diff --git "a/data/results/longbench/test/generation/gov_report.json" "b/data/results/longbench/test/generation/gov_report.json" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/data/results/longbench/test/generation/gov_report.json" @@ -0,0 +1,1202 @@ +[ + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides background information and issues for Congress on multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC), which are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting. However, the report also highlights potential issues for Congress, such as whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used. The report also discusses the difference between contracting mechanisms and funding approaches in defense acquisition programs. The use of MYP and BBC can materially change the total procurement cost of a ship, and the report emphasizes that the choice of contracting mechanism should be based on a careful analysis of the program's requirements and the potential benefits and drawbacks of each approach. The report concludes by summarizing the contracting approaches of MYP and BBC and how they compare to annual contracting.", + "answer": [ + "Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP. Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting. BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report provides an overview of the inventory, status, and sustainment of 12 selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft. The inventory totaled 2,823 aircraft and required approximately $20 billion to operate and support in fiscal year 2016. The report discusses the logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations, and DOD policy provides direction to service components on sustainment planning across the life cycle of the weapon system. The policy requires the services to develop and implement a sustainment strategy, such as a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan, for sustaining its weapon systems. The report also discusses the various DOD offices that have roles and responsibilities related to sustaining fixed-wing aircraft. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD ), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (ASD ), and Program Executive Officers are among the key offices mentioned. The report also discusses the various metrics used to measure aircraft availability and readiness, such as aircraft availability, mission capable status, and budgeted and executed flight hours. The report concludes by stating that the Air Force and Navy have not documented sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems, and that the Navy has not implemented all of the recommendations from the Weapon System Readiness Program. The report recommends that the Air Force and Navy develop and document sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems and implement the recommendations from the Weapon System Readiness Program. The report also recommends that DOD provide guidance on how to develop sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems.", + "answer": [ + "DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted with sustainment challenges. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the sustainment of major weapon systems. This report, among other things, (1) examines the trends in availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they met availability goals, and (2) assesses the extent that the departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft by considering a variety of factors, such as the type, age, and manufacturer of the aircraft, among other factors, and analyzed condition and availability data, O&S costs, and sustainment challenges from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017 for each aircraft in a “Sustainment Quick Look.” GAO also analyzed policies, strategies, and plans, and interviewed Navy and Air Force officials in program offices, squadrons, and maintenance depots. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, the Air Force and Navy generally did not meet aircraft availability goals, and operating and support (O&S) cost trends for GAO's selected fixed-wing aircraft varied. Specifically, GAO found that availability declined for 6 of 12 aircraft—3 from each service—between fiscal years 2011 and 2016; availability fell short of goals for 9 of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016; and O&S costs increased for 5 of the aircraft, and maintenance costs—the largest share—increased for 8 of 12 aircraft. GAO found, and officials agreed, that these aircraft face similar challenges. a Obsolescence means a part is unavailable due to its lack of usefulness or it is no longer current or available for production. b Diminishing manufacturing sources is a loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers. The Air Force and Navy have documented sustainment strategies for some aircraft, regularly reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented improvement plans. The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for all aircraft GAO reviewed; however, the Navy has not documented or updated its sustainment strategies for four aircraft. Specifically, the Navy does not have a documented sustainment strategy for the C-2A, and has not updated the strategies for the E2C, EA-18G, and F/A-18A-D since before 2012. The Navy is in the process of documenting its strategies, but Department of Defense (DOD) policy is unclear on whether a sustainment strategy is required and has to be updated every 5 years for weapon systems that are in the operations and support phase of their life cycle (i.e., legacy systems). Also, Navy guidance does not specify a requirement for legacy systems, although Air Force guidance does. Clarifying the requirements to document sustainment strategies for legacy systems, and documenting those strategies, would add additional visibility over the availability and O&S costs of DOD aircraft and any associated sustainment risks. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in April 2018. Information on aircraft availability and other related information was deemed to be sensitive and has been omitted from this report. GAO is recommending that DOD and the Navy update or issue new policy and guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems. DOD concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United Nations, International Criminal Police Organization, and other organizations have reported that wildlife trafficking networks span the globe. The scale of wildlife crime has increased in recent years, with environmental crime on the rise. The U.S. trade in wildlife and related products includes a variety of species, such as live reptiles, birds, and mammals, as well as elephant ivory. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are responsible for enforcing laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA have special agents who investigate wildlife crime, including international and domestic wildlife trafficking rings. They work with other government agencies and organizations to combat wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA also collaborate with nongovernmental organizations to combat wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA have used financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking, but the effectiveness of this approach has not been thoroughly evaluated. The report recommends that FWS and NOAA review their policies on financial rewards and compare their policies with federal internal control standards on control activities. The report also recommends that FWS and NOAA evaluate the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking and compare their policies with federal internal control standards on control activities. The report concludes that FWS and NOAA should improve their use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking.", + "answer": [ + "Wildlife trafficking—the poaching and illegal trade of plants, fish, and wildlife—is a multibillion-dollar, global criminal activity that imperils thousands of species. FWS and NOAA enforce laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking that authorize the agencies to pay financial rewards for information about such illegal activities. GAO was asked to review FWS's and NOAA's use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking. This report examines (1) laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which the agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) the agencies' reward policies, (3) information available to the public on rewards, and (4) the extent to which the agencies reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. GAO reviewed laws, examined FWS and NOAA policies and public communications on rewards, analyzed agency reward data for fiscal years 2007 through 2017 and assessed their reliability, interviewed FWS and NOAA officials, and compared agency policies and public communications on rewards to federal internal control standards. Multiple laws—such as the Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act—authorize the Departments of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA reported paying few rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017. Specifically, the agencies collectively reported paying 27 rewards, totaling $205,500. Agency officials said that the information was complete to the best of their knowledge but could not sufficiently assure that this information represented all of their reward payments. FWS and NOAA have reward policies that outline the general process for preparing reward proposals, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts. Some FWS agents GAO interviewed said that in developing proposals, they did not know whether their proposed reward amounts were enough, too little, or too much. By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare proposed reward amounts, consistent with federal internal control standards. FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on rewards. For example, most agency websites did not indicate that providing information on wildlife trafficking could qualify for a reward. This is inconsistent with federal standards that call for management to communicate quality information so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. FWS and NOAA officials said they have not communicated general reward information because of workload concerns, but they said it may be reasonable to provide more information in some instances. By developing plans to communicate more reward information to the public, the agencies can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking that they otherwise might not receive. FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. The agencies have not done so because using rewards has generally not been a priority. FWS and NOAA officials agreed that such a review would be worthwhile but provided no plans for doing so. By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that FWS and NOAA track reward information, FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS and NOAA develop plans to communicate more reward information to the public, and FWS and NOAA review the effectiveness of their reward use. Both agencies concurred with these recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nCross-border data flows are essential for international trade and commerce. They enable companies to communicate, track global supply chains, share research, and provide cross-border services. Digital commerce relying on data flows drives 22% of global economic output, and global GDP is expected to increase by another $2 trillion by 2020 due to advances in emerging technologies. However, concerns around the security and privacy of the information being transmitted arise. Cross-border data flows are central to trade negotiations as organizations rely on the transmission of information to use cloud services and share nonpersonal corporate data as well as personal data with partners, subsidiaries, and customers. U.S. policymakers are considering various policy options to address online privacy, which could affect cross-border data flows.\n\nThe United States has aimed to eliminate trade barriers and establish enforceable international rules and best practices that allow policymakers to achieve public policy objectives, including promoting online security and privacy. Building consensus for international rules and norms on data flows and privacy has become increasingly important as recent incidents have heightened the public's awareness of the risk of personal data stored online.\n\nCountries vary in their policies and laws on these issues. The United States has traditionally supported open data flows and has regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce, including eliminating trade barriers and opening markets. Other countries are developing data privacy policies that affect international trade as some governments or groups seek to limit data flows outside of an organization or across national borders for various reasons.\n\nImpeding cross-border data flows, including through some privacy regulations, may decrease efficiency and reduce the benefits of digital trade. Policymakers must find a balance between protecting individual privacy and promoting open data flows. The United States is actively engaging in trade negotiations to address these issues, and Congress is examining multiple issues related to cross-border data flows and online privacy.\n\nIn conclusion, cross-border data flows are crucial for international trade and commerce. Policymakers must find a balance between protecting individual privacy and promoting open data flows. The United States is actively engaging in trade negoti", + "answer": [ + "\"Cross-border data flows\" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation. Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows. Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities. There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines. Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation. Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government supports the development of airport infrastructure in three main ways: the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC), and tax-exempt bonds. AIP provides grants for capital projects related to aircraft operations, while PFCs generate revenue for a broader range of projects. Tax-exempt bonds offer investors preferential income tax treatment. The federal role in airport infrastructure began during World War II and has evolved over time. The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 established the forerunner programs of AIP and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. The Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 allowed airports to impose PFCs on passengers. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 extended AIP funding through 2023. The trust fund is the primary source of funding for most FAA activities. The National Plan of Integrated Airport System (NPIAS) lists airports eligible for AIP funding. The structure of AIP funding distribution reflects congressional priorities. AIP grants are usually limited to construction of improvements related to aircraft operations. Commercial revenue-producing facilities are generally not eligible for AIP funding. The GAO found that airport-generated net income financed about 38% of airports' capital spending, AIP 33%, PFCs 18%, capital contributions by airport sponsor 6%, and state grants nearly 5%. The FAA publishes the NPIAS biannually. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 authorized AIP funding through FY2023. The trust fund was designed to assure an adequate and consistent source of funds for federal airport and airway programs. It is the primary funding source for most FAA activities. The money flowing into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund comes from a variety of aviation-related taxes. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 extended AIP funding through FY2023. The trust fund was designed to assure an adequate and consistent source of funds for federal airport and airway programs. It is the primary funding source for", + "answer": [ + "There are five major sources of airport capital development funding: the federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP); local passenger facility charges (PFCs) imposed pursuant to federal law; tax-exempt bonds; state and local grants; and airport operating revenue from tenant lease and other revenue-generating activities such as landing fees. Federal involvement is most consequential in AIP, PFCs, and tax-exempt financing. The AIP has been providing federal grants for airport development and planning since the passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). AIP funding is usually spent on projects that support aircraft operations such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety or emergency equipment. The funds obligated for AIP are drawn from the airport and airway trust fund, which is supported by a variety of user fees and fuel taxes. Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airport's financial situation and the type of project being considered. Although smaller airports' individual grants are of much smaller dollar amounts than the grants going to large and medium hub airports, the smaller airports are much more dependent on AIP to meet their capital needs. This is particularly the case for noncommercial airports, which received over 25% of AIP grants distributed in FY2018. Larger airports are much more likely to issue tax-exempt bonds or finance capital projects with the proceeds of PFCs. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) provided annual AIP funding of $3.35 billion from the airport and airway trust fund for five years from FY2019 to FY2023. The act left the basic structure of AIP unchanged, but authorized supplemental annual funding of over $1 billion from the general fund to the AIP discretionary funds, starting with $1.02 billion in FY2019, and required at least 50% of the additional discretionary funds to be available to nonhub and small hub airports. The act included a provision permitting eligible projects at small airports (including those in the State Block Grant Program) to receive a 95% federal share of project costs (otherwise capped at 90%), if such projects are determined to be successive phases of a multiphase construction project that received a grant in FY2011. The 2018 reauthorization expanded the number of states that could participate in the State Block Grant Program from 10 to 20 and also expanded the existing airport privatization pilot program (now renamed the Airport Investment Partnership Program) to include more than 10 airports. The law included a provision that forbids states or local governments from levying or collecting taxes on a business at an airport that \"is not generally imposed on sales or services by that State, political subdivision, or authority unless wholly utilized for airport or aeronautical purposes.\" The airport improvement issues Congress generally faces in the context of FAA reauthorization include the following: Should airport development funding be increased or decreased? Should the $4.50 ceiling on PFCs be eliminated, raised, or kept as it is? Could AIP be restructured to address congestion at the busiest U.S. airports, or should a large share of AIP resources continue to go to noncommercial airports that lack other sources of funding? Should Congress set tighter limits on the purposes for which AIP and PFC funds may be spent? This report provides an overview of airport improvement financing, with emphasis on AIP and the related passenger facility charges. It also discusses some ongoing airport issues that are likely to be included in a future FAA reauthorization debate." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) uses Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations to fund the acquisition, construction, installation, and equipping of temporary or permanent public works, military installations, facilities, and real property needed to support U.S. military forces in the United States and overseas. The National Defense Authorization Act authorizes amounts to be appropriated in each of the 18 programmatic MILCON appropriations accounts. Each year, conference committee reports or explanatory statements accompanying each fiscal year’s National Defense Authorization Act establish appropriated funding levels for MILCON projects. The process through which the active component requests funding for construction projects is supported by DOD’s Form 1391 Military Construction Project Data (Form 1391). The Form 1391 is used to support each project proposed for inclusion in the MILCON appropriations request submitted concurrently with all other DOD appropriations requests annually. The forms are used for both new projects as well as urgent unforeseen projects. The Form 1391 describes the scope, total project costs, and estimates of specific project elements. Costs associated with other project elements such as contingency and supervision, inspection, and design are also to be captured and included in the total requested amount. The Form 1391 is to include a description of the proposed construction and a requirements statement indicating what requirement the project provides. Project budget estimates are initially developed at the installation level and are provided to the next responsible level for review, validation, refinement, prioritization, and approval. Administrative support is to be provided when requested across the departments, but ultimately the installation is the originator and the primary responsible entity in developing the completed Form 1391. MILCON appropriations are generally available for obligation for 5 fiscal years, at which time the appropriation expires. For 5 years after they expire, appropriations are available for limited purposes, such as liquidating obligations made during the period of availability or adjusting contract costs. After these 5 years, any remaining unexpended amounts, whether obligated or unobligated, are canceled and returned to the U.S. Treasury. Once funds are returned to the U.S. Treasury, they are no longer available for any purposes", + "answer": [ + "Between fiscal years 2005 and 2016, Congress annually appropriated between $2.5 to $9.6 billion in MILCON funding for the active component of the U.S. military to use for projects worldwide. Reliable project construction cost estimates are of great importance, since those estimates drive these appropriations. House Report 114-537 accompanying a proposed bill authorizing national defense activities for fiscal year 2017 included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's MILCON cost estimating. This report examines the extent to which (1) the active component obligated and expended the MILCON appropriations received during fiscal years 2005-2016, (2) the active component reprogrammed MILCON appropriations during fiscal years 2010 through 2016, and (3) DOD's MILCON cost estimates are reliable for selected projects and DOD's guidance for developing estimates fully incorporates the steps needed for developing reliable estimates. GAO analyzed the active components' MILCON execution data and reviewed DOD's guidance for cost estimating and compared it with the best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide . During fiscal years 2005 through 2016, Congress appropriated about $66 billion in military construction funds (MILCON) to the active duty Army, Navy, and Air Force (referred to as the active component) for projects. As of September 30, 2016, the active component had obligated all but about $5.1 billion and expended all but about $11 billion of those funds. Of the $5.1 billion remaining unobligated, about $4.6 billion was still available to be obligated because MILCON appropriations are generally available for new obligations for 5 years. According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, available but unobligated amounts no longer needed may be either taken back by Congress or reprogrammed to other MILCON projects that the active component identifies as needing additional funding. During fiscal years 2010 through 2016, the active component reprogrammed about $1.6 billion in MILCON appropriations to fund emergency projects, projects that were authorized but did not receive specific appropriations, and projects needing additional funding. Of this amount, the Army reprogrammed about $789 million; the Navy, about $535 million; and the Air Force, about $295 million. DOD's guidance does not fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable estimates and the estimates for three projects that GAO reviewed were not reliable. Specifically, two of the three high-value projects GAO examined experienced a more than 30-percent increase from the initial cost estimates submitted to Congress. GAO determined that DOD cost estimators did not follow all the best practices associated with the four characteristics—comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—of a reliable estimate for these projects. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies 12 steps that, if used, are more likely to result in reliable and valid cost estimates. However, as shown below, DOD's construction guidance—the Unified Facilities Criteria—does not include all of these steps. Until DOD incorporates these steps, DOD and congressional decision-makers may not have reliable estimates to inform their decisions regarding appropriations and the oversight of projects. GAO recommends that DOD ensure that its cost estimating guidance fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable cost estimates. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated that it will issue revised cost guidance in fiscal year 2019 that more fully incorporates those steps that would benefit the military construction program." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the requirements for postsecondary schools to participate in federal student aid programs. To be eligible, schools must be certified by the Education Department, accredited by a recognized accrediting agency, and authorized by the state in which they are located. The report explains that the Federal Student Aid (FSA) is responsible for ensuring that schools with access to federal student aid are eligible and capable of properly administering federal student aid funds. FSA is also responsible for conducting ongoing financial oversight of schools that receive federal student aid. This includes reviewing annual financial statement audits to assess a school’s financial responsibility and providing additional oversight to schools that do not meet financial responsibility standards outlined in the Higher Education Act. The report also highlights the role of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in assessing the quality of school compliance audits and selecting a sample to review each year. The OIG reviews the audit documentation to ensure that it supports the auditor’s opinions and that the audit results are reliable. The report further explains that FSA uses provisional certification for initial, or first-time, applicants, as well as schools that are applying for recertification. Provisional certification is the only approval status available to new schools. In addition, FSA may decide to recertify a school provisionally if it determines that a school has not fully complied with federal student aid requirements. The report concludes by stating that FSA and OIG have taken steps to address audit quality and the information available to FSA staff when making certification decisions. These steps include training for auditors, timeliness of OIG quality reviews, guidance to schools on selecting an auditor, audit guide revisions, and a working group to update FSA guidance.", + "answer": [ + "Education provided over $122 billion in grants, loans and work study funds to help students pay for college at about 6,000 schools in fiscal year 2017. Education is responsible for certifying that these schools are eligible for and capable of properly administering federal student aid funds. Schools are required to submit an annual compliance audit that provides information on schools' administrative capability, which Education considers in its school certification decisions. GAO was asked to review Education's process for certifying schools to receive federal student aid. This report examines (1) how Education certifies schools to administer federal student aid and how frequently schools are approved and denied certification; and (2) the role of compliance audits in the certification process and what, if any, steps Education has taken to address the quality of the audit information. GAO analyzed data on school certification outcomes for calendar years 2006-2017 (when GAO determined data were most reliable); reviewed data and reports summarizing Education's reviews of compliance audit quality for fiscal years 2006-2017; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 21 school certification decisions from fiscal years 2015 and 2016, selected for a mix of decisions, school characteristics, and geographic regions; examined relevant federal laws, regulations, policy manuals and guidance; and interviewed Education officials. The Department of Education (Education) is responsible for evaluating a variety of information to determine whether a postsecondary school should be certified to administer federal student aid programs, and agency data show that it approves most schools that apply. Education procedures instruct regional office staff to review school policies, financial statements, and compliance audits prepared by independent auditors, among other things. Education can certify schools to participate in federal student aid programs for up to 6 years, or it can provisionally certify them for less time if it determines that increased oversight is needed—for example, when a school applies for certification for the first time or when it has met some but not all requirements to be fully certified. In calendar years 2006 through 2017, Education fully or provisionally approved most schools applying for initial or recertification to receive federal student aid (see figure). Note: Schools applying for certification for the first time and approved are placed in provisional certification. In deciding whether to certify schools, Education particularly relies on compliance audits for direct information about how well schools are administering federal student aid, and Education's offices of Federal Student Aid and Inspector General have taken steps to address audit quality. The Inspector General annually selects a sample of compliance audits for quality reviews based on risk factors, such as auditors previously cited for errors. In fiscal years 2006 through 2017, 59 percent of the 739 selected audits received failing scores. Audits that fail must be corrected; if not, the school generally must repay federal student aid covered by the audit. Because higher risk audits are selected for review, Inspector General officials said they cannot assess the overall prevalence of quality problems in compliance audits. These two Education offices have taken steps to improve audit quality. For example, the Inspector General offered additional training to auditors on its revised 2016 audit guide and provided guidance to schools on hiring an auditor, while Federal Student Aid created a working group to strengthen its procedures for addressing poor quality compliance audits. Education's efforts to address audit quality could help ensure that these audits provide reliable information for school certification decisions. GAO is not making recommendations in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government continues to face cybersecurity threats and incidents that can pose a serious challenge to economic, national, and personal privacy and security. In fiscal year 2017, federal agencies reported 35,277 information security incidents to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). These incidents involved various threat vectors, such as web-based attacks, phishing attacks, and the loss or theft of computer equipment. Examples of major incidents include the Iranian cybersecurity theft campaign that stole more than 31 terabytes of documents and data from over 140 American universities, 30 U.S. companies, and 5 federal government agencies, and the Russian government targeting U.S. government entities and critical infrastructure sectors.\n\nFederal law and policy, including the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and the presidential executive order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, prescribe the federal approach and strategy for securing information systems. The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 requires protecting federal networks through the use of federal intrusion prevention and detection capabilities. The NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity provides guidance for agencies in implementing an information security program.\n\nFISMA sets requirements for effectively securing federal systems and information. OMB and DHS have oversight roles in ensuring federal agencies' compliance with the law. FISMA assigns to NIST the responsibility for developing standards and guidelines that include minimum information security requirements. NIST has issued several publications to provide guidance for agencies in implementing an information security program.\n\nThe Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 sets forth authority for enhancing federal intrusion prevention and detection capabilities among federal entities. The act contains several provisions for DHS and OMB. DHS is required to deploy, operate, and maintain capabilities to prevent and detect cybersecurity risks in network traffic traveling to or from an agency's information system. DHS is also required to improve intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, as appropriate, by regularly deploying new technologies and modifying existing technologies.\n\nThe report evaluates", + "answer": [ + "Federal agencies are dependent on information systems to carry out operations. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. To reduce the risk of a successful cyberattack, agencies can deploy intrusion detection and prevention capabilities on their networks and systems. GAO first designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. In 2015, GAO expanded this area to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information. Most recently, in September 2018, GAO updated the area to identify 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address major cybersecurity challenges. The federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is grounded in the provisions of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and Executive Order 13800. The act requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to secure their information systems. The Executive Order, issued in May 2017, directs agencies to use the National Institute of Standards and Technology's cybersecurity framework to manage cybersecurity risks. The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to report on the effectiveness of the government's approach and strategy for securing its systems. GAO determined (1) the reported effectiveness of agencies' implementation of the government's approach and strategy; (2) the extent to which DHS and OMB have taken steps to facilitate the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal systems; and (3) the extent to which agencies reported implementing capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed OMB reports related to agencies' information security practices including OMB's annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2017. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency-reported security performance metrics and IG-reported information for the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. In addition, GAO evaluated plans, reports, and other documents related to DHS intrusion detection and prevention programs, and interviewed OMB, DHS, and agency officials. The 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) have often not effectively implemented the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems (see figure below). Until agencies more effectively implement the government's approach and strategy, federal systems will remain at risk. To illustrate: As required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB), inspectors general (IGs) evaluated the maturity of their agencies' information security programs using performance measures associated with the five core security functions—identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The IGs at 17 of the 23 agencies reported that their agencies' programs were not effectively implemented. IGs also evaluated information security controls as part of the annual audit of their agencies' financial statements, identifying material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in internal controls for financial reporting at 17 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. Chief information officers (CIOs) for 17 of the 23 agencies reported not meeting all elements of the government's cybersecurity cross-agency priority goal. The goal was intended to improve cybersecurity performance through, among other things, maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats; and implementing technologies and processes that reduce malware risk. Executive Order 13800 directed OMB, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to assess and report on the sufficiency and appropriateness of federal agencies' processes for managing cybersecurity risks. Using performance measures for each of the five core security functions, OMB determined that 13 of the 23 agencies were managing overall enterprise risks, while the other 10 agencies were at risk. In assessing agency risk by core security function, OMB identified a few agencies to be at high risk (see figure at the top of next page). DHS and OMB facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency systems, but further efforts remain. For example, in response to prior GAO recommendations, DHS had improved the capabilities of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which is intended to detect and prevent malicious traffic from entering agencies' computer networks. However, the system still had limitations, such as not having the capability to scan encrypted traffic. The department was also in the process of enhancing the capabilities of federal agencies to automate network monitoring for malicious activity through its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. However, the program was running behind schedule and officials at most agencies indicated the need for additional training and guidance. Further, the Federal CIO issued a mandated report assessing agencies' intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, but the report did not address required information, such as the capability of NCPS to detect advanced persistent threats, and a cost/benefit comparison of capabilities to commercial technologies and tools. Selected agencies had not consistently implemented capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions into their computer networks. Specifically, the agencies told GAO that they had not fully implemented required actions for protecting email, cloud services, host-based systems, and network traffic from malicious activity. For example, 21 of 23 agencies had not, as of September 2018, sufficiently enhanced email protection through implementation of DHS' directive on enhanced email security. In addition, less than half of the agencies that use cloud services reported monitoring these services. Further, most of the selected 23 agencies had not fully implemented the tools and services available through the first two phases of DHS's CDM program. Until agencies more thoroughly implement capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions, federal systems and the information they process will be vulnerable to malicious threats. GAO is making two recommendations to DHS, to among other things, coordinate with agencies to identify additional needs for training and guidance. GAO is also making seven recommendations to OMB to, among other things, direct the Federal CIO to update the mandated report with required information, such as detecting advanced persistent threats. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. OMB did not indicate whether it concurred with the recommendations or not." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe USAID has provided over $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza since 1993, primarily using funds appropriated through the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The ESF provides project assistance and debt relief payments to PA creditors, and USAID implements most ESF programs, including those related to private sector development, health, water and road infrastructure, local governance, civil society, rule of law, education, and youth development. The assistance to the West Bank and Gaza contributes to building a more democratic, stable, prosperous, and secure Palestinian society, which is in the interest of the Palestinians, the United States, and Israel. The USAID assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is conducted under antiterrorism policies and procedures outlined in an administrative policy document known as Mission Order 21. As of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $544.1 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $350.6 million (over 64 percent) of approximately $544.5 million in ESF assistance allocated for the West Bank and Gaza in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. The largest share of USAID’s ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported the agency’s Economic Growth and Infrastructure development objective, which accounted for about 60 percent of USAID’s ESF project assistance. The second-largest share supported the agency’s Investing in the Next Generation development objective, which accounted for about 27 percent of USAID’s ESF project assistance. The smallest share supported the agency’s Governance and Civic Engagement development objective, which accounted for about 6 percent of USAID’s ESF project assistance. USAID made direct payments of ESF assistance to PA creditors totaling about $75 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $70 million from fiscal year 2016 funds. USAID officials stated that they took four additional steps to mitigate findings noted in the assessment of the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s fuel", + "answer": [ + "Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs. USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials. As of March 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had allocated about $545 million of funding appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. USAID obligated about $544 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $351 million (over 64 percent) of the total allocations. Project assistance accounted for approximately $399 million of the obligated funds, while payments to Palestinian Authority (PA) creditors accounted for $145 million (see figure). USAID's obligations for project assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported three development objectives—Economic Growth and Infrastructure ($239 million), Investing in the Next Generation ($107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, USAID made payments directly to PA creditors—two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network. USAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA. In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries. These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements. GAO is not making recommendations in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nSmall businesses have played a crucial role in job creation in the United States, particularly in the construction, housing, and retail sectors. However, during the recent recession, small businesses accounted for almost 60% of net job losses. Since then, small businesses have added about 65% of net new jobs. The federal government has enacted several laws to enhance small business access to capital, including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. The Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) was established as part of the Small Business Jobs Act to encourage community banks to increase their lending to small businesses. The SBLF provided $30 billion in funding to community banks with less than $10 billion in assets. The SBLF's advocates argued that the fund was an important part of a larger effort to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report examines the SBLF's structure, arguments for and against its enactment, and its implementation by the Department of the Treasury. The report also discusses bills introduced during recent Congresses to amend the SBLF. The Federal Reserve Board's survey of senior loan officers shows that credit standards for small business loans have improved steadily since 2009. However, the supply of small business loans has not kept pace with demand, which is a concern. The report concludes by discussing the potential impact of the SBLF on small business lending and job creation.", + "answer": [ + "Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Several laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example, P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. This report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. The report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund \"to increase the availability of credit for small businesses.\" H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans. The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed FY2020 shipbuilding program and the Navy's longer-term shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes on this issue can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.\n\nThe report discusses the 355-ship force-level goal that the Navy released in December 2016, which replaced a 308-ship goal released in March 2015. The 355-ship force-level goal is the largest force-level goal that the Navy has released since a 375-ship goal that was in place in 2002-2004. The force level of 355 ships is a goal to be attained in the future; the actual size of the Navy in recent years has generally been between 270 and 290 ships. The report also covers the issue of funding for the procurement of an amphibious assault ship called LHA-9.\n\nThe report discusses the strategic and budgetary context in which U.S. Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans may be considered. It also covers the issue of the Administration's FY2020 budget proposal, which withdrew funding for a mid-life refueling overhaul for the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman and retirement of CVN-75 around FY2", + "answer": [ + "The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. On December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by the Navy in 2016. The Navy states that a new FSA is now underway as the successor to the 2016 FSA. This new FSA, Navy officials state, is to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan includes 55 new ships, or an average of 11 new ships per year. The Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan includes 304 ships, or an average of about 10 per year. If the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan is implemented, the Navy projects that it will achieve a total of 355 ships by FY2034. This is about 20 years sooner than projected under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan—an acceleration primarily due to a decision announced by the Navy in April 2018, after the FY2019 plan was submitted, to increase the service lives of all DDG-51 destroyers to 45 years. Although the Navy projects that the fleet will reach a total of 355 ships in FY2034, the Navy in that year and subsequent years will not match the composition called for in the FY2016 FSA. One issue for Congress is whether the new FSA that the Navy is conducting will change the 355-ship force-level objective established by the 2016 FSA and, if so, in what ways. Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) loan program guarantees loans made by commercial lenders to small businesses for working capital and other general business purposes. The SBA guarantees a portion of the loan in case of default. The program is administered by lenders with delegated authority, who are mostly banks but also include non-bank lenders. To be eligible for the program, a business must be an operating for-profit small firm located in the United States and meet the credit elsewhere requirement. The credit elsewhere requirement ensures that borrowers have sought credit elsewhere before applying for an SBA loan. The SBA has revised its standard operating procedure to require documentation that specifically identifies the factors in the present financing that meet the credit elsewhere test. The SBA also has different categories of lenders, including those with delegated authority, those in the Preferred Lenders Program, and those in the SBA Express program. The SBA Express program allows lenders to make loan approval decisions, including credit determinations, without prior review by the SBA. The SBA Office of Credit Risk Management oversees 7(a) lenders, including those with delegated authority. The office is responsible for managing all activities regarding lender reviews, preparing written reports, evaluating new programs, and recommending changes to existing programs to assess risk potential. The 7(a) program accounts for a small portion of total small business lending. The SBA charges fees to lenders and borrowers to cover the estimated cost of the program associated with borrower defaults. The program is subject to on-site reviews and targeted reviews to ensure compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement. The SBA also conducts random audits of lenders to assess their use of the credit elsewhere test. The SBA has identified disparities in credit access among small businesses, particularly among businesses owned by women and minorities. The SBA has also identified disparities in credit access among small businesses in distressed areas. The SBA has taken steps to address these disparities, including providing technical assistance and offering training to lenders. The SBA has also implemented a program to provide financial assistance to lenders that make loans to small businesses in distressed areas. The SBA has also implemented a program to provide financial assistance to lenders that make loans to small businesses owned by women and", + "answer": [ + "SBA's 7(a) program is required to serve creditworthy small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit through a conventional lender at reasonable terms. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review the 7(a) program. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how SBA monitors lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement, (2) the extent to which SBA evaluates trends in lender credit elsewhere practices, and (3) lenders' views on the credit elsewhere criteria for 7(a) loans. GAO analyzed SBA data on 7(a) loans approved for fiscal years 2007–2016, the latest available, and reviewed literature on small business lending; reviewed standard operating procedures, other guidance, and findings from SBA reviews performed in fiscal year 2016; and interviewed lender associations and a nonrepresentative sample of 7(a) lenders selected that concentrated on larger lenders. For its 7(a) loan program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has largely delegated authority to lenders to make 7(a) loan determinations for those borrowers who cannot obtain conventional credit at reasonable terms elsewhere. To monitor lender compliance with the “credit elsewhere” requirement SBA primarily uses on-site reviews conducted by third-party contractors with SBA participation and oversight, and other reviews. According to SBA guidance, lenders making 7(a) loans must take steps to ensure and document that borrowers meet the program's credit elsewhere requirement. However, GAO noted a number of concerns with SBA's monitoring efforts. Specifically, GAO found the following: Over 40 percent (17 of 40) of the on-site lender reviews performed in fiscal year 2016 identified lender noncompliance with the requirement. On-site reviewers identified several factors, such as weakness in lenders' internal control processes that were the cause for lender noncompliance. Most on-site reviewers did not document their assessment of lenders' policies or procedures, because SBA does not require them to do so. As a result SBA does not have information that could help explain the high noncompliance rate. Federal internal control standards state that management should design control activities, including appropriate documentation, and use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without better information on lenders' procedures for complying with the documentation requirement, SBA may be limited in its ability to promote compliance with requirements designed to help ensure that the 7(a) program reaches its target population. SBA does not routinely collect or analyze information on the criteria used by lenders for credit elsewhere justifications. SBA recently began collecting some information on lenders' use of the criteria, but this information is limited, and SBA does not analyze the information that it does collect to better understand lenders' practices. Federal internal control standards state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without more robust information and analysis, SBA may be limited in its ability to understand how lenders are using the credit elsewhere criteria and identify patterns of use by certain lenders that place them at a higher risk of not reaching borrowers who cannot obtain credit from other sources at reasonable terms. In general, representatives from 8 of 11 lenders that GAO interviewed stated that SBA's credit elsewhere criteria are adequate for determining small business eligibility for the 7(a) program. These criteria help them target their lending to small businesses that would otherwise have difficulty obtaining conventional credit because they are often new businesses or have a shortage of collateral. However, they also said that other factors—such as lender policies and economic conditions—can affect their decisions to offer 7(a) loans. In January 2018, SBA issued revised guidance for the 7(a) program and has provided training on this new guidance to lenders and trade associations. Lenders told GAO they are still in the process of understanding the new requirements. GAO recommends that SBA (1) require its on-site reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and procedures related to the credit elsewhere documentation requirement, (2) collect information on lenders' use of credit elsewhere criteria, and (3) analyze that information to identify trends. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 was enacted to focus federal agencies on performance by requiring them to develop long-term and annual goals and measure and report on progress towards those goals annually. GPRA laid a solid foundation for results-oriented management. However, the benefit of collecting performance information is fully realized only when that information is actually used by managers to make decisions aimed at improving results. Although performance planning and measurement had slowly become a part of agencies’ cultures, managers’ use of that information for various management activities generally had remained unchanged. In response to a request from Congress, a framework was developed in 2005 to help agencies better incorporate performance information into their decision making. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) was enacted, which significantly expanded and enhanced the statutory framework for federal performance management. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report accompanying the bill stated that agencies were not consistently using performance information to improve their management and results. The GPRAMA requires certain agencies to designate a subset of their respective goals as their highest priorities and measure and assess progress toward those goals at least quarterly through data-driven reviews. Our recent work and surveys suggest that data-driven reviews are having their intended effect. However, our surveys of federal managers have continued to show that reported government-wide uses of performance information generally have not changed or in some cases have declined. The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) outlines a long-term vision for modernizing federal operations and improving the ability of agencies to achieve outcomes. The PMA highlights the need for agencies to apply data-driven decision-making practices. The administration has established the Leveraging Data as a Strategic Asset (LDSA) office to help agencies improve their use of performance information. The LDSA office has identified practices that promote the use of performance information and has developed a guide for agencies to use in implementing these practices. The report concludes with recommendations for OMB and agencies to improve the use of performance information. The report also highlights the importance of data-driven reviews in improving the use of performance information.", + "answer": [ + "To reform the federal government and make it more efficient and effective, agencies need to use data about program performance. The benefit of collecting performance information is only fully realized when it is used by managers to make decisions aimed at improving results. GAO was asked to review agencies' use of performance information. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which: (1) 24 agencies' reported use of performance information and related leading practices has changed since 2013 and (2) the Executive Branch has taken actions to enhance the use of performance information. To address the first objective, GAO analyzed results from its 2017 survey of federal managers, and compared them to 2013 results. The survey covered a stratified random sample of 4,395 managers from the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies. The survey had a 67 percent response rate and results can be generalized to the population of managers government-wide and at each agency. For the second objective, GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed staff from OMB and the PIC. Agencies' reported use of performance information to make decisions, and leading practices that can promote such use, generally has not improved since GAO's last survey of federal managers in 2013. However, GAO's survey results continue to point to certain practices that could help agencies improve managers' use of performance information. For example, as shown in the table below, GAO's survey found that managers whose programs were subject to data-driven reviews (regular reviews used to assess progress on select agency goals) to a greater extent reported statistically significantly greater use of performance information to make decisions. The Executive Branch has begun taking steps to improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the government. For example, In the President's Management Agenda and government-wide reform plan, released in March and June 2018 respectively, the administration acknowledged the need to do more, and announced a goal, among other actions, to improve the use of data in federal decision making. However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and others responsible for this goal have yet to fully develop action plans to hold agencies accountable for achieving it. The Performance Improvement Council (PIC), which is chaired by OMB, has undertaken efforts to improve the use of performance information by, for example, creating a working group on agency performance reviews. But it has not yet taken a systematic approach to identify and share proven practices that led to, or challenges that may be hampering, increased use of performance information by managers. GAO's survey results identified agencies that may have insights into such practices and challenges. More fully developing action plans for the new goal, and identifying and sharing proven practices and challenges, could help ensure the Executive Branch takes further steps to improve the use of performance information by managers within agencies and across the federal government. To improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the federal government, GAO recommends that OMB work with (1) fellow goal leaders to more fully develop action plans for the new goal to improve the use of data and (2) the PIC to prioritize efforts to identify and share proven practices and challenges. OMB had no comments on this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the implementation of telework and space planning in federal agencies. The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires agencies to designate a Telework Managing Officer and incorporate telework into their continuity of operations plans. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) assesses agency-established telework outcome goals, such as real estate savings, and tracks telework eligibility and participation rates across the government. The percentage of federal workers eligible to telework remained stable at about 45 percent, on average, from fiscal year 2012 to 2015, while the percentage of eligible employees who participated in telework increased from 29 percent to 46 percent.\n\nThe report also discusses the National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property and the Reduce the Footprint policy, which require CFO Act agencies to improve the efficiency of real property use, control costs, and reduce holdings. These policies require agencies to develop Five-Year Real Property Efficiency Plans, develop office space standards, and freeze the footprint of office space. The report notes that employee telework has changed the dynamic of the federal real property portfolio and resulted in a need for less space.\n\nThe report then discusses the concept of mobility, which includes telework, desk-sharing, site work, and travel. Agencies can strategically use telework combined with desk-sharing and hoteling to reduce space needs and increase efficiency. The report describes a continuum of three different scenarios for the ways agencies may use mobility to reduce and use office space more efficiently.\n\nThe report also discusses the role of the General Services Administration (GSA) in promulgating rules and developing guidance promoting the efficient use of real property. GSA provides guidance, assistance, and oversight to client agencies regarding the establishment and operation of alternative workplace arrangements, which include leveraging telework to reduce space needs. GSA directly assists client agencies with identifying and prioritizing opportunities to improve and implement real-property efficiency measures.\n\nThe report found that the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported using telework to reduce or use space more efficiently. The agencies discussed telework in the context of space planning and achieving greater space efficiencies", + "answer": [ + "Federal agencies are exploring ways to use telework as a tool to reduce the federal footprint and use space more efficiently. GAO was asked to examine the effects of telework on agencies' space-planning efforts. In this report, GAO reviewed: (1) how the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported using telework in office space planning; (2) the specific ways selected agencies and GSA used telework in their office space planning; and (3) any challenges the civilian CFO Act agencies faced in using telework in office space planning. GAO surveyed all 23 civilian CFO Act agencies, analyzed each agency's space-planning documents, and Real Property Efficiency Plans . GAO reviewed four agencies in greater detail based on analysis of telework data and other factors. For those four agencies GAO conducted site visits, interviewed officials, and analyzed agency documents. GAO also identified challenges agencies faced in using telework in space planning, based on survey results, agency documents, and interviews. The 23 civilian Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies reported various ways of considering and using telework as a space-planning tool, by, for example, implementing desk-sharing for employees who telework in order to relinquish leased space, or increasing the number of staff working in an existing space without increasing its size. All of the 23 agencies discussed telework in the context of space planning and achieving greater space efficiencies in either their space-planning documents or Real Property Efficiency Plans . The agencies that used telework as a space-planning tool generally reported implementing smaller or unassigned workstations. Three of the four agencies GAO reviewed in greater detail––the General Services Administration (GSA); the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice; the Centers for Disease Control at the Department of Health and Human Services; and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service at the Department of the Treasury––leveraged telework to reduce or use office space more efficiently. For example, GSA and the Office of Justice Programs used telework to accommodate more employees in a smaller office space as illustrated in figure 1 below. The Centers for Disease Control used telework to accommodate more employees in the same amount of space. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service reduced space without telework by reducing the size of individual workstations. The 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported several challenges in using telework to reduce space including human capital issues, mission suitability, and measuring cost savings attributable to telework. About two-thirds of the agencies said they would find it helpful to have additional information, assistance, or resources in using telework as a space-planning tool. GSA provides guidance to improve space utilization. However, GAO found that GSA last developed relevant formal guidance in 2006. This information, and that on GSA's telework and space-planning websites, was neither specific nor detailed and therefore of limited assistance to agencies that would like to use telework as a space-planning tool. Additionally, GSA's space-planning tool—the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool, intended to help agencies quantify the benefits and costs of telework––remains under development after more than 4 years, and GSA officials have not decided whether to make the tool available to other federal agencies. As such, agencies reported that they lack adequate guidance to determine how best to reduce space or use it more efficiently, and how to assess the benefits and costs of using telework in space planning. GSA concurred with recommendations that GSA should: (1) develop guidance on how agencies can use telework as a strategic space-planning tool and make this guidance readily available and (2) complete and make the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool available to federal agencies for use in assessing the benefits and costs of telework." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report highlights the inherent risks to IT systems supporting federal agencies and critical infrastructures due to their complexity and dynamic nature. The risk is compounded by the interconnectedness of these systems with other networks and the increasing sophistication of cyber threats. The report cites examples of cyber incidents that have impacted various critical infrastructure sectors, including the Atlanta ransomware attack, the Iranian cybersecurity theft campaign, and the Equifax data breach. The report also identifies weaknesses in federal agencies' cybersecurity programs and personnel, including the lack of a comprehensive cybersecurity workforce and insufficient training for cybersecurity personnel. The report recommends a coordinated federal strategy to address these challenges, including identifying and addressing cybersecurity workforce gaps, improving cybersecurity training, and implementing effective cybersecurity policies and procedures. The report also highlights the risks associated with the use of new technologies, such as IoT devices and data analytics software, and the need to address privacy and security concerns related to these technologies. The report concludes by emphasizing the importance of addressing these challenges to protect national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety.", + "answer": [ + "Federal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures—such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services—are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. This report provides an update to the information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches. GAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010 aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings. As of August 2018, about 1,000 still needed to be implemented." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe report discusses the changes made to the position of the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following the passage of the NDAA in December 2016. The Under Secretary is now required to report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security and is responsible for leading, conducting, and coordinating department-wide policy development and implementation, and strategic planning. The report also highlights the vacancies in the top positions in the five sub-offices of the Policy, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (PLCY) and the lack of clear roles and responsibilities for PLCY. The report recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security should finalize a delegation of authority or similar document that clearly defines PLCY's mission, roles, and responsibilities relative to DHS's operational and support components. The report also recommends that the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY's workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership.", + "answer": [ + "GAO has designated DHS management as high risk because of challenges in building a cohesive department. PLCY supports cohesiveness by, among other things, coordinating departmentwide policy and strategy. In the past, however, questions have been raised about PLCY's efficacy. In December 2016, the NDAA codified PLCY's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities. GAO was asked to evaluate PLCY's effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS established an organizational structure and processes and procedures that position PLCY to be effective, (2) DHS and PLCY have ensured alignment of workforce with priorities, and (3) PLCY has engaged relevant component staff to help identify and respond to emerging needs. GAO analyzed the NDAA, documents describing specific responsibilities, and departmentwide policies and strategies. GAO also interviewed officials in PLCY and all eight operational components. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) organizational structure and efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective–have been effective. For example, PLCY's coordination efforts for a strategy and policy executive steering committee have been successful, particularly for strategies. However, PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policies that affect multiple DHS components. In large part, these challenges are because DHS does not have clearly-defined roles and responsibilities with accompanying processes and procedures to help PLCY lead and coordinate policy in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable manner. Until PLCY's roles and responsibilities for policy are more clearly defined and corresponding processes and procedures are in place, situations where the lack of clarity hampers PLCY's effectiveness in driving policy are likely to continue. Development of a delegation of authority, which involves reaching agreement about PLCY's roles and responsibilities and clearly documenting them, had been underway. However, it stalled due to changes in department leadership. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. PLCY does some workforce planning as part of its annual budgeting process, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help ensure that PLCY's workforce aligns with its and DHS's priorities and goals. According to PLCY officials, the nature of its mission requires a flexible staffing approach. As such, a portion of the staff functions as generalists who can be assigned to meet the needs of different situations, including unexpected changing priorities due to an emerging need. However, shifting short-term priorities requires tradeoffs, which may divert attention and resources from longer-term priorities. As of June 5, 2018, PLCY also had a number of vacancies in key leadership positions, which further limited attention to certain priorities. According to PLCY officials, PLCY recently began a review to identify the office's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA) and other statutes, compare these authorities to the current organization and operations, and address any workforce capacity gaps. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions and to communicate effectively with DHS leadership about tradeoffs. Officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy, but component officials identified opportunities to better connect PLCY and component staff to improve communication flow about emerging policy and strategy needs. Among the ideas offered by component officials to enhance communication and collaboration were holding routine small-group meetings, creating forums for periodic knowledge sharing, and maintaining accurate and up-to-date contact information for all staff-level stakeholders. GAO is making four recommendations. DHS concurred with three recommendations, including that DHS finalize a delegation of authority defining PLCY's roles and responsibilities and develop corresponding processes and procedures. DHS did not concur with a recommendation to apply the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and communicate workforce needs. GAO believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) outlines the process for states or tribal entities to request a presidential disaster declaration. The act defines the federal government’s role in responding and recovering after a disaster and establishes the programs and process through which the federal government provides disaster assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibility for coordinating the federal response and recovery, which typically consists of providing grants to assist state and tribal entities to alleviate damage resulting from disasters.\n\nFEMA provides assistance through the Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs. The IA program provides financial and direct assistance to disaster victims for expenses and needs that cannot be met through other means, such as insurance. The IA program comprises five different programs, which may be requested by states or tribal entities when they submit a disaster declaration request.\n\nThe Stafford Act requires FEMA to consider six factors when assessing requests for a disaster declaration and when developing a recommendation to the President for a federal disaster declaration. These factors include concentration of damages, trauma, special populations, voluntary agency assistance, insurance coverage, and average amount of individual assistance by state. FEMA uses these factors to measure the severity, magnitude, and impact of the disaster.\n\nIn 2015, FEMA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to revise the six current IA regulatory factors to provide more objective criteria, clarify eligibility thresholds, and speed the declaration process. However, the proposed rule has not yet been finalized.\n\nFEMA’s regional offices evaluate the request and make a regional recommendation through the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendation (RVAR), which documents information on all relevant IA regulatory factors. However, FEMA’s regional offices do not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of the current IA regulatory factors.\n\nThe report recommends that the Administrator of FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the RVAR for each element of the current IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. DHS concurred with the recommendation and described planned actions to address it. The working group will draft survey questions for FEMA region", + "answer": [ + "FEMA's IA program provides help to individuals to meet their immediate needs after a disaster, such as shelter and medical expenses. When a state, U.S. territory, or tribe requests IA assistance through a federal disaster declaration, FEMA evaluates the request against regulatory factors, such as concentration of damages, and provides a recommendation to the President, who makes a final declaration decision. GAO was asked to review FEMA's IA declaration process. This report examines (1) the number of IA declaration requests received, declared, and denied, and IA actual obligations from calendar years 2008 through 2016, (2) the extent to which FEMA accounts for the regulatory factors when evaluating IA requests, and (3) any challenges FEMA regions and select states reported on the declaration process and factors and any FEMA actions to revise them. GAO reviewed FEMA's policies, IA declaration requests and obligation data, and FEMA's RVARs from July 2012 through December 2016, the most recent years for which data were available. GAO also reviewed proposed rulemaking comments and interviewed FEMA officials from all 10 regions and 11 state emergency management offices selected based on declaration requests and other factors. From calendar years 2008 through 2016, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency and Management Agency (FEMA) received 294 Individual Assistance (IA) declaration requests from states, U.S. territories, and tribes to help individuals meet their immediate needs after a disaster. Of these, the President declared 168 and denied 126 requests. Across the various types of IA declaration requests, severe storms (190) were the most common disaster type and drought (1) was among the least common. FEMA obligated about $8.6 billion in IA for disaster declarations during this period. GAO found that FEMA regions did not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of established IA regulatory factors when making IA recommendations to headquarters. Following a declaration request, a FEMA region is to prepare a Regional Administrator's Validation and Recommendation (RVAR)—a document designed to include data on each of the six IA regulatory factors for each declaration request as well as the regional administrator's recommendation. GAO reviewed all 81 RVARs from July 2012—the date FEMA began using the new RVAR template—through December 2016. GAO found that regions did not consistently obtain and document information for the elements required under the six regulatory factors (see table). For example, only 44 of the 81 RVARs documented all elements under the concentration of damage factor. By evaluating why regions are not completing all elements of each current IA regulatory factor, FEMA could identify whether any corrective steps are needed. Officials from the 10 FEMA regions and 11 states GAO interviewed, reported positive relationships with each other, but also cited various challenges with the IA declaration process and regulatory factors. For example, these officials told GAO that there are no established minimum thresholds for IA, making final determinations more subjective and the rationale behind denials unclear. However, as required by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, FEMA has taken steps to revise the IA factors by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking. According to FEMA, the proposed rule aims to provide more objective criteria, clarify the threshold for eligibility, and speed up the IA declaration process. As of April 2018, the proposed rule was still under consideration. According to FEMA officials, they plan to finalize the rule in late 2018; therefore, it is too early to know the extent to which it will address these challenges. GAO recommends that FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the RVARs for each element of the current IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. DHS concurred with the recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe Forest Service is responsible for managing public lands, conducting research, and working with state and local governments to manage forest land. The agency has a workforce of over 30,000 employees and hires thousands more in the summer months. The Forest Service is organized into three main program areas: managing public lands, conducting research, and working with state and local governments. The agency's budgetary resources are allocated through the National Forest System, research stations, and state and private forestry areas. The Forest Service has a Directive System that provides guidance to employees and is responsible for issuing administrative policies, practices, and procedures. The agency has documented processes for allotting its budgetary resources, but lacks an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that appropriated amounts are used for the purposes designated. The Forest Service did not properly allocate certain funds for specific purposes detailed in the appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. The agency did not have a properly designed and documented system for administrative control of funds. The Forest Service did not have control activities for fund transfers for fire suppression activities under its Wildland Fire Management program. The agency did not have an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not properly allocate certain funds for specific purposes detailed in the appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. The agency did not have a properly designed and documented system for administrative control of funds. The Forest Service did not have control activities for fund transfers for fire suppression activities under its Wildland Fire Management program. The agency did not have an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not properly allocate certain funds for specific purposes detailed in the appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. The agency did not have a properly designed and documented system for administrative control of funds. The Forest Service did not have control activities for fund transfers for fire suppression activities under its Wildland Fire Management program. The agency did not have an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest", + "answer": [ + "The Forest Service, an agency within USDA, performs a variety of tasks as steward of 193 million acres of public forests and grasslands. Its budget execution process for carrying out its mission includes (1) allotments, which are authorizations by an agency to incur obligations within a specified amount, and (2) unliquidated obligations, which represent budgetary resources that have been committed but not yet paid. Deobligation refers to an agency's cancellation or downward adjustments of previously incurred obligations, which may result in funds that may be available for reobligation. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's internal controls over its budget execution processes. This report examines the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) review and certification of unliquidated obligations. GAO reviewed the Forest Service's policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Forest Service received discretionary no-year appropriations of $5.1 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively. It is critical for the Forest Service to manage its budgetary resources efficiently and effectively. While the Forest Service had processes over certain of its budget execution activities, GAO found the following internal control deficiencies: Budgetary resources . The purpose statute requires that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not have an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts were used as designated. In fiscal year 2017, GAO issued a legal opinion that the Forest Service had failed to comply with the purpose statute with regard to a $65 million line-item appropriation specifically provided for the purpose of acquiring aircraft for the next-generation airtanker fleet. Further, the Forest Service lacked a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year appropriation balances from prior years were reviewed for their continuing need; did not have a properly designed system for administrative control of funds, which keeps obligations and expenditures from exceeding limits authorized by law; and had not properly designed control activities for fund transfers to its Wildland Fire Management program. These deficiencies increase the risk that the Forest Service may make budget requests in excess of its needs. Reimbursable agreements . To carry out its mission, the Forest Service enters into reimbursable agreements with agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities. The Forest Service (1) did not have adequately described processes and related control activities in manuals and handbooks for its reimbursable agreement processes and (2) lacked control activities related to segregating incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers. For example, line officers may be responsible for initiating cost sharing agreements, modifying cost settlement packages, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent incompatible duties. As a result, programs and resources may not be protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Unliquidated obligations . The Forest Service's processes and control activities over the review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure the best use of funds and that unliquidated obligations would be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs. Further, the current process, as designed, was inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy. In addition, the Forest Service's manuals and handbooks, which provide directives for the areas that GAO reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service's 5-year review policy. Further, standard operating procedures and desk guides prepared by staff to supplement the manuals and handbooks were not issued as directives and therefore were not considered official policy. This increases the risk that control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency. GAO is making 11 recommendations to improve processes and related internal control activities over the management of the Forest Service's budgetary resources, reimbursable receivables and collections, and its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations. The Forest Service generally agreed with the report and stated that it has made significant progress to address the report findings." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Constitution grants the President the power to appoint officers of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. The confirmation process, which serves several purposes, allows the Senate to examine the qualifications of nominees and influence policy. The Senate confirms a high percentage of nominations, mostly non-policy positions, due to the President's preference for a smooth and fast confirmation process and the involvement of Senators in the nomination stage. The Senate has made several changes to the confirmation process since 2011, including reducing the threshold for invoking cloture on nominations and reducing the time required for a cloture process. The number of nominations subjected to cloture motions increased significantly when the Senate was controlled by the same party as the President. Nominations that are not confirmed or rejected are returned to the President, who can submit a new nomination to the Senate. Recess appointments, which do not require the advice and consent of the Senate, have sometimes been controversial and have led to inter-branch conflict.", + "answer": [ + "Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States \"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.\" This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure. Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees \"unless otherwise ordered.\" Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some \"privileged\" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright. The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in \"executive session,\" a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure. The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval. After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is \"will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?\" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased. On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process. Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that provides medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill in the course of their employment, and benefits to the survivors of deceased workers. The LHWCA covers private-sector firms and their employees who work on or adjacent to navigable waters of the United States. The program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), which pays approximately $1.41 billion in cash and medical benefits to injured workers and the families of deceased workers each year. The LHWCA is a no-fault system that pays workers for employment-related injuries or illnesses without considering the culpability of any one party. Workers' compensation is mandatory in all states and the District of Columbia, with the exception of Texas. In Texas, employers may opt out of the workers' compensation system, but in doing so subject themselves to civil actions brought by injured employees. The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 to cover longshore and harbor workers who were not covered by any workers' compensation system. The program was amended in 2009 to exclude workers who build, repair, or dismantle any recreational vessel over 65 feet in length. The DOL promulgated implementing regulations for the new recreational vessel provision in 2011. The LHWCA provides disability benefits to covered workers to partially cover wages lost due to the inability to work because of a covered injury or illness. The amount of disability benefits is based on the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to maximum and minimum benefits based on the National Average Weekly Wage (NAWW). The LHWCA provides benefits in cases of total disability, temporary partial disability, and permanent partial disability. The program also provides cash benefits to the surviving spouses and minor children of workers killed on the job. The responsibility for the payment of benefits under the LHWCA rests with the employer or the employer's insurance company, but decisions on benefit eligibility and the amount of benefits are made by the DOL. The LHWCA claims process begins upon the report of an injury, illness", + "answer": [ + "The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that covers certain private-sector maritime workers. Firms that employ these workers are required to purchase workers' compensation or self-insure and are responsible for providing medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill on the job and survivors benefits to the families of covered workers who die on the job. The LHWCA is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), and all benefit costs are paid by employers and their insurance carriers. In 2016, more than $1.4 billion in LHWCA benefits were paid to beneficiaries. Congress has extended the LHWCA provisions to cover workers outside of the maritime industry, such as overseas government contractors and civilian employees of military post exchanges. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), persons who repair recreational vessels of any size were added to the LHWCA exemption list. In 2011, the DOL implemented this provision; since then, those regulations have proven controversial and numerous bills have been introduced to modify the regulatory definition to increase the number of workers exempted from the LHWCA. The LHWCA pays for all medical care associated with a covered injury or illness. Disability benefits are based on a worker's pre-injury wage, and, unlike comparable state workers' compensation benefits, are adjusted annually to reflect national wage growth." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report analyzes the annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2019. It compares the enacted FY2018 appropriations, the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request, and the appropriations measures developed and considered by Congress. The report identifies additional informational resources and provides a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) policy experts on specific topics. The report explains several specialized budgetary concepts and provides an overview of the appropriations process for DHS.\n\nThe Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2019, a decrease of 0.6% from the enacted level for FY2018. The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA). The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 3109, which included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019, $901 million above the Administration's request and $611 million above the enacted level for FY2018. The House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, which included a continuing resolution that funded the Department at a rate of $44.9 billion. The final FY2019 appropriations act contained $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $901 million above the Administration's request and $611 million above the enacted level for FY2018.\n\nThe report explains several specialized budgetary concepts, including budget authority, obligations, outlays, discretionary and mandatory spending, offsetting collections, allocations, and adjustments to the discretionary spending caps under the BCA. It also discusses the scoring methodology used in the report and the role of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in comparing data.\n\nIn conclusion, this report provides a detailed analysis of the annual appropriations for DHS for FY2019, including the enacted levels,", + "answer": [ + "This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy. On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard. As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5. P.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard. This report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the role of race in higher education, specifically the use of affirmative action. It examines two different contexts: the mandatory use of race-conscious measures to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation in public university systems and the voluntary use of race-conscious measures to promote diversity in student bodies. The report discusses how the federal courts have analyzed these two contexts under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.\n\nThe report first considers affirmative action in its original sense: the mandatory race-conscious measures that the federal courts have imposed on de jure segregated public university systems. The Supreme Court has made clear that a state that had a segregated system must eliminate all \"vestiges\" of that system, including through expressly race-conscious remedies. The Court has charted a three-step inquiry for assessing whether a state has fulfilled this constitutional obligation.\n\nThe report then discusses affirmative action in its other sense: the voluntary use of race-conscious policies to promote diversity in student bodies. The Court has subjected these policies to a particularly searching form of review, known as strict scrutiny. The Court has upheld these policies under a single theory: that the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body uniquely justify some consideration of race when deciding how to assemble an incoming class. However, the Court now requires universities to articulate in concrete and precise terms what their diversity-related goals are and why they have chosen those goals in particular.\n\nThe report concludes by discussing the role that Title VI plays in ensuring equal protection in higher education, both public and private, including several avenues for congressional action under the Act. The report also discusses the potential for Congress to amend Title VI to provide for disparate impact liability, which would resolve a significant and ongoing debate on the issue.\n\nOverall, the report provides a comprehensive overview of the role of race in higher education and the legal framework that governs it. It highlights the complexities and nuances of affirmative action policies and the ongoing debates surrounding them. The report also emphasizes the role of Congress in shaping the future of affirmative action in higher education.", + "answer": [ + "When federal courts have analyzed and addressed \"affirmative action\" in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of \"equal protection.\" The first has its roots in the original sense of \"affirmative action:\" the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state's formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state's consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior \"dual\" systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state's efforts in \"dismantl[ing]\" its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures—in this de jure context—are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations. Outside this de jure context, \"affirmative action\" has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the \"benign\" use of racial classifications—voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities. The federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies—\"affirmative action\" in its perhaps more familiar sense—to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court's review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities' use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension—between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies—beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas. Though the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding—including private colleges and universities—from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions' compliance with Title VI." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by WIOA, authorizes several grant programs to support employment and independent living for persons with disabilities. The State Vocational Rehabilitation Services program is the primary federal government effort to help individuals with disabilities prepare for and obtain employment. Eligible individuals work with state VR agency staff to create an individualized plan for employment that describes the employment goal and the specific services needed to achieve that goal. Education’s Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) awards funds to state VR agencies through the program to help individuals with disabilities engage in gainful employment. States must provide a 21.3 percent nonfederal match of these funds. In fiscal year 2016, total program funds for VR, including state match funds, were $3.81 billion. States, territories, and the District of Columbia generally designate a single agency to administer the program, although states may designate more than one agency. Twenty-three states have two separate agencies, one that exclusively serves blind and visually impaired individuals and another that serves individuals who are not blind or visually impaired. Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the five territories have a single combined agency that serves both blind and visually impaired individuals and individuals with other types of impairments. In total, there are 79 state VR agencies.\n\nWIOA amended the Rehabilitation Act to require state VR agencies to provide students with disabilities with pre-employment transition services. These services are intended to ensure that students with disabilities have meaningful opportunities to receive training and other supports and services they need to achieve employment outcomes. WIOA requires states to make pre-employment transition services available statewide to all students with disabilities in need of such services, regardless of whether a student has submitted an application for services from a state VR agency. In 2014, Education provided states with additional information about each of the required pre-employment transition services.\n\nWIOA also requires local offices of state VR agencies to conduct coordination responsibilities, which includes coordinating with state and local educational agencies to ensure the provision of pre-employment transition services.", + "answer": [ + "WIOA requires states to reserve at least 15 percent of their total State Vocational Rehabilitation Services program funds to provide pre-employment transition services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work. GAO was asked to review how states were implementing these services. This report examines (1) steps states reported taking to implement pre-employment transition services, and (2) implementation challenges states reported and how Education has addressed them. GAO reviewed documents and funding data from Education, and federal laws and regulations; surveyed all 79 state VR agencies (74 responded); held discussion groups with representatives of 29 state VR agencies; and interviewed officials from Education and three states (Idaho, Illinois, and Maryland) GAO selected for variety in size and type of agencies, among other factors. Of the 74 state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies that responded to GAO's survey, most reported expanding services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work as required under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), enacted in July 2014. Most state agencies reported serving more students and providing work-based learning experiences and other activities, referred to as pre-employment transition services (see figure). State VR agencies reported two key challenges with implementing pre-employment transition services for students as required by WIOA. Spending reserved funds : States reported spending about $357 million out of the $465 million reserved for these services in fiscal year 2016. Education officials said that states had difficulty determining what expenditures were allowable, and some state officials said they would like more detailed information from Education. Education officials said they plan to clarify guidance but have no timeframe for providing further information, which would help states to better plan their use of reserved funds. Finalizing interagency agreements : Fewer than half the state VR agencies that responded to GAO's survey (34 of 74) reported updating their interagency agreement with their state's educational agency. Interagency agreements can help promote collaboration by, for example, establishing roles and responsibilities of each agency. Although Education offers technical assistance on interagency agreements, without increased efforts to raise awareness about the importance of these agreements and provide assistance to states where needed, Education may miss opportunities to help state VR and educational agencies efficiently and effectively coordinate services. In addition, WIOA requires Education to highlight best state practices, and most VR agencies responding to GAO's survey (63 of 74) reported this would be useful. Education does not have a written plan or timeframe for identifying and disseminating best practices. As a result, Education may miss opportunities to help more students with disabilities successfully transition from school to work. GAO is recommending that Education (1) establish timeframes for providing additional information on allowable expenditures, (2) take additional steps to assist states that have not updated and finalized their interagency agreements, and (3) develop a written plan with specific timeframes and activities for identifying and disseminating best practices. Education agreed with the first recommendation and disagreed with the other two. GAO revised the second recommendation and maintains that specific information is needed for the third, as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nMedicare is a federal program that provides health insurance coverage for millions of Americans aged 65 and older, as well as certain disabled individuals under 65. The program is funded through a combination of payroll taxes, premiums, and general revenues. Medicare is divided into four parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance), Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance), Part C (Medicare Advantage), and Part D (Outpatient Prescription Drug Benefits).\n\nPart A covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing care, hospice care, and some home health services. It is primarily funded by a dedicated payroll tax of 2.9% of earnings, shared equally between employers and workers. Higher income individuals pay an additional 0.9% on income over $200,000 for single tax filers or $250,000 for joint tax filers.\n\nPart B covers physician services, outpatient services, and some home health and preventive services. It is funded through beneficiary premiums (set at 25% of estimated program costs for the aged) and general revenues (the remaining amount, approximately 75%).\n\nPart C (Medicare Advantage) is a private plan option that covers all Parts A and B services, except hospice. Individuals choosing to enroll in Part C must also enroll in Part B. Part C is funded through the HI and SMI trust funds.\n\nPart D covers outpatient prescription drug benefits. Funding is included in the SMI trust fund and is financed through beneficiary premiums, general revenues, and state transfer payments.\n\nMedicare serves approximately one in six Americans and virtually all of the population aged 65 and older. In 2019, the program will cover an estimated 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that total Medicare spending in 2019 will be about $772 billion; of this amount, approximately $749 billion will be spent on benefits.\n\nThe program is expected to place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. In response to these concerns, Congress", + "answer": [ + "Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. It was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide health insurance to individuals 65 and older, and has been expanded over the years to include permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Medicare, which consists of four parts (A-D), covers hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, and hospice care, among other services. Generally, individuals are eligible for Medicare if they or their spouse worked for at least 40 quarters in Medicare-covered employment, are 65 years old, and are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Individuals may also qualify for coverage if they are a younger person who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death, or have end-stage renal disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or transplant). The program is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and by private entities that contract with CMS to provide claims processing, auditing, and quality oversight services. In FY2019, the program is expected to cover approximately 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of about $772 billion. Spending under the program (except for a portion of administrative costs) is considered mandatory spending and is not subject to the annual appropriations process. Services provided under Parts A and B (also referred to as \"original\" or \"traditional\" Medicare) are generally paid directly by the government on a \"fee-for-service\" basis, using different prospective payment systems or fee schedules. Under Parts C and D, private insurers are paid a monthly \"capitated\" amount to provide enrollees with required benefits. Medicare is required to pay for all covered services provided to eligible persons, so long as specific criteria are met. Since 1965, the Medicare program has undergone considerable change. For example, during the 111th Congress, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152) made numerous changes to the Medicare program that modified provider reimbursements, provided incentives to increase the quality and efficiency of care, and enhanced certain Medicare benefits. In the 114th Congress, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) changed the method for calculating updates to Medicare payment rates to physicians and altered how physicians and other practitioners will be paid in the future. Projections of future Medicare expenditures and funding indicate that the program will place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. For example, the Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund is projected to become insolvent in 2026. Additionally, although the Supplementary Medical Insurance (Parts B and D) trust fund is financed in large part through federal general revenues and cannot become insolvent, associated spending growth is expected to put increasing strains on the country's competing spending priorities. As such, Medicare is expected to be a high-priority issue in the current Congress, and Congress may consider a variety of Medicare reform options ranging from further modifications of provider payment mechanisms to redesigning the entire program. This report provides a general overview of the Medicare program including descriptions of the program's history, eligibility criteria, covered services, provider payment systems, and program administration and financing. A list of commonly used acronyms, as well as information on beneficiary cost sharing, may be found in the appendixes." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. foreign aid program is the largest component of the international affairs budget and has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Global development has been cited as a third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy, in the national security strategies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations. The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy does not explicitly address the status of development vis-à-vis diplomacy and defense, but it does note the historic importance of aid in achieving foreign policy goals and supporting U.S. national interests.\n\nThe report addresses frequently asked questions about the U.S. foreign aid program, including its objectives, costs, and organization; the role of Congress; and how it compares to those of other aid donors. It attempts to present a current snapshot of American foreign assistance, as well as illustrating the extent to which this instrument of U.S. foreign policy has evolved over time.\n\nThe report covers a broad range of foreign aid topics, including traditional and nontraditional aid, the role of Congress in overseeing foreign aid, and the various objectives and rationales for foreign aid. Traditional foreign aid is primarily funded through the foreign operations and international food aid titles of the agriculture and foreign operations appropriations. Nontraditional sources of assistance, such as military and defense-related aid, have grown in recent years.\n\nThe report also highlights the various U.S. government agencies involved in foreign aid, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report provides a detailed breakdown of the different types of foreign aid, including economic, humanitarian, and military aid.\n\nOverall, the report provides a comprehensive overview of the U.S. foreign aid program and its evolution over time. It highlights the important role that foreign aid plays in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals and supporting U.S. national interests. The report also underscores the need for continued oversight and analysis of the U.S. foreign aid program to ensure that it remains effective and efficient in achieving its objectives.", + "answer": [ + "Foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of national security, commercial, and humanitarian rationales, U.S. assistance flows through many federal agencies and supports myriad objectives. These include promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding access to health care and education, promoting stability in conflict regions, countering terrorism, promoting human rights, strengthening allies, and curbing illicit drug production and trafficking. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with national security policy. At the same time, many Americans and some Members of Congress view foreign aid as an expense that the United States cannot afford given current budget deficits. In FY2017, U.S. foreign assistance, defined broadly, totaled an estimated $49.87 billion, or 1.2% of total federal budget authority. About 44% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development programs, including political/strategic economic assistance; 35% for military aid and nonmilitary security assistance; 18% for humanitarian activities; and 4% to support the work of multilateral institutions. Assistance can take the form of cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, or technical assistance, and, in recent decades, is provided almost exclusively on a grant rather than loan basis. Most U.S. aid is implemented by nongovernmental organizations rather than foreign governments. The United States is the largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for about 24% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2017 (the latest year for which these data are available). Key foreign assistance trends in the past decade include growth in development aid, particularly global health programs; increased security assistance directed toward U.S. allies in the anti-terrorism effort; and high levels of humanitarian assistance to address a range of crises. Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding over the past decade was the highest it has been since the Marshall Plan in the years immediately following World War II. In FY2017, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt received the largest amounts of U.S. aid, reflecting long-standing aid commitments to Israel and Egypt, the strategic significance of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the strategic and humanitarian importance of Jordan as the crisis in neighboring Syria continues. The Near East region received 27% of aid allocated by country or region in FY2017, followed by Africa, at 25%, and South and Central Asia, at 15%. This was a significant shift from a decade prior, when Africa received 19% of aid and the Near East 34%, reflecting significant increases in HIV/AIDS-related programs concentrated in Africa between FY2007 and FY2017 and the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military assistance to Iraq began to decline starting in FY2011, but growing concern about the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has reversed this trend. This report provides an overview of the U.S. foreign assistance program by answering frequently asked questions on the subject. It is intended to provide a broad view of foreign assistance over time, and will be updated periodically. For more current information on foreign aid funding levels, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Cory R. Gill." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative is a proposal to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment, through an interstate compact. The NPV initiative has been promoted since 2006 by National Popular Vote Inc. The United States is unique among \"presidential\" republics by providing an indirect election to choose its chief executive through the electoral college system. The electoral college system was established by Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution and has been complemented over the past two centuries by a range of federal and state laws, political party procedures, and enduring political traditions. The NPV initiative aims to achieve direct popular election while circumventing the requirements of Article V. The NPV compact would guarantee that the popular vote winners would always be elected President and Vice President. The NPV initiative has been successful in achieving the support of 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes. However, the lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future. The NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, but has not gained widespread awareness among the public at large. The NPV initiative has been the subject of legal challenges, with critics arguing that it might violate the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution's Article II. The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries.", + "answer": [ + "The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors \"in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... \" Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact. By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors. The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election. Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the \"battleground states,\" campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted \"end run\" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts. The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is \"entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act.\" This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe President's budget for IT in fiscal year 2018 is the largest ever budgeted, at over $96 billion. However, past reports have shown that federal IT investments often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, with little impact on mission-related outcomes. Examples of failed projects include the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, the Secure Border Initiative Network, and the Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program. These failures often stem from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. In addition, executive-level governance and oversight across the government has often been ineffective, specifically from CIOs.\n\nFurthermore, security deficiencies can threaten systems once they become operational. In 2016, 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers Act agencies spent a combined total of approximately $4 billion on IT security-related activities. However, cybersecurity work at federal agencies continues to highlight information security deficiencies. Examples of risks found at federal agencies include privacy risks not being analyzed, outdated policies and procedures, and weaknesses in IT security.\n\nCongress and the President have enacted various key pieces of reform legislation to address IT management issues, including the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). This legislation aims to improve covered agencies' acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies' progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. The law includes specific requirements related to seven areas: Agency CIO authority enhancements, Federal data center consolidation initiative, Enhanced transparency and improved risk management, Portfolio review, Expansion of training and use of IT acquisition cadres, Government-wide software purchasing program, and Maximizing the benefit of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative.\n\nHowever, the implementation of FITARA has been limited. In 2018, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the CIOs of 24 agencies did not have the necessary authority to effectively oversee IT acquisitions and operations. The G", + "answer": [ + "The federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, IT investments have too often failed or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Further, increasingly sophisticated threats and frequent cyber incidents underscore the need for effective information security. As a result, GAO added two areas to its high-risk list: IT security in 1997 and the management of IT acquisitions and operations in 2015. This statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving IT management and ensuring the security of federal IT. It is primarily based on GAO's prior reports issued between February 1997 and May 2018 (and an ongoing review) on (1) CIO responsibilities, (2) agency CIOs' involvement in approving IT contracts, (3) data center consolidation efforts, (4) the management of software licenses, and (5) compliance with cybersecurity requirements. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations and ensure the security of federal IT through a series of initiatives. As of May 2018, agencies had fully implemented about 61 percent of the approximately 800 IT management-related recommendations that GAO made from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Likewise, since 2010, agencies had implemented about 66 percent of the approximately 2,700 security-related recommendations as of May 2018. Even with this progress, significant actions remain to be completed. Chief Information Officer (CIO) responsibilities . Laws such as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) and related guidance assigned 35 key IT management responsibilities to CIOs to help address longstanding challenges. However, in a draft report on CIO responsibilities, GAO's preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 selected agencies have policies that fully address the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance. GAO intends to recommend that OMB and each of the selected 24 agencies take actions to improve the effectiveness of CIO's implementation of their responsibilities. IT contract approval . According to FITARA, covered agencies' CIOs are required to review and approve IT contracts. Nevertheless, in January 2018, GAO reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. Consequently, GAO made 39 recommendations to improve CIO oversight over IT acquisitions. Consolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was codified and expanded in FITARA. According to agencies, data center consolidation and optimization efforts have resulted in approximately $3.9 billion of cost savings through 2018. Even so, additional work remains. GAO has made 160 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the reporting of related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets; however, as of May 2018, 80 of the recommendations have not been fully addressed. Managing software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings, and made 135 recommendations to improve such management. Four years later, 78 of the recommendations remained open. Improving the security of federal IT systems . While the government has acted to protect federal information systems, agencies need to improve security programs, cyber capabilities, and the protection of personally identifiable information. Over the last several years, GAO has made about 2,700 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information. These recommendations identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen their information security programs and technical controls over their computer networks and systems. As of May 2018, about 800 of the information security-related recommendations had not been implemented. From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. Since 2010, GAO also made about 2,700 recommendations to federal agencies to improve the security of federal systems. These recommendations include those to improve the implementation of CIO responsibilities, the oversight of the data center consolidation initiative, software license management efforts, and the strength of security programs and technical controls. Most agencies agreed with these recommendations, and GAO will continue to monitor their implementation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the role of Congress in foreign policy debates over U.S. intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It highlights the strong impact of U.S. intervention on the postwar Bosnian state and the country's geopolitical importance to U.S. interests in the Western Balkans. The report examines Bosnia's internal and external challenges and its role in Balkan stability. It also provides historical context on Bosnia's ethnic and religious diversity, the causes of the 1992-1995 war, and the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the conflict. The report concludes by discussing ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization. The report emphasizes the importance of Congress's engagement with Bosnia and the Western Balkans to address these challenges.", + "answer": [ + "Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, \"Bosnia\") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and \"spoiler\" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Justice (DOJ) and its components, as well as the judiciary, play important roles in requesting and collecting restitution for victims of federal crimes. DOJ's Criminal Division and the Criminal Divisions of the 94 USAOs are responsible for identifying and notifying victims, determining their losses, prosecuting cases, and negotiating plea agreements that may include restitution. The Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section within DOJ's Criminal Division manages the Asset Forfeiture Program. FLUs within each USAO undertake activities to collect restitution from offenders in their district. All USAOs have asset forfeiture staff responsible for forfeiting property seized by law enforcement agencies because it was used in criminal activities or purchased with the proceeds of criminal activities. Coordination between the FLU and Asset Forfeiture units is highly encouraged to use forfeited assets as a means to collect on unpaid restitution debts. DOJ requires each USAO to have its own policies and procedures related to debt collection efforts but allows them discretion in developing these policies and procedures. EOUSA provides USAOs with management assistance, guidance, training, and administrative support. The Judicial Conference is the national policy-making body for the federal courts and the Clerk of each District Court is responsible for the receipt of restitution from offenders and for disbursing payments to victims. The Judicial Conference has taken policy positions on restitution-related issues and has supported legislative proposals to improve the restitution process. AOUSC is the agency within the judiciary that provides a broad range of legislative, legal, financial, technology, management, administrative, and program support services to federal courts. USSC is an independent agency within the judiciary which, among other activities, establishes and promulgates detailed sentencing guidelines that judges are to consider in sentencing offenders convicted of federal crimes, including guidelines on when and how to order restitution. DOJ has identified and recommended numerous practices for federal prosecutors and FLU staff to use throughout the restitution process. Semi-structured interviews with officials from six USAOs found that the most effective practices for ensuring victims receive full and timely restitution include requesting", + "answer": [ + "One of the goals of federal criminal restitution is to restore victims of federal crimes to the position they occupied before the crime was committed by providing compensation. Various entities within the federal government are involved in the process of requesting, ordering, and collecting restitution for crime victims, including DOJ and the judiciary. The Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review the federal criminal restitution process for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. This report addresses, among other things: (1) the extent to which information is available on restitution requested by DOJ and ordered by courts; (2) the amount of restitution debt DOJ collected and the amount that remains outstanding; and, (3) the extent to which DOJ has conducted oversight on the collection of restitution. GAO analyzed laws, policies and procedures as well as USSC data on restitution orders and DOJ data on restitution collected from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of six federal judicial districts based on restitution collections and spoke with USAO officials and federal probation officers. Officials from selected U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) stated that they document requests for restitution in case files and employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. GAO's analysis of U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) data—an agency within the judiciary—showed that information on restitution orders was available for 95 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Specifically, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced during this time period and restitution was ordered for 33,158, or 15 percent, of those offenders. Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33.9 billion in restitution. Most federal offenders sentenced during these years were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses. In interviews, USAO officials stated that these offenses do not typically have victims requiring restitution. GAO found that data on reasons why restitution was not ordered were incomplete for 5 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Determining why data on restitution orders are incomplete may inform the judiciary of the cause of the incomplete data and any efforts needed to improve USSC data. GAO's analysis of Department of Justice (DOJ) data showed that USAOs collected $2.95 billion in restitution debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, see figure below. However, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in previously ordered restitution remained outstanding, and USAOs identified $100 billion of that outstanding debt as uncollectible due to offenders' inability to pay. DOJ identified improving debt collection—including restitution—as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. While DOJ is developing analytical tools to monitor the collection of restitution, it has not established performance measures or goals. Performance measures and goals would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs' success in collecting restitution and, by extension, the department's success in achieving a major management initiative. GAO is making three recommendations. GAO is making one to the judiciary to determine why data on restitution orders are incomplete. GAO is making two recommendations to DOJ, including one to implement performance measures and goals for the collection of restitution. The judiciary and DOJ concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report lists a comprehensive chronology of official activities in response to incidents of military sexual assault, as well as legislative action on the issue. The report is divided into three sections: the DOD and the Obama Administration's actions, congressional action, and legislation in the 113th (2013-2014) and 114th (2015-2016) Congresses. The report also includes a resources section with related articles, hearings, and reports.\n\nIn June 2012, DOD announced Army Major General Gary S. Patton as the new director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO). In September 2012, DOD announced improvements to prospective commander and senior enlisted training and a review of the initial military training environment in every service. In December 2012, DOD released key findings from the Academic Program Year (APY) 2011-2012 Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the United States Military Service Academies. The report showed an increase in reported sexual assaults at all three military academies.\n\nIn March 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that DOD's Office of General Counsel would review Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) after an Air Force officer's court-martial conviction for sexual assault was dismissed using the authority provided by Article 60. In May 2013, DOD announced the establishment of the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel consisting of nine selected appointees.\n\nIn May 2013, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the Military Justice Improvement Act, which would have removed the military judge's power to dismiss charges of sexual assault. The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and later passed the House of Representatives.\n\nIn June 2013, the DOD released the Final 2013 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategy. The report showed a 6% increase in the number of sexual assaults reported by military personnel in FY2012. The report also showed that an anonymous survey of military personnel showed", + "answer": [ + "This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources. For current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) system established by regulation in October 2001. The FMAG system provides federal assistance for fire suppression activities. The authority to declare a FMAG has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. The federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. The report addresses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service on FMAGs. It discusses how FMAGs are requested, how requests are evaluated using thresholds, and the types of assistance provided under an FMAG declaration. The report also highlights the criteria used to evaluate wildfires and make a determination whether to issue an FMAG. The report also explains how FMAGs are funded through FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) and how the decision to issue a FMAG declaration is not contingent on the DRF balance. Additionally, the report explains how FMAGs do not reduce the amount of funding available for major disasters.", + "answer": [ + "Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to \"declare\" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Indian Health Service (IHS) is a government agency that provides health services to members of American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) tribes, primarily in rural areas on or near reservations. IHS operates a network of hospitals, clinics, and health stations, and also provides funds to tribally operated facilities. The agency allocated about $1.9 billion for health services in fiscal year 2017. IHS federally operated facilities provide mostly primary and emergency care, with some ancillary and specialty services. The agency faces challenges in recruiting and retaining health care providers, particularly in rural areas. As of November 2017, IHS had vacancies for physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, dentists, and pharmacists, among other positions. The agency has implemented strategies to address these vacancies, such as offering housing units near medical facilities and implementing accredited physician residency programs. Tribal officials from the Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation have also used similar strategies to recruit and retain health care providers.", + "answer": [ + "IHS is charged with providing health care to AI/AN people who are members or descendants of 573 tribes. According to IHS, AI/AN people born today have a life expectancy that is 5.5 years less than all races in the United States, and they die at higher rates than other Americans from preventable causes. The ability to recruit and retain a stable clinical workforce capable of providing quality and timely care is critical for IHS. GAO was asked to review provider vacancies at IHS. This report examines (1) IHS provider vacancies and challenges filling them; (2) strategies IHS has used to recruit and retain providers; and (3) strategies IHS has used to mitigate the negative effects of provider vacancies. GAO reviewed IHS human resources data for the provider positions that the agency tracks. GAO also reviewed policies, federal internal control standards, and legal authorities related to providers in federally operated IHS facilities. GAO interviewed IHS officials at the headquarters and area level and at selected facilities. GAO selected facilities based on variation in their number of direct care outpatient visits and inpatient hospital beds in 2014. Indian Health Service (IHS) data show sizeable vacancy rates for clinical care providers in the eight IHS geographic areas where the agency provides substantial direct care to American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) people. The overall vacancy rate for providers—physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified nurse midwives, physician assistants, dentists, and pharmacists—was 25 percent, ranging from 13 to 31 percent across the areas. IHS officials told GAO that challenges to filling these vacancies include the rural location of many IHS facilities and insufficient housing for providers. Officials said long-standing vacancies have a negative effect on patient access, quality of care, and employee morale. IHS uses multiple strategies to recruit and retain providers, including offering increased salaries for certain positions, but it still faces challenges matching local market salaries. IHS also offers other financial incentives, and has made some housing available when possible. In addition, IHS uses strategies, such as contracting with temporary providers, to maintain patient access to services and reduce provider burnout. Officials said these temporary providers are more costly than salaried employees and can interrupt patients' continuity of care. However, IHS lacks agency-wide information on the costs and number of temporary providers used at its facilities, which impedes IHS officials' ability to target its resources to address gaps in provider staffing and ensure access to health services across IHS facilities. GAO recommends that IHS obtain, on an agency-wide basis, information on temporary provider contractors, including their associated cost and number of full-time equivalents, and use this information to inform decisions about resource allocation and provider staffing. IHS concurred with GAO's recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe US Navy currently has 51 attack submarines, comprising 33 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines. These submarines are homeported at bases in the US and overseas. The Navy has a strict safety culture and operates a supply-based submarine force that does not compromise on adherence to training and maintenance standards to meet combatant commander demands. The SUBSAFE program was established in 1963 to prevent another loss at sea after the USS Thresher sank during deep submergence tests. Since then, no SUBSAFE-certified submarine has ever been lost. However, the Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time, resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. Between fiscal year 2008 and the end of fiscal year 2018, attack submarines will have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. The Navy incurs significant costs in operating and supporting submarines that are experiencing maintenance delays and idle time. The Navy has started to address workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards, but it will require several years of sustained management attention to reach fruition.", + "answer": [ + "According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders. GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted. The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program is a key U.S. defense capability that is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy. The program equips Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers with a capability for conducting BMD operations. Congress is currently considering whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program. The decisions made by Congress could significantly affect U.S. BMD capabilities and funding requirements, as well as the BMD-related industrial base.\n\nThe Aegis BMD system has been in use since the 1970s and has been updated many times since. Most of the Navy's cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the Aegis ship combat system. The Aegis system is an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons. The system was originally developed for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface threats, and subsurface threats.\n\nThe Aegis BMD system exists in several variants, with the most recent version being the Flight III version. The Flight III version is equipped with a new radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or the SPY-6 radar, which is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.\n\nSales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway. Most of Japan's Aegis-equipped ships are currently BMD-capable, and Japan plans to make all of them BMD-capable in coming years. The Aegis-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are not BMD-capable.\n\nIn-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and subsequent years", + "answer": [ + "The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. government has various agencies that promote exports, but the use of funds to promote tobacco and tobacco products is restricted. The State, Commerce, and USDA agencies are among those that receive appropriations that are not allowed to be used for this purpose. Since the 1990s, Congress has prohibited the use of funds generally appropriated for these agencies from being used to promote the sale or export of U.S. tobacco and tobacco products. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) stopped its efforts to gather and disseminate tobacco-related production and consumption information overseas in the early 2000s. The use of funds for promoting tobacco exports is mandatory for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (2018 State Appropriations Act), but the term “should” is used instead of “shall,” giving the agency more discretion. State collaborates with Commerce, USDA, and other agencies to develop and issue an interagency guidance cable to implement funding restrictions on promoting tobacco. The cable serves as the primary source of guidance for implementing the restrictions on promoting tobacco for officials at all posts overseas. State has updated and issued the interagency guidance cable four times since 2013 to address changes in tobacco technology and other emerging issues. However, two significant changes to the cable over the past 5 years have been identified. The first is the addition of information concerning attendance at corporate social responsibility events, and the second is the expansion of the description of “tobacco and tobacco products” to address the emergence of new delivery systems for tobacco. State officials have not changed how they address the restrictions and do not plan to promote the sale or export of U.S. tobacco. The legislation restricting fiscal year 2018 appropriations provided to Commerce and USDA from being used to promote tobacco retains the mandatory “shall” language.", + "answer": [ + "The World Health Organization estimates that tobacco use kills over 7 million people each year, more than tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria combined. Since the 1990s, Congress has enacted restrictions regarding the use of certain appropriated funds to promote U.S. tobacco exports. GAO was asked to review the implementation of these restrictions. This report examines (1) guidance select U.S. agencies have issued to implement these restrictions, (2) whether overseas officials from select U.S. agencies were aware of the restrictions and guidance, and (3) select U.S. agencies' implementation of the guidance overseas. GAO reviewed U.S. laws, agency guidance, and internal communications; analyzed Commerce data; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C. and in 24 offices across 11 overseas posts in 9 countries. GAO selected these countries based on criteria that included U.S. tobacco export totals, smoking rates, and geographic dispersion. Congress has restricted the use of certain appropriated funding to promote tobacco exports and the Departments of State (State), Commerce (Commerce), and Agriculture (USDA) have issued interagency guidance through the cable system that they rely on to implement these restrictions. State collaborates with these and other agencies to periodically update this cable. The cable informs officials about the types of actions they should take—such as providing routine business facilitation services to all U.S. companies—and the types of actions they should not take—such as attending events sponsored by tobacco companies. Most, but not all, officials overseas that GAO interviewed were aware of the restrictions and received some guidance concerning the restrictions. However, GAO found that some officials did not recall receiving the interagency guidance cable. In addition, State and USDA's current training materials do not address the restrictions. Federal internal control standards state that appropriate training is essential to an organization's operational success. Thus, providing officials overseas with training about the funding restrictions and related guidance would help to ensure that officials are aware of the restrictions. U.S. officials overseas have implemented restrictions on promoting tobacco, but some officials said that the interagency guidance lacks clarity. Officials said that they have not promoted tobacco by, for example, attending events sponsored solely by tobacco companies. However, officials identified three areas of the guidance that are unclear: (1) attendance at events not sponsored by U.S. tobacco companies but attended by representatives of these companies; (2) the types of services officials can provide tobacco companies; and (3) the description of tobacco products, such as whether component parts for electronic cigarettes are included. Federal standards for internal control state that management should clearly document internal controls in policies and guidance to prevent officials from failing to achieve an objective or address a risk. By providing more specific guidance, the agencies would help ensure that officials consistently implement the funding restrictions on promoting tobacco. GAO recommends that (1) State and USDA include information about the funding restrictions and guidance in training materials for relevant employees and (2) State, in consultation with Commerce and USDA, assess and update the interagency guidance cable, as needed, on promoting tobacco in light of questions raised by officials at posts overseas. State and USDA concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers failed to conduct required reviews of providers' clinical care after concerns were raised about their care. The report covered a period from October 2013 to March 2017 and found that the five selected VA medical centers lacked documentation of the reviews they claimed to have conducted. The report also found that the VA medical centers did not always conduct reviews of providers' clinical care in a timely manner. The report identified two factors responsible for the inadequate documentation and untimely reviews: VHA policy does not require VA medical centers to document all types of reviews of providers' clinical care, including retrospective reviews, and VHA's oversight of the reviews of providers' clinical care is inadequate. The report recommended that VHA require documentation of all reviews of providers' clinical care after concerns have been raised, establish a timeliness requirement for initiating such reviews, and strengthen its oversight by requiring networks to oversee VA medical centers to ensure that such reviews are documented and initiated in a timely manner. The report also found that the VA medical centers did not always report providers to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) and state licensing boards as required. The report recommended that VHA require its networks to establish a process for overseeing VA medical centers to ensure they are reporting to the NPDB and to state licensing boards and to ensure that this reporting is timely. VA concurred with these recommendations and described plans for VHA to revise existing policy and update the standardized audit tool used by the networks to include more comprehensive oversight of VA medical centers' reviews of providers' clinical care after concerns have been raised.", + "answer": [ + "This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns ( GAO-18-63 ). Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers—physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services—after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges. GAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that selected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and none of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs. GAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of \"rules.\" Enacted in 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, the CRA requires agencies to report the issuance of \"rules\" to Congress and provides Congress with special procedures under which to consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto. The CRA's scope is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) notice-and-comment requirements. Some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The 115th Congress used the CRA to pass, for the first time, a resolution of disapproval overturning an agency guidance document that had not been promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures. The resolution was signed into law by the President on May 21, 2018. The CRA's expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn rules become available only when agencies submit their rules to Congress. In many cases, agencies fail to submit those rules. This report describes what types of agency actions can be overturned using the CRA by providing a close examination and discussion of the statutory definition of \"rule.\" The report then explains how Members can use the CRA to overturn agency rules that have not been submitted to Congress. The report concludes by discussing the potential impact of the CRA on agency actions and the role of GAO in overseeing the CRA.", + "answer": [ + "The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of \"rules.\" The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto. The CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word \"rule\" from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as \"the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.\" The CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition: any rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing; any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. The class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures. Even if an agency action falls under the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a \"rule\" but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA's special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress. To protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question falls within the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report highlights the challenges faced by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in aligning its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. The shift from inpatient to outpatient care has resulted in underutilized space, and the aging infrastructure and limited stakeholder involvement have further complicated the issue. VA has reported 430 vacant or mostly vacant buildings that are more than 60 years old, and an additional 784 buildings that are underutilized. The historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. VA has also encountered challenges in its facility alignment efforts due to a lack of consistent stakeholder engagement.\n\nThe report recommends that VA improve stakeholder communication guidance and evaluate its efforts, address identified limitations to the Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) process, and assess the value of the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP) process as a facility-planning tool. The report also suggests that Congress may wish to consider seven elements when evaluating proposed legislation for disposing of or realigning VA property. These elements include establishing goals for the process, developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, establishing an organizational structure, establishing a common analytical framework, developing BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve accountability for implementation, and involving the audit community to better ensure data accuracy.", + "answer": [ + "VA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, utilizing more than 6,000 federally owned and 1,500 leased buildings. DOD has repeatedly applied the BRAC process to reduce the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases and to save billions of dollars that could be applied to higher priority defense needs. This statement is based on GAO's April 2017 report related to VA facility alignment ( GAO-17-349 ) and numerous GAO reports related to the BRAC process as summarized in a June 2011 testimony ( GAO-11-704T ) and a March 2012 testimony ( GAO-12-513T ). This statement addresses (1) the factors that affect VA's facility alignment and the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veterans' population, and (2) the key elements and challenges affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005. Detailed information on our scope and methodologies for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony. Geographic shifts in the veterans' population, changes in health care delivery, aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. Further, the historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities. GAO reported that two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities—VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—have limitations that undermine VA's efforts to achieve its goals. Specifically: VA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year's planned project narratives before knowing if their previous submissions have been funded. The overlapping budget cycle, which is outside of VA's control, combined with other SCIP limitations—including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information—make it difficult for VA to rely on SCIP to accurately identify the capital necessary to address its service and infrastructure gaps. VA concurred that it needs to address SCIP limitations that are within its control, as GAO recommended; VA has made some progress in implementing the recommendation has made some progress in implementing the recommendation.\\ The VAIP process is estimated to cost $108 million and to produce market-level service delivery plans and facility master plans. However, the VAIP master plans incorrectly assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. GAO recommended that VA consider discontinuing the VAIP facility master plans pending an assessment of their value as a facility-planning tool. VA agreed with the recommendation and is implementing it while pursuing a national realignment strategy.. Key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process could benefit VA's asset and infrastructure review. The key elements included: (1) establishing goals for the process, (2) developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, and (3) establishing an organizational structure to develop closure and realignment options. GAO identified key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved; these challenges would need to be addressed if VA is to successfully apply the process. These challenges included: (1) large, complex recommendations required sustained senior leadership's attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders, and (2) the large number of actions that depend on each other for successful implementation. In the April 2017 report, GAO made recommendations related to capital planning and stakeholder involvement. VA concurred with the recommendations to the extent that they were within its control and has started making improvements." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has struggled with internal control and financial management system deficiencies since its creation in 2003. To address these issues, DHS initiated a decentralized approach to upgrade or replace legacy financial management systems and evaluated various modernization options, including the use of Shared Service Providers (SSPs). The TRIO modernization project focused on migrating the financial management systems of Coast Guard, DNDO, and TSA to a modernized solution provided by IBC. DHS's efforts to effectively assess and manage risks associated with this project are essential to realizing its modernization goals. In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to consider federal SSPs as part of their Annual Accountability Reports (AAs). In May 2014, Treasury and OMB designated IBC as one of four federal SSPs for financial management. FIT's responsibilities related to the governance and oversight of federal SSPs were subsequently transferred to USSM after USSM was established in October 2015.\n\nConcerns about the Core Accounting System (CAS) Suite led Coast Guard to conduct an Alternatives Analysis (AA) in January 2012 to develop a path forward for modernizing its financial management system. In August 2012, Coast Guard established its CAS Replacement project team to further evaluate alternatives and develop a recommended course of action. In June 2013, Coast Guard completed additional market research, including further analysis of commercial SSPs. In July 2013, the TRIO components determined that migrating to a federal SSP was the best course of action and subsequently conducted discovery phase efforts with IBC from November 2013 through May 2014 to further explore functional requirements for procurement, asset, and financial management services. In August 2014, FIT and OMB concurred with this recommendation, and DHS entered into an interagency agreement (IAA) with IBC for implementation.\n\nThe IAA included a description of the services IBC was to provide and the roles and responsibilities of DHS, the TRIO components, and IBC. The IAA also required IBC to prepare a detailed project management", + "answer": [ + "To help address long-standing financial management system deficiencies, DHS initiated its TRIO project, which has focused on migrating three of its components to a modernized financial management system provided by IBC, an OMB-designated, federal SSP. House Report Number 3128 included a provision for GAO to assess the risks of DHS using IBC in connection with its modernization efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which DHS and the TRIO components followed best practices in analyzing alternatives, and the key factors, metrics, and processes used in their choice of a modernized financial management system; (2) the extent to which DHS managed the risks of using IBC for its TRIO project consistent with risk management best practices; and (3) the key factors and challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and DHS's plans for completing remaining key priorities. GAO interviewed key officials, reviewed relevant documents, and determined whether DHS followed best practices identified by GAO as necessary characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process and other risk management best practices. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TRIO project represents a key effort to address long-standing financial management system deficiencies. During 2012 and 2013, the TRIO components—U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—each completed an alternatives analysis (AA) to determine a preferred alternative for modernizing its financial management system. GAO found that DNDO's AA substantially met the four characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible—that GAO previously identified for a reliable, high-quality analysis of alternatives (AOA) process. However, Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially meet three of these characteristics, and DHS guidance for conducting AAs did not substantially incorporate certain best practices, such as identifying significant risks and mitigation strategies and performing an independent review to help validate the AOA process. Based on these analyses and other factors, the TRIO components determined that migrating to a federal shared service provider (SSP) represented the best alternative, and in 2014, DHS selected the Department of the Interior's Interior Business Center (IBC) as the federal SSP for the project. However, because Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially reflect all of the characteristics noted above, they are at increased risk that the alternative selected may not achieve mission needs. DHS also did not fully follow best practices for managing project risks related to its use of IBC on the TRIO project. Specifically, DHS followed three of seven risk management best practices, such as determining risk sources and categories and establishing a risk management strategy. However, it did not fully follow four best practices for defining risk parameters, identifying risks, developing risk mitigation plans, and implementing these plans largely because its guidance did not sufficiently address these best practices. For example, although DHS created joint teams with IBC and provided additional resources to IBC to help address risk mitigation concerns, it did not always develop sufficiently detailed risk mitigation plans that also included contingency plans for selected critical risks. As a result, although IBC's capacity and experience for migrating large agencies the size of Coast Guard and TSA was identified as a risk in July 2014, a contingency plan working group to address this concern was not established until January 2017. By not fully following risk management best practices, DHS is at increased risk that potential problems may not be identified or properly mitigated. DHS, IBC, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other federal oversight agencies identified various challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and contributed to a 2-year delay in the implementation of Coast Guard's and TSA's modernized solutions. These challenges include the lack of sufficient resources, aggressive schedule, complex requirements, increased costs, and project management and communication concerns. To help address these challenges, DHS and IBC established review teams and have taken other steps to assess potential mitigating steps. In May 2017, DHS determined that migrating the solution from IBC to a DHS data center represented the best option and initiated discovery efforts to further assess this as its path forward for the TRIO project. GAO recommends that DHS more fully follow best practices for conducting an AOA process and managing risks. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions it will take, or has taken, in response." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United States has several international agreements that require treaty partners to provide certain information to the IRS, which helps prevent the use of foreign bank accounts to facilitate tax evasion. FATCA goes further, requiring FFIs to report more detailed information to the IRS about their U.S. customers annually. These provisions are important developments in efforts to combat tax evasion by U.S. persons holding investments in offshore accounts. FATCA requires certain taxpayers to report foreign financial accounts and other specified foreign financial assets whose aggregate value exceeds specified thresholds to the IRS on Form 8938. These thresholds vary by filing status and domestic or foreign residency. FATCA also promotes third-party reporting of foreign financial assets by requiring a withholding agent to withhold 30 percent on certain payments to an FFI unless the FFI or the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located has entered into an agreement with the United States to report certain account information of their U.S. customers. Under such an agreement, participating FFIs report detailed information to the IRS annually about accounts held by their U.S. customers using an IRS Form 8966, FATCA Report (Form 8966). FATCA allows IRS to compare information reported by FFIs on Forms 8966 to information reported by U.S. persons on Forms 8938. This comparison can be used to ensure taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets and income from international investments. FATCA also includes two alternative intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of FATCA by removing partner jurisdictions’ legal impediments to comply with FATCA reporting requirements and reducing burdens on FFIs located in partner jurisdictions. FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs report information on U.S. persons’ accounts to their respective host country tax authorities (HCTAs), which then compile the information and transmit it to the IRS. In contrast, FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs or countries treated as not having an IGA in effect directly report information on U.S. persons’ accounts to the IRS. The FATCA reporting requirements also include a separate self-reporting requirement for foreign accounts.", + "answer": [ + "Concerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. House Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO—among other things—(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad. GAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas. Data quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons—and employing a plan to leverage such data—would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance. Due to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. According to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449—or nearly 178 percent—from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above. Treasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them. GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure includes $1.8 trillion for the Department of Defense (DOD), $154 billion for the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard (see Figure 1 ).\n\nThe report serves as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues. It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans).\n\nThe report discusses the use of supplemental appropriations for unforeseen needs or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded. Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations. Throughout the 20th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities. However, the report raises questions about whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts.\n\nThe report also discusses the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for ongoing activities that are not unforeseen needs. The report notes that the Bush and Obama Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt", + "answer": [ + "Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period. Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits. While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a \"safety valve\" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or \"gimmick\"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a \"slush fund\" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast, mineral-rich nation that has undergone political upheaval and armed conflict since gaining its independence from Belgium in 1960. The eastern DRC has continued to be plagued by violence, often perpetrated against civilians by illegal armed groups and some members of the Congolese national military. In 2012, an illegal armed group occupied the city of Goma and other cities in the eastern DRC and clashed with the Congolese national army. During this time, the United Nations reported numerous cases of sexual violence against civilians, including women and children, which were perpetrated by armed groups and some members of the Congolese national military. In 2017, the United Nations reported that serious violations of human rights remain widespread in the DRC, including continued acts of sexual violence by government security forces as well as nonstate armed groups.\n\nThe DRC is a major source of four conflict minerals—tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold—which are used in a wide variety of products, including automobiles, electronics, and jewelry. In August 2012, the SEC adopted its conflict minerals disclosure rule in response to Section 1502(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The rule requires companies to disclose whether they use conflict minerals and, if so, to conduct due diligence on their supply chains to determine the source and chain of custody of those minerals. In 2017, the SEC reported that almost all companies that filed conflict minerals disclosures reported performing inquiries about their conflict minerals’ country of origin and exercising due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of those minerals. However, many companies reported challenges in determining the country of origin and an estimated 53% of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from covered countries.\n\nThe SEC disclosure rule addresses the four conflict minerals named in the Dodd-Frank Act from the DRC and covered countries. The rule outlines a process for companies to follow, as applicable, to comply with the rule. The process broadly", + "answer": [ + "Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals”— in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the SEC to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. In this report, GAO provides information about (1) companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries published in 2017 and early 2018. GAO analyzed a generalizable random sample of SEC filings and interviewed relevant officials. GAO reviewed U.S., United Nations, and international organizations' reports; interviewed DRC officials, and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in New York at the United Nations headquarters. GAO is not making any recommendations. GAO's review of companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—about the same as in 2016 and 2015. Percentages of companies reporting country-of-origin inquiries in 2017 were also similar to the percentages from those 2 prior years. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries—similar to the estimated 49 percent in 2016 and 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see figure). In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated some challenges in determining the country of origin. Similar to the prior 2 years, almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country-of-origin inquiries, reported doing so. After conducting due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of any conflict minerals used, an estimated 37 percent of these companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Four companies in GAO's sample declared their products “DRC conflict-free,” and of those, three included the required Independent Private Sector Audit report (IPSA), and one did not. In 2017, 16 companies filed an IPSA; 19 did so in 2016. GAO found information on the rate of sexual violence in the 2017 Uganda and Burundi Demographic and Health Surveys. For Uganda, 22 percent of women and 9 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. For Burundi, 23 percent of women and 6 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous GAO reports." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. government has multiple agencies with roles and responsibilities related to the screening and vetting of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applicants. The validity period and number of entries for NIVs vary depending on factors such as the type of visa and reciprocity arrangements with the applicant's country of nationality. The State Department is responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications and manages the NIV application process. The length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months depending on factors such as the type of visa and visa demand. The screening and vetting process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, including petitions, USCIS background checks, NIV application, and inadmissibility and ineligibility checks. The report discusses the impact of various executive orders and court decisions on the NIV application process. The report also highlights the challenges and changes in NIV adjudication due to factors such as global economic conditions and terrorism. The report concludes with a summary of the impact of the Supreme Court's decision on the President's ability to establish nationality-based entry restrictions.", + "answer": [ + "Previous attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's process for adjudicating NIVs, which are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. For example, the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, led to concerns about NIV screening and vetting processes because one of the attackers was admitted into the United States under a NIV. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018. GAO was asked to review NIV screening and vetting. This report examines (1) outcomes and characteristics of adjudicated NIV applications from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, and (2) key changes made to the NIV adjudication process in response to executive actions taken in 2017. GAO analyzed State NIV adjudication data for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data available. GAO visited seven consular posts selected based on visa workload and other factors. GAO reviewed relevant executive orders and proclamations, and documents related to implementing these actions. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2018. Information that DHS, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence deemed sensitive has been removed. The total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. NIV adjudications varied by visa group, country of nationality, and refusal reason: Visa group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourists and business visitors. During this time, adjudications for temporary workers increased by about 50 percent and decreased for students and exchange visitors by about 2 percent. Country of nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent). Refusal reason. State data indicate that over this time period, 18 percent of adjudicated applications were refused; more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought, and a small percentage (0.05 percent) were due to terrorism and security-related concerns. In 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern, the development of uniform baseline screening and vetting standards, and changes to NIV screening and vetting procedures. GAO's analysis of State data indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions. State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others developed standards for screening and vetting by the U.S. government for all immigration benefits, such as for the requirement for applicants to undergo certain security checks. Further, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form to collect additional information from some visa applicants, such as email addresses and social media handles." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government recognizes 573 Indian tribes as distinct, independent political communities with tribal sovereignty. Tribal lands vary in size, demographics, and location, ranging from remote rural areas to urban locations. The term “broadband” refers to high-speed Internet access that provides an “always-on” connection. The federal government has emphasized the importance of ensuring Americans have access to broadband, and various agencies provide funding to subsidize broadband deployment in areas where private investment has not attracted investment. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, specifies that consumers in rural, insular, and high-cost areas should have access to telecommunication services and rates that are “reasonably comparable” to consumers in urban areas. To achieve this goal, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) administers the High-Cost program, which provides subsidies to providers of phone service in rural, insular, and other remote areas. In 2011, FCC launched a series of reforms to its High-Cost program, including adding support for broadband services, and created the Connect America Fund, which provides subsidies to fixed and mobile providers of telecommunications and broadband services in rural, insular, and other remote areas. FCC requires broadband providers to report on their broadband deployment by filing a form twice a year, which is used to develop a statutorily mandated annual report on advanced telecommunications capability. In addition, FCC began publishing its own maps of broadband deployment in 2013, using the information from providers’ Form 477 filings. However, FCC’s method of collecting mobile and fixed broadband data from providers does not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands. Specifically, FCC’s Form 477 captures nationwide broadband availability data, but does not collect data on tribal lands that is granular enough to determine mobile coverage or fixed broadband availability. As a result, FCC’s maps of broadband deployment may overstate broadband access on tribal lands. To address this issue, FCC is conducting a review of its data collection process and considering proposals to improve the accuracy of its", + "answer": [ + "Broadband furthers economic development, educational attainment, and public health and safety; however, residents of tribal lands have lower levels of broadband access relative to the U.S. population. Congress has prioritized identifying and targeting funds to unserved areas. FCC uses data from broadband providers to develop maps and reports depicting broadband availability in the United States, with specific information on tribal lands. GAO was asked to review FCC's efforts to collect broadband data for tribal lands. This report examines the extent to which: (1) FCC's approach to collecting broadband data accurately captures broadband access on tribal lands and (2) FCC obtains tribal input on the data. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 25 tribal governments or tribally owned providers, and visited nine tribal lands. The selected tribes varied geographically and in levels of broadband availability, among other characteristics. GAO also reviewed FCC's rulemakings on broadband data and interviewed other tribal stakeholders, FCC officials, and 13 non-tribal broadband providers selected to include a diversity of technologies. Provider and tribal interviews were based on non-generalizable samples. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects data on broadband availability from providers, but these data do not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands. Specifically, FCC collects data on broadband availability; these data capture where providers may have broadband infrastructure. However, FCC considers broadband to be “available” for an entire census block if the provider could serve at least one location in the census block. This leads to overstatements of service for specific locations like tribal lands (see figure). FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that this approach leads to overstatements of broadband availability. Because FCC uses these data to measure broadband access, it also overstates broadband access—the ability to obtain service—on tribal lands. Additionally, FCC does not collect information on several factors—such as affordability, quality, and denials of service—that FCC and tribal stakeholders stated can affect the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands can access broadband services. FCC provides broadband funding for unserved areas based on its broadband data. Overstatements of access limit FCC's and tribal stakeholders' abilities to target broadband funding to such areas. For example, some tribal officials stated that inaccurate data have affected their ability to plan their own broadband networks and obtain funding to address broadband gaps on their lands. By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be better able to target federal broadband funding to tribal areas that need it the most and to more accurately assess FCC's progress toward its goal of increasing all Americans' access to affordable broadband. FCC does not have a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data. In the National Broadband Plan , FCC highlighted the need for a targeted approach to improve broadband availability data for tribal lands. As outlined in the plan, such an approach would include working with tribes to ensure that information is accurate and useful. About half of the tribal stakeholders GAO interviewed raised concerns that FCC relies solely on data from providers, and most stated FCC should work with tribes to improve the accuracy of FCC's data. Establishing a formal process to obtain input from tribal governments on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data could help improve the accuracy of FCC's broadband data for tribal lands. GAO is making three recommendations to FCC, including that it collect and report data that accurately measure tribal broadband access as well as develop a process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of the data. FCC agreed with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses community banks and credit unions, which are smaller financial institutions that provide banking services to local communities. Community banks are defined as those with under $10 billion in total assets. The report notes that small banks tend to engage in relationship banking, which involves considering not only data models but also information acquired by working with the banking customer over time. This model allows small banks to extend credit to customers such as small business owners who might not receive a loan from larger banks. Community banks have almost $300 billion outstanding in loans with an original principal balance of under $1 million, which represents 20 percent of their total lending. Credit unions are nonprofit member-owned institutions that take deposits and make loans. They are subject to limits on their membership because members must have a \"common bond.\" The report notes that the total amount of business lending credit unions can do is not to generally exceed 1.75 times the actual net worth of the credit union. The report also discusses the regulatory oversight of community banks and credit unions by various federal agencies. The report concludes by summarizing the findings of the 2017 Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA) review of regulations that affect community banks and credit unions. The review identified areas of regulations that could be streamlined and reduced in burden. The report recommends that the federal agencies responsible for overseeing community banks and credit unions should conduct more quantitative analyses of the impact of regulations on community banks and credit unions. The report also recommends that the agencies should consider the cumulative impact of regulations on community banks and credit unions. The report was conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and was released in February 2018.", + "answer": [ + "In recent decades, many new regulations intended to strengthen financial soundness, improve consumer protections, and aid anti-money laundering efforts were implemented for financial institutions. Smaller community banks and credit unions must comply with some of the regulations, but compliance can be more challenging and costly for these institutions. GAO examined (1) the regulations community banks and credit unions viewed as most burdensome and why, and (2) efforts by depository institution regulators to reduce any regulatory burden. GAO analyzed regulations and interviewed more than 60 community banks and credit unions (selected based on asset size and financial activities), regulators, and industry associations and consumer groups. GAO also analyzed letters and transcripts commenting on regulatory burden that regulators prepared responding to the comments. Interviews and focus groups GAO conducted with representatives of over 60 community banks and credit unions indicated regulations for reporting mortgage characteristics, reviewing transactions for potentially illicit activity, and disclosing mortgage terms and costs to consumers were the most burdensome. Institution representatives said these regulations were time-consuming and costly to comply with, in part because the requirements were complex, required individual reports that had to be reviewed for accuracy, or mandated actions within specific timeframes. However, regulators and others noted that the regulations were essential to preventing lending discrimination and use of the banking system for illicit activity, and they were acting to reduce compliance burdens. Institution representatives also said that the new mortgage disclosure regulations increased compliance costs, added significant time to loan closings, and resulted in institutions absorbing costs when others, such as appraisers and inspectors, changed disclosed fees. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued guidance and conducted other outreach to educate institutions after issuing these regulations in 2013. But GAO found that some compliance burdens arose from misunderstanding the disclosure regulations—which in turn may have led institutions to take actions not actually required. Assessing the effectiveness of the guidance for the disclosure regulations could help mitigate the misunderstandings and thus also reduce compliance burdens. Regulators of community banks and credit unions—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration—conduct decennial reviews to obtain industry comments on regulatory burden. But the reviews, conducted under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA), had the following limitations: CFPB and the consumer financial regulations for which it is responsible were not included. Unlike executive branch agencies, the depository institution regulators are not required to analyze and report quantitative-based rationales for their responses to comments. Regulators do not assess the cumulative burden of the regulations they administer. CFPB has formed an internal group that will be tasked with reviewing regulations it administers, but the agency has not publicly announced the scope of regulations included, the timing and frequency of the reviews, and the extent to which they will be coordinated with the other federal banking and credit union regulators as part of their periodic EGRPRA reviews. Congressional intent in mandating that these regulators review their regulations was that the cumulative effect of all federal financial regulations be considered. In addition, sound practices required of other federal agencies require them to analyze and report their assessments when reviewing regulations. Documenting in plans how the depository institution regulators would address these EGRPRA limitations would better ensure that all regulations relevant to community banks and credit unions were reviewed, likely improve the analyses the regulators perform, and potentially result in additional burden reduction. GAO makes a total of 10 recommendations to CFPB and the depository institution regulators. CFPB should assess the effectiveness of guidance on mortgage disclosure regulations and publicly issue its plans for the scope and timing of its regulation reviews and coordinate these with the other regulators' review process. As part of their burden reviews, the depository institution regulators should develop plans to report quantitative rationales for their actions and addressing the cumulative burden of regulations. In written comments, CFPB and the four depository institution regulators generally agreed with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for providing assistance to those affected by disasters and emergencies. It awards grants to state, local, and tribal governments and nongovernmental entities to help communities prevent, prepare for, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from disasters and terrorist attacks. FEMA manages 45 active disaster and non-disaster grant programs, which are grouped into 12 distinct grant categories. The agency obligated about $104.5 billion in disaster relief grants from 2005 to 2014 and has awarded over $22 billion in grants for the four major disasters in 2017.\n\nThe current FEMA grants management environment is complex with many stakeholders, IT systems, and users. The agency is modernizing its IT systems to improve efficiency and cooperation across the organization. The General Management Modernization Program (GMM) is a key part of this effort. GMM aims to standardize and modernize the agency’s grants management processes. The program is using an Agile development approach, which is a type of incremental development that calls for the rapid delivery of software in small, short increments.\n\nThe audit found that FEMA had not fully implemented all six cybersecurity practices identified in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Risk Management Framework. The agency had partially addressed some practices, but not others. The audit also found that FEMA had not established a cost estimate or a robust schedule for GMM. The agency had not developed a program management plan, program management plan management plan, or program management plan execution plan. The audit recommended that FEMA establish a cost estimate, robust schedule, and program management plan.\n\nThe audit also found that FEMA had not fully implemented all six cybersecurity practices identified in the NIST Risk Management Framework. The agency had partially addressed some practices, but not others. The audit recommended that FEMA establish a cost estimate, robust schedule, and program management plan. The audit also recommended that FEMA establish a program management plan management plan and program management plan execution plan.\n\nIn summary, the FEMA grants management environment is complex and the agency is modernizing its IT systems to improve", + "answer": [ + "FEMA, a component of DHS, annually awards billions of dollars in grants to help communities prepare for, mitigate the effects of, and recover from major disasters. However, FEMA's complex IT environment supporting grants management consists of many disparate systems. In 2008, the agency attempted to modernize these systems but experienced significant challenges. In 2015, FEMA initiated a new endeavor (the GMM program) aimed at streamlining and modernizing the grants management IT environment. GAO was asked to review the GMM program. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which FEMA is implementing leading practices for reengineering its grants management processes and incorporating needs into IT requirements; (2) assess the reliability of the program's estimated costs and schedule; and (3) determine the extent to which FEMA is addressing key cybersecurity practices. GAO compared program documentation to leading practices for process reengineering and requirements management, cost and schedule estimation, and cybersecurity risk management, as established by the Software Engineering Institute, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and GAO. Of six important leading practices for effective business process reengineering and information technology (IT) requirements management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully implemented four and partially implemented two for the Grants Management Modernization (GMM) program (see table). Specifically, FEMA ensured senior leadership commitment, took steps to assess its business environment and performance goals, took recent actions to track progress in delivering IT requirements, and incorporated input from end user stakeholders. However, FEMA has not yet fully established plans for implementing new business processes or established complete traceability of IT requirements. Until FEMA fully implements the remaining two practices, it risks delivering an IT solution that does not fully modernize FEMA's grants management systems. While GMM's initial May 2017 cost estimate of about $251 million was generally consistent with leading practices for a reliable, high-quality estimate, it no longer reflects current assumptions about the program. FEMA officials stated in December 2018 that they had completed a revised cost estimate, but it was undergoing departmental approval. GMM's program schedule was inconsistent with leading practices; of particular concern was that the program's final delivery date of September 2020 was not informed by a realistic assessment of GMM development activities, and rather was determined by imposing an unsubstantiated delivery date. Developing sound cost and schedule estimates is necessary to ensure that FEMA has a clear understanding of program risks. Of five key cybersecurity practices, FEMA fully addressed three and partially addressed two for GMM. Specifically, it categorized GMM's system based on security risk, selected and implemented security controls, and monitored security controls on an ongoing basis. However, the program had not initially established corrective action plans for 13 medium- and low-risk vulnerabilities. This conflicts with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance that specifies that corrective action plans must be developed for every weakness identified. Until FEMA, among other things, ensures that the program consistently follows the department's guidance on preparing corrective action plans for all security vulnerabilities, GMM's system will remain at increased risk of exploits. GAO is making eight recommendations to FEMA to implement leading practices related to reengineering processes, managing requirements, scheduling, and implementing cybersecurity. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the federal government to provide grants to states for wastewater treatment plant construction. The grants are administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The CWA was amended in 1987 to create the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program, which provides seed money for state-administered loans to build sewage treatment plants. The CWSRF program was phased in beginning in FY1989 and replaced the previous Title II program in FY1991. The CWSRF program is funded through a combination of federal grants and state-administered loans. The federal government provides seed money for the loans, and the states repay the loans. The CWSRF program is intended to promote state and local self-sufficiency in financing water infrastructure projects. The CWSRF program has been successful in providing funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. However, the program has faced challenges in recent years due to budget constraints. The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to eliminate funding for the CWSRF program. The CWSRF program has been a key source of funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The program has been successful in promoting state and local self-sufficiency in financing water infrastructure projects. The program has also been successful in providing funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The CWSRF program has faced challenges in recent years due to budget constraints. The program has been successful in providing funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The CWSRF program has been a key source of funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The program has been successful in promoting state and local self-sufficiency in financing water infrastructure projects. The program has also been successful in providing funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The CWSRF program has faced challenges in recent years due to budget constraints. The CWSRF program has been a key source of funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The program has been successful in promoting state and local self-sufficiency in financing water infrastructure projects. The program has also been successful in providing funding for wastewater infrastructure projects. The CWSRF program has faced challenges", + "answer": [ + "The principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is authorized in the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established as a grant program in 1972, it now capitalizes state loan programs through the clean water state revolving loan fund (CWSRF) program. Since FY1972, appropriations have totaled $98 billion. In 1996, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, P.L. 104-182) to authorize a similar state loan program for drinking water to help systems finance projects needed to comply with drinking water regulations and to protect public health. Since FY1997, appropriations for the drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program have totaled $23 billion. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both SRF programs, which annually distribute funds to the states for implementation. Funding amounts are specified in the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account of EPA annual appropriations acts. The combined appropriations for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure assistance have represented 25%-32% of total funds appropriated to EPA in recent years. Prior to CWA amendments in 1987 (P.L. 100-4), Congress provided wastewater grant funding directly to municipalities. The federal share of project costs was generally 55%; state and local governments were responsible for the remaining 45%. The 1987 amendments replaced this grant program with the SRF program. Local communities are now often responsible for 100% of project costs, rather than 45%, as they are required to repay loans to states. The greater financial burden of the act's loan program on some cities has caused some to seek continued grant funding. Although the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide \"additional subsidization\" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270) increased this proportion to 35% while conditionally requiring states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants for these purposes. Congress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted SRF grants to provide additional subsidization. Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. The act provided $1.694 billion for the CWSRF and $1.163 billion for the DWSRF program, nearly identical to the FY2018 appropriations. The FY0219 act provided $68 million for the WIFIA program, a $5 million increase from the FY2018 appropriation. Compared to the FY2019 appropriation levels, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to decrease the appropriations for the CWSRF, DWSRF, and WIFIA programs by 34%, 26%, and 63%, respectively." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report examines the practice of charging different prices for the same or similar consumer goods and services based on gender. Firms may use differences in packaging, scent, or other product characteristics to differentiate products and charge different prices for men and women. However, firms may also charge different prices for the same goods and services based on other factors, such as age or ability to pay. The report analyzes data from retail price scanners and online advertised prices for personal care products targeted to women and men. It finds that women’s versions of personal care products sold at a statistically significant higher average price than men’s versions for 5 out of 10 product categories. The report also notes that differences in prices may be due to other factors, such as differences in creditworthiness, rather than gender bias. The report concludes that while there is no federal law that prohibits businesses from charging different prices for the same or similar consumer goods and services targeted to men and women, consumer protection laws do prohibit sex discrimination in credit and real estate transactions. The report recommends that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Federal Trade Commission, and other agencies investigate alleged violations of fair lending laws and collect complaints from the public about price discrimination based on gender. The report also suggests that agencies provide consumer protection information specific to gender price discrimination.", + "answer": [ + "Gender-related price differences occur when consumers are charged different prices for the same or similar goods and services because of factors related to gender. While variation in costs and consumer demand may give rise to such price differences, some policymakers have raised concerns that gender bias may also be a factor. While the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Fair Housing Act prohibit discrimination based on sex in credit and housing transactions, no federal law prohibits businesses from charging consumers different prices for the same or similar goods targeted to different genders. GAO was asked to review gender-related price differences for consumer goods and services sold in the United States. This report examines, among other things, (1) how prices compared for selected goods and services marketed to men and women, and potential reasons for any price differences; (2) what is known about price differences for men and women for products not differentiated by gender, such as mortgages; and (3) the extent to which federal agencies have identified and addressed any concerns about gender-related price differences. To examine these issues, GAO analyzed retail price data, reviewed relevant academic studies, analyzed federal consumer complaint data, and interviewed federal agency officials, industry experts, and academics. Firms differentiate many consumer products to appeal separately to men and women by slightly altering product attributes like color or scent. Products differentiated by gender may sell for different prices if men and women have different demands or willingness to pay for these product attributes. Of 10 personal care product categories (e.g., deodorants and shaving products) that GAO analyzed, average retail prices paid were significantly higher for women's products than for men's in 5 categories. In 2 categories—shaving gel and nondisposable razors—men's versions sold at a significantly higher price. One category—razor blades--had mixed results based on two price measures analyzed, and two others—disposable razors and mass-market perfumes—showed no significant gender price differences. GAO found that the target gender for a product is a significant factor contributing to price differences identified, but GAO did not have sufficient information to determine the extent to which these gender-related price differences were due to gender bias as opposed to other factors, such as different advertising costs. Though the analysis controlled for several observable product attributes, such as product size and packaging type, all underlying differences in costs and demand for products targeted to different genders could not be fully observed. Studies GAO reviewed found limited evidence of gender price differences for four products or services not differentiated by gender—mortgages, small business credit, auto purchases, and auto repairs. For example, with regard to mortgages, women as a group paid higher average mortgage rates than men, in part due to weaker credit characteristics, such as lower average income. However, after controlling for borrower credit characteristics and other factors, three studies did not find statistically significant differences in borrowing costs between men and women, while one found women paid higher rates for certain subprime loans. In addition, one study found that female borrowers defaulted less frequently than male borrowers with similar credit characteristics, and the study suggested that women may pay higher mortgage rates than men relative to their default risk. While these studies controlled for factors other than gender that could affect borrowing costs, several lacked important data on certain borrower risk characteristics, such as credit scores, which could affect analysis of gender disparities. Also, several studies analyzed small samples of subprime loans that were originated in 2005 or earlier, which limits the generalizability of the results. In their oversight of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Federal Trade Commission, and Department of Housing and Urban Development have identified limited consumer concerns based on gender-related pricing differences. GAO's analysis of complaint data received by the three agencies from 2012–2017 found that they had received limited consumer complaints about gender-related price differences. The agencies provide general consumer education resources on discrimination and consumer awareness. However, given the limited consumer concern, they have not identified a need to incorporate additional materials specific to gender-related price differences into their existing consumer education resources." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe National Inventory of Dams in the United States shows that there are approximately 90,500 dams, with 2,100 associated with hydropower projects. These dams account for 8% of the total electric generating capacity in the country. The Federal Power Act gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over 1,000 non-federal hydropower projects, which consist of over 2,500 dams. FERC licenses and provides oversight of these projects to ensure their safe operation. FERC officials work directly with licensees to help ensure compliance with licenses and federal guidelines for dam safety. FERC assigns a hazard classification to each dam based on potential consequences of failure. FERC uses a multi-layered oversight approach that includes independent and coordinated actions with dam owners and independent consultants. FERC requires licensees of high and significant hazard dams to have an Owner’s Dam Safety Program. FERC conducts regular safety inspections, reviews technical analyses, and analyzes safety as part of project relicensing. FERC also requires licensees to hire independent consulting engineers to inspect and evaluate high hazard dams and certain types of dams above a certain height or size. FERC issues hydropower licenses for new projects and reissues licenses for existing projects during relicensing. FERC evaluates safety, environmental, recreational, cultural, and resource development factors during relicensing. FERC requires licensees to conduct various engineering studies related to dam performance in accordance with FERC safety requirements. FERC staff generally conducts and collects information from dam safety inspections consistent with guidance in its Operating Manual. FERC uses a variety of tools to develop engineering studies of dam performance, including programs and modeling tools developed by government agencies and commercially available modeling tools. FERC licensees and their consultants use a variety of datasets to develop engineering studies of dam performance, including data maintained and updated by various government agencies. FERC has a framework for its dam safety oversight approach, including guidelines for inspections, procedures for reviewing technical analyses, and criteria for reviewing license applications. FERC", + "answer": [ + "In February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses—which can last up to 50 years—to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions. GAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident. Guidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license. GAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal child nutrition programs provide financial assistance to schools and other institutions in the form of cash, commodity food, and administrative support. The primary goal is to improve children's nutrition and support the agriculture economy. The report describes the various meal, snack, and milk reimbursement programs that fall under this umbrella, including the National School Lunch Program, School Breakfast Program, Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, and Special Milk Program.\n\nThe programs operate under different eligibility rules and funding structures. For example, the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program provide financial support and/or foods to institutions that prepare meals and snacks served outside of the home. The Child and Adult Care Food Program provides assistance for child care settings and summer programs. The Special Milk Program provides financial assistance for milk to be served in non-profit schools.\n\nThe report provides a detailed overview of each program's operation, including eligibility rules, participation, and funding. The programs have evolved over time, with new initiatives and funding being added to support nutrition education, farm-to-school programs, and other activities.\n\nThe report also discusses the role of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service in administering the programs at the federal level. The programs are operated by a wide variety of local public and private providers, with varying degrees of state involvement.\n\nOverall, the federal child nutrition programs play a crucial role in providing nutritious meals and snacks to millions of children across the United States. The report provides a comprehensive overview of the programs, their operation, and their impact on children's health and the agriculture economy.", + "answer": [ + "The \"child nutrition programs\" refer to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in school or institutional settings. The best known programs, which serve the largest number of children, are the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). The child nutrition programs also include the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which provides meals and snacks in day care and after school settings; the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides food during the summer months; the Special Milk Program (SMP), which supports milk for schools that do not participate in NSLP or SBP; and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), which funds fruit and vegetable snacks in select elementary schools. Funding: The vast majority of the child nutrition programs account is considered mandatory spending, with trace amounts of discretionary funding for certain related activities. Referred to as open-ended, \"appropriated entitlements,\" funding is provided through the annual appropriations process; however, the level of spending is controlled by benefit and eligibility criteria in federal law and dependent on the resulting levels of participation. Federal cash funding (in the form of per-meal reimbursements) and USDA commodity food support is guaranteed to schools and other providers based on the number of meals or snacks served and participant category (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies). Participation: The child nutrition programs serve children of varying ages and in different institutional settings. The NSLP and SBP have the broadest reach, serving qualifying children of all ages in school settings. Other child nutrition programs serve more-narrow populations. CACFP, for example, provides meals and snacks to children in early childhood and after-school settings among other venues. Programs generally provide some subsidy for all food served but a larger federal reimbursement for food served to children from low-income households. Administration: Responsibility for child nutrition programs is divided between the federal government, states, and localities. The state agency and type of local provider differs by program. In the NSLP and SBP, schools and school districts (\"school food authorities\") administer the program. Meanwhile, SFSP (and sometimes CACFP) uses a model in which sponsor organizations handle administrative responsibilities for a number of sites that serve meals. Reauthorization: The underlying laws covering the child nutrition programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296, enacted December 13, 2010). This law made significant changes to child nutrition programs, including increasing federal financing for school lunches, expanding access to community eligibility and direct certification options for schools, and expanding eligibility options for home child care providers. The law also required an update to school meal nutrition guidelines as well as new guidelines for food served outside the meal programs (e.g., snacks sold in vending machines and cafeteria a la carte lines). Current Issues: The 114th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization, and there was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115th Congress. However, the vast majority of operations and activities continue with funding provided by appropriations laws. Current issues in the child nutrition programs are discussed in CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government provides benefits to coal miners affected by black lung disease and other lung diseases linked to coal mining. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund finances these benefits, primarily through an excise tax on coal production. However, the decline in excise tax rates and financial strain on the trust fund due to the decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of black lung disease, and bankruptcies in the coal sector have raised concerns about the trust fund's financial outlook. This report provides background information and policy options to help inform the debate surrounding the coal excise tax rate and other considerations related to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.\n\nBlack lung disease is an interstitial lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust, which scars the lung tissue and affects the gas-exchanging ability of the lungs. Exposure to coal dust over an extended period can lead to black lung disease and continued exposure can lead to the progression from early stages to more advanced stages of scarring. There is no cure for black lung disease, and it can lead to loss of lung function, the need for lung transplantation, and premature death.\n\nThe federal Black Lung Program was created in 1969 to provide benefits to miners with black lung disease and their families. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was established in 1972 to finance these benefits. The trust fund is primarily funded through an excise tax on coal production, with revenue limited to 4.4% of the sales price for underground-mined coal or 2% of the sales price for surface-mined coal. If excise tax revenue is insufficient, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury.\n\nIn 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal. Starting in 2019, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. The decline in excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on the trust fund.\n\nThe trust fund has faced challeng", + "answer": [ + "The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2019, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977. The decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal reduced in 2019, the 116th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nPuerto Rico, a U.S. territory with 3.3 million residents, is experiencing a prolonged period of economic contraction. Its economy has been in decline since the 1990s, with real GDP and GNP falling by more than 9% between 2005 and 2016. The population has also declined, with a 12.8% drop from 2004 to 2017. The labor force has also shrunk, with a 1.1 million person decrease from 2006 to 2017. The government has operated with a deficit since 2002, and its deficits grew over time.\n\nPuerto Rico's economy is affected by various factors, including a decline in manufacturing, a high public debt, and a shrinking population. The high public debt is due to factors such as a decline in tax revenue, an increase in government spending, and a lack of fiscal discipline. The government has also issued a large amount of debt to finance its operations, leading to a high debt-to-GDP ratio.\n\nThe report identifies federal actions that could address the factors contributing to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt. These actions include improving transparency and accountability, addressing the high public debt, promoting economic growth, and improving fiscal management. The report also notes that the federal government has already taken some actions to address Puerto Rico's financial situation, such as providing disaster relief and extending certain tax credits.\n\nThe report concludes by stating that addressing Puerto Rico's financial situation is important for both the U.S. government and the Puerto Rican people. The report recommends that the U.S. government continue to work with the Puerto Rican government to address the factors contributing to the territory's financial condition and levels of debt. The report also suggests that the U.S. government consider providing additional assistance to Puerto Rico to help address its economic challenges.", + "answer": [ + "Puerto Rico has roughly $70 billion in outstanding debt and $50 billion in unfunded pension liabilities and since August 2015 has defaulted on over $1.5 billion in debt. The effects of Hurricanes Irma and Maria will further affect Puerto Rico's ability to repay its debt, as well as its economic condition. In response to Puerto Rico's fiscal crisis, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Security Act (PROMESA) in 2016, which included a provision for GAO to review Puerto Rico's debt. This report describes the factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt and federal actions that could address these factors. Consistent with PROMESA, GAO focused on actions that would not increase the federal deficit. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Puerto Rico and federal governments and conducted a review of relevant literature. GAO also interviewed former Puerto Rico officials and experts in Puerto Rico's economy, the municipal securities markets, and state and territorial budgeting, financial management, and debt practices, as well as officials from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (created by PROMESA). GAO is not making recommendations based on the federal actions identified because policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs related to implementation. The Puerto Rico government generally agreed with the factors we identified and provided additional information. GAO incorporated technical comments from SEC as appropriate. The factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt relate to (1) the Puerto Rico government running persistent annual deficits—where expenses exceed revenues—and (2) its use of debt to cope with deficits. Based on a literature review and interviews with current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's persistent deficits: The Puerto Rico government's inadequate financial management and oversight practices. For example, the Puerto Rico government frequently overestimated the amount of revenue it would collect and Puerto Rico's agencies regularly spent more than the amounts Puerto Rico's legislature appropriated for a given fiscal year. Policy decisions by Puerto Rico's government. For example, Puerto Rico borrowed funds to balance budgets and insufficiently addressed public pension funding shortfalls. Puerto Rico's prolonged economic contraction. Examples of factors contributing to the contraction include outmigration and the resulting diminished labor force, and the high cost of importing goods and energy. Additional factors enabled Puerto Rico to use debt to finance its deficits, such as high demand for Puerto Rico debt. One cause of high demand was that under federal law, income from Puerto Rico bonds generally receives more favorable tax treatment than income from bonds issued by states and their localities. Based on an assessment of relevant literature and input from current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified three potential federal actions that may help address some of these factors. GAO also identified considerations for policymakers related to these actions. Modify the tax exempt status for Puerto Rico municipal debt. Making interest income from Puerto Rico bonds earned by investors residing outside of Puerto Rico subject to applicable state and local taxes could lower demand for Puerto Rico debt. However, reduced demand could hinder Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds for capital investments or liquidity. Apply federal investor protection laws to Puerto Rico. Requiring Puerto Rico investment companies to disclose risks with Puerto Rico bonds and adhere to other requirements could lower demand for the bonds. However, this action could also limit Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds. Modify the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) authority over municipal bond disclosure requirements. SEC could be allowed to require timely disclosure of materials—such as audited financial statements—associated with municipal bonds. Over the past decade, Puerto Rico often failed to provide timely audited financial statements related to its municipal bonds. Timely disclosure could help investors make informed decisions about investing in municipal bonds. However, a broad requirement could place additional burdens on all U.S. municipal issuers, such as the costs of standardizing reporting." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) manages four principal programs: Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and health-insurance marketplaces. Medicare and Medicaid are the largest programs and have been growing steadily. CMS uses managed-care delivery systems to provide care, and the number of beneficiaries enrolled in these programs has increased. CMS receives appropriations to carry out antifraud activities through several funds, including the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) program and the Medicaid Integrity Program. Improper payments are a significant risk to the Medicare and Medicaid programs and can include payments made as a result of fraud. CMS has designated Medicare and Medicaid as high-risk programs due to their size, scope, and complexity. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has also designated all parts of Medicare as well as Medicaid as high-priority programs. The report highlights the importance of combating fraud in these programs and the need for CMS to develop an antifraud strategy based on fraud risk assessments for Medicare and Medicaid. The report recommends that CMS provide fraud-awareness training to all employees, conduct fraud risk assessments for Medicare and Medicaid, and create, document, implement, and communicate an antifraud strategy that is aligned with and responsive to regularly assessed fraud risks. HHS agreed with the recommendations.", + "answer": [ + "CMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health coverage for over 145 million Americans through its four principal programs, with annual outlays of about $1.1 trillion. GAO has designated the two largest programs, Medicare and Medicaid, as high risk partly due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. In fiscal year 2016, improper payment estimates for these programs totaled about $95 billion. GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and the subsequent enactment of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 have called attention to the importance of federal agencies' antifraud efforts. This report examines (1) CMS's approach for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs, and (2) how CMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid align with the Fraud Risk Framework. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and HHS and CMS documents, such as program-integrity manuals. It also interviewed CMS officials and a sample of CMS stakeholders, including state officials and contractors. GAO selected states based on fraud risk and other factors, such as geographic diversity. GAO selected contractors based on a mix of companies and geographic areas served. The approach that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs—Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the health-insurance marketplaces—is incorporated into its broader program-integrity approach. According to CMS officials, this broader program-integrity approach can help the agency develop control activities to address multiple sources of improper payments, including fraud. As the figure below shows, CMS views fraud as part of a spectrum of actions that may result in improper payments. CMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). This framework describes leading practices in four components: commit , assess , design and implement , and evaluate and adapt . CMS has shown commitment to combating fraud in part by establishing a dedicated entity—the Center for Program Integrity—to lead antifraud efforts. Furthermore, CMS is offering and requiring antifraud training for stakeholder groups such as providers, beneficiaries, and health-insurance plans. However, CMS does not require fraud-awareness training on a regular basis for employees, a practice that the framework identifies as a way agencies can help create a culture of integrity and compliance. Regarding the assess and design and implement components, CMS has taken steps to identify fraud risks, such as by designating specific provider types as high risk and developing associated control activities. However, it has not conducted a fraud risk assessment for Medicare or Medicaid, and has not designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy. A fraud risk assessment allows managers to fully consider fraud risks to their programs, analyze their likelihood and impact, and prioritize risks. Managers can then design and implement a strategy with specific control activities to mitigate these fraud risks, as well as an appropriate evaluation approach consistent with the evaluate and adapt component. By developing a fraud risk assessment and using that assessment to create an antifraud strategy and evaluation approach, CMS could better ensure that it is addressing the full portfolio of risks and strategically targeting the most-significant fraud risks facing Medicare and Medicaid. GAO recommends that CMS (1) provide and require fraud-awareness training to its employees, (2) conduct fraud risk assessments, and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare and Medicaid, including an approach for evaluation. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe RAD program was authorized by Congress in 2011 and allows public housing authorities (PHAs) to convert public housing units to long-term project-based voucher or rental assistance contracts. The program has two components: converting PHA-owned public housing units to properties with project-based voucher or rental assistance contracts and converting privately owned properties with expiring subsidies to project-based voucher or rental assistance contracts. The RAD program aims to preserve affordability and improve the physical and financial condition of federally assisted rental properties. The program has been implemented in phases and is currently fully subscribed with all 225,000 units allocated. As of September 2017, 689 conversions involved a total of 74,709 units. The RAD program has been successful in preserving affordability and improving the physical condition of properties. However, there have been challenges in implementing the program, including difficulties in obtaining financing and complying with regulations. The program has also faced criticism for not doing enough to protect tenants during the conversion process. The report recommends that HUD improve its oversight of the program and provide better guidance to PHAs. The report also recommends that HUD improve its data collection and analysis to better understand the impact of the program on tenants and the housing market.", + "answer": [ + "HUD administers the Public Housing program, which provides federally assisted rental units to low-income households through PHAs. In 2010, HUD estimated its aging public housing stock had $25.6 billion in unmet capital needs. To help address these needs, the RAD program was authorized in fiscal year 2012. RAD allows PHAs to move (convert) properties in the public housing program to Section 8 rental assistance programs, and retain property ownership or transfer it to other entities. The conversion enables PHAs to access additional funding, including investor equity, generally not available for public housing properties. GAO was asked to review public housing conversions under RAD and any impact on residents. This report addresses, among other objectives, HUD's (1) assessment of conversion outcomes; (2) oversight of resident safeguards; and (3) provisions to help preserve the long-term affordability of units. GAO analyzed data on RAD conversions through fiscal year 2017; reviewed a sample of randomly selected, nongeneralizable RAD property files; and interviewed HUD officials, PHAs, developers, academics, and affected residents. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) put procedures in place to evaluate and monitor the impact of conversion of public housing properties under the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. RAD's authorizing legislation requires HUD to assess and publish findings about the amount of private-sector leveraging. HUD uses a variety of metrics to measure conversion outcomes. But, the metric HUD uses to measure private-sector leveraging—the share of private versus public funding for construction or rehabilitation of assisted housing—has limitations. For example, HUD's leveraging ratio counts some public resources as leveraged private-sector investment and does not use final (post-completion) data. As a result, HUD's ability to accurately assess private-sector leveraging is limited. HUD does not systematically use its data systems to track effects of RAD conversions on resident households (such as changes in rent and income, or relocation) or monitor use of all resident safeguards. Rather, since 2016, HUD has required public housing agencies (PHA) or other post-conversion owners to maintain resident logs and collect such information. But the resident logs do not contain historical program information. HUD has not developed a process for systematically reviewing information from its data systems and resident logs on an ongoing basis. HUD has been developing procedures to monitor compliance with some resident safeguards—such as the right to return to a converted property—and begun a limited review of compliance with these safeguards. However, HUD has not yet developed a process for monitoring other safeguards—such as access to other housing voucher options. Federal internal control standards require agencies to use quality information to achieve objectives, and obtain and evaluate relevant and reliable data in a timely manner for use in effective monitoring. Without a comprehensive review of household information and procedures for fully monitoring all resident safeguards, HUD cannot fully assess the effects of RAD on residents. RAD authorizing legislation and the program's use agreements (contracts with property owners) contain provisions intended to help ensure the long-term availability of affordable units, but the provisions have not been tested in situations such as foreclosure. For example, use agreements between HUD and property owners specify affordability and use restrictions that according to the contract would survive a default or foreclosure. HUD officials stated that HUD intends to develop procedures to identify and respond to risks to long-term affordability, including default or foreclosure in RAD properties. However, HUD has not yet done so. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving goals and objectives. Procedures that address oversight of affordability requirements would better position HUD to help ensure RAD conversions comply with program requirements, detect potential foreclosure and other risks, and take corrective actions. GAO makes five recommendations to HUD intended to improve leveraging metrics, monitoring of the use and enforcement of resident safeguards, and compliance with RAD requirements. HUD agreed with our recommendations to improve metrics and build on existing oversight." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses how federal agencies acquire heavy equipment, which includes construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment, airfield-specialized trucks and trailers, self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors, and soil preparation and harvesting equipment. Agencies can purchase or lease the equipment, with leases being time-limited and distinct from purchases. The report uses the terms \"rental\" to refer to short-term leases and \"long-term lease\" to refer to leases that are not considered rentals. In 2013, GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which has helped eliminate ownership and maintenance costs for infrequently used heavy equipment. However, there are no central reporting requirements for agencies' inventories of heavy equipment. Each federal agency is required to maintain inventory controls for its property, which includes heavy equipment. Agencies maintain inventory data through the use of agency-specific databases and can set their own requirements for what data are required and how these data are maintained. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governs the acquisition process of executive branch agencies when acquiring certain goods and services, including heavy equipment. The FAR requires agency officials to evaluate cost and other factors by conducting a \"lease-versus-purchase\" analysis before acquiring heavy equipment. The report also discusses the ownership of heavy equipment by various federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, which owns the majority of the equipment. The report provides data on the number, types, acquisition year, and location of agencies' owned heavy equipment in their inventories as of June 2017. The report concludes by stating that the data provided are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of documenting leased and rental heavy equipment.", + "answer": [ + "Federal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment. GAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies. Of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment. The three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth—the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively. The Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the changes in the size and composition of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce since 2001. The military, civilian, and contractor workforces peaked around 2011 and have since decreased in size due to various factors such as U.S. involvement in conflicts, military to civilian and contractor conversions, contractor insourcing, and growth in certain workforces such as acquisition and cyber. DOD’s workforce management is governed by several workforce management statutes, including sections 129, 129a, and 2463 of Title 10 of the United States Code. DOD Instruction 1100.22 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for determining the appropriate workforce mix of the military, civilian, and contracted services. The instruction provides criteria for workforce-mix decisions and directs DOD components to conduct a cost comparison to determine the low-cost provider for all new or expanding mission requirements and for functions that have been contracted but could be performed by DOD civilian employees.\n\nThe report also discusses DOD’s efforts to better understand the costs associated with its workforces. In September 2013, DOD improved its methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost of work performed by military and civilian personnel and contractor support. However, the methodology continued to have certain limitations, such as the lack of guidance for certain cost elements related to overhead. The report makes five recommendations, including for DOD to assess the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the continued use of different cost-estimation tools across the department or directing department-wide application of one tool, and revise its guidance in accordance with the findings of its assessment.\n\nThe report also discusses DOD’s Cost-Comparison Report that addressed three elements and partially addressed one element concerning the accounting for the fully-burdened, or full, cost of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing functions at the selected installations. DOD concluded that for the 21,000 federal civilians and service contractors compared, neither federal civilians nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with the costs being dependent upon the function being performed", + "answer": [ + "In addition to more than 2.2 million active duty and reserve personnel, DOD employs about 760,000 federal civilians and more than 560,000 contractors. In the Senate Report 114-49 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for DOD to issue a report (1) assessing functions performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel, (2) accounting for the full costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing these functions, (3) comparing these costs, and (4) assessing available hiring and retention authorities for federal civilians. The Senate report also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's report, which DOD submitted to Congress in April 2017. This report examines the extent to which DOD's report addressed the prescribed congressional elements. GAO reviewed DOD's report and compared it to the prescribed elements, examined documents relevant to DOD's cost estimating and comparison methodology, and interviewed DOD officials, including those in its Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation responsible for the calculations in DOD's report. In response to Congressional direction, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report in April 2017 comparing the costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel at select installations. The report addressed three out of four provision elements and partially addressed one, as discussed below. DOD concluded that neither federal civilians nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with costs being dependent on position, location, and level of seniority. DOD noted that it used a non-probability based sample of personnel for its report, and the results are not generalizable. An assessment of performance of functions being performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel at six military installations, with four being in the continental United States and two being outside the continental United States. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it developed a methodology to assess performance of functions performed by federal civilians and service contractors at 17 organizations within nine geographic regions including two locations outside the continental United States. DOD used data from the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System to identify military installations with large reported numbers of federal civilians. DOD determined that personnel need to perform at least 80 percent common tasks to be able to make a comparison. An accounting of the fully-burdened, or full, cost of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing functions at the selected installations including training, benefits, reimbursable costs, and facility overhead. GAO believes that DOD partially addressed this requirement because while it calculated the labor costs of selected federal civilian and service contractor full-time equivalents performing similar functions for organizations at government-owned facilities, it excluded certain non-labor costs from its calculations. A comparison of the costs of performance of these functions by federal civilians and service contractor personnel at the selected installations. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it compared calculated costs for selected federal civilians and service contractors performing similar functions at selected installations and included those comparisons in its report. An assessment of the flexible employment authorities for the employment and retention of federal civilian employees. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it sent questionnaires to DOD hiring officials and human resource professionals to collect information on flexible employment authorities and conducted interviews with these and human resource professionals at the same 17 organizations used for the cost comparison. Based on an analysis of the information collected, DOD's report included several conclusions regarding flexible hiring authorities and made one recommendation. GAO is not making any recommendations; however, DOD non-concurred with GAO's assessment that DOD partially addressed the element to account for the full cost of personnel. GAO believes the assessment is correct as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established policies and processes for managing its multi-billion dollar acquisition investments. These policies and processes are primarily set forth in its Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001. DHS uses these policies and processes to deliver systems that help close critical capability gaps and enable the department to execute its missions and achieve its goals.\n\nDHS policies and processes for managing its major acquisition programs are overseen by the Under Secretary for Management, who serves as the department’s Chief Acquisition Officer. The Under Secretary for Management is responsible for managing the implementation of the department’s acquisition policies. The Under Secretary for Management serves as the acquisition decision authority for the department’s largest acquisition programs, those with LCCEs of $1 billion or greater. Component Acquisition Executives may be delegated acquisition decision authority for programs with cost estimates between $300 million and less than $1 billion.\n\nDHS uses an acquisition life cycle that includes requirements development, test and evaluation, and resource allocation. The department categorizes its 28 major acquisition programs and sets acquisition milestones for each program. DHS uses an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to establish a program’s schedule, costs, and key performance parameters. The APB is the agreement between program, component, and department-level officials establishing how systems will perform, when they will be delivered, and what they will cost.\n\nDHS has identified several programs that are not meeting their acquisition milestones or cost and schedule thresholds. The department is taking steps to address these issues and improve its acquisition management practices. For example, DHS is revising the acquisition milestones for some programs and is working to improve the efficiency of its acquisition processes.\n\nIn conclusion, DHS has established policies and processes for managing its acquisition investments. These policies and processes are intended to help the department deliver systems that address critical capability gaps and enable it to execute its missions and achieve its goals. The department is taking steps to address issues with its acquisition milestones and cost and schedule thresholds, and is working to improve its acquisition management practices.", + "answer": [ + "Each year, the DHS invests billions of dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part, because of management and funding issues. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions. This report, GAO's fourth annual review, assesses the extent to which: (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key practices for effectively managing a portfolio of investments. GAO reviewed 28 acquisition programs, including DHS's largest programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of April 2017, and programs GAO or DHS identified as at risk of poor outcomes. GAO assessed cost and schedule progress against baselines, assessed DHS's policies and processes against GAO's key portfolio management practices, and met with relevant DHS officials. During 2017, 10 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet those goals. GAO reviewed 28 programs in total, 4 of which were new programs that GAO did not assess because they did not establish cost and schedule goals before the end of calendar year 2017 as planned. The table shows the status of the 24 programs GAO assessed. Reasons for schedule delays or cost increases included technical challenges, changes in requirements, and external factors. Recent enhancements to DHS's acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio management practices (see table). However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these policies. GAO identified two areas where DHS could strengthen its portfolio management policies and implementation efforts: DHS's policies do not reflect the key practice to reassess a program that breaches—or exceeds—its cost, schedule, or performance goals in the context of the portfolio to ensure it is still relevant or affordable. Acquisition management officials said that, in practice, they do so based on a certification of funds memorandum—a tool GAO has found to be effective for DHS leadership to assess program affordability—submitted by the component when one of its programs re-baselines in response to a breach. Documenting this practice in policy would help ensure DHS makes strategic investment decisions within its limited budget. DHS is not leveraging information gathered from reviews once programs complete implementation to manage its portfolio of active acquisition programs. DHS's acquisition policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews after initial capabilities are deployed, which is in line with GAO's key practices. Acquisition management officials said they do not consider the results of these reviews in managing DHS's portfolio because the reviews are typically conducted after oversight for a program shifts to the components. Leveraging these results across DHS could enable DHS to address potential issues that may contribute to poor outcomes, such as schedule slips and cost growth, for other programs in its acquisition portfolio. GAO recommends DHS update its acquisition policy to require certification of fund memorandums when programs re-baseline as a result of a breach and assess programs' post-implementation reviews to improve performance across the acquisition portfolio. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report is about the challenges faced by the U.S. Navy in maintaining readiness and the steps taken to address them. The Navy has experienced significant mishaps at sea resulting in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships. The report identifies 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness and the Navy has implemented 78 of them so far. The report also discusses the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time. The report shows photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017. The report also discusses the challenges faced by the Marine Corps in achieving readiness, including acute readiness problems in aviation units. The report concludes that the Navy and Marine Corps are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities and the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years. The report also discusses the challenges faced by the Navy in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships. The report recommends that the Navy and Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls and that the Navy takes steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy. The report concludes that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future.", + "answer": [ + "The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands. This statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them. This statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate. The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover. GAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is a government agency that insures private mortgage lenders against borrower default on certain mortgage loans. FHA was created in 1934 during the Great Depression to encourage lending for housing and stimulate the construction industry. FHA insurance protects lenders, not borrowers, in the event of borrower default. To be eligible for FHA insurance, the mortgage must be originated by a lender approved by FHA and meet certain criteria. FHA is one of three government agencies that provide insurance or guarantees on certain home mortgages made by private lenders, along with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). FHA is the most broadly targeted of these agencies, with mortgages available to a wide range of borrowers. FHA's market share tends to fluctuate in response to economic conditions and other factors. During the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA's market share rose sharply, peaking at over 30% of home-purchase mortgages in 2009 and 2010. In 2017, FHA insured 19.5% of new home purchase mortgages and about 16.7% of new mortgages overall. FHA's market share can be measured in a number of different ways, including the number of mortgages insured, the dollar volume of mortgages insured, and the share of all mortgages or home purchase mortgages. FHA's market share is also reported as a share of all mortgages with some kind of mortgage insurance, including mortgages with private mortgage insurance and mortgages insured by another government agency. FHA's market share tends to be highest for home purchase mortgages. FHA's market share has decreased somewhat from its peak during the housing market turmoil, although it generally remains higher than it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The appropriate market share for FHA has been a subject of ongoing debate among policymakers.", + "answer": [ + "The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. FHA insures private lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on mortgages that meet certain criteria, thereby expanding the availability of mortgage credit beyond what may be available otherwise. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA is to repay the lender the remaining amount owed. A household that obtains an FHA-insured mortgage must meet FHA's eligibility and underwriting standards, including showing that it has sufficient income to repay a mortgage. FHA requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% from most borrowers, which is lower than the down payment required for many other types of mortgages. FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a statutory maximum mortgage amount, which varies by area and is based on area median house prices but cannot exceed a specified ceiling in high-cost areas. (The ceiling is set at $726,525 in high-cost areas in calendar year 2019.) Borrowers are charged fees, called mortgage insurance premiums, in exchange for the insurance. In FY2018, FHA insured over 1 million new mortgages (including both home purchase and refinance mortgages) with a combined principal balance of $209 billion. FHA's share of the mortgage market tends to vary with economic conditions and other factors. In the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007 and a related contraction of mortgage lending, FHA insured a larger share of mortgages than it had in the preceding years. Its overall share of the mortgage market increased from about 3% in calendar year 2005 to a peak of 21% in 2009. Since that time, FHA's share of the mortgage market has decreased somewhat, though it remains higher than it was in the early 2000s. In calendar year 2017, FHA's overall share of the mortgage market was about 17%. FHA-insured mortgages, like all mortgages, experienced increased default rates during the housing downturn that began around 2007, leading to concerns about the stability of the FHA insurance fund for single-family mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). In response to these concerns, FHA adopted a number of policy changes in an attempt to limit risk to the MMI Fund. These changes have included raising the fees that it charges and making changes to certain eligibility criteria for FHA-insured loans." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests a total of $2,347 million (i.e., about $2.3 billion) in procurement funding for the CVN-78 program. Congress's decisions on the CVN-78 program could substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission also proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 ( Harry S. Truman ), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time. However, the Administration later withdrew this proposal. The report discusses the current aircraft carrier force, the requirement for a minimum number of operational aircraft carriers, and the Navy's force-level goal of 355 ships. It also discusses the CVN-78 class program, including the procurement strategy, cost, and schedule. The report also discusses the potential impact of the proposed FY2020 budget on the CVN-78 program. The report concludes with recommendations for Congress regarding the CVN-78 program.\n\nThe report provides a comprehensive overview of the CVN-78 program, including its procurement strategy, cost, and schedule. It also discusses the potential impact of the proposed FY2020 budget on the program. The report concludes with recommendations for Congress regarding the program. The report is useful for Congress in understanding the current state of the CVN-78 program and the potential oversight issues that may arise. The report provides a good summary of the key issues and recommendations for Congress.", + "answer": [ + "CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,084.0 million (i.e., about $13.1 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394.9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding. The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. The Navy is currently working to complete construction, testing, and certification of the ship's 11 weapons elevators. CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,327.4 million (i.e., about $11.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024. CVN-80 (Enterprise) and CVN-81 (not yet named) are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress. DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the contract on January 31, 2019. Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $246.6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637.3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883.9 million (i.e., about $2.9 billion). Using higher estimated baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $770.9 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $3,086.3 million, for a combined reduction of $3,857.2 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion). CVN-80 was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,335.1 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2025 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,062.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028. Prior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81 was scheduled to be procured in FY2023. Following the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, the Navy has chosen to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020 (as opposed to a ship that was procured in FY2019). The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,450.7 million (i.e., about $12.5 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy plans to fully fund the ship beginning in FY2019 and extending beyond FY2026 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,285.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 (Harry S. Truman), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time. On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024. Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following: DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019; the Navy's decision, as part of its FY2020 budget submission, to not accelerate the scheduled procurement of CVN-82 from FY2028 to an earlier fiscal year; whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program; the date for achieving the Navy's 12-ship force-level goal for aircraft carriers; cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; Navy efforts to complete the construction, testing, and certification of the weapons elevators on CVN-78; additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a December 2018 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD weapon systems; whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses risk management for security of federal facilities, which involves a continuous process of assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, responding with countermeasures, and monitoring risks. The ISC was established after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 to enhance security in federal facilities. The ISC has developed a set of standards, including the ISC Standard, which prescribes a process for agencies to follow in developing their risk assessment methodologies. The ISC Standard requires agencies to determine the security level of each facility, ranging from level I to V, and to customize countermeasures based on the assessed level of risk. The report also discusses the physical security programs of four federal agencies: CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service. The agencies' security assessment methodologies did not fully align with the ISC Standard, and some did not consider all of the undesirable events during assessments. The report identifies management challenges faced by the agencies in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring results. The performance audit upon which the report is based was conducted from June 2016 to August 2017 and was prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The public version of the report was also prepared in accordance with these standards.\n\nIn summary, the report highlights the importance of risk management for security of federal facilities and the ISC's role in developing standards for agencies to follow. It also provides insights into the physical security programs of four federal agencies and the challenges they face in conducting assessments and monitoring results. The report was prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.", + "answer": [ + "Protecting federal employees and facilities from security threats is of critical importance. Most federal agencies are generally responsible for their facilities and have physical security programs to do so. GAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess facilities' security risks. This report examines: (1) how selected agencies' assessment methodologies align with the ISC's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results. GAO selected four agencies—CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service—based on their large number of facilities and compared each agency's assessment methodology to the ISC Standard; analyzed facility assessment schedules and results from 2010 through 2016; and interviewed security officials. GAO also visited 13 facilities from these four agencies, selected based on geographical dispersion and their high risk level. None of the four agencies GAO reviewed—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service—used security assessment methodologies that fully aligned with the Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard (the ISC Standard). This standard requires that methodologies used to identify necessary facility countermeasures—such as fences and closed-circuit televisions—must: 1. Consider all of the undesirable events (i.e., arson and vandalism) identified by the ISC Standard as possible risks to facilities. 2. Assess three factors—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—for each of these events and use these three factors to measure risk. All four agencies used methodologies that included some ISC requirements when conducting assessments. CBP and FAA assessed vulnerabilities but not threats and consequences. ARS and the Forest Service assessed threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but did not use these factors to measure risk. In addition, the agencies considered many, but not all 33 undesirable events related to physical security as possible risks to their facilities. Agencies are taking steps to improve their methodologies. For example, ARS and the Forest Service now use a methodology that measures risk and plan to incorporate the methodology into policy. Although CBP and FAA have updated their methodologies, their policies do not require methodologies that fully align with the ISC standard. As a result, these agencies miss the opportunity for a more informed assessment of the risk to their facilities. All four agencies reported facing management challenges in conducting physical security assessments or monitoring assessment results. Specifically, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service have not met the ISC's required time frame of every 3 years for conducting assessments. For example, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities. While these three agencies have plans to address backlogs, CBP's plan does not balance conducting risk assessments with other competing security priorities, such as updating its policy manual, and ARS and the Forest Service lack a means to monitor completion of future assessments. Furthermore, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service did not have the data or information systems to monitor assessment schedules or the status of countermeasures at facilities, and their policies did not specify such data requirements. For example, ARS and the Forest Service do not collect and analyze security-related data, such as countermeasures' implementation. FAA does not routinely monitor the performance of its physical security program. Without improved monitoring, agencies are not well equipped to prioritize their highest security needs, may leave facilities' vulnerabilities unaddressed, and may not take corrective actions to meet physical security program objectives. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that the agencies under review deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends: (1) that CBP and FAA update policies to require the use of methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard; (2) that CBP revise its plan to eliminate the assessments backlog; and (3) that all four agencies improve monitoring of their physical security programs. All four agencies agreed with the respective recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002, which requires federal agencies to identify programs and activities that may be susceptible to significant improper payments and estimate the amount of improper payments for susceptible programs and activities. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) developed the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) to estimate the national Medicaid improper payment rate. The report explains the PERM methodology and how it is used to target program integrity activities and oversight of states’ Medicaid programs. The report also discusses the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, which requires the Inspector General of each agency to conduct a compliance review to report on the agency’s compliance with several criteria, including that an agency has reported an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for each program and activity. The report concludes by stating that the PERM likely underestimates program integrity risks in Medicaid managed care and that CMS needs better information about these risks to ensure the integrity of the Medicaid program. The report provides technical comments from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and lists the staff members who made key contributions to the report. The report also includes a list of audits and investigations of Medicaid managed care organizations and providers from January 2012 to September 2017, which show cases of MCO overpayments to providers or unallowable costs, as well as gaps in managed care oversight.", + "answer": [ + "The improper payment rate is a sentinel measure of program integrity risks for the Medicaid program. CMS and the states oversee Medicaid, whose size, structure, and diversity make it vulnerable to improper payments. CMS estimates the Medicaid improper payment rate annually through its PERM, which includes an estimate for Medicaid managed care, in which states contract with MCOs to provide services to Medicaid enrollees. GAO was asked to study the PERM methodology for managed care. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which the PERM accounts for program integrity risks in Medicaid managed care, including CMS's and states' oversight. GAO identified program integrity risks reported in 27 federal and state audits and investigations issued between January 2012 and September 2017; reviewed federal regulations and guidance on the PERM and CMS's Focused Program Integrity Reviews; and contacted program integrity officials in the 16 states with a majority of 2016 Medicaid spending for managed care, as well as CMS officials and program integrity experts. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) estimate of improper payments for Medicaid managed care has limitations that are not mitigated by the agency's and states' current oversight efforts. One component of the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) measures the accuracy of capitated payments, which are periodic payments that state Medicaid agencies make to managed care organizations (MCO) to provide services to enrollees and to cover other allowable costs, such as administrative expenses. However, the managed care component of the PERM neither includes a medical review of services delivered to enrollees, nor reviews of MCO records or data. Further, GAO's review of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified key program risks. Ten of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified about $68 million in overpayments and unallowable MCO costs that were not accounted for by PERM estimates; another of these investigations resulted in a $137.5 million settlement. These audits and investigations were conducted over more than 5 years and involved a small fraction of the more than 270 MCOs operating nationwide as of September 2017. To the extent that overpayments and unallowable costs are unidentified and not removed from the cost data used to set capitation rates, they may allow inflated MCO payments and minimize the appearance of program risks in Medicaid managed care. CMS and states have taken steps to improve oversight of Medicaid managed care through updated regulations, focused reviews of states' managed care programs, and federal program integrity contractors' audits of managed care services. However, some of these efforts went into effect only recently, and others are unlikely to address the risks in managed care across all states. Furthermore, these efforts do not ensure the identification and reporting of overpayments to providers and unallowable costs by MCOs. Federal internal control standards call for agency management to identify and respond to risks. Without addressing key risks, such as the extent of overpayments and unallowable costs, CMS cannot be certain that its estimated improper payment rate for managed care (0.3 percent compared with 12.9 percent in Medicaid fee-for-service) accurately reflects program risks. The Administrator of CMS should consider and take steps to mitigate the program risks that are not measured in the PERM, such as overpayments and unallowable costs; such an effort could include actions such as revising the PERM methodology or focusing additional audit resources on managed care. HHS concurred with this recommendation. HHS also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States, responsible for monetary policy, provision of emergency liquidity, supervision of certain types of banks and other financial firms, and provision of payment system services. Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Fed, but retains oversight responsibilities. The Fed's primary tool for monetary policy is targeting the federal funds rate, which it has been doing since the financial crisis. The Fed lowered the federal funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% in December 2008, the first time rates were ever lowered to the zero lower bound. The Fed has been raising rates since December 2015, but has been described as \"patient\" in recent months due to increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility. The Fed's regulatory responsibilities include supervising banks for safety and soundness, supervising nonbank systemically important financial institutions, regulating the payment system, and setting margin requirements on certain securities. The Fed has focused more on attempting to mitigate systemic risk through its regulations since the financial crisis. The Fed's balance sheet is currently around $4 trillion, and it intends to reduce it to a size consistent with its goals. The Fed has been using reverse repos to drain liquidity from the system and influence short-term market rates. The Fed's interest rate on bank reserves has been slightly higher than the federal funds rate, which some have criticized as a subsidy to banks. The Fed's regulatory responsibilities are an important part of its role in ensuring financial stability and mitigating systemic risk. The Fed's actions have been instrumental in supporting the economic recovery from the financial crisis. However, the Fed's monetary policy decisions have been criticized by some as contributing to the precrisis housing bubble. The Fed's decisions regarding interest rates and the balance sheet have significant implications for the economy and financial stability. The Fed's decisions are data-dependent and are made with the goal of fulfilling its mandate of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Fed's actions have been closely watched by market participants and policymakers alike. The Fed's decisions have significant implications for the economy", + "answer": [ + "Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the nation's central bank, but retains oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of \"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.\" To meet its price stability mandate, the Fed has set a longer-run goal of 2% inflation. The Fed's control over monetary policy stems from its exclusive ability to alter the money supply and credit conditions more broadly. Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by setting a target for the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks borrow and lend reserves on an overnight basis. It meets its target through open market operations, financial transactions traditionally involving U.S. Treasury securities. Beginning in 2007, the federal funds target was reduced from 5.25% to a range of 0% to 0.25% in December 2008, which economists call the zero lower bound. By historical standards, rates were kept unusually low for an unusually long time to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis and its aftermath. Starting in December 2015, the Fed has been raising interest rates and expects to gradually raise rates further. The Fed raised rates once in 2016, three times in 2017, and four times in 2018, by 0.25 percentage points each time. In light of increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility, the Fed announced in January 2019 that it would be \"patient\" before raising rates again. The Fed influences interest rates to affect interest-sensitive spending, such as business capital spending on plant and equipment, household spending on consumer durables, and residential investment. In addition, when interest rates diverge between countries, it causes capital flows that affect the exchange rate between foreign currencies and the dollar, which in turn affects spending on exports and imports. Through these channels, monetary policy can be used to stimulate or slow aggregate spending in the short run. In the long run, monetary policy mainly affects inflation. A low and stable rate of inflation promotes price transparency and, thereby, sounder economic decisions. The Fed's relative independence from Congress and the Administration has been justified by many economists on the grounds that it reduces political pressure to make monetary policy decisions that are inconsistent with a long-term focus on stable inflation. But independence reduces accountability to Congress and the Administration, and recent legislation and criticism of the Fed by the President has raised the question about the proper balance between the two. While the federal funds target was at the zero lower bound, the Fed attempted to provide additional stimulus through unsterilized purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a practice popularly referred to as quantitative easing (QE). Between 2009 and 2014, the Fed undertook three rounds of QE. The third round was completed in October 2014, at which point the Fed's balance sheet was $4.5 trillion—five times its precrisis size. After QE ended, the Fed maintained the balance sheet at the same level until September 2017, when it began to very gradually reduce it to a more normal size. The Fed has raised interest rates in the presence of a large balance sheet through the use of two new tools—by paying banks interest on reserves held at the Fed and by engaging in reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) through a new overnight facility. In January 2019, the Fed announced that it would continue using these tools to set interest rates permanently, in which case the balance sheet may not get much smaller than its current size of $4 trillion. With regard to its mandate, the Fed believes that unemployment is currently lower than the rate that it considers consistent with maximum employment, and inflation is close to the Fed's 2% goal by the Fed's preferred measure. Even after recent rate increases, monetary policy is still considered expansionary. This monetary policy stance is unusually stimulative compared with policy in this stage of previous expansions, and is being coupled with a stimulative fiscal policy (larger structural budget deficit). Debate is currently focused on how quickly the Fed should raise rates. Some contend the greater risk is that raising rates too slowly at full employment will cause inflation to become too high or cause financial instability, whereas others contend that raising rates too quickly will cause inflation to remain too low and choke off the expansion." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Buy American Act of 1933 was enacted during the Great Depression to create and preserve jobs for American workers. It established a preference for the federal government to buy domestic end products. The Act applies to products that are purchased for use within the United States or obtained through contracts under the micro-purchase threshold. The Act does not apply to products purchased for use outside the United States or obtained through contracts under the micro-purchase threshold. The Act applies to end products that are manufactured in the United States, provided that the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the total cost of all components. The Act characterizes end products based on their origin, not the vendor's location. The Act has exceptions that permit federal agencies to buy foreign end products in certain circumstances. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 waives domestic purchasing requirements, including the Buy American Act, for certain acquisitions of foreign end products from countries that are party to international trade agreements or are considered designated countries by the U.S. Trade Representative. The FAR sets forth several exceptions that permit federal agencies to buy foreign end products. The steps that contracting officers must take to determine or document an exception will vary depending on the circumstances of the acquisition. The Buy American Act's applicability is based on the country of origin of the product being supplied, not the country of the vendor offering the product to the government. Vendors must certify where their products are manufactured or produced. The report found that the FPDS-NG data was sufficiently reliable to allow the calculation of the approximate extent of obligations for foreign end products and the use of the Buy American Act exceptions and the Trade Agreements Act waiver. However, the report identified reporting errors and data system limitations that prevented precise determination of the amount spent on foreign end products through the use of exceptions and waivers. The report recommended that agencies communicate the steps contracting officials should take to implement the Buy American Act and provide guidance on how to navigate exceptions and waivers. The report also recommended that agencies provide training and guidance to contracting officials to ensure proper reporting of data. The report identified four agencies—the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs—that had the highest fiscal year ", + "answer": [ + "The Buy American Act of 1933, as amended, is the main U.S. law promoting domestic purchasing. The Act permits agencies to buy foreign end products only under certain exceptions, such as when domestic items are not available at a reasonable cost. Further, U.S. trade agreements waive the Buy American restrictions for certain products. GAO was asked to review implementation of the Buy American Act. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Act. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies related to the Buy American Act and analyzed data for fiscal year 2017 from FPDS-NG. GAO also analyzed a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—the agencies with the most obligations for products in fiscal year 2017. The 38 awards selected include a mix of foreign and domestic products, as well as dollars obligated. Finally, GAO interviewed cognizant contracting and policy officials from the selected agencies. According to data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) in fiscal year 2017, foreign end products accounted for less than 5 percent—about $7.8 billion—of federal obligations for products potentially subject to the Buy American Act. Federal agencies procured foreign products using exceptions to Buy American Act requirements, as well as through waivers or when the Buy American Act did not apply, as shown in the figure. The amount of foreign end products purchased could be greater than reported in FPDS-NG, however, due to reporting errors and system limitations. GAO found that 6 of the 38 contracts reviewed from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA) inaccurately recorded waiver or exception information. FPDS-NG system limitations compound these errors because it does not fully capture Buy American Act data. Among other things, the database does not always enable agencies to report the use of exceptions or waivers on contracts for both foreign and domestic products, reducing data accuracy. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is considering strategies to improve Buy American Act data. The four agencies GAO reviewed varied in their approaches to Buy American Act training and guidance. DOD reports that it will have trained more than 18,000 personnel by the end of 2018. DHS reports training almost 1,400 people—approximately 94 percent of its contracting staff—as of April 2018. Some VA courses mention the Act, but none is focused specifically on implementing its requirements. HHS does not have agency-level training or guidance on the Act. GAO found that contracting officers for the contracts it reviewed face challenges implementing Buy American Act requirements. Having specific and targeted Buy American Act guidance and training can better ensure that agencies meet the Act's requirements. GAO is recommending that OMB take steps to improve Buy American Act data and that HHS, DHS, and VA improve agency guidance and training on implementing the Act. All of the agencies either concurred or generally concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the evolution of 911 services from basic 911 to Enhanced 911 and the next evolution, NG911, which uses IP-based technology to deliver and process 911 traffic. NG911 systems provide call centers with enhanced capabilities to route and transfer calls and data, which could improve call centers’ abilities to handle overflow calls and increase information sharing with first responders. The report explains the 911 communications process and how NG911 systems work. It also discusses the challenges states and localities face in transitioning to NG911, including insufficient funding and technical and operational challenges such as interoperability and cybersecurity risks. The report highlights federal actions taken to support state and local implementation of NG911, including grant programs, guides on technology standards and procurement practices, and technical assistance. The report concludes by discussing the importance of the NG911 transition and the need for states and localities to work together to ensure a smooth transition.", + "answer": [ + "Each year, millions of Americans call 911 for help during emergencies. However, the nation's legacy 911 system relies on aging infrastructure that is not designed to accommodate modern communications technologies. As a result, states and localities are upgrading to NG911, which offers improved capabilities, such as the ability to process images, audio files, and video. While deploying NG911 is the responsibility of state and local entities, federal agencies also support implementation, led by NHTSA's National 911 Program, which facilitates collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 stakeholders. GAO was asked to review NG911 implementation nationwide. This report examines: (1) state and local progress and challenges in implementing NG911 and (2) federal actions to address challenges and planned next steps. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agency reports and plans. GAO also analyzed NHTSA's survey data on state 911 implementation for calendar year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, and interviewed federal officials, state and local officials from nine states (selected to represent different regions and various phases of NG911 implementation), and officials from industry and advocacy groups. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) National 911 Program's most recent national survey on Next Generation 911 (NG911) implementation indicated that about half of states were in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015, but that state and local progress varied. Specifically, 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in their state processed calls using NG911 systems; however, 18 states reported having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place—which may indicate these states were in the early phases of planning for the transition to NG911 or had not yet begun. GAO spoke with state and local 911 officials in 9 states, which were in various phases of implementing NG911, and found that none of the 9 selected states were accepting images, audio files, or video. State and local 911 officials identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911. Such challenges are related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. For example, officials in 3 states said that the current funding they collect from telephone service subscribers may not be sufficient to support NG911's transition costs while simultaneously funding the operation of existing 911 systems. Federal agencies—including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—have responsibilities to support NG911 implementation, such as through coordinating activities and administering grants, and are taking actions to assist state and local entities in addressing challenges to NG911's implementation. Such actions include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders to explore emerging NG911 issues. For example, as the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, NHTSA's National 911 Program is developing resources on NG911 topics, such as federal funding and governance structures. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to facilitate the state and local transition to NG911, the program lacks specific performance goals and measures to assess its progress. Without such goals and measures, it is not clear to what extent the program is effectively achieving its mission. In 2018, the National 911 Program plans to establish an interagency initiative tasked with creating a National NG911 Roadmap. This roadmap is intended to identify next steps for the federal government in supporting the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a list of national-level tasks as part of its roadmap initiative, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out these tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap's objectives. Collaborating with the appropriate federal agencies to determine federal roles and responsibilities to carry out the roadmap's national-level tasks could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve those tasks. Furthermore, developing an implementation plan that details how the roadmap's tasks will be achieved would place the National 911 Program in a better position to effectively lead interagency efforts to implement NG911 nationwide. GAO recommends that NHTSA's National 911 Program develop performance goals and measures and, for the National NG911 Roadmap, determine agencies' roles and responsibilities and develop an implementation plan. NHTSA agreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) is an independent federal agency that administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). The RRB covers workers who are employed by railroads engaged in interstate commerce and related subsidiaries, railroad associations, and railroad labor organizations. Lifelong railroad workers receive railroad retirement benefits instead of Social Security benefits; railroad workers with nonrailroad experience receive benefits either from railroad retirement or Social Security, depending on the length of their railroad service. The number of railroad workers has been declining since the 1950s, although the rate of decline has been irregular and recent years have seen increases in railroad employment after reaching an all-time low of 215,000 workers in January 2010. The total number of beneficiaries under the RRA and RUIA decreased from 623,000 in FY2008 to 574,000 in FY2017, and total benefit payments increased from $10.1 billion to $12.6 billion during the same time. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries. Almost $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits were paid to approximately 28,000 claimants. The RRA authorizes retirement, survivor, and disability benefits for railroad workers and their families. In December 2017, there were a total of 526,100 RRA beneficiaries, decreasing from 672,400 in 2001. This decline might partly result from the decline in railroad employment in the past five decades. The average monthly benefit for each beneficiary was about $1,986 in 2017, which increased from $1,043 in 2001, reflecting the growth", + "answer": [ + "The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries and paid $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits to approximately 28,000 claimants. Of the total $12.5 billion benefit payments in the same fiscal year, 60.0% was paid to retired workers, 8.0% to disabled workers, 14.4% to spouses, and 16.8% to survivors. The Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) authorizes retirement, disability, and survivor benefits for railroad workers and their families. RRA is financed primarily by payroll taxes, financial interchanges from Social Security, and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT). Railroad retirement payroll taxes have two tiers: the Tier I tax is essentially the same as the Social Security payroll tax and the Tier II tax is set each year based on the railroad retirement system's asset balances, benefit payments, and administrative costs. In FY2017, the gross RRA funding was about $12.7 billion. Railroad retirement annuities are also divided into two tiers. Tier I annuities are designed to be nearly equivalent to Social Security benefits and are based on both railroad retirement and Social Security-covered employment. However, Tier I annuities are more generous than Social Security benefits in certain situations. For example, at the age of 60, railroad workers with at least 30 years of covered railroad work may receive unreduced retirement annuities. Tier II annuities are similar to private pensions and based solely on covered railroad service. Tier II annuities are paid in addition to Tier I annuities. Railroad disability annuities may be payable to totally disabled railroad workers who are permanently disabled from all work and occupational disabled workers who are found to be permanently disabled from their regular railroad occupations. Eligible spouses and survivors of railroad workers may receive a certain portion of Tier I and Tier II benefits, but divorced spouses and surviving divorced spouses are eligible for only a certain portion of Tier I benefits. The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) authorizes unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers. RUIA is financed solely by railroad employers, whose contributions are based on the taxable earnings of their employees. Eligibility for railroad unemployment and sickness benefits is based on recent railroad service and earnings. The maximum daily unemployment and sickness benefit payable in the benefit year that began July 1, 2018, is $77, and the maximum benefit for a biweekly claim is $770. Normal benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks in a benefit year. The railroad unemployment and sickness system remains affected by sequestration, as unemployment benefits will continue to be reduced through at least September 30, 2019." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Veterans Affairs (VA) department is responsible for promoting the health, welfare, and dignity of all veterans in the United States. It operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in America, providing health care to millions of veterans and their families at over 1,500 facilities. The department’s three major components—the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA)—are responsible for carrying out its mission. The VHA provides health care services, including primary care and specialized care, and performs research and development to improve veterans’ needs. The VBA provides a variety of benefits to veterans and their families, including disability compensation, educational opportunities, assistance with home ownership, and life insurance. The NCA provides burial and memorial benefits to veterans and their families. The department relies on approximately 340,000 employees to provide services and benefits. The use of IT is critical to the department’s efforts to provide benefits and services to veterans. The department operates and maintains an IT infrastructure that provides the backbone necessary to meet the day-to-day operational needs of its medical centers, veteran-facing systems, benefits delivery systems, memorial services, and all other systems supporting the department’s mission. The department has 576 active or in-development systems in its inventory of IT systems. VHA is the parent organization for 319 of these systems, which provide capabilities related to veterans’ health care delivery. VistA serves an essential role in helping the department to fulfill its health care delivery mission. The department has expended extensive resources to modernize VistA and increase its ability to allow for the viewing or exchange of patient information with the Department of Defense (DOD) and private sector health providers. However, the department has unaddressed needs that indicate its current health IT systems, including VistA, do not fully support the organization’s business functions. The department has a centralized organization, the Office of Information and Technology (OI&T), which is responsible for providing strategy and technical direction, guidance, and policy related to how IT resources are to be acquired and managed for the department. The department’s budget request for fiscal year 2018 includes nearly", + "answer": [ + "The use of IT is crucial to helping VA effectively serve the nation's veterans and, each year, the department spends billions of dollars on its information systems and assets. However, VA has faced challenges spanning a number of critical initiatives related to modernizing its major systems. To improve all major federal agencies' acquisitions and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings, in December 2014 Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act , or FITARA). GAO was asked to summarize its previous and ongoing work regarding VA's history of efforts to modernize VistA, including past use of contractors, and the department's recent effort to acquire a commercial electronic health record system to replace VistA. GAO was also asked to provide an update on VA's progress in key FITARA-related areas, including (1) data center consolidation and optimization, (2) incremental system development practices, and (3) software license management. VA generally agreed with the information upon which this statement is based. For nearly two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has undertaken multiple efforts to modernize its health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (known as VistA). Two of VA's most recent efforts included the Integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) program, a joint program with the Department of Defense (DOD) intended to replace separate systems used by VA and DOD with a single system; and the VistA Evolution program, which was to modernize VistA with additional capabilities and a better interface for all users. VA has relied extensively on assistance from contractors for these efforts. VA obligated over $1.1 billion for contracts with 138 contractors during fiscal years 2011 through 2016 for iEHR and VistA Evolution. Contract data showed that the 15 key contractors that worked on both programs accounted for $741 million of the funding obligated for system development, project management, and operations and maintenance to support the two programs (see figure). VA recently announced that it intends to change its VistA modernization approach and acquire the same electronic health record system that DOD is implementing. With respect to key FITARA-related areas, the department has reported progress on consolidating and optimizing its data centers, although this progress has fallen short of targets set by the Office of Management and Budget. VA has also reported $23.61 million in data center-related cost savings, yet does not expect to realize further savings from additional closures. In addition, VA's Chief Information Officer (CIO) certified the use of adequate incremental development for 10 of the department's major IT investments; however, VA has not yet updated its policy and process for CIO certification as GAO recommended. Finally, VA has issued a software licensing policy and has generated an inventory of its software licenses to inform future investment decisions. GAO has made multiple recommendations to VA aimed at improving the department's IT management. VA has generally agreed with the recommendations and begun taking responsive actions." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nClimate change poses serious risks to many physical and ecological systems upon which society depends, although the exact details of these impacts are uncertain. Climate change may intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, and sea level rise. It also increases the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including sudden-onset disasters, such as floods. These effects of climate change may alter existing migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). For example, sea level rise may result in the salinization of soil and drinking water, thereby undermining a country or community’s ability to sustain livelihoods and maintain critical services, which could cause some people to migrate. Sudden-onset disasters may also contribute to migration as people flee natural disasters, in most cases leading to temporary displacement. If unable or unwilling to migrate, people may find themselves trapped or choosing to stay in deteriorating conditions. Climate change generally impacts internal migration, while migration across international borders due to climate change is less common. The effects of climate change add another layer of complexity to the decision to migrate, but there is debate about the role climate change plays in migration. The lack of reliable data is due in part to the multi-causal nature of migration. The U.S. Global Change Research Program has stated that migration, such as displacement resulting from extreme weather events, is a potential national security issue. Migration, potentially driven by climate change, may contribute to instability and result in national security challenges. Identifying the cause of a conflict, however, is complicated, and experts debate the connections linking climate, migration, and national security. State, USAID, and DOD are among the U.S. government agencies with a role in responding to issues related to climate change, including as a driver of migration. However, the report found that climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the policy documents reviewed for either the current or previous administrations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. The report recommends that the Secretary of State ensure that agencies have the necessary information to assess the impacts of climate change on migration and that DOD work with other agencies to incorporate adaptation into planning and collaboration at overseas", + "answer": [ + "The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends. GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern. State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration. The three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration. GAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe issue of executive discretion has been a topic of debate in liberal democracies for centuries. The United States Constitution is silent on the matter of emergency powers, so Congress and the President have answered these questions in various ways over the past two centuries. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the President acted without congressional approval in times of crisis, risking impeachment and personal civil liability. Congress later claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide whether to ratify the President's actions or indemnify him for civil liability. By the 20th century, Congress created statutory bases for the President to declare a state of emergency and use extraordinary delegated powers. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one such example of a delegation of emergency authority. It grants the President extensive power to regulate economic transactions during a state of emergency. However, some scholars argue that IEEPA has become a source of unchecked executive authority in the economic realm. Recently, Presidential actions have drawn attention to presidential emergency powers under the National Emergencies Act (NEA), which IEEPA is a part of. If Congress decides to modify IEEPA, it may address how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The report also discusses the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), which granted the President broad authority over international trade, investment, migration, and communications during World War I. TWEA was one of 22 statutes passed by Congress to give the President control over private property for public use during the war. The report concludes by discussing the use of IEEPA by Presidents since its enactment in 1977. The President has used IEEPA to regulate transactions with designated individuals and entities, freeze assets, and impose sanctions. The report also discusses the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which replaced the expired Export Administration Act of 1979 and required the President to continue using IEEPA to implement certain export controls. The report raises the possibility that Congress may wish to revisit the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not updated in the Export", + "answer": [ + "The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act's enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute's oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President upon declaration of a state of emergency. Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. The Trading with the Enemy Act was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became a critically important means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States. Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to annually assess and extend, if appropriate, the emergency. However, some experts argue that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark immigration case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target individuals, groups, and non-state actors such as terrorists and persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities. As of March 1, 2019, Presidents had declared 54 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 29 of which are still ongoing. Typically, national emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer--the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, may soon enter its fifth decade. IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress' duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA's role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe national pipeline system in the United States consists of over 2.7 million miles of pipelines transporting oil, natural gas, and other hazardous liquids. These pipelines run under remote and open terrain, as well as densely populated areas. The system is comprised of three main types: hazardous liquid, natural gas transmission and storage, and natural gas distribution. Over 3,000 pipeline companies operate the nation's pipeline systems, which can traverse multiple states and the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico.\n\nThe inherent design and operation of U.S. pipeline systems may reduce some potential impacts of lost service. However, pipeline infrastructure is generally considered resilient and versatile. Pipeline operators have historically been able to quickly respond to incidents and restore pipeline service. Pipeline infrastructure also includes redundancies such as parallel pipelines or interconnections that enable operators to reroute material through the network.\n\nPipelines are vulnerable to physical attacks, including the use of firearms or explosives, largely due to their stationary nature, the volatility of transported products, and the dispersed nature of pipeline networks spanning urban and outlying areas. Terrorists and other malicious groups have targeted oil and gas pipelines globally, and some have targeted U.S. pipelines without success. Environmental activists and lone actors seeking to halt the construction of new pipelines through sabotage have also emerged as a new threat.\n\nThe sophisticated computer systems that pipeline operations rely on are also vulnerable to various cyber threats. The frequency, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats have increased, and attacks have become easier to launch. The energy sector, which includes pipelines, experienced more cyber incidents than any sector from 2013 to 2015, accounting for 35 percent of the 796 incidents reported by all critical infrastructure sectors. In 2016, the energy sector was the third most frequently attacked sector.\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for the security of the nation's pipeline systems. TSA determines the criticality of pipeline systems and their facilities based on their importance to the nation's energy infrastructure, service to installations critical to national defense, or potential impact on", + "answer": [ + "More than 2.7 million miles of pipeline transport and distribute oil, natural gas, and other hazardous products throughout the United States. Interstate pipelines run through remote areas and highly populated urban areas, and are vulnerable to accidents, operating errors, and malicious physical and cyber-based attack or intrusion. The energy sector accounted for 35 percent of the 796 critical infrastructure cyber incidents reported to DHS from 2013 to 2015. Several federal and private entities have roles in pipeline security. TSA is primarily responsible for the oversight of pipeline physical security and cybersecurity. GAO was asked to review TSA's efforts to assess and enhance pipeline security and cybersecurity. This report examines, among other objectives: (1) the guidance pipeline operators reported using to address security risks and the extent that TSA ensures its guidelines reflect the current threat environment; (2) the extent that TSA has assessed pipeline systems' security risks; and (3) the extent TSA has assessed its effectiveness in reducing pipeline security risks. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as its Pipeline Security Guidelines ; evaluated TSA pipeline risk assessment efforts; and interviewed TSA officials, 10 U.S. pipeline operators—selected based on volume, geography, and material transported—and representatives from five industry associations. Pipeline operators reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address physical and cybersecurity risks, including the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pipeline Security Guidelines , initially issued in 2011. TSA issued revised guidelines in March 2018 to reflect changes in the threat environment and incorporate most of the principles and practices from the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity . However, TSA's revisions do not include all elements of the current framework and TSA does not have a documented process for reviewing and revising its guidelines on a regular basis. Without such a documented process, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical security and cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment that pipelines face. Further, GAO found that the guidelines lack clear definitions to ensure that pipeline operators identify their critical facilities. GAO's analysis showed that operators of at least 34 of the nation's top 100 critical pipeline systems (determined by volume of product transported) deemed highest risk had identified no critical facilities. This may be due, in part, to the guidelines not clearly defining the criteria to determine facilities' criticality. To assess pipeline security risks, TSA conducts pipeline security reviews—Corporate Security Reviews and Critical Facility Security Reviews—to assess pipeline systems' vulnerabilities. However, GAO found that the number of TSA security reviews has varied considerably over the last several years, as shown in the table on the following page. TSA officials stated that staffing limitations have prevented TSA from conducting more reviews. Staffing levels for TSA's Pipeline Security Branch have varied significantly since fiscal year 2010 with the number of staff ranging from 14 full-time equivalents in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to 1 in 2014. Further, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and competencies—such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise—necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities. By establishing a strategic workforce plan, TSA can help ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing. GAO also identified factors that likely limit the usefulness of TSA's risk assessment methodology for prioritizing pipeline system reviews. Specifically, TSA has not updated its risk assessment methodology since 2014 to reflect current threats to the pipeline industry. Further, its sources of data and underlying assumptions and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs are not fully documented. In addition, the risk assessment has not been peer reviewed since its inception in 2007. Taking steps to strengthen its risk assessment, and initiating an independent, external peer review would provide greater assurance that TSA ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods. TSA has established performance measures to monitor pipeline security review recommendations, analyze their results, and assess effectiveness in reducing risks. However, these measures do not possess key attributes—such as clarity, and having measurable targets—that GAO has found are key to successful performance measures. By taking steps to ensure that its pipeline security program performance measures exhibit these key attributes, TSA could better assess its effectiveness at reducing pipeline systems' security risks. Pipeline Security Branch officials also reported conducting security reviews as the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to reduce pipeline security risks. However, TSA has not tracked the status of Corporate Security Review recommendations for the past 5 years. Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews' recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk. GAO makes 10 recommendations to TSA to improve its pipeline security program management (many are listed on the next page), and DHS concurred. GAO recommends, among other things, that the TSA Administrator take the following actions: implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines at defined intervals; clarify TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities; develop a strategic workforce plan for TSA's Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division; update TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology to include current data to ensure it reflects industry conditions and threats; fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; ensure the Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures; and enter information on Corporate Security Review recommendations and monitor and record their status." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the global defense posture of the United States and its impact on military operations overseas. The posture is driven by national-level and DOD-specific guidance, including the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The report focuses on the European Command (EUCOM), which is responsible for missions in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. EUCOM evaluates the adequacy of posture in Europe to support relevant plans and achieve military objectives. The number of U.S. military sites and personnel in Europe have decreased since the end of the Cold War, but EUCOM has identified five lines of effort to enhance its posture under the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). ERI is intended to provide short-term reassurance to allies and partners and deter Russian aggression in the long term. The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense prioritize ERI posture initiatives relative to those funded in the base budget, develop estimates for future sustainment costs, and provide Congress with estimates of future costs and underlying assumptions. The report also identifies approximately $224 million in unspecified minor military construction and facilities maintenance and repair projects programmed or obligated for ERI in fiscal years 2015 through 2017.", + "answer": [ + "In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the President announced the ERI, to reassure allies in Europe of U.S. commitment to their security. This initiative has been funded using OCO appropriations, which Congress provides in addition to DOD's base budget appropriations. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review matters related to ERI. In this report, we (1) describe changes in ERI's objectives, funding under ERI, and DOD's posture in Europe since 2014 and (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD's planning processes for posture initiatives funded under ERI prioritize those initiatives, estimate their long-term costs, and communicate their estimated costs to Congress. GAO analyzed DOD strategy documentation, budget and cost analysis guidance, budget justification materials, and cost and obligations data. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, the military services, and the State Department. Since 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to European posture. DOD expanded ERI's objectives from the short-term reassurance of allies and partners to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail. With respect to funding, DOD will have requested approximately $4.5 billion for ERI's posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017 (about $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 alone), and in July 2016 EUCOM identified funding needs for future posture initiatives. The expansion of ERI's objectives has contributed to DOD's enhancing its posture in Europe. Specifically, DOD has increased the size and duration of Army combat unit deployments, planned to preposition Army equipment in Eastern Europe, added new enduring locations (e.g., locations that DOD expects to access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future), improved infrastructure, and negotiated new agreements with European nations. As of April 2017, DOD was considering further force enhancements under ERI as part of the department's ERI budget request. DOD also was reviewing whether new enduring locations to support ERI were needed and was considering other improvements to existing infrastructure. DOD's process for planning ERI has not established priorities among posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those in its base budget, nor estimated long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, nor communicated future costs to Congress. ERI is being planned using a separate process from DOD's established processes and is funded from DOD's overseas contingency operations (OCO) appropriations. GAO found several weaknesses: Lack of prioritization : DOD establishes priorities among ERI posture initiatives but has not evaluated them against base budget initiatives using its posture management process. As a result, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives and may be investing in projects that it will not continue should OCO funding become unavailable. Lack of sustainment costs : EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term costs to sustain equipment and construction funded under ERI. Based on DOD's approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, GAO determined that these costs could be substantial. DOD officials said that GAO correctly applied DOD's approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment. In the absence of comprehensive estimates, DOD has been limited in its ability to assess affordability and plan for future costs. Not communicating future costs : DOD limits Congress's visibility into the resources needed to implement ERI and achieve its objectives because it does not include future costs in its ERI budget request. This is a public version of a classified report issued in August 2017. Information on specific posture planning, guidance, and budget estimates that DOD deemed to be classified have been omitted from this report. GAO recommends that DOD prioritize ERI posture initiatives against initiatives in its base budget, develop cost estimates for sustaining initiatives, and communicate future costs to Congress. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are warranted." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal and State Medicaid spending on long-term care has increased significantly over the years. The spending on long-term care services provided in home and community settings, including assisted living facilities, exceeds the amount spent on institutional settings such as nursing homes. However, Medicaid statute does not provide for coverage of room and board charges of an assisted living facility. The Federal and State governments have different roles in the oversight of Medicaid. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for oversight of state Medicaid programs, while states are responsible for the day-to-day administration of their Medicaid programs. CMS issues program requirements in the form of regulations and guidance, approves changes states make to their programs, provides technical assistance to states, collects and reviews required information and data from states and, in some cases, reviews individual state programs. States are required to identify and designate a single state agency to administer or supervise the administration of its Medicaid program. The state Medicaid agency may partially or fully delegate the administration and oversight of the state’s HCBS programs to another state agency or other entity. However, the state Medicaid agency is ultimately accountable to the federal government for compliance with the HCBS requirements. The report also highlights the lack of oversight and quality of care in assisted living facilities. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts with state entities to regularly inspect nursing facilities and investigate complaints to assess whether nursing homes meet federal quality requirements. However, there is no standardized framework for oversight, investigation and inspections, and reporting on quality of care concerns for assisted living facilities and other types of HCBS providers. The report recommends that CMS provide guidance and clarify requirements regarding the monitoring and reporting of deficiencies that states using HCBS waivers are required to report on their annual reports. The report also recommends that CMS establish standard Medicaid reporting requirements for all states to annually report key information on critical incidents, including the type of critical incidents involving Medicaid beneficiaries and the type of residential facilities, including assisted living facilities, where critical incidents occurred. Finally, the report recommends that CMS ensure that all", + "answer": [ + "The number of individuals receiving long term care services from Medicaid in community residential settings is expected to grow. These settings, which include assisted living facilities, provide a range of services that allow aged and disabled beneficiaries, who might otherwise require nursing home care, to remain in the community. State Medicaid programs and CMS, the federal agency responsible for overseeing the state programs, share responsibility for ensuring that beneficiaries' health and welfare is protected. GAO was asked to examine state and federal oversight of assisted living services in Medicaid. This report (1) describes state spending on and coverage of these services, (2) describes how state Medicaid agencies oversee the health and welfare of beneficiaries in these settings, and (3) examines the extent that CMS oversees state Medicaid agency monitoring of assisted living services. GAO surveyed all state Medicaid agencies and interviewed officials in a nongeneralizeable sample of three states with varied oversight processes for their assisted living programs. GAO reviewed regulations and guidance, and interviewed CMS officials. State Medicaid agencies in 48 states that covered assisted living services reported spending more than $10 billion (federal and state) on assisted living services in 2014. These 48 states reported covering these services for more than 330,000 beneficiaries through more than 130 different programs. Most programs were operated under Medicaid waivers that allow states to target certain populations, limit enrollment, or restrict services to certain geographic areas. With respect to oversight of their largest assisted living programs, state Medicaid agencies reported varied approaches to overseeing beneficiary health and welfare, particularly in how they monitored critical incidents involving beneficiaries receiving assisted living services. State Medicaid agencies are required to protect beneficiary health and welfare and operate systems to monitor for critical incidents—cases of potential or actual harm to beneficiaries such as abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Twenty-six state Medicaid agencies could not report to GAO the number of critical incidents that occurred in assisted living facilities, citing reasons including the inability to track incidents by provider type (9 states), lack of a system to collect critical incidents (9 states), and lack of a system that could identify Medicaid beneficiaries (5 states). State Medicaid agencies varied in what types of critical incidents they monitored. All states identified physical, emotional, or sexual abuse as a critical incident. A number of states did not identify other incidents that may indicate potential harm or neglect such as medication errors (7 states) and unexplained death (3 states). State Medicaid agencies varied in whether they made information on critical incidents and other key information available to the public. Thirty-four states made critical incident information available to the public by phone, website, or in person, while another 14 states did not have such information available at all. Oversight of state monitoring of assisted living services by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is limited by gaps in state reporting. States are required to annually report to CMS information on deficiencies affecting beneficiary health and welfare for the most common program used to provide assisted living services. However, states have latitude in what they consider a deficiency. States also must describe their systems for monitoring critical incidents, but CMS does not require states to annually report data from their systems. Under federal internal control standards, agencies should have processes to identify information needed to achieve objectives and address risk. Without clear guidance on reportable deficiencies and no requirement to report critical incidents, CMS may be unaware of problems. For example, CMS found, after an in-depth review in one selected state seeking to renew its program, that the state lacked an effective system for assuring beneficiary health and welfare, including reporting insufficient information on the number of unexpected or suspicious beneficiary deaths. The state had not reported any deficiencies in annual reports submitted to CMS in 5 prior years. GAO recommendations to CMS include clarifying state requirements for reporting program deficiencies and requiring annual reporting of critical incidents. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to clarify deficiency reporting and stated that it would consider annual reporting requirements for critical incidents after completing an ongoing review." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United States has two agencies that regulate rail transportation safety: the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). FRA oversees safety of railroads operating on the general system, which includes freight railroads and intercity passenger and commuter railroads. FTA oversees safety of rail transit systems that serve individual metropolitan areas. Rail transit is an important component of the nation’s transportation network, providing over 4.4 billion passenger trips in 2016. FTA’s state safety oversight program requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety of rail transit systems. FRA and FTA have made progress in enhancing safety oversight, but limitations have been identified. FRA has established a comprehensive Public Transportation Safety Program, while FTA has developed a Public Transportation Safety Program that relies on state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations. FRA and FTA have faced challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of state safety agencies’ enforcement. FTA has not developed a method to evaluate the effectiveness of states’ enforcement practices. FRA has provided state safety agencies with examples of authorities to address a lack of action or cooperation by the rail transit operator, but FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state enforcement authorities and practices as a whole are effective. FTA has made progress in evaluating existing rail transit safety standards and providing guidance to states as part of the certification process, but limitations in FTA’s approach may still hinder the success of the state-based rail transit safety oversight program. FTA should develop a plan with a timeline for developing guidance for state safety agencies about how to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program and develop and communicate a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of the enforcement authorities and practices of state safety agencies.", + "answer": [ + "In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads. GAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure). There are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents. GAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe NASA Commercial Crew Program is a multi-phased effort to develop and demonstrate crew transportation capabilities. The program has engaged several companies using both agreements and contract vehicles. The early phases were under Space Act agreements, which allowed for greater flexibility. NASA awarded FAR-based contracts for the final two phases. The contractors are developing crew transportation systems, with Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner and SpaceX’s Dragon 2 as the main systems. The Commercial Crew Transportation Capability phase contracts include three types of services. The contractors must complete development of their crew transportation systems and undergo certification before they can fly crewed missions to the ISS. NASA has made changes to the contracts that have increased their value. The contractors have experienced delays in their schedules, with NASA expecting the earliest possible completion date to be August 2018. NASA has not developed a contingency plan to address potential delays. The program has identified safety requirements for the contractors, including a loss of crew analysis. NASA has not fully implemented the recommendations of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel to address the dual-hat issue. The program has not fully integrated the safety and mission assurance technical authority role. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to incorporate the loss of crew analysis into the certification process. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue of how to ensure that the contractors have a shared understanding of the agency certification review requirements. The program has not fully addressed the issue", + "answer": [ + "In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion, to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the ISS. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017. A House report accompanying H.R. 5393 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program, including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and (2) how NASA's certification process addresses safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems. GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and two of NASA's independent review bodies that provide oversight. Both of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors, Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are making progress finalizing designs and building hardware for their crew transportation systems, but both contractors continue to delay their certification milestone (see figure). Certification is the process that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will use to ensure that each contractor's system meets its requirements for human spaceflight for the Commercial Crew Program. Further delays are likely as the Commercial Crew Program's schedule risk analysis shows that the certification milestone is likely to slip. The analysis identifies a range for each contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as an average. The average certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for SpaceX, according to the program's April 2018 analysis. Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Additional delays could result in a gap in U.S. access to the space station as NASA has contracted for seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft only through November 2019. NASA is considering potential options, but it does not have a contingency plan for ensuring uninterrupted U.S. access. NASA's certification process addresses the safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems through several mechanisms, but there are factors that complicate the process. One of these factors is the loss of crew metric that was put in place to capture the probability of death or permanent disability to an astronaut. NASA has not identified a consistent approach for how to assess loss of crew. As a result, officials across NASA have multiple ways of assessing the metric that may yield different results. Consequently, the risk tolerance level that NASA is accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting the results of its assessment. Federal internal controls state that management should define risk tolerances so they are clear and measurable. Without a consistent approach for assessing the metric, the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew. GAO is making five recommendations, including that NASA develop a contingency plan for ensuring a U.S. presence on the ISS and clarify how it will determine its risk tolerance for loss of crew. NASA concurred with three recommendations; partially concurred on the recommendation related to loss of crew; and non-concurred with a recommendation to report its schedule analysis to Congress. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the appointment processes of various legislative branch agencies and entities. The first four agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The next two are appointed by Congress, the next by the Librarian of Congress, and the last by a board of directors. The report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights. The report provides information on the appointment processes, length of tenures, reappointment or removal provisions, salaries and benefits, and most recent appointments for each agency. The Architect of the Capitol is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of 10 years. The Comptroller General is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and serves a 15-year term. The Director of the Congressional Budget Office is appointed wholly by Congress for a four-year term. The Chair of the board of directors of the Office of Compliance appoints and may remove an Executive Director. The Register of Copyrights is currently appointed by the Librarian of Congress, but legislation was considered in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process to a presidential appointment, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.", + "answer": [ + "The leaders of the legislative branch agencies and entities—the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Library of Congress (LOC), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Publishing Office (GPO, formerly Government Printing Office), the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Office of Compliance—are appointed in a variety of manners. Four agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; two are appointed by Congress; one is appointed by the Librarian of Congress; and one is appointed by a board of directors. Congress has periodically examined the procedures used to appoint these officers with the aim of protecting the prerogatives of, and ensuring accountability to, Congress within the framework of the advice and consent appointment process established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. This report contains information on the legislative branch agency heads' appointment processes, length of tenures (if terms are set), reappointment or removal provisions (if any), salaries and benefits, and most recent appointments. This report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe banking industry plays a crucial role in connecting borrowers to savers and allocating funds across the economy. However, it is inherently risky due to extending credit and undertaking liabilities. Regulatory systems have developed over time to balance the benefits of banking with limiting risks. Congress often considers policies related to the banking industry. The last decade has been transformative, with the 2007-2009 financial crisis revealing weaknesses in the pre-crisis financial regulatory regime. In response, policymakers implemented numerous changes to financial regulation, including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Recently, some observers have raised concerns that regulatory changes may have costs, such as reduced credit availability and slower economic growth. In response, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, which modified regulations for small and large banks. Federal banking regulatory agencies have also proposed further changes. The implementation of post-crisis regulations and changes made pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act occurred over several years, with recent changes under Trump Administration appointees. The regulators now believe they have sufficient information to determine which regulations may be ineffective or inefficient. Recently, these regulators have proposed several proposals to reduce regulatory burden. The issue of whether regulatory burden can be reduced without undermining the goals and effectiveness of regulations is a key concern. Market trends and economic conditions continue to affect the banking industry as new regulations are implemented. The development of new technologies, such as fintech, and a rising interest rate environment are notable conditions. This report provides a broad overview of selected banking-related issues, including safety and soundness regulation, consumer protection, community banks, large banks, and recent market and economic trends. The report also discusses issues related to fintech and cybersecurity. Banks face regulations intended to increase profitability without excessive risk and to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. They are also subject to regulations to reduce crime, including anti-money laundering measures and cybersecurity regulations. The report analyzes selected issues related to these regulations. The debate over the Volcker Rule, which restricts proprietary trading, is discussed", + "answer": [ + "Regulation of the banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the past decade. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many new bank regulations were implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) or under the existing authorities of bank regulators to address apparent weaknesses in the regulatory regime. While some observers view those changes as necessary and effective, others argued that certain regulations were unjustifiably burdensome. To address those concerns, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) relaxed certain regulations. Opponents of that legislation argue it unnecessarily pared back important safeguards, but proponents of deregulation argue additional pare backs are needed. Meanwhile, a variety of economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, the 116th Congress faces many issues related to banking, including the following: Safety and Soundness. Banks are subject to regulations designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. Examples include requirements to hold a certain amount of capital (which enables a bank to absorb losses without failing) and the so-called Volcker Rule (a ban on banks' proprietary trading). In addition, anti-money laundering requirements aim to reduce the likelihood banks will execute transactions involving criminal proceeds. Banks are also required to take steps to avoid becoming victims of cyberattacks. The extent to which these regulations (i) are effective, and (ii) appropriately balance benefits and costs is a matter of debate. Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, and Access to Banking. Certain laws are designed to protect consumers and ensure that lenders use fair lending practices. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authorities to regulate for consumer protection. No consensus exists on whether current regulations strike an appropriate balance between protecting consumers while ensuring access to credit and justifiable compliance costs. In addition, whether Community Reinvestment Act regulations as currently implemented effectively and efficiently encourage banks to provide services in their areas of operation is an open question. Large Banks and \"Too Big To Fail.\" Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with very large and complex financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for certain large banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one fails. In addition, bank regulators imposed additional capital requirements on certain large, complex banks. Subsequently, some argued that certain of these additional regulations were too broadly applied and overly stringent. In response, Congress reduced the applicability of the Dodd-Frank measures and regulators have proposed changes to the capital rules. Whether relaxing these rules will provide needed relief to these banks or unnecessarily pare back important safeguards is a debated issue. Community Banks. The number of small or \"community\" banks has declined substantially in recent decades. No consensus exists on the degree to which regulatory burden, market forces, and the removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are causing the decline. What Companies Should Be Eligible for Bank Charters. To operate legally as a bank, an institution must hold a charter granted by a state or federal government. Traditionally, these are held by companies generally focused on and led by people with experience in finance. However, recently companies with a focus on technology are interested in having legal status as a bank, either through a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state-level industrial loan company charter. Policymakers disagree over whether allowing these companies to operate as banks would create appropriately regulated providers of financial services or inappropriately extend government-backed bank safety nets and disadvantage existing banks. Recent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces also pose issues for the banking industry. Some observers argue that increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated \"shadow banking\" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. If interest rates rise, it could create opportunities and risks. Such trends could have implications for how the financial system performs and influence debates over appropriate banking regulations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nColombia, a long-standing democracy in the Western Hemisphere, has experienced a multisided civil conflict for over five decades. The conflict ended in August 2017 with the signing of a U.N.-monitored disarmament. The National Center for Historical Memory 2013 report revealed that 220,000 Colombians died in the conflict, with 81% being civilians. The conflict has had a significant impact on Colombian society, including 23,000 selective assassinations, 5 million internally displaced persons, 27,000 kidnappings, and 11,000 land mine amputees. Over 8 million Colombians, or 15% of the population, have registered as conflict victims. Despite the violence, Colombia has achieved significant progress in reducing violence and promoting economic growth. Between 2000 and 2016, Colombia saw a 94% decrease in kidnappings and a 53% reduction in homicides. Colombia has become one of Latin America's most attractive locations for foreign direct investment. However, the economy slowed to 3.1% growth in 2015 and declined to 1.7% in 2017, primarily due to dependence on oil and other commodity exports.\n\nBetween 2012 and 2016, the Colombian government held formal peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's largest guerrilla organization. In August 2016, the government and FARC negotiators announced they had concluded their talks and achieved a 300-page peace agreement. The accord was subsequently narrowly defeated in a popular referendum held in early October 2016, but was revised by the Santos government and agreed to by the FARC and then ratified by the Colombian Congress at the end of November 2016. The Colombian conflict predates the formal founding of the FARC in 1964. The conflict stems from significant disparities and inequalities suffered by landless peasants in the country's peripheral regions. The Colombian political landscape has long been marked by polarization and violence", + "answer": [ + "A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict. President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country's largest leftist guerrilla organization—his government's primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia's Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize. On August 7, 2018, Iván Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia's youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country's second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos. Since the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia's long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country's improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia's progress. The FARC's demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups. Many observers continue to raise concerns about the country's human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela's humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Political upheaval has added yet more uncertainty after the United States and many other Western Hemisphere and European nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition in Venezuela and recognized the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country's interim president in January 2019. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia's top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by an estimated 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia's 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia's Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988 established a framework for the U.S. government to potentially provide federal payment for third-party claims resulting from commercial launch or reentry accidents. The act aimed to create a competitive environment for the U.S. commercial space launch industry while minimizing costs to taxpayers. All FAA-licensed commercial launches and reentries by U.S. companies, whether unmanned or manned, are covered by federal indemnification for third-party damages that result from the launch or reentry.\n\nIn 2016, FAA issued five active licenses, with an average third-party MPL of about $51 million and ranging from $10 million to $99 million. The amount of insurance coverage that FAA requires launch companies to purchase, the MPL value, is intended to reflect the greatest dollar amount of loss to third parties and the federal government for bodily injury and property damage that can be reasonably expected to result from a launch or reentry accident. FAA calculates separate MPL values for potential damages to third parties and the federal government.\n\nThe FAA determines MPL values for third parties with the intent of estimating the greatest dollar amount of losses that reasonably could be expected from a launch or reentry accident, which have no less than a 1 in 10 million chance of occurring. For damages to the federal government, FAA determines MPL values with the intent of estimating the greatest dollar amount of losses that reasonably could be expected from a launch or reentry accident, which have no less than a 1 in 100,000 chance of occurring.\n\nThe FAA’s process for determining the MPL value for a launch or reentry license generally includes three elements: the number of casualties, the cost of casualties, and property damage. FAA uses a risk profile method to estimate the number of casualties, which simulates a range of possible scenarios to create a distribution of potential casualty numbers and the simulated probability of different levels of casualty numbers. FAA also uses a new tool called the Range Risk Tool to estimate the risk of launch and reentry operations.\n\nHowever, FAA has not fully addressed the three requirements mandated by the Com", + "answer": [ + "The federal government shares liability risks with the commercial space launch industry for accidents that result in damages to third parties or federal property. This arrangement requires space launch companies to have a specific amount of insurance to cover these damages. The government is potentially liable for damages above that amount, up to a cap GAO estimated to be $3.1 billion in 2017, subject to appropriations in advance. CSLCA, enacted in 2015, directed the Department of Transportation, of which FAA is a part, to evaluate its MPL methodology and, if necessary, develop a plan to update that methodology. The act also included a provision requiring GAO to assess FAA's evaluation and any actions needed to update the methodology. This report discusses the extent to which (1) FAA's evaluation report addresses the requirements in CSLCA and (2) FAA has addressed previously identified weaknesses in the MPL methodology. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed FAA on its loss methodology evaluation and actions to address weaknesses. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) report evaluating its maximum probable loss (MPL) methodology did not fully address the evaluation and consultation requirements specified by the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA). Balance of Risk. CSLCA required FAA to include ensuring that the federal government is not exposed to greater indemnification costs and that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary as a result of FAA's MPL methodology. FAA said that it ensured this balance by improving its methodology, but it did not reevaluate its probability thresholds after revising its methodology. These thresholds are used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the government. Impact on Costs. The act required FAA to consider the costs to both the industry and the federal government of implementing an updated methodology. FAA's report discussed the impact on indirect costs, such as data collection, but did not discuss direct costs: insurance premiums for launch companies and indemnification liability for the federal government. Consultation. The act also required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology in accordance with the preceding requirements. While the agency consulted with some stakeholders, these consultations were limited in scope. FAA officials said they have not been able to take the actions needed to fully satisfy the mandated elements because of issues such as resource limitations and the lack of available data. However, by not resolving these issues, FAA lacks assurance that launch companies are not purchasing more insurance than needed or that the federal government is not being exposed to greater indemnification costs than expected. FAA has addressed two of three previously identified weaknesses in its MPL methodology but has not yet dealt with the remaining weakness. Specifically, the agency has revised its methodology for estimating the number of potential casualties for a launch and changed the factor it uses to derive estimated property damage from estimated casualties. However, FAA has not updated the amount used for the cost of an individual casualty. GAO recommended in a March 2017 report (GAO-17-366) that FAA update this amount. Not doing so could understate the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase, exposing the federal government to excess risk. GAO also determined that while FAA has two tools and methods it can use in making its MPL estimates, it does not have guidance on determining which are most appropriate for a given launch scenario. For example, one tool is more comprehensive but also labor intensive to use, while the other is inappropriate for certain launch scenarios and could result in misleading MPL amounts. Officials said they have begun to create such guidance but do not have an estimated completion date. Without such guidance, FAA cannot ensure that the most appropriate MPL methodology is used for each launch. FAA should fully address mandated requirements in evaluating its MPL—probability thresholds, direct costs, and stakeholder consultations— and establish an estimated completion date for developing guidance on tools and methods to use for specific launch scenarios. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations, and provided technical comments." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe Coast Guard is a multimission agency with over 47,000 members and a fleet of 201 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and over 1,400 boats and ships. The agency is responsible for 11 statutory missions and manages these missions through six mission programs. The Coast Guard conducts marine safety activities, including safety inspections and vessel accident investigations, among other activities. However, the agency faces challenges in acquiring new assets to modernize its fleet, and concerns surrounding the affordability of these efforts remain. The agency also faces challenges in collecting and using data to effectively manage its programs. For example, the agency does not have complete data on the population of the active U.S. commercial fishing vessel fleet, which limits its ability to assess accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Additionally, the agency uses unrealistic asset performance data, which does not reflect asset condition and unscheduled maintenance. The agency also faces challenges in using performance goal data, as some of the data is not reliable or valid. The agency has taken steps to address some of these challenges, but more work is needed to improve data collection and management.", + "answer": [ + "The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management. This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning. This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials. GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data. GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) was established in 1953 to support small businesses during times of war and to promote their interests in the federal contracting process. The SBA's primary goal is to ensure that small businesses receive a fair proportion of federal contracts and subcontracts. Congress has passed various laws and regulations to support small businesses, including the Small Business Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Small Business Administration Act.\n\nThe SBA administers several programs to support small businesses, such as loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital, contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting, direct loan programs for disaster recovery, and small business management and technical assistance training programs.\n\nFederal agencies are required to set aside contracts for small businesses and to establish small business procurement goals. The SBA also provides oversight and assistance to ensure that these goals are met. The SBA's Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) works with federal agencies to promote contracting with small businesses.\n\nThe SBA also provides various contracting preferences to specific types of small businesses, such as 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, WOSBs, and SDVOSBs. These preferences allow small businesses to compete for contracts that they might not otherwise be able to win.\n\nThe federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses generally, 5% to SDBs, and 3% to SDVOSBs. However, it has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses.\n\nOverall, the SBA and federal agencies have various programs and requirements in place to promote federal contracting and subcontracting with small businesses. These programs aim to increase competition, lower barriers to entry, and provide assistance to small businesses to help them succeed in the federal contracting process.", + "answer": [ + "Congress has broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, that is, the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One way in which Congress has exercised this authority is by adopting measures to promote contracting and subcontracting between \"small businesses\" and federal agencies. These measures, among other things, declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a \"fair proportion\" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses; establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; establish an annual Small Business Goaling Report to measure progress in meeting these goals; generally require federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000), but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to set aside contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies to make sole source awards to small businesses when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available, under urgent and compelling circumstances); authorize federal agencies to set aside contracts for, or grant other contracting preference to, specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs) and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)); and task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and other federal procurement officers with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation. Small business contracting programs generally have strong bipartisan support. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition, or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact and operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates note that implementing regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) narrow the reach (and impact) of some small business contracting preferences by excluding specific types of contracts, such as those listed in the Federal Supply Schedules, from FAR requirements pertaining to small business contracting. Advocates want the federal government to enact policies that reduce or eliminate such exclusions. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business opportunities to win federal contracts and promoting a more diversified, robust economy. Many observers judge the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities by whether federal government and individual federal agencies meet the predetermined procurement goals in the annual Small Business Goaling Report. In recent years, the federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses, 5% to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), and 3% to SDVOSBs. It has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses. The Small Business Goaling Report is the most convenient measure available to compare federal small business contracting performance over time, but it has limitations. For example, the SBA excludes some contracts from the report in its determination of what is \"small business eligible\" and some federal procurement activities are not included because they are not recorded in the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation. It also does not evaluate the effect these contracts have on small businesses, industry competitiveness, or the overall economy." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 was established to preserve, develop, and ensure accessibility to outdoor recreation resources. The fund receives revenue from oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), federal motorboat fuel tax, and surplus property sales. However, the revenue is only available if appropriated by Congress through the discretionary appropriations process. The LWCF receives additional revenue from the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA), which provides mandatory appropriations for grants to states for outdoor recreation purposes. The overall level of annual appropriations has varied widely since the fund's inception in 1965. Of the total revenues that have accrued ($40.9 billion), less than half have been appropriated ($18.9 billion) through FY2019. The unappropriated balance in the fund is estimated at $22.0 billion through FY2019. The LWCF Act outlines uses for federal and state purposes. It states that not less than 40% of the total made available to the fund must be used for federal purposes and not less than 40% must be used to provide financial assistance to states. The act lists the federal purposes for which the President is to allot LWCF funds unless otherwise allotted in the appropriation Act. These purposes primarily relate to the acquisition of lands and waters by the federal government. The state grant program is authorized to provide matching grants to states for outdoor recreation purposes. In practice, the appropriations acts have provided funding for three general purposes: land acquisition, the state grant program, and other purposes. The largest portion of the total ($11.4 billion) has been appropriated for federal land acquisition. The state grant program has received the second-largest portion ($4.8 billion). Other purposes have received the remaining $2.7 billion. The report discusses the other purposes for which LWCF appropriations have been provided throughout the fund's history. It identifies the amount of funding contained in annual appropriations laws for other purposes and the types of purposes for which funds have been appropriated. The balance of the report discusses the other purposes for which LWCF appropriations have been provided throughout", + "answer": [ + "The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 (P.L. 88-578) created the LWCF in the Treasury as a funding source to implement the outdoor recreation goals set out by the act. The LWCF Act authorizes the fund to receive $900 million annually, with the monies available only if appropriated by Congress (i.e., discretionary appropriations). The fund also receives mandatory appropriations under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA). The level of annual appropriations for the LWCF has varied since the origin of the fund in FY1965. The LWCF Act outlines uses of the fund for federal and state purposes. Of the total made available through appropriations or deposits under GOMESA, not less than 40% is to be used for \"federal purposes\" and not less than 40% is to be used to provide \"financial assistance to states.\" The act lists the federal purposes for which the President is to allot LWCF funds \"unless otherwise allotted in the appropriation Act making them available.\" These purposes primarily relate to acquisition of lands and waters (and interests therein) by the federal government. With regard to state purposes, the act authorizes a matching grant program to states for outdoor recreation purposes. Throughout the LWCF's history, appropriations acts typically have provided funds for land acquisition and outdoor recreational grants to states. Beginning in FY1998, appropriations also have been provided each year (except FY1999) to fund other purposes related to natural resources. The extent to which the LWCF should be used for purposes other than federal land acquisition and outdoor recreation grants to states, and which other purposes should be funded from the LWCF, continue to be the subject of legislation and debate in Congress. In the past few decades, Presidents have sought LWCF funds for a variety of other purposes. Congress chooses which if any of these requests to fund, and has chosen programs not sought by the President for a particular year. Among other programs, appropriations have been provided for facility maintenance of the land management agencies, ecosystem restoration, the Historic Preservation Fund, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the Forest Legacy Program, State and Tribal Wildlife Grants (under the Fish and Wildlife Service), the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, U.S. Geological Survey science and cooperative programs, and Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian Land and Water Claim Settlements. Since FY1998, a total of $2.7 billion has been appropriated for other purposes, of a total LWCF appropriation of $18.9 billion over the history of the fund. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service have received the largest shares of the total appropriations for other purposes, about $1.4 billion (53%) and $1.0.billion (38%), respectively, from FY1998 to FY2019. Several agencies shared the remaining $0.2 billion (9%) of the appropriations. Both the dollar amounts and the percentages of annual LWCF appropriations for other purposes have varied widely since FY1998. The dollar amounts have ranged from $0 in FY1999 to $456.0 million in FY2001. The percentage of annual funds provided for other purposes ranged from 0% in FY1999 to a high of 59% in both FY2006 and FY2007. In some years, the appropriation for other purposes was significantly less than the Administration requested. For instance, for FY2008, the George W. Bush Administration sought $313.1 million; the appropriation was $101.3 million. The appropriation for other purposes last exceeded $100.0 million in FY2010, and most recently was $93.3 million, in FY2019. Prior to FY2008, several other purposes typically were funded each year from LWCF. Since FY2008, funds have been appropriated annually only for grants under two programs: Forest Legacy and Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund. These two programs and a third grant program—State and Tribal Wildlife Grants—have received more than three-quarters ($2.1 billion, 79%) of the total appropriation for other purposes since FY1998." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Navy has experienced four significant mishaps at sea since January 2017, resulting in the loss of 17 sailors and serious damage to Navy ships. Three of the mishaps occurred to ships homeported overseas in Yokosuka, Japan. The Navy has 277 ships, a 17 percent reduction from 1998, and has been deploying more ships overseas to maintain the same level of presence. The Navy has been reporting low readiness levels due to increased deployment lengths needed to meet high demand for aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships. The Navy has been assigning more surface combatants and amphibious ships to overseas homeports since 2006, and currently 14 percent of the fleet is homeported overseas. Homeporting ships overseas is an efficient method for providing forward presence and rapid crisis response, but it comes at a cost. Ships homeported overseas have higher operations and support costs and do not operate within the traditional fleet response plan cycles. The Navy has extended deployments of the Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to 8 and 8.5 months, respectively, in 2016. The Navy has had to shorten, eliminate, or defer training and maintenance periods to support these high deployment rates, which has resulted in declining ship conditions across the fleet and increased time required for shipyards to complete maintenance. The Navy has developed revised operational schedules for all ships homeported overseas, but they have not been employed as of June 2017. The high operational tempo for ships homeported overseas limits the time for crew training, and there are no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships homeported in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan. The Navy's Surface Force Readiness Manual states that these ships should maintain maximum training, material condition, and manning readiness. The condition of overseas-homeported ships has decreased even faster than that of U.S.-based ships, and casualty reports show that equipment casualties require unscheduled maintenance and have a negative effect on fleet operations. The Navy has priorit", + "answer": [ + "Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships. This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on work it has published since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues. GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data. GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include: Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas: Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented. Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week. Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations). Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges. GAO made 14 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe term digital economy has different meanings in different policy contexts. In the context of international tax policy, certain digital economy business models have been singled out for selective taxation by some jurisdictions, primarily in Europe. These taxes are called digital services taxes (DSTs). Proponents of DSTs argue that they are necessary to have multinational corporations (MNCs) pay their fair share of taxes, tax profits derived from consumers in their jurisdictions, or adapt traditional rules and systems of international taxation to account for new forms of disruptive business models. However, the U.S. government has opposed these unilateral taxes, arguing that they are primarily political efforts to target U.S. corporations.\n\nDSTs are applied to MNCs that operate in two-sided markets, where they provide services to individual users at zero charge and sell other services to businesses. The main issues with DSTs are that MNCs in the digital economy can establish a physical presence without paying taxes in the country where their customers reside, and they can shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions where they conduct little to no real economic activity.\n\nThe report analyzes DST proposals from an economic and policy perspective as they have been introduced, discussed, and adapted in European countries. It also discusses the challenges of taxing the digital economy, including the difficulty of establishing a physical presence and transfer pricing rules.\n\nThe report concludes that MNCs in the digital economy are not paying a fair share of taxes in their jurisdictions. It argues that DSTs are not the solution to this problem, as they are unilateral and do not address the underlying issues of taxing digital business models. Instead, the report suggests that a comprehensive international agreement is needed to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy.\n\nIn summary, the report discusses the challenges of taxing the digital economy and the limitations of DSTs as a solution. It argues that a comprehensive international agreement is needed to address the challenges of taxing digital business models.", + "answer": [ + "Several countries, primarily in Europe, and the European Commission have proposed or adopted taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain \"digital economy\" sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their residents. These proposals have generally been labeled as \"digital services taxes\" (DSTs). For example, beginning in 2019, Spain is imposing a DST of 3% on online advertising, online marketplaces, and data transfer service (i.e., revenue from sales of user activities) within Spain. Only firms with €750 million in worldwide revenue and €3 million in revenues with users in Spain are to be subject to the tax. In 2020, the UK plans to implement a 3% DST that would apply only to businesses whose revenues exceed £25 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of £500 million annually. The UK labels its DST as an \"interim\" solution until international tax rules are modified to allow countries to tax the profits of foreign MNCs if they have a substantial enough \"digital presence\" based on local users. The member states of the European Commission are also actively considering such a rule. These policies are being considered and enacted against a backdrop of ongoing, multilateral negotiations among members and nonmembers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These negotiations, prompted by discussions of the digital economy, could result in significant changes for the international tax system. Proponents of DSTs argue that digital firms are \"undertaxed.\" This sentiment is driven in part by some high-profile tech companies that reduced the taxes they paid by assigning ownership of their income-producing intangible assets (e.g., patents, marketing, and trade secrets) to affiliate corporations in low-tax jurisdictions. Proponents of DSTs also argue that the countries imposing tax should be entitled to a share of profits earned by digital MNCs because of the \"value\" to these business models made by participation of their residents through their content, reviews, purchases, and other contributions. Critics of DSTs argue that the taxes target income or profits that would not otherwise be subject to taxation under generally accepted income tax principles. U.S. critics, in particular, see DSTs as an attempt to target U.S. tech companies, especially as minimum thresholds are high enough that only the largest digital MNCs (such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon) will be subject to these specific taxes. DSTs are structured as a selective tax on revenue (akin to an excise tax) and not as a tax on corporate profits. A tax on corporate profits taxes the return to investment in the corporate sector. Corporate profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost. In contrast, DSTs are \"turnover taxes\" that apply to the revenue generated from taxable activities regardless of costs incurred by a firm. Additionally, international tax rules do not allow countries to tax an MNC's cross-border income solely because their residents purchase goods or services provided by that firm. Rather, ownership of assets justifies a country to be allocated a share of that MNC's profits to tax. Under these rules and their underlying principles, the fact that a country's residents purchase digital services from an MNC is not a justification to tax the MNC's profits. DSTs are likely to have the economic effect of an excise tax on intermediate services. The economic incidence of a DST is likely to be borne by purchasers of taxable services (e.g., companies paying digital economy firms for advertising, marketplace listings, or user data) and possibly consumers downstream from those transactions. As a result, economic theory and the general body of empirical research on excise taxes predict that DSTs are likely to increase prices in affected markets, decrease quantity supplied, and reduce investment in these sectors. Compared to a corporate profits tax—which, on balance, tends to be borne by higher-income shareholders—DSTs are expected to be more regressive forms of raising revenue, as they affect a broad range of consumer goods and services. Certain design features of DSTs could also create inequitable treatment between firms and increase administrative complexity. For example, minimum revenue thresholds could be set such that primarily large, foreign (and primarily U.S.) corporations are subject to tax. Requirements to identify the location of users could also introduce significant costs on businesses. This report traces the emergence of DSTs from multilateral tax negotiations in recent years, addresses various purported policy justifications of DSTs, provides an economic analysis of their effects, and raises several issues for Congress." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nCommercial disclosure requirements that compel speech are an uneasy and shifting space in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has upheld some commercial disclosure requirements that target conduct and only incidentally burden speech, but has not applied strict scrutiny to such provisions. Instead, courts have employed less rigorous standards to evaluate such provisions. The Court's recent decision in NIFLA suggests that it may be moving away from a more deferential treatment of commercial disclosure requirements, perhaps subjecting them to heightened scrutiny. The Court has long emphasized that the government can regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public, but a court would likely require more proof from the government under strict scrutiny. Congress has enacted a wide variety of disclosure requirements, many of which compel commercial speech. The Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is protected, but it also foresaw \"no obstacle\" to government regulation of \"false\" speech or even of commercial speech that is only \"deceptive or misleading.\" The Court has explained why regulating for truthfulness in the commercial arena is unlikely to undesirably inhibit spontaneity because commercial speech is generally more calculated and motivated by a commercial interest. In light of NIFLA, courts may be more likely to scrutinize commercial disclosure requirements under Zauderer, particularly if the disclosure requirement is content-based.", + "answer": [ + "Federal law contains a wide variety of disclosure requirements, including food labels, securities registrations, and disclosures about prescription drugs in direct-to-consumer advertising. These disclosure provisions require commercial actors to make statements that they otherwise might not, compelling speech and implicating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Nonetheless, while commercial disclosure requirements may regulate protected speech, that fact in and of itself does not render such provisions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has historically allowed greater regulation of commercial speech than of other types of speech. Since at least the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court has been increasingly protective of commercial speech. This trend, along with other developments in First Amendment law, has led some commentators to question whether the Supreme Court might apply a stricter test in assessing commercial disclosure requirements in the near future. Nonetheless, governing Supreme Court precedent provides that disclosure requirements generally receive lesser judicial scrutiny when they compel only commercial speech, as opposed to noncommercial speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, a decision released in June 2018, the Supreme Court explained that it has applied a lower level of scrutiny to compelled disclosures under two circumstances. First, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld laws that regulate commercial speech if the speech regulation is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is focused on conduct and only incidentally burdens speech. If a law is properly characterized as a regulation of conduct, rather than speech, then it may be subject to rational basis review, a deferential standard that asks only whether the regulation is a rational way to address the problem. However, it can be difficult to distinguish speech from conduct, and the Supreme Court has not frequently invoked this doctrine to uphold laws against First Amendment challenges. Second, the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a lower level of scrutiny to certain commercial disclosure requirements under the authority of a 1985 case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Zauderer, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement after noting that the challenged provision compelled only \"factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.\" The Court said that under the circumstances, the service provider's First Amendment rights were sufficiently protected because the disclosure requirement was \"reasonably related\" to the government's interest \"in preventing deception of consumers.\" Lower courts have generally interpreted Zauderer to mean that if a commercial disclosure provision requires only \"factual and uncontroversial information\" about the goods or services being offered, it should be analyzed under rational basis review. If a commercial disclosure requirement does not qualify for review under Zauderer, then it will most likely be analyzed under the intermediate standard that generally applies to government actions that regulate commercial speech. Some legal scholars have argued that recent Supreme Court case law suggests the Court may subject commercial disclosure provisions to stricter scrutiny in the future, either by limiting the factual circumstances under which these two doctrines apply or by creating express exceptions to these doctrines. If a court applies a heightened level of scrutiny, it may require the government to present more evidence of the problem it is seeking to remedy and stronger justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement to achieve its purposes." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United States has been committed to building Afghanistan's security and governance since 2001 to prevent the country from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. The two main missions in Afghanistan are a counterterrorism mission led by the United States and the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The security environment has deteriorated since the January 2015 transition to Afghan-led security, with nearly 24,000 security incidents in 2017, the most ever recorded. The United States contributes more troops to Resolute Support than any other coalition nation, with about 8,500 assigned to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The United States provides the majority of funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, with other international donors and the Afghan government also contributing. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for overseeing the training and equipping of the ANDSF through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The report highlights six key equipment types the United States has funded for the ANDSF, including weapons, radios, vehicles, explosive disposal equipment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment, and aircraft. The report also discusses the organization of the ANDSF, with the Ministry of Defense overseeing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Ministry of the Interior overseeing the Afghan National Police (ANP). The report concludes with a summary of the ANDSF's organization and a discussion of the challenges facing the specialized forces, including the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Security Forces. The report was based on a review of reports from the Center for Naval Analyses, DOD and NATO documents and reports, and reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the DOD Inspector General. The report also includes interviews with DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan.", + "answer": [ + "Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years. While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable. GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan. GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) was enacted in 1974 and provides formula grants to states to improve child protective service systems. The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) administers the CAPTA state grant program and provides guidance and oversight to states. In fiscal year 2017, Congress provided about $25 million for the program. States are required to submit plans outlining how they intend to use CAPTA funds to improve their child protective service systems. State plans remain in effect for the duration of states’ participation in the grant program, and modifications must be submitted if needed. In addition to state plans, states are required to submit an annual data report providing information on agency decisions made in response to referrals of child abuse and neglect, as well as preventive services provided to families. CAPTA requires state governors to provide assurances in their state plans, including an assurance that states have in effect and are enforcing a state law or program that includes policies and procedures to address the needs of infants affected by prenatal substance abuse or displaying withdrawal symptoms at birth. Since 2003, governors have had to provide an assurance that states have in effect and are enforcing a state law or program that includes policies and procedures to address the needs of infants affected by prenatal substance abuse or displaying withdrawal symptoms at birth. Under states’ policies and procedures, health care providers are required to notify CPS of such infants. Governors must also assure that a plan of safe care is developed for these infants. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA) amended certain provisions of CAPTA that relate to substance-affected infants. CAPTA also requires states to have policies and procedures to address the needs of substance-affected infants and their families, including mothers with a substance use disorder. However, states have experienced challenges implementing new CAPTA requirements. Many states reported in a survey that they are not completely adhering to the law. This is reflected in ACF’s review of state plans, some of which are resulting in program improvement plans. States cite challenges that stem, in part, from ACF’s lack of", + "answer": [ + "Under CAPTA, states perform a range of prevention activities, including addressing the needs of infants born with prenatal drug exposure. The number of children under the age of 1 entering foster care increased by about 15 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015. Child welfare professionals attribute the increase to the opioid epidemic. GAO was asked to examine the steps states are taking to implement CAPTA requirements on substance-affected infants and related amendments enacted in 2016. This report examines (1) the extent to which states have adopted policies and procedures to notify CPS of substance-affected infants; (2) state efforts to develop plans of safe care, and associated challenges; and (3) steps HHS has taken to help states implement the provisions. To obtain this information, GAO surveyed state CPS directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and reached a 100 percent response rate. GAO also visited 3 states (Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); reviewed relevant documents such as federal laws and regulations, and HHS guidance; and interviewed HHS officials. GAO did not assess states' compliance with CAPTA requirements. All states reported adopting, to varying degrees, policies and procedures regarding health care providers notifying child protective services (CPS) about infants affected by opioids or other substances. Under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), as amended, governors are required to provide assurances that the states have laws or programs that include policies and procedures to address the needs of infants affected by prenatal substance use. This is to include health care providers notifying CPS of substance-affected infants. In response to GAO's survey, 42 states reported having policies and procedures that require health care providers to notify CPS about substance-affected infants and 8 states reported having policies that encourage notification. The remaining 1 state has a policy requiring health care providers to assess the needs of mothers and infants and if they conclude that infants are at risk for abuse or neglect, CPS is notified. In response to GAO's survey, 49 states reported that their CPS agency has policies to develop a plan of safe care; 2 reported not having such a requirement. Under CAPTA, states are required to develop a plan of safe care for substance-affected infants. Although not defined in law, a plan of safe care generally entails an assessment of the family's situation and a plan for connecting families to appropriate services to stabilize the family and ensure the child's safety and well-being. States reported that plans typically address the infant's safety needs, immediate medical needs, and the caregiver's substance use treatment needs. However, officials in the 3 states GAO visited noted challenges, including uncertainty about what to include in plans and the level of intervention needed for infants at low risk of abuse or neglect. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided technical assistance and guidance to states to implement these CAPTA requirements. Most states reported in GAO's survey that additional guidance and assistance would be very or extremely helpful for addressing their challenges. Nevertheless, HHS officials told GAO that the agency does not anticipate issuing additional written guidance, but that states can access technical assistance through their regional offices and the National Center on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare—a resource center funded by HHS. However, of the 37 states that reported on the helpfulness of the assistance they have received, 19 said it was only moderately helpful to not helpful. States offered suggestions for improving the assistance, such as developing substance abuse training materials for staff and holding video conferences with other states to share information. In October 2017, HHS officials explained that some states have submitted plans that include details on how they are addressing the CAPTA requirements. HHS officials reported that some of the plans submitted to date indicated that states are not meeting the requirements and those states have been asked to develop program improvement plans. Without more specific guidance and assistance to enhance states' understanding of CAPTA requirements and better address known challenges such as the ones described in this report, states may miss an opportunity to provide more effective protections and services for the children and families most in need. GAO recommends that HHS provide additional guidance and technical assistance to states to address known challenges and enhance their understanding of requirements. HHS did not concur with the recommendation. As discussed in the report, GAO continues to believe that added guidance would benefit states." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the use of correspondent banking relationships for transferring U.S. humanitarian assistance funds to recipient countries. The number of correspondent banking relationships has declined in recent years, which could affect the ability to send and receive international payments and drive some payment flows underground. U.S. banks and financial institutions must comply with the Bank Secrecy Act’s anti-money laundering regulations and relevant regulations that implement U.S. sanctions when performing overseas money transfers. Banks must also comply with regulations that implement U.S. sanctions in certain countries. The report examines banking access challenges faced by U.S. government agencies and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in providing humanitarian assistance in high-risk countries. The report identifies four countries where the U.S. government has imposed sanctions and examines the banking access challenges faced by NPOs in those countries. The report also reviews the extent to which USAID implementing partners reported banking access challenges in their progress reports. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. agencies to help address banking access challenges.", + "answer": [ + "Since 2012, the United States has provided approximately $36 billion in humanitarian assistance to save lives and alleviate human suffering. Much of this assistance is provided in areas plagued by conflict or other issues that increase the risk of financial crimes. The World Bank and others have reported that humanitarian assistance organizations face challenges in accessing banking services that could affect project implementation. GAO was asked to review the possible effects of decreased banking access for nonprofit organizations on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. In this report, GAO examines (1) the extent to which State and USAID partners experienced banking access challenges, (2) USAID partners' reporting on such challenges, and (3) actions U.S. agencies have taken to help address such challenges. GAO selected four high-risk countries—Syria, Somalia, Haiti, and Kenya—based on factors such as their inclusion in multiple financial risk-related indices, and selected a non-generalizable sample of 18 projects in those countries. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed U.S. officials and the 18 partners for the selected projects. Implementing partners (partners) for 7 of 18 Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) humanitarian assistance projects that GAO selected noted encountering banking access challenges, such as delays or denials in transferring funds overseas. Of those 7 projects, 1 partner told us that banking access challenges adversely affected its project and 2 additional partners told us that the challenges had the potential for adverse effects. Moreover, the majority of partners (15 out of 18) for the 18 projects noted experiencing banking access challenges on their global portfolio of projects over the previous 5 years. USAID's partners' written reports do not capture potential risks posed by banking access challenges because USAID generally does not require most partners to report in writing any challenges that do not affect implementation. Six of the 7 projects that encountered challenges were USAID-funded. Of those 6 USAID projects, 5 partners told us that these challenges did not rise to the threshold of affecting project implementation that would necessitate reporting, and 1 did not report challenges although its project was adversely affected. Additionally, GAO's review of about 1,300 USAID partner reports found that the few instances where challenges were mentioned lacked sufficient detail for GAO to determine their type, severity, or origin. Without information on banking access challenges that pose potential risks to project implementation, USAID is not aware of the full extent of risks to achieving its objectives. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and State have taken various actions to help address banking access challenges encountered by nonprofit organizations (NPO), but USAID's efforts have been limited. Treasury's efforts have focused on engagement between NPOs and U.S. agencies, while State has issued guidance on the topic to its embassies and designated an office to focus on these issues. In contrast, USAID lacks a comparable office, and NPOs stated that it is difficult to find USAID staff to engage with on this topic. Further, GAO found that awareness of specific challenges was generally limited to USAID staff directly overseeing the project. Without communicating these challenges to relevant parties, USAID may not be aware of all risks to agency objectives and may not be able to effectively engage with external entities on efforts to address these challenges. GAO recommends that USAID should take steps to (1) collect information on banking access challenges experienced by USAID's partners and (2) communicate that information both within USAID and with external entities, such as other U.S. agencies and partners. USAID concurred with our recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe EFMP provides support to families with special needs at their current and proposed locations. Servicemembers relocate frequently, generally moving every 3 years if in the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, and every 4 years if in the Air Force. In fiscal year 2016, the Military Services relocated approximately 39,000 servicemembers enrolled in the EFMP to CONUS installations. To implement DOD’s policy on support for families with special needs, DOD requires each Service to establish its own EFMP for active duty servicemembers. EFMPs are to have three components: identification and enrollment, assignment coordination, and family support.\n\nIdentification and enrollment: Medical and educational personnel at each installation are responsible for identifying eligible family members with special medical or educational needs to enroll in the EFMP. Once identified by a qualified medical provider, active duty servicemembers are required to enroll in their service’s EFMP. Servicemembers are also required to self-identify when they learn a family member has a qualifying condition.\n\nAssignment coordination: Before finalizing a servicemember’s assignment to a new location, DOD requires each Military Service to consider any family member’s special needs during this process, including the availability of required medical and special educational services at a new location.\n\nFamily support: DOD requires each Military Service’s EFMP to include a family support component through which it helps families with special needs identify and gain access to programs and services at their current, as well as proposed, locations. Servicemembers assigned to a joint base would receive family support from the Service that is responsible for leading that installation.\n\nThe Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs (Office of Special Needs or OSN) was established to develop, implement, and oversee a policy to support these families. OSN is responsible for collaborating with the Services to standardize EFMP components as appropriate and for monitoring the Services’ EFMPs. OSN has been delegated the responsibility of implementing DOD’s policy for families with special needs by the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness through the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs according to DOD officials.\n\nEach Military Service has designated a program manager for its EFMP who is also responsible", + "answer": [ + "Military families with special medical and educational needs face unique challenges because of their frequent moves. To help assist these families, DOD provides services plans, which document the support a family member requires. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the Services' EFMPs, including DOD's oversight of these programs. This report examines the extent to which (1) each Service provides family support and (2) the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support. GAO analyzed DOD and Service-specific EFMP guidance and documents; analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available); visited seven military installations, selected for their large numbers of military-connected students; and interviewed officials responsible for implementing each Service's EFMP, as well as officials in OSN that administer DOD's EFM policy. The support provided to families with special needs through the Department of Defense's (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) varies widely for each branch of Military Service. Federal law requires DOD's Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop a uniform policy that includes requirements for (1) developing and updating a services plan for each family with special needs and (2) resources, such as staffing, to ensure an appropriate number of family support providers. OSN has developed such a policy, but DOD relies on each Service to determine its compliance with the policy. However, Army and Navy officials said they have not received feedback from OSN about the extent to which their Service-specific guidance complies. Federal internal control standards call for developing clear policies to achieve agency goals. In addition, DOD's most recent annual reports to Congress do not indicate the extent to which each Service provides services plans or allocates sufficient resources for family support providers. According to GAO's analysis, the Military Services have developed relatively few services plans, and there is wide variation in the number of family support providers employed, which raises questions about potential gaps in services for families with special needs (see table). Each Service uses various mechanisms to monitor how servicemembers are assigned to installations (assignment coordination) and obtain family support, but DOD has not established common performance measures to assess these activities. DOD has taken steps to better support families with special needs, according to the DOD officials GAO interviewed. For example, DOD established a working group to identify gaps in services. However, OSN officials said that DOD lacks common performance measures for assignment coordination and family support because the Services have not reached consensus on what those measures should be. In addition, OSN does not have a process to systematically evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. Federal internal control standards call for assessing performance over time and evaluating the results of monitoring activities. Without establishing common performance measures and assessing monitoring activities, DOD will be unable to fully determine the effect of its efforts to better support families with special needs and the adequacy of the Services' EFMPs as required by federal law. GAO makes a total of three recommendations to DOD. DOD should assess and report to Congress on the extent to which each Service provides sufficient family support personnel and services plans, develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, and evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. DOD agreed with these recommendations and plans to develop performance metrics for assignment coordination and develop plans to evaluate the Services' monitoring activities." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large deployable space telescope designed to operate in infrared wavelengths and succeed the aging Hubble Space Telescope. JWST is intended to study the first stars, planets in other solar systems, and the evolution of galaxies. The telescope is being developed by NASA, contractors, and international partners. The project is divided into three segments: observatory, ground, and launch. The observatory segment includes the Optical Telescope Element, Integrated Science Instrument Module, and spacecraft, along with major subsystems like the sunshield and cryocooler. JWST is dependent on software to deploy and control its components and collect and transmit data. The project is currently relying on two contractors, Northrop Grumman and the Space Telescope Science Institute. The JWST project has a history of schedule delays and cost overruns, which led to replans in 2011 and 2018. The project is now in the final phase of integration and test, with a system integration review planned for August 2019. The project has implemented several oversight augmentations, including more on-site coverage at the contractor facility and cultural improvements. However, the project has not conducted a Joint Cost and Schedule Liability (JCL) analysis as part of its second replan. The GAO recommends that NASA direct the JWST project office to conduct a JCL prior to the system integration review. The JCL would provide better information on the project's status and help decision makers determine if the project can complete remaining development with acceptable risk and within its cost and schedule constraints. The JWST project is one of NASA's most expensive and complex science projects, and the GAO will continue to monitor the project's progress in future reviews.", + "answer": [ + "JWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. The project has delayed its planned launch three times since September 2017 due to problems discovered in testing. In June 2018, NASA approved new cost and schedule estimates for JWST. Since the project established its cost and schedule baselines in 2009, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and the launch date has been moved back by 81 months. Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the seventh report. This report assesses (1) the considerations NASA took into account when updating the project's cost and schedule commitments and (2) the extent to which NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, among other issues. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials. In June 2018, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revised the cost and schedule commitments for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) to reflect known technical challenges, as well as provide additional time to address unanticipated challenges. For example, the revised launch readiness date of March 2021 included 5.5 months to address a design issue for the cover of the sunshield (see image). The purpose of the sunshield is to protect the telescope's mirrors and instruments from the sun's heat. NASA found that hardware on the cover came loose during testing in April 2018. The new cost estimate of $9.7 billion is driven by the schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor's workforce on board longer than expected. Before the project enters its final phase of integration and test, it must conduct a review to determine if it can launch within its cost and schedule commitments. As part of this review, the project is not required to update its joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis—an analysis that provides the probability the project can meet its cost and schedule commitments—but government and industry cost and schedule experts have found it is a best practice to do so. Such analysis would provide NASA officials with better information to support decisions on allocating resources, especially in light of the project's recent cost and schedule growth. NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, and identified the JWST project manager as responsible for monitoring the continued implementation of these changes. Examples of recent changes include increasing on-site presence at the contractor facility and conducting comprehensive audits of design processes. Sustaining focus on these changes through launch will be important if schedule pressures arise later and because of past challenges with communications. GAO will follow up on the project's monitoring of these improvements in future reviews. GAO recommends NASA update the project's joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis. NASA concurred with the recommendation made in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the various child nutrition programs in the United States, which are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS). These programs provide food to children in institutional settings, such as schools, child care centers, and after-school programs. The largest programs are the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP), which subsidize free, reduced-price, and full-price meals in participating schools. Other programs include the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, Special Milk Program, Child and Adult Care Food Program, and Summer Food Service Program. The report also discusses the expiration of some authorities created by the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA) in 2015 and the potential impact on program operations. The report notes that the HHFKA reauthorization process has been ongoing since 2010, with proposals being made in the 114th and 115th Congresses. The report highlights some of the issues that have been raised in recent years, such as the nutritional quality of foods served in schools, access to food during the summer months, and the use of non-USDA foods in school meals. The report concludes by stating that the implementation of the HHFKA, child nutrition reauthorization efforts in the 114th and 115th Congresses, and the child nutrition-related topics raised during 2018 farm bill negotiations have raised issues that may be relevant for Congress in future reauthorization efforts or other policymaking opportunities.", + "answer": [ + "The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs—the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program—as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program. The most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law's implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress. Current issues discussed in this report include the following: Nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk. Offerings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings. \"Buy American\" requirements for school meals. The school meals programs' authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to \"enforce full compliance\" with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment. Congregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the \"congregate feeding\" requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program. Implementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data. Unpaid meal costs and \"lunch shaming.\" The issue of students not paying for meals and schools' handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as \"lunch shaming\" practices, including throwing away a student's selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization. Paid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made—some successfully—to loosen these \"paid lunch equity\" requirements in recent years." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the structure and operations of multiemployer pension plans, which are defined benefit pension plans created and maintained through collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and two or more employers. There are about 1,400 such plans nationwide covering over 10 million participants. The plans are jointly administered and governed by a board of trustees selected by labor and management. Employer contributions are pooled in a trust fund for investment purposes, to pay benefits to retirees and their beneficiaries, and for administrative expenses. The trustees decide how the trust fund should be invested, but can use investment managers. The funded percentage of a plan is its ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities. The discount rate is used to convert projected future benefits into their present value. The assumed-return approach is used to determine the discount rate, which depends on the allocation of plan assets. The report notes that while the multiemployer system was significantly underfunded around 2001 and 2009, its funded position has improved since 2009. However, some plans face serious financial difficulties. The report also discusses the Central States Pension Fund (CSPF), which is one of the largest multiemployer plans. CSPF was the subject of investigations in the 1970s and 1980s and entered into a consent decree in 1982. The plan's funded status has declined over time, and it has been in critical condition since 2014. The report describes the role of the Department of Labor (DOL) in overseeing the management of the plan and the consent decree. The report concludes by summarizing the key findings and recommendations.", + "answer": [ + "Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained pension agreements often between labor unions and two or more employers. CSPF is one of the nation's largest multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, covering about 385,000 participants. Since 1982, the plan has operated under a court-enforceable consent decree which, among other things, requires that the plan's assets be managed by independent parties. Within 7 years, CSPF estimates that the plan's financial condition will require severe benefit cuts. GAO was asked to review the events and factors that led to the plan's critical financial status and how its investment outcomes compare to similar plans. GAO describes (1) what is known about the factors that contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition; (2) what has been CSPF's investment policy, and the process for setting and executing it, since the consent decree was established; and (3) how CSPF's investments have performed over time, particularly compared to similar pension plans. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed CSPF representatives, International Brotherhood of Teamsters officials and members, federal officials, and knowledgeable industry stakeholders; reviewed CSPF documentation including investment policy statements and board of trustee meeting minutes; and analyzed investment returns and fees from required, annual pension plan filings and from consultant benchmarking reports. The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers, and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002, as shown in the figure below. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry as well as a decline in union membership contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition. Both CSPF's investment policy and the process for setting and executing it have changed several times since the consent decree was established in 1982. The original consent decree gave an independent asset manager—called a named fiduciary—exclusive authority to set and change the plan's investment policies and manage plan assets, and prohibited CSPF trustees from managing assets or making investment decisions. Initially, the named fiduciaries sold the troubled real estate assets acquired during the pre-consent decree era. Subsequent changes include the following: In 1993, the named fiduciaries started to increase investment in equities, and their policies continued to direct that asset allocations be weighted toward equities until early 2017. Between 2003 and 2010, the court approved three plan decisions to move a total of 50 percent of CSPF's assets into passively-managed accounts (passive management typically seeks to match the performance of a specific market index and reduce investment fees). An early-2017 investment policy change precipitated by CSPF's deteriorating financial condition will continue to move plan assets into fixed income investments ahead of projected insolvency, or the date when CSPF is expected to have insufficient assets to pay promised benefits when due. As a result, assets will be gradually transitioned from “return-seeking assets”—such as equities and emerging markets debt—to high-quality investment grade debt and U.S. Treasury securities with intermediate and short-term maturities. The plan is projected to become insolvent on January 1, 2025. CSPF officials and named fiduciary representatives said these changes are intended to reduce the plan's exposure to market risk and volatility, and provide participants greater certainty prior to projected insolvency. GAO found that CSPF's investment returns and expenses were generally in line with similarly sized institutional investors and with demographically similar multiemployer pension plans. For example, GAO's analysis of returns using the peer group measure used by CSPF known as the Wilshire Associates' Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), showed that CSPF's annual investment returns since 1995 were above the median about as many times as they were below. Similarly, comparing CSPF's returns to a peer group of similar multiemployer defined benefit plans using federally required annual reports found that CSPF's annual investment returns were in line with those of its peers. Specifically, CSPF's annual returns were above the median nine times and below it six times—and CSPF's overall (dollar-weighted) average annual return from 2000 through 2014 was close to that of the peer median average return of 4.8 percent. In addition, GAO found that CSPF's investment fees and other administrative expenses have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. For example: CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were about 9 percent lower than the median of large defined benefit multiemployer plans over the 2000 through 2014 period—though much of that difference is accounted for by a relative reduction in investment fees since 2007. CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were, on average, about 34 basis points (or 0.34 percent). CSPF's administrative expenses related to the day-to-day operations of the plan have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. CSPF's administrative expenses per participant were below the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans for 12 of the 15 years over the 2000 through 2014 period. As of 2014, CSPF's administrative expense was $98 per participant, which is about 16 percent less than the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans. GAO is not making recommendations in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 provided up to $10 billion in funding for veterans to obtain health care services from community providers through the Choice Program when they faced long wait times, lengthy travel distances, or other challenges accessing care at VA medical facilities. The temporary authority and funding for the Choice Program was separate from other previously existing programs through which VA has the option to purchase care from community providers. Legislation enacted in August and December of 2017 and June 2018 provided an additional $9.4 billion for the Veterans Choice Fund. The Choice Program will sunset on June 6, 2019. In October 2014, VA modified its existing contracts with two TPAs that were administering another VA community care program—the Patient-Centered Community Care program—to add certain administrative responsibilities associated with the Choice Program. The TPAs, Health Net and TriWest, are responsible for managing networks of community providers who deliver care in a specific multi-state region. They are responsible for establishing networks of community providers, scheduling appointments with community providers for eligible veterans, and paying community providers for their services. The TPAs process claims they receive from community providers for the care they deliver to veterans and pay providers for approved claims. VA’s TPAs do not have a payment timeliness requirement for the payments they make to community providers. Instead, a contract modification established a non-enforceable goal of processing and paying clean claims within 30 days of receipt. To be reimbursed for its payments to providers, the TPAs submit electronic invoices to VA. VA reviews the TPAs’ invoices and either approves or rejects them. The federal Prompt Payment Act requires VA to pay its TPAs within 30 days of receipt of invoices that it approves. The VA MISSION Act of 2018 requires VA to consolidate its community care programs once the Choice Program sunsets, authorizes VA to utilize a TPA for claims processing, and requires VA to reimburse community providers in a tim", + "answer": [ + "Questions have been raised about the lack of timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program and how this may affect the willingness of providers to participate in the program as well as in the forthcoming Veterans Community Care Program. You asked GAO to review issues related to the timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program. This report examines, among other things, (1) the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers' claims and factors affecting timeliness of payments, and (2) actions taken by VA and the TPAs to reduce the length of time TPAs take to pay community providers for Choice Program claims. GAO reviewed TPA data on the length of time taken to pay community provider claims from November 2014 through June 2018, the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review. GAO also reviewed documentation, such as the contracts between VA and its TPAs, and interviewed VA and TPA officials. In addition, GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 15 community providers, selected based on their large Choice Program claims volume, to learn about their experiences with payment timeliness. The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program) was created in 2014 to address problems with veterans' timely access to care at VA medical facilities. The Choice Program allows eligible veterans to obtain health care services from providers not directly employed by VA (community providers), who are then reimbursed for their services through one of the program's two third-party administrators (TPA). GAO's analysis of TPA data available for November 2014 through June 2018 shows that the length of time the TPAs took to pay community providers' clean claims each month varied widely—from 7 days to 68 days. VA and its TPAs identified several key factors affecting timeliness of payments to community providers under the Choice Program, including VA's untimely payments to TPAs, which in turn extended the length of time TPAs took to pay community providers' claims; and inadequate provider education on filing claims. VA has taken actions to address key factors that have contributed to the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers. For example, VA updated its payment system and related processes to pay TPAs more quickly. According to VA data, as of July 2018, VA was paying at least 90 percent of the TPAs' invoices within 7 days. In addition, VA and the TPAs have taken steps to improve provider education to help providers resolve claims processing issues. However, 9 of the 15 providers GAO interviewed said they continue to experience lengthy telephone hold times. According to VA and TPA officials, steps have been taken to improve the customer service offered to community providers. However, VA officials do not collect data on or monitor TPA compliance with customer service requirements—such as calls being answered within 30 seconds or less—for provider calls because they said they are not enforcing the requirements and are allowing TPAs to prioritize calls from veterans. Without collecting data and monitoring compliance, VA does not have information on challenges providers may face when contacting TPAs to resolve payment issues. GAO is making two recommendations, including that VA should collect data on and monitor compliance with its requirements pertaining to customer service for community providers. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe WMATA (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) was created in 1967 to plan, develop, finance, and operate a regional transportation system in the National Capital area. It operates six rail lines connecting various locations within the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. WMATA’s rail system has 118 linear miles of guideway, with 51 miles of subway, 58 miles at ground level, and 9 miles on aerial structures.\n\nWMATA’s capital investments are funded through multiple sources, including grants from the federal government, state and local jurisdictions, and long-term debt. From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, WMATA received about $5.8 billion in capital funding, with about half coming from the federal government and 41 percent from state and local jurisdictions.\n\nWMATA has several steps in its capital planning process, including a Capital Needs Inventory, Annual Capital Budget, and Six-Year Capital Improvement Program. The Capital Needs Inventory identifies capital investment needs, and the Annual Capital Budget and Six-Year Capital Improvement Program identify projects WMATA plans to undertake.\n\nWMATA has recently undertaken efforts to address issues related to the condition and maintenance of its track. After SafeTrack concluded in June 2017, WMATA implemented a track preventive maintenance program designed to incorporate industry-wide best practices related to track maintenance. The program commenced in June 2017 and focuses on six separate initiatives that together address two most pressing track maintenance concerns—electrical fires caused by cable and insulator defects along the track wayside and defects to the track itself, including unsecured rail fasteners and worn track switches.\n\nThe FTA (Federal Transit Administration) plays a role in WMATA activities by providing and directing the use of federal funds, overseeing safety, and requiring transit asset management. FTA provides grants that support capital investment in public transportation and has provided such funding to WMATA.\n\nThe report identifies weaknesses in WMATA’s capital planning process, including a lack of an objective, data-driven, and risk-based approach to estimate major rehabilitation and capital asset replacement needs, a", + "answer": [ + "Safety incidents in recent years on WMATA's rail system have raised questions about its processes for performing critical maintenance and replacing capital assets. WMATA initiated a new preventive maintenance program for its rail track in 2017, and is currently implementing a new capital planning process. GAO was asked to examine issues related to WMATA's capital funding and maintenance practices. This report examines: (1) how WMATA spent its capital funds from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, (2) how WMATA's new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the prior process, and (3) WMATA's progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices. GAO analyzed WMATA's financial and program information, interviewed officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, and five transit agencies selected for similarities to WMATA. GAO compared WMATA's capital planning process and track maintenance program with leading practices. From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this period, WMATA's capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually. WMATA's new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion. Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning process, WMATA's stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions. WMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program, WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new program's success. GAO is making five recommendations, including that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the track preventive maintenance program. WMATA described actions planned or underway to address GAO's recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that administers trade rules and agreements negotiated by its 164 members. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995 and the rules and agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO encompasses and expands on the commitments and institutional functions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was established in 1947. The vast majority of world trade, approximately 98%, takes place among WTO members. The WTO serves as an important forum for resolving trade disputes.\n\nThe United States and other countries sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation, stability, and prosperity worldwide. Today, the U.S. and other countries trade under the terms set by the WTO agreements. The terms govern the majority of U.S. trading relationships. Some 65% of U.S. global trade is with countries that do not have free trade agreements with the United States, including China, the European Union, India, and Japan, and thus rely on the terms of WTO agreements.\n\nCongress has recognized the WTO as the \"foundation of the global trading system\" within U.S. trade legislation and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. U.S. free trade agreements also build on core WTO agreements. While the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) represents the United States at the WTO, Congress holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes U.S. trade negotiating objectives and principles and implements U.S. trade agreements through legislation. U.S. priorities and objectives for the GATT/WTO are reflected in trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the USTR and other executive branch agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments.\n\nThe WTO's effectiveness as a negotiating body for broad-based trade liberalization has come under scrutiny. The organization has struggled to reach consensus", + "answer": [ + "Historically, the United States' leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United States a seat at the table to shape the international trade agenda in ways that both advance and defend U.S. interests. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trade agenda remain of interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes trade negotiating objectives and principles through legislation. Congress has recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the \"foundation of the global trading system\" within trade promotion authority (TPA) and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO have been reflected in various TPA legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments. The WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and the rules and agreements resulting from multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in 1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and WTO, the United States, with other countries, sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members. The WTO is a consensus and member-driven organization. Its core principles include nondiscrimination (most favored nation treatment and national treatment), freer trade, fair competition, transparency, and encouraging development. These are enshrined in a series of WTO trade agreements covering goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights, and trade facilitation, among other issues. Some countries, including China, have been motivated to join the WTO not just to expand access to foreign markets but to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides an enforceable means for members to resolve disputes over WTO commitments and obligations. The WTO has processed more than 500 disputes, and the United States has been an active user of the dispute settlement system. Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism an important success of the system. At the same time, some members, including the United States, contend it has procedural shortcomings and has exceeded its mandate in deciding cases. Many observers are concerned that the effectiveness of the WTO has diminished since the collapse of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, and believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the global trading system. To date, WTO members have been unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement on trade liberalization and rules. While global supply chains and technology have transformed international trade and investment, global trade rules have not kept up with the pace of change. Many countries have turned to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) outside the WTO as well as plurilateral agreements involving subsets of WTO members rather than all members. At the latest WTO Ministerial conference in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced. Several members committed to make progress on ongoing talks, such as fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, while other areas remain stalled. While many were disappointed by the limited progress, in the U.S. view, the outcome signaled that \"the impasse at the WTO was broken,\" paving the way for groups of like-minded countries to pursue new work in other key areas. Certain WTO members have begun to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Potential reforms concern the administration of the organization, its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new agreements. Proposed DS reforms also attempt to improve the working of the dispute settlement system, particularly the Appellate Body—the seven-member body that reviews appeals by WTO members of a panel's findings in a dispute case. Some U.S. frustrations with the WTO are not new and many are shared by other trading partners, such as the European Union. At the same time, the Administration's overall approach has spurred new questions regarding the future of U.S. leadership and U.S. priorities for improving the multilateral trading system. Concerns have emphasized that the Administration's recent actions to unilaterally raise tariffs under U.S. trade laws and to possibly impede the functioning of the dispute settlement system might undermine the credibility of the WTO system. A growing question of some observers is whether the WTO would flounder for lack of U.S. leadership, or whether other WTO members like the EU and China taking on larger roles would continue to make it a meaningful actor in the global trade environment. The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to Congress. Important issues it may address include how current and future WTO agreements affect the U.S. economy, the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, whether new U.S. negotiating objectives or oversight hearings are needed to address prospects for new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant authorities and impact of potential U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on U.S. economic and foreign policy interests." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the steps that executive branch agencies are required to take regarding improper payments under the Improper Payments Elimination Act (IPIA), as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) and IPERIA. The steps include conducting a risk assessment, developing improper payment estimates, analyzing the root causes of improper payments, and reporting on the results of addressing these requirements. The report also discusses the annual determination and reporting requirements for inspectors general regarding compliance with six criteria listed in the law. The report highlights the importance of developing statistically valid improper payment estimates and using appropriate sampling approaches for identifying improper payments. The report provides examples of how different agencies have applied these requirements to their programs and activities. The report concludes with recommendations for the Director of OMB regarding the development of guidance on how agencies should test to identify improper payments and the appropriate treatment of nonresponse cases during improper payment testing.", + "answer": [ + "Improper payments—which include payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount—are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Executive branch agencies are required to annually estimate improper payments for certain programs. Estimation of improper payments is key to understanding the extent of the problem and to developing effective corrective actions. Relevant laws and guidance provide agencies flexibility in developing estimates. This report describes agencies' processes to estimate improper payments in selected programs for fiscal year 2017 and the extent to which certain differences in these processes can affect the usefulness of the resulting estimates. GAO selected 10 programs across six agencies with the largest reported program outlays in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. For these programs, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, analyzed agencies' policies and procedures, and interviewed officials at relevant agencies and OMB staff. The six agencies GAO reviewed reported taking various approaches related to key components of estimating improper payments—shown in the figure below—for 10 selected programs, which collectively reported outlays of over $2.5 trillion for fiscal year 2017. Sample selection. Eight of the 10 programs GAO reviewed reported using statistically valid approaches, and the remaining 2 reported using alternative methodologies approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The sampled data elements varied, including payments, medical claims, and tax returns. The age of the data used to develop fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimates also varied, ranging from calendar year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. Identification of improper payments. Some of the six agencies reported using processes designed specifically to estimate improper payments, whereas others reported leveraging existing reviews. These agencies' policies and procedures include a review of aspects of eligibility, except for those related to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Pay and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Retirement overpayments. DOD and OPM have not fully assessed whether their estimation processes effectively consider key program risks. OMB guidance does not specifically address how agencies are to test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments are addressed. The six agencies also varied in the treatment of insufficient documentation, both in identifying and in reporting the root causes of improper payments. For the agencies that contact entities outside the agency to estimate improper payments, the treatment of nonresponse differed, with one agency including nonresponses as improper payments and another generally excluding the nonresponse cases from review. Although OMB guidance states that agencies should treat cases of insufficient documentation as improper payments, it does not specifically address the treatment of nonresponse cases. Calculation of the improper payment estimate. The six agencies generally reported using law and OMB guidance to calculate improper payment estimates for the selected programs, except for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) removed overpayments that were recovered when developing its estimate. OMB guidance requires agencies to include recovered amounts in their estimates. Removing these overpayments understates the EITC improper payment estimate and may limit IRS's ability to develop corrective actions to prevent improper payments. GAO recommends that OMB develop guidance on treatment of nonresponse cases and testing to identify improper payments, that DOD and OPM assess their estimation processes, and that IRS revise its methodology to not exclude recovered payments from its estimate. All of the agencies either agreed or partially agreed with the specific recommendations to them. GAO believes that the actions are warranted, as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is a mandatory program for servicemembers in the U.S. Coast Guard. The program is managed by the Health, Safety, and Work-Life Directorate, which oversees TAP policy. TAP managers are assigned to 13 installations where Health, Safety, and Work-Life offices are located. One or two TAP managers are assigned to each of the Coast Guard’s nine districts, which often span multiple states and territories. The program manager in Coast Guard Headquarters manages the Transition Assistance Program.\n\nTAP-eligible Coast Guard servicemembers sometimes work in small, widely dispersed units assigned to remote locations, including on Coast Guard vessels. One aspect of the Coast Guard’s mission requires Coast Guard servicemembers to respond to emergency situations at a moment’s notice. The Coast Guard, which is overseen by DHS, generally oversees TAP implementation for its servicemembers. Federal law requires DOD and DHS to require eligible servicemembers under their respective command to participate in TAP, with some exceptions.\n\nThe redesigned TAP, which began in 2011, includes pre-separation or transition counseling, where servicemembers are briefed on TAP requirements and available transition resources. Participants register for and attend TAP courses. The core curriculum includes three required courses: the Department of Labor (DOL) Employment Workshop, unless exempt, and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Benefits Briefings I and II. Participants may also elect to attend additional 2-day classes either at a Coast Guard or DOD installation or online through the Joint Knowledge Online platform.\n\nFederal law requires the Coast Guard to permit servicemembers who elect to take these additional 2-day classes to receive them. Federal law establishes a time frame within which servicemembers with anticipated separation or retirement dates should begin the program. According to federal law, retirees with anticipated separation dates are expected to begin TAP as soon as possible during the 24-month period preceding that date, but not later than 90 days before separation. Similarly, servicemembers with anticipated separation dates who are not retiring are expected to begin as", + "answer": [ + "Thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers have left the military and transitioned into civilian life, and some of these new veterans may face significant challenges, such as finding and maintaining employment. To help them prepare, federal law mandated that DHS provide separating Coast Guard servicemembers with counseling, employment assistance, and information on veterans' benefits through TAP. GAO was asked to examine TAP implementation. This review analyzes (1) the reliability of TAP data on participation levels for Coast Guard servicemembers and the factors that affect participation, and (2) the Coast Guard's performance measures and monitoring efforts related to TAP. GAO interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff; surveyed 12 Coast Guard installations that conduct TAP (100 percent response rate); collected and reviewed participation data for reliability; and interviewed TAP managers from three installations selected for size and location, and 25 Coast Guard servicemembers at one location. (For a companion report on TAP implementation for separating and retiring servicemembers in other military services, see GAO-18-23 .) The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), lacks complete or reliable data on participation in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), designed to assist servicemembers returning to civilian life. According to senior Coast Guard officials, a major reason why data are not reliable is the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data. Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis and may not be timely or complete, according to officials. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Until the Coast Guard issues an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data, it will lack quality information to gauge the extent to which it is meeting TAP participation requirements in the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011. According to GAO's survey of Coast Guard installations, various factors affected participation, such as servicemembers serving at geographically remote locations or separating from the Coast Guard rapidly. TAP officials and Coast Guard servicemembers GAO interviewed said commanders and direct supervisors sometimes pulled servicemembers out of TAP class or postponed participation because of mission priorities. TAP managers also said they rely on delivering TAP online because many Coast Guard servicemembers are stationed remotely. The Coast Guard cannot effectively measure performance to ensure key TAP requirements are met because it lacks reliable data and does not monitor compliance with several TAP requirements. Further, the Coast Guard has not established a formal performance goal against which it can measure progress, although federal internal control standards stipulate that management should consider external requirements—such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply—to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms. Establishing a goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance. In addition, the Coast Guard does not monitor TAP requirements regarding the timeliness of servicemembers' TAP participation or their access to additional 2-day classes. Consequently, it cannot know whether servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the program or those who elected to attend additional 2-day classes were able to do so before separation or retirement, as required by the Act. Finally, the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard staff in implementing TAP. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity. Issuing an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that defines roles and responsibilities would clarify who is ultimately responsible for ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers attend TAP, thereby facilitating accountability. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard issue a new Commandant Instruction establishing data collection policies, set TAP performance goals, monitor timeliness and access, and define roles and responsibilities. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the effects of radiation exposure on human health and the guidelines set by federal agencies to regulate radiation exposure. The higher the radiation dose, the sooner the effects will appear, and the higher the probability of death. Radiation doses such as those received by survivors of the atomic bombs in Japan can cause cancers such as leukemia and colon cancer, and if levels are high enough, acute radiation syndrome. The symptoms of this syndrome range from nausea, fatigue, and vomiting to death within days or weeks. In contrast, the effects of low-dose radiation are more difficult to detect. Below about 100 millisieverts (mSv)—the level below which the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s 2006 report on radiation and human health considered radiation to be low dose—data do not definitively establish the dose-response relationship between cancer and radiation exposure.\n\nFederal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have developed and applied radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public. They have generally followed the advice of scientific advisory bodies, including the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, and the National Academies’ Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board. This advice includes the use of the linear no-threshold model, which assumes that the risk of cancer increases with every incremental increase in radiation exposure.\n\nThe federal regulations set dose limits for radiation exposure that are below the level in the National Academies’ 2006 report on radiation and human health for defining low-dose radiation. For example, NRC’s annual dose limit for members of the public (excluding natural, or background, sources of radiation) from operation of nuclear power plants is a hundredth of the level the National Academies considers low dose. NRC based the dose limit on an advisory body recommendation that the cancer risk to the general public from exposure to radiation should be comparable to the public’s risk from everyday activities, such as taking public transportation.\n\nThe low-dose radiation", + "answer": [ + "This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Low-Dose Radiation: Interagency Collaboration on Planning Research Could Improve Information on Health Effects ( GAO-17-546 ). The Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Food and Drug Administration generally used the advice of scientific advisory bodies to develop and apply radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public in the radiation exposure settings that GAO reviewed. These settings were: (1) the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; (2) the cleanup of sites with radiological contamination; (3) the use of medical equipment that produces radiation; and (4) accidental or terrorism-related exposure to radiation. Specifically, the agencies relied on the advice of three scientific advisory bodies that supported the use of a model that assumes the risk of cancer increases with every incremental radiation exposure. Accordingly, the agencies have set regulatory dose limits and issued guidance to confine exposure to levels that reduce the risk of cancer, while recognizing that scientific uncertainties occur in estimating cancer risks from low-dose radiation. For example, NRC requires nuclear power plants to consider measures for limiting workers' exposure below NRC's regulatory dose limit, such as by using robots for maintenance work in radiation areas. GAO identified seven federal agencies that funded research on low-dose radiation's health effects. In fiscal years 2012 to 2016, DOE, NRC, EPA, and four other federal agencies obligated about $210 million for such research . Although the agencies have collaborated on individual projects on radiation's health effects, they have not established a collaborative mechanism to set research priorities. GAO's previous work has shown that federal agencies can use such mechanisms to implement interagency collaboration to develop and coordinate sound science policies. In the past, DOE took a leading role in this area because DOE provided stable funding and advocated for greater coordination on research on low-dose radiation's health effects. However, since fiscal year 2012, DOE has phased out funding for one of its main research programs in this area. This has created a void in coordination efforts among federal agencies, and no other agency has stepped forward to fill this void. Because of DOE's prior experience as a leader in this area of research and its research responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it could play an important role in helping federal agencies establish a coordinating mechanism for low-dose radiation research. Dollars are in millions and have not been adjusted for inflation Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-17-546" + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977 to encourage federally insured banks to serve the credit needs of the local communities where they operate. The CRA requires federal banking regulators to conduct examinations to assess whether banks are meeting local credit needs. Banks receive CRA credits for engaging in qualifying activities such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending, community investments, and low-cost services that benefit low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas. These credits are used to issue a performance rating for each bank, which is taken into account when banks apply for charters, branches, mergers, and acquisitions.\n\nThe CRA has been debated for its potential impact on lending activity. Some argue that it may induce banks to forgo more profitable lending opportunities in nontargeted neighborhoods by encouraging a disproportionate amount of lending in LMI communities. Others argue that the CRA compels banks to make loans to higher-risk borrowers that may compromise the financial stability of the banking system.\n\nThe CRA applies to banking institutions with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), such as national banks, savings associations, and state-chartered commercial and savings banks. It does not apply to credit unions, insurance companies, securities companies, and other nonbank institutions.\n\nThe Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC administer the CRA, which is implemented via Regulation BB. The CRA requires federal banking regulatory agencies to evaluate the extent to which regulated institutions are effectively meeting the credit needs within their designated assessment areas, including LMI neighborhoods, in a manner consistent with the federal prudential regulations for safety and soundness.\n\nThe CRA's impact on lending activity has been publicly debated. Some observers are concerned that the CRA may induce banks to forgo more profitable lending opportunities in nontargeted neighborhoods by encouraging a disproportionate amount of lending in LMI communities. Furthermore, some argue that the CRA compels banks to make loans to higher-risk borrowers that are", + "answer": [ + "The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; P.L. 95-128, 12 U.S.C. §§2901-2908) addresses how banking institutions meet the credit needs of the areas they serve, particularly in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The federal banking regulatory agencies—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—currently implement the CRA. The regulators issue CRA credits, or points, where banks engage in qualifying activities—such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities—that occur with a designated assessment area. These credits are then used to issue each bank a performance rating. The CRA requires these ratings be taken into account when banks apply for charters, branches, mergers, and acquisitions among other things. The CRA, which was enacted in 1977, was subsequently revised in 1989 to require public disclosure of bank CRA ratings to establish a four-tiered system of descriptive performance levels (i.e., Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance). In 1995, the CRA examination was customized to account for differences in bank sizes and business models. In 2005, the bank size definitions were revised and indexed to the Consumer Price Index. The 2005 amendments also expanded opportunities for banks to earn CRA credit for public welfare investments (such as providing housing, services, or jobs that primarily benefit LMI individuals). Qualifying activities under the CRA have evolved to include consumer and business lending, community investments, and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities. Congressional interest in the CRA stems from various perceptions of its effectiveness. Some have argued that, by encouraging lending in LMI neighborhoods, the CRA may also encourage the issuance of higher-risk loans to borrowers likely to have repayment problems (under the presumption that low-income is correlated with lower creditworthiness), which can translate into losses for lenders. Others are concerned that the CRA is not generating sufficient incentives to increase credit availability to qualified LMI borrowers, which may impede economic recovery for some, particularly following the 2007-2009 recession. This report informs the congressional debate concerning the CRA's effectiveness in incentivizing bank lending and investment activity to LMI borrowers. After a discussion of the CRA's origins, it presents the CRA's examination process and bank activities that are eligible for consideration of CRA credits. Next, it discusses the difficulty of determining the CRA's influence on bank behavior. For example, the CRA does not specify the quality and quantity of CRA-qualifying activities, meaning that compliance with the CRA does not require adherence to lending quotas or benchmarks. In the absence of benchmarks, determining the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors is not straightforward. Banks also face a variety of financial incentives—for example, capital requirements, the prevailing interest rate environment, changes in tax laws, and technological innovations—that influence how much (or how little) they lend to LMI borrowers. Because multiple financial profit incentives and CRA incentives tend to exist simultaneously, it is difficult to determine the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the structure and operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which includes the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and National Cemetery Administration (NCA). VA has over 1,000 facilities and offices throughout the nation, as well as in the U.S. territories and the Philippines. The report highlights the various offices and agencies responsible for addressing misconduct within VA, including the Office of Human Resource Management, Office of Accountability Review, Office of Inspector General, Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection, Corporate Senior Executive Management Office, Client Services Response Team, National Cemetery Administration, Office of the Medical Inspector, Office of Research Oversight, Office of Resolution Management, and Office of Security and Law Enforcement.\n\nThe report also discusses the process for addressing employee misconduct within VA. The Office of Human Resource Management develops policies with regard to performance management and assesses the effectiveness of department-wide human-resource programs and policies. The Office of Accountability Review was established in 2014 to ensure leadership accountability for improprieties related to patient scheduling and access to care, whistle-blower retaliation, and related disciplinary matters that affect public trust in VA. The Office of Inspector General provides oversight through independent audits, inspections, and investigations to prevent and detect criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in VA programs and operations. The Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection receives whistle-blower complaints. The Corporate Senior Executive Management Office supports the entire life-cycle management of VA’s senior executives by developing policy and providing corporate-level personnel services. The Client Services Response Team serves to centralize and streamline internal processes to improve VHA’s overall responsiveness to concerns of veterans, employees, and other internal and external stakeholders. The National Cemetery Administration honors veterans and their families with final resting places in national shrines that commemorate their service. The Office of the Medical Inspector assesses the quality of VA health care through investigations of VA facilities nationwide. The Office of Research Oversight promotes the responsible conduct of research, serves as the primary V", + "answer": [ + "VA provides services and benefits to veterans through hospitals and other facilities nationwide. Misconduct by VA employees can have serious consequences for some veterans, including poor quality of care. GAO was asked to review employee misconduct across VA. This report reviews the extent to which VA (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, (2) adheres to documentation-retention procedures when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct, (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed according to VA investigative standards and these officials are held accountable, and (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA. GAO analyzed 12 information systems across VA to assess the reliability of misconduct data, examined a stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from 2009 through 2015, analyzed data and reviewed cases pertaining to senior officials involved in misconduct, reviewed procedures pertaining to whistle-blower investigations, and examined a nongeneralizable sample of whistle-blower disclosures from 2010 to 2014. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collects data related to employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, but fragmentation and data-reliability issues impede department-wide analysis of those data. VA maintains six information systems that include partial data related to employee misconduct. For example, VA's Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data system collects information on disciplinary actions that affect employee leave and pay, but the system does not collect information on other types of disciplinary actions. The system also does not collect information such as the offense or date of occurrence. GAO also identified six other information systems that various VA administrations and program offices use to collect specific information regarding their respective employees' misconduct and disciplinary actions. GAO's analysis of all 12 information systems found data-reliability issues—such as missing data, lack of identifiers, and lack of standardization among fields. Without collecting reliable misconduct and disciplinary action data on all cases department-wide, VA's reporting and decision making on misconduct are impaired. VA inconsistently adhered to its guidance for documentation retention when adjudicating misconduct allegations, based on GAO's review of a generalizable sample of 544 out of 23,622 misconduct case files associated with employee disciplinary actions affecting employee pay. GAO estimates that VA would not be able to account for approximately 1,800 case files. Further, GAO estimates that approximately 3,600 of the files did not contain required documentation that employees were adequately informed of their rights during adjudication procedures—such as their entitlement to be represented by an attorney. The absence of files and associated documentation suggests that individuals may not have always received fair and reasonable due process as allegations of misconduct were adjudicated. Nevertheless, VA's Office of Human Resource Management does not regularly assess the extent to which files and documentation are retained consistently with applicable requirements. VA did not consistently ensure that allegations of misconduct involving senior officials were reviewed according to investigative standards and these officials were held accountable. For example, based on a review of 23 cases of alleged misconduct by senior officials that the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) referred to VA facility and program offices for additional investigation, GAO found VA frequently did not include sufficient documentation for its findings, or provide a timely response to the OIG. In addition, VA was unable to produce any documentation used to close 2 cases. Further, OIG policy does not require the OIG to verify the completeness of investigations, which would help ensure that facility and program offices had met the requirements for investigating allegations of misconduct. Regarding senior officials, VA did not always take necessary measures to ensure they were held accountable for substantiated misconduct. As the figure below shows, GAO found that the disciplinary action proposed was not taken for 5 of 17 senior officials with substantiated misconduct. As a result of June 2017 legislation, a new office within VA—the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection—will be responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of misconduct involving senior officials. VA has procedures for investigating whistle-blower complaints, but the procedures allow the program office or facility where a whistle-blower has reported misconduct to conduct the investigation. According to the OIG, it has the option of investigating allegations of misconduct, or exercising a “right of first refusal” whereby it refers allegations of misconduct to the VA facility or program office where the allegation originated. VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all referred allegations of misconduct are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct, to ensure independence. As a result, GAO found instances where managers investigated themselves for misconduct, presenting a conflict of interest. Data and whistle-blower testimony indicate that retaliation may have occurred at VA. As the table below shows, individuals who filed a disclosure of misconduct with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received disciplinary action at a much higher rate than the peer average for the rest of VA in fiscal years 2010–2014. Additionally, GAO's interviews with six VA whistle-blowers who claim to have been retaliated against provided anecdotal evidence that retaliation may be occurring. These whistle-blowers alleged that managers in their chain of command took several untraceable actions to retaliate against the whistle-blowers, such as being denied access to computer equipment necessary to complete assignments. GAO makes numerous recommendations to VA to help enhance its ability to address misconduct issues (several of the recommendations are detailed on the following page). GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and disciplinary-action data department-wide; such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields; direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA's policies regarding misconduct adjudication documentation; direct the Office of Human Resource Management to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with applicable requirements; direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the required elements have been addressed; direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented; and develop procedures to ensure (1) whistle-blower investigations are reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation, and (2) VA employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation. GAO also recommends, among other things, that the VA OIG revise its policy and require verification of evidence produced in senior-official case referrals. VA concurred with nine recommendations and partially concurred with five. In response, GAO modified three of the recommendations. The VA OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other. GAO continues to believe that both are warranted." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act) to regulate interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The FCC's mission is to ensure that the American people have access to a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service at reasonable charges. The 1934 Act is divided into titles and sections that describe various powers and concerns of the commission. The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one member to serve as chairman. The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act, but how this mandate is applied depends on which of two regulatory philosophies is relied upon to interpret it. The FCC's strategic goals are set forth in its quadrennial Strategic Plan. The FCC has seven bureaus and ten offices that process applications for licenses and other filings, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The FCC's budget is funded through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and its annual Agency Financial Report, Annual Performance Report, and Performance Budget are available on the FCC website. The FCC has faced significant changes over time in how it regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries, with changes in FCC leadership leading to changes in the agency's strategic goals. The FCC's current chairman, Ajit Pai, has prioritized reducing regulatory burdens and ensuring that regulations reflect the realities of the current marketplace.", + "answer": [ + "The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or \"Communications Act\"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, \"without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.\" The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how \"the public interest\" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries. The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks. The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues. Beginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as \"Section (9) fees,\" are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years. For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the various powers that the President of the United States has to respond to crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation. These powers are derived from the Constitution or statutory law and can be continuously available to the President with little or no qualification. Some of these authorities are standby emergency authorities that remain dormant until the President formally declares a national emergency. Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated emergency authority. The report traces the history of emergency powers in the United States, from the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War to the National Emergencies Act of 1976. It discusses the different views of the presidency regarding the exercise of emergency powers and the extent to which these powers are limited by the Constitution. The report also highlights the various statutory grants of power for emergency conditions that the President is authorized by Congress to take some special or extraordinary action to address problems of governing effectively in times of exigency. The report concludes by noting that the authority of the President is largely determined by the President himself and that the extent of the invocation and use of emergency powers is also contingent upon the personal conception that the President has of the presidency.", + "answer": [ + "The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe US Postal Service (USPS) has a growing competitive products sector, with the volume of these products increasing from 750 million pieces in fiscal year 2008 to 4.9 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017. Revenue from these products increased from 10% of all USPS mail revenues in 2008 to 28% in 2017. USPS expects continued growth in e-commerce to increase the volume of its last-mile delivery service, which involves delivery from retail locations and fulfillment centers to customers. USPS uses scanning technology to provide real-time visibility for the location of competitive products in its delivery process and to reduce costs through optimizing its network. USPS divides the country into seven postal areas, with managers at each level responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performance of the level below them. Competitive products are tracked through automation and passive and active scan technology, with barcodes linking the items to information in USPS databases. USPS has an overall organizational goal of accurately scanning 100% of all mail pieces with a barcode, including competitive products. However, individual management employee-performance goals for scanning are slightly lower than 100%. USPS reports indicate that competitive products are almost always scanned and scanned correctly, with some missed and inaccurate scans occurring. USPS has an internal control framework for its financial internal control activities but has not adopted a set of internal control standards for its operational internal control activities. The USPS OIG has found instances of missed or inaccurate scans due to post office personnel not always following scanning procedures. USPS has committed to improving scanning procedures and communication of these procedures to employees.", + "answer": [ + "USPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints. GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance. Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan. USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products. GAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nNASA is a government agency responsible for advancing science, technology, aeronautics, and space exploration. It has a portfolio of major projects ranging from space satellites to spacecraft for transporting humans and cargo. NASA has a life cycle for its space flight projects that consists of two phases: formulation and implementation. Formulation involves taking a project from concept to preliminary design, while implementation includes building, launching, and operating the system. NASA requires approval from senior officials at key decision points before entering each new phase. NASA has a joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) initiative that provides a point-in-time estimate of cost and schedule for major projects. NASA policy requires that projects be baselined and budgeted at the 70 percent confidence level. NASA has three major space telescope projects: WFIRST, TESS, and JWST. WFIRST is in the earliest stages of the acquisition life cycle, TESS is set to launch in March 2018, and JWST is one of NASA’s most complex projects and top priorities. JWST has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. NASA has learned from the JWST project and is implementing lessons learned to improve project outcomes. NASA is enhancing oversight of contractors to improve project outcomes. NASA continues to make progress in developing its space telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it. However, there is an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays. NASA could improve project outcomes by implementing key project management tools and prior GAO recommendations. NASA is committed to continuing to work with GAO and the subcommittee to address these issues.", + "answer": [ + "Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion. This statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate. There are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months. GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs, contracting programs, direct loan programs, and small business management and technical assistance training programs. The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program has been operational since April 1971 and is designed to increase small business access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracting, by guaranteeing bid, performance, payment, and specified ancillary bonds. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. The surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety, a contractor, and a project owner. The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program is important to small businesses interested in competing for a federal contract because the federal government requires prime contractors to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount the contracting officer considers adequate, to protect the government. The program has faced challenges in recent years, including a decrease in the number of final surety bonds guaranteed and a decrease in the number of applicants. The SBA has taken steps to address these challenges, including increasing the bond limit and implementing the Quick Bond Program. The SBA has also focused on strengthening relationships with individual surety companies and emphasizing process improvements to streamline the application requirements for small businesses and surety companies. The program has faced criticism from some who believe it is not necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds and others who believe the existing program is sufficient to meet the need.", + "answer": [ + "The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) which requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House and file quarterly reports disclosing their lobbying activities. The report provides an overview of the registration and filing process, the definition of a lobbyist, and the information required in the LD-2 quarterly reports. The report also discusses the guidance issued by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House to assist lobbyists with compliance and the role of the USAO in ensuring compliance. The report notes that the LDA defines a lobbyist as an individual who is employed or retained by a client for compensation, who has made more than one lobbying contact, and whose lobbying activities represent at least 20 percent of the time that he or she spends on behalf of the client during the quarter. The report also notes that lobbying firms are required to register for each client if they receive or expect to receive more than $3,000 in income from that client for lobbying activities. The report concludes by stating that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, along with USAO, are responsible for ensuring LDA compliance.", + "answer": [ + "The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that 87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement; 99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and 93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required. These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) is a government agency that provides various programs to support small businesses. These programs include loan guaranty and venture capital programs to help small businesses access capital, contracting programs to increase their opportunities in federal contracting, direct loan programs for disaster recovery, and small business management and technical assistance training programs. The SBA's appropriations have varied significantly since FY2000, with disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and other programs spending categories experiencing significant fluctuations.\n\nDisaster assistance appropriations have varied significantly due to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from major hurricanes. Business loan credit subsidies represent the net present value of cash flows to and from the SBA over the life of the agency's loan portfolios. The variation in appropriations for this category is primarily due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following economic slowdowns, however, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically insufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted.\n\nThe other programs spending category has generally increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. In addition, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for SBA programs in this category in FY2009 and FY2010 as a means to enhance small businesses' access to capital, which had become constrained during and immediately following the Great Recession.\n\nThe SBA's Entrepreneurial Development noncredit programs have also received increased funding. The SBA's Entrepreneurship Education initiative offers high-growth small businesses in underserved communities a seven-month executive leader education series consisting of more than 100 hours of specialized training, technical resources, a professional networking system, and other resources to strengthen their business model and promote economic development within urban communities. The Growth Accelerator initiative provides $50,000 matching grants each year to universities and private sector", + "answer": [ + "This report examines the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) appropriations (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. It also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, actual and anticipated expenditures for comparative purposes. SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three of the agency's major spending categories: disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and \"other programs,\" a category that includes salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development programs. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have ranged from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation can be attributed primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and more recently, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The SBA's appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. This variation is due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following recessions, however, that revenue is typically insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. The SBA's appropriations for other programs, as a collective, have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. This variation is primarily due to congressional response to changing economic conditions. For example, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. Overall, since FY2000, appropriations for other programs have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. This report provides appropriations for all five major components of the other programs spending category, including the SBA's entrepreneurial development programs. The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Black Lung Disability Trust Fund provides cash assistance and medical benefits to miners suffering from black lung disease. The maximum cash assistance payments range from $650 to $1,300 per month, depending on the number of dependents. Medical benefits cover the treatment of black lung-related conditions, with an average annual cost of approximately $6,980 per miner. There were about 25,700 total beneficiaries in fiscal year 2017. The number of beneficiaries has decreased due to declining coal mining employment and an aging beneficiary population. However, the number of beneficiaries could increase in the near future due to the increased occurrence of black lung disease and its most severe form, progressive massive fibrosis, particularly among Appalachian coal miners.\n\nThe Trust Fund is primarily funded by the coal tax, which is imposed at two rates depending on whether the coal is extracted from underground or surface mines. The current tax rates are $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4.4 percent of the sales price. The Trust Fund also receives other miscellaneous revenue from interest payments and various fines and penalties paid by mine operators.\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, black lung claims had an approval rate of about 29 percent. Of the 19,430 primary black lung beneficiaries receiving benefits, 64 percent were paid from the Trust Fund, 25 percent were paid by liable mine operators, and 11 percent were receiving interim benefits.\n\nThe Trust Fund has consistently had expenditures exceeding revenue, leading to a debt that exceeded $10 billion by fiscal year 2008. Legislation has been enacted over the years to improve Trust Fund finances, but it has not completely addressed the debt. The Trust Fund has borrowed from the Treasury’s general fund to cover annual differences between expenditures and revenues.\n\nSeveral options have been simulated to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050. These include forgiving a portion of the Trust Fund’s debt, reducing the coal tax rates,", + "answer": [ + "With revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it. This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures. GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the management and disposal of personal property by federal agencies. Personal property includes commonly used items like computers and office equipment, as well as specialized items like scientific devices and fire control equipment. Some items require special handling, such as hazardous materials, animals, and firearms. Federal agencies manage personal property while they are using it, and executive agencies are required by law to maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems, continually survey property under their control to identify excess, promptly report excess property to GSA, and use existing agency property or obtain excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property. GSA assists agencies when they no longer need personal property and has established a government-wide personal-property disposal process in federal regulation. The process begins when an agency declares a personal property item as \"excess\" and ends with the disposal of the property. There are four potential disposal methods: transfer to another federal agency or certain non-federal entities, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction. Federal agencies and some non-federal entities have priority to acquire excess property through transfer. If none of these eligible entities have requested the property for transfer after 21 days, the property becomes \"surplus\" and may be donated to eligible entities through a State Agency for Surplus Property. If the property is not donated within 5 days after the close of the 21-day screening period, it may be sold to the general public, and finally, unsold property may be abandoned or destroyed. The report also discusses the policies and processes for carrying out the responsibilities of maintaining adequate accountability systems and inventory controls for property under their control by the five selected agencies. The agencies have policies for regularly inventorying their personal property to physically locate and verify property tracked in their asset management systems. The report concludes by discussing the role of OMB in establishing government-wide management policies and requirements and providing guidance to agencies to implement them. The report also highlights the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives started in 2012 to reduce the amount of domestic office and warehouse space needed by the federal government, in part, through consolidations and improved space utilization. As a result, federal agencies have", + "answer": [ + "The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property. GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes. The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed. The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years. OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. government engages with other countries in the Western Hemisphere through various inter-American organizations, including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH. These organizations serve as effective implementing partners for projects serving U.S. national interests and priorities throughout the hemisphere. The member states collectively finance these organizations by providing assessed and voluntary contributions. The organizations’ regional knowledge and technical expertise make them effective in implementing projects. The U.S. government provides voluntary contributions to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA primarily through assistance agreements for specific projects from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. The Institute of Internal Auditors provides a framework for international organizations to oversee funds. The strategic goals of the four inter-American organizations are predominantly aligned with the high-level strategic goals for the Western Hemisphere documented by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. The U.S. agencies evaluate each inter-American organization to ensure U.S. and organization goals are aligned. The organizations have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, including external auditors and internal audit boards. The report found that the monitoring activities identified in the agreements were not always fully documented, and some agencies did not have documentation of key monitoring activities. The report recommends that the agencies ensure that they have full documentation of key monitoring activities.", + "answer": [ + "The United States is a member of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange. GAO was asked to review U.S. assistance to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) assesses the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examines how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of assistance agreements; and (4) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, USDA, and the organizations. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of the 60 assistance agreements that were awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to OAS, PAHO, and IICA and were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016. For each agency, GAO selected three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. GAO found that strategic goals of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH) are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For example, IICA's strategic goals of a productive agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural development, and food security are aligned with USDA's foreign assistance goals. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA fund activities in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements) with OAS, PAHO, and IICA, which in 2016 totaled $32 million. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that these agreements align with U.S. strategic goals. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, such as external auditors, internal audit boards, and anti-fraud and ethics policies. State and USDA have directly supported these mechanisms. For example, State engaged in the selection process for OAS's Inspector General. GAO's review of 12 selected assistance agreements found that USDA included no financial or performance monitoring provisions in one of its agreements and that State did not include two key monitoring provisions in one of its agreements, called for by applicable guidance. GAO found that the remaining 10 agreements it reviewed contained all key monitoring provisions and that State has since taken corrective action. GAO found that U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed (see table). For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as for financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities and USDA officials did not explain their lack of documentation. USAID officials explained that their lack of full documentation was due, in part, to grant officers not always following their document management policies. State and HHS have since taken corrective action. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. GAO recommends that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe rise of e-commerce has led to a significant change in the market for counterfeit goods, according to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The report analyzes documents from CBP, ICE, and international organizations and interviews with CBP and ICE officials. The report finds that counterfeiters are increasingly using primary markets, such as e-commerce websites, corporate and government supply chains, and traditional retail stores, to sell counterfeit goods. This shift has led to changes in the ways counterfeit goods are sold, making it more difficult for consumers to identify them. CBP and ICE officials report that the volume, variety, and methods of shipment of counterfeit goods seized have changed in recent years. The report also highlights the challenges that the changing market for counterfeit goods poses to CBP, ICE, and the private sector. These challenges include the increasing sophistication of counterfeits, the need for CBP and ICE officials to have in-depth knowledge of a broad range of products, and the growth of e-commerce, which has accelerated the pace at which counterfeiters can gain access to consumers. The report recommends that CBP take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts and enhance information sharing with the private sector.", + "answer": [ + "This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data. The report does not provide information on TANF program rules, but discusses TANF financing and federal requirements in a separate report. The report notes that on January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019. The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of FY2019, but additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter of FY2019. TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds. In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states, with the bulk of the TANF funding in a basic block grant to the states. The report also notes that states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10.3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. The report also discusses the uses of federal TANF grants to states, including basic assistance, work-related activities, child care funding, and refundable tax credits. The report notes that TANF is a major contributor of child care funding, with $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) being either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant in FY2017. The report also highlights that TANF is a major contributor to the child welfare system, spending about $2.2 billion on such activities. TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services. The report concludes by noting that TANF law permits states to \"reserve\" unused funds without time limit, which allows for flexibility in timing of the use of TANF", + "answer": [ + "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk). TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement. The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the \"recipients\" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the \"typical\" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were \"child-only\" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents. Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by \"credits.\" Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) sets payment rates for laboratory tests performed in the United States. Prior to 2018, payment rates were based on rates charged for laboratory tests in 1984 through 1985 adjusted for inflation. There were 57 separate fee schedules for laboratory tests, and CMS used these to calculate a national limitation amount for individual laboratory tests. Medicare paid bundled payment rates for certain laboratory tests that were performed as a group, called panel tests. Panel tests could be divided into two categories: those without billing codes and those with billing codes. Panel tests without billing codes were composed of at least 2 of 23 distinct component tests. Medicare paid for both types of panel tests using a bundled rate based on the number of tests performed, with modest payment increases for each additional test conducted. In 2018, the Protecting American Global Leadership and Strengthening Act (PAMA) replaced the 57 separate fee schedules with a single national fee schedule. Payment rates for the single national fee schedule were based on private-payer rates for laboratory tests paid from January 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016. Medicare paid for panel tests without billing codes by counting the number of component tests performed. Medicare paid for panel tests with billing codes based on how the laboratory submitted the claim. The three laboratory types that received the most revenue from the CLFS in 2016 were independent laboratories, hospital-outreach laboratories, and physician-office laboratories. Estimates of the size of the total U.S. laboratory market vary, but the Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership estimated that the laboratory industry received $87 billion in revenue in 2017, while another market report estimated the laboratory industry received $75 billion in revenue in 2016. The three laboratory types that generally receive the most revenue overall are independent laboratories, hospital-outreach laboratories, and physician-office laboratories, when laboratory tests performed in hospital inpatient and outpatient settings were excluded. Private-payer rates for laboratory tests conducted by these laboratory types", + "answer": [ + "Medicare paid $7.1 billion for 433 million laboratory tests in 2017. These tests help health care providers prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases. PAMA included a provision for GAO to review CMS's implementation of new payment rates for these tests. This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) how CMS developed the new payment rates; (2) challenges CMS faced in setting accurate payment rates and what factors may have mitigated these challenges; and (3) the potential effect of the new payment rates on Medicare expenditures. GAO analyzed 2016 Medicare claims data (the most recent data available when GAO started its work and the year on which new payment rates were based) and private-payer data CMS collected. GAO also interviewed CMS and industry officials. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) revised the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) for 2018, establishing new Medicare payment rates for laboratory services. Prior to 2018, these rates were based on historical laboratory fees and were typically higher than the rates paid by private payers. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA) required CMS to develop a national fee schedule for laboratory tests based on private-payer data. To revise the rates, CMS collected data on private-payer rates from approximately 2,000 laboratories and calculated median payment rates, weighted by volume. GAO found that the median private-payer rates were lower than Medicare's maximum payment rates in 2017 for 88 percent of tests. CMS is gradually phasing in reductions to Medicare payment rates, limited annually at 10 percent over a 3-year period (2018 through 2020), as outlined in PAMA. CMS relied on laboratories to determine whether they met data reporting requirements, but agency officials told GAO that CMS did not receive data from all laboratories required to report. CMS did not estimate the amount of data it should have received from laboratories that were required to report but did not. CMS took steps to exclude inaccurate private-payer data and estimated how collecting certain types and amounts of additional private-payer data could affect Medicare expenditures. However, it is not known whether CMS's estimates reflect the actual risk of incomplete data resulting in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. GAO found that PAMA's phased in reductions to new Medicare payment rates likely mitigated this risk of inaccurate Medicare payment rates from 2018 through 2020. However, GAO found that collecting incomplete data could have a larger effect on the accuracy of Medicare payment rates in future years when PAMA allows for greater payment-rate reductions. CMS's implementation of the new payment rates could lead Medicare to pay billions of dollars more than is necessary and result in CLFS expenditures increasing from what Medicare paid prior to 2018 for two reasons. First, CMS used the maximum Medicare payment rates in 2017 as a baseline to start the phase in of payment-rate reductions instead of using actual Medicare payment rates. This resulted in excess payments for some laboratory tests and, in some cases, higher payment rates than those Medicare previously paid, on average. GAO estimated that Medicare expenditures from 2018 through 2020 may be $733 million more than if CMS had phased in payment-rate reductions based on the average payment rates in 2016. Second, CMS stopped paying a bundled payment rate for certain panel tests (groups of laboratory tests generally performed together), as was its practice prior to 2018, because CMS had not yet clarified its authority to do so under PAMA, according to officials. CMS is currently reviewing whether it has the authority to bundle payment rates for panel tests to reflect the efficiency of conducting a group of tests. GAO estimated that if the payment rate for each panel test were unbundled, Medicare expenditures could increase by as much as $10.3 billion from 2018 through 2020 compared to estimated Medicare expenditures using lower bundled payment rates for panel tests. GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS (1) collect complete private-payer data from all laboratories required to report or address the estimated effects of incomplete data, (2) phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates rather than the maximum payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018, and (3) use bundled rates for panel tests. HHS concurred with GAO's first recommendation, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other two, and has since issued guidance to help address the third. GAO believes CMS should fully address these recommendations to prevent Medicare from paying more than is necessary." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nBanks play a critical role in the US economy, providing loans, checking and savings accounts, and other financial services. They are subject to various regulations to ensure safety and stability, consumer protection, and anti-money laundering efforts. The division of regulatory authority between the federal government and states plays a key role in shaping these regulations. Federal preemption is a perennial subject of interest in bank regulation. The Supreme Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law: express preemption, where federal law contains explicit preemptive language, and implied preemption, where federal law's structure and purpose imply preemption. The doctrine of federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.\n\nThe report provides an overview of banking preemption, discussing general principles of federal preemption, the history of the American \"dual banking system,\" the Supreme Court's decisions in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson and cases concerning visitorial powers, the OCC's preemption rules and provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and current issues in banking preemption.\n\nThe report also discusses the OCC's decision to grant special purpose national bank charters to FinTech companies, which has generated debate over the role of federal preemption in fostering innovation and regulatory consistency. Finally, the report examines how federal law affects traditional banks' responses to changes in state law, specifically in relation to marijuana legalization.\n\nIn conclusion, the report highlights the importance of federal preemption in shaping banking regulations and the ongoing debates surrounding its role in fostering innovation and consistency. The report also underscores the significance of the division of regulatory authority between the federal government and states in shaping these regulations.", + "answer": [ + "Banks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling money from savers to borrowers and facilitating productive investment. While the nature of lawmakers' interest in bank regulation has shifted over time, most bank regulations fall into one of three general categories. First, banks must abide by a variety of safety-and-soundness requirements designed to minimize the risk of their failure and maintain macroeconomic stability. Second, banks must comply with consumer protection rules intended to deter abusive practices and provide consumers with complete information about financial products and services. Third, banks are subject to various reporting, recordkeeping, and anti-money laundering requirements designed to assist law enforcement in investigating criminal activity. The substantive content of these requirements remains the subject of intense debate. However, the division of regulatory authority over banks between the federal government and the states plays a key role in shaping that content. In some cases, federal law displaces (or \"preempts\") state bank regulations. In other cases, states are permitted to supplement federal regulations with different, sometimes stricter requirements. Because of its substantive implications, federal preemption has recently become a flashpoint in debates surrounding bank regulation. In the American \"dual banking system,\" banks can apply for a national charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a state charter from a state's banking authority. A bank's choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator, as the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks and state regulatory agencies serve as the primary regulators of state-chartered banks. However, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also play an important role in bank regulation. The Federal Reserve supervises all national banks and state-chartered banks that become members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), while the FDIC supervises all state banks that do not become members of the FRS. This complex regulatory architecture has resulted in a \"symbiotic system\" with both federal regulation of state banks and state regulation of national banks. In the modern dual banking system, national banks are often subject to generally applicable state laws, and state banks are subject to both generally applicable federal laws and regulations imposed by their federal regulators. The evolution of this system during the 20th century caused the regulation of national banks and state banks to converge in a number of important ways. However, despite this convergence, federal preemption provides national banks with certain unique advantages. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts state laws that \"significantly interfere\" with the powers of national banks. The Court has also issued two decisions on the preemptive scope of a provision of the NBA limiting states' \"visitorial powers\" over national banks. Finally, OCC rules have taken a broad view of the preemptive effects of the NBA, limiting the ways in which states can regulate national banks. Courts, regulators, and legislators have recently confronted a number of issues involving banking preemption and related federalism questions. Specifically, Congress has considered legislation that would overturn a line of judicial decisions concerning the circumstances in which non-banks can benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws. The OCC has also announced its intention to grant national bank charters to certain financial technology (FinTech) companies—a decision that is currently being litigated. Finally, Congress has recently turned its attention to the banking industry's response to state efforts to legalize and regulate marijuana." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding program is a plan to build a new class of 20 fleet oilers for the Navy. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The TAO-205 program is important for the Navy's ability to operate at sea on a sustained basis and for the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The primary role of Navy fleet oilers is to transfer fuel to Navy surface ships that are operating at sea, so as to extend the operating endurance of these surface ships and their embarked aircraft. The TAO-205 class design will have capabilities similar to those of the Kaiser-class ships, and will rely on existing technologies rather than new technologies. The TAO-205s are to be double-hulled, like modern commercial oil tankers, with a space between the two hulls to protect the inner hull against events that puncture the outer hull. The question is whether TAO-205s should be equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like oilers were during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, or with greater amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like TAOEs and AORs were during the Cold War. Building TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy could increase TAO-205 procurement costs by tens of millions of dollars per ship, depending on the amount of additional ship self-defense equipment. The TAO-205 program has faced some delays due to a flooding incident at a NASSCO graving dock in July 2018. The program office has largely kept to its construction schedule to date for the first ship, but the incident has affected the delivery of future ships. The program office stated that this incident has not affected current ship fabrication activities. However, the dock's unavailability while repairs are planned and implemented has disrupted the contractor's schedule for future ships. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2023) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the next seven ships", + "answer": [ + "The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million. Issues for Congress include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government is the largest employer in the United States, with over two million workers employed in the United States, U.S. Territories, and foreign countries. The competitive service is the largest of the three service classifications, consisting of all civil service positions in the executive branch, except for positions that are specifically excepted from the competitive service by statute, by the President, or by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Applicants for competitive service positions compete with other applicants and are evaluated according to objective standards. The General Schedule (GS) is a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated \"GS-1\" through \"GS-15.\" Employees in the competitive service are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule, and employees who are not serving a probationary or trial period, or have completed one year of current continuous service in a position other than a temporary appointment limited to one year or less, maintain specified notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions.\n\nThe excepted service consists of those civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES. Positions in the excepted service may be designated by statute or by OPM, and are not subject to competitive examination. The Senior Executive Service (SES) is a cadre of high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. While they are considered federal employees within the civil service system, the SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. SES positions are not in the competitive service, and SES members are not subject to the same removal protections as career appointees in the competitive service. The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service, and SES members' annual aggregate pay is capped at the rate for Level I of the Executive Schedule.", + "answer": [ + "According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service—the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements. The competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be \"practical in character\" and relate to \"matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought.\" Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances. The excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes. The pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated \"GS-1\" through \"GS-15.\" This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees. The SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions. The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding China's actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), with a focus on implications for U.S. strategic and policy interests. The issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS, particularly China's island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.\n\nThe report discusses China's near-seas region, first and second island chains, and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) disputes. It also examines China's island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands, which have raised concerns about China's intentions and the implications for regional stability. The report notes that China's actions in the SCS and ECS can engage U.S. interests for a variety of strategic, political, and economic reasons, including the fact that the SCS and ECS border three U.S. treaty allies and the Taiwan Strait. The report also discusses the potential implications of China's actions for U.S. military operations and the U.S. position in the region.\n\nThe report concludes by discussing potential U.S. responses to China's actions in the SCS and ECS. It notes that the United States should communicate clearly its position and intentions, and that U.S. actions could include strengthening alliances, increasing military capabilities, and using international legal mechanisms. The report also suggests that the United States should consider becoming a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's Agreement on the Conservation and Management of High", + "answer": [ + "China's actions in recent years in the South China Sea (SCS)—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in his responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing to consider his nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated that \"China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.\" Chinese control of the SCS—and, more generally, Chinese domination of China's near-seas region, meaning the SCS, the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. China is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes with multiple neighboring countries over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over these disputes centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition. In addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The position of the United States and most other countries is that while international law gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace since 2001, and has potential implications not only for China's EEZs, but for U.S. naval operations in EEZs globally, and for international law of the sea. A key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy—for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe defense lab enterprise consists of 63 labs, warfare centers, and engineering centers across the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. About 50,000 federally employed scientists and engineers work at these defense labs to support warfighter needs and develop transformative capabilities. Defense labs are managed and operated within the military service chain of command. DOD budgets for technology and product development activities under its research, development, test, and evaluation budget, which DOD groups into seven budget activity categories for its annual budget estimates. Air Force and Army labs rely on appropriated funding provided from the service—often referred to as mission funding—or from customers (or some combination thereof). Customers, such as program offices, provide funding to defense labs for technology development activities and related research. The Air Force and Army funding structure is in contrast to Navy research and development activities, which operate under the Navy Working Capital Fund. Under this funding model, the Navy employs a Capital Investment Program to obtain capital assets, including minor military construction projects for labs. The program provides the framework for planning, coordinating, and controlling Navy working capital funds and expenditures to obtain capital assets.\n\nDOD sponsors other entities to provide for its technology development needs. These include Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) operated by universities, other not-for-profit or nonprofit organizations, or private firms under long-term contracts. DOD designates 3 FFRDCs as research and development labs, which maintain long-term competencies in key technology areas. In addition to these, DOD sponsors 2 systems engineering and integration FFRDCs and 5 studies and analysis FFRDCs. DOD also sponsors University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) operated by universities. DOD requires that UARCs be affiliated with a university and generally may not compete against industry in response to a competitive Request for Proposals for development or production that involves engineering expertise. DOD currently sponsors 13 UARCs.\n\nKey DOD offices provide oversight to the defense labs. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) serves as DOD’s chief", + "answer": [ + "Congress created several authorities that provide DOD research labs with ways to increase efficiency and foster innovation. Senate report 114-255 contained a provision for GAO to study governance models used by federal labs. This report evaluates DOD labs' use of authorities to foster innovation and efficiency. GAO selected four authorities that recent work on best practices for science and technology management and expedited defense lab hiring have shown to be the most crucial for supporting innovation; administered a survey to 44 lab directors to gain insight into their use of the authorities; interviewed key lab officials and contractors; and reviewed relevant policies and guidance. Congress has provided the Department of Defense's (DOD) research labs with several authorities to enhance management and operations. Four authorities that GAO examined provide lab directors with greater ability to make their own decisions regarding the funding of projects, hiring, lab management, and purchasing of equipment or services. 1. Laboratory initiated research authority. This authority, as implemented, provides labs with a means to fund new science and technology projects that they consider a priority. Labs may use a percentage of all funds available to the lab and are permitted to charge customers of the lab a percentage fee of the costs for activities performed by the lab for the customer. 2. Direct hire authority. This authority enables labs to compete with private industry for high-quality talent. For example, it provides for streamlined hiring of applicants with relevant advanced degrees, or students enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs. 3. Laboratory enhancement pilot program authority. This authority generally allows lab directors to propose alternative methods that might lead to more effective lab management, and waive certain policies or procedures that might affect implementation of these methods. 4. Micro-purchase authority. This authority raises the threshold for small purchases for DOD research lab activities from $3,500 to $10,000 to facilitate acquisitions. While labs have used these authorities, their use has sometimes been limited, particularly with the laboratory initiated research authority. DOD lab directors at Air Force, Navy, and Army cited several obstacles that impede wider use of that authority, specifically: Air Force: Financial management officials at the Air Force stated that the service's accounting system does not currently have an automated capability to transfer the allowable percentage fee of costs to a central account at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This lack of capability, officials noted, creates a significant administrative burden related to charging these fees. Navy: In fiscal year 2017, Navy labs invested $7.3 million in lab infrastructure projects, compared to $32.9 million and $53.7 million at the Air Force and Army, respectively. Navy lab officials told us that they were restricted in their use of infrastructure funds available under the laboratory initiated research authority due to a lack of clear guidance as to whether and how to use this authority within the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund. Army: The Army requires its labs to use a similar percentage of funds from two sources: (1) what it refers to as directly appropriated funds and (2) funds labs charge for customer activities. Some Army lab directors reported assessing a lower rate on customer funds than allowed so as not to drive customers away. The labs then generally charge a lower than desired rate on their directly appropriated funds, which further constrains the total funding available to them. GAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's use of laboratory initiated research authority, including that the Air Force assess potential accounting system improvements, the Navy clarify how labs can use the authority for infrastructure improvements, and the Army assess its policy to determine whether changes are needed to remove disincentives for labs to use the authority. DOD concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe federal government provides a range of assistance to individuals, state and local governments, and nongovernmental entities after major disasters, including natural disasters and terrorist attacks. This report identifies programs frequently used to provide financial assistance in the disaster response and recovery process. The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) is the primary vehicle for FEMA assistance to individuals and households after a major disaster declaration. It is intended to meet basic needs and support recovery efforts, but it cannot compensate disaster survivors for all losses. The Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) program provides benefits to individuals rendered jobless as a direct result of a major disaster and who are not eligible for regular federal or state unemployment compensation. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides grants to states, territories, and local governments to address a wide range of community development and infrastructure needs, including disaster recovery. The Small Business Administration (SBA) offers disaster loans to homeowners and renters, as well as businesses and nonprofit organizations, to help them recover from the effects of a disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also provides assistance through the Agency's Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP) and the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The report also highlights other federal programs that may be used to provide assistance in disaster situations, such as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program, and the Economic Development Administration (EDA). The report concludes by noting that Congress and the Administration may respond to domestic needs arising from major disasters by changing the conditions of these programs.", + "answer": [ + "This report is designed to assist Members of Congress and their staff as they address the needs of their states, communities, and constituents after a disaster. It includes a summary of federal programs that provide federal disaster assistance to individual survivors, states, territories, local governments, and nongovernmental entities following a natural or man-made disaster. A number of federal agencies provide financial assistance through grants, loans, and loan guarantees to assist in the provision of critical services, such as temporary housing, counseling, and infrastructure repair. The programs summarized in this report fall into two broad categories. First, there are programs specifically authorized for use during situations occurring because of a disaster. Most of these programs are administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Second are general assistance programs that in some instances may be used either in disaster situations or to meet other needs unrelated to a disaster. Many federal agencies, including the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), administer programs that may be included in the second category. The programs in the report are primarily organized by recipient: individuals, state and local governments, nongovernmental entities, or businesses. These programs address a variety of short-term needs, such as food and shelter, and long-term needs, such as the repair of public utilities and public infrastructure. The report also includes a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on disaster assistance as well as relevant federal agency websites that provide information on disaster responses, updates on recovery efforts, and resources on federal assistance programs. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the process of states reporting expenditures to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the requirements for these reports. States are required to report their expenditures within 30 days of the end of each quarter, but may adjust their past reporting for up to 2 years after the expenditure was made. Adjustments can reflect resolved disputes or reclassifications of expenditures. Expenditures reported after the 2-year filing limit are generally not eligible for a federal match, with certain exceptions. The CMS-64 is a series of forms that capture expenditure data for different aspects of states’ Medicaid programs. States report their expenditures quarterly on the CMS-64 at an aggregate level, and these reported expenditures are not linked to individual enrollees or services. The report also discusses the oversight process by which CMS assures that expenditures reported by states are supported and allowable. CMS regional offices perform the ongoing oversight, with enhanced oversight procedures in the 20 states with the highest federal Medicaid expenditures. The report also highlights some weaknesses in the oversight process, including the lack of a comprehensive risk assessment and inconsistency in the sampling methodology used to review expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population. The report makes three recommendations for CMS to improve its oversight process, including completing a comprehensive, national risk assessment, clarifying internal guidance on when a variance analysis on higher matched expenditures is required, and revising the sampling methodology for reviewing expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population to better target reviews to areas of high risk.", + "answer": [ + "Medicaid has grown by over 50 percent over the last decade, with about $370 billion in federal spending in fiscal year 2017. CMS is responsible for assuring that expenditures—reported quarterly by states—are consistent with Medicaid requirements and matched with the correct amount of federal funds. CMS's review of reported expenditures has become increasingly complex due to variation in states' Medicaid programs and an increasing number of different matching rates. GAO was asked to examine CMS's oversight of state-reported Medicaid expenditures. In this report, GAO examined how CMS assures that (1) expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements; and (2) the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures subject to a higher match. GAO also examined the financial impact of resolved errors. GAO reviewed documentation for the most recently completed quarterly reviews by 3 of CMS's 10 regional offices for six states that varied by Medicaid program expenditures and design. GAO also reviewed policies, procedures, and data on resolved errors; and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO assessed CMS's oversight processes against federal standards for internal control. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has various review processes in place to assure that expenditures reported by states are supported and consistent with Medicaid requirements. The agency also has processes to review that the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures receiving a higher than standard federal matching rate, which can include certain types of services and populations. These processes collectively have had a considerable federal financial benefit, with CMS resolving errors that reduced federal spending by over $5.1 billion in fiscal years 2014 through 2017. However, GAO identified weaknesses in how CMS targets its resources to address risks when reviewing whether expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements. CMS devotes similar levels of staff resources to review expenditures despite differing levels of risk across states. For example, the number of staff reviewing California's expenditures—which represent 15 percent of federal Medicaid spending—is similar to the number reviewing Arkansas' expenditures, which represents 1 percent of federal Medicaid spending. CMS cancelled in-depth financial management reviews in 17 out of 51 instances over the last 5 years. These reviews target expenditures considered by CMS to be at risk of not meeting program requirements. CMS told GAO that resource constraints contributed to both weaknesses. However, the agency has not completed a comprehensive assessment of risk to (1) determine whether oversight resources are adequate and (2) focus on the most significant areas of risk. Absent such an assessment, CMS is missing an opportunity to identify errors in reported expenditures that could result in substantial savings to the Medicaid program. GAO also found limitations in CMS's processes for reviewing expenditures that receive a higher federal matching rate. Internal guidance for examining variances in these expenditures was unclear, and not all reviewers in the three CMS regional offices GAO reviewed were investigating significant variances in quarter-to-quarter expenditures. Review procedures for expenditures for individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were not tailored to different risk levels among states. For example, in its reviews of a sample of claims for this population, CMS reviewed claims for the same number of enrollees—30—in California as for Arkansas, even though California had 10 times the number of newly eligible enrollees as Arkansas. Without clear internal guidance and better targeting of risks in its review procedures for expenditures receiving higher matching rates, CMS may overpay states. GAO is making three recommendations, including that CMS improve its risk-based targeting of oversight efforts and resources, and clarify related internal guidance. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report provides an overview of the history of military rule in Egypt, from the Free Officers Movement in 1952 to the present day. It highlights the strong backing of the military establishment for the four presidents who have ruled Egypt, with the only significant opposition coming from the Muslim Brotherhood. The report also discusses the political turmoil that occurred during the Arab Spring and the military's reassertion of control following the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. The report then focuses on the current situation in Egypt, with President Abdel Fattah el Sisi consolidating his power amid a continuing macroeconomic recovery. The report notes that Egypt is poised to play an increasingly active role in the region, but its relations with the United States have been strained due to criticism of its human rights record. The report also discusses the proposed constitutional amendments that would extend presidential term limits and executive branch control over the judiciary, which would grant President Sisi unprecedented power. The report concludes by noting that while Egypt has significant partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France, it relies heavily on the United States for economic and military aid.", + "answer": [ + "Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some \"soft power\" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, \"And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas.\" The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the concept of hosted payloads, which are instruments or packages of equipment integrated onto a host satellite that operates in orbit using the host satellite's resources. A commercially hosted DOD payload is a DOD payload on a commercial satellite. Hosted payloads may be experimental or operational, and they offer potential benefits such as cost savings, faster on-orbit capability, increased deterrence and resilience, and continual technology upgrades. The report notes that the DOD has been looking at ways to break up larger satellites into smaller ones to increase resilience, and hosted payloads are among the avenues being considered. The report also discusses the potential challenges of matching a DOD payload with a commercial host, including the size, weight, power, thermal requirements, and required orbital characteristics of both the payload and host satellite. The report concludes by stating that the DOD would benefit from centralizing knowledge and data on commercially hosted payloads to make more informed decisions about using them. The Secretary of Defense should require programs using hosted payloads to provide cost and technical data, and lessons learned to a central office. The report is available on the GAO website.\n\nThe report highlights the potential benefits of using commercially hosted payloads for space-based capability, such as cost savings and faster on-orbit capability. However, it also notes that hosted payloads may not be suitable for some missions due to limitations in the host satellite's resources. The report suggests that the DOD should centralize knowledge and data on commercially hosted payloads to make more informed decisions about using them. The report concludes by recommending that the Secretary of Defense require programs using hosted payloads to provide cost and technical data, and lessons learned to a central office. The report is available on the GAO website.", + "answer": [ + "Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to develop, produce, and field large, complex satellites. For such satellite systems, a single adversary attack or on-orbit failure can result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and significant loss of vital capabilities. As DOD plans new space systems and addresses an increasingly contested space environment, it has the opportunity to consider different acquisition approaches. One such approach is to integrate a government sensor or payload onto a commercial host satellite. House Armed Services Committee report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, included a provision for GAO to review DOD's use of commercially hosted payloads. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD uses commercially hosted payloads and (2) describes and assesses factors that affect their use. GAO reviewed DOD policies, documentation, and planning documents, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and civil government officials, and commercial stakeholders. GAO and others have found that using commercial satellites to host government sensors or communications packages—called payloads—may be one way DOD can achieve on-orbit capability faster and more affordably. Using hosted payloads may also help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability. Since 2009, DOD has used three commercially hosted payloads, with three more missions planned or underway through 2022 (see figure below). DOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from using commercially hosted payloads to date, and expects to realize additional savings and deliver faster capabilities on orbit from planned missions. Cost savings can result from sharing development, launch, and ground system costs with the commercial host company. Among the factors that affect DOD's use of hosted payloads are a perception among some DOD officials that matching government payloads to commercial satellites is too difficult; and limited, fragmented knowledge on how to mitigate various challenges GAO found that further opportunities to use hosted payloads may emerge as DOD plans new and follow-on space systems in the coming years. However, DOD's knowledge on using hosted payloads is fragmented, in part because programs are not required to share information. In 2011, the Air Force created a Hosted Payload Office to provide expertise and other tools to facilitate matching government payloads with commercial hosts. However, GAO found that DOD programs using hosted payloads are not required and generally do not provide cost and technical data, or lessons learned, to the Hosted Payload Office, or another central office for analysis. Requiring programs that use hosted payloads agency-wide to provide this information to a central location would better position DOD to make informed decisions when considering acquisition approaches for upcoming space system designs. GAO recommends that DOD require programs using commercially hosted payloads to contribute resulting data to a central location. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should assess whether the Air Force's Hosted Payload Office is the appropriate location to collect and analyze the data. DOD concurred with the recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe technology sector has major employment hubs across the country, including the San Francisco Bay area, the greater New York City region, and the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria region. Technology workers are also employed at companies outside the technology sector, such as in the retail or financial services industries. Federal law prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability status. Federal contractors and subcontractors are required to take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) enforce these laws and have a memorandum of understanding to minimize duplication of effort. EEOC investigates charges of employment discrimination and enforces federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin, age, and disability. OFCCP enforces affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements for federal contractors. The report analyzes data from the EEOC Integrated Mission System (IMS) and the National Science Foundation’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to identify trends in technology employment by race and gender. The report also examines charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC against technology companies and evaluations of technology contractors completed by OFCCP. The report concludes with recommendations for OFCCP to improve its compliance evaluation process and to prioritize investigations of technology contractors with the highest potential for systemic discrimination.", + "answer": [ + "Technology companies are a major source of high-paying U.S. jobs, but some have questioned the sector's commitment to equal employment opportunity. EEOC provides federal oversight of nondiscrimination requirements by investigating charges of discrimination, and OFCCP enforces federal contractors' compliance with affirmative action requirements. GAO was asked to review workforce trends in the technology sector and federal oversight. This report examines (1) trends in the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the technology sector workforce; and (2) EEOC and OFCCP oversight of technology companies' compliance with equal employment and affirmative action requirements. GAO analyzed workforce data from the American Community Survey for 2005-2015 and EEOC Employer Information Reports for 2007-2015, the latest data available during our analysis. GAO analyzed OFCCP data on compliance evaluations for fiscal years 2011-2016. GAO interviewed agency officials, researchers, and workforce, industry, and company representatives. The estimated percentage of minority technology workers increased from 2005 to 2015, but GAO found that no growth occurred for female and Black workers, whereas Asian and Hispanic workers made statistically significant increases (see figure). Further, female, Black, and Hispanic workers remain a smaller proportion of the technology workforce—mathematics, computing, and engineering occupations—compared to their representation in the general workforce. These groups have also been less represented among technology workers inside the technology sector than outside it. In contrast, Asian workers were more represented in these occupations than in the general workforce. Stakeholders and researchers GAO interviewed identified several factors that may have contributed to the lower representation of certain groups, such as fewer women and minorities graduating with technical degrees and company hiring and retention practices. Both the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have taken steps to enforce equal employment and affirmative action requirements in the technology sector, but face limitations. While EEOC has identified barriers to recruitment and hiring in the technology sector as a strategic priority, when EEOC conducts investigations, it does not systematically record the type of industry, therefore limiting sector-related analyses to help focus its efforts. EEOC has plans to determine how to add missing industry codes but has not set a timeframe to do this. In addition, OFCCP's regulations may hinder its ability to enforce contractors' compliance because OFCCP directs contractors to set placement goals for all minorities as a group rather than for specific racial/ethnic groups. OFCCP also has not made changes to its establishment-based approach to selecting entities for review in decades, even though changes have occurred in how workplaces are structured. Without taking steps to address these issues, OFCCP may miss opportunities to hold contractors responsible for complying with affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements. GAO makes 6 recommendations, including that EEOC develop a timeline to improve industry data collection and OFCCP take steps toward requiring more specific minority placement goals by contractors and assess key aspects of its selection approach. EEOC neither agreed nor disagreed with its recommendation, and OFCCP stated the need for regulatory change to alter placement goal requirements. GAO continues to believe actions are needed, as discussed in the report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe CHIP-IN Act was created to address the needs of veterans in Omaha by constructing an ambulatory care center. The Omaha donor group was interested in constructing the center, but VA was uncertain about building a replacement medical center. The CHIP-IN Act allowed for private money to help address VA’s needs. The Omaha donor group applied to participate in the pilot program and VA executed a donation agreement in April 2017. The ambulatory care center will provide approximately 158,000 gross square feet of outpatient clinical functions. The CHIP-IN Act has certain requirements for donations under the pilot program, such as the property being previously appropriated for a VA facility project or identified as a need in VA’s long-range capital planning process. The VA Office of Construction and Facilities Management (CFM) is responsible for the pilot program. The CHIP-IN steering committee was formed to implement the pilot program. The committee has not yet established objectives, developed an assessment methodology and evaluation plan, or documented how they will make decisions about scalability of the pilot program. VA officials have worked to communicate with relevant stakeholders, but have not yet established objectives, developed an assessment methodology and evaluation plan, or documented how they will make decisions about scalability of the pilot program. The report recommends that VA ensure that internal stakeholders agree to and document clear, measurable objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot, develop an assessment methodology and evaluation plan that are linked to objectives, and document the roles and responsibilities of the CHIP-IN steering committee and identify available staff resources. VA has concurred with the recommendations and stated that it has begun or is planning to take actions to address them.", + "answer": [ + "VA has pressing infrastructure needs. The Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016 (CHIP-IN Act) authorized VA to accept donated real property—such as buildings or facility construction or improvements—through a pilot program. VA has initiated one project in Omaha, Nebraska, through a partnership with a donor group. VA can accept up to five donations through the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021. The CHIP-IN Act includes a provision for GAO to report on donation agreements. This report (1) examines the extent to which the VA's pilot design aligns with leading practices and (2) discusses what VA has learned from the pilot to date. GAO reviewed VA documents, including plans for the pilot program, and visited the Omaha pilot project. GAO interviewed VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and three non-federal entities that responded to VA's request seeking donors. GAO compared implementation of VA's pilot to leading practices for pilot design, organizational transformation, and cross-functional teams. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is conducting a pilot program, called CHIP-IN, that allows VA to partner with non-federal entities and accept real property donations from them as a way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. Although VA signed its first project agreement under the program in April 2017, VA has not yet established a framework for effective design of the pilot program. Specifically, VA's pilot program design is not aligned with four of five leading practices for designing a well-developed and documented pilot program. VA has begun to implement one leading practice by improving its efforts to communicate with relevant stakeholders, such as including external stakeholders in key meetings. However, the VA offices involved have not agreed upon and documented clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program, which is a leading practice. Further, VA has not developed an assessment methodology or an evaluation plan that would help inform decisions about whether or how the pilot approach could be expanded. While VA officials said they intend to develop these items as tasks for the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee, they have no timeline for doing so. Without clear objectives and assessment and evaluation plans, VA and Congress may have difficulty determining whether the pilot approach is an effective way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. To date, the CHIP-IN pilot suggests that donation partnerships could improve construction projects, but identifying donors and establishing a team for the pilot program have presented challenges. Officials from VA and the donor group for the first pilot project—an ambulatory care center in Omaha, Nebraska—said they are completing the project faster than if it had been a standard federal construction project, while achieving potential cost savings by using private sector practices. However, VA officials said it is challenging to find partners to make large donations with no financial return, and VA's lack of marketing and philanthropic development experience exacerbates that challenge. VA and the donor group agreed that a dedicated team of individuals with relevant expertise could facilitate the pilot's implementation. The new CHIP-IN steering committee could serve this purpose, but it lacks documented roles and responsibilities. Establishing a team with clear roles and responsibilities and identifying both available and needed staff resources could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet veterans' needs. GAO is recommending that VA: (1) establish pilot program objectives, (2) develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan, and (3) document roles and responsibilities and identify available and needed staff resources. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the responsibilities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in addressing lead paint hazards in federally-assisted housing. EPA sets federal standards for lead hazards in paint, soil, and dust, and regulates the training and certification of workers who remediate lead paint hazards. CDC sets a health guideline known as the “blood lead reference value” to identify children exposed to more lead than most other children. HUD has primary responsibility for addressing lead paint hazards in federally-assisted housing, and has issued regulations under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992). The Lead Disclosure Rule and the Lead Safe Housing Rule are the two key regulations that HUD has issued under Title X. The Lead Disclosure Rule requires sellers and lessors to disclose any known information, available records, and reports on the presence of lead paint and lead paint hazards and provide an EPA-approved information pamphlet prior to sale or lease. The Lead Safe Housing Rule establishes procedures for evaluating whether a lead paint hazard exists, controlling or eliminating the hazard, and notifying occupants of any lead paint hazards identified and related remediation efforts. The report also discusses the Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes (Lead Office) within HUD, which is responsible for administering HUD’s two lead hazard control grant programs, providing guidance on HUD’s lead paint regulations, and tracking HUD’s efforts to make housing lead-safe. The report concludes by highlighting the importance of HUD’s efforts to make housing lead-safe and the need for HUD to improve its monitoring and enforcement of lead paint regulations.", + "answer": [ + "Lead paint in housing is the most common source of lead exposure for U.S. children. HUD awards grants to state and local governments to reduce lead paint hazards in housing and oversees compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs. The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, includes a provision that GAO review HUD’s efforts to address lead paint hazards. This report examines HUD’s efforts to (1) incorporate statutory requirements and other relevant federal standards in its lead grant programs, (2) monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs, (3) adopt federal health guidelines and environmental standards for its lead grant and rental assistance programs, and (4) measure and report on the performance of its lead efforts. GAO reviewed HUD documents and data related to its grant programs, compliance efforts, performance measures, and reporting. GAO also interviewed HUD staff and some grantees. The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) lead grant and rental assistance programs have taken steps to address lead paint hazards, but opportunities exist for improvement. For example, in 2016, HUD began using new tools to monitor how public housing agencies comply with lead paint regulations. However, HUD could further improve efforts in the following areas: Lead grant programs. While its recent grant award processes incorporate statutory requirements on applicant eligibility and selection criteria, HUD has not fully documented or evaluated these processes. For example, HUD’s guidance is not sufficiently detailed to ensure consistent and appropriate grant award decisions. Better documentation and evaluation of HUD’s grant program processes could help ensure that lead grants reach areas at risk of lead paint hazards. Further, HUD has not developed specific time frames for using available local-level data to better identify areas of the country at risk for lead paint hazards, which could help HUD target its limited resources. Oversight. HUD does not have a plan to mitigate and address risks related to noncompliance with lead paint regulations by public housing agencies. We identified several limitations with HUD’s monitoring efforts, including reliance on public housing agencies’ self-certifying compliance with lead paint regulations and challenges identifying children with elevated blood lead levels. Additionally, HUD lacks detailed procedures for addressing noncompliance consistently and in a timely manner. Developing a plan and detailed procedures to address noncompliance with lead paint regulations could strengthen HUD’s oversight of public housing agencies. Inspections. The lead inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program is less strict than that of the public housing program. By requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the standard for the voucher program, HUD would be positioned to take steps to better protect children in voucher units from lead exposure as indicated by analysis of benefits and costs. Performance assessment and reporting. HUD lacks comprehensive goals and performance measures for its lead reduction efforts. In addition, it has not complied with annual statutory reporting requirements, last reporting as required on its lead efforts in 1997. Without better performance assessment and reporting, HUD cannot fully assess the effectiveness of its lead efforts. GAO makes nine recommendations to HUD including to improve lead grant program and compliance monitoring processes, request authority to amend its lead inspection standard in the voucher program, and take additional steps to report on progress. HUD generally agreed with eight of the recommendations. HUD disagreed that it should request authority to use a specific, stricter inspection standard. GAO revised this recommendation to allow HUD greater flexibility to amend its current inspection standard as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) significantly enhances GPRA, the centerpiece of a statutory framework that Congress put in place during the 1990s to address longstanding performance and management problems in the federal government. GPRAMA was passed in 2010 to address persistent federal performance challenges, including focusing attention on crosscutting issues and enhancing the use and usefulness of performance information. The Act requires OMB and agencies to establish various government-wide and agency-specific performance goals, including cross-agency priority (CAP) goals, strategic objectives, and agency priority goals (APGs).\n\nCAP goals are crosscutting and include outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of policy areas as well as goals for management improvements needed across the government. OMB is required to coordinate with agencies to establish CAP goals at least every 4 years. OMB is also required to coordinate with agencies to develop annual federal government performance plans to define the level of performance to be achieved toward the CAP goals.\n\nStrategic objectives are the outcome or impact the agency is intending to achieve through its various programs and initiatives. Agencies establish strategic objectives in their strategic plans and may update the objectives during the annual update of performance plans.\n\nAPGs are at the agency level and are identified every 2 years by the heads of certain agencies in consultation with OMB. These goals reflect the agencies’ highest priorities and are informed by the CAP goals as well as consultations with relevant congressional committees and other interested parties.\n\nOMB and agencies are required to develop and publish new CAP goals, APGs, and strategic plans (with updated strategic objectives) in February 2018. GPRAMA and related OMB guidance require agencies to regularly assess their progress in achieving goals and objectives through performance reviews.\n\nThe report also discusses the importance of data-driven reviews, strategic reviews, and the roles of the Chief Operating Officer, Performance Improvement Officer, Goal Leaders, and Performance Improvement Council in implementing GPRAMA.\n\nThe report also highlights several areas where agencies have made progress in implementing GPRAMA, such as increased use of performance data and improved collaboration among agencies", + "answer": [ + "Full implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed. Cross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public. Performance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews—for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could lead to increased use of performance information. Daily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013). Transparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results. In addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Colorado River Basin is a vital water source for agriculture, municipalities, and industry in the western United States and Mexico. The federal government, through the Bureau of Reclamation, plays a significant role in managing the basin's water resources. The basin's water is primarily used for irrigation and municipal and industrial purposes. The river also provides important benefits for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreation. However, the basin is currently experiencing a severe drought that has reduced water levels in the river and its reservoirs. The drought is expected to continue due to climate change and altered precipitation patterns.\n\nThe Colorado River Compact of 1922 established the framework for apportioning water between the Upper and Lower Basins. The compact was modified by the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, which authorized the construction of Hoover Dam and related facilities. The Upper Basin DCP and Lower Basin DCP were developed in response to the ongoing drought to reduce water usage and maintain lake levels. The DCPs include significant cutbacks in water usage for Arizona, Nevada, and California.\n\nCongress has played a significant role in funding and overseeing the management of Colorado River facilities and programs. It has also approved Indian water rights settlements and funding for conservation and development projects. Congress may need to consider new authorities for the Bureau of Reclamation to combat drought and enter into agreements with states and Colorado River contractors. The ongoing drought and potential for future water shortages may prompt Congress to take further action to manage the Colorado River Basin.", + "answer": [ + "The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies. River Management The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam. Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of \"shortage,\" under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future. Drought Contingency Plans Despite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation. Congressional Role Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts)." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government collects funds from various sources, including user fees, fines, and penalties. In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. government’s total receipts were $3.3 trillion and collections of fees, fines, and penalties were more than $350 billion. User fees are charges assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government, while fines and penalties are imposed by courts as punishment for criminal violations or civil monetary penalties collected from financial institutions. The design and structure of statutory authorities for fees, fines, and penalties can vary widely. The type of collection determines how OMB and Treasury report the collections. Offsetting collections can provide agencies with more flexibility because they are generally available for agency obligation without an additional annual appropriation. In contrast, offsetting receipts and governmental receipts involve greater congressional opportunities for control and oversight because, generally, additional congressional action is needed before the collections are available for agency obligation. The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) require federal agencies to report data on federal spending and federal programs publicly available. However, there is no source of data that lists all collections of specific fees, fines, and penalties at a government-wide or agency level. The report assesses the availability and usefulness of publicly available data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties reported in government-wide sources. The criteria for assessment include clear and accessible presentation, complete, and accurate. The report identifies the Budget of the U.S. Government, the Financial Report of the U.S. Government, the Daily Treasury Statement, the Monthly Treasury Statement, the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances, and USAspending.gov as sources of government-wide information on collections of fees, fines, and penalties. The report also identifies the challenges and benefits of government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties, including data elements that facilitate congression", + "answer": [ + "Congress has authorized federal agencies to collect hundreds of billions of dollars annually in fees, fines, and penalties. These collections can fund a variety of programs, including programs related to national security, and the protection of natural resources. Data on collections are important for congressional oversight and to provide transparency in agencies' use of federal resources. GAO was asked to review the availability of government-wide data on fees, fines, and penalties. This report examines (1) the extent to which data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publically available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight; and (2) the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties. GAO assessed government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data against criteria for availability and usefulness based on multiple sources, including prior GAO work and input from staff of selected congressional committees. GAO interviewed OMB staff, Treasury officials, and representatives of organizations with expertise in federal budget issues and reviewed prior GAO work to identify benefits and challenges of reporting these data. There are no comprehensive, government-wide data at the level of detail that identifies specific fees, fines, or penalties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) report data that include these collections at the budget account level, which generally covers a set of agency activities or programs. OMB and Treasury also report some summary data for budgeting and financial management purposes. In the Budget of the U.S. Government , for example, OMB data showed government-wide fees totaled just over $335 billion in fiscal year 2017. These reports, however, are not designed to inventory or analyze fee, fine, or penalty collections and have significant limitations for that purpose. Although OMB collects more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties, it does not make the data publicly available. OMB uses the disaggregated data in its OMB MAX database—such as the agency and account—to compile reported totals, such as the government-wide fees total in the Budget of the U.S. Government . Until OMB makes more disaggregated data publicly available, Congress has limited information on collections by agency to inform oversight and decision-making. OMB's government-wide total of fees includes collections that are not fees and excludes some fee collections. The total includes all collections for accounts in which fees make up at least half of the account's collections and excludes all others. OMB does not direct agencies to regularly review and update the accounts included in the total. Therefore, if accounts' makeups change such that fee collections drop below, or rise above, the 50 percent threshold, accounts may have incorrect fee designations and the total may be inaccurate. Further, OMB does not disclose the limitation that the total may exclude some fees and include other collections that are not fees. As a result, some users of the data are likely unaware of the potential for the total fees to be overestimated or underestimated. Further, no source of government-wide data consistently reports data elements on fees, fines, and penalties that could help inform congressional oversight. Generally, congressional staff told us that additional data, such as amounts of specific penalties, would increase transparency and facilitate oversight. These data could help Congress identify trends in collections and significant changes that could be an indication of an agency's performance. While reporting government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data provides benefits, there are trade-offs in terms of the time and federal resources it would take to develop and implement a process for agencies to report these data. The level of federal investment would vary depending on factors, such as the number of data elements included and the level of detail reported. Developing a comprehensive and accessible data source would provide greater benefits, but would likely be resource intensive. Alternatively, incorporating a small number of data elements that Congress identifies as most useful for oversight into ongoing government-wide reporting efforts could incrementally improve transparency and information for oversight and decision-making, with fewer resources. GAO is making four recommendations to enhance OMB reporting on fees, fines, and penalties, including making disaggregated data publically available, updating instructions to federal agencies to review accounts designated as containing fees, and disclosing limitations in data reported. OMB did not provide comments." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) administers loan guaranty programs to support small businesses, including the flagship 7(a) program. The SBA also has several subprograms, such as SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage Pilot, that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for specific groups of borrowers. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. The SBA's 7(a) program has been justified as a means to help small businesses access capital necessary for growth and job creation. However, concerns have been raised about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. Some argue that business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint are better means to help small businesses. The SBA's administration of the 7(a) program has been criticized for lacking outcome-based performance measures. Recently, Congress has taken steps to help small businesses gain greater access to capital, such as increasing the maximum loan limit and providing additional funding. The SBA has also implemented changes to the program, such as increasing the maximum allowable loan amount for the 7(a) program and creating the Community Advantage 7(a) loan initiative. The SBA's Community Advantage program is designed to increase lending to underserved low- and moderate-income communities. The program has been extended several times and has 113 approved lenders as of September 2018. The SBA has also placed a moratorium on accepting new CA lender applications to mitigate risk. The report provides a detailed overview of the SBA's loan guaranty programs, including borrower and lender eligibility standards, program requirements, and statistics on loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program and recent congressional and presidential actions to help small businesses gain greater access to capital.", + "answer": [ + "The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses \"that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions.\" The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide business loans and loan guaranties to American small businesses. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. The report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to enhance small businesses' access to capital. For example, Congress approved legislation during the 111th Congress to provide more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raise the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs. The SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for smaller 7(a) loans from FY2014 through FY2018; and is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. The SBA has also waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) since January 1, 2014; and reduced the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans from FY2015 through FY2018. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. Congress also approved legislation that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion (on disbursements) in FY2014 to $23.5 billion in FY2015, $26.5 billion in FY2016, $27.5 billion in FY2017, $29.0 billion in FY2018, and $30 billion in FY2019. P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator, starting in FY2019 and after providing at least 30 days' notice to specified congressional committees, to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides free meals to children in low-income areas during certain periods when school is not in session. The program operates between May and September and in vacation periods for programs operating on a continuous school calendar. The SFSP is administered at the federal level by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and at the state level by state agencies. The program is administered by state-approved sponsors, such as school districts, local government entities, or private nonprofit organizations.\n\nThe report analyzes participation in the SFSP by reviewing data from FNS and state agencies. It found that the number of SFSP meals served nationwide during the summer increased from 113 million meals in fiscal year 2007 to 149 million meals in fiscal year 2016, a 32% increase. However, the number of meals served decreased by 6% from 156 million meals in summer 2015 to 149 million meals in summer 2016. Factors that may have affected year-to-year fluctuations include changes in funding for summer programs, sponsor participation, weather, and the number of weekdays available for sites to serve meals within a given summer.\n\nThe report also examines challenges in providing summer meals, such as difficulties in estimating participation, lack of awareness of the program, and challenges in providing meals to children in remote areas. It recommends that FNS and state agencies work to improve data collection and sharing, increase awareness of the program, and explore alternative models for providing meals in remote areas.\n\nOverall, the report provides an overview of the SFSP and highlights the importance of the program in providing meals to children in low-income areas during the summer months. It also identifies challenges in implementing the program and offers recommendations for improvement.", + "answer": [ + "The SFSP, a federal nutrition assistance program, is intended to provide food to children in low-income areas during periods when area schools are closed for vacation. In the last decade, federal expenditures for SFSP have increased as the program has expanded, according to USDA data. GAO was asked to review the SFSP. This report examines (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges, if any, in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia; visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations; analyzed meal site data from the 3 states; and interviewed USDA, state and national organization officials, and SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators. Nationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directs states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, participation estimates have been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directs states to use will continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes. Other federal and nonfederal programs help feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed. For example, in July 2016, USDA data indicate about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allows school meal providers to serve summer meals. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with providers and national organizations indicate the reach of such efforts is limited. States and SFSP providers reported challenges with meal sites, participation, and program administration; USDA has taken steps to address these areas. Specifically, in GAO's survey, a majority of states reported challenges with availability and awareness of meal sites, as well as limited program participation and administrative capacity. National, state, and local officials have taken steps to address these issues, such as increasing outreach and offering activities to attract participation. In addition, 17 states in GAO's survey and providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites are in safe locations. To address this safety issue, USDA has granted some states and sponsors flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, USDA has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers when granting this flexibility. Further, some states and sponsors that have requested this flexibility reported difficulty obtaining data to show these circumstances exist, hampering their ability to ensure safe meal delivery. GAO is making four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP and communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Medicare program is the largest health insurance program administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). It provides health insurance for individuals aged 65 and over, certain individuals with disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease. The program is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse due to its size, scope, and complexity. The extent of fraud in the Medicare program is difficult to determine as it involves intentional deception. The government agency responsible for managing fraud risks in the Medicare program is CMS.\n\nCMS has designated Medicare as a high-risk program due to its vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has also designated all parts of Medicare as a high priority program due to the high amount of improper payments. Improper payments are payments made in an incorrect amount or those that should not have been made at all. CMS manages its fraud risks as part of a broader program-integrity approach working with a broad array of stakeholders.\n\nCMS's program-integrity approach includes efforts to address waste, abuse, and improper payments as well as fraud across its four principal programs. In Medicare, CMS collaborates with contractors, health-insurance plans, and law-enforcement and other agencies to carry out its program-integrity responsibilities. CMS has taken some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare, but has not conducted a fraud risk assessment or developed a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Fraud Risk Framework.\n\nThe Fraud Risk Framework provides a comprehensive set of key components and leading practices that serve as a guide for agency managers to use when developing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based way. The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 requires OMB to establish guidelines for federal agencies to create controls to identify and assess fraud risks and design and implement antifraud control activities. The act requires federal agencies to submit to Congress a progress report each year for 3 consecutive years on the implementation of the controls established under OMB guidelines.\n\nCMS", + "answer": [ + "Medicare covered over 58 million people in 2017 and has wide-ranging impact on the health-care sector and the overall U.S. economy. However, the billions of dollars in Medicare outlays as well as program complexity make it susceptible to improper payments, including fraud. Although there are no reliable estimates of fraud in Medicare, in fiscal year 2017 improper payments for Medicare were estimated at about $52 billion. Further, about $1.4 billion was returned to Medicare Trust Funds in fiscal year 2017 as a result of recoveries, fines, and asset forfeitures. In December 2017, GAO issued a report examining how CMS managed its fraud risks overall and particularly the extent to which its efforts in the Medicare and Medicaid programs aligned with GAO's Framework. This testimony, based on that report, discusses the extent to which CMS's management of fraud risks in Medicare aligns with the Framework. For the report, GAO reviewed CMS policies and interviewed officials and external stakeholders. In its December 2017 report, GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) antifraud efforts for Medicare partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Framework). The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 required OMB to incorporate leading practices identified in this Framework in its guidance to agencies on addressing fraud risks. Consistent with the Framework, GAO determined that CMS had demonstrated commitment to combating fraud by creating a dedicated entity to lead antifraud efforts; the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) serves as this entity for fraud, waste, and abuse issues in Medicare. CMS also promoted an antifraud culture by, for example, coordinating with internal stakeholders to incorporate antifraud features into new program design. To increase awareness of fraud risks in Medicare, CMS offered and required training for stakeholder groups such as providers of medical services, but it did not offer or require similar fraud-awareness training for most of its workforce. CMS took some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare; however, it had not conducted a fraud risk assessment or designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Framework. CMS identified fraud risks through control activities that target areas the agency designated as higher risk within Medicare, including specific provider types, such as home health agencies. Building on earlier steps and conducting a fraud risk assessment, consistent with the Framework, would provide the detailed information and insights needed to create a fraud risk profile, which, in turn, is the basis for creating an antifraud strategy. CMS established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity control activities that, if aligned with an antifraud strategy, could enhance the effectiveness of fraud risk management in Medicare. For example, CMS used return-on-investment and savings estimates to measure the effectiveness of its Medicare program-integrity activities. In developing an antifraud strategy, consistent with the Framework, CMS could include plans for refining and building on existing methods such as return-on-investment, to evaluate the effectiveness of all of its antifraud efforts. In its December 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations, namely that CMS (1) require and provide fraud-awareness training to its employees; (2) conduct fraud risk assessments; and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare, including an approach for evaluation. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with these recommendations and reportedly is evaluating options to implement them. Accordingly, the recommendations remain open." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for delivering Social Security services that meet the changing needs of the public. The agency administers three programs: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income. In fiscal year 2019, SSA is expected to pay $892 billion in old-age and survivors insurance benefits, $149 billion in disability insurance benefits, and nearly $59 billion in federal benefits and state supplementary payments. SSA relies heavily on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities. The agency’s IT systems are used to handle millions of transactions, maintain records for beneficiaries and recipients, and evaluate evidence and make determinations of eligibility for benefits. SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency’s IT systems. However, SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT. The agency has previously issued reports highlighting various weaknesses in its system development practices, governance, requirements management, and strategic planning. In 2016, SSA requested $132 million in its fiscal year 2019 budget to modernize its IT environment. The agency’s priority IT spending initiatives in the budget include updating database designs, eliminating the use of outdated code, and upgrading infrastructure. One of the agency’s priority IT spending initiatives is the Disability Case Processing System, which has been under development since December 2010. However, SSA has reported substantial difficulty in carrying out this initiative, citing software quality and poor system performance as issues. In June 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed the initiative on its government-wide list of 10 high-priority programs requiring attention. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) was enacted in December 2014 to improve agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. The act includes specific requirements related to seven areas: agency CIO authority enhancements, federal data center cons", + "answer": [ + "SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government collects various fees and charges from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from \"business-like activities,\" in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities, such as filing or inspection fees, which stem from the federal government's sovereign powers. Other federal fees or charges are intragovernmental transactions that do not involve the public. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) charges other federal agencies fees to cover the cost of background investigations. For many federal agencies, fees or user charges amount to a minimal portion of budgetary resources. Other regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are wholly or partially funded by user fees and other nontax receipts. User fees from the public accounted for $331 billion in FY2017, about a tenth of total federal receipts ( $3.32 trillion ).\n\nFees may not be compulsory, but not paying them may make it impossible to carry out many activities legally. For instance, without paying passport application fees and obtaining a passport, people cannot fly to other countries. Nor can businesses issue securities without paying federal filing fees. The statutory basis for each particular fee or user charge varies in specificity and in the degree of discretion granted to the executive branch. For example, authorizing legislation might specify in detail how certain fees are imposed and how proceeds are used. In other cases, federal agencies rely on broader authorities to impose user fees.\n\nUser fees have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and they can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation", + "answer": [ + "The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from \"business-like activities,\" in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a \"fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.\" User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed. Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense. In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command. However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia. Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure.\n\nThroughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations. Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces. Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations. The new statute, later codified as 10 U.S.C. 2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P.L. 95-82), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process. These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays. The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size.\n\nIn the decade that followed the passage of 10 U.S.C. 2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities. By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation (P.L. 1", + "answer": [ + "Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to attend certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). In academic year 2016-2017, 6,760 institutions were classified as Title IV eligible IHEs. Of these, 29.4% were public institutions, 27.8% were private nonprofit institutions, and 42.9% were proprietary institutions. It is estimated that $122.5 billion was made available to students through Title IV federal student aid in FY2017. To be eligible for Title IV assistance, students must attend an institution that is eligible to participate in Title IV programs. IHEs must meet a variety of requirements to participate in the Title IV programs. First, an IHE must meet basic eligibility criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education. In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, which includes being legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education in the state in which it is located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education (ED) for such purposes, and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. The state authorization and accreditation components of the triad were developed independently to address the issues of quality assurance and consumer protection, and the federal government (ED specifically) generally relies on states and accrediting agencies to determine standards of educational program quality. The federal government's only direct role in determining Title IV eligibility is through the process of certification of eligibility and ensuring IHEs meet some additional Title IV requirements. Certification focuses on an institution's fiscal responsibility and administrative capacity to administer Title IV funds. An IHE must fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and Title IV program administration. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For instance, proprietary institutions must derive at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). Failure to fulfill some of these requirements does not necessarily end an IHE'", + "answer": [ + "Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). These IHEs include public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions. For students attending such institutions to be able to receive Title IV assistance, an institution must meet basic criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education (e.g., programs leading to a degree or preparing a student for gainful employment in a recognized occupation). In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to operate in the state in which it is physically located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Department of Education (ED), and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. These requirements are intended to provide a balance between consumer protection, quality assurance, and oversight and compliance in postsecondary education providers participating in Title IV student aid programs. An IHE must also fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and the administration of the Title IV student aid programs. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For example, proprietary institutions must meet HEA requirements that are otherwise inapplicable to public and private nonprofit institutions, including deriving at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). While an institution is ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. This report first describes the types of institutions eligible to participate in Title IV programs and discusses the program integrity triad. It then discusses additional issues related to institutional eligibility, including program participations agreements, required campus safety policies and crime reporting, and distance and correspondence education." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides an overview of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and its potential impact in the United States. FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals, causing fever and painful lesions on their hooves, mouths, and udders. The disease is not considered a public health or food safety threat, but it can cause severe productivity losses in livestock. The virus can survive in the environment for many months and spread through contact with infected animals or contaminated objects. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but the disease could be introduced from countries where it is present. The report discusses the potential economic consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States, including trade disruptions and loss of livestock. The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for responding to outbreaks of foreign animal diseases, including FMD. The report highlights the challenges that USDA faces in preparing for and responding to an FMD outbreak, including difficulties in identifying and vaccinating large numbers of animals, communication issues, and difficulties in implementing biosecurity measures. The report recommends that USDA prioritize corrective actions to address these challenges and improve its preparedness for an FMD outbreak. The report also discusses the potential use of the National Veterinary Stockpile to provide vaccines during an outbreak. The report concludes with a summary of the challenges USDA faces in preparing for an FMD outbreak and the need for the agency to prioritize corrective actions to improve its preparedness.", + "answer": [ + "FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes painful lesions on the hooves and mouths of some livestock, making it difficult for them to stand or eat, thus greatly reducing meat and milk production. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but FMD is present in much of the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic impacts, in part because trade partners would likely halt all imports of U.S. livestock and livestock products until the disease was eradicated. These imports were valued at more than $19 billion in 2017. GAO was asked to review USDA's efforts to prepare for an FMD outbreak. This report examines (1) USDA's planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak; (2) challenges USDA would face in pursuing its response goals; and (3) how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges. GAO observed a USDA FMD preparedness exercise; reviewed agency documents and nongeneralizable questionnaire responses from 29 respondents from federal and state government, livestock industries, and universities; and interviewed officials from federal and state governments and representatives of livestock industries and universities. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) planned approach for responding to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) includes several strategies. These strategies generally rely on killing infected and susceptible animals, vaccinating uninfected animals, or a combination of both approaches. USDA would implement one or more of the strategies, depending on factors such as the outbreak's size and the resources available, according to agency documents. USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD quickly; eradicating FMD while seeking to stabilize industry and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. GAO identified challenges in 11 areas—including allocating a limited supply of FMD vaccine—based on its review of USDA documents, responses to GAO's questionnaire, and interviews with agency officials and others with expertise on FMD. According to USDA, the agency may not have a sufficient supply of FMD vaccine to control more than a small outbreak because of limited resources to obtain vaccine. As shown below, the current vaccine supply would be sufficient to protect about 14 percent of Texas's cattle or about 4 percent of Iowa's swine; these states' cattle and swine populations are the nation's largest. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision to increase the FMD vaccine supply. USDA has identified dozens of corrective actions to mitigate the challenges of responding to an FMD outbreak, as called for in USDA procedures, but has not prioritized these corrective actions or monitored their completion, as also called for in its procedures. USDA has identified the corrective actions through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys, and lessons learned from other foreign animal disease outbreaks. However, USDA has not completed all of the corrective actions, including actions related to vaccination. Agency officials stated that they have not completed such corrective actions because they have been responding to outbreaks of other animal diseases and have limited resources. Without following agency procedures to prioritize and monitor corrective actions, USDA cannot ensure that it is allocating its resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak. GAO is recommending that USDA follow its procedures to prioritize and monitor the completion of corrective actions that the agency has identified for FMD preparedness. USDA agreed with these recommendations, and described actions it will take to implement them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe report discusses the use of opioid medications in healthcare and the risks associated with their misuse. Opioid medications are available in different forms and can be prescribed to treat pain or coughing. However, they can also be misused and lead to addiction, which can be fatal. MAT (Medication-Assisted Treatment) is a combination of behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications (methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone) that can be more effective in reducing opioid use and increasing retention in treatment compared to abstinence-based treatment. Three medications are currently approved by the FDA for use in MAT for opioid use disorders. Methadone is a full opioid agonist that binds to and activates opioid receptors to prevent withdrawal symptoms and reduce drug cravings. Buprenorphine is a partial opioid agonist that reduces or eliminates opioid withdrawal symptoms and drug cravings. Naltrexone is an opioid antagonist that blocks the euphoria the user would normally feel and results in withdrawal symptoms if recent opioid use has occurred. MAT can be prescribed in certain authorized settings, such as OTPs (Opioid Treatment Programs) or in physicians' offices. The report also discusses five key efforts from 2015 to 2017 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders. These efforts include grant programs, such as the Targeted Capacity Expansion: Medication Assisted Treatment – Prescription Drug and Opioid Addiction (MAT-PDOA) grant program, which provides funding to states to increase their capacity to provide MAT and recovery support services to individuals with opioid use disorders. The report concludes by stating that HHS has implemented five key efforts to expand access to MAT for opioid use disorders and that the department will continue to work to develop robust performance measures, including measures related to MAT, as part of its overall Opioid Strategy.", + "answer": [ + "The misuse of prescription opioid pain relievers and illicit opioids, such as heroin, has contributed to increases in overdose deaths. According to the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data, in 2015 over 52,000 people died of drug overdose deaths, and about 63 percent of them involved an opioid. For those who are addicted to or misuse opioids, MAT has been shown to be an effective treatment. GAO was asked to review HHS and other efforts related to MAT for opioid use disorders. This report (1) describes HHS's key efforts to expand access to MAT, (2) examines HHS's evaluation, if any, of its efforts to expand access to MAT, and (3) describes efforts by selected stakeholders (states, private health insurers, and national associations) to expand access to MAT. GAO gathered information from HHS officials as well as a non-generalizable selection of 15 stakeholders selected based on their MAT expansion activities, among other factors. GAO also assessed HHS's evaluation plans using internal control standards for defining objectives and evaluating results. In an effort to reduce the prevalence of opioid misuse and the fatalities associated with it, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established a goal to expand access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT). MAT is an approach that combines behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications, such as methadone and buprenorphine. HHS has implemented five key efforts since 2015 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders—four grant programs that focus on expanding access to MAT in various settings (including rural primary care practices and health centers) and regulatory changes that expand treatment capacity by increasing patient limits for buprenorphine prescribers and allowing nurse practitioners and physician assistants to prescribe buprenorphine. Some of the grant awards were made in 2015, while others were made as recently as May 2017. (See figure.) As of August 2017, efforts under all the grant programs were ongoing. Grant recipients can use funding to undertake a range of activities, such as hiring and training providers and supporting treatments involving MAT. In addition, certain providers and grant recipients are required to develop plans for preventing MAT medications from being diverted for nonmedical purposes. HHS officials told GAO that as of August 2017, the department was in the process of finalizing its plans to evaluate its efforts to address the opioid epidemic. In September 2016, HHS awarded a contract to conduct the evaluation. HHS officials told GAO that they are still working with the contractor to finalize the evaluation approach and that it will focus on whether HHS's efforts to address the opioid epidemic have been implemented as intended. HHS officials said that in the future, HHS may also evaluate whether, or to what extent, its efforts have been effective in expanding access to MAT, in addition to evaluating implementation. While HHS has some of the information that could be used in a future evaluation of the effectiveness of its efforts to expand access to MAT, it has not adopted specific performance measures with targets specifying the magnitude of the increases HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts to expand access to MAT, and by when. For example, HHS has not established a long-term target specifying the percentage increase in the number of prescriptions for buprenorphine HHS would like to achieve, which would help to show whether efforts by HHS and others are resulting in a sufficient number of prescriptions for MAT medications. HHS has also not chosen a specific method of measuring treatment capacity or established targets associated with it, which would help determine whether a sufficient number of providers are becoming available to evaluate and treat patients who may benefit from MAT. Without specifying these performance measures and associated targets, HHS will not have an effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand access to MAT or whether new approaches are needed. Gauging this progress is particularly important given the large gap identified nationwide between the total number of individuals who could benefit from MAT and the limited number who can currently access it based on provider availability. In addition, GAO also found that as of August 2017, HHS had not finalized its approach for its planned evaluation activities, including timeframes. Without timeframes for the evaluation's activities, HHS increases the risk that the evaluation will not be completed as expeditiously as possible. In addition to HHS efforts to expand access to MAT, officials from selected states, private health insurers, and national associations reported using several efforts to expand patients' access to MAT for opioid use disorders. For example, several stakeholders provided GAO with the following examples of their efforts: States. State health officials from all five selected states have implemented or are planning approaches that focus on integrating the use of MAT into primary care, such as by providing services for centralized intake and initial management of patients or through telehealth that connects patients in rural areas with addiction specialists in a different location. Private health insurers. Three private health insurers reported removing prior authorization requirements for MAT medications so patients can avoid a waiting period before receiving the medications. National associations. Officials told GAO that they are conducting outreach and training for their members and developing tools and resource guides. For example, one association developed a road map with strategies that state policymakers can use to address the opioid epidemic, including strategies for reducing the stigma associated with MAT through educating the public and potential providers. GAO recommends that HHS take two actions: (1) establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT, and (2) establish timeframes for its evaluation of its efforts to expand access to MAT. HHS concurred with both recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe report discusses the separation of policy questions from funding questions in federal legislation. It explains that authorization legislation establishes, continues, or modifies the organization or activities of a federal entity or program, but it does not provide funding. Instead, the authority to obligate payments from the Treasury is left to separate appropriations measures. The report traces the origin of the formal rule mandating the separation of general legislation from appropriations to 1835, when the House debated the problem of delay in enacting appropriations due to the inclusion of \"debatable matters of another character, new laws which created long debates in both Houses.\" The rule was expanded in 1876 to include only retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill. The Holman rule has remained a part of House rules since that time, but its language was amended in the 98 th Congress to narrow the exception to the general prohibition against legislation in appropriation measures. The report also discusses the separate order adopted for the 115 th Congress that provides that any reference in clause 2 of rule XXI to a provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill shall be construed as applying to any provision or amendment (offered after the bill has been read for amendment) that retrenches expenditures by—(1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill; (2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or (3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. The purpose of this provision is to see if the reinstatement of the Holman rule will provide Members with additional tools to reduce spending during consideration of the regular general appropriation bill.", + "answer": [ + "Although congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding, House rules provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance allows for the inclusion of legislative language in general appropriations bills or amendments thereto for \"germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill.\" This exception appears in clause 2(b) of House Rule XXI and is known as the Holman rule, after Representative William Holman of Indiana, who first proposed the exception in 1876. Since the period immediately after its initial adoption, the House has interpreted the Holman rule through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. Under current precedents, for a legislative provision or amendment to be in order, the legislative language in question must be both germane to other provisions in the measure and must produce a clear reduction of appropriations in that bill. In addition, the House adopted a separate order during the 115th Congress that provided for retrenchments of expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill to be construed as applying to: any provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by— (1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill; (2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or (3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. This separate order was not readopted for the 116th Congress. This report provides a history of this provision in House rules and an analysis of precedents that are illustrative of its possible application." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the challenges faced by runaway and homeless youth in the United States. It highlights the lack of safe shelter and support systems for these youth, which leaves them vulnerable to high-risk behaviors and further victimization. The report also describes the federal programs that have been established to assist runaway and homeless youth, including the Runaway Youth Act of 1974, which was enacted to provide services specifically for this population. The report details the three programs that make up the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP): the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The report also discusses the difficulties in defining and counting the runaway and homeless youth population, as well as the factors that influence homelessness and leaving home. The report concludes by summarizing the federal efforts to support runaway and homeless youth, including the evolution of federal policies to respond to these youth. The report provides funding information for the BCP program and discusses other federal programs that may be used to assist runaway and homeless youth. The report also highlights the lack of a standardized methodology for counting the runaway and homeless youth population and the challenges in determining the number of youth who are homeless or runaway. The report concludes by discussing the importance of addressing the needs of runaway and homeless youth and the need for continued federal support to ensure their safety and well-being.", + "answer": [ + "This report discusses runaway and homeless youth, and the federal response to support this population. There is no single definition of the terms \"runaway youth\" or \"homeless youth.\" However, both groups of youth share the risk of not having adequate shelter and other provisions, and may engage in harmful behaviors while away from a permanent home. Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth. The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements. From the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both. The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age). The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute. Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million. The RHYP program is made up of three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The BCP provides temporary shelter, counseling, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). The TLP is targeted to older youth ages 16 through 22 (and sometimes an older age). In FY2017, the TLP program served 3,517 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 299 grantees (most recent figures available). Youth who use the TLP receive longer-term housing with supportive services. The SOP provides education, treatment, counseling, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sex exploitation, and trafficking. In FY2017, the SOP grantees made contact with 24,366 youth. The RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness. The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes. Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth. In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report provides an overview of the FY2019 budget request and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations. The report also provides a review of these trade agencies' programs.\n\nThe President submitted his FY2019 budget request to Congress on February 12, 2018. The Administration requested a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, which represented an 8.9% decrease in funding from the FY2018 appropriated amount. The request included reduced funding for all three trade agencies: $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Despite the proposed overall decrease in funding for CJS trade-related agencies, the Administration proposed increasing some trade enforcement activities within ITA and USTR.\n\nThe House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported their CJS appropriation bills in the spring of 2018. Both committees largely declined the budget cuts requested by the Administration for these three trade agencies. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House committee bill included a total of $647.6 million for the three trade-related agencies, which was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted amount. The House committee recommended $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 1", + "answer": [ + "The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). The Administration's Request On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Congressional Actions In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities. After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the state and local government sector will likely face a persistent difference between revenue and spending over the next 50 years. This long-term outlook is measured by the operating balance, which is a measure of the sector’s ability to cover its current expenditures out of current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) during the simulation period, a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are generally expected to grow at a faster rate than revenues.\n\nThe GAO simulated the state and local government sector’s operating balance to understand the sector’s long-term fiscal outlook. The sector’s operating expenditures were 15.1 percent of GDP in 2017. These expenditures are comprised of employee compensation, social benefit payments, interest payments, capital outlays, and other expenditures. The sector’s operating revenues were 13.8 percent of GDP in 2017. These revenues are comprised of taxes, transfer receipts, and other types of revenues.\n\nThe report also measured the fiscal gap, which is an estimate of actions that must be taken today and maintained for each year going forward to achieve fiscal balance during the simulation period. The fiscal gap is about 14.7 percent of total expenditures or about 2.4 percent of GDP. This means that eliminating the difference between the sector’s expenditures and revenues during the 50-year simulation period would likely require action to be taken today and maintained for each year going forward.\n\nThe report suggests that growth in the sector’s overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures. These expenditures are projected to increase from about 4.1 percent of GDP in 2018 to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2067. Two types of health care expenditures, Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees, will likely constitute a growing expenditure for state and local governments during the simulation period.\n\nThe report", + "answer": [ + "Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published simulations of long-term fiscal trends in the state and local government sector, which have consistently shown that the sector faces long-term fiscal pressures. While most states have requirements related to balancing their budgets, deficits can arise because the planned annual revenues are not generated at the expected rate, demand for services exceeds planned expenditures, or both, resulting in a near-term operating deficit. This report updates GAO's state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the components of state and local expenditures likely to contribute to the sector's fiscal pressures. In addition, this report identifies considerations related to federal policy and other factors that could contribute to uncertainties in the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal outlook. GAO's model uses the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts as the primary data source and presents the results in the aggregate for the state and local sector as a whole. The model shows the level of receipts and expenditures for the sector until 2067, based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. In addition, the model assumes that the current set of policies in place across state and local government remains constant to show a simulated long-term outlook. GAO's simulations suggest that the state and local government sector will likely face an increasing difference between revenues and expenditures during the next 50 years as reflected by the operating balance--a measure of the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of its current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are expected to grow faster than revenues throughout the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that growth in the sector's overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures--in particular, Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees. These expenditures are projected to grow as a share of GDP during the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that revenues from personal income taxes and federal grants to states and localities will increase during the simulation period. However, revenues will grow more slowly than expenditures such that the sector faces a declining fiscal outlook. GAO also identified federal policy changes that could affect the state and local government sector's fiscal outlook. For example, the effects of the recently-enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will likely depend on how states incorporate the Act into their state income tax rules. In addition, other factors, such as economic growth and rates of return on pension assets, could shift future fiscal outcomes for the sector." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. Marine Corps is responsible for providing an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and conduct naval land campaigns. The Marine Corps is required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program was cancelled in 2011 due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) were developed to replace the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and provide a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like the AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles. The ACV and MPC are intended to replace the AAV and provide a more practical and cost-efficient manner of conducting amphibious and land operations. The ACV is expected to achieve Initial Operational Capability in the fourth quarter of FY 2020. The consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 variants into a single variant is planned to enable continuous production of ACVs to completely replace the AAV. The ACV 2.0 is planned to be capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, capable of high water speeds and deployment from ships far from the coast. The FY2020 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in the Base Budget, as well as FY2020 requested quantities. The consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 variants could result in cost savings and additional ACVs. The adoption of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept could have implications for the ACV program, including the requirement for enhanced survivability, lethality, or Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) features.", + "answer": [ + "On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a \"more affordable and sustainable\" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program \"on ice\" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a \"drastic shift,\" the Marines decided to \"resurrect\" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United States and Israel have a strong relationship, with cooperation in various areas, including addressing threats from Iran and Hezbollah, Israeli-Palestinian issues, and domestic political issues. Israel relies on its military and homeland security capabilities, as well as its cooperation with the United States, to manage potential threats to its security and existence. Israel has a robust homeland security system and has reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems and other heightened security measures. Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of \"nuclear opacity\" or amimut. A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads. The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969. Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles. Israeli officials closely consult with U.S. counterparts in an effort to influence U.S. decision-making on key regional issues. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU) commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Israel's leaders and supporters argue that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria. Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas. Limited Israeli strikes to enforce \"redlines\" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides. U.S. involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue. The U.S. base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly \"served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon.\" Israeli officials favor continued U.S. involvement", + "answer": [ + "Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) establishes foreign currency budget rates to determine the amount of foreign currency needed for overseas expenditures. These rates are used to build the annual budget and determine the amount of foreign currency needed for obligations and disbursements. DOD has used various methodologies to establish these rates, including a centered weighted average model that combined a 5-year average of exchange rates and an average of the most recently observed 12 months of exchange rates. For fiscal year 2017, DOD adjusted its methodology to establish the foreign currency budget rates using a 6-month average of Wall Street Journal rates.\n\nDOD incurs obligations for its overseas operations and records these obligations using the foreign currency budget rates. DOD uses the Department of Treasury’s International Treasury Services (ITS.gov) system to liquidate these obligations through disbursements. The ITS.gov system offers various rates, including advanced rates available up to 5 days in advance of disbursement and the spot rate. The spot rate is the price for foreign currencies for delivery in 2 business days.\n\nThe differences between the foreign currency budget rates and the actual exchange rates used for disbursements result in gains or losses in the appropriated amounts available for overseas expenditures. DOD manages these gains and losses through the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account. The FCFD account is a no-year account that maintains the budgeted level of operations in the MILPERS and O&M appropriation accounts by mitigating substantial gains or losses to those appropriations caused by foreign currency rate fluctuations.\n\nGAO reviewed DOD’s management of the FCFD account and found that the account balances were not always accurate and up-to-date. GAO recommended that DOD improve the accuracy and completeness of the FCFD account data and documentation. GAO also recommended that DOD provide more transparency and guidance on the factors considered in revising foreign currency budget rates and the potential cost savings from using alternate rates.\n\nIn summary, DOD establishes foreign currency budget rates to determine the amount of foreign currency needed for overseas expenditures. These rates are used to build the annual budget and determine", + "answer": [ + "DOD requested about $60 billion for fiscal years 2009 - 2017 to purchase goods and services overseas and reimburse service-members for costs incurred while stationed abroad. DOD uses foreign currency exchange rates to budget and pay (that is, disburse amounts) for these expenses. It also manages the FCFD account to mitigate a loss in buying power that results from foreign currency rate changes. GAO was asked to examine DOD's processes to budget for and manage foreign currency fluctuations. This report (1) describes DOD's revision of its foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised rates and projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs; (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to disburse funds to liquidate O&M obligations, and determined whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the FCFD account balance. GAO analyzed data on foreign currency rates, DOD financial management regulations, a non-generalizable sample of foreign currency disbursement data, and FCFD account balances. The Department of Defense (DOD) revised its foreign currency exchange rates (“budget rates”) during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 for each of the nine foreign currencies it uses to develop its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget request. These revisions decreased DOD's projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. DOD's revision of the budget rates during these years also decreased the expected gains (that is, buying power) that would have resulted from an increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies. DOD did not revise its budget rates in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. For fiscal year 2017, DOD changed its methodology for producing budget rates, resulting in rates that were more closely aligned with market rates. According to officials, that change made it unnecessary to revise the budget rates during the fiscal year. DOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates used to pay (that is, disburse amounts) for goods and services, but DOD has not fully determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional savings. The Army has estimated potential savings of up to $10 million annually by using a foreign currency rate available 3 days in advance of paying for goods or services rather than a more costly rate available up to 5 days in advance. The Army has converted to the use of a 3-day advanced rate. GAO's analysis suggests that DOD could achieve cost savings if the services reviewed and consistently selected the most cost-effective foreign currency rates when paying for their goods and services. Absent a review, DOD is at risk for paying more than it would otherwise be required to conduct its transactions. DOD used the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses (that is, less buying power) due to unfavorable foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years GAO reviewed. Since 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD account balance at the statutory limit of $970 million, largely by transferring unobligated balances before they are cancelled from certain DOD accounts into the FCFD. However, DOD has not identified the appropriate FCFD account balance needed to maintain program operations by routinely analyzing projected losses and basing any transfers into the account on those expected losses. Thus, DOD may be maintaining balances that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed, and that could have been used for other purposes or returned to the Treasury Department (see figure). GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD review opportunities to achieve cost savings by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates used for the payment of goods and services, and analyze projected losses to manage the FCFD account balance. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assesses the progress and challenges in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The report identifies several areas of improvement, including data sharing among agencies and states, accuracy of data used to identify high-risk facilities, and risk assessment approach. The report also highlights the progress made by DHS in addressing the recommendations made by the GAO, such as developing a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, identifying potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate, and enhancing its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk. The report also notes that DHS has made progress in reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review. However, the report also identifies challenges such as the low participation in the Expedited Approval Program (EAP) and the need for DHS to document processes and procedures for managing compliance of facilities that have not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans. The report concludes by stating that DHS has made progress in addressing the recommendations made by the GAO and has taken steps towards improving the CFATS program, but there is still room for improvement.", + "answer": [ + "Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the use of coal as an energy source in the United States and the impact of coal mining on the environment. In 2016, coal accounted for 17% of energy production and 30% of electricity production in the US. Approximately 730 million tons of coal were mined domestically, with 40% produced on federal lands. The report highlights the two main methods of coal mining: surface mining and underground mining. Surface mining involves clearing forests and vegetation, and removing topsoil, while underground mining involves tunneling to access coal. The report also discusses the regulations in place to mitigate the negative impacts of coal mining on the environment, including the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). SMCRA requires mine operators to obtain permits and submit reclamation plans before starting mining operations. The report also highlights the use of financial assurances to ensure that reclamation is completed in compliance with water quality standards. The report concludes by discussing the potential risks associated with self-bonding, a type of financial assurance allowed under SMCRA.", + "answer": [ + "Coal accounts for 17 percent of domestic energy production. SMCRA requires coal mine operators to reclaim lands that were disturbed during mining and to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available to complete reclamation if the operator does not do so. Recent coal company bankruptcies have drawn attention to whether financial assurances obtained by OSMRE and state agencies will be adequate to reclaim land once coal mining operations have ceased. GAO was asked to review management of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. This report describes, among other things, the amounts and types of financial assurances held for coal mine reclamation in 2017 and the challenges that OSMRE and state agencies face in managing these financial assurances. GAO collected and analyzed data from OSMRE and 23 state agencies; reviewed federal laws, regulations, and directives; and interviewed OSMRE and state agency officials and representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries and environmental organizations. State agencies and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) reported holding approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds (guaranteed by a third party), collateral bonds (guaranteed by a tangible asset, such as a certificate of deposit), and self-bonds (guaranteed on the basis of a coal operator's own finances) as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. OSMRE and state agencies face several challenges in managing financial assurances, according to the stakeholders GAO interviewed. Specifically, Obtaining additional financial assurances from operators for unanticipated reclamation costs, such as long-term treatment for water pollution, can be difficult. Determining the financial stability of surety companies has been challenging in certain instances. Self-bonding presents a risk to the government because it is difficult to (1) ascertain the financial health of an operator, (2) determine whether the operator qualifies for self-bonding, and (3) obtain a replacement for existing self-bonds when an operator no longer qualifies. In addition, some stakeholders said that the risk from self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). GAO's previous work examining environmental cleanup found that the financial risk to government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. GAO also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for various energy and mineral extraction sectors and found that coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. However, because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonds pose to the federal government and states would require SMCRA be amended. GAO recommends that Congress consider amending SMCRA to eliminate self-bonding. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government operates on an annual budget, with most agencies receiving funding through regular appropriations acts or continuing resolutions (CRs). When a CR is needed, it provides interim budget authority, but it is not a long-term solution. Since the fiscal year began on October 1, 1977, there have been 20 funding gaps, with the most recent occurring in FY2019. A funding gap occurs when there is no budget authority for a particular project or activity, and it can result in a shutdown of affected projects and activities, including the furlough of non-excepted personnel. The Antideficiency Act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of federal funds in the absence of appropriations.\n\nThe Civiletti letters, issued in 1980 and early 1981, provide guidance on the limits of federal government activities during a funding gap. They state that agencies may make no contracts and obligate no further funds except as \"authorized by law\" and may fulfill certain legal obligations connected with the orderly termination of agency operations. Exceptions may be made for activities involving \"the safety of human life or the protection of property.\"\n\nWhen a funding gap occurs, executive agencies begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, including the furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. However, a funding gap may result in a shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not in others.\n\nProposals have been made to establish an \"automatic continuing resolution\" (ACR) that would provide a fallback source of funding authority for activities in the event that timely enactment of appropriations is disrupted. This would avoid funding gaps and ensure that a source of funding is available automatically and remains available as long as needed. Although the House and Senate have considered ACR proposals in the past, none has been enacted into law on a permanent basis.", + "answer": [ + "The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving \"the safety of human life or the protection of property.\" The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. When a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent. Since FY1977, 20 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 34 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps do not appear to have resulted in a \"shutdown.\" Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often \"continued to operate during periods of expired funding.\" In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. Two funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 full days. During FY2018, there was a funding gap when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two full days. The most recent funding gap occurred during FY2019, when a CR covering federal agencies and activities funded in 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills expired on December 21, 2018. It concluded on January 25, 2019, after lasting 34 full days. For a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) provides document services through three broad categories: printing and reproduction, device procurement, and electronic content management. DOD’s Instruction on document services designates DLA Document Services as DOD’s single manager for printing and high-speed, high-volume duplication. DLA Document Services’ customer service network comprises a headquarters and 132 production facilities worldwide. DOD components, including the military services, use annual appropriations and their own working capital funds to reimburse the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund for document services. DOD initiated efforts to increase efficiencies in document services in 2011, including a 20 percent reduction in printing and reproduction spending in fiscal year 2013. DLA Document Services developed a transformation plan to further increase efficiencies and better accomplish its mission of providing document services to DOD and the military services. The plan includes closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 brick and mortar facilities in the continental United States over the course of fiscal years 2018 and 2019. The transformation plan also calls for DLA Document Services to adjust the size and composition of its workforce. DOD has taken steps toward achieving efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan for DLA Document Services, taking steps to reduce the cost and number of office print devices, and increasing its use of electronic content management. However, further gains may be possible in areas such as better managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, reducing overlap in procuring print devices, meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices, and consolidating locations that provide mission specialty printing. The report recommends that DOD should evaluate DLA Document Services’ transformation plan against leading practices for consolidation and efficiency initiatives. The report also recommends that DOD should provide more accurate and complete financial information to key stakeholders to manage its document services.", + "answer": [ + "DOD has reported printing costs that totaled about $608 million, on average, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. DLA Document Services has key DOD-wide responsibilities for (1) printing and reproduction, (2) print device procurement, and (3) electronic content management (e.g., digital document repositories). Other DOD components, including the military services, also maintain some document services capabilities at various locations. House Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 included a provision for GAO to examine DOD's document services. This report evaluates (1) the progress DOD has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, to achieve further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials regarding DOD's efficiency initiatives, including DLA Document Services' transformation plan; reviewed print device procurement contracts and pricing information; and analyzed DOD budget data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to achieve efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan to consolidate existing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Document Services facilities. However, GAO identified four areas where further gains may be possible: Managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services. DOD has designated DLA Document Services as the single manager for printing and reproduction services, but DOD customers, citing concerns with DLA's services, have also obtained these services directly from the Government Publishing Office and via in-house print facilities (see fig.). DOD has not assessed DLA's performance in this role or whether additional efficiencies may be possible in light of DLA's transformation plan. Reducing overlap in procuring print devices. GAO found that DOD components used at least four different contract sources to acquire print devices. DOD has not assessed which acquisition approach represents the best value; doing so might better position DOD to further reduce its costs. Meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices. DOD and the military services have not demonstrated that they achieved established goals for reducing the number of print devices. Additional controls and assignment of oversight responsibilities to monitor progress could better enable DOD to achieve its cost savings goals, estimated to be millions of dollars annually. Consolidating DLA facilities. DLA is closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 facilities in the United States. However, GAO found that for four of seven types of specialty services, DLA plans to retain facilities that are responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for each of those specialties, which suggests that further consolidations are possible. DOD includes the cost of non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising time for recruiting, within its budget materials for printing and reproduction. It does not include costs to acquire print devices and for electronic content management. As a result, DOD and the Congress lack the oversight into total document services costs needed to make informed decisions. GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate options to achieve additional cost savings and other efficiencies in its document services and report more accurate budget data. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe federal government owns and leases hundreds of thousands of buildings across the country, costing billions of dollars annually to operate and maintain. To address long-standing issues, the federal government has undertaken several government-wide initiatives and issued memorandums to CFO Act agencies. OMB and GSA provide leadership in managing federal real property. OMB issued a memorandum in 2012 requiring agencies to dispose of excess properties and more efficiently use real estate assets. In 2013, OMB clarified the Freeze the Footprint policy, requiring agencies to maintain no more than their fiscal year 2012 total square footage of domestic office and warehouse space. In 2015, OMB transitioned from freezing the federal government’s real property footprint to reducing it. The National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property outlined three key steps to improve real property management: freeze growth in the inventory, measure performance and use data to identify opportunities to improve efficiency, and reduce the size of the inventory by consolidating, co-locating, and disposing of properties. The RTF policy requires agencies to submit annual Real Property Efficiency Plans to GSA and OMB, set reduction targets for domestic office and warehouse space, and identify potential projects related to office and warehouse consolidation, co-location, disposal, construction, and acquisition efforts. GSA has two key responsibilities related to real property management: acquiring, managing, and disposing of federally owned real property, and leasing commercial buildings on behalf of agencies. GSA’s Public Buildings Service functions as the federal government’s principal landlord. GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy is responsible for identifying, evaluating, and promoting best practices to improve the efficiency of management processes. Based on a review of agencies’ 2016 and 2017 Plans, all 24 CFO Act agencies described strategies for reducing office and warehouse space. Agencies cited consolidation, co-location, and disposal as the primary means to reduce their office and warehouse space. The report also identified four challenges agencies face in achieving their RTF targets: space reduction costs, mission delivery, employee organization concerns, and work", + "answer": [ + "The federal government continues to work to reduce its real property inventory and associated costs. GSA provides space for agencies in government-owned and commercially leased buildings. In 2015, the OMB issued a memorandum requiring the 24 agencies with chief financial officers to reduce their domestic office and warehouse space. These agencies are required to set annual reduction targets for a 5-year time period and update their real property plans annually. GAO was asked to review the implementation of this space reduction initiative. This report discusses: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 agencies identified to achieving their reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent these agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 targets; and (3) how GSA manages vacated space it had leased to these agencies. GAO conducted a content analysis of the 24 agencies' real property plans for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 and analyzed agencies' data as submitted to GSA on their targets and reductions for fiscal year 2016, the only year for which data were available. GAO selected five agencies as case studies based on several factors, including size of the agencies' office and warehouse portfolio, agency reduction targets, and fiscal year 2016 reported reductions. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from GSA, OMB, and GAO's case study agencies. GAO provided a draft of this product to GSA, OMB, and our case study agencies for comment. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate. Most of the 24 agencies with chief financial officers reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) that they planned to consolidate their office and warehouse space and allocate fewer square feet per employee as the key ways to achieve their space reduction targets. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported it will consolidate staff from five component agencies in two office buildings. When complete, the space allocated per employee will average about 250 square feet down from a high of 420 square feet per employee. In taking these actions, the agencies most often identified the cost of space reduction projects as a challenge to achieving their targets. Agencies cited costs such as for space renovations to accommodate more staff and required environmental clean-up before disposing of property as challenges to completing projects. Some agencies required to maintain offices across the country reported that their mission requirements limit their ability to reduce their space. In fiscal year 2016, 17 of the 24 agencies reported they reduced their space, but had varying success achieving their first-year targets. Of the 17 agencies, 9 exceeded their target and reduced more space than planned, 7 missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent), and 1 reduced space, despite a targeted increase. Agency officials said that it is not unusual for projects to shift to different years and that such shifts could lead to missing targets one year and exceeding them the next. GSA has processes to manage the space vacated by agencies that is leased through GSA. For example, starting in November 2016, GSA started tracking agencies' space release requests centrally to help standardize the process and established an e-mail address to which agencies can submit requests. GSA relies on regional offices to manage real property in their regions and to identify tenants for vacant space or to remove unused space from the inventory. GSA's regional officials said regular monitoring and coordinating with agencies minimizes the likelihood GSA is caught off guard by a return of space. These processes also help them to plan ahead. GSA met its 2016 performance goal to have an annual vacant space rate of no more than 3.2 percent in its federally owned and leased buildings. However, given the recent implementation of the space reduction initiative, it is too early to determine the extent to which agencies will return space to GSA prior to the end of their leases and the effect on GSA's inventory." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report analyzes the role of cash and noncash payment systems in the United States and the potential implications of a reduced role of cash payments in the economy. Cash remains an important method of payment in the United States, but anecdotal evidence suggests that electronic payment systems are becoming increasingly popular and cost-effective relative to cash payments. Newer digital currencies, such as cryptocurrencies, offer alternative payment options that are independent of traditional systems.\n\nThe report divides into two parts. Part I analyzes cash and noncash payment systems and the advantages and costs specific to each payment system. It also examines potential obstacles to the adoption of alternative electronic payment systems. Part II analyzes the potential implications of a reduced role of cash payments in the economy, including potential benefits, costs, and risks.\n\nThe report presents two international case studies of economies in which noncash payment systems rapidly expanded. In Sweden, the use of cash has declined significantly, and many businesses no longer accept cash. In Kenya, mobile money services, such as M-Pesa, have become popular and have increased access to financial services for lower-income groups.\n\nThe report concludes that the role of cash in the payment system may continue to decline in coming years due to buyer or seller preference or government policy. The consequences of an evolution away from cash are being debated, with proponents arguing that it could generate important benefits, including improved efficiency of the payment system, reduced crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Opponents argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy.\n\nThe report suggests that Congress may consider policy issues related to the declining use of cash relative to electronic forms of payment. It also highlights the importance of understanding the potential implications of a reduced role of cash payments in the economy and the potential benefits and risks associated with different payment systems.", + "answer": [ + "Electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient due to technological advances in digitization and data processing. Anecdotal reporting and certain analyses suggest that businesses and consumers are increasingly eschewing cash payments in favor of electronic payment methods. Such trends have led analysts and policymakers to examine the possibility that the use and acceptance of cash will significantly decline in coming years and to consider the effects of such an evolution. Cash is still a common and widely accepted payment system in the United States. Cash's advantages include its simplicity and robustness as a payment system that requires no ancillary technologies. In addition, it provides privacy in transactions and protection from cyber threats or financial institution failures. However, using cash involves costs to businesses and consumers who pay fees to obtain, manage, and protect cash and exposes its users to loss through misplacement, theft, or accidental destruction of physical currency. Cash also concurrently generates government revenues through \"profits\" earned by producing it and by acting as interest-free liabilities to the Federal Reserve (in contrast to reserve balances on which the Federal Reserve pays interest), while reducing government revenues by facilitating some tax avoidance. The relative advantages and costs of various payment methods will largely determine whether and to what degree electronic payment systems will displace cash. Traditional noncash payment systems (such as credit and debit cards and interbank clearing systems) involving intermediaries such as banks and central banks address some of the shortcomings of cash payments. These systems can execute payments over physical distance, allow businesses and consumers to avoid some of the costs and risks of using cash, and are run by generally trusted and closely regulated intermediaries. However, the maintenance and operation of legacy noncash systems involve their own costs, and the intermediaries charge fees to recoup those costs and earn profits. The time it takes to finalize certain transactions—including crediting customer accounts for check or electronic deposits—can lead to consumers incurring additional costs. In addition, these systems involve cybersecurity risks and generally require customers to divulge their private personal information to gain system access, which raises privacy concerns. To date, the migration away from cash has largely been in favor of traditional noncash payment systems; however, some observers predict new alternative systems will play a larger role in the future. Such alternative systems aim to address some of the inefficiencies and risks of traditional noncash systems, but face obstacles to achieving that aim and involve costs of their own. Private systems using distributed ledger technology, such as cryptocurrencies, may not serve the main functions of money well and face challenges to widespread acceptance and technological scalability. These systems also raise concerns among certain observers related to whether these systems could facilitate crime, provide inadequate protections to consumers, and may adversely affect governments' ability to implement or transmit monetary policy. The potential for increased payment efficiency from these systems is promising enough that certain central banks have investigated the possibility of issuing government-backed, electronic-only currencies—called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)—in such a way that the benefits of certain alternative payment systems could be realized with appropriately mitigated risk. How CBDCs would be created and function are still matters of speculation at this time, and the possibility of their introduction raises questions about the appropriate role of a central bank in the financial system and the economy. If the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. Proponents of reducing cash usage (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society) argue that doing so will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Based on their assessment of the magnitude of these benefits and costs and the likelihood that market forces will displace cash as a payment system, policymakers may choose to encourage or discourage this trend." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe federal government operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs) through the Department of Energy. These agencies were created to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams and provide service to small communities and farms. Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area and has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is the first PMA and is self-financed, receiving no federal appropriations. BPA has permanent Treasury borrowing authority and has initiated strategies to address a changing power generation and demand market. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) is the largest PMA in terms of service area and markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers. The Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA) and the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA) also operate in distinct geographic areas and serve preference customers. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act, and questions of privatization of these federal agencies.", + "answer": [ + "The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., \"preference customers\"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that \"eliminating or reducing\" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would \"encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers.\" The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a \"net-zero\" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe report discusses the role and responsibilities of the minority leader in the US House of Representatives. The minority leader is the head of the \"loyal opposition\" and is elected every two years by secret ballot of their party caucus or conference. The position is not well-defined and the duties are based on tradition and custom. The minority leader serves as the leader and spokesperson for the minority party and participates in certain institutional prerogatives afforded to Members in the minority. The report also discusses the historical origin of the position and the various party and institutional responsibilities of the minority leader. The minority leader faces challenges in promoting and publicizing the party's priorities, serving the interests of their rank-and-file members, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity. The ultimate goal of the minority leader is to lead the party into majority status.", + "answer": [ + "The House minority leader, the head of the \"loyal opposition,\" is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader occupies a number of important institutional and party roles and responsibilities, and his or her fundamental goal is to recapture majority control of the House. From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with like-minded colleagues, to advance party objectives. Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party's agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success. From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or a designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nTitle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in educational programs receiving federal funding. The statute does not explicitly address sexual abuse or harassment, but the Supreme Court has held that a school district can be held liable for damages based on a deliberately indifferent response to a teacher's sexual abuse or harassment of a student. The Court has also held that a school board may be liable under Title IX for a deliberately indifferent response to student-on-student sexual harassment. Federal agencies that administer Title IX have determined that educational institutions can be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment under the statute in certain circumstances. Title IX is primarily enforced through private rights of action and federal agency enforcement. The proposed Title IX regulations would significantly change educational institutions' responsibilities for responding to sexual harassment allegations. The regulations would require schools to provide written notice of allegations, provide an opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and evidence, and allow cross-examination by a party's advisor. The proposed regulations would also alter the ultimate decisionmaking requirements for schools. The antidiscrimination mandate of Title IX prohibits discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in educational programs in general terms. The statute does not expressly refer to or address sex discrimination in the form of sexual abuse, sexual harassment, or sexual assault. The remedial scheme for a private right of action to address such claims has been created by the Supreme Court. Federal agencies have issued shifting guidelines regarding the responsibilities of educational institutions in complying with Title IX. The legal standards that apply in a private suit for damages under Title IX have been judicially implied. Congress could modify the legal standards or directly amend Title IX to clarify the appropriate standard in private suits for damages as well as in the administrative enforcement context.", + "answer": [ + "Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment at educational institutions. It bars discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Although Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual harassment or abuse, the Supreme Court and federal agencies have determined that such conduct can sometimes constitute discrimination in violation of the statute; educational institutions in some circumstances can be held responsible when a teacher sexually harasses a student or when one student harasses another. Title IX is mainly enforced (1) through private rights of action brought directly against schools by or on behalf of students subjected to sexual misconduct; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. To establish liability in a private right of action, a party seeking damages for a Title IX violation must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998, and Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided the next year. Gebser provides that when a teacher commits harassment against a student, a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an \"appropriate person,\" and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. Davis instructs that, besides showing actual knowledge by an appropriate person and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was \"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions set forth a high threshold for a private party seeking damages against an educational institution based on its response to sexual harassment. In turn, federal appellate courts have differed in how to apply the standards set in Gebser and Davis, diverging on the nature and amount of evidence sufficient to support a claim. In each of the last several presidential administrations, the Department of Education (ED) issued a number of guidance documents that instruct schools on their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflected a different standard than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment (the Court in Davis acknowledged that the threshold for liability in a private right of action could be higher than the standard imposed in the administrative enforcement context). Those guidance documents had, among other things, established that sometimes a school could be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment by a teacher, irrespective of actual notice; and schools could be held responsible for student-on-student harassment if a \"responsible employee\" knew or should have known of the harassment (constructive notice). ED's previous guidance also instructed educational institutions that they sometimes could be responsible for responding to incidents of sexual harassment occurring off campus. ED also cautioned schools on the use of mediation to resolve allegations of sexual harassment. With regard to the procedures used by schools to resolve sexual harassment allegations, ED informed schools that they must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to establish culpability, and the agency strongly discouraged schools from allowing parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. In response to guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from the department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) between 2011 and 2016, schools developed several procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual harassment and assault complied with Title IX. A number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in handling their case. ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2018, after revoking some of its previous guidance to schools in 2017. The proposed regulations would, in several ways, tether the administrative requirements for schools to the standard set by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis. In doing so, the proposed regulations would depart from the standards set by ED in previous guidance documents (some of which have since been rescinded). The new regulations would require \"actual notice,\" rather than constructive notice, of harassment by an education institution to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities, and provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate Title IX only if it amounts to deliberate indifference. In addition, the new regulations would more narrowly define what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX, and also impose new procedural requirements, which appear to reflect due process concerns, when schools investigate sexual harassment or assault allegations and make determinations of culpability." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe National Science Foundation (NSF) relies on two programs to bring rotators into the agency: the IPA program and the VSEE program. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) develops policies on agencies’ use of the IPA program and promulgates program regulations. The key differences between IPA and VSEE rotators include their employment status and compensation. IPA rotators are appointed as federal employees on a nonpaid leave of absence from their home institutions, while VSEE rotators continue to be employed by their home institutions and receive full salaries and benefits. NSF reimburses its cost-sharing amounts to home institutions, which continue to pay rotators’ full salaries and benefits. NSF does not cap the salaries of IPA rotators, but VSEE rotators’ salaries are capped at the federal maximum for the position they hold at NSF. Both IPA and VSEE rotators are eligible for certain other types of reimbursement, such as moving expenses and travel-related expenses.\n\nNSF uses rotators in executive and program director positions across its seven scientific directorates. The agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce. However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders and adjust the programs, if warranted.\n\nThe NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan. The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should also evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results. These recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce.", + "answer": [ + "NSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees. GAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. The numbers of rotators—outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment—at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018. NSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators. GAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\nThe 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues, including assisted housing programs, housing finance, and housing affordability. The report provides a high-level overview of the most prominent housing-related issues that may be of interest during the Congress. It is meant to provide a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to provide detailed information or analysis. However, it includes references to more in-depth CRS reports on these issues where possible. The report provides background on housing and mortgage market conditions to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. The discussion of market conditions is at the national level, but it is important to be aware that local housing market conditions can vary dramatically. National housing market indicators can provide an overall sense of general trends in housing. In general, rising home prices, relatively low interest rates, and rising rental costs have been prominent features of housing and mortgage markets in recent years. However, these trends have led to increased concerns about housing affordability for both prospective homebuyers and renters. The report also discusses current trends in selected owner-occupied housing and mortgage market indicators, including nominal house prices, average mortgage interest rates, and rental costs. It concludes by noting that the affordability of owner-occupied housing may hold steady or improve, potentially impacting housing market activity.", + "answer": [ + "The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following: The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively. Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. corporate income tax system is based on worldwide economic activity. However, many corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions, which creates complications for tax administration and compliance. Corporations may also actively choose to organize in ways that reduce their U.S. and worldwide tax liabilities. This has led to various strategies, including inversions, expatriation, and mergers.\n\nInversions were commonly structured as a U.S. corporation merging with a foreign company, with the new company retaining the U.S. corporation's tax status. However, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 largely prevented the tax benefits of inversions by denying or restricting the tax benefits if the owners of the new company were not substantially different from the owners of the original company. The JOBS Act also allowed a firm to invert only if it had substantial business operations in the country where the new headquarters was to be located.\n\nDespite these restrictions, several high-profile companies announced mergers or plans to merge with non-U.S. firms in 2014, including Pfizer, Chiquita, and Omnicom. The Treasury Department responded with regulatory changes in 2014 and 2015 to limit the tax benefits of inversions. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 made further changes to the corporate tax and international tax rules, including specific provisions aimed at discouraging inversions.\n\nThe report concludes by discussing various proposals to reform the corporate tax system, including limiting the tax benefits of inversions, eliminating deferral, and addressing earnings stripping. There is disagreement among experts about the feasibility and desirability of these proposals.\n\nIn summary, the report discusses the complexities of the U.S. corporate income tax system and the strategies corporations use to reduce their tax liabilities. It highlights the regulatory changes made by the Treasury Department and Congress to limit the tax benefits of inversions and the proposals for further reform. The report concludes with a discussion of the ongoing debate about the best way to address these issues.", + "answer": [ + "News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate \"inversions\" or \"expatriations\": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the \"parent\" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings, and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the locations of many of the newly created parent corporations. These types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place. However, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located; the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. If the original U.S. shareholders owned less than 60%, the firm was not considered as inverting. Two features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. The U.K. joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax in 2009. At the same time, the U.K. also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Inverted firms could reduce worldwide taxes by stripping taxable earnings out of the new U.S. subsidiary, largely through allocating debt to that subsidiary. Soon after, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This \"second wave\" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie canceled their plans in the wake of 2014 Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms completed merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Evidence suggests that these Treasury regulations have been an important factor in subsequently decreasing these merger-related inversions. Two policy options had been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. In December 2017, P.L. 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) lowered the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform which some argued would slow the rate of inversions. Other tax reform proposals suggested that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There were concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. P.L. 115-97, while moving in some ways to a territorial tax, also instituted a number of measures aimed at combatting profit shifting, including a global minimum tax on intangible income that limited the tax benefits of a territorial tax. The second option is to directly target inversions. The 2017 act included several provisions that discouraged inversions. In addition, further anti-inversion provisions have been introduced, most recently H.R. 5108 and S. 2459 in the 115th Congress, to treat all firms in which former U.S. shareholders have more than 50% ownership (or in which management and control is in the United States) as U.S. firms. These bills also provided that debt could also be allocated to the U.S. member of a worldwide operation in proportion to the U.S. ownership of assets." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe United Nations (UN) has been conducting peacekeeping operations since 1948. As of June 30, 2017, the UN had 16 active peacekeeping operations worldwide, with eight of them in sub-Saharan Africa. UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from primarily military operations to multidimensional operations that include civilian and police personnel. The UN’s goal is to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to implement peace agreements or political processes. The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7.9 billion, with individual operation budgets ranging from $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to over $1.2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, contributing an average of about $2.1 billion per year from fiscal years 2014 to 2017. The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every three years, with the United States’ assessment averaging about 28.5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. In April 2014, the UN Security Council established MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (CAR) following escalating sectarian violence that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and the displacement of over 2.5 million people. MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, supporting the implementation of the transition process, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, promoting and protecting human rights, supporting justice and the rule of law, and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes. In November 2017, the UN Security Council extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018.", + "answer": [ + "To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Small Business Act of 1953 authorized the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to assist small businesses as a means to deter monopoly and oligarchy formation within all industries and the market failures caused by the elimination or reduction of competition in the marketplace. The Act defines a small business as one that is organized for profit, has a place of business in the United States, operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials, or labor, is independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field on a national basis. The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors to determine its size standards, which are used to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance and that these small businesses are not dominant in their field on a national basis. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards are also used to determine eligibility for federal small business contracting purposes. The SBA's size standards have been challenged by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and Members of Congress concerned that the size standards may not adequately target federal assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. The SBA's size standards have also been challenged by legislation such as the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs. The SBA's ongoing review of its size standards is conducted in part to prevent small business size standards from becoming outdated. The SBA also adjusts its receipts-based size standards for inflation at least once every five years and reviews size standards within specific industries whenever it determines that market conditions within that industry have changed. Congress has several options related to the SBA's ongoing review of its size standards, including waiting for the SBA to issue its proposed rule before providing input or establishing a dialogue with the agency. The", + "answer": [ + "Small business size standards are of congressional interest because they have a pivotal role in determining eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and, in some instances, tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation's small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of four measures: (1) number of employees, (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years, (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year, or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts. The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. This report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directed the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324, the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during recent Congresses (including H.R. 33, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584, during the 115th Congress) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe shift from defined benefit (DB) pension plans to defined contribution (DC) retirement plans has transferred certain types of risk from employers to employees. DC plans, such as 401(k) plans, offer a fixed level of retirement income based on contributions and investment performance. Tax incentives encourage employers to sponsor retirement plans and employees to participate. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs DC plans. Traditional 401(k) plans allow tax-deferred contributions and tax-free withdrawals after age 59½. Roth IRAs provide after-tax contributions and tax-free withdrawals in retirement. IRA assets account for almost 33% of total U.S. retirement assets, with over 94% of funds flowing into traditional IRAs from 401(k) plans. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Labor (DOL) share responsibility for enforcing laws governing IRAs. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) reported that 34.8% of households in the United States owned an IRA in 2017.\n\nThe report also examines early withdrawals from retirement savings. The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) allows certain early withdrawals for qualified higher education expenses, qualified first-time homebuyer distributions, and hardship withdrawals. The report analyzes company practices and stakeholder suggestions for reducing early withdrawals. The report does not endorse or recommend any specific strategy.\n\nIn conclusion, the shift from DB to DC retirement plans has transferred certain types of risk from employers to employees. Tax incentives encourage employers to sponsor retirement plans and employees to participate. The report examines early withdrawals from retirement savings and suggests strategies to reduce them. The IRS and DOL share responsibility for enforcing laws governing retirement savings. The Investment Company Institute reported that 34.8% of households in the United States owned an IRA in 2017.", + "answer": [ + "Federal law encourages individuals to save for retirement through tax incentives for 401(k) plans and IRAs—the predominant forms of retirement savings in the United States. In 2017, U.S. plans and IRAs reportedly held investments worth nearly $17 trillion dollars. Federal law also allows individuals to withdraw assets from these accounts under certain circumstances. DOL and IRS oversee 401(k) plans, and collect annual plan data—including financial information—on the Form 5500. For both IRAs and 401(k) plans, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the incidence and amount of early withdrawals; (2) factors that might lead individuals to access retirement savings early; and (3) policies and strategies that might reduce the incidence and amounts of early withdrawals. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from IRS, the Census Bureau, and DOL from 2013 (the most recent complete data available); and interviewed a diverse range of stakeholders identified in the literature, including representatives of companies sponsoring 401(k) plans, plan administrators, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and participant advocates. In 2013 individuals in their prime working years (ages 25 to 55) removed at least $69 billion (+/- $3.5 billion) of their retirement savings early, according to GAO's analysis of 2013 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (DOL) data. Withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRA)—$39.5 billion (+/- $2.1 billion)—accounted for much of the money removed early, were equivalent to 3 percent (+/- 0.15 percent) of the age group's total IRA assets, and exceeded their IRA contributions in 2013. Participants in employer-sponsored plans, like 401(k) plans, withdrew at least $29.2 billion (+/- $2.8 billion) early as hardship withdrawals, lump sum payments made at job separation (known as cashouts), and loan balances that borrowers did not repay. Hardship withdrawals in 2013 were equivalent to about 0.5 percent (+/-0.06 percent) of the age group's total plan assets and about 8 percent (+/- 0.9 percent) of their contributions. However, the incidence and amount of certain unrepaid plan loans cannot be determined because the Form 5500—the federal government's primary source of information on employee benefit plans—does not capture these data. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified flexibilities in plan rules and individuals' pressing financial needs, such as out-of-pocket medical costs, as factors affecting early withdrawals of retirement savings. Stakeholders said that certain plan rules, such as setting high minimum loan thresholds, may cause individuals to take out more of their savings than they need. Stakeholders also identified several elements of the job separation process affecting early withdrawals, such as difficulties transferring account balances to a new plan and plans requiring the immediate repayment of outstanding loans, as relevant factors. Stakeholders GAO interviewed suggested strategies they believed could balance early access to accounts with the need to build long-term retirement savings. For example, plan sponsors said allowing individuals to continue to repay plan loans after job separation, restricting participant access to plan sponsor contributions, allowing partial distributions at job separation, and building emergency savings features into plan designs, could help preserve retirement savings (see figure). However, they noted, each strategy involves tradeoffs, and the strategies' broader implications require further study. GAO recommends that, as part of revising the Form 5500, DOL and IRS require plan sponsors to report the incidence and amount of all 401(k) plan loans that are not repaid. DOL and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nGeorgia is a country located in the South Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian Seas. It has a long history of being incorporated into empires, including the Russian Empire. Georgia gained independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is considered one of the most democratic states among the USSR's successor states. Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance with a prime minister as the most powerful executive. The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces and has the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain circumstances. Georgia has unresolved conflicts with two Russian-supported regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After a short war with Russia in 2008, Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of these breakaway regions and stationed military forces on their territory. Georgia has a unique Caucasian language and an autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church with roots dating back to the fourth century. The United States has provided significant foreign aid to Georgia since the 2008 war, primarily through military assistance. The United States has gradually deepened its postwar defense cooperation with Georgia, including the approval of major defensive lethal weaponry sales. The United States and Georgia have held annual joint military exercises since 2011. The United States is Georgia's seventh-largest source of merchandise imports and eighth-largest destination for exports. The two countries have discussed the possibility of a free-trade agreement since 2012.", + "answer": [ + "Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the states that gained their independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to Europe and Eurasia. Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD) has close to a three-fourths supermajority in parliament and governs with limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 and 2018 appeared to show stronger growth than it had in the previous four years. The GD led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili's center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili's government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates. Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States \"does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations\" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia's military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which originally passed the House by unanimous consent in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6219), was reintroduced in the 116th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2019, Congress appropriated almost $90 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $68 million a year on average. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $35 million in Foreign Military Financing and $2 million in International Military Education and Training funds. Defense assistance also includes a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nSpinal cord injuries are complex and lifelong injuries that can result in impaired nervous system functions and secondary medical complications. These complications can include autonomic dysreflexia, depression, impaired bowel and bladder functioning, pressure ulcers, spasticity, syringomyelia, and others. Acquired brain injuries can also result in changes to physical, behavioral, and cognitive functioning.\n\nThe report discusses the different payment systems for acute care hospitals and long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and how they are classified based on Medicare diagnosis groups. The LTCH PPS has been modified to establish a two-tiered payment system, with certain discharges paid at the standard rate and others paid at a lower, site-neutral rate. The number of LTCHs has grown rapidly in recent years, raising concerns about the appropriateness of their care and the cost of their services.\n\nThe report also examines the payment policies for LTCHs and how they compare to those for acute care hospitals. The analysis uses Medicare claims data to determine whether each discharge would have qualified for the LTCH standard rate in the baseline year of fiscal year 2013. The analysis assumes that any discharge that met the criteria for the standard rate would qualify, unless the case was a psychiatric or rehabilitation stay.\n\nThe report concludes by discussing the potential impact of the site-neutral payment policy on the qualifying hospitals. The policy may result in a reduction in payments for discharges that do not qualify for the standard rate. The analysis uses the fiscal year 2018 rates to conduct simulations for payment policies in effect for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The analysis assumes that the site-neutral payment policy will apply to discharges from fiscal year 2019 through 2021. The report also discusses the potential impact of the policy on the eligibility of the qualifying hospitals for the standard rate.", + "answer": [ + "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pays LTCHs for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. There were about 400 LTCHs across the nation in 2016. The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to examine certain issues pertaining to LTCHs. This report examines (1) the health care needs of Medicare beneficiaries who receive services from the two qualifying hospitals; (2) how Medicare LTCH payment polices could affect the two qualifying hospitals; and (3) how the two qualifying hospitals compare with other LTCHs and other facilities that may treat Medicare patients with similar conditions. GAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare claims and other data for the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat patients with spinal cord injuries. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and stakeholders from the qualifying hospitals, other facilities that treat spinal cord patients, specialty associations, and others. GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We also provided the two qualifying hospitals summaries of information we collected from them, to confirm the accuracy of statements included in our draft report. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate. Spinal cord injuries may result in secondary complications that often lead to decreased functional independence and quality of life. The 21st Century Cures Act changed how Medicare pays certain long-term care hospitals (LTCH) that provide spinal cord specialty treatment. For these hospitals, the act included a temporary exception from how Medicare pays other LTCHs. Two LTCHs—Craig Hospital in Englewood, Colorado and Shepherd Center in Atlanta, Georgia—have qualified for this exception. GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries treated at these two hospitals typically receive specialized care for multiple chronic conditions and other long-term complications that develop after initial injuries, such as pressure ulcers that can result in life-threatening infection. The two hospitals also provide specialty care for acquired brain injuries, such as traumatic brain injuries. GAO's simulations of Medicare payments to these two hospitals using claims data from two baseline years—fiscal years 2013 and 2016—illustrate potential effects of payment policies. LTCHs are paid under a two-tiered system for care provided to beneficiaries: they receive the LTCH standard federal payment rate—or standard rate—for certain patients discharged from the LTCH, and a generally lower rate—known as a “site-neutral” rate—for all other discharges. Under the temporary exception, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center receive the standard rate for all discharges during fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Assuming their types of discharges remain the same as in fiscal years 2013 and 2016, GAO's simulations of Medicare payments in the baseline years indicate: Most of the discharges we examined would not qualify for the standard rate, if the exception did not apply. Medicare payments would generally decrease under fiscal year 2020 payment policy, once the exception expires. However, the actual effects of Medicare's payment policies on these two hospitals could vary based on factors, including the severity of patient conditions (e.g., Medicare payment is typically higher for more severe injuries), and whether hospitals' discharges meet criteria for the standard rate. Similarities and differences may exist between the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat Medicare patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. Patients with spinal cord and brain injuries may receive care in other LTCHs, but GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries at these other LTCHs are treated for conditions other than spinal cord and brain injuries. Certain inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) also provide post-acute rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. While data limitations make a direct comparison between these facilities and the two qualifying hospitals difficult, GAO identified some similarities and differences. For example, officials from some IRFs we interviewed reported providing several of the same programs and services as the two qualifying hospitals to medically complex patients, but the availability of services and complexity of patients varied. Among other reasons, the different Medicare payment requirements that apply to LTCHs and IRFs affect the types of services they provide and the patients they treat." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nCongressional Gold Medals have been awarded since the late 1700s to express public gratitude for distinguished contributions, dramatize the virtues of patriotism, and perpetuate the remembrance of great events. The first Congressional Gold Medals were issued by the Continental Congress. Since then, Congress has awarded gold medals to honor individuals and groups for their achievements. There are no permanent statutory provisions specifically relating to the creation of Congressional Gold Medals. When such an award is deemed appropriate, Congress has, by special action, provided for the creation of a personalized medal to be given in its name.\n\nThe first Congressional Gold Medals were struck in Paris under the direction of Colonel David Humphrey. Initially, gold medals were awarded for the most distinguished achievements. Silver and bronze medals, and ceremonial swords, were awarded for less eminent, but still notable, accomplishments. However, only the gold medal has been continuously awarded to the present day.\n\nThe first Congressional Gold Medal was authorized on March 25, 1776, for George Washington, then commander of the Continental Army, for his \"wise and spirited conduct\" in bringing about British evacuation of Boston. During the next 12 years, the Continental Congress authorized an additional six gold medals for Revolutionary military leaders.\n\nFollowing the ratification of the Constitution, the first two Congressional Gold Medals were given in 1800 to Captain Thomas Truxtun for his gallant effort during the action between the U.S. frigate Constellation and the French ship La Vengeance and in 1805 to Commodore Edward Preble for gallantry and good conduct during the War with Tripoli. After those medals were awarded, Congress issued gold medals primarily for military achievements in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.\n\nIn the 19th and early 20th centuries, gold medals were awarded for a variety of achievements, including exploration, science, and the arts. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the scope of Congressional Gold Medals was broadened to include recognition of excellence in fields such as athletics, aviation, diplomacy,", + "answer": [ + "Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition—the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name—Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Congressional gold medal legislation generally has a specific format. Once a gold medal is authorized, it follows a specific process for design, minting, and awarding. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a gold medal's design. Once the medal has been struck, a ceremony will often be scheduled to formally award the medal to the recipient. In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, and some have expressed interest in examining the gold medal awarding process. Should Congress want to make such changes, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to what individual or groups might be honored; potential specification of gold medal design elements; and where gold medals for groups might be housed once the award is made. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of gold medal legislation and whether statutory standards on the number of gold medals issued per year or per Congress might be established for gold medals." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the capabilities of radar systems, including Cobra Dane, in providing information for ballistic missile defense, space surveillance, and intelligence-gathering missions. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses these radar systems to track incoming missile threats, classify them, and determine if a threat was intercepted successfully. The report also highlights the importance of the location of these radar systems in providing these capabilities. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center is responsible for the sustainment of the Cobra Dane radar, with Air Force Space Command overseeing its operation at Shemya Island. The report also discusses the funding for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, with the Air Force and Missile Defense Agency sharing the costs. The report also notes that the Air Force and MDA are working to modernize the radar system. The report also discusses the limitations of the radar system in providing space surveillance capabilities when it is not operationally available. The report concludes by summarizing the funding for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and the modernization projects.", + "answer": [ + "First fielded in 1976 on Shemya Island in Alaska, the Cobra Dane radar faces growing sustainment challenges that DOD plans to address through modernization projects. Anticipating future needs, DOD began investing in new radar systems that share capabilities with Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, including the LRDR (Alaska), the Space Fence (Marshall Islands), and the Pacific Radar (location to be determined). The conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the Air Force's report to Congress on the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. This report identifies information included in the Air Force's report and describes additional information that GAO reviewed on (1) the capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar and other planned radars to meet DOD's mission requirements, (2) Cobra Dane's operational availability and the plan to mitigate the effect on those missions when Cobra Dane is not available, and (3) DOD's funding plan and project cost estimates for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and its site at Shemya Island. GAO reviewed the Air Force report and related documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force reported how the Cobra Dane radar and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) have shared and unique capabilities to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. The report noted that the respective locations of both radar systems affect their ability to provide those capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has other radar investments—the Pacific Radar and the Space Fence, which, according to DOD officials, may reduce DOD's reliance on Cobra Dane to provide ballistic missile defense and space surveillance capabilities. The Air Force's report to Congress noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability, which refers to the percentage of time that the radar is able to meet its missions. GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available. For example, U.S. Northern Command and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials stated that they can mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available by using the Sea-Based X-band radar to provide support for ballistic missile defense. The Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to conduct space surveillance if Cobra Dane were not available, as Cobra Dane tracks objects no other radar can track. However, MDA officials noted there are no plans to take Cobra Dane offline long enough to compromise space surveillance. The Air Force and MDA plan to contribute total funding of $278.6 million for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, according to their fiscal year 2019 budget plans. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Further, the Air Force report noted that the Air Force also plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane's site at Shemya Island. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for one project—known as the transmitter group replacement—but not for its other two projects. Air Force officials plan to complete cost estimates for those two projects in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe DEA is responsible for regulating the availability of controlled substances while preventing their diversion. The Controlled Substances Act requires all manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers to register with DEA unless exempt. DEA regulates these entities to prevent diversion and abuse. The Disposal Act allows the public to deliver unused controlled substances to authorized collectors, which DEA is responsible for regulating. DEA has three options for disposal: disposal bins, mail-back programs, and take-back events. Law enforcement agencies can use any of these methods without authorization. DEA requires authorized collectors to modify their registration to participate in disposal. About 3% of pharmacies and other eligible entities have become DEA-authorized collectors. Most authorized collectors are pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. DEA regulations require that all controlled substances collected in the disposal bin's inner liners must be destroyed in compliance with federal, state, and local laws and rendered non-retrievable. Authorized collectors can destroy the inner liner on their premises or contract with a reverse distributor to do so. DEA does not collect information on the use of disposal bins, such as the amount and types of prescription drugs deposited into the bins. Stakeholders reported uncertainty regarding how to comply with DEA's regulations for prescription drug disposal bins, and some have not participated due to these uncertainties. DEA provides guidance on its website, answers questions from participants and others, and gives training presentations at conferences. Some stakeholders reported that DEA's requirements may conflict with other state and federal regulations, such as transportation and disposal of hazardous waste.", + "answer": [ + "In 2015, 3.8 million Americans reported misusing prescription drugs within the last month, and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. About half of the people who reported misusing prescription drugs in 2015 received them from a friend or relative. One way to help prevent this kind of diversion and potential misuse is by providing secure and convenient ways to dispose of unused, unneeded, or expired prescription medications. The Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 authorizes pharmacies and other entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances to also collect unused prescription drugs for disposal. In 2014, DEA finalized regulations for the implementation of the Act, establishing a voluntary process for eligible entities to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs using disposal bins. GAO was asked to review participation among authorized collectors that maintain disposal bins. In this report GAO describes (1) participation rates among entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs and (2) factors that affect participation. GAO analyzed the most currently available DEA data from April 2017 on entities eligible to participate and those participating as authorized collectors. GAO also conducted interviews with DEA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 11 stakeholder organizations selected to illustrate different types of authorized collectors and long-term care facilities. GAO is not making any recommendations. DEA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO found that about 3 percent of pharmacies and other entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs for disposal have volunteered to do so. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorizes these entities to dispose of unused drugs to help reduce their potential misuse. Analysis of DEA data shows that as of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) eligible entities—that is, certain entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered with DEA to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most—about 81 percent—of the authorized collectors were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. GAO also found that participation rates varied by state, though in 44 states less than 5 percent of the state's pharmacies and other eligible entities had registered to become authorized collectors. Stakeholders cited several factors that may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have registered with DEA as authorized collectors of unused drugs. Most notably, stakeholders representing authorized collectors told GAO that because participation is voluntary, the cost associated with maintaining a disposal bin—which includes purchasing and installing the bin according to DEA requirements and paying for the destruction of its contents—is an important factor to weigh against potential benefits. DEA noted that availability of disposal by law enforcement agencies also contributes to low participation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe House of Representatives has standing rules that govern how bills and resolutions are to be taken up and considered on the floor. However, to expedite legislation receiving floor action, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration. This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution (special rule) or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure. In general, special rules enable the consideration of complex or contentious legislation, such as major appropriations or reauthorizations, while the suspension of the rules procedure is usually applied to broadly supported legislation that can be approved without floor amendments or extensive debate in the chamber. Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules. The suspension procedure allows nonprivileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments. Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold. Decisions to schedule bills for consideration under suspension are generally based on how widely supported the measures are, how long Members wish to debate them, and whether they want to propose floor amendments. These decisions are not necessarily related to the subject matter of the measure. Accordingly, measures brought up under suspension cover a wide range of policy areas but most often address government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities. This report describes the suspension procedure, which is defined in clause 1 of House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under suspension during the 114th Congress (2015-2016). The report includes statistical data on the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsors of measures, committee consideration, length of floor debate, voting, and resolution of differences between the chambers. The suspension of the rules procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV. Bills, resolutions, House amendments to Senate bills, amendments to the Constitution, conference reports, and other types of business may be considered under suspension, even those \"that would otherwise be subject to a point of order…[or have] not been reported or referred to", + "answer": [ + "Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016)." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe National Cemeteries Act of 1973 created the modern veterans’ cemetery system in the United States. The National Cemetery Administration (NCA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) manages most of the veterans’ cemeteries in the country. Since 1978, NCA has also provided funding through the VA’s Veterans Cemetery Grants Program (Grants Program) to help establish, expand, or improve state and tribal veterans’ cemeteries. The Grants Program is designed to complement national cemeteries by assisting state, territory, and tribal government applicants to establish, expand, or improve veterans’ cemeteries.\n\nNCA has changed its policies and procedures over time to better serve and honor veterans and their family members. For example, in 2011, NCA lowered its policy threshold for establishing new national cemeteries from an area having at least 170,000 veterans who are unserved by burial options to an area having 80,000 unserved veterans. This change was made in recognition that many highly populated areas still lacked reasonable access to a burial option and based on data and analysis provided by an independent review of VA’s burial benefits program in 2008.\n\nNCA offers a variety of facilities to meet the burial needs of veterans, including various cemetery configurations that either provide burial options to eligible veterans or improve their access to burial options. NCA uses county-level population data to determine whether veterans currently have reasonable access to burial options and uses county-level population projections to support decisions about future cemetery locations. NCA makes its decisions regarding whether a veteran is served or unserved based on the county in which the veteran resided, without reference to the location of the veteran’s actual residence.\n\nNCA’s current long-range plan to achieve its goal of providing reasonable access to 95 percent of the veteran population covers fiscal years 2018-2022. NCA’s plan includes establishing 18 new national cemeteries, comprised of five traditional national cemeteries and 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries", + "answer": [ + "The VA is responsible for ensuring that veterans have reasonable access to burial options in a national or state veterans' cemetery. In fiscal year 2018 VA estimated that about 92 percent of veterans had reasonable access to burial options, which was an increase from 90 percent in fiscal year 2014 but short of its goal of 96 percent by the end of fiscal year 2017. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns that there are geographic pockets where veterans remain unserved by burial options. House Report 115-188 accompanying a bill for the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, includes a provision for GAO to examine veterans' access to burial options. This report (1) describes VA's plan for increasing reasonable access to burial options for veterans and (2) assesses VA's progress in implementing its plan and any challenges experienced. GAO reviewed applicable VA and NCA documents, compared NCA's cost-estimating practices with GAO's cost-estimating 12 steps, and met with cognizant officials regarding NCA's efforts to provide reasonable access to burial options. Within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Cemetery Administration (NCA) has a plan to establish 18 new national cemeteries to increase reasonable access to burial options for veterans. NCA defines reasonable access as a national or state veterans' cemetery being located within 75 miles of veterans' homes. Key parts of NCA's plan include establishing 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries and awarding grant funds to state applicants for establishing new state veterans' cemeteries. NCA has made limited progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access and is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. For example, NCA has opened only two of its planned urban and rural initiative sites and is behind its original schedule for the other 11 (see fig. below). The primary factor delaying NCA's completion of these cemeteries has been challenges in acquiring suitable land. NCA has also been challenged in producing accurate estimates of construction costs for most of its rural initiative sites. Cost estimates have increased more than 200 percent (from about $7 million to $24 million) for these sites, and NCA's guidance for developing cost estimates for the cemeteries does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in cost-estimating leading practices—such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis or a sensitivity analysis. As a result, NCA is not well positioned to provide reliable and valid cost estimates to better inform decisions to enhance veterans' cemetery access. GAO recommends that NCA fully adopt cost-estimating leading practices into its procedures to assist in improving its cost estimates for establishing cemeteries. NCA concurred with our recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report focuses on the administration of federal elections in the United States, specifically how state and local election systems work and how they interact with federal activity on election administration. The report highlights that the administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized, with thousands of state and local systems responsible for conducting elections rather than a single, unified national system. The report also emphasizes that understanding how state and local election systems work is relevant to Congress for at least two reasons: first, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes, and second, Congress can require or encourage changes to the way state and local election systems work. The report describes the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections. It then uses examples from past federal action on election administration to illustrate some of the ways the duties and structures of state and local election systems interact with federal activity. The report concludes by introducing some considerations that may be relevant to Members interested in election administration. The report does not cover the federal role in administering federal elections, election administration in the U.S. territories, the role of law enforcement and the courts in election administration, or issues of constitutional or legal interpretation. The report focuses on the three main parts of the federal election process: voter registration, vote casting, and vote counting. The report describes common patterns in the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and how these duties can be described as policymaking, implementation, and funding. The report also highlights that the way federal elections are administered varies between and within states, and that a full accounting of these variations is beyond the scope of the report.", + "answer": [ + "The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system. States and localities share responsibility for most election administration duties. Exactly how responsibilities are assigned at the state and local levels varies both between and within states, but there are some general patterns in the distribution of duties. States typically have primary responsibility for making decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking). Localities typically have primary responsibility for conducting elections in accordance with those rules (implementation). Localities, with varying contributions from states, typically also have primary responsibility for paying for the activities and resources required to conduct elections (funding). The structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections also vary between and within states. Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the system, the relationship between local election officials and the state, and the population size and density of the jurisdiction the system serves. The leadership of a state or local election system may be elected or appointed, and both the leaders and the methods used to select them may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. State officials may have more or less direct influence over local election officials, and the extent of their influence may be affected by other structural features of the state's election systems, such as the methods used to select local officials. Finally, larger election jurisdictions have different administrative advantages and challenges than smaller ones, and more urban jurisdictions have different advantages and challenges than more rural ones. These differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in structural features of the election systems that serve them, such as how the systems allocate resources and where they find specialized expertise. Understanding the duties and structures of state and local election systems may be relevant to Congress for at least two reasons. First, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes. The effectiveness of federal action depends in part on how it is implemented. How it is implemented can depend, in turn, on how the state and local election systems that implement it work. Second, Congress can make or incentivize changes to the way state and local election systems work. Congress has a number of policy tools it can use to affect the administration of federal elections. The use of these tools can—either intentionally or unintentionally—affect the state and local election systems that administer federal elections." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nGrade-crossing safety has improved significantly since 1975, with the number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings declining. However, since 2009, the number of crashes and fatalities has plateaued. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are responsible for safety at grade crossings, with FHWA overseeing the Section 130 Program that provides funds to states for the elimination of hazards at highway-rail grade crossings. FHWA uses a statutory formula to distribute Section 130 Program funds, which averaged $235 million per year during the last 10 years. States determine what improvements need to be made at grade crossings, and FHWA has oversight responsibilities regarding the use of federal funds. FRA provides safety oversight of both freight and passenger railroads, collecting and analyzing data, issuing and enforcing safety regulations, and conducting focused inspections and audits. FRA also works with FHWA and other DOT operating administrations to improve grade-crossing safety. The report examines the focus of FRA’s grade-crossing-safety research, how states select and implement grade-crossing projects, and the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects. The report also describes FRA’s efforts to test new approaches that could improve safety. The report found that FRA’s research is aimed at understanding the causes of grade-crossing crashes and identifying potential improvements. The report also found that states select Section 130 Program projects based on a variety of factors, including the number of grade crossings and crashes, and the amount of Section 130 Program funds they receive. The report also found that FHWA and FRA have taken steps to address the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects, including providing guidance and technical assistance. The report concludes that FHWA and FRA have made progress in improving grade-crossing safety, but there is room for further improvement. The report recommends that FHWA and FRA continue to work together to address the challenges in implementing and assessing projects, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the Section 130 Program.", + "answer": [ + "Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity. Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates. To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections. Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas. GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Purple Heart is a military award that has been given to soldiers since 1782. It is intended to recognize soldiers who have been wounded or killed in combat. The award has undergone several changes in eligibility over time, with the most recent changes being made in 2015. The debate over eligibility for the Purple Heart has been controversial, especially with veterans groups. Congress has considered several pieces of legislation that would change who would be eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and under what conditions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly increased the number of servicemembers receiving the Purple Heart award as well as the potential conditions under which they receive the award. Increasingly acknowledged conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as accidents and other events while deployed, bring up new questions as to when a servicemember deserves a Purple Heart. The July 17, 2015, shooting of servicemembers at a Marine recruiting office and a naval reserve center in Chattanooga, TN, again prompted questions about applying the Purple Heart to terrorist attacks versus criminal acts. Veterans groups often voice their views when Congress or the President proposes making changes to expand eligibility for the Purple Heart. These groups argue, for example, that a servicemember who acquires PTSD may not always deserve the same recognition as a servicemember killed or wounded in direct combat, while others contend that these medical conditions can debilitate servicemembers just as much as physical injuries and can have lasting effects on servicemembers' lives. Determining which actions and events make a servicemember qualified for receiving a Purple Heart, and whether expanding eligibility does a disservice to those who have already earned the award, are contentious elements of this debate. Although Congress has traditionally left many military award requirements to the executive branch, the Constitution does allow Congress to act in this area, and events have prompted changes regarding eligibility for the Purple Heart. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 expanded eligibility by redefining what should be considered an attack by a \"foreign terrorist organization\" for", + "answer": [ + "The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers. Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes. While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power \"To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces\" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. \"Buck\" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart. Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers \"should\" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is responsible for overseeing the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which provides food assistance to low-income individuals and families. The program has several work requirements for recipients, including registering for work, reporting to an employer if referred by a state agency, accepting a bona fide offer of a suitable job, and participating in a SNAP Employment and Training (E&T) program or workfare. Able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) are subject to additional work requirements, including working or participating in a work program for 20 hours or more per week, or participating in workfare. ABAWDs who fail to comply with these requirements without good cause may lose their eligibility for benefits.\n\nFederal requirements for state SNAP E&T programs were first enacted in 1985 and provide states with flexibility in how they design their programs. States have the option to offer SNAP E&T services on a voluntary basis to some or all SNAP recipients, or require some or all SNAP work registrants to participate in the program as a condition of eligibility. States determine which service components to provide participants through their SNAP E&T programs, although they must provide at least one from a federally determined list.\n\nTotal federal expenditures on SNAP E&T programs were more than $337 million in fiscal year 2016. States are eligible to receive three types of federal funding available for state SNAP E&T programs: 100 percent funds, 50 percent federal reimbursement funds, and ABAWD pledge funds.\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget has designated SNAP as a high-priority program due to the estimated dollar amount in improper payments. According to USDA’s fiscal year 2015 agency financial report, $2.6 billion, or 3.66 percent, of all SNAP benefits paid in fiscal year 2014 were improper. The most common primary cause of dollar errors was household income. States review the accuracy of SNAP payments to recipients on an ongoing basis, and FNS assesses the accuracy", + "answer": [ + "SNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking. This testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product. Overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight. USDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain. Improper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review. Recipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud. Retailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking—a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking. GAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the potential for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to be used as a maritime fuel in the shipping industry. LNG has the potential to reduce harmful air emissions, create a new market for domestic natural gas, and create economic opportunities in domestic shipbuilding. However, LNG bunkering (vessel refueling) requires specialized vessels and land-based infrastructure, as well as appropriate regulatory oversight. The report also discusses the upcoming International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards limiting the maximum sulfur content in shipping fuels, which will require vessel operators to consider alternatives to petroleum-based fuels. The IMO 2020 standards will reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels from 4.5% to 0.5%. The report also discusses the potential for LNG to compete with other bunker fuels in the market, and the current status of LNG bunkering globally and in the United States. The report concludes by discussing the potential economic opportunities and challenges of LNG bunkering for the United States.", + "answer": [ + "The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine (\"bunker\") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems (\"scrubbers\") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report provides an overview of the number of public elementary and secondary schools in the United States and the local educational agencies that oversee them. It also discusses charter schools, which are public schools that operate independently from traditional school districts. The report highlights the importance of testing and remediating lead in school drinking water, as lead exposure can have detrimental health effects, particularly for children. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards for drinking water contaminants and has established regulations for lead in water systems. However, the report notes that the EPA has not established an enforceable maximum contaminant level for lead in drinking water. Instead, it has established an action level of 15 micrograms of lead per liter of water. The report also discusses the role of state educational agencies in administering state and federal education laws and providing guidance on testing and remediation of lead in school drinking water. It notes that different state agencies, including agencies for education, health, and environmental protection, may provide guidance to school districts and schools. The report concludes by discussing the importance of preventing lead exposure and the need for continued efforts to protect children from environmental threats.", + "answer": [ + "No federal law requires testing of drinking water for lead in schools that receive water from public water systems, although these systems are regulated by the EPA. Lead can leach into water from plumbing materials inside a school. The discovery of toxic levels of lead in water in Flint, Michigan, in 2015 has renewed awareness about the danger lead exposure poses to public health, especially for children. GAO was asked to review school practices for lead testing and remediation. This report examines the extent to which (1) school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in drinking water; (2) states are supporting these efforts; and (3) federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts. GAO administered a web-based survey to a stratified, random sample of 549 school districts, the results of which are generalizable to all school districts. GAO visited or interviewed officials with 17 school districts with experience in lead testing, spread among 5 states, selected for geographic variation. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed relevant laws and documents. An estimated 43 percent of school districts, serving 35 million students, tested for lead in school drinking water in 2016 or 2017, according to GAO's nationwide survey of school districts. An estimated 41 percent of school districts, serving 12 million students, had not tested for lead. GAO's survey showed that, among school districts that did test, an estimated 37 percent found elevated lead (lead at levels above their selected threshold for taking remedial action.) (See figure.) All school districts that found elevated lead in drinking water reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate exposure to lead, including replacing water fountains, installing filters or new fixtures, or providing bottled water. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 8 states have requirements that schools test for lead in drinking water as of 2017, and at least 13 additional states supported school districts' voluntary efforts with funding or in-kind support for testing and remediation. In addition, the five states GAO visited provided examples of technical assistance to support testing in schools. EPA provides guidance and other resources to states and school districts regarding testing and remediating lead in drinking water, and the Department of Education (Education) provides some of this information on its websites. School district officials that used EPA's written guidance said they generally found it helpful. Although EPA guidance emphasizes the importance of addressing elevated lead levels, GAO found that some aspects of the guidance, such as the threshold for taking remedial action, were potentially misleading and unclear, which can put school districts at risk of making uninformed decisions. In addition, many school districts reported a lack of familiarity with EPA's guidance, and their familiarity varied by region of the country. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school district efforts on lead in drinking water, despite agreeing to do so in a 2005 memorandum of understanding. Such collaboration could encourage testing and ensure that more school districts will have the necessary information to limit student and staff exposure to lead. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that EPA update its guidance on how schools should determine lead levels requiring action and for EPA and Education to collaborate to further disseminate guidance and encourage testing for lead. EPA and Education agreed with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion annually on goods and services. Most of these acquisitions are governed by Title 10 of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). DOD can also use other transaction (OT) authorities to enter into transactions without triggering standard acquisition statutes and regulations. OTs were established to allow for research, prototyping, and production without the standard procurement rules. In recent years, Congress has expanded OT authorities and DOD is increasingly using them. This report examines how OTs work, why they were established, potential benefits and risks, and whether there is data available to measure their effectiveness. OTs can be structured in various ways, including direct relationships between a single government agency and a single provider, joint ventures, partnerships, multiple agencies joining together, or through a consortium. OTs can be beneficial in promoting defense technology and the defense industrial base, potentially advancing the domestic commercial technology base. However, there are concerns about the lack of oversight and accountability, potential for abuse, and the impact on competition. The report also discusses the limitations and requirements of OT authorities. Overall, the use of OTs is a complex issue with potential benefits and risks that need to be carefully considered.", + "answer": [ + "The Department of Defense (DOD) obligates more than $300 billion annually to buy goods and services, and to support research and development. Most of these acquisitions are governed by procurement statutes and regulations found in Title 10 (and parts of other select titles) of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Under certain circumstances, DOD can enter into an other transaction (OT) agreement instead of a traditional contract. OT agreements are generally exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations. These exemptions grant government officials the flexibility to include, amend, or exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory in traditional procurements (e.g., termination clauses, cost accounting standards, payments, audit requirements, intellectual property, and contract disputes). OT authorities also grant more flexibility to structure agreements in numerous ways, including joint ventures; partnerships; consortia; or multiple agencies joining together to fund an agreement encompassing multiple providers. Other transaction agreements are legally binding contracts; they are referred to as agreements to distinguish them from the traditional procurement contracts governed by the FAR and procurements laws. Other transaction authorities are set forth in two sections of law: 10 U.S.C. 2371—granting authority to use OTs for basic, applied, and advanced research projects. 10 U.S.C. 2371b—granting authority to use OTs for prototype projects and follow-on production. Under this authority, a prototype project can only be conducted if at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participates in the project; all significant participants are small businesses or nontraditional defense contractors; at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is provided by nongovernment participants; or the senior procurement acquisition official provides a written justification for using an OT. Follow-on production can only be conducted when the underlying prototype OT was competitively awarded, and the prototype project was successfully completed. OTs have the potential to provide significant benefits to DOD, including attracting nontraditional contractors with promising technological capabilities to work with DOD, establishing a mechanism to pool resources with other entities to facilitate development of, and obtain, state-of-the-art dual-use technologies, and offering a unique mechanism for DOD to invest in, and influence the direction of, technology development. A number of analysts warn that along with the potential benefits come significant risks, including potentially diminished oversight and exemption from laws and regulations designed to protect government and taxpayer interests. In FY2017, DOD obligated $2.1 billion on prototype OT agreements, representing less than 1% of contract obligations for the year. However, the use of OTs is expected to grow at a rapid pace, due in part to recent statutory changes expanding other transaction authorities. A number of analysts and officials have raised concerns that if DOD uses OTs in ways not intended by Congress—or is perceived to abuse the authority—Congress could clamp down on the authority. Generally, DOD lacks authoritative data that can be used to measure and evaluate the use of other transaction authorities." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the legal landscape governing data protection in the United States, which is complex and highly technical. The report contrasts the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with more comprehensive regulatory models in the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The report examines potential legal considerations for the 116th Congress should it consider crafting more comprehensive federal data protection legislation. The report also discusses the evolution of privacy tort law in the United States and the limited remedies it provides. The report concludes by noting that the legal landscape for data protection is likely to create challenges for legislators and that any future legislation will likely involve numerous decision points and legal considerations.", + "answer": [ + "Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans' electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both \"consumer facing\" and \"behind the scenes\" actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional \"right to privacy\" developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals' personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers' personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments—such as California and the European Union (EU)—have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the importance of reliable cost estimates for federal government programs, particularly for the 2020 Census. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires programs to maintain current and well-documented cost estimates that cover the full life-cycle of the program. Reliable cost estimates are critical for budgeting, planning, and managing programs, and can help managers make informed investment decisions, allocate resources, measure progress, and ensure accountability for results.\n\nThe report analyzes the Bureau of the Census's (Bureau) life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and finds that it does not fully meet the criteria for a high-quality estimate. The estimate is not well-documented, accurate, or credible, and does not meet the best practices for cost estimation. The report recommends that the Bureau take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate.\n\nThe report also discusses the Bureau's efforts to improve its cost estimation process, including the development of guidance, policies, and procedures for cost estimation. The Bureau has made progress in addressing weaknesses in its cost estimation process, but more work is needed to ensure that its cost estimates are reliable and meet best practices.\n\nThe report concludes that the lack of a reliable cost estimate is one of the reasons the 2020 Census has been designated a GAO High-Risk Area. The report emphasizes the importance of reliable cost estimates for federal government programs and highlights the need for the Bureau to take specific steps to improve its cost estimation process.", + "answer": [ + "In October 2017, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) announced that the projected life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census had climbed to $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its 2015 estimate. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. Without this capability, the Bureau is at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. This report evaluates the reliability of the Bureau's revised life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and the extent to which the Bureau is using it as a management tool, and compares the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate and used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) as criteria. Since 2015, the Census Bureau (Bureau) has made significant progress in improving its ability to develop a reliable cost estimate. While improvements have been made, the Bureau's October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure.) Specifically, for the characteristic of being well-documented, GAO found that some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations. In GAO's assessment of the 2015 version of the 2020 Census cost estimate, GAO recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that each of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate is met. The Bureau agreed and has taken steps, but has not fully implemented this recommendation. A reliable cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, helping management make informed decisions. During this review, GAO found the Bureau used the cost estimate to inform decision making. Factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from nonresponding housing units. Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017. An overall increase in information technology (IT) costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017. GAO is not making any new recommendations but maintains its earlier recommendation—that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In its response to this report, Commerce generally agreed with the findings related to cost estimation improvements, but disagreed that the cost estimate was not reliable. However, until GAO's recommendation is fully implemented the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the compensation of Members of Congress and how it has been determined since the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1789. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution states that no law varying the compensation for the services of Senators and Representatives shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. Since FY1983, Member salaries have been funded in a permanent appropriations account. The most recent pay adjustment for Members of Congress was in January 2009. Since then, the compensation for most Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico has been $174,000. The only exceptions include the Speaker of the House ($223,500) and the President pro tempore of the Senate and the majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate ($193,400).\n\nThe report provides historical tables on the rate of pay for Members of Congress since 1789, details on enacted legislation with language prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustment since the most recent adjustment, the adjustments projected by the Ethics Reform Act as compared with actual adjustments in Member pay, and Member pay in constant and current dollars since 1992.\n\nThere are three basic ways to adjust Member pay: specific legislation was enacted to adjust Member pay prior to 1968, pursuant to recommendations from the President based on those made by a quadrennial salary commission, and annual adjustments. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established a formula based on changes in private sector wages and salaries as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for the annual adjustment. The annual adjustment automatically goes into effect unless Congress statutorily prohibits the adjustment, revises the adjustment, or the annual base pay adjustment of GS employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled adjustment for Members, in which case Members would be paid the lower rate.\n\nUnder this revised method, annual adjustments were accepted 13 times and denied 16 times. The maximum potential January 2020 Member pay adjustment of 2.6%, or $4,500, was known when the Bureau", + "answer": [ + "Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees. Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500. If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009. Both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has defined various types of unwanted sexual behaviors, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence. Sexual assault is defined as intentional sexual contact characterized by force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Domestic violence is an offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or state law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person. DOD has various offices and organizations responsible for addressing unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for developing the overall policy and guidance for the department’s efforts to prevent and respond to instances of sexual assault. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) serves as the department’s single point of authority, accountability, and oversight for its sexual assault prevention and response program. The military services have their own offices responsible for overseeing and managing the military service’s sexual assault prevention and response program. The policy for preventing and responding to sexual harassment is under the purview of the military equal opportunity program, which aims to promote equal opportunity in an environment free from harassment, including sexual harassment. The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) oversees the department’s efforts to promote equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion management, and to help prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment throughout DOD. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute develops training and studies on equal opportunity. The report also discusses the Defense Department’s efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including the development of a framework for preventing sexual violence, the use of data to identify trends and inform prevention strategies, and the implementation of a policy to address unwanted sexual behaviors in the military.", + "answer": [ + "Unwanted sexual behaviors in the military—including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault—undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a “continuum of harm,” which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. GAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Secret Service is responsible for protecting the President, Vice President, and other national leaders, as well as safeguarding the nation's currency and financial payment systems. The component has approximately 7,100 employees, including special agents, administrative and technical staff, and a full-time CIO. The Secret Service heavily relies on its IT infrastructure and communications systems to perform daily duties. In 2018, the Secret Service planned to spend $104.8 million to modernize and maintain its IT environment. The component consolidated all IT staff and assets under the CIO in 2017. The Secret Service follows DHS policies and processes for managing acquisitions, including IT acquisitions. DHS categorizes acquisition programs based on their life cycle costs and expected cost. The Secret Service developed a policy for managing non-major acquisition programs, which is consistent with DHS's framework. The Secret Service uses agile development methodology for certain projects. The component has faced challenges in implementing workforce planning and recruiting, and has not consistently tracked agile metrics. The Secret Service has not consistently tracked cost, schedule, and agile-related data for its IT investments. The component's IT workforce staffing levels are below approved levels. The Secret Service's Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment includes two programs and one project with capabilities in planning or development and modernization. The cost and schedule estimates for each program and project have changed, with key reasons identified by the Secret Service's Office of the Chief Information Officer. The Secret Service's Office of the Chief Information Officer is responsible for monitoring the IITT investment's performance and progress. The Secret Service has not consistently tracked agile metrics for its IT investments. The Secret Service's IT workforce staffing levels are below approved levels. The Secret Service's Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment includes two programs and one project with capabilities in planning or development and modernization. The cost and schedule estimates for each program and project have changed, with key reasons identified by the Secret Service's Office of the Chief Information Officer. The Secret Service's Office of the Chief Information Officer is responsible for monitoring the IITT investment's performance and progress. The Secret Service has not consistently tracked agile metrics for", + "answer": [ + "Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. To accomplish its mission, the Secret Service relies heavily on the use of IT infrastructure and systems. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment—a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component's business operations. GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's oversight of its IT portfolio and workforce. This report discusses the extent to which the (1) CIO implemented selected IT oversight responsibilities, (2) Secret Service implemented leading IT workforce planning and management practices, and (3) Secret Service and DHS implemented selected performance monitoring practices for IITT. GAO assessed agency documentation against 14 selected component CIO responsibilities established in DHS policy; 15 selected leading workforce planning and management practices within 5 topic areas; and two selected leading industry project monitoring practices that, among other things, were, in GAO's professional judgment, of most significance to managing IITT. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component's IT policies align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. Additional efforts to fully implement these 3 responsibilities will further position the CIO to effectively manage the IT portfolio. Of the 15 selected practices within the 5 workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8, and did not implement 4 (see table). Within the strategic planning area, the component partly implemented the practice to, among other things, develop IT competency needs. While the Secret Service had defined general core competencies for its workforce, the Office of the CIO (OCIO) did not identify all of the technical competencies needed to support its functions. As a result, the office was limited in its ability to address any IT competency gaps that may exist. Also, while work remains to improve morale across the component, the Secret Service substantially implemented the employee morale practices for its IT staff. Secret Service officials said the gaps in implementing the workforce practices were due to, among other things, their focus on reorganizing the IT workforce within OCIO. Until the Secret Service fully implements these practices for its IT workforce, it may be limited in its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the component's IT infrastructure and services. Of the two selected IT project monitoring practices, DHS and the Secret Service fully implemented the first practice to monitor the performance of the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. In addition, for the second practice—to monitor projects on incremental development metrics—the Secret Service fully implemented the practice on one of IITT's projects and partially implemented it on another. In particular, OCIO did not fully measure post-deployment user satisfaction with the system on one project. OCIO plans to conduct a user satisfaction survey of the system by September 2018, which should inform the office on whether the system is meeting users' needs. GAO is making 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the issue of school discipline and the role of implicit bias in how teachers and staff make decisions about disciplining students. Implicit bias can cause teachers to judge students differently based on their race and sex, leading to certain groups of students being more harshly disciplined than others. The report also highlights the role of health and social challenges outside the classroom that can affect children's behavior in school, such as trauma and mental health issues. The report provides data on the number of students disciplined and the types of offenses for which they were disciplined. It also discusses the role of federal laws and guidance in enforcing civil rights laws related to school discipline. The report concludes by summarizing recent laws and initiatives aimed at addressing school discipline issues.\n\nThe report emphasizes the need to address the root causes of student misbehavior and to implement evidence-based practices that promote positive behavior and reduce exclusionary discipline. It also highlights the importance of training teachers and staff to recognize and address implicit bias in their decision-making. The report suggests that schools should use data to identify patterns of discipline and to develop strategies to address disparities in discipline. Finally, the report recommends that schools work with families and communities to address the health and social challenges that can affect students' behavior and success in school.", + "answer": [ + "Research has shown that students who experience discipline that removes them from the classroom are more likely to repeat a grade, drop out of school, and become involved in the juvenile justice system. Studies have shown this can result in decreased earning potential and added costs to society, such as incarceration and lost tax revenue. Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in the administration of discipline in public schools. GAO was asked to review the use of discipline in schools. To provide insight into these issues, this report examines (1) patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, (2) challenges selected school districts reported with student behavior and how they are approaching school discipline, and (3) actions Education and Justice have taken to identify and address disparities or discrimination in school discipline. GAO analyzed discipline data from nearly all public schools for school year 2013-14 from Education's Civil Rights Data Collection; interviewed federal and state officials, as well as officials from a total of 5 districts and 19 schools in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas. We selected these districts based on disparities in suspensions for Black students, boys, or students with disabilities, and diversity in size and location. We also reviewed federal laws and a non-generalizable sample of seven recently resolved federal school discipline investigations (selected in part based on the type of alleged discrimination). We incorporated technical comments from the agencies as appropriate. Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were disproportionately disciplined (e.g., suspensions and expulsions) in K-12 public schools, according to GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) national civil rights data for school year 2013-14, the most recent available. These disparities were widespread and persisted regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school attended. For example, Black students accounted for 15.5 percent of all public school students, but represented about 39 percent of students suspended from school—an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage points (see figure). Officials GAO interviewed in all five school districts in the five states GAO visited reported various challenges with addressing student behavior, and said they were considering new approaches to school discipline. They described a range of issues, some complex—such as the effects of poverty and mental health issues. For example, officials in four school districts described a growing trend of behavioral challenges related to mental health and trauma. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the issues that influence student behavior, officials from all five school districts GAO visited were implementing alternatives to disciplinary actions that remove children from the classroom, such as initiatives that promote positive behavioral expectations for students. Education and the Department of Justice (Justice) documented several actions taken to identify and address school discipline issues. For example, both agencies investigated cases alleging discrimination. Further, to help identify persistent disparities among the nation's schools, Education collects comprehensive data on school discipline every other year through its Civil Rights Data Collection effort." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe federal government owns approximately 640 million acres of land in the United States, with the majority located in 12 western states. Four federal agencies—the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S. Forest Service—administer about 95% of these lands. However, there is no single law that provides these agencies with the authority to acquire and/or dispose of lands. Instead, Congress has provided various acquisition and disposal authorities through laws enacted over more than a century.\n\nThe BLM has the broadest authority for both acquisitions and disposals, while the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS and FWS have more limited authorities, mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest or for wildlife refuges.\n\nAgencies acquire and dispose of federal land through various means, including exchanges, sales, transfers, and patents. The Land and Water Conservation Fund provides the primary source of funding for land acquisition.\n\nCongress frequently considers proposals to establish, modify, or eliminate acquisition and disposal authorities. Recent proposals include allowing states to exchange land grant parcels for federal lands, directing the BLM and FS to convey small tracts to adjacent landowners, and reauthorizing and amending BLM authority to sell or exchange land under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act.\n\nThe extent to which the federal government should own land remains controversial, with many advocating for divestment and others supporting the policy of retaining lands in federal ownership.", + "answer": [ + "The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition. Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe legislative process in the House of Representatives is governed by a complex set of rules, precedents, and practices. The official manual of House rules is over 1,000 pages long and is supplemented by 30 volumes of precedents. However, understanding the House's legislative procedures is not as difficult as the sheer number and size of these documents might suggest. The House's procedures are largely predictable, with most rules following similar procedures under similar circumstances. The underlying principle behind the House's rules is that a majority of Members should ultimately be able to work their will on the floor. The Constitution authorizes each house of Congress to determine its own rules, and the House can amend its rules unilaterally. The House is free to suspend, waive, or ignore its rules whenever it chooses to do so. The House limits the opportunities for each Representative to participate in floor deliberations and imposes time limits on debate. The House also limits debate in other important respects, such as requiring all debate to be germane to the legislative business and consistent with rules of courtesy and decorum. The House uses several modes of consideration for legislation, depending on the importance and potential cost of the bill and the amount of controversy it has generated. The House most frequently resorts to a set of procedures called \"suspension of the rules\" to act quickly on bills that enjoy overwhelming but not unanimous support. The House also has a Committee of the Whole, which is a procedural device that allows Members to consider bills in a more informal setting. The Constitution requires that a quorum be present on the floor when the House is conducting business. A quorum is a majority of the Representatives in the House. The House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not. The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting. The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches. The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives. A new edition", + "answer": [ + "The daily order of business on the floor of the House of Representatives is governed by standing rules that make certain matters and actions privileged for consideration. On a day-to-day basis, however, the House can also decide to grant individual bills privileged access to the floor, using one of several parliamentary mechanisms. The standing rules of the House include several different parliamentary mechanisms that the body may use to act on bills and resolutions. Which of these will be employed in a given instance usually depends on the extent to which Members want to debate and amend the legislation. In general, all of the procedures of the House permit a majority of Members to work their will without excessive delay. The House considers most legislation by motions to suspend the rules, with limited debate and no floor amendments, with the support of at least two-thirds of the Members voting. Occasionally, the House will choose to consider a measure on the floor by the unanimous consent of Members. The Rules Committee is instrumental in recommending procedures for considering major bills and may propose restrictions on the floor amendments that Members can offer or bar them altogether. Many major bills are first considered in Committee of the Whole before being passed by a simple majority vote of the House. The Committee of the Whole is governed by more flexible procedures than the basic rules of the House, under which a majority can vote to pass a bill after only one hour of debate and with no floor amendments. Although a quorum is supposed to be present on the floor when the House is conducting business, the House assumes a quorum is present unless a quorum call or electronically recorded vote demonstrates that it is not. However, the standing rules preclude quorum calls at most times other than when the House is voting. Questions are first decided by voice vote, although any Member may then demand a division vote. Before the final result of a voice or division vote is announced, Members can secure an electronically recorded vote instead if enough Members desire it or if a quorum is not present in the House. The constitutional requirements for making law mean that each chamber must pass the same measure with the identical text before transmitting it to the President for his consideration. When the second chamber of Congress amends a measure sent to it by the first chamber, the two chambers must resolve legislative differences to meet this requirement. This can be accomplished by shuttling the bill back and forth between the House and Senate, with each chamber proposing amendments to the position of the other, or by establishing a conference committee to try to negotiate a compromise version of the legislation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThis report addresses frequently asked questions related to the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for executive, administrative, and professional employees (the \"EAP\" or \"white collar\" exemptions). The report provides an overview of the main federal statute on overtime pay—the FLSA—and of defining and delimiting the EAP exemptions. The report discusses the applicability of the EAP exemptions and provides information on the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule.\n\nThe FLSA, enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Section 7(a) of the FLSA specifies that unless an employee is specifically exempted in the FLSA, he or she is considered to be a covered \"nonexempt\" employee and must receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times (\"time and a half\") the employee's regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.\n\nThe EAP exemptions were included in the FLSA at the time of enactment to address the difficulty in standardizing the work performed by EAP employees and to provide other forms of compensation not available to nonexempt workers. The Secretary of Labor is authorized to define and delimit the EAP exemptions. Including the first rulemaking on EAP exemptions in 1938, DOL has finalized nine rules.\n\nTo qualify for the EAP exemption, an employee generally has to meet three criteria: the \"salary basis\" test, the \"duties\" test, and the \"salary level\" test. An EAP employee must be paid on a \"salary basis,\" rather than on a per hour basis. That is, an EAP employee must receive a predetermined and fixed payment that is not subject to reduction due to variations in the quantity or quality of work. The salary must be paid on a weekly or less-frequent basis. Job titles alone do not determine exemption status for an employee. Rather, the Secretary of Labor, through issuance of regulations, specifies the duties that EAP employees must perform to be", + "answer": [ + "The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide \"executive, administrative, and professional\" employees (the \"EAP\" or \"white collar\" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption \"from time to time.\" To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the \"salary basis\" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the \"duties\" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the \"salary level\" test). In March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened. This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress on February 12, 2018, which included $41.86 billion of base (or enduring) funds for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). The request was a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared to FY2018 levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding levels, and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) signed into law on February 15 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts, a 0.3% decrease over the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request.\n\nThe FY2019 appropriation process was shaped by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA), which raised overall revised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). The BBA increased FY2019 defense funding levels by $85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion. The BBA also extended direct spending reductions from FY2021 in the original BCA through FY2027, as amended.\n\nThe Administration distinguished SFOPS spending as either enduring (base) funds or those to support overseas contingency operations (OCO). The OCO designation gained increased significance with enactment of the BCA, which specified that emergency or OCO funds do not count toward the spending limits established by the act. In FY2019, the Administration did not seek foreign affairs OCO funds, but requested the entire SFOPS budget within base funds. The final legislation, P.L. 116-6, included $8.0 billion designated as", + "answer": [ + "The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012. The FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts. FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F). P.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO. This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison. This report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examines vacancies in the Department of State’s (State) Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and State’s efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. The GAO analyzed State’s personnel data on Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts from the department’s Global Employment Management System (GEMS) as of March 2018. The GEMS data includes Foreign Service positions filled by permanent Foreign Service employees as well as positions filled by nonpermanent Foreign Service employees, such as Consular Fellows. The GEMS data show that the majority of Foreign Service employees (73 percent) work in positions at overseas posts, while some Foreign Service staff (27 percent) are assigned to positions in the United States. The report found that as of March 31, 2018, overall, 13 percent of State’s overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant. This vacancy percentage is similar to the percentages of vacancies in overseas Foreign Service positions that were reported in 2012 and 2008. The report also found that the number of both staffed and vacant overseas Foreign Service positions increased between 2008 and 2018. Despite the increase in the number of positions staffed, the report found that State’s ability to hire Foreign Service employees to fill persistent vacancies has been affected by factors such as reduced appropriations. The report recommends that State define the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and develop a corrective action plan to address these vacancies. The report is available at no charge on the GAO website.", + "answer": [ + "State staffs Foreign Service employees to more than 270 embassies and consulates worldwide to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. In 2009 and 2012, GAO identified ongoing Foreign Service staffing gaps. GAO was asked to review State's Foreign Service staffing. This report examines (1) vacancies in State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State's efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State's Global Employment Management System data as of March 2018. The system includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions, including the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions and whether each position is filled or vacant. GAO also reviewed its relevant prior reports and State workforce planning documents. In addition, GAO interviewed State staff at 10 overseas posts, selected on the basis of large numbers of Foreign Service vacancies and diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant at these posts, among other factors. The Department of State's (State) data show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts since 2008. According to the data, 13 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of March 2018. This percentage is similar to the percentages GAO reported for 2008 and 2012, when 14 percent of these positions were vacant. In addition, State's data show persistent vacancies at overseas posts in generalist positions that help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and in specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. State's data also show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts with State's highest foreign policy priorities and in regions with security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests. According to staff at overseas posts, Foreign Service vacancies adversely affect State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Staff at overseas posts told us that vacancies increase workloads, contributing to low morale and higher stress for Foreign Service staff and that vacancies in Political and Economic positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—limit the reporting on political and economic issues that posts are able to provide to State headquarters. Notably, officials also stated that vacancies in specialist positions may heighten security risks at overseas posts and disrupt post operations. For instance, some overseas post staff said that vacancies in Information Management positions had increased the vulnerability of posts' computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats. State described various efforts—implemented by multiple offices in the department —to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies, but these efforts are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. An example of State's efforts is the “Hard-to-Fill” program, which allows Civil Service staff an opportunity to fill a Foreign Service vacancy on a single overseas tour. According to GAO's 2017 High-Risk Series report, an agency should design and implement an action plan—integrated across its relevant offices—that defines the root causes of all skills gaps and suggests corrective measures. However, State has not developed such an action plan for reducing persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Without developing an integrated action plan, overseas Foreign Service vacancies may persist. As a result, State's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and help ensure secure and efficient operations could be adversely impacted. GAO recommends that State develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. State concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will take steps to develop an integrated action plan." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the changes in the oil and petroleum markets since the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the 1970s. The US has become a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products, with net imports declining from 12 million barrels per day in 2005 to fewer than 4 million barrels per day in 2017. The SPR was established to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and to carry out obligations of the US under the international energy program. The report discusses the infrastructure of the SPR, which is owned by the federal government, managed by DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves, and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC. The SPR stores crude oil in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas. The report also discusses the two regional petroleum product reserves, the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve. The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve holds 1 million barrels of ultra low sulfur distillate, a petroleum product essentially equivalent to diesel fuel but that is also used for heating oil. The Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve holds 1 million barrels of gasoline for consumers in the northeastern US. The report concludes with recommendations for DOE to supplement its 2016 long-term strategic review by conducting an additional analysis that takes into account private-sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes. The report also recommends that DOE take actions to ensure that the agency periodically conducts and provides to Congress a strategic review of the SPR that takes into account changes in crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and contains additional analysis, such as the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes.", + "answer": [ + "More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Veterans Health Administration (VA) has been working on a program called MSPV-NG to standardize the ordering of medical supplies across its 170 medical centers. The legacy MSPV program prevented VHA from standardizing items used across its medical centers and affected its ability to leverage its buying power to achieve greater cost avoidance. The MSPV-NG program aims to standardize requirements for supply items for greater clinical consistency, demonstrate cost avoidance by leveraging VA’s substantial buying power when making competitive awards, achieve greater efficiency in ordering and supply chain management, and involve clinicians in requirements development to ensure uniform clinical review of medical supplies. The VA launched the MSPV-NG program in December 2016, but allowed a 4-month transition period. After April 2017, medical centers could no longer use the legacy program. MSPV-NG now restricts ordering to a narrow formulary. VHA policy requires medical centers to use MSPV-NG when purchasing items that are available in the formulary. The VA has faced challenges in implementing the MSPV-NG program, including lack of a documented program strategy, leadership stability, and workforce capacity for the transition. The VA has also faced challenges in obtaining clinician input and ensuring that the formulary meets the needs of medical centers. As a result, the VA has not been able to fully achieve its goals for the MSPV-NG program.", + "answer": [ + "VA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program. The program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016. This testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure). As a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.) VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings. GAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the process for naming Navy ships, which has evolved over time. The Secretary of the Navy traditionally has had the authority to name new Navy ships, but the location of the relevant code in the U.S. Code is silent on the issue. The Naval History and Heritage Command compiles primary and alternate ship name recommendations each year, which are forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Secretary of the Navy relies on many sources to make his decisions, including recommendations from the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and concerned citizens. The report also discusses the rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships, which have evolved over time. There have been numerous exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. The report concludes that the Secretary of the Navy's discretion to make exceptions to ship-naming conventions is one of the Navy's oldest ship-naming traditions. The report also discusses the process for naming Navy ships in the future, stating that the evolutionary process of the past will continue. The report was submitted in response to Section 1014 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act.", + "answer": [ + "Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. Since 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that global climate change is already impacting the United States and will intensify in the future. The severity of future impacts depends on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to changes. The report discusses the potential for a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee to control greenhouse gas emissions. A carbon tax could apply to emissions or their inputs, primarily fossil fuels. A carbon price increase would stimulate innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies and could have both economy-wide impacts and negative effects on specific industries and demographic groups. The report examines key design decisions for a carbon tax system, including the point of taxation, rate of taxation, and potential border carbon adjustments. It also discusses distribution of carbon tax revenues and additional considerations, such as GHG emissions estimates and economic impacts. The report concludes with a summary of potential carbon tax impacts on energy use and prices.\n\nThe report notes that a carbon tax is one policy option to address U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to climate change and related impacts. Economic modeling indicates that a carbon tax would achieve emission reductions, depending on the scope and rate of the tax. A carbon tax would generate new revenue, but the magnitude of the revenues would depend on the scope and rate of the tax and multiple market factors. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. The report highlights potential economy-wide costs and disproportionate impacts on emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries and fossil fuel communities. It suggests that policymakers could allocate some of the carbon tax revenue to provide transition assistance to affected employees and communities.\n\nIn summary, the report discusses the potential for a carbon tax to control greenhouse gas emissions and reduce their impacts on the economy and society. It examines key design decisions and potential impacts of a carbon tax system. The report emphasizes the importance of careful consideration of policy design and potential trade-offs in implementing a carbon tax to address climate change.", + "answer": [ + "The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that \"the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur.\" Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution \"expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.\" Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25/metric ton of CO2 and $50/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions). A carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)—and supporting other policy objectives. A primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program's magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues. In general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution). A price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly \"emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries.\" Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a \"border carbon adjustment\" program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the funding requirements for postal retiree health benefits in the United States. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) covers federal employees and retirees, including postal and nonpostal retirees. Retiree participation in FEHBP is voluntary, with about 500,000 postal retirees participating in the program. The funding requirements for these benefits are established by law, with responsibility divided among the US Postal Service (USPS), the federal government, and postal retirees. The funding requirements changed in 2006, with USPS required to fully prefund retiree health benefits. The RHB Fund was established in the U.S. Treasury for USPS to deposit money into, and OPM uses the fund to pay USPS’s share of postal retiree premiums for health benefits. The funding requirements for these benefits are unsustainable, with the RHB Fund projected to be depleted in 12 years under the current status quo. USPS has missed approximately $38 billion in payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010, and the fund’s balance is declining. The report also discusses potential policy approaches to address the financial shortfall in this area, including increasing Medicare participation by postal retirees, changing the level of prefunding for retiree health benefits, and investing assets outside the U.S. Treasury. The report concludes that Congress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing.", + "answer": [ + "USPS is required to prefund its share of health benefits costs for its retirees. To do so, USPS is required to make payments into the RHB Fund, which is administered by OPM. However, USPS has not made any payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010. At the end of fiscal year 2017, USPS had missed $38.2 billion in payments, leaving the fund 44 percent funded. Pursuant to law, beginning in fiscal year 2017, OPM started drawing from the fund to cover USPS's share of postal retirees' health benefits premiums. GAO was asked to review issues related to the sustainability of the RHB Fund. This report examines (1) the financial outlook for the RHB Fund and (2) policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, among other topics. GAO evaluated financial projections for the RHB Fund from OPM. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and identified policy approaches primarily by identifying legislative proposals, and literature on actions of companies and state governments to address retiree health benefits. These approaches are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. GAO also interviewed experts in retiree health benefits and postal stakeholders, chosen on the basis of relevant publications and prior GAO work, and interviewed and obtained written responses from OPM and USPS officials. The financial outlook of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund) is poor. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the fund's assets declined to $49.8 billion and unfunded liabilities rose to $62.2 billion. Based on Office of Personnel Management (OPM) projections requested by GAO, the fund is on track to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 if the United States Postal Service (USPS) continues to make no payments into the fund. Annual payments of $1 billion or $2 billion into the fund would extend the projected depletion date by 2 to 5 years (see figure). USPS has said that its required payments to the fund are unaffordable relative to its current financial situation and outlook. For the past 11 years USPS has incurred large operating losses that it expects will continue. Additionally, USPS has stated that its opportunities for revenue generation and cost-cutting are limited. USPS reported that it did not make required fund payments in 2017 in order to preserve liquidity and cover operational costs. If the fund becomes depleted, USPS would be required by law to make the payments necessary to cover its share of health benefits premiums for current postal retirees. Current law does not address what would happen if the fund becomes depleted and USPS does not make payments to cover those premiums. Depletion of the fund could affect postal retirees as well as USPS, customers, and other stakeholders, including the federal government. About 500,000 postal retirees receive health benefits and OPM expects that number to remain about the same through 2035. GAO identified three categories of policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, based on legislative proposals and pertinent literature. First, some approaches, such as generally requiring eligible postal retirees to participate in Medicare, would shift costs to the federal government. Second, some approaches would reduce benefits or increase costs to postal retirees and/or employees. Third, some approaches would change how benefits are financed (see table). All of these approaches have different potential effects and would require congressional action. Thus, it is up to Congress to consider the merits of different approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. It would be preferable to take action when careful consideration is possible, rather than wait until lack of adequate funding could disrupt postal retiree health benefits. Congress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. USPS agreed that congressional action is needed and offered views on some policy approaches discussed in this report." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses NAS, a withdrawal condition in infants that can result from prenatal opioid use. Prenatal opioid use can take various forms, including prescription use, medication-assisted treatment for addiction, and illicit use. The report notes that there is currently no national standard of care for screening or treating NAS. The Finnegan Neonatal Abstinence Scoring Tool is commonly used to diagnose NAS. The American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommend non-pharmacologic treatment first, such as rooming-in with the mother. Pharmacologic treatment may be necessary for moderate to severe NAS symptoms. The report notes that Medicaid pays for over 80% of NAS cases. The report also discusses the challenges in addressing NAS, including gaps in research, treatment, and data. The report recommends that HHS develop a national standard of care for NAS and that research be conducted to determine the most effective treatment for pregnant women with opioid use disorders and their infants. The report also recommends that Medicaid programs provide coverage for medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorders during pregnancy.", + "answer": [ + "As the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, so has the number of pregnant women who use opioids, which can result in NAS. A recent peer-reviewed study found that cases of NAS have grown nearly five-fold between 2000 and 2012 and that most infants with NAS are covered under Medicaid. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine NAS in the United States and related treatment services covered under Medicaid. This report 1) describes the hospital and non-hospital settings for treating infants with NAS and how Medicaid pays for services, 2) describes recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, and 3) examines HHS's strategy for addressing NAS. GAO reviewed HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials. GAO also conducted site visits to four states—Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—selected based on several factors, including incidence rates of NAS and geographic variation. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 32 organizations, including health care providers and state officials in the selected states. The prenatal use of opioids or other drugs can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). Health care providers, state officials, and other stakeholders told GAO that most infants with NAS are treated in the hospital—such as in a neonatal intensive care unit—though some may be referred to a non-hospital setting—such as a neonatal withdrawal center with nursery rooms—to complete their treatment. The table below provides more information on settings for treating infants with NAS and on how Medicaid pays for services in these settings. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature reviewed, there are several recommended practices and challenges associated with addressing NAS. The most frequently recommended practices included prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment to infants—treatment that does not involve medications—such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment; educating mothers and health care providers on treatment of NAS, among other things; and using a protocol in the hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included the maternal use of multiple drugs—or polysubstance use—as it can exacerbate NAS symptoms; stigma faced by pregnant women who use opioids; hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and gaps in research and data on NAS, such as research on the long-term effects of the condition. In May 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a strategy document that makes key recommendations to address NAS. The Strategy recommends, for example, that health care providers receive continuing education on managing and treating infants with NAS and promote non-pharmacologic treatment. According to HHS officials, these recommendations will inform planning and policy across the department. However, HHS has yet to determine how and when the recommendations will be implemented, including establishing priorities; the roles and responsibilities of other federal, state, and public stakeholders; implementation timeframes; and methods for assessing progress. HHS officials told GAO that they expect to develop an implementation plan sometime in 2017 but had no timeline for doing so. Without a plan that clearly specifies how HHS will implement the Strategy and assess its progress, the department increases the risk that its recommendations for addressing NAS will not be implemented. HHS should expeditiously develop a plan for implementing the recommendations included in its strategy related to addressing NAS. HHS concurred that it should expeditiously address NAS, but noted implementation of the strategy is contingent on funding." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the collection, use, and sharing of personal information by Internet content providers and Internet service providers. It notes that while many companies have privacy policies, there is no comprehensive federal privacy law governing these practices. The report cites the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act as examples of tailored laws that govern the use and protection of personal information for specific purposes. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy using its broad authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. The report highlights several FTC investigations and enforcement actions related to Internet privacy, including issues with vehicle data privacy, information resellers, mobile device location data, and Internet of things. The report also discusses the use of the Fair Information Practice Principles to guide privacy practices and the potential for Congress to enact comprehensive Internet privacy legislation. The report concludes by stating that there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute with specific standards and that Congress should consider developing such legislation to enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment.", + "answer": [ + "In April 2018, Facebook disclosed that a Cambridge University researcher may have improperly shared the data of up to 87 million of its users with a political consulting firm. This disclosure followed other recent incidents involving the misuse of consumers' personal information from the Internet, which is used by about three-quarters of Americans. GAO was asked to review federal oversight of Internet privacy. This report addresses, among other objectives: (1) how FTC and FCC have overseen consumers' Internet privacy and (2) selected stakeholders' views on the strengths and limitations of how Internet privacy currently is overseen and how, if it all, this approach could be enhanced. GAO evaluated FTC and FCC Internet privacy enforcement actions and authorities and interviewed representatives from industry, consumer advocacy groups, and academia; FTC and FCC staff; former FTC and FCC commissioners; and officials from other federal oversight agencies. Industry stakeholders were selected to represent different sectors, and academics were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe FBI and GSA conducted studies over the past decade to assess the Hoover Building and other headquarters facilities’ strategic and mission needs. The assessments revealed that the FBI’s current assets did not fully support its long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. The security concerns include the dispersion of staff in annexes, which creates security challenges, and the occupancy of space leased from foreign owners in at least six different locations, including one in Washington, D.C. The space constraints at the Hoover Building and the resulting dispersion of staff sometimes prevent the FBI from physically locating certain types of analysts and specialists together, which in turn hampers collaboration and the performance of some classified work. The building condition is also deteriorating, and GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions. The FBI reported facing several operational and logistical challenges due to the space constraints at the Hoover Building. The report recommends that GSA evaluate its strategy to minimize major repair and recapitalization investments and take action to address any facility condition issues that could put FBI operations at risk and lead to further deterioration of the building.", + "answer": [ + "GSA, which manages federal real property on behalf of other federal agencies, faces challenges in funding new construction projects due to budget constraints—including obtaining upfront funding—among other reasons. One type of transaction, called a swap exchange, enables GSA to apply the value of federal property to finance construction without relying on appropriated funds. Under such an exchange, GSA transfers the title of the unneeded property to a private investor after receiving the agreed upon construction services at another location. GSA proposed a swap exchange procurement for construction of a new FBI headquarters building in exchange for the Hoover Building and appropriations to compensate for the difference in value between the Hoover Building and the new building. GSA cancelled this procurement in July 2017 due to lack of funding. This statement addresses (1) GSA's and FBI's assessments of the Hoover Building, (2) GSA efforts to implement swap exchanges, and (3) alternative approaches to funding real property projects. It is based on GAO's body of reports on real property from 2011 to 2017, and selected updates from GSA. In November 2011, GAO reported that, according to General Services Administration (GSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assessments, the FBI's headquarters building (Hoover Building) and its accompanying facilities in Washington, D.C., did not fully support the FBI's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since GAO's report, the assessments have not materially changed, for example: Security: GAO's prior work noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes creates security challenges, including where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. Earlier this year, GAO reported the FBI is leasing space in D.C. from foreign owners. Space : In 2011, GAO reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover Building is unusable. GSA noted in its fiscal year 2017 project prospectus for the FBI headquarters consolidation that the Hoover Building cannot be redeveloped to meet the FBI's current needs. Building Condition: In GAO's 2011 report, GAO noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments identified significant recapitalization needs. Since GAO's report and in response to GAO's recommendation, GSA has evaluated its approach to maintaining the building and completed some repairs to ensure safety. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and chose not to pursue several proposed swap exchanges, most recently the planned swap exchange for the Hoover Building. GSA has developed criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange, in response to recommendations in GAO's 2014 report. In addition, GSA officials told GAO that they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential risks associated with future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. Nevertheless, several factors may continue to limit use of swap exchanges, including market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties and an investor's approach for valuing properties. For example, in reviewing a proposed swap exchange in Washington, D.C., GAO found in a 2016 report that the proposals from two firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA's appraised property value. In a 2014 report, GAO identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms—including the use of private sector funds or land swaps—for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding, though GAO has previously reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and maintain fiscal controls. GAO has reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. In addition, alternative budgetary structures could be established, such as changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects. GAO has made recommendations in the past to GSA on various real property issues, including to develop additional guidance for swap exchanges and to evaluate its approach to maintaining the Hoover Building. GSA agreed with these two recommendations and addressed them." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: providing temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and stabilizing the economy during recessions. The joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments. UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state. As of the date of this publication, no state is in an active EB period.\n\nThe Social Security Act of 1935 authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits. Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits. Federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, but the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state. This results in essentially 53 different programs.\n\nTo be eligible for UC benefits, a worker must have earned a certain amount of wages or worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period prior to unemployment. Most states require individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own and to be able and willing to work. These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions.\n\nThe UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA). The specifics regarding SUTA taxes are determined by each state.\n\nDuring the partial government shutdown that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, furloughed federal employees may be eligible for Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) benefits. States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC.\n\nThere have been proposals in Congress to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay during", + "answer": [ + "The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of \"unemployment.\" In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for incarcerating all federal offenders sentenced to prison. BOP manages the human resource operations of its institutions, including the use of retention incentives, under the oversight of the Department of Justice’s Justice Management Division (JMD). BOP administers, monitors, and oversees retention incentives through its Central Office, regional offices, and institutions. The Central Office serves as BOP’s headquarters and provides oversight of BOP operations and program areas. The Human Resource Management Division (HRMD) within the Central Office is responsible for developing, implementing, and administering human resource policies and programs, including the use of retention incentives that meet OPM and DOJ requirements. The Program Review Division (PRD) within the Central Office assesses BOP programs, including human resources, to ensure they are managed and operated effectively. BOP funds the majority of its retention incentives through its Salaries and Expenses appropriation account, which represented almost 93 percent of BOP’s budget in FY 2016. BOP’s Central Office allocates funding from the Salaries and Expenses account to the regional offices, which then determine how to allocate their budget among various salary and expense activities, including retention incentives. HRMD delegates retention incentive determinations to each institution. In accordance with OPM requirements and BOP’s October 2016 Program Statement on Compensation, the wardens make retention incentive requests based on documented evidence that the employee possesses unusually high or unique qualifications or meets a special need of the agency and has a performance rating of at least “successful or its equivalent.” These incentives are calculated as a percentage of the employee’s basic pay and are disbursed in installments to the employee each pay period. BOP also has authority to provide other compensation-based human capital flexibilities to employees, in certain circumstances. These include recruitment and relocation incentives, student loan repayments, special salary rates, physicians and dental comparability allowances, and retention incentives for certain eligible physicians or dental professionals who enter into service agreements. BOP retention incentive expenditures generally increased", + "answer": [ + "BOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives. This report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries. BOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness. BOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff. GAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe report discusses the increase in safety defect vehicle recalls and the efforts made by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to improve recall completion rates. The report highlights the importance of communication between NHTSA and the auto industry in identifying and addressing defective vehicles. The report also discusses the role of public awareness campaigns in encouraging consumers to complete repairs.\n\nThe report notes that the number of vehicles affected by safety defect vehicle recalls has increased dramatically since 2011, in part due to large-scale recalls such as the General Motors ignition switch recall and the Takata airbag recall. The report states that NHTSA and the auto industry have committed to identifying and implementing effective strategies to inform consumers of safety defects.\n\nThe report discusses the importance of providing clear and accurate information to consumers about safety defects and recall repairs. The report notes that consumers consider a variety of factors when deciding whether to complete repairs, including safety risk, convenience, and availability of a loaner vehicle. The report also highlights the role of public awareness campaigns in encouraging consumers to complete repairs.\n\nThe report concludes by discussing the results of a usability study conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov. The study found that consumers had difficulty finding information on the website and that the website did not always meet federal and industry key website usability practices. The report recommends that NHTSA improve the usability of its website to make it easier for consumers to find information about safety defects and recall repairs.", + "answer": [ + "The number of vehicles affected by safety defect recalls increased sharply in recent years—from nearly 13 million in 2011 to over 51 million in 2016. Once a defect is identified, auto manufacturers are required to send written notification to vehicle owners by mail. NHTSA also aims to enhance awareness of auto recalls by providing information on its website, NHTSA.gov . The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision requiring GAO to study the use of publicly available safety recall information. This report addresses: (1) how consumers and industry stakeholders use such information and (2) how easy to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, among other objectives. To understand consumers' use of auto recall information and to test website usability, GAO conducted 12 focus groups with 94 consumers who had a recall. Focus groups were held in six locations selected for population and geographic variation. GAO identified key website usability practices and requested an evaluation by website usability professionals. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and NHTSA documents, and interviewed industry stakeholders—including 10 manufacturers selected based on sales market share and other factors. Consumers, manufacturers, and auto dealers use publicly available auto recall information differently. For example, the 94 consumers in 12 focus groups that GAO conducted used this information to decide whether to repair their vehicles. These consumers overwhelmingly cited safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered. Most consumers reported a preference for receiving recall notification by at least one electronic means, such as by e-mail or text message, in addition to mail. However, only 7 of 94 consumers reported receiving electronic notifications, suggesting a gap between the industry's auto recall notification practices and consumers' preferences. (See fig.). In response to a mandate in law, in September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a proposed rule that, if finalized, would require manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to mail. Most consumers in GAO's focus group website usability tests found the auto recall areas of NHTSA's website—NHTSA.gov—easy to use; however, some consumers experienced difficulties when asked to complete auto recall related tasks. For example, when consumers attempted to search for recalls affecting their specific vehicles, some found the search results confusing, leading them to question the accuracy of the results. Similarly, some consumers were hampered in searching for recalls by their vehicles' year, make, and model because the website did not always display model options using plain language. GAO found that the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, and that an independent evaluation conducted by website usability professionals at GAO's request identified similar issues. NHTSA is in the process of consolidating its websites and plans to conduct a website usability study of NHTSA.gov with consumers after the consolidation is complete. However, the agency has not determined a completion date for the consolidation effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without establishing a completion date and taking interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov, consumers will likely continue to experience difficulties, which may limit the effectiveness of the website's primary means of providing consumers with information about recalls affecting their vehicles. GAO recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties GAO identified. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nCluster munitions are weapons that disperse smaller submunitions into an area, and they have been used in at least 21 states by 13 different countries. They are valued militarily because one munition can kill or destroy many targets within its impact area, and they permit a smaller force to engage a larger adversary. However, cluster munitions have been criticized for their large number of residual unexploded submunitions, which can cause civilian casualties for decades. A newer generation of sensor-fuzed submunitions is being introduced to improve the munitions' and submunitions' accuracy and to reduce the large number of residual unexploded submunitions. The fundamental criticisms of cluster munitions are that they disperse large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, that they frequently fail to detonate and are difficult to detect, and that submunitions can remain explosive hazards for decades. The United States has not used cluster munitions since 2003, during the intervention in Iraq. In 2006, Israeli use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon resulted in widespread international criticism. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was negotiated in 2008 and 2009, but the parties have not reached agreement on a new proposal. The CCM aims to restrict or ban specific types of weapons used in armed conflicts. The United States, Russia, and the Republic of Korea maintain that they cannot afford to replace all current submunitions with \"smart\" submunitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to reduce cluster munitions failure rates, and the Army's Alternative Warhead Program (AWP) is intended to assess and recommend new technologies to reduce or eliminate cluster munitions failure rates.", + "answer": [ + "Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD \"will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.\" Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages the Public Assistance (PA) grant program, which provides funds to states, local governments, Indian tribes, and private nonprofit organizations in response to presidentially declared disasters. The PA program is designed to repair public infrastructure such as roads, schools, and bridges. The program is managed by FEMA's Office of Response and Recovery, which includes temporary, reservist, and permanent employees under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Title 5. Reservists make up the largest share of the PA workforce.\n\nThe PA program has faced challenges in the past, including workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation. The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has reported on these challenges and recommended improvements. FEMA has taken steps to address these issues, including implementing the PA Consistency Initiative and developing the Public Assistance Program Delivery Transition Standard Operating Procedure.\n\nFEMA is currently implementing a new model for hazard mitigation in the PA program. The new model includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for hazard mitigation across all disasters, a new hazard mitigation cadre, and a new hazard mitigation delivery model. The new model aims to increase the consistency and effectiveness of hazard mitigation in the PA program.\n\nThe PA program has also implemented FAC-Trax, a new software system to manage the PA process. The system includes a hazard mitigation module and aims to improve efficiency and effectiveness. However, the program has faced challenges in implementing the new system, including staffing and training issues.\n\nOverall, the PA program plays a critical role in providing funds to repair public infrastructure and support communities affected by disasters. The program has faced challenges in the past and is currently implementing new models and systems to improve its effectiveness. The DHS OIG will continue to monitor the program to ensure it is effectively addressing the needs of communities affected by disasters.", + "answer": [ + "FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017. GAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past. FEMA designed a new PA information and case management system—called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)—to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls—project planning and risk management—that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls—requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model. GAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for various civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project and Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy, and independent agencies like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The FY2020 budget request from President Trump proposes a $1.309 billion increase for DOE nuclear weapons activities, but substantial reductions for DOE energy research and development programs, including a $178 million reduction in fossil fuels and $502 million reduction in nuclear energy. The budget also proposes a $2.172 billion reduction for USACE and $462 million reduction for Reclamation and CUP. The FY2020 budget request is $6.64 billion below the FY2019 appropriation. The budget enforcement measures affecting the bill include limits on total discretionary spending and allocations of this amount that apply to spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee. The Administration's budget request could generate controversy during congressional consideration of Energy and Water Development appropriations for FY2020. The report provides details on the proposed funding levels and issues for each agency and independent agency included in the bill.", + "answer": [ + "The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores)." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides financial assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, firefighters, employees of emergency management agencies, and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB program also offers educational assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers who are killed or permanently disabled. The PSOB program is administered by the PSOB Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and is funded through the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.\n\nTo be eligible for PSOB benefits, a person must have served in one of the following categories of public safety officers: law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain in a public agency; FEMA employee or a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency employee; or emergency medical services member. There is no minimum amount of time a person must have served to be eligible for benefits. The PSOB program covers a public safety officer's death or disability if it occurred as the result of an injury incurred in the line of duty. The PSOB regulations provide that an injury occurs in the line of duty if it (1) is the result of the public safety officer's authorized activities while on duty, (2) occurs while responding to an emergency or request for assistance, or (3) occurs while commuting to or from duty in an authorized department or personal vehicle.\n\nThe PSOB program provides a one-time lump-sum benefit of $359,316 for death and a monthly full-time attendance benefit of $1,224 for PSOEA assistance. The PSOB and PSOEA benefit amounts are indexed to reflect changes in the cost of living. The PSOEA program provides financial assistance with costs associated with higher education to the spouse or children of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits. To be eligible for PSOEA benefits, a spouse must have been married to an eligible public safety officer at the time of the officer's", + "answer": [ + "The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. In FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nThe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is a government agency responsible for disease prevention and control, environmental health, and public education. The agency relies heavily on information technology to fulfill its mission and support related administrative needs. CDC has approximately 20,000 employees across the United States and around the world. For fiscal year 2017, the agency’s total appropriation was approximately $12 billion, with $424 million spent on information technology. The agency has systems dedicated to supporting public health science, practice, and administration, all of which rely on an information technology infrastructure that includes network components, critical servers, and data centers. CDC is responsible for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support the agency and its operations. The agency’s chief information officer (CIO) is responsible for establishing and enforcing policies and procedures protecting information resources. The CIO designated a chief information security officer (CISO) to oversee compliance with applicable information security and privacy requirements. The CISO is responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and disruption of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. To further ensure information security compliance, information systems security officers (ISSO) are responsible for managing the information security program within their respective organizations and reporting on security program matters to the CISO. Security stewards perform operational security analyses supporting the efforts of the ISSO. Business stewards serve as program managers, accepting full accountability for the operations of the systems and ensuring that security is planned, documented, and properly resourced for each aspect of the information security program. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets. FISMA assigns responsibility to the head of each agency for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or", + "answer": [ + "CDC is responsible for detecting and responding to emerging health threats and controlling dangerous substances. In carrying out its mission, CDC relies on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive data. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are protected from misuse and modification. GAO was asked to examine information security at CDC. In June 2018, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented technical controls and an information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. This current report is a public version of the June 2018 report. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which CDC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO reviewed supporting documents regarding CDC's actions on previously identified recommendations and interviewed personnel at CDC. As GAO reported in June 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented technical controls and an information security program that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. However, GAO identified control and program deficiencies in the core security functions related to identifying risk, protecting systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations (see table below). GAO made 195 recommendations to address these deficiencies. As of August 2018, CDC had made significant progress in resolving many of the security deficiencies by implementing 102 of 184 (about 55 percent) technical control recommendations, and partially implementing 1 of 11 information security program recommendations made in the June 2018 report. The figure shows the status of CDC's efforts to implement the 195 recommendations. Additionally, CDC has created remedial action plans to implement the majority of the remaining open recommendations by September 2019. Until CDC implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and destruction." + ] + }, + { + "output": "\n\nIn March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. The United States provided logistical and intelligence support to the coalition's operations without taking direct military action. Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula, with members considering legislative proposals to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties, improve humanitarian conditions, end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid, combat Iranian support for the Houthis, preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait, and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen. The conflict has evolved and grown gradually, with Congress becoming more involved over time. The balance of votes has shifted in favor of measures critical or restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures. However, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen.", + "answer": [ + "This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak." + ] + } +] \ No newline at end of file