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Narayan Nettar for Respondent No. 3. FAC
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. FAC
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court by which it set aside the order of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gokak issuing process against respondents 1 & 2 in exercise of his discretion under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. FAC
The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and although the High Court has taken great pains to write a laboured judgment the point involved is short and simple and does not merit a detailed discussion. FAC
The police of Gokak Police Station submitted a charge sheet against Nagappa Giddannavar and seven others under sections 302, 114, 148, 147 and other sections on the allegations that on July 19, 1973 the accused persons had waylaid and murdered one Nagappa son of the appellant in this Court. FAC
The appellant, who had filed the report before the police does not appear to have bean satisfied with the investigation by the police which according to her was tainted and had suppressed some important materials, filed a complaint before the Magistrate at Gokak on October 4, 1973 alleging that respondents 1 & 2 had in...
On receiving the complaint on October 4, 1973 the Magistrate decided to hold an inquiry into the complaint himself and in pursuance of his decision he recorded some evidence on October 8, 1973. FAC
Thereafter the case was posted for October 10, 1973 for arguments and further evidence, if any. FAC
On October 10, 1973 the Magistrate observed that six witnesses had been examined and the evidence recorded so far was sufficient for the Court to determine the question as to whether or not process should be issued to respondents 1 & 2. FAC
He then adjourned the case for argument for October 12, 1973. FAC
On that day arguments were heard but before any order could be passed the Magistrate who had recorded the evidence was transferred and therefore the case had to be adjourned. FAC
The new Magistrate took up the matter on November 26, 1973 and after hearing the complainant he adjourned the case to December 3, 1973 and on this day he directed that further inquiry may be made by Superintendent of Police, Belgaum and he accordingly referred the matter for inquiry and report to the Superintendent of ...
It seems to us that in view of the change of the Magistrate the successor Magistrate was not able to grasp the implications of the proceedings which had been taken by his predecessor who had in fact first decided to hold an inquiry himself and after recording the evidence had decided to pass an order under section 204 ...
Before however he could pass any order he was succeeded by the present Magistrate. FAC
The appellant filed an application in revision to the High Court on December 11, 1973 against the order of the Magistrate dated December 3, 1973 referring the matter to the Superintendent of Police for inquiry and report. FAC
While the application was pending before the High Court, respondents 1 & 2 filed a petition before the High Court praying for an early hearing of the revision and for vacation of the stay order. FAC
Along with this petition the respondents filed a number of documents including the copies of the petitions sent by the appellant to the Chief Minister and the Speaker. FAC
We might indicate here that there was absolutely no occasion for the respondents to have filed the documents before the High Court in a miscellaneous petition nor did they obtain any permission of the Court for filing those documents. Ratio
The High Court, after hearing the revision application filed be the appellant, allowed the same mainly on the ground that as the Magistrate had ultimately decided to hold an inquiry into the truth or falsehood of the complaint himself he had no jurisdiction to stop that inquiry and then make a reference to the police a...
The High Court accordingly quashed the order of the Magistrate and directed him to decide the case in accordance with the law after recording further evidence, if any. RLC
It appears that the High Court did not give any directions to the Magistrate for considering the documents which had been filed by the respondents before it but by a subsequent order merely forwarded the documents to the Magistrate. Ratio
The papers were sent back to the Magistrate on January 7, 1975 and by his order dated January 27, 1975 the Magistrate was informed that the appellant did not want to adduce any further evidence. FAC
The matter was accordingly posted for argument on February 7, 1975 and after hearing the 126 arguments and considering the evidence recorded by the Magistrate he by his order dated February 11, 1975 directed process to be issued against respondents 1 & 2 under section 204(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. FAC
Respondents 1 & 2 then preferred a revision against this order to the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the order of the Magistrate may be quashed. FAC
This revision was allowed by the High Court by the impugned order against which special leave was granted by this Court at the instance of the appellant. FAC
In support of the appeal Mr. H. B. Datar submitted that the Magistrate had given cogent reasons for holding that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against respondents 1 & 2 and the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the Magistrate by examining the merits of the case after taking into co...
In our opinion the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. ARG
Mr. M. C. Bhandare sought to repel the argument of the appellant on the ground that the order of the Magistrate was perverse and as the case was full of patent absurdities and was politically motivated the prosecution of respondents 1 & 2 would amount to unnecessary harassment resulting in abuse of the process of the C...
In the view we take in the instant case it is not necessary for us to enter into the merits of the case at this stage. Ratio
It is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding agai...
It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. Ratio
In Chandra Deo Singh vs Prokash Chandra Bose(1) this Court had after fully considering the matter observed as follows: "The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is suffic...
The learned Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under section 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. PRE
No doubt, as stated in sub section(1) of section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean th...
" Indicating the scope, ambit of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court in Vadilal Panchal vs Dattatrya Dulaji Ghadigaonker and Another(1) observed as follows: "Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks lit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelli...
The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. PRE
The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage; for the person complained against can` be legally called upon to answer; the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial." PRE
It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the inquiry under section 202 of the. Ratio
Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited limited only to the ascertainment of the truth of falsehood, of the allegations made in the complaint (1) on the materials placed by the complaint before the Court. Ratio
(ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that, the accused may have. Ratio
In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus us standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. Ratio
Mr. Bhandare laid great stress on the words "the truth or falsehood of the complaint" and contended that in determining whether the complaint is false the Court can go into the question of the broad probabilities of the case or intrinsic infirmities appearing in the evidence. Ratio
It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant ill support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation bet...
The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Ratio
Once the Magistrate has exercise his discretion it is not for (1) , 9. 128 the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for. Ratio
that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. Ratio
These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under section 2042 of the Code. Ratio
Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case agai...
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. Ratio
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. Ratio
Applying these principles to the facts of facts present case it seems to US that the present case is not one in which the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. Ratio
To begin with, the order of the Magistrate dated February 11, 1975 issuing process against respondents 1 and `2 is a very well reasoned one which takes into consideration the allegations in the complaint as also the evidence adduced in support of it. Ratio
The Magistrate clearly applied his mind and has analysed the evidence into three categories (1) those witnesses who have deposed as eye witnesses regarding the actual occurrence and the part attributed to respondents 1 and 2. Ratio
The Magistrate then refers to other witnesses who corroborated the evidence of the complainant, and thirdly the Magistrate relied on the evidence of witnesses who were admittedly signatories to the dying declaration and had clearly stated on oath that the names of respondents 1 and 2 were mentioned in their presence by...
On a consideration of this evidence the Magistrate was satis 129 fied that a prima facie case against respondents 1 and 2 was made out and he accordingly issued process against them. FAC
It was not a case where the Magistrate had passed an order issuing process In a mechanical manner or just by way of routine. Ratio
The High Court appears to have gone into the whole history of the case, examined the merits of the evidence, the contradictions and what it called the improbabilities and after a detailed discussion not only of the materials produced before the Magistrate but also of the document which had been filed by the defence and...
In the first place the High Court ought not to have considered the document filed by respondents 1 and 2 in the previous revision without obtaining the permission of the Court and` particularly when the High Court itself gave no directions whatsoever to the Magistrate to consider those documents. Ratio
In fact the Magistrate considering the question as to whether process should be issued against the accused or not cannot be into the materials placed by the accused and therefore the High Court could not have given any such directions while disposing of the previous, revision. Ratio
The impugned order of the High Court proceeds on the basis that it was incumbent on the Magistrate to have considered the documents and their effect on the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by the complainant. Ratio
This was an entirely wrong approach As we arc clearly of the opinion that the Magistrate was fully justified in completely excluding the documents from consideration, we refrain from making any observation regarding the, effect of those documents. Ratio
In fact the documents filed by the respondents were mere copies and they were, therefore, not admissible. Ratio
At any rate, at the stage of section 202, or section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the accused had no locus standi the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go into any materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused who could be present only to watch the proceedings and not to participate ...
Indeed if the documents or the evidence produced by the accused is allowed to be taken by the Magistrate then an inquiry under section 202 would have to be converted into a full dress trial defeating the very object for which this section has been engrafted he High Court in quashing the order of the Magistrate complete...
to consider the limited scope of an inquiry under section 202. Ratio
Having gone through the order of the Magistrate we do not find any error or law committed by him. Ratio
The Magistrate was exercises ' his discretion and has given cogent reasons for his conclusion. Ratio
Whether the reasons were, good or bad, sufficient or insufficient, is not a matter which could have been examined by the High Court ill revision. Ratio
We are constrained to observe that the High Court went out of its way write a laboured judgment highlighting certain aspect of the case of the accused as appearing from the documents filed 'of them which they were not entitled to file and which were not entitled in law to be considered. Ratio
For these reasons, therefore, we arc satisfied that the order of the High Court suffers from a serious legal infirmity and the High Court 11 833 SCI/76 130 has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in revision by quashing the order of the Magistrate. Ratio
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated December 16, 1975 and restore the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents 1 and 2. Ratio
At the time of granting the special leave, we has directed the Sessions Judge who was trying the original case resulting from the F.I.R. lodged before the police to stay proceedings to the extent that the judgment was not to be pronounced until this appeal was disposed of. Ratio
We understand that the Sessions case is now concluded before the learned Sessions Judge and arguments have also been heard. Ratio
1 view of the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents 1 and 2 which has been confirmed by us, the respondents will have to face a supplementary trial and it is not conducive in the interests of justice to allow the other trial to be stayed any further. Ratio
The Sessions Judge is therefore directed to dispose of the Sessions Case and the stay granted by this Court earlier is Vacated. RPC
Appeal allowed. RPC
Appeal No.1539 of 1971. FAC
(From the Judgment and Order dated 5 8 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 58/65). FAC
B.B. Ahuja and R.N. Sachthey, for the Appellant. FAC
A.T.M. Sampath and Ram Lal, for Respondent No. 1. 215 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. FAC
This appeal on certificate is directed against an appellate judgment, dated August 5, 1969, of a Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. FAC
It arises as follows: M/s. S.B. Singar Singh and Sons (hereinafter called the assessee) were assessed to Excess Profits tax for the chargeable accounting periods, ending March 31, 1945 and March 31, 1946. FAC
under two assessment orders dated August 26, 1949. FAC
The previous years 193637 was chosen by the assessee as his standard period. FAC
" The profits of that year were Rs. 38,703/ . FAC
After deducting the profits of the standard year, the Excess Profits Tax Officer, assessed the tax on the remaining amounts of profits. FAC
The Excess Profits Tax thus assessed for the accounting years, was to the tune of Rs. 1,06,181.5 and Rs. 48,978/ , respectively. FAC
In his orders, the assessing Officer said that "for reasons detailed in the earlier assessment orders no adjustments are made for capital variations in the standard period and the chargeable accounting period". FAC
These reasons as given in the earlier assessment order, dated October 30, 1947, per taining to the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1944, were: "As complete and regular accounts are not maintained by the assessee, it is not possible to make any adjustment for variations in average capital which cannot be a...
Against the orders of assessment, the assessee preferred two appeals on September 24, 1949 to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner. FAC
By two separate applications dated October 24, 1949, the assessee took an additional ground of appeal which obvious ly he had not taken in the original memorandum of appeal that the Excess Profits Tax Officer had erred in not allowing adjustments on account of the increase and decrease of capital in the relevant charge...
The assessee added that he "was always prepared to file his computa tions of average capital". FAC
Dismissing the appeals by his orders, dated November 24, 1949, the Assist ant Appellate Commissioner negatived the assessee 's contention, in these terms: "As in these years no regular accounts have been maintained and it is not possible to make any adjustment for variations in average capital which cannot be exactly a...
No figures have been shown to me, nor has any exact working been fur nished at this stage. FAC
The accounts are left in the same manner as for the earlier years. FAC
Profits in the major accounts had to be worked out by the application of a rate to the turnover. FAC
I am, thus, unable to allow this contention. FAC
" Aggrieved, the assessee carried appeals to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. FAC
In the memoranda of appeals, one of the specific grounds taken was, that "the Excess Profits Tax Officer and the Assistant Appellate Commissioner had erred in not allowing to the assessee proper standard profits in accordance with the standard period subject to the adjust ment on account of the increase and decrease of...
" It was reiter ated that "the 216 appellant was always prepared to file his computation of average capital. FAC