-correction examples successfully induces ESR-like behavior in smaller models. These findings have dual implications: ESR could protect against adversarial manipulation but might also interfere with beneficial safety interventions that rely on activation steering. Understanding and controlling these resistance mechanisms is important for developing transparent and controllable AI systems. Code is available at github.com/agencyenterprise/endogenous-steering-resistance.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant progress on a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their effectiveness in specialized and rapidly evolving domains such as Web3 remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce DMind Benchmark, a novel framework that systematically tests LLMs across nine key categories encompassing blockchain fundamentals, infrastructure, smart contract analysis, decentralized finance (DeFi), decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), non-fungible tokens (NFTs), token economics, meme concepts, and security vulnerabilities. DMind Benchmark goes beyond conventional multiple-choice questions by incorporating domain-specific subjective tasks (e.g., smart contract code auditing and repair, numeric reasoning on on-chain data, and fill-in assessments), thereby capturing real-world complexities and stress-testing model adaptability. We evaluate fifteen popular LLMs (from ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Claude, and Gemini series) on DMind Benchmark, uncovering performance gaps in Web3-specific reasoning and application, particularly in emerging areas like token economics and meme concepts. Even the strongest models face significant challenges in identifying subtle security vulnerabilities and analyzing complex DeFi mechanisms. To foster progress in this area, we publicly release our benchmark dataset, evaluation pipeline, and annotated results at http://www.dmind.ai, offering a valuable resource for advancing specialized domain adaptation and the development of more robust Web3-enabled LLMs.

Personalized generative diffusion models, capable of synthesizing highly realistic images based on a few reference portraits, may pose substantial social, ethical, and legal risks via identity replication. Existing defense mechanisms rely on computationally intensive adversarial perturbations tailored to individual images, rendering them impractical for real-world deployment. This study introduces the Real-time Identity Defender (RID), a neural network designed to generate adversarial perturbations through a single forward pass, bypassing the need for image-specific optimization. RID achieves unprecedented efficiency, with defense times as low as 0.12 seconds on a single NVIDIA A100 80G GPU (4,400 times faster than leading methods) and 1.1 seconds per image on a standard Intel i9 CPU, making it suitable for edge devices such as smartphones. Despite its efficiency, RID achieves promising protection performance across visual and quantitative benchmarks, effectively mitigating identity replication risks. Our analysis reveals that RID's perturbations mimic the efficacy of traditional defenses while exhibiting properties distinct from natural noise, such as Gaussian perturbations. To enhance robustness, we extend RID into an ensemble framework that integrates multiple pre-trained text-to-image diffusion models, ensuring resilience against black-box attacks and post-processing techniques, including image compression and purification. Our model is envisioned to play a crucial role in safeguarding portrait rights, thereby preventing illegal and unethical uses.

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become critical to modern software development, but their reliance on uncurated web-scale datasets for training introduces a significant security risk: the absorption and reproduction of malicious content. To systematically evaluate this risk, we introduce Scam2Prompt, a scalable automated auditing framework that identifies the underlying intent of a scam site and then synthesizes innocuous, developer-style prompts that mirror this intent, allowing us to test whether an LLM will generate malicious code in response to these innocuous prompts. In a large-scale study of four production LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama-4-Scout, and DeepSeek-V3), we found that Scam2Prompt's innocuous prompts triggered malicious URL generation in 4.24% of cases. To test the persistence of this security risk, we constructed Innoc2Scam-bench, a benchmark of 1,559 innocuous prompts that consistently elicited malicious code from all four initial LLMs. When applied to seven additional production LLMs released in 2025, we found the vulnerability is not only present but severe, with malicious code generation rates ranging from 12.7% to 43.8%. Furthermore, existing safety measures like state-of-the-art guardrails proved insufficient to prevent this behavior, with an overall detection rate of less than 0.3%.

Having reliable specifications is an unavoidable challenge in achieving verifiable correctness, robustness, and interpretability of AI systems. Existing specifications for neural networks are in the paradigm of data as specification. That is, the local neighborhood centering around a reference input is considered to be correct (or robust). While existing specifications contribute to verifying adversarial robustness, a significant problem in many research domains, our empirical study shows that those verified regions are somewhat tight, and thus fail to allow verification of test set inputs, making them impractical for some real-world applications. To this end, we propose a new family of specifications called neural representation as specification, which uses the intrinsic information of neural networks - neural activation patterns (NAPs), rather than input data to specify the correctness and/or robustness of neural network predictions. We present a simple statistical approach to mining neural activation patterns. To show the effectiveness of discovered NAPs, we formally verify several important properties, such as various types of misclassifications will never happen for a given NAP, and there is no ambiguity between different NAPs. We show that by using NAP, we can verify a significant region of the input space, while still recalling 84% of the data on MNIST. Moreover, we can push the verifiable bound to 10 times larger on the CIFAR10 benchmark. Thus, we argue that NAPs can potentially be used as a more reliable and extensible specification for neural network verification.

Self-supervised learning has become an incredibly successful method for feature learning, widely applied to many downstream tasks. It has proven especially effective for discriminative tasks, surpassing the trending generative models. However, generative models perform better in image generation and detail enhancement. Thus, it is natural for us to find a connection between SSL and generative models to further enhance the representation capacity of SSL. As generative models can create new samples by approximating the data distribution, such modeling should also lead to a semantic understanding of the raw visual data, which is necessary for recognition tasks. This enlightens us to combine the core principle of the diffusion model: diffusion noise, with SSL to learn a competitive recognition model. Specifically, diffusion noise can be viewed as a particular state of mask that reveals a close relationship between masked image modeling (MIM) and diffusion models. In this paper, we propose N-JEPA (Noise-based JEPA) to incorporate diffusion noise into MIM by the position embedding of masked tokens. The multi-level noise schedule is a series of feature augmentations to further enhance the robustness of our model. We perform a comprehensive study to confirm its effectiveness in the classification of downstream tasks. Codes will be released soon in public.

Despite advances in transformer-based language models (LMs), a fundamental question remains largely unanswered: Are all layers activated during inference? We investigate this question by detecting unactivated layers (which we refer to as Voids) using a non-trainable and parameter-free adaptive computation method called L2 Adaptive Computation (LAC). We adapt LAC from its original efficiency-focused application to trace activated layers during inference. This method monitors changes in the L2-norm of activations to identify voids. We analyze layer activation in instruction-tuned LMs across two phases: Prompt Processing (PP), where we trace activated layers for each token in the input prompts, and Response Generation (RG), where we trace activated layers for each generated token. We further demonstrate that distinct layers are activated during these two phases. To show the effectiveness of our method, we evaluated three distinct instruction-tuned LMs from the Llama, Mistral, and Qwen families on three benchmarks: MMLU, GPQA Diamond, and BoolQ. For example, on MMLU with a zero-shot setting, skipping voids in Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct resulted in an improvement from 69.24 to 71.29 while the model uses only 30% of the layers. Similarly, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 on GPQA Diamond improved from 13.88 to 18.36 when using 70% of the layers during both the PP and RG phases. These results show that not all layers contribute equally during inference, and that selectively skipping most of them can improve the performance of models on certain tasks.

Recent text-to-image generative models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate diverse and creative imagery guided by a target text prompt. While revolutionary, current state-of-the-art diffusion models may still fail in generating images that fully convey the semantics in the given text prompt. We analyze the publicly available Stable Diffusion model and assess the existence of catastrophic neglect, where the model fails to generate one or more of the subjects from the input prompt. Moreover, we find that in some cases the model also fails to correctly bind attributes (e.g., colors) to their corresponding subjects. To help mitigate these failure cases, we introduce the concept of Generative Semantic Nursing (GSN), where we seek to intervene in the generative process on the fly during inference time to improve the faithfulness of the generated images. Using an attention-based formulation of GSN, dubbed Attend-and-Excite, we guide the model to refine the cross-attention units to attend to all subject tokens in the text prompt and strengthen - or excite - their activations, encouraging the model to generate all subjects described in the text prompt. We compare our approach to alternative approaches and demonstrate that it conveys the desired concepts more faithfully across a range of text prompts.

With the rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), concerns regarding their security have increasingly captured the attention of both academia and industry. Although MLLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, designing effective multimodal jailbreak attacks poses unique challenges, especially given the distinct protective measures implemented across various modalities in commercial models. Previous works concentrate risks into a single modality, resulting in limited jailbreak performance. In this paper, we propose a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack method, called HIMRD, which consists of two elements: multimodal risk distribution strategy and heuristic-induced search strategy. The multimodal risk distribution strategy is used to segment harmful instructions across multiple modalities to effectively circumvent MLLMs' security protection. The heuristic-induced search strategy identifies two types of prompts: the understanding-enhancing prompt, which helps the MLLM reconstruct the malicious prompt, and the inducing prompt, which increases the likelihood of affirmative outputs over refusals, enabling a successful jailbreak attack. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this approach effectively uncovers vulnerabilities in MLLMs, achieving an average attack success rate of 90% across seven popular open-source MLLMs and an average attack success rate of around 68% in three popular closed-source MLLMs. Our code will coming soon. Warning: This paper contains offensive and harmful examples, reader discretion is advised.

With the unprecedented performance being achieved by text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, T2I customization further empowers users to tailor the diffusion model to new concepts absent in the pre-training dataset, termed subject-driven generation. Moreover, extracting several new concepts from a single image enables the model to learn multiple concepts, and simultaneously decreases the difficulties of training data preparation, urging the disentanglement of multiple concepts to be a new challenge. However, existing models for disentanglement commonly require pre-determined masks or retain background elements. To this end, we propose an attention-guided method, AttenCraft, for multiple concept disentanglement. In particular, our method leverages self-attention and cross-attention maps to create accurate masks for each concept within a single initialization step, omitting any required mask preparation by humans or other models. The created masks are then applied to guide the cross-attention activation of each target concept during training and achieve concept disentanglement. Additionally, we introduce Uniform sampling and Reweighted sampling schemes to alleviate the non-synchronicity of feature acquisition from different concepts, and improve generation quality. Our method outperforms baseline models in terms of image-alignment, and behaves comparably on text-alignment. Finally, we showcase the applicability of AttenCraft to more complicated settings, such as an input image containing three concepts. The project is available at https://github.com/junjie-shentu/AttenCraft.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to support personalized and sustained interactions. However, most work on personalized agents prioritizes utility and user experience, treating memory as a neutral component and largely overlooking its safety implications. In this paper, we reveal intent legitimation, a previously underexplored safety failure in personalized agents, where benign personal memories bias intent inference and cause models to legitimize inherently harmful queries. To study this phenomenon, we introduce PS-Bench, a benchmark designed to identify and quantify intent legitimation in personalized interactions. Across multiple memory-augmented agent frameworks and base LLMs, personalization increases attack success rates by 15.8%-243.7% relative to stateless baselines. We further provide mechanistic evidence for intent legitimation from internal representations space, and propose a lightweight detection-reflection method that effectively reduces safety degradation. Overall, our work provides the first systematic exploration and evaluation of intent legitimation as a safety failure mode that naturally arises from benign, real-world personalization, highlighting the importance of assessing safety under long-term personal context. WARNING: This paper may contain harmful content.

Reinforcement learning (RL) can improve the prompt following capability of text-to-image (T2I) models, yet obtaining high-quality reward signals remains challenging: CLIP Score is too coarse-grained, while VLM-based reward models (e.g., RewardDance) require costly human-annotated preference data and additional fine-tuning. We propose PromptEcho, a reward construction method that requires no annotation and no reward model training. Given a generated image and a guiding query, PromptEcho computes the token-level cross-entropy loss of a frozen VLM with the original prompt as the label, directly extracting the image-text alignment knowledge encoded during VLM pretraining. The reward is deterministic, computationally efficient, and improves automatically as stronger open-source VLMs become available. For evaluation, we develop DenseAlignBench, a benchmark of concept-rich dense captions for rigorously testing prompt following capability. Experimental results on two state-of-the-art T2I models (Z-Image and QwenImage-2512) demonstrate that PromptEcho achieves substantial improvements on DenseAlignBench (+26.8pp / +16.2pp net win rate), along with consistent gains on GenEval, DPG-Bench, and TIIFBench without any task-specific training. Ablation studies confirm that PromptEcho comprehensively outperforms inference-based scoring with the same VLM, and that reward quality scales with VLM size. We will open-source the trained models and the DenseAlignBench.

Modern Vision-Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate sophisticated reasoning, escalating privacy risks beyond simple attribute perception to individual-level linkage. Current privacy benchmarks are structurally insufficient for this new threat, as they primarily evaluate privacy perception while failing to address the more critical risk of privacy reasoning: a VLM's ability to infer and link distributed information to construct individual profiles. To address this critical gap, we propose MultiPriv, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate individual-level privacy reasoning in VLMs. We introduce the Privacy Perception and Reasoning (PPR) framework and construct a novel, bilingual multimodal dataset to support it. The dataset uniquely features a core component of synthetic individual profiles where identifiers (e.g., faces, names) are meticulously linked to sensitive attributes. This design enables nine challenging tasks evaluating the full PPR spectrum, from attribute detection to cross-image re-identification and chained inference. We conduct a large-scale evaluation of over 50 foundational and commercial VLMs. Our analysis reveals: (1) Many VLMs possess significant, unmeasured reasoning-based privacy risks. (2) Perception-level metrics are poor predictors of these reasoning risks, revealing a critical evaluation gap. (3) Existing safety alignments are inconsistent and ineffective against such reasoning-based attacks. MultiPriv exposes systemic vulnerabilities and provides the necessary framework for developing robust, privacy-preserving VLMs.

The rapid advancement of generative models has significantly enhanced the realism and customization of digital content creation. The increasing power of these tools, coupled with their ease of access, fuels the creation of photorealistic fake content, termed deepfakes, that raises substantial concerns about their potential misuse. In response, there has been notable progress in developing detection mechanisms to identify content produced by these advanced systems. However, existing methods often struggle to adapt to the continuously evolving landscape of deepfake generation. This paper introduces Prompt2Guard, a novel solution for exemplar-free continual deepfake detection of images, that leverages Vision-Language Models (VLMs) and domain-specific multimodal prompts. Compared to previous VLM-based approaches that are either bounded by prompt selection accuracy or necessitate multiple forward passes, we leverage a prediction ensembling technique with read-only prompts. Read-only prompts do not interact with VLMs internal representation, mitigating the need for multiple forward passes. Thus, we enhance efficiency and accuracy in detecting generated content. Additionally, our method exploits a text-prompt conditioning tailored to deepfake detection, which we demonstrate is beneficial in our setting. We evaluate Prompt2Guard on CDDB-Hard, a continual deepfake detection benchmark composed of five deepfake detection datasets spanning multiple domains and generators, achieving a new state-of-the-art. Additionally, our results underscore the effectiveness of our approach in addressing the challenges posed by continual deepfake detection, paving the way for more robust and adaptable solutions in deepfake detection.

Modern generators render talking-head videos with impressive levels of photorealism, ushering in new user experiences such as videoconferencing under constrained bandwidth budgets. Their safe adoption, however, requires a mechanism to verify if the rendered video is trustworthy. For instance, for videoconferencing we must identify cases in which a synthetic video portrait uses the appearance of an individual without their consent. We term this task avatar fingerprinting. We propose to tackle it by leveraging facial motion signatures unique to each person. Specifically, we learn an embedding in which the motion signatures of one identity are grouped together, and pushed away from those of other identities, regardless of the appearance in the synthetic video. Avatar fingerprinting algorithms will be critical as talking head generators become more ubiquitous, and yet no large scale datasets exist for this new task. Therefore, we contribute a large dataset of people delivering scripted and improvised short monologues, accompanied by synthetic videos in which we render videos of one person using the facial appearance of another. Project page: https://research.nvidia.com/labs/nxp/avatar-fingerprinting/.

Modern text-to-image generative models can inadvertently reproduce copyrighted content memorized in their training data, raising serious concerns about potential copyright infringement. We introduce Guardians of Generation, a model agnostic inference time framework for dynamic copyright shielding in AI image generation. Our approach requires no retraining or modification of the generative model weights, instead integrating seamlessly with existing diffusion pipelines. It augments the generation process with an adaptive guidance mechanism comprising three components: a detection module, a prompt rewriting module, and a guidance adjustment module. The detection module monitors user prompts and intermediate generation steps to identify features indicative of copyrighted content before they manifest in the final output. If such content is detected, the prompt rewriting mechanism dynamically transforms the user's prompt by sanitizing or replacing references that could trigger copyrighted material while preserving the prompt's intended semantics. The adaptive guidance module adaptively steers the diffusion process away from flagged content by modulating the model's sampling trajectory. Together, these components form a robust shield that enables a tunable balance between preserving creative fidelity and ensuring copyright compliance. We validate our method on a variety of generative models such as Stable Diffusion, SDXL, and Flux, demonstrating substantial reductions in copyrighted content generation with negligible impact on output fidelity or alignment with user intent. This work provides a practical, plug-and-play safeguard for generative image models, enabling more responsible deployment under real-world copyright constraints. Source code is available at: https://respailab.github.io/gog

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific data points from a trained model to satisfy privacy, copyright, and safety requirements. In real deployments, providers distribute a global model to many edge devices, where each client personalizes the model using private data. When a deletion request is issued, clients may ignore it or falsely claim compliance, and providers cannot check their parameters or data. This makes verification difficult, especially because personalized models must forget the targeted samples while preserving local utility, and verification must remain lightweight on edge devices. We introduce ZK APEX, a zero-shot personalized unlearning method that operates directly on the personalized model without retraining. ZK APEX combines sparse masking on the provider side with a small Group OBS compensation step on the client side, using a blockwise empirical Fisher matrix to create a curvature-aware update designed for low overhead. Paired with Halo2 zero-knowledge proofs, it enables the provider to verify that the correct unlearning transformation was applied without revealing any private data or personalized parameters. On Vision Transformer classification tasks, ZK APEX recovers nearly all personalization accuracy while effectively removing the targeted information. Applied to the OPT125M generative model trained on code data, it recovers around seventy percent of the original accuracy. Proof generation for the ViT case completes in about two hours, more than ten million times faster than retraining-based checks, with less than one gigabyte of memory use and proof sizes around four hundred megabytes. These results show the first practical framework for verifiable personalized unlearning on edge devices.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Promptable segmentation typically requires instance-specific manual prompts to guide the segmentation of each desired object. To minimize such a need, task-generic promptable segmentation has been introduced, which employs a single task-generic prompt to segment various images of different objects in the same task. Current methods use Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to reason detailed instance-specific prompts from a task-generic prompt for improving segmentation accuracy. The effectiveness of this segmentation heavily depends on the precision of these derived prompts. However, MLLMs often suffer hallucinations during reasoning, resulting in inaccurate prompting. While existing methods focus on eliminating hallucinations to improve a model, we argue that MLLM hallucinations can reveal valuable contextual insights when leveraged correctly, as they represent pre-trained large-scale knowledge beyond individual images. In this paper, we utilize hallucinations to mine task-related information from images and verify its accuracy for enhancing precision of the generated prompts. Specifically, we introduce an iterative Prompt-Mask Cycle generation framework (ProMaC) with a prompt generator and a mask generator.The prompt generator uses a multi-scale chain of thought prompting, initially exploring hallucinations for extracting extended contextual knowledge on a test image.These hallucinations are then reduced to formulate precise instance-specific prompts, directing the mask generator to produce masks that are consistent with task semantics by mask semantic alignment. The generated masks iteratively induce the prompt generator to focus more on task-relevant image areas and reduce irrelevant hallucinations, resulting jointly in better prompts and masks. Experiments on 5 benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of ProMaC. Code given in https://lwpyh.github.io/ProMaC/.

Recent advances in text-to-image diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable generation capabilities, yet they raise significant concerns regarding safety, copyright, and ethical implications. Existing concept erasure methods address these risks by removing sensitive concepts from pre-trained models, but most of them rely on data-intensive and computationally expensive fine-tuning, which poses a critical limitation. To overcome these challenges, inspired by the observation that the model's activations are predominantly composed of generic concepts, with only a minimal component can represent the target concept, we propose a novel training-free method (ActErase) for efficient concept erasure. Specifically, the proposed method operates by identifying activation difference regions via prompt-pair analysis, extracting target activations and dynamically replacing input activations during forward passes. Comprehensive evaluations across three critical erasure tasks (nudity, artistic style, and object removal) demonstrates that our training-free method achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) erasure performance, while effectively preserving the model's overall generative capability. Our approach also exhibits strong robustness against adversarial attacks, establishing a new plug-and-play paradigm for lightweight yet effective concept manipulation in diffusion models.

This work addresses the computational challenge of enforcing privacy for agentic Large Language Models (LLMs), where privacy is governed by the contextual integrity framework. Indeed, existing defenses rely on LLM-mediated checking stages that add substantial latency and cost, and that can be undermined in multi-turn interactions through manipulation or benign-looking conversational scaffolding. Contrasting this background, this paper makes a key observation: internal representations associated with privacy-violating intent can be separated from benign requests using linear structure. Using this insight, the paper proposes NeuroFilter, a guardrail framework that operationalizes contextual integrity by mapping norm violations to simple directions in the model's activation space, enabling detection even when semantic filters are bypassed. The proposed filter is also extended to capture threats arising during long conversations using the concept of activation velocity, which measures cumulative drift in internal representations across turns. A comprehensive evaluation across over 150,000 interactions and covering models from 7B to 70B parameters, illustrates the strong performance of NeuroFilter in detecting privacy attacks while maintaining zero false positives on benign prompts, all while reducing the computational inference cost by several orders of magnitude when compared to LLM-based agentic privacy defenses.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

Annotating medical data for training AI models is often costly and limited due to the shortage of specialists with relevant clinical expertise. This challenge is further compounded by privacy and ethical concerns associated with sensitive patient information. As a result, well-trained medical segmentation models on private datasets constitute valuable intellectual property requiring robust protection mechanisms. Existing model protection techniques primarily focus on classification and generative tasks, while segmentation models-crucial to medical image analysis-remain largely underexplored. In this paper, we propose a novel, stealthy, and harmless method, StealthMark, for verifying the ownership of medical segmentation models under black-box conditions. Our approach subtly modulates model uncertainty without altering the final segmentation outputs, thereby preserving the model's performance. To enable ownership verification, we incorporate model-agnostic explanation methods, e.g. LIME, to extract feature attributions from the model outputs. Under specific triggering conditions, these explanations reveal a distinct and verifiable watermark. We further design the watermark as a QR code to facilitate robust and recognizable ownership claims. We conducted extensive experiments across four medical imaging datasets and five mainstream segmentation models. The results demonstrate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and harmlessness of our method on the original model's segmentation performance. For example, when applied to the SAM model, StealthMark consistently achieved ASR above 95% across various datasets while maintaining less than a 1% drop in Dice and AUC scores, significantly outperforming backdoor-based watermarking methods and highlighting its strong potential for practical deployment. Our implementation code is made available at: https://github.com/Qinkaiyu/StealthMark.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Reward models (RMs) used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) are vulnerable to reward hacking: as the policy maximizes a learned proxy reward, true quality plateaus or degrades. We make the assumption that reward hacking is often caused by flipped advantage signs: instead of reducing the likelihood of a bad response, a flipped sign causes the update to increase it. By considering an adversarial perturbation in the RM parameter space, we can derive a certified sign-preservation radius, which is the smallest perturbation that can flip the advantage sign during policy optimization. Based on this formulation, we propose Sign-Certified Policy Optimization (SignCert-PO), down-weighting non-robust completions in the policy gradient update. Unlike prior approaches that require multiple RMs or access to the RM training data, SignCert-PO is lightweight and operates purely at the policy optimization stage using only the RM parameters and on-policy completions. On TL;DR summarization and AlpacaFarm benchmarks, SignCert-PO consistently achieves a better win rate than baselines and reduces reward hacking.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

Personal sensing, leveraging data passively and near-continuously collected with wearables from patients in their ecological environment, is a promising paradigm to monitor mood disorders (MDs), a major determinant of worldwide disease burden. However, collecting and annotating wearable data is very resource-intensive. Studies of this kind can thus typically afford to recruit only a couple dozens of patients. This constitutes one of the major obstacles to applying modern supervised machine learning techniques to MDs detection. In this paper, we overcome this data bottleneck and advance the detection of MDs acute episode vs stable state from wearables data on the back of recent advances in self-supervised learning (SSL). This leverages unlabelled data to learn representations during pre-training, subsequently exploited for a supervised task. First, we collected open-access datasets recording with an Empatica E4 spanning different, unrelated to MD monitoring, personal sensing tasks -- from emotion recognition in Super Mario players to stress detection in undergraduates -- and devised a pre-processing pipeline performing on-/off-body detection, sleep-wake detection, segmentation, and (optionally) feature extraction. With 161 E4-recorded subjects, we introduce E4SelfLearning, the largest to date open access collection, and its pre-processing pipeline. Second, we show that SSL confidently outperforms fully-supervised pipelines using either our novel E4-tailored Transformer architecture (E4mer) or classical baseline XGBoost: 81.23% against 75.35% (E4mer) and 72.02% (XGBoost) correctly classified recording segments from 64 (half acute, half stable) patients. Lastly, we illustrate that SSL performance is strongly associated with the specific surrogate task employed for pre-training as well as with unlabelled data availability.

Existing end-to-end sign-language animation systems suffer from low naturalness, limited facial/body expressivity, and no user control. We propose a human-centered, real-time speech-to-sign animation framework that integrates (1) a streaming Conformer encoder with an autoregressive Transformer-MDN decoder for synchronized upper-body and facial motion generation, (2) a transparent, editable JSON intermediate representation empowering deaf users and experts to inspect and modify each sign segment, and (3) a human-in-the-loop optimization loop that refines the model based on user edits and ratings. Deployed on Unity3D, our system achieves a 13 ms average frame-inference time and a 103 ms end-to-end latency on an RTX 4070. Our key contributions include the design of a JSON-centric editing mechanism for fine-grained sign-level personalization and the first application of an MDN-based feedback loop for continuous model adaptation. This combination establishes a generalizable, explainable AI paradigm for user-adaptive, low-latency multimodal systems. In studies with 20 deaf signers and 5 professional interpreters, we observe a +13 point SUS improvement, 6.7 point reduction in cognitive load, and significant gains in naturalness and trust (p < .001) over baselines. This work establishes a scalable, explainable AI paradigm for accessible sign-language technologies.

Despite their impressive capabilities, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models remain prone to generating unsafe and toxic content. While activation steering offers a promising inference-time intervention, we observe that linear activation steering frequently degrades image quality when applied to benign prompts. To address this trade-off, we first construct SafeSteerDataset, a contrastive dataset containing 2300 safe and unsafe prompt pairs with high cosine similarity. Leveraging this data, we propose Conditioned Activation Transport (CAT), a framework that employs a geometry-based conditioning mechanism and nonlinear transport maps. By conditioning transport maps to activate only within unsafe activation regions, we minimize interference with benign queries. We validate our approach on two state-of-the-art architectures: Z-Image and Infinity. Experiments demonstrate that CAT generalizes effectively across these backbones, significantly reducing Attack Success Rate while maintaining image fidelity compared to unsteered generations. Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive text and images.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in various domains but remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks. Existing prompt-defense strategies, including parameter-modifying and parameter-free approaches, face limitations in adaptability, interpretability, and customization, constraining their effectiveness against evolving threats. To address these challenges, we propose ShieldLearner, a novel paradigm that mimics human learning in defense. Through trial and error, it autonomously distills attack signatures into a Pattern Atlas and synthesizes defense heuristics into a Meta-analysis Framework, enabling systematic and interpretable threat detection. Furthermore, we introduce Adaptive Adversarial Augmentation to generate adversarial variations of successfully defended prompts, enabling continuous self-improvement without model retraining. In addition to standard benchmarks, we create a hard test set by curating adversarial prompts from the Wildjailbreak dataset, emphasizing more concealed malicious intent. Experimental results show that ShieldLearner achieves a significantly higher defense success rate than existing baselines on both conventional and hard test sets, while also operating with lower computational overhead, making it a practical and efficient solution for real-world adversarial defense.

Recently, diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in generating tasks, including image and audio generation. However, like other generative models, diffusion models are prone to privacy issues. In this paper, we propose an efficient query-based membership inference attack (MIA), namely Proximal Initialization Attack (PIA), which utilizes groundtruth trajectory obtained by epsilon initialized in t=0 and predicted point to infer memberships. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method can achieve competitive performance with only two queries on both discrete-time and continuous-time diffusion models. Moreover, previous works on the privacy of diffusion models have focused on vision tasks without considering audio tasks. Therefore, we also explore the robustness of diffusion models to MIA in the text-to-speech (TTS) task, which is an audio generation task. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to study the robustness of diffusion models to MIA in the TTS task. Experimental results indicate that models with mel-spectrogram (image-like) output are vulnerable to MIA, while models with audio output are relatively robust to MIA. {Code is available at https://github.com/kong13661/PIA}.

The field of large language models (LLMs) has grown rapidly in recent years, driven by the desire for better efficiency, interpretability, and safe use. Building on the novel approach of "activation engineering," this study explores personality modification in LLMs, drawing inspiration from research like Refusal in LLMs Is Mediated by a Single Direction (arXiv:2406.11717) and Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition (arXiv:2312.06681). We leverage activation engineering to develop a method for identifying and adjusting activation directions related to personality traits, which may allow for dynamic LLM personality fine-tuning. This work aims to further our understanding of LLM interpretability while examining the ethical implications of such developments.

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

Recent advancements in text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating high-fidelity images. However, these models often struggle to faithfully render complex user prompts, particularly in aspects like attribute binding, negation, and compositional relationships. This leads to a significant mismatch between user intent and the generated output. To address this challenge, we introduce PromptEnhancer, a novel and universal prompt rewriting framework that enhances any pretrained T2I model without requiring modifications to its weights. Unlike prior methods that rely on model-specific fine-tuning or implicit reward signals like image-reward scores, our framework decouples the rewriter from the generator. We achieve this by training a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rewriter through reinforcement learning, guided by a dedicated reward model we term the AlignEvaluator. The AlignEvaluator is trained to provide explicit and fine-grained feedback based on a systematic taxonomy of 24 key points, which are derived from a comprehensive analysis of common T2I failure modes. By optimizing the CoT rewriter to maximize the reward from our AlignEvaluator, our framework learns to generate prompts that are more precisely interpreted by T2I models. Extensive experiments on the HunyuanImage 2.1 model demonstrate that PromptEnhancer significantly improves image-text alignment across a wide range of semantic and compositional challenges. Furthermore, we introduce a new, high-quality human preference benchmark to facilitate future research in this direction.

Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when rephrased in past tense, a critical generalization gap is revealed in current alignment methods whose underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. In this work, we introduce Activation-Scaling Guard (ASGuard), an insightful, mechanistically-informed framework that surgically mitigates this specific vulnerability. In the first step, we use circuit analysis to identify the specific attention heads causally linked to the targeted jailbreaking such as a tense-changing attack. Second, we train a precise, channel-wise scaling vector to recalibrate the activation of tense vulnerable heads. Lastly, we apply it into a "preventative fine-tuning", forcing the model to learn a more robust refusal mechanism. Across four LLMs, ASGuard effectively reduces the attack success rate of targeted jailbreaking while preserving general capabilities and minimizing over refusal, achieving a Pareto-optimal balance between safety and utility. Our findings underscore how adversarial suffixes suppress the propagation of the refusal-mediating direction, based on mechanistic analysis. Furthermore, our work showcases how a deep understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical, efficient, and targeted methods for adjusting model behavior, charting a course for more reliable and interpretable AI safety.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

The growing misuse of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has led providers to deploy multiple safeguards, including alignment tuning, system prompts, and content moderation. However, the real-world robustness of these defenses against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We introduce Multi-Faceted Attack (MFA), a framework that systematically exposes general safety vulnerabilities in leading defense-equipped VLMs such as GPT-4o, Gemini-Pro, and Llama-4. The core component of MFA is the Attention-Transfer Attack (ATA), which hides harmful instructions inside a meta task with competing objectives. We provide a theoretical perspective based on reward hacking to explain why this attack succeeds. To improve cross-model transferability, we further introduce a lightweight transfer-enhancement algorithm combined with a simple repetition strategy that jointly bypasses both input-level and output-level filters without model-specific fine-tuning. Empirically, we show that adversarial images optimized for one vision encoder transfer broadly to unseen VLMs, indicating that shared visual representations create a cross-model safety vulnerability. Overall, MFA achieves a 58.5% success rate and consistently outperforms existing methods. On state-of-the-art commercial models, MFA reaches a 52.8% success rate, surpassing the second-best attack by 34%. These results challenge the perceived robustness of current defense mechanisms and highlight persistent safety weaknesses in modern VLMs. Code: https://github.com/cure-lab/MultiFacetedAttack

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled understanding of both speech and non-speech audio, but exposing new safety risks emerging from complex audio inputs that are inadequately handled by current safeguards. We introduce SACRED-Bench (Speech-Audio Composition for RED-teaming) to evaluate the robustness of LLMs under complex audio-based attacks. Unlike existing perturbation-based methods that rely on noise optimization or white-box access, SACRED-Bench exploits speech-audio composition mechanisms. SACRED-Bench adopts three mechanisms: (a) speech overlap and multi-speaker dialogue, which embeds harmful prompts beneath or alongside benign speech; (b) speech-audio mixture, which imply unsafe intent via non-speech audio alongside benign speech or audio; and (c) diverse spoken instruction formats (open-ended QA, yes/no) that evade text-only filters. Experiments show that, even Gemini 2.5 Pro, the state-of-the-art proprietary LLM, still exhibits 66% attack success rate in SACRED-Bench test set, exposing vulnerabilities under cross-modal, speech-audio composition attacks. To bridge this gap, we propose SALMONN-Guard, a safeguard LLM that jointly inspects speech, audio, and text for safety judgments, reducing attack success down to 20%. Our results highlight the need for audio-aware defenses for the safety of multimodal LLMs. The benchmark and SALMONN-Guard checkpoints can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/tsinghua-ee/SACRED-Bench. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

The widespread deployment of LLMs across enterprise services has created a critical security blind spot. Organizations operate multiple LLM services handling billions of queries daily, yet regulatory compliance boundaries prevent these services from sharing threat intelligence about prompt injection attacks, the top security risk for LLMs. When an attack is detected in one service, the same threat may persist undetected in others for months, as privacy regulations prohibit sharing user prompts across compliance boundaries. We present BinaryShield, the first privacy-preserving threat intelligence system that enables secure sharing of attack fingerprints across compliance boundaries. BinaryShield transforms suspicious prompts through a unique pipeline combining PII redaction, semantic embedding, binary quantization, and randomized response mechanism to potentially generate non-invertible fingerprints that preserve attack patterns while providing privacy. Our evaluations demonstrate that BinaryShield achieves an F1-score of 0.94, significantly outperforming SimHash (0.77), the privacy-preserving baseline, while achieving 64x storage reduction and 38x faster similarity search compared to dense embeddings.

Backdoor attacks targeting text-to-image diffusion models have advanced rapidly. However, current backdoor samples often exhibit two key abnormalities compared to benign samples: 1) Semantic Consistency, where backdoor prompts tend to generate images with similar semantic content even with significant textual variations to the prompts; 2) Attention Consistency, where the trigger induces consistent structural responses in the cross-attention maps. These consistencies leave detectable traces for defenders, making backdoors easier to identify. In this paper, toward stealthy backdoor samples, we propose Trigger without Trace (TwT) by explicitly mitigating these consistencies. Specifically, our approach leverages syntactic structures as backdoor triggers to amplify the sensitivity to textual variations, effectively breaking down the semantic consistency. Besides, a regularization method based on Kernel Maximum Mean Discrepancy (KMMD) is proposed to align the distribution of cross-attention responses between backdoor and benign samples, thereby disrupting attention consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a 97.5% attack success rate while exhibiting stronger resistance to defenses. It achieves an average of over 98% backdoor samples bypassing three state-of-the-art detection mechanisms, revealing the vulnerabilities of current backdoor defense methods. The code is available at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/TwT.

Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.

Modern large language models (LLMs) are typically secured by auditing data, prompts, and refusal policies, while treating the forward pass as an implementation detail. We show that intermediate activations in decoder-only LLMs form a vulnerable attack surface for behavioral control. Building on recent findings on attention sinks and compression valleys, we identify a high-gain region in the residual stream where small, well-aligned perturbations are causally amplified along the autoregressive trajectory--a Causal Amplification Effect (CAE). We exploit this as an attack surface via Sensitivity-Scaled Steering (SSS), a progressive activation-level attack that combines beginning-of-sequence (BOS) anchoring with sensitivity-based reinforcement to focus a limited perturbation budget on the most vulnerable layers and tokens. We show that across multiple open-weight models and four behavioral axes, SSS induces large shifts in evil, hallucination, sycophancy, and sentiment while preserving high coherence and general capabilities, turning activation steering into a concrete security concern for white-box and supply-chain LLM deployments.

Modern neural networks rely on generic activation functions (ReLU, GELU, SiLU) that ignore the mathematical structure inherent in scientific data. We propose Neuro-Symbolic Activation Discovery, a framework that uses Genetic Programming to extract interpretable mathematical formulas from data and inject them as custom activation functions. Our key contribution is the discovery of a Geometric Transfer phenomenon: activation functions learned from particle physics data successfully generalize to ecological classification, outperforming standard activations (ReLU, GELU, SiLU) in both accuracy and parameter efficiency. On the Forest Cover dataset, our Hybrid Transfer model achieves 82.4% accuracy with only 5,825 parameters, compared to 83.4% accuracy requiring 31,801 parameters for a conventional heavy network -- a 5.5x parameter reduction with only 1% accuracy loss. We introduce a Parameter Efficiency Score (E_{param} = AUC / log_{10}(Params)) and demonstrate that lightweight hybrid architectures consistently achieve 18-21% higher efficiency than over-parameterized baselines. Crucially, we establish boundary conditions: while Physics to Ecology transfer succeeds (both involve continuous Euclidean measurements), Physics to Text transfer fails (discrete word frequencies require different mathematical structures). Our work opens pathways toward domain-specific activation libraries for efficient scientific machine learning.

Human language processing relies on the brain's capacity for predictive inference. We present a machine learning framework for decoding neural (EEG) responses to dynamic visual language stimuli in Deaf signers. Using coherence between neural signals and optical flow-derived motion features, we construct spatiotemporal representations of predictive neural dynamics. Through entropy-based feature selection, we identify frequency-specific neural signatures that differentiate interpretable linguistic input from linguistically disrupted (time-reversed) stimuli. Our results reveal distributed left-hemispheric and frontal low-frequency coherence as key features in language comprehension, with experience-dependent neural signatures correlating with age. This work demonstrates a novel multimodal approach for probing experience-driven generative models of perception in the brain.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where reliable visual grounding carries operational consequences, yet their behavior under progressively coercive prompt phrasing remains undercharacterized. Existing hallucination benchmarks predominantly rely on neutral prompts and binary detection, leaving open how both the incidence and the intensity of fabrication respond to graded linguistic pressure across structurally distinct task types. We present Ghost-100, a procedurally constructed benchmark of 800 synthetically generated images spanning eight categories across three task families: text-illegibility, time-reading, and object-absence, each designed under a negative-ground-truth principle that guarantees the queried target is absent, illegible, or indeterminate by construction. Every image is paired with five prompts drawn from a structured 5-Level Prompt Intensity Framework, holding the image and task identity fixed while varying only directive force, so that tone is isolated as the sole independent variable. We adopt a dual-track evaluation protocol: a rule-based H-Rate measuring the proportion of responses in which a model crosses from grounded refusal into unsupported positive commitment, and a GPT-4o-mini-judged H-Score on a 1-5 scale characterizing the confidence and specificity of fabrication once it occurs. We additionally release a three-stage automated validation workflow, which retrospectively confirms 717 of 800 images as strictly compliant. Evaluating nine open-weight VLMs, we find that H-Rate and H-Score dissociate substantially across model families, reading-style and presence-detection subsets respond to prompt pressure in qualitatively different ways, and several models exhibit non-monotonic sensitivity peaking at intermediate tone levels: patterns that aggregate metrics obscure.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Smart contracts on the blockchain offer decentralized financial services but often lack robust security measures, leading to significant economic losses. While substantial research has focused on identifying vulnerabilities in smart contracts, a notable gap remains in evaluating the malicious intent behind their development. To address this, we introduce SmartIntentNN (Smart Contract Intent Neural Network), a deep learning-based tool designed to automate the detection of developers' intent in smart contracts. Our approach integrates a Universal Sentence Encoder for contextual representation of smart contract code, employs a K-means clustering algorithm to highlight intent-related code features, and utilizes a bidirectional LSTM-based multi-label classification network to predict ten distinct categories of unsafe intent. Evaluations on 10,000 real-world smart contracts demonstrate that SmartIntentNN surpasses all baselines, achieving an F1-score of 0.8633. A demo video is available at https://youtu.be/otT0fDYjwK8.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

Safety alignment is a key requirement for building reliable Artificial General Intelligence. Despite significant advances in safety alignment, we observe that minor latent shifts can still trigger unsafe responses in aligned models. We argue that this stems from the shallow nature of existing alignment methods, which focus on surface-level refusal behaviors without sufficiently altering internal representations. Consequently, small shifts in hidden activations can re-trigger harmful behaviors embedded in the latent space. To explore the robustness of safety alignment to latent perturbations, we introduce a probing method that measures the Negative Log-Likelihood of the original response generated by the model. This probe quantifies local sensitivity in the latent space, serving as a diagnostic tool for identifying vulnerable directions. Based on this signal, we construct effective jailbreak trajectories, giving rise to the Activation Steering Attack (ASA). More importantly, these insights offer a principled foundation for improving alignment robustness. To this end, we introduce Layer-wise Adversarial Patch Training~(LAPT), a fine-tuning strategy that inject controlled perturbations into hidden representations during training. Experimental results highlight that LAPT strengthen alignment robustness without compromising general capabilities. Our findings reveal fundamental flaws in current alignment paradigms and call for representation-level training strategies that move beyond surface-level behavior supervision. Codes and results are available at https://github.com/Carol-gutianle/LatentSafety.

Neurophysiological recordings such as electroencephalography (EEG) offer accessible and minimally invasive means of estimating physiological activity for applications in healthcare, diagnostic screening, and even immersive entertainment. However, these recordings yield high-dimensional, noisy time-series data that typically require extensive pre-processing and handcrafted feature extraction to reveal meaningful information. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in applying representation learning techniques from large pre-trained (foundation) models to effectively decode and interpret biosignals. We discuss the challenges posed for incorporating such methods and introduce BioCodec, an alternative representation learning framework inspired by neural codecs to capture low-level signal characteristics in the form of discrete tokens. Pre-trained on thousands of EEG hours, BioCodec shows efficacy across multiple downstream tasks, ranging from clinical diagnostic tasks and sleep physiology to decoding speech and motor imagery, particularly in low-resource settings. Additionally, we provide a qualitative analysis of codebook usage and estimate the spatial coherence of codebook embeddings from EEG connectivity. Notably, we also document the suitability of our method to other biosignal data, i.e., electromyographic (EMG) signals. Overall, the proposed approach provides a versatile solution for biosignal tokenization that performs competitively with state-of-the-art models. The source code and model checkpoints are shared.

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We introduce Gradient-Controlled Decoding (GCD), a training-free guardrail that combines an acceptance anchor token ("Sure") and refusal anchor token ("Sorry") tightening the decision boundary and significantly lowering false positives. In the mitigation stage, if a prompt is flagged, GCD preset-injects one or two refusal tokens ("Sorry, I can't...") before autoregressive decoding resumes, guaranteeing first-token safety regardless of sampling strategy. On ToxicChat, XSTest-v2, and AdvBench, GCD reduces false positives by 52% vs. GradSafe at comparable recall, lowers attack success rate by up to 10% vs. the strongest decoding-only baseline, adds under 15-20 ms latency on an average on V100 instances, transfers to LLaMA-2-7B, Mixtral-8x7B, and Qwen-2-7B, and requires only 20 demonstration templates.

Mobile applications are widely used for online services sharing a large amount of personal data online. One-time authentication techniques such as passwords and physiological biometrics (e.g., fingerprint, face, and iris) have their own advantages but also disadvantages since they can be stolen or emulated, and do not prevent access to the underlying device, once it is unlocked. To address these challenges, complementary authentication systems based on behavioural biometrics have emerged. The goal is to continuously profile users based on their interaction with the mobile device. However, existing behavioural authentication schemes are not (i) user-agnostic meaning that they cannot dynamically handle changes in the user-base without model re-training, or (ii) do not scale well to authenticate millions of users. In this paper, we present AuthentiSense, a user-agnostic, scalable, and efficient behavioural biometrics authentication system that enables continuous authentication and utilizes only motion patterns (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer data) while users interact with mobile apps. Our approach requires neither manually engineered features nor a significant amount of data for model training. We leverage a few-shot learning technique, called Siamese network, to authenticate users at a large scale. We perform a systematic measurement study and report the impact of the parameters such as interaction time needed for authentication and n-shot verification (comparison with enrollment samples) at the recognition stage. Remarkably, AuthentiSense achieves high accuracy of up to 97% in terms of F1-score even when evaluated in a few-shot fashion that requires only a few behaviour samples per user (3 shots). Our approach accurately authenticates users only after 1 second of user interaction. For AuthentiSense, we report a FAR and FRR of 0.023 and 0.057, respectively.

Hallucination, where models generate fluent text unsupported by visual evidence, remains a major flaw in vision-language models and is particularly critical in sign language translation (SLT). In SLT, meaning depends on precise grounding in video, and gloss-free models are especially vulnerable because they map continuous signer movements directly into natural language without intermediate gloss supervision that serves as alignment. We argue that hallucinations arise when models rely on language priors rather than visual input. To capture this, we propose a token-level reliability measure that quantifies how much the decoder uses visual information. Our method combines feature-based sensitivity, which measures internal changes when video is masked, with counterfactual signals, which capture probability differences between clean and altered video inputs. These signals are aggregated into a sentence-level reliability score, providing a compact and interpretable measure of visual grounding. We evaluate the proposed measure on two SLT benchmarks (PHOENIX-2014T and CSL-Daily) with both gloss-based and gloss-free models. Our results show that reliability predicts hallucination rates, generalizes across datasets and architectures, and decreases under visual degradations. Beyond these quantitative trends, we also find that reliability distinguishes grounded tokens from guessed ones, allowing risk estimation without references; when combined with text-based signals (confidence, perplexity, or entropy), it further improves hallucination risk estimation. Qualitative analysis highlights why gloss-free models are more susceptible to hallucinations. Taken together, our findings establish reliability as a practical and reusable tool for diagnosing hallucinations in SLT, and lay the groundwork for more robust hallucination detection in multimodal generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Vision-language models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information. However, their vulnerability to adversarially manipulated inputs presents significant risks, leading to compromised outputs and raising concerns about the reliability in VLM-integrated applications. Detecting these malicious prompts is thus crucial for maintaining trust in VLM generations. A major challenge in developing a safeguarding prompt classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled benign and malicious data. To address the issue, we introduce VLMGuard, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled user prompts in the wild for malicious prompt detection. These unlabeled prompts, which naturally arise when VLMs are deployed in the open world, consist of both benign and malicious information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated maliciousness estimation score for distinguishing between benign and malicious samples within this unlabeled mixture, thereby enabling the training of a binary prompt classifier on top. Notably, our framework does not require extra human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiment shows VLMGuard achieves superior detection results, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Disclaimer: This paper may contain offensive examples; reader discretion is advised.

The reliance of mobile GUI agents on Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) introduces a severe privacy vulnerability: screenshots containing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are often sent to untrusted, third-party routers. These routers can exploit their own MLLMs to mine this data, violating user privacy. Existing privacy perturbations fail the critical dual challenge of this scenario: protecting PII from the router's MLLM while simultaneously preserving task utility for the agent's MLLM. To address this gap, we propose the Dual-Task Adversarial Protector (DualTAP), a novel framework that, for the first time, explicitly decouples these conflicting objectives. DualTAP trains a lightweight generator using two key innovations: (i) a contrastive attention module that precisely identifies and targets only the PII-sensitive regions, and (ii) a dual-task adversarial objective that simultaneously minimizes a task-preservation loss (to maintain agent utility) and a privacy-interference loss (to suppress PII leakage). To facilitate this study, we introduce PrivScreen, a new dataset of annotated mobile screenshots designed specifically for this dual-task evaluation. Comprehensive experiments on six diverse MLLMs (e.g., GPT-5) demonstrate DualTAP's state-of-the-art protection. It reduces the average privacy leakage rate by 31.6 percentage points (a 3.0x relative improvement) while, critically, maintaining an 80.8% task success rate - a negligible drop from the 83.6% unprotected baseline. DualTAP presents the first viable solution to the privacy-utility trade-off in mobile MLLM agents.

While Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) offer powerful capabilities, they pose privacy risks by unintentionally memorizing sensitive personal information. Current unlearning benchmarks attempt to mitigate this using fictitious identities but overlook a critical stage 1 failure: models fail to effectively memorize target information initially, rendering subsequent unlearning evaluations unreliable. Diagnosing under-memorization and the multi-hop curse as root causes, we introduce ReMem, a Reliable Multi-hop and Multi-image Memorization Benchmark. ReMem ensures robust foundational learning through principled data scaling, reasoning-aware QA pairs, and diverse visual contexts. Additionally, we propose a novel Exposure metric to quantify the depth of information erasure from the model's internal probability distribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ReMem provides a rigorous and trustworthy framework for diagnosing both learning and unlearning behaviors in LVLMs.

Despite efforts to align large language models to produce harmless responses, they are still vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit unrestricted behaviour. In this work, we investigate persona modulation as a black-box jailbreaking method to steer a target model to take on personalities that are willing to comply with harmful instructions. Rather than manually crafting prompts for each persona, we automate the generation of jailbreaks using a language model assistant. We demonstrate a range of harmful completions made possible by persona modulation, including detailed instructions for synthesising methamphetamine, building a bomb, and laundering money. These automated attacks achieve a harmful completion rate of 42.5% in GPT-4, which is 185 times larger than before modulation (0.23%). These prompts also transfer to Claude 2 and Vicuna with harmful completion rates of 61.0% and 35.9%, respectively. Our work reveals yet another vulnerability in commercial large language models and highlights the need for more comprehensive safeguards.

Silent Speech Interfaces (SSIs) offer a noninvasive alternative to brain-computer interfaces for soundless verbal communication. We introduce Multimodal Orofacial Neural Audio (MONA), a system that leverages cross-modal alignment through novel loss functions--cross-contrast (crossCon) and supervised temporal contrast (supTcon)--to train a multimodal model with a shared latent representation. This architecture enables the use of audio-only datasets like LibriSpeech to improve silent speech recognition. Additionally, our introduction of Large Language Model (LLM) Integrated Scoring Adjustment (LISA) significantly improves recognition accuracy. Together, MONA LISA reduces the state-of-the-art word error rate (WER) from 28.8% to 12.2% in the Gaddy (2020) benchmark dataset for silent speech on an open vocabulary. For vocal EMG recordings, our method improves the state-of-the-art from 23.3% to 3.7% WER. In the Brain-to-Text 2024 competition, LISA performs best, improving the top WER from 9.8% to 8.9%. To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first instance where noninvasive silent speech recognition on an open vocabulary has cleared the threshold of 15% WER, demonstrating that SSIs can be a viable alternative to automatic speech recognition (ASR). Our work not only narrows the performance gap between silent and vocalized speech but also opens new possibilities in human-computer interaction, demonstrating the potential of cross-modal approaches in noisy and data-limited regimes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to generating harmful content when prompted with carefully crafted inputs, a vulnerability known as LLM jailbreaking. As LLMs become more powerful, studying jailbreak methods is critical to enhancing security and aligning models with human values. Traditionally, jailbreak techniques have relied on suffix addition or prompt templates, but these methods suffer from limited attack diversity. This paper introduces DiffusionAttacker, an end-to-end generative approach for jailbreak rewriting inspired by diffusion models. Our method employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) text diffusion model as a generator, conditioning on the original prompt and guiding the denoising process with a novel attack loss. Unlike previous approaches that use autoregressive LLMs to generate jailbreak prompts, which limit the modification of already generated tokens and restrict the rewriting space, DiffusionAttacker utilizes a seq2seq diffusion model, allowing more flexible token modifications. This approach preserves the semantic content of the original prompt while producing harmful content. Additionally, we leverage the Gumbel-Softmax technique to make the sampling process from the diffusion model's output distribution differentiable, eliminating the need for iterative token search. Extensive experiments on Advbench and Harmbench demonstrate that DiffusionAttacker outperforms previous methods across various evaluation metrics, including attack success rate (ASR), fluency, and diversity.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Using risky text prompts, such as pornography and violent prompts, to test the safety of text-to-image (T2I) models is a critical task. However, existing risky prompt datasets are limited in three key areas: 1) limited risky categories, 2) coarse-grained annotation, and 3) low effectiveness. To address these limitations, we introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a comprehensive benchmark designed for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models. Specifically, we first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts. Finally, we obtain 6,432 effective risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons. Moreover, to facilitate the evaluation, we propose a reason-driven risky image detection method that explicitly aligns the MLLM with safety annotations. Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies, offering nine key insights into the strengths and limitations of T2I model safety. Finally, we discuss potential applications of T2I-RiskyPrompt across various research fields. The dataset and code are provided in https://github.com/datar001/T2I-RiskyPrompt.

This study reveals a previously unexplored vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing aligned LLMs predominantly respond to unsafe queries with refusals, which often begin with a fixed set of prefixes (I'm sorry). We demonstrate that this rigid refusal pattern is a vulnerability and introduce a novel refusal unlearning technique that exploits it. Specifically, we fine-tune LLMs using merely 1,000 benign samples, where each response is prepended with a refusal prefix. The underlying intuition is to disrupt the refusal completion pathway, thereby driving the model to forget how to refuse while following harmful instructions. This intuition is further supported by theoretical proofs. We apply this approach to a total of 16 LLMs, including various open-source models from Llama, Qwen, and Gemma families, as well as closed-source models such as Gemini and GPT. Experimental results show that the safety scores of previously aligned LLMs degrade both consistently and substantially. Importantly, we verify that the observed gain cannot be attributed to plain fine-tuning or random prefix effects. Our findings suggest that current safety alignment may rely heavily on token sequence memorization rather than reasoning, motivating future work beyond simple refusal mechanisms. Code has been released: https://github.com/guoyang9/refusal-unlearning.

Biometric authentication systems that make use of signature verification methods often render optimum performance only under limited and restricted conditions. Such methods utilize several training samples so as to achieve high accuracy. Moreover, several constraints are imposed on the end-user so that the system may work optimally, and as expected. For example, the user is made to sign within a small box, in order to limit their signature to a predefined set of dimensions, thus eliminating scaling. Moreover, the angular rotation with respect to the referenced signature that will be inadvertently introduced as human error, hampers performance of biometric signature verification systems. To eliminate this, traditionally, a user is asked to sign exactly on top of a reference line. In this paper, we propose a robust system that optimizes the signature obtained from the user for a large range of variation in Rotation-Scaling-Translation (RST) and resolves these error parameters in the user signature according to the reference signature stored in the database.