Daily Papers

Robust robotic manipulation requires reliable failure detection and recovery. Although recent Vision-Language Models (VLMs) show promise in robot failure detection, their generalization is severely limited by the scarcity and narrow coverage of failure data. To address this bottleneck, we propose an automatic framework for generating diverse robotic planning and execution failures across both simulated and real-world environments. Our approach perturbs successful manipulation trajectories to synthesize failures that reflect realistic failure distributions, and leverages VLMs to produce structured step-by-step reasoning traces. This yields FailCoT, a large-scale failure reasoning dataset built upon the RLBench simulator and the BridgeDataV2 real-robot dataset. Using FailCoT, we train Guardian, a multi-view reasoning VLM for unified planning and execution verification. Guardian achieves state-of-the-art performance on three unseen real-world benchmarks: RoboFail, RoboVQA, and our newly introduced UR5-Fail. When integrated with a state-of-the-art LLM-based manipulation policy, it consistently boosts task success rates in both simulation and real-world deployment. These results demonstrate that scaling high-quality failure reasoning data is critical for improving generalization in robotic failure detection. Code, Data, and Models available at https://www.di.ens.fr/willow/research/guardian/.

While large language models (LLMs) are successful in completing various language processing tasks, they easily fail to interact with the physical world by generating control sequences properly. We find that the main reason is that LLMs are not grounded in the physical world. Existing LLM-based approaches circumvent this problem by relying on additional pre-defined skills or pre-trained sub-policies, making it hard to adapt to new tasks. In contrast, we aim to address this problem and explore the possibility to prompt pre-trained LLMs to accomplish a series of robotic manipulation tasks in a training-free paradigm. Accordingly, we propose a framework called LLM+A(ffordance) where the LLM serves as both the sub-task planner (that generates high-level plans) and the motion controller (that generates low-level control sequences). To ground these plans and control sequences on the physical world, we develop the affordance prompting technique that stimulates the LLM to 1) predict the consequences of generated plans and 2) generate affordance values for relevant objects. Empirically, we evaluate the effectiveness of LLM+A in various language-conditioned robotic manipulation tasks, which show that our approach substantially improves performance by enhancing the feasibility of generated plans and control and can easily generalize to different environments.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable planning abilities across various domains, including robotics manipulation and navigation. While recent efforts in robotics have leveraged LLMs both for high-level and low-level planning, these approaches often face significant challenges, such as hallucinations in long-horizon tasks and limited adaptability due to the generation of plans in a single pass without real-time feedback. To address these limitations, we propose a novel multi-agent LLM framework, Multi-Agent Large Language Model for Manipulation (MALMM) that distributes high-level planning and low-level control code generation across specialized LLM agents, supervised by an additional agent that dynamically manages transitions. By incorporating observations from the environment after each step, our framework effectively handles intermediate failures and enables adaptive re-planning. Unlike existing methods, our approach does not rely on pre-trained skill policies or in-context learning examples and generalizes to a variety of new tasks. We evaluate our approach on nine RLBench tasks, including long-horizon tasks, and demonstrate its ability to solve robotics manipulation in a zero-shot setting, thereby overcoming key limitations of existing LLM-based manipulation methods.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

This paper introduces ChatbotManip, a novel dataset for studying manipulation in Chatbots. It contains simulated generated conversations between a chatbot and a (simulated) user, where the chatbot is explicitly asked to showcase manipulation tactics, persuade the user towards some goal, or simply be helpful. We consider a diverse set of chatbot manipulation contexts, from consumer and personal advice to citizen advice and controversial proposition argumentation. Each conversation is annotated by human annotators for both general manipulation and specific manipulation tactics. Our research reveals three key findings. First, Large Language Models (LLMs) can be manipulative when explicitly instructed, with annotators identifying manipulation in approximately 84\% of such conversations. Second, even when only instructed to be ``persuasive'' without explicit manipulation prompts, LLMs frequently default to controversial manipulative strategies, particularly gaslighting and fear enhancement. Third, small fine-tuned open source models, such as BERT+BiLSTM have a performance comparable to zero-shot classification with larger models like Gemini 2.5 pro in detecting manipulation, but are not yet reliable for real-world oversight. Our work provides important insights for AI safety research and highlights the need of addressing manipulation risks as LLMs are increasingly deployed in consumer-facing applications.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Task-oriented LLM-based agents are increasingly used in domains with strict policies, such as refund eligibility or cancellation rules. The challenge lies in ensuring that the agent consistently adheres to these rules and policies, appropriately refusing any request that would violate them, while still maintaining a helpful and natural interaction. This calls for the development of tailored design and evaluation methodologies to ensure agent resilience against malicious user behavior. We propose a novel threat model that focuses on adversarial users aiming to exploit policy-adherent agents for personal benefit. To address this, we present CRAFT, a multi-agent red-teaming system that leverages policy-aware persuasive strategies to undermine a policy-adherent agent in a customer-service scenario, outperforming conventional jailbreak methods such as DAN prompts, emotional manipulation, and coercive. Building upon the existing tau-bench benchmark, we introduce tau-break, a complementary benchmark designed to rigorously assess the agent's robustness against manipulative user behavior. Finally, we evaluate several straightforward yet effective defense strategies. While these measures provide some protection, they fall short, highlighting the need for stronger, research-driven safeguards to protect policy-adherent agents from adversarial attacks

In recent developments within the research community, the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) in creating fully autonomous agents has garnered significant interest. Despite this, LLM-based agents frequently demonstrate notable shortcomings in adjusting to dynamic environments and fully grasping human needs. In this work, we introduce the problem of LLM-based human-agent collaboration for complex task-solving, exploring their synergistic potential. In addition, we propose a Reinforcement Learning-based Human-Agent Collaboration method, ReHAC. This approach includes a policy model designed to determine the most opportune stages for human intervention within the task-solving process. We construct a human-agent collaboration dataset to train this policy model in an offline reinforcement learning environment. Our validation tests confirm the model's effectiveness. The results demonstrate that the synergistic efforts of humans and LLM-based agents significantly improve performance in complex tasks, primarily through well-planned, limited human intervention. Datasets and code are available at: https://github.com/XueyangFeng/ReHAC.

LLM agents have emerged as powerful systems for tackling multi-turn tasks by interleaving internal reasoning and external tool interactions. Agentic Reinforcement Learning has recently drawn significant research attention as a critical post-training paradigm to further refine these capabilities. In this paper, we present AT^2PO (Agentic Turn-based Policy Optimization via Tree Search), a unified framework for multi-turn agentic RL that addresses three core challenges: limited exploration diversity, sparse credit assignment, and misaligned policy optimization. AT^2PO introduces a turn-level tree structure that jointly enables Entropy-Guided Tree Expansion for strategic exploration and Turn-wise Credit Assignment for fine-grained reward propagation from sparse outcomes. Complementing this, we propose Agentic Turn-based Policy Optimization, a turn-level learning objective that aligns policy updates with the natural decision granularity of agentic interactions. ATPO is orthogonal to tree search and can be readily integrated into any multi-turn RL pipeline. Experiments across seven benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements over the state-of-the-art baseline by up to 1.84 percentage points in average, with ablation studies validating the effectiveness of each component. Our code is available at https://github.com/zzfoutofspace/ATPO.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has shown great potential in refining robotic manipulation policies, yet its efficacy remains strongly bottlenecked by the difficulty of designing generalizable reward functions. In this paper, we propose a framework for online policy refinement by adapting foundation VLMs into online reward generators. We develop a robust, scalable reward model based on a state-of-the-art VLM, trained on a large-scale, multi-source dataset encompassing real-world robot trajectories, human-object interactions, and diverse simulated environments. Unlike prior approaches that evaluate entire trajectories post-hoc, our method leverages the VLM to formulate a multifaceted reward signal comprising process, completion, and temporal contrastive rewards based on current visual observations. Initializing with a base policy trained via Imitation Learning (IL), we employ these VLM rewards to guide the model to correct sub-optimal behaviors in a closed-loop manner. We evaluate our framework on challenging long-horizon manipulation benchmarks requiring sequential execution and precise control. Crucially, our reward model operates in a purely zero-shot manner within these test environments. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly improves the success rate of the initial IL policy within just 30 RL iterations, demonstrating remarkable sample efficiency. This empirical evidence highlights that VLM-generated signals can provide reliable feedback to resolve execution errors, effectively eliminating the need for manual reward engineering and facilitating efficient online refinement for robot learning.

Recent studies on software tool manipulation with large language models (LLMs) mostly rely on closed model APIs. The industrial adoption of these models is substantially constrained due to the security and robustness risks in exposing information to closed LLM API services. In this paper, we ask can we enhance open-source LLMs to be competitive to leading closed LLM APIs in tool manipulation, with practical amount of human supervision. By analyzing common tool manipulation failures, we first demonstrate that open-source LLMs may require training with usage examples, in-context demonstration and generation style regulation to resolve failures. These insights motivate us to revisit classical methods in LLM literature, and demonstrate that we can adapt them as model alignment with programmatic data generation, system prompts and in-context demonstration retrievers to enhance open-source LLMs for tool manipulation. To evaluate these techniques, we create the ToolBench, a tool manipulation benchmark consisting of diverse software tools for real-world tasks. We demonstrate that our techniques can boost leading open-source LLMs by up to 90% success rate, showing capabilities competitive to OpenAI GPT-4 in 4 out of 8 ToolBench tasks. We show that such enhancement typically requires about one developer day to curate data for each tool, rendering a recipe with practical amount of human supervision.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

This paper investigates privacy jailbreaking in LLMs via steering, focusing on whether manipulating activations can bypass LLM alignment and alter response behaviors to privacy related queries (e.g., a certain public figure's sexual orientation). We begin by identifying attention heads predictive of refusal behavior for private attributes (e.g., sexual orientation) using lightweight linear probes trained with privacy evaluator labels. Next, we steer the activations of a small subset of these attention heads guided by the trained probes to induce the model to generate non-refusal responses. Our experiments show that these steered responses often disclose sensitive attribute details, along with other private information about data subjects such as life events, relationships, and personal histories that the models would typically refuse to produce. Evaluations across four LLMs reveal jailbreaking disclosure rates of at least 95%, with more than 50% on average of these responses revealing true personal information. Our controlled study demonstrates that private information memorized in LLMs can be extracted through targeted manipulation of internal activations.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled 2 times 2^4 design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.

Despite significant progress in alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that elicit harmful behaviors. Activation steering techniques offer a promising inference-time intervention approach, but existing methods suffer from critical limitations: activation addition requires careful coefficient tuning and is sensitive to layer-specific norm variations, while directional ablation provides only binary control. Recent work on Angular Steering introduces continuous control via rotation in a 2D subspace, but its practical implementation violates norm preservation, causing distribution shift and generation collapse, particularly in models below 7B parameters. We propose Selective Steering, which addresses these limitations through two key innovations: (1) a mathematically rigorous norm-preserving rotation formulation that maintains activation distribution integrity, and (2) discriminative layer selection that applies steering only where feature representations exhibit opposite-signed class alignment. Experiments across nine models demonstrate that Selective Steering achieves 5.5x higher attack success rates than prior methods while maintaining zero perplexity violations and approximately 100\% capability retention on standard benchmarks. Our approach provides a principled, efficient framework for controllable and stable LLM behavior modification. Code: https://github.com/knoveleng/steering

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exciting progress in acquiring diverse new capabilities through in-context learning, ranging from logical reasoning to code-writing. Robotics researchers have also explored using LLMs to advance the capabilities of robotic control. However, since low-level robot actions are hardware-dependent and underrepresented in LLM training corpora, existing efforts in applying LLMs to robotics have largely treated LLMs as semantic planners or relied on human-engineered control primitives to interface with the robot. On the other hand, reward functions are shown to be flexible representations that can be optimized for control policies to achieve diverse tasks, while their semantic richness makes them suitable to be specified by LLMs. In this work, we introduce a new paradigm that harnesses this realization by utilizing LLMs to define reward parameters that can be optimized and accomplish variety of robotic tasks. Using reward as the intermediate interface generated by LLMs, we can effectively bridge the gap between high-level language instructions or corrections to low-level robot actions. Meanwhile, combining this with a real-time optimizer, MuJoCo MPC, empowers an interactive behavior creation experience where users can immediately observe the results and provide feedback to the system. To systematically evaluate the performance of our proposed method, we designed a total of 17 tasks for a simulated quadruped robot and a dexterous manipulator robot. We demonstrate that our proposed method reliably tackles 90% of the designed tasks, while a baseline using primitive skills as the interface with Code-as-policies achieves 50% of the tasks. We further validated our method on a real robot arm where complex manipulation skills such as non-prehensile pushing emerge through our interactive system.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent systems are increasingly deployed for complex real-world tasks but remain vulnerable to natural language-based attacks that exploit over-privileged tool use. This paper aims to understand and mitigate such attacks through the lens of privilege escalation, defined as agent actions exceeding the least privilege required for a user's intended task. Based on a formal model of LLM agent systems, we identify novel privilege escalation scenarios, particularly in multi-agent systems, including a variant akin to the classic confused deputy problem. To defend against both known and newly demonstrated privilege escalation, we propose SEAgent, a mandatory access control (MAC) framework built upon attribute-based access control (ABAC). SEAgent monitors agent-tool interactions via an information flow graph and enforces customizable security policies based on entity attributes. Our evaluations show that SEAgent effectively blocks various privilege escalation while maintaining a low false positive rate and negligible system overhead. This demonstrates its robustness and adaptability in securing LLM-based agent systems.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Reinforcement learning for LLM reasoning has rapidly emerged as a prominent research area, marked by a significant surge in related studies on both algorithmic innovations and practical applications. Despite this progress, several critical challenges remain, including the absence of standardized guidelines for employing RL techniques and a fragmented understanding of their underlying mechanisms. Additionally, inconsistent experimental settings, variations in training data, and differences in model initialization have led to conflicting conclusions, obscuring the key characteristics of these techniques and creating confusion among practitioners when selecting appropriate techniques. This paper systematically reviews widely adopted RL techniques through rigorous reproductions and isolated evaluations within a unified open-source framework. We analyze the internal mechanisms, applicable scenarios, and core principles of each technique through fine-grained experiments, including datasets of varying difficulty, model sizes, and architectures. Based on these insights, we present clear guidelines for selecting RL techniques tailored to specific setups, and provide a reliable roadmap for practitioners navigating the RL for the LLM domain. Finally, we reveal that a minimalist combination of two techniques can unlock the learning capability of critic-free policies using vanilla PPO loss. The results demonstrate that our simple combination consistently improves performance, surpassing strategies like GRPO and DAPO.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

The capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are routinely evaluated by other LLMs trained to predict human preferences. This framework--known as LLM-as-a-judge--is highly scalable and relatively low cost. However, it is also vulnerable to malicious exploitation, as LLM responses can be tuned to overfit the preferences of the judge. Previous work shows that the answers generated by a candidate-LLM can be edited post hoc to maximise the score assigned to them by a judge-LLM. In this study, we adopt a different approach and use the signal provided by judge-LLMs as a reward to adversarially tune models that generate text preambles designed to boost downstream performance. We find that frozen LLMs pipelined with these models attain higher LLM-evaluation scores than existing frameworks. Crucially, unlike other frameworks which intervene directly on the model's response, our method is virtually undetectable. We also demonstrate that the effectiveness of the tuned preamble generator transfers when the candidate-LLM and the judge-LLM are replaced with models that are not used during training. These findings raise important questions about the design of more reliable LLM-as-a-judge evaluation settings. They also demonstrate that human preferences can be reverse engineered effectively, by pipelining LLMs to optimise upstream preambles via reinforcement learning--an approach that could find future applications in diverse tasks and domains beyond adversarial attacks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a promising approach for robotic manipulation, but it can suffer from low sample efficiency and requires extensive exploration of large state-action spaces. Recent methods leverage the commonsense knowledge and reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) to guide exploration toward more meaningful states. However, LLMs can produce plans that are semantically plausible yet physically infeasible, yielding unreliable behavior. We introduce LLM-TALE, a framework that uses LLMs' planning to directly steer RL exploration. LLM-TALE integrates planning at both the task level and the affordance level, improving learning efficiency by directing agents toward semantically meaningful actions. Unlike prior approaches that assume optimal LLM-generated plans or rewards, LLM-TALE corrects suboptimality online and explores multimodal affordance-level plans without human supervision. We evaluate LLM-TALE on pick-and-place tasks in standard RL benchmarks, observing improvements in both sample efficiency and success rates over strong baselines. Real-robot experiments indicate promising zero-shot sim-to-real transfer. Code and supplementary material are available at https://llm-tale.github.io.

This paper presents a novel approach to enhance autonomous robotic manipulation using the Large Language Model (LLM) for logical inference, converting high-level language commands into sequences of executable motion functions. The proposed system combines the advantage of LLM with YOLO-based environmental perception to enable robots to autonomously make reasonable decisions and task planning based on the given commands. Additionally, to address the potential inaccuracies or illogical actions arising from LLM, a combination of teleoperation and Dynamic Movement Primitives (DMP) is employed for action correction. This integration aims to improve the practicality and generalizability of the LLM-based human-robot collaboration system.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents in various contexts by providing tools at their disposal. However, LLM agents can exhibit unpredictable behaviors, including taking undesirable and/or unsafe actions. In order to measure the latent propensity of LLM agents for taking illegal actions under an EU legislative context, we introduce EU-Agent-Bench, a verifiable human-curated benchmark that evaluates an agent's alignment with EU legal norms in situations where benign user inputs could lead to unlawful actions. Our benchmark spans scenarios across several categories, including data protection, bias/discrimination, and scientific integrity, with each user request allowing for both compliant and non-compliant execution of the requested actions. Comparing the model's function calls against a rubric exhaustively supported by citations of the relevant legislature, we evaluate the legal compliance of frontier LLMs, and furthermore investigate the compliance effect of providing the relevant legislative excerpts in the agent's system prompt along with explicit instructions to comply. We release a public preview set for the research community, while holding out a private test set to prevent data contamination in evaluating upcoming models. We encourage future work extending agentic safety benchmarks to different legal jurisdictions and to multi-turn and multilingual interactions. We release our code on https://github.com/ilijalichkovski/eu-agent-bench{this URL}.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents equipped with external tools have become increasingly powerful for complex tasks such as web shopping, automated email replies, and financial trading. However, these advancements amplify the risks of adversarial attacks, especially when agents can access sensitive external functionalities. Nevertheless, manipulating LLM agents into performing targeted malicious actions or invoking specific tools remains challenging, as these agents extensively reason or plan before executing final actions. In this work, we present UDora, a unified red teaming framework designed for LLM agents that dynamically hijacks the agent's reasoning processes to compel malicious behavior. Specifically, UDora first generates the model's reasoning trace for the given task, then automatically identifies optimal points within this trace to insert targeted perturbations. The resulting perturbed reasoning is then used as a surrogate response for optimization. By iteratively applying this process, the LLM agent will then be induced to undertake designated malicious actions or to invoke specific malicious tools. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to existing methods across three LLM agent datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/UDora.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

We introduce a novel reinforcement learning framework of LLM agents named AGILE (AGent that Interacts and Learns from Environments) designed to perform complex conversational tasks with users, leveraging LLMs, memory, tools, and interactions with experts. The agent possesses capabilities beyond conversation, including reflection, tool usage, and expert consultation. We formulate the construction of such an LLM agent as a reinforcement learning (RL) problem, in which the LLM serves as the policy model. We fine-tune the LLM using labeled data of actions and the PPO algorithm. We focus on question answering and release a dataset for agents called ProductQA, comprising challenging questions in online shopping. Our extensive experiments on ProductQA, MedMCQA and HotPotQA show that AGILE agents based on 7B and 13B LLMs trained with PPO can outperform GPT-4 agents. Our ablation study highlights the indispensability of memory, tools, consultation, reflection, and reinforcement learning in achieving the agent's strong performance. Datasets and code are available at https://github.com/bytarnish/AGILE.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, has resulted in the widespread presence of LLM-generated content on social media platforms, raising concerns about misinformation, data biases, and privacy violations, which can undermine trust in online discourse. While detecting LLM-generated content is crucial for mitigating these risks, current methods often focus on binary classification, failing to address the complexities of real-world scenarios like human-LLM collaboration. To move beyond binary classification and address these challenges, we propose a new paradigm for detecting LLM-generated content. This approach introduces two novel tasks: LLM Role Recognition (LLM-RR), a multi-class classification task that identifies specific roles of LLM in content generation, and LLM Influence Measurement (LLM-IM), a regression task that quantifies the extent of LLM involvement in content creation. To support these tasks, we propose LLMDetect, a benchmark designed to evaluate detectors' performance on these new tasks. LLMDetect includes the Hybrid News Detection Corpus (HNDC) for training detectors, as well as DetectEval, a comprehensive evaluation suite that considers five distinct cross-context variations and two multi-intensity variations within the same LLM role. This allows for a thorough assessment of detectors' generalization and robustness across diverse contexts. Our empirical validation of 10 baseline detection methods demonstrates that fine-tuned PLM-based models consistently outperform others on both tasks, while advanced LLMs face challenges in accurately detecting their own generated content. Our experimental results and analysis offer insights for developing more effective detection models for LLM-generated content. This research enhances the understanding of LLM-generated content and establishes a foundation for more nuanced detection methodologies.

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents have been widely deployed in a wide range of applications in the real world, including healthcare diagnostics, financial analysis, customer support, robotics, and autonomous driving, expanding their powerful capability of understanding, reasoning, and generating natural languages. However, the wide deployment of LLM-based applications exposes critical security and reliability risks, such as the potential for malicious misuse, privacy leakage, and service disruption that weaken user trust and undermine societal safety. This paper provides a systematic overview of the details of adversarial attacks targeting both LLMs and LLM-based agents. These attacks are organized into three phases in LLMs: Training-Phase Attacks, Inference-Phase Attacks, and Availability & Integrity Attacks. For each phase, we analyze the details of representative and recently introduced attack methods along with their corresponding defenses. We hope our survey will provide a good tutorial and a comprehensive understanding of LLM security, especially for attacks on LLMs. We desire to raise attention to the risks inherent in widely deployed LLM-based applications and highlight the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies for evolving threats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to act like planners that can decompose high-level instructions into a sequence of executable instructions. However, current LLM-based planners are only able to operate with a fixed set of skills. We overcome this critical limitation and present a method for using LLM-based planners to query new skills and teach robots these skills in a data and time-efficient manner for rigid object manipulation. Our system can re-use newly acquired skills for future tasks, demonstrating the potential of open world and lifelong learning. We evaluate the proposed framework on multiple tasks in simulation and the real world. Videos are available at: https://sites.google.com/mit.edu/halp-robot-learning.

Large language model (LLM) agents need to perform multi-turn interactions in real-world tasks. However, existing multi-turn RL algorithms for optimizing LLM agents fail to perform effective credit assignment over multiple turns while leveraging the generalization capabilities of LLMs and it remains unclear how to develop such algorithms. To study this, we first introduce a new benchmark, ColBench, where an LLM agent interacts with a human collaborator over multiple turns to solve realistic tasks in backend programming and frontend design. Building on this benchmark, we propose a novel RL algorithm, SWEET-RL (RL with Step-WisE Evaluation from Training-time information), that uses a carefully designed optimization objective to train a critic model with access to additional training-time information. The critic provides step-level rewards for improving the policy model. Our experiments demonstrate that SWEET-RL achieves a 6% absolute improvement in success and win rates on ColBench compared to other state-of-the-art multi-turn RL algorithms, enabling Llama-3.1-8B to match or exceed the performance of GPT4-o in realistic collaborative content creation.

Previous works on Large Language Models (LLMs) have mainly focused on evaluating their helpfulness or harmlessness. However, honesty, another crucial alignment criterion, has received relatively less attention. Dishonest behaviors in LLMs, such as spreading misinformation and defrauding users, eroding user trust, and causing real-world harm, present severe risks that intensify as these models approach superintelligence levels. Enhancing honesty in LLMs addresses critical deficiencies and helps uncover latent capabilities that are not readily expressed. This underscores the urgent need for reliable methods and benchmarks to effectively ensure and evaluate the honesty of LLMs. In this paper, we introduce BeHonest, a pioneering benchmark specifically designed to assess honesty in LLMs comprehensively. BeHonest evaluates three essential aspects of honesty: awareness of knowledge boundaries, avoidance of deceit, and consistency in responses. Building on this foundation, we designed 10 scenarios to evaluate and analyze 9 popular LLMs on the market, including both closed-source and open-source models from different model families with varied model sizes. Our findings indicate that there is still significant room for improvement in the honesty of LLMs. We also encourage the AI community to prioritize honesty alignment in LLMs. Our benchmark and code can be found at: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/BeHonest.

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously solve complex tasks, raising urgent needs for IP protection and regulatory provenance. While content watermarking effectively attributes LLM-generated outputs, it fails to directly identify the high-level planning behaviors (e.g., tool and subgoal choices) that govern multi-step execution. Critically, watermarking at the planning-behavior layer faces unique challenges: minor distributional deviations in decision-making can compound during long-term agent operation, degrading utility, and many agents operate as black boxes that are difficult to intervene in directly. To bridge this gap, we propose AgentMark, a behavioral watermarking framework that embeds multi-bit identifiers into planning decisions while preserving utility. It operates by eliciting an explicit behavior distribution from the agent and applying distribution-preserving conditional sampling, enabling deployment under black-box APIs while remaining compatible with action-layer content watermarking. Experiments across embodied, tool-use, and social environments demonstrate practical multi-bit capacity, robust recovery from partial logs, and utility preservation. The code is available at https://github.com/Tooooa/AgentMark.

Robotic manipulation policies often fail to generalize because they must simultaneously learn where to attend, what actions to take, and how to execute them. We argue that high-level reasoning about where and what can be offloaded to vision-language models (VLMs), leaving policies to specialize in how to act. We present PEEK (Policy-agnostic Extraction of Essential Keypoints), which fine-tunes VLMs to predict a unified point-based intermediate representation: 1. end-effector paths specifying what actions to take, and 2. task-relevant masks indicating where to focus. These annotations are directly overlaid onto robot observations, making the representation policy-agnostic and transferable across architectures. To enable scalable training, we introduce an automatic annotation pipeline, generating labeled data across 20+ robot datasets spanning 9 embodiments. In real-world evaluations, PEEK consistently boosts zero-shot generalization, including a 41.4x real-world improvement for a 3D policy trained only in simulation, and 2-3.5x gains for both large VLAs and small manipulation policies. By letting VLMs absorb semantic and visual complexity, PEEK equips manipulation policies with the minimal cues they need--where, what, and how. Website at https://peek-robot.github.io/.

Robot manipulation has seen tremendous progress in recent years, with imitation learning policies enabling successful performance of dexterous and hard-to-model tasks. Concurrently, scaling data and model size has led to the development of capable language and vision foundation models, motivating large-scale efforts to create general-purpose robot foundation models. While these models have garnered significant enthusiasm and investment, meaningful evaluation of real-world performance remains a challenge, limiting both the pace of development and inhibiting a nuanced understanding of current capabilities. In this paper, we rigorously evaluate multitask robot manipulation policies, referred to as Large Behavior Models (LBMs), by extending the Diffusion Policy paradigm across a corpus of simulated and real-world robot data. We propose and validate an evaluation pipeline to rigorously analyze the capabilities of these models with statistical confidence. We compare against single-task baselines through blind, randomized trials in a controlled setting, using both simulation and real-world experiments. We find that multi-task pretraining makes the policies more successful and robust, and enables teaching complex new tasks more quickly, using a fraction of the data when compared to single-task baselines. Moreover, performance predictably increases as pretraining scale and diversity grows. Project page: https://toyotaresearchinstitute.github.io/lbm1/

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Inference-time LLM alignment methods, particularly activation steering, offer an alternative to fine-tuning by directly modifying activations during generation. Existing methods, however, often rely on non-anticipative interventions that ignore how perturbations propagate through transformer layers and lack online error feedback, resulting in suboptimal, open-loop control. To address this, we show empirically that, despite the nonlinear structure of transformer blocks, layer-wise dynamics across multiple LLM architectures and scales are well-approximated by locally-linear models. Exploiting this property, we model LLM inference as a linear time-varying dynamical system and adapt the classical linear quadratic regulator to compute feedback controllers using layer-wise Jacobians, steering activations toward desired semantic setpoints in closed-loop with minimal computational overhead and no offline training. We also derive theoretical bounds on setpoint tracking error, enabling formal guarantees on steering performance. Using a novel adaptive semantic feature setpoint signal, our method yields robust, fine-grained behavior control across models, scales, and tasks, including state-of-the-art modulation of toxicity, truthfulness, refusal, and arbitrary concepts, surpassing baseline steering methods. Our code is available at: https://github.com/trustworthyrobotics/lqr-activation-steering

The rapid rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has created new disruptive possibilities for persuasive communication, by enabling fully-automated personalized and interactive content generation at an unprecedented scale. In this paper, we survey the research field of LLM-based persuasion that has emerged as a result. We begin by exploring the different modes in which LLM Systems are used to influence human attitudes and behaviors. In areas such as politics, marketing, public health, e-commerce, and charitable giving, such LLM Systems have already achieved human-level or even super-human persuasiveness. We identify key factors influencing their effectiveness, such as the manner of personalization and whether the content is labelled as AI-generated. We also summarize the experimental designs that have been used to evaluate progress. Our survey suggests that the current and future potential of LLM-based persuasion poses profound ethical and societal risks, including the spread of misinformation, the magnification of biases, and the invasion of privacy. These risks underscore the urgent need for ethical guidelines and updated regulatory frameworks to avoid the widespread deployment of irresponsible and harmful LLM Systems.

Evaluation of robotic manipulation systems has largely relied on fixed benchmarks authored by a small number of experts, where task instances, constraints, and success criteria are predefined and difficult to extend. This paradigm limits who can shape evaluation and obscures how policies respond to user-authored variations in task intent, constraints, and notions of success. We argue that evaluating modern manipulation policies requires reframing evaluation as a language-driven process over structured physical domains. We present RoboPlayground, a framework that enables users to author executable manipulation tasks using natural language within a structured physical domain. Natural language instructions are compiled into reproducible task specifications with explicit asset definitions, initialization distributions, and success predicates. Each instruction defines a structured family of related tasks, enabling controlled semantic and behavioral variation while preserving executability and comparability. We instantiate RoboPlayground in a structured block manipulation domain and evaluate it along three axes. A user study shows that the language-driven interface is easier to use and imposes lower cognitive workload than programming-based and code-assist baselines. Evaluating learned policies on language-defined task families reveals generalization failures that are not apparent under fixed benchmark evaluations. Finally, we show that task diversity scales with contributor diversity rather than task count alone, enabling evaluation spaces to grow continuously through crowd-authored contributions. Project Page: https://roboplayground.github.io

Large language model (LLM) steering has emerged as a promising paradigm for controlling model behavior at inference time through targeted manipulation of hidden states, offering a lightweight alternative to expensive retraining. However, existing steering frameworks suffer from critical limitations: computational inefficiency, limited extensibility, and restricted functionality that hinder both research progress and practical deployment. We present EasySteer, a unified framework for high-performance, extensible LLM steering built on vLLM. Our system features modular architecture with pluggable interfaces for both analysis-based and learning-based methods, fine-grained parameter control, pre-computed steering vectors for eight application domains, and an interactive demonstration system. Through deep integration with vLLM's optimized inference engine, EasySteer achieves 5.5-11.4times speedup over existing frameworks. Extensive experiments demonstrate its effectiveness in overthinking mitigation, hallucination reduction, and other key applications. EasySteer transforms steering from research technique to production-ready capability, establishing critical infrastructure for deployable, controllable language models.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges to evaluate agent performance, particularly in non-verifiable settings where judgments rely on agent trajectories including chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. This paradigm implicitly assumes that the agent's CoT faithfully reflects both its internal reasoning and the underlying environment state. We show this assumption is brittle: LLM judges are highly susceptible to manipulation of agent reasoning traces. By systematically rewriting agent CoTs while holding actions and observations fixed, we demonstrate that manipulated reasoning alone can inflate false positive rates of state-of-the-art VLM judges by up to 90% across 800 trajectories spanning diverse web tasks. We study manipulation strategies spanning style-based approaches that alter only the presentation of reasoning and content-based approaches that fabricate signals of task progress, and find that content-based manipulations are consistently more effective. We evaluate prompting-based techniques and scaling judge-time compute, which reduce but do not fully eliminate susceptibility to manipulation. Our findings reveal a fundamental vulnerability in LLM-based evaluation and highlight the need for judging mechanisms that verify reasoning claims against observable evidence.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained human trust due to their capabilities and helpfulness. However, this in turn may allow LLMs to affect users' mindsets by manipulating language. It is termed as gaslighting, a psychological effect. In this work, we aim to investigate the vulnerability of LLMs under prompt-based and fine-tuning-based gaslighting attacks. Therefore, we propose a two-stage framework DeepCoG designed to: 1) elicit gaslighting plans from LLMs with the proposed DeepGaslighting prompting template, and 2) acquire gaslighting conversations from LLMs through our Chain-of-Gaslighting method. The gaslighting conversation dataset along with a corresponding safe dataset is applied to fine-tuning-based attacks on open-source LLMs and anti-gaslighting safety alignment on these LLMs. Experiments demonstrate that both prompt-based and fine-tuning-based attacks transform three open-source LLMs into gaslighters. In contrast, we advanced three safety alignment strategies to strengthen (by 12.05%) the safety guardrail of LLMs. Our safety alignment strategies have minimal impacts on the utility of LLMs. Empirical studies indicate that an LLM may be a potential gaslighter, even if it passed the harmfulness test on general dangerous queries.

The fine-tuning of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning (RL) is generally formulated as direct policy optimization. This approach was naturally favored as it efficiently improves a pretrained LLM, seen as an initial policy. Another RL paradigm, Q-learning methods, has received far less attention in the LLM community while demonstrating major success in various non-LLM RL tasks. In particular, Q-learning effectiveness comes from its sample efficiency and ability to learn offline, which is particularly valuable given the high computational cost of sampling with LLMs. However, naively applying a Q-learning-style update to the model's logits is ineffective due to the specificity of LLMs. Our core contribution is to derive theoretically grounded loss functions from Bellman equations to adapt Q-learning methods to LLMs. To do so, we carefully adapt insights from the RL literature to account for LLM-specific characteristics, ensuring that the logits become reliable Q-value estimates. We then use this loss to build a practical algorithm, ShiQ for Shifted-Q, that supports off-policy, token-wise learning while remaining simple to implement. Finally, we evaluate ShiQ on both synthetic data and real-world benchmarks, e.g., UltraFeedback and BFCL-V3, demonstrating its effectiveness in both single-turn and multi-turn LLM settings

LLM app (tool) ecosystems are rapidly evolving to support sophisticated use cases that often require extensive user data collection. Given that LLM apps are developed by third parties and anecdotal evidence indicating inconsistent enforcement of policies by LLM platforms, sharing user data with these apps presents significant privacy risks. In this paper, we aim to bring transparency in data practices of LLM app ecosystems. We examine OpenAI's GPT app ecosystem as a case study. We propose an LLM-based framework to analyze the natural language specifications of GPT Actions (custom tools) and assess their data collection practices. Our analysis reveals that Actions collect excessive data across 24 categories and 145 data types, with third-party Actions collecting 6.03% more data on average. We find that several Actions violate OpenAI's policies by collecting sensitive information, such as passwords, which is explicitly prohibited by OpenAI. Lastly, we develop an LLM-based privacy policy analysis framework to automatically check the consistency of data collection by Actions with disclosures in their privacy policies. Our measurements indicate that the disclosures for most of the collected data types are omitted, with only 5.8% of Actions clearly disclosing their data collection practices.

We propose LLM-Interleaved (LLM-I), a flexible and dynamic framework that reframes interleaved image-text generation as a tool-use problem. LLM-I is designed to overcome the "one-tool" bottleneck of current unified models, which are limited to synthetic imagery and struggle with tasks requiring factual grounding or programmatic precision. Our framework empowers a central LLM or MLLM agent to intelligently orchestrate a diverse toolkit of specialized visual tools, including online image search, diffusion-based generation, code execution, and image editing. The agent is trained to select and apply these tools proficiently via a Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework that features a hybrid reward system combining rule-based logic with judgments from LLM and MLLM evaluators. Trained on a diverse new dataset using four different model backbones, LLM-I demonstrates state-of-the-art performance, outperforming existing methods by a large margin across four benchmarks. We also introduce a novel test-time scaling strategy that provides further performance gains. Project Page: https://github.com/ByteDance-BandAI/LLM-I.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

In reinforcement learning, specification gaming occurs when AI systems learn undesired behaviors that are highly rewarded due to misspecified training goals. Specification gaming can range from simple behaviors like sycophancy to sophisticated and pernicious behaviors like reward-tampering, where a model directly modifies its own reward mechanism. However, these more pernicious behaviors may be too complex to be discovered via exploration. In this paper, we study whether Large Language Model (LLM) assistants which find easily discovered forms of specification gaming will generalize to perform rarer and more blatant forms, up to and including reward-tampering. We construct a curriculum of increasingly sophisticated gameable environments and find that training on early-curriculum environments leads to more specification gaming on remaining environments. Strikingly, a small but non-negligible proportion of the time, LLM assistants trained on the full curriculum generalize zero-shot to directly rewriting their own reward function. Retraining an LLM not to game early-curriculum environments mitigates, but does not eliminate, reward-tampering in later environments. Moreover, adding harmlessness training to our gameable environments does not prevent reward-tampering. These results demonstrate that LLMs can generalize from common forms of specification gaming to more pernicious reward tampering and that such behavior may be nontrivial to remove.

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

In long-horizon tasks, recent agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) face a significant challenge that sparse, outcome-based rewards make it difficult to assign credit to intermediate steps. Previous methods mainly focus on creating dense reward signals to guide learning, either through traditional reinforcement learning techniques like inverse reinforcement learning or by using Process Reward Models for step-by-step feedback. In this paper, we identify a fundamental problem in the learning dynamics of LLMs: the magnitude of policy gradients is inherently coupled with the entropy, which leads to inefficient small updates for confident correct actions and potentially destabilizes large updates for uncertain ones. To resolve this, we propose Entropy-Modulated Policy Gradients (EMPG), a framework that re-calibrates the learning signal based on step-wise uncertainty and the final task outcome. EMPG amplifies updates for confident correct actions, penalizes confident errors, and attenuates updates from uncertain steps to stabilize exploration. We further introduce a bonus term for future clarity that encourages agents to find more predictable solution paths. Through comprehensive experiments on three challenging agent tasks, WebShop, ALFWorld, and Deep Search, we demonstrate that EMPG achieves substantial performance gains and significantly outperforms strong policy gradient baselines. Project page is at https://empgseed-seed.github.io/

The interaction between users and applications is increasingly shifted toward natural language by deploying Large Language Models (LLMs) as the core interface. The capabilities of these so-called agents become more capable the more tools and services they serve as an interface for, ultimately leading to agentic systems. Agentic systems use LLM-based agents as interfaces for most user interactions and various integrations with external tools and services. While these interfaces can significantly enhance the capabilities of the agentic system, they also introduce a new attack surface. Manipulated integrations, for example, can exploit the internal LLM and compromise sensitive data accessed through other interfaces. While previous work primarily focused on attacks targeting a model's alignment or the leakage of training data, the security of data that is only available during inference has escaped scrutiny so far. In this work, we demonstrate how the integration of LLMs into systems with external tool integration poses a risk similar to established prompt-based attacks, able to compromise the confidentiality of the entire system. Introducing a systematic approach to evaluate these confidentiality risks, we identify two specific attack scenarios unique to these agentic systems and formalize these into a tool-robustness framework designed to measure a model's ability to protect sensitive information. Our analysis reveals significant vulnerabilities across all tested models, highlighting an increased risk when models are combined with external tools.

Training LLMs as interactive agents for multi-turn decision-making remains challenging, particularly in long-horizon tasks with sparse and delayed rewards, where agents must execute extended sequences of actions before receiving meaningful feedback. Most existing reinforcement learning (RL) approaches model LLM agents as flat policies operating at a single time scale, selecting one action at each turn. In sparse-reward settings, such flat policies must propagate credit across the entire trajectory without explicit temporal abstraction, which often leads to unstable optimization and inefficient credit assignment. We propose HiPER, a novel Hierarchical Plan-Execute RL framework that explicitly separates high-level planning from low-level execution. HiPER factorizes the policy into a high-level planner that proposes subgoals and a low-level executor that carries them out over multiple action steps. To align optimization with this structure, we introduce a key technique called hierarchical advantage estimation (HAE), which carefully assigns credit at both the planning and execution levels. By aggregating returns over the execution of each subgoal and coordinating updates across the two levels, HAE provides an unbiased gradient estimator and provably reduces variance compared to flat generalized advantage estimation. Empirically, HiPER achieves state-of-the-art performance on challenging interactive benchmarks, reaching 97.4\% success on ALFWorld and 83.3\% on WebShop with Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (+6.6\% and +8.3\% over the best prior method), with especially large gains on long-horizon tasks requiring multiple dependent subtasks. These results highlight the importance of explicit hierarchical decomposition for scalable RL training of multi-turn LLM agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising basis for creating agents that can tackle complex tasks through iterative environmental interaction. Existing methods either require these agents to mimic expert-provided trajectories or rely on definitive environmental feedback for reinforcement learning which limits their application to specific scenarios like gaming or code generation. This paper introduces a novel training method for LLM-based agents using weakly supervised signals from a critic LLM, bypassing the need for expert trajectories or definitive feedback. Our agents are trained in iterative manner, where they initially generate trajectories through environmental interaction. Subsequently, a critic LLM selects a subset of good trajectories, which are then used to update the agents, enabling them to generate improved trajectories in the next iteration. Extensive tests on the API-bank dataset show consistent improvement in our agents' capabilities and comparable performance to GPT-4, despite using open-source models with much fewer parameters.

Recently, tool-augmented LLMs have gained increasing attention. Given an instruction, tool-augmented LLMs can interact with various external tools in multiple rounds and provide a final answer. However, previous LLMs were trained on overly detailed instructions, which included API names or parameters, while real users would not explicitly mention these API details. This leads to a gap between trained LLMs and real-world scenarios. In addition, most works ignore whether the interaction process follows the instruction. To address these issues, we constructed a training dataset called MGToolBench, which contains statement and category-level instructions to better reflect real-world scenarios. In addition, we propose ToolPlanner, a two-stage reinforcement learning framework that utilizes path planning and two feedback mechanisms to enhance the LLM's task completion and instruction-following capabilities. Experimental results show that ToolPlanner significantly improves the Match Rate, Pass Rate and Win Rate by 26.8%, 20.2%, and 5.6% compared to the SOTA model. Human evaluation verifies that the multi-granularity instructions can better align with users' usage habits. Our data and code will be released upon acceptance.

Existing LLM-based agents have achieved strong performance on held-in tasks, but their generalizability to unseen tasks remains poor. Hence, some recent work focus on fine-tuning the policy model with more diverse tasks to improve the generalizability. In this work, we find that finetuning a reward model to guide the policy model is more robust than directly finetuning the policy model. Based on this finding, we propose AgentRM, a generalizable reward model, to guide the policy model for effective test-time search. We comprehensively investigate three approaches to construct the reward model, including explicit reward modeling, implicit reward modeling and LLM-as-a-judge. We then use AgentRM to guide the answer generation with Best-of-N sampling and step-level beam search. On four types of nine agent tasks, AgentRM enhances the base policy model by 8.8 points on average, surpassing the top general agent by 4.0. Moreover, it demonstrates weak-to-strong generalization, yielding greater improvement of 12.6 on LLaMA-3-70B policy model. As for the specializability, AgentRM can also boost a finetuned policy model and outperform the top specialized agent by 11.4 on three held-in tasks. Further analysis verifies its effectiveness in test-time scaling. Codes will be released to facilitate the research in this area.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

Training generalist policies for robotic manipulation has shown great promise, as they enable language-conditioned, multi-task behaviors across diverse scenarios. However, evaluating these policies remains difficult because real-world testing is expensive, time-consuming, and labor-intensive. It also requires frequent environment resets and carries safety risks when deploying unproven policies on physical robots. Manually creating and populating simulation environments with assets for robotic manipulation has not addressed these issues, primarily due to the significant engineering effort required and the substantial sim-to-real gap, both in terms of physics and rendering. In this paper, we explore the use of action-conditional video generation models as a scalable way to learn world models for policy evaluation. We demonstrate how to incorporate action conditioning into existing pre-trained video generation models. This allows leveraging internet-scale in-the-wild online videos during the pre-training stage and alleviates the need for a large dataset of paired video-action data, which is expensive to collect for robotic manipulation. Our paper examines the effect of dataset diversity, pre-trained weights, and common failure cases for the proposed evaluation pipeline. Our experiments demonstrate that across various metrics, including policy ranking and the correlation between actual policy values and predicted policy values, these models offer a promising approach for evaluating policies without requiring real-world interactions.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit robust problem-solving capabilities for diverse tasks. However, most LLM-based agents are designed as specific task solvers with sophisticated prompt engineering, rather than agents capable of learning and evolving through interactions. These task solvers necessitate manually crafted prompts to inform task rules and regulate LLM behaviors, inherently incapacitating to address complex dynamic scenarios e.g., large interactive games. In light of this, we propose Agent-Pro: an LLM-based Agent with Policy-level Reflection and Optimization that can learn a wealth of expertise from interactive experiences and progressively elevate its behavioral policy. Specifically, it involves a dynamic belief generation and reflection process for policy evolution. Rather than action-level reflection, Agent-Pro iteratively reflects on past trajectories and beliefs, fine-tuning its irrational beliefs for a better policy. Moreover, a depth-first search is employed for policy optimization, ensuring continual enhancement in policy payoffs. Agent-Pro is evaluated across two games: Blackjack and Texas Hold'em, outperforming vanilla LLM and specialized models. Our results show Agent-Pro can learn and evolve in complex and dynamic scenes, which also benefits numerous LLM-based applications.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

We present Universal Manipulation Interface (UMI) -- a data collection and policy learning framework that allows direct skill transfer from in-the-wild human demonstrations to deployable robot policies. UMI employs hand-held grippers coupled with careful interface design to enable portable, low-cost, and information-rich data collection for challenging bimanual and dynamic manipulation demonstrations. To facilitate deployable policy learning, UMI incorporates a carefully designed policy interface with inference-time latency matching and a relative-trajectory action representation. The resulting learned policies are hardware-agnostic and deployable across multiple robot platforms. Equipped with these features, UMI framework unlocks new robot manipulation capabilities, allowing zero-shot generalizable dynamic, bimanual, precise, and long-horizon behaviors, by only changing the training data for each task. We demonstrate UMI's versatility and efficacy with comprehensive real-world experiments, where policies learned via UMI zero-shot generalize to novel environments and objects when trained on diverse human demonstrations. UMI's hardware and software system is open-sourced at https://umi-gripper.github.io.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Robot learning approaches such as behavior cloning and reinforcement learning have shown great promise in synthesizing robot skills from human demonstrations in specific environments. However, these approaches often require task-specific demonstrations or designing complex simulation environments, which limits the development of generalizable and robust policies for unseen real-world settings. Recent advances in the use of foundation models for robotics (e.g., LLMs, VLMs) have shown great potential in enabling systems to understand the semantics in the world from large-scale internet data. However, it remains an open challenge to use this knowledge to enable robotic systems to understand the underlying dynamics of the world, to generalize policies across different tasks, and to adapt policies to new environments. To alleviate these limitations, we propose an agentic framework for robot self-guidance and self-improvement, which consists of a set of role-specialized conversational agents, such as a high-level advisor, a grounding agent, a monitoring agent, and a robotic agent. Our framework iteratively grounds a base robot policy to relevant objects in the environment and uses visuomotor cues to shift the action distribution of the policy to more desirable states, online, while remaining agnostic to the subjective configuration of a given robot hardware platform. We demonstrate that our approach can effectively guide manipulation policies to achieve significantly higher success rates, both in simulation and in real-world experiments, without the need for additional human demonstrations or extensive exploration. Code and videos available at: https://agenticrobots.github.io

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

Reward models (RMs) play a critical role in enhancing the reasoning performance of LLMs. For example, they can provide training signals to finetune LLMs during reinforcement learning (RL) and help select the best answer from multiple candidates during inference. In this paper, we provide a systematic introduction to RMs, along with a comprehensive survey of their applications in LLM reasoning. We first review fundamental concepts of RMs, including their architectures, training methodologies, and evaluation techniques. Then, we explore their key applications: (1) guiding generation and selecting optimal outputs during LLM inference, (2) facilitating data synthesis and iterative self-improvement for LLMs, and (3) providing training signals in RL-based finetuning. Finally, we discuss critical open questions regarding the selection, generalization, evaluation, and enhancement of RMs, based on existing research and our own empirical findings. Our analysis aims to provide actionable insights for the effective deployment and advancement of RMs for LLM reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) possess the potential to exert substantial influence on public perceptions and interactions with information. This raises concerns about the societal impact that could arise if the ideologies within these models can be easily manipulated. In this work, we investigate how effectively LLMs can learn and generalize ideological biases from their instruction-tuning data. Our findings reveal a concerning vulnerability: exposure to only a small amount of ideologically driven samples significantly alters the ideology of LLMs. Notably, LLMs demonstrate a startling ability to absorb ideology from one topic and generalize it to even unrelated ones. The ease with which LLMs' ideologies can be skewed underscores the risks associated with intentionally poisoned training data by malicious actors or inadvertently introduced biases by data annotators. It also emphasizes the imperative for robust safeguards to mitigate the influence of ideological manipulations on LLMs.

Performing tasks on the web presents fundamental challenges to large language models (LLMs), including combinatorially large open-world tasks and variations across web interfaces. Simply specifying a large prompt to handle all possible behaviors and states is extremely complex, and results in behavior leaks between unrelated behaviors. Decomposition to distinct policies can address this challenge, but requires carefully handing off control between policies. We propose Stacked LLM Policies for Web Actions (SteP), an approach to dynamically compose policies to solve a diverse set of web tasks. SteP defines a Markov Decision Process where the state is a stack of policies representing the control state, i.e., the chain of policy calls. Unlike traditional methods that are restricted to static hierarchies, SteP enables dynamic control that adapts to the complexity of the task. We evaluate SteP against multiple baselines and web environments including WebArena, MiniWoB++, and a CRM. On WebArena, SteP improves (14.9\% to 33.5\%) over SOTA that use GPT-4 policies, while on MiniWob++, SteP is competitive with prior works while using significantly less data. Our code and data are available at https://asappresearch.github.io/webagents-step.

Recent research has shown that LLM performance on reasoning tasks can be enhanced by scaling test-time compute. One promising approach, particularly with decomposable problems, involves arranging intermediate solutions as a graph on which transformations are performed to explore the solution space. However, prior works rely on pre-determined, task-specific transformation schedules which are subject to a set of searched hyperparameters. In this work, we view thought graph transformations as actions in a Markov decision process, and implement policy agents to drive effective action policies for the underlying reasoning LLM agent. In particular, we investigate the ability for another LLM to act as a policy agent on thought graph environments and introduce ARIES, a multi-agent architecture for reasoning with LLMs. In ARIES, reasoning LLM agents solve decomposed subproblems, while policy LLM agents maintain visibility of the thought graph states, and dynamically adapt the problem-solving strategy. Through extensive experiments, we observe that using off-the-shelf LLMs as policy agents with no supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can yield up to 29% higher accuracy on HumanEval relative to static transformation schedules, as well as reducing inference costs by 35% and avoid any search requirements. We also conduct a thorough analysis of observed failure modes, highlighting that limitations on LLM sizes and the depth of problem decomposition can be seen as challenges to scaling LLM-guided reasoning.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75\% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

With the prosperity of large language models (LLMs), powerful LLM-based intelligent agents have been developed to provide customized services with a set of user-defined tools. State-of-the-art methods for constructing LLM agents adopt trained LLMs and further fine-tune them on data for the agent task. However, we show that such methods are vulnerable to our proposed backdoor attacks named BadAgent on various agent tasks, where a backdoor can be embedded by fine-tuning on the backdoor data. At test time, the attacker can manipulate the deployed LLM agents to execute harmful operations by showing the trigger in the agent input or environment. To our surprise, our proposed attack methods are extremely robust even after fine-tuning on trustworthy data. Though backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in natural language processing, to the best of our knowledge, we could be the first to study them on LLM agents that are more dangerous due to the permission to use external tools. Our work demonstrates the clear risk of constructing LLM agents based on untrusted LLMs or data. Our code is public at https://github.com/DPamK/BadAgent

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

Bias in LLMs can harm user experience and societal outcomes. However, current bias mitigation methods often require intensive human feedback, lack transferability to other topics or yield overconfident and random outputs. We find that involving LLMs in role-playing scenario boosts their ability to recognize and mitigate biases. Based on this, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Multi-role Debates as Feedback (RLDF), a novel approach for bias mitigation replacing human feedback in traditional RLHF. We utilize LLMs in multi-role debates to create a dataset that includes both high-bias and low-bias instances for training the reward model in reinforcement learning. Our approach comprises two modes: (1) self-reflection, where the same LLM participates in multi-role debates, and (2) teacher-student, where a more advanced LLM like GPT-3.5-turbo guides the LLM to perform this task. Experimental results across different LLMs on BBQ and our datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in bias mitigation. Our source code and datasets are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RLDF-E344.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a range of text-generation tasks. However, LLMs still struggle with problems requiring multi-step decision-making and environmental feedback, such as online shopping, scientific reasoning, and mathematical problem-solving. Unlike pure text data, collecting large-scale decision-making data is challenging. Moreover, many powerful LLMs are only accessible through APIs, which hinders their fine-tuning for agent tasks due to cost and complexity. To address LLM agents' limitations, we propose a framework that can automatically learn a reward model from the environment without human annotations. This model can be used to evaluate the action trajectories of LLM agents and provide heuristics for task planning. Specifically, our approach involves employing one LLM-based agent to navigate an environment randomly, generating diverse action trajectories. Subsequently, a separate LLM is leveraged to assign a task intent and synthesize a negative response alongside the correct response for each trajectory. These triplets (task intent, positive response, and negative response) are then utilized as training data to optimize a reward model capable of scoring action trajectories. The effectiveness and generalizability of our framework are demonstrated through evaluations conducted on different agent benchmarks. In conclusion, our proposed framework represents a significant advancement in enhancing LLM agents' decision-making capabilities. By automating the learning of reward models, we overcome the challenges of data scarcity and API limitations, potentially revolutionizing the application of LLMs in complex and interactive environments. This research paves the way for more sophisticated AI agents capable of tackling a wide range of real-world problems requiring multi-step decision-making.

Quantization leverages lower-precision weights to reduce the memory usage of large language models (LLMs) and is a key technique for enabling their deployment on commodity hardware. While LLM quantization's impact on utility has been extensively explored, this work for the first time studies its adverse effects from a security perspective. We reveal that widely used quantization methods can be exploited to produce a harmful quantized LLM, even though the full-precision counterpart appears benign, potentially tricking users into deploying the malicious quantized model. We demonstrate this threat using a three-staged attack framework: (i) first, we obtain a malicious LLM through fine-tuning on an adversarial task; (ii) next, we quantize the malicious model and calculate constraints that characterize all full-precision models that map to the same quantized model; (iii) finally, using projected gradient descent, we tune out the poisoned behavior from the full-precision model while ensuring that its weights satisfy the constraints computed in step (ii). This procedure results in an LLM that exhibits benign behavior in full precision but when quantized, it follows the adversarial behavior injected in step (i). We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an attack across three diverse scenarios: vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal attack. In practice, the adversary could host the resulting full-precision model on an LLM community hub such as Hugging Face, exposing millions of users to the threat of deploying its malicious quantized version on their devices.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, their potential use in automating cyberattacks becomes increasingly likely. With capabilities such as reconnaissance, exploitation, and command execution, LLMs could soon become integral to autonomous cyber agents, capable of launching highly sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we introduce novel defense strategies that exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of attacking LLMs. By targeting weaknesses such as biases, trust in input, memory limitations, and their tunnel-vision approach to problem-solving, we develop techniques to mislead, delay, or neutralize these autonomous agents. We evaluate our defenses under black-box conditions, starting with single prompt-response scenarios and progressing to real-world tests using custom-built CTF machines. Our results show defense success rates of up to 90\%, demonstrating the effectiveness of turning LLM vulnerabilities into defensive strategies against LLM-driven cyber threats.

The rapid advancement in large language models (LLMs) has brought forth a diverse range of models with varying capabilities that excel in different tasks and domains. However, selecting the optimal LLM for user queries often involves a challenging trade-off between accuracy and cost, a problem exacerbated by the diverse demands of individual queries. In this work, we present a novel framework that formulates the LLM selection process as a multi-armed bandit problem, enabling dynamic and intelligent routing of queries to the most appropriate model. Our approach incorporates a preference-conditioned dynamic routing mechanism, allowing users to specify their preferences at inference time, thereby offering a customizable balance between performance and cost. Additionally, our selection policy is designed to generalize to unseen LLMs, ensuring adaptability to new models as they emerge. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves significant improvements in both accuracy and cost-effectiveness across various LLM platforms, showcasing the potential of our framework to adaptively optimize LLM selection in real-world scenarios.

Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

In multi-agent tasks, the central challenge lies in the dynamic adaptation of strategies. However, directly conditioning on opponents' strategies is intractable in the prevalent deep reinforcement learning paradigm due to a fundamental ``representational bottleneck'': neural policies are opaque, high-dimensional parameter vectors that are incomprehensible to other agents. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift that bridges this gap by representing policies as human-interpretable source code and utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as approximate interpreters. This programmatic representation allows us to operationalize the game-theoretic concept of Program Equilibrium. We reformulate the learning problem by utilizing LLMs to perform optimization directly in the space of programmatic policies. The LLM functions as a point-wise best-response operator that iteratively synthesizes and refines the ego agent's policy code to respond to the opponent's strategy. We formalize this process as Programmatic Iterated Best Response (PIBR), an algorithm where the policy code is optimized by textual gradients, using structured feedback derived from game utility and runtime unit tests. We demonstrate that this approach effectively solves several standard coordination matrix games and a cooperative Level-Based Foraging environment.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have achieved widespread application across various fields. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs suffer from a lack of structured reasoning ability, particularly for complex tasks requiring domain-specific best practices, which are often unavailable in the training data. Although multi-step prompting methods incorporating human best practices, such as chain-of-thought and tree-of-thought, have gained popularity, they lack a general mechanism to control LLM behavior. In this paper, we propose SHERPA, a model-driven framework to improve the LLM performance on complex tasks by explicitly incorporating domain-specific best practices into hierarchical state machines. By structuring the LLM execution processes using state machines, SHERPA enables more fine-grained control over their behavior via rules or decisions driven by machine learning-based approaches, including LLMs. We show that SHERPA is applicable to a wide variety of tasks-specifically, code generation, class name generation, and question answering-replicating previously proposed approaches while further improving the performance. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SHERPA for the aforementioned tasks using various LLMs. Our systematic evaluation compares different state machine configurations against baseline approaches without state machines. Results show that integrating well-designed state machines significantly improves the quality of LLM outputs, and is particularly beneficial for complex tasks with well-established human best practices but lacking data used for training LLMs.

A core challenge for autonomous LLM agents in collaborative settings is balancing robust privacy understanding and preservation alongside task efficacy. Existing privacy benchmarks only focus on simplistic, single-turn interactions where private information can be trivially omitted without affecting task outcomes. In this paper, we introduce MAGPIE (Multi-AGent contextual PrIvacy Evaluation), a novel benchmark of 200 high-stakes tasks designed to evaluate privacy understanding and preservation in multi-agent collaborative, non-adversarial scenarios. MAGPIE integrates private information as essential for task resolution, forcing agents to balance effective collaboration with strategic information control. Our evaluation reveals that state-of-the-art agents, including GPT-5 and Gemini 2.5-Pro, exhibit significant privacy leakage, with Gemini 2.5-Pro leaking up to 50.7% and GPT-5 up to 35.1% of the sensitive information even when explicitly instructed not to. Moreover, these agents struggle to achieve consensus or task completion and often resort to undesirable behaviors such as manipulation and power-seeking (e.g., Gemini 2.5-Pro demonstrating manipulation in 38.2% of the cases). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust privacy understanding and are not yet adequately aligned to simultaneously preserve privacy and maintain effective collaboration in complex environments.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

Large-scale reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has demonstrated its effectiveness in harnessing the potential of large language models (LLMs) for single-turn reasoning tasks. In realistic reasoning scenarios, LLMs can often utilize external tools to assist in task-solving processes. However, current RL algorithms inadequately balance the models' intrinsic long-horizon reasoning capabilities and their proficiency in multi-turn tool interactions. To bridge this gap, we propose Agentic Reinforced Policy Optimization (ARPO), a novel agentic RL algorithm tailored for training multi-turn LLM-based agents. Through preliminary experiments, we observe that LLMs tend to exhibit highly uncertain behavior, characterized by an increase in the entropy distribution of generated tokens, immediately following interactions with external tools. Motivated by this observation, ARPO incorporates an entropy-based adaptive rollout mechanism, dynamically balancing global trajectory sampling and step-level sampling, thereby promoting exploration at steps with high uncertainty after tool usage. By integrating an advantage attribution estimation, ARPO enables LLMs to internalize advantage differences in stepwise tool-use interactions. Our experiments across 13 challenging benchmarks in computational reasoning, knowledge reasoning, and deep search domains demonstrate ARPO's superiority over trajectory-level RL algorithms. Remarkably, ARPO achieves improved performance using only half of the tool-use budget required by existing methods, offering a scalable solution for aligning LLM-based agents with real-time dynamic environments. Our code and datasets are released at https://github.com/dongguanting/ARPO

Configuring LLM-based agent systems involves choosing workflows, tools, token budgets, and prompts from a large combinatorial design space, and is typically handled today by fixed large templates or hand-tuned heuristics. This leads to brittle behavior and unnecessary compute, since the same cumbersome configuration is often applied to both easy and hard input queries. We formulate agent configuration as a query-wise decision problem and introduce ARC (Agentic Resource & Configuration learner), which learns a light-weight hierarchical policy using reinforcement learning to dynamically tailor these configurations. Across multiple benchmarks spanning reasoning and tool-augmented question answering, the learned policy consistently outperforms strong hand-designed and other baselines, achieving up to 25% higher task accuracy while also reducing token and runtime costs. These results demonstrate that learning per-query agent configurations is a powerful alternative to "one size fits all" designs.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

A broad use case of large language models (LLMs) is in goal-directed decision-making tasks (or "agent" tasks), where an LLM needs to not just generate completions for a given prompt, but rather make intelligent decisions over a multi-turn interaction to accomplish a task (e.g., when interacting with the web, using tools, or providing customer support). Reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general paradigm to address such agent tasks, but current RL methods for LLMs largely focus on optimizing single-turn rewards. By construction, most single-turn RL methods cannot endow LLMs with the ability to intelligently seek information over multiple turns, perform credit assignment, or reason about their past actions -- all of which are critical in agent tasks. This raises the question: how can we design effective and efficient multi-turn RL algorithms for LLMs? In this paper, we develop a framework for building multi-turn RL algorithms for fine-tuning LLMs, that preserves the flexibility of existing single-turn RL methods for LLMs (e.g., proximal policy optimization), while accommodating multiple turns, long horizons, and delayed rewards effectively. To do this, our framework adopts a hierarchical RL approach and runs two RL algorithms in parallel: a high-level off-policy value-based RL algorithm to aggregate reward over utterances, and a low-level RL algorithm that utilizes this high-level value function to train a token policy within each utterance or turn. Our hierarchical framework, Actor-Critic Framework with a Hierarchical Structure (ArCHer), can also give rise to other RL methods. Empirically, we find that ArCHer significantly improves efficiency and performance on agent tasks, attaining a sample efficiency of about 100x over existing methods, while also improving with larger model capacity (upto the 7 billion scale that we tested on).

Robotic manipulation in real-world settings remains challenging, especially regarding robust generalization. Existing simulation platforms lack sufficient support for exploring how policies adapt to varied instructions and scenarios. Thus, they lag behind the growing interest in instruction-following foundation models like LLMs, whose adaptability is crucial yet remains underexplored in fair comparisons. To bridge this gap, we introduce GenManip, a realistic tabletop simulation platform tailored for policy generalization studies. It features an automatic pipeline via LLM-driven task-oriented scene graph to synthesize large-scale, diverse tasks using 10K annotated 3D object assets. To systematically assess generalization, we present GenManip-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios refined via human-in-the-loop corrections. We evaluate two policy types: (1) modular manipulation systems integrating foundation models for perception, reasoning, and planning, and (2) end-to-end policies trained through scalable data collection. Results show that while data scaling benefits end-to-end methods, modular systems enhanced with foundation models generalize more effectively across diverse scenarios. We anticipate this platform to facilitate critical insights for advancing policy generalization in realistic conditions. Project Page: https://genmanip.axi404.top/.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

In complex multi-agent environments, achieving efficient learning and desirable behaviours is a significant challenge for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) systems. This work explores the potential of combining MARL with Large Language Model (LLM)-mediated interventions to guide agents toward more desirable behaviours. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs can be used to interpret and facilitate interventions that shape the learning trajectories of multiple agents. We experimented with two types of interventions, referred to as controllers: a Natural Language (NL) Controller and a Rule-Based (RB) Controller. The NL Controller, which uses an LLM to simulate human-like interventions, showed a stronger impact than the RB Controller. Our findings indicate that agents particularly benefit from early interventions, leading to more efficient training and higher performance. Both intervention types outperform the baseline without interventions, highlighting the potential of LLM-mediated guidance to accelerate training and enhance MARL performance in challenging environments.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across various industries due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, for safe and effective real-world deployments, ensuring honesty and helpfulness is critical. This paper addresses the question: Can we prioritize the helpfulness of LLMs while preserving their honesty? To begin with, we establish exhaustive principles aimed at guaranteeing the honesty of LLM. Additionally, we introduce a novel dataset, referred to as HoneSet, comprising 930 queries spanning six categories meticulously crafted to assess an LLM's capacity for maintaining honesty. Subsequently, we present two approaches to augmenting honesty and helpfulness in LLMs: a training-free enhancement and a fine-tuning-based improvement. The training-free approach, which is based on curiosity-driven prompting, empowers LLMs to articulate internal confusion and uncertainty regarding queries, thereby optimizing their responses. Conversely, the fine-tuning-based method employs a two-stage process inspired by curriculum learning: initially instructing LLMs to discern between honest and dishonest responses, then refining their training to enhance helpfulness. Experiments conducted on nine prominent LLMs demonstrate a significant improvement in alignment with honesty across all models through the implementation of our proposed enhancements. Particularly noteworthy is the 65.3% enhancement observed in Llama3-8b and the remarkable 124.7% improvement in Mistral-7b, as measured by the H^{2} (honest and helpful) assessment. We believe that our work can pave the way for developing more trustworthy LLMs for real-world applications.

Despite advances in large language models (LLMs) on reasoning and instruction-following benchmarks, it remains unclear whether they can reliably produce outputs aligned with a broad variety of user goals, a concept we refer to as steerability. The abundance of methods proposed to modify LLM behavior makes it unclear whether current LLMs are already steerable, or require further intervention. In particular, LLMs may exhibit (i) poor coverage, where rare user goals are underrepresented; (ii) miscalibration, where models overshoot requests; and (iii) side effects, where changes to one dimension of text inadvertently affect others. To systematically evaluate these failures, we introduce a framework based on a multi-dimensional goal space that models user goals and LLM outputs as vectors with dimensions corresponding to text attributes (e.g., reading difficulty). Applied to a text-rewriting task, we find that current LLMs struggle with steerability, as side effects are persistent. Interventions to improve steerability, such as prompt engineering, best-of-N sampling, and reinforcement learning fine-tuning, have varying effectiveness, yet side effects remain problematic. Our findings suggest that even strong LLMs struggle with steerability, and existing alignment strategies may be insufficient. We open-source our steerability evaluation framework at https://github.com/MLD3/steerability.

The proliferation of LLM-based agents has led to increasing deployment of inter-agent collaboration for tasks like scheduling, negotiation, resource allocation etc. In such systems, privacy is critical, as agents often access proprietary tools and domain-specific databases requiring strict confidentiality. This paper examines whether LLM-based agents demonstrate an understanding of contextual privacy. And, if instructed, do these systems preserve inference time user privacy in non-adversarial multi-turn conversation. Existing benchmarks to evaluate contextual privacy in LLM-agents primarily assess single-turn, low-complexity tasks where private information can be easily excluded. We first present a benchmark - MAGPIE comprising 158 real-life high-stakes scenarios across 15 domains. These scenarios are designed such that complete exclusion of private data impedes task completion yet unrestricted information sharing could lead to substantial losses. We then evaluate the current state-of-the-art LLMs on (a) their understanding of contextually private data and (b) their ability to collaborate without violating user privacy. Empirical experiments demonstrate that current models, including GPT-4o and Claude-2.7-Sonnet, lack robust understanding of contextual privacy, misclassifying private data as shareable 25.2\% and 43.6\% of the time. In multi-turn conversations, these models disclose private information in 59.9\% and 50.5\% of cases even under explicit privacy instructions. Furthermore, multi-agent systems fail to complete tasks in 71\% of scenarios. These results underscore that current models are not aligned towards both contextual privacy preservation and collaborative task-solving.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Generative reward models (also known as LLMs-as-judges), which use large language models (LLMs) to evaluate answer quality, are increasingly adopted in reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). They are often preferred over rigid rule-based metrics, especially for complex reasoning tasks involving free-form outputs. In this paradigm, an LLM is typically prompted to compare a candidate answer against a ground-truth reference and assign a binary reward indicating correctness. Despite the seeming simplicity of this comparison task, we find that generative reward models exhibit surprising vulnerabilities to superficial manipulations: non-word symbols (e.g., ":" or ".") or reasoning openers like "Thought process:" and "Let's solve this problem step by step." can often lead to false positive rewards. We demonstrate that this weakness is widespread across LLMs, datasets, and prompt formats, posing a serious threat for core algorithmic paradigms that rely on generative reward models, such as rejection sampling, preference optimization, and RLVR. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective data augmentation strategy and train a new generative reward model with substantially improved robustness. Our findings highlight the urgent need for more reliable LLM-based evaluation methods. We release our robust, general-domain reward model and its synthetic training data at https://huggingface.co/sarosavo/Master-RM and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sarosavo/Master-RM.

Scaling laws have emerged as important components of large language model (LLM) training as they can predict performance gains through scale, and provide guidance on important hyper-parameter choices that would otherwise be expensive. LLMs also rely on large, high-quality training datasets, like those sourced from (sometimes sensitive) user data. Training models on this sensitive user data requires careful privacy protections like differential privacy (DP). However, the dynamics of DP training are significantly different, and consequently their scaling laws are not yet fully understood. In this work, we establish scaling laws that accurately model the intricacies of DP LLM training, providing a complete picture of the compute-privacy-utility tradeoffs and the optimal training configurations in many settings.

Researchers have been studying approaches to steer the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and build personalized LLMs tailored for various applications. While fine-tuning seems to be a direct solution, it requires substantial computational resources and may significantly affect the utility of the original LLM. Recent endeavors have introduced more lightweight strategies, focusing on extracting "steering vectors" to guide the model's output toward desired behaviors by adjusting activations within specific layers of the LLM's transformer architecture. However, such steering vectors are directly extracted from the activations of human preference data and thus often lead to suboptimal results and occasional failures, especially in alignment-related scenarios. This work proposes an innovative approach that could produce more effective steering vectors through bi-directional preference optimization. Our method is designed to allow steering vectors to directly influence the generation probability of contrastive human preference data pairs, thereby offering a more precise representation of the target behavior. By carefully adjusting the direction and magnitude of the steering vector, we enabled personalized control over the desired behavior across a spectrum of intensities. Extensive experimentation across various open-ended generation tasks, particularly focusing on steering AI personas, has validated the efficacy of our approach. Moreover, we comprehensively investigate critical alignment-concerning scenarios, such as managing truthfulness, mitigating hallucination, and addressing jailbreaking attacks. Remarkably, our method can still demonstrate outstanding steering effectiveness across these scenarios. Furthermore, we showcase the transferability of our steering vectors across different models/LoRAs and highlight the synergistic benefits of applying multiple vectors simultaneously.

Robotic manipulation policies are commonly initialized through imitation learning, but their performance is limited by the scarcity and narrow coverage of expert data. Reinforcement learning can refine polices to alleviate this limitation, yet real-robot training is costly and unsafe, while training in simulators suffers from the sim-to-real gap. Recent advances in generative models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in real-world simulation, with diffusion models in particular excelling at generation. This raises the question of how diffusion model-based world models can be combined to enhance pre-trained policies in robotic manipulation. In this work, we propose World4RL, a framework that employs diffusion-based world models as high-fidelity simulators to refine pre-trained policies entirely in imagined environments for robotic manipulation. Unlike prior works that primarily employ world models for planning, our framework enables direct end-to-end policy optimization. World4RL is designed around two principles: pre-training a diffusion world model that captures diverse dynamics on multi-task datasets and refining policies entirely within a frozen world model to avoid online real-world interactions. We further design a two-hot action encoding scheme tailored for robotic manipulation and adopt diffusion backbones to improve modeling fidelity. Extensive simulation and real-world experiments demonstrate that World4RL provides high-fidelity environment modeling and enables consistent policy refinement, yielding significantly higher success rates compared to imitation learning and other baselines. More visualization results are available at https://world4rl.github.io/.

Visuomotor policies trained via behavior cloning are vulnerable to covariate shift, where small deviations from expert trajectories can compound into failure. Common strategies to mitigate this issue involve expanding the training distribution through human-in-the-loop corrections or synthetic data augmentation. However, these approaches are often labor-intensive, rely on strong task assumptions, or compromise the quality of imitation. We introduce Latent Policy Barrier, a framework for robust visuomotor policy learning. Inspired by Control Barrier Functions, LPB treats the latent embeddings of expert demonstrations as an implicit barrier separating safe, in-distribution states from unsafe, out-of-distribution (OOD) ones. Our approach decouples the role of precise expert imitation and OOD recovery into two separate modules: a base diffusion policy solely on expert data, and a dynamics model trained on both expert and suboptimal policy rollout data. At inference time, the dynamics model predicts future latent states and optimizes them to stay within the expert distribution. Both simulated and real-world experiments show that LPB improves both policy robustness and data efficiency, enabling reliable manipulation from limited expert data and without additional human correction or annotation.

We study an emerging problem named "grasping the invisible" in robotic manipulation, in which a robot is tasked to grasp an initially invisible target object via a sequence of pushing and grasping actions. In this problem, pushes are needed to search for the target and rearrange cluttered objects around it to enable effective grasps. We propose to solve the problem by formulating a deep learning approach in a critic-policy format. The target-oriented motion critic, which maps both visual observations and target information to the expected future rewards of pushing and grasping motion primitives, is learned via deep Q-learning. We divide the problem into two subtasks, and two policies are proposed to tackle each of them, by combining the critic predictions and relevant domain knowledge. A Bayesian-based policy accounting for past action experience performs pushing to search for the target; once the target is found, a classifier-based policy coordinates target-oriented pushing and grasping to grasp the target in clutter. The motion critic and the classifier are trained in a self-supervised manner through robot-environment interactions. Our system achieves a 93% and 87% task success rate on each of the two subtasks in simulation and an 85% task success rate in real robot experiments on the whole problem, which outperforms several baselines by large margins. Supplementary material is available at https://sites.google.com/umn.edu/grasping-invisible.

Process Reward Models (PRMs) are rapidly becoming the backbone of LLM reasoning pipelines, yet we demonstrate that state-of-the-art PRMs are systematically exploitable under adversarial optimization pressure. To address this, we introduce a three-tiered diagnostic framework that applies increasing adversarial pressure to quantify these vulnerabilities. Static perturbation analysis uncovers a fluency-logic dissociation: high invariance to surface-level style changes reward changes <0.1, yet inconsistent detection of logically-corrupted reasoning, with different models failing on different attack types. Adversarial optimization demonstrates that gradient-based attacks inflate rewards on invalid trajectories, with reward landscapes exhibiting wide, exploitable peaks. RL-induced reward hacking exposes the critical failure mode: policies trained on AIME problems achieve near-perfect PRM rewards (>0.9), while ground-truth accuracy remains low (below 4%), with 43% of reward gains attributable to stylistic shortcuts. These findings reveal that current PRMs function as fluency detectors rather than reasoning verifiers, creating systematic blind spots that undermine their use as training signals. We release PRM-BiasBench and a diagnostic toolkit to enable robustness evaluation before deployment. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/SqueezeAILab/reward-under-attack.