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README.md
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@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ Dataset** product. It contains roughly **~1.3% of the full dataset** at
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identical schema, threat-actor-tier distribution, and statistical fingerprint,
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so you can evaluate fit before licensing the full product.
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| File | Rows (sample) | Rows (full) | Description |
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|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------|
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| `identity_topology.csv` | ~150 | ~3,200 | Identity domain registry |
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- **Conditional Access (CA) policy enforcement** modeling — ZTNA block
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strength tunable per architecture
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## Calibrated Benchmark Targets
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The full product is calibrated to **12 benchmark validation tests** drawn
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## Suggested Use Cases
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- Training **
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-
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- **Impossible travel detection** — geo-velocity feature engineering
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- **MFA bypass detection** — distinguish FIDO2 anomalies from push fatigue
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- **Lateral movement detection** — session-graph traversal patterns
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- **Golden Ticket / Pass-the-Hash** detection benchmarking
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- **UEBA precision/recall tuning** with calibrated false-positive baselines
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- **Conditional Access policy effectiveness** simulation
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- **Insider threat scoring** with composite behavioral indicators
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- **Zero Trust posture validation** — ZTNA block rate analysis
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## Loading the Data
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enriched = sessions.merge(users, on="user_id", how="left",
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suffixes=("", "_user"))
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# Threat-actor tier classification target (4-class)
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y_tier = sessions["threat_actor_capability_tier"]
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# Binary account-takeover detection target
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y_it = sessions["impossible_travel_flag"]
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```
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## License
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This **sample** is released under **CC-BY-NC-4.0** (free for non-commercial
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identical schema, threat-actor-tier distribution, and statistical fingerprint,
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so you can evaluate fit before licensing the full product.
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> 🤖 **Trained baseline available:**
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> [**xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier**](https://huggingface.co/xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier)
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> — XGBoost + PyTorch MLP for **3-class user-risk-tier classification**
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> (insider-threat scoring use case), stratified split, multi-seed evaluation
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> (ROC-AUC 0.812 ± 0.048). **Includes a structural-leakage diagnostic on
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> the threat-actor detection task** that buyers planning ATO / threat-actor
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> ML work should read first.
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| File | Rows (sample) | Rows (full) | Description |
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|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------|
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| `identity_topology.csv` | ~150 | ~3,200 | Identity domain registry |
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- **Conditional Access (CA) policy enforcement** modeling — ZTNA block
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strength tunable per architecture
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## Trained Baseline Available
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A working baseline classifier trained on this sample is published at
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**[xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier](https://huggingface.co/xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier)**.
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| Component | Detail |
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|---|---|
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| Primary task | **3-class user_risk_tier classification** (insider-threat scoring) |
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| Diagnostic | Audit of threat-actor detection on this sample (see `leakage_diagnostic.json`) |
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| Models | XGBoost (`model_xgb.json`) + PyTorch MLP (`model_mlp.safetensors`) |
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| Features | 34 per-user features (aggregates + non-leaky session aggregates + engineered) |
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| Split | **Stratified by user_risk_tier** — user-level task, n=200 |
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| Validation | Single seed + multi-seed aggregate across 10 seeds |
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| Demo | `inference_example.ipynb` — end-to-end copy-paste |
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| Headline metrics | XGBoost: accuracy 0.700 ± 0.082, macro ROC-AUC 0.812 ± 0.048 (multi-seed) |
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**Important diagnostic finding for buyers planning threat-actor detection
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work:** the model card documents that this sample's threat-actor-vs-legitimate
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session populations have **non-overlapping anomaly score distributions**
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across at least six feature groups (velocity, timestamp, credential attempt
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count, login outcome, geo country, device trust). As a result, a plain
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XGBoost achieves 100% test accuracy on threat-actor binary detection that
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does not reflect real-world detection difficulty. The baseline model
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targets `user_risk_tier` instead, which is a legitimate ML task on the
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sample. See the model card's [Leakage diagnostic](https://huggingface.co/xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier#leakage-diagnostic)
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section for the full audit and recommendations.
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## Calibrated Benchmark Targets
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The full product is calibrated to **12 benchmark validation tests** drawn
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## Suggested Use Cases
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- Training **insider threat scoring** models —
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[worked example available](https://huggingface.co/xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier)
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- **Account takeover (ATO) detection** model development (see leakage diagnostic in the baseline model card before training)
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- **Threat-actor tier classification** — 4-class with realistic class imbalance (see leakage diagnostic before training)
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- **Impossible travel detection** — geo-velocity feature engineering
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- **MFA bypass detection** — distinguish FIDO2 anomalies from push fatigue
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- **Lateral movement detection** — session-graph traversal patterns
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- **Golden Ticket / Pass-the-Hash** detection benchmarking
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- **UEBA precision/recall tuning** with calibrated false-positive baselines
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- **Conditional Access policy effectiveness** simulation
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- **Zero Trust posture validation** — ZTNA block rate analysis
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## Loading the Data
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enriched = sessions.merge(users, on="user_id", how="left",
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suffixes=("", "_user"))
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# Threat-actor tier classification target (4-class) — see leakage diagnostic
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y_tier = sessions["threat_actor_capability_tier"]
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# Binary account-takeover detection target
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y_it = sessions["impossible_travel_flag"]
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```
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For a worked end-to-end example with user-risk-tier classification,
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stratified splitting, and feature engineering, see the inference notebook
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in the [baseline classifier repo](https://huggingface.co/xpertsystems/cyb006-baseline-classifier/blob/main/inference_example.ipynb).
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## License
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This **sample** is released under **CC-BY-NC-4.0** (free for non-commercial
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