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Apr 16

BRIDGE and TCH-Net: Heterogeneous Benchmark and Multi-Branch Baseline for Cross-Domain IoT Botnet Detection

IoT botnet detection has advanced, yet most published systems are validated on a single dataset and rarely generalise across environments. Heterogeneous feature spaces make multi-dataset training practically impossible without discarding semantic interpretability or introducing data integrity violations. No prior work has addressed both problems with a formally specified, reproducible methodology. This paper does. We introduce BRIDGE (Benchmark Reference for IoT Domain Generalisation Evaluation), the first formally specified heterogeneous multi-dataset benchmark for IoT intrusion detection, unifying CICIDS-2017, CIC-IoT-2023, Bot-IoT, Edge-IIoTset, and N-BaIoT through a 46-feature semantic canonical vocabulary grounded in CICFlowMeter nomenclature, with genuine-equivalence-only feature mapping, explicit zero-filling, and per-dataset coverage from 15% to 93%. A leave-one-dataset-out (LODO) protocol makes the generalisation gap precisely measurable: all five evaluated architectures achieve mean LODO F1 between 0.39 and 0.47, and we establish the first community generalisation baseline at mean LODO F1 = 0.5577, a result that shifts the agenda from single-benchmark optimisation toward cross-environment generalisation. We propose TCH-Net, a multi-branch network fusing a three-path Temporal branch (residual convolutional-BiGRU, stride-downsampled BiGRU, pre-LayerNorm Transformer), a provenance-conditioned Contextual branch, and a Statistical branch via Cross-Branch Gated Attention Fusion (CB-GAF) with learnable sigmoid gates for dynamic feature-wise mixing. Across five random seeds, TCH-Net achieves F1 = 0.8296 +/- 0.0028, AUC = 0.9380 +/- 0.0025, and MCC = 0.6972 +/- 0.0056, outperforming all twelve baselines (p < 0.05, Wilcoxon) and recording the highest LODO F1 overall. BRIDGE and the full pipeline are at https://github.com/Ammar-ss/TCH-Net.

  • 7 authors
·
Apr 12

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attacks is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely. As agents increasingly process untrusted data from emails, documents, tool outputs, and external APIs, robust attack detection becomes essential. Yet current evaluation practices and production systems have fundamental limitations. We present a comprehensive analysis using a diverse benchmark of 18 datasets spanning harmful requests, jailbreaks, indirect prompt injections, and extraction attacks. We propose Leave-One-Dataset-Out (LODO) evaluation to measure true out-of-distribution generalization, revealing that the standard practice of train-test splits from the same dataset sources severely overestimates performance: aggregate metrics show an 8.4 percentage point AUC inflation, but per-dataset gaps range from 1% to 25% accuracy-exposing heterogeneous failure modes. To understand why classifiers fail to generalize, we analyze Sparse Auto-Encoder (SAE) feature coefficients across LODO folds, finding that 28% of top features are dataset-dependent shortcuts whose class signal depends on specific dataset compositions rather than semantic content. We systematically compare production guardrails (PromptGuard 2, LlamaGuard) and LLM-as-judge approaches on our benchmark, finding all three fail on indirect attacks targeting agents (7-37% detection) and that PromptGuard 2 and LlamaGuard cannot evaluate agentic tool injection due to architectural limitations. Finally, we show that LODO-stable SAE features provide more reliable explanations for classifier decisions by filtering dataset artifacts. We release our evaluation framework at https://github.com/maxf-zn/prompt-mining to establish LODO as the appropriate protocol for prompt attack detection research.

  • 1 authors
·
Feb 15