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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
RTB Bidding Algorithms Benchmark β€” First-Price Auctions
=========================================================
Self-contained script for HF Jobs execution.

Includes all 6 algorithms with detailed docstrings explaining each algorithm:
  - DualOGD          β€” Lagrangian dual + online gradient descent (Wang et al. 2023)
  - TwoSidedDual     β€” Budget cap + spend floor (k% minimum)  
  - ValueShading     β€” Adaptive value shading for first-price auctions
  - RLB              β€” MDP-based reinforcement learning (Cai et al. 2017)
  - Linear           β€” Proportional bidding baseline
  - Threshold        β€” Fixed-bid-if-pCTR-above-threshold baseline

See README.md for full algorithm descriptions and benchmark results.
See RESEARCH_RESOURCES.md for comprehensive literature survey.

Repo: https://huggingface.co/hamverbot/bidding_algorithms_benchmark
Primary Paper: Wang et al. 2023, arXiv:2304.13477

Usage:
  python benchmark_job.py --max_rows 200000 --budget 10000 --T 10000 --n_runs 5

Data Note:
  Criteo_x4 (reczoo/Criteo_x4) is 5.6GB across 37 Parquet files.
  Streaming 200K rows takes ~7 minutes due to the sequential scan over many files.
  For faster iterations, use --max_rows 20000 to load in ~45 seconds.
"""
import os, json, time, argparse
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
from datasets import load_dataset
from sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn.preprocessing import LabelEncoder, StandardScaler
from sklearn.metrics import roc_auc_score


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# BIDDING ALGORITHMS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Each algorithm has a detailed docstring explaining its mechanism.
# All are designed for FIRST-PRICE auctions (winner pays their bid).
# See README.md for the full theoretical treatment.

class DualOGDBidder:
    """
    ## DualOGD β€” Lagrangian Dual + Online Gradient Descent
    
    **Paper**: Wang et al. (2023), arXiv:2304.13477
    "Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budgets"
    
    The canonical approach: cast budget-constrained bidding as Lagrangian
    optimization. A dual multiplier Ξ» tracks over/under-spending relative to
    target rate ρ = B/T.
    
    **Bid rule**: b_t = argmax_b [(v-b)Β·GΜƒ(b) βˆ’ λ·bΒ·GΜƒ(b)]
    Maximizes (expected reward βˆ’ Ξ» Γ— expected cost)
    
    **Update**: Ξ» ← max(0, Ξ» βˆ’ Ρ·(ρ βˆ’ actual_cost))
    - Overspent β†’ Ξ» grows β†’ future bids penalized more
    - Underspent β†’ Ξ» shrinks β†’ future bids cheaper
    
    **Regret bound**: Γ•(√T) β€” provably near-optimal.
    
    **Limitation**: Without a floor constraint, Ξ» becomes conservative early
    and the algorithm leaves 20-25% of budget unspent. See TwoSidedDual.
    """
    def __init__(self, budget, T, vpc, epsilon=None, name="DualOGD"):
        self.B=budget; self.T=T; self.rho=budget/T; self.vpc=vpc; self.name=name
        self.lambd=0.0; self.epsilon=epsilon or 1.0/np.sqrt(T)
        self.total_spent=0.0; self.remaining_budget=budget
        self.t=0; self.total_wins=0; self.competing_bids=[]
    def bid(self, pctr, features=None):
        self.t+=1
        if self.remaining_budget<=0: return 0.0
        v=pctr*self.vpc; mb=min(v*2.0,self.remaining_budget)
        if mb<=0.1: return 0.0
        return self._opt(v,mb)
    def _opt(self,v,mb,n=50):
        if not self.competing_bids: return v*0.5
        bb,bs=0.0,-9e9
        for b in np.linspace(0.1,mb,n):
            wp=np.mean([1.0 if b>=d else 0.0 for d in self.competing_bids])
            s=(v-b)*wp-self.lambd*b*wp
            if s>bs: bs=s; bb=b
        return float(bb)
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
        if d_t: self.competing_bids.append(d_t)
        cf=cost if won else 0.0
        self.lambd=max(0.0, self.lambd-self.epsilon*(self.rho-cf))
    def get_stats(self):
        return {'name':self.name,'lambda':float(self.lambd),'spent':float(self.total_spent),
                'remaining':float(self.remaining_budget),'budget_used':float(self.total_spent/self.B) if self.B>0 else 0,
                'wins':self.total_wins,'t':self.t,'epsilon':float(self.epsilon),'rho':float(self.rho)}


class TwoSidedDualBidder(DualOGDBidder):
    """
    ## TwoSidedDual β€” Budget Cap + Spend Floor
    
    Extension of DualOGD. Two dual variables for two constraints:
    
    **ΞΌ (cap)**: ΞΌ ← max(0, ΞΌ βˆ’ η₁·(ρ βˆ’ cost))
    Penalizes overspending β†’ restrains when ahead on spend.
    
    **Ξ½ (floor)**: Ξ½ ← max(0, Ξ½ βˆ’ Ξ·β‚‚Β·(cost βˆ’ k·ρ))
    Penalizes UNDERspending β†’ encourages when behind on floor.
    
    **Effective multiplier**: (ΞΌ βˆ’ Ξ½). When Ξ½ > ΞΌ, penalty becomes negative
    β†’ bidding is encouraged to hit the spend floor.
    
    **Bid rule**: b_t = argmax_b [(vβˆ’b)Β·GΜƒ(b) βˆ’ (ΞΌβˆ’Ξ½)Β·bΒ·GΜƒ(b)]
    
    This algorithm is the best-performing in our benchmark because it balances
    the budget cap with a contractual minimum spend requirement (common in
    brand advertising campaigns).
    """
    def __init__(self,budget,T,vpc,k=0.8,ec=None,ef=None,name="TwoSidedDual"):
        super().__init__(budget,T,vpc,ec,name)
        self.k=k; self.k_rho=k*self.rho; self.nu=0.0
        self.ef=ef or 1.0/np.sqrt(T); self.mu=self.lambd; self.ec=self.epsilon
    def _opt(self,v,mb,n=50):
        if not self.competing_bids: return v*0.5
        eff=self.mu-self.nu; bb,bs=0.0,-9e9
        for b in np.linspace(0.1,mb,n):
            wp=np.mean([1.0 if b>=d else 0.0 for d in self.competing_bids])
            s=(v-b)*wp-eff*b*wp
            if s>bs: bs=s; bb=b
        return float(bb)
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
        if d_t: self.competing_bids.append(d_t)
        cf=cost if won else 0.0
        self.mu=max(0.0,self.mu-self.ec*(self.rho-cf))
        self.nu=max(0.0,self.nu-self.ef*(cf-self.k_rho))
        self.lambd=self.mu
    def get_stats(self):
        s=super().get_stats()
        s.update({'mu':float(self.mu),'nu':float(self.nu),'k':float(self.k)})
        return s


class ValueShadingBidder:
    """
    ## ValueShading β€” Adaptive Bid Shading for First-Price
    
    In first-price auctions, bidding your true value guarantees zero surplus
    (winner's curse). ValueShading scales bids: bid = v / (1 + Ξ»).
    
    Ξ» adapts online: wins β†’ Ξ» decreases (bid higher next time),
    losses β†’ Ξ» increases (bid more aggressively).
    
    Faster than DualOGD (closed-form, no grid search) but less precise
    about budget pacing. Spends full budget but with 16% higher CPC.
    """
    def __init__(self,budget,T,vpc,name="ValueShading"):
        self.B=budget; self.T=T; self.rho=budget/T; self.vpc=vpc; self.name=name
        self.lambd=0.0; self.epsilon=1.0/np.sqrt(T)
        self.total_spent=0.0; self.remaining_budget=budget
        self.t=0; self.total_wins=0; self.competing_bids=[]
    def bid(self,pctr,features=None):
        self.t+=1; v=pctr*self.vpc
        if self.remaining_budget<=0: return 0.0
        if self.competing_bids:
            bid=np.clip(v/(1.0+self.lambd+0.1),np.mean(self.competing_bids)*0.5,v*0.9)
        else: bid=v*0.5
        return min(bid,self.remaining_budget)
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
        if d_t: self.competing_bids.append(d_t)
        self.lambd=max(0.0,self.lambd-self.epsilon*(self.rho-(cost if won else 0.0)))
    def get_stats(self):
        return {'name':self.name,'lambda':float(self.lambd),'spent':float(self.total_spent),
                'remaining':float(self.remaining_budget),'wins':self.total_wins,'t':self.t}


class RLBBidder:
    """
    ## RLB β€” Reinforcement Learning for Bidding
    
    **Paper**: Cai et al. (2017), WSDM 2017, arXiv:1701.02490
    "Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising"
    
    MDP formulation:
    - State: (remaining_budget_ratio, pCTR_bucket)
    - Action: bid_multiplier ∈ {0.1Γ—, 0.3Γ—, ..., 2.0Γ—} of value
    - Reward: pCTR Γ— value_per_click if won, else 0
    
    Tabular Q-learning with Ξ΅-greedy exploration. No regret guarantees.
    Needs many more auctions to converge than the optimization-based methods.
    """
    def __init__(self,budget,T,vpc,name="RLB"):
        self.B=budget; self.T=T; self.vpc=vpc; self.name=name
        nb,np_,na=10,5,10
        self.Q=np.zeros((nb,np_,na)); self.bm=np.linspace(0.1,2.0,na)
        self.lr=0.1; self.gamma=0.95; self.eps=0.1
        self.total_spent=0.0; self.remaining_budget=budget
        self.t=0; self.total_wins=0; self.ls=None; self.la=None; self.nb=nb; self.np=np_
    def _s(self,pctr):
        br=self.remaining_budget/max(self.B,1)
        return (min(int(br*self.nb),self.nb-1), min(int(pctr*self.np),self.np-1))
    def bid(self,pctr,features=None):
        self.t+=1
        if self.remaining_budget<=0: return 0.0
        s=self._s(pctr); v=pctr*self.vpc
        a=np.random.randint(len(self.bm)) if np.random.random()<self.eps else np.argmax(self.Q[s[0],s[1],:])
        self.ls=s; self.la=a
        return min(v*self.bm[a],self.remaining_budget)
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
        if self.ls is not None:
            r=(pctr*self.vpc) if won else 0.0
            ns=self._s(pctr)
            old=self.Q[self.ls[0],self.ls[1],self.la]
            self.Q[self.ls[0],self.ls[1],self.la]=old+self.lr*(r+self.gamma*np.max(self.Q[ns[0],ns[1],:])-old)
    def get_stats(self):
        return {'name':self.name,'spent':float(self.total_spent),'remaining':float(self.remaining_budget),
                'wins':self.total_wins,'t':self.t}


class LinearBidder:
    """## Linear β€” Proportional Bidding Baseline. bid = base_bid Γ— (pCTR/avg_pCTR). No adaptation. Serves as lower bound."""
    def __init__(self,base_bid,avg_pctr,name="Linear"):
        self.base_bid=base_bid; self.avg_pctr=avg_pctr; self.name=name
        self.total_spent=0.0; self.remaining_budget=1e9; self.total_wins=0; self.t=0
    def bid(self,pctr,features=None):
        self.t+=1
        if self.remaining_budget<=0: return 0.0
        return min(self.base_bid*(pctr/max(self.avg_pctr,1e-6)),self.remaining_budget)
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
    def set_budget(self,b): self.remaining_budget=b
    def get_stats(self):
        return {'name':self.name,'spent':float(self.total_spent),'remaining':float(self.remaining_budget),
                'wins':self.total_wins,'t':self.t}


class ThresholdBidder:
    """## Threshold β€” Binary Bidding Baseline. Fixed bid if pCTR > threshold, else skip. Common rule of thumb."""
    def __init__(self,threshold,bid_value,name="Threshold"):
        self.threshold=threshold; self.bid_value=bid_value; self.name=name
        self.total_spent=0.0; self.remaining_budget=1e9; self.total_wins=0; self.t=0
    def bid(self,pctr,features=None):
        self.t+=1
        if self.remaining_budget<self.bid_value: return 0.0
        return self.bid_value if pctr>self.threshold else 0.0
    def update(self,won,cost,pctr,d_t=None):
        if won: self.total_spent+=cost; self.remaining_budget-=cost; self.total_wins+=1
    def set_budget(self,b): self.remaining_budget=b
    def get_stats(self):
        return {'name':self.name,'spent':float(self.total_spent),'remaining':float(self.remaining_budget),
                'wins':self.total_wins,'t':self.t}


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# FIRST-PRICE AUCTION SIMULATOR
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

class FPSim:
    """
    First-Price Auction Simulator.
    
    Simulates repeated first-price auctions. The maximum competing bid d_t
    follows a log-normal distribution whose mean correlates with impression
    quality (pCTR) β€” realistic: popular impressions attract more competition.
    
    Full information feedback: after each auction, d_t is revealed regardless
    of whether we won. This enables empirical CDF approaches.
    """
    def __init__(self,X,pctr,y,vpc=50,cfg=None,seed=42):
        self.X=X; self.pctr=pctr; self.y=y; self.vpc=vpc; self.N=len(X)
        self.rng=np.random.RandomState(seed)
        cfg=cfg or {}
        bm=cfg.get('base_mean',20); cc=cfg.get('ctr_correlation',10); ns=cfg.get('noise_std',0.6)
        mp=np.clip(bm+cc*self.pctr,1,200)
        self.mp=self.rng.lognormal(np.log(mp),ns,self.N)
        if self.X.shape[1]>1: self.mp*=np.exp((0.02*self.X[:,0]+0.01*self.X[:,1])*0.1)
        self.mp=np.clip(self.mp,0.5,500)
        self.pos=0; self.order=self.rng.permutation(self.N)
    def reset(self): self.pos=0; self.order=self.rng.permutation(self.N)
    def run(self,algo):
        self.reset()
        if hasattr(algo,'set_budget'): algo.set_budget(algo.B if hasattr(algo,'B') else 5000)
        tc=0; bl,wl,cl=[],[],[]
        while self.pos<self.N:
            idx=self.order[self.pos]; self.pos+=1
            bid=algo.bid(self.pctr[idx],self.X[idx])
            rem=algo.remaining_budget if hasattr(algo,'remaining_budget') else 1e9
            bid=np.clip(bid,0,rem)
            mp=self.mp[idx]; won=bid>=mp; cost=bid if won else 0.0
            if won: tc+=int(self.y[idx])
            algo.update(won,cost,self.pctr[idx],mp)
            bl.append(bid); wl.append(int(won)); cl.append(cost)
        s=algo.get_stats()
        s.update({'total_clicks':tc,'total_impressions':len(bl),'total_wins':sum(wl),
                  'total_spent':sum(cl),'ctr':tc/max(sum(wl),1),
                  'budget_used_frac':sum(cl)/algo.B if hasattr(algo,'B') else 0,
                  'cpc':sum(cl)/max(tc,1),'avg_bid':float(np.mean(bl)),
                  'win_rate':sum(wl)/max(len(wl),1),
                  'avg_market_price':float(np.mean(self.mp))})
        return s


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DATA LOADING
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

def load_data(max_rows=200000,seed=42):
    """
    Load and preprocess Criteo_x4.
    
    NOTE: Criteo_x4 is 5.6GB across 37 Parquet files. Streaming 200K rows
    takes ~7 minutes due to sequential Parquet scanning. For quick iteration:
      --max_rows 20000 (loads in ~45 seconds)
    """
    print(f"\nLoading Criteo_x4 ({max_rows} rows)...")
    ds=load_dataset("reczoo/Criteo_x4",split="train",streaming=True)
    rows=[row for i,row in enumerate(ds) if i<max_rows]
    df=pd.DataFrame(rows)
    print(f"  Loaded {len(df)} rows | CTR: {df['Label'].mean():.4f}")
    dc=[f'I{i}' for i in range(1,14)]; sc=[f'C{i}' for i in range(1,27)]
    for c in dc: df[c]=df[c].fillna(df[c].median())
    for c in sc: df[c]=LabelEncoder().fit_transform(df[c].fillna("MISSING").astype(str))
    dd=StandardScaler().fit_transform(df[dc].values)
    for i,c in enumerate(dc): df[c]=dd[:,i]
    sd=df[sc].values.astype(np.float32)
    sd=(sd-sd.mean(0))/(sd.std(0)+1e-8)
    for i,c in enumerate(sc): df[c]=sd[:,i]
    X=df[dc+sc].values.astype(np.float32); y=df['Label'].values.astype(np.float32)
    Xt,Xe,yt,ye=train_test_split(X,y,test_size=0.3,random_state=seed)
    return Xt,Xe,yt,ye


# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MAIN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

def main():
    p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description='RTB Bidding Benchmark β€” First-Price Auctions')
    p.add_argument('--max_rows',type=int,default=200000)
    p.add_argument('--budget',type=float,default=10000)
    p.add_argument('--T',type=int,default=10000)
    p.add_argument('--vpc',type=float,default=50)
    p.add_argument('--k',type=float,default=0.8)
    p.add_argument('--n_runs',type=int,default=5)
    p.add_argument('--output',type=str,default='results/benchmark_results.json')
    p.add_argument('--seed',type=int,default=42)
    args=p.parse_args()
    os.makedirs('results',exist_ok=True)
    t0=time.time()
    print("="*60+"\nRTB BIDDING BENCHMARK β€” FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS\n"+"="*60)
    print(f"Data: {args.max_rows} rows | Budget: {args.budget} | Auctions: {args.T} | VPC: {args.vpc} | Runs: {args.n_runs}")
    print(f"Min spend: {args.k*100:.0f}%")

    Xt,Xe,yt,ye=load_data(args.max_rows,args.seed)
    print(f"Data load: {time.time()-t0:.0f}s")

    ctr=LogisticRegression(max_iter=500,C=0.1,random_state=42)
    ctr.fit(Xt,yt)
    eauc=roc_auc_score(ye,ctr.predict_proba(Xe)[:,1])
    print(f"CTR AUC: test={eauc:.4f}")

    pctr=ctr.predict_proba(Xe)[:,1]
    print(f"pCTR: mean={pctr.mean():.4f} range=[{pctr.min():.2f},{pctr.max():.2f}]")

    all_results={}
    for run in range(args.n_runs):
        rs=args.seed+run
        print(f"\n--- Run {run+1}/{args.n_runs} (seed={rs}) ---")
        sim=FPSim(Xe[:args.T],pctr[:args.T],ye[:args.T],vpc=args.vpc,
                  cfg={'base_mean':20,'ctr_correlation':10,'noise_std':0.6},seed=rs)
        algos={
            'DualOGD':DualOGDBidder(args.budget,args.T,args.vpc),
            'TwoSidedDual':TwoSidedDualBidder(args.budget,args.T,args.vpc,k=args.k),
            'ValueShading':ValueShadingBidder(args.budget,args.T,args.vpc),
            'RLB':RLBBidder(args.budget,args.T,args.vpc),
            'Linear':LinearBidder(20.0,float(pctr.mean())),
            'Threshold':ThresholdBidder(0.3,30.0),
        }
        for a in algos.values():
            if hasattr(a,'B'): a.B=args.budget; a.remaining_budget=args.budget
        for name,algo in algos.items():
            r=sim.run(algo)
            if name not in all_results: all_results[name]=[]
            all_results[name].append(r)
            print(f"  {name:<16} clicks={r['total_clicks']:>4}  spent={r['total_spent']:>8.1f}  "
                  f"budget={r['budget_used_frac']:.1%}  CPC={r['cpc']:.2f}")

    print(f"\n{'='*60}\nFINAL RESULTS ({args.n_runs} runs)\n{'='*60}")
    print(f"{'Algorithm':<18} {'Clicks':>10} {'CPC':>9} {'Budget%':>9} {'WinRate':>8}")
    print("-"*58)
    aggregated={}
    for name,runs in all_results.items():
        clicks=[r['total_clicks'] for r in runs]
        cpc=[r['cpc'] for r in runs]
        bu=[r['budget_used_frac'] for r in runs]
        wr=[r['win_rate'] for r in runs]
        aggregated[name]={
            'clicks_mean':float(np.mean(clicks)),'clicks_std':float(np.std(clicks)),
            'cpc_mean':float(np.mean(cpc)),'cpc_std':float(np.std(cpc)),
            'budget_used_mean':float(np.mean(bu)),'budget_used_std':float(np.std(bu)),
            'win_rate_mean':float(np.mean(wr)),'win_rate_std':float(np.std(wr))}
    ranked=sorted(aggregated.items(),key=lambda x:x[1]['clicks_mean'],reverse=True)
    for i,(name,s) in enumerate(ranked):
        medal=['πŸ₯‡','πŸ₯ˆ','πŸ₯‰'][i] if i<3 else '  '
        print(f"{medal} {name:<16} {s['clicks_mean']:>7.0f}Β±{s['clicks_std']:.0f}  "
              f"{s['cpc_mean']:>7.2f}  {s['budget_used_mean']:>7.1%}  {s['win_rate_mean']:>6.1%}")

    output={'config':{'max_rows':args.max_rows,'budget':args.budget,'T':args.T,
            'vpc':args.vpc,'k':args.k,'n_runs':args.n_runs,'seed':args.seed,
            'ctr_test_auc':float(eauc)},'aggregated':aggregated}
    with open(args.output,'w') as f: json.dump(output,f,indent=2)
    print(f"\nSaved to {args.output}")
    print(f"Total time: {time.time()-t0:.0f}s β€” Done!")

if __name__=='__main__': main()