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values | title stringlengths 10 284 | full_content stringlengths 103 34.2k | description stringlengths 46 14.4k ⌀ | proof_of_concept stringclasses 438
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cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | H-01 | high | Attackers can steal tokens and break the protocol's invariant | Attackers can steal tokens and break the protocol's invariant
### Description
The protocol exposes an external function `Well::swapFrom()` which allows any caller to swap `fromToken` to `toToken`.
The function `Well::_getIJ()` is used to get the index of the `fromToken` and `toToken` in the Well's `tokens`.
But the f... | The protocol exposes an external function `Well::swapFrom()` which allows any caller to swap `fromToken` to `toToken`.
The function `Well::_getIJ()` is used to get the index of the `fromToken` and `toToken` in the Well's `tokens`.
But the function `Well::_getIJ` is not implemented correctly.
```solidity
Well.sol
566: ... | Assume a Well with two tokens `t0, t1` is deployed with `ConstantProduct2.sol` as the Well function.
1. The protocol is in a state of `(400 ether, 100 ether)` (`reserve0, reserve1`).
2. An attacker Alice calls `swapFrom(t1, t1, 100 ether, 0)`.
3. At [L148](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb... | The protocol aims for a generalized constant function AMM (CFAMM) and the core invariant of the protocol is there are always more reserved tokens than the actual token balance (`reserves[i] >= tokens[i].balanceOf(well) for all i`).
The incorrect implementation of `_getIJ()` allows attackers to break this invariant and ... | - Add a sanity check to revert if `fromToken==toToken` in the function `Well::swapFrom()` and `Well::swapTo()` .
- Add a sanity check to revert if `iToken==jToken` in the function `Well::_getIJ()` assuming this internal function is not supposed to used with same tokens.
- We strongly recommend adding a check in the fun... | 3 | true | true | 6,248 | high | high | token | Well.sol
566: function _getIJ(//@audit returns (i, 0) if iToken==jToken while it should return (i, i)
567: IERC20[] memory _tokens,
568: IERC20 iToken,
569: IERC20 jToken
570: ) internal pure returns (uint i, uint j) {
571: for (uint k; k < _tokens.length; ++k) {
572: ... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
Well.sol
566: function _getIJ(//@audit returns (i, 0) if iToken==jToken while it should return (i, i)
567: IERC20[] memory _tokens,
568: IERC20 iToken,
569: IERC20 jToken
570: ) internal pure returns (uint i, uint j) {
571: for (uint k; k < _tokens.len... | 3 | Well.sol
566: function _getIJ(//@audit returns (i, 0) if iToken==jToken while it should return (i, i)
567: IERC20[] memory _tokens,
568: IERC20 iToken,
569: IERC20 jToken
570: ) internal pure returns (uint i, uint j) {
571: for (uint k; k < _tokens.length; ++k) {
572: ... | true | true | 9.6 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | H-02 | high | Attacker can steal reserves and subsequent liquidity deposits due to lack of input token validation | Attacker can steal reserves and subsequent liquidity deposits due to lack of input token validation
### Description
The protocol exposes an external function `Well::swapFrom()` which allows any caller to swap `fromToken` to `toToken`.
If one of the parameters `fromToken/toToken` is not in `_tokens`, this causes simil... | The protocol exposes an external function `Well::swapFrom()` which allows any caller to swap `fromToken` to `toToken`.
If one of the parameters `fromToken/toToken` is not in `_tokens`, this causes similar issues in `_getIJ` with an index `i/j` being returned as zero.
It appears you can specify a garbage `fromToken` to ... | Beliw is a test case to show this exploit scenario.
The attacker can deploy his own garbage token and call `Well::swapFrom(garbageToken, tokens[1])` that drains the `tokens[0]` balance of the Well.
Note that the similar exploit is also possible for `Well::swapTo()`.
```solidity
function test_exploitGarbageFromToken() ... | The insufficient sanity check on the input tokens of `swapFrom()`(and `swapTo()`) allows attackers to extract tokens and break the protocol's invariant.
Because this exploit does not require any additional assumptions, we evaluate the severity to HIGH. | - Add a sanity check to revert if either `iToken` or `jToken` is not found in the `_tokens` array.
- We also strongly recommend adding a check in the function `Well::_executeSwap()` to make sure the Well has enough reserves on every transaction. | 2 | true | true | 4,727 | high | high | input-validation | function test_exploitGarbageFromToken() prank(user) public {
// this is the maximum that can be sent to the well before hitting ByteStorage: too large
uint256 inAmount = type(uint128).max - tokens[0].balanceOf(address(well));
IERC20 garbageToken = IERC20(new MockToken("GarbageToken", "GTKN", 18));
Mock... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function test_exploitGarbageFromToken() prank(user) public {
// this is the maximum that can be sent to the well before hitting ByteStorage: too large
uint256 inAmount = type(uint128).max - tokens[0].balanceOf(address(well));
IERC20 garbageToken = IERC20(new MockToken("GarbageTo... | 2 | function test_exploitGarbageFromToken() prank(user) public {
// this is the maximum that can be sent to the well before hitting ByteStorage: too large
uint256 inAmount = type(uint128).max - tokens[0].balanceOf(address(well));
IERC20 garbageToken = IERC20(new MockToken("GarbageToken", "GTKN", 18));
Mock... | true | true | 7.76 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | H-03 | high | `removeLiquidity` logic is not correct for general Well functions other than ConstantProduct | `removeLiquidity` logic is not correct for general Well functions other than ConstantProduct
### Description
The protocol aims for a generalized permission-less CFAMM (constant function AMM) where various Well functions can be used.
At the moment, only constant product Well function types are defined but we assume s... | The protocol aims for a generalized permission-less CFAMM (constant function AMM) where various Well functions can be used.
At the moment, only constant product Well function types are defined but we assume support for more generalized Well functions are intended.
The current implementation of `removeLiquidity()` and... | We wrote a test case with the quadratic Well function used by Numoen.
```solidity
// QuadraticWell.sol
/**
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
**/
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
import "src/libraries/LibMath.sol";
contract QuadraticWell is IWellFunction {
using LibMath for uin... | The current `removeLiquidity()` logic assumes specific conditions on the Well function (specifically, some sort of linearity).
This limits the generalization of the protocol, opposed to its original purpose.
Because this will lead to loss of funds for the liquidity providers for general Well functions, we evaluate the ... | We believe that it is not possible to cover all kinds of Well functions without adding some additional functions in the interface `IWellFunction`.
We recommend adding a new function in the `IWellFunction` interface, possibly in the form of `function calcWithdrawFromLp(uint lpTokenToBurn) returns (uint reserve)`.
The o... | 2 | true | true | 8,193 | high | high | access-control | // QuadraticWell.sol
/**
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
**/
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
import "src/libraries/LibMath.sol";
contract QuadraticWell is IWellFunction {
using LibMath for uint;
uint constant PRECISION = 1e18;//@audit-info assume 1:1 upperbound for this... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// QuadraticWell.sol
/**
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
**/
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
import "src/libraries/LibMath.sol";
contract QuadraticWell is IWellFunction {
using LibMath for uint;
uint constant PRECISION = 1e18;//@audit-info as... | 2 | // QuadraticWell.sol
/**
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
**/
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
import "src/libraries/LibMath.sol";
contract QuadraticWell is IWellFunction {
using LibMath for uint;
uint constant PRECISION = 1e18;//@audit-info assume 1:1 upperbound for this... | true | true | 9.35 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | H-04 | high | Read-only reentrancy | Read-only reentrancy
### Description
The current implementation is vulnerable to read-only reentrancy, especially in the function [removeLiquidity](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/Well.sol#L296).
The implementation does not conform to the [CEI pattern](https:/... | The current implementation is vulnerable to read-only reentrancy, especially in the function [removeLiquidity](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/Well.sol#L296).
The implementation does not conform to the [CEI pattern](https://fravoll.github.io/solidity-patterns/ch... | Below is a test case to show the existing read-only reentrancy.
```solidity
// MockCallbackRecipient.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import {console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract MockCallbackRecipient {
fallback() external payable {
console.log("here");
(bool ... | Although this is not a direct risk to the protocol itself as it is, this can lead to a critical issue in the future.
We evaluate the severity to HIGH. | Implement the CEI pattern in relevant functions.
For example, the function `Well::removeLiquidity` can be modified as below.
```solidity
function removeLiquidity(
uint lpAmountIn,
uint[] calldata minTokenAmountsOut,
address recipient
) external nonReentrant returns (uint[] memory tokenAmountsOut) {
IER... | 3 | true | true | 4,500 | high | high | reentrancy | // MockCallbackRecipient.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import {console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract MockCallbackRecipient {
fallback() external payable {
console.log("here");
(bool success, bytes memory result) = msg.sender.call(abi.encodeWithSignature("getR... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// MockCallbackRecipient.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import {console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract MockCallbackRecipient {
fallback() external payable {
console.log("here");
(bool success, bytes memory result) = msg.sender.call(a... | 3 | // MockCallbackRecipient.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import {console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract MockCallbackRecipient {
fallback() external payable {
console.log("here");
(bool success, bytes memory result) = msg.sender.call(abi.encodeWithSignature("getR... | true | true | 9.26 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | M-01 | medium | Insufficient support for fee-on-transfer ERC20 tokens | Insufficient support for fee-on-transfer ERC20 tokens
### Description
The Well does not rely on the `balanceOf()` function from ERC20 to retrieve current reserve balances.
This is a good design choice.
Reserves values stored in the protocol should be equal to or less than the actual balance.
The current implementati... | The Well does not rely on the `balanceOf()` function from ERC20 to retrieve current reserve balances.
This is a good design choice.
Reserves values stored in the protocol should be equal to or less than the actual balance.
The current implementation assumes `safeTransfer()` will always increase the actual balance equa... | null | Because this vulnerability is dependent on the tokens, we evaluate the severity to MEDIUM. | - If the protocol does not intend to support these kinds of tokens, prevent them by checking the actual balance increase after calling safeTransfer.
- If the protocol wants to support any kind of ERC20 tokens, use a hook method so that the caller can decide the sending amount and check the balance increase amount after... | 0 | false | true | 1,197 | medium | medium | token | 0 | true | false | 3.83 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | M-02 | medium | Some tokens revert on transfer of zero amount | Some tokens revert on transfer of zero amount
### Description
Well protocol intends to be used with various ERC20 tokens.
Some ERC20 tokens revert on transferring zero amount and it is recommended to transfer only when the amount is positive.([Ref](https://github.com/d-xo/weird-erc20#revert-on-zero-value-transfers))
... | Well protocol intends to be used with various ERC20 tokens.
Some ERC20 tokens revert on transferring zero amount and it is recommended to transfer only when the amount is positive.([Ref](https://github.com/d-xo/weird-erc20#revert-on-zero-value-transfers))
In several places, the current implementation does not check the... | null | For some ERC20 tokens, the protocol's important functions (e.g. `removeLiquidity`) would revert and this can lead to insolvency.
We evaluate the severity to MEDIUM. | Check the transfer amount to be positive before calling transfer functions. | 0 | false | true | 983 | medium | medium | token | 0 | true | false | 3.77 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | M-03 | medium | Need to make sure the tokens are unique for ImmutableTokens | Need to make sure the tokens are unique for ImmutableTokens
### Description
The current implementation does not enforce uniqueness in the `_tokens` of `ImmutableTokens`.
Assuming `_tokens[0]=_tokens[1]`.
An honest liquidity provider calls `addLiquidity([1 ether,1 ether], 200 ether, address)`, resulting in the reserv... | The current implementation does not enforce uniqueness in the `_tokens` of `ImmutableTokens`.
Assuming `_tokens[0]=_tokens[1]`.
An honest liquidity provider calls `addLiquidity([1 ether,1 ether], 200 ether, address)`, resulting in the reserves being `(1 ether, 1 ether)`.
At this point, anyone can call the function `sk... | null | Assuming normal liquidity providers are smart enough to check the tokens before sending funds, the likelihood is low, hence we evaluate the severity to MEDIUM. | Enforce uniqueness of the array `_tokens` in `ImmutableTokens`.
This can also be done in the function `ImmutableTokens::getTokenFromList()`. | 0 | false | true | 874 | medium | medium | token | 0 | true | false | 3.41 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | L-01 | low | Incorrect sload in LibBytes | Incorrect sload in LibBytes
### Description
The function `storeUint128` in `LibBytes` intends to pack uint128 `reserves` starting at the given slot but will actually overwrite the final slot if [storing an odd number of reserves](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/sr... | The function `storeUint128` in `LibBytes` intends to pack uint128 `reserves` starting at the given slot but will actually overwrite the final slot if [storing an odd number of reserves](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#L78). It is currently... | The following test case demonstrates this issue more clearly:
```solidity
// NOTE: Add to LibBytes.t.sol
function test_exploitStoreAndRead() public {
// Write to storage slot to demonstrate overwriting existing values
// In this case, 420 will be stored in the lower 128 bits of the last slot
bytes32 slot =... | Given that assets are not directly at risk, we evaluate the severity to LOW. | Implement the following fix to load the existing value from storage and pack in the lower bits:
```solidity
sload(add(slot, mul(maxI, 32)))
```
 | 2 | true | true | 3,334 | low | low | token | // NOTE: Add to LibBytes.t.sol
function test_exploitStoreAndRead() public {
// Write to storage slot to demonstrate overwriting existing values
// In this case, 420 will be stored in the lower 128 bits of the last slot
bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
uint256 maxI = (NUM_RESERVES_MAX - 1) / 2;
... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// NOTE: Add to LibBytes.t.sol
function test_exploitStoreAndRead() public {
// Write to storage slot to demonstrate overwriting existing values
// In this case, 420 will be stored in the lower 128 bits of the last slot
bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
uint256 maxI = (NUM... | 2 | // NOTE: Add to LibBytes.t.sol
function test_exploitStoreAndRead() public {
// Write to storage slot to demonstrate overwriting existing values
// In this case, 420 will be stored in the lower 128 bits of the last slot
bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
uint256 maxI = (NUM_RESERVES_MAX - 1) / 2;
... | true | true | 8.41 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-01 | informational | Non-standard storage packing | Non-standard storage packing
Per the [Solidity docs](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/internals/layout_in_storage.html), the first item in a packed storage slot is stored lower-order aligned; however, [manual packing](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/lib... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 495 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-02 | informational | EIP-1967 second pre-image best practice | EIP-1967 second pre-image best practice
When calculating custom [EIP-1967](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1967) storage slots, as in [Well.sol::RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/Well.sol#L37), it is [best practice](https://ethereum-magic... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 493 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-03 | informational | Remove experimental ABIEncoderV2 pragma | Remove experimental ABIEncoderV2 pragma
ABIEncoderV2 is enabled by default in Solidity 0.8, so [two](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#L6) [instances](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 366 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-04 | informational | Inconsistent use of decimal/hex notation in inline assembly | Inconsistent use of decimal/hex notation in inline assembly
For readability and to prevent errors when working with inline assembly, decimal notation should be used for integer constants and hex notation for memory offsets. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 223 | informational | informational | rounding | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-05 | informational | Unused variables, imports and errors | Unused variables, imports and errors
In `LibBytes`, the [`temp` variable]((https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#L39)) of `storeUint128` is unused and should be removed.
In `LibMath`:
- OpenZeppelin SafeMath is imported but not used
- `PRBMath_... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 369 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-06 | informational | Inconsistency in LibMath comments | Inconsistency in LibMath comments
There is inconsistent use of `x` in comments and `a` in code within the `nthRoot` and `sqrt` [functions](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/libraries/LibMath.sol#L44-L147) of `LibMath`. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 274 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-07 | informational | FIXME and TODO comments | FIXME and TODO comments
There are several [FIXME](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/interfaces/IWell.sol#L268) and [TODO](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/libraries/LibMath.sol#L36) comments that should be a... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 329 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-08 | informational | Use correct NatSpec tags | Use correct NatSpec tags
Uses of `@dev See {IWell.fn}` should be replaced with `@inheritdoc IWell` to inherit the NatSpec documentation from the interface. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 155 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-09 | informational | Format for readability | Format for readability
For readability, code should be formatted according to the [Solidity Style Guide](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#other-recommendations) which includes surrounding operators with a single space on either side: e.g. [`numberOfBytes0 - 1`](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 408 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | NC-10 | informational | Spelling errors | Spelling errors
The following spelling errors were identified:
- ['configurating'](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/interfaces/IWell.sol#L110) should become 'configuration'
- ['Pump'/'_pumo'](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf9... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 383 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | G-1 | gas | Simplify modulo operations | Simplify modulo operations
In `LibBytes::storeUint128` and `LibBytes::readUint128`, `reserves.lenth % 2 == 1` and `i % 2 == 1` can be simplified to `reserves.length & 1 == 1` and `i & 1 == 1`. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 192 | informational | gas | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-03-13-beanstalk_wells_v0.1 | Beanstalk Wells Initial Audit Report | March 13, 2023 | G-2 | gas | Branchless optimization | Branchless optimization
The `sqrt` function in `MathLib` and [related comment](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4/src/libraries/LibMath.sol#L136-L145) should be updated to reflect changes in Solmate's `FixedPointMathLib` which now includes the [branchless optimization]... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 485 | informational | gas | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | M-01 | medium | Bad signature validation, malleability & lack of zero address protection in `updateValidatorSet` | Bad signature validation, malleability & lack of zero address protection in `updateValidatorSet`
### Description
The `ecrecover` built-in will return `address(0)` if it fails to recover the signer from a message digest and corresponding signature. There is no `address(0)` check in [`Signature::recoverSigner`](https:/... | The `ecrecover` built-in will return `address(0)` if it fails to recover the signer from a message digest and corresponding signature. There is no `address(0)` check in [`Signature::recoverSigner`](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Signature.sol#L62) or [`Bridge:... | The following forge test can be seen to demonstrate these findings:
```solidity
function test_signatureMalleabilityAndBadValidation() public {
address sender = makeAddr("alice");
address pwner = makeAddr("pwner");
uint256 amount = 1e5;
uint256 nonce = 0;
ValidatorSet memory validatorSet = Validator... | Given the vulnerability described has a low likelihood but high impact, we evaluate the severity to MEDIUM. | As mentioned above, it is recommended to correctly validate recovered signers and protect against signature malleability by using the [OpenZeppelin ECDSA library](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol). Additionally, add zero address validation to `Bri... | 1 | true | true | 8,406 | medium | medium | input-validation | function test_signatureMalleabilityAndBadValidation() public {
address sender = makeAddr("alice");
address pwner = makeAddr("pwner");
uint256 amount = 1e5;
uint256 nonce = 0;
ValidatorSet memory validatorSet = ValidatorSet(0, s_validators,s_powers);
Signature[] memory sigs = _getSignatures(sende... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function test_signatureMalleabilityAndBadValidation() public {
address sender = makeAddr("alice");
address pwner = makeAddr("pwner");
uint256 amount = 1e5;
uint256 nonce = 0;
ValidatorSet memory validatorSet = ValidatorSet(0, s_validators,s_powers);
Signature[] memory... | 1 | function test_signatureMalleabilityAndBadValidation() public {
address sender = makeAddr("alice");
address pwner = makeAddr("pwner");
uint256 amount = 1e5;
uint256 nonce = 0;
ValidatorSet memory validatorSet = ValidatorSet(0, s_validators,s_powers);
Signature[] memory sigs = _getSignatures(sende... | true | true | 8.5 | high |
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | M-02 | medium | Incorrect initialization of `powerThreshold` and lack of validation | Incorrect initialization of `powerThreshold` and lack of validation
### Description
The `Bridge::powerThreshold` should be 2/3 the sum of the validator power across current validators at any point; however, the [calculation](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Br... | The `Bridge::powerThreshold` should be 2/3 the sum of the validator power across current validators at any point; however, the [calculation](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L94) in `Bridge2::constructor` is not correct and it's initialized to `(2 * _... | null | It is possible malicious actions that are lack of validation power are allowed due to wrong initialization of `powerThreshold`.
Because the initializer is assumed to be called by an admin and there is also another admin function to change the `powerThreshold`, we evaluate the severity to MEDIUM. | - Initialize `powerThreshold` to the 2/3 the sum of the initial validator powers.
- Add validation for the new `powerThreshold` in `Bridge::changePowerThreshold()` to allow only reasonable values (ranging from 2/3 to total of the current cumulative validation power). | 0 | false | true | 2,686 | medium | medium | access-control | 0 | true | false | 5.5 | medium | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | L-01 | low | Prevent setting the new epoch to an arbitrary large value | Prevent setting the new epoch to an arbitrary large value
### Description
In the function `Bridge::updateValidatorSet`, the new epoch is [checked](https://github.com/ChainAccelOrg/hyperliquid-audit/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L213) to be greater than the current epoch. However, there is n... | In the function `Bridge::updateValidatorSet`, the new epoch is [checked](https://github.com/ChainAccelOrg/hyperliquid-audit/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L213) to be greater than the current epoch. However, there is no check to prevent setting the new epoch to an arbitrary large value which c... | null | This is not likely to happen but we evaluate as LOW because it can freeze the protocol, locking funds and effectively make the whole protocol insolvent. | It is recommended to allow increase of epoch only to some limited extent, rather than any arbitrary large number. | 0 | false | true | 1,169 | low | low | other | 0 | true | false | 3.35 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-01 | informational | Make `minTotalValidatorPower` immutable | Make `minTotalValidatorPower` immutable
Given that `Bridge::minTotalValidatorPower` is initialized once in the constructor and never modified thereafter, it can be made immutable. This also has the effect of reducing gas usage in functions which currently read its value from storage.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
`minTot... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 355 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-02 | informational | Avoid using an initializer unless absolutely necessary | Avoid using an initializer unless absolutely necessary
[This comment](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L85-L86) references the potential introduction of a separate initializer but it should be noted that bad initialization is the cause of many exploi... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 435 | informational | informational | initialization | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-03 | informational | Use calldata for all function arguments that are not modified | Use calldata for all function arguments that are not modified
If function arguments are not intended to be modified then it is best practice to pass them as calldata arguments rather than memory, for example in [https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#LL94C... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 618 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-04 | informational | `updateValidatorSet` block scope is not necessary | `updateValidatorSet` block scope is not necessary
The block scope in `Bridge::updateValidatorSet` is not necessary as the contract successfully compiles without it and so can be removed.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The block scope has been removed. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 248 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-05 | informational | Emit events before interaction | Emit events before interaction
To strictly conform to checks-effect-interactions, it is recommended to emit events prior to any [external interactions](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L122-L123). This is generally advised to ensure correct migration... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 556 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-06 | informational | Make USDC amount naming more verbose | Make USDC amount naming more verbose
The naming of the USDC amount parameter in [`Bridge::deposit and Bridge::withdraw`](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L120-L152) is not clear, i.e. change `uint256 usdc` to `uin256 usdcAmount`.
### `f045dbf` Resol... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 559 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-07 | informational | Rename file to `Bridge2.sol` to match the contract name | Rename file to `Bridge2.sol` to match the contract name
The `Bridge2` contract resides in `Bridge.sol`; however, it is best practice to follow the convention of one contract per file with the same name.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The client team has renamed the contract to `Bridge.sol` with the following comment:
> W... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 438 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-08 | informational | Add missing NatSpec comments to document function parameters and behaviour | Add missing NatSpec comments to document function parameters and behaviour
It is recommended to document all function behaviours and parameters, especially if they are public-facing.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The client team acknowledges this finding with the following comment:
> Light comments were added to functio... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 339 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-09 | informational | No need to explicitly initialize variables to 0 | No need to explicitly initialize variables to 0
Variables are initalized to 0 by default in Solidity, so a [number](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L169-L170) of [superfluous](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c0945070... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 566 | informational | informational | initialization | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-10 | informational | Use addition assignment operator | Use addition assignment operator
The addition assignment operator `+=` can be used when [checking new validator powers](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Bridge.sol#L238).
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The addition assignment operator has been used. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 304 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-11 | informational | Localhost chain id can be 1337 or 31337 | Localhost chain id can be 1337 or 31337
The default localhost chain id for some frameworks (e.g. HardHat) is `31337` rather than `1337`. For example, it is not possible to run signature tests using forge without changing `Signature::LOCALHOST_CHAIN_ID` to `31337`.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
This has been resolved by t... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 343 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-12 | informational | Rename to DOMAIN_SEPARATOR and use `block.chainId` directly | Rename to DOMAIN_SEPARATOR and use `block.chainId` directly
References to `*_DOMAIN_HASH` in `Signature` should be renamed to `*_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` to be more consistent with the EIP and avoid confusion. Additionally, it is recommended to use `block.chainId` directly, caching on contract creation and only recomputing t... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 782 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-13 | informational | Rename to `EIP712_DOMAIN_TYPEHASH` | Rename to `EIP712_DOMAIN_TYPEHASH`
Add an [additional underscore](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Signature.sol#L19) for readability.
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The constant has been renamed to `EIP712_DOMAIN_TYPEHASH`. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 279 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-14 | informational | Include `byte32 salt` in domain typehash | Include `byte32 salt` in domain typehash
Per the [EIP](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712), `bytes32 salt` should be added to the [domain separator](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Signature.sol#L20) as a last-resort means to distinguish this application f... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 934 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | hyperliquid-dex-report | Cyfrin Hyperliquid Audit Report | April 11, 2023 | NC-15 | informational | Verifying contract TODO | Verifying contract TODO
Update the [verifying contract address](https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/contracts/blob/e0aff464865aa98c09450702d7fb36b1fcd4508c/Signature.sol#L25).
### `f045dbf` Resolution
The client team acknowledges this finding with the following comment:
> Removed the TODO. Keeping the verifying addr... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 431 | informational | informational | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | H-01 | high | Specified `minOutput` will remain locked in `LSSVMRouter::swapNFTsForSpecificNFTsThroughETH` | Specified `minOutput` will remain locked in `LSSVMRouter::swapNFTsForSpecificNFTsThroughETH`
**Description:**
The Cyfrin team understands that `LSSVMRouter` is slightly out of scope for this audit, given that it is intended to be deprecated and replaced by `VeryFastRouter`; however, a slightly modified version of this ... | The Cyfrin team understands that `LSSVMRouter` is slightly out of scope for this audit, given that it is intended to be deprecated and replaced by `VeryFastRouter`; however, a slightly modified version of this contract is currently deployed and [live on mainnet](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2b2e8cda09bba9660dca5cb623... | Apply the following git diff:
```diff
diff --git a/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdea5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+prag... | This vulnerability results in the locking of user funds with high impact and likelihood. If the problematic functions were integrated into a UI, then this would be evaluated as CRITICAL, but given that the current integrations significantly reduce the likelihood, we evaluate the severity as HIGH. | Pass `minOutput` through to the internal functions to be used in refund calculations and correctly reflect the true contract balance, validating that this amount is not exceeded. This way, the [`outputAmount`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/LSSVMRouter.sol#L94) [ret... | 1 | true | true | 11,884 | high | high | integer-overflow | diff --git a/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdea5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
+
+import {IERC721}... | diff | // Code block 1 (diff):
diff --git a/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdea5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.... | 1 | true | true | 8.5 | high | |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | H-02 | high | Malicious pair can re-enter `VeryFastRouter` to drain original caller's funds | Malicious pair can re-enter `VeryFastRouter` to drain original caller's funds
**Description:**
[`VeryFastRouter::swap`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L266) is the main entry point for a user to perform a batch of sell and buy orders on the new Su... | [`VeryFastRouter::swap`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L266) is the main entry point for a user to perform a batch of sell and buy orders on the new Sudoswap router, allowing partial fill conditions to be specified. Sell orders are executed first... | The following diff demonstrates a honeypot pair which re-enters the swap and drains the original caller's ETH:
```diff
diff --git a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
index 16047b9..2bd3797 100644
--- a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
+++ b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ contract VeryFastRouter {
er... | This vulnerability results in the loss of user funds, with high impact and medium likelihood, so we evaluate the severity to HIGH. | Validate user inputs to `VeryFastRouter::swap`, in particular pairs, and consider making this function non-reentrant. | 1 | true | true | 20,490 | high | high | reentrancy | diff --git a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
index 16047b9..2bd3797 100644
--- a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
+++ b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ contract VeryFastRouter {
error VeryFastRouter__InvalidPair();
error VeryFastRouter__BondingCurveQuoteError();
+ event vfr_log_named_uint ... | diff | // Code block 1 (diff):
diff --git a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
index 16047b9..2bd3797 100644
--- a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
+++ b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ contract VeryFastRouter {
error VeryFastRouter__InvalidPair();
error VeryFastRouter__BondingCurveQuoteError();
+ eve... | 1 | true | true | 8.5 | high | |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | H-03 | high | Linearity assumption on the royalty can lead to denial of service | Linearity assumption on the royalty can lead to denial of service
**Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions [`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L556) and [`VeryFastRouter::_f... | `VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions [`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L556) and [`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d781... | null | The linearity assumption can be violated, especially in the case of external royalty info providers (possibly malicious), and this can lead to protocol failing to behave as expected, as legitimate swaps will fail.
Due to these incorrect assumptions affecting the core functions, we evaluate the severity to HIGH. | While we understand the protocol team intended to reduce gas costs by using the linearity assumption, we recommend using the actual royalty amount to calculate `priceToFillAt` and `numItemsToFill`. | 3 | false | true | 8,657 | high | high | dos | VeryFastRouter.sol
576: // Perform binary search
577: while (start <= end) {
578: // We check the price to sell index + 1
579: (
580: CurveErrorCodes.Error error,
581: /* newSpotPrice */
582: ,
583: /* newDelta */
58... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
VeryFastRouter.sol
576: // Perform binary search
577: while (start <= end) {
578: // We check the price to sell index + 1
579: (
580: CurveErrorCodes.Error error,
581: /* newSpotPrice */
582: ,
583: ... | 3 | VeryFastRouter.sol
576: // Perform binary search
577: while (start <= end) {
578: // We check the price to sell index + 1
579: (
580: CurveErrorCodes.Error error,
581: /* newSpotPrice */
582: ,
583: /* newDelta */
58... | true | true | 8.5 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | M-01 | medium | Possible reverts due to using stricter requirements in inner swap | Possible reverts due to using stricter requirements in inner swap
**Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` to find the maximum possible amount of tokens to be swapped.
The output is supposed to b... | `VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` to find the maximum possible amount of tokens to be swapped.
The output is supposed to be the _actual_ cost of the swap, and it is used as the [`minExpectedTokenOutput`](h... | null | Although this does not lead to direct loss of funds, we are evaluating the severity of MEDIUM because it can lead to unintended protocol behavior. | We recommend using `minExpectedOutputPerNumNFTs` and `maxCostPerNumNFTs` instead of the output of `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` as arguments to the actual swap functions. | 1 | false | true | 5,194 | medium | medium | dos | VeryFastRouter.sol
326: uint256 numItemsToFill;
327: uint256 priceToFillAt;
328:
329: {
330: // Grab royalty for calc in _findMaxFillableAmtForSell
331: (,, uint256 royaltyAmount) = order.pair.calculateRoyaltiesView(
332: ... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
VeryFastRouter.sol
326: uint256 numItemsToFill;
327: uint256 priceToFillAt;
328:
329: {
330: // Grab royalty for calc in _findMaxFillableAmtForSell
331: (,, uint256 royaltyAmount) = order.pair.calculateRo... | 1 | VeryFastRouter.sol
326: uint256 numItemsToFill;
327: uint256 priceToFillAt;
328:
329: {
330: // Grab royalty for calc in _findMaxFillableAmtForSell
331: (,, uint256 royaltyAmount) = order.pair.calculateRoyaltiesView(
332: ... | true | true | 6.5 | medium |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | M-02 | medium | Different rounding directions are recommended for getting buy/sell info | Different rounding directions are recommended for getting buy/sell info
**Description:**
This issue pertains to the need for more implementation of different rounding directions for buy and sell operations in the AMM pools.
In several `ICurve` implementations (`XykCurve`, `GDACurve`), the `ICurve::getBuyInfo` and `ICur... | This issue pertains to the need for more implementation of different rounding directions for buy and sell operations in the AMM pools.
In several `ICurve` implementations (`XykCurve`, `GDACurve`), the `ICurve::getBuyInfo` and `ICurve::getSellInfo` functions are implemented using the same rounding direction.
This does n... | null | The issue may result in financial loss for pair creators and negatively impact the platform's overall stability, especially for tokens with fewer decimals. We, therefore, rate the severity as MEDIUM. | Ensure that the buy price and protocol/trade fees are rounded up to prevent selling items at a lower price than desired and leaking value from the system. | 0 | false | true | 1,599 | medium | medium | token | 0 | true | false | 4.43 | medium | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | M-03 | medium | GDACurve does not validate new spot price | GDACurve does not validate new spot price
**Description:**
The new spot price calculated in `GDACurve::getBuyInfo` and `GDACurve::getSellInfo` is not currently validated against `MIN_PRICE`, meaning that the price could fall below this value.
```solidity
GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is mult... | The new spot price calculated in `GDACurve::getBuyInfo` and `GDACurve::getSellInfo` is not currently validated against `MIN_PRICE`, meaning that the price could fall below this value.
```solidity
GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is multiplied by alpha^n and divided by the time decay so future
... | null | null | As with an exponential bonding curve, we recommend introducing minimum price validation in `GDACurve::getBuyInfo` and `GDACurve::getSellInfo` when the spot price is updated. | 2 | false | true | 2,440 | medium | medium | integer-overflow | GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is multiplied by alpha^n and divided by the time decay so future
// calculations do not need to track number of items sold or the initial time/price. This new spot price
// implicitly stores the the initial price, total items sold so far, and time... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is multiplied by alpha^n and divided by the time decay so future
// calculations do not need to track number of items sold or the initial time/price. This new spot price
// implicitly stores the the initial price, total... | 2 | GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is multiplied by alpha^n and divided by the time decay so future
// calculations do not need to track number of items sold or the initial time/price. This new spot price
// implicitly stores the the initial price, total items sold so far, and time... | false | true | 6.5 | medium |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | M-04 | medium | Binary search implementation may not always find the optimal solution | Binary search implementation may not always find the optimal solution
**Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` utilize binary search to determine the maximum trade amount. The binary search seeks a solution in a linear, sorted space based on a test fu... | `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` utilize binary search to determine the maximum trade amount. The binary search seeks a solution in a linear, sorted space based on a test function (a criteria function used to decide the next search area). However, the current ... | Consider a situation with the following conditions:
1. A pool containing a collection of 11 NFTs with an Exponential Bonding Curve (Spot Price: 1 eth, Delta: 1.05).
2. Alice computes the maximum bids for buying a collection of NFTs using `VeryFastRouter::getNFTQuoteForBuyOrderWithPartialFill`.
3. Alice desires to acqu... | This issue does not result in an immediate financial loss. Nevertheless, users acquire fewer NFTs than they originally planned to buy. Given the significance of the core logic, the impact of this issue is considered to be MEDIUM. | null | 2 | true | false | 10,604 | medium | medium | integer-overflow | function testSwapBinarySearch_audit() public{
//START_INDEX=0, END_INDEX=10
uint256[] memory nftIds;
LSSVMPair pair;
uint256 numNFTsForQuote = END_INDEX + 1;
//1. create an array of nft ids
nftIds = _getArray(START_INDEX, END_INDEX);
assertEq(nftIds.length, END_I... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function testSwapBinarySearch_audit() public{
//START_INDEX=0, END_INDEX=10
uint256[] memory nftIds;
LSSVMPair pair;
uint256 numNFTsForQuote = END_INDEX + 1;
//1. create an array of nft ids
nftIds = _getArray(START_INDEX, END_INDEX);
a... | 2 | function testSwapBinarySearch_audit() public{
//START_INDEX=0, END_INDEX=10
uint256[] memory nftIds;
LSSVMPair pair;
uint256 numNFTsForQuote = END_INDEX + 1;
//1. create an array of nft ids
nftIds = _getArray(START_INDEX, END_INDEX);
assertEq(nftIds.length, END_I... | true | true | 8 | high |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-01 | low | Owner calling `LSSVMPair::changeSpotPrice` can cause arithmetic over/underflows on later swaps | Owner calling `LSSVMPair::changeSpotPrice` can cause arithmetic over/underflows on later swaps
**Description:**
Changing the spot price to a value higher than the current ERC20 (or ETH) balance of the pair can cause unintended reverts in valid swap calls later on.
**Proof of Concept:**
Full proof of concept [here](ht... | Changing the spot price to a value higher than the current ERC20 (or ETH) balance of the pair can cause unintended reverts in valid swap calls later on. | Full proof of concept [here](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/pull/1/files#diff-ccfdcc468a169eaf116e657d2cd2406530c2a693627167e375d78dcf8a73d87d). Snippet:
```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {InvariantERC721LinearERC20} from "./InvariantERC721Lin... | `ILSSVMPair::swapNFTsForToken` reverts with a `TRANSFER_FAILED` error message despite the user obtaining a quote using `ILSSVMPair::getSellNFTQuote` in a prior call. | `ILSSVMPair::getSellNFTQuote` should return a legitimate error code if the expected output exceeds the pair's balance.
This mitigates the impact on the end user trying to perform the swap. It will return a helpful error in the view function prior to the swap attempt rather than passing there, then failing on the actual... | 1 | true | true | 2,422 | low | low | integer-overflow | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {InvariantERC721LinearERC20} from "./InvariantERC721LinearERC20.t.sol";
import {IERC721Mintable} from "../interfaces/IERC721Mintable.sol";
contract SwapArithmeticOverflow is InvariantERC721LinearERC20 {
function setUp() p... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {InvariantERC721LinearERC20} from "./InvariantERC721LinearERC20.t.sol";
import {IERC721Mintable} from "../interfaces/IERC721Mintable.sol";
contract SwapArithmeticOverflow is InvariantERC721LinearER... | 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {InvariantERC721LinearERC20} from "./InvariantERC721LinearERC20.t.sol";
import {IERC721Mintable} from "../interfaces/IERC721Mintable.sol";
contract SwapArithmeticOverflow is InvariantERC721LinearERC20 {
function setUp() p... | true | true | 5.8 | medium |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-02 | low | Partially fillable order could revert | Partially fillable order could revert
**Description:**
In the sell logic of `VeryFastRouter::swap`, the protocol does not check the fillable amount and executes the swap if [`pairSpotPrice == order.expectedSpotPrice`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/0967f16fb0f32b0b76f37c09e6acf35ac007225f/src/VeryFastRouter.so... | In the sell logic of `VeryFastRouter::swap`, the protocol does not check the fillable amount and executes the swap if [`pairSpotPrice == order.expectedSpotPrice`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/0967f16fb0f32b0b76f37c09e6acf35ac007225f/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L281). But this will revert if the pair has insuffici... | null | Partially fillable orders would revert unnecessarily.
While this does not affect funds, users would experience a revert for valid transactions. | Consider handling cases where the pair has insufficient balance to prevent reverting for partially fillable orders. | 0 | false | true | 1,105 | low | low | dos | 0 | true | false | 3.46 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-03 | low | Make `LSSVMPair::call` payable to allow value to be sent with external calls | Make `LSSVMPair::call` payable to allow value to be sent with external calls
**Description:**
Currently, [`LSSVMPair::call`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/LSSVMPair.sol#L640) simply passes a [value of zero](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813... | Currently, [`LSSVMPair::call`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/LSSVMPair.sol#L640) simply passes a [value of zero](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/LSSVMPair.sol#L661); however, there may be instances in which non-z... | null | If the owner wishes to send ETH with the external call, they cannot do so, which may impact the external call's functionality. | Consider allowing value to be passed to external calls by making `LSSVMPair::call` payable. | 0 | false | true | 870 | low | low | dos | 0 | true | false | 3.42 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-04 | low | Incorrect/incomplete NatSpec & comments | Incorrect/incomplete NatSpec & comments
The NatSpec for `LSSVMPair::getAssetRecipient` currently [reads](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/0967f16fb0f32b0b76f37c09e6acf35ac007225f/src/LSSVMPair.sol#L319) "Returns the address that assets that receives assets when a swap is done with this pair" but it should be "Re... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 2,243 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-05 | low | Unreachable code path in `RoyaltyEngine::_getRoyaltyAndSpec` | Unreachable code path in `RoyaltyEngine::_getRoyaltyAndSpec`
Within `RoyaltyEngine`, `int16` values have been copied over from the manifold contract for use as enum values relating to different royalty specifications with `int16 private constant NONE = -1;` and `int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0;`. The [if case... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 953 | low | low | other | if (spec == NONE) {
return (recipients, amounts, spec, royaltyAddress, addToCache);
} | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
if (spec == NONE) {
return (recipients, amounts, spec, royaltyAddress, addToCache);
} | 1 | if (spec == NONE) {
return (recipients, amounts, spec, royaltyAddress, addToCache);
} | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-06 | low | `vm.prank()` before nested function call in tests does not work as intended | `vm.prank()` before nested function call in tests does not work as intended
Foundry's prank cheat code applies to the next external call only. [Nested](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/test/base/VeryFastRouterAllSwapTypes.sol#L1090-L1092) [calls](https://github.com/su... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 788 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-07 | low | Event parameter names are incorrect | Event parameter names are incorrect
The first parameter in each of these `LSSVMPair` events is named incorrectly:
```solidity
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint25... | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 780 | low | low | other | event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountOut, ... | 2 | event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountOut, u... | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-08 | low | `LSSVMPair` does not inherit `ILSSVMPair` | `LSSVMPair` does not inherit `ILSSVMPair`
The interface `ILSSVMPair` is defined and used in several places, but the abstract `LSSVMPair` does not inherit from it.
Consider adding `is ILSSVMPair` to the `LSSVMPair` contract declaration.
**Sudoswap:**
Acknowledged.
**Cyfrin:**
Acknowledged. | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 291 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-09 | low | `MerklePropertyChecker::hasProperties` does not validate `ids.length` equals `proofList.length` | `MerklePropertyChecker::hasProperties` does not validate `ids.length` equals `proofList.length`
This function loops over supplied ids and performs proof verification to ensure each id is valid.
If additional proofs are supplied, the loop will terminate before these are reached and so they are never used in verification... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 550 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-10 | low | Redundant zero address check in `LSSVMPair::initialize` | Redundant zero address check in `LSSVMPair::initialize`
The initializer argument `_assetRecipient` is assigned to the state variable only if it is not the zero address; however, in `LSSVMPair::getAssetRecipient`, the owner address is returned if `assetRecipient` is the zero address, and so this check is redundant. The ... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 549 | low | low | initialization | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-11 | low | Redundant zero value check in `LSSVMPair::getBuyNFTQuote` and `LSSVMPair::getSellNFTQuote` | Redundant zero value check in `LSSVMPair::getBuyNFTQuote` and `LSSVMPair::getSellNFTQuote`
The `numNFTs` argument to `LSSVMPair::getBuyNFTQuote` is validated to be a non-zero value; however, in `ICurve::getBuyNFTQuote`, all current implementations revert if the `numItems` parameter is zero, and so this check on the pai... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 395 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-12 | low | Simplify `LSSVMPair::_calculateBuyInfoAndUpdatePoolParams` and `LSSVMPair::_calculateSellInfoAndUpdatePoolParams` conditionals | Simplify `LSSVMPair::_calculateBuyInfoAndUpdatePoolParams` and `LSSVMPair::_calculateSellInfoAndUpdatePoolParams` conditionals
Per the comment "Consolidate writes to save gas" in `LSSVMPair::_calculateBuyInfoAndUpdatePoolParams`, further optimizations can be made by reducing the logic to two if statements and storing v... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 793 | low | low | other | // Consolidate writes to save gas
// Emit spot price update if it has been updated
if (currentSpotPrice != newSpotPrice) {
spotPrice = newSpotPrice;
emit SpotPriceUpdate(newSpotPrice);
}
// Emit delta update if it has been updated
if (currentDelta != newDelta) {
delta = newDelta;
emit DeltaUpdate(newDe... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// Consolidate writes to save gas
// Emit spot price update if it has been updated
if (currentSpotPrice != newSpotPrice) {
spotPrice = newSpotPrice;
emit SpotPriceUpdate(newSpotPrice);
}
// Emit delta update if it has been updated
if (currentDelta != newDelta) {
delta = newDelta... | 1 | // Consolidate writes to save gas
// Emit spot price update if it has been updated
if (currentSpotPrice != newSpotPrice) {
spotPrice = newSpotPrice;
emit SpotPriceUpdate(newSpotPrice);
}
// Emit delta update if it has been updated
if (currentDelta != newDelta) {
delta = newDelta;
emit DeltaUpdate(newDe... | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-13 | low | Cache local variable earlier in `LSSVMPairERC20::_pullTokenInputs` | Cache local variable earlier in `LSSVMPairERC20::_pullTokenInputs`
Given that there are multiple instances where `token()` is called directly, the local variable `ERC20 token_ = token()` should be cached in the same manner as `_assetRecipient` at the start of the function to reduce the number of storage reads.
It is a... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 1,296 | low | low | token | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-14 | low | Gas Optimizations | Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance` | 4 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | Use assembly to check for `address(0)` | 10 |
| [GAS-3](#GAS-3) | `array[index] += amount` is cheaper than `array[index] = array[index] + amount` (or related variants) ... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 1,120 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-15 | low | <a name="GAS-1"></a>[GAS-1] Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance` | <a name="GAS-1"></a>[GAS-1] Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance`
Use assembly when getting a contract's balance of ETH.
You can use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance` when getting your contract's balance of ETH to save gas.
Additionally, you can use `balance(address)` instead of `addr... | null | null | null | null | 4 | false | false | 873 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
91: withdrawETH(address(this).balance); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
91: withdrawETH(address(this).balance);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
421: protocolFeeRecipient.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
172: balance = address... | 4 | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
91: withdrawETH(address(this).balance);
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
421: protocolFeeRecipient.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
172: balance = address(pair).balance;
File: settings/Splitter.sol
27: uint256 ethBalance = addre... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-16 | low | <a name="GAS-2"></a>[GAS-2] Use assembly to check for `address(0)` | <a name="GAS-2"></a>[GAS-2] Use assembly to check for `address(0)`
*Saves 6 gas per instance*
*Instances (10)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
139: if (owner() != address(0)) revert LSSVMPair__AlreadyInitialized();
152: if (_assetRecipient != address(0)) {
333: if (_assetRecipient == addres... | null | null | null | null | 5 | false | false | 1,058 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
139: if (owner() != address(0)) revert LSSVMPair__AlreadyInitialized();
152: if (_assetRecipient != address(0)) {
333: if (_assetRecipient == address(0)) {
346: if (_feeRecipient == address(0)) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
139: if (owner() != address(0)) revert LSSVMPair__AlreadyInitialized();
152: if (_assetRecipient != address(0)) {
333: if (_assetRecipient == address(0)) {
346: if (_feeRecipient == address(0)) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVM... | 5 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
139: if (owner() != address(0)) revert LSSVMPair__AlreadyInitialized();
152: if (_assetRecipient != address(0)) {
333: if (_assetRecipient == address(0)) {
346: if (_feeRecipient == address(0)) {
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
438: if (_protocolFeeRecipient ... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-17 | low | <a name="GAS-3"></a>[GAS-3] `array[index] += amount` is cheaper than `array[index] = array[index] + amount` (or related variants) | <a name="GAS-3"></a>[GAS-3] `array[index] += amount` is cheaper than `array[index] = array[index] + amount` (or related variants)
When updating a value in an array with arithmetic, using `array[index] += amount` is cheaper than `array[index] = array[index] + amount`.
This is because you avoid an additonal `mload` when ... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 919 | low | low | other | File: VeryFastRouter.sol
126: prices[i] = prices[i] + (prices[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18);
218: outputAmounts[i] = outputAmounts[i] - (outputAmounts[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
126: prices[i] = prices[i] + (prices[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18);
218: outputAmounts[i] = outputAmounts[i] - (outputAmounts[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18); | 1 | File: VeryFastRouter.sol
126: prices[i] = prices[i] + (prices[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18);
218: outputAmounts[i] = outputAmounts[i] - (outputAmounts[i] * slippageScaling / 1e18); | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-18 | low | <a name="GAS-4"></a>[GAS-4] Using bools for storage incurs overhead | <a name="GAS-4"></a>[GAS-4] Using bools for storage incurs overhead
Use uint256(1) and uint256(2) for true/false to avoid a Gwarmaccess (100 gas), and to avoid Gsset (20000 gas) when changing from ‘false’ to ‘true’, after having been ‘true’ in the past. See [source](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contract... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 686 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
56: mapping(ICurve => bool) public bondingCurveAllowed;
57: mapping(address => bool) public override callAllowed;
60: mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public settingsForCollection; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
56: mapping(ICurve => bool) public bondingCurveAllowed;
57: mapping(address => bool) public override callAllowed;
60: mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public settingsForCollection; | 1 | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
56: mapping(ICurve => bool) public bondingCurveAllowed;
57: mapping(address => bool) public override callAllowed;
60: mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public settingsForCollection; | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-19 | low | <a name="GAS-5"></a>[GAS-5] Cache array length outside of loop | <a name="GAS-5"></a>[GAS-5] Cache array length outside of loop
If not cached, the solidity compiler will always read the length of the array during each iteration. That is, if it is a storage array, this is an extra sload operation (100 additional extra gas for each iteration except for the first) and if it is a memory... | null | null | null | null | 9 | false | false | 2,609 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
673: for (uint256 i; i < calls.length;) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
673: for (uint256 i; i < calls.length;) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
68: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
93: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: ... | 9 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
673: for (uint256 i; i < calls.length;) {
File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
68: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
93: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
57: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
File... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-20 | low | <a name="GAS-6"></a>[GAS-6] Use calldata instead of memory for function arguments that do not get mutated | <a name="GAS-6"></a>[GAS-6] Use calldata instead of memory for function arguments that do not get mutated
Mark data types as `calldata` instead of `memory` where possible. This makes it so that the data is not automatically loaded into memory. If the data passed into the function does not need to be changed (like updat... | null | null | null | null | 3 | false | false | 1,008 | low | low | other | File: lib/IOwnershipTransferReceiver.sol
6: function onOwnershipTransferred(address oldOwner, bytes memory data) external payable; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: lib/IOwnershipTransferReceiver.sol
6: function onOwnershipTransferred(address oldOwner, bytes memory data) external payable;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
45: function transferOwnership(address newOwner, bytes memory data) public payab... | 3 | File: lib/IOwnershipTransferReceiver.sol
6: function onOwnershipTransferred(address oldOwner, bytes memory data) external payable;
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
45: function transferOwnership(address newOwner, bytes memory data) public payable virtual onlyOwner {
File: settings/StandardSettings.... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-21 | low | <a name="GAS-7"></a>[GAS-7] Use Custom Errors | <a name="GAS-7"></a>[GAS-7] Use Custom Errors
[Source](https://blog.soliditylang.org/2021/04/21/custom-errors/)
Instead of using error strings, to reduce deployment and runtime cost, you should use Custom Errors. This would save both deployment and runtime cost.
*Instances (21)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
504... | null | null | null | null | 3 | false | false | 2,002 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMRouter.sol
504: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
506: require(factory.getPairTokenType(msg.sender) == ILSSVMPairFactoryLike.PairTokenType.ERC20, "Not ERC20 pair");
522: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
536: require(factory.isValidP... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
504: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
506: require(factory.getPairTokenType(msg.sender) == ILSSVMPairFactoryLike.PairTokenType.ERC20, "Not ERC20 pair");
522: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
536: ... | 3 | File: LSSVMRouter.sol
504: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
506: require(factory.getPairTokenType(msg.sender) == ILSSVMPairFactoryLike.PairTokenType.ERC20, "Not ERC20 pair");
522: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
536: require(factory.isValidP... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-22 | low | <a name="GAS-8"></a>[GAS-8] Don't initialize variables with default value | <a name="GAS-8"></a>[GAS-8] Don't initialize variables with default value
*Instances (10)*:
```solidity
File: RoyaltyEngine.sol
35: int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0;
81: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numTokens;) {
182: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
264: ... | null | null | null | null | 3 | false | false | 796 | low | low | initialization | File: RoyaltyEngine.sol
35: int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0;
81: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numTokens;) {
182: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
336: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numBps;) {
349: ... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: RoyaltyEngine.sol
35: int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0;
81: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numTokens;) {
182: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
336: for (uint256 i = ... | 3 | File: RoyaltyEngine.sol
35: int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0;
81: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numTokens;) {
182: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < royalties.length;) {
336: for (uint256 i = 0; i < numBps;) {
349: ... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-23 | low | <a name="GAS-9"></a>[GAS-9] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas | <a name="GAS-9"></a>[GAS-9] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas
If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that [returns a tuple](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-frax/blob/90f55a9ce4e25bc... | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 936 | low | low | other | File: bonding-curves/ExponentialCurve.sol
15: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1000000 wei; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: bonding-curves/ExponentialCurve.sol
15: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1000000 wei;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: bonding-curves/GDACurve.sol
21: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1 gwei; | 2 | File: bonding-curves/ExponentialCurve.sol
15: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1000000 wei;
File: bonding-curves/GDACurve.sol
21: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1 gwei; | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-24 | low | <a name="GAS-10"></a>[GAS-10] Use shift Right/Left instead of division/multiplication if possible | <a name="GAS-10"></a>[GAS-10] Use shift Right/Left instead of division/multiplication if possible
Shifting left by N is like multiplying by 2^N and shifting right by N is like dividing by 2^N
*Instances (13)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
335: }
```
```solidity
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
535: ... | null | null | null | null | 3 | false | false | 800 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
335: } | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
335: }
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
535: );
544: ) {
546: }
550: start = (start + end) / 2 + 1;
551: priceToFillAt = currentCost;
594: // get fee... | 3 | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
335: }
File: VeryFastRouter.sol
535: );
544: ) {
546: }
550: start = (start + end) / 2 + 1;
551: priceToFillAt = currentCost;
594: // get feeMultiplier from deltaAndFeeMultiplier
605: ... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-25 | low | <a name="GAS-11"></a>[GAS-11] Use `storage` instead of `memory` for structs/arrays | <a name="GAS-11"></a>[GAS-11] Use `storage` instead of `memory` for structs/arrays
Using `memory` copies the struct or array in memory. Use `storage` to save the location in storage and have cheaper reads:
*Instances (29)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
492: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyalty(nft(), assetId, sal... | null | null | null | null | 10 | false | false | 2,482 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
492: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyalty(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
505: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyaltyView(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
679: if (!success && revertOnFail) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
492: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyalty(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
505: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyaltyView(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
679: if (!success && revertOnFail) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
299: ... | 10 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
492: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyalty(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
505: ROYALTY_ENGINE.getRoyaltyView(nft(), assetId, saleAmount);
679: if (!success && revertOnFail) {
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
299: if (nftIds.length == 0) {
File: RoyaltyEngine.sol
87:... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-26 | low | <a name="GAS-12"></a>[GAS-12] Use != 0 instead of > 0 for unsigned integer comparison | <a name="GAS-12"></a>[GAS-12] Use != 0 instead of > 0 for unsigned integer comparison
*Instances (3)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
233: if (remainingValue > 0) {
372: if (remainingValue > 0) {
592: if (remainingValue > 0) {
``` | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 266 | low | low | integer-overflow | File: LSSVMRouter.sol
233: if (remainingValue > 0) {
372: if (remainingValue > 0) {
592: if (remainingValue > 0) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
233: if (remainingValue > 0) {
372: if (remainingValue > 0) {
592: if (remainingValue > 0) { | 1 | File: LSSVMRouter.sol
233: if (remainingValue > 0) {
372: if (remainingValue > 0) {
592: if (remainingValue > 0) { | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-27 | low | <a name="GAS-13"></a>[GAS-13] `internal` functions not called by the contract should be removed | <a name="GAS-13"></a>[GAS-13] `internal` functions not called by the contract should be removed
If the functions are required by an interface, the contract should inherit from that interface and use the `override` keyword
*Instances (8)*:
```solidity
File: lib/LSSVMPairCloner.sol
22: function cloneERC721ETHPair(
... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 714 | low | low | other | File: lib/LSSVMPairCloner.sol
22: function cloneERC721ETHPair(
112: function cloneERC721ERC20Pair(
204: function isERC721ETHPairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
238: function isERC721ERC20PairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
274: add... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: lib/LSSVMPairCloner.sol
22: function cloneERC721ETHPair(
112: function cloneERC721ERC20Pair(
204: function isERC721ETHPairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
238: function isERC721ERC20PairClone(address factory, address implementation, addr... | 1 | File: lib/LSSVMPairCloner.sol
22: function cloneERC721ETHPair(
112: function cloneERC721ERC20Pair(
204: function isERC721ETHPairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
238: function isERC721ERC20PairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
274: add... | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-28 | low | Non Critical Issues | Non Critical Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [NC-1](#NC-1) | Missing checks for `address(0)` when assigning values to address state variables | 4 |
| [NC-2](#NC-2) | `require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings | 1 |
| [NC-3](#NC-3) | Event is missing `indexed` fields | 18 |
| [... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 511 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-29 | low | <a name="NC-1"></a>[NC-1] Missing checks for `address(0)` when assigning values to address state variables | <a name="NC-1"></a>[NC-1] Missing checks for `address(0)` when assigning values to address state variables
*Instances (4)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
110: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
349: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
```
```solidity
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
25: _owner ... | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 372 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
110: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
349: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
110: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
349: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
25: _owner = initialOwner;
71: _owner = newOwner; | 2 | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
110: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
349: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
25: _owner = initialOwner;
71: _owner = newOwner; | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-30 | low | <a name="NC-2"></a>[NC-2] `require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings | <a name="NC-2"></a>[NC-2] `require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings
*Instances (1)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
126: require(msg.data.length == _immutableParamsLength());
``` | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 227 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
126: require(msg.data.length == _immutableParamsLength()); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
126: require(msg.data.length == _immutableParamsLength()); | 1 | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
126: require(msg.data.length == _immutableParamsLength()); | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-31 | low | <a name="NC-3"></a>[NC-3] Event is missing `indexed` fields | <a name="NC-3"></a>[NC-3] Event is missing `indexed` fields
Index event fields make the field more quickly accessible to off-chain tools that parse events. However, note that each index field costs extra gas during emission, so it's not necessarily best to index the maximum allowed per event (three fields). Each event ... | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 1,773 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
82: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
83: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
84: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
85: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
86: event SpotPriceUpdate(uint128 n... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
82: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
83: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
84: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
85: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
86: eve... | 2 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
82: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
83: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
84: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
85: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
86: event SpotPriceUpdate(uint128 n... | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-32 | low | <a name="NC-4"></a>[NC-4] Constants should be defined rather than using magic numbers | <a name="NC-4"></a>[NC-4] Constants should be defined rather than using magic numbers
*Instances (3)*:
```solidity
File: settings/Splitter.sol
23: return _getArgAddress(20);
```
```solidity
File: settings/StandardSettings.sol
70: return _getArgUint64(40);
77: return _getArgUint64(48);
``` | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 320 | low | low | other | File: settings/Splitter.sol
23: return _getArgAddress(20); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: settings/Splitter.sol
23: return _getArgAddress(20);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: settings/StandardSettings.sol
70: return _getArgUint64(40);
77: return _getArgUint64(48); | 2 | File: settings/Splitter.sol
23: return _getArgAddress(20);
File: settings/StandardSettings.sol
70: return _getArgUint64(40);
77: return _getArgUint64(48); | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-33 | low | <a name="NC-5"></a>[NC-5] Functions not used internally could be marked external | <a name="NC-5"></a>[NC-5] Functions not used internally could be marked external
*Instances (28)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
323: function getAssetRecipient() public view returns (address payable) {
344: function getFeeRecipient() public view returns (address payable _feeRecipient) {
```
```solidity
... | null | null | null | null | 9 | false | false | 2,899 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
323: function getAssetRecipient() public view returns (address payable) {
344: function getFeeRecipient() public view returns (address payable _feeRecipient) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
323: function getAssetRecipient() public view returns (address payable) {
344: function getFeeRecipient() public view returns (address payable _feeRecipient) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
342: function openLock() public {
347: ... | 9 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
323: function getAssetRecipient() public view returns (address payable) {
344: function getFeeRecipient() public view returns (address payable _feeRecipient) {
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
342: function openLock() public {
347: function closeLock() public {
499: function getS... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-34 | low | <a name="NC-6"></a>[NC-6] Typos | <a name="NC-6"></a>[NC-6] Typos
*Instances (84)*:
```diff
File: LSSVMPair.sol
- 52: // Sudoswap Royalty Engine
+ 52: // @notice Sudoswap Royalty Engine
- 60: // However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways.
+ 60: // @notice However, this should NOT be ass... | null | null | null | null | 15 | false | false | 13,184 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
- 52: // Sudoswap Royalty Engine
+ 52: // @notice Sudoswap Royalty Engine
- 60: // However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways.
+ 60: // @notice However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways... | diff | // Code block 1 (diff):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
- 52: // Sudoswap Royalty Engine
+ 52: // @notice Sudoswap Royalty Engine
- 60: // However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways.
+ 60: // @notice However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spo... | 15 | false | true | 3 | low | |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-35 | low | Low Issues | Low Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-1](#L-1) | `abi.encodePacked()` should not be used with dynamic types when passing the result to a hash function such as `keccak256()` | 1 |
| [L-2](#L-2) | Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why | 32 |
| [L-3](#L-3) | Initializers could be front-run | 10 |
| [L-... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 362 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-36 | low | <a name="L-1"></a>[L-1] `abi.encodePacked()` should not be used with dynamic types when passing the result to a hash function such as `keccak256()` | <a name="L-1"></a>[L-1] `abi.encodePacked()` should not be used with dynamic types when passing the result to a hash function such as `keccak256()`
Use `abi.encode()` instead which will pad items to 32 bytes, which will [prevent hash collisions](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/abi-spec.html#non-standard-packe... | null | null | null | null | 1 | false | false | 1,018 | low | low | other | File: property-checking/MerklePropertyChecker.sol
25: if (!MerkleProof.verify(proof, root, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ids[i])))) { | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: property-checking/MerklePropertyChecker.sol
25: if (!MerkleProof.verify(proof, root, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ids[i])))) { | 1 | File: property-checking/MerklePropertyChecker.sol
25: if (!MerkleProof.verify(proof, root, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ids[i])))) { | false | true | 1 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-37 | low | <a name="L-2"></a>[L-2] Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why | <a name="L-2"></a>[L-2] Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why
*Instances (32)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
130: function _preCallCheck(address) internal pure override {}
```
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
373: } catch {}
375: } catch {}
379: } catch {}
... | null | null | null | null | 12 | false | false | 2,041 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
130: function _preCallCheck(address) internal pure override {} | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
130: function _preCallCheck(address) internal pure override {}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
373: } catch {}
375: } catch {}
379: } catch {}
384: } catch {}
385: } catch {}
390: ... | 12 | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
130: function _preCallCheck(address) internal pure override {}
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
373: } catch {}
375: } catch {}
379: } catch {}
384: } catch {}
385: } catch {}
390: } catch {}
391: } catch {}
398: ... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-38 | low | <a name="L-3"></a>[L-3] Initializers could be front-run | <a name="L-3"></a>[L-3] Initializers could be front-run
Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case forcing a re-deployment
*Instances (10)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
132: function initialize(
140: __Own... | null | null | null | null | 5 | false | false | 1,175 | low | low | front-running | File: LSSVMPair.sol
132: function initialize(
140: __Ownable_init(_owner); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
132: function initialize(
140: __Ownable_init(_owner);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
568: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, _delta, _fee, _spotPrice);
596: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, ... | 5 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
132: function initialize(
140: __Ownable_init(_owner);
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
568: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, _delta, _fee, _spotPrice);
596: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, _delta, _fee, _spotPrice);
625: _pair.initializ... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-39 | low | <a name="L-4"></a>[L-4] Unsafe ERC20 operation(s) | <a name="L-4"></a>[L-4] Unsafe ERC20 operation(s)
*Instances (7)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
576: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
606: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
673: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sende... | null | null | null | null | 4 | false | false | 735 | low | low | token | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
576: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
606: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
673: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, recipient, ids[i]); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
576: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
606: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
673: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, recipient, ids[i]);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
... | 4 | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
576: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
606: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
673: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, recipient, ids[i]);
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
525: nft.transferFrom(fro... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-40 | low | Medium Issues | Medium Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [M-1](#M-1) | Centralization Risk for trusted owners | 23 |
| [M-2](#M-2) | Solmate's SafeTransferLib does not check for token contract's existence | 18 | | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 204 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-41 | low | <a name="M-1"></a>[M-1] Centralization Risk for trusted owners | <a name="M-1"></a>[M-1] Centralization Risk for trusted owners
**Impact:**
Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.
*Instances (23)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPri... | null | null | Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.
*Instances (23)*:
```solidity
File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPrice) external onlyOwner {
595: function changeDelta(uint128 newDelta) ex... | null | 8 | false | false | 2,574 | low | low | other | File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPrice) external onlyOwner {
595: function changeDelta(uint128 newDelta) external onlyOwner {
610: function changeFee(uint96 newFee) external onlyOwner {
625: function changeAssetRecipient(address payable newRecipient) external onlyOwne... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPrice) external onlyOwner {
595: function changeDelta(uint128 newDelta) external onlyOwner {
610: function changeFee(uint96 newFee) external onlyOwner {
625: function changeAssetRecipient(address payable new... | 8 | File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPrice) external onlyOwner {
595: function changeDelta(uint128 newDelta) external onlyOwner {
610: function changeFee(uint96 newFee) external onlyOwner {
625: function changeAssetRecipient(address payable newRecipient) external onlyOwne... | true | true | 4 | medium |
cyfrin | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | 2023-06-01-sudoswap-report | null | L-42 | low | <a name="M-2"></a>[M-2] Solmate's SafeTransferLib does not check for token contract's existence | <a name="M-2"></a>[M-2] Solmate's SafeTransferLib does not check for token contract's existence
There is a subtle difference between the implementation of solmate’s SafeTransferLib and OZ’s SafeERC20: OZ’s SafeERC20 checks if the token is a contract or not, solmate’s SafeTransferLib does not.
https://github.com/transm... | null | null | null | null | 6 | false | false | 2,212 | low | low | token | File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
90: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, inputAmountExcludingRoyalty - protocolFee);
94: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, royaltyRecipients[i], royaltyAmounts[i]);
102: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(factory()), prot... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
90: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, inputAmountExcludingRoyalty - protocolFee);
94: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, royaltyRecipients[i], royaltyAmounts[i]);
102: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.send... | 6 | File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
90: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, inputAmountExcludingRoyalty - protocolFee);
94: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, royaltyRecipients[i], royaltyAmounts[i]);
102: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(factory()), prot... | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-01 | low | Perform additional validation on Chainlink fast gas feed | Perform additional validation on Chainlink fast gas feed
**Description:** When consuming data feeds provided by Chainlink, it is important to validate a number of thresholds and return values. Without this, it is possible for a consuming contract to use stale or otherwise incorrect/invalid data. `LimitOrderRegistry` c... | When consuming data feeds provided by Chainlink, it is important to validate a number of thresholds and return values. Without this, it is possible for a consuming contract to use stale or otherwise incorrect/invalid data. `LimitOrderRegistry` currently correctly validates the time since the last update against an owne... | null | `LimitOrderRegistry::performUpkeep` is reliant on this functionality within `LimitOrderRegistry::getGasPrice` which could result in DoS on fulfilling orders if not functioning correctly; however, the escape-hatch is simply having the owner set the feed address to `address(0)` which causes the owner-specified fallback v... | Consider calling `IChainlinkAggregator::latestRoundData` within a `try/catch` block and include the following additional validation:
```solidity
require(signedGasPrice > 0, "Negative gas price");
require(signedGasPrice < maxGasPrice, "Upper gas price bound breached");
require(signedGasPrice > minGasPrice, "Lower gas p... | 1 | false | true | 1,909 | low | low | input-validation | require(signedGasPrice > 0, "Negative gas price");
require(signedGasPrice < maxGasPrice, "Upper gas price bound breached");
require(signedGasPrice > minGasPrice, "Lower gas price bound breached");
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Round incomplete"); | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
require(signedGasPrice > 0, "Negative gas price");
require(signedGasPrice < maxGasPrice, "Upper gas price bound breached");
require(signedGasPrice > minGasPrice, "Lower gas price bound breached");
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Round incomplete"); | 1 | require(signedGasPrice > 0, "Negative gas price");
require(signedGasPrice < maxGasPrice, "Upper gas price bound breached");
require(signedGasPrice > minGasPrice, "Lower gas price bound breached");
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Round incomplete"); | true | true | 4.59 | medium |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-02 | low | Withdrawing native assets may revert if wrapped native balance is zero | Withdrawing native assets may revert if wrapped native balance is zero
**Description:** The function `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative` allows the owner to withdraw native and wrapped native assets from the contract. If balances of both are zero, calls to this function revert as there is nothing to withdraw.
```sol... | The function `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative` allows the owner to withdraw native and wrapped native assets from the contract. If balances of both are zero, calls to this function revert as there is nothing to withdraw.
```solidity
/**
* @notice Allows owner to withdraw wrapped native and native assets from this ... | null | This would temporarily prevent the withdrawal of any native token balance until the wrapped native token balance is also non-zero, although it seems none of the wrapped native tokens revert on zero transfers on current intended target chains. | Separately validate the wrapped native token balance prior to attempting the transfer. | 2 | false | true | 2,193 | low | low | access-control | /**
* @notice Allows owner to withdraw wrapped native and native assets from this contract.
*/
function withdrawNative() external onlyOwner {
uint256 wrappedNativeBalance = WRAPPED_NATIVE.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 nativeBalance = address(this).balance;
// Make sure there is something to withdraw.
... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/**
* @notice Allows owner to withdraw wrapped native and native assets from this contract.
*/
function withdrawNative() external onlyOwner {
uint256 wrappedNativeBalance = WRAPPED_NATIVE.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 nativeBalance = address(this).balance;
// Make sure ther... | 2 | /**
* @notice Allows owner to withdraw wrapped native and native assets from this contract.
*/
function withdrawNative() external onlyOwner {
uint256 wrappedNativeBalance = WRAPPED_NATIVE.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 nativeBalance = address(this).balance;
// Make sure there is something to withdraw.
... | true | true | 6.86 | medium |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-03 | low | `call()` should be used instead of `transfer()` on address payable | `call()` should be used instead of `transfer()` on address payable
**Description:** The `transfer()` and `send()` functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas. Historically, it has often been recommended to use these functions for value transfers to guard against reentrancy attacks. However, the gas cost of EVM instru... | The `transfer()` and `send()` functions forward a fixed amount of 2300 gas. Historically, it has often been recommended to use these functions for value transfers to guard against reentrancy attacks. However, the gas cost of EVM instructions may change significantly during hard forks which may break already deployed co... | null | The use of the deprecated `transfer()` function will cause transactions to fail:
* If `owner` calling `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative`/`sender` calling `LimitOrderRegistry::claimOrder` is a smart contract that does not implement a payable function.
* If `owner` calling `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative`/`sender`... | Use `call()` or solmate's `safeTransferETH` instead of `transfer()`, but be sure to respect the [Checks Effects Interactions (CEI) pattern](https://fravoll.github.io/solidity-patterns/checks_effects_interactions.html). | 0 | false | true | 2,452 | low | low | reentrancy | 0 | true | false | 4.74 | medium | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-04 | low | Fee-on-transfer/deflationary tokens will not be supported | Fee-on-transfer/deflationary tokens will not be supported
**Description:** When creating a new order, `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` assumes that the amount of deposited tokens is equal to the
function parameter plus the balance before the deposit. For tokens which take a fee on every transfer, this assumption does no... | When creating a new order, `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` assumes that the amount of deposited tokens is equal to the
function parameter plus the balance before the deposit. For tokens which take a fee on every transfer, this assumption does not hold and so the true amount transferred is less than the specified amount.... | null | It will not be possible to use fee-on-transfer/deflationary tokens within the protocol. | Avoid allowlisting such problematic tokens. If it is desired to support such tokens then it recommended to cache token balances before and after any transfers, using the difference between those two balances rather than the input amount as the amount received. | 1 | false | true | 1,318 | low | low | token | uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18; | 1 | uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18; | true | true | 4.96 | medium |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-05 | low | Fulfillable ITM orders may not always be fulfilled | Fulfillable ITM orders may not always be fulfilled
**Description:** Currently, orders are only fulfillable via `LimitOrderRegistry::performUpkeep` which processes them
via the doubly linked list, with a limit of `maxFillsPerUpkeep` orders per call. Considering extreme and/or adversarial market conditions, there is no ... | Currently, orders are only fulfillable via `LimitOrderRegistry::performUpkeep` which processes them
via the doubly linked list, with a limit of `maxFillsPerUpkeep` orders per call. Considering extreme and/or adversarial market conditions, there is no guarantee that all legitimate orders will eventually be processed. If... | null | Valid and fulfillable ITM orders may not be fulfilled even though their liquidity within the position is technically being used for the duration the pool tick exceeds their target tick price. | To guarantee that any order can be fulfilled, consider adding a public `fulfillOrder` function that can be called by any user to fulfil a specific order independently from its position in the list. The order can be simply fulfilled and removed from the list, without affecting the upkeep procedure. | 0 | false | true | 1,863 | low | low | other | 0 | true | false | 3.97 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-06 | low | Spelling errors and incorrect NatSpec | Spelling errors and incorrect NatSpec
The following spelling errors and incorrect NatSpec were identified:
* `cancelOrder` is [documented](https://github.com/crispymangoes/uniswap-v3-limit-orders/blob/83f5db9cb90926c11ee6ce872dc165b7f600f3d8/src/LimitOrderRegistry.sol#L657) to send all swap fees from a position to the... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 2,654 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-07 | low | Avoid hardcoding addresses when contract is intended to be deployed to multiple chains | Avoid hardcoding addresses when contract is intended to be deployed to multiple chains
While the [`LimitOrderRegistry::fastGasFeed`](https://github.com/crispymangoes/uniswap-v3-limit-orders/blob/83f5db9cb90926c11ee6ce872dc165b7f600f3d8/src/LimitOrderRegistry.sol#L190-L193) state variable is [overwritten](https://githu... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 1,114 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-08 | low | Validate inputs to `onlyOwner` functions | Validate inputs to `onlyOwner` functions
Whilst there is a comment that states no input validation is performed on inputs to `LimitOrderRegistry::setRegistrar`
and `LimitOrderRegistry::setFastGasFeed` because it is in the owner's best interest to choose valid addresses, it is recommended that some guardrails still be ... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 1,303 | low | low | access-control | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-09 | low | Limit orders can be frozen for one side of a Uniswap v3 pool if `minimumAssets` has not been set for one of the tokens | Limit orders can be frozen for one side of a Uniswap v3 pool if `minimumAssets` has not been set for one of the tokens
To prevent spamming low liquidity orders, `LimitOrderRegistry::minimumAssets` must be set for a given asset before limit orders are allowed to be placed. A Uniswap v3 pool contains two assets, but `Li... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 815 | low | low | token | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-10 | low | Improvements to use of ternary operator | Improvements to use of ternary operator
There is currently one [instance](https://github.com/crispymangoes/uniswap-v3-limit-orders/blob/83f5db9cb90926c11ee6ce872dc165b7f600f3d8/src/LimitOrderRegistry.sol#L903) of ternary operator usage that can be simplified, with the boolean expression being evaluated directly:
```so... | null | null | null | null | 4 | false | false | 1,152 | low | low | other | bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper ? true : false; | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper ? true : false;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper;
// Code block 3 (solidity):
if (direction)
assetIn = poolToData[pool].token0;
else assetIn = poolToData[pool].token1;
// Code block 4 (solidity):
asse... | 4 | bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper ? true : false;
bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper;
if (direction)
assetIn = poolToData[pool].token0;
else assetIn = poolToData[pool].token1;
assetIn = direction ? poolToData[pool].token0 : poolToData[pool].token1; | false | true | 3 | low |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-11 | low | Move shared logic to internal functions called within a modifier | Move shared logic to internal functions called within a modifier
```solidity
...
if (direction) data.token0.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount0);
else data.token1.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount1);
// 0.9999e18 accounts for rounding errors in the Uniswap V3 protocol.
uint128 amount0Mi... | null | null | null | null | 2 | false | false | 1,574 | low | low | logic-error | ...
if (direction) data.token0.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount0);
else data.token1.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount1);
// 0.9999e18 accounts for rounding errors in the Uniswap V3 protocol.
uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18;
uint128 amount1Min = ... | solidity | // Code block 1 (solidity):
...
if (direction) data.token0.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount0);
else data.token1.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount1);
// 0.9999e18 accounts for rounding errors in the Uniswap V3 protocol.
uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e1... | 2 | ...
if (direction) data.token0.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount0);
else data.token1.safeApprove(address(POSITION_MANAGER), amount1);
// 0.9999e18 accounts for rounding errors in the Uniswap V3 protocol.
uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18;
uint128 amount1Min = ... | false | true | 2 | low |
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-12 | low | Re-entrancy in `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` means tokens with transfer hooks could take over execution to manipulate price to be immediately ITM, bypassing validation | Re-entrancy in `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` means tokens with transfer hooks could take over execution to manipulate price to be immediately ITM, bypassing validation
Whilst there does not appear to be any direct benefit to an attacker, it is possible for tokens with transfer hooks to take over execution from in-fli... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 1,323 | low | low | reentrancy | 0 | false | false | 0 | low | ||||
cyfrin | uniswap-v3-limit-orders | 2023-06-07-cyfrin-uniswap-v3-limit-orders | null | L-13 | low | Use stack variables rather than making repeated external calls | Use stack variables rather than making repeated external calls
Within `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative`, calls to determine the contract balance of native/wrapped native assets are cached in [stack variables](https://github.com/crispymangoes/uniswap-v3-limit-orders/blob/83f5db9cb90926c11ee6ce872dc165b7f600f3d8/src/... | null | null | null | null | 0 | false | false | 897 | low | low | other | 0 | false | false | 0 | low |
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