diff --git "a/ids-supp/i2c/test/corpus.jsonl" "b/ids-supp/i2c/test/corpus.jsonl" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/ids-supp/i2c/test/corpus.jsonl" @@ -0,0 +1,4063 @@ +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-ef116be1e759c47958dcef26b00677239b77be97c9f803abd9f8db2a8bf2da32","title":"","text":"3.2.3. An integer indicating the sequence of this catalog object update. The first catalog object produced under a given name|namespace carries a sequence number of zero. Each successive update of that catalog, either as an independent or delta update, increments the sequence number by one. 3.2.4. <\/ins> An array of track objects trackobject. If the 'tracks' field is present then the 'catalog' field MUST NOT be present. 3.2.4. <\/del> 3.2.5. <\/ins> An array of catalog objects catalogobject. If the 'catalogs' field is present then the 'tracks' field MUST NOT be present. A catalog MUST NOT list itself in the catalog array. 3.2.5. <\/del> 3.2.6. <\/ins> A catalog object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RC', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. 3.2.6. <\/del> 3.2.7. <\/ins> A track object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RT', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. 3.2.7. <\/del> 3.2.8. <\/ins> A number specifying the moq-transport object number from which this catalog represents a delta update. See deltaupdate for additional details. Absence of this parent sequence number indicates that this catalog is independent and completely describes the content available in the broadcast. <\/del> An optional integer specifying the catalog sequence number sequencenumber number from which this catalog represents a delta update. See deltaupdate for additional details. Absence of this parent sequence number indicates that this catalog is independent and completely describes the content available in the broadcast. <\/ins> 3.2.8. <\/del> 3.2.9. <\/ins> The name space under which the track name is defined. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. The track namespace is required to be specified"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-a5e2b143da4e535c3ac048a206d45b124ef3d9fd6c24f6f07cea593e9ecc4541","title":"","text":"or catalog object. A namespace declared in a track object or catalog object overwrites any inherited name space. 3.2.9. <\/del> 3.2.10. <\/ins> A string defining the name of the track. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. Within the catalog, track names MUST be unique per namespace. 3.2.10. <\/del> 3.2.11. <\/ins> A string defining the type of payload encapsulation. Allowed values are strings as defined in Table 2. Table 2: Allowed packaging values 3.2.11. <\/del> 3.2.12. <\/ins> Each track description can specify an optional operation value that identifies the catalog producer's intent. Track operation is a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-180351cede4b97b5b5deb7457fd32ea3f22a34eecd9119587a7cb21c3a2272f0","title":"","text":"The default track operation is 'Add'. This value does not need to be declared in the track object. 3.2.12. <\/del> 3.2.13. <\/ins> A string defining a human-readable label for the track. Examples might be \"Overhead camera view\" or \"Deutscher Kommentar\". Note that the JSON spec requires UTF-8 support by decoders. 3.2.13. <\/del> 3.2.14. <\/ins> An integer specifying a group of tracks which are designed to be rendered together. Tracks with the same group number SHOULD be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-f9d829bbe3f00ef58f65ff36990d74033ee0afc515ce4165afdd0a7839568e98","title":"","text":"accompany one another. A common example would be tying together audio and video tracks. 3.2.14. <\/del> 3.2.15. <\/ins> An integer specifying a group of tracks which are alternate versions of one-another. Alternate tracks represent the same media content,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-57c1899b31c468767c3fea3916aeda144bd1c41a2e1005d18297998ce01eaeea","title":"","text":"be a set video tracks of the same content offered in alternate bitrates. 3.2.15. <\/del> 3.2.16. <\/ins> A string holding Base64 BASE64 encoded initialization data for the track. 3.2.16. <\/del> 3.2.17. <\/ins> A string specifying the track name of another track which holds initialization data for the current track. Initialization tracks"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-34c5e5519afe1b0389a710f994800f8ba7d9b8a494130aa2da62e717bed91c87","title":"","text":"only via the initialization track field of the track which they initialize. 3.2.17. <\/del> 3.2.18. <\/ins> An object holding a series of name\/value pairs which a subscriber can use to select tracks for subscription. If present, the selection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-7e876cb8dfa195f0c0bc2e0370fecbb02ed5bfbdac1edb4a661005070d3f7505","title":"","text":"declaration of a selection parameter at the track level overrides the inherited root value. 3.2.18. <\/del> 3.2.19. <\/ins> Certain tracks may depend on other tracks for decoding. Dependencies holds an array of track names trackname on which the current track is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-24b40d13442f05ca166066a6f639f273ad0da082b63e83ff9894beb2dc140e0f","title":"","text":"the dependencies is assumed to match that of the track declaring the dependencies. 3.2.19. <\/del> 3.2.20. <\/ins> A number identifying the temporal layer\/sub-layer encoding of the track, starting with 0 for the base layer, and increasing with higher temporal fidelity. 3.2.20. <\/del> 3.2.21. <\/ins> A number identifying the spatial layer encoding of the track, starting with 0 for the base layer, and increasing with higher fidelity. 3.2.21. <\/del> 3.2.22. <\/ins> A string defining the codec used to encode the track. For LOC packaged content, the string codec registrations are defined in Sect 3 and Section 4 of WEBCODECS-CODEC-REGISTRY. For CMAF packaged content, the string codec registrations are defined in XXX. 3.2.22. <\/del> 3.2.23. <\/ins> A string defining the mime type MIME of the track. This parameter is typically supplied with CMAF packaged content. 3.2.23. <\/del> 3.2.24. <\/ins> A number defining the framerate of the track, expressed as frames per second. 3.2.24. <\/del> 3.2.25. <\/ins> A number defining the bitrate of track, expressed in bits second. 3.2.25. <\/del> 3.2.26. <\/ins> A number expressing the encoded width of the track content in pixels. 3.2.26. <\/del> 3.2.27. <\/ins> A number expressing the encoded height of the video frames in pixels. 3.2.27. <\/del> 3.2.28. <\/ins> The number of audio frame samples per second. This property SHOULD only accompany audio codecs. 3.2.28. <\/del> 3.2.29. <\/ins> A string specifying the audio channel configuration. This property SHOULD only accompany audio codecs. A string is used in order to provide the flexibility to describe complex channel configurations for multi-channel and Next Generation Audio schemas. 3.2.29. <\/del> 3.2.30. <\/ins> A number expressing the intended display width of the track content in pixels. 3.2.30. <\/del> 3.2.31. <\/ins> A number expressing the intended display height of the track content in pixels. 3.2.31. <\/del> 3.2.32. <\/ins> A string defining the dominant language of the track. The string MUST be one of the standard Tags for Identifying Languages as defined"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-a60ac5fc3a28fa24148165603645a792c7483ceeae87e2995bce2d2ce762f126","title":"","text":"The following rules MUST be followed in processing delta updates: If a catalog is received without the parent sequence number field parentsequencenumber defined, then it is an independent catalog and no delta update processing is required. If a catalog is received with a parent sequence number field present, then the content of the catalog MUST be parsed as if the catalog contents had been added to the contents received on the referenced moq-transport object. Newer field definitions overwrite older field definitions. <\/del> parentsequence defined, then it is an independent catalog and no delta update processing is required. If a catalog is received with the parent sequence number field present, then the contents of the catalog MUST be parsed as if the catalog contents had been added to the state represented by the catalog whose sequence number matches the parent sequence number. Newer field definitions overwrite older field definitions. <\/ins> Track namespaces may not be changed across delta updates."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-586cb915db7f7ec1822d5d16b262aca2128e873ebe21b683cb196908780343de","title":"","text":"of the catalog may subscribe to the track. Delete: Indicates that media producer is no longer producing media on the associated track. <\/del> on the associated track. Subscribers SHOULD terminate their subscriptions. <\/ins> A catalog update in which all previously added tracks are deleted SHOULD be interpreted by a subscriber to indicate that the publisher"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-f5d8d9884d079a501d3b6358a5d25d6973b4429d134b07a9437952b18095f57b","title":"","text":"Table 3: Allowed track operations The default track operation is 'Add'. This value does not need to be <\/del> The default track operation is 'add'. This value does not need to be <\/ins> declared in the track object. 3.2.13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-beae263045b0a72af75ad777763a37d162ed702b7a85ebad3475e978864fc85f","title":"","text":"3.2.9. The name space under which the track name is defined. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. The track namespace is required to be specified for each track object. If the track namespace is declared in the root of the JSON document, then its value is inherited by all tracks and catalogs and it does not need to be re-declared within each track or catalog object. A namespace declared in a track object or catalog object overwrites any inherited name space. <\/del> 2.3 of MoQTransport. If the track namespace is declared in the root of the JSON document, then its value is inherited by all tracks and catalogs and it does not need to be re-declared within each track or catalog object. A namespace declared in a track object or catalog object overwrites any inherited name space. The track namespace is optional. If it is not declared at the root or track level, then each track MUST inherit the namespace of the catalog track. <\/ins> 3.2.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-11c6ac09b09f025a6ece953d0d52bf6ebaf1571c470ae94dbfa6e0350467ca41","title":"","text":"This example shows catalog for a media producer capable of sending 3 time-aligned video tracks for high definition, low definition and medium definition video qualities, along with an audio track. <\/del> medium definition video qualities, along with an audio track. In this example the namesapce is absent, which infers that each track must inherit the namespace of the catalog. <\/ins> 3.4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-04d930aa3be09f520bb34a8b2f9fff373cad00819323836fc47ea26ddf93b162","title":"","text":"A number indicating the streaming format type. Every MoQ Streaming Format normatively referencing this catalog format MUST register itself in the \"MoQ Streaming Format Type\" table. See iana for additional details. <\/del> itself in the \"MoQ Streaming Format Type\" table. See ianaconsiderations for additional details. <\/ins> 3.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-5c6391eec418987b658dc987a6d80735c6d50f51b3986327bb35dd16d2e82e5f","title":"","text":"5. This section details how the MoQ Streaming Format Type can be registered. The type registry can be updated by incrementally expanding the type space, i.e., by allocating and reserving new type identifiers. As per [RFC8126], this section details the creation of the \"MoQ Streaming Format Type\" registry. <\/del> This section details how the MoQ Streaming Format Type and new fields can be registered for inclusion in a catalog. <\/ins> 5.1. This document creates a new registry, \"MoQ Streaming Format Type\". The registry policy is \"RFC Required\". The Type value is 2 octets. The range is 0x0000-0xFFFF.The initial entry in the registry is: <\/del> This registry is managed by the IANA according to the RFC Required policy of RFC5226. The Type value is 2 octets. The range is 0x0000-0xFFFF. The initial entry in the registry is: <\/ins> Every MoQ streaming format draft normatively referencing this catalog format MUST register itself a unique type identifier. <\/del> No RFC is provided for the initial entry as it is reserved for Every MoQ streaming format draft normatively referencing this catalog format MUST register itself a unique type identifier. The type registry can be updated by incrementally expanding by allocating and reserving new type identifiers. 5.2. This document creates a new IANA registry for the Common Catalog fields. The registry is called \"MoQ Common Catalog Fields\". This registry is managed by the IANA according to the Specification Required policy of RFC5226. The initial entries in the registry are: Any registration for a new Field name MUST provide the following information: Descriptive Name - a descriptive name for the field. Field Name - the JSON field name, as will be used inside the JSON catalog. Required - the string \"yes\" if the field is required in all catalogs and \"opt\" if it is not. Location - a string defining the permissible locations for the field within the catalog: 'R' - the field is located in the Root of the JSON object. 'RC' - the field may be located in either the Root or a Catalog object. 'RTC' - the field may be located in either the Root, or a Track object or a Catalog object. 'TC' - the field may be located in either a Track object or a Catalog object. 'RT' - the field may be located in either the Root or a Track object. 'T' - the field is located in a Track object. 'S' - the field is located in the Selection Parameters object. JSON Type - the JSON type of the field value, which must be one of String, Array, Number, Object or Boolean. Specification - a URL to the specification which defines the usage of the field within the catalog, per the Specification Required policy of RFC5226. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-51b091cc054194d74d3e88e7e1cb101680d5025b468c63880c9af380ed145a94","title":"","text":"3.2.3. A boolean that if true indicates that the publisher MAY issue incremental (delta) updates - see patch. If false or absent, then the publisher gaurantees that they will NOT issue any incremental updates and that any future updates to the catalog will be independent. The default value is false. This field MUST be present if its value is true, but may be omitted if the value is false. 3.2.4. <\/ins> An array of track objects trackobject. If the 'tracks' field is present then the 'catalog' field MUST NOT be present. 3.2.4. <\/del> 3.2.5. <\/ins> An array of catalog objects catalogobject. If the 'catalogs' field is present then the 'tracks' field MUST NOT be present. A catalog MUST NOT list itself in the catalog array. 3.2.5. <\/del> 3.2.6. <\/ins> A catalog object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RC', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. 3.2.6. <\/del> 3.2.7. <\/ins> A track object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RT', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. 3.2.7. <\/del> 3.2.8. <\/ins> The name space under which the track name is defined. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. If the track namespace is declared in the root"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-6d809fb160e879ac8833dea0707b578efb9170875bc2101d2cd18e978d631851","title":"","text":"optional. If it is not declared at the root or track level, then each track MUST inherit the namespace of the catalog track. 3.2.8. <\/del> 3.2.9. <\/ins> A string defining the name of the track. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. Within the catalog, track names MUST be unique per namespace. 3.2.9. <\/del> 3.2.10. <\/ins> A string defining the type of payload encapsulation. Allowed values are strings as defined in Table 2. Table 2: Allowed packaging values 3.2.10. <\/del> 3.2.11. <\/ins> Each track description can specify an optional operation value that identifies the catalog producer's intent. Track operation is an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-82568c6bc72d1d98c5dd2b5e518286be10b90435e00a5c2a14c36e72fecebe4a","title":"","text":"The default track operation is 'add'. This value does not need to be declared in the track object. 3.2.11. <\/del> 3.2.12. <\/ins> A string defining a human-readable label for the track. Examples might be \"Overhead camera view\" or \"Deutscher Kommentar\". Note that the JSON spec requires UTF-8 support by decoders. 3.2.12. <\/del> 3.2.13. <\/ins> An integer specifying a group of tracks which are designed to be rendered together. Tracks with the same group number SHOULD be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-c58eb95ca6da044ac54f1ea4ac5ea3b876637e9a6cd1ecb5315a9ab9cfb9fd2e","title":"","text":"accompany one another. A common example would be tying together audio and video tracks. 3.2.13. <\/del> 3.2.14. <\/ins> An integer specifying a group of tracks which are alternate versions of one-another. Alternate tracks represent the same media content,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-296f85636d7cb1c1041151a86e866837268c6df72840f60b8f6e0051b5f2b8a0","title":"","text":"be a set video tracks of the same content offered in alternate bitrates. 3.2.14. <\/del> 3.2.15. <\/ins> A string holding Base64 BASE64 encoded initialization data for the track. 3.2.15. <\/del> 3.2.16. <\/ins> A string specifying the track name of another track which holds initialization data for the current track. Initialization tracks"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-87197bed7827ee2d9f4469eb1abd62b356beaa5477ad81430c10329ad9dd8746","title":"","text":"only via the initialization track field of the track which they initialize. 3.2.16. <\/del> 3.2.17. <\/ins> An object holding a series of name\/value pairs which a subscriber can use to select tracks for subscription. If present, the selection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-d70949af3026292aeb7d3e068804c1d1d4d401507ea7967e64f131658bd2476c","title":"","text":"declaration of a selection parameter at the track level overrides the inherited root value. 3.2.17. <\/del> 3.2.18. <\/ins> Certain tracks may depend on other tracks for decoding. Dependencies holds an array of track names trackname on which the current track is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-713826d8fe3fff3b1f31b4cd5e1832f1da0c98194168df19eab86c4cb629b8c1","title":"","text":"the dependencies is assumed to match that of the track declaring the dependencies. 3.2.18. <\/del> 3.2.19. <\/ins> A number identifying the temporal layer\/sub-layer encoding of the track, starting with 0 for the base layer, and increasing with higher temporal fidelity. 3.2.19. <\/del> 3.2.20. <\/ins> A number identifying the spatial layer encoding of the track, starting with 0 for the base layer, and increasing with higher fidelity. 3.2.20. <\/del> 3.2.21. <\/ins> A string defining the codec used to encode the track. For LOC packaged content, the string codec registrations are defined in Sect 3 and Section 4 of WEBCODECS-CODEC-REGISTRY. For CMAF packaged content, the string codec registrations are defined in XXX. 3.2.21. <\/del> 3.2.22. <\/ins> A string defining the mime type MIME of the track. This parameter is typically supplied with CMAF packaged content. 3.2.22. <\/del> 3.2.23. <\/ins> A number defining the framerate of the track, expressed as frames per second. 3.2.23. <\/del> 3.2.24. <\/ins> A number defining the bitrate of track, expressed in bits second. 3.2.24. <\/del> 3.2.25. <\/ins> A number expressing the encoded width of the track content in pixels. 3.2.25. <\/del> 3.2.26. <\/ins> A number expressing the encoded height of the video frames in pixels. 3.2.26. <\/del> 3.2.27. <\/ins> The number of audio frame samples per second. This property SHOULD only accompany audio codecs. 3.2.27. <\/del> 3.2.28. <\/ins> A string specifying the audio channel configuration. This property SHOULD only accompany audio codecs. A string is used in order to provide the flexibility to describe complex channel configurations for multi-channel and Next Generation Audio schemas. 3.2.28. <\/del> 3.2.29. <\/ins> A number expressing the intended display width of the track content in pixels. 3.2.29. <\/del> 3.2.30. <\/ins> A number expressing the intended display height of the track content in pixels. 3.2.30. <\/del> 3.2.31. <\/ins> A string defining the dominant language of the track. The string MUST be one of the standard Tags for Identifying Languages as defined"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-84ff16f7106761bb2faaaf92efa37e0afce8b16b5b4b3d70b7521e1a18159e6c","title":"","text":"This example shows catalog for a media producer capable of sending 3 time-aligned video tracks for high definition, low definition and medium definition video qualities, along with an audio track. In this example the namesapce is absent, which infers that each track must inherit the namespace of the catalog. <\/del> this example the namespace is absent, which infers that each track must inherit the namespace of the catalog. Additionally this example shows the presence of the supportsDeltaUpdates flag. <\/ins> 3.4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-8f9510bd6cd68e4d18c650426b16cb569b65ec661440e07e740fcae779a26ef6","title":"","text":"This example shows the catalog for a media producer that is outputting two streaming formats simultaneously under different namespaces. Note that each track name referenced points at another catalog object. <\/del> catalog object and that only the first catalog supports incremental delta updates. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-98a77eb01db04d31d1e673fc7a5c88c72b2979b145041c775d8f58bb1cffe1c4","title":"","text":"'RC' - the field may be located in either the Root or a Catalog object. 'RTC' - the field may be located in either the Root, or a Track object or a Catalog object. <\/del> 'TFC' - the field may be located in either a Track object, the Common Track Fields object or a Catalog object. <\/ins> 'TC' - the field may be located in either a Track object or a Catalog object. <\/del> 'TF' - the field may be located in either a Track object or a Common Track Fields object <\/ins> 'RT' - the field may be located in either the Root or a Track object. 'T' - the field is located in a Track object. <\/del> 'T' - the field is located in a Track object <\/ins> 'S' - the field is located in the Selection Parameters object."} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-78b79b3cc65302cd0b88db5cee87f4833fa13d20d3a182f0c6adeff598f96348","title":"","text":"3.2.4. An object holding a collection of Track Fields (objects with a location of TF or TFC in table 1) which are to be inherited by all tracks. A field defined at the Track object level always supercedes any value inherited from the Common Track Fields object. 3.2.5. <\/ins> An array of track objects trackobject. If the 'tracks' field is present then the 'catalog' field MUST NOT be present. 3.2.5. <\/del> 3.2.6. <\/ins> An array of catalog objects catalogobject. If the 'catalogs' field is present then the 'tracks' field MUST NOT be present. A catalog MUST NOT list itself in the catalog array. 3.2.6. <\/del> 3.2.7. <\/ins> A catalog object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RC', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. <\/del> specified as 'RC' or 'TFC' in Table 1. <\/ins> 3.2.7. <\/del> 3.2.8. <\/ins> A track object is a collection of fields whose location is specified as 'RT', 'TC' or 'RTC' in Table 1. <\/del> as 'TFC', 'TF' or 'T' in Table 1. <\/ins> 3.2.8. <\/del> 3.2.9. <\/ins> The name space under which the track name is defined. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. If the track namespace is declared in the root"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-14f5f18cffce60f31952aadbfe4bcd1cb2cc7ebdfc4d250c81182f4673e2205e","title":"","text":"optional. If it is not declared at the root or track level, then each track MUST inherit the namespace of the catalog track. 3.2.9. <\/del> 3.2.10. <\/ins> A string defining the name of the track. See section 2.3 of MoQTransport. Within the catalog, track names MUST be unique per namespace. 3.2.10. <\/del> 3.2.11. <\/ins> A string defining the type of payload encapsulation. Allowed values are strings as defined in Table 2. Table 2: Allowed packaging values 3.2.11. <\/del> 3.2.12. <\/ins> Each track description can specify an optional operation value that identifies the catalog producer's intent. Track operation is an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-492052b75dff97c71e2a75fe4fc3079e9e70a2c7e93037011e3b3069aca24b28","title":"","text":"The default track operation is 'add'. This value does not need to be declared in the track object. 3.2.12. <\/del> 3.2.13. <\/ins> A string defining a human-readable label for the track. Examples might be \"Overhead camera view\" or \"Deutscher Kommentar\". Note that the JSON spec requires UTF-8 support by decoders. 3.2.13. <\/del> 3.2.14. <\/ins> An integer specifying a group of tracks which are designed to be rendered together. Tracks with the same group number SHOULD be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-catalog-format-ea10729bcb8c835a82116e81f610eebb328ea2df6818acfa81a1ce5160f10db9","title":"","text":"This example shows catalog for a sports broadcast sending time- aligned audio and video tracks using CMAF packaging. Init segments are delivered as inband data. <\/del> are delivered as inband data. The data has been truncated for clarity. <\/ins> 3.4.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-3a431023676254fc0cc93860a554b70d6c3b217a2aaec4bcd7b0cd9cebac3dfc","title":"","text":"Abstract Abstract Text <\/del> This document describes a tree algorithm for COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs specifically designed for implementations that rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to make the tree more tamper-resistant. <\/ins> 1. Introduction Text <\/del> The Concise Encoding of Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (CoMeTre) I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs defines a standard format for carrying COSE-encoded Merkle Tree proofs and the associated signed root value. This is helpful to pove to a verifier that a given serializable element is recorded at a given index in the Merkle Tree, or to prove that a tree is an extension of another. In this document, we describe how to verify such CoMeTre proofs for a new type of trees associated with the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF). Compared to RFC9162, the leaves of CCF trees carry additional opaque infomation that is used to verify that elements are only written by the Trusted Execution Environment, which addresses the persistance of committed transactions that happen between new signatures of the Merkle Tree root. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-dbb0b9413b99c57f5bed12464c3f920bba482ba03dadbf2c95e993e62e09e21d","title":"","text":"2. Context <\/del> Recall the definition of CoMeTre inclusion proofs, which are parametrized by 3 CBOR data types that are specific to the Tree Algorithm: This document defines the \"CCF-leaf\" and \"CCF-inclusion-proof\" CBOR types. The signed Merkle Root data type \"smtr\" is the same as in I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs but MUST set the protected header parameter carrying the identifier of the tree algorithm, \"tree_alg\", to the value TBD_1. 2.1. The input of the Merkle Tree Hash (MTH) function is a list of n bytestrings, written D_n = {d[0], d[1], ..., d[n-1]}. The output is a single HASH_SIZE bytestring, also called the tree root hash. This function is defined as follows: The hash of an empty list is the hash of an empty string: The hash of a list with one entry (also known as a leaf hash) is: For n > 1, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n (i.e., k < n <= 2k). The Merkle Tree Hash of an n-element list D_n is then defined recursively as: where: || denotes concatenation : denotes concatenation of lists D[k1:k2] = D'_(k2-k1) denotes the list {d'[0] = d[k1], d'[1] = d[k1+1], ..., d'[k2-k1-1] = d[k2-1]} of length (k2 - k1). 2.2. Each leaf in a CCF Merkle Tree carries the following components: The \"internal_hash\" and \"internal_data\" bytestrings are internal to the CCF implementation. Similarly, the auxiliary tree entries are internal to CCF. They are opaque to receipt Verifiers, but they commit the TS to the whole tree contents and may be used for additional, CCF-specific auditing. 2.3. CCF inclusion proofs are one of the tree-specific fields of a \"signed-inclusion-proof\". They consist of a list of digests tagged with a single left-or-right bit. Unlike some other tree algorithms, the index of the element in the tree is not explicit in the inclusion proof, but the list of left-or- right bits can be treated as the binary decomposition of the index, from the least significant (leaf) to the most significant (root). 2.4. When a client has received an inclusion proof and wishes to verify inclusion of a signed inclusion proof: 2.5. TBD <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-88aa8b20ebdfbb4b82ce3c564ba044f75852fae6c790be0c185080009cea1049","title":"","text":"5.1.1. This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Algorithm Parameters' registries in the 'Standards Action With Expert Review category. <\/del> This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the 'Tree Algorithms' registry: Identifier: TBD_1 Tree Algorithm: ccf_ledger Reference: This document <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-b4f1aa126bf06f8c6eba439a7161fef9263b0aea305dd5fe2f59cafaa16086e6","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes a tree algorithm for COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs specifically designed for implementations that rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to make the tree more tamper-resistant. <\/del> This document defines a new verifiable data structure type for COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs specifically designed for implementations that rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to provide stronger tamper-evidence guarantees. <\/ins> 1. The Concise Encoding of Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (CoMeTre) I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs defines a standard format for carrying COSE-encoded Merkle Tree proofs and the associated signed root value. This is helpful to pove to a verifier that a given serializable element is recorded at a given index in the Merkle Tree, or to prove that a tree is an extension of another. In this document, we describe how to verify such CoMeTre proofs for a new type of trees associated with the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF). Compared to RFC9162, the leaves of CCF trees carry additional opaque infomation that is used to verify that elements are only written by the Trusted Execution Environment, which addresses the persistance of committed transactions that happen between new signatures of the Merkle Tree root. <\/del> D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs defines a common framework for defining different types of proofs, such as proof of inclusion, about verifiable data structures (also abbreviated as \"logs\" in this document). For instance, inclusion proofs guarantee to a verifier that a given serializable element is recorded at a given state of the log, while consistency proofs are used to establish that an inclusion proof is still consistent with the new state of the log at a later time. In this document, we define a new type of log, associated with the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) ledger. Compared to RFC9162, the leaves of CCF trees carry additional opaque information that is used to verify that elements are only written by the Trusted Execution Environment, which addresses the persistence of committed transactions that happen between new signatures of the Merkle Tree root. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-b86c15528ebbfb4d5105231b5dcf06877fdc7b3351511ed0a1b80ae5582d5078","title":"","text":"2. Recall the definition of CoMeTre inclusion proofs, which are parametrized by 3 CBOR data types that are specific to the Tree Algorithm: This document defines the \"CCF-leaf\" and \"CCF-inclusion-proof\" CBOR types. The signed Merkle Root data type \"smtr\" is the same as in I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs but MUST set the protected header parameter carrying the identifier of the tree algorithm, \"tree_alg\", to the value TBD_1. <\/del> This documents extends the verifiable data structure registry of I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs with the following value: <\/ins> 2.1. The input of the Merkle Tree Hash (MTH) function is a list of n bytestrings, written D_n = {d[0], d[1], ..., d[n-1]}. The output is a single HASH_SIZE bytestring, also called the tree root hash. <\/del> The input of the Merkle Tree Hash (MTH) function is a list of n byte strings, written D_n = {d[0], d[1], ..., d[n-1]}. The output is a single HASH_SIZE byte string, also called the Merkle root hash. <\/ins> This function is defined as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-770a2ef29e124a85a47383e5e9dc0d95021667fe6c5748346392f228aac6039c","title":"","text":"2.2. Each leaf in a CCF Merkle Tree carries the following components: <\/del> Each leaf in a CCF ledger carries the following components: <\/ins> The \"internal_hash\" and \"internal_data\" bytestrings are internal to <\/del> The \"internal_hash\" and \"internal_data\" byte strings are internal to <\/ins> the CCF implementation. Similarly, the auxiliary tree entries are internal to CCF. They are opaque to receipt Verifiers, but they commit the TS to the whole tree contents and may be used for additional, CCF-specific auditing. 2.3. <\/del> 3. <\/ins> CCF inclusion proofs are one of the tree-specific fields of a \"signed-inclusion-proof\". They consist of a list of digests tagged with a single left-or-right bit. <\/del> CCF inclusion proofs consist of a list of digests tagged with a single left-or-right bit. <\/ins> Unlike some other tree algorithms, the index of the element in the tree is not explicit in the inclusion proof, but the list of left-or- right bits can be treated as the binary decomposition of the index, from the least significant (leaf) to the most significant (root). 2.4. <\/del> 3.1. <\/ins> When a client has received an inclusion proof and wishes to verify inclusion of a signed inclusion proof: <\/del> The proof signature for a CCF inclusion proof is a COSE signature (encoded with the \"COSE_Sign1\" CBOR type) which includes the following additional requirements for protected and unprotected headers. Please note that there may be additional headers defined by the application. <\/ins> 2.5. <\/del> The protected headers for the CCF inclusion proof signature MUST include the following: <\/ins> TBD <\/del> \"verifiable-data-structure: int\/tstr\". This header MUST be set to the verifiable data structure algorithm identifier for \"ccf- ledger\" (TBD_1). <\/ins> 3. <\/del> \"proof-type: int\". This header MUST be set to the value of the \"inclusion\" proof type in the IANA registry of Verifiable Data Structure Proof Type. <\/ins> Privacy Considerations <\/del> The unprotected header for a CCF inclusion proof signature MUST include the following: \"inclusion-proof: bstr .cbor CCF-inclusion-proof\". This contains the serialized CCF inclusion proof, as defined above. \"leaf\" (label TBD_2): \"bstr .cbor CCF-leaf\". This contains the CCF-specific serialization of the leaf element The payload of the signature is the CCF ledger Markle root digest, and MUST be detached in order to force verifiers to recompute the root from the inclusion proof in the unprotected header. This provides a safeguard against implementation errors that use the payload of the signature but do not recompute the root from the inclusion proof. 3.2. CCF uses the following algorithm to recompute the payload of the signature based on the \"inclusion-proof\" header: <\/ins> 4. Security Considerations <\/del> Privacy Considerations <\/ins> 5. 5.1. <\/del> Security Considerations 6. 6.1. 6.1.1. This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the 'COSE Header Parameters' registry: Label: TBD_2 Value type: \"bstr\" Reference: This document <\/ins> 5.1.1. <\/del> 6.1.2. <\/ins> This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the 'Tree Algorithms' registry: Identifier: TBD_1 <\/del> Identifier: TBD_1 (requested assignment 2) <\/ins> Tree Algorithm: ccf_ledger <\/del> Tree Algorithm: ccf-ledger <\/ins> Reference: This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-ef0f7a5be36ea2075ef94129058a72e7b9278f8b7d2234c2ff8b2ecbd8d3bb7a","title":"","text":" A CoMETRE Profile and Tree Algorithm for the Confidential Consortium Framework <\/del> COSE Receipts with CCF <\/ins> draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-latest Abstract This document defines a new verifiable data structure type for COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs specifically designed for implementations that rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to provide stronger tamper-evidence guarantees. <\/del> Signed Merkle Tree Proofs specifically designed for transaction ledgers produced by Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) to provide stronger tamper-evidence guarantees. <\/ins> 1. The Concise Encoding of Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (CoMeTre) I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs defines a common framework for defining different types of proofs, such as proof of inclusion, about verifiable data structures (also abbreviated as \"logs\" in this document). For instance, inclusion proofs guarantee to a verifier that a given serializable element is recorded at a given state of the log, while consistency proofs are used to establish that an inclusion proof is still consistent with the new state of the log at a later time. In this document, we define a new type of log, associated with the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) ledger. Compared to RFC9162, the leaves of CCF trees carry additional opaque information that is used to verify that elements are only written by the Trusted Execution Environment, which addresses the persistence of committed transactions that happen between new signatures of the Merkle Tree root. <\/del> verifiable data structures (VDS). For instance, inclusion proofs guarantee to a verifier that a given serializable element is recorded at a given state of the VDS, while consistency proofs are used to establish that an inclusion proof is still consistent with the new state of the VDS at a later time. In this document, we define a new type of VDS, associated with the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) ledger. This VDS carries indexed transaction information in a binary Merkle Tree, where new transactions are appended to the right, so that the binary decomposition of the index of a transaction can be interpreted as the position in the tree if 0 represents the left branch and 1 the right branch. Compared to RFC9162, the leaves of CCF trees carry additional internal information for the following purposes: To bind the full details of the transaction executed, which is a super-set of what is exposed in the proof and captures internal information details useful for detailed system audit, but not for application purposes. To verify that elements are only written by the Trusted Execution Environment, which addresses the persistence of committed transactions that happen between new signatures of the Merkle Tree root. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-37309b488bfbba2b829566d4e81425c356d72cc5dfc4615eee870bd43a113dd1","title":"","text":"This documents extends the verifiable data structure registry of I- D.steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs with the following value: This document defines inclusion proofs for CCF ledgers. Verifiers MUST reject all other proof types <\/ins> 2.1. The input of the Merkle Tree Hash (MTH) function is a list of n byte strings, written D_n = {d[0], d[1], ..., d[n-1]}. The output is a single HASH_SIZE byte string, also called the Merkle root hash. <\/del> A CCF ledger is a binary Merkle Tree constructed from a hash function H, which is defined from the log type. For instance, the hash function for \"CCF_LEDGER_SHA256\" is \"SHA256\", whose \"HASH_SIZE\" is 32 bytes. The Merkle tree encodes an ordered list of \"n\" transactions T_n = {T[0], T[1], ..., T[n-1]}. We define the Merkle Tree Hash (MTH) function, which takes as input a list of serialized transactions (as byte strings), and outputs a single HASH_SIZE byte string called the Merkle root hash, by induction on the list: <\/ins> This function is defined as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-cf147a496b64c430b65ed3e1ec7401c3d0f1f4234596617a121256500390d46d","title":"","text":"Each leaf in a CCF ledger carries the following components: The \"internal_hash\" and \"internal_data\" byte strings are internal to the CCF implementation. Similarly, the auxiliary tree entries are internal to CCF. They are opaque to receipt Verifiers, but they commit the TS to the whole tree contents and may be used for additional, CCF-specific auditing. <\/del> The \"internal-transaction-hash\" and \"internal-evidence\" byte strings are internal to the CCF implementation. They can be safely ignored by receipt Verifiers, but they commit the TS to the whole tree contents and may be used for additional, CCF-specific auditing. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-50319933bbf0032b85752d94fa5af44918e7243b6334cbd41521566c41b911a4","title":"","text":"the verifiable data structure algorithm identifier for \"ccf- ledger\" (TBD_1). \"proof-type: int\". This header MUST be set to the value of the <\/del> \"label: int\". This header MUST be set to the value of the <\/ins> \"inclusion\" proof type in the IANA registry of Verifiable Data Structure Proof Type. <\/del> Structure Proof Type (-1). <\/ins> The unprotected header for a CCF inclusion proof signature MUST include the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-42bd1497ba018e26b21117077d7b43c0ee804938685d85ac280cb743b150e1c9","title":"","text":"\"inclusion-proof: bstr .cbor CCF-inclusion-proof\". This contains the serialized CCF inclusion proof, as defined above. \"leaf\" (label TBD_2): \"bstr .cbor CCF-leaf\". This contains the CCF-specific serialization of the leaf element The payload of the signature is the CCF ledger Markle root digest, <\/del> The payload of the signature is the CCF ledger Merkle root digest, <\/ins> and MUST be detached in order to force verifiers to recompute the root from the inclusion proof in the unprotected header. This provides a safeguard against implementation errors that use the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-aee897508286ad18b11831f9c2f1c06b246dbc47f7fd0c0379affef6638eaeda","title":"","text":"3.2. CCF uses the following algorithm to recompute the payload of the signature based on the \"inclusion-proof\" header: <\/del> CCF uses the following algorithm to verify an inclusion receipt: <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-09f2a25eaefd00af34453546da4ce9f598e496ab0e3fb0904cffb16b246fcd05","title":"","text":"Reference: This document Label: TBD_3 Value type: \"bstr\" Reference: This document <\/ins> 6.1.2. This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the 'Tree Algorithms' registry: <\/del> ''COSE Verifiable Data Structures' registry: Name: CCF_LEDGER_SHA256 <\/ins> Identifier: TBD_1 (requested assignment 2) <\/del> Value: TBD_1 (requested assignment 2) <\/ins> Tree Algorithm: ccf-ledger <\/del> Description: Historical transaction ledgers, such as the CCF ledger <\/ins> Reference: This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-5b40bd34030ccd4e971d8a9543a0e4fde9a77da7f3d8dd0b38e3065fb110d3ca","title":"","text":"6.1.1. This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the 'COSE Header Parameters' registry: Label: TBD_2 (requested assignment 36) Value type: ccf-leaf Reference: This document Label: TBD_3 (requested assignment 37) Value type: [+ ccf-proof-element] Reference: This document 6.1.2. This document requests IANA to add the following new value to the ''COSE Verifiable Data Structures' registry: <\/del> 'COSE Verifiable Data Structures' registry: <\/ins> Name: CCF_LEDGER_SHA256 Value: TBD_1 (requested assignment 2) Description: Historical transaction ledgers, such as the CCF ledger <\/del> Description: Historical transaction ledgers produced by Trusted Execution Environments, such as the CCF ledger <\/ins> Reference: This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-77886702ddf3fc989760435a255699fd8805bfdcf2298a4be0da7b5974cbdc99","title":"","text":"Name: CCF_LEDGER_SHA256 Value: TBD_1 (requested assignment 2) <\/del> Value: 2 (requested assignment) <\/ins> Description: Historical transaction ledgers produced by Trusted Execution Environments, such as the CCF ledger <\/del> Description: Append-only logs that are integrity-protected by a Merkle Tree and signatures produced via Trusted Execution Environments containing a mix of public and confidential information, as specified by the Confidential Consortium Framework. <\/ins> Reference: This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-2bce71cc2dd0893443385ed6a420db320594912f9f30f7e462fa8a8c162fe37e","title":"","text":"This documents extends the verifiable data structure registry of I- D.ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs with the following value: This document defines inclusion proofs for CCF ledgers. Verifiers MUST reject all other proof types <\/del> This document defines inclusion proofs for CCF ledgers. Corresponding CCF Verifiers MUST reject proof types they do not support. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-cometre-ccf-profile-5810c5ef292ca3b01d3a7860ca70d6bad137bcb49cada956237d198358e9cc6a","title":"","text":"5. Privacy Considerations <\/del> TBD <\/ins> 6. Security Considerations <\/del> Maybe a list of precursors that are specific to CCF VDS goes here (e.g., trade-offs, pro\/con, use of TEE). <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-48a8062c7d10e774d0f0347f809aca5f4d0ed722fb6d9dcaa7fa819a042fd706","title":"","text":"The \"3161-ttc\" protected header parameter contains a DER-encoded RFC3161 TimeStampToken wrapped in a CBOR byte string (Major type 2). To minimize dependencies, the hash algorithm used for signing the COSE message SHOULD be the same as the algorithm used in the RFC3161 MessageImprint. <\/ins> 3.2. The \"3161-ctt\" COSE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-a21358f748428614aefc35e48c0180f6b0b2d83d0e20108720096b1e66afb5e4","title":"","text":"structure, together with the hash itself. As part of the signature verification, the receiver MUST make sure that the message imprint in the embedded timestamp token matches either the payload or the signature fields, depending on the mode of use. <\/del> that the message imprint in the embedded timestamp token matches a hash of either the payload, signature, or signature fields, depending on the mode of use and type of COSE structure. <\/ins> RFC3161 provides an example that illustrates how timestamp tokens can be used to verify signatures of a timestamped message when utilizing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-89c243b6ee914128ff379111f44bb8c0ab3c53ca70584b1963efc1a62580ae8c","title":"","text":"header parameter MUST be used for the mode described in sec- timestamp-then-cose. The \"3161-ttc\" protected header is defined as follows: Name: 3161-ttc Label: TBD Value Type: bstr Value Registry: Description: RFC 3161 timestamp token Reference: sec-tst-hdr-ttc of RFCthis The content of the byte string are the bytes of the DER-encoded RFC 3161 TimeStampToken structure. <\/del> The \"3161-ttc\" protected header parameter contains a DER-encoded RFC3161 TimeStampToken wrapped in a CBOR byte string (Major type 2). <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-f6ff4e841e2a6a2f3fa4267847f8bbe74fbe6ad83da4f176bf1b0f5427fb3fd6","title":"","text":"may not be possible if the timestamp token has been obtained outside the processing context in which the COSE object is assembled. The \"3161-ctt\" unprotected header is defined as follows: Name: 3161-ctt Label: TBD Value Type: bstr Value Registry: Description: RFC 3161 timestamp token Reference: sec-tst-hdr-ctt of RFCthis <\/del> The \"3161-ctt\" unprotected header parameter contains a DER-encoded RFC3161 TimeStampToken wrapped in a CBOR byte string (Major type 2). <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-18eac7e4f22440fd87c2998f205a67d0d17f05ac96fba512ec1c1ab0c894ffb7","title":"","text":"6. IANA is requested to add the two COSE header parameters described in sec-tst-hdr to the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry in the IANA.cose registry group. <\/del> IANA is requested to add the COSE header parameters defined in tbl- new-hdrs to the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry IANA.cose_header- parameters. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-2084350acf6a6a6b03d0b6cdb5df8f556cefdc8226d6baca4523f95a305b9aea","title":"","text":"operation is desired. In this context, timestamp tokens are similar to a countersignature RFC9338 made by the TSA. <\/del> made by the TSA. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-20268fd59a76dff73c4ea952667d8482de5cb288e46ebfbdf9272ff62087776b","title":"","text":"5. The security considerations made in RFC3161 as well as those of RFC9338 apply. <\/del> Please review the Security Considerations section in RFC3161; these considerations apply to this document as well. Also review the Security Considerations section in STD96; these considerations apply to this document as well, especially the need for implementations to protect private key material. <\/ins> In the \"Timestamp, then COSE\" (TTC) sequence of operation, the TSA is given an opaque identifier (a cryptographic hash value) for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-cbf9b37ccb63abad9ba9a55166952d90b95935c684d5ebee4b920fa8ac14506b","title":"","text":"considerations apply to this document as well, especially the need for implementations to protect private key material. In the \"Timestamp, then COSE\" (TTC) sequence of operation, the TSA is given an opaque identifier (a cryptographic hash value) for the payload. While this means that the content of the payload is not directly revealed, to prevent comparison with known payloads or disclosure of identical payloads being used over time, the payload would need to be armored, e.g., with a nonce that is shared with the recipient of the header parameter but not the TSA. Such a mechanism can be employed inside the ones described in this specification, but is out of scope for this document. <\/del> The following scenario assumes an attacker can manipulate the clocks on the COSE signer and its relying parties, but not the TSA. It is also assumed that the TSA is a trusted third party, so the attacker cannot impersonate the TSA and create valid timestamp tokens. In such a setting, any tampering with the COSE signer's clock does not have an impact because, once the timestamp is obtained from the TSA, it becomes the only reliable source of time. However, in both CTT and TTC mode, a denial of service can occur if the attacker can adjust the relying party's clock so that the CMS validation fails. This could disrupt the timestamp validation. In CTT mode, an attacker could manipulate the unprotected header by removing or replacing the timestamp. To avoid that, the signed COSE object should be integrity protected during transit and at rest. In TTC mode, the TSA is given an opaque identifier (a cryptographic hash value) for the payload. While this means that the content of the payload is not directly revealed, to prevent comparison with known payloads or disclosure of identical payloads being used over time, the payload would need to be armored, e.g., with a nonce that is shared with the recipient of the header parameter but not the TSA. Such a mechanism can be employed inside the ones described in this specification, but is out of scope for this document. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-07fbb0d9d750085a4d17e752a276647cd6aec738ffc72cf3d25dec733c6cef6d","title":"","text":"This document defines a CBOR Signing And Encrypted (COSE) header parameter for incorporating RFC 3161-based timestamping into COSE message structures (COSE_Sign and COSE_Sign1). This enables the use of established RFC 3161 timestamping infrastructure to prove the <\/del> message structures (\"COSE_Sign\" and \"COSE_Sign1\"). This enables the use of established RFC 3161 timestamping infrastructure to prove the <\/ins> creation time of a message. 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-09969d637f64d215ff5eee33f358683838970b7cbb22c543e78762c5f802318c","title":"","text":"(COSE) STD96 header parameters that carry the TimestampToken (TST) output of RFC 3161, thus allowing existing and widely deployed trust infrastructure to be used with COSE structures used for signing (COSE_Sign and COSE_Sign1). <\/del> (\"COSE_Sign\" and \"COSE_Sign1\"). <\/ins> 1.1. This section discusses two use cases, each representing one of the two modes of use defined in modes. A first use case is a digital document signed alongside a trustworthy timestamp. This is a common case in legal contracts. In such scenario, the document signer wants to reinforce the claim that the document existed on a specific date. To achieve this, the document signer acquires a fresh TST for the document from a TSA, combines it with the document, and then signs the bundle. Later on, a relying party consuming the signed bundle can be certain that the document existed at the time specified by the TSA. The relying party does not have to trust the signer's clock, which may have been maliciously altered or simply inaccurate. This usage scenario motivates the \"Timestamp then COSE\" mode defined in sec-timestamp-then-cose. A second use case is the notarization of a signed document by registering it at a Transparency Service. This is common for accountability and auditability of issued documents. Once a document is registered at a Transparency Service's append-only log, it cannot be changed. In certain cases, the registration policy of a Transparency Service may require adding a trustworthy timestamp to the document at the time of registration. This is done to enhance confidence in the timing of the registration, ensuring that the registration could not have occurred before a certain point in time. To achieve this, the Transparency Service acquires a TST from a TSA, bundles it alongside the signed document, and then registers it. A relying party that wants to ascertain the time of registration of a given document does not have to trust the Transparency Service's clock, which may have been maliciously altered or can simply be inaccurate. This usage scenario motivates the \"COSE then Timestamp\" mode described in sec-cose-then-timestamp. 1.2. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-9e634d29a607ff69ea244db130c24f5bb606ff0fd743b71d18f7384b83bd78ca","title":"","text":"2. There are two different modes of composing COSE protection and timestamping. <\/del> timestamping, motivated by the usage scenarios discussed above. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-8f09956ec72e91149cdf87a32172ae18d053bbadb8c95e945017b18934f379db","title":"","text":"There are two different modes of composing COSE protection and timestamping, motivated by the usage scenarios discussed above. The diagrams in this section illustrate the processing flow of the specified modes. For simplicity, only the \"COSE_Sign1\" processing is shown. Similar diagrams for \"COSE_Sign\" can be derived by allowing multiple \"private-key\" boxes and replacing the label \"[signature]\" with \"[signatures]\". <\/ins> 2.1. fig-timestamp-then-cose shows the case where a datum is first"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-f55f7976bcb9e2260d6aa5a68af77e60c8b28282275378a8773f1a5bb3281529","title":"","text":"The message imprint sent in the request to the TSA MUST be either: the hash of the signature field of the COSE_Sign1 message. <\/del> the hash of the signature field of the \"COSE_Sign1\" message. <\/ins> the hash of the signatures field of the COSE_Sign message. <\/del> the hash of the signatures field of the \"COSE_Sign\" message. <\/ins> In either case, to minimize dependencies, the hash algorithm SHOULD be the same as the algorithm used for signing the COSE message. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-c9a38eae964e8ad114b1c5ba62be4079944115bfe2cbb7d8a7a501ff9df135e2","title":"","text":"The original datum becomes the payload of the signed COSE message. The message imprint sent to the TSA (RFC3161) MUST be the hash of the payload field of the COSE signed object. <\/ins> 2.2. fig-cose-then-timestamp shows the case where the signature(s) field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-4c7d384afeec088d799e6c1789c4ce73ca9a6dcbba28a52fd086efa62a24bbab","title":"","text":"3. To carry RFC 3161 timestamp tokens in COSE signed messages, a new COSE header parameter, \"rfc3161-tst\", is defined as follows: <\/del> The two modes described in sec-timestamp-then-cose and sec-cose-then- timestamp use different inputs into the timestamping machinery, and consequently create different kinds of binding between COSE and TST. To clearly separate their semantics two different COSE header parameters are defined as described in the following subsections. 3.1. The \"3161-ttc\" COSE <\/ins> Name: rfc3161-tst <\/del> header parameter MUST be used for the mode described in sec- timestamp-then-cose. The \"3161-ttc\" protected header is defined as follows: Name: 3161-ttc <\/ins> Label: TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-344e601bb38080404b8183b5134cbb73f8cb9d8076bf04e435cf151b7d6c944b","title":"","text":"Description: RFC 3161 timestamp token Reference: RFCthis <\/del> Reference: sec-tst-hdr-ttc of RFCthis <\/ins> The content of the byte string are the bytes of the DER-encoded RFC 3161 TimeStampToken structure. When used as described in sec-timestamp-then-cose, the message imprint sent to the TSA (RFC3161) MUST be the hash of the payload field of the COSE signed object. <\/del> 3.2. The \"3161-ctt\" COSE <\/ins> When used as described in sec-cose-then-timestamp, the message imprint sent in the request to the TSA MUST be either: <\/del> header parameter MUST be used for the mode described in sec-cose- then-timestamp. The message imprint sent in the request to the TSA MUST be either: <\/ins> the hash of the signature field of the COSE_Sign1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-c5833e7e6a975786c5c87227163804c982c3b7465e80ee8f57ff8fa5b8945ba4","title":"","text":"may not be possible if the timestamp token has been obtained outside the processing context in which the COSE object is assembled. The \"3161-ctt\" unprotected header is defined as follows: Name: 3161-ctt Label: TBD Value Type: bstr Value Registry: none Description: RFC 3161 timestamp token Reference: sec-tst-hdr-ctt of RFCthis 4. <\/ins> RFC 3161 timestamp tokens use CMS as signature envelope format. STD70 provides the details about signature verification, and RFC3161 provides the details specific to timestamp token validation. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-aa4a97ef5520842dfe5d7f116eb24fe00a9de6769e8f12b567e3d0de1ba896a9","title":"","text":"As part of the signature verification, the receiver MUST make sure that the message imprint in the embedded timestamp token matches either the payload or the signature fields, depending on the mode of use.. <\/del> use. <\/ins> Guidance is illustrated in RFC3161 via an example that shows how timestamp tokens can be used during signature verification of a timestamped message when using X.509 certificates. <\/del> RFC3161 provides an example that illustrates how timestamp tokens can be used to verify signatures of a timestamped message when utilizing X.509 certificates. <\/ins> 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> The security considerations made in RFC3161 as well as those of RFC9338 apply. 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> IANA is requested to add the COSE Header parameter described in sec- tst-hdr to the \"COSE Header Parameters\" of the IANA.cose registry. <\/del> IANA is requested to add the two COSE Header parameters described in sec-tst-hdr to the \"COSE Header Parameters\" of the IANA.cose registry. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-d9a7602ad0cdc6d808afbcb8f975061d52040cb15d1d3849055f51b4f628c002","title":"","text":"Trust in the TS itself is supported both by protecting their implementation (using, for instance, replication, trusted hardware, and system attestation) and by enabling independent audits of the correctness and consistency of its ledger, thereby holding the <\/del> and remote attestation of systems) and by enabling independent audits of the correctness and consistency of its ledger, thereby holding the <\/ins> organization accountable that operates it. Unlike CT, where independent auditors are responsible for enforcing the consistency of multiple independent instances of the same global ledger, we require"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-ef5f8ecb6628d55e05b2849a7633059f0e30ab748f969a228109f7af27a87ae3","title":"","text":"of Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust throughout this document. When used in text, the corresponding terms are capitalized. To ensure readability, only a core set of terms is included in this section. <\/del> included in this section.[^1] <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-fd8cf271ff403b246c6bf2c3bbdfc6019e329dbeb51149e7c567b0a8d717c3e9","title":"","text":"Custom policies may use additional information present in the ledger outside of claims. For instance, issuers may have to register on the TS before claims can be accepted; a custom policy may be used to enforce access control to the transparency service. Similarly, policies may be used <\/del> enforce access control to the transparency service. Verifying the signature of the issuer is also a form of registration policy, but it is globally enforced in order to separate authentication and authorization, with policy only considering authentic inputs. <\/ins> tbl-initial-named-policies defines an initial set of named policies that TS may decide to enforce. This may be evolved in future drafts."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-570790cbb9487f69fec2873c95c1f6b63af634aed8ae4742b35127a472ee637b","title":"","text":"6. This section details the interoperability requirements for implementers of claim issuance and validation libraries, and <\/del> implementers of claim issuance and validation libraries, and of <\/ins> transparency services. 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-338e52b346bd3ad9dbacc4c726d704c6f12f3e305848793fc602e6e983144380","title":"","text":"serialization), ease of processing and availability of implementations. At a high-level, a claim is a COSE single-signed object (i.e. \"COSE_Sign1\") that contains the correct set of protected headers. Although issuers and relays may attach unprotected headers to claims, transparency services and verifiers MUST NOT rely on the presence or value of unrpotected headers in claims during registration and validation. <\/del> At a high-level that is the context of this architecture, a Claim is a COSE single-signed object (i.e. \"COSE_Sign1\") that contains the correct set of protected headers. Although issuers and relays may attach unprotected headers to claims, transparency services and verifiers MUST NOT rely on the presence or value of additional unprotected headers in claims during registration and validation. <\/ins> All claims MUST include the following protected headers: algorithm (label: \"1\"): Asymmetric signature algorithm as integer, for example \"-35\" for ECDSA with SHA-384, see COSE Algorithms registry [2] <\/del> algorithm (label: \"1\"): Asymmetric signature algorithm used by the claim issuer, as an integer, for example \"-35\" for ECDSA with SHA- 384, see COSE Algorithms registry [2]; <\/ins> issuer (label: \"TBD\", to be registered): DID (Decentralized Identifier, see W3C Candidate Recommendation [3]) of the signer as string, for example \"did:web:example.com\" <\/del> Identifier, see W3C Candidate Recommendation [3]) of the signer, as a string, for example \"did:web:example.com\"; <\/ins> feed (label: \"TBD\"): the issuer's name for the artifact <\/del> feed (label: \"TBD\"): the issuer's name for the artifact, as a string; <\/ins> payload type (label: \"3\"): Media type of payload as string, for <\/del> payload type (label: \"3\"): Media type of payload as a string, for <\/ins> example \"application\/spdx+json\" registration policy info (label: \"TBD\"): a map of additional attributes to help enforce registration policies <\/del> attributes to help enforce registration policies; <\/ins> DID key selection hint (label: \"TBD\"): a DID method-specific selector for the signing key <\/del> selector for the signing key, as a bytestring. <\/ins> Additionally, claims MAY carry the following unprotected headers:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-bc7190c8c65bb0ba4e83fb8a479407340e7c1eb03ec38d4bb7954e811a8ef8ff","title":"","text":"6.2. There are many types of statements (such as SBOMs, malware scans, audit reports, policy definitions) that issuers may want to turn into claims. The issuer must first decide on a suitable format to <\/del> audit reports, policy definitions) that Issuers may want to turn into Claims. The Issuer must first decide on a suitable format to <\/ins> serialize the statement, such as: - JSON-SPDX - CBOR-SPDX - SWID - CoSWID - CycloneDX - in-toto - SLSA"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-9aa4aac4780b6e2ecca69a9c48ad15ebccf37366a363177aceb641f65e83a93f","title":"","text":"The same claim may be independently registered in multiple TS. To register a claim, the service performs the following steps: Client authentication. <\/del> Client authentication. This is implementation-specific, and MAY be unrelated to the issuer identity. Claims may be registered by a different party than their issuer. <\/ins> So far, implementation-specific, and unrelated to the issuer identity. Claims may be registered by a different party than their issuer. Issuer identification. The service must check that the ledger records a recent DID document for the \"issuer\" protected header of the envelope. This MAY require that the service resolve the issuer DID and record the resulting document. (See issuer identity above.) <\/del> Issuer identification. The TS MUST store evidence of the DID resolution for the \"issuer\" protected header of the envelope and the resolved key manifest at the time of registration for auditing. This MAY require that the service resolve the issuer DID and record the resulting document, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. <\/ins> Envelope signature verification, as described in COSE signature, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the issuer"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-f9fb647b4db0e8da13cdbf5953776ecfc08003973dad2820ed3e56fe0876572f","title":"","text":"6.4. Trusted input for receipt verification: the identity and the public signature-verification key of the transparency service. These may be included in the verifier's trusted configuration, or determined by a trusted policy. Verification steps: Verify receipt (see I-D.birkholz-scitt-receipts). Verify issuer signature. Freshness\/revocation? Validate format of the envelope contents. Once verified, the claims together with their authenticated issuer and transparent ledger identities can be used as input to an authorization policy. <\/del> This section provides additional implementation considerations, the high-level validation algorithm is described in validation, with the ledger-specific details of checking receipts are covered in I- D.birkholz-scitt-receipts. Before checking a claim, the verifier must be configured with one or more identities of trusted transparency services. If more than one service is configured, the verifier MUST return which service the claim is registered on. In some scenarios, the verifier already expects a specific issuer and feed for the claim, while in other cases they are not known in advance and can be an output of validation. Verifiers SHOULD offer a configuration to decide if the issuer's signature should be locally verified (which may require a DID resolution, and may fail if the manifest is not available or if the key is revoked), or if it should trust the validation done by the TS during registration. Some verifiers MAY decide to locally re-apply some or all of the registration policies if they have limited trust in the TS. In addition, verifiers MAY apply arbitrary validation policies after the signature and receipt have been checked. Such policies may use as input all information in the envelope, the receipt, and the payload, as well as any local state. Verifiers SHOULD offer options to store or share receipts in case they are needed to audit the TS in case of a dispute. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-e9fec8ada37b2a7cad8331c4241539363aca386308d8e910a8985d4a72aa24e6","title":"","text":"8. Editor's Note: this may be moved to appendix. <\/ins> 8.1. 8.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-39852d708f3d0f4c9090edf49caaf7ebcc3818c0bbe0a6faaee485f72451e66e","title":"","text":"9. Privacy Considerations <\/del> Unless advertised by the TS, every issuer should treat its claims as public. In particular, their envelope and statement should not carry any private information in plaintext. <\/ins> 10. Security Considerations <\/del> On its own, verifying a transparent claim does not guarantee that its envelope or contents are trustworthy--just that they have been signed by the apparent issuer and counter-signed by the TS. If the verifier trusts the issuer, it can infer that the claim was issued with this envelope and contents, which may be interpreted as the issuer saying the artifact is fit for its intended purpose. If the verifier trusts the TS, it can independently infer that the claim passed the TS registration policy and that has been persisted in the ledger. Unless advertised in the TS registration policu, the verifier should not assume that the ordering of transparent claims in the ledger matches the ordering of their issuance. Similarly, the fact that an issuer can be held accountable for its transparent claims does not on its own provide any mitigation or remediation mechanism in case one of these claims turned out to be misleading or malicious--just that signed evidence will be available to support them. Issuers SHOULD ensure that the statements in their claims are correct and unambiguous, for example by avoiding ill-defined or ambiguous formats that may cause verifiers to interpret the claim as valid for some other purpose. Issuers and Transparency Services SHOULD carefully protect their private signing keys and avoid these keys for any purpose not described in this architecture. In case key re-use is unavoidable, they MUST NOT sign any other message that may be verified as an envelope. <\/ins> 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-a4649978cba7fa388062c66125b2ae8c7c91209a396536d80f0576202335938f","title":"","text":"they MUST NOT sign any other message that may be verified as an Envelope. 10.1. We provide a generic threat model for SCITT, describing its residual security properties when some of its actors (identity providers, Issuers, TS, and Auditors) are corrupt or compromised. This model may need to be refined to account for specific supply chains and use cases. 10.1.1. SCITT primarily supports evidence of Claim integrity, both from the Issuer (authentication) and from the TS (transparency). These guarantees are meant to hold for the long term, possibly decades. We conservatively suppose that some issuers and some TS will be corrupt. SCITT entities explicitly trust one another on the basis of their long-term identity, which maps to shorter-lived cryptographic credentials. Hence, a Verifier would usually validate a transparent signed Claim from a given Issuer, registered at a given TS (both identified in the Verifier's local authorization policy) and would not depend on any other Issuer or TS. We cannot stop authorized supply chain actors from making false claims (either by mistake or by corruption) but we can make them accountable by ensuring their Claims are systematically registered at a trustworthy TS. Similarly, we aim to provide strong residual guarantees against a faulty\/corrupt TS. We cannot stop a TS from registering Claims that do not meet its stated Registration Policy, or to issue Receipts that are not consistent with their append-only Registry, but we can hold it accountable and guarantee that it will be blamed by any Auditor that replays their Registry against any contested Receipt. Note that SCITT does not require trust in a single centralized TS: different actors may rely on different TS, each registering a subset of claims subject to their own policy. In both cases, SCITT provides generic, universally-verifiable cryptographic evidence to individually blame the Issuer or the TS. This enables valid actors to detect and disambiguate malicious actors who make contradictory Claims to different entities (Verifiers, Auditors, Issuers). On the other hand, their liability and the resulting damage to their reputation are application specific, and out of scope for SCITT. Verifiers and Auditors need not be trusted by other actors. In particular, they cannot \"frame\" an Issuer or a TS for claims they did not issue or register. If a TS is honest, then a transparent signed Claim with a correct Receipt of registration at a given position ensures that the signed claim passed its Registration Policy and was recorded at that position in its Registry. Conversely, a corrupt TS may 1. refuse or delay the registration of Claims; 2. register Claims that do not pass its Registration Policy (e.g. Claims with Issuer identities and signatures that do not verify.) 3. issue verifiable Receipts for Claims that do not match its Registry; 4. refuse access to its Registry (e.g. to Auditors, possibly after storage loss) An Auditor granted (partial) access to the Registry and to a collection of disputed Receipts will be able to replay it, detect any invalid Registration (2) or incorrect receipt in this collection (3), and blame the TS for them. This ensures any Verifier that trust at least one such Auditor that (2,3) will be blamed to the TS. Due to the operational challenge of maintaining a globally consistent append-only Registry, some TS may provide limited support for historical queries on the Claims they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent Registration or Issuer equivocation. Verifier and Auditors may also witness (1,4) but may not be able to collect verifiable evidence for it. Networking and Storage are trusted only for availability. Auditing may involve access to data beyond what is persisted in the TS log. For example, the registered TS may include only the hash of a detailed SBOM, which may limit the scope of auditing. Resistance to denial-of-service is implementation specific. Actors should independently keep their own record of the Claims they issue, endorse, verify, or audit. 10.1.2. The network is untrusted. All contents exchanged between actors is protected using secure authenticated channels (TLS) but, as usual, this may not exclude network traffic analysis. The TS is trusted with the confidentiality of the claims presented for registration. Some TS may publish every claim in their logs, to facilitate their dissemination and auditing. Others may just return receipts to the client that present claims for registration, and disclose the ledger only to auditors trusted with the confidentiality of its contents. A collection of transparent Claims leaks no information about the contents of other Claims registered at the TS. Nonetheless, Issuers should carefully review the inclusion of private\/confidential materials in their Claims; they may for instance remove any PII, or include instead opaque cryptographic commitments, such as hashes. The confidentiality of queries is implementation-specific, and generally not guaranteed. For example, while offline Claim verification is private, a TS may monitor which of its Claims are being verified from lookups to ensure their freshness. 10.1.3. We rely on standard cryptographic security for signing schemes (EUF- CMA: for a given key, given the public key and any number of signed messages, the attacker cannot forge a valid signature for any other message) and for receipts schemes (log collision-resistance: for a given commitment such as a Merkle-tree root, there is a unique log such that any valid path authenticates a claim in this log.) SCITT supports cryptographic agility: the actors depend only on the subset of signing and receipt schemes they trust. This enables the gradual transition to stronger algorithms, including e.g. post- quantum signature algorithms. 10.1.4. Trust in clients that submit Claims for registration is implementation-specific. Hence, an attacker may attempt to register any Claim it has obtained, at any TS that accepts them, possibly multiple times and out of order. This may be mitigated by a TS that enforces restrictive access control and registration policies. 10.1.5. The identity resolution mechanism is trusted to associate long-term identifiers with their public signature-verification keys. (The TS and other parties may record identity-resolution evidence to facilitate its auditing.) If one of the credentials of an Issuer gets compromised, SCITT still guarantee the authenticity of all claims signed with this credential that have been registered on a TS before the compromise. It is up to the Issuer to notify TS of credential revocation to stop Verifiers from accepting Claims signed with compromised credentials. [See the thread of revocation for additional details.] The confidentiality of any identity lookup during Claim Registration or Claim Verification is out of scope. <\/ins> 11. See Body mybody."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-5776f1d66899593d0d1f830cffea8143204b94c65162a57830364ce1b9d1cff5","title":"","text":"There are many types of Statements (such as SBOMs, malware scans, audit reports, policy definitions) that Issuers may want to turn into Claims. The Issuer must first decide on a suitable format to serialize the Statement, such as: - JSON-SPDX - CBOR-SPDX - SWID - CoSWID - CycloneDX - in-toto - SLSA <\/del> serialize the Statement, such as: JSON-SPDX CBOR-SPDX SWID CoSWID CycloneDX in-toto SLSA <\/ins> Once the Statement is serialized with the correct content type, the Issuer should fill in the attributes for the Registration policy"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-5a3b72895110ea53242f0c0cb5a17a9860beb46473216d7c563e13da1262275e","title":"","text":"7. We explain how multiple, independent Transparency Services can be composed to distribute supply chains without a single transparency authority trusted by all parties. Multiple SCITT instances, governed and operated by different organizations. For example, - a small, simple SCITT instance may keep track specifically of the software used for operating SCITT services. - an air-gapped data center may operate its own SCITT Registry to retain full control and auditing of its software supplies. <\/del> Editor's note: This section needs work. <\/ins> How? - Policy-based. Within an organization, local Verifiers contact an authoritative SCITT that records the latest policies associated with classes of Artifacts; these policies indicate which Issuers and Registries are trusted for verifying signed Transparent Claims for these Artifacts. <\/del> Multiple, independently-operated transparency services can help secure distributed supply chains, without the need for a single, centralized service trusted by all parties. For example, multiple SCITT instances may be governed and operated by different organizations that do not trust one another. <\/ins> Other federation mechanisms? <\/del> This may involve registering the same Claims at different transparency services, each with their own purpose and registration policy. This may also involve attaching multiple Receipts to the same Claims, each Receipt endorsing the Issuer signature and a subset of prior Receipts, and each TS verifying prior Receipts as part of their registration policy. <\/ins> We'd like to attach multiple Receipts to the same signed Claims, each Receipt endorsing the Issuer signature and a subset of prior Receipts. This involves down-stream Registries verifying and recording these Receipts before issuing their own Receipts. <\/del> For example, a supplier TS may provide a complete, authoritative Registry for some kind of Claims, whereas a consumer TS may collect different kinds of Claims to ensure complete auditing for a specific use case, and possibly require additional reviews before registering some of these claims. <\/ins> 8. Editor's Note: this may be moved to appendix. <\/del> Editor's Note: This may be moved to appendix. <\/ins> 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-architecture-66b497f927581aaf830e830e1a0cc299fffb206929c149c50bd220c3a05cc279","title":"","text":"Claim Issuer, as an integer, for example \"-35\" for ECDSA with SHA- 384, see COSE Algorithms registry [2]; Issuer (label: \"TBD\", to be registered): DID (Decentralized <\/del> Issuer (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"391\"): DID (Decentralized <\/ins> Identifier, see W3C Candidate Recommendation [3]) of the signer, as a string, for example \"did:web:example.com\"; Feed (label: \"TBD\"): the Issuer's name for the Artifact, as a string; <\/del> Feed (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"392\"): the Issuer's name for the Artifact, as a string; <\/ins> payload type (label: \"3\"): Media type of payload as a string, for example \"application\/spdx+json\" Registration policy info (label: \"TBD\"): a map of additional attributes to help enforce Registration policies; <\/del> Registration policy info (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"393\"): a map of additional attributes to help enforce Registration policies; <\/ins> DID key selection hint (label: \"TBD\"): a DID method-specific selector for the signing key, as a bytestring. <\/del> Key ID (label: \"4\"): Key ID, as a bytestring. <\/ins> Additionally, Claims MAY carry the following unprotected headers: Receipts (label: \"TBD\", to be registered): Array of Receipts, <\/del> Receipts (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"394\"): Array of Receipts, <\/ins> defined in In CDDL RFC8610 notation, the Envelope is defined as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-7357658b243464f2f702d87ab64e5df7c6f485ddfb87575ebefe04e12d0d7f09","title":"","text":"The Receipt structure is a CBOR array with two items, in order: \"service_id\": The service identifier as tstr. <\/del> \"protected\": The protected header of the countersigner. <\/ins> \"contents\": The proof as a CBOR structure determined by the tree algorithm."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-0f1fcaae7cd46ea5ed144fcb6f2c593a0068abeb8c6f10ee91481f7de35cc473","title":"","text":"The following parameters MUST be included in the protected header of the countersigner (sign_protected in cose_sign1_countersign): Service ID (label: TBD): The Service identifier, as defined in the Transparency Service parameters. <\/ins> Issued At (label: TBD): The time at which the countersignature was issued as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC, ignoring leap seconds."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-cb8a575ef520b3cda2b545c66154c236b67dbfdee82d58c3cd190b1c85d84d7d","title":"","text":"length \"HASH_SIZE\". \"leaf_info\": auxiliary inputs to recompute the leaf digest included in the Merkle tree: the internal hash, the internal data, and the protected header of the countersigner. <\/del> included in the Merkle tree: the internal hash and the internal data. <\/ins> \"internal_hash\" MUST be a bytestring of length \"HASH_SIZE\";"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-3763ee5548170832c94b6d85e00316321b5466da424361e8ea05a080077b1552","title":"","text":"5.5. Given the TS parameters, a signed envelope, and a Receipt for it, the following steps must be followed to verify this Receipt. <\/del> Given a signed envelope and a Receipt for it, the following steps must be followed to verify this Receipt. Decode the protected header of the Receipt and look-up the TS parameters using the service_id field. <\/ins> Verify that the Receipt Content structure is well-formed, as described in ReceiptContents. Construct a \"Countersign_structure\" as described in cose_sign1_countersign, using \"sign_protected\" from the \"leaf_info\" field of the receipt contents. <\/del> cose_sign1_countersign, using the protected header of the Receipt as \"sign_protected\". <\/ins> Compute \"LeafBytes\" as the bytestring concatenation of the internal hash, the hash of internal data, and the hash of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-279dbe2206567a8843b7000f576692baf3ef4cf39b9d3d84561dddf53608917a","title":"","text":"Verify the certificate chain established by the node certificate embedded in the receipt and the fixed service certificate in the TS parameters (see parameters) using the Issued At time from \"sign_protected\" to verify the validity periods of the certificates. The chain MUST enable the use of the public key in the receipt certificate for signature verification with the <\/del> TS parameters (see parameters) using the Issued At time from the protected header of the Receipt to verify the validity periods of the certificates. The chain MUST enable the use of the public key in the receipt certificate for signature verification with the <\/ins> Signature Algorithm of the TS parameters. Verify that \"signature\" is a valid signature value of the root"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-e804042e0dd65022433a01f96654d46a8f1da6d95ee91dd6764bf367414708ce","title":"","text":"item reflects that a CCF ledger records both signed envelopes and auxiliary entries.) For each signed envelope, compute the \"Countersign_structure\" as described in cose_sign1_countersign. <\/del> For each signed envelope, create the countersigner protected header and compute the \"Countersign_structure\" as described in cose_sign1_countersign. <\/ins> For each item in the list, compute \"LeafBytes\" as the bytestring concatenation of the internal hash, the hash of internal data and,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-a9f49622ed067b1a218a8417d32c91e58fa928cb89b1a4b0461207a9378cbc10","title":"","text":"fixed \"node_certificate\" and \"signature\", and the bytestrings \"internal_hash\" and \"internal_data\" provided with the envelope. Produce the receipt using the Service Identifier and this receipt contents. <\/del> Produce the receipt using the countersigner protected header and this receipt's contents. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-397a345bdb2250d25e0b653c712a3f6f65117f16f3514b1bc64a0efb2f27b79b","title":"","text":"6. The CCF 2 tree algorithm specifies an algorithm based on a binary <\/del> The CCF tree algorithm specifies an algorithm based on a binary <\/ins> Merkle tree over the sequence of all ledger entries, as implemented in the CCF version 2 framework (see CCF_Merkle_Tree). <\/del> in the CCF framework (see CCF_Merkle_Tree). <\/ins> 6.1. The algorithm requires that the TS define additional parameters: Hash Algorithm: The hash algorithm used in its Merkle Tree (see hash-alg-registry). Signature Algorithm: The signature algorithm used (see sig-alg- registry). <\/del> Signature Algorithm: The ECDSA signature algorithm used to sign the Merkle tree root (see sig-alg-registry). <\/ins> Service Certificate: The self-signed X.509 certificate used as trust anchor to verify signatures generated by the transparency service using the Signature Algorithm. All definitions in this section use the hash algorithm set in the TS parameters (see Section parameters). We write HASH to refer to this algorithm, and HASH_SIZE for the fixed length of its output in bytes. <\/del> All definitions in this section use the hash algorithm required by the signature algorithm set in the TS parameters (see Section parameters). We write HASH to refer to this algorithm, and HASH_SIZE for the fixed length of its output in bytes. <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-617fd365e79310b8a4264f9c178153ab7171336bc7c6e7699d676b47099c3365","title":"","text":"The Receipt contents structure is a CBOR array. The items of the array in order are: \"signature\": the signature over the Merkle tree root as bstr. <\/del> \"signature\": the ECDSA signature over the Merkle tree root as bstr. Note that the Merkle tree root hash is the prehashed input to ECDSA and is not hashed twice. <\/ins> \"node_certificate\": a DER-encoded X.509 certificate for the public key for signature verification. This certificate MUST be a valid"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-556deb3a79fc7c062b2aa8989ee57ed47231f8c1168442493965011625fe3f16","title":"","text":"10.2.2. IANA is asked to establish a registry of hash algorithm identifiers, named \"Hash Algorithms\", with the following registration procedures: TBD The \"Hash Algorithms\" registry initially consists of: The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as a cryptographic hash algorithm with no known preimage or collision attacks. These attacks can damage the integrity of the ledger. 10.2.3. <\/del> IANA is asked to establish a registry of signature algorithm identifiers, named \"Signature Algorithms\", with the following registration procedures: TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-bc77f4baa3b1f50cffeb7c68f102d6bb638d3b8af0fe33d5cc9eb862337c25aa","title":"","text":"verifiable cryptographic proof of endorsement of the signed envelope by the countersigner. Compared with countersignatures on single COSE envelopes, - Receipts countersign the envelope in context, providing authentication both of the envelope and of its logical position in the authenticated data structure. - Receipts are proof of commitment to the whole contents of the data structure, even if the Verifier knows only some of its contents. - Receipts can be issued in bulk, using a single public- key signature for issuing a large number of Receipts. <\/del> Compared with countersignatures on single COSE envelopes, Receipts countersign the envelope in context, providing authentication both of the envelope and of its logical position in the authenticated data structure. Receipts are proof of commitment to the whole contents of the data structure, even if the Verifier knows only some of its contents. Receipts can be issued in bulk, using a single public-key signature for issuing a large number of Receipts. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-36fd10bf1e5cb4535098cca29cf877194f4cd7ad0052f6bc450786b58da13e1c","title":"","text":"a Service identifier: An opaque identifier (e.g. UUID) that uniquely identifies the service and can be used to securely retrive all other Serivce parameters. <\/del> retrive all other Service parameters. <\/ins> The Tree algorithm used for issuing receipts, and its additional global parameters, if any. This document creates a registry (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-8021c90813395db57f67bcc591164764b0761d0852f3e00c429ea9b3f5c227ba","title":"","text":"Label: TBD Value Type: Receipt \/ [+ Receipt] <\/del> Value Type: [+ Receipt] <\/ins> Description: A COSE_Sign1 Countersign Receipt to be embedded in the unprotected header of the countersigned COSE_Sign1 message. <\/del> Description: One or more COSE_Sign1 Countersign Receipts to be embedded in the unprotected header of the countersigned COSE_Sign1 message. <\/ins> 9.1.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-5070f0f3fbb0222e50f6d472a1e0104d5c4c1bfb1b42fdf8e01da9e1796cbecd","title":"","text":"2. The SCITT REST API is designed to support identifier systems that are currently relevant to supply chains, including DID, x509 and PGP. In order to support these systems, the API must be aware of specific header parameters, in particular, \"kid\", \"x5u\" and \"x5c\". The API enables implementers to deploy interoperable URIs for disclosing information feeds related to supply chain actors, and artifacts accessible via transparency services. <\/ins> 2.1. TBD (comments on OAuth \/ Client Attestation). 2.2. TBD (comments on GAIN \/ OIDC). 2.3. TBD (comments on URLs \/ QR Codes). 3. 3.1. <\/ins> All messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests. If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-23afc7636cf43a2d2b04ae8fb795e341b6ef8808543a77a3e50515d9d1ba382a","title":"","text":"to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. 2.1.1. <\/del> 3.1.1. <\/ins> 2.1.1.1. <\/del> 3.1.1.1. <\/ins> Headers:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-344ed8980694c3bd8ad8fd43deafb299af4bed567268b8afcaf1525ee7754315","title":"","text":"Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message 2.1.1.2. <\/del> 3.1.1.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-3f676448b7e21a98cb81d7d5c0179658fff4cfdeeb74e19a41067d4117c1d29a","title":"","text":"Operation ID returned in the response. Clients should always obtain a Receipt as a proof that Registration has succeeded. 2.1.2. <\/del> 3.1.2. <\/ins> 2.1.2.1. <\/del> 3.1.2.1. <\/ins> 2.1.2.2. <\/del> 3.1.2.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-8ec430f6e18fda8454826845d0d6ce2bd49f0e1ec53eb7ee2f9990568b5f47d1","title":"","text":"status. This is because differentiating between the two may not be possible in an eventually consistent system. 2.1.3. <\/del> 3.1.3. <\/ins> 2.1.3.1. <\/del> 3.1.3.1. <\/ins> Query parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-599fb92fb5e1561ca58ac4a9620ffd41a0a1fd440c027b99d53ac0521202f8df","title":"","text":"Signed Statement is returned with the corresponding Registration Receipt embedded in the COSE unprotected header. 2.1.3.2. <\/del> 3.1.3.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-da2160ee3ab68900bfd4446f9c679d996036488c49fd5b240912277bb2cd040a","title":"","text":"Error code: \"entryNotFound\" 2.1.4. <\/del> 3.1.4. <\/ins> 2.1.4.1. <\/del> 3.1.4.1. <\/ins> 2.1.4.2. <\/del> 3.1.4.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-703a7f67c67974fa822a713115f739b70be395b67a38f12df28315d87b7107fe","title":"","text":"The retrieved Receipt may be embedded in the corresponding COSE_Sign1 document in the unprotected header. 3. <\/del> 4. <\/ins> Privacy Considerations 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> Security Considerations 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> Maybe 6.1. This section requests registration of the \"application\/receipt+cose\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry in the manner described in RFC6838. TODO: Consider negotiation for receipt as \"JSON\" or \"YAML\". TODO: Consider impact of media type on \"Data URIs\" and QR Codes. To indicate that the content is a SCITT Receipt: Type name: application Subtype name: receipt+cose Required parameters: n\/a Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: TODO Security considerations: TODO Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: this specification Applications that use this media type: TBD Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: Magic number(s): n\/a File extension(s): n\/ a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a Person & email address to contact for further information: TODO Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: none Author: TODO Change Controller: IESG Provisional registration? No <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-93db9eb12f69ba7b996eab05983f706cc504a3354863ee6edd624a87c9111a45","title":"","text":"2.1. In cases where a signed statement is issued by one party and registered by another, there is a need to prove posession of key material and detect tampering while authenticating both parties. Typically a nonce would be chosen by the transparency service and the second party would sign over the nonce, when registering the first issuer's signed statement. In order to avoid interactivity and improve interoperability, document describes a non-exclusive, but mandatory to support, confirmation scheme In this scheme the verifier's challenge is a recent unix timestamp, the presenting party need not request this information from the transparency service. Here is an example key binding token that can be paired with the confirmation claim in a signed statement: When applying registration policies to signed statements with confirmation, the transparency service acts as a verifier, and performs the following checks: verify the integrity of the issuer's signed statement confirm the verified content meets the registration policy for the transparency service. verify the key binding token, using the confirmation claim in the verified issuer signed statement ensure the key binding token has a nonce that is a string representation of a recent unix timestamp The exact window of validity for proving possession is a configuration detail of the transparency service. unix timestamps are used so that only a losely synchronised notion of time need be assumed and there is no requirement to account for timezones If the confirmation key is stolen, the attacker can produce key binding tokens from that point forward in time. In an interactive confirmation schema, the transparency service can force the confirmation key holder to produce a signature over a nonce that is not guessable, and this prevents certain attacks related to the duration of access to a signing capability and other timing details. However, the cost of coordinating with the transparency service, coupled with the purpose of registering with a transparency service (to obtain a receipt, proving a signed statement was acceptable at a point in time) justify specifying the recent timestamp nonce as a mandatory to implement context binding. In the case that a SCITT transparency service wants to support challenges (nonces) that are context binding, the transparency service can expose a \"challenge token endpoint\". This endpoint can process request paramters, and issuer a challenge token, that future regsitrations can use to bind to the original request. This interaction model works well for scenarios where requirements for a given regsitration might change over time, but it is important for the registering party to commit to acceptable values at the time that a signed statement is registered. These endpoints are optional to implement. 2.1.1. 2.1.1.1. 2.1.1.2. Header: \"Content-Type: application\/json\" (Optional) Header: \"Retry-After: \" Query: \"?intention={todo}\" Body: \"{ \"token\": \"JWT | SD-JWT | base64url( CWT | SD-CWT )>\" }\" 2.1.2. 2.1.2.1. Headers: \"Content-Type: application\/cose\" Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message Note: that the challenge token MUST be present and integrity protected when submitting signed statements to this endpoint. Note: this endpoint is a duplicate of \"POST https:\/\/transparency.example\/ entries\" 2.2. <\/ins> All messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests. If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-2cc2211f4f53b3a9c8ff57077955dadf4ccbafe6de67cc05b034130e9647b653","title":"","text":"to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. 2.1.1. <\/del> 2.2.1. <\/ins> 2.1.1.1. <\/del> 2.2.1.1. <\/ins> Headers:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-324d685c917bf8b5adaa525a526a94459be369fb51aaa9c5b2ae5c7053abf48f","title":"","text":"Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message 2.1.1.2. <\/del> 2.2.1.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-c1ebd6df2b039b379e1a6e0faecdf2f1629a9a3af8773fc6fc7e8cb5c68f6b85","title":"","text":"Operation ID returned in the response. Clients should always obtain a Receipt as a proof that Registration has succeeded. 2.1.2. <\/del> 2.2.2. <\/ins> 2.1.2.1. <\/del> 2.2.2.1. <\/ins> 2.1.2.2. <\/del> 2.2.2.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-58e2449bb9225faad4c6fa40784461981d1a2e896da6e098b24092ce69a4b571","title":"","text":"status. This is because differentiating between the two may not be possible in an eventually consistent system. 2.1.3. <\/del> 2.2.3. <\/ins> 2.1.3.1. <\/del> 2.2.3.1. <\/ins> Query parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-0919f518fa00ca1b9ed8f381f8cdd9d14ee47225f82c7a7d0a61eb7caaab3a8b","title":"","text":"Signed Statement is returned with the corresponding Registration Receipt embedded in the COSE unprotected header. 2.1.3.2. <\/del> 2.2.3.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-scrapi-cb13e60e8a6a6d75538fd7aa46a206f7384c436c3796638526b36c2bdd98749b","title":"","text":"Error code: \"entryNotFound\" 2.1.4. <\/del> 2.2.4. <\/ins> 2.1.4.1. <\/del> 2.2.4.1. <\/ins> 2.1.4.2. <\/del> 2.2.4.2. <\/ins> One of the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-828b26e6f537ed759da7c27e1f49417212dd62d476210241789e365754887d85","title":"","text":"supply chain attacks across the entire software lifecycle while prioritizing data privacy. Insert more detail on the development and deployment flows, threat landscape, and notional artifacts that allow security\/compliance risk assessment. <\/del> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-efd8d45acdb6ff4ec119fade33d17dc0bf977e772731bcf8ee81e04fefd27dac","title":"","text":"2. As illustrated in livecycle-threats, a supply chain attack may <\/del> Supply chain security is paramount to protecting critical infrastructure, aerospace, and defense and avoiding impacts on security, the economy, public health, and safety. It has historically focused on risk management practices to safeguard logistics, meet compliance regulations, demand forecasts, and optimize inventory. While these elements are foundational to a healthy supply chain, an integrated cyber security-based perspective of the software supply chains remains broadly undefined. Recently, the global community has experienced numerous supply chain attacks by cybercriminals targeting weaknesses in software supply chains. As illustrated in lifecycle-threats, a software supply chain attack may <\/ins> leverage one or more lifecycle stages and directly or indirectly target the component. DevSecOps relies on third-party and open-source solutions, expanding supply chain complexity, and reducing the visibility of the lifecycle compliance. One solution approach is to enhance the auditability and accountability of Digital Supply Chain Artifacts (DSCA) by using an interoperable, scalable, and flexible decentralized architecture with a transparent registry. The required software artifacts are highly variable based on community policy requirements, and the solution approach should be artifact agnostic to enable adaptation to these broad policies. Example artifacts may include commit signatures, build environment and parameters, software bill of materials, static and dynamic application security testing results, fuzz testing results, release approvals, deployment records, vulnerability scan results, and patch logs. <\/ins> 3. TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-d5ec2cc5134ae3e0764b6cf0b0870cea0830a7dfba6e9a9c460631412778f058","title":"","text":"4.2. Authoritative entities, such as auditing or code-review companies, a certification entities or a government bodies, continuously produce endorsements about software products and identifiable software components. Endorsements can include statements vouching for the trustworthiness of a software product or the lack thereof. Consumers of these endorsements include entities, such as distributing entities, as well as end users. There can be one or more endorsing entities that produce endorsements relevant to one or more of these consumer groups. Discovery off all sources of endorsements and\/or the identity of endorsing entities is creating significant cost not all consumer groups can afford. Some endorsers actively do not acknowledge other endorsers that highlight a lack of trustworthiness of certain released software products. In the end, identifying all relevant endorsements from multiple sources typically ends up to be a <\/del> Authoritative entities, such as auditing or code-review companies, certification entities or government bodies, continuously produce statements about software products and identifiable software components. Such statements can vouch for the trustworthiness of a software product or the lack thereof. Consumers of these statements include entities, such as distributing entities, as well as end users. There can be one or more entities that produce statements relevant to one or more of these consumer groups. Discovery of all sources of statements and\/or the identity of authoritative entities creates significant cost not all consumer groups can afford. Some authoritative entities actively do not acknowledge other authoritative entities that highlight a lack of trustworthiness of certain released software products. In the end, identifying all relevant statements from multiple sources typically ends up to be a <\/ins> responsibility of the consumer. As a consumer of released software wants: * to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative or relevant endorsing entities to a entity they * to offload the burden to filter from and select all endorsements that are applicable to the released software product * to make informed decisions on which endorsing entities to believe based on the best visibility of all endorsing entities possible <\/del> A consumer of released software wants: * to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative entities to an entity who does this on their behalf * to offload the burden to filter from and select all statements that are applicable to the released software product to an entity who does this on their behalf * to make informed decisions on which authoritative entities to believe based on the best visibility of all authoritative entities possible <\/ins> There is no standardized way to: * aggregate large numbers of related endorsements in one place and discover them there * of referencing other endorsements via an endorsement * identify or discover all (or at least a critical mass) relevant endorsing entities <\/del> statements in one place and discover them there * referencing other statements via a statement * identifing or discover all (or at least a critical mass) of relevant authoritative entities <\/ins> 4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-126c56cb60a0b173bdfcca01dbd62dcbdb84b7b8234373684dda83d03dc6e8b0","title":"","text":"This eventually leads to a loss of reputation and company closure for Vendor OS-X. 5. Consumers want to understand and verify that an actual trust bond exists between the Supplier of a certain software component package and the Signing Authority of that software component package (4.1.1) Consumers want to obtain statements from producers and third- parties related to the software product in a timely and unambiguous fashion (4.2.1) Consumers want to attribute statements to an authoritative issuer (4.2.2) Consumers want to associate statements with other statements in a meaningful manner (4.2.3) Consumers want to consistently, efficiently, and homogeneously check the authenticity of statements (4.2.4) Consumers want to understand if a particular provider is actually the original provider or a promoter (4.3.1) Consumers want to know if and how the source, or resulting binary, of a promoted software component differs from the original software component (4.3.2) Consumers want to check the provenance and history of a software component's source back to its origin (4.3.3) Consumers want to assess whether to trust a promoter or not (4.3.4) To be continued... <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-47a16887fc89697ca945fa3688b3734758cb486c289acf3595c5d059015da630","title":"","text":"A certain software component product is created and packaged by a Supplier. The package by itself does not include a proof of authenticity. A signing authority is tasked with adding a proof of authenticity. Trust has to be established from the Supplier towards the Signing Authority - and vice versa. The mutual trust relationship (trust bond) between Supplier and Signing Authority is <\/del> authenticity. Trustworthiness has to be established from the Supplier towards the Distributor - and vice versa. The mutual trustworthiness relationship between Supplier and Distributor is <\/ins> established per each individual software component package. A consumer of a released software wants: to understand and verify that an actual trust bond exists between the Supplier of a certain software component package and the Signing Authority of that software component package. <\/del> to understand and verify that an actual trustworthiness relationship exists between the Supplier of a certain software component package and the Distributor of that software component package. <\/ins> There is no standardized way to: enable the consumer to verify that a trust bond for a certain software component package exists and is still valid. <\/del> enable the consumer to verify that a trustworthiness relationship for a certain software component package exists and is still valid. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-49886f22b262a3e4b77a7cd9807bcfc6e5dfc2bd42053c60909098b574969290","title":"","text":"3.1. A certain software component product is created and packaged by a Supplier. The package by itself does not include a proof of authenticity. A signing authority is tasked with adding a proof of authenticity. Trust has to be established from the Supplier towards the Signing Authority - and vice versa. The mutual trust relationship (trust bond) between Supplier and Signing Authority is established per each individual software component package. <\/del> Consumers wish to verify the authenticity and integrity of software they use before installation. To do this today, they rely on the digital signature of the software. This can be misleading, however, as there is no guarantee that the certificate used to sign the software is authorized by the Supplier for signing. For example, a malicious actor may obtain a signing certificate from a reputable organization and use that certificate to sign malicious software. The consumer, believing the software originated from the reputable organization, would then install malicious software. <\/ins> A consumer of a released software wants: <\/del> A consumer of software wants: <\/ins> to understand and verify that an actual trust bond exists between the Supplier of a certain software component package and the Signing Authority of that software component package. <\/del> to verify the authenticity and integrity of software they use before installation. <\/ins> There is no standardized way to: enable the consumer to verify that a trust bond for a certain software component package exists and is still valid. <\/del> enable the consumer to verify that software originated from a 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the Supplier. <\/ins> 3.2. Authoritative entities, such as auditing or code-review companies, certification entities or government bodies, continuously produce statements about software products and identifiable software components. Such statements can vouch for the trustworthiness of a software product or the lack thereof. Consumers of these statements include entities, such as distributing entities, as well as end users. There can be one or more entities that produce statements relevant to one or more of these consumer groups. Discovery of all sources of statements and\/or the identity of authoritative entities creates significant cost not all consumer groups can afford. Some authoritative entities actively do not acknowledge other authoritative entities that highlight a lack of trustworthiness of certain released software products. In the end, identifying all relevant statements from multiple sources typically ends up to be a responsibility of the consumer. A consumer of released software wants: * to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative entities to an entity who does this on their behalf * to offload the burden to filter from and select all statements that are applicable to the released software product to an entity who does this on their behalf * to make informed decisions on which authoritative entities to believe based on the best visibility of all authoritative entities possible There is no standardized way to: * aggregate large numbers of related statements in one place and discover them there * referencing other statements via a statement * identifing or discover all (or at least a critical mass) of relevant authoritative entities <\/del> In IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects. For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product. The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. There are multiple such authoritative bodies that make such assessments. There is no assurance that all the bodies may be aware of statements from other authoritative entities or actively acknowledge them. Discovery of all sources of such reports and\/or identity of the authoritaitve bodies adds a significant cost to the end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software component wants: to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative entities to an entity who does it on their behalf to offload the burden to filter from and select all statements that are applicable to a particular release of a multi release software product, to an entity who does this on their behalf to make an informed decisions on which authoritative entities to believe based on the best visibility of all authoritative entities possible There is no standardized way to: aggregate large numbers of related statements in one place and discover them referencing other statements via a statement identifying or discover all (or at least a critical mass) of relevant authoritative entities <\/ins> 3.3. A released software product is accompanied by a set of complementary statements about it's security compliance and is deemed trustworthy by both producers and consumers. After some time, new statements produced and published by third-parties show that a software component used in the software product contains a potential weakness. Over time, a statement from another third-party illustrates that the weakness is exposed in the software product in a way that it is an exploitable vulnerability. The producer of the software product now provides a statement that confirms the linking of software component <\/del> This use case is a specialization of the use case above. A released software product is often accompanied by a set of complementary statements about it's security compliance. This gives enough confidence to both producers and consumers that the released software has a good security standard and is suitable to use. Subsequently, multiple security researchers often run sophisticated security analysis tools on the same product. The intention is to identify any security weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the package. Initially a particluar analysis can identify itself as a simple weakness in a software component. Over a period of time, a statement from another third-party illustrates that the weakness is exposed in the same software component in a way that it is an exploitable vulnerability. The producer of the software product now provides a statement that confirms the linking of software component <\/ins> vulnerability with the software product and also issues an advisory statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability ad-hoc. Later, the <\/del> statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability. At first, the <\/ins> producer provides an updated software product that still uses the vulnerable software component but shields the issue in a fashion that inhibits exploitation. A second update of the software product includes a patch to the affected software component created by the software product producer. A third update includes an updated version of the formerly insecure software component. For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and consumers. <\/del> inhibits exploitation. Later, A second update of the software product includes a security patch to the affected software component from the software producer. Finally, A third update includes a new release (updated version) of the formerly insecure software component. For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and consumers. <\/ins> A consumer of a released software wants: to know where to get these statements from producers and third- parties related to the software product in a timely and <\/del> to know where to get these security statements from producers and third-parties related to the software product in a timely and <\/ins> unambiguous fashion, how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-91e1f3b890cac98d953aafc7530b888cb8d1cb0e804f7446b5802e5261ea5867","title":"","text":"A software component source (e.g., a library) released by a certain original producer is becoming popular. The released software component source is accompanied by a statement of authenticity (e.g., a detached signature). Over time, there has been an increasing amount of providers of the same version of the software component source over the Internet. Some popular providers package the software component and provide the package with proof of authenticity using their own issuer authority. Some packages include the original statement of authenticity, and some do not. Over time, some providers no longer offer the exact same software component source but pre-compiled software component binaries. Some sources do not provide the exact same software component but include patches and <\/del> a detached signature). Over time, due to its enhanced applicability to various products, there has been an increasing amount of multiple providers of the same software component version on the internet. Some providers include this particular software component as part of their release package bundle and provide the package with proof of authenticity using their own issuer authority. Some packages include the original statement of authenticity, and some do not. Over time, some providers no longer offer the exact same software component source but pre-compiled software component binaries. Some sources do not provide the exact same software component but include patches and <\/ins> fixes produced by third-parties, as these emerge faster than solutions from the original producer. Due to complex distribution and promotion lifecycle scenarios, the original software component"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-a071dfe1fc87132c992bda0564dbcf38ea5e11c1d03955fcb14b6d940ce476e1","title":"","text":"3.5. In contrast to operating systems or user space software components of a large and complex systems, firmware components are often already executed during boot-cycles before there is an opportunity to authenticate them. Authentication takes place, for example, by validating a signature or by creating a hash of measurements and comparing them to a reference value. Corresponding procedures are often called authenticated, measured, or secure boot. The output of these high assurance boot procedures is often used as input to more complex verification known as remote attestation procedures. If measurements before execution are not possible, static after-the- fact analysis is required. When best practices are followed, in such cases measurements (e.g., a hash or digests) are stored in a protected or shielded environment (e.g., TEEs or TPMs). After finishing a high assurance boot sequence, these measurements about foundational firmware are retrieved after-the-fact from shielded locations and must be compared to reference values that are part of Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs). A verifying system appraising the integrity of a high assurance boot sequence must identify, locate, retrieve, and authenticate corresponding RIMs. A consumer of published software wants: to easily identify sources for RIMs to select appropriate RIMs and download them for the appraisal of measurements to be able to assure the authenticity, applicability, and freshness of RIMs over time There is no standardized way to: identify, locate, retrieve and authenticate RIMs in a uniform fashion to uniquely identify among multiple potential available RIMs (e.g., by age, source, signing authority, etc.) to store RIMs in a fashion that enables their usage in appraisal procedures years after they were created in a secure and believable fashion 3.6. <\/ins> An organization has established procurement requirements and compliance policies for software use. In order to allow the acquisition and deployment of software in certain security domains of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-8521ad9e72625ac0edb84f224b5630965973a865b21b539c38581c93025bb3db","title":"","text":"allow for more than one level of complexity of audit procedures (potentially depending on criticality) 3.6. <\/del> 3.7. <\/ins> Some software is deployed on systems not connected to the Internet. Authenticity checks for off-line systems can occur at time of deployment of released software. Off-line systems require appropriate configuration and maintenance to be able to conduct useful authenticity checks. If the off-line systems are operation are part of constrained node environments, they do not possess the <\/del> useful authenticity checks. If the off-line systems in operation are part of constrained node environments, they do not possess the <\/ins> capabilities to process and evaluate all kinds of different authenticity proofs that come with a released software."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-91490a30ffdb8b4f100fcbb054662d995957a53e5d123fc0644806448a3cfa67","title":"","text":"such as global open source repositories down to off-line constrained devices 3.7. 3.7.1. Firmware is ubiquitous in IoT devices (e.g., appliances, televisions, smart LED bulbs, HVAC, automobiles), runs at the highest privilege level possible, and is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. <\/del> 3.8. <\/ins> Firmware is powerful. It runs in the highest privilege level possible and is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. <\/del> 3.8.1. <\/ins> 3.7.2. <\/del> Firmware is a critical component for successful execution of any constrained IoT device. It is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. <\/ins> Personal health monitoring devices, i.e., eHealth devices, are generally battery driven and offer health telemetry monitoring, such"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-4a200e57b0da7c37fa99554bbe40a4e7d6534958214ef7a4e5afbfbaf46d8c05","title":"","text":"also provide an update framework, which verifies the integrity and authenticity of firmware updates before allowing installation. 3.7.2.1. Even with a robust firmware update system, the following problems remain as given below: <\/del> The various stake holders of a firmware update system wants to ascertain: <\/ins> How does the client applying the firmware update on the system know that the received firmware is not faulty or malicious?"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-4726ce56107ddd82451b034171a21d946b2a3567fd5fc16da5cea7bebc6d75e1","title":"","text":"devices or one specially crafted for just a small subset of a fleet of devices? 3.8. ### Introduction Software Integration is a complex activity. It implies combining various software components from multiple suppliers and producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly and provisioning. <\/del> 3.9. <\/ins> Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. <\/del> Software Integration is a complex activity. This typically involves getting various software components from multiple suppliers and producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly. <\/ins> 3.8.1. SoftAuto Ltd and Smart Cars Ltd are two different companies that source third-party integrated software for the autonomous vehicles they produce. Both these companies source integrated software solutions from Micro Coding Wizard (MCW), a fictitious company that sells integrated software solutions. MCW assembles the OS from Vendor OS-X that is built on top of firmware released by Component Vendor-A and then integrates a package manager and some open-source libraries to make the final software product. The assembled software is loaded onto a car manufactured by Smart Cars Ltd. The car has been sold and is actively used by Customer-Y. <\/del> Car manufacturers source integrated software for their autonomous vehicles from third parties that integrates software components from various sources. Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. <\/ins> 3.8.2. <\/del> 3.9.1. <\/ins> While the software runs on the automated vehicle, periodic vulnerability scanning software detects a known security issue with one component. Customer-Y is prompted with a \"Warning Indicator\" on the dashboard. As a result, Customer-Y reports the problem to Smart Cars Ltd. Smart Cars Ltd, has little insight into the root cause of the error, communicates to MCW, and requests them to look into the problem. <\/del> with one component. End User gets a \"Warning Indicator\" on the dashboard. As a result it reports the problem to the car manufacturer. It is then subsequently notified to the integrator. <\/ins> MCW does an initial investigation and suspects that the binary received from Vendor OS-X has some problems. It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built operating systems binary to ascertain that the software was produced without tampering by Vendor OS-X. <\/del> Integrator analysis leads to a suspected issue with the supplied Operating System (OS) software from an Independent Software Vendor (ISV). It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built OS binary to ascertain that the software was produced without tampering by Vendor <\/ins> Unfortunately, there is no way for the integrator to know if the binary was compromised, so the integrator is concerned they may have delivered malware unknowingly to their customers. Vendor OS-X attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In <\/del> ISV attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In <\/ins> addition, they also reveal their build environment and the architecture they used during the build. However, there are no \"Verifiable Proofs\" of the statement made by Vendor OS-X. MCW, Smart Cars Ltd., and Customer-Y now have to trust without the ability to verify the claims made by Vendor OS-X. Vendor OS-X thinks there is some mistake on the part of MCW that has led to this situation. The deadlock continues, with no clear resolution. <\/del> ISV. All the stakeholders, in the ecosystem (end user, car manufacturer and the integrator) has to trust without any ability to verify the claims made by the ISV. <\/ins> This eventually leads to a loss of reputation and company closure for Vendor OS-X."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-7f4f4be21f30511375f75cdf11fc0ad0e1bb9521a2cbc1127a7fff5065197296","title":"","text":"Consumers want to assess whether to trust a promoter or not (4.3.4) To be continued... <\/del> Consumers and other stakeholders in the system wants to verify the claims made by a software supplier by recreating the build environment to ascertain that the delivered binary is precisely the same one as claimed by the supplier <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-cdc7abe750b432684262a527c0ccc607a39e50a9819b34123a02eb91e0c9d1cb","title":"","text":"3.1. A certain software component product is created and packaged by a Supplier. The package by itself does not include a proof of authenticity. A signing authority is tasked with adding a proof of authenticity. Trustworthiness has to be established from the Supplier towards the Distributor - and vice versa. The mutual trustworthiness relationship between Supplier and Distributor is established per each individual software component package. <\/del> Consumers wish to verify the authenticity and integrity of software they use before installation. To do this today, they rely on the digital signature of the software. This can be misleading, however, as there is no guarantee that the certificate used to sign the software is authorized by the Supplier for signing. For example, a malicious actor may obtain a signing certificate from a reputable organization and use that certificate to sign malicious software. The consumer, believing the software originated from the reputable organization, would then install malicious software. <\/ins> A consumer of a released software wants: <\/del> A consumer of software wants: <\/ins> to understand and verify that an actual trustworthiness relationship exists between the Supplier of a certain software component package and the Distributor of that software component package. <\/del> to verify the authenticity and integrity of software they use before installation. <\/ins> There is no standardized way to: enable the consumer to verify that a trustworthiness relationship for a certain software component package exists and is still valid. <\/del> enable the consumer to verify that software originated from a 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the Supplier. <\/ins> 3.2. Authoritative entities, such as auditing or code-review companies, certification entities or government bodies, continuously produce statements about software products and identifiable software components. Such statements can vouch for the trustworthiness of a software product or the lack thereof. Consumers of these statements include entities, such as distributing entities, as well as end users. There can be one or more entities that produce statements relevant to one or more of these consumer groups. Discovery of all sources of statements and\/or the identity of authoritative entities creates significant cost not all consumer groups can afford. Some authoritative entities actively do not acknowledge other authoritative entities that highlight a lack of trustworthiness of certain released software products. In the end, identifying all relevant statements from multiple sources typically ends up to be a responsibility of the consumer. A consumer of released software wants: <\/del> In IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects. For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product. The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. There are multiple such authoritative bodies that make such assessments. There is no assurance that all the bodies may be aware of statements from other authoritative entities or actively acknowledge them. Discovery of all sources of such reports and\/or identity of the authoritaitve bodies adds a significant cost to the end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software component wants: <\/ins> to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative entities to an entity who does this on their behalf <\/del> entities to an entity who does it on their behalf <\/ins> to offload the burden to filter from and select all statements that are applicable to the released software product to an entity who does this on their behalf <\/del> that are applicable to a particular release of a multi release software product, to an entity who does this on their behalf <\/ins> to make informed decisions on which authoritative entities to <\/del> to make an informed decisions on which authoritative entities to <\/ins> believe based on the best visibility of all authoritative entities possible There is no standardized way to: aggregate large numbers of related statements in one place and discover them there <\/del> discover them <\/ins> referencing other statements via a statement"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-42063e04cd808bd6c68b12b339bb368d2eb7c7be47138ac1647230d0cb643559","title":"","text":"3.3. A released software product is accompanied by a set of complementary statements about it's security compliance and is deemed trustworthy by both producers and consumers. After some time, new statements produced and published by third-parties show that a software component used in the software product contains a potential weakness. Over time, a statement from another third-party illustrates that the weakness is exposed in the software product in a way that it is an exploitable vulnerability. The producer of the software product now provides a statement that confirms the linking of software component <\/del> This use case is a specialization of the use case above. A released software product is often accompanied by a set of complementary statements about it's security compliance. This gives enough confidence to both producers and consumers that the released software has a good security standard and is suitable to use. Subsequently, multiple security researchers often run sophisticated security analysis tools on the same product. The intention is to identify any security weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the package. Initially a particluar analysis can identify itself as a simple weakness in a software component. Over a period of time, a statement from another third-party illustrates that the weakness is exposed in the same software component in a way that it is an exploitable vulnerability. The producer of the software product now provides a statement that confirms the linking of software component <\/ins> vulnerability with the software product and also issues an advisory statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability ad-hoc. Later, the <\/del> statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability. At first, the <\/ins> producer provides an updated software product that still uses the vulnerable software component but shields the issue in a fashion that inhibits exploitation. A second update of the software product includes a patch to the affected software component created by the software product producer. A third update includes an updated version of the formerly insecure software component. For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and consumers. <\/del> inhibits exploitation. Later, A second update of the software product includes a security patch to the affected software component from the software producer. Finally, A third update includes a new release (updated version) of the formerly insecure software component. For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and consumers. <\/ins> A consumer of a released software wants: to know where to get these statements from producers and third- parties related to the software product in a timely and <\/del> to know where to get these security statements from producers and third-parties related to the software product in a timely and <\/ins> unambiguous fashion, how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-0c9a0b8ff4ed0e3ba4c487f809aad72b4914dd4dc06e5a05bb2a1fc2bba59de2","title":"","text":"Authenticity checks for off-line systems can occur at time of deployment of released software. Off-line systems require appropriate configuration and maintenance to be able to conduct useful authenticity checks. If the off-line systems are operation are part of constrained node environments, they do not possess the <\/del> useful authenticity checks. If the off-line systems in operation are part of constrained node environments, they do not possess the <\/ins> capabilities to process and evaluate all kinds of different authenticity proofs that come with a released software."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-80379c420d77657aac217b94d131c33204992668dba36e71b2d34ce8be462967","title":"","text":"3.7.1. Firmware is ubiquitous in IoT devices (e.g., appliances, televisions, smart LED bulbs, HVAC, automobiles), runs at the highest privilege level possible, and is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. Firmware is powerful. It runs in the highest privilege level possible and is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. 3.7.2. <\/del> Firmware is a critical component for successful execution of any constrained IoT device. It is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. <\/ins> Personal health monitoring devices, i.e., eHealth devices, are generally battery driven and offer health telemetry monitoring, such"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-25980eb07a54e5255db87345f5517ff1615adf95bceeae3803b2c0bcbd87628b","title":"","text":"3.8. ### Introduction Software Integration is a complex activity. It implies combining various software components from multiple suppliers and producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly and provisioning. <\/del> Software Integration is a complex activity. This typically involves getting various software components from multiple suppliers and producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly. <\/ins> Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. <\/del> Car manufacturers source integrated software for their autonomous vehicles from third parties that integrates software components from various sources. Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. <\/ins> 3.8.1. SoftAuto Ltd and Smart Cars Ltd are two different companies that source third-party integrated software for the autonomous vehicles they produce. Both these companies source integrated software solutions from Micro Coding Wizard (MCW), a fictitious company that sells integrated software solutions. MCW assembles the OS from Vendor OS-X that is built on top of firmware released by Component Vendor-A and then integrates a package manager and some open-source libraries to make the final software product. The assembled software is loaded onto a car manufactured by Smart Cars Ltd. The car has been sold and is actively used by Customer-Y. 3.8.2. <\/del> While the software runs on the automated vehicle, periodic vulnerability scanning software detects a known security issue with one component. Customer-Y is prompted with a \"Warning Indicator\" on the dashboard. As a result, Customer-Y reports the problem to Smart Cars Ltd. <\/del> with one component. End User gets a \"Warning Indicator\" on the dashboard. As a result it reports the problem to the car manufacturer. It is then subsequently notified to the integrator. <\/ins> Smart Cars Ltd, has little insight into the root cause of the error, communicates to MCW, and requests them to look into the problem. MCW does an initial investigation and suspects that the binary received from Vendor OS-X has some problems. It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built operating systems binary to ascertain that the software was produced without tampering by Vendor OS-X. <\/del> Integrator analysis leads to a suspected issue with the supplied Operating System (OS) software from an Independent Software Vendor (ISV). It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built OS binary to ascertain that the software was produced without tampering by Vendor <\/ins> Unfortunately, there is no way for the integrator to know if the binary was compromised, so the integrator is concerned they may have delivered malware unknowingly to their customers. Vendor OS-X attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In <\/del> ISV attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In <\/ins> addition, they also reveal their build environment and the architecture they used during the build. However, there are no \"Verifiable Proofs\" of the statement made by Vendor OS-X. MCW, Smart Cars Ltd., and Customer-Y now have to trust without the ability to verify the claims made by Vendor OS-X. Vendor OS-X thinks there is some mistake on the part of MCW that has led to this situation. The deadlock continues, with no clear resolution. <\/del> ISV. All the stakeholders, in the ecosystem (end user, car manufacturer and the integrator) has to trust without any ability to verify the claims made by the ISV. <\/ins> This eventually leads to a loss of reputation and company closure for Vendor OS-X."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-1ca866648e8ba8486dd0ad12117823f50fe1a06ca7059da12a2a7b7d5c5fa8ca","title":"","text":"There is no standardized way to: enable the consumer to verify that software originated from a 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the Supplier. <\/del> 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the supplier and is still valid. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-293228154a5dd3fe3aff92591b2311817ca4c8f0cacd9f13d005e31aea30a510","title":"","text":"identity of the authoritaitve bodies adds a significant cost to the end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software component wants: <\/del> A consumer of released software product wants: <\/ins> to offload the burden of identifying all relevant authoritative entities to an entity who does it on their behalf"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-b9de8b0d8cc21aaa6d974fbc324b1c88f4869ffa41e453720ed0006598e78d49","title":"","text":"There is no standardized way to: enable the consumer to verify that software originated from a 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the Supplier. <\/del> 'duly authorized signing party' on behalf of the supplier, and is still valid. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-f118e7d6063c5770095f9e0515b46fc8df05fc7c385fc5b8ac2688dec30709c9","title":"","text":"3.7. 3.7.1. <\/del> Firmware is a critical component for successful execution of any constrained IoT device. It is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. Personal health monitoring devices, i.e., eHealth devices, are generally battery driven and offer health telemetry monitoring, such as temperature, blood pressure, and pulse rate. These devices typically connect to the Internet through an intermediary base station using wireless technologies. Through this connection, the telemetry data and analytics transfer, and devices receive firmware updates when published by the vendor. The public network, open distribution system, and firmware update process create several security challenges. <\/del> security story of the devices it powers. For example, personal health monitoring devices (eHealth devices) are generally battery driven and offer health telemetry monitoring, such as temperature, blood pressure, and pulse rate. These devices typically connect to the Internet through an intermediary base station using wireless technologies. Through this connection, the telemetry data and analytics transfer, and devices receive firmware updates when published by the vendor. The public network, open distribution system, and firmware update process create several security challenges. Consumers and other interested parties of a firmware update ecosystem wants: to know that the received firmware for system update is not faulty or malicious to know if the signing identity used to assert the authenticity of the firmware is somehow used to sign unintended updates to ascertain that the released firmware is not subverted or compromised due to an insider risk - be it malicious or otherwise to confirm that the publishers know if their deliverable has been compromised. Can they trust their key protection or audit logging? <\/ins> Today, the best-in-class firmware vendors who supply the firmware also provide an update framework, which verifies the integrity and authenticity of firmware updates before allowing installation. <\/del> to know how the update client on an instance of a health monitoring system discerns a general update from one specially crafted for just a small subset of a fleet of devices <\/ins> The various stake holders of a firmware update system wants to ascertain: <\/del> There is no standardized way to: <\/ins> How does the client applying the firmware update on the system know that the received firmware is not faulty or malicious? <\/del> provide an update framework that allows validation of authenticity of firmware revisions <\/ins> What if the signing identity used to assert the authenticity of the firmware is somehow used to sign unintended updates? <\/del> to verify that the firmware update seen by a single device, is indeed the same as seen by all the devices. <\/ins> How can one ascertain that the released firmware is not subverted or compromised due to an insider risk - be it malicious or otherwise? <\/del> reliably discern an update that has been signed by the appropriate and intended signing identity <\/ins> How does the publisher even know that their deliverable has been compromised? Can they trust their key protection or audit logging? How does the update client on an instance of a health monitoring system know that they have been given the same update as all other devices or one specially crafted for just a small subset of a fleet of devices? <\/del> Make an informed judgement on all available information about firmware at the install time. For example, the firmware is still in a good state or otherwise? <\/ins> 3.8. Software Integration is a complex activity. This typically involves getting various software components from multiple suppliers and producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly. For example, car manufacturers source integrated software for their autonomous vehicles from third parties that integrates software components from various sources. Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. <\/ins> Car manufacturers source integrated software for their autonomous vehicles from third parties that integrates software components from various sources. Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. 3.8.1. While the software runs on the automated vehicle, periodic vulnerability scanning software detects a known security issue with one component. End User gets a \"Warning Indicator\" on the dashboard. As a result it reports the problem to the car manufacturer. It is then subsequently notified to the integrator. Integrator analysis leads to a suspected issue with the supplied Operating System (OS) software from an Independent Software Vendor (ISV). It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built OS binary to ascertain that the software was produced without tampering by Vendor <\/del> Consumer of an integrated software wants: <\/ins> Unfortunately, there is no way for the integrator to know if the binary was compromised, so the integrator is concerned they may have delivered malware unknowingly to their customers. <\/del> all components presents in a software product listed, and the ability to identify and retrieve them from a secure and tamperproof location <\/ins> ISV attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In addition, they also reveal their build environment and the architecture they used during the build. <\/del> to receive an alert when a vulnerability scan detects a known security issue on a running software component <\/ins> However, there are no \"Verifiable Proofs\" of the statement made by ISV. All the stakeholders, in the ecosystem (end user, car manufacturer and the integrator) has to trust without any ability to verify the claims made by the ISV. <\/del> verifiable proofs on build process and build environment with all supplier tiers to ensure end to end build quality and security <\/ins> This eventually leads to a loss of reputation and company closure for Vendor OS-X. 4. Consumers want to verify the authenticity and integrity of software they use before installation (4.1.1) Consumers want to obtain statements from producers and third- parties related to the software product in a timely and unambiguous fashion (4.2.1) Consumers want to attribute statements to an authoritative issuer (4.2.2) Consumers want to associate statements with other statements in a meaningful manner (4.2.3) Consumers want to consistently, efficiently, and homogeneously check the authenticity of statements (4.2.4) Consumers want to understand if a particular provider is actually the original provider or a promoter (4.3.1) Consumers want to know if and how the source, or resulting binary, of a promoted software component differs from the original software component (4.3.2) <\/del> There is no standardized way to: <\/ins> Consumers want to check the provenance and history of a software component's source back to its origin (4.3.3) <\/del> provide a tiered and transparent framework that allows for verification of integrity and authenticity of the integrated software at both component and product level before installation <\/ins> Consumers want to assess whether to trust a promoter or not (4.3.4) <\/del> notify software integrators of vulnerabilities identified during security scans of running software <\/ins> Consumers and other stakeholders in the system wants to verify the claims made by a software supplier by recreating the build environment to ascertain that the delivered binary is precisely the same one as claimed by the supplier <\/del> provide valid annotations on build integrity to ensure conformance <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-591634cebc23616746844820036758efeb9f3f305a8430478dfc8b1f6711ea64","title":"","text":"assessments. There is no assurance that all the bodies may be aware of statements from other authoritative entities or actively acknowledge them. Discovery of all sources of such reports and\/or identity of the authoritaitve bodies adds a significant cost to the <\/del> identity of the authoritative bodies adds a significant cost to the <\/ins> end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software product wants:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-2c0b3108d7524631030ec940299a348913ca4adbb8e50f3973021539617dedd8","title":"","text":"security analysis tools on the same product. The intention is to identify any security weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the package. Initially a particluar analysis can identify itself as a simple <\/del> Initially a particular analysis can identify itself as a simple <\/ins> weakness in a software component. Over a period of time, a statement from another third-party illustrates that the weakness is exposed in the same software component in a way that it is an exploitable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-1acead603983b79c23c1b19597d2b38b535d0b5081d512a2f6116f66e199b446","title":"","text":"allow for application in constrained node environments a simple and low cost way to update the configuration of a system component in charge of validity or authenticity cecking <\/del> component in charge of validity or authenticity checking <\/ins> There is no standardized way to:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-ec8f2cc236881fa746ed17c4e9da79ca5362b1e555c4aab1994cf9d1daefad75","title":"","text":"4.1. Micro Coding Wizards (MCW) is a small, fictional, software development company providing software solutions to help manage a fleet of electric vehicles (EV) for corporations. MCW's software solution, MCWManager, is an asset management platform specifically designed to manage electric vehicle fleets. MCWManager tracks usage, charge level, range, and other important characteristics of each EV in the fleet. The US Department of the Interior (DOI), a government agency has expressed interest in licensing the MCWManager software to manage a fleet of 20 Electric Vehicles, spread across the Western Region, which includes States west of the Rocky Mountains. <\/del> development company providing software solutions for managing fleets of electric vehicles (EV). MCW's software solution, MCWManager, is an asset management platform specifically designed to manage fleets of electric vehicles. MCWManager tracks usage, charge level, range, and other important characteristics of each EV in the fleet. The US Department of the Interior (DOI), a government agency has expressed interest in licensing the MCWManager software to manage a fleet, starting with 20 Electric Vehicles. <\/ins> MCW has been informed by DOI that their software will be subject to Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO) 14028 recommendations from NIST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-7faf15420e5a7dc74c83081095702b45bb8bf9f66517190ec7a283c4837c207d","title":"","text":"Makes a claim to establish its own identity as a producer of the overall SBOM. The issuer in certain situations can make further claims (example claims that relate to steps that might assist independent building of the software components, to arrive at the final deliverable). <\/del> The issuer may make further claims, fo example: claims that relate to steps that might assist independent building of the software components. <\/ins> Once all the claim construction is complete, make a CBOR data payload of all the claims. <\/del> Place all claims in a CBOR data payload for submission to SCITT. <\/ins> Signs the payload using SCITT recommended signing scheme. For now this will be COSE signing. <\/del> Signs the payload using COSE signing. <\/ins> Submits the COSE signed object to the transparent registry. <\/del> Submits the COSE signed object to the SCITT instance. <\/ins> Receives the return receipts (A COSE Countersignature object, <\/del> Receives the return receipts: A COSE Countersignature object, <\/ins> containing the inclusion proofs, the original COSE payload and a signature from the transparency service). <\/del> signature from the transparency service. <\/ins> Producer would then ship the software along with the return <\/del> Producer would then distribute the software along with the return <\/ins> receipts to the Software Consumer. 4.1.2. A software consumer, in this case DOI, receives the software <\/del> A software consumer, in this case DOI, consumes the software <\/ins> deliverable along with return receipts from the Producer. The Consumer may choose to verify that the received software"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-d262447f4e0ab129a0b0ac3e1a347953d6be6d789185811c456026fc5530f5e1","title":"","text":"Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO) 14028 recommendations from NIST and will need to supply \"Software Bill of Materials\" (SBOM) and a \"Vulnerability Disclosure Report\" (VDR) NIST attestation to the DOI prior to procurement. <\/del> prior to procurement. Unlike SBOMs, VDRs continue to evolve over time as new vulnerabilities are discovered that may impact previously released software. Consumers will continually check their vendors and potentially other SCITT sources for updated VDR reports providing the most up to date information on new and previously consumed software. <\/ins> 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-1089696c3d6dd9cad3c3e9aef9c7b80b15f1b5d80e88e6e24a176988e4f1204b","title":"","text":"Generate a Vulnerability Disclosure Report (VDR) listing all the known vulnerabilities and mitigation plans to meet Executive Order 14028 and OMB M-22-18 requirements. <\/del> 14028 and OMB M-22-18 requirements with the date the report was generated. <\/ins> Digitally sign the VDR artifact. Place the VDR and digital signature artifacts within an access- controlled location, i.e., a customer portal, and provide the end consumer with a link to these artifacts for downloading to the customers environment. <\/del> Submit the VDR and digital signature to the same SCITT instance, providing a common feed of supply chain information. If the VDR contains critical vulnerabilities, a SCITT claim may be generated, identifying any potential mitigations such as new versions. <\/ins> 4.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-de66af4b9a5100f58628b1da4eaee59ba47ff13ca338ee02d44033b67cdde924","title":"","text":"Abstract Generalized Software Supply Chain Use Case Descriptions <\/del> This document includes a collection of representative Software Supply Chain Use Case Descriptions. These use cases aim at identifying software supply chain problems that the industry faces today and acts as a guideline for developing a comprehensive solution for these class of scnenarios. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-4f3231a4e51d066af46116b428c9ad975bfd7b1c82a83c4057178327ee3227aa","title":"","text":"third-party code, development practices and tools, deployment methods and infrastructure, and interfaces and protocols. The software supply chain comprises all elements associated with an application's design, development, deployment, and maintenance throughout its entire lifecycle. The complexity of software coupled with a lack of lifecycle visibility increases the risks associated with system attack surface and the number of cyber threats capable of harmful impacts, such as exfiltration of data, disruption of operations, and loss of reputation, intellectual property, and financial assets. There is a need for a platform architecture that will allow consumers to know that suppliers maintained appropriate security practices without requiring access to proprietary intellectual property. SCITT-enabled products and analytics solutions will assist in managing compliance and assessing risk to help prevent and detect supply chain attacks across the entire software lifecycle while prioritizing data privacy. <\/del> design, development, build, integration, deployment, and maintenance throughout its entire lifecycle. The complexity of software coupled with a lack of lifecycle visibility increases the risks associated with system attack surface and the number of cyber threats capable of harmful impacts, such as exfiltration of data, disruption of operations, and loss of reputation, intellectual property, and financial assets. There is a need for a platform architecture that will allow consumers to know that suppliers maintained appropriate security practices without requiring access to proprietary intellectual property. SCITT-enabled products and analytics solutions will assist in managing compliance and assessing risk to help prevent and detect supply chain attacks across the entire software lifecycle while prioritizing data privacy. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-birkholz-scitt-software-supply-chain-use-cases-751844efb114f78616711667df5a017e6e907ed3c5b26050e12a0427a65d76ab","title":"","text":"4.1. Micro Coding Wizards (MCW) is a small, fictional, software development company providing software solutions to help manage a fleet of electric vehicles (EV) for corporations. MCW's software solution, MCWManager, is an asset management platform specifically designed to manage electric vehicle fleets. MCWManager tracks usage, charge level, range, and other important characteristics of each EV in the fleet. The US Department of the Interior (DOI), a government agency has expressed interest in licensing the MCWManager software to manage a fleet of 20 Electric Vehicles, spread across the Western Region, which includes States west of the Rocky Mountains. MCW has been informed by DOI that their software will be subject to Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO) 14028 recommendations from NIST and will need to supply \"Software Bill of Materials\" (SBOM) and a \"Vulnerability Disclosure Report\" (VDR) NIST attestation to the DOI prior to procurement. <\/del> 4.1.1. A software producer, in this case MCW, creates a digitally signed SBOM, listing all the components contained in the final \"distribution package\" which a software consumer downloads in preparation for deployment within their digital ecosystem. The following steps are performed by the Software Producer: Create the \"final SBOM\" listing all the components contained in the final distribution package of a software product, which the customer will install into their environment. The SBOM must follow NTIA minimum elements for SBOM's and other NTIA and NIST recommendations for SBOM, to meet Executive Order 14028 and OMB M-22-18 requirements. (Co)SWID, SPDX or CycloneDX SBOM formats are acceptable for this artifact. <\/del> Firmware is ubiquitous. It is in phone, watch, TV, alarm clock, baby monitor, WiFi devices and possibly even in light bulbs if one uses LED lamps. In any given desktop or Personal Computer (PC) there is a BIOS or UEFI type firmware that people are familiar with, but there are also scores of other hidden firmware blobs running on small controllers which power things like managment engines, keyboards, network cards, hard disks, SSD's etc. <\/ins> Digitally sign the SBOM artifact. Place the SBOM and digital signature artifacts within an access- controlled location, i.e. a customer portal, and provide the end consumer with a link to these artifacts for downloading to the customers environment. <\/del> Firmware is powerful, it runs in a highest previlege level possible and is often the bedrock on which the security story of the devices it powers. <\/ins> 4.1.2. A software consumer, in this case DOI, obtains a digitally signed SBOM artifact from a software vendor, which initiates the following risk assessment process: Produce a SHA-256 hash value for the SBOM artifact. Verify the digital signature over the SBOM artifact and identify the signing key used to sign the SBOM, referred to as the SKID (Secret Key ID), assuming the signature is verified successfully. Submit an inquiry to a trusted SCITT Registry requesting confirmation that a trust declaration is present in the registry for the combination of SHA-256 hash value and SKID associated with the SBOM. If a trust declaration is on file with the SCITT trusted registry then continue with the risk assessment, otherwise inform the consumer that the SBOM hash and SKID combination are not registered, and the risk assessment ceases. Continue with the risk assessment by performing a vulnerability search for each SBOM component, identifying any CVE's that are reported. <\/del> Personal health monitoring devices, i.e., eHealth devices are typically battery driven and located physically on or under user control to monitor some bodily function, such as temperatire, blood pressure or pulse rate. These devices typically connect to the Internet through an intermediary base statation, using wireless technologies. This connection is used to report the monitored data and also to update the firmware on the health monitoring system. This public network and open distribution system produces its own security challenges. <\/ins> 4.2. MCW has been informed by DOI that their software will be subject to Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO) 14028 recommendations from NIST and will need to supply \"Software Bill of Materials\" (SBOM) and a \"Vulnerability Disclosure Report\" (VDR) NIST attestation to the DOI prior to procurement. <\/del> Today, the best-in-class firmware vendors who supply the firmware also provide an update framework, which verifies the integrity and authenticity of firmware updates before allowing them to be installed. <\/ins> 4.2.1. <\/del> 4.1.2.1. <\/ins> A software producer, in this case MCW, participates in a Vulnerability Disclosure Program, and generates a Vulnerability Disclosure Report listing all the known vulnerabilities and mitigations, which a software consumer downloads in preparation for deployment within their digital ecosystem. The following steps are performed by the Software Producer: <\/del> Even with a robust firmware update system the following problems remain as given below: <\/ins> Participate in a Vulnerability Disclosure program. <\/del> How does the client applying the firmware update on the system know, that the received firmware is not faulty or even malicious ? <\/ins> Generate a Vulnerability Disclosure Report (VDR) listing all the known vulnerabilities and mitigation plans to meet Executive Order 14028 and OMB M-22-18 requirements. <\/del> What if the signing identity used to assert the authenticity of the firmware is somehow used to sign unintended updates (whether through outright compromise as in the Realtek identity used to sign the Stuxnet worm)? <\/ins> Digitally sign the VDR artifact. <\/del> How can one ascertain that the released firmare is not subverted or compromised due to an insider risk - be it malicious or otherwise ? <\/ins> Place the VDR and digital signature artifacts within an access- controlled location, i.e., a customer portal, and provide the end consumer with a link to these artifacts for downloading to the customers environment. <\/del> How the publisher themselves even know that there deliverable has been compromised in some way, can they trust their key protection or audit logging ? <\/ins> 4.2.2. <\/del> How the update client on an instance of health monitoring system know that they have been given the same update as all other devices or one especially crafted for just a small subset of fleet of devices ? <\/ins> A software consumer, in this case DOI, obtains a digitally signed VDR artifact from a software vendor, which initiates the following risk assessment process: <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> Produce a SHA-256 hash value for the VDR artifact. <\/del> ### Introduction <\/ins> Verify the digital signature over the VDR artifact and identify the signing key used to sign the VDR, referred to as the SKID (Secret Key ID), assuming the signature is verified successfully. <\/del> Software Integration is a complex activity. It essentially implies combining various different software components coming from a a range of suppliers and producing a combined executable to be given to a Device Manufacturer. Then the executable is loaded into the device, as part of device assembly. <\/ins> Submit an inquiry to a trusted SCITT Registry requesting confirmation that a trust declaration is present in the registry for the combination of SHA-256 hash value and SKID associated with the SBOM. <\/del> The complexity adds a level of security vulnerability into the delivered software. <\/ins> Consumer checks SBOM against NIST NVD. If vulnerabilities have been reported within NVD and not in the producer provided VDR, then raise an issue with the producer for report accuracy. <\/del> 4.2.1. <\/ins> If a trust declaration is on file with the SCITT trusted registry then continue with the risk assessment, otherwise inform the consumer that the VDR hash and SKID combination are not registered, and the risk assessment ceases. <\/del> SoftAuto Ltd and Smart Cars Ltd are two different companies that source developed integrated software that can be loaded into autonmous vehicles they produce. Both these companies, source integrated software solution from Micro Coding Wizard (MCW) a fictitious company that sells integrated software solutions that can be loaded into specific vehicle product. MCW assembles the OS from Vendor OS-X that is built on top of Firmware released by Component Vendor-A and then integrates a package manager and some open source libraries to make the final software product. The assembled software is loaded onto a car manufactured by Smart Cars Ltd. The car is been sold and is been actively used by Customer-Y. <\/ins> Continue with the risk assessment by performing a vulnerability search for each SBOM component, identifying any CVE's that are reported. <\/del> 4.2.2. <\/ins> 4.3. <\/del> While the software is been running on the automated vehicle, a periodic vulnerability scanning software detects some known security issue with one of the component. Customer-Y is prompted with a \"Warning Indictor\" on the dashboard. As a result, Customer-Y reports the problem to Smart Cars Ltd. <\/ins> Consistent with the NIST Guidance and by the timelines identified below, agencies are required to obtain a self-attestation from the software producer before using the software. <\/del> Smart Cars Ltd, while not very sure what could be the problem, under panic communicates to MCW and requests them to look into the problem. <\/ins> 4.3.1. <\/del> MCW does initial investigation and suspects that the binary received from Vendor OS-X has some problems. It demands specific environment and architectural details associated with the built operating systems binary to ascertain that the software was produced without any tampering by the Vendor OS-X. <\/ins> An acceptable self-attestation must include the following minimum requirements: <\/del> Unfortunately there is no way for the integrator to know, if the binary was compromised, so the integrator is concerned they may have delivered malware unknowingly to their customers. <\/ins> The software producer's name. <\/del> Vendor OS-X attempts to show that it did all the steps correctly. It does disclose information about the binary they delivered. In addition to this, they also demonstrated the build environment and the architecture, they used during the build. <\/ins> A description of which product or products the statement refers to (preferably focused at the company or product line level and inclusive of all unclassified products sold to Federal agencies). <\/del> However there is no \"Verifiable Proofs\" of the statement made by Vendor OS-X. <\/ins> A statement attesting that the software producer follows secure development practices and tasks that are itemized in the standard self-attestation form. <\/del> MCW, Smart Cars Ltd., and Customer-Y now has to trust without any means of verifying the claims made by Vendor OS-X. <\/ins> Self-attestation is the minimum level required; however, agencies may make risk-based determinations that a third-party assessment is required due to the criticality of the service or product that is being acquired, as defined in M-21-30. <\/del> Vendor OS-X thinks there is some mistake on the part of MCW that has led to this situation. <\/ins> 4.3.2. <\/del> The deadlock continues, with no clear resolution. <\/ins> TBD <\/del> This eventually leads to loss of reputation and company closure for Vendor OS-X. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-01deb32481fd908c8e2ba0a8e7b1db623ed115b015994768943464834d6f0000","title":"","text":"4. 4.1. <\/ins> There are two ways a client can receive updates for a resource: At a high level, an ALTO client opens a persistent HTTP connection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-60d8151920b5118b64d655b6bf480378000144580282bb6c810fb363b38ebcca","title":"","text":"A client that prefers server push can use the following workflow: 4.1. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> The HTTP version a \"https\" connection uses is negotiated between client and server using the TLS ALPN extension, described in RFC9113"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-968395340ace73e4b9faf6fcfb53f7cd09c2ff73148184cc88cfd899e680d40a","title":"","text":"Hence, the server processing logic SHOULD be: 7.2.1. <\/del> It is RECOMMENDED that the server uses the following HTTP codes to indicate errors, with the media type \"application\/alto-error+json\", regarding update item requests."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-92bc5c372b99e12d2582f5fa61b75d7271e2d7291942d59e468a03de2b845fc0","title":"","text":"8.3. 8.3.1. <\/del> The server push MUST satisfy the following requirements: 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-a45d916f3308e906eed26b8b82c43ac4af12126e7be6ab56a6d1aaddf8c6b039","title":"","text":"11. IANA is requested to register the following media types following the same process in RFC7285: <\/del> IANA is requested to register the following media types from the registry available at IANA-Media-Type: <\/ins> application\/alto-tips+json: as described in open-resp;"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-ad4b01ed0f46d5b6cbb0589b6823123f6f50a69f5831a2d122c0b5afd9c46293","title":"","text":"TIPS uses this directory schema to generate template URIs which allow clients to construct the location of incremental updates after receiving the tips-view-uri path from the server. The generic template for the location of the update item on the edge from node i to node j in the updates graph is: <\/del> template for the location of the update item on the edge from node 'i' to node 'j' in the updates graph is: <\/ins> Due to the sequential nature of the update item IDs, a client can long poll a future update that does not yet exist (e.g., the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-809ff7dbdfd88eb30af775307fd64d28f278553f51a016adbe48ad04cb01613e","title":"","text":"4.4. Conceptually, the sequence number space of TIPS views satisfy the following requirements: First, for a specific client, it may expect to see the same sequence number for the same version, to avoid occasional disconnections. Second, the coupling of sequence numbers should be minimized for ALTO resources monitored by multiple clients. <\/del> following requirements: First, a specific client may expect to see the same sequence number for the same version to avoid occasional disconnections. Second, the coupling of sequence numbers should be minimized for ALTO resources monitored by multiple clients. <\/ins> Thus, the sequence number space is constant for each TIPS view per <\/del> Thus, the sequence number space is constant for each TIPS view per- <\/ins> client but is independent across TIPS views. Note that For the same TIPS resource queried by different clients, multiple TIPS views will be created, one for each client, whose sequence number spaces are independent. Independence implies that the clients must not assume there is a <\/del> Independence implies that ALTO clients must not assume there is a <\/ins> consensus of how different versions map to sequence numbers but does not force the sequence numbers to be different. See shared- tips-view for cases where an ALTO server may desire to use the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-19400789ea3f364bd32be47c4c797955f88c2e015819d58ad34fd103ecf283e7","title":"","text":"5.4. Extending the IRD example in Section 8.1 of RFC8895, below is the IRD of an ALTO server supporting ALTO base protocol, ALTO\/SSE, and ALTO TIPS. <\/del> Extending the IRD example in Section 8.1 of RFC8895, ex-ird is the IRD of an ALTO server supporting ALTO base protocol, ALTO\/SSE, and ALTO TIPS. <\/ins> Note that it is straightforward for an ALTO server to run HTTP\/2 and support concurrent retrieval of multiple resources such as \"my-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-03deef804b866787128a8d5ee2e5ac7b9414b92fc88ad30bdb88d518aa5785db","title":"","text":"\"400 Bad Request\" to the ALTO client; the body of the response follows the generic ALTO error response format specified in Section 8.5.2 of RFC7285. Hence, an example ALTO error response has the format: <\/del> the format shown in ex-bad-reques. <\/ins> Note that \"field\" and \"value\" are optional fields. If the \"value\" field exists, the \"field\" field MUST exist."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-2994e7d32a065f846a397c540b08011e451530ae4ad08858dfc52818fa358f31","title":"","text":"For simplicity, assume that the ALTO server is using the Basic authentication. If a client with username \"client1\" and password \"helloalto\" wants to create a TIPS view of an ALTO Cost Map resource with resource ID \"my-routingcost-map\", it can send the following request: <\/del> with resource ID \"my-routingcost-map\", it can send the request depiced in ex-op. <\/ins> If the operation is successful, the ALTO server returns the following message: <\/del> If the operation is successful, the ALTO server returns the message shown in ex-op-rep. <\/ins> 6.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-307563d9a1cab655317047a1408bcb3989669030bb1638ccd4eba5db226df84a","title":"","text":"7.3. Assume the client wants to get the contents of the update item on edge 0 to 101. The request is: <\/del> edge 0 to 101. The format of the request is shown in ex-ge. <\/ins> And the response will be: <\/del> The response is shown in ex-get-res. <\/ins> 7.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-alto-new-transport-9e0782baccf90ebf0e8d9491aeb48f4cc7e5facae84455010212074d03b52931","title":"","text":"correctly enabled. The requested URL is the root path of the TIPS view, appended with \"push\", as shown below. The server returns an JSON object with content type \"application\/ alto-tipsparams+json\". The response MUST include only one field \"server-push\". If the server push is enabled, the value of the \"server-push\" field MUST be the JSONBool value \"true\" (without the quote marks), and otherwise JSONBool value \"false\" (without the quote marks). <\/del> The server returns a JSON object with content type \"application\/alto- tipsparams+json\". The response MUST include only one field \"server- push\". If the server push is enabled, the value of the \"server-push\" field MUST be the JSONBool value \"true\" (without the quote marks), and otherwise JSONBool value \"false\" (without the quote marks). <\/ins> 8.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-hevc-webrtc-d8eb26dc362a86d33a234408cefe424e072ba3e6ac656afa7e1d45f67de5c9a7","title":"","text":"is communicated using PACI Extensions defined in [RFC7798] Section 4.4.4.2. A WebRTC implementation that has negotiated use of RTP header extensions containing TSCI information (such as the Dependency Descriptor [DD]) SHOULD NOT send TSCI information within the PACI, and where TSCI information is being received in RTP header extensions MUST ignore TSCI information contained in the PACI. <\/del> NOT send TSCI information within the PACI. If TSCI information is being received in an RTP header extension, implementations MUST ignore TSCI information contained in the PACI. <\/ins> Implementations of the H.265 codec have utilized a wide variety of optional parameters. To improve interoperability, the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-hevc-webrtc-f22638191970008b4ea5fa0bde47275e37218e1e5b3bc4af5e8d94f3e836f712","title":"","text":"tx-mode: Implementations SHOULD NOT include this parameter within SDP. If no tx-mode parameter is present, a value of \"SRST\" MUST be inferred. Support for the \"MRST\" and \"MRMT\" modes is OPTIONAL; implementations that do not support the \"MRST\" or \"MRMT\" modes MUST NOT include these modes in the tx-mode parameter. <\/del> Implementations MUST support \"SRST\"; support for \"MRST\" and \"MRMT\" is OPTIONAL. Implementations that do not support \"MRST\" or \"MRMT\" MUST NOT include these tx-mode values in SDP. <\/ins> sprop-sps, sprop-pps, sprop-vps, sprop-sei: H.265 allows sequence and picture information to be sent both in-band and out-of-band. WebRTC implementations"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-99aed12448e85f94a9ec3c7b87513bc1d3465726b9243243661095406434be1a","title":"","text":"RTP Payload Format for sub-codestream latency JPEG 2000 streaming draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-02 <\/del> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-03 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-84121e7a04039cdb7e8d9e3ad29c2e28c547ee1832bc42c490b7a69caa2e3584","title":"","text":"11. This memo requests that IANA registers the content type specified at sec-media-type. The media type is also requested to be added to the IANA registry for RTP Payload Format MIME types [1]. <\/del> sec-media-type. <\/ins> 12."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-474492c80e04009b4e7d0dd3be27f1bd140bc901ce133b9f05b794e88e92d617","title":"","text":"Security considerations related to the JPEG 2000 codestream contained in the payload are discussed at RFC3745. 13. References 13.1. URIs [1] http:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/rtp-parameters <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-5f99c800983eb740dbe0394917adce1dee3f6cc05482a6f54d2e9071d03765d9","title":"","text":"RTP Payload Format for sub-codestream latency JPEG 2000 streaming draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-03 <\/del> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-j2k-scl-04 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-19f7331b0ab95bd4fa929845384626225ab0ae82a62b17d69086c1c411e62f26","title":"","text":"This document defines state variables and constants for the BBR algorithm. The variables starting with C, P, or rs not defined below are defined in delivery-rate-samples, \"Delivery Rate Samples\". <\/del> Variables for connection state (C), per-packet state (P), or per-ACK rate sample (rs) that are not defined below are defined in delivery- rate-samples, \"Delivery Rate Samples\". <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-30718d54a90267582c34a225ed01e94984c2131e4d1900830ecfe0ea86dc1379","title":"","text":"bottleneck link in one round-trip or less. As noted in BBRDrainPacingGain, any value at or below 1 \/ BBRStartupCwndGain = 1 \/ 2 = 0.5 will theoretically achieve this. BBR uses the value 0.35, which has been shown to offer good performance on YouTube, when compared with other alternatives. <\/del> which has been shown to offer good performance when compared with other alternatives. <\/ins> 2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-3a5d3550469348f472a51f0f8dcc293a7e9838a425362ff0b91e5a4f32c2de72","title":"","text":"all three tactics, to measure the network path and try to optimize its operating point. BBR's state machine uses two control mechanisms. Primarily, it uses the pacing_gain (see the \"Pacing Rate\" section), which controls how fast packets are sent relative to BBR.bw. A pacing_gain > 1 decreases inter-packet time and increases inflight. A pacing_gain < 1 has the opposite effect, increasing inter-packet time and while aiming to decrease inflight. Second, if the state machine needs to quickly reduce inflight to a particular absolute value, it uses the cwnd. <\/del> BBR's state machine uses two control mechanisms: the pacing_gain and the cwnd. Primarily, it uses the pacing_gain (see the \"Pacing Rate\" section), which controls how fast packets are sent relative to BBR.bw. A pacing_gain > 1 decreases inter-packet time and increases inflight. A pacing_gain < 1 has the opposite effect, increasing inter-packet time and while aiming to decrease inflight. The cwnd is sufficiently larger than the BDP to allow the higher pacing gain to accumulate more packets in flight. Only if the state machine needs to quickly reduce inflight to a particular absolute value, it uses the cwnd. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-41493f1bece3c827fd51c4977f8f22a60c4967579c883580c2b8b98ae56b6685","title":"","text":"utilized the per-flow available bandwidth, and sets both BBR.full_bw_now and BBR.full_bw_reached to true. Upon starting a full pipe detection process, the following initialization runs: <\/del> Upon starting a full pipe detection process (either on startup or when probing for an increase in bandwidth), the following steps are taken: <\/ins> While running the full pipe detection process, upon an ACK that acknowledges new data, and when the delivery rate sample is not application-limited (see delivery-rate-samples), BBR runs the \"full pipe\" estimator: BBR waits three rounds to have solid evidence that the sender is not detecting a delivery-rate plateau that was temporarily imposed by the receive window. Allowing three rounds provides time for the receiver's receive-window auto-tuning to open up the receive window and for the BBR sender to realize that BBR.max_bw should be higher: in the first round the receive-window auto-tuning algorithm grows the receive window; in the second round the sender fills the higher receive window; in the third round the sender gets higher delivery- rate samples. This three-round threshold was validated by YouTube experimental data. <\/del> BBR waits three packet-timed round trips to have reasonable evidence that the sender is not detecting a delivery-rate plateau that was temporarily imposed by congestion or receive-window auto-tuning. This three-round threshold was validated by experimental data to allow the receiver the chance to grow its receive window. <\/ins> 4.3.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-64fb250c324a277d74fc275c8d5548ba5a35749085de5fd3336ce11933e3ae5c","title":"","text":"Startup by switching to a pacing_gain well below 1.0, until any estimated queue has been drained. It uses a pacing_gain of BBRDrainPacingGain = 0.35, chosen via analysis BBRDrainPacingGain and experimentation (on YouTube) to try to drain the queue in less than one round-trip: <\/del> experimentation to try to drain the queue in less than one round- trip: <\/ins> In Drain, when the amount of data in flight is less than or equal to the estimated BDP, meaning BBR estimates that the queue at the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-dfb60dd599f706c7e4c842a8bfd80b807ed68eea7db4ba59ff0a070a65d4fcb7","title":"","text":"corresponding to that ACK, and generating a delivery rate sample at later a time (upon the arrival of the next ACK). This can underestimate the delivery rate due the artificially inflated \"rs.interval\". As with any effect that can cause underestimation, it is RECOMMENDED that applications or congestion control algorithms using the output of this algorithm apply appropriate filtering to mitigate the impact of this effect. <\/del> \"rs.interval\". The impact of this effect is mitigated using the BBR.max_bw filter. <\/ins> 4.5.2.4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-ccwg-bbr-1717b1ecc4025c421777cc5e8e0bc1974fb1645b5d95c2a48100349b6faed776","title":"","text":"ends of the connections do not accept SACK), then this algorithm can be extended to estimate approximate delivery rates using duplicate ACKs (much like Reno and RFC5681 estimates that each duplicate ACK indicates that a data packet has been delivered). The details of this extension will be described in a future version of this draft. <\/del> indicates that a data packet has been delivered). <\/ins> 4.5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-drip-arch-5acb200b47bbec41313b6c86ace2ecfa4c96fa26f69994e28186943c58ef8252","title":"","text":"F3411-22a does not specify the time source, but GNSS is generally assumed, as latitude, longitude and geodetic altitude must be reported and most small UAS use GNSS for positioning and navigation. F3586-22, to satisfy FAA_RID, specifies use of the US Government operated GPS (with its sub-microsecond accuracy but only 1.5 second precision) and tamper protection of the entire UAS RID subsystem. Thus, in messages sourced by the UA, timestamp accuracy and precision each can be assumed to be 1.5 seconds at worst. GCS often have access to cellular LTE or other time sources better than the foregoing, and such better time sources would be required to support multilateration in harvestbridforutm, but such better time sources cannot be assumed generally for purposes of security analysis. <\/del> Note: For example, to satisfy FAA_RID, F3586-22 specifies tamper protection of the entire RID subsystem and use of the US Government operated GPS. GPS has sub-microsecond accuracy and 1.5 second precision. In this example, UA-sourced messages can be assumed to have timestamp accuracy and precision of 1.5 seconds at worst. GCS often have access to cellular LTE or other time sources better than the foregoing, and such better time sources would be required to support multilateration in harvestbridforutm, but such better time sources cannot be assumed generally for purposes of security analysis. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-0a917a6a926922513d30ddeebff61524d62de597e5fb7eb77d555e74c2795637","title":"","text":"1. Digital Map provides a core multi-layer topology model and data and connects them to the other models and data. This includes layers from physical topology to service topology. <\/del> Digital Map is a data model that provides a view of the operator's networks and services, including how it is connected to other models\/ data (e.g. inventory, observability sources, and operational knowledge). It specifically provides an approach to model multi- layered topology and appropriate mechanism to navigate amongs layers and correlate between them. This includes layers from physical topology to service topology. This model is applicable to multiple domains (access, core, data centers, etc.) and technologies (Optical, IP, etc.). <\/ins> The Digital Map modelling defines the core topological entities (network, node, link, and interface) at each layer, their role in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-2cc9d415fb18c148a8d7eae7c4d0448e3dc0e4df3f678c655f9cd4ece3556a68","title":"","text":"2. The document defines the following terms: <\/del> The document makes use of the following terms: Topology in this document refers to the network and service topology. Network topology defines how physical or logical nodes, links and interfaces are related and arranged. Service topology defines how service components (e.g., VPN instances, customer interfaces, and customer links) between customer sites are interrelated and arranged. There are at least 8 types of topologies: point to point, bus, ring, star, tree, mesh, hybrid and daisy chain. Topologies may be unidirectional or bidirectional (bus, some rings). <\/ins> Network topology defines how physical or logical nodes, links and interfaces are related and arranged. Service topology defines how service components (e.g., VPN instances, customer interfaces, and customer links) between customer sites are interrelated and arranged. There are at least 8 types of topologies: point to point, bus, ring, star, tree, mesh, hybrid and daisy chain. Topologies may be unidirectional or bidirectional (bus, some rings). <\/del> A multi-layered topology models relationships between different layers of topology, where each layer represents a connectivity aspect of the network and services that needs to be configured, controlled and monitored. Each layer of topology has a separate lifecycle. <\/ins> Defines a layer in the multilayer topology. A multilayer topology models relationships between different layers of connectivity, where each layer represents a connectivity aspect of the network and service that needs to be configured, controlled and monitored. <\/del> Represents topology at a single layer in the multi-layered topology. <\/ins> The topology layer can also represent what needs to be managed by a specific user, for example IGP layer can be of interest to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-01daf03b695ce6871fbd181ba221913ebfd47a6a6ec9361b468b861507cbdeb9","title":"","text":"that can differ for different types of services and for different providers\/solutions. The top layer represents the application\/flow view of <\/del> The top layer represents the application\/flow view of service <\/ins> connectivity. Basis for the Operator Network and Services Models that provides topological information of the network. It provides the core multi-layer topology model\/data and how to connect them to the other models\/data. <\/del> The document defines the following terms: Digital Map is a data model that provides a view of the operator's networks and services, including how it is connected to other models\/data (e.g. inventory, observability sources, and operational knowledge). It specifically provides an approach to model multi-layered topology and appropriate mechanism to navigate amongs layers and correlate between them. This model is applicable to multiple domains (access, core, data centers, etc.) and technologies (Optical, IP, etc.). <\/ins> The set of principles, guidelines, and conventions to model the Digital Map using the IETF RFC8345 approach. They cover the network types (layers and sublayers), entity types, entity roles (network, node, termination point or link), entity properties, relationship types between entities and relationships to other entities o. <\/del> entities. <\/ins> Defines the core topological entities, their role in the network, core properties and relationships both inside each layer and between the layers. <\/del> core topological properties and relationships both inside each layer and between the layers. <\/ins> It is the basic topological model with the links to other models and connects them all: configuration, maintenance, assurance"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-14f5fdda62540fc0082970ac1c9a74a4f5cfb5fb09f6867c5c8df8739f9952d5","title":"","text":"nodes, links and termination points inside a network, relationships between instances belonging to different networks, links to functional data for the instances, including configuration, health, symptoms. :The data can be historical, real-time, or future data for 'what-if' scenarios. <\/del> configuration, health, symptoms. The data can be historical, real-time, or future data for 'what- if' scenarios. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-3969743ee0cda948afdd03d61839e34a0c8ebaa8fde53161fe9accf7f0157a24","title":"","text":"operations use cases, but it is also a requirement for the Digital Twin. The following sections shows some example use case descriptions to initiate the discussion what type of info is needed to describe the use cases in the context of Digital Map. The next version of the draft will include more info on these use cases, from the perspective of what is the value of the digital map for each use case and how the Digital Map API can be used. This will also clarify if only read and if\/when write interface is needed per use case. 3.1. The application will be able to retrieve physical topology from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to retrieve physical inventory of individual devices and cables. The application may request either one or multiple layers of topology via the Digital Map API and and from the response it will be able to retrieve both physical and logical inventory. 3.2. 3.3. The application will be able to retrieve all services from the Digital Map API for selected network type. The application will be able to retrieve the topology for selected services via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to navigate via the supporting relationship top-down to the lower layers. That way, it will be able to determine what logical resources are used by the service. The supporting relations to the lowest layer will help application to determine what physical resources are used by the service. 3.4. The application will be able to navigate from the Physical, L2 or L3 topology to the services that use specific resources. For example, the application will be able to select the resouce and by navigation the supporting relationship bottom-up come to the service and its nodes, tps and links. 3.5. The application will be able to retrieve topology layer and any network\/node\/tp\/link instances from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to determine the health of each instance by navigating to the SAIN subservices and its symptoms. 3.6. The application will be able to retieve the topology at any layer from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to navigate any retrieve any KPIs for selected topology entity. 3.7. 3.8. 3.9. 3.10. 3.11. <\/ins> 4. 4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-c1bbe311df4da8ae278c98b46c934a53b491782d6aedad573b785748d2c75939","title":"","text":"that some of them are supported by default by RFC8345): Basic model with network, node, link, and interface entity types. This means that users of the Digital Map model must be able to understand topology model at any layer via these core concepts only, without having to go to the details of the specific"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-da8c823b04463224ee2ff41ad227fbbcf561bfee180a6fe68d601fbf94041ede","title":"","text":"capability to retrieve the links to external data\/models. Digital Map models and APIs must be common over different network domains (campus, core, data center, etc.). This means that clients of the Digital Map API must be able to understand the topology model of layers of any domain without having to understand the details of any technologies and domains. <\/del> domains (campus, core, data center, etc.). This means that clients of the Digital Map API must be able to understand the topology model of layers of any domain without having to understand the details of any technologies and domains. <\/ins> Digital Map must provide semantics for layered network topologies and for linking external models\/data."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-76b0b922a7c9ce53df76df052c418102f635a8f5f16941e74cf53ea92cfb8f07","title":"","text":"4.2. The following are design requirements for modelling the Digital Map: <\/del> The following are design requirements for modelling the Digital Map. Theey are derived from the core requerements collected from the operators and although there is some duplication, these are focused on summarizing the requirements for the design of the model and API: <\/ins> Digital Map should contain only topological information."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-0992350b425479776163dd2fcbffcb8b4f5f3d95d7da8e1a86804a415965d404","title":"","text":"identify topological entities at different layers, identify their roles, and topological relationships between them. Digital Map should contain only topological relationships inside each layer or between the layers (underlay\/overlay). <\/del> Digital Map should contain all topological relationships inside each layer or between the layers (underlay\/overlay) Digital Map should contain links to other models\/data to enable generic navigation to other YANG models in generic way. <\/ins> Provide capability for conditional retrieval of parts of Digital Map. Must support geo-spatial, temporal, and historical data. The temporal and historical can be supported external to the Digital Map. <\/del> temporal and historical can also be supported external to the Digital Map. <\/ins> 4.3. The following are the architectural requirements for the Digital Map: <\/del> The following are the architectural requirements for the controller that provides Digital Map API: <\/ins> Scale, performance, ease of integration."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-23d21bb89be956bc86c658a9ff55a0eda9b62761e08668c22f662fe94bed4df9","title":"","text":"The topology layer can also represent what needs to be managed by a specific user, for example IGP layer can be of interest to the operator troubleshooting or optimizating the routing, while the <\/del> operator troubleshooting or optimizing the routing, while the <\/ins> optical layer may be of interest to the user managing the optical network."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-fbc3701f81375bb212ae15b48707f88db72b107daca3a8340b6d68f6d909b1cc","title":"","text":"operations use cases, but it is also a requirement for the Digital Twin. The following sections shows some example use case descriptions to initiate the discussion what type of info is needed to describe the use cases in the context of Digital Map. The next version of the draft will include more info on these use cases, from the perspective of what is the value of the digital map for each use case and how the Digital Map API can be used. This will also clarify if only read and if\/when write interface is needed per use case. <\/del> The following sections includes some initial use case descriptions to initiate the discussion about what type of info is needed to describe the use cases in the context of Digital Map. The next version of the draft will include more info on these use cases and more input from the operaotors, from the perspective of what the value of the digital map for each use case is and how the Digital Map API can be used. This will also clarify if only read and if\/when write interface is needed per use case. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-76ec9716452e75ae0b5a84dddd66a225095c9240f1a7429d3d9b80402a84d685","title":"","text":"3.3. The application will be able to retrieve all services from the Digital Map API for selected network type. The application will be <\/del> Digital Map API for selected network types. The application will be <\/ins> able to retrieve the topology for selected services via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to navigate via the supporting relationship top-down to the lower layers. That way, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-fee36c2ea12802c9908f4b16fe5277ec5ef8a8ba12220b8d2b0a146607770e7b","title":"","text":"The application will be able to navigate from the Physical, L2 or L3 topology to the services that use specific resources. For example, the application will be able to select the resouce and by navigation <\/del> the application will be able to select the resouce and by navigating <\/ins> the supporting relationship bottom-up come to the service and its nodes, tps and links."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-9f2e331754416048986b0ab806e032317841c9393c198f10645860bf0a9b24be","title":"","text":" Digital Map: Concept, Requirements, and Use Cases draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-latest <\/del> SIMAP: Concept, Requirements, and Use Cases draft-ietf-nmop-simap-concept-latest <\/ins> Abstract This document defines the concept of Digital Map, and identifies a set of Digital Map requirements and use cases. <\/del> This document defines the concept of Service & Infrastructure Maps (SIMAP), and identifies a set of SIMAP requirements and use cases. <\/ins> The document intends to be used as a reference for the assessment effort of the various topology modules to meet Digital Map requirements. <\/del> effort of the various topology modules to meet SIMAP requirements. <\/ins> 1. Digital Map is a data model that provides a view of the operator's networks and services, including how it is connected to other models\/ data (e.g. inventory, observability sources, and operational knowledge). It specifically provides an approach to model multi- layered topology and appropriate mechanism to navigate amongs layers and correlate between them. This includes layers from physical topology to service topology. This model is applicable to multiple domains (access, core, data centers, etc.) and technologies (Optical, IP, etc.). The Digital Map modelling defines the core topological entities (network, node, link, and interface) at each layer, their role in the network topology, core topological properties, and topological relationships both inside each layer and between the layers. It also defines how to access other external models from the topology. The Digital Map model is a topological model that is linked to the other functional models and connects them all: configuration, maintenance, assurance (KPIs, status, health, and symptoms), Traffic- Engineering (TE), different behaviors and actions, simulation, emulation, mathematical abstractions, AI algorithms, etc. These other models exist outside of the digital map and are not defined during digital map modelling. The Digital Map data consists of virtual instances of network and service topologies at different layers. The Digital Map provides access to this data via standard APIs for both read and write operations (write operations for offline simulations), with query capabilities and links to other YANG modules (e.g., Service Assurance for Intent-based Networking (SAIN) RFC9417, Service Attachement Points (SAPs) RFC9408, Inventory I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang, and non-YANG models. <\/del> Service & Infrastructure Maps (SIMAP) is a data model that provides a view of the operator's networks and services, including how it is connected to other models\/data (e.g. inventory, observability sources, and operational knowledge). It specifically provides an approach to model multi-layered topology and appropriate mechanism to navigate amongs layers and correlate between them. This includes layers from physical topology to service topology. This model is applicable to multiple domains (access, core, data centers, etc.) and technologies (Optical, IP, etc.). The SIMAP modelling defines the core topological entities (network, node, link, and interface) at each layer, their role in the network topology, core topological properties, and topological relationships both inside each layer and between the layers. It also defines how to access other external models from the topology. The SIMAP model is a topological model that is linked to the other functional models and connects them all: configuration, maintenance, assurance (KPIs, status, health, and symptoms), Traffic-Engineering (TE), different behaviors and actions, simulation, emulation, mathematical abstractions, AI algorithms, etc. These other models exist outside of the SIMAP and are not defined during SIMAP modelling. The SIMAP data consists of virtual instances of network and service topologies at different layers. The SIMAP provides access to this data via standard APIs for both read and write operations (write operations for offline simulations), with query capabilities and links to other YANG modules (e.g., Service Assurance for Intent-based Networking (SAIN) RFC9417, Service Attachement Points (SAPs) RFC9408, Inventory I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang, and non-YANG models. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-95828b5cc6585b928dd638bd3025435f9122ad63442bf62eb3db482bc3d2bed3","title":"","text":"The document defines the following terms: Digital Map is a data model that provides a view of the operator's <\/del> SIMAP is a data model that provides a view of the operator's <\/ins> networks and services, including how it is connected to other models\/data (e.g. inventory, observability sources, and operational knowledge). It specifically provides an approach to model multi-layered topology and appropriate mechanism to navigate amongs layers and correlate between them. This model is <\/del> amongs layers and correlate between them. This includes layers from physical topology to service topology. This model is <\/ins> applicable to multiple domains (access, core, data centers, etc.) and technologies (Optical, IP, etc.). The set of principles, guidelines, and conventions to model the Digital Map using the IETF RFC8345 approach. They cover the network types (layers and sublayers), entity types, entity roles (network, node, termination point or link), entity properties, relationship types between entities and relationships to other entities. <\/del> Service & Infrastructure Maps (SIMAP) using the IETF RFC8345 approach. They cover the network types (layers and sublayers), entity types, entity roles (network, node, termination point or link), entity properties, relationship types between entities and relationships to other entities. <\/ins> Defines the core topological entities, their role in the network, core topological properties and relationships both inside each"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-1c122f10d737f9c4265b677895fce8bf116e6660fd36e7dfa18d4fa4e4f6dcd0","title":"","text":"3. The following are sample use cases that require Digital Map: <\/del> The following are sample use cases that require SIMAP: <\/ins> Generic inventory queries"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-7e1e38b1cc708fa609b2d3f1808228773fd93ff8e9c1395dd7a9ac495b0de889","title":"","text":"Intent\/service assurance Service E2E and per-link KPIs on the Digital Map (connectivity status, high-availability, delay, jitter, and loss) <\/del> Service E2E and per-link KPIs on SIMAP (connectivity status, high- availability, delay, jitter, and loss) <\/ins> Capacity planning"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-9a28f264d5de6c4ace8e799f363ff17bf774910cf10698be0c5bde58dc590da8","title":"","text":"Digital Twin Overall, the Digital Map is needed to provide the mechanism to connect data islands from the core multi-layered topology. It is a solution feasible and useful in the short-term for the existing operations use cases, but it is also a requirement for the Digital Twin. <\/del> Overall, the SIMAP is needed to provide the mechanism to connect data islands from the core multi-layered topology. It is a solution feasible and useful in the short-term for the existing operations use cases, but it is also a requirement for the SIMAP. <\/ins> The following sections includes some initial use case descriptions to initiate the discussion about what type of info is needed to describe the use cases in the context of Digital Map. The next version of the draft will include more info on these use cases and more input from the operaotors, from the perspective of what the value of the digital map for each use case is and how the Digital Map API can be used. This will also clarify if only read and if\/when write interface is needed per use case. <\/del> the use cases in the context of SIMAP. The next version of the draft will include more info on these use cases and more input from the operators, from the perspective of what the value of the SIMAP for each use case is and how the SIMAP API can be used. This will also clarify if only read and if\/when write interface is needed per use case. <\/ins> 3.1. The application will be able to retrieve physical topology from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to retrieve physical inventory of individual devices and cables. <\/del> controller via SIMAP API and from the response it will be able to retrieve physical inventory of individual devices and cables. <\/ins> The application may request either one or multiple layers of topology via the Digital Map API and and from the response it will be able to <\/del> via the SIMAP API and and from the response it will be able to <\/ins> retrieve both physical and logical inventory. For Access network providers the ability to have linkage in the SIMAP of the complete network (active + passive) is essential as it provides many advantages for optimized customer service, reduced MTTR, and lower operational costs through truck roll reduction. <\/ins> 3.2. 3.3. The application will be able to retrieve all services from the Digital Map API for selected network types. The application will be able to retrieve the topology for selected services via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to navigate via the supporting relationship top-down to the lower layers. That way, it will be able to determine what logical resources are used by the service. The supporting relations to the lowest layer will help application to determine what physical resources are used by the service. <\/del> The application will be able to retrieve all services from the SIMAP API for selected network types. The application will be able to retrieve the topology for selected services via SIMAP API and from the response it will be able to navigate via the supporting relationship top-down to the lower layers. That way, it will be able to determine what logical resources are used by the service. The supporting relations to the lowest layer will help application to determine what physical resources are used by the service. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-873e8a08e2be8554495969d4dead5929f014cbbf4ea67bfd8c1f5b26f239b9ab","title":"","text":"3.5. The application will be able to retrieve topology layer and any network\/node\/tp\/link instances from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will be able to determine the health of each instance by navigating to the SAIN subservices and its symptoms. <\/del> network\/node\/tp\/link instances from the controller via the SIMAP API and from the response it will be able to determine the health of each instance by navigating to the SAIN subservices and its symptoms. <\/ins> 3.6. The application will be able to retieve the topology at any layer from the controller via Digital Map API and from the response it will <\/del> from the controller via the SIMAP API and from the response it will <\/ins> be able to navigate any retrieve any KPIs for selected topology entity."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-0b7c4487d48e21860f0e90a76e8e72a9fdcf6609e7a15f9bb6867450bec93ab4","title":"","text":"4.1. The following are the core requirements for the Digital Map (note that some of them are supported by default by RFC8345): <\/del> The following are the core requirements for the SIMAP (note that some of them are supported by default by RFC8345): <\/ins> Basic model with network, node, link, and interface entity types. This means that users of the Digital Map model must be able to <\/del> This means that users of the SIMAP model must be able to <\/ins> understand topology model at any layer via these core concepts only, without having to go to the details of the specific augmentations to understand the topology. Layered Digital Map, from physical network (ideally optical, layer 2, layer 3) up to service and intent views. <\/del> Layered SIMAP, from physical network (ideally optical, layer 2, layer 3) up to service and intent views. SIMAP must support topology of the complete network, including active and passive parts. For Access network providers the ability to have linkage in the SIMAP of the complete network (active + passive) is essential as it provides many advantages for optimized customer service, reduced MTTR, and lower operational costs through truck roll reduction. <\/ins> Open and programmable Digital Map. <\/del> Open and programmable SIMAP. <\/ins> This includes \"read\" operations to retrieve the view of the network, typically as application-facing interface of Software Defined Networking (SDN) controllers or orchestrators. It also includes \"write\" operations, not for the ability to directly change the Digital Map data (e.g., changing the network or service parameters), but for offline simulations, also known as <\/del> directly change the SIMAP data (e.g., changing the network or service parameters), but for offline simulations, also known as <\/ins> what-if scenarios. Running a \"what-if\" analysis requires the ability to take snapshots and to switch easily between them. Note that there is a need to distinguish between a change on the Digital Map for future simulation and a change that reflects the current reality of the network. <\/del> SIMAP for future simulation and a change that reflects the current reality of the network. <\/ins> Standard based Digital Map Models and APIs, for multi-vendor support. <\/del> Standard based SIMAP Models and APIs, for multi-vendor support. <\/ins> Digital Map must provide the standard YANG APIs that provide for read\/write and queries. These APIs must also provide the capability to retrieve the links to external data\/models. <\/del> SIMAP must provide the standard YANG APIs that provide for read\/ write and queries. These APIs must also provide the capability to retrieve the links to external data\/models. <\/ins> Digital Map models and APIs must be common over different network <\/del> SIMAP models and APIs must be common over different network <\/ins> domains (campus, core, data center, etc.). This means that clients of the Digital Map API must be able to <\/del> This means that clients of the SIMAP API must be able to <\/ins> understand the topology model of layers of any domain without having to understand the details of any technologies and domains. Digital Map must provide semantics for layered network topologies and for linking external models\/data. <\/del> SIMAP must provide semantics for layered network topologies and for linking external models\/data. <\/ins> Digital Map must provide intra-layer and inter-layer relationships. <\/del> SIMAP must provide intra-layer and inter-layer relationships. <\/ins> Digital Map must be extensible with metadata. <\/del> SIMAP must be extensible with metadata. <\/ins> Digital Map must be pluggable. That is, <\/del> SIMAP must be pluggable. That is, <\/ins> Must connect to other YANG modules for inventory, configuration, assurance, etc. Given that no all involved components can be available using YANG, there is a need to connect Digital Map YANG model with other modelling mechanisms. <\/del> YANG, there is a need to connect SIMAP YANG model with other modelling mechanisms. <\/ins> Digital Map must be optimized for graph traversal for paths. This means that only providing link nodes and source and sink relationships to termination-points may not be sufficient, we may need to have the direct relationship between the termination points or nodes. <\/del> SIMAP must be optimized for graph traversal for paths. This means that only providing link nodes and source and sink relationships to termination-points may not be sufficient, we may need to have the direct relationship between the termination points or nodes. <\/ins> 4.2. The following are design requirements for modelling the Digital Map. Theey are derived from the core requerements collected from the operators and although there is some duplication, these are focused on summarizing the requirements for the design of the model and API: <\/del> The following are design requirements for modelling the SIMAP. Theey are derived from the core requerements collected from the operators and although there is some duplication, these are focused on summarizing the requirements for the design of the model and API: <\/ins> Digital Map should contain only topological information. <\/del> SIMAP should contain only topological information. <\/ins> Digital Map is not required to contain all models and data required for all the management and use cases. However, it should be designed to support adequate pointers to other functional data and models to ease navigating in the overall system. For example: <\/del> SIMAP is not required to contain all models and data required for all the management and use cases. However, it should be designed to support adequate pointers to other functional data and models to ease navigating in the overall system. For example: <\/ins> ACLs and Route Policies are not required to be supported in the Digital Map, they would be linked to Digital Map <\/del> ACLs and Route Policies are not required to be supported in the SIMAP, they would be linked to the SIMAP <\/ins> Dynamic paths may either be outside of the Digital Map or part of traffic engineering data\/models <\/del> Dynamic paths may either be outside of the SIMAP or part of traffic engineering data\/models <\/ins> Digital Map entities should mainly contain properties used to identify topological entities at different layers, identify their roles, and topological relationships between them. <\/del> SIMAP entities should mainly contain properties used to identify topological entities at different layers, identify their roles, and topological relationships between them. <\/ins> Digital Map should contain all topological relationships inside each layer or between the layers (underlay\/overlay) <\/del> SIMAP should contain all topological relationships inside each layer or between the layers (underlay\/overlay) <\/ins> Digital Map should contain links to other models\/data to enable generic navigation to other YANG models in generic way. <\/del> SIMAP should contain links to other models\/data to enable generic navigation to other YANG models in generic way. <\/ins> Provide capability for conditional retrieval of parts of Digital Map. <\/del> Provide capability for conditional retrieval of parts of SIMAP. <\/ins> Must support geo-spatial, temporal, and historical data. The temporal and historical can also be supported external to the Digital Map. <\/del> SIMAP. <\/ins> 4.3. The following are the architectural requirements for the controller that provides Digital Map API: <\/del> that provides SIMAP API: <\/ins> Scale, performance, ease of integration."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-digital-map-concept-2721372d1107b3b38fcdff7c9a20bd4b9defc810300cb706f3e99a9ddfb33702","title":"","text":"5. As this document covers the Digital Map concepts, requirements, and use cases, there is no specific security considerations. However, the RFC 8345 Security Considerations aspects will be useful when <\/del> As this document covers the SIMAP concepts, requirements, and use cases, there is no specific security considerations. However, the RFC 8345 Security Considerations aspects will be useful when <\/ins> designing the solution. 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-91239be095e094adcde053cfe9562d8c4687a0779e07b95227de27613d03a247","title":"","text":"A network incident refers to an unexpected interruption of a network service, degradation of a network service quality, or sub-health of a network service. Different data sources including alarms, metrics <\/del> network service. Different data sources including alarms, metrics, <\/ins> and other anomaly information can be aggregated into few amount of network incidents by data correlation analysis and the service impact analysis. This document defines YANG Modules for the network incident lifecycle management. The YANG modules are meant to provide a standard way to report, diagnose, and resolve network incidents for the sake of <\/del> management. These YANG modules are meant to provide a standard way to report, diagnose, and resolve network incidents for the sake of <\/ins> network service health and root cause analysis. 1. RFC8969 defines a framework for Automating Service and Network Management with YANG to full life cycle network management. A set of YANG data models have already been developed in IETF for Network performance monitoring and fault monitoring,e.g.,A YANG RFC7950 data model for alarm management RFC8632 defines a standard interface for alarm management. A data model for Network and VPN Service <\/del> Management with YANG RFC7950 to full life cycle network management. A set of YANG data models have already been developed in IETF for network performance monitoring and fault monitoring, e.g., a YANG data model for alarm management RFC8632 defines a standard interface for alarm management. A data model for Network and VPN Service <\/ins> Performance Monitoring RFC9375 defines a standard interface for network performance management. In addition, distributed tracing mechanism defined in W3C-Trace-Context can also be used to analyze and debug operations, such as configuration transactions, across multiple distributed systems. <\/del> mechanism defined in W3C-Trace-Context can be used to analyze and debug operations, such as configuration transactions, across multiple distributed systems. <\/ins> However these YANG data models for network maintenance are based on <\/del> However, these YANG data models for network maintenance are based on <\/ins> specific data source information and manage alarms and performance metrics data separately by different layers in various different management systems. In addition, the frequency and quantity of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-12411c0fd1191320dae01e2f67840da324eeb986427e9821d2fbc3c5d08819ad","title":"","text":"System (OSS) are increased dramatically (in many cases multiple orders of magnitude) with the growth of service types and complexity and greatly overwhelm OSS platforms; with existing known dependency relation between fault, alarm and events at each layer (e.g.,packet layer or optical layer), , it is possible to compress a series of alarms into fewer incidents and there are many solutions in the market today that essentially do this to some degree. However traditional solutions such as data compression are time-consuming and labor-intensive, usually rely on maintenance engineers' experience for data analysis, which result in low processing efficiency, inaccurate root cause identification and duplicated tickets. In addition, it is also difficult to assess the impact of alarms, performance metrics and other anomaly data on network services without known relation across layer of the network topology data or the relation with other network topology data. <\/del> relation between fault, alarm and events at each layer (e.g., packet layer or optical layer), it is possible to compress series of alarms into fewer incidents and there are many solutions in the market today that essentially do this to some degree. However, conventional solutions such as data compression are time-consuming and labor- intensive, usually rely on maintenance engineers' experience for data analysis, which result in low processing efficiency, inaccurate root cause identification and duplicated tickets. It is also difficult to assess the impact of alarms, performance metrics and other anomaly data on network services without known relation across layers of the network topology data or the relation with other network topology data. <\/ins> To address these challenges, a network wide incident-centric solution is proposed to establish dependency relation with both network service and network topology at different layers , which not only can be used at specific layer in specific domain but also can be used to span across layer for multi-layer network troubleshooting. A network incident refers to an unexpected interruption of a network service, degradation of a network service quality, or sub-health of a network service TMF724A. Different data sources including alarms, metrics and other anomaly information can be aggregated into few amount of incidents irrespective layer by correlation analysis and the service impact analysis. For example, the protocols related to the interface fail to work properly due to Service Level Objective (SLO) violation, large amount of alarms may be reported to upper layer management system and aggregated into one or a few incidents when some network services may be affected by this incident (e.g. L3VPN services related with the interface will become unavailable I-D.ietf-ippm-pam ). An incident may also be raised through the analysis of some network performance metrics, for example, as described in SAIN RFC9417 , network services can be decomposed to several sub-services, specific metrics are monitored for each sub- service, symptoms will occur if services\/sub-services are unhealthy (after analyzing metrics), these symptoms may raise one incident when it causes degradation of the network services. <\/del> is specified to establish the dependency relation with both network service and network topology at different layers, which not only can be used at a specific layer in a domain but also can be used to span across layers for multi-layer network troubleshooting. A network incident refers to an unexpected interruption of a network service, degradation of a network service quality, or sub-health of a network service TMF724A. Different data sources including alarms, metrics, and other anomaly information can be aggregated into few amount of incidents irrespective layer by correlation analysis and the service impact analysis. For example, if the protocols related to the interface fail to work properly due to Service Level Objective (SLO) violation, large amount of alarms may be reported to upper layer management system and aggregated into one or a few incidents when some network services may be affected by this incident (e.g., L3VPN services bound to this interface will become unavailable I- D.ietf-ippm-pam). An incident may also be raised through the analysis of some network performance metrics, for example, as described in SAIN RFC9417, network services can be decomposed to several sub-services, specific metrics are monitored for each sub- service, symptoms will occur if services\/sub-services are unhealthy (after analyzing metrics), these symptoms may raise one incident when it causes degradation of the network services. <\/ins> In addition, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) play a important role in the processing of large amounts of data with <\/del> are key technologies in the processing of large amounts of data with <\/ins> complex data correlations. For example, Neural Network Algorithm or Hierarchy Aggregation Algorithm can be used to replace manual alarm data correlation. Through online and offline learning, these"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-a88393adb4beefba3f8bf7edd7d9f850610c8518e88cd105a18be168873917e6","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. <\/del> The following terms are defined in RFC8632 and are not redefined here:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-7f1bff4592f244a3262ffe0145f06e01197061c452a7003a04acfa68d70da442","title":"","text":"The following terms are defined in this document: Network Incident: An unexpected interruption of a network service, degradation of network service quality, or sub-health of a network service TMF724A. Problem: The cause of one or more incidents. The cause is not usually known when a problem record is created, and the problem management process is responsible for further investigation TMF724A. Incident management: Lifecycle management of incidents including incident identification, reporting, acknowledge, diagnosis, and resolution. Incident management system: An entity which implements incident management. It include incident management server and incident management client. Incident management server: An entity which provides some functions of incident management. For example, it can detect an incident, perform incident diagnosis, resolution and prediction,etc. Incident management client: An entity which can manage incidents. For example, it can receive incident notifications, query the information of incidents, instruct the incident management server to diagnose, resolve, etc. <\/del> 3. 3.1. Traditionally, the dispatching of trouble tickets is mostly based on alarms data analysis and need to involve operators' maintenance engineers. These operators' maintenance engineers are able to monitor and detect that alarms at both end devices of specific network tunnel or at both optical layer and IP layer which are associated with the same network fault. Therefore, they can correlate these alarms to the same trouble ticket, which is in the low automation. If there are more alarms, then the human costs for network maintenance are increased accordingly. <\/del> Usually, the dispatching of trouble tickets is mostly based on alarms data analysis and need to involve operators' maintenance engineers. These operators' maintenance engineers are able to monitor and detect that alarms at both end devices of specific network tunnel or at both optical layer and IP layer which are associated with the same network fault. Therefore, they can correlate these alarms to the same trouble ticket, which is in the low automation. If there are more alarms, then the human costs for network maintenance are increased accordingly. <\/ins> Some operators preconfigure whitelist and adopt some coarse granularity data correlation rules for the alarm management. It"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-99fd1f87dbe9d30f3cd1c68a81abcfb4e9fea9138e514f2505c1fec20415ee73","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification defines a new method of client authentication for OAuth2 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7523. This <\/del> OAuth2 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7521. This <\/ins> new method enables client deployments that are traditionally viewed as public clients to be able to authenticate with the authorization server through an attested key based authentication scheme. 1. RFC7523 defines a way for a client to include an assertion in a token <\/del> RFC7521 defines a way for a client to include an assertion in a token <\/ins> request to an authorization server for the purposes of client authentication. This specification extends this mechanism to provide a way for a client instance to authenticate it self with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-39093a41ebe6acd99bbfd22089c7cc6326894d6815e2147ec8a97ee346d4c7e3","title":"","text":"authorization server MUST validate BOTH the JWTs present in the \"client_assertion\" parameter according to the criteria below. It is RECOMMENDED that the authorization server validate the Client Key Attestation prior to validating the Client Key Attestation PoP. <\/ins> 3.1.1. The following rules apply to validating the client key attestation"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-37b26b6563afdc011686d4a7018b90441d989de76f57e9643ffe85f4466081fe","title":"","text":"the time window during which the JWT can be used. The authorization server MUST reject any JWT with an expiration time that has passed, subject to allowable clock skew between systems. Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs with an \"exp\" claim value that is unreasonably far in the future. <\/del> The JWT MUST contain an \"cnf\" claim conforming RFC7800 that conveys the key to be used for sender constraining tokens issued"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-cdca002f4ced3707e9ebfab0fb4c227f2bd34f4a937076af2e51ecda1040f8f9","title":"","text":"processing. The JWT MAY contain an \"iat\" (issued at) claim that identifies the time at which the JWT was issued. Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs with an \"iat\" claim value that is unreasonably far in the past. <\/del> time at which the JWT was issued. <\/ins> The JWT MAY contain a \"jti\" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token. The authorization server MAY ensure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-3bd759173741f9ab640d50d5340122b50db4699745d9453f85c502b2f7cd10b8","title":"","text":"The JWT MAY contain other claims. The JWT MUST be digitally signed or have a Message Authentication Code (MAC) applied by the issuer. The authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature or MAC. <\/del> The JWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. The authorization server MUST reject the JWT if it is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) based algorithm. The authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. <\/ins> The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\". <\/del> all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. <\/ins> The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-c51ebb62021b69a4b7b64cb85f22517076bb766f3796b7b7e383acb6346d014e","title":"","text":"Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs with an \"exp\" claim value that is unreasonably far in the future. The JWT MUST contain a \"jti\" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token. The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used \"jti\" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable \"exp\" instant. The JWT MUST contain an \"aud\" (audience) claim containing a value that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. The RFC8414 issuer identifier URL of the authorization server MUST be used as a value for an \"aud\" element to identify the authorization server as the intended audience of the JWT. <\/ins> The JWT MAY contain an \"nbf\" (not before) claim that identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-92c9fcdf61ea586c73d070b2ac927014b37bc9f1fc6d80ef71e37a63ac58d0cb","title":"","text":"server may reject JWTs with an \"iat\" claim value that is unreasonably far in the past. The JWT MAY contain a \"jti\" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token. The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used \"jti\" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable \"exp\" instant. <\/del> The JWT MAY contain other claims. The JWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-f493e492c6aa0befafc6cd717b8ab0dd76412642b28920a4faf3acbdded019db","title":"","text":"the \"cnf\" claim of the corresponding client key attestation JWT. The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\". <\/del> all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. <\/ins> The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4. TODO Security <\/del> 4.1. Implementers should be aware that the design of this authentication mechanism deliberately allows for a client instance to re-use a single Client Attestation JWT in multiple interactions\/requests with an authorization server, whilst producing a fresh Client Attestation PoP JWT. Client deployments should consider this when determining the validity period for issued Client Attestation JWTs as this ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. <\/ins> 5. This document has no IANA actions. <\/del> TODO 6. 6.1. This section registers the value \"client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation\" in the IANA \"OAuth URI\" registry established by \"An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth\" RFC6755. o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC 6.2. This section registers the value \"attest_key_client_auth\" in the IANA \"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods\" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: \"attest_key_client_auth\" o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-6818ff2fc2a8922c8154a2761c0630e08b2dc4c8af7a50881cf0cdd206d4f543","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification defines a new method of client authentication for OAuth2 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7521. This <\/del> OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7521. This <\/ins> new method enables client deployments that are traditionally viewed as public clients to be able to authenticate with the authorization server through an attested key based authentication scheme. <\/del> server through an attestation based authentication scheme. <\/ins> 1. RFC7521 defines a way for a client to include an assertion in a token request to an authorization server for the purposes of client authentication. This specification extends this mechanism to provide a way for a client instance to authenticate it self with the authorization server through an attested key based authentication scheme. <\/del> a way for a client instance to authenticate itself with the authorization server through assertion that is bound to a public key (for proof of possession). This assertion is designated as Client Attestation. The Authorization Server will communicate its requirements for the attestation scheme through its metadata. A Client instance that wants to request an access token from this Authorization Server will need to obtain a Client Attestation JWT from its client backend first. Therefore the client will generate an key (Client Instance Key) and (platform specific) attestations to proof its genuinity and security to the client backend. The Client instance sends this data to the client backend in request for a Client Attestation JWT. If the Client Backend successfully validates the Client Instance Key and further data, it will generate a signed Client Attestation JWT. As the Client Attestation JWT is cryptographically bound to the Client Instance Key generated by the client, the attestation is bound to this particular client instance. The client backend will respond to the client's request by sending the Client Attestation JWT. The client can proceed and generate a Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) for the Client Instance Key. Lastly, the client sends both the Client Attestation JWT and the Client Attestation PoP with the Token Request to the Authorization Server. The Authorization Server will validate the client attestation and thus authenticates the client. The Authorization Server may continue to issue sender-constrained access tokens using DPoP. <\/ins> The following diagram depicts the conceptual interactions. Note defining the protocol for steps 2 and 4, including how the client instance authenticates with the client backend is out of scope of this specification. <\/del> Note that the data and protocols used for requesting and sending a Client Attestation JWT (steps 2 and 4) and how the client instance authenticates with the client backend is out of scope of this specification. <\/ins> This specification only defines the format of the client assertion that a client instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server (indicated in step 6), which is comprised of two key parts: <\/del> This specification only defines the format of the Client Assertion JWT that a client instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server (indicated in step 6), which is comprised of two key parts: <\/ins> A client key attestation - produced by the client backend. <\/del> A Client Attestation JWT- produced by the client backend. <\/ins> A client key attestation proof of possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance. <\/del> A Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-2184b888422ed12fa94f1114bac3f6f7a4fd3251557cba63f39fb7b48e140c3d","title":"","text":"3. Client Attestation JWT A JSON Web Token (JWT) generated by the client backend that authenticates the client instance. Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) A Proof of Possession generated by the client instance for the key that is used in the Client Attestation JWT. Client Instance Key A cryptographic, asymmetric key generated by the client instance and proven to the client backend. The public key is contained in the Client Attestation JWT and is used to sign the Client Attestation Proof of Possession 4. <\/ins> To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. The value of the \"client_assertion_type\" is \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key-attestation\". <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation\". <\/ins> The value of the \"client_assertion\" parameter contains two JWTs, separated by a '~' character. It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~` character. The first JWT MUST be the client key attestation JWT defined in client-key- attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client key attestation PoP defined in client-key-attestation-pop-jwt. <\/del> precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~' character. The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client attestation PoP defined in client- attestation-pop-jwt. <\/ins> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): 3.1. <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> In order to authenticate the client using this scheme, the authorization server MUST validate BOTH the JWTs present in the \"client_assertion\" parameter according to the criteria below. It is RECOMMENDED that the authorization server validate the Client Key Attestation prior to validating the Client Key Attestation PoP. <\/del> Attestation JWT prior to validating the Client Attestation PoP. <\/ins> 3.1.1. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the client key attestation JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/ins> discretion of the authorization server. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-53086e088b8086e2657d601c2ab640e16be1d668fed510fc1e3f5de7952e2d08","title":"","text":"The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 3.1.2. <\/del> 4.1.2. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the client key attestation PoP JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server. <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation PoP JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server. <\/ins> The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim with a value corresponding to the \"client_id\" of the OAuth client."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-93b8d3163f366799964f7b39d2ea6cf4224654b06f6e133eac5988488fc321b5","title":"","text":"authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. The public key used to verify the JWT MUST be the key located in the \"cnf\" claim of the corresponding client key attestation JWT. <\/del> the \"cnf\" claim of the corresponding client attestation JWT. <\/ins> The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-8505b2c20a3717539db21e820eb8215a5a9db664aa841f6f4c391ff30f28dd58","title":"","text":"The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> Implementers should be aware that the design of this authentication mechanism deliberately allows for a client instance to re-use a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-c849d682755e5b4c7912c37d45abb745d7e66d6312052c77dbf6ab52ec5359ca","title":"","text":"ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. 4.2. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> Authorization servers issuing a refresh token in response to a token request using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- key-attestation\" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749]. To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion- type:jwt-key-attestation\" authentication method. The client MUST also use the same client attestation key that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. <\/del> client-attestation\" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749]. To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation\" authentication method. The client MUST also use the same Client Attestation that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. <\/ins> 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> 5.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> Implementers should be aware that using the same client attestation across multiple authorization servers could result in correlation of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-ec67e819a39a566cb48b46c7a4ca701ce763015117c82ea2fe4bb072dcceaa55","title":"","text":"are therefore RECOMMENDED to use different client attestations across different authorization servers. 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> TODO 7. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> 7.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> This section registers the value \"client-assertion-type:jwt-key- <\/del> This section registers the value \"client-assertion-type:jwt-client- <\/ins> attestation\" in the IANA \"OAuth URI\" registry established by \"An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth\" RFC6755. o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-key- <\/del> o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- <\/ins> attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC 7.2. <\/del> 8.2. <\/ins> This section registers the value \"attest_key_client_auth\" in the IANA <\/del> This section registers the value \"attest_jwt_client_auth\" in the IANA <\/ins> \"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods\" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: \"attest_key_client_auth\" <\/del> o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: \"attest_jwt_client_auth\" <\/ins> o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-4d0b2d5b33399c9f4df4f1f969e465a727006e70dd6aaec28e4bcf5ba2847942","title":"","text":"ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single Client Attestation JWT. 4.2. Authorization servers issuing a refresh token in response to a token request using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- key-attestation\" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 [@!RFC6749]. To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion- type:jwt-key-attestation\" authentication method. The client MUST also use the same client attestation key that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. <\/ins> 5. TODO"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-89571b9140e1041163dc730f04a083089d7497302f853730d2bea8e75cd1b113","title":"","text":" OAuth 2.0 Attestation Based Client Authentication <\/del> OAuth 2.0 Attestation-Based Client Authentication <\/ins> draft-looker-oauth-attestation-based-client-authentication-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-6c231e78ac6b8c6034db6d1f42172ff3289a5aba6462a332c2e072b85bf954a3","title":"","text":"Note that the protocol for steps 2 and 4 and how the client instance authenticates with the client backend is out of scope of this specification. <\/del> specification. Note also that this specification can be utilized without the client having a backend server at all; in this case, each client instance will perform the functions described as being done by the backend for itself. <\/ins> This specification defines the format of the Client Attestation that a client instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server, which is comprised of two key parts: A Client Attestation JWT- produced by the client backend. <\/del> A Client Attestation JWT - typically produced by the client backend. <\/ins> A Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-d2323001283f43c64a8131a423b0fef1f69f2270b0c46fb6b9998f9eb0d9ddd1","title":"","text":"3. Client Attestation JWT A JSON Web Token (JWT) generated by the client backend which is bound to a key managed by a client instance which can then be used by the instance for client authentication. Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) JWT A Proof of Possession generated by the client instance using the key that the Client Attestation JWT is bound to. Client Instance Key A cryptographic, asymmetric key generated by the client instance and proven to the client backend. The public key is contained in the Client Attestation JWT and is used to sign the Client Attestation Proof of Possession. <\/del> 4. To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-526ee5c3277182e5c661f699280902b7c9ecf8ea72d1782ae95087fd11452d6f","title":"","text":"7. TODO <\/del> The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-281d321ad5b18d5ce10372b0084315c51d0939eb8c07033b9fa9db2cecd6201c","title":"","text":"attestation\" in the IANA \"OAuth URI\" registry established by \"An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth\" RFC6755. o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation o Common Name: OAuth2 Attested Key Based Client Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC <\/del> URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation Common Name: OAuth 2.0 Attested Key-Based Client Authentication Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: TBC <\/ins> 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-331cd33d248714ed848da332aa163d37dbcad3fedcf03dbf9082aa69b8d3de06","title":"","text":"\"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods\" registry established by OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591. o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: \"attest_jwt_client_auth\" o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): TBC <\/del> Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: \"attest_jwt_client_auth\" Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): TBC <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-1923c35c960ff23f55228b14991421c41447698222d14093b357aa1f9a5542a3","title":"","text":"time at which the JWT was issued. The JWT MAY contain a \"jti\" (JWT ID) claim that provides a unique identifier for the token. The authorization server MAY ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used \"jti\" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable \"exp\" instant. <\/del> identifier for the token. <\/ins> The JWT MAY contain other claims."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-fce1a68a10c06ffa85a8338326dd093bc6524be390f6a41105484479fc2fff60","title":"","text":"instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client- assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation\" authentication method. The client MUST also use the same Client Attestation that was used for authentication when the refresh token was issued. <\/del> client MUST also use the same key that was present in the \"cnf\" claim of the client attestation that was used for client authentication when the refresh token was issued. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-e9f6dfd00b5e10d265f50bc1a633cd0d6213bc431e6cea7f169a69a8e6fb5c63","title":"","text":"To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. The value of the \"client_assertion_type\" is \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation\". The value of the \"client_assertion\" parameter contains two JWTs, separated by a '~' character. It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs seperated by the '~' character. The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST the client attestation PoP defined in client- attestation-pop-jwt. <\/del> The value of the \"client_assertion_type\" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- client-attestation\". The value of the \"client_assertion\" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to a value containing two JWTs, separated by a '~' character. It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs separated by the '~' character. The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST be the client attestation PoP defined in client-attestation-pop-jwt. <\/ins> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-1d71110914e4e62e3628ebefc16c45e89ad24b83fce919cdfde105d191ffcc39","title":"","text":"5. TODO <\/del> 5.1. Implementers should be aware that using the same client attestation across multiple authorization servers could result in correlation of the end user using the client instance through claim values (including the public key in the \"cnf\" claim). Client deployments are therefore RECOMMENDED to use different client attestations across different authorization servers. <\/ins> 6. 6.1. <\/del> TODO 7. 7.1. <\/ins> This section registers the value \"client-assertion-type:jwt-key- attestation\" in the IANA \"OAuth URI\" registry established by \"An IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-db90f23e3a881ee4c898e2c1b85e29f32f98771f078291a66ca9994330296c69","title":"","text":"Authentication Authentication o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document: TBC 6.2. <\/del> 7.2. <\/ins> This section registers the value \"attest_key_client_auth\" in the IANA \"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods\" registry established by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-035a58a274a940d580aa476e3db35a1f64caf14fb34f818480949067b5562c58","title":"","text":"The following diagram depicts the overall architecture and protocol flow. The flow starts with the Authorization Server communicating its requirements for the client authentication to the client, made available in its metadata. A Client instance that wants to request an access token from this Authorization Server needs to obtain a Client Attestation JWT, for example, from its client backend first. Therefore, the client generates a key (Client Instance Key) and (platform specific) attestations to prove its authenticity, integrity and security to the client backend (step 1). The Client instance sends this data to the client backend in request for a Client Attestation JWT (step 2). If the Client Backend successfully validates the Client Instance Key and further data, it generates a signed Client Attestation JWT (step 3). As the Client Attestation JWT is cryptographically bound to the Client Instance Key generated by the client, the attestation is bound to this particular client instance. The client backend responds to the client's request by sending the Client Attestation JWT (step 4). The client can proceed now and generate a Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) for the Client Instance Key (step 5). Lastly, the client sends both the Client Attestation JWT and the Client Attestation PoP with the Token Request to the Authorization Server. The Authorization Server validates the client attestation and thus authenticates the client. The Authorization Server may continue to issue sender-constrained access tokens using RFC9449. Note that the protocol for steps 2 and 4 and how the client instance authenticates with the client backend is out of scope of this <\/del> The following steps describe this OAuth flow: (1) The Client Instance generates a key (Client Instance Key) and optional further attestations (that are out of scope) to prove its authenticity to the Client Backend. (2) The Client Instance sends this data to the Client Backend in request for a Client Attestation JWT. (3) The Client Backend validates the Client Instance Key and optional further data. It generates a signed Client Attestation JWT that is cryptographically bound to the Client Instance Key generated by the Client. Therefore, the attestation is bound to this particular Client Instance. (4) The Client Backend responds to the Client Instance by sending the Client Attestation JWT. (5) The Client Instance generates a Proof of Possession (PoP) with the Client Instance Key. (6) The Client Instance sends both the Client Attestation JWT and the Client Attestation PoP JWT to the authorization server, e.g. within a token request. The authorization server validates the Client Attestation and thus authenticates the Client Instance. Note that the protocol for steps (2) and (4) and how the Client Instance authenticates to the Client Backend is out of scope of this <\/ins> specification. Note also that this specification can be utilized without the client having a backend server at all; in this case, each client instance will perform the functions described as being done by the backend for itself. This specification defines the format of the Client Attestation that a client instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an <\/del> a Client Instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an <\/ins> authorization server, which is comprised of two key parts: A Client Attestation JWT - typically produced by the client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-92194494db3e2214be78667bd5c70e174027b96683d547d171aa69e4241f18fc","title":"","text":"be used as a value for an \"aud\" element to identify the authorization server as the intended audience of the JWT. The JWT MAY contain an \"nonce\" claim containing a String value that is provided by the authorization server to associate the Client Attestation PoP JWT with a particular transaction and prevent replay attacks. <\/ins> The JWT MAY contain an \"nbf\" (not before) claim that identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-4e6bb2b263c2c996a9e6856c61c3fd3e8fb87c2c1417dc35bf6ded9d0d3fdbf8","title":"","text":"The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies. 7.1. The following mechanisms exist within this client authentication method in order to allow an authorization server to detect replay attacks for presented client attestation PoPs: The client uses \"jti\" (JWT ID) claims for the Client Attestation PoP JWT and the authorization server maintains a list of used (seen) \"jti\" values for the time of which the JWT would be considered valid based on the applicable \"exp\" claim. If any Client Attestation PoP JWT would be replayed, the authorization server would recognize the \"jti\" and respond with an authentication error. The authorization server provides a nonce for the particular transaction and the client uses it for the \"nonce\" claim in the Client Attestation PoP JWT. The authorization server validates that the nonce matches for the transaction. This approach may require an additional roundtrip in the protocol. The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The authorization server may expect the usage of a nonce in the Client Attestation PoP JWT, but instead of providing the nonce explicitly, the client may implicitly reuse an existing artefact, e.g. the authorization code. The authorization server MUST ensure that the nonce provides sufficient entropy. The approach using a nonce explicitly provided by the authorization server gives stronger replay attack detection guarantees, however support by the authorization server is OPTIONAL to simplify mandatory implementation requirements. The \"jti\" method is mandatory and hence acts as a default fallback. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-3bd52b4a252c34d9d6f12c0d7b181036670a31c3c40d5d0e04388ca300a40ebc","title":"","text":"of the client attestation that was used for client authentication when the refresh token was issued. 5.3. This specification does not provide a mechanism to rotate the Client Instance Key in the Client Attestation JWT's \"cnf\" claim. If the Client Instance needs to use a new Client Instance Key for any reason, then it MUST request a new Client Attestation JWT from its Client Backend. <\/ins> 6. 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-bd38f41e36054c585ce222c30d68d8572a82042788c17a9e822afbbeed1b620e","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification defines a new method of client authentication for OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 by extending the approach defined in RFC7521. This new method enables client deployments that are traditionally viewed as public clients to be able to authenticate with the authorization server through an attestation based authentication scheme. <\/del> This specification defines an extension to the OAuth 2 protocol as defined in RFC6749 which enables a Client Instance to include an attestation in interactions with an Authorization Server or a Resource Server. This new method enables Client Instances involved in a client deployment that is traditionally viewed as a public client, to be able to provide an attestation in order to authenticate. <\/ins> 1. RFC7521 defines a way for a client to include an assertion in a token request to an authorization server for the purposes of client authentication. This specification uses this framework to define a new assertion type that provides a way for a client instance to authenticate itself with the authorization server through an assertion that is bound to a public key (for proof of possession). This assertion is designated with the name of Client Attestation in this draft. <\/del> The following diagram depicts the overall architecture and protocol flow."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-5316377f13144fabf25f93b98a04fd9d1ccb22dbcbfd984b840fc49316f61929","title":"","text":"token request. The authorization server validates the Client Attestation and thus authenticates the Client Instance. Note that the protocol for steps (2) and (4) and how the Client Instance authenticates to the Client Backend is out of scope of this specification. Note also that this specification can be utilized without the client having a backend server at all; in this case, each client instance will perform the functions described as being done by the backend for itself. This specification defines the format of the Client Attestation that a Client Instance uses to authenticate in its interactions with an authorization server, which is comprised of two key parts: A Client Attestation JWT - typically produced by the client backend. <\/del> Please note that the protocol details for steps (2) and (4), particularly how the Client Instance authenticates to the client Backend, are beyond the scope of this specification. Furthermore, this specification is designed to be flexible and can be implemented even in scenarios where the client does not have a backend server. In such cases, each Client Instance is responsible for performing the functions typically handled by the backend on its own. <\/ins> A Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP) - produced by the client instance. <\/del> This approach acknowledges the evolving landscape of OAuth 2.0 deployments, where the ability for public clients to authenticate securely and reliably has become increasingly important. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-f924d937bfc820e633b2cc6e8e6e44cbb5390a5201f312ce87d62e308ea417e2","title":"","text":"4. To perform client authentication using this scheme, the client instance uses the following parameter values and encodings. <\/del> This draft introduces the concept of client attestations to the OAuth 2 protocol, using two JWTs: a Client Attestation and a Client Attestation Proof of Possession (PoP). These JWTs are transmitted via HTTP headers in an HTTP request from a Client Instance to an Authorization Server or Resource Server. The primary purpose of these headers is to authenticate the Client Instance. <\/ins> The value of the \"client_assertion_type\" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- client-attestation\". <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> The value of the \"client_assertion\" parameter (as defined in RFC7521) set to a value containing two JWTs, separated by a '~' character. It MUST NOT contain more or less than precisely two JWTs separated by the '~' character. The first JWT MUST be the client attestation JWT defined in client-attestation-jwt, the second JWT MUST be the client attestation PoP defined in client-attestation-pop-jwt. <\/del> A Client Attestation JWT and Client Attestation PoP JWT is included in an HTTP request using the following request header fields. <\/ins> The following example demonstrates client authentication using this scheme during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): <\/del> The following is an example of the OAuth-Client-Attestation header. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> The following is an example of the OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP header. <\/ins> In order to authenticate the client using this scheme, the authorization server MUST validate BOTH the JWTs present in the \"client_assertion\" parameter according to the criteria below. <\/del> Note that per RFC9110 header field names are case-insensitive; so OAUTH-CLIENT-ATTESTATION, oauth-client-attestation, etc., are all valid and equivalent header field names. Case is significant in the header field value, however. The OAuth-Client-Attestation and OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP HTTP header field values uses the token68 syntax defined in Section 11.2 of RFC9110 (repeated below for ease of reference). <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED that the authorization server validate the Client Attestation JWT prior to validating the Client Attestation PoP. 4.1.1. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the client attestation JWT. <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the Client Attestation JWT. <\/ins> Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the authorization server. <\/del> discretion of the Authorization Server. <\/ins> The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a unique identifier for the entity that issued the JWT. In the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-f13e391009d989dc0d9f6b9155a747e03878d80ed05064eb4d36394b10df6d5d","title":"","text":"The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4.1.2. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the Client Attestation JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the Client Attestation PoP JWT. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/ins> discretion of the Authorization Server. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim with a value"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-e84451d2e7575f55e5f84f0641a09b20c65e50b7a069f5791ba5c3a360853e18","title":"","text":"authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. The public key used to verify the JWT MUST be the key located in the \"cnf\" claim of the corresponding client attestation JWT. <\/del> the \"cnf\" claim of the corresponding Client Attestation JWT. <\/ins> The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-a5b74f2512cffdbb8626021e0c49aaff91ad458022dd65536d47bf72337920e8","title":"","text":"The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4.4. To validate an HTTP request which contains the client attestation headers, the receiving server MUST ensure the following with regard to a received HTTP request: There is precisely one OAuth-Client-Attestation HTTP request header field, where its value is a single well-formed JWT conforming to the syntax outlined in []{client-attestation-jwt}. There is precisely one OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP HTTP request header field, where its value is a single well-formed JWT conforming to the syntax outlined in []{client-attestation-pop- jwt}. The signature of the Client Attestation PoP JWT obtained from the OAuth-Client-Attestation-PoP HTTP header verifies with the public key contained in the \"cnf\" claim of the Client Attestation JWT obtained from the OAuth-Client-Attestation HTTP header. <\/ins> 5. 5.1. <\/del> While usage of the the client attestation mechanism defined by this draft can be used in a variety of different HTTP requests to different endpoints, usage with token endpoint as defined by RFC6749 has particular additional considerations outlined below. The authorization server MUST perform all of the checks outlined in checking-http-requests-with-client-attestations for a received access token request which is making use of the client attestation mechanism as defined by this draft. The following example demonstrates usage of the client attestation mechanism in an access token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): 6. 6.1. <\/ins> Implementers should be aware that the design of this authentication mechanism deliberately allows for a client instance to re-use a <\/del> mechanism deliberately allows for a Client Instance to re-use a <\/ins> single Client Attestation JWT in multiple interactions\/requests with an authorization server, whilst producing a fresh Client Attestation PoP JWT. Client deployments should consider this when determining the validity period for issued Client Attestation JWTs as this ultimately controls how long a client instance can re-use a single <\/del> ultimately controls how long a Client Instance can re-use a single <\/ins> Client Attestation JWT. 5.2. <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> Authorization servers issuing a refresh token in response to a token request using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt- client-attestation\" client authentication method MUST bind the refresh token to the client instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 RFC6749. To prove this binding, the client instance MUST authenticate itself to the authorization server when refreshing an access token using the \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client- assertion-type:jwt-client-attestation\" authentication method. The client MUST also use the same key that was present in the \"cnf\" claim of the client attestation that was used for client authentication when the refresh token was issued. 5.3. <\/del> request using the client attestation mechanism as defined by this draft MUST bind the refresh token to the Client Instance, and NOT just the client as specified in section 6 RFC6749. To prove this binding, the Client Instance MUST use the client attestation mechanism when refreshing an access token. The client MUST also use the same key that was present in the \"cnf\" claim of the client attestation that was used when the refresh token was issued. 6.2.1. Because the Client Attestation and Client Attestation PoP are communicated using HTTP headers, implementers should consider that web servers may have a default maximum HTTP header size configured which could be too low to allow conveying a Client Attestation and or Client Attestation PoP in an HTTP request. It should be noted, that this limit is not given by the HTTP RFC9112, but instead web server implementations commonly set a default maximum size for HTTP headers. As of 2024, typical limits for modern web servers configure maximum HTTP headers as 8 kB or more as a default. ## Rotation of Client Instance Key <\/ins> This specification does not provide a mechanism to rotate the Client Instance Key in the Client Attestation JWT's \"cnf\" claim. If the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-4476a253837cc5872c1b222590f7510958e776cb24b41b47740a426c67d12b13","title":"","text":"reason, then it MUST request a new Client Attestation JWT from its Client Backend. 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> 6.1. <\/del> 7.1. <\/ins> Implementers should be aware that using the same client attestation across multiple authorization servers could result in correlation of the end user using the client instance through claim values <\/del> the end user using the Client Instance through claim values <\/ins> (including the public key in the \"cnf\" claim). Client deployments are therefore RECOMMENDED to use different client attestations across different authorization servers. 7. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> The guidance provided by RFC7519 and RFC8725 applies. 7.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> The following mechanisms exist within this client authentication method in order to allow an authorization server to detect replay"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-fd8a86297b387fa1680cfe5e5fb44227eaf8d1c1659c78710de01d7a179431eb","title":"","text":"implementation requirements. The \"jti\" method is mandatory and hence acts as a default fallback. 8. 8.1. This section registers the value \"client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation\" in the IANA \"OAuth URI\" registry established by \"An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth\" RFC6755. URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-client- attestation Common Name: OAuth 2.0 Attested Key-Based Client Authentication Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: TBC <\/del> 9. <\/ins> 8.2. <\/del> 9.1. <\/ins> This section registers the value \"attest_jwt_client_auth\" in the IANA \"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods\" registry established by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-7678e73202e77714a3d5c151c2ab4d9b7441fcac05004664fbe6350cb42126c3","title":"","text":"7.2. The \"scopes_supported\" parameter is the list of scopes the resource server is willing to disclose that it supports. It is not meant to indicate that an OAuth client should request all scopes in the list. The client SHOULD still follow OAuth best practices and request tokens with as limited scope as possible for the given operation, as described in Section 2.3 of OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics. 7.3. <\/ins> TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the client, as described in TLSRequirements, when making a protected resource metadata request. Checking that the server certificate is valid for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-5ddb13333601f8c2ffae6446f69bd4881cff33cfa72ecb787a0b3effc80913f1","title":"","text":"value in the protected resource metadata document received by the client. 7.3. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> Publishing information about the protected resource in a standard format makes it easier for both legitimate clients and attackers to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-1576a47fdde2231a23861bbb2272f3e6c5dd0e3dcc831a19c5010dcb68f5d613","title":"","text":"this specification, the same defenses against attacks that might be mounted that use this information should be applied. 7.4. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> Secure determination of appropriate authorization servers to use with a protected resource for all use cases is out of scope of this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-2f5a284dc815568c49f35b0785d4dfc36616998bc9b1d6cf1b5e6ce71060baad","title":"","text":"against one another for consistency when these lists are used by the application profile. 7.5. <\/del> 7.6. <\/ins> The OAuth client is expected to fetch the authorization server metadata based on the value of the issuer in the resource server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-665301916425a28cead9f06b6e9c3ea16a13cc5cdeca9249b52f09f954f96ae5","title":"","text":"recommendations can be found in the OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet OWASP.SSRF. 7.6. <\/del> 7.7. <\/ins> This specification may be deployed in a scenario where the desired HTTP resource is identified by a user-selected URL. If this resource"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-abefd1b8f3542a8802c8c77aef8bf7d350fc3b1c9760fcb9f674f98ea491647d","title":"","text":"7.4. If a client expects to interact with multiple resource servers, the client SHOULD request audience-restricted access tokens using RFC8707, and the authorization server SHOULD support audience- restricted access tokens. Without audience-restricted access tokens, a malicious resource server (RS1) may be able to use the \"WWW-Authenticate\" header to get a client to request an access token with a scope used by a legitimate resource server (RS2), and after the client sends a request to RS1, then RS1 could re-use the access token at RS2. While this attack is not explicitly enabled by this specification, and is possible in a plain OAuth 2.0 deployment, it is made somewhat more likely by the use of dynamically-configured clients. As such, the use of audience-restricted access tokens and Resource Indicators RFC8707 is RECOMMENDED when using the features in this specification. 7.5. <\/ins> Publishing information about the protected resource in a standard format makes it easier for both legitimate clients and attackers to use the protected resource. Whether a protected resource publishes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-69c812d676e123027a4d65b778d8e3a04e44ab40c0fc193eac5cd58c32323d15","title":"","text":"this specification, the same defenses against attacks that might be mounted that use this information should be applied. 7.5. <\/del> 7.6. <\/ins> Secure determination of appropriate authorization servers to use with a protected resource for all use cases is out of scope of this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-06c3f4bc33db23b7e7ce5e2692a5d1fd4efa396fc30b26fc68f05f33dd8cf719","title":"","text":"against one another for consistency when these lists are used by the application profile. 7.6. <\/del> 7.7. <\/ins> The OAuth client is expected to fetch the authorization server metadata based on the value of the issuer in the resource server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-a060cf0b3575ce85e7268543d9dd4afdfd72d83f912fcbe352e42f8f6fa7b35b","title":"","text":"recommendations can be found in the OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet OWASP.SSRF. 7.7. <\/del> 7.8. <\/ins> This specification may be deployed in a scenario where the desired HTTP resource is identified by a user-selected URL. If this resource"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-11931b5a1e9ffb919afa05d7cb90887156e3404f6fb5025e04c2d350675338d0","title":"","text":"RFC7033, in a manner related to the description in Section 2 of OpenID.Discovery. PRMetadata defines metadata values that a protected resource can publish, which includes things like which scopes are supported, how a client can present an access token, and more. These values may be used by other specifications, such as the \"jwks_uri\" used to publish public keys the resource server uses to sign resource responses, as described in Section 5.6.2 of FAPI.MessageSigning. <\/ins> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-57733e52679b33c63e8cb525cc5fea7b6f4f7da973db6bf6412cc5120da32bc6","title":"","text":"OPTIONAL. URL of the protected resource's JWK Set JWK document. This contains keys belonging to the protected resource. For instance, this JWK Set MAY contain encryption key(s) that are used to encrypt access tokens to the protected resource. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, a \"use\" (public key use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set to indicate each key's intended usage. <\/del> This contains public keys belonging to the protected resource. For instance, this JWK Set MAY contain encryption key(s) that are used to encrypt access tokens to the protected resource. The JWK Set MAY also contain signing key(s) that the resource server uses to sign responses. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, a \"use\" (public key use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set to indicate each key's intended usage. <\/ins> RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the RFC6749 \"scope\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-cf393fad724857a83a7b90b7ab17b5e64b7707d2119a2bedc8365adb8df8cd83","title":"","text":"This specification defines the following term: A URL that uses the \"https\" scheme and has no fragment components where \".well-known\" RFC5785 resources containing information about the protected resource are published. <\/del> The Protected resource's resource identifier, which is a URL that uses the \"https\" scheme and has no query or fragment components. Protected resource metadata is published at a \".well-known\" location RFC5785 derived from this resource identifier, as described in PRConfig. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-981d20a6cd708d319127977b143c2c6ed2ce7951af6b79fa6ec4f38ed61bda38","title":"","text":"REQUIRED. The protected resource's resource identifier, which is a URL that uses the \"https\" scheme and has no fragment components. This is the location where \".well-known\" RFC5785 resources containing information about the protected resource are published. Using these well-known resources is described in PRConfig. <\/del> a URL that uses the \"https\" scheme and has no query or fragment components. Using these well-known resources is described in PRConfig. <\/ins> OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of OAuth authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-905715efc3a71dd423a821e53277284667aed791fa4356b74f887793c8a9c1f7","title":"","text":"Protected resources supporting metadata MUST make a JSON document containing metadata as specified in PRMetadata available at a path formed by concatenating a well-known URI string such as \"\/.well- known\/oauth-protected-resource\" to the protected resource's resource identifier. The syntax and semantics of \".well-known\" are defined in RFC5785. The well-known URI path suffix used MUST be registered in the IANA \"Well-Known URIs\" registry IANA.well-known. <\/del> formed by inserting a well-known URI string into the protected resource's resource identifier between the host component and the path component, if any. By default, the well-known URI string used is \"\/.well-known\/oauth-protected-resource\". The syntax and semantics of \".well-known\" are defined in RFC5785. The well-known URI path suffix used MUST be registered in the IANA \"Well-Known URIs\" registry IANA.well-known. <\/ins> Different applications utilizing OAuth protected resources in application-specific ways may define and register different well-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-4736a8f0b5d2e8e642e6f672434302923eee10682d5359ff8845459e9239a8b6","title":"","text":"as used by those applications. For instance, if the Example application uses an OAuth protected resource in an Example-specific way, and there are Example-specific metadata values that it needs to publish, then it might register and use the \"example-resource- configuration\" URI path suffix and publish the metadata document at the path formed by concatenating \"\/.well-known\/example-resource- configuration\" to the protected resource's resource identifier. <\/del> publish, then it might register and use the \"example-protected- resource\" URI path suffix and publish the metadata document at the path formed by inserting \"\/.well-known\/example-protected-resource\" between the host and path components of the protected resource's resource identifier. Alternatively, many such applications will use the default well-known URI string \"\/.well-known\/oauth-protected- resource\", which is the right choice for general-purpose OAuth protected resources, and not register an application-specific one. <\/ins> An OAuth 2.0 application using this specification MUST specify what well-known URI string it will use for this purpose. The same protected resource MAY choose to publish its metadata at multiple well-known locations relative to its resource identifier, for example, publishing metadata at both \"\/.well-known\/example-resource- configuration\" and \"\/.well-known\/oauth-protected-resource\". <\/del> well-known locations derived from its resource identifier, for example, publishing metadata at both \"\/.well-known\/example-protected- resource\" and \"\/.well-known\/oauth-protected-resource\". <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-4e00cdd65cf5e0afcc19452c7a5a1b1524d16505667ccfcff0765c1408d0ae46","title":"","text":"component: If the resource identifier value contains a path component, any terminating \"\/\" MUST be removed before appending \"\/.well-known\/\" and the well-known URI path suffix. The consumer of the metadata would make the following request when the resource identifier is <\/del> terminating \"\/\" MUST be removed before inserting \"\/.well-known\/\" and the well-known URI path suffix between the host component and the path component. The consumer of the metadata would make the following request when the resource identifier is <\/ins> \"https:\/\/resource.example.com\/resource1\" and the well-known URI path suffix is \"oauth-protected-resource\" to obtain the metadata, since the resource identifier contains a path component:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-3f373caef24e90a57342c8d30fe9727ae329e3758d1298cd59edf573ee52777b","title":"","text":"3.3. The \"resource\" value returned MUST be identical to the protected resource's resource identifier value that was concatenated with the well-known URI path suffix to create the URL used to retrieve the <\/del> resource's resource identifier value into which the well-known URI path suffix was inserted to create the URL used to retrieve the <\/ins> metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-f77c490840a6285fae15756370a82ab226ca96a0c859bbf32e0c3bf00d950b3e","title":"","text":"metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. If the protected resource metadata was retrieved from a URL returned by the protected resource via the WWW-Authenticate \"resource_metadata\" parameter, then the \"resource\" value returned MUST be identical to the URL that the client used to make the request to the resource server. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. <\/ins> 4. To support use cases in which the set of legitimate protected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-35ccdcc79d0dd571999e22d037bab6da2cbd0df3c11e8919a37573dbda89abf1","title":"","text":"5. A protected resource MAY use a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response to return its resource identifier to the client. The client can then retrieve protected resource metadata using the resource identifier as described in PRConfig. The client might then, for instance, determine what authorization server to use for the resource based on protected resource metadata retrieved. <\/del> a URL to its protected resource metadata to the client. The client can then retrieve protected resource metadata as described in PRConfig. The client might then, for instance, determine what authorization server to use for the resource based on protected resource metadata retrieved. <\/ins> A typical end-to-end flow doing so is as follows. Note that while this example uses the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow, a similar"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-ac386b6efd7ee7412e51c38c78f227de27834fb19131edb2a3b7b6667520f247","title":"","text":"presenting an access token. The resource server responds with a \"WWW-Authenticate\" header including the resource identifier of the protected resource. <\/del> including the URL of the protected resource metadata. <\/ins> The client fetches resource metadata from the \".well-known\/oauth- protected-resource\" location derived from the resource identifier according to PRConfig. <\/del> The client fetches the protected resource metadata from this URL. <\/ins> The protected resource responds with the protected resource metadata according to PRConfigurationResponse. The client validates the protected resource metadata. <\/ins> The client builds the authorization server metadata URL from an issuer identifier in the resource metadata according to RFC8414 and makes a request to fetch the authorization server metadata."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-0a3b94ba819f87315bb72db462d532767d1e6af63478e3d9d5ddeb4491da3274","title":"","text":"5.1. This specification introduces a new parameter in the \"WWW- Authenticate\" response to indicate the resource identifier of the protected resource: <\/del> Authenticate\" response to indicate the protected resource metadata URL: <\/ins> The resource identifier of the protected resource. <\/del> The URL of the protected resource metadata. <\/ins> The HTTP status code and error string in the response are defined by RFC6750. The issuer parameter MAY be combined with other parameters defined in other extensions, such as the \"max_age\" parameter defined by RFC9470. <\/del> The \"resource_metadata\" parameter MAY be combined with other parameters defined in other extensions, such as the \"max_age\" parameter defined by RFC9470. <\/ins> 5.2. At any point, for any reason determined by the protected resource, the protected resource MAY respond with a new \"WWW-Authenticate\" challenge that includes a value for the resource identifier to indicate that its metadata MAY have changed. If the client receives such a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response, it is expected retrieve the protected resource metadata again, and SHOULD use the new metadata values obtained. Among other things, this enables a resource server to change which authorization servers it uses without any other coordination with clients. <\/del> challenge that includes a value for the protected resource metadata URL to indicate that its metadata MAY have changed. If the client receives such a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response, it is expected retrieve the protected resource metadata again, and SHOULD use the new metadata values obtained. Among other things, this enables a resource server to change which authorization servers it uses without any other coordination with clients. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-cbde4945e92a00c9a686bb16fd2c644cd9bcf0d6c7ba9ce94f6306c9805921d5","title":"","text":"There are some existing methods by which an unrecognized client can make use of an authorization server, such as using Dynamic Client Registration RFC7591, to register the client prior to initiating the <\/del> Registration RFC7591 to register the client prior to initiating the <\/ins> authorization flow. Future extensions might define alternatives, such as using URLs to identify clients."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-34123b9593d3c97df374d9ca59506edc62064afcbb1818b78bac5c76e45d40ee","title":"","text":"Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. Note that this is the same equality comparison procedure described in Section 8.3 of RFC8259. <\/ins> 7. 7.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-0562b39bbbeee06e713fa9032c5b542bf9b0a490b21052a295a1390d19b5f705","title":"","text":"OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token RFC6750 presentation methods that this protected resource supports. Defined values are \"[\"header\", \"fragment\", \"query\"]\", <\/del> supports. Defined values are \"[\"header\", \"body\", \"query\"]\", <\/ins> corresponding to Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of RFC 6750."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-35ad3d4b64d97330af07d51ac1f56888898ebcf5ebbee8c52b3642c241edf1d3","title":"","text":"used. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token RFC6750 presentation methods that this protected resource supports. Defined values are \"[\"header\", \"body\", \"query\"]\", <\/del> OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the supported methods of sending an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token RFC6750 to the protected resource. Defined values are \"[\"header\", \"body\", \"query\"]\", <\/ins> corresponding to Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of RFC 6750."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-23d8aacddf74721eb430e51ae67033e9a2b5b26a6c3078c842757a8d15de1ed6","title":"","text":"is \"\/.well-known\/oauth-protected-resource\". The syntax and semantics of \".well-known\" are defined in RFC5785. The well-known URI path suffix used MUST be registered in the IANA \"Well-Known URIs\" registry IANA.well-known. <\/del> IANA.well-known. Examples of this construction can be found in PRConfigurationRequest. <\/ins> Different applications utilizing OAuth protected resources in application-specific ways MAY define and register different well-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-5fb297b3233f8cf4e8a073175f78dd9c548eb60e3a749072284d3859cc8d748d","title":"","text":"to the resource server. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. These validation actions can thwart impersonation attacks, as described in Impersonation. <\/ins> 4. To support use cases in which the set of legitimate protected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-b6dafd8852397ad45fcaf5391cc2d969ab5e5d603e795bce4fb3bcb8d4f32e27","title":"","text":"the resource identifier URL it is using as the prefix for the metadata request exactly matches the value of the \"resource\" metadata value in the protected resource metadata document received by the client. <\/del> client, as described in PRConfigurationValidation. <\/ins> 7.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-2166cead1fb264c4f3135745aeb51482aefc6f13048b96590eb4d700bd817e91","title":"","text":"The resource server responds with the protected resource metadata according to PRConfigurationResponse. The client validates the protected resource metadata. <\/del> The client validates the protected resource metadata, as described in PRConfigurationValidation. <\/ins> The client builds the authorization server metadata URL from an issuer identifier in the resource metadata according to RFC8414"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-2a081cfd771f3aafb2e6c8447cc98cdc62de4ea94427eb1285d65ec959cad00d","title":"","text":"the protected resource MAY respond with a new \"WWW-Authenticate\" challenge that includes a value for the protected resource metadata URL to indicate that its metadata MAY have changed. If the client receives such a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response, the client SHOULD retrieve the protected resource metadata again, and SHOULD use the new metadata values obtained. Among other things, this enables a resource server to change which authorization servers it uses without any other coordination with clients. <\/del> receives such a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response, it SHOULD retrieve the updated protected resource metadata and use the new metadata values obtained. Among other things, this enables a resource server to change which authorization servers it uses without any other coordination with clients. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-8874683f606e093cf78cfb6e5d6ddb6fe14fdd64dda0c5eeabc60250d3b803d7","title":"","text":"7.6. To support use cases in which the set of legitimate authorization servers to use with the protected resource is fixed and enumerable, this specification defines the \"authorization_servers\" metadata value, which enables explicitly listing them. Note that if the set of legitimate protected resources to use with an authorization server is also fixed and enumerable, lists in the protected resource metadata and authorization server metadata should be cross-checked against one another for consistency when these lists are used by the application profile. <\/ins> Secure determination of appropriate authorization servers to use with a protected resource for all use cases is out of scope of this specification. This specification assumes that the client has a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-df8f238147ab1a3e61619ce5c001600ea319fe702ac7ac8cc37b6bb5b4de627c","title":"","text":"other means of determining appropriate associations between protected resources and authorization servers are also possible. To support use cases in which the set of legitimate authorization servers to use with the protected resource is fixed and enumerable, this specification defines the \"authorization_servers\" metadata value, which enables explicitly listing them. Note that if the set of legitimate protected resources to use with an authorization server is also fixed and enumerable, lists in the protected resource metadata and authorization server metadata should be cross-checked against one another for consistency when these lists are used by the application profile. <\/del> 7.7. The OAuth client is expected to fetch the authorization server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-19b8279121dab785a4bcbab54ee752d0d820433a814a25c01b1b0d06d08cef63","title":"","text":"IANA.well-known. Examples of this construction can be found in PRConfigurationRequest. The term \"application\", as used below (and as used in RFC8414), encompasses all the components used to accomplish the task for the use case. That can include OAuth clients, authorization servers, protected resources, and non-OAuth components, inclusive of the code running in each of them. Applications are built to solve particular problems and may utilize many components and services. <\/ins> Different applications utilizing OAuth protected resources in application-specific ways MAY define and register different well- known URI path suffixes for publishing protected resource metadata"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-dab3b38f3232bbf9214dc7675fa7a32ffc4437ba63108268869cac7166bce12e","title":"","text":"specification, and allows clients to choose their preferred authentication scheme. A fair question is whether allowing clients to choose from among supported authentication methods represents an opportunity for a downgrade attack. Since resource servers will only enumerate authentication methods acceptable to them, by definition, any choice made by the client from among them is one that the resource server is OK with. Thus, the resource server allowing the use of different supported authentication methods does not represent an opportunity for a downgrade attack. <\/del> 6. Processing some OAuth 2.0 messages requires comparing values in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-dbced8a730fe4d5099b9ba4101ee88365994293311aef17fb6fd4816d1d87471","title":"","text":"RFC8414, which enables a client to obtain metadata about an OAuth 2.0 authorization server. The means by which the client obtains the location of the protected resource is out of scope of this document. In some cases, the location may be manually configured into the client; for example, an email client could provide an interface for a user to enter the URL of their RFC8620 server. In other cases, it may be dynamically discovered; for example, a user could enter their email address into an email client, the client could perform RFC7033 discovery (in a manner related to the description in Section 2 of OpenID.Discovery) to find the resource server, then fetch the resource server metadata to find the authorization server to use to obtain authorization to access the user's email. <\/ins> The metadata for a protected resource is retrieved from a well-known location as a JSON RFC8259 document, which declares information about its capabilities and optionally, its relationships to other services."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-5da1e8c1856b5940a079ce170e1699bf46bd73ff19d58e1651e95496e3d80d2e","title":"","text":"authoritative for the protected resource, as described in Impersonation. The means by which the client obtains the location of the protected resource is out of scope. In some cases, the location may be manually configured into the client. In other cases, it may be dynamically discovered, for instance, through the use of RFC7033, in a manner related to the description in Section 2 of OpenID.Discovery. <\/del> PRMetadata defines metadata values that a protected resource can publish, which includes things like which scopes are supported, how a client can present an access token, and more. These values may be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-e3f36aa9179d5356c2f8a49604cec20e018f4a6b090f305bf6e34fab5df95fb0","title":"","text":"WWW-Authenticate describes the use of \"WWW-Authenticate\" by protected resources to dynamically inform clients of the URL of their protected resource metadata. This use of \"WWW-Authenticate\" can indicate that the protected resource metadata MAY have changed. <\/del> the protected resource metadata may have changed. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-054ad9a7f6d258a8d8dcfad71282543751ef75ef2cfd44455e52f9d18c50abdd","title":"","text":"At any point, for any reason determined by the resource server, the protected resource MAY respond with a new \"WWW-Authenticate\" challenge that includes a value for the protected resource metadata URL to indicate that its metadata MAY have changed. If the client <\/del> URL to indicate that its metadata may have changed. If the client <\/ins> receives such a \"WWW-Authenticate\" response, it SHOULD retrieve the updated protected resource metadata and use the new metadata values obtained, after validating them as described in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-82e9784839fc9796269b0c6dfa7fcc5bcf34af33f1e262b49a99bdead7437c81","title":"","text":"Values are registered on a Specification Required RFC8126 basis after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. <\/del> allow for the allocation of values prior to publication of the final version of a specification, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that the specification will be completed and published. However, if the specification is not completed and published in a timely manner, as determined by the Designated Experts, the Designated Experts may request that IANA withdraw the registration. <\/ins> Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., \"Request to register OAuth Protected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-47918cb7beb48145ad5a4e0fd349767053e0667fdaf80d9595d0cba3def35e8f","title":"","text":"Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts. The reason for the use of the mailing list is to enable public review of registration requests, enabling both Designated Experts and other interested parties to provide feedback on proposed registrations. The reason to allow the Designated Experts to allocate values prior to publication as a final specification is to enable giving authors of specifications proposing registrations the benefit of review by the Designated Experts before the specification is completely done, so that if problems are identified, the authors can iterate and fix them before publication of the final specification. <\/ins> 8.1. This specification establishes the IANA \"OAuth Protected Resource"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-723e9395e6ad0037f7c43ea6cbfceccf44ec97111a8f87f394841f12210625d3","title":"","text":"(\"7\"). All bits of the byte array at a particular index are set to a status value. The complete byte array is compressed using the \"DEFLATE\" RFC1951 compression method and stored using the \"ZLIB\" RFC1950 data format. Implementations are RECOMMENDED to use the highest compression level available. <\/del> The byte array is compressed using DEFLATE RFC1951 with the ZLIB RFC1950 data format. Implementations are RECOMMENDED to use the highest compression level available. <\/ins> The following example illustrates a Status List that represents the statuses of 16 Referenced Tokens, requiring 16 bits (2 bytes) for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-c473bb8db85834a9e8b4620c3c4f83b750ee8e73a69dfe5e706f276afb8d5fd4","title":"","text":"The following content applies to the JWT Claims Set: \"iss\": REQUIRED. The \"iss\" (issuer) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the Status List Token. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the Referenced Token. <\/del> \"iss\": REQUIRED when also present in the Referenced Token. The \"iss\" (issuer) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the Status List Token. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the Referenced Token. <\/ins> \"sub\": REQUIRED. The \"sub\" (subject) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for that Status List Token. The value MUST be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6f27ad8d67bcc6be8099c217fe9aa8c1ec9f3e2011402afcdb9a1c77eb6743d4","title":"","text":"The following content applies to the JWT Claims Set: \"iss\": REQUIRED. The \"iss\" (issuer) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the Referenced Token. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced Status List Token. <\/del> \"iss\": REQUIRED when also present in the Status List Token. The \"iss\" (issuer) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the Referenced Token. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced Status List Token. <\/ins> \"status\": REQUIRED. The \"status\" (status) claim MUST specify a JSON Object that contains at least one reference to a status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4b0b6ff349f7ea45131917bf2783ec436429566d75673a9d002c1192e350d758","title":"","text":"11.3. Once the Relying Party gets the Referenced Token, this enables him to request the Status List to validate the status of the Token through the provided \"uri\" property and look up the corresponding \"index\". <\/del> Once the Relying Party receives the Referenced Token, this enables him to request the Status List to validate its status through the provided \"uri\" parameter and look up the corresponding \"index\". <\/ins> However, the Relying Party may persistently store the \"uri\" and \"index\" of the Referenced Token to request the Status List again at a later time. By doing so regularly, the Relying Party may create a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-42a1ac2b3ea920399dea16e35da40fa525f93f129f580cd43b647c5631823094","title":"","text":"regular validity checks, but might also be abused in cases where this is not intended and unknown to the Holder, e.g. profiling the suspension of a driving license or checking the employment status of an employee credential. This behaviour could be constrained by adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security- authorization. <\/del> an employee credential. This behaviour could be mitigated by: - adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security-authorization. - regular re-issuance of the Referenced Token, see implementation-lifecycle. <\/ins> 11.4. Colluding Issuers and Relying Parties have the possibility to identify the usage of credentials of a particular Holder, as the Referenced Token contains unique, trackable data. <\/del> Colluding Issuers and a Relying Parties have the possibility to link two transactions, as the tuple of \"uri\" and \"index\" inside the Referenced Token are unique and therefore traceable data. By comparing the status claims of received Referenced Tokens, two colluding Relying Parties could determine that they have interacted with the same user or an Issuer could trace the usage of its issued Referenced Token by colluding with various Relying Parties. It is therefore recommended to use Status Lists for Referenced Token formats that have similar unlinkability properties. <\/ins> To avoid privacy risks for colluding Relying Parties, it is recommended that Issuers use batch issuance to issue multiple tokens, such that Holders can use individual tokens for specific Relying Parties. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a dedicated Status List entry. Revoking batch issued Referenced Tokens might reveal this correlation later on. <\/del> RECOMMENDED that Issuers use batch issuance to issue multiple tokens, see implementation-lifecycle. <\/ins> To avoid information leakage by the values of \"uri\" and \"index\", Issuers are RECOMMENDED to: <\/del> To avoid further correlatable information by the values of \"uri\" and \"index\", Issuers are RECOMMENDED to: <\/ins> choose non-sequential, pseudo-random or random indices"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-be2bae1b2d03291458a03fafc5648bf82e1b26fec3dfb29b0e97ee07348e43e8","title":"","text":"12. TBD Declare whether JWT and CWT representations can be used interchangeably by the same issuer. For instance, declare whether a status list can reference both JWT and CWT tokens. <\/del> 12.1. The lifetime of a Status List (and the Status List Token) depends on the lifetime of its Referenced Tokens. Once all Referenced Tokens are expired, the Issuer may stop serving the Status List (and the Status List Token). Referenced Tokens may be regularly re-issued to increase security or to mitigate linkability and prevent tracking by Relying Parties. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a fresh Status List entry. Referenced Tokens may also be issued in batches, such that Holders can use individual tokens for every transaction. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a dedicated Status List entry. Revoking batch issued Referenced Tokens might reveal this correlation later on. <\/ins> 13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-cc05cb1abba134833eabd3a9295e92d4fe93f36c9e22eec408a9b15fb6ca645b","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification defines status list data structures for representing the status of JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 and CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) RFC8392. The status list data structures <\/del> representing the status of JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519, CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) RFC8392, and other tokens secured by CBOR Object Signing and Encryption _8152. The status list data structures <\/ins> themselves are also represented as JWTs or CWTs. 1. JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 and CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) RFC8392 as secure token formats, have vast possible applications. Some of these <\/del> JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519, CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) _8152 objects, and CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) RFC8392 as secure token formats, have vast possible applications. Some of these <\/ins> applications can involve issuing a token whereby certain semantics about the token can change over time, which are important to be able to communicate to relying parties in an interoperable manner, such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21b5bc9bc38f0f24c696e2d74c5a2c7b3c1ab871272dcdd5b049a1ae1fef8288","title":"","text":"4.2. TBD <\/del> This section defines the \"StatusList\" structure for a CBOR-encoded Status List. The \"StatusList\" structure is a map (Major Type 5) and defines the following entries: * \"bits\": REQUIRED. Unsigned int (Major Type 0) that contains the number of bits in the per Referenced Token in the Status List. The allowed values for \"bits\" are 1, 2, 4 and 8. * \"lst\": REQUIRED. Byte string (Major Type 2) that contains the Status List as specified in status-list-json. The following example illustrates the CBOR representation of the Status List: The following is the CBOR diagnostic output of the example above: <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-42fe7377da9fe96ae9c64f6fa2512b774d15ed6a44dc47e9c37cfa84bac763bc","title":"","text":"5.2. TBD <\/del> The Status List Token MUST be encoded as a \"CBOR Web Token (CWT)\" according to RFC8392. Applications MAY use the media type \"statuslist+cwt\" for a CWT in accordance with the rules outlined in this specification. The following content applies to the CWT protected header: \"3\" (content type): REQUIRED. The CWT content type MUST be \"statuslist+cbor\". The following content applies to the CWT Claims Set: \"1\" (issuer): REQUIRED. Same definition as \"iss\" claim in (#status-list-token-jwt). \"2\" (subject): REQUIRED. Same definition as \"sub\" claim in (#status-list-token-jwt). \"6\" (issued at): REQUIRED. Same definition as \"iat\" claim in (#status-list-token-jwt). \"4\" (expiration time): OPTIONAL. Same definition as \"exp\" claim in (#status-list-token-jwt). \"TBD\" (status list): REQUIRED. The status list claim MUST specify the Status List conforming to the rules outlined in status-list- cbor. The following additional rules apply: The CWT MAY contain other claims. The CWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject the JWT if it is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject CWTs with an invalid signature. Relying parties MUST reject CWTs that are not valid in all other respects per \"CBOR Web Token (CWT)\" RFC8392. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a Status List Token in CWT format: The following is the CBOR diagnostic output of the example above: <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-0405fc6ab3363616b837d426de8b865cf6da37be5fa4835610ef003c1229f313","title":"","text":"6.3. TBD <\/del> The Referenced Token MUST be encoded as a \"COSE Web Token (CWT)\" object according to RFC8392. The following content applies to the JWT Claims Set: \"1\" (issuer): REQUIRED. Same definition as \"iss\" claim in (#referenced-token-jwt). \"TBD\" (status): REQUIRED. The status claim is encoded as a \"Status\" CBOR structure and MUST include at least one data item that refers to a status mechanism. Each data item in the \"Status\" CBOR structure comprises a key-value pair, where the key must be a CBOR text string (Major Type 3) specifying the identifier of the status mechanism, and the corresponding value defines its contents. This specification defines the following data items: \"status_list\" (status list): REQUIRED when the status list mechanism defined in this specification is used. It has the same definition as the \"status_list\" claim in (#referenced- token-jwt) but MUST be encoded as a \"StatusListInfo\" CBOR structure with the following fields: \"idx\": REQUIRED. Same definition as \"idx\" claim in (#referenced-token-jwt). \"uri\": REQUIRED. Same definition as \"uri\" claim in (#referenced-token-jwt). Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a decoded payload of a Referenced Token: TBD: example 6.4. The Referenced Token MUST be encoded as a \"COSE_Sign1\" or \"COSE_Sign\" CBOR structure as defined in \"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)\" RFC8152. It is required to encode the status mechanisms Referenced Tokens refer to using the \"Status\" CBOR structure defined in (#referenced- token-cwt). It is RECOMMENDED to use \"status\" for the label of the field that contains the \"Status\" CBOR structure. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a decoded payload of a Referenced Token: TBD: example <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-bb8c47a49052fffc906491f6f28efba226bac4cbe2d24649d64f64fa16a6cc9d","title":"","text":"\"4\" (expiration time): OPTIONAL. Same definition as \"exp\" claim in status-list-token-jwt. \"65534\" (status list): REQUIRED. The status list claim MUST <\/del> \"65534\" (time to live): OPTIONAL. Same definition as \"ttl\" claim in status-list-token-jwt. \"65535\" (status list): REQUIRED. The status list claim MUST <\/ins> specify the Status List conforming to the rules outlined in status-list-cbor."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4dbc8e28482475ff2c30a0668ae596b4a87c36dbad6ea8a6453aae00a0d61813","title":"","text":"Claim Name: \"status\" Claim Key: TBD (requested assignment 65535) <\/ins> Claim Description: Reference to a status or validity mechanism containing up-to-date status information on the CWT."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-5d7a0519c421f3b0aea64117ffc30d224efb482dadc62104f016ad8129f6c37e","title":"","text":"Specification Document(s): status-list-token-cwt of this specification Claim Name: \"ttl\" Claim Key: TBD (requested assignment 65534) Claim Description: Time to Live Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-list-token-cwt of this specification <\/ins> 13.4. This specification establishes the IANA \"Status Mechanism Methods\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4bafdccf52a74f42cab4d934f3fddc1a04764b0c0cec1d20246cd7bec0482f8d","title":"","text":"The following content applies to the CWT Claims Set: \"1\" (issuer): REQUIRED. Same definition as \"iss\" claim in referenced-token-jwt. <\/del> \"1\" (issuer): REQUIRED when also present in the Referenced Token. Same definition as \"iss\" claim in referenced-token-jwt. <\/ins> \"65535\" (status): REQUIRED. The status claim is encoded as a \"Status\" CBOR structure and MUST include at least one data item"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d256b59e5152fb944deb8676728f45c9e763d53849e60db0284793daecfa31ee","title":"","text":"MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the Referenced Token. \"sub\": REQUIRED. The \"sub\" (subject) claim MUST specify a unique string identifier for the Status List Token. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"uri\" claim contained in the \"status_list\" claim of the Referenced Token. <\/del> \"sub\": REQUIRED. The \"sub\" (subject) claim MUST specify the URI of the Status List Token. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"uri\" claim contained in the \"status_list\" claim of the Referenced Token. <\/ins> \"iat\": REQUIRED. The \"iat\" (issued at) claim MUST specify the time at which the Status List Token was issued."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-9235e22b0cd597ce285211bd86b9c02fc11d92eb2e0ee45db72aacbee1fb5cda","title":"","text":"List. Each Referenced Token is allocated an index during issuance that represents its position within this bit array. The value of the bit(s) at this index correspond to the Referenced Token's status. A Status List may either be provided by an endpoint or be signed and <\/del> Status List may either be provided via HTTPS or be signed and <\/ins> embedded into a Status List Token, whereas this document defines its representations in JWT and CWT. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-db57303e65d08a996b251e2bc07dead487ad7b0a0eab33aefdc6c32cb54100e6","title":"","text":"8.1. To obtain the Status List or Status List Token, the Relying Party MUST send a HTTP GET request to the Status List Endpoint. Communication with the Status List Endpoint MUST utilize TLS. Which version(s) should be implemented will vary over time. A TLS server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. <\/del> MUST send an HTTP GET request to the URI provided in the Referenced Token. If the Status List is provided by an HTTP endpoint (and not as a Status List Token), the provider of the Status List MUST utilize TLS. Which version(s) should be implemented will vary over time. A TLS server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. <\/ins> The Relying Party SHOULD send the following Accept-Header to indicate the requested response type:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6603a2f1bbd668f682fc605ef5e219eefb7abd709c665256b031b8a19d57fc65","title":"","text":"Status List as specified in status-list-json. The following example illustrates the CBOR representation of the Status List: <\/del> Status List in Hex: <\/ins> The following is the CBOR diagnostic output of the example above: <\/del> The following is the CBOR Annotated Hex output of the example above: <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-37f02baabc11ef1c5960c6d17f8c9a44a6d3589125c870121896d217552b07c3","title":"","text":"discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a Status List Token in CWT format (not including the type header yet): <\/del> CWT format in Hex: <\/ins> The following is the CBOR diagnostic output of the example above: <\/del> The following is the CBOR Annotated Hex output of the example above: <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-714af0908e942641e058c827f95a3d67f4402b2102da9285f55628ed41b965a1","title":"","text":"Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a decoded payload of a Referenced Token: <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a Referenced Token in CWT format in Hex: The following is the CBOR Annotated Hex output of the example above: <\/ins> 6.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-e069898c34f7da023e8b4a8caa4c75442c9dc8a10e3ba6a966c31d9925396e8d","title":"","text":"8.3. If caching is required (e.g., to enable the use of alternative mechanisms for hosting, like Content Delivery Networks), the control of the caching mechanism SHOULD be implemented using the standard HTTP Cache-Control as defined in RFC9111. 8.4. <\/del> TBD 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-c46e3560878028494d67c7006a1e1536ddc5a009989217e392df3b95178f0d18","title":"","text":"The following content applies to the CWT protected header: \"16\" TBD (type): REQUIRED. The type of the CWT MUST be \"statuslist+cwt\" as defined in CWT.typ. <\/del> \"16\" (type): REQUIRED. The type of the CWT MUST be \"statuslist+cwt\" as defined in RFC9596. <\/ins> The following content applies to the CWT Claims Set:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-852ced6c31c1fbc87c645b01a8829471a2820bcffa1466780ccbf3039d8da08a","title":"","text":"\"65534\" (time to live): OPTIONAL. Same definition as \"ttl\" claim in status-list-token-jwt. \"65535\" (status list): REQUIRED. The status list claim MUST <\/del> \"65533\" (status list): REQUIRED. The status list claim MUST <\/ins> specify the Status List conforming to the rules outlined in status-list-cbor."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d6729e5e6dee965665aa8f2b60886f3e9d37725ccf1d760b9fe009acc2c75373","title":"","text":"Claim Name: \"status_list\" Claim Key: TBD (requested assignment 65533) <\/ins> Claim Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other CWTs encoded as a bitarray."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-74b92882c86066b05a7fd5ead4af31bd31093eeed95ac9571a59cb322a335723","title":"","text":"The allowed values for \"bits\" are 1, 2, 4 and 8. \"lst\": REQUIRED. Byte string (Major Type 2) that contains the Status List as specified in status-list-json. <\/del> Status List as specified in status-list. <\/ins> \"aggregation_uri\": OPTIONAL. Text string (Major Type 3) that contains a URI to retrieve the Status List Aggregation for this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-3830007a9783b5fbf168a09658da102052324ce19a8202d4b61f406d122b30f5","title":"","text":"\"lst\": REQUIRED. JSON String that contains the status values for all the Referenced Tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be the base64url-encoded (as defined in Section 2 of RFC7515) Status List as specified in status-list. <\/del> value MUST be the base64url-encoded Status List as specified in status-list. <\/ins> \"aggregation_uri\": OPTIONAL. JSON String that contains a URI to retrieve the Status List Aggregation for this type of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4c511ef76762353800ce692b993ca0d4445ab885d9cd0d1c17f4f7f9e882cc25","title":"","text":"These bits are concatenated: Resulting in the byte array and compressed\/base64url encoded status <\/del> Resulting in the byte array and compressed\/base64url-encoded status <\/ins> list: 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6c48ddc77406b94806c85273da3d36173814eaa16375a318de72525760f2c4f6","title":"","text":"server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. The HTTP endpoint SHOULD support the use of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) CORS and\/or other methods as appropriate to enable Browser-Based clients to access it. <\/ins> The Relying Party SHOULD send the following Accept-Header to indicate the requested response type:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-af2ce61f6ca4ca7977286ae290ff0cc2aa05f2e4d21d902f9208ac2af1347360","title":"","text":"applications can involve issuing a token whereby certain semantics about the token can change over time which are important to be able to communicate to relying parties in an interoperable manner, such as whether the token is considered revoked by its issuer. This document defines a status list using JWT and CWT for representation that is capable of communicating the individual statuses of multiple tokens. The document also defines how an issuer of a token references a status list in a JWT or CWT which has a status to convey. <\/del> whether the token is considered invalidated or suspended by its issuer. This document defines a Status List in JWT and CWT representations that describes the individual statuses of multiple Referenced Tokens. The statuses of all Referenced Tokens are conveyed via a bit array in the Status List. Each Referenced Token is allocated an index during issuance which represents a position within this bit array and the value of the bit(s) at this position correspond to the Referenced Token's status. The document also defines how an issuer of a Referenced Token in JWT or CWT representation references a Status List Token. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types, the document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. The Status List Token may be used by an issuer in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model, as described in (XXX) to express the status of verifiable credentials (Referenced Tokens) issued by an issuer. <\/ins> The following diagram depicts the basic conceptual relationship. 1.1. Revocation mechanisms are an essential part for most identity ecoosystems. In the past, revocation of X.509 TLS certificates has been proven difficult as traditional certificate revocation lists (CRLs) have limited scalability and the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) has additional privacy risks as the client is leaking the requested website to a third party. OSCP stapling is adressing some of these problems at the cost of less up-to-date data. Modern approaches use accumulator-based revocation registries and Zero- Knowledge-Proofs to accomodate for this privacy gap but face scalability issues again. The approach of this specification seeks to find a balance between scalability, security and privacy by minimizing the status information to mere bits and compressing the resulting binary data. Thereby a Status List may contain statuses of 100.000 or more Referenced Tokens, but still remain relatively small. Placing large amounts of Referenced Tokens into the same list also enables a herd privacy towards the Issuer. <\/ins> 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-b65a649d031b5fbfc22cd3455e27f1cb734bc2f1f134e8f57cbb2f901285542d","title":"","text":"3. 3.1. <\/del> Status List A bit array that lists the statuses of many Referenced Tokens. Status List Token A token in JWT or CWT representation that contains a Status List. Referenced Token A token in JWT or CWT representation which contains a reference to a Status List Token. The information from the contained Status List may give a verifier additional information about up-to-date status of the Referenced Token. 4. 4.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating a JWT which references a status list. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. <\/del> The following rules apply to validating a Referenced Token in JWT representation which references a Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. <\/ins> The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a unique string based identifier for the entity that issued the JWT."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2dea2a023f1d4da76a268f0b27e7f445a88e5cd4cd50bd82fd681d1e91d31b54","title":"","text":"compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced status list JWT. <\/del> the referenced Status List Token. <\/ins> The JWT MUST contain an \"sts\" (status) claim conforming to the <\/del> The JWT MUST contain an \"status\" (status) claim conforming to the <\/ins> rules outlined in The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 3.1.1. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the \"sts\" (status) claim <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the \"status\" (status) claim <\/ins> The claim value MUST be a valid JSON object. The claim value object MUST contain a \"typ\" (type) attribute with a string based value that represents the type of status list referenced. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"typ\" attribute in the \"sts_lst\" claim for the referenced status list. <\/del> The claim value object MUST contain an \"idx\" (index) attribute with a numberic based value that represents the index to check for status information in the status list for the current JWT. The <\/del> status information in the Status List for the current JWT. The <\/ins> value of this attribute MUST be a non-negative number, containing a value of zero or greater. Refer to xx for details on the validation procedure. The claim value object MUST contain a \"uri\" attribute with a string based value that identifies the status list containing the <\/del> string based value that identifies the Status List containing the <\/ins> status information for the JWT. The value of this attribute MUST be a uri conforming to 3.2. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating a JWT based status list. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/del> The following rules apply to validating a JWT based Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/ins> discretion of the verifying party. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d0512d2ccc4028ec1829324b1e7796bd192504173b329d9037aaa30daab836a1","title":"","text":"The JWT MUST contain an \"iat\" (issued at) claim that identifies the time at which it was issued. The JWT MUST contain an \"sts_lst\" (status list) claim conforming to the rules outlined in jwt-status-list-claim-format. <\/del> The JWT MUST contain an \"status_list\" (status list) claim conforming to the rules outlined in jwt-status-list-claim-format. <\/ins> The JWT MAY contain an \"exp\" (expiration time) claim that convey's when it is considered expired by its issuer."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2474b1bfa7fa4110fddb457e285868692aa665a904497b8d6de4efe071cafe8a","title":"","text":"Relying parties MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. 3.2.1. <\/del> 4.2.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the \"sts_lst\" (status list) claim <\/del> The following rules apply to validating the \"status_list\" (status list) claim <\/ins> The claim value MUST be a valid JSON object. The claim value object MUST contain a \"typ\" (type) attribute with a string based value that represents the type of status list referenced. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"typ\" attribute in the \"sts\" claim for the token who's status is being validated. <\/del> The claim value object MUST contain a \"bit_size\" attribute with an numeric based value that represents the number of bits per Referenced Token in the Status List (\"lst\") of the Status List JWT. The allowed values for \"bit_size\" are 1,2,4 and 8. <\/ins> The claim value object MUST contain a \"lst\" (list) attribute with a string based value that represents the status values for all the tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be a base64 encoded string using RFCXXX containing a GZIP compressed octet string RFC1952. <\/del> a string based value that represents the bit array containing the Status Type values for all the Referenced Tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be a base64 encoded string using RFCXXX containing a GZIP compressed octet string RFC1952. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This document formally defines the \"revocation-list\" status list type which applies the following additional validation rules beyond those described in jwt-format-and-processing and jwt-status-list-format- and-processing. <\/del> This document defines the possible statuses of Referenced Tokens as Status Type values. If the Status List contains more than one bit per token (as defined by \"bits\" in the Status List) then the whole value of bits MUST describe one value. A Status List can not encompass multiple statuses per individual bits for a Reference Token. <\/ins> The \"uri\" attribute contained within a JWT using the \"sts\" claim MUST be an HTTPS based URL that when resolved via an HTTPS GET request returns a content type \"application\/jwt\" containing the status list. <\/del> The registry in this document describes the basic Status Type values required for the most common use cases. The registry may be extended as describes in XXX. <\/ins> TODO add more <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> 4. <\/del> A status describes the state, mode, condition or stage of an entity that is described by the status list. Status Types MUST be numeric based values between 0 and 255. Status types described by this specifiction comprise: 0x00 - \"VALID\" - The status of the Token is valid, correct or legal. 0x01 - \"INVALID\" - The status of the Token is revoked, annuled, taken back, recalled or cancelled. This state is irreversible. 0x02 - \"SUSPENDED\" - The status of the Token is temporarily unvalid, hanging, debared from privilege. This state is reversible. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> The issuer of the Status List Token MUST choose an adequate \"bit_size\" to be able to describe the required Status Types.ST be used for the \"typ\" attribute within the \"status_list\". 5.1.1. In the first example the Status List shall be used as a revocation list. It only requires the Status Types \"VALID\" and \"INVALID\", therefore a \"bit_size\" of 1 is sufficient. In the second example the Status List shall additionally include the Status Type \"SUSPENDED. As the Status Type value for \"SUSPENDED\" is 0x02 and doe snot fit into 1 bit, the \"bit_size\" is required to be 2. 5.2. 6. 6.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on risks of incorrect parsing\/decoding leading to erroneuos status data 4.2. <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> TODO consumers\/Verifiers of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data 4.3. <\/del> 6.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on authorization mechanisms preventing misuse and profiling as described in privacy section 4.4. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on status list only providing the up-to date\/latest status, no historical data, may be provided by the underlying hosting architecture 5. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> 5.1. <\/del> 7.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on herd privacy, size of the status list 5.2. <\/del> 7.2. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Verifiers regularly fetching the status list to create a profile, possible countermeasures with authorized access to the status list 5.3. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Issuer-Verifier correlation and Verifier-Verifier correlation as the status list introduces unique,trackable data TODO elaborate on issuers avoiding sequential usage of indices and status lists <\/del> lists TODO elaborate that a status list only gives information about the maximum number of possible statuses that a list conveys, issuers are recommended to pre-allocate lists, use dead entries that are never assigned or other obfuscation mechanisms <\/ins> 5.4. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per JWT token that do not offer herd privacy <\/del> TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per Referenced Token that do not offer herd privacy <\/ins> 5.5. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on increased privacy if the status list is hosted by a third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities <\/del> third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities TODO evaluate deifnition of Status List Provider? An entity that hosts the Status List as a resource for potential verifiers. The Status List Provider may be the issuer of the Status List but may also be outsourced to a trusted third party. <\/ins> 6. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d1dd9653f4bdddcaea435bebe647a96c9cf96ffb2d08f2d98e88a399ca37074a","title":"","text":"suspension of a driving license or checking the employment status of an employee credential. This behaviour could be mitigated by: - adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security-authorization. - regular re-issuance of the Referenced Token, see implementation-lifecycle. <\/del> This behaviour could be mitigated by: adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security- authorization. regular re-issuance of the Referenced Token, see implementation- lifecycle. <\/ins> 12.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-bb5e28f437ed2f0242714ca88d15d6ffe29692ed04bf496e1a37b217d3749db7","title":"","text":"Claim Name: \"status_list\" Claim Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other JWTs encoded as a bitarray. <\/del> information on multiple tokens. <\/ins> Change Controller: IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6325a86fedded9861e44c71e7521145aaa25a3c3991c55833e53e7b08da97711","title":"","text":"Status Method Value: \"status_list\" Status Method Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other JWTs encoded as a bitarray. <\/del> status information on multiple tokens. <\/ins> Change Controller: IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-05f0425b9a402d2b482892479020913316b161efd9856c98c6782ef0f9253386","title":"","text":"Claim Key: TBD (requested assignment 65533) Claim Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other CWTs encoded as a bitarray. <\/del> information on multiple tokens. <\/ins> Change Controller: IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-115d66a2af1d64da39185a48f889ef2068b27598ea1d6ad0b3bc86136ecdd605","title":"","text":"Status Method Value: \"status_list\" Status Method Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other CWTs encoded as a bitarray. <\/del> status information on multiple tokens. <\/ins> Change Controller: IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-530a07016cb9686f4b22f0181ac8097e9d62b3af1614ccc236fbec77516dbfb6","title":"","text":"Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: binary; A JSON-based Status List is a JSON Object. <\/del> Encoding considerations: See status-list-json of this specification <\/ins> Security considerations: See (#Security) of [ this specification ] <\/del> Security considerations: See Security of this specification <\/ins> Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: [ this specification ] <\/del> Published specification: this specification <\/ins> Applications that use this media type: Applications using [ this specification ] for updated status information of tokens <\/del> Applications that use this media type: Applications using this specification for updated status information of tokens <\/ins> Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: File extension(s): n\/a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a <\/del> Additional information: n\/a <\/ins> Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-5c8f35c917cbafd1cc0c44039a166fd491e2b6ed078adda5ebcd2cf65ba3ae84","title":"","text":"Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: binary; A JWT-based Status List is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters. <\/del> Encoding considerations: See status-list-token-jwt of this specification <\/ins> Security considerations: See (#Security) of [ this specification ] <\/del> Security considerations: See Security of this specification <\/ins> Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: [ this specification ] <\/del> Published specification: this specification <\/ins> Applications that use this media type: Applications using [ this specification ] for updated status information of tokens <\/del> Applications that use this media type: Applications using this specification for updated status information of tokens <\/ins> Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: File extension(s): n\/a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a <\/del> Additional information: n\/a <\/ins> Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d7a97d927435852b271bb0834def39c52fd0c30c7d1cbc9540dc9555965604eb","title":"","text":"Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: binary; A CBOR-based Status List is a CBOR Object. <\/del> Encoding considerations: See status-list-cbor of this specification <\/ins> Security considerations: See (#Security) of [ this specification ] <\/del> Security considerations: See Security of this specification <\/ins> Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: [ this specification ] <\/del> Published specification: this specification <\/ins> Applications that use this media type: Applications using [ this specification ] for updated status information of tokens <\/del> Applications that use this media type: Applications using this specification for updated status information of tokens <\/ins> Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: File extension(s): n\/a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a <\/del> Additional information: n\/a <\/ins> Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-60fd8a93c812ac862a345a1e916efff606b34fb017555d5eaecf55f6b36d06d5","title":"","text":"Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: binary; <\/del> Encoding considerations: See status-list-token-cwt of this specification <\/ins> Security considerations: See (#Security) of [ this specification ] <\/del> Security considerations: See Security of this specification <\/ins> Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: [ this specification ] <\/del> Published specification: this specification <\/ins> Applications that use this media type: Applications using [ this specification ] for updated status information of tokens <\/del> Applications that use this media type: Applications using this specification for updated status information of tokens <\/ins> Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: File extension(s): n\/a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a <\/del> Additional information: n\/a <\/ins> Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-553c0fd2d4d1c39c8f209ab2072d9971a8a7312696da5a302c9bae3206d590a6","title":"","text":"SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials SD-JWT.VC introduce the usage of Status List in Section 3.2.2.2. The \"status\" object uses the same encoding as a JWT as defined in referenced-token-jwt. <\/del> encoding as a JWT as defined in referenced-token-jose. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example for a Referenced Token in SD-JWT-VC serialized form as received from an Issuer:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-009de3887ea1db706bd85b9737a91b23d609f6ba07003f900bb755a6c97c65b1","title":"","text":"6.3. The Referenced Token MUST be encoded as a \"COSE Web Token (CWT)\" object according to RFC8392. <\/del> The Referenced Token MAY be encoded as a \"COSE Web Token (CWT)\" object according to RFC8392 or other formats based on COSE. <\/ins> The following content applies to the CWT Claims Set:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-d30ad638f8b204b2dc9e0346ae3ce3ade1a1323471179f18aa13213e338b934b","title":"","text":"\"status_list\" (status list): REQUIRED when the status list mechanism defined in this specification is used. It has the same definition as the \"status_list\" claim in referenced-token- jwt but MUST be encoded as a \"StatusListInfo\" CBOR structure <\/del> jose but MUST be encoded as a \"StatusListInfo\" CBOR structure <\/ins> with the following fields: \"idx\": REQUIRED. Same definition as \"idx\" claim in referenced-token-jwt. <\/del> referenced-token-jose. <\/ins> \"uri\": REQUIRED. Same definition as \"uri\" claim in referenced-token-jwt. <\/del> referenced-token-jose. <\/ins> Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-fb112133301e5ab868920ba7952752c7aac1d80760656fdfd99e9213879bba97","title":"","text":"The following is the CBOR Annotated Hex output of the example above: 6.4. The Referenced Token MUST be encoded as a \"COSE_Sign1\" or \"COSE_Sign\" CBOR structure as defined in \"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)\" RFC9052. It is required to encode the status mechanisms referred to in the Referenced Token using the \"Status\" CBOR structure defined in referenced-token-cwt. <\/del> ISO mdoc ISO.mdoc may utilize the Status List mechanism by introducing the \"status\" parameter in the Mobile Security Object (MSO) as specified in Section 9.1.2. The \"status\" parameter uses the same encoding as a CWT as defined in referenced-token-cose. <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED to use \"status\" for the label of the field that contains the \"Status\" CBOR structure."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4763f1a1bcebbe0f816d5eb4599045e993bbcfa51b4bfc88f8719a723830f3fb","title":"","text":"Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The following is a non-normative example for a decoded payload of a Referenced Token: <\/del> The following is a non-normative example for an IssuerAuth as specified in ISO mDL (also referred to as signed MSO) in Hex: <\/ins> TBD: example <\/del> The following is the CBOR Diagnostic Notation of the example above: <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-a6ee78e4a305ab6fb82afae748cd171264f61b21dafaff3044cc507ce4a05b53","title":"","text":"Check for the existence of a \"status\" claim, check for the existence of a \"status_list\" claim within the \"status\" claim and validate that the content of \"status_list\" adheres to the rules defined in referenced-token-jwt for JWTs and referenced-token-cwt for CWTs. This step can be overruled if defined within the <\/del> defined in referenced-token-jose for JWTs and referenced-token- cose for CWTs. This step can be overruled if defined within the <\/ins> Referenced Token Format natively Resolve the Status List from the provided URI"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-9d6b4fd9db25bf8bb3a5ecea22b57ce1d972fca2c2bd232efec2c2011f1ac10f","title":"","text":"Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): referenced-token-jwt of this <\/del> Specification Document(s): referenced-token-jose of this <\/ins> specification 14.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-a8b9a76a931addf6ec55debc8ecdcc4a080a6a38ba29a5aecf4b916c2710a4f9","title":"","text":"Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): referenced-token-cwt of this <\/del> Specification Document(s): referenced-token-cose of this <\/ins> specification 14.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6edcefcf568bc83eda69b9807efa761fc3bd3810e2c6b9feee817d06bb3b1e73","title":"","text":"The claim value object MUST contain a \"lst\" (list) attribute with a string based value that represents the status values for all the tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be a base64 encoded string using RFCXXX containing a GZIP compressed octet string RFC1952. <\/del> tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be computed using the algorithm described in jwt-status-list-claim-encoding. 3.2.2. Each status of a Referenced Token MUST be represented with a bit size of 1,2,4, or 8. Therefore up to 2,4,16, or 256 statuses for a Referenced Token, depending on the bit-size, are possible. This limitation is intended to limit bit manipulation necessary to a single byte for every operation and thus keeping implementations simpler and less error prone. The overall status list is encoded as a byte array. Depending on the \"bit-size\" each byte corresponds to 8\/(#bit-size) statuses (8,4,2, or 1). The status of each Referenced Token is identified using an index that maps to one or more specific bits within the byte array. The index starts counting at 0 and ends with \"size\" - 1(being the last valid entry). The bits within an array are counted from least significant bit \"0\" to the most significant bit (\"7\"). All bits of the byte array at a particular index are set to a status value. The complete byte array is compressed using gZIP RFC1952. The result of the gZIP compression is then encoded as base64 encoding as defined in Section 4 of RFC4648 and stored as a string. Example of a byte representing 8 statuses (1-bit status list) with indices 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (1 byte): Example of a more complex status list of length 12 using 2 bit statuses (3 bytes): <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-83d51af62131a0b4ef2fb0fd016f1e220bfe329cd192735b29db2979335a576c","title":"","text":"List. Each Referenced Token is allocated an index during issuance that represents its position within this bit array. The value of the bit(s) at this index correspond to the Referenced Token's status. A Status List may either be provided via HTTPS or be signed and embedded into a Status List Token, whereas this document defines its representations in JWT and CWT. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. The document also defines how an issuer of a Referenced Token references a Status List (Token). <\/del> Status List may either be provided via HTTPS or be protected within a Status List Token by cryptographic signature or MAC, whereas this document defines its representations in JWT and CWT. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. The document also defines how an issuer of a Referenced Token references a Status List (Token). <\/ins> An example for the usage of a Status List is to manage the status of issued access tokens as defined in section 1.4 of RFC6749. Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-f0ba4e89f96910d0e93b0c9c8f473e9f6a8619895d2b74b22663c70ef2f0e906","title":"","text":"The JWT MAY contain other claims. The JWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject the JWT if it is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. <\/del> The JWT MUST be secured using a cryptographic signature or MAC algorithm. Relying Parties MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature. <\/ins> Relying parties MUST reject JWTs that are not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. <\/del> discretion of the Relying Party. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example for a Status List Token in JWT format:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-e7f98ba5d943297028cdeaf0cd9ca4096a87b6da451733a1b1c96c1ec5f97b0c","title":"","text":"The CWT MAY contain other claims. The CWT MUST be digitally signed using an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject the CWT if it is using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. Relying parties MUST reject CWTs with an invalid signature. <\/del> The CWT MUST be secured using a cryptographic signature or MAC algorithm. Relying Parties MUST reject CWTs with an invalid signature. <\/ins> Relying parties MUST reject CWTs that are not valid in all other respects per \"CBOR Web Token (CWT)\" RFC8392. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. <\/del> discretion of the Relying Party. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example for a Status List Token in CWT format in Hex:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-22b47c9cde395e076b325b5b6dd53519e045ad8300952c0fb4d25e559ab8c022","title":"","text":"7. This document defines potential statuses of Referenced Tokens as Status Type values. If the Status List contains more than one bit per token (as defined by \"bits\" in the Status List), then the whole value of bits MUST describe one value. A Status List can not represent multiple statuses per Referenced Token. The registry in this document describes the basic Status Type values required for the most common use cases. Additional values may defined for particular use cases. <\/del> This document defines statuses of Referenced Tokens as Status Type values. A status describes the state, mode, condition or stage of an entity that is represented by the Referenced Token. A Status List can not represent multiple statuses per Referenced Token. If the Status List contains more than one bit per token (as defined by \"bits\" in the Status List), then the whole value of bits MUST describe one value. Status Types MUST have a numeric value between 0 and 255 for their representation in the Status List. The issuer of the Status List MUST choose an adequate \"bits\" (bit size) to be able to describe the required Status Types for its application. <\/ins> 7.1. A status describes the state, mode, condition or stage of an entity that is described by the Status List. Status Types MUST be numeric values between 0 and 255. Status types described by this specification comprise: <\/del> This document creates a registry in iana-status-types that includes the most common Status Type values. Additional values may defined for particular use cases. Status Types described by this document comprise: 0x00 - \"VALID\" - The status of the Referenced Token is valid, correct or legal. 0x01 - \"INVALID\" - The status of the Referenced Token is revoked, annulled, taken back, recalled or cancelled. 0x02 - \"SUSPENDED\" - The status of the Referenced Token is temporarily invalid, hanging, debarred from privilege. This state is reversible. <\/ins> 0x00 - \"VALID\" - The status of the Token is valid, correct or legal. <\/del> 0x03 - \"APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_3\" - The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. <\/ins> 0x01 - \"INVALID\" - The status of the Token is revoked, annulled, taken back, recalled or cancelled. This state is irreversible. <\/del> 0x0E - \"APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_14\" - The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. <\/ins> 0x02 - \"SUSPENDED\" - The status of the Token is temporarily invalid, hanging, debarred from privilege. This state is reversible. <\/del> 0x0F - \"APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_15\" - The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. <\/ins> The Status Issuer MUST choose an adequate \"bits\" (bit size) to be able to describe the required Status Types for the application."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-503f39a3ccb3b60e34b70a8863fdd1a89cb0109f60b93c552f7df5060728fbbc","title":"","text":"Upon receiving a Referenced Token, a Relying Party MUST first perform the validation of the Referenced Token - e.g., checking for expected attributes, valid signature, expiration time. As this is out of scope of this document, this validation is not be described here, but is expected to be done according to the format of the Referenced Token. <\/del> attributes, valid signature, expiration time. The processing rules for JWT or CWT precede any evaluation of a Referenced Token's status. For example, if a token is evaluated as being expired through the \"exp\" (Expiration Time) but also has a status of 0x00 (\"VALID\"), the token is considered expired. As this is out of scope of this document, this validation is not be described here, but is expected to be done according to the format of the Referenced Token. <\/ins> If this validation was not successful, the Referenced Token MUST be rejected. If the validation was successful, the Relying Party MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-71042a123b9092b645ce6d58bfb05ca882d07f73e655197243172d6984e207f9","title":"","text":"14.5. This specification establishes the IANA \"Status Types\" registry for Status List values. The registry records the a human readable label, the bit representation and a common description for it. 14.5.1. Status Type Name: Status Type Description: Status Type value: Change Controller: Specification Document(s): 14.5.2. Status Type Name: VALID Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is valid, correct or legal. Status Type value: \"0x00\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-types of this specification Status Type Name: INVALID Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is revoked, annulled, taken back, recalled or cancelled. Status Type value: \"0x01\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-types of this specification Status Type Name: SUSPENDED Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is temporarily invalid, hanging, debarred from privilege. This state is reversible. Status Type value: \"0x02\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-types of this specification Status Type Name: APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_3 Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. Status Type value: \"0x03\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-types of this specification Status Type Name: APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_14 Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. Status Type value: \"0x0E\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): status-types of this specification Status Type Name: APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_15 Status Type Description: The status of the Referenced Token is implicitly given by the particular use case and the meaning of this value is known out-of-band. Status Type value: \"0x0F\" Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): referenced-token-jose of this specification 14.6. <\/ins> This section requests registration of the following media types RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.MediaTypes in the manner described in RFC6838."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-f16fc3c281c8aba1ee96abf0c8bfc549db965435da21b828fa4d93551fb228c8","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification defines status list data structures and processing rules for representing the status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption(COSE), such as JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and ISO mdoc. Status Lists are provided in the form of JWTs or CWTs. <\/del> This specification defines a mechanism, data structures and processing rules for representing the status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), such as JWT, SD-JWT VC, CBOR Web Token and ISO mdoc. It also defines an extension point and a registry for future status mechanisms. <\/ins> 1. Token formats secured by JOSE IANA.JOSE or COSE RFC9052, such as JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519, CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) RFC8392 and ISO mdoc ISO.mdoc, have vast possible applications. Some of these applications can involve issuing a token whereby certain semantics about the token can change over time, which are important to be able to communicate to relying parties in an interoperable manner, such as whether the token is considered invalidated or suspended by its issuer. This document defines a Status List and its representations in JWT and CWT formats that describe the individual statuses of multiple Referenced Tokens, which themselves are most commonly data structures secured by JOSE or COSE. The statuses of all Referenced Tokens are conveyed via a bit array in the Status List. Each Referenced Token is allocated an index during issuance that represents its position within this bit array. The value of the bit(s) at this index correspond to the Referenced Token's status. A Status List is provided within a Status List Token protected by cryptographic signature or MAC and this document defines its representations in JWT and CWT format. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. The document also defines how an issuer of a Referenced Token references a Status List Token. <\/del> Token formats secured by JOSE IANA.JOSE or COSE RFC9052, such as JWTs RFC7519, SD-JWT VCs SD-JWT.VC, CWTs RFC8392 and ISO mdoc ISO.mdoc, have vast possible applications. Some of these applications can involve issuing a token whereby certain semantics about the token or its validity may change over time. Communicating these changes to relying parties in an interoperable manner, such as whether the token is considered invalidated or suspended by its issuer, is important for many of these applications. This document defines a Status List data structure that describes the individual statuses of multiple Referenced Tokens. A Referenced Token may be of any format, but is most commonly a data structures secured by JOSE or COSE. The Referenced Token is referenced by the Status List, which described the status of the Referenced Token. The statuses of all Referenced Tokens are conveyed via a bit array in the Status List. Each Referenced Token is allocated an index during issuance that represents its position within this bit array. The value of the bit(s) at this index correspond to the Referenced Token's status. A Status List is provided within a Status List Token protected by cryptographic signature or MAC and this document defines its representations in JWT and CWT format. <\/ins> An example for the usage of a Status List is to manage the status of issued access tokens as defined in section 1.4 of RFC6749. Token Introspection RFC7662 defines another way to determine the status of an issued access token, but it requires the party trying to validate an access tokens status to directly contact the token issuer, whereas the mechanism defined in this specification does not have this limitation. Another possible use case for the Status List is to express the status of verifiable credentials (Referenced Tokens) issued by an Issuer in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model SD-JWT.VC. The following diagram depicts the relationship between the involved roles (Relying Party is equivalent to Verifier of SD-JWT.VC): <\/del> The following diagram depicts the relationship between the artifacts: <\/ins> An Issuer issues Referenced Tokens to a Holder, the Holder uses and presents those Referenced Tokens to a Relying Party. The Issuer"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-691269f904fc174898a12967176690c67b394aff76ada6bbc3bbe31ad5248aef","title":"","text":"resolvable endpoint. The roles of the Issuer (of the Referenced Token), the Status Issuer and the Status Provider may be fulfilled by the same entity. If not further specified, the term Issuer may refer to an entity acting for all three roles. <\/del> to an entity acting for all three roles. This document describes how an Issuer references a Status List Token and how a Relying Party fetches and validates Status Lists. <\/ins> The following diagram depicts the relationship between the artifacts: <\/del> The following diagram depicts the relationship between the involved roles (Relying Party is equivalent to Verifier of SD-JWT.VC): Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. <\/ins> The Referenced Token is referenced by the Status List, which described the status of the Referenced Token. The Status List is embedded and secured within a Status List Token. <\/del> Furthermore, the document defines an extension point that enables other specifications to describe additional status mechanisms and creates an IANA registry. <\/ins> 1.1. An example for the usage of a Status List is to manage the status of issued access tokens as defined in section 1.4 of RFC6749. Token Introspection RFC7662 defines another way to determine the status of an issued access token, but it requires the party trying to validate an access tokens status to directly contact the token issuer, whereas the mechanism defined in this specification does not have this limitation. Another possible use case for the Status List is to express the status of verifiable credentials (Referenced Tokens) issued by an Issuer in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model SD-JWT.VC. 1.2. <\/ins> Revocation mechanisms are an essential part for most identity ecosystems. In the past, revocation of X.509 TLS certificates has been proven difficult. Traditional certificate revocation lists"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-768003c85fea302eb18010603f3cbf3a9992f238e8a171055989256018ac420d","title":"","text":"this specification. Other specifications can register other members used for status retrieval. 1.2. <\/del> 1.3. <\/ins> The decisions taken in this specification aim to achieve the following design goals:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2816f234968cd4c1a0c9f85b5b0ab33c2b85ef9f8eeb9e78699d0ad375e12b7a","title":"","text":"compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced status list JWT. <\/del> the referenced Status List Token. <\/ins> The JWT MUST contain an \"status\" (status) claim conforming to the rules outlined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-c240a8923de818da674e7ee24c927b8ba46e2f6e0a63378f6dbbbb693ccfbc75","title":"","text":"The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 3.1.1. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the \"status\" (status) claim The claim value MUST be a valid JSON object. The claim value object MUST contain a \"typ\" (type) attribute with a string based value that represents the type of status list <\/del> a string based value that represents the type of Status List <\/ins> referenced. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"typ\" attribute in the \"status_list\" claim for the referenced status list. <\/del> attribute in the \"status_list\" claim for the referenced Status List. <\/ins> The claim value object MUST contain an \"idx\" (index) attribute with a numberic based value that represents the index to check for status information in the status list for the current JWT. The <\/del> status information in the Status List for the current JWT. The <\/ins> value of this attribute MUST be a non-negative number, containing a value of zero or greater. Refer to xx for details on the validation procedure. The claim value object MUST contain a \"uri\" attribute with a string based value that identifies the status list containing the <\/del> string based value that identifies the Status List containing the <\/ins> status information for the JWT. The value of this attribute MUST be a uri conforming to 3.2. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating a JWT based status list. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/del> The following rules apply to validating a JWT based Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the <\/ins> discretion of the verifying party. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6c641fe8ac7153066a5ca2bccb76df49dd80fb94e5c4f8da47f884aa40b76b94","title":"","text":"Relying parties MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. 3.2.1. <\/del> 4.2.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the \"status_list\" (status list) claim"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-7445b0e02a8c8c2cee6124d2a49d57ab21529e113b0a306740a5aff8d9276eaa","title":"","text":"The claim value object MUST contain a \"typ\" (type) attribute with a string based value that represents the type of status list referenced. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"typ\" attribute in the \"status\" claim for the token who's status is being validated. <\/del> attribute in the \"status\" claim for the Referenced Token who's status is being validated. <\/ins> The claim value object MUST contain a \"lst\" (list) attribute with a string based value that represents the status values for all the tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be a base64 encoded string using RFCXXX containing a GZIP compressed octet string RFC1952. <\/del> Referenced Tokens it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be a base64 encoded string using RFCXXX containing a GZIP compressed octet string RFC1952. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> This document formally defines the \"revocation-list\" status list type which applies the following additional validation rules beyond those described in jwt-format-and-processing and jwt-status-list-format- and-processing. <\/del> described in jwt-referenced-token and jwt-status-list-format-and- processing. <\/ins> The \"uri\" attribute contained within a JWT using the \"status\" claim MUST be an HTTPS based URL that when resolved via an HTTPS GET"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-4577bbe4dd941f53592d77c347c7979d82a034a933c95de8e3dde3148e1e7907","title":"","text":"TODO add more 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on risks of incorrect parsing\/decoding leading to erroneuos status data 4.2. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> TODO consumers\/Verifiers of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data 4.3. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on authorization mechanisms preventing misuse and profiling as described in privacy section 4.4. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on status list only providing the up-to date\/latest status, no historical data, may be provided by the underlying hosting architecture 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> 5.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on herd privacy, size of the status list 5.2. <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Verifiers regularly fetching the status list to create a profile, possible countermeasures with authorized access to the status list 5.3. <\/del> 6.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Issuer-Verifier correlation and Verifier-Verifier correlation as the status list introduces unique,trackable data TODO"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-f0dc8b23b4022cb23ce93d549da7903b862d3cd7ef8f1daaf00bd9d074750676","title":"","text":"are recommended to pre-allocate lists, use dead entries that are never assigned or other obfuscation mechanisms 5.4. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per JWT token that do not offer herd privacy <\/del> TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per Referenced Token that do not offer herd privacy <\/ins> 5.5. <\/del> 6.5. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on increased privacy if the status list is hosted by a third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities <\/del> third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities TODO evaluate deifnition of Status List Provider? An entity that hosts the Status List as a resource for potential verifiers. The Status List Provider may be the issuer of the Status List but may also be outsourced to a trusted third party. <\/ins> 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-5e4d5954cc636bcab7b7b855288a510d053d862e662a1590c9eed86bde79082e","title":"","text":"\"aggregation_uri\": OPTIONAL. JSON String that contains a URI to retrieve the Status List Aggregation for this type of Referenced Token. See section batch-fetching for further detail. <\/del> Referenced Token. See section aggregation for further detail. <\/ins> The following example illustrates the JSON representation of the Status List:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-c358771dd1261522e3286734e3f9c443713f921aa616c8dee9d2364c9671708a","title":"","text":"\"aggregation_uri\": OPTIONAL. Text string (Major Type 3) that contains a URI to retrieve the Status List Aggregation for this type of Referenced Token. See section batch-fetching for further detail. <\/del> type of Referenced Token. See section aggregation for further detail. <\/ins> The following example illustrates the CBOR representation of the Status List in Hex:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2492dc977990eee008e394d5ca1b9580b5115c4a30c4d1af64b7b7ef9170bb4f","title":"","text":"The Issuer MAY link to the Status List Aggregation URI in metadata that can be provided by different means like .well-known metadata as is used commonly in OAuth and OpenID, or via a VICAL extension for ISO mDoc \/ mDL. <\/del> ISO mDoc \/ mDL. If the Issuer is an OAuth Authorization Server according to RFC6749, it is RECOMMENDED to use \"status_list_aggregation_endpoint\" for its metadata defined by RFC8414. <\/ins> The concrete specification on how this is implemented depends on the specific ecosystem and is out of scope of this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-14187eae35f05dac21fa7f23c18c72f2105718579bc2275d8afb240ec17e1cc5","title":"","text":"14.6. This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA \"OAuth Authorization Server Metadata\" registry IANA.OAuth.Params established by RFC8414. Metadata Name: status_list_aggregation_endpoint Metadata Description: URL of the Authorization Server aggregating OAuth Token Status List URLs for token status management. Change Controller: IETF Reference: aggregation of this specification 14.7. <\/ins> This section requests registration of the following media types RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.MediaTypes in the manner described in RFC6838."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-99e5b5874332ca2a65793a0cb581bddc23c3c256e3d1171d319b4de570c1884d","title":"","text":"If the Relying Party does not send an Accept Header, the response type is assumed to be known implicit or out-of-band. A successful response that contains a Status List Token MUST use an HTTP status code in the 2xx range. A response MAY also choose to redirect the client to another URI using a HTTP status code in the 3xx range, which clients SHOULD follow. A client SHOULD detect and intervene in cyclical redirections (i.e., \"infinite\" redirection loops). <\/ins> The following are non-normative examples for a request and response for a Status List Token with type \"application\/statuslist+jwt\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-6fbd5891350f7c30e15d282c3c7b2a657982e1f585b243bf85c57602314bc0ea","title":"","text":"The HTTP response SHOULD use gzip Content-Encoding as defined in RFC9110. If caching-related HTTP headers are present in the HTTP response, Relying Parties SHOULD prioritize the exp and ttl claims within the Status List Token over the HTTP headers for determining caching behavior. <\/ins> 8.3. Upon receiving a Referenced Token, a Relying Party MUST first perform"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2d095865dd74093321a49570ccf01d391c91a7788d1f775878a5caa6a16a6b47","title":"","text":"11. The Status List as defined in status-list only exists in cryptographically secured containers which allows checking the integrity and origin without relying on other aspects like transport security (e.g., the web PKI). <\/ins> 11.1. Implementers should be particularly careful for the correct parsing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-aacda5112f50e37612c99bd7dbbff150efa918f0cb34d77e19983e905e910ce6","title":"","text":"11.3. When Relying Parties fetch the Status List, they need to be aware of its up-to-date status. The 'ttl' (time-to-live) claim in the Status List Token provides one mechanism for setting a maximum cache time for the fetched data. This property permits distribution of a Status List to a CDN or other distribution mechanism while giving guidance to consumers of the Status List on how often they need to fetch a fresh copy of the Status List even if that Status List is not expired. <\/del> When fetching a Status List Token, Relying Parties must carefully evaluate how long a Status List is cached for. Collectively the \"iat\", \"exp\" and \"ttl\" claims when present in a Status List Token communicate how long a Status List should be cached and should be considered valid for. The following diagram illustrates the relationship between these claims and how they are designed to influence caching. It is essential to understand the distinct purposes of the \"ttl\" and \"exp\" claims. The \"ttl\" claim represents a duration to be interpreted relative to the time the Status List is fetched, indicating when a new version of the Status List may be available. In contrast, the \"exp\" claim specifies an absolute timestamp, marking the point in time when the Status List expires and MUST NOT be relied upon any longer. Together, these claims provide guidance on when to check for updates (\"ttl\" claim) and when the Status List must be refreshed or replaced (\"exp\" claim). <\/ins> 12."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-ae38cbc4552db00fa5f9163adbf0bde5865799c0671e4d13e9f99a56654d48d2","title":"","text":"status mechanism method member and a reference to the specification that defines it. JWT Status Mechanism Methods are registered by Specification Required [RFC5226] after a three-week review period on the jwt-reg- review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of names prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., \"Request to register JWT Status Mechanism Method: example\"). Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. <\/ins> 14.2.1. Status Method Value:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-5325eeb89f80d9129db12c8113060edee7c93cb311ae921ea9c361036f34cc45","title":"","text":"status mechanism method member and a reference to the specification that defines it. CWT Status Mechanism Methods are registered by Specification Required [RFC5226] after a three-week review period on the cwt-reg- review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of names prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., \"Request to register CWT Status Mechanism Method: example\"). Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. <\/ins> 14.4.1. Status Method Value:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-746781637d920ab008ce369c79bbb0b74a05f81c28f6777a049332fbe23c3b44","title":"","text":"Status List values. The registry records the a human readable label, the bit representation and a common description for it. Status Types are registered by Specification Required [RFC5226] after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of names prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., \"Request to register Status Type name: example\"). Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. <\/ins> 14.5.1. Status Type Name:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-9e16652da8fee7a09c9724dd19e6188c5e451260e60bb36ecdf706d7ea6e6ad0","title":"","text":"single byte for every operation and thus keeping implementations simpler and less error prone. The overall status list is encoded as a byte array. Depending on <\/del> The overall Status List is encoded as a byte array. Depending on <\/ins> the \"bit-size\" each byte corresponds to 8\/(#bit-size) statuses (8,4,2, or 1). The status of each Referenced Token is identified using an index that maps to one or more specific bits within the byte array. The index starts counting at 0 and ends with \"size\" - 1(being the last valid entry). The bits within an array are counted from least significant bit \"0\" to the most significant bit (\"7\"). All bits of the byte array at a particular index are set to a status value. <\/del> using the \"index\" that maps to one or more specific bits within the byte array. The index starts counting at 0 and ends with \"size\" - 1(being the last valid entry). The bits within an array are counted from least significant bit \"0\" to the most significant bit (\"7\"). All bits of the byte array at a particular index are set to a status value. <\/ins> The complete byte array is compressed using gZIP RFC1952."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-49629bf6c54792abcf8a1da7fd0770c10ff557c15f41d022913983cd47df2977","title":"","text":"base64 encoding without padding encoding as defined in Section 2 of RFC7515 and stored as a string. Example of a two byte status list representing 16 statuses (1-bit status list) with indices 0 to 16 (2 bytes): <\/del> Example of a Status List representing the statuses of 16 Referenced Tokens (1-bit status type) with indices 0 to 15 (2 bytes): These bits are concatenated: After compression and Base64URL encoding the generated Status List is: <\/ins> Example of a more complex status list of length 12 using 2 bit statuses (3 bytes): These bits are concatenated: byte 0 1 2 bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ values |1|1|0|0|1|0|0|1| |0|1|0|0|0|1|0|0| |1|1|1|1|1|0|0|1| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ status 3 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 3 3 2 1 index 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 11 10 9 8 _ __\/ 0xC9 0x44 0xF9 This results in the byte array: After compression and Base64URL encoding the generated Status List is: <\/ins> 5. This document defines the possible statuses of Referenced Tokens as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-66e0d167c8d4af0620e71427bc568f201568246f0d7cd420438ad4d35640d233","title":"","text":"These bits are concatenated: Resulting in the byte array: <\/ins> After compression and Base64URL encoding the generated Status List is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-ec54ea9ac1516e354907b0c3e43553a74b86703f691c3fbcc1c1dfbcc0ca4551","title":"","text":"These bits are concatenated: byte 0 1 2 bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ values |1|1|0|0|1|0|0|1| |0|1|0|0|0|1|0|0| |1|1|1|1|1|0|0|1| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ \\ \/ status 3 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 3 3 2 1 index 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 11 10 9 8 _ __\/ 0xC9 0x44 0xF9 This results in the byte array: <\/del> Resulting in the byte array: <\/ins> After compression and Base64URL encoding the generated Status List is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-cd8304b6bbe2ee1946da523ddc8a07285a2b6008c12a9f7e7157317e45c9a2b2","title":"","text":"4.1. The following rules apply to validating a Referenced Token in JWT representation, which references a Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the JWT. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced Status List Token. The JWT MUST contain an \"status\" (status) claim conforming to the rules outlined in The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4.1.1. The following rules apply to validating the \"status\" (status) claim The claim value MUST be a valid JSON object. The claim value object MUST contain an \"idx\" (index) member with a numeric value that represents the index to check for status information in the Status List for the current JWT. The value of this member MUST be a non-negative number, containing a value of zero or greater. The claim value object MUST contain a \"uri\" member with a string value that identifies the Status List containing the status information for the JWT. The value of this member MUST be a uri conforming to RFC3986. 4.2. <\/del> The following rules apply to validating a JWT-based Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-9218924aa57fac316748c65e8ad9596afaa1cde3f4e1a7869f4309ad654d167a","title":"","text":"Relying parties MUST reject JWTs that are not valid in all other respects per \"JSON Web Token (JWT)\" RFC7519. 4.2.1. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> The following rules apply to validating the \"status_list\" (status list) claim"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-61a028744d0e16893ce5647dc7b8570df70ff489f161ba9e4624ced247c74975","title":"","text":"it conveys statuses for. The value MUST be computed using the algorithm described in jwt-status-list-claim-encoding. 4.2.2. <\/del> 4.1.2. <\/ins> Each status of a Referenced Token MUST be represented with a bit size of 1,2,4, or 8. Therefore up to 2,4,16, or 256 statuses for a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-253337aba2ea96eef3eea377a4e14b0c56425f5df045e566aaef13431e680804","title":"","text":"The result of the gZIP compression is then base64url-encoded, as defined in Section 2 of RFC7515. 4.2. The following rules apply to validating a Referenced Token in JWT representation, which references a Status List Token. Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the discretion of the verifying party. The JWT MUST contain an \"iss\" (issuer) claim that contains a unique string identifier for the entity that issued the JWT. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC3986. The value MUST be equal to that of the \"iss\" claim contained within the referenced Status List Token. The JWT MUST contain an \"status\" (status) claim conforming to the rules outlined in The following example is the decoded header and payload of a JWT meeting the processing rules as defined above. 4.2.1. The following rules apply to validating the \"status\" (status) claim The claim value MUST be a valid JSON object. The claim value object MUST contain an \"idx\" (index) member with a numeric value that represents the index to check for status information in the Status List for the current JWT. The value of this member MUST be a non-negative number, containing a value of zero or greater. The claim value object MUST contain a \"uri\" member with a string value that identifies the Status List containing the status information for the JWT. The value of this member MUST be a uri conforming to RFC3986. <\/ins> 5. This document defines potential statuses of Referenced Tokens as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-bb2c879f908a9329dd8a377edc79c5994fce0c3fbbacdbbdc86330e602136ed0","title":"","text":"7. 7.1. To obtain the Status List or Status List Token, the Verifier MUST send a HTTP GET request to the Status List Endpoint. Communication with the Status List Endpoint MUST utilize TLS. Which version(s) should be implemented will vary over time. A TLS server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. The Verifier SHOULD send the following Accept-Header to indicate the requested response type: \"application\/statuslist+jwt\" for Status List JWTs \"application\/statuslist+cwt\" for Status List CWTs If the Verifier does not send an Accept Header, the reponse type is assumed to be known implicit or out-of-band. 7.2. In the successful response, the Status List Provider MUST use the following content-type: \"application\/statuslist+jwt\" for Status List JWTs \"application\/statuslist+cwt\" for Status List CWTs In the case of \"application\/statuslist+jwt\", the response MUST be of type JWT and follow the rules of jwt-status-list-format-and- processing. In the case of \"application\/statuslist+cwt\", the response MUST be of type JWT and follow the rules of cwt-status-list- format. The response SHOULD use gzip Content-Encoding as defined in RFC9110. 7.3. If caching is required (e.g., to enable the use of alternative mechanisms for hosting, like Content Delivery Networks), the control of the caching mechanism SHOULD be implemented using the standard HTTP Cache-Control as defined in RFC9111. 7.4. 8. <\/ins> TBD Define parallel CWT representations for Status Lists and Referenced Tokens."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-84aba1847343582837c0854e130be8e5c2774ee1ce5f30d7d537ba253cf1dac2","title":"","text":"interchangeably by the same issuer. For instance, declare whether a status list can reference both JWT and CWT tokens. 8. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> 8.1. <\/del> 9.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on risks of incorrect parsing\/decoding leading to erroneous status data 8.2. <\/del> 9.2. <\/ins> TODO consumers\/Verifiers of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data 8.3. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on authorization mechanisms preventing misuse and profiling as described in privacy section 8.4. <\/del> 9.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on status list only providing the up-to date\/latest status, no historical data, may be provided by the underlying hosting architecture 9. <\/del> 10. <\/ins> 9.1. <\/del> 10.1. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on herd privacy, size of the status list 9.2. <\/del> 10.2. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Verifiers regularly fetching the status list to create a profile, possible countermeasures with authorized access to the status list 9.3. <\/del> 10.3. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on Issuer-Verifier correlation and Verifier-Verifier correlation as the status list introduces unique,trackable data TODO"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-cfee9e72a424cd29bea1a251722ce6c5739b7588aa65abb4d2bf73cc3d4de71a","title":"","text":"are recommended to pre-allocate lists, use dead entries that are never assigned or other obfuscation mechanisms 9.4. <\/del> 10.4. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per Referenced Token that do not offer herd privacy 9.5. <\/del> 10.5. <\/ins> TODO elaborate on increased privacy if the status list is hosted by a third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities TODO"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-cd815e8e899c7e933f87d110cdca2bdfb9532b75d5f1685919a5bac951080c3a","title":"","text":"List Provider may be the issuer of the Status List but may also be outsourced to a trusted third party. 10. <\/del> 11. <\/ins> This document specifies no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-5670507d2e5566db28d81e35de240479c08de2410ebabec9565f4cbc96de33ea","title":"","text":"10.1. TODO elaborate on herd privacy, size of the status list <\/del> The main privacy consideration for a Status List, especially in the context of the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model, is to prevent the Issuer from tracking the usage of the Referenced Token when the status is being checked. If an Issuer offers status information by referencing a specific token, this would enable him to create a profile for the issued token by correlating the date and identity of Verifiers, that are requesting the status. The Status List approaches these privacy implications by integrating the status information of many Referenced Tokens into the same list. Therefore, the Issuer does not learn for which Referenced Token the Verifier is requesting the Status List. The privacy of the Holder is protected by the anonymity within the set of Referenced Tokens in the Status List, also called herd privacy. This limits the possibilities of tracking by the Issuer. The herd privacy is depending on the number of entities within the Status List called its size. A larger size results in better privacy but also impacts the performance as more data has to be transferred to read the Status List. <\/ins> 10.2. TODO elaborate on Verifiers regularly fetching the status list to create a profile, possible countermeasures with authorized access to the status list <\/del> A malicious Issuer could bypass the privacy benefits of the herd privacy by generating a unique Status List for every Referenced Token. By these means, he could maintain a mapping between Referenced Tokens and Status Lists and thus track the usage of Referenced Tokens by utilizing this mapping for the incoming requests. This malicious behaviour could be detected by Verifiers that request large amounts of Referenced Tokens by comparing the number of different Status Lists and their sizes. <\/ins> 10.3. TODO elaborate on Issuer-Verifier correlation and Verifier-Verifier correlation as the status list introduces unique,trackable data TODO elaborate on issuers avoiding sequential usage of indices and status lists TODO elaborate that a status list only gives information about the maximum number of possible statuses that a list conveys, issuers are recommended to pre-allocate lists, use dead entries that are never assigned or other obfuscation mechanisms <\/del> Once the Verifier gets the Referenced Token, this enables him to request the Status List to validate the status of the Token through the provided \"uri\" property and look up the corresponding \"index\". However, the Verifier may persistently store the \"uri\" and \"index\" of the Referenced Token to request the Status List again at a later time. By doing so regularly, the Verifier may create a profile of the Referenced Token's validity status. This behaviour may be inteded as a feature, e.g. for a KYC process that requires regular validity checks, but might also be abused in cases where this is not intended and unknown to the Holder, e.g. profiling the suspension of a driving license or checking the employment status of an employee credential. This behaviour could be constrained by adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security-authorization. <\/ins> 10.4. TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per Referenced Token that do not offer herd privacy <\/del> Colluding Issuers and Verifiers have the possibility to identify the usage of credentials of a particular Holder, as the Referenced Token contains unique, trackable data. To avoid privacy risks for colluding Verifiers, it is recommended that Issuers use batch issuance to issue multiple tokens, such that Holders can use individual tokens for specific Verifiers. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a dedicated Status List entry. Revoking batch issued Referenced Tokens might reveal this correlation lateron. To avoid information leakage by the values of \"uri\" and \"index\", Issuers are RECOMMENDED to: choose non-sequential, pseudo-random or random indices use decoy or dead entries to obfuscate the real number of Referenced Tokens within a Status List choose to deploy and utilize multiple Status Lists simulantaniously <\/ins> 10.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-ebecf8b9189ca022e65b83e91d8b3062ed09afcfb2c42801f194119cef1e3635","title":"","text":"7.1. To obtain the Status List or Status List Token, the Verifier MUST send a HTTP GET request to the Status List Endpoint. Communication with the Status List Endpoint MUST utilize TLS. Which version(s) should be implemented will vary over time. A TLS server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. <\/del> To obtain the Status List or Status List Token, the Relying Party MUST send a HTTP GET request to the Status List Endpoint. Communication with the Status List Endpoint MUST utilize TLS. Which version(s) should be implemented will vary over time. A TLS server certificate check MUST be performed as defined in Section 5 and 6 of RFC6125. <\/ins> The Verifier SHOULD send the following Accept-Header to indicate the requested response type: <\/del> The Relying Party SHOULD send the following Accept-Header to indicate the requested response type: <\/ins> \"application\/statuslist+jwt\" for Status List JWTs \"application\/statuslist+cwt\" for Status List CWTs If the Verifier does not send an Accept Header, the reponse type is assumed to be known implicit or out-of-band. <\/del> If the Relying Party does not send an Accept Header, the reponse type is assumed to be known implicit or out-of-band. <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-3b9421a333177ab7e5cac71dfbeb2d5398ff909584fdfcc99e0d6734d199421a","title":"","text":"9.2. TODO consumers\/Verifiers of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data <\/del> TODO consumers\/Relying Party of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data <\/ins> 9.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-ad52adeb0991ad1d004f335b323de87cf3ad2b6eae7fcca23bd7140d28977db7","title":"","text":"from tracking the usage of the Referenced Token when the status is being checked. If an Issuer offers status information by referencing a specific token, this would enable him to create a profile for the issued token by correlating the date and identity of Verifiers, that are requesting the status. <\/del> issued token by correlating the date and identity of Relying Parties, that are requesting the status. <\/ins> The Status List approaches these privacy implications by integrating the status information of many Referenced Tokens into the same list. Therefore, the Issuer does not learn for which Referenced Token the Verifier is requesting the Status List. The privacy of the Holder is protected by the anonymity within the set of Referenced Tokens in the Status List, also called herd privacy. This limits the possibilities of tracking by the Issuer. <\/del> Relying Party is requesting the Status List. The privacy of the Holder is protected by the anonymity within the set of Referenced Tokens in the Status List, also called herd privacy. This limits the possibilities of tracking by the Issuer. <\/ins> The herd privacy is depending on the number of entities within the Status List called its size. A larger size results in better privacy"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-3af6f711d4127a688cb0da1833055a87e00ced0366df6a6d54db2fcee9dfe87c","title":"","text":"Token. By these means, he could maintain a mapping between Referenced Tokens and Status Lists and thus track the usage of Referenced Tokens by utilizing this mapping for the incoming requests. This malicious behaviour could be detected by Verifiers that request large amounts of Referenced Tokens by comparing the number of different Status Lists and their sizes. <\/del> requests. This malicious behaviour could be detected by Relying Parties that request large amounts of Referenced Tokens by comparing the number of different Status Lists and their sizes. <\/ins> 10.3. Once the Verifier gets the Referenced Token, this enables him to <\/del> Once the Relying Party gets the Referenced Token, this enables him to <\/ins> request the Status List to validate the status of the Token through the provided \"uri\" property and look up the corresponding \"index\". However, the Verifier may persistently store the \"uri\" and \"index\" of the Referenced Token to request the Status List again at a later time. By doing so regularly, the Verifier may create a profile of the Referenced Token's validity status. This behaviour may be inteded as a feature, e.g. for a KYC process that requires regular validity checks, but might also be abused in cases where this is not intended and unknown to the Holder, e.g. profiling the suspension of a driving license or checking the employment status of an employee credential. This behaviour could be constrained by adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security-authorization. <\/del> However, the Relying Party may persistently store the \"uri\" and \"index\" of the Referenced Token to request the Status List again at a later time. By doing so regularly, the Relying Party may create a profile of the Referenced Token's validity status. This behaviour may be inteded as a feature, e.g. for a KYC process that requires regular validity checks, but might also be abused in cases where this is not intended and unknown to the Holder, e.g. profiling the suspension of a driving license or checking the employment status of an employee credential. This behaviour could be constrained by adding authorization rules to the Status List, see security- authorization. <\/ins> 10.4. Colluding Issuers and Verifiers have the possibility to identify the usage of credentials of a particular Holder, as the Referenced Token contains unique, trackable data. <\/del> Colluding Issuers and Relying Parties have the possibility to identify the usage of credentials of a particular Holder, as the Referenced Token contains unique, trackable data. <\/ins> To avoid privacy risks for colluding Verifiers, it is recommended that Issuers use batch issuance to issue multiple tokens, such that Holders can use individual tokens for specific Verifiers. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a dedicated Status List entry. Revoking batch issued Referenced Tokens might reveal this correlation lateron. <\/del> To avoid privacy risks for colluding Relying Parties, it is recommended that Issuers use batch issuance to issue multiple tokens, such that Holders can use individual tokens for specific Relying Parties. In this case, every Referenced Token MUST have a dedicated Status List entry. Revoking batch issued Referenced Tokens might reveal this correlation lateron. <\/ins> To avoid information leakage by the values of \"uri\" and \"index\", Issuers are RECOMMENDED to:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-454833c463ebd2f0ed41f15a80004f25a6182e6f5247527dd4a7ba6ee486ad2f","title":"","text":"TODO elaborate on increased privacy if the status list is hosted by a third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities TODO evaluate deifnition of Status List Provider? An entity that hosts the Status List as a resource for potential verifiers. The Status List Provider may be the issuer of the Status List but may also be outsourced to a trusted third party. <\/del> the Status List as a resource for potential Relying Parties. The Status List Provider may be the issuer of the Status List but may also be outsourced to a trusted third party. <\/ins> 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-2f3ef099dd5fd2d47df1fd7c773f02c19eed35111a341c218d0e9c6b5107ac90","title":"","text":"12. This document specifies no IANA actions. <\/del> 12.1. This specification requests registration of the following Claims in the IANA \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry [@IANA.JWT] established by [@!RFC7519]. Claim Name: \"status\" Claim Description: Reference to a status list containing up-to- date status information on the JWT. Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): [[ (#jwt-referenced-token) of this specification ]] Claim Name: \"status_list\" Claim Description: A status list containing up-to-date status information on multiple other JWTs encoded as a bitarray. Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): [[ (#jwt-status-list-claim-format) of this specification ]] 12.2. This section requests registration of the following media types [@RFC2046] in the \"Media Types\" registry [@IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [@RFC6838]. To indicate that the content is an JWT-based Status List: Type name: application * Subtype name: statuslist+jwt * Required parameters: n\/a * Optional parameters: n\/a * Encoding considerations: binary; A JWT-based Status List is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters. * Security considerations: See (#Security) of [[ this specification ]] * Interoperability considerations: n\/a * Published specification: [[ this specification ]] * Applications that use this media type: Applications using [[ this specification ]] for updated status information of tokens * Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a * Additional information: * File extension(s): n\/a * Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a * Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de * Intended usage: COMMON * Restrictions on usage: none * Author: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de * Change controller: IETF * Provisional registration? No To indicate that the content is an CWT-based Status List: Type name: application * Subtype name: statuslist+cwt * Required parameters: n\/a * Optional parameters: n\/a * Encoding considerations: binary * Security considerations: See (#Security) of [[ this specification ]] * Interoperability considerations: n\/a * Published specification: [[ this specification ]] * Applications that use this media type: Applications using [[ this specification ]] for updated status information of tokens * Fragment identifier considerations: n\/ a * Additional information: * File extension(s): n\/a * Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a * Person & email address to contact for further information: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de * Intended usage: COMMON * Restrictions on usage: none * Author: Paul Bastian, paul.bastian@posteo.de * Change controller: IETF * Provisional registration? No <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-e52307e3569c5d0de547847ca304a676897b2abe56bfd32dff510618805831c1","title":"","text":"the Referenced Token. The JWT MUST contain a \"sub\" (subject) claim that contains an unique string identifier for that Referenced Token. The value <\/del> unique string identifier for that Status List Token. The value <\/ins> MUST be equal to that of the \"uri\" claim contained in the \"status\" claim of the Referenced Token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-9643ec019075d489b8b7231ab8aa2dd5dfddc55ee5c99736b679b0979ad95713","title":"","text":"4. TODO Security <\/del> 4.1. TODO elaborate on risks of incorrect parsing\/decoding leading to erroneuos status data 4.2. TODO consumers\/Verifiers of the status list should be aware if they fetch the up-to-date data 4.3. TODO elaborate on authorization mechanisms preventing misuse and profiling as described in privacy section 4.4. TODO elaborate on status list only providing the up-to date\/latest status, no historical data, may be provided by the underlying hosting architecture <\/ins> 5. TODO elaborate on heard privacy <\/del> 5.1. TODO elaborate on herd privacy, size of the status list 5.2. TODO elaborate on Verifiers regularly fetching the status list to create a profile, possible countermeasures with authorized access to the status list 5.3. TODO elaborate on Issuer-Verifier correlation and Verifier-Verifier correlation as the status list introduces unique,trackable data TODO elaborate on issuers avoiding sequential usage of indices and status lists 5.4. TODO elaborate on issuers generating unique status lists per JWT token that do not offer herd privacy 5.5. TODO elaborate on increased privacy if the status list is hosted by a third party instead of the issuer reducing tracking possiblities <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-59d599bb0bd96b3d9632ccd69e1471c7ef944985b07ae411902e00e293c3583e","title":"","text":"(\"7\"). All bits of the byte array at a particular index are set to a status value. The complete byte array is compressed using gZIP RFC1952. <\/del> The complete byte array is compressed using the \"DEFLATE\" RFC1951 compression method and stored using the \"ZLIB\" RFC1950 data format. Implementations are RECOMMENDED to use the highest compression level available. <\/ins> The result of the gZIP compression is then base64url-encoded, as <\/del> The result of the compression is then base64url-encoded, as <\/ins> defined in Section 2 of RFC7515. 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-441b89327d7f748ea5b08aca0e61ecd8d003e42ee16ded83725b307193bc431b","title":"","text":"(bit size) to be able to describe the required Status Types for the application. The processing rules for JWT or CWT precede any evaluation of a referenced tokens status. For example if a token is evaluated as being expired through the \"exp\" (Expiration Time) but also has a status of 0x00 (\"VALID\"), the token is considered expired. <\/ins> 6. 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-cde7486d33e9e198938ad6035802211162fab646e025f4389e445fa906bb8d58","title":"","text":"references a Status List Token. Status Lists may be composed for expressing a range of Status Types. This document defines basic Status Types for the most common use cases as well as an extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. The Status List Token may be used by an issuer in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model to express the status of verifiable credentials (Referenced Tokens) issued by an issuer. The following diagram depicts the basic conceptual relationship. <\/del> extensibility mechanism for custom Status Types. An example for the usage of a Status List is to manage the status of issued access tokens as defined in section 1.4 of RFC6749. Token Introspection RFC7662 defines another way to determine the status of an issued access token, but it requires the party trying to validate an access tokens status to directly contact the token issuer, whereas the mechanism defined in this specification does not have this limitation. Another possible use case for the Status List is to express the status of verifiable credentials (Referenced Tokens) issued by an issuer in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier model. The following diagram depicts the basic conceptual relationship. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-be57bbbffdcd158c1db913d2964f3ae8076ca5cb0c08d4de37dd47213d16bcfd","title":"","text":" OAuth Status List <\/del> Token Status List <\/ins> draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4f0b101545db5352e914817a2056d98d9cce54f5ad64020c3c0bf7b8596b473c","title":"","text":"ts_identifier: The DID of the Transparency Service that issued the Receipt. Verifiers MAY use this DID as a key discovery mechanism to verify the Receipt; in this case the verification is the same as for Signed Claims and the signer MAY include the \"kid\" header <\/del> as for Signed Statment and the signer MAY include the \"kid\" header <\/ins> parameter. Verifiers MUST support the \"did:web\" method, all other methods are optional."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-bb948516851a03c7ddfc040390e25777034ecc34758d63d87fae2de0a173ed6e","title":"","text":"The SCITT version header MUST be included and its value match the \"version\" field of the Receipt stucture. The DID of issuer header (like in Signed Claims) MUST be included and its value match the \"ts_identifier\" field of the Receipt structure. <\/del> The DID of issuer header (like in Signed Statements) MUST be included and its value match the \"ts_identifier\" field of the Receipt structure. <\/ins> TS MAY include the Registration policy info header to indicate to verifiers what policies have been applied at the registration of this claim. <\/del> this Statement. <\/ins> Since I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs uses optional headers, the \"crit\" header (id: 2) MUST be included and all SCITT-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-09290a7f0f59548b8706de2b7a8375525e5d503fd1b0ad1f85134461c9e9e715","title":"","text":"The value of \"id\" might be found the \"iss\" or \"sub\" claims if they are present in the protected header or payload. \"resolve = (id: string, accept: content_type = 'application\/ did+json') => idDocument (of content type application\/did+json). \" <\/del> For example: \"did:example:123 \" <\/del> Might resolve to: \"{ \"id\": \"did:example:123\", \"verificationMethod\": [{ \"id\": \"#key-42\", \"type\": \"JsonWebkey\", \"controller\": \"did:example:123\", \"publicKeyJwk\": { \"kty\": \"EC\", \"crv\": \"P-384\", \"alg\": \"ES384\", \"x\": \"LCeAt2sW36j94wuFP0gNEIHDzqR6Nh_Udu2ObLer3cKFBCaAHY1svmbPV69bP3RH\", \"y\": \"zz2SkcOGYM6PbYlw19tcbpzo6bEMYHIwGBnN5rd8QWykAprstPdxx4U0uScvDcYd\" } }] } \" <\/del> Editor note, we might wish to eliminate this intermediate identity document content type, by treating it as an alterative encoding of \"application\/jwk-set+json\" or \"application\/cose-key-set\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-8dc5fd2bec3d41e3b1e35e1f816e444bf49bf053d18e4ed26f5a709a68fce1d7","title":"","text":"\"application\/jwk-set+json\", which will contain specific keys... for example: ```json { \"keys\": [ { \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"n\": \"wW9TkSbcn5FV3iUJ-812sqTvwTGCFrDm6vD2U-g23gn6rrBdFZQbf2bgEnSkolp h6CanOYTQ1lKVhKjHLd6Q4MDVGidbVBhESxib2YIzJVUS- 0oQgizkBEJxyHI4Zl3xX_sdA_yegLUi-Ykt_gaMPSw_vpxe-pBxu-jd14i-jDfwoPJUdF 8ZJGS9orCPRiHCYLDgOscC9XibH9rUbTvG8q4bAPx9Ox6malx4OLvU3pXVjew6LG3iBi2 YhpCWe6voMvZJYXqC1n5Mk_KOdGcCFtDgu3I56SGSfsF7- tI7qG1ZO8RMuzqH0LkJVirujYzXrnMZ7WgbMPXmHU8i4z04zw\", \"e\": \"AQAB\", \"kid\": \"NTBGNTJEMDc3RUE3RUVEOTM4NDcyOEFDNzEyOTY5NDNGOUQ4OEU5OA\", \"x5t\": \"NTBGNTJEMDc3RUE3RUVEOTM4NDcyOEFDNzEyOTY5NDNGOUQ4OEU5OA\", \"x5c\": [ \"MIIDCzCCAfOgAwIBAgIJANPng0XRWwsdMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBwxGjA YBgNVBAMMEWNvbnRvc28uYXV0aDAuY29tMB4XDTE0MDcxMTE2NTQyN1oXDTI4MDMxOTE2 NTQyN1owHDEaMBgGA1UEAwwRY29udG9zby5hdXRoMC5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBA QUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDBb1ORJtyfkVXeJQn7zXaypO\/BMYIWsObq8PZT6DbeCfqusF 0VlBt\/ZuASdKSiWmHoJqc5hNDWUpWEqMct3pDgwNUaJ1tUGERLGJvZgjMlVRL7ShCCLOQ EQnHIcjhmXfFf+x0D\/J6AtSL5iS3+Bow9LD++nF76kHG76N3XiL6MN\/Cg8lR0XxkkZL2i sI9GIcJgsOA6xwL1eJsf2tRtO8byrhsA\/H07HqZqXHg4u9TeldWN7DosbeIGLZiGkJZ7q +gy9klheoLWfkyT8o50ZwIW0OC7cjnpIZJ+wXv60juobVk7xEy7OofQuQlWKu6NjNeucx ntaBsw9eYdTyLjPTjPAgMBAAGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTLarHdkNa5CzPyiKJU51t8JWn 9WTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTLarHdkNa5CzPyiKJU51t8JWn9WTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH\/MA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQA2FOjm+Bpbqk59rQBC0X6ops1wBcXH8clnXfG1G9qeRwLEw Sef5HPz4TTh1f2lcf4Pcq2vF0HbVNJFnLVV+PjR9ACkto+v1n84i\/U4BBezZyYuX2ZpEb v7hV\/PWxg8tcVrtyPaj60UaA\/pUA86CfYy+LckY4NRKmD7ZrcCzjxW2hFGNanfm2FEryx XA3RMNf6IiW7tbJ9ZGTEfA\/DhVnZgh\/e82KVX7EZnkB4MjCQrwj9QsWSMBtBiYp0\/vRi9 cxDFHlUwnYAUeZdHWTW+Rp2JX7Qwf0YycxgyjkGAUEZc4WpdNiQlwYf5G5epfOtHGiwiJ S+u\/nSYvqCFt57+g3R+\" ] }, { \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"n\": \"ylgVZbNR4nlsU_AbU8Zd7ZhVfmYuwq-RB1_YQWHY362pAed-qgSXV1Qm KwCukQ2WDsPHWgpPuEf3O_acmJcCiSxhctpBr5WKkji5o50YX2FqC3xymGkYW5NilvFzn KaKU45ulBVByrcb3Vt8BqqBAhaD4YywZZKo7mMudcq_M__f0_tB4fHsHHe7ehWobWtzAW 7_NRP0_FjB4Kw4PiqJnChPvfbuxTCEUcIYrshRwD6GF4D_oLdeR44dwx4wtEgvPOtkQ5X IGrhQC_sgWcb2jh7YXauVUjuPezP- VkK7Wm9mZRe758q43SWxwT3afo5BLa3_YLWazqcpWRXn9QEDWw\", \"e\": \"AQAB\", \"kid\": \"aMIKy_brQk3nLd0PKd9ln\", \"x5t\": \"-xcTyx47q3ddycG7LtE6QCcETbs\", \"x5c\": [ \"MIIC\/TCCAeWgAwIBAgIJH62yWyX7VxxQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBwxGjA YBgNVBAMTEWNvbnRvc28uYXV0aDAuY29tMB4XDTIwMDMxMTE5Mjk0N1oXDTMzMTExODE5 Mjk0N1owHDEaMBgGA1UEAxMRY29udG9zby5hdXRoMC5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBA QUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDKWBVls1HieWxT8BtTxl3tmFV+Zi7Cr5EHX9hBYdjfrakB53 6qBJdXVCYrAK6RDZYOw8daCk+4R\/c79pyYlwKJLGFy2kGvlYqSOLmjnRhfYWoLfHKYaRh bk2KW8XOcpopTjm6UFUHKtxvdW3wGqoECFoPhjLBlkqjuYy51yr8z\/9\/T+0Hh8ewcd7t6 Fahta3MBbv81E\/T8WMHgrDg+KomcKE+99u7FMIRRwhiuyFHAPoYXgP+gt15Hjh3DHjC0S C8862RDlcgauFAL+yBZxvaOHthdq5VSO497M\/5WQrtab2ZlF7vnyrjdJbHBPdp+jkEtrf 9gtZrOpylZFef1AQNbAgMBAAGjQjBAMA8GA1UdEwEB\/wQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFPV dE4SPvuhlODV0GOcPE4QZ7xNuMA4GA1UdDwEB\/wQEAwIChDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC AQEAu2nhfiJk\/Sp49LEsR1bliuVMP9nycbSz0zdp2ToAy0DZffTd0FKk\/wyFtmbb0UFTD 2aOg\/WZJLDc+3dYjWQ15SSLDRh6LV45OHU8Dkrc2qLjiRdoh2RI+iQFakDn2OgPNgquL+ 3EEIpbBDA\/uVoOYCbkqJNaNM\/egN\/s2vZ6Iq7O+BprWX\/eM25xw8PMi+MU4K2sJpkcDRw oK9Wy8eeSSRIGYnpKO42g\/3QI9+BRa5uD+9shG6n7xgzAPGeldUXajCThomwO8vInp6Vq Y8k3IeLEYoboJj5KMfJgOWUkmaoh6ZBJHnCogvSXI35jbxCxmHAbK+KdTka\/ Yg2MadFZdA==\" ] } ] } ``` <\/del> If SCITT wanted to be interoperable with OIDC, we would define key dereferencing in a way that was compatible with how OIDC handles it today."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4af6ca06608044bc2a6da9e72beb2e45ff655e0c5ec6256bc76c12528ecfcbe3","title":"","text":"See also draft-ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in-headers [1]. \"dereference = (id: string, accept: content_type = 'application\/ jwk+json') => publicKeyJwk (of content type application\/jwk+json). \" <\/del> For example, when DIDs are used: \"did:example:123#key-42 \" <\/del> Might dereference to: \"{ \"kty\": \"EC\", \"crv\": \"P-384\", \"alg\": \"ES384\", \"x\": \"LCeAt2sW36j94wuFP0gNEIHDzqR6Nh_Udu2ObLer3cKFBCaAHY1svmbPV69bP3RH\", \"y\": \"zz2SkcOGYM6PbYlw19tcbpzo6bEMYHIwGBnN5rd8QWykAprstPdxx4U0uScvDcYd\" } \" <\/del> 5.1.2. Many Issuers issue Signed Statements about different Artifacts under"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-01db01df85cc02e85a3431e6f48a939eb1b6ca12e3b31965e46e84487ad8039c","title":"","text":"Transparency Services. To register a Signed Statement, the Transparency Service performs the following steps: Issuer Key Discovery The Transparency Service MUST perform DID resolution of the Issuer's key and store evidence of the lookup. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer DID in real-time, or relies on retrieving cached resolution. Signature verification The Transparency Service MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement, as described in RFC 9360, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer DID document. Signed Statement validation The Transparency Service MUST check that the Signed Statement includes a Statement payload and the protected headers listed above. The Transparency Service MAY additionally verify the Statement payload format and content. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST perform DID resolution of the Issuer's key and store evidence of the lookup. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer DID in real-time, or relies on retrieving cached resolution. <\/ins> Apply Registration Policy For named policies, the Transparency Service MUST check that the required Registration info attributes are present in the headers and apply the check described in Table 1. A Transparency Service MUST reject Signed Statements that contain an attribute used for a named policy that is not enforced by the service. Custom Signed Statements are evaluated given the current Registry state and the entire Envelope, and may use information contained in the attributes of named policies. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement, as described in RFC 9360, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer DID document. <\/ins> Register the Signed Statement to the append-only log. Return the Transparent Statement, which includes the Receipt. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST check that the Signed Statement includes a Statement payload and the protected headers listed above. The Transparency Service MAY additionally verify the Statement payload format and content. For named policies, the Transparency Service MUST check that the required Registration info attributes are present in the headers and apply the check described in Table 1. A Transparency Service MUST reject Signed Statements that contain an attribute used for a named policy that is not enforced by the service. Custom Signed Statements are evaluated given the current Registry state and the entire Envelope, and may use information contained in the attributes of named policies. Register the Signed Statement to the append-only log Return the Transparent Statement, which includes the Receipt <\/ins> Details about generating Receipts are described in Receipt. The last two steps may be shared between a batch of Signed Statements"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-8d3fce08eaeed97634aa8f22cc6b7b643244be1fff2fc6f831d3afc8b8f63609","title":"","text":"ts_identifier: The DID of the Transparency Service that issued the Receipt. Verifiers MAY use this DID as a key discovery mechanism to verify the Receipt; in this case the verification is the same as for Signed Statment and the signer MAY include the \"kid\" header parameter. Verifiers MUST support the \"did:web\" method, all other methods are optional. <\/del> as for Signed Statement and the signer MAY include the \"kid\" header parameter. Verifiers MUST support the \"did:web\" method, all other methods are optional. <\/ins> We also introduce the following requirements for the COSE signature of the Merkle Root: The SCITT version header MUST be included and its value match the \"version\" field of the Receipt stucture. <\/del> \"version\" field of the Receipt structure. <\/ins> The DID of issuer header (like in Signed Statements) MUST be included and its value match the \"ts_identifier\" field of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-6698c8c2bd49f85bfbe3c627724ba54293a37b80b723e0476a43e75efff0dab2","title":"","text":"Transparency Services. To register a Signed Statement, the service performs the following steps: Client authentication. This is implementation-specific and MAY be unrelated to the Issuer identity. Signed Statements may be registered by a different party than their Issuer. Issuer identification. The Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the DID resolution for the Issuer protected header of the Envelope and the resolved key manifest at the time of Registration for auditing. This MAY require that the service resolves the Issuer DID and record the resulting document, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. Envelope signature verification, as described in COSE signature, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer DID document. <\/del> This is implementation-specific and MAY be unrelated to the Issuer identity. Signed Statements may be registered by a different party than their Issuer. <\/ins> Envelope validation. The service MUST check that the Envelope includes a Statement payload and the protected headers listed above. The service MAY additionally verify the Statement payload format and content. Apply Registration Policy: for named policies, the Transparency Service must check that the required Registration info attributes are present in the Envelope and apply the check described in Table 1. A Transparency Service MUST reject Signed Statements that contain an attribute used for a named policy that is not enforced by the service. Custom Signed Statements are evaluated given the current Registry state and the entire Envelope, and MAY use information contained in the attributes of named policies. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the DID resolution for the Issuer protected header of the Envelope and the resolved key manifest at the time of Registration for auditing. This MAY require that the service resolves the Issuer DID and record the resulting document, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. As described in COSE signature, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer DID document The service MUST check that the Envelope includes a Statement payload and the protected headers listed above The service MAY additionally verify the Statement payload format and content. for named policies, the Transparency Service must check that the required Registration info attributes are present in the Envelope and apply the check described in Table 1. A Transparency Service MUST reject Signed Statements that contain an attribute used for a named policy that is not enforced by the service. Custom Signed Statements are evaluated given the current Registry state and the entire Envelope, and MAY use information contained in the attributes of named policies. <\/ins> Commit (register) the new Signed Statement to the Registry Sign and return the Receipt. <\/del> Sign and return the Receipt <\/ins> The last two steps MAY be shared between a batch of Signed Statements recorded in the Registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f145664d26b2edff90a3cd03df3ab94b0c959062b1714f7c084566b04397d5e6","title":"","text":"Error code: \"badSignatureAlgorithm\" TODO: more error codes to be defined, see #17 [4] <\/ins> Status 404 - Unknown Operation ID"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f011d0adc910b0beb39eb9a7c679bee309ba0eaf136b59df187b58df2681392a","title":"","text":"Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded appropriately. Conversely, a corrupt Transparency Service may 1. refuse or delay the Registration of Signed Statements, 2. register Signed Statements that do not pass its Registration Policy (e.g., Signed Statement with Issuer identities and signatures that do not verify), 3. issue verifiable Receipts for Signed Statements that do not match its Registry, or 4. refuse access to its Registry (e.g., to Auditors, possibly after storage loss). <\/del> Conversely, a corrupt Transparency Service may refuse or delay the Registration of Signed Statements, register Signed Statements that do not pass its Registration Policy (e.g., Signed Statement with Issuer identities and signatures that do not verify), issue verifiable Receipts for Signed Statements that do not match its Registry, or refuse access to its Registry (e.g., to Auditors, possibly after storage loss). <\/ins> An Auditor granted (partial) access to a Registry and to a collection of disputed Receipts will be able to replay it, detect any invalid"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-16187fc836ba04c0ad342fc323a689db095923fd08326ec243d12f5af2375b46","title":"","text":"[3] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/ issues\/17 [4] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/ issues\/17 <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-da40db509541e430a8c545f71e854776c41526cde070d3e090fdd827f5742a4e","title":"","text":"by enforcing the following complementary security guarantees: Statements made by Issuers about supply chain Artifacts must be identifiable, authentic, and non-repudiable; <\/del> identifiable, authentic, and non-repudiable <\/ins> such Statements must be registered on a secure append-only Log, so <\/del> Such Statements must be registered on a secure append-only Log, so <\/ins> that their provenance and history can be independently and consistently audited; <\/del> consistently audited <\/ins> Issuers can efficiently prove to any other party the Registration of their Signed Statements; verifying this proof ensures that the Issuer is consistent and non-equivocal when producing Signed Statements. <\/del> Statements <\/ins> The first guarantee is achieved by requiring Issuers to sign their Statements and associated metadata using a distributed public key"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4e69f037c00a62d8f875b051e9347d7b25c7ea8ce0e11f5e5afc97b29560f84d","title":"","text":"JSON encoding. Registration Policy info (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"393\"): A map of additional attributes to help enforce Registration Policies. <\/del> containing key\/value pairs set by the Issuer which are sealed on Registration and non-opaque to the Transparency Service. The key\/ value pair semantics are specified by each Issuer or are specific to the Issuer and Feed tuple. Examples include: the sequence number of signed statements on a feed, Issuer metadata, or a reference to other transparent statements (e.g., augments, replaces, new-version, CPE-for). <\/ins> Key ID (label: \"4\"): Key ID, as a bytestring."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-9e2bcd3cf69270879cd6ea1224d25c56eb12eb0be45d94ae4b4164ba44007890","title":"","text":"service MAY enforce its own Registration Policies for authorizing entities to register their Signed Statements to the append-only Log. Some Transparency Services may also enforce authorization policies limiting who can write, read and audit specific Feeds or the full <\/del> limiting who can write, read and audit specific Subjects or the full <\/ins> registry. It is critical to provide interoperability for all Transparency Services instances as the composition and configuration of involved supply chain entities and their system components is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b276a6cacf5c4044fe0947fa2b3ea6387a2fcb922554c9b4c405ac58c2525d7a","title":"","text":"Service may restrict access to Signed Statements through access control policies. However, third parties (such as Auditors) would be granted access as needed to attest to the validity of the Artifact, Feed or the entirety of the Transparency Service. <\/del> Subject or the entirety of the Transparency Service. <\/ins> Trust in the Transparency Service itself is supported both by protecting their implementation (using, for instance, replication,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-9b1b0ca5f08d107886f112d3d72717d3486ea0daf1853ef9bfa25bc41a675451","title":"","text":"the same DID, so it is important for everyone to be able to immediately recognize by looking at the Envelope of a Signed Statements what Artifact it is referring to. This information is stored in the Feed header of the Envelope. Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by \"kid\" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed Statements under the same key. <\/del> stored in the Subject header of the Envelope. Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by \"kid\" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed Statements under the same key. <\/ins> 5.1.3. Besides Issuer, Feed and kid, the only other mandatory metadata in a Signed Statement is the type of the Payload, indicated in the \"cty\" <\/del> Besides Issuer, Subject and kid, the only other mandatory metadata in a Signed Statement is the type of the Payload, indicated in the \"cty\" <\/ins> (content type) Envelope header. However, this set of mandatory metadata is not sufficient to express many important Registration Policies. For example, a Registry may only allow a Signed Statement"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ba6e3c73a20685fe34222831747e393b342e5e7d0f3d2a83f4be2cdd346ae717","title":"","text":"Beyond the trusted components, Transparency Services may operate additional endpoints for auditing, for instance to query for the history of Signed Statements registered by a given Issuer via a certain Feed. Implementations of Transparency Services SHOULD avoid using the service identity and extending the Registry in auditing endpoints, except if it is necessary to compute a Registry <\/del> certain Subject. Implementations of Transparency Services SHOULD avoid using the service identity and extending the Registry in auditing endpoints, except if it is necessary to compute a Registry <\/ins> consistency proofs. Other evidence to support the correctness and completeness of the audit response MUST be computed from the Registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-dcd4ba6f7d194b31897b281f0c85dc0908b68937626025ffe9534de7233aa1c5","title":"","text":"the distributed identifier of the Issuer (or its resolved key manifest), the expected name of the Artifact (i.e., the Feed), <\/del> the expected name of the Artifact (i.e., the Subject), <\/ins> the list of service identities of trusted Transparency Services."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b12e1f0d7572192317b97b265f68d356b666e66e925cb4c54dac4190736656de","title":"","text":"Identifier DID-CORE) of the signer, as a string. \"did:web:example.com\" is an example of a DID. Feed (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"392\"): The Issuer's name for the Artifact, as a string. <\/del> Subject (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"392\"): The Subject to which the Statement refers, as a bytestring, chosen by the Issuer. <\/ins> Content type (label: \"3\"): Media type of payload, as a string. For example, \"application\/spdx+json\" is the media type of SDPX in JSON encoding. Registration Policy info (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"393\"): A map of additional attributes to help enforce Registration Policies. <\/del> containing key\/value pairs set by the Issuer which are sealed on Registration and non-opaque to the Transparency Service. The key\/ value pair semantics are specified by each Issuer or are specific to the Issuer and Feed tuple. Examples include: the sequence number of signed statements on a feed, Issuer metadata, or a reference to other transparent statements (e.g., augments, replaces, new-version, CPE-for). <\/ins> Key ID (label: \"4\"): Key ID, as a bytestring."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-bc92364fe06e137228ce44c5f41a1a361084d6d7c3f9ea703e82bf2ace8e1f24","title":"","text":"return which service the Transparent Statement is registered on. In some scenarios, the Verifier already expects a specific Issuer and Feed for the Transparent Statement, while in other cases they are not known in advance and can be an output of validation. Verifiers MAY be configured to re-verify the Issuer's signature locally, but this requires a fresh resolution of the Issuer's DID, which MAY fail if the DID Document is not available or if the statement's signing key has been revoked. Otherwise, the Verifier trusts the validation done by the Transparency Service during Registration. <\/del> Subject for the Transparent Statement, while in other cases they are not known in advance and can be an output of validation. Verifiers MAY be configured to re-verify the Issuer's signature locally, but this requires a fresh resolution of the Issuer's DID, which MAY fail if the DID Document is not available or if the statement's signing key has been revoked. Otherwise, the Verifier trusts the validation done by the Transparency Service during Registration. <\/ins> Some Verifiers MAY decide to locally re-apply some or all of the Registration Policies, if they have limited trust in the Transparency"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-aaeec5d9c414470bd0c33823ef0a27ea7638ea5c755f8739fe887a6f5e80ff28","title":"","text":" : organizations, stakeholders, and users involved in creating or <\/del> : organizations, consumers, and users involved in creating or <\/ins> attesting to supply chain artifacts, releasing authentic Statements to a definable set of peers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e40e4ee0c4297da2b0687fc1ce6dd7c456ab1e4a9bf5270c32fe421ee71b8c26","title":"","text":"The interoperability guaranteed by the Transparency Services is enabled via core components (architectural constituents). Many of the data elements processed by the core components are based on the Concise Signing and Encryption (COSE) standard specified in RFC9052, <\/del> CBOR Signing and Encryption (COSE) standard specified in RFC9052, <\/ins> which is used to produce Signed Statements about Artifacts and to build and maintain a Merkle tree that functions as an Append-only Log for corresponding Signed Statements."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a827bf95e038bc089a694a12d80884efffe70a13ea2713ae1f77618c49d25243","title":"","text":"the data elements processed by the core components are based on the CBOR Signing and Encryption (COSE) standard specified in RFC9052, which is used to produce Signed Statements about Artifacts and to build and maintain a Merkle tree that functions as an Append-only Log for corresponding Signed Statements. <\/del> build and maintain an Append-only Log for corresponding Signed Statements. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-fd1929187bda0e84d9869f0712b79071441bf2b3633d054d90c5ee001e5c55fc","title":"","text":"as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed Statements (which must be used by all Issuers) and a very thin wrapper format for Receipts, which specifies the Transparency Service identity and the agility parameters for the Merkle Tree Proof. Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specified in the COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. <\/del> identity and the agility parameters for the Signed Inclusion Proofs. Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specified in the COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle- tree-proofs. <\/ins> This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-bc57e2342a619e1dc82b222b54a2a7c6483e3b4e1a1b02455890726f6bb1ebc6","title":"","text":"other variants. The Transparency Service is only required to support concise Receipts (i.e., whose size grows at most logarithmically in the number of entries in the Append-only Log) that can be encoded as a COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof. <\/del> a Signed Inclusion Proof. <\/ins> It is possible to offer multiple signature algorithms for the COSE signature of receipts' Signed Merkle Tree, or to change the signing algorithm at later points. However, the Merkle Tree algorithm (including its internal hash function) cannot easily be changed without breaking the consistency of the Append-only Log. It is possible to maintain separate Registries for each algorithm in parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. <\/del> signature of receipts' Signed Inclusion Proofs, or to change the signing algorithm at later points. However, the verifiable data structure cannot easily be changed without breaking the consistency of the Append-only Log. It is possible to maintain separate Registries for each algorithm in parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. <\/ins> 5.2.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e79c2d3c82c4c655fb77dfb2e6f6888f509f610035cc00e892f010e808d0a40e","title":"","text":"6.4. When a Signed Statement is registered by a Transparency Service a Transparent Statement is created. This Transparent Statement consists of the Signed Statement and a Receipt. Receipts are based on COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs) with an additional wrapper structure that adds the following information: <\/del> Receipt becomes available. When a Receipt is included in a Signed Statement a Transparent Statement is produced. Receipts are based on Signed Inclusion Proofs as described in COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs). Receipts protected headers have additional mandatory fields: : The \"crit\" header (id: 2) MUST be included and all SCITT- specific headers (version, DID of Transparency Service and Registration Policy) MUST be marked critical <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b815fdf1cfa7768db24a1372720b71f3d6beb841261c8a7e0b13e9f3d49aad3f","title":"","text":" : The DID of the Transparency Service that issued the Receipt. Verifiers MAY use this DID as a key discovery mechanism to verify the Receipt. The verification is the same for Signed Statement and the signer MAY include the \"kid\" header parameter. Verifiers MUST support the \"did:web\" method, all other methods are optional. <\/del> : The Transparency Service MAY include the Registration policy info header to indicate to Verifiers what policies have been applied at the registration of this Statement <\/ins> The following requirements for the COSE signature of the Merkle Root are added: <\/del> Inside Reg_info, the Transparency Service may include the registration time to help Verifiers decide about the trustworthiness of the Transparent Statement. <\/ins> The SCITT version header MUST be included and its value match the \"version\" field of the Receipt structure <\/del> The registration time is defined as the timestamp at which the Transparency Service has added this Signed Statement to its Append- only Log. <\/ins> The DID of Issuer header (in Signed Statements) MUST be included and its value match the \"ts_identifier\" field of the Receipt structure <\/del> Editor's Note: The WG is discussing if existing CWT claims might better support these design principles. <\/ins> Transparency Service MAY include the Registration policy info header to indicate to Verifiers what policies have been applied at the registration of this Statement <\/del> Here is an example transparent statement: <\/ins> Since I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs uses optional headers, the \"crit\" header (id: 2) MUST be included and all SCITT- specific headers (version, DID of Transparency Service and Registration Policy) MUST be marked critical <\/del> 6.4.1. <\/ins> The Transparency Service may include the registration time to help Verifiers decide about the trustworthiness of the Transparent Statement. The registration time is defined as the timestamp at which the Transparency Service has added this Signed Statement to its Append-only Log. <\/del> 6.4.1.1. Notice the payload is detached, this is to support very large supply chain artifacts, and to ensure that Transparent Statements can integrate with existing file systems. Notice the unprotected header can contain multiple receipts. 6.4.1.2. Notice the content type, transparency services might support only certain content types from certain issuers, per their registration policies. Notice the CWT Claims, transparency services might support only statements about certain artifacts from certain issuers, per their registration policies. 6.4.1.3. Notice the unprotected header contains verifiable data structure proofs, see the protected header for details regarding the specific verifiable data structure used. 6.4.1.4. Notice the verifiable data structure used is RFC9162_SHA256 in this case. We know from the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry that RFC9162_SHA256 is value 1, and that it supports -1 (inclusion proofs) and -2 (consistency proofs). 6.4.1.5. This is a decoded inclusion proof for RFC9162_SHA256, other verifiable data structures might encode inclusion proofs differently. <\/ins> 6.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-0a4648b695a0675cdfad8e4469689fd1fd6376b9b2b8e13dbfb574d8b1f5a40a","title":"","text":"Before checking a Transparent Statement, the Verifier must be configured with one or more identities of trusted Transparency Services. If more than one service is configured, the Verifier MUST return which service the Transparent Statement is registered on. In some scenarios, the Verifier already expects a specific Issuer and Subject for the Transparent Statement, while in other cases they are not known in advance and can be an output of validation. Verifiers MAY be configured to re-verify the Issuer's signature locally, but this requires a fresh resolution of the Issuer's DID, which MAY fail if the DID document is not available or if the Statement's signing key has been revoked. Otherwise, the Verifier trusts the validation done by the Transparency Service during Registration. <\/del> Services. Verifiers MAY be configured to re-verify the Issuer's Signed Statment locally, but this requires a fresh resolution of the Issuer's verificaton keys, which MAY fail if the key has been revoked. <\/ins> Some Verifiers MAY decide to locally re-apply some or all of the Registration Policies, if they have limited trust in the Transparency Services. In addition, Verifiers MAY apply arbitrary validation policies after the signature and Receipt have been checked. Such policies may use as input all information in the Envelope, the Receipt, and the Statement payload, as well as any local state. <\/del> policies after the Transparent Statement has been verified and validated. Such policies may use as input all information in the Envelope, the Receipt, and the Statement payload, as well as any local state. <\/ins> Verifiers MAY offer options to store or share the Receipt of the Transparent Statement for auditing the Transparency Services in case"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a0f3a2c5ac0edef24ae86cdf52fb90f352fb5b38c594c89194f427ee801510ad","title":"","text":"This may involve registering the same Signed Statements at different Transparency Services, each with their own purpose and Registration Policy. This may also involve attaching multiple Receipts to the same Signed Statements, each Receipt endorsing the Issuer signature and a subset of prior Receipts, and each Transparency Service verifying prior Receipts as part of their Registration Policy. For example, a supplier may provide a complete, authoritative Transparency Service for its Signed Statements, whereas a Verifiers's Transparency Service may collect different kinds of Signed Statements to ensure complete auditing for a specific use case, and possibly require additional reviews before registering some of these Signed <\/del> Policy. This may also involve attaching multiple Receipts to the same Signed <\/ins> Statements. An independent entities (security companies) may Issue statements of quality about different artifacts on their own Transparency Service. Verifiers choose which independent entities they trust, just as entities choose different security companies today. <\/del> For example, a software producer of a supply chain artifact might rely on multiple independent software producers operating transparency services for their upstream artifacts. Downstream producers benefit from upstream producers providing higher transparency regarding their artifacts. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-909c3437957cbc496412ed00d5b246638d11a666797a58ad9dd9aeaa9897b3d1","title":"","text":"5.2.2. The Transparency Service records its configuration in the Append-Only Log using Transparent Statements with distinguished media type \"application\/scitt-configuration\". The registration policy for statements with the media type suffix (\"+\" is implementation-specific. The implementation SHOULD document them, for example defining the Issuers authorized to register configuration Signed Statements. The Transparency Service is configured by the last Transparent Statement of this type. The Transparency Service MUST register a Signed Statement that defines its initial configuration before registering any other Signed Statement. The Transparency Service MAY register an additional Signed Statement that updates its configuration. The Transparency Service provides an endpoint that returns the Transparent Statement that describes its current configuration. The configuration \"reg_info\" SHOULD include a secure version number and a timestamp. The sample configuration payload uses the CDDL 5.2.3. <\/ins> Authorization is needed prior to registration of Signed Statements to ensure completeness of an audit. A Transparency Service that registers valid Signed Statement offered by anonymous Issuers would"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-38a48adef28ab93924f42d410e62cb146cc1ba7b8a5bed6685dc49126d46dda0","title":"","text":"specification leaves the implementation of the Registration Policy to the provider of the Transparency Services and its users. A provider of a Transparency Service indicates what Registration Policy is used in a given deployment and inform its users about changes to the Registration Policy by issuing and registering configuration statements. <\/ins> As a minimum, a Transparency Service MUST authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement, which requires some form of trust anchor. As defined in RFC6024, \"A trust anchor represents an authoritative"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-8f7a4d81098616259ca07f3ead6d573776b0266fb3b3f54eddb3638f7aa11318","title":"","text":"key or other structure, as appropriate. It can be a non-root certificate when it is a certificate. A provider of a Transparency Service is, however, expected to indicate what Registration Policy is used in a given deployment and inform its users about changes to the Registration Policy. 5.2.3. <\/del> 5.2.4. <\/ins> There are many different candidate verifiable data structures that may be used to implement an Append-only Log, such as chronological"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3fa884073171bc3a2a897e9da4daf2c51846fed19b66387fd234257897921256","title":"","text":"parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. 5.2.3.1. <\/del> 5.2.4.1. <\/ins> A Transparency Service is append-only. Once a Signed Statement is registered and becomes a Transparent Statement, it cannot be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-942f8f8b646b295fb7c88657c66376f03b2a7f3c9e8b39600964854b86e9cda1","title":"","text":"Append-only Log becomes immutable, and the Receipt provides universally-verifiable evidence of this property. 5.2.3.2. <\/del> 5.2.4.2. <\/ins> There is no fork in the Append-only Log. Everyone with access to its contents sees the same sequence of entries, and can check its"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-736475c7f351937efba4e8196ec0437e93e09b54c6da01ab009f37921f05030e","title":"","text":"state of the Append-only Log, encoded in an old Receipt, is consistent with the current Append-only Log state. 5.2.3.3. <\/del> 5.2.4.3. <\/ins> Everyone with access to the Transparency Service can check the correctness of its contents. In particular:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ad4b2bdb4941b46d5df03f980b0bf5825ff2e35179cfe25e792c9c0012a59b12","title":"","text":"a Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of client authentication and access control 5.2.3.4. <\/del> 5.2.4.4. <\/ins> Transparency Services MAY document their governance rules and procedures for operating the Transparency Service and updating its"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b68768388f2e6a95ad4b42045de68c01ad0096413177d14268dc1b18a88463dd","title":"","text":"issued with those keys. The Issuer's DID is required and appears in the \"1 iss\" claim of the \"13 CWT_Claims\" protected header of the Signed Statements' Envelope. <\/del> \"15 CWT_Claims\" protected header of the Signed Statements' Envelope. <\/ins> The version of the key from the DID Document used to sign the Signed Statement is written in the \"4 kid\" protected header."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-61f943d01b3f78e79aa4984c1df48b789f70f874828e48b54d756a3ca9312de3","title":"","text":"Some Verifiers may systematically fetch all Transparent Statements using the CWT_Claims Subject and assess them alongside the Transparent Statement they are verifying to ensure freshness, completeness of evidence, and the promise of non-equivocation. <\/del> completeness of evidence, and Non-equivocation. <\/ins> Some Verifiers may choose to subset the collection of Statements, filtering on the payload type (Protected Header \"3\"), the CWT (Protected Header \"13\") Issuer claim, or other non-opaque properties. <\/del> (Protected Header \"15\") Issuer claim, or other non-opaque properties. <\/ins> Some Verifiers may systematically resolve Issuer DIDs to fetch the latest corresponding DID documents. This behavior strictly enforces"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-d877eb0d0c96cd5c0e1c63869dea80c849268c163e69838b373317350c86e876","title":"","text":" (label: \"13\" pending CWT_CLAIM_COSE): A CWT representing the <\/del> (label: \"15\" pending CWT_CLAIM_COSE): A CWT representing the <\/ins> Issuer (\"iss\") making the statement, and the Subject (\"sub\") to correlate a collection of statements about an Artifact. Additional CWT_CLAIMS MAY be used, while \"iss\" and \"sub\" MUST be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-04a33ad5f8ecc3b47f76c8816f0a3d8878d94225bf371acb70f5f9ddec00f42a","title":"","text":"will be available to support them. An Issuer that knows of a changed state of quality for an Artifact, SHOULD Register a new Signed Statement, using the same \"13\" CWT \"iss\" <\/del> SHOULD Register a new Signed Statement, using the same \"15\" CWT \"iss\" <\/ins> and \"sub\" claims. Issuers MUST ensure that the Statement payloads in their Signed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5af21f222dc8fdd544af0c5f69bd8a2d86cb35fcb29daa8c0adf3c34b3e60b39","title":"","text":"In both cases, the SCITT Architecture provides generic, universally- verifiable cryptographic proof to individually blame Issuers or the Transparency Service. On one hand, this enables valid actors to detect and disambiguate malicious actors who issue contradictory Signed Statements to different entities (Verifiers, Auditors, Issuers), otherwise known as 'equivocation'. On the other hand, their liability and the resulting damage to their reputation are <\/del> detect and disambiguate malicious actors who employ Equivocation with Signed Statements to different entities. On the other hand, their liability and the resulting damage to their reputation are <\/ins> application specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. Verifiers and Auditors need not be trusted by other actors. In"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-18f726c2363a77116a15d6b35ce20f3ae2308d076cff2bb93f91fdadfbed21cd","title":"","text":"Append-only Log, some Transparency Services may provide limited support for historical queries on the Signed Statements they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent Registration or Issuer equivocation. <\/del> Registration or Issuer Equivocation. <\/ins> Verifiers and Auditors may also witness (1, 4) but may not be able to collect verifiable evidence for it."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-09cd61fef8bd69c822a53b6436b29e640417df625fa62b2c08e327028e1466c1","title":"","text":"to notify Transparency Services of credential revocation to stop Verifiers from accepting Signed Statements signed with compromised credentials. Issuers SHOULD register new Signed Statements indicating the revocation, using the same \"13\" CWT \"iss\" and \"sub\" <\/del> indicating the revocation, using the same \"15\" CWT \"iss\" and \"sub\" <\/ins> claims. The confidentiality of any identity lookup during Signed Statement"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-0ef15fb01dcdc812bdf503b9ec33d8a35cc060b2432d37a23fc2171e68bae857","title":"","text":" (label: \"15\" pending CWT_CLAIM_COSE): A CWT representing the <\/del> (label: \"15\" pending CWT_CLAIMS_COSE): A CWT representing the <\/ins> Issuer (\"iss\") making the statement, and the Subject (\"sub\") to correlate a collection of statements about an Artifact. Additional CWT_CLAIMS MAY be used, while \"iss\" and \"sub\" MUST be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b8ff35f0e4686f8b35acd3f877c6391ebccdf74448057bcb9b9be13d39c3f752","title":"","text":"8. Unless advertised by a Transparency Service, every Issuer must treat Signed Statements it registered (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as public. In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload MUST NOT carry any private information in <\/del> Transparency Services are often publicly accessible. Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible. In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in <\/ins> plaintext. Transparency Services can have an authorization policy controlling who can access the Append-only Log. While this can be used to limit who can read the Log, it may also limit the usefulness of the system. Some jurisdictions have a Right to be Forgotten. However, once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. <\/ins> 9. On its own, verifying a Transparent Statement does not guarantee that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5dcdaae23e04533d24e01b8684ef7fe7b1d6be6f8003b9f547ad6a429e7c7d72","title":"","text":"10.1. This section requests registration of the following media types [@RFC2046] in the \"Media Types\" registry [@IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [@RFC6838]. <\/del> RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.media-types in the manner described in RFC6838. <\/ins> To indicate that the content is an scitt configuration represented as JSON:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f9a71eb120f2879e49ddaa3b8ea0438c0221312403f9fa16ad848cdeaabcbe6a","title":"","text":"encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object. Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this specification ]]. <\/del> of TBD. <\/ins> Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: [[ this specification ]] <\/del> Published specification: TBD <\/ins> Applications that use this media type: TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1f6865f9ab6289a6a404c3f9be81046e326de94c91255460cc9028fa0e437575","title":"","text":"enforcing a Registration Policy. It also maintains a service key, which is used to endorse the state of the Append-only Log in Receipts. All Transparency Services MUST expose standard endpoints for Registration of Signed Statements and Receipt issuance, which is described in TODO: scrapi. Each Transparency Service also defines its own Registration Policies, which MUST apply to all entries in the Append-only Log. <\/del> for Registration of Signed Statements and Receipt issuance. Each Transparency Service also defines its own Registration Policies, which MUST apply to all entries in the Append-only Log. <\/ins> The combination of Identity, Registration Policy evaluation, and the Transparency Service endpoint constitute the trusted part of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ef9ab40559e1ac79a5c646728ee0a5ca7eab8cbc4a0313ea839e101646283d3a","title":"","text":"5.1.3. An Issuer can make multiple Statements about the same Artifact. For example, an Issuer can make amended Statements about the same Artifact as their view changes over time. Multiple Issuers can make different, even conflicting Statements, about the same Artifact. Verifiers can choose which Issuers they trust. Multiple Issuers can make the same Statement about a single Artifact, affirming multiple Issuers agree. 5.1.4. <\/ins> SCITT payloads are opaque to Transparency Services. For interoperability, Registration Policy decisions should be based on interpretation of the mandatory metadata in the protected header of a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-279e7b4a26e9b04f98fc9fda0cb8e9d47a1ff12e48268ac1bec23a71601b17cb","title":"","text":"tree-proofs. This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance process, Transparency Service and the Signed Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process. <\/del> associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and Signed Statements, Transparency Service and the Signed Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process. <\/ins> 5.1. 5.1.1. Before an Issuer is able to produce Signed Statements, it must first create an identifier and obtain an identity document, that is acceptable to the Transparency Service. Transparency Services MAY support many different identity document formats. <\/del> create an identifier and obtain an identity document that is acceptable to the Transparency Service. Transparency Services MUST support the capability to associate an X.509v3 certificate with a Signed Statement using a hash (thumbprint) of the certificate as specified in RFC9360 by supporting the \"x5t\" COSE header parameter. The \"x5t\" COSE header parameter MUST be included in the protected header of a Signed Statement's COSE envelope. The mechanisms how Transparency Services obtain corresponding X.509v3 certificates, e.g., as part of enforcing Registration Policy, is out-of-scope of this document. Transparency Services MAY support many other identifier formats for identifying many other identity document formats. Alternative identifiers for identity documents MUST also be included in the protected header of the COSE envelope. Only one type of identity document identifier MUST be included in a Signed Statement's COSE envelope. <\/ins> Issuers SHOULD use consistent identifiers for all their Statements about Artifacts, to simplify authorization by Verifiers and auditing. If an Issuer uses multiple identifiers, they MUST ensure that statements signed under each identifier are consistent. Issuers MAY rotate verification keys at any time, or at a consistent cryptoperiod. Issuers MAY migrate to new signing and verification <\/del> about Artifacts to simplify authorization by Verifiers and auditing. If an Issuer uses multiple identifiers across their Statements, they MUST ensure that Statements signed under each identifier are consistent. Issuers MAY rotate verification keys at any time and SHOULD rotate verification keys at an appropriate and consistent cryptoperiod (see KEY-MANAGEMENT). Issuers MAY migrate to new signing and verification <\/ins> algorithms, but the Transparency Service remains responsible for admitting signed statements that match its policies. The Issuer's identifier is required and appears in the \"1 iss\" claim of the \"15 CWT_Claims\" protected header of the Signed Statements' Envelope. The version of the key used to sign the Signed Statement is written in the \"4 kid\" protected header. Key discovery protocols are out of scope for this document. <\/del> admitting Signed Statements that complies with its active Registration Policies. The version of the key used to sign the Signed Statement MAY be included via the \"kid\" COSE header parameter in the protected header. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. An Issuer identifier is required to be included in the COSE envelope. The protected header of a Signed Statement MUST include the \"CWT Claims\" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE. The CBOR map that constitutes the corresponding \"CWT Claims\" value MUST include the \"Issuer Claim\" (Claim label 1, see IANA.cwt) where the value MUST represent the Issuer identifier. An Subject identifier is also required to be included in the COSE envelope. The CBOR map that constitutes the corresponding \"CWT Claims\" value MUST include the \"Subject Claim\" (Claim label 2, see IANA.cwt) where the value MUST represent the Subject identifier. Figure fig-signed-statement illustrated a normative CDDL definition for the composition of the protected header in COSE envelope of SCITT Signed Statements. <\/ins> 5.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-6125cac05a1670e8b49ec8552f29041af132abab89898042b034ee552c6ac8f5","title":"","text":"are capitalized. To ensure readability, only a core set of terms is included in this section. Verifiers use the Feed to ensure completeness and Non-equivocation in supply chain evidence by identifying all Transparent Statements linked to the Artifact they are evaluating. <\/ins> 4. In this document, the definition of transparency is intended to build"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-461df32a2f4b73db73a700ff28c86362a1815de21b24390663ffa5766b5d9964","title":"","text":"are capitalized. To ensure readability, only a core set of terms is included in this section. The terms \"header\", \"payload\", and \"to-be-signed bytes\" are defined in RFC9052. <\/ins> 4. In this document, the definition of transparency is intended to build"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e50ace5016e3b8c31259b41591b6381432bb10586c17b20659ff06172f48123b","title":"","text":"are capitalized. To ensure readability, only a core set of terms is included in this section. Verifiers use the Feed to ensure completeness and Non-equivocation in supply chain evidence by identifying all Transparent Statements linked to the Artifact they are evaluating. <\/del> 4. In this document, the definition of transparency is intended to build"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a0a67ff8bc90ce02b6c24ff119b613ca4b410f17f8280f4252a1182250457e37","title":"","text":"CT logs produce Signed Certificate Timestamps (Transparent Statements) SCTs are checked by browsers (Verifiers) <\/del> Signed Certificate Timestamps are checked by Verifiers. <\/ins> The Append-only Log can be checked by Auditors Note that just like CT logs are independent and their contents need not be consistent, Transparency Services are similarly independent of each other. <\/del> The Append-only Log can be checked by Verifiers and Auditors <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-75aa60c3181dbb20eaf89475aa64be9f6ebd375fe9c87b423622a382cc8a221c","title":"","text":"Anyone with access to the Transparency Service can independently verify its consistency and review the complete list of Transparent Statements registered by each Issuer. However, the Registrations of <\/del> Statements registered by each Issuer. However, the Registrations on <\/ins> separate Transparency Services are generally disjoint, though it is possible to take a Transparent Statement from one Transparency Service and register it again on another (if its policy allows), so the authorization of the Issuer and of the Transparency Service by the Verifier of the Receipt are generally independent. <\/del> possible to take a Transparent Statement, a Signed Statement with a Receipt from the first Transparency Service in its unprotected header, and register it on another Transparency Service, where the second receipt will be over the first Receipt in the unprotected header. <\/ins> Reputable Issuers are thus incentivized to carefully review their Statements before signing them to produce Signed Statements."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-fe1ece51d8146e2db4fa219bf31b2d3860237d97554e5d0351e82f6f7d005c76","title":"","text":"Multiple Issuers can make the same Statement about a single Artifact, affirming multiple Issuers agree. 5.1.4. SCITT payloads are opaque to Transparency Services. For interoperability, Registration Policy decisions should be based on interpretation of the mandatory metadata in the protected header of a Signed Statement. Each implementation of a Transparency Service MAY support additional metadata, specific to its implementation through additional \"Reserved for Private Use\" [1] keys within the \"CWT_Claims\" header. <\/del> 5.2. The role of Transparency Service can be decomposed into several major functions. The most important is maintaining an Append-only Log, the verifiable data structure that records Signed Statements, and enforcing a Registration Policy. It also maintains a service key, which is used to endorse the state of the Append-only Log in Receipts. All Transparency Services MUST expose standard endpoints for Registration of Signed Statements and Receipt issuance. Each Transparency Service also defines its own Registration Policies, which MUST apply to all entries in the Append-only Log. The combination of Identity, Registration Policy evaluation, and the Transparency Service endpoint constitute the trusted part of the Transparency Service. Each of these components MUST be carefully protected against both external attacks and internal misbehavior by some or all of the operators of the Transparency Service. For instance, the code for the Registration Policy evaluation and endorsement may be protected by running in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The Transparency Service may be replicated with a consensus algorithm, such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (pBFT PBFT) and may be used to protect against malicious or vulnerable replicas. Threshold signatures may be use to protect the service key, etc. Beyond the trusted components, Transparency Services may operate additional endpoints for auditing, for instance to query the history of Signed Statements registered by a given Issuer via a certain Subject. Implementations of Transparency Services SHOULD avoid using the service identity and extending the Transparency Service in auditing endpoints, except if it is necessary to compute an Append- only Log consistency proofs. Other evidence to support the correctness and completeness of the audit response MUST be computed from the Append-only Log. <\/del> functions. The most important function is to maintain a Registration Policy for the Append-only Log that is the verifiable data structure that records Signed Statements. All Transparency Services MUST expose APIs for Registration of Signed Statements and Receipt issuance. Transparency Services may support additional APIs for auditing, for instance to query the history of Signed Statements. <\/ins> 5.2.1. The log is empty when the service is intialized. The first entry is a signed statement for key material. The second set of entries are signed statements for additional domain specific policy. The third set of entries are signed statements for artifacts. 5.2.2. <\/ins> Every Transparency Service MUST have a public service identity, associated with public\/private key pairs for signing on behalf of the service. In particular, this identity must be known by Verifiers when validating a Receipt. <\/del> associated with public\/private key pairs for signing Receipts on behalf of the service. In particular, this identity must be known by Verifiers when validating a Receipt. <\/ins> This identity MUST be stable for the lifetime of the service, so that all Receipts remain valid and consistent. The Transparency Service"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1327e0ef3be9170f016c541f2d500a24207557ec47966031e8204355d00c45e2","title":"","text":"Receipts for the software and configuration of the service, as measured in its attestation report. 5.2.2. The Transparency Service records its configuration in the Append-Only Log using Transparent Statements with distinguished media type \"application\/scitt-configuration\". The registration policy for statements with the media type suffix (\"+\" is implementation-specific. The implementation SHOULD document them, for example defining the Issuers authorized to register configuration Signed Statements. The Transparency Service is configured by the last Transparent Statement of this type. The Transparency Service MUST register a Signed Statement that defines its initial configuration before registering any other Signed Statement. The Transparency Service MAY register an additional Signed Statement that updates its configuration. The Transparency Service provides an endpoint that returns the Transparent Statement that describes its current configuration. The configuration \"reg_info\" SHOULD include a secure version number and a timestamp. The sample configuration payload uses the CDDL <\/del> 5.2.3. Authorization is needed prior to registration of Signed Statements to ensure completeness of an audit. A Transparency Service that registers valid Signed Statement offered by anonymous Issuers would provide limited to no value to Verifiers. More advanced use case will rely on the Transparency Service performing additional domain- specific checks before a Signed Statement is accepted. For example, some Transparency Services may validate the non-opaque content (payload) of Signed Statements. <\/del> Registration Policies refers to the checks that are performed before a Signed Statement is registered given a set of input values. This specification leaves the implementation of the Registration Policy to the provider of the Transparency Services and its users. A provider of a Transparency Service indicates what Registration Policy is used in a given deployment and inform its users about changes to the Registration Policy by issuing and registering configuration statements. <\/del> a Signed Statement is added to an append only log, and a corrosponding receipt becomes available. <\/ins> As a minimum, a Transparency Service MUST authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement, which requires some form of trust anchor. As"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-dac3abd340912f76462fbb80625df600b87f65157f83ec601cf57b6c7b185672","title":"","text":"key or other structure, as appropriate. It can be a non-root certificate when it is a certificate. 5.2.4. <\/del> Hints for discovering the trust anchors, MUST be placed in the protected header of signed statements as described in SECTION TBD. Before a policy is used to decide if a Signed Statement is added to the append only log, the policy MUST be added. Before a Signed Statement is added to the append only log, the trust anchor used to verify it MUST be added. In order to add a trust anchor, the anchor must be converted to a Signed Statement with a content type. During initialization of a Transparency serivce, the first Signed Statements registered will be for trust anchor material, that is not validated by any registration policy. This trust anchor material will then be used to verify subsequent Signed Statements. This specification leaves the implementation of the Registration Policy to the operator of the Transparency Service. <\/ins> There are many different candidate verifiable data structures that may be used to implement an Append-only Log, such as chronological Merkle Trees, sparse\/indexed Merkle Trees, full blockchains, and many other variants. The Transparency Service is only required to support concise Receipts (i.e., whose size grows at most logarithmically in the number of entries in the Append-only Log) that can be encoded as a Signed Inclusion Proof. It is possible to offer multiple signature algorithms for the COSE signature of receipts' Signed Inclusion Proofs, or to change the signing algorithm at later points. However, the verifiable data structure cannot easily be changed without breaking the consistency of the Append-only Log. It is possible to maintain separate Registries for each algorithm in parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. 5.2.4.1. A Transparency Service is append-only. Once a Signed Statement is registered and becomes a Transparent Statement, it cannot be modified, deleted, or reordered within the Append-only Log. In particular, once a Receipt is returned for a given Signed Statement, the registered Signed Statement and any preceding entry in the Append-only Log becomes immutable, and the Receipt provides universally-verifiable evidence of this property. 5.2.4.2. There is no fork in the Append-only Log. Everyone with access to its contents sees the same sequence of entries, and can check its consistency with any Receipts they have collected. Transparency Service implementations MAY provide a mechanism to verify that the state of the Append-only Log, encoded in an old Receipt, is consistent with the current Append-only Log state. 5.2.4.3. Everyone with access to the Transparency Service can check the correctness of its contents. In particular: the Transparency Service defines and enforces deterministic Registration Policies that can be re-evaluated based solely on the contents of the Append-only Log at the time of Registration, and must then yield the same result the ordering of entries, their cryptographic contents, and the Transparency Services' governance may be non-deterministic, but they must be verifiable a Transparency Service MAY store evidence about the resolution of identifiers, identity documents, and key material. a Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of client authentication and access control 5.2.4.4. Transparency Services MAY document their governance rules and procedures for operating the Transparency Service and updating its code. <\/del> 5.2.4. <\/ins> Example: relying on Transparent Statements about code updates, secured on its own Append-only Log, or on some auxiliary Transparency Service. <\/del> The security properties of the append only log are determined by the choice of verifiable data structure used to produce receipts. <\/ins> Governance procedures, their auditing, and their transparency are implementation specific. <\/del> In addition to Receipts, some verifiable data structures might support additional proof types, such as proofs of consistency, or proofs of non inclusion. <\/ins> Governance may be based on a consortium of members that are jointly responsible for the Transparency Services, or automated based on the contents of an auxiliary governance Transparency Service. <\/del> 5.2.4.1. <\/ins> Governance typically involves additional records in the Append- only Log to enable its auditing. The Transparency Service may contain both Transparent Statements and governance entries. <\/del> Transparency Services can be deployed along side other database or object storage technologies. <\/ins> Issuers, Verifiers, and third-party Auditors may review the Transparency Service governance before trusting the service, or on a regular basis. <\/del> For example, a Transparency Service that is supporting a software package management system, might be referenced from the APIs exposed for package management, for example, providing an ability to request a fresh receipt for a given software package, or to request a list of signed statements and artifacts associatd with a software package. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-fa8c267fce7763b5255bbb27f9f20f549c92e892e38351ea45846e41d5efec65","title":"","text":"7. : This topic is still under discussion, see issue 79 [2] <\/del> : This topic is still under discussion, see issue 79 [1] <\/ins> Multiple, independently-operated Transparency Services can help secure distributed supply chains, without the need for a single,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-43709637a4205cead997d4face8df27b042931c56d34c9c8c432384bfdb52627","title":"","text":"use is unavoidable, keys MUST NOT sign any other message that may be verified as an Envelope as part of a Signed Statement. Each of these functions MUST be carefully protected against both external attacks and internal misbehavior by some or all of the operators of the Transparency Service. For instance, the code for the Registration Policy evaluation and endorsement may be protected by running in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The Transparency Service may be replicated with a consensus algorithm, such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (pBFT PBFT) and may be used to protect against malicious or vulnerable replicas. Threshold signatures may be use to protect the service key, etc. <\/ins> 9.1. SCITT provides the following security guarantees:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-10d075ce0d0fc79c7ff8197d086d1dd5b02fbf3c951d814817c974bce4ff9945","title":"","text":"11.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/cwt\/cwt.xhtml#claims-registry [2] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/ <\/del> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/ <\/ins> issues\/79"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-242cbe5ba32128828a8507b71afe62d9946aa3b4d14c9762299fa35083514171","title":"","text":"5. This topic is still under discussion, see issue 79 [1] <\/del> Transparency Services MAY have Registration Policies that require Receipts from other Transparency Services to be included in the Unprotected Header of Signed Statements at the time of Registration. <\/ins> Multiple, independently-operated Transparency Services can help secure distributed supply chains, without the need for a single, centralized service trusted by all parties. For example, multiple Transparency Service instances may be governed and operated by different organizations that are either unaware of the other or do not trust one another. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST reject Signed Statements that are invalid according to their Registration Policy, which can include requirements associated with the unprotected bytes comprising the cose-sign1 unprotected header. <\/ins> This may involve registering the same Signed Statements at different Transparency Services, each with their own purpose and Registration Policy. <\/del> A Receipt for a Transparent Statement, proves that a Transparent Statement is included in an Append-only Log. <\/ins> This may also involve attaching multiple Receipts to the same Signed Statements. <\/del> Receipts for Transparent Statements, are a special case of Receipts for Signed Statements. Verifying Receipts for Transparent Statements can be difficult. Transparency Services SHOULD copy the unprotected header they observed at the time of registration into the Protected Header of their Receipt. This ensures that the exact bytes which they have included in their append only log, can be reconstructed, even though some of those bytes lacked integrited protection, due to being located in the unprotected header of a Signed Statement. <\/ins> For example, a software producer of a supply chain artifact might rely on multiple independent software producers operating transparency services for their upstream artifacts. Downstream producers benefit from upstream producers providing higher transparency regarding their artifacts. <\/del> Depending on the complexity of the unprotected header, additional cannonicalization operations MAY be required in order to recover the exact bytes that were included in the Append-only Log of a specific Transparency Service. Implementers are cautioned that maintaining the order of Receipts in the unprotected header is essential for uniquely identifying a Signed Statement with a specific series of Receipts in its unprotected header. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a3b7c5cdf32bb95596dc0e112616144202bcc3dc63f89800b38dc5d5a36054b4","title":"","text":"Change Controller: IETF Provisional registration? No 9. References 9.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/ issues\/79 <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-fa169315027d5c17e9e45456d87bddcd99460acaac8cc380fce098c096907b5e","title":"","text":"4.2.1. The same Signed Statement may be independently registered in multiple Transparency Services. To register a Signed Statement, the Transparency Service performs the following steps: <\/del> To register a Signed Statement, the Transparency Service performs the following steps: <\/ins> This is implementation-specific and MAY be unrelated to the Issuer identity. Signed Statements may be registered by a different party than their Issuer. <\/del> A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service, to Register Signed Statements. Authentication and authorization is implementation-specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST perform resolution of the Issuer's identity. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer ID in real-time, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. For auditing, during Registration, the Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the lookup, including if it was resolved from a cache. <\/del> identity, which may be different than the Client identity. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer ID in real- time, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. For auditing, during Registration, the Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the lookup, including if it was resolved from a cache. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-d7cdc33b4d141094c1f465f0fa37a0665307ea9a2c23236e76db7ee18ee37a1f","title":"","text":"4.1. An important function of a Transparency Service is to maintain Registration Policies for the Append-only Log. The Append-only Log is the verifiable data structure which registers Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST feature an Append-only Log. The Append- only Log is the verifiable data structure that registers Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. <\/ins> All Transparency Services MUST expose APIs for the registration of Signed Statements and issuance of Receipts."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4e4d6d6c5f2f2cddcfcd9eda5d2bf8e8846a4bb5766a804d8236ac89d969f43c","title":"","text":"Transparency Services MAY support additional APIs for auditing, for instance, to query the history of Signed Statements. Typically a Transparency Services has a single Issuer identity which <\/del> Typically a Transparency Service has a single Issuer identity which <\/ins> is present in the \"iss\" claim of Receipts for that service. Multi-tenant support can be enabled through the use of identifiers in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-465a3f77caa6bfdee17238f5b52b41f7db1e5c82c2885de5deb44d56c7cb8778","title":"","text":"4.1.1. The Append-only Log is empty when the Transparency Service is initialized. The first entry that is added to the Append-only Log MUST be a Signed Statement including key material. The second set of entries are Signed Statements for additional domain-specific Registration Policy. The third set of entries are Signed Statements for Artifacts. From here on a Transparency Service can check Signed Statements on registration via policy (that is at minimum, key material and typically a Registration Policy) and is therefore in a reliable state to register Signed Statements about Artifacts or a new Registration Policy. <\/del> Registration Policies refer to additional checks over and above the Mandatory Registration Checks that are performed before a Signed Statement is accepted to be registered to the Append-only Log. <\/ins> 4.1.2. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST maintain Registration Policies which govern whether or not a given Signed Statement is eligible for registration. Registration Policies MUST be made transparent and available to all clients of the Transparency Service by registering them as Signed Statements on the Append-only Log. <\/ins> Registration Policies refer to the checks that are performed before a Signed Statement is registered to an Append-only Log, and a corresponding Receipt becomes available. As a minimum, a Transparency Service MUST authenticate the Issuer of Signed Statements, which requires a trust anchor in the form of an already registered Signed Statement including key material (see ts- initialization). As defined in RFC6024, \"A trust anchor represents an authoritative entity via a public key and associated data. The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.\" Typical representations of a trust anchor include certificates or raw public keys. The \"x5t\" and \"kid\" Claims in the protected header of Signed Statements can be used as hints for discovering trust anchors. Before a Registration Policy is used to decide if a Signed Statement is registered, the policy MUST be registered. Before a Signed Statement is registered, the trust anchor used to verify it MUST be registered (e.g., via a registered Registration Policy). In order to register a trust anchor, the trust anchor MUST be converted to a Signed Statement with a matching content type Claim. During initialization of a Transparency Service, the first Signed Statements registered will be for a trust anchor that is not validated by any Registration Policy. Transparency Services MUST specify their supported signature algorithms in their Registration Policies. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST reject any attempt to register Signed Statements until at least one Registration Policy is registered. <\/ins> This specification leaves implementation, encoding and documentation of Registration Policies to the operator of the Transparency Service. 4.1.1.1. Transparency Services MUST, at a minimum, perform the following checks before registering a Signed Statement: * Authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement To authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement the Transparency Service MUST refer to a trust anchor as defined in RFC6024: \"A trust anchor represents an authoritative entity via a public key and associated data. The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.\" Typical representations of a trust anchor include certificates or raw public keys. The \"x5t\" and \"kid\" Claims in the protected header of Signed Statements can be used as hints for discovering trust anchors. Before a Signed Statement is registered, the trust anchor used to verify its Issuer MUST be registered with the Transparency Service. * Inclusion of Issuer trust anchors in a registered Registration Policy * Submission of Issuer trust anchors as a Signed Statement 4.1.2. Since a Registration Policy is required prior to the registration of any Signed Statements, a means is required to configure the first Registration Policy that is not the standard issuance of a Signed Statement. Transparency Services MUST support at least one of these methods: * A built-in default Registration Policy * Acceptance of a first Signed Statement whose payload is a valid Registration Policy, without performing registration checks * An out-of-band authenticated management interface <\/ins> 4.1.3. The security properties of the Append-only Log are determined by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5988ec2f0ac6b8d1b5a0f0a1f64729cb28a4f3992c31e216cab35a58e9e8ae19","title":"","text":"discovered out of band and Registration Policies are not assured on the presence of these optional fields. A Registration Policy that requires an optional field to be present MUST reject any Signed Statements or Receipts that an invalid according to the policy. <\/del> Statements or Receipts that are invalid according to the policy. <\/ins> fig-signed-statement-edn illustrates a payload that is detached. This is to support very large supply chain artifacts, and to ensure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a74cf63cc7961f7e41d0b3cc441c32efead62d7b717df17b677317383a1b40bb","title":"","text":"4.1.1.1. Transparency Services MUST, at a minimum, perform the following checks before registering a Signed Statement: * Authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement <\/del> checks before registering a Signed Statement: Authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST authenticate the Issuer of Signed Statements by validating the COSE signature and checking the identity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-37f27103b08ae97dc67befe31a927a711e42cf29defcac99d3cd4a0abd12a485","title":"","text":"any Signed Statements, a means is required to configure the first Registration Policy that is not the standard issuance of a Signed Statement. Transparency Services MUST support at least one of these methods: * A built-in default Registration Policy * Acceptance of a first Signed Statement whose payload is a valid Registration Policy, without performing registration checks * An out-of-band authenticated management interface <\/del> methods: A built-in default Registration Policy Acceptance of a first Signed Statement whose payload is a valid Registration Policy, without performing registration checks An out-of-band authenticated management interface <\/ins> 4.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-10191b81c75ce01689205ba1068b802d0cc73ef0befdb588f8232bcbf4bc7283","title":"","text":"Signed Statements presented for Registration. Some Transparency Services may publish every Signed Statement in their logs, to facilitate their dissemination and auditing. Others may just return Receipts to clients that present Singed Statements for Registration, <\/del> Receipts to clients that present Signed Statements for Registration, <\/ins> and disclose the Append-only Log only to Auditors trusted with the confidentiality of its contents."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-98a4c3b741aa84a3b5763e951133e752042b73ed919d74642765945116c560eb","title":"","text":"interoperability across different implementations of Transparency Services with various auditing and compliance requirements. Issuers can register their Signed Statements on any Transparency Service, with the guarantee that all Consumers will be able to verify them. <\/del> with the guarantee that all Auditors and Verifiers will be able to verify them. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7dfc58398229dcb25f41a7451c3bc9c65b2501ead86a2aaed346a499922ea158","title":"","text":"SCITT architecture. Its goal is to enhance auditability and accountability across supply chains. In supply chains, artifacts travel down the chain until they are eventually consumed by someone. Consumers like to have information about the artifacts that they consume. There are many parties who publish information about artifacts: For example, the original manufacturer may provide information about the state of the artifact when it left the factory. The shipping company may add information about the transport environment of the artifact. Compliance auditors may provide information about their compliance assessment of the <\/del> In supply chains, downstream artifacts are built upon upstream artifacts. The complexity of traceability and quality control for these supply chains increases with the number of artifacts and parties contributing to them. There are many parties who publish information about artifacts: For example, the original manufacturer may provide information about the state of the artifact when it left the factory. The shipping company may add information about the transport environment of the artifact. Compliance auditors may provide information about their compliance assessment of the <\/ins> artifact. Security companies may publish vulnerability information about an artifact. Consumers may even publish the fact that they consume an artifact. <\/del> about an artifact. Some of these parties may publish information about their analysis or use of an artifact. <\/ins> SCITT provides a way for consumers to obtain this information in a way that is \"transparent\", that is, parties cannot lie about the <\/del> SCITT provides a way for Relying Parties to obtain this information in a way that is \"transparent\", that is, parties cannot lie about the <\/ins> information that they publish without it being detected. SCITT achieves this by having producers publish information in a Transparency Service, where consumers (also called Verifiers) can check the information. <\/del> Transparency Service, where Relying Parties can check the information. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-eac8faeee0e9a49060892ad5d6763c32fa246a6384866a8e545d4b66e6760dc1","title":"","text":"wrapper format for Receipts, which specifies the Transparency Service identity and the agility parameters for the Signed Inclusion Proofs. Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specified in the COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle- <\/del> COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- <\/ins> tree-proofs. This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-41d2dfb9b15beaccb6861509001e13d6ffdd1e128e0c79debe7f7b369bab5800","title":"","text":"proofs of non inclusion. Specific verifiable data structures, such those describes in RFC9162 and I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs are out of scope for this document. <\/del> and I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs are out of scope for this document. <\/ins> 4.1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ce32c236365605026e8ab2495c1178340c8b739f8f43e9c52086ecd39d4ada4b","title":"","text":"A Receipt is a Signed Statement, (cose-sign1), with addition claims in its protected header related to verifying the inclusion proof in its unprotected header. See I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. <\/del> its unprotected header. See I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. <\/ins> fig-signed-statement-cddl illustrates a normative CDDL definition for of the protected header for Signed Statements and Receipts."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-d3d3c6681657d4c40f53d85234c45cc5a4a988addf902a79303adc14e29d43a6","title":"","text":"Statement a Transparent Statement is produced. Receipts are based on Signed Inclusion Proofs as described in COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs). <\/del> Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs). <\/ins> The registration time is defined as the timestamp at which the Transparency Service has added this Signed Statement to its Append-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ba3a502cd333672f9291650802fecacaa08d2739115d5a112e2467dd2ec48da0","title":"","text":"Verifiers MUST apply the verification process as described in Section 4.4 of RFC9052. In order to verify the inclusion proof that is included in the Receipt, the verification process for the inclusion proof MUST be performed as described in the document that registers corresponding Verifiable Data Structure Parameters (see I-D.draft-steele-cose- merkle-tree-proofs). APIs exposing verification logic for Transparent Statements may wish to provide more details that a single boolean result, for example, indicating if the signature on the Receipt or Signed Statement is valid, if claims related to the validity period are valid, or if the inclusion proof in the Receipt is valid. <\/del> APIs exposing verification logic for Transparent Statements may provide more details than a single boolean result. For example, an API may indicate if the signature on the Receipt or Signed Statement is valid, if claims related to the validity period are valid, or if the inclusion proof in the Receipt is valid. <\/ins> The algorithm-specific details of checking inclusion proofs are covered in I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. The pseudo-code <\/del> covered in I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. The pseudo-code <\/ins> for validation of a transparent statement is as follows: Before checking a Transparent Statement, the Verifier must be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-87f9fe93b156fbfc02072786c9246335d506e41b254a6ca6c7209f511ab36926","title":"","text":"registration. Registration Policies MUST be made transparent and available to all clients of the Transparency Service by registering them as Signed Statements on the Append-only Log. <\/del> Relying Parties of the Transparency Service by registering them as Signed Statements on the Append-only Log, and distributing associated Receipts. Distribution of Receipts is out of scope for this document.``` <\/ins> This specification leaves implementation, encoding and documentation of Registration Policies to the operator of the Transparency Service."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7c9fbdcfd456625b66fea3635614688cedf4d3458c72650ff51af9d9a5d73b84","title":"","text":" A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service, to Register Signed Statements. Authentication and authorization is implementation-specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. <\/del> A client application authenticates with the Transparency Service, to Register Signed Statements on behalf of one or more issuers. Authentication and authorization is implementation-specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST perform resolution of the Issuer's identity, which may be different than the Client identity. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer ID in real- time, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. For auditing, during Registration, the Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the lookup, including if it was resolved from a cache. <\/del> identity. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer ID in real-time, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. For auditing, during Registration, the Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the lookup, including if it was resolved from a cache. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7c3aaa556d19d4bcebc3c2de850038441c04fe4aa2b3241f08f5cd146089db94","title":"","text":"4.3. The client (which is not necessarily the Issuer) that registers a Signed Statement and receives a Receipt can produce a Transparent Statement by adding the Receipt to the Unprotected Header of the Signed Statement. <\/del> Client applications MAY register Signed Statements on behalf of one or more Issuers. Client applications MAY request Receipts regardless of the identity of the Issuer of the associated Signed Statement. <\/ins> When a Signed Statement is registered by a Transparency Service a Receipt becomes available. When a Receipt is included in a Signed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-58a493e64b139151701ead22d3d2fccf10178a7ee0702ac6faf01b41160c7000","title":"","text":"The Transparency Service is trusted with the confidentiality of the Signed Statements presented for Registration. Some Transparency Services may publish every Signed Statement in their logs, to facilitate their dissemination and auditing. Others may just return Receipts to clients that present Signed Statements for Registration, and disclose the Append-only Log only to Auditors trusted with the confidentiality of its contents. <\/del> facilitate their dissemination and auditing. Transparency Services MAY return Receipts to client applications synchronously or asynchronously. <\/ins> A collection of Signed Statements must not leak information about the contents of other Signed Statements registered on the Transparency"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-6e25ff0ca6764f938f0b22e276c4d8d8a3b96d7b6a8b05373281b9b3450ff715","title":"","text":"6.2.5. Trust in clients that submit Signed Statements for Registration is implementation-specific. An attacker may attempt to register any Signed Statement it has obtained, at any Transparency Service that accepts them, possibly multiple times and out of order. This may be mitigated by a Transparency Service that enforces restrictive access control and Registration Policies. <\/del> Authentication of client applications is out of scope for this document. Transparency Services MUST authenticate both client applications and the Issuer of signed statements in order to ensure that implementation specific authentication and authorization policies are enforced. The specification of authentication and authorization policies is out of scope for this document. <\/ins> 6.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ade9ebdb4d199a1860bca41420d794ded0570265bb8168c92b2c040985637f78","title":"","text":"govern whether or not a given Signed Statement is eligible for registration. Registration Policies MUST be made transparent and available to all clients of the Transparency Service by registering them as Signed Statements on the Append-only Log. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors used to authenticate Issuers, which MAY be included in the registration policy statement. For instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, the discovery URL of an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE compatible PKI trust anchor. Registration Policies and trust anchors MUST be made transparent and available to all clients of the Transparency Service by registering them as Signed Statements on the Append-only Log. <\/ins> This specification leaves implementation, encoding and documentation of Registration Policies to the operator of the Transparency Service. <\/del> of Registration Policies and trust anchors to the operator of the Transparency Service. <\/ins> 4.1.1.1. Transparency Services MUST, at a minimum, perform the following checks before registering a Signed Statement: Authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement The Transparency Service MUST authenticate the Issuer of Signed Statements by validating the COSE signature and checking the identity of the issuer through one of its configured trust anchors, using the \"x5t\" and \"kid\" headers in the protected header as hints. For instance, for X.509 signed claims the Transparency Service must validate a complete certificate chain from the certificate identified by \"x5t\" to one of the trusted root authority certificate of the Transparency Service. The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.\" Before a Signed Statement is registered, the trust anchor used to verify its Issuer MUST be registered with the Transparency Service. <\/del> During registration, a Transparency Services MUST, at a minimum, authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement by validating the COSE signature and checking the identity of the issuer against one of its configured trust anchors, using the \"x5t\" (34), \"x5chain\"(33) and \"kid\"(4) protected headers of the Signed Statement as hints. For instance, in order to authenticate X.509 Signed Statements, the Transparency Service MUST build and validate a complete certificate chain from the Issuer's certificate identified by \"x5t\", to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service. The Transparency Service MUST evaluate the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log. 4.1.1.2. The operator of a Transparency Service MAY update the registration policy or the trust anchors of a transparency service at any time. This presents a challenge to Auditors and Relying Parties if they cannot determine what policy was used to register a given Transparent Statement. Transparency Services MUST ensure that for any Transparent Statment they accept, enough information is made available to Auditors (either in the Append-only Log and retrievable through audit APIs, or included in the Receipt) to identify and recover the Transparent Statements describing the registration policy and trust anchors that were in use at the time that Transparent Statement was registered. In particular, this information SHOULD enable Auditors to re-validate the mandatory Issuer authentication check, unless the required information isn't available (e.g. the authentication protocol is not verifiable), or it is confidential (e.g. an OAuth access token embedding the Issuer's pubic key), or it is private (e.g. a Issuer certificate containing the name and email address of a developer). <\/ins> 4.1.2. Since a Registration Policy is required prior to the registration of any Signed Statements, a means is required to configure the first Registration Policy that is not the standard issuance of a Signed Statement. Transparency Services MUST support at least one of these methods: <\/del> Since the mandatory registration checks rely on having registered Signed Statements for the registration policy and trust anchors, Transparency Services MUST support at least one of the three following bootstrapping mechanisms: <\/ins> A built-in default Registration Policy <\/del> A built-in default Registration Policy and initial list of trust anchors; <\/ins> Acceptance of a first Signed Statement whose payload is a valid Registration Policy, without performing registration checks <\/del> Registration Policy and trust anchors, omitting the normal registration checks; <\/ins> An out-of-band authenticated management interface <\/del> An out-of-band authenticated management interface to configure the registration policy and trust anchors. <\/ins> 4.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5c0ca841475adf0069e841f2835d278159d7bda76101965cb163cc82e591bcbe","title":"","text":"sense for their operational use cases. At least one identifier for an identity document MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE envelope, either \"x5t\" or \"kid\". <\/del> the protected header of the COSE envelope, as one of \"x5t\", \"x5chain\" or \"kid\". <\/ins> Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. Support for \"kid\" is optional. <\/del> Support for \"kid\" and \"x5chain\" is optional. <\/ins> When \"x5t\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. <\/del> When \"x5t\" or \"x5chain\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. <\/ins> The mechanisms for how Transparency Services obtain identity documents is out-of-scope of this document. The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when the \"x5t\" header parameter is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. <\/del> The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when neither \"x5t\" nor \"x5chain\" are present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. <\/ins> The protected header of a Signed Statement and a Receipt MUST include the \"CWT Claims\" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a4dfe3e183727bba353850c823e3bdec6519e53035683063261ac515aaaef899","title":"","text":"The terms \"header\", \"payload\", and \"to-be-signed bytes\" are defined in RFC9052. The terms claim is defined in RFC8392, and is repeated here for readability: <\/ins> 3. In this document, the definition of transparency is intended to build"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e135eea626a9ab3f3477033414db02c1fd9800a4d3872cdf55fcd9d5dc4a42bd","title":"","text":"to allow implementations to make the restrictions that make the most sense for their operational use cases. At least one identifier for an identity document MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE envelope, as one of \"x5t\", \"x5chain\" or \"kid\". Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. Support for \"kid\" and \"x5chain\" is optional. When \"x5t\" or \"x5chain\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. The mechanisms for how Transparency Services obtain identity documents is out-of-scope of this document. The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when neither \"x5t\" nor \"x5chain\" are present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. The protected header of a Signed Statement and a Receipt MUST include the \"CWT Claims\" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE. The \"CWT Claims\" value MUST include the \"Issuer Claim\" (Claim label 1) and the \"Subject Claim\" (Claim label 2) IANA.cwt. A Receipt is a Signed Statement, (cose-sign1), with addition claims in its protected header related to verifying the inclusion proof in its unprotected header. See I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. fig-signed-statement-cddl illustrates a normative CDDL definition for of the protected header for Signed Statements and Receipts. Everything that is optional in the following CDDL can potentially be discovered out of band and Registration Policies are not assured on the presence of these optional fields. A Registration Policy that requires an optional field to be present MUST reject any Signed Statements or Receipts that are invalid according to the policy. fig-signed-statement-edn illustrates a payload that is detached. This is to support very large supply chain artifacts, and to ensure that Transparent Statements can integrate with existing file systems. <\/del> There are many types of Statements (such as SBOMs, malware scans, audit reports, policy definitions) that Issuers may want to turn into Signed Statements. An Issuer must first decide on a suitable format"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1304f1e965aa64128cd7495773965a38514fa3219c848d78d8c186143c63f49b","title":"","text":"Once all the Envelope headers are set, an Issuer MUST use a standard COSE implementation to produce an appropriately serialized Signed Statement (the SCITT tag of \"COSE_Sign1_Tagged\" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed Statement). <\/del> Statement. The SCITT tag \"COSE_Sign1_Tagged\" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed Statement. <\/ins> Issuers may produce Signed Statements about different Artifacts under the same Identity. Issuers and Relying Parties must be able to recognize the Artifact to which the statements pertain by looking at the Signed Statement. The \"iss\" and \"sub\" claims, within the CWT_Claims protected header, are used to identify the Artifact the statement pertains to. See Subject under terminology Terminology. <\/del> statement pertains to. (See Subject under terminology Terminology.) <\/ins> Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by \"kid\" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-96d53a411cc4fdf052793bac8f9822f37bd26a4c8d7e4c538e4bd7ab4bb5435e","title":"","text":"Multiple Issuers can make the same Statement about a single Artifact, affirming multiple Issuers agree. At least one identifier for an identity document MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE envelope, as one of \"x5t\", \"x5chain\" or \"kid\". Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. Support for \"kid\" and \"x5chain\" is optional. When \"x5t\" or \"x5chain\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. The mechanisms for how Transparency Services obtain identity documents is out-of-scope of this document. The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when neither \"x5t\" nor \"x5chain\" are present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. The protected header of a Signed Statement and a Receipt MUST include the \"CWT Claims\" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE. The \"CWT Claims\" value MUST include the \"Issuer Claim\" (Claim label 1) and the \"Subject Claim\" (Claim label 2) IANA.cwt. A Receipt is a Signed Statement, (cose-sign1), with addition claims in its protected header related to verifying the inclusion proof in its unprotected header. See I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. <\/ins> 4.2.1. fig-signed-statement-cddl illustrates a normative CDDL definition for of the protected header for Signed Statements and Receipts. Everything that is optional in the following CDDL can potentially be discovered out of band and Registration Policies are not assured on the presence of these optional fields. A Registration Policy that requires an optional field to be present MUST reject any Signed Statements or Receipts that are invalid according to the policy. fig-signed-statement-edn illustrates an instance of a Signed Statement in EDN, with a payload that is detached. Detached payloads support large artifacts, and ensure Signed Statements can integrate with existing storage systems. fig-signed-statement-protected-header-edn illustrates the decoded protected header of the Signed Statement in fig-signed-statement-edn. It indicates the Signed Statement is securing a JSON content type, and identifying the content with the \"sub\" claim \"vendor.product.example\". 4.3. <\/ins> To register a Signed Statement, the Transparency Service performs the following steps:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-06a6646983aa1751dbc94483143d54bc3a1d7518687ba12716c0745e15372101","title":"","text":"multiple receipts may be attached to the unprotected header of the Signed Statement, creating a Transparent Statement. 4.3. <\/del> 4.4. <\/ins> The Client (which is not necessarily the Issuer) that registers a Signed Statement and receives a Receipt can produce a Transparent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-67506a40dca0570ede76ee26409c3b407752624de53acdb401aed75502b0c418","title":"","text":"fig-transparent-statement-cddl illustrates a normative CDDL definition of Transparent Statements. fig-transparent-statement-edn illustrates a payload that is detached. The unprotected header can contain multiple receipts. <\/del> fig-transparent-statement-edn illustrates a Transparent Statement with a detached payload, and two receipts in its unprotected header. The label 394 \"receipts\" in unprotected header can contain multiple receipts. <\/ins> Notice the verifiable data structure used is RFC9162_SHA256 in this case. We know from the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry that RFC9162_SHA256 is value 1, and that it supports -1 (inclusion proofs) and -2 (consistency proofs). <\/del> fig-receipt-edn one of the decoded Receipt from fig-transparent- statement-edn. The Receipt contains inclusion proofs for verifiable data structures. The unprotected header contains verifiable data structure proofs. See the protected header for details regarding the specific verifiable data structure used. Referencing the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry, RFC9162_SHA256 is value \"1\", which supports \"-1\" (inclusion proofs) and \"-2\" (consistency proofs). <\/ins> Notice the unprotected header contains verifiable data structure proofs, see the protected header for details regarding the specific verifiable data structure used. <\/del> fig-receipt-protected-header-edn illustrates the decoded protected header of the Transparent Statement in fig-transparent-statement-edn. The verifiable data structure (\"-111\") uses \"1\" from (RFC9162_SHA256). <\/ins> This is a decoded inclusion proof for RFC9162_SHA256, other verifiable data structures might encode inclusion proofs differently. <\/del> fig-receipt-inclusion-proof-edn illustrates the decoded inclusion proof from fig-receipt-edn. This inclusion proof indicates that the size of the transparency log was \"8\" at the time the receipt was issued. The structure of this inclusion proof is specific to the verifiable data structure used (RFC9162_SHA256). <\/ins> 4.3.1. <\/del> 4.4.1. <\/ins> Relying Parties MUST apply the verification process as described in Section 4.4 of RFC9052. <\/del> Section 4.4 of RFC9052, when checking the signature of Signed Statements and Receipts. A Relying Party MUST trust the verification key or certificate and the associated identity of at least one issuer of a Receipt. A Relying Party MAY decide to verify only a single Receipt that is acceptable to them, and not check the signature on the Signed Statement or Receipts which rely on verifiable data structures which they do not understand. <\/ins> APIs exposing verification logic for Transparent Statements may provide more details than a single boolean result. For example, an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-9cbe38347f46a8ff4704b85abfd2add6973b19cc0c31874fb362efe32003f330","title":"","text":"is valid, if claims related to the validity period are valid, or if the inclusion proof in the Receipt is valid. The algorithm-specific details of checking inclusion proofs are covered in I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs. The pseudo-code for validation of a transparent statement is as follows: Before checking a Transparent Statement, the Verifier must be configured with one or more identities of trusted Transparency Services. <\/del> Relying Parties MAY be configured to re-verify the Issuer's Signed Statement locally, but this requires a fresh resolution of the Issuer's verification keys, which MAY fail if the key has been revoked. Some Relying Parties MAY decide to locally re-apply some or all of the Registration Policies, if they have limited trust in the Transparency Services. In addition, Relying Parties MAY apply arbitrary validation policies after the Transparent Statement has been verified and validated. Such policies may use as input all information in the Envelope, the Receipt, and the Statement payload, as well as any local state. Relying Parties MAY offer options to store or share the Receipt of the Transparent Statement for auditing the Transparency Services in case a dispute arises. <\/del> Statement locally. In addition, Relying Parties MAY apply arbitrary validation policies after the Transparent Statement has been verified and validated. Such policies may use as input all information in the Envelope, the Receipt, and the Statement payload, as well as any local state. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-181fe6efa865876c9968e62de22e0e679c757e08693a347cf57ac7fa39d04c44","title":"","text":"Transparency Services MUST maintain Registration Policies. Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors used to authenticate Issuers, which MAY be included in a registration policy statement. For instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, the discovery URL of an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE compatible PKI trust anchor. <\/del> Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors, which SHOULD be used by Relying Parties to authenticate Issuers, and which MAY be included in a registration policy statement. For instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, the discovery URL of an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE compatible PKI trust anchor. <\/ins> Registration Policies and trust anchors MUST be made transparent and available to all Relying Parties of the Transparency Service by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7f10bbb8fcaa937f94dbd2b0d0777fbbdb83de4b7c60265b18cd77b88a09e5f2","title":"","text":"4.1.1.1. During registration, a Transparency Service MUST, at a minimum, authenticate the Issuer of the Signed Statement by validating the COSE signature and checking the identity of the issuer against one of its currently configured trust anchors, using the \"x5t\" (34), \"x5chain\"(33) or \"kid\"(4) protected headers of the Signed Statement as hints. For instance, in order to authenticate X.509 Signed Statements, the Transparency Service MUST build and validate a complete certificate chain from the Issuer's certificate identified by \"x5t\", to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service. <\/del> syntactically check the Issuer of the Signed Statement by cryptographically verifying the COSE signature according to RFC9052. The Issuer identity MUST be bound to the Signed Statement by including an identifier in the protected header. If the protected header includes multiple identifiers, all those that are registered by the Transparency Service MUST be checked. For instance, when using X.509 Signed Statements, the Transparency Service MUST build and validate a complete certificate chain from the Issuer's certificate identified by \"x5t\", to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST apply the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log at the time of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3c4bdd2e107e25b331c52ebea52fd2127921ea013fc43850f3ef0acfe608fd58","title":"","text":"Transparency Services MUST ensure that for any Signed Statement they register, enough information is made available to Auditors (either in the Append-only Log and retrievable through audit APIs, or included in the Receipt) to authenticate and retrieve the Transparent Statements describing the registration policy and trust anchors that apply to this registration. <\/del> in the Receipt) to reproduce the Registration checks that were defined by the Registration Policies at the time of Registration. <\/ins> 4.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-0f6f36f98ccf52dfd84667622278186ff647997ae8c443ff9eceda357db68480","title":"","text":"the protected header of the COSE envelope, as one of \"x5t\", \"x5chain\" or \"kid\". Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. <\/del> When using x509, Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. <\/ins> Support for \"kid\" and \"x5chain\" is optional."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-348b6e4fd991fcdcca492a3164acb6c0474ac895537fad4870895b02c3d385ab","title":"","text":" The Transparency Service MUST perform resolution of the Issuer's identity, which may be different than the Client identity. This step may require that the service retrieves the Issuer ID in real- time, or rely on a cache of recent resolutions. For auditing, during Registration, the Transparency Service MUST store evidence of the lookup, including if it was resolved from a cache. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST syntactically validate the Issuer's identity claims, which may be different than the Client identity. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-461028749d824655beef75f60f28d05e8cd369be00616faedd77054f5101bf97","title":"","text":"On its own, verifying a Transparent Statement does not guarantee that its Envelope or contents are trustworthy. Just that they have been signed by the apparent Issuer and counter-signed by the Transparency Service. If the Verifier trusts the Issuer, it can infer that an Issuer's Signed Statement was issued with this Envelope and contents, which may be interpreted as the Issuer saying the Artifact is fit for its intended purpose. If the Verifier trusts the Transparency Service, it can independently infer that the Signed Statement passed the Transparency Service Registration Policy and that has been persisted in the Append-only Log. Unless advertised in the Transparency Service Registration Policy, the Verifier cannot assume that the ordering of Signed Statements in the Append-only Log matches the ordering of their issuance. <\/del> Service. If the Verifier trusts the Issuer, after validation of the Issuer identity, it can infer that an Issuer's Signed Statement was issued with this Envelope and contents, which may be interpreted as the Issuer saying the Artifact is fit for its intended purpose. If the Verifier trusts the Transparency Service, it can independently infer that the Signed Statement passed the Transparency Service Registration Policy and that has been persisted in the Append-only Log. Unless advertised in the Transparency Service Registration Policy, the Verifier cannot assume that the ordering of Signed Statements in the Append-only Log matches the ordering of their issuance. <\/ins> Similarly, the fact that an Issuer can be held accountable for its Transparent Statements does not on its own provide any mitigation or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-93b293c8bd3a1fac3e600c9be2f251fa49baf3b68a0e69c5fab00d2457ae7957","title":"","text":"SCITT provides the following security guarantees: Statements made by Issuers about supply chain Artifacts are identifiable, authentic, and non-repudiable <\/del> identifiable, can be authenticated, and once authenticated, are non-repudiable <\/ins> Statement provenance and history can be independently and consistently audited"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-08153e0cf5358da197ed765dc693f69719020260a222c6ed9f386b8d4b6787b7","title":"","text":"Transparency Services MUST ensure that for any Signed Statement they register, enough information is made available to Auditors (either in the Append-only Log and retrievable through audit APIs, or included in the Receipt) to authenticate and retrieve the Transparent Statements describing the registration policy and trust anchors that apply to this registration. <\/del> in the Receipt) to authenticate and retrieve the Signed Statements describing the registration policy and trust anchors that apply to this registration. <\/ins> 4.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-03d18280e2dbc363c3daf8407e38e86d543dc4c81252e4b9fa14ac976effd7d4","title":"","text":"that is supporting a software package management system, might be referenced from the APIs exposed for package management. Providing an ability to request a fresh receipt for a given software package, or to request a list of Signed Statements and Artifacts associated with a software package. <\/del> or to request a list of Signed Statements associated with the software package. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1964aee70295d29f1e2294a875961eebf6a24194560425d571e2c1cbd5ded796","title":"","text":"Transparency Service has added this Signed Statement to its Append- only Log. The WG is discussing if existing CWT claims might better support these design principles. <\/del> fig-transparent-statement-cddl illustrates a normative CDDL definition of Transparent Statements."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3f0a06519588b88e720a964ce4e1255edf3c6918a478a73e4faba1ef6fcc3c94","title":"","text":"only Log using a combination of trusted hardware, replication and consensus protocols, and cryptographic evidence. A Receipt is an offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is recorded in the Append-only Log. Receipts do not expire, but it is possible to append new entries (more recent Signed Statements) that subsume older entries (less recent Signed Statements). <\/del> the Append-only Log. Receipts do not have an expiration time, but the corresponding key material could. Requesting a refreshed receipt can result in the same receipt with a different signature or signature with a different signing algorithm. <\/ins> Anyone with access to the Transparency Service can independently verify its consistency and review the complete list of Transparent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-fc7f069f50682fa0e52fac558a783aae9e427f9b5d16ba3857ccbad0043760c2","title":"","text":"only Log using a combination of trusted hardware, replication and consensus protocols, and cryptographic evidence. A Receipt is an offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is recorded in the Append-only Log. Receipts do not expire, but it is possible to append new entries (more recent Signed Statements) that subsume older entries (less recent Signed Statements). <\/del> the Append-only Log. Requesting a receipt can result in the production of a new receipt for the same signed statement. A Receipt's verification key, signing algorithm, validity period, header parameters or other claims MAY change each time a Receipt is produced. <\/ins> Anyone with access to the Transparency Service can independently verify its consistency and review the complete list of Transparent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-dc352585d11628fe40b7496ff1bf794f9262dd247e09de018afdcbc0dbcaefa8","title":"","text":"are capitalized. To ensure readability, only a core set of terms is included in this section. : <\/del> The terms \"header\", \"payload\", and \"to-be-signed bytes\" are defined in RFC9052."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3a98eadf8fbc63645464e76a9cc49a1d616b0ffad69abc797f27fc457119e5ec","title":"","text":"Statement a Transparent Statement is produced. Receipts are based on Signed Inclusion Proofs as described in COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs). <\/del> Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs) that also provides the COSE header parameter semantics for label 394. <\/ins> The Registration time is defined as the timestamp at which the Transparency Service has added this Signed Statement to its Append-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-8d07d505b9df00d4cf6ead341e2bf9c46a2888e7d86385f722d5b35d703bd480","title":"","text":"fig-transparent-statement-edn illustrates a Transparent Statement with a detached payload, and two Receipts in its unprotected header. The label 394 \"receipts\" in unprotected header can contain multiple Receipts. <\/del> The type of label 394 \"receipts\" in the unprotected header is a CBOR array that can contain one or more Receipts (each entry encoded as a .cbor encoded Receipts). <\/ins> fig-receipt-edn one of the decoded Receipt from fig-transparent- statement-edn. The Receipt contains inclusion proofs for verifiable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3f936fd4068e38d9ede470cd2aaaf16262bdddea0067ed23e334c90e7ea4a7e1","title":"","text":"7. TBD; mybody. <\/del> 7.1. This section requests registration of the following media types RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.media-types in the manner described in RFC6838. To indicate that the content is an scitt configuration represented as JSON: Type name: application Subtype name: scitt-configuration+json Required parameters: n\/a Optional parameters: n\/a Encoding considerations: binary; application\/scitt- configuration+json values are represented as a JSON Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object. Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of TBD. Interoperability considerations: n\/a Published specification: TBD Applications that use this media type: TBD Fragment identifier considerations: n\/a Additional information: Magic number(s): n\/a File extension(s): n\/a Macintosh file type code(s): n\/a Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: none Author: TBD Change Controller: IETF Provisional registration? No <\/del> Pending WG discussion. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-905295d5d03677bcd809b84d2b0266a4ce9981d4e7dc2fab904a7ae814d01432","title":"","text":"Multiple Issuers can make the same Statement about a single Artifact, affirming multiple Issuers agree. At least one identifier for an identity document MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of \"x5t\" or \"kid\". Additionally, \"x5chain\" that corresponds to either \"x5t\" or \"kid\" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. <\/del> At least one identifier representing one credential MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of \"x5t\" or \"kid\". Additionally, \"x5chain\" that corresponds to either \"x5t\" or \"kid\" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. <\/ins> When using x509, Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-efc316783f9606ac66b7822347d1e64eefbed5857d6c633552c84801e37db324","title":"","text":"and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. The mechanisms for how Transparency Services obtain identity documents is out-of-scope of this document. <\/del> The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when \"x5t\" is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-9f59562e3adec5d5d3999885b3abc56037509ca1c2d085dc87279d285ce3b480","title":"","text":"proof of Registration by a Transparency Service, in the form of a Receipt that countersigns the Signed Statement and witnesses its inclusion in the Append-only Log of a Transparency Service. By extension, the document may say an Artifact (a firmware binary) is transparent if it comes with one or more Transparent Statements from its author or owner, though the context should make it clear what type of Signed Statements is expected for a given Artifact. <\/del> extension, the Signed Statement may say an Artifact (for example, a firmware binary) is transparent if it comes with one or more Transparent Statements from its author or owner, though the context should make it clear what type of Signed Statements is expected for a given Artifact. <\/ins> Transparency does not prevent dishonest or compromised Issuers, but it holds them accountable. Any Artifact that may be verified, is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3205ffe88afd9c0f2e2f7472b77dad630bba96c74dc9721bbb3ca502799ddb2c","title":"","text":"Artifacts, from the build and supply of software and IoT devices to advanced manufacturing and food supply. SCITT is a generalization of Certificate Transparency RFC9162, which can be interpreted as a transparency architecture for the supply chain of X.509 certificates. Considering CT in terms of SCITT: <\/del> SCITT is a generalization of Certificate Transparency (CT) RFC9162, which can be interpreted as a transparency architecture for the supply chain of X.509 certificates. Considering CT in terms of SCITT: <\/ins> CAs (Issuers) sign X.509 TBSCertificates (Artifacts) to produce X.509 certificates (Signed Statements) <\/del> CAs (Issuers) sign the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate structure to produce an X.509 certificate (Signed Statements) <\/ins> CAs submit the certificates to one or more CT logs (Transparency Services)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-03642cf929b4f916fa10ac1958d217119fe91a6b63894471b485063712751ad1","title":"","text":"Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors, which SHOULD be used by Relying Parties to authenticate Issuers, and which MAY be included in a Registration Policy statement. For instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, the discovery URL of an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE compatible PKI trust anchor. <\/del> instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, a pointer to an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE- compatible trust anchor. <\/ins> Registration Policies and trust anchors MUST be made transparent and available to all Relying Parties of the Transparency Service by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ff278ad4975cfdabb77333e14c410ad05f8fb4d3cf533b0449d0412d46e1f4d8","title":"","text":"identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. When using x509, Support for \"x5t\" is mandatory to implement. <\/del> When using x.509 certificates, support for \"x5t\" is REQUIRED to implement. <\/ins> Support for \"kid\" in the protected header and \"x5chain\" in the unprotected heaer is optional. <\/del> unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. <\/ins> When \"x5t\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-304ff5639f10a16ac50c653597e0a5cdd19c743d5063be8591de1134f32e4b2a","title":"","text":" A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service, to Register Signed Statements on behalf of one or more Issuers. Authentication and authorization is implementation-specific, and out of scope of the SCITT Architecture. <\/del> A Client authenticates with the Transparency Service before registering Signed Statements on behalf of one or more Issuers. Authentication and authorization are implementation-specific and out of scope of the SCITT architecture. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST syntactically validate the Issuer's identity Claims, which may be different than the Client identity. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification, as defined in RFC9052, and MAY perform additional checks as part of its Registration Policy. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1b52dd9a5c8afc86022a3d1729d3436e79ce28d876efc77fb0db61fcf30d107c","title":"","text":"The Transparency Service MUST check that the Signed Statement includes the required protected headers listed above. The Transparency Service MAY verify the Statement payload format, content and other optional properties. <\/del> includes the required protected headers. The Transparency Service MAY validate the Signed Statement payload in order to enforce domain specific registration policies that apply to specific content types. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-78eab1dbf304b32b67b2a709f840babe2e8dc2aa6c8d4f569d66edde5c85f94c","title":"","text":", which MAY be asynchronous from Registration. The Transparency Service MUST be able to provide a Receipt for all registered Statements. A Receipt for a Signed Statement MAY be provided asynchronously. Details about generating Receipts are described in Receipt. <\/del> Signed Statements. Details about generating Receipts are described in Receipt. <\/ins> The last two steps may be shared between a batch of Signed Statements recorded in the Append-only Log."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-2d729ef77ffc52de9c6dda4f8e357a22d49a4dda4e279b9fc61a936edb0b947d","title":"","text":"Signed Statement can be tampered with by a malicious Transparency Service (e.g., one that does not incorporate remote attestation), which may replace the intermediate certificates and ultimately connect to an unexpected root. This modification can allow malicious TS to forge Claims that look genuine except for the wrong trust anchor. Auditors MUST perform certification path validation in accordance with PKIX rules specified in RFC5280. In particular, Auditors MUST verify that certification paths chain to one or more trust anchors (often represented as root certificates). <\/del> connect to an unexpected root. This modification helps protect against person-in-the-middle attacks, but not denial-of-service. Auditors MUST perform certification path validation in accordance with PKIX rules specified in RFC5280. In particular, Auditors MUST verify that certification paths chain to one or more trust anchors (often represented as root certificates). <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-aadd6a219a789ec7c341aa40ed60747bd37e20c3d2b9316a0dbf1a1bc2b55ead","title":"","text":"be used to protect against malicious or vulnerable replicas. Threshold signatures may be use to protect the service key, etc. Issuers and Transparency Services MUST rotate verification keys for signature checking in well-defined cryptoperiods (see KEY- MANAGEMENT). <\/del> Issuers and Transparency Services MUST rotate their keys in well- defined cryptoperiods, see KEY-MANAGEMENT. <\/ins> A Transparency Service MAY provide additional authenticity assurances about its secure implementation and operation, enabling remote"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f3e72148a7b5e2dac9381b1d16f3ef97172745ef50077b7471e1253323483a4d","title":"","text":"5. Transparency Services are often publicly accessible. Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible. In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. Transparency Services can have an authorization policy controlling who can access the Append-only Log. While this can be used to limit who can read the Log, it may also limit the usefulness of the system. Some jurisdictions have a Right to be Forgotten. However, once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. <\/del> Transparency Services MAY support anonymous access, Issuers MUST ensure Signed Statements submitted to public access services are acceptable for public disclosure. In this case, Signed Statements MUST NOT carry confidential information. Once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. In some deployments, a Relaying Party, such as an Auditor, might require access to Signed Statements and Statements, which can be made available through adjacent services. Transparency Services MUST enforce access control to the Append-only Log. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-8e47bb9ae8ccdeb33ccd1d951c7f6e6d7b019a86466fe79996c8df941befc9b1","title":"","text":"who can access the Append-only Log. While this can be used to limit who can read the Log, it may also limit the usefulness of the system. Some jurisdictions have a Right to be Forgotten. However, once a Signed Statement is inserted into the Append-only Log maintained by a Transparency Service, it cannot be removed from the Log. <\/del> Once a cryptographic digest of the Signed Statement is registered on the Append-only Log, the registration cannot be removed from the Append-only Log. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f04c45d77229a995dad8c756875163bc398a3097046a91e42967f5f551d6c16b","title":"","text":"5. Transparency Services are often publicly accessible. Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible. In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. <\/del> Issuers should treat Signed Statements (rendering them as Transparent Statements) as publicly accessible. In particular, a Signed Statement Envelope and Statement payload should not carry any private information in plaintext. <\/ins> Transparency Services can have an authorization policy controlling who can access the Append-only Log. While this can be used to limit"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e968cef4d6c6b4da2897efa5eb23904856b4f128d7220c702d3d49fab910a215","title":"","text":"Implementations of Transparency Services may protect their Append- only Log using a combination of trusted hardware, replication and consensus protocols, and cryptographic evidence. A Receipt is an offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is recorded in <\/del> offline, universally-verifiable proof that an entry is registered in <\/ins> the Append-only Log. Requesting a receipt can result in the production of a new receipt for the same signed statement. A Receipt's verification key, signing algorithm, validity period,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-d2be43464ce71bbdfdd60c28a73b496697e921941f29e645d942deca11c1dc20","title":"","text":"4.1. Transparency Services MUST feature an Append-only Log. The Append- only Log is the verifiable data structure that records Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. <\/del> only Log is the verifiable data structure that records registered Signed Statements and supports the production of Receipts. <\/ins> All Transparency Services MUST expose APIs for the Registration of Signed Statements and issuance of Receipts."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-abc888766090a8e6c44b44975e2b122711c9caf2c69632b31da5e27513ef6a1f","title":"","text":"in Receipt. The last two steps may be shared between a batch of Signed Statements recorded in the Append-only Log. <\/del> registered in the Append-only Log. <\/ins> A Transparency Service MUST ensure that a Signed Statement is registered before releasing its Receipt."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ef209b5d404f08ebbbc52321e07807230cc1535544da57bb905d1dbbc067a154","title":"","text":"If a Transparency Service is honest, then a Transparent Statement including a correct Receipt ensures that the associated Signed Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded <\/del> Statement passed its Registration Policy and was registered <\/ins> appropriately. Conversely, a corrupt Transparency Service may:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-567d99462d26dc957029670722705f1c678b9eaa6364691f12c19593e60c25c2","title":"","text":"header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope, to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service. An \"x5chain\" with a leaf certificate that corresponds to the \"x5t\" value MAY be included in the unprotected header in support of certain supply chain scenarios. <\/del> the \"x5t\" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST apply the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log at the time of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-063c59e3f29a0d41c0b00240268897995afedea2a154938cb5cbd7006b0d0ed2","title":"","text":"statement-edn. The Receipt contains inclusion proofs for verifiable data structures. The unprotected header contains verifiable data structure proofs. See the protected header for details regarding the specific verifiable data structure used. Referencing the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry, RFC9162_SHA256 is value \"1\", which supports \"-1\" (inclusion proofs) and \"-2\" (consistency proofs). <\/del> specific verifiable data structure used. Per the COSE Verifiable Data Structure Registry documented in I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs, the COSE key type RFC9162_SHA256 is value \"1\". Labels identify inclusion proofs (\"-1\") and consistency proofs (\"-2\"). <\/ins> fig-receipt-protected-header-edn illustrates the decoded protected header of the Transparent Statement in fig-transparent-statement-edn."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-edb746259e5593f4878766c9c6d53a32a3db20ad19268bbe78df834dfb94c2e9","title":"","text":"Support for \"kid\" in the protected header and \"x5chain\" in the unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. When \"x5t\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string with a value between 1 and 8192 characters in length that fits the regular expression of a distinguished name. <\/del> When \"x5t\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392. The \"iss\" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. <\/ins> The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when \"x5t\" is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-0cd81d8979248a0b4dd7e7b44e274ec700562526d12ba9fe8bcce76a6646ce4a","title":"","text":"COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs. This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: <\/del> fig-concept-relationship illustrates entities and processes that comprise a Transparency Service independent of any one use case. <\/ins> Issuers and Signed Statements <\/del> This section describes the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: <\/ins> Transparency Service and the registration process <\/del> Issuers that use their credentials to create Signed Statements about Artifacts <\/ins> Relying Parties of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process <\/del> Transparency Services that evaluate Signed Statements against Registration Policies, producing Receipts upon successful Registration. The returned Receipt may be combined with the Signed Statement to create a Transparent Statement. Relying Parties that: collect Receipts of Signed Statements for subsequent registration of Transparent Statements; retrieve Transparent Statements for analysis of Statements about Artifacts themselves (e.g. verification); or replay all the Transparent Statements to check for the consistency of the Transparency Service's Append-only Log (e.g. auditing) <\/ins> The subsequent sections describe the main concepts, namely Transparency Service, Signed Statements, Registration, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-84bc3d9af25c68059eeee64cd6183b1c04dcdba710ab778931e82a7d37a8770e","title":"","text":"CT logs produce Signed Certificate Timestamps (Transparent Statements) Signed Certificate Timestamps are checked by Relying Parties <\/del> Signed Certificate Timestamps, Signed Tree Heads, and their respective consistency proofs are checked by Relying Parties <\/ins> The Append-only Log can be checked by Auditors"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-029536b98b5f5f2ccbfc3ddd6b548015df6584d129db0243e196d2acd896920b","title":"","text":"Statement pertains to. (See Subject under terminology Terminology.) Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by \"kid\" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed <\/del> protected header) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed <\/ins> Statements under the same key. An Issuer can make multiple Statements about the same Artifact. For"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-6aa3363adf42613e7ad76fdce61bf88bf6ba598f8bee512aef4d92bf9cc08c37","title":"","text":"(see RFC8610) for of the protected header and unprotected header of Signed Statements and Receipts. Everything that is optional in the following CDDL definition can potentially be discovered out of band and Registration Policies are not assured on the presence of these optional fields. A Registration Policy that requires an optional field to be present MUST reject any Signed Statements or Receipts that are invalid according to the Registration Policy. <\/del> This definition specifies the minimal mandatory labels. Implementation-specific Registration Policies may define additional mandatory labels. A Transparency Service implementation MUST reject registering Signed Statements that do not meet their current Registration Policy requirements. Each implementation SHOULD provide details for their registration policies through documentation or discovery APIs. <\/ins> fig-signed-statement-edn illustrates an instance of a Signed Statement in Extended Diagnostic Notation (EDN), with a payload that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4c76b333628c4dddff7542573e90f77678cf1e5ef4a8c36f6c7c0924e6bbe5cf","title":"","text":"Statement is accepted to be registered to the Append-only Log. Transparency Services MUST maintain Registration Policies. Transparency Services MUST also maintain a list of trust anchors, which SHOULD be used by Relying Parties to authenticate Issuers, and which MAY be included in a Registration Policy statement. For <\/del> Transparency Services MUST maintain a list of trust anchors (see definition of trust anchor in RFC4949). Transparency Services MUST authenticate signed statements as part of a Registration Policy. For <\/ins> instance, a trust anchor could be an X.509 root certificate, a pointer to an OpenID Connect identity provider, or any other COSE- compatible trust anchor."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-94ddedab283202f621139b61f73c746e0b6976b1b195f0674ff2c97748b0295b","title":"","text":"COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-ietf-cose-merkle- tree-proofs. This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: <\/del> fig-concept-relationship illustrates the three main roles and associated processes that comprise a Transparency Service, independent of any one use case. <\/ins> Issuers and Signed Statements <\/del> Issuers that use their credentials to create Signed Statements about Artifacts. Issuer Credentials are also used to verify the Signed Statements within the Transparency Service registration process, and Transparent Statements. <\/ins> Transparency Service and the registration process <\/del> Transparency Services that evaluate Signed Statements against Registration Policies, using credentials to sign Receipts upon successful Registration. <\/ins> Relying Parties of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process <\/del> Relying Parties that: collect Receipts, combining them with the Signed Statements to create a Transparent Statement; retrieve Transparent Statements for analysis of Statements about Artifacts; uses credentials to authenticate the Signed Statement and the Receipts of the Transparent Statement (e.g. verification); replay segments of Transparent Statements checking for the consistency of the Transparency Service's Append-only Log (e.g. auditing) In addition, fig-concept-relationship illustrates multiple Transparency Services and multiple Receipts as a single Signed Statement MAY be registered with one or more Transparency Service. Each Transparency Service produces a Receipt, which may be aggregated in a single Transparent Statement, demonstrating the Signed Statement was registered by multiple Transparency Services. The arrows indicate the flow of information. <\/ins> The subsequent sections describe the main concepts, namely Transparency Service, Signed Statements, Registration, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e776b01a1c460bc9562f65be0b253a31635245768063129f7193969dec2b025a","title":"","text":"use is unavoidable, keys MUST NOT sign any other message that may be verified as an Envelope as part of a Signed Statement. Each of these functions MUST be carefully protected against both external attacks and internal misbehavior by some or all of the operators of the Transparency Service. <\/del> For instance, the code for the Registration Policy evaluation and endorsement may be protected by running in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7594491944d91cdf1e05d59393fc76993b151e25f837eb44bc1cf19e32c53b1d","title":"","text":"by the Transparency Service MUST be checked. In essence, when using X.509 Signed Statements, the Transparency Service MUST build and validate a complete certificate chain from the Issuer's certificate identified by \"x5t\" located in the protected header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope, to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor of the Transparency Service. An \"x5chain\" with a leaf certificate that corresponds to the \"x5t\" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. <\/del> Service MUST build and validate a complete certification path from an Issuer's certificate to one of the root certificates most recently registered as a trust anchor by the Transparency Service. The protected header of the COSE_Sign1 Envelope MUST include either the Issuer's certificate as \"x5t\" or the chain including the Issuer's certificate as \"x5chain\". If \"x5t\" is included in the protected header, an \"x5chain\" with a leaf certificate corresponding to the \"x5t\" value MAY be included in the unprotected header. <\/ins> The Transparency Service MUST apply the Registration Policy that was most recently added to the Append-only Log at the time of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-ca4ab71dac4cac9a1d9bfaed477b07a9fd41b1098755ac8545c99da290fb799e","title":"","text":"affirming multiple Issuers agree. At least one identifier representing one credential MUST be included in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of \"x5t\" or \"kid\". Additionally, \"x5chain\" that corresponds to either \"x5t\" or \"kid\" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. <\/del> in the protected header of the COSE Envelope, as one of \"x5t\", \"x5chain\" or \"kid\". Additionally, \"x5chain\" that corresponds to either \"x5t\" or \"kid\" identifying the leaf certificate in the included certification path MAY be included in the unprotected header of the COSE Envelope. <\/ins> When using x.509 certificates, support for \"x5t\" is REQUIRED to implement. <\/del> When using x.509 certificates, support for either \"x5t\" or \"x5chain\" in the protected header is REQUIRED to implement. <\/ins> Support for \"kid\" in the protected header and \"x5chain\" in the unprotected header is OPTIONAL to implement. When \"x5t\" is present, \"iss\" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392. The \"iss\" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. <\/del> When \"x5t\" or \"x5chain\" is present in the protected header, \"iss\" MUST be a string that meets URI requirements defined in RFC8392. The \"iss\" value's length MUST be between 1 and 8192 characters in length. <\/ins> The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when \"x5t\" is not present. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. <\/del> The \"kid\" header parameter MUST be present when neither \"x5t\" nor \"x5chain\" is present in the protected header. Key discovery protocols are out-of-scope of this document. <\/ins> The protected header of a Signed Statement and a Receipt MUST include the \"CWT Claims\" header parameter as specified in CWT_CLAIMS_COSE."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a6acc0c6414b37d9f30152561970661283bd8e81fc773f41aaf6b27ebcb404ec","title":"","text":" The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification, as defined in RFC9052, and MAY perform additional checks as part of its Registration Policy. The Transparency Service MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement, as described in RFC9360, using the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer. The Transparency Service MUST check that the Signed Statement includes the required protected headers. The Transparency Service MAY validate the Signed Statement payload in order to enforce domain specific registration policies that apply to specific content types. <\/del> The Transparency Service MUST perform signature verification per RFC9052 and MUST verify the signature of the Signed Statement with the signature algorithm and verification key of the Issuer per RFC9360. The Transparency Service MUST also check the Signed Statement includes the required protected headers. The Transparency Service MAY validate the Signed Statement payload in order to enforce domain specific registration policies that apply to specific content types. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5421e264174be6e8e5438630af0a4c692145419b1b4a2dfa387ee03af21becb6","title":"","text":"contents of the Registry at the time of registration, and must then yield the same result. The ordering of entries, their cryptographic contents, and the <\/del> the ordering of entries, their cryptographic contents, and the <\/ins> Registry governance may be non-deterministic, but they must be verifiable. A Transparency Services SHOULD store evidence about the resolution <\/del> a Transparency Services SHOULD store evidence about the resolution <\/ins> of distributed identifiers into manifests. A Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of <\/del> a Transparency Service MAY additionally support verifiability of <\/ins> client authentication and access control. 5.2.3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-26e412198dc508f06e6b29cd374fb192e1d80343ecd9e0ed75493f6fee7cd3eb","title":"","text":"Many Issuers issue Signed Statements about different Artifacts under the same DID, so it is important for everyone to be able to immediately recognize by looking at the Envelope of a Signed Statments what Artifact it is referring to. This information is <\/del> Statements what Artifact it is referring to. This information is <\/ins> stored in the Feed header of the Envelope. Issuers MAY use different signing keys (identified by \"kid\" in the resolved key manifest) for different Artifacts, or sign all Signed Statements under the same"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-b061159a937d884b60644f1150e0ae21d90607e71f4b477c8210db6cadd137e8","title":"","text":"COSE Envelope of the Signed Statement. The key of the map entry corresponds to the name of the policy, while its value (including its type) is policy-specific. For instance, the \"register_by\" policy defines the maximum timestamp by which a Signed Statemnet can be <\/del> defines the maximum timestamp by which a Signed Statement can be <\/ins> registered, hence the associated value contains an unsigned integer. While this design ensures that all verifiers get the same guarantee"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-3580faee07b6e05455404d4f8bc419dac5940843f3d11af4660e12ad305cc3cc","title":"","text":"details. Some Verifiers may systematically resolve Issuer DIDs to fetch the latest corresponding DID documents. This behaviour strictly enforces <\/del> latest corresponding DID documents. This behavior strictly enforces <\/ins> the revocation of compromised keys: once the Issuer has updated its Statement to remove a key identifier, all Signed Statements include the corresponding \"kid\" will be rejected. However, others may"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-9fd01348eed9dcf62f8e8e2ec1fd9e1f53fa0cf8a5948ea81102f7e689ccc881","title":"","text":"latest version, Issuers SHOULD use the \"sequence_no\" or \"issuer_ts\" attributes. Once all the Envelope headers are set, an Issuer SHOULD use a standard COSE implementation to produce an appropriately serialized Signed Statement (the SCITT tag of \"COSE_Sign1_Tagged\" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed <\/del> Once all the Envelope headers are set, an Issuer MUST use a standard COSE implementation to produce an appropriately serialized Signed Statement (the SCITT tag of \"COSE_Sign1_Tagged\" is outside the scope of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed <\/ins> Statement). 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-80385547bb2407bd98eae9bc9c60da1d127250f1a49891b69ae4a64c6ebfe721","title":"","text":"Signed Statement Issuers rely on being discoverable and represented as the responsible parties for their registered Signed Statements via Transparency Services in a believable manner. Analogously, <\/del> Transparency Services in a believable manner. The issuer of a Signed Statement should be authenticated and authorized according to the registration policy of the transparency service. Analogously, <\/ins> Transparent Statement Consumers rely on verifiable trustworthiness assertions associated with Transparent Statements and their processing provenance in a believable manner. If trust can be put into the operations that record Signed Statements (i.e., a believable notarization function) in a secure, append-only Registry via online operations, the same trust can be put into a corresponding Receipt that is the resulting documentation of these online operations issued by the Transparency Services and that can be validated in offline operations. <\/del> into the operations that record Signed Statements in a secure, append-only log via online operations, the same trust can be put into the resulting transparent statement, issued by the Transparency Services and that can be validated in offline operations. <\/ins> The Transparency Services specified in this architecture can be implemented by various different types of services in various types"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-14414ad2dcde30ad32f1119c50b5c8e8899685463cc9be669c9619324e1e8be1","title":"","text":"components are based on the Concise Signing and Encryption standard specified in RFC9052, which is used to sign released Statements about Artifacts and to build and maintain a Merkle tree that functions as an append-only Registry for corresponding Signed Statements. The format and verification process for Registry-based transparency receipts are described in I-D.birkholz-scitt-receipts. <\/del> an append-only Registry for corresponding Signed Statements. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-7f67c8c1550f92e32e29725249b789d1352ac199c8dd5fff1fe042f269d10156","title":"","text":"The SCITT architecture consists of a very loose federation of Transparency Services, and a set of common formats and protocols for issuing, registering and auditing Transparent Statements. In order to accommodate as many Transparency Service implementations as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed <\/del> issuing, registering and auditing Transparent Statements. In order to accommodate as many Transparency Service implementations as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed <\/ins> Statements (which must be used by all Issuers) and a very thin wrapper format for Receipts, which specifies the Transparency Service identity and the Registry algorithm. Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specific to the Registry algorithm. The I- D.birkholz-scitt-receipts document defines two initial Registry algorithms (for historical and sparse Merkle Trees), but other Registry formats (such as blockchains, or hybrid historical and indexed Merkle Trees) may be proposed later. <\/del> identity and the agility parameters for the Merkle Tree Proof. Most of the details of the Receipt's contents are specified in the COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. <\/ins> In this section, a high level the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-97f38c3a67928356cdf22da55d84d8a263fc5732fe94433969f860564084cb94","title":"","text":"Trees, sparse\/indexed Merkle Trees, full blockchains, and many other variants. The Registry is only required to support concise Receipts (i.e., whose size grows at most logarithmically in the number of entries in the Registry). This does not necessarily rule out blockchains as a Registry, but may necessitate advanced Receipt schemes that use arguments of knowledge and other verifiable computing techniques. Since the details of how to verify a Receipt are specific to the data structure, no particular Registry format is specified in this document. Instead, two initial formats for Registry in I-D.birkholz- scitt-receipts using historical and sparse Merkle Trees are proposed. Beyond the format of Receipts, generic properties that should be satisfied by the components in the Transparency Services that have the ability to write to the Registry are required. <\/del> entries in the Registry) that can be encoded as a COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proof. It is possible to offer multiple signature algorithms for the COSE signature of receipts' Signed Merkle Tree, or to change the signing algorithm at a later points. However, the Merkle Tree algorithm (including its internal hash function) cannot easily be changed without beaking the consistency of the Registry. It is possible to maintain separate Registries for each algorithm in parallel but the Transparency Service is then responsible for proving their mutual consistency. <\/ins> 5.2.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-04ce0d6c643a58e091fecaf168cec3f116012c945847b57afbde679a49bf077a","title":"","text":"headers: Receipts (label: \"TBD\", temporary: \"394\"): Array of Receipts, defined in <\/del> defined below. This allows the Receipt to be attached to the Signed Statement, thus making a Transparent Statement. <\/ins> In CDDL RFC8610 notation, the Envelope is defined as follows: 6.2. Receipts are based on COSE Signed Merkle Tree Proofs (I-D.draft- steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs) with an additional wrapper structure that adds the following information: version: Receipt version number; this should be set to \"0\" for implementation of this document. We envision that future version of SCITT may add support for more complex receipts; for instance, registrations on multiple TS, receipts for dependency graphs and endorsements of Signed Claims, etc. ts_identifier: The DID of the Transparency Service that issued the claim. Verifiers MAY use this DID as a key discovery mechanism to verify the COSE Merkle Root signature; in this case the verification is the same as for Signed Claims and the signer should include the Key ID header. Verifiers MUST support the \"did:web\" method, all other methods are optional. We also introduce the following requirements for the COSE signature of the Merkle Root: The SCITT version header MUST be included and its value match the \"version\" field of the Receipt stucture. The DID of issuer header (like in Signed Claims) MUST be included and its value match the \"ts_identifier\" field of the Receipt structure. TS MAY include the Registration policy info header to indicate to verifiers what policies have been applied at the registration of this claim. Since -COSEMTP uses optional headers, the \"crit\" header (id: 2) MUST be included and all SCITT-specific headers (version, issuer DID and Registration Policy) MUST be marked critical. The following registration policies are built-in and MAY be used by verifiers to help decide the trustworthiness of the Transparent Statement: Registration time: the timestamp at which the TS has added this Signed Claim to its Registry DID Manifest: the manifest that was retured by resolving the DID of the issuer at registration, according to the TS. Sequence number: the sequence number of this statement with relation to other statements with the same issuer and feed. There is no guarantee that all Signed Statements are registered with contiguous sequence numbers; only that it is monotonic and follows the issuer sequence numbers. 6.3. <\/ins> There are many types of Statements (such as SBOMs, malware scans, audit reports, policy definitions) that Issuers may want to turn into Signed Statements. An Issuer must first decide on a suitable format"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-28e5933d7f03577b3492643e2286339a7e1e2b00fcc6b6c4dd0b8692d2e1630a","title":"","text":"of COSE, and used to indicate that a signed object is a Signed Statement). 6.3. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> Transparency Service implementations MUST indicate their support for registration policies and MUST check that all the policies indicated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a56c796ef12abb69bf53814f71961c1c2f557af1ea847a99832d84fb0bde1e7d","title":"","text":"guarantee out of the registration policies regardless of where it is registered. 6.4. <\/del> 6.5. <\/ins> The same Signed Statement may be independently registered in multiple Transparency Services. To register a Signed Statement, the service"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-75280c07441a5dab36f74e29f3f33a5583b9eb011f32051d12bb63840182272d","title":"","text":"re-issue Receipts for the Registry content, for instance after a transient fault during Signed Statement Registration. 6.5. <\/del> 6.6. <\/ins> This section provides additional implementation considerations. The high-level validation algorithm is described in validation; the Registry-specific details of checking Receipts are covered in I- D.birkholz-scitt-receipts. <\/del> Registry-specific details of checking Receipts are covered in -COMTRE. <\/ins> Before checking a Transparent Statement, the Verifier must be configured with one or more identities of trusted Transparency"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-281db326c15dd3b774e8459522de2ed1044c185e2152f242d85cf6d2fea8d297","title":"","text":"Error code: \"entryNotFound\" The retrieved Receipt may be embedded in the corresponding COSE_Sign1 document in the unprotected header, see draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts (TODO [1]: replace with final reference). <\/del> document in the unprotected header. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-e97afb1cd028bb629c42baf61191d3c6bcfada5ec678502c60316a46b1e1ad41","title":"","text":"Repository: http:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/scitt Index value: No transformation needed. 12. References 12.1. URIs [1] more error codes to be defined, see [#17](https:\/\/github.com\/ ietf-wg-scitt\/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture\/issues\/17) <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-a498b9f0e1e86f2897c991c15886a573d41c54b793a3c8fb5b4b125fbfc70c51","title":"","text":"in how each Transparency Service is implemented and operates. Each service MAY enforce its own Registration Policy for authorizing entities to register their Signed Statements to the append-only Log. Some Transparency Services may also enforce role based access control (RBAC) policies limiting who can write, read and audit specific Feeds or the full Registry. It is critical to provide interoperability for all Transparency Services instances as the composition and configuration of involved supply chain entities and their system components is ever-changing and always in flux. <\/del> Some Transparency Services may also enforce authorization policies limiting who can write, read and audit specific Feeds or the full registry. It is critical to provide interoperability for all Transparency Services instances as the composition and configuration of involved supply chain entities and their system components is ever-changing and always in flux. <\/ins> A Transparency Services provides visibility into Signed Statements associated with various supply chains and their sub-systems. These"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-f1e1d7b5bd0bf46ad73e03aab89a65e361b9b7d847efc9abc461b29bb3d519c4","title":"","text":"Signed Statement about an Artifact. Issuers may Register new Signed Statements about Artifacts, but they cannot delete or alter Signed Statements previously added to the append-only Log. A Transparency Service may restrict access to Signed Statements through Role Based Access Control, however third parties such as Auditors would be <\/del> Service may restrict access to Signed Statements through access control policies. However, third parties (such as Auditors) would be <\/ins> granted access as needed to attest to the validity of the Artifact, Feed or entirety of the Transparency Service. <\/del> Feed or the entirety of the Transparency Service. <\/ins> Trust in the Transparency Service itself is supported both by protecting their implementation (using, for instance, replication,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-1af72e372c891bc2e378ff0b3563be9aec280b992e65d5274a5ae8b586e2365c","title":"","text":"The SCITT architecture consists of a very loose federation of Transparency Services, and a set of common formats and protocols for issuing, registering and auditing Transparent Statements. <\/del> issuing, registering Signed Statements and auditing Transparent Statements. <\/ins> In order to accommodate as many Transparency Service implementations as possible, this document only specifies the format of Signed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-884ec4c25d2878d5058a256ecc2a25abcdd7394be4924ac922f5925f653d1c3a","title":"","text":"Signed Merkle Tree Proof document I-D.draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs. In this section, a high level the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance process, transparency Registry and the Transparent Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers and the Receipt validation process. <\/del> This section describes at a high level, the three main roles and associated processes in SCITT: Issuers and the Signed Statement issuance process, Transparency Service and the Signed Statement Registration process, as well as Verifiers of the Transparent Statements and the Receipt validation process. <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-48f472b32d7516dffc1e7d0b192f4961d97888b4281f6e2e214d5a6897ac4d02","title":"","text":"Beyond the trusted components, Transparency Services may operate additional endpoints for auditing, for instance to query for the history of Transparent Statements registered by a given Issuer via a <\/del> history of Signed Statements registered by a given Issuer via a <\/ins> certain Feed. Implementations of Transparency Services SHOULD avoid using the service identity and extending the Registry in auditing endpoints; as much as practical, the Registry SHOULD contain enough"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4656c6127b5842b14a524b660713eb957280d5fa1c57f6894ba3214c939b7a11","title":"","text":"5.2.2. A Transparency Services that accepts to register any valid Signed Statement offered by an Issuer would end up providing only limited value to Verifiers. In consequence, a baseline transparency guarantee policing the Registration of Signed Statements is required to ensure completeness of audit, which can help detect equivocation. Most advanced SCITT scenarios rely on the Transparency Service performing additional domain-specific checks before a Signed Statement is accepted: Transparency Services may only allow trusted authenticated users to register Signed Statements, Transparency Services may try to check that a new Signed Statement is consistent with previous Signed Statements from the same Issuers or that Signed Statements are registered in the correct order and cannot be re- played; some Transparency Services may even interpret and validate the payload of Signed Statements. In general, Registration Policies are applied at the discretion of the Transparency Services, and Verifiers use Receipts as witnesses that confirm that the Registration Policy of the Transparency Services was satisfied at the time of creating a Transparent Statement via Signed Statement Registration. Transparency Service implementations SHOULD make their full Registration Policy public and auditable, e.g. by recording stateful policy inputs at evaluation time in the Registry to ensure that policy can be independently validated later. From an interoperability point of view, the policy that was applied by the Transparency Services is opaque to the Verifier, which is forced to trust the associated Registration Policy. If the policy of the Transparency Services evolves over time, or is different across Issuers, the assurances derived from Receipt validation may not be uniform across all Signed Statements over time. To help Verifiers interpret the semantics of Signed Statement Registration, the SCITT Architecture defines a standard mechanism to include signals the Signed Statement itself which policies have been applied by the Transparency Service from a defined set of Registration Policies with standardized semantics. Each policy that is expected to be enforced by the Transparency Service is represented by an entry in the Registration Policy info map (\"reg_info\") in the COSE Envelope of the Signed Statement. The key of the map entry corresponds to the name of the policy, while its value (including its type) is policy-specific. For instance, the \"register_by\" policy defines the maximum timestamp by which a Signed Statement can be registered, hence the associated value contains an unsigned integer. While this design ensures that all Verifiers get the same guarantee regardless of where a Transparent Statement is registered, its main downside is that it requires the Issuer to include the necessary policies in the Envelope when the Signed Statement is produced. Furthermore, it makes it impossible to register the same Signed Statement on two different Transparency Services, if their required Registration Policies are incompatible. <\/del> Statement offered by anonymous Issuers would only provide limited value, or no value, to verifiers. As a consequence, some form of \"authorization\" is needed before registration of Signed Statements to ensure completeness of audit. More advanced use case will rely on the Transparency Service performing additional domain-specific checks before a Signed Statement is accepted. For example, some Transparency Services may validate the content of Signed Statements. We use the term \"registration policies\" to refer to the checks that are performed before a Signed Statement is registered given a set of input values. This baseline specification leaves the implementation of the registration policy to the provider of the Transparency Services and its users. As a minimum we expect that a deployment authenticates the Issuer of the Signed Statement, which requires some form of trust anchor. As defined in RFC6024, \"A trust anchor represents an authoritative entity via a public key and associated data. The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.\" The Trust Anchor may be a certificate, a raw public key or other structure, as appropriate. It can be a non-root certificate when it is a certificate. A provider of a Transparency Service is, however, expected to indicate what registration policy is used in a given deployment and inform its users about changes to the registration policy. <\/ins> 5.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-0ed4516a9080d7586ec1be0cbcc5114f42144b3b7cffdbb1811ae9afb73cbed8","title":"","text":"the Transparency Service Registration Policy and that has been persisted in the Registry. Unless advertised in the Transparency Service Registration Policy, the Verifier should not assume that the ordering of Transparent Statements in the Registry matches the ordering of their issuance. <\/del> ordering of Signed Statements in the Registry matches the ordering of their issuance. <\/ins> Similarly, the fact that an Issuer can be held accountable for its Transparent Statements does not on its own provide any mitigation or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-249c275df21f2b584393aaed73517c92aba603724eae36e82526cddfe78f62b3","title":"","text":"10.1.1.1. If a Transparency Service is honest, then a Transparent Statement including a correct Receipt ensures that the Transparent Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded appropriately. <\/del> including a correct Receipt ensures that the associated Signed Statement passed its Registration Policy and was recorded appropriately. <\/ins> Conversely, a corrupt Transparency Service may 1. refuse or delay the Registration of Signed Statements, 2. register Signed Statements that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-c7bffaffe655c5fecd7fb688dbefc43b01218cd5357e654e08254b6915a08512","title":"","text":"Due to the operational challenge of maintaining a globally consistent append-only Log, some Transparency Services may provide limited support for historical queries on the Transparent Statements they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent <\/del> support for historical queries on the Signed Statements they have registered, and accept the risk of being blamed for inconsistent <\/ins> Registration or Issuer equivocation. Verifier and Auditors may also witness (1,4) but may not be able to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-41bdb3ada33fcadaa929709728eee4004658d5a7a0ae85908cc9e3a6f2caa42b","title":"","text":"The Transparency Service is trusted with the confidentiality of the Signed Statements presented for Registration. Some Transparency Services may publish every Transparent Statement in their logs, to <\/del> Services may publish every Signed Statement in their logs, to <\/ins> facilitate their dissemination and auditing. Others may just return Receipts to clients that present Singed Statements for Registration, and disclose the Append-only Log only to Auditors trusted with the confidentiality of its contents. A collection of Transparent Statements must not leak information about the contents of other Transparent Statements registered on the Transparency Service. <\/del> A collection of Signed Statements must not leak information about the contents of other Signed Statements registered on the Transparency Service. <\/ins> Nonetheless, Issuers should carefully review the inclusion of private\/confidential materials in their Statements. For example,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-4e0249d952f09c78c34153f6da617c4d5a3e0665b498130e5f39b6d45d80eae3","title":"","text":"manifest used to sign the Signed Statement is written in the \"kid\" header. \"kid\" MUST either be an absolute URL, or a relative URL. Relative URL MUST be relative to an \"iss\" value. When relative URL is used, \"iss\" MUST also be present in the protected header. Resolving \"kid\" MUST return an identity document of a registered content type (a set of public keys). In the case of \"kid\" being an absolute DID URL, the identity document is called a DID Document, and is expected ot have content type \"application\/did+json\". To dereference a DID URL, it first MUST be resolved. After that the fragment is processed according to the media type. For example, when resolving \"did:example:123#key-42\", first, the identity document for \"did:example:123\" is resolved as content type \"application\/did+json\", next, the fragment \"#key-2\" is dereferenced to a verification method that contains a \"publicKeyJwk\" property. The content type of \"publicKeyJwk\" is expected to be \"application\/ jwk+json\". The details of both \"DID resolution\" and \"DID dereferencing\" are out of scope for this document. The \"iss\" or \"kid\", might not be DID URLs, however the following interfaces MUST be satisfied in order to ensure issuer identity documents, and associated keys are discoverable in a consistent manner. 5.1.1.1. The value of \"id\" might be found the \"iss\" or \"sub\" claims if they are present in the protected header or payload. \"resolve = (id: string, accept: content_type = 'application\/ did+json') => idDocument (of content type application\/did+json). \" For example: \"did:example:123 \" Might resolve to: \"{ \"id\": \"did:example:123\", \"verificationMethod\": [{ \"id\": \"#key-42\", \"type\": \"JsonWebkey\", \"controller\": \"did:example:123\", \"publicKeyJwk\": { \"kty\": \"EC\", \"crv\": \"P-384\", \"alg\": \"ES384\", \"x\": \"LCeAt2sW36j94wuFP0gNEIHDzqR6Nh_Udu2ObLer3cKFBCaAHY1svmbPV69bP3RH\", \"y\": \"zz2SkcOGYM6PbYlw19tcbpzo6bEMYHIwGBnN5rd8QWykAprstPdxx4U0uScvDcYd\" } }] } \" Editor note, we might wish to eliminate this intermediate identity document content type, by treating it as an alterative encoding of \"application\/jwk-set+json\" or \"application\/cose-key-set\". However, there is no media type fragment processing directive that would enable dereferencing the known key set content types, listed above. 5.1.1.1.1. For well known token types, such as \"id_token\" or \"access_token\". \"iss\" MUST be a URL, and it MUST have keys discoverable in the following way: \"iss\" can be used to build a \".well-known\" URL to discovery the issuer's configuration. For example, \"iss\" \"contoso.example\" will have the following open id connect configuration URL. \"https:\/\/contoso.example\/.well-known\/openid-configuration\". This URL will resolve to a JSON document which contains the property: \"jwks_uri\", for example \"https:\/\/contoso.example\/.well-known\/ jwks.json\" This URL will resolve to a JSON document of content type \"application\/jwk-set+json\", which will contain specific keys... for example: ```json { \"keys\": [ { \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"n\": \"wW9TkSbcn5FV3iUJ-812sqTvwTGCFrDm6vD2U-g23gn6rrBdFZQbf2bgEnSkolp h6CanOYTQ1lKVhKjHLd6Q4MDVGidbVBhESxib2YIzJVUS- 0oQgizkBEJxyHI4Zl3xX_sdA_yegLUi-Ykt_gaMPSw_vpxe-pBxu-jd14i-jDfwoPJUdF 8ZJGS9orCPRiHCYLDgOscC9XibH9rUbTvG8q4bAPx9Ox6malx4OLvU3pXVjew6LG3iBi2 YhpCWe6voMvZJYXqC1n5Mk_KOdGcCFtDgu3I56SGSfsF7- tI7qG1ZO8RMuzqH0LkJVirujYzXrnMZ7WgbMPXmHU8i4z04zw\", \"e\": \"AQAB\", \"kid\": \"NTBGNTJEMDc3RUE3RUVEOTM4NDcyOEFDNzEyOTY5NDNGOUQ4OEU5OA\", \"x5t\": \"NTBGNTJEMDc3RUE3RUVEOTM4NDcyOEFDNzEyOTY5NDNGOUQ4OEU5OA\", \"x5c\": [ \"MIIDCzCCAfOgAwIBAgIJANPng0XRWwsdMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBwxGjA YBgNVBAMMEWNvbnRvc28uYXV0aDAuY29tMB4XDTE0MDcxMTE2NTQyN1oXDTI4MDMxOTE2 NTQyN1owHDEaMBgGA1UEAwwRY29udG9zby5hdXRoMC5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBA QUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDBb1ORJtyfkVXeJQn7zXaypO\/BMYIWsObq8PZT6DbeCfqusF 0VlBt\/ZuASdKSiWmHoJqc5hNDWUpWEqMct3pDgwNUaJ1tUGERLGJvZgjMlVRL7ShCCLOQ EQnHIcjhmXfFf+x0D\/J6AtSL5iS3+Bow9LD++nF76kHG76N3XiL6MN\/Cg8lR0XxkkZL2i sI9GIcJgsOA6xwL1eJsf2tRtO8byrhsA\/H07HqZqXHg4u9TeldWN7DosbeIGLZiGkJZ7q +gy9klheoLWfkyT8o50ZwIW0OC7cjnpIZJ+wXv60juobVk7xEy7OofQuQlWKu6NjNeucx ntaBsw9eYdTyLjPTjPAgMBAAGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTLarHdkNa5CzPyiKJU51t8JWn 9WTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTLarHdkNa5CzPyiKJU51t8JWn9WTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH\/MA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQA2FOjm+Bpbqk59rQBC0X6ops1wBcXH8clnXfG1G9qeRwLEw Sef5HPz4TTh1f2lcf4Pcq2vF0HbVNJFnLVV+PjR9ACkto+v1n84i\/U4BBezZyYuX2ZpEb v7hV\/PWxg8tcVrtyPaj60UaA\/pUA86CfYy+LckY4NRKmD7ZrcCzjxW2hFGNanfm2FEryx XA3RMNf6IiW7tbJ9ZGTEfA\/DhVnZgh\/e82KVX7EZnkB4MjCQrwj9QsWSMBtBiYp0\/vRi9 cxDFHlUwnYAUeZdHWTW+Rp2JX7Qwf0YycxgyjkGAUEZc4WpdNiQlwYf5G5epfOtHGiwiJ S+u\/nSYvqCFt57+g3R+\" ] }, { \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"n\": \"ylgVZbNR4nlsU_AbU8Zd7ZhVfmYuwq-RB1_YQWHY362pAed-qgSXV1Qm KwCukQ2WDsPHWgpPuEf3O_acmJcCiSxhctpBr5WKkji5o50YX2FqC3xymGkYW5NilvFzn KaKU45ulBVByrcb3Vt8BqqBAhaD4YywZZKo7mMudcq_M__f0_tB4fHsHHe7ehWobWtzAW 7_NRP0_FjB4Kw4PiqJnChPvfbuxTCEUcIYrshRwD6GF4D_oLdeR44dwx4wtEgvPOtkQ5X IGrhQC_sgWcb2jh7YXauVUjuPezP- VkK7Wm9mZRe758q43SWxwT3afo5BLa3_YLWazqcpWRXn9QEDWw\", \"e\": \"AQAB\", \"kid\": \"aMIKy_brQk3nLd0PKd9ln\", \"x5t\": \"-xcTyx47q3ddycG7LtE6QCcETbs\", \"x5c\": [ \"MIIC\/TCCAeWgAwIBAgIJH62yWyX7VxxQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBwxGjA YBgNVBAMTEWNvbnRvc28uYXV0aDAuY29tMB4XDTIwMDMxMTE5Mjk0N1oXDTMzMTExODE5 Mjk0N1owHDEaMBgGA1UEAxMRY29udG9zby5hdXRoMC5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBA QUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDKWBVls1HieWxT8BtTxl3tmFV+Zi7Cr5EHX9hBYdjfrakB53 6qBJdXVCYrAK6RDZYOw8daCk+4R\/c79pyYlwKJLGFy2kGvlYqSOLmjnRhfYWoLfHKYaRh bk2KW8XOcpopTjm6UFUHKtxvdW3wGqoECFoPhjLBlkqjuYy51yr8z\/9\/T+0Hh8ewcd7t6 Fahta3MBbv81E\/T8WMHgrDg+KomcKE+99u7FMIRRwhiuyFHAPoYXgP+gt15Hjh3DHjC0S C8862RDlcgauFAL+yBZxvaOHthdq5VSO497M\/5WQrtab2ZlF7vnyrjdJbHBPdp+jkEtrf 9gtZrOpylZFef1AQNbAgMBAAGjQjBAMA8GA1UdEwEB\/wQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFPV dE4SPvuhlODV0GOcPE4QZ7xNuMA4GA1UdDwEB\/wQEAwIChDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC AQEAu2nhfiJk\/Sp49LEsR1bliuVMP9nycbSz0zdp2ToAy0DZffTd0FKk\/wyFtmbb0UFTD 2aOg\/WZJLDc+3dYjWQ15SSLDRh6LV45OHU8Dkrc2qLjiRdoh2RI+iQFakDn2OgPNgquL+ 3EEIpbBDA\/uVoOYCbkqJNaNM\/egN\/s2vZ6Iq7O+BprWX\/eM25xw8PMi+MU4K2sJpkcDRw oK9Wy8eeSSRIGYnpKO42g\/3QI9+BRa5uD+9shG6n7xgzAPGeldUXajCThomwO8vInp6Vq Y8k3IeLEYoboJj5KMfJgOWUkmaoh6ZBJHnCogvSXI35jbxCxmHAbK+KdTka\/ Yg2MadFZdA==\" ] } ] } ``` If SCITT wanted to be interoperable with OIDC, we would define key dereferencing in a way that was compatible with how OIDC handles it today. 5.1.1.2. \"kid\" is always present in the protected header. If \"iss\" is also present, \"kid\" MUST be a relative URL to \"iss\", otherwise \"kid\" MUST be an absolute URL that starts with \"iss\". \"id\" = \"kid\" if \"iss\" is undefined, or \"iss\" + \"#\" + \"kid\" when \"iss\" is defined. See also draft-ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in-headers [1]. \"dereference = (id: string, accept: content_type = 'application\/ jwk+json') => publicKeyJwk (of content type application\/jwk+json). \" For example, when DIDs are used: \"did:example:123#key-42 \" Might dereference to: \"{ \"kty\": \"EC\", \"crv\": \"P-384\", \"alg\": \"ES384\", \"x\": \"LCeAt2sW36j94wuFP0gNEIHDzqR6Nh_Udu2ObLer3cKFBCaAHY1svmbPV69bP3RH\", \"y\": \"zz2SkcOGYM6PbYlw19tcbpzo6bEMYHIwGBnN5rd8QWykAprstPdxx4U0uScvDcYd\" } \" <\/ins> 5.1.2. Many Issuers issue Signed Statements about different Artifacts under"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-5abadae6a3f868dc2f2d0c1327a13ba9e6cf29fb71998ff03f60d33b78765dca","title":"","text":"Repository: http:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/scitt Index value: No transformation needed. 12. References 12.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/datatracker.ietf.org\/doc\/draft-ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in- headers\/ <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-15b3c42e713a985d9966d866bfba50622f6a6807a6f094769cf8fccbd7812cd2","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines the SCITT REST API, an http interface to transparency services, supporting the primary operations needed to implement the SCITT Architecture I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture. <\/del> This document describes a REST API that supports the normative requirements of the SCITT Architecture I-D.draft-ietf-scitt- architecture. Optional key discovery and query interfaces are provided to support interoperability issues with Decentralized Identifiers, X509 Certificates and Artifact Reposistories. <\/ins> 1. This API definition MAY be exposed externally as part of a suite of APIs, or be encapsulated internally and exposed indirectly via proprietary APIs. <\/del> The SCITT Architecture I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture defines the core operations necessary to support supply chain transparency using COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption). <\/ins> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. The SCITT REST API is designed to support identifier systems that are currently relevant to supply chains, including DID, x509 and PGP. In order to support these systems, the API must be aware of specific header parameters, in particular, \"kid\", \"x5u\" and \"x5c\". The API enables implementers to deploy interoperable URIs for disclosing information feeds related to supply chain actors, and artifacts accessible via transparency services. 2.1. TBD (comments on OAuth \/ Client Attestation). 2.2. TBD (comments on GAIN \/ OIDC). 2.3. TBD (comments on URLs \/ QR Codes). 3. 3.1. In cases where a signed statement is issued by one party and registered by another, there is a need to prove possession of key material and detect tampering while authenticating both parties. Typically a nonce would be chosen by the transparency service and the second party would sign over the nonce, when registering the first issuer's signed statement. In order to avoid interactivity and improve interoperability, document describes a non-exclusive, but mandatory to support, confirmation scheme In this scheme the verifier's challenge is a recent Unix timestamp, the presenting party need not request this information from the transparency service. Here is an example key binding token that can be paired with the confirmation claim in a signed statement: When applying registration policies to signed statements with confirmation, the transparency service acts as a verifier, and performs the following checks: verify the integrity of the issuer's signed statement confirm the verified content meets the registration policy for the transparency service. verify the key binding token, using the confirmation claim in the verified issuer signed statement ensure the key binding token has a nonce that is a string representation of a recent Unix timestamp <\/del> Issuance of Signed Statements <\/ins> The exact window of validity for proving possession is a configuration detail of the transparency service. Unix timestamps are used so that only a losely synchronised notion of time need be assumed and there is no requirement to account for timezones. <\/del> Verification of Signed Statements <\/ins> If the confirmation key is stolen, the attacker can produce key binding tokens from that point forward in time. In an interactive confirmation schema, the transparency service can force the confirmation key holder to produce a signature over a nonce that is not guessable, and this prevents certain attacks related to the duration of access to a signing capability and other timing details. However, the cost of coordinating with the transparency service, coupled with the purpose of registering with a transparency service (to obtain a receipt, proving a signed statement was acceptable at a point in time) justify specifying the recent timestamp nonce as a mandatory to implement context binding. <\/del> Registration of Signed Statements <\/ins> In the case that a SCITT transparency service wants to support challenges (nonces) that are context binding, the transparency service can expose a \"challenge token endpoint\". <\/del> Issuance of Receipts <\/ins> This endpoint can process request parameters, and issuer a challenge token, that future registrations can use to bind to the original request. This interaction model works well for scenarios where requirements for a given registration might change over time, but it is important for the registering party to commit to acceptable values at the time that a signed statement is registered. These endpoints are optional to implement. <\/del> Verification of Receipts <\/ins> 3.1.1. <\/del> Production of Transparent Statements <\/ins> 3.1.1.1. <\/del> Verification of Transparent Statements <\/ins> 3.1.1.2. <\/del> In addition to defining concrete HTTP endpoints for these operations, this specification defines support for the following endpoints which support these operations: <\/ins> Header: \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> Resolving Verification Keys for Issuers <\/ins> (Optional) Header: \"Retry-After: \" <\/del> Retrieving Receipts Asynchronously <\/ins> Query: \"?intention={todo}\" <\/del> Retrieving Signed Statements from an Artifact Repository <\/ins> Body: \"{ \"token\": \"JWT | SD-JWT | base64url( CWT | SD-CWT )>\" }\" <\/del> Retrieving Statements from an Artifact Repository <\/ins> 3.1.2. <\/del> 1.1. <\/ins> 3.1.2.1. <\/del> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. <\/ins> Headers: <\/del> This specification uses the terms \"Signed Statement\", \"Receipt\", \"Transparent Statement\", \"Artifact Repositories\", \"Transparency Service\", \"Append-Only Log\" and \"Registration Policy\" as defined in I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture. <\/ins> \"Content-Type: application\/cose\" <\/del> This specification uses \"payload\" as defined in RFC9052. <\/ins> Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message <\/del> 2. <\/ins> Note: that the challenge token MUST be present and integrity protected when submitting signed statements to this endpoint. Note: this endpoint is a duplicate of \"POST https:\/\/transparency.example\/ entries\" <\/del> Authentication is out of scope for this document. If Authentication is not implemented, rate limiting or other denial of service mititations MUST be applied to enable anonymous access. <\/ins> 3.2. <\/del> NOTE: '' line wrapping per RFC 8792 in HTTP examples. <\/ins> All messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-acbd7ff3efb1f387a042b55073b9f2eaa6e1322e384d14bdb3f03dd97fec0226","title":"","text":"to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. 3.2.1. <\/del> 2.1. <\/ins> 3.2.1.1. <\/del> The following HTTP endpoints are mandatory to implement to enable conformance to this specification. <\/ins> Headers: <\/del> 2.1.1. <\/ins> \"Content-Type: application\/cose\" <\/del> Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to discovery the capabilites of a transparency service implementing this specification. <\/ins> Body: SCITT COSE_Sign1 message <\/del> Request: <\/ins> 3.2.1.2. <\/del> Response: <\/ins> One of the following: <\/del> Additional fields may be present. Fields that are not understood MUST be ignored. <\/ins> Status 201 - Registration is successful. <\/del> 2.1.2. <\/ins> Header \"Location: \/entries\/\" <\/del> Authentication MUST be implemented for this endpoint. <\/ins> Header \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request to register a Signed Statement: <\/ins> Body \"{ \"entryId\": \" }\" <\/del> Request: <\/ins> Status 202 - Registration is running. <\/del> The Registration Policy for the Transparency Service MUST be applied to the payload bytes, before any additional processing is performed. <\/ins> Header \"Location: \/operations\/\" <\/del> If the \"payload\" is detached, the Transparency Service depends on the authentication context of the client in the Registration Policy. If the \"payload\" is attached, the Transparency Service depends on both the authentication context of the client, and the verification of the Signed Statement in the Registration Policy. The details of Registration Policy are out of scope for this document. <\/ins> Header \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> If registration succeeds the following identifier MAY be used to refer to the Signed Statement that was accepted: <\/ins> (Optional) Header: \"Retry-After: \" <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:scitt:signed-statement:sha- 256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o\" <\/ins> Body \"{ \"operationId\": \"\", \"status\": \"running\" }\" <\/del> If the \"payload\" was attached, or otherwise communicated to the Transparency Service, the following identifier MAY be used to refer to the \"payload\" of the Signed Statement: <\/ins> Status 400 - Registration was unsuccessful due to invalid input. <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:scitt:statement:sha- 256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o\" <\/ins> Error code \"badSignatureAlgorithm\" <\/del> Response: <\/ins> TBD: more error codes to be defined <\/del> One of the following: <\/ins> If 202 is returned, then clients should wait until Registration succeeded or failed by polling the Registration status using the Operation ID returned in the response. Clients should always obtain a Receipt as a proof that Registration has succeeded. <\/del> 2.1.2.1. <\/ins> 3.2.2. <\/del> The response contains the Receipt for the Signed Statement. Fresh receipts may be requested through the resource identified in the Location header. <\/ins> 3.2.2.1. <\/del> 2.1.2.2. <\/ins> 3.2.2.2. <\/del> The response contains a reference to the receipt which will eventually be available for the Signed Statement. <\/ins> One of the following: <\/del> If 202 is returned, then clients should wait until Registration succeeded or failed by polling the receipt endpoint using the receipt identifier returned in the response. <\/ins> Status 200 - Registration is running <\/del> 2.1.2.3. <\/ins> Header: \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> One of the following errors: <\/ins> (Optional) Header: \"Retry-After: \" <\/del> TODO: other error codes <\/ins> Body: \"{ \"operationId\": \"\", \"status\": \"running\" }\" <\/del> 2.2. <\/ins> Status 200 - Registration was successful <\/del> The following HTTP endpoints are optional to implement. <\/ins> Header: \"Location: \/entries\/\" <\/del> 2.2.1. <\/ins> Header: \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> Authentication MUST be implemented for this endpoint. <\/ins> Body: \"{ \"operationId\": \"\", \"status\": \"succeeded\", \"entryId\": \"\" }\" <\/del> This endpoint enables a Transparency Service to be an issuer of Signed Statements on behalf of authenticated clients. This supports cases where a client lacks the ability to perform complex cryptographic operations, but can be authenticated and report statements and measurements. <\/ins> Status 200 - Registration failed <\/del> Request: <\/ins> Header \"Content-Type: application\/json\" <\/del> Response: <\/ins> Body: \"{ \"operationId\": \"\", \"status\": \"failed\", \"error\": { \"type\": \"\", \"detail\": \"\" } }\" <\/del> 2.2.2. <\/ins> Error code: \"badSignatureAlgorithm\" <\/del> Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact Repositories, and serve \"payload\" values directly, instead of indirectly through Receipts. Request: <\/ins> Status 404 - Unknown Operation ID <\/del> Response: <\/ins> Error code: \"operationNotFound\" <\/del> 2.2.3. <\/ins> This can happen if the operation ID has expired and been deleted. <\/del> Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. <\/ins> If an operation failed, then error details SHOULD be embedded as a JSON problem details object in the \"\"error\"\" field. <\/del> This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of indirectly through Receipts. <\/ins> If an operation ID is invalid (i.e., it does not correspond to any submit operation), a service may return either a 404 or a \"running\" status. This is because differentiating between the two may not be possible in an eventually consistent system. <\/del> Request: <\/ins> 3.2.3. <\/del> Response: <\/ins> 3.2.3.1. <\/del> 2.2.4. <\/ins> Query parameters: <\/del> Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. <\/ins> (Optional) \"embedReceipt=true\" <\/del> Request: <\/ins> If the query parameter \"embedReceipt=true\" is provided, then the Signed Statement is returned with the corresponding Registration Receipt embedded in the COSE unprotected header. <\/del> Response: <\/ins> 3.2.3.2. <\/del> If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append- Only Log: <\/ins> One of the following: <\/del> If the Signed Statement requested is not yet included in the Append- Only Log: <\/ins> Status 200. <\/del> Additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present. Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. <\/ins> Header: \"Content-Type: application\/cose\" <\/del> 2.2.5. <\/ins> Body: COSE_Sign1 <\/del> This endpoint is inspired by I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc. Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to discover verification keys, which is the reason that authentication is not required. <\/ins> Status 404 - Entry not found. <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the Issuer Metadata configuration when \"iss\" is set to \"https:\/\/transparency.example\/tenant\/1234\": <\/ins> Error code: \"entryNotFound\" <\/del> Request: <\/ins> 3.2.4. <\/del> Response: <\/ins> 3.2.4.1. <\/del> 2.2.6. <\/ins> 3.2.4.2. <\/del> This endpoint in inspired by I-D.draft-demarco-oauth-nonce-endpoint. <\/ins> One of the following: <\/del> Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to demonstrate proof of posession, which is the reason that authentication is not required. Client holding signed statements that require demonstrating proof of possession MUST use this endpoint to obtain a nonce. <\/ins> Status 200. <\/del> Request: <\/ins> Header: \"Content-Type: application\/cbor\" <\/del> Response: <\/ins> Body: SCITT_Receipt <\/del> 2.2.7. <\/ins> Status 404 - Entry not found. <\/del> This endpoint enables the use of the DID Web Decentralized Identifier Method, as an alternative expression of the Issuer Metadata endpoint. <\/ins> Error code: \"entryNotFound\" <\/del> This endpoint is DEPRECATED. <\/ins> The retrieved Receipt may be embedded in the corresponding COSE_Sign1 document in the unprotected header. <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the Issuer Metadata configuration when \"iss\" is set to \"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\": <\/ins> 4. <\/del> Request: Response: 3. <\/ins> TODO 5. <\/del> 4. <\/ins> TODO 6. <\/del> TODO: Consider negotiation for receipt as \"JSON\" or \"YAML\". TODO: Consider impact of media type on \"Data URIs\" and QR Codes. 5. <\/ins> 6.1. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> IANA is requested to register the URN sub-namespace \"urn:ietf:params:scitt\" in the \"IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers\" Registry IANA.params, following the template in RFC3553: 6.2. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> TODO: Register them from here. <\/del> The following value is requested to be registered in the \"Well-Known URIs\" registry (using the template from RFC5785): <\/ins> 6.3. <\/del> URI suffix: issuer Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFCthis. Related information: N\/A <\/ins> For discovering scitt configuration. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> TODO: Register them from here. <\/del> The following value is requested to be registered in the \"Well-Known URIs\" registry (using the template from RFC5785): <\/ins> 6.4. <\/del> URI suffix: transparency-configuration Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFCthis. Related information: N\/A <\/ins> This section requests registration of the \"application\/receipt+cose\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry in the manner described in RFC6838. <\/del> TODO: Register them from here. <\/ins> TODO: Consider negotiation for receipt as \"JSON\" or \"YAML\". TODO: Consider impact of media type on \"Data URIs\" and QR Codes. <\/del> 5.4. This section requests registration of the \"application\/ scitt.receipt+cose\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry in the manner described in RFC6838. <\/ins> To indicate that the content is a SCITT Receipt: Type name: application Subtype name: receipt+cose <\/del> Subtype name: scitt.receipt+cose <\/ins> Required parameters: n\/a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-b48b95e5600aaea07e5344ba2f9e45a4d66a1a8270f0fbe7b9f9bc85e47ee936","title":"","text":"2.1.2. Authentication MUST be implemented for this endpoint. <\/del> Authentication MAY be implemented for this endpoint. See notes on detached payloads below. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request to register a Signed Statement:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-49791851404639fbf98886ebbe8fc63bef25a40ad3affef5920d53f6b7b7bef6","title":"","text":"If the \"payload\" is detached, the Transparency Service depends on the authentication context of the client in the Registration Policy. If the \"payload\" is attached, the Transparency Service depends on both the authentication context of the client, and the verification of the Signed Statement in the Registration Policy. The details of Registration Policy are out of scope for this document. <\/del> the authentication context of the client (if present), and the verification of the Signed Statement in the Registration Policy. The details of Registration Policy are out of scope for this document. <\/ins> If registration succeeds the following identifier MAY be used to refer to the Signed Statement that was accepted:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-a585df83490adaaf92189513349fde8cb22eeb0721174ac66a9834aca87d73b0","title":"","text":"eventually be available for the Signed Statement. If 202 is returned, then clients should wait until Registration succeeded or failed by polling the receipt endpoint using the receipt <\/del> succeeded or failed by polling the Resolve Receipt endpoint using the <\/ins> identifier returned in the response. 2.1.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-403c8fd890b7744aee1ca1a4456a8cc2b89c3212e6b8931c2b351b55971ce107","title":"","text":"Response: 2.2.4.1. <\/ins> If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append- Only Log: If the Signed Statement requested is not yet included in the Append- Only Log: <\/del> 2.2.4.2. If registration of the Signed Statement requested is in progress but not yet included in the Append-Only Log: 2.2.4.3. If the Signed Statement requested is neither registered in the log nor subject to an in-progress registration: 2.2.4.4. If a client is polling for an in-progress registration too frequently then the Transparency Service MAY, in addition to implementing rate- limiting, return a 429 response: 2.2.4.5. <\/ins> Additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present. Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. <\/del> For all responses additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present. Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. <\/ins> 2.2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-5e8d02a54838552b6773b63fa1b8c29325ec7d99fff2a086e739be8696cba047","title":"","text":"2.1.1. Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to discovery the capabilities of a transparency service implementing this specification. <\/del> Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to discover the capabilities and current configuration of a transparency service implementing this specification. <\/ins> Request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-d5a82bcd3c17522f165516e5f4e9272a409596936e47ab5ccda6a8659fd99c79","title":"","text":"Authentication MAY be implemented for this endpoint. See notes on detached payloads below. This endpoint is used to register a Signed Statement with a Transparency Service. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request to register a Signed Statement:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-267edcf369beb1217e1f04cb6e93d7d43f43a37ef033347b7379676e35ccb501","title":"","text":"If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it MUST return an HTTP 4xx or 5xx status code, and the body SHOULD be a JSON problem details object (RFC9457) containing: <\/del> Concise Problem Details object (RFC9290) containing: <\/ins> type: A URI reference identifying the problem. To facilitate <\/del> title: A human-readable string identifying the error that prevented the Transparency Service from processing the request, ideally short and suitable for inclusion in log messages. detail: A human-readable string describing the error in more depth, ideally with sufficient detail to enable the error to be rectified. instance: A URN reference identifying the problem. To facilitate <\/ins> automated response to errors, this document defines a set of standard tokens for use in the type field within the URN namespace of: \"urn:ietf:params:scitt:error:\". detail: A human-readable string describing the error that prevented the Transparency Service from processing the request, ideally with sufficient detail to enable the error to be rectified. <\/del> response-code: The HTTP error response code relating to this error. application\/concise-problem-details+cbor <\/ins> Error responses SHOULD be sent with the \"Content-Type: application\/ problem+json\" HTTP header. <\/del> NOTE: SCRAPI is not a CoAP API. Nonetheless Constrained Problem Details objects (RFC9290) provide a useful CBOR encoding for problem details and avoids the need for mixing CBOR and JSON in endpoint implementations. <\/ins> As an example, submitting a Signed Statement with an unsupported signature algorithm would return a \"400 Bad Request\" status code and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-3e37c68d09b163a843852814346e1fb462b30ffbc8973c07426d1031df1667f7","title":"","text":"Clients SHOULD treat 500 and 503 HTTP status code responses as transient failures and MAY retry the same request without modification at a later date. Note that in the case of a 503 response, the Transparency Service MAY include a \"Retry-After\" header field per RFC9110 in order to request a minimum time for the client to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. <\/del> modification at a later date. Note that in the case of any error response, the Transparency Service MAY include a \"Retry-After\" header field per RFC9110 in order to request a minimum time for the client to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header field, this document does not specify a minimum. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-1aa5375fa7caa7cee3d60368d77a296738f1fec71c2b0b6dd35c6f6ea85c2ef3","title":"","text":"Response: Additional fields may be present. Fields that are not understood MUST be ignored. <\/del> Responses to this message are vendor-specific. Fields that are not understood MUST be ignored. <\/ins> 2.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-a5c058a01495f2616359ce71fb828e12d2b20cb19c4d7a129f7e94156ae2d159","title":"","text":"2.1.2.3. One of the following errors: TODO: other error codes <\/del> The following expected errors are defined. Implementations MAY return other errors, so long as they are valid RFC9290 objects. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-4eece7a160a21e4e2f7975932ec627b83514ed437aa053f6fc7ace441b3f84a5","title":"","text":"Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact Repositories, and serve \"payload\" values directly, instead of <\/del> Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of <\/ins> indirectly through Receipts. Request: Response: 2.2.3. Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint. <\/del> One of the following: <\/ins> This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of indirectly through Receipts. <\/del> 2.2.2.1. <\/ins> Request: <\/del> 2.2.2.2. <\/ins> Response: <\/del> The following expected errors are defined. Implementations MAY return other errors, so long as they are valid RFC9290 objects. <\/ins> 2.2.4. <\/del> 2.2.3. <\/ins> Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-461b31514c98e808078e9012ae206c17bf024eb215202c14fdbbc06d8054da38","title":"","text":"Response: 2.2.4.1. <\/del> 2.2.3.1. <\/ins> If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append- Only Log: 2.2.4.2. <\/del> 2.2.3.2. <\/ins> If registration of the Signed Statement requested is in progress but not yet included in the Append-Only Log: 2.2.4.3. <\/del> 2.2.3.3. <\/ins> If the Signed Statement requested is neither registered in the log nor subject to an in-progress registration: 2.2.4.4. <\/del> 2.2.3.4. <\/ins> If a client is polling for an in-progress registration too frequently then the Transparency Service MAY, in addition to implementing rate- limiting, return a 429 response: 2.2.4.5. <\/del> 2.2.3.5. <\/ins> For all responses additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present. Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation specific, and out of scope for this specification. 2.2.5. <\/del> 2.2.4. <\/ins> This endpoint is used to exchange old or expiring receipts for fresh ones."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-3dfa917736a56937393af0ff4c7a9c1b7c2cb7d6e98f56c098348f777f4185fe","title":"","text":"Request: 2.2.5.1. <\/del> 2.2.4.1. <\/ins> A new receipt: 2.2.6. <\/del> 2.2.5. <\/ins> This endpoint is inspired by I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc. Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-789e5f43be3b2e27ef28d5c304145b31e21a781e71301f5f84ce332f50208888","title":"","text":"Response: 2.2.7. <\/del> 2.2.6. <\/ins> This endpoint in inspired by I-D.draft-demarco-oauth-nonce-endpoint."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-065ce84058f6f9bb570d9fa68a9e85c31e4579874bd5b3d5aed048091f17d54c","title":"","text":"Response: 2.2.6. This endpoint in inspired by I-D.draft-demarco-oauth-nonce-endpoint. Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This endpoint is used to demonstrate proof of possession, which is the reason that authentication is not required. Client holding signed statements that require demonstrating proof of possession MUST use this endpoint to obtain a nonce. Request: Response: <\/del> 3. TODO"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-6a89d0d5c73b9309c51376077e27f18b5580304181c45070a08a987ab95ab15c","title":"","text":"4. TODO <\/del> 4.1. This document describes the interoperable API for client calls to, and implementations of, a Transparency Service as specified in [SCITT-ARCH]. As such the security considerations in this section are concerned only with security considerations that are relevant at that implementation layer. All questions of security of the related COSE formats, algorithm choices, cryptographic envelopes, verifiable data structures and the like are handled elsewhere and out of scope of this document. 4.2. SCITT is concerned with issues of cross-boundary supply-chain-wide data integrity and as such must assume a very wide range of deployment environments. Thus, no assumptions can be made about the security of the computing environment in which any client implementation of this specification runs. 4.3. [SCITT-ARCH] defines 2 distinct roles that require authentication: Issuers who sign Statements, and clients that submit API calls on behalf of Issuers. While Issuer authentication and signing of Statements is very important for the trustworthiness of systems implementing the SCITT building blocks, it is out of scope of this document. This document is only concerned with authentication of API clients. For those endpoints that require client authentication, Transparency Services MUST support at least one of the following options: - HTTP Authorization header with a bearer JWT - domain-bound API key - TLS client authentication Transparency Services MUST provide a configuration surface that allows Issuers to specify which authorized clients can submit Statements on their behalf. Where authentication methods rely on long term secrets, both clients and Transparency Services implementing this specification MUST allow for the revocation and rolling of authentication secrets. 4.4. 4.4.1. The most serious threats to implementations on Transparency Services are ones that would cause the failure of their main promises, to wit: - Threats to strong identification, for example representing the Statements from one issuer as those of another - Threats to payload integrity, for example changing the contents of a Signed Statement before making it transparent - Threats to non-equivocation, for example attacks that would enable the presentation or verification of divergent proofs for the same Statement payload 4.4.1.1. While denial of service attacks are very hard to defend against completely, and Transparency Services are unlikely to be in the critical path of any safety-liable operation, any attack which could cause the failure of Signed Statement registration, for example, should be considered in scope. In principle DoS attacks are easily mitigated by the client checking that the Transparency Service has registered any submitted Signed Statement and returned a Receipt. Since verification of Receipts does not require the involvement of the Transparency Service DoS attacks are not a major issue. Clients to Transparency Services SHOULD ensure that Receipts are available for their registered Statements, either on a periodic or needs-must basis, depending on the use case. Beyond this, implementers of Transparency Services SHOULD implement general good practice around network attacks, flooding, rate limiting etc. 4.4.1.2. Since the purpose of this API is to ultimately put the message payloads on a Transparency Log there is limited risk to eavesdropping. Nonetheless transparency may mean 'within a limited community' rather than 'in full public', so implementers MUST add protections against man-in-the-middle and network eavesdropping, such as TLS. 4.4.1.3. While most relevant modification attacks are mitigated by the use of the Issuer signature on the Signed Statement, the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint presents an opportunity for manipulation of messages and misrepresentation of Issuer intent that could mislead later Verifiers. Transparency Services offering the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint MUST require authentication and transport-level security for that endpoint, MUST NOT modify anything in the message to be signed, and MUST take steps to ensure that the party calling the endpoint is authorized to register statements on behalf of the specified Issuer. 4.4.1.4. While most relevant insertion attacks are mitigated by the use of the Issuer signature on the Signed Statement, the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint presents an opportunity for insertion of messages and misrepresentation of Issuer intent that could mislead later Verifiers. There are 2 most likely avenues to this attack: - Stolen client endpoint authentication credentials * Stolen or misused Issuer keys held in the Transparency Service on behalf of clients Clients relying on the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint SHOULD take steps to ensure their endpoint authentication credentials are securely stored and can be rotated and\/or revoked in the case of a breach. Transparency Services offering the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint MUST require authentication and transport-level security for that endpoint, and MUST enable the rotation and revocation of those credentials. Transparency Services offering the \"Issue Statement\" endpoint MUST take careful steps in both design and operation of their software stack to prevent the theft or inappropriate use of the Issuer keys they use to sign Statements on behalf of Issuers, such as HSMs for storage and least-privilege, regularly refreshed access controls for use. Transparency Services MAY also implement additional protections such as anomaly detection or rate limiting in order to mitigate the impact of any breach. 4.4.2. 4.4.2.1. Replay attacks are not particularly concerning for SCITT or SCRAPI: once a statement is made it is intended to be immutable and non- repudiable, so making it twice should not lead to any particular issues. There could be issues at the payload level (for instance, the statement \"it is raining\" may true when first submitted but not when replayed), but being payload-agnostic implementations of SCITT services cannot be required to worry about that. If the semantic content of the payload are time dependent and susceptible to replay attacks in this way then timestamps MAY be added to the payload signed by the Issuer. 4.4.2.2. Once registered with a Transparency Service, Transparent Statements cannot be deleted. Thus, any message deletion attack must occur prior to registration else it is indistinguishable from a man-in-the- middle or denial-of-service attack on this interface. 5. <\/ins> TODO: Consider negotiation for receipt as \"JSON\" or \"YAML\". TODO: Consider impact of media type on \"Data URIs\" and QR Codes. 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> 5.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> IANA is requested to register the URN sub-namespace \"urn:ietf:params:scitt\" in the \"IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers\" Registry IANA.params, following the template in RFC3553: 5.2. <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> The following value is requested to be registered in the \"Well-Known URIs\" registry (using the template from RFC5785):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-d2f2c7a93c9a678eb9ef5527e99cc8ecaf15a533d9d2f654f6da877b90061118","title":"","text":"URI suffix: issuer Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): RFCthis. Related information: N\/A 5.3. <\/del> 6.3. <\/ins> The following value is requested to be registered in the \"Well-Known URIs\" registry (using the template from RFC5785):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-06df7883261def5bf70b95152987f12fe4e30ac04d62e996027b56b8249349ab","title":"","text":"TODO: Register them from here. 5.4. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> This section requests registration of the \"application\/ scitt.receipt+cose\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-7f681be47bf5824ab6179bd403c4fcdb30d08cec8d5e368ca57f925624ca33e5","title":"","text":"SCITT architecture focuses on ensuring statement authenticity, visibility\/transparency, and intends to provide scalable accessibility. The following use case illustrates the scope of SCITT and elaborate on the generic problem statement above. <\/del> and elaborates on the generic problem statement above. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-e718b5da3a79fa6a56f35f214c838d5b49d5d5d2353c0227bbca8613cbf58b50","title":"","text":"3.2. In IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects. For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product. The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. <\/del> In the IT industry it is a common practice that once a software product is released, it is evaluated on various aspects. For example, an auditing company, a code review company or a government body will examine the software product and issue authoritative reports about the product. The end users (consumers or distribution entities) use these report to make an accurate assessment as to whether the software product is deemed fit to use. <\/ins> There are multiple such authoritative bodies that make such assessments. There is no assurance that all the bodies may be aware of statements from other authoritative entities or actively acknowledge them. Discovery of all sources of such reports and\/or identity of the authoritative bodies adds a significant cost to the <\/del> identities of the authoritative bodies adds a significant cost to the <\/ins> end user or consumer of the product. A consumer of released software product wants:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-a6d1a249f8dbbca8b874b22202d3acd0015a061bfb1720b8ba96aba59132bdbd","title":"","text":"entities to an entity who does it on their behalf to offload the burden to filter from and select all statements that are applicable to a particular release of a multi release <\/del> that are applicable to a particular version of a multi release <\/ins> software product, to an entity who does this on their behalf to make an informed decisions on which authoritative entities to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-ddbc2c92e987344593e0b9383c9ceeb74b5e78e9dab9bf4c81d4e46cd1f0b7c3","title":"","text":"statement on how to mitigate the vulnerability. At first, the producer provides an updated software product that still uses the vulnerable software component but shields the issue in a fashion that inhibits exploitation. Later, A second update of the software <\/del> inhibits exploitation. Later, a second update of the software <\/ins> product includes a security patch to the affected software component from the software producer. Finally, A third update includes a new <\/del> from the software producer. Finally, a third update includes a new <\/ins> release (updated version) of the formerly insecure software component. For this release, both the software product and the affected software component are deemed secure by the producer and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-5cc72069806385850a53a09db38d02f22091b7c0d3e9f797e2ecb4bb2370d666","title":"","text":"to know where to get these security statements from producers and third-parties related to the software product in a timely and unambiguous fashion, <\/del> unambiguous fashion <\/ins> how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer, <\/del> how to attribute them to an authoritative issuer <\/ins> how to associate the statements in a meaningful manner via a set of well-known semantic relationships, and <\/del> of well-known semantic relationships <\/ins> how to consistently, efficiently, and homogeneously check their authenticity. <\/del> authenticity <\/ins> There is no standardized way to: know the various sources of statements, <\/del> know the various sources of statements <\/ins> how to express the provenance and historicity of statements, <\/del> how to express the provenance and historicity of statements <\/ins> how to related\/link various heterogeneous statements in a simple fashion, and <\/del> fashion <\/ins> check that the statement comes from a source with authority to issue that statement. <\/del> issue that statement <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-0502831eab6e4e5f3c5eed4c457634299d4f02e43f07e23dc1e95d2a8b2e7c9d","title":"","text":"A consumer of a released software wants: to understand if a particular provider is actually the original provider or a promoter, <\/del> provider or a promoter <\/ins> to know if and how the source, or resulting binary, of a promoted software component differs from the original software component, <\/del> software component differs from the original software component <\/ins> to check the provenance and history of a software component's source back to its origin, and <\/del> source back to its origin <\/ins> to assess whether to trust a promoter or not. <\/del> to assess whether to trust a promoter or not <\/ins> There is no standardized way to:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-51a5613c599e8b56d123068e1ee69d5bba184dacd0c7bd11603cd1dcc4ac3b09","title":"","text":"artifact against a Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM). Corresponding procedures are often called authenticated, measured, or secure boot. The output of these high assurance boot procedures is often used as input to more complex verification known as remote attestation <\/del> input to more complex verifications known as remote attestation <\/ins> procedures. If measurements before execution are not possible, static after-the-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-3e68b271f63a01979d81db451dbe48d1ca3f8233ed9cdef5c94d171be0f70d6a","title":"","text":"acquisition and deployment of software in certain security domains of the organization, a check of software quality and characteristics must succeed. Compliance and requirement checking includes audits of the results of organisational procedures and technical procedures, <\/del> the results of organizational procedures and technical procedures, <\/ins> which can originate from checks conducted by the organization itself or checks conducted by trusted third parties. Consecutively, consumers of statements about a released software can be auditors. Examples of procedure results important to audits include: available fresh and applicable code reviews, certification documents (e.g., FIPS or Common Criteria), virus scans, vulnerability disclosure reports (fixed or not fixed), security impact or applicability justification statements. Relevant compliance, requirement, and check result documents originate from various sources and include a wide range of representations and formats. <\/del> consumers of statements about released software can be auditors. Examples of procedure results important to audits include: available fresh and applicable code reviews certification documents (e.g., FIPS or Common Criteria) virus scans vulnerability disclosure reports (fixed or not fixed) security impact or applicability justification statements Relevant compliance, requirement, and check result documents originate from various sources and include a wide range of representations and formats. <\/ins> A consumer of a released software wants:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-5fc39aacfb1cffa7570109b0b73f8b6537536d51ae398567a765eb28b5632367","title":"","text":"compromised due to an insider risk - be it malicious or otherwise to confirm that the publishers know if their deliverable has been compromised. Can they trust their key protection or audit logging? <\/del> compromised. (For example, can they trust their key protection or audit logging?) <\/ins> to know how the update client on an instance of a health monitoring system discerns a general update from one specially"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-3d7c7c572b299e90ccbe1fc8882ce52aa80f7ea3f9458300ee548407fefc67bf","title":"","text":"of firmware revisions to verify that the firmware update seen by a single device, is indeed the same as seen by all the devices. <\/del> indeed the same as seen by all the devices <\/ins> reliably discern an update that has been signed by the appropriate and intended signing identity make an informed judgement on all available information about firmware at the install time. For example, the firmware is still in a good state or otherwise? <\/del> firmware at the install time. (For example, the firmware is still in a good state or otherwise?) <\/ins> 3.9. Software Integration is a complex activity. This typically involves getting various software components from multiple suppliers and <\/del> getting various software components from multiple suppliers, <\/ins> producing an integrated package deployed as part of device assembly. For example, car manufacturers source integrated software for their autonomous vehicles from third parties that integrates software components from various sources. Integration complexity creates a higher risk of security vulnerabilities to the delivered software. Consumer of an integrated software wants: <\/del> Consumers of an integrated software wants: <\/ins> all components presents in a software product listed, and the ability to identify and retrieve them from a secure and tamper-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-80a48b74a05bfe0eb52aa8b2a762e5821dafe224c1d6e823785b5925cc0b2700","title":"","text":"security scans of running software provide valid annotations on build integrity to ensure conformance 3.10. Software producers often have multiple and concurrent supported versions of a product. The versions may represent major feature or compatibility differentiating releases (1.0, 2.0), or implementations for different Operating System Platforms and Architectures (Linux, Mac, Windows, AMD, ARM, x86, x64). For each release, the software producer must be capable of providing statements, unique to that version. Producers may provide free patching to a specific version the consumer has purchased, while requiring upgrades to newer major releases. Consumers need to know which updates are compatible with their environment. Third parties that provide statements of quality need to know how to differentiate supported version bands, avoiding the recommendation to upgrade to an incompatible version. As versions age, and vulnerabilities are discovered, consumers need to know the newer version of a particular product. Software producers implement versioning updates, however there are no standards for consumers and third parties to apply across software producers. Consumers and Producers want: a standard means to associate vulnerability information, statements of quality, statements of support and end of life (EOL) with a specific version of a product a standard means to identify a patched version, specific to their Operating System and Platform a standard means to differentiate major and minor version upgrades a standard means to provide concurrent versioned updates <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-9868f41d93509eb72c726e46ffc7e48e5a6f548d7e7cbc3a346474cf5714cefb","title":"","text":"must succeed. Compliance and requirement checking includes audits of the results of organizational procedures and technical procedures, which can originate from checks conducted by the organization itself or checks conducted by trusted third parties. Consecutively, <\/del> or checks conducted by trusted third parties. Consequently, <\/ins> consumers of statements about released software can be auditors. Examples of procedure results important to audits include:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4c97716f15aacec34cc5645d0c3778e03d130860a4436aed77e349d2c40477e6","title":"","text":"host on a locally reachable stub network can only interoperate with hosts on the network link(s) to which it is connected. It may be noted that just as you can plug several home routers together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing preventing the owner of a stub network router from plugging it into another stub network router. In the case of an IoT wireless network, there may be no way to do this, nor would it be desirable, but a stub router that uses ethernet on both the infrastructure and stub network sides could be connected this way. Nothing in this document is intended to prevent this from being done, but neither do we attempt to solve the problems that this could create. <\/del> It may be noted that just as you can plug several CPEs together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing preventing the owner of a stub network router from plugging it into another stub network router. In the case of an IoT wireless network, there may be no way to do this, nor would it be desirable, but a stub router that uses ethernet on both the infrastructure and stub network sides could be connected this way. Nothing in this document is intended to prevent this from being done, but neither do we attempt to solve the problems that this could create. <\/ins> The goal of this document is to describe the minimal set of changes or behaviors required to use existing IETF specifications to support"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-aa762bac27c25e0c606569bcb3d46fedf41c235da89d9ae60ab1777b598e82c5","title":"","text":"described in RFC4861. Support for adjacent infrastructure links on networks where Neighbor Discovery is not supported are out of scope for this document. Stub routers do not provide routing between adjacent infrastructure links when connected to more than one such link. <\/del> Discovery is not supported and is out of scope for this document. Stub routers do not provide routing between adjacent infrastructure links when connected to more than one such link. <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-d7a26536bf29a9416d7eb758f58434cee7b878668386d9ce42a68d04050484df","title":"","text":"A prefix is not considered a usable on-link prefix if it is advertised on the link as on-link, but the 'm' bit is set in the Router Advertisement message header (RFC4861) that contains the Prefix option. This indicates that node addressibility is being <\/del> Prefix option. This indicates that node addressability is being <\/ins> managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"usable\"—not all hosts can actually use it."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-c9daa3a1438e0bcfd22b258ce15232f041ed9e5a01c91f27ebbae66a99661465","title":"","text":"reachable, it is necessary that each partition of the stub network have its own prefix. When such a partition occurs, the stub routers must detect that it has occurred. If a stub router is currently providing a prefix on the stub network, it need take no action. If a stub router had not been providing a prefix on the stub network, and now discovers that there is no stub router providing a prefix on the network, it MUST begin to provide its own prefix on the stub network. It MUST also advertise reachability to that new prefix on its adjacent infrastructure link(s). <\/del> providing a prefix on the stub network, it needs to take no action. If a stub router had not been providing a prefix on the stub network, and now discovers that there is no stub router providing a prefix on the network, it MUST begin to provide its own prefix on the stub network. It MUST also advertise reachability to that new prefix on its adjacent infrastructure link(s). <\/ins> When partitions of this type occur, they may also heal. When a partition heals in a situation where two stub routers have both been"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-43e7809ec083b7406507a38671ddedad1dbe360106d142c79043fa95e86947a3","title":"","text":"host on a locally reachable stub network can only interoperate with hosts on the network link(s) to which it is connected. It may be noted that just as you can plug several CPEs together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing preventing the owner of a stub network router from plugging it into another stub network router. In the case of an IoT wireless network, there may be no way to do this, nor would it be desirable, but a stub router that uses ethernet on both the infrastructure and stub network sides could be connected this way. Nothing in this document is intended to prevent this from being done, but neither do we attempt to solve the problems that this could create. <\/del> It may be noted that just as you can plug several Home Gateway devices together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing preventing the owner of a stub network router from plugging it into another stub network router. In the case of an IoT wireless network, there may be no way to do this, nor would it be desirable, but a stub router that uses ethernet on both the infrastructure and stub network sides could be connected this way. Nothing in this document is intended to prevent this from being done, but neither do we attempt to solve the problems that this could create. <\/ins> The goal of this document is to describe the minimal set of changes or behaviors required to use existing IETF specifications to support"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-ec2c70127b77af6219247da85598d5a78826d2aed7ac0a11f94065392a928c5e","title":"","text":"reachable, it is necessary that each partition of the stub network have its own prefix. When such a partition occurs, the stub routers must detect that it has occurred. If a stub router is currently providing a prefix on the stub network, it needs to take no action. If a stub router had not been providing a prefix on the stub network, and now discovers that there is no stub router providing a prefix on the network, it MUST begin to provide its own prefix on the stub network. It MUST also advertise reachability to that new prefix on its adjacent infrastructure link(s). <\/del> providing a prefix on the stub network, it does not need to take action. If a stub router had not been providing a prefix on the stub network, and now discovers that there is no stub router providing a prefix on the network, it MUST begin to provide its own prefix on the stub network. It MUST also advertise reachability to that new prefix on its adjacent infrastructure link(s). <\/ins> When partitions of this type occur, they may also heal. When a partition heals in a situation where two stub routers have both been"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4792f5304104029ebc10dcaf7b66e6656d07c044ff762854849ea5bd30428648","title":"","text":"STUB_PROVIDED_PREFIX_LIFETIME seconds. The stub router sends a router advertisement containing this prefix. The 'A' (autonomous configuration), 'L' (on-link) RFC4861 and the Stub Router bit (I- D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the prefix header. <\/del> D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the Router Advertisement header flags field RFC5175. <\/ins> This router advertisement MUST also include a Route Information Option (RFC4191) for each routable prefix advertised on the stub"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-86b4a8dec8f2d0fca722ccc2cb41c287412a2e1d88839b8331669d03ae3c67bb","title":"","text":"autonomous configuration. A prefix is not considered a usable on-link prefix if it is advertised on the link as on-link, but the 'm' bit is set in the Router Advertisement message header (RFC4861) that contains the Prefix option. This indicates that node addressability is being managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"usable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/del> advertised on the link as on-link, but the 'a' bit is not set in the Prefix Information option header (RFC4861) that contains the Prefix option. This indicates that node addressability is being managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"usable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/ins> A prefix is considered to be advertised on the link if, when a Router Solicit message (RFC4861) is sent, a Router Advertisement message is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-129294b16dafef9997750770f2104b8571141122a7fd8cd4131df9723d5a6b47","title":"","text":"header flags field RFC5175. This router advertisement MUST also include a Route Information Option (RFC4191) for each routable prefix advertised on the stub <\/del> option (RFC4191) for each routable prefix advertised on the stub <\/ins> network. If the stub router is also a normal router (e.g. a home WiFi router), it SHOULD include all other routes that it is advertising in the RA, if there is space."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-53347a1e4dc8cdc4a80ea1b289c52f73eff211cc4d11d63a53ad09004247b66e","title":"","text":"It is also possible that stub routers for more than one stub network may be connected to the same adjacent infrastructure link. In this case, the stub routers will be advertising Router Information Options <\/del> case, the stub routers will be advertising Router Information options <\/ins> in their router advertisements for their OSNR prefixes. Stub routers MUST track the presence of such routes, and MUST advertise reachability to them on interfaces connected to stub networks."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4053abaa1d6908f8729393ad7e70ba78334b98fae9b528f49172b60234684758","title":"","text":"5.2.3. If DHCPv6 PD is available on the link, it is preferable to acquire a prefix using DHCPv6 PD rather than generating a ULA prefix, because the DHCPv6-PD-provided prefix is routable at least on the local infrastructure. Therefore, when DHCPv6-PD is available, the stub router MUST use DHCPv6 PD rather than its own prefix. <\/del> prefix using DHCPv6 PD rather than generating a ULA prefix. Using a prefix provided by the infrastructure DHCPv6 prefix delegation service means (assuming the infrastructure is configured correctly) that routing is possible between the stub network links and all links on the infrastructure network, and possibly to the general internet. By contrast, if the prefix generated by the stub router is used, reachability is only possible between the stub network and the adjacent infrastructure link, because the OSNR prefix in this case is not known to the infrastructure network routing fabric. So when the only prefix that is available is the one provided by the stub router, cloud services will not be reachable via IPv6, and infrastructure- provided NAT64 will not work. Therefore, when DHCPv6-PD is available, the stub router MUST use DHCPv6 PD rather than its own prefix. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a27f55a1ea5805fb593d4d15b2328e2b95c9ab345dbc9af1b809be022395de48","title":"","text":"NAT64 prefix(es) MUST be advertised by those stub routers that are able to discover it. In order for infrastructure-provided NAT64 to work, the stub network must have an OSNR prefix that is known to the infrastructure. Typically this means that the stub router must have acquired this prefix using DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation. Unless otherwise configured to do so, the stub router MUST NOT advertise infrastructure-provided NAT64 service on the stub network if it has not acquired the OSNR prefix through DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation. <\/ins> 6.2. Most infrastructure networks at present do not provide NAT64 service. It is therefore necessary for stub routers to be able to provide <\/del> Many infrastructure networks do not provide DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation. In these cases it is necessary for stub routers to be able to provide <\/ins> NAT64 service if IPv4 hosts are to be reachable from the stub network. <\/del> network. Therefore, stub routers MUST be capable of providing NAT64 service to the stub network. When infrastructure-provided NAT64 service is not present or is not usable, and when no other NAT64 service is already advertised on the stub network, stub routers MUST, by default, enable their own NAT64 service and advertise it on the stub network. <\/ins> To provide NAT64 service, a stub router must allocate a NAT64 prefix. For convenience, the stub network allocates a single prefix out of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-6b8981d3049987189df1d1a045e171101b89804c3348cb910acbd8726e8fbb6e","title":"","text":"Additional section. The resolver should also include an ipv4only.arpa record in the Additional section. 7. <\/del> 6.3. Some network media may provide their own mechanisms for advertising NAT64 service to the stub network. If such a mechanism is available, stub routers MUST use the mechanism provided by the network medium used on the stub network to advertise NAT64 service. Otherwise, NAT64 service MUST be advertised using the PREF64 Router Advertisement option RFC8781. 6.4. <\/ins> If a stub network is constructed using mesh technology, it may become partitioned. In such a situation, it may be one stub router is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-0dd0bca3e02c075f8fdd2afba579076f730615af6349cacad7deb6c5a69e7aae","title":"","text":"then the ULA prefix that is numerically lowest should be kept, and the others deprecated. By using this approach, it is not necessary for the routers to coordinate in advance. 6.5. In order to provide network access, stub routers must provide some network services to the stub network. We have previously discussed the following services: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-10528fde14f9f41940c6828113564d59fbd355724876a2ef4c39bf433bf25b88","title":"","text":"Automatically Connecting Stub Networks to Unmanaged Infrastructure draft-lemon-stub-networks-07 <\/del> draft-ietf-snac-simple-00 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a0e0bd75bd5debbf521b145e1d8f0a0f0817ff8f13034188e77836ec16afa3b9","title":"","text":"6. Stub Network routers must be capable of providing NAT64 themselves, and must be capable of discovering the availability of NAT64 service on the infrastructure network and providing it when it is available and usable. Some network media may provide their own mechanisms for advertising NAT64 service to the stub network. If such a mechanism is available, stub routers MUST use the mechanism provided by the network medium used on the stub network to advertise NAT64 service. Otherwise, NAT64 service MUST be advertised using the PREF64 Router Advertisement option RFC8781. There are four possible combinations of circumstances in which to consider how to provide NAT64 service: In the first case, infrastructure-provided NAT64 is preferred, and the stub router MUST advertise this service to the stub network. In the second case, there is no way to provide connectivity to the infrastructure: we don't have IPv6 routing, because we don't have a routable prefix, we don't have NAT64 for the same reason, and we don't have IPv4, so the stub router can't do NAT64 on its own. In this case, the stub router MUST NOT advertise NAT64 service. In the third case, despite the infrastructure providing NAT64, we can't use it, so the stub router MUST provide its own NAT64 service. In the fourth case, the stub router MUST provide its own NAT64 service. An additional complication is that there may be more than one stub router connecting the stub network to infrastructure. In this case, it may be desirable to limit the number of stub routers providing NAT64 service, or it may be acceptable for all stub routers to provide it. In the latter case, this should not be a problem: since each stub router is using its own ULA prefix to provide NAT64, any 5-tuple that goes through a stub router's NAT64 translator will necessarily have as its destination an IPv6 address in a particular NAT64 prefix, and that address will select the correct stub router through which to send the packet for translation. A further complication is that in some cases, some stub routers connected to the stub network may not be able to advertise an infrastructure-provided NAT64 prefix, while others may. In this case, when the infrastructure-provided NAT64 service appears on the stub network, stub routers that are not able to advertise an infrastructure NAT64 service MUST NOT do so. To differentiate between infrastructure-provided NAT64 service and stub router-provided NAT64 service, stub routers that advertise infrastructure-provided NAT64 service MUST use a preference of medium for this service. Stub routers advertising their own service MUST use a preference of low. In some cases a stub router may be administratively configured with a NAT64 prefix. In this situation, the stub router MUST advertise the prefix with a preference of high. Stub routers must monitor the advertisement of other NAT64 prefixes on the stub network. If a stub router is advertising a NAT64 prefix, and a NAT64 prefix is advertised on the stub network with a higher preference, the stub router SHOULD deprecate the prefix it is advertising. <\/ins> 6.1. Stub networks are defined to be IPv6-only because it would be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a761d3c44d350b6244efe604aa210ddc9ad915f783eeed3f87ee7c56309a4746","title":"","text":"Additional section. The resolver should also include an ipv4only.arpa record in the Additional section. 6.3. Some network media may provide their own mechanisms for advertising NAT64 service to the stub network. If such a mechanism is available, stub routers MUST use the mechanism provided by the network medium used on the stub network to advertise NAT64 service. Otherwise, NAT64 service MUST be advertised using the PREF64 Router Advertisement option RFC8781. 6.4. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> If a stub network is constructed using mesh technology, it may become partitioned. In such a situation, it may be one stub router is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-2a1289711ff1dea361def0e0efe1eb8da78bef26b9c5674973a053eb3befa6c2","title":"","text":"the others deprecated. By using this approach, it is not necessary for the routers to coordinate in advance. 6.5. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> In order to provide network access, stub routers must provide some network services to the stub network. We have previously discussed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-fb60b35342e5f35b793ed90eaca9937788f1059b1abe3e91a817b4213c2edb86","title":"","text":"Automatically Connecting Stub Networks to Unmanaged Infrastructure draft-ietf-snac-simple-00 <\/del> draft-ietf-snac-simple-01 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-bccb1b3fe177b07053798a7f673f1c7e1f64d5bce348099bdd582d19c29a4f49","title":"","text":"different ULA prefix each time it connects to a different infrastructure network. If IPv6 prefix delegation is available, which implies that IPv6 service is also available on the infrastructure link, then the stub router MAY use IPv6 prefix delegation to acquire a prefix to advertise on the stub network, rather than allocating one out of its ULA prefix. <\/del> 5.2.3. If DHCPv6 PD is available on the link, it is preferable to acquire a prefix using DHCPv6 PD rather than generating a ULA prefix. Using a prefix provided by the infrastructure DHCPv6 prefix delegation service means (assuming the infrastructure is configured correctly) that routing is possible between the stub network links and all links on the infrastructure network, and possibly to the general internet. <\/del> If IPv6 prefix delegation and IPv6 service is both available on the infrastructure link, then the stub router MUST attempt to acquire a prefix using DCHPv6 prefix delegation. Using a prefix provided by the infrastructure DHCPv6 prefix delegation service means (assuming the infrastructure is configured correctly) that routing is possible between the stub network links and all links on the infrastructure network, and possibly to the general internet. <\/ins> By contrast, if the prefix generated by the stub router is used, reachability is only possible between the stub network and the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-5f5419666cd1d8e01d548826470ed29f1bec6f871b36fd8a3556e9bfd9a2c8f4","title":"","text":"not known to the infrastructure network routing fabric. So when the only prefix that is available is the one provided by the stub router, cloud services will not be reachable via IPv6, and infrastructure- provided NAT64 will not work. Therefore, when DHCPv6-PD is available, the stub router MUST use DHCPv6 PD rather than its own prefix. <\/del> provided NAT64 will not work. Therefore, when the stub router is able to successfully acquire a prefix using DHCPv6 PD, it MUST use DHCPv6 PD rather than its own self-generated ULA prefix. A stub router SHOULD request stub network prefixes with length 64. If the stub router obtains a prefix with length less than 64, it SHOULD generate a \/64 from the obtained prefix by padding with zeros. If the stub router obtains a prefix with length greater than 64, the stub router MUST treat the prefix as unusable and allocate a prefix out of its ULA prefix instead. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-ba7770114386dec84a23a78f6ceb5428c071092028e9eda5619db75b0ee6f7fb","title":"","text":"A prefix is considered to be advertised on the link if, when a Router Solicit message (RFC4861) is sent, a Router Advertisement message is received in response which contains a prefix information option (RFC4861) <\/del> (RFC4861) for that prefix. <\/ins> After an RA message containing a suitable prefix has been received, it can be assumed for some period of time thereafter that that prefix"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4ab9e304b457dee34ea2fd439e1d5c9c05519f218d21c6df663f10b412aa5202","title":"","text":"to the destination, and will drop the packet. To address this problem, stub routers SHOULD remember the last time a prefix was advertised across restarts. On restart, the router can immediately begin deprecating the prefix, and can stop after the prefix valid lifetime goes to zero, based on the recorded time that the last advertisement was sent. <\/del> prefix was advertised across restarts. On restart, the router configures the prefix on its interface but does not advertise it in Router Advertisements. Devices that are still using that prefix will be seen as on-link to the router, and so packets will be delivered using ND on-link rather than forwarded to the default router. <\/ins> When a stub router has only flash memory with limited write lifetime, it may be inappropriate to do a write to flash every time an RA"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-7d8649575ebfa1cc99a248a61df5d23691647004fe3c629536782c030483d10c","title":"","text":"record the set of prefixes that have been advertised on infrastructure and the maximum valid lifetime that was advertised. On restart, the router should assume that hosts on the infrastructure link have received advertisements for any such prefixes, and should immediately deprecate them, and continue to do so until the maximum valid lifetime has elapsed after restart. [WG: we could actually just not advertise the prefix, rather than deprecating it. In this case, the host should wind up preferring some other prefix for new connections anyway, because it will have a later preferred lifetime expiry. As long as we remember the route and resume forwarding for it, existing connections can continue until the prefix becomes invalid. Further experience with this shows that this solution doesn't work well at all. Ideally the stub routers would all use some identifier specific to the stub network to construct the prefix advertised on the AIL. At present Thread uses the Thread \"extended PAN ID\", which is a 64-bit quantity. Perhaps something like the SSID could be used for a WiFi stub network. I don't think there's a way to specify this generally. But it seems as if the solution proposed here probably isn't worth doing.] <\/del> link have received advertisements for any such prefixes. When possible, it is best if all stub routers serving a particular stub network use the same 64-bit prefix on the AIL. For example, Thread stub routers use bits from the Thread Extended PAN ID to generate the ULA prefix's Global ID and Subnet ID. The Global ID generation conforms to RFC4193 because the Extended PAN ID is generated randomly using the same mechanism that is specified in RFC 4193 for the ULA prefix bits. <\/ins> 5.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-78aed40a293f3fa1a48d39405a19c42d3f0b4b9d36a3993f20072504634023ee","title":"","text":"Automatically Connecting Stub Networks to Unmanaged Infrastructure draft-ietf-snac-simple-02 <\/del> draft-ietf-snac-simple-04 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-e76b55bddd36a519e846877cf9f3a5f1ea464bacc99c4bf304f07a457fde9442","title":"","text":"Each stub network will have some set of prefixes that are advertised as on-link for that network. A stub router connected to that stub network SHOULD advertise reachability to all such prefixes on any AIL to which it is attached using router advertisements <\/del> to which it is attached using router advertisements. A stub router SHOULD NOT advertise itself as a default router on an AIL by setting a non-zero Router Lifetime value in the header of its Router Advertisements. The exception to this rule is the case where the stub router itself is the default router for a particular AIL: for example, it may be the home router providing connectivity to an ISP. <\/ins> 5.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4a3c868255ffccc5c14467492707326b2c3f21e03fb55704d1085bc28fea88ef","title":"","text":"sent to that router, it will ultimately reach host (B) on the stub network. To achieve the reachability goal described above, this document assumes hosts attempting to reach destinations on the stub network maintain a routing table - Type C hosts as defined in RFC4191). Type A and Type B hosts are out-of-scope for this document. <\/ins> 1.2. In addition to the interoperability goals we've described above, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-8a25530c5dfc801d5ba4aa1dcf76f656073ca151598383360b284cf5ff695541","title":"","text":"straightforward as connecting a new host to the same infrastructure network. Stub routers can be attached to any network. However, there are network configurations where a stub router will not work. An analysis of networks where stub routers could be attached is provided in net-analysis. <\/ins> 2. 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-fe13f24d6db15a032d7b7f024071ab6f6753b7ae09f0f65c7ef2da7cc6f06e60","title":"","text":"of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"suitable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. Note: there can be layer two networks where neighbor discovery is not supported and therefore we cannot set the 'L' bit, but could set the 'A' bit. The behavior of stub networks when connecting to such networks is out of scope for this document. <\/ins> A prefix is considered to be advertised on the link if, when a Router Solicit message (RFC4861) is sent, a Router Advertisement message is received in response which contains a prefix information option"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-99673f60d57da4fc39bcd69c987ef07bb7daba99fbcf88e477ff33afe0850323","title":"","text":"Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses (RFC4193) are randomly allocated prefixes. A stub router MUST allocate a single ULA Site Prefix for use in providing on-link prefixes to the stub network and the adjacent infrastructure link, as needed. <\/del> adjacent infrastructure link as described in state-begin-advertising. <\/ins> Any ULA Link Prefixes allocated by a stub router SHOULD be maintained across reboots, and SHOULD remain stable over time. (TBD: mention"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-b1b730618d51203203119419c25edf935c0e2531135602744a9a374f85d808c0","title":"","text":"the interface. This prefix has a valid and preferred lifetime of STUB_PROVIDED_PREFIX_LIFETIME seconds. The stub router sends a router advertisement (RA) containing this prefix in a Prefix Information Option (PIO). In the PIO, the A (autonomous configuration) flag RFC4861 MUST be set and the L (on-link) flag SHOULD be set. The exception cases where the L flag can be cleared is where the specific link-layer technology and\/or configuration requires clearing the L flag. <\/del> Information Option (PIO). In the PIO, the 'A' flag bit (autonomous configuration) flag RFC4861 MUST be set and the 'L' flag bit (on-link prefix) MUST be set. Link-layer technologies that require the 'L' flag bit to be cleared are out of scope of this document. <\/ins> The Stub Router flag (I-D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the RA flags field. The values of the M and O flags MUST be copied from"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-912012b8255fb84a5b3f24e01ed150b12a6820d7247c6384f2765547466e9aa6","title":"","text":"In order to provide network access, stub routers must provide some network services to the stub network. We have previously discussed the following services: 9. This document has no IANA actions. 10. Because a SNAC router operates as an IPv6 router that sends and receives IPv6 Neighbor Discovery protocol messages, the security considerations of Section 11 of RFC4861 apply. No additional security considerations are identified. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-cb478a55478e84b620510aa226d41720a41f40a01e49bc5b3fb8f240130b16dd","title":"","text":"all times, when a new host arrives on the AIL, it is able to acquire an IPv6 address on that link. During all of the states mentioned here except for state-unknown, the SNAC router is expected to treat the infrastructure interface as an Advertising Interface as described in RFC4861. There are two sets of information that need to be sent in an RA; if neither is present, then the SNAC router SHOULD NOT send an RA even if it is treating the infrastructure interface as an advertising interface. These two sets of information are the on-link prefix, if any, that is to be advertised. Whether or not such a prefix is advertised, and what exactly is advertised regarding that prefix, is determined by the state machine. The other set of information is a set of routes to prefixes on the SNAC network. Whenever we know of a reachable (scope is not link-local) prefix on the SNAC network, we include an RIO option in the RA on the infrastructure network indicating that that prefix is reachable through the SNAC router. It is important to note that it is possible for an on-link, routable prefix to be advertised and then withdrawn on the SNAC network, but for it to still be valid, and for there to still be some communication occurring using that prefix. In order to avoid prematurely interrupting such communication, the SNAC router MUST maintain a list of prefixes known to be valid on the SNAC network, even if those prefixes have been deprecated, and MUST include RIO options for all such prefixes in the RAs that it sends on the adjacent infrastructure link. <\/ins> 5.1.2.1. When the stub router interface first connects to the AIL, it MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-434e14ff2bda0e686ce177bb9116abd288385086bbd479fb6bec33f19fb3e45d","title":"","text":"5.1.2.2. When entering this state, if the router MUST discontinue treating the interface as an Advertising Interface as described in RFC4861, if it has been doing so. <\/del> When a new host appears on the AIL and sends an initial router solicit, if it does not receive a suitable on-link prefix, it will not be able to communicate. Consequently, the stub router MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-22c61d5fa4dec262b5822e56c035719a131486df58319d26e88afec8ecbcf6cd","title":"","text":"stub router MUST treat the prefix as unsuitable and allocate a ULA Link Prefix out of its ULA Site Prefix instead. A DHCPv6-PD client can request a particular lease interval for the DHCPv6-delegated prefix. However, there is no particular reason for a SNAC router to specify this interval. 5.2.3.1. It is possible that a SNAC router might obtain a prefix from a DHCPv6 server using prefix delegation and then something about the infrastructure network attachment might change that affects the validity of that prefix for use on the stub network. The section of I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis titled \"Refreshing Configuration Information\" discusses the various scenarios that can occur. We assume that the DHCPv6 prefix delegation client being used by the SNAC router conforms to this specification. Situations that can occur include (but are not limited to): The SNAC router MUST NOT use a prefix once the DHCPv6-PD client has determined that it is no longer valid. If the DHCPv6-PD client provides a new prefix, and the old prefix is still valid, the SNAC router SHOULD explicitly deprecate the old prefix at the same time that it first advertises the new prefix. If the DHCPv6-PD client determines that the prefix it provided to use as the OSNR prefix is no longer valid, and no replacement prefix is provided by the DHCPv6 server, then the SNAC router MUST switch to the ULA link prefix that it has allocated for use on the SNAC network. In the case that the DHCPv6-PD client is unable to renew its lease on the current OSNR prefix, and time between the T2 interval for the prefix assignment I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis and the end of the lease has been reached, then the SNAC router MUST deprecate the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix and begin advertising the ULA link prefix. A failure to renew the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix could be because the SNAC network has been disconnected from one AIL and moved to a different AIL. In this situation, if the new AIL also has IPv6 service and DHCPv6-PD service, the DHCPv6 client will get a clear indication that the old prefix is no longer valid. However, it may be that no DHCPv6-PD service is available on the new link, either because it is an IPv4-only link or because it's an IPv6-capable link that doesn't provide DHCPv6 service. In this situation, if the SNAC network remains connected to the link and no DHCPv6 service appears, the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix will eventually time out and be replaced. The SNAC router SHOULD NOT attempt to replace it prior to this normal timeout process, because there is no benefit to changing the OSNR prefix on the SNAC network in such a situation, and it's possible that the SNAC router will return to the other link before the OSNR prefix expires. <\/ins> 5.3. Stub routers MUST advertise reachability to stub network OSNR"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-290c9c3957653cd8e33acfd0386c620999d7b97e6015d9f45e31309e73bc9b14","title":"","text":"6. SNAC networks rely on IPv6 to enable routing between links, which would not be possible with IPv4 due to the lack of a standard mechanism similar to router advertisements in IPv4. However, it can stll be useful for hosts on the SNAC network to establish communications with IPv4-only hosts on the infrastructure network. Although NAT64 provides IPv6-only hosts with a way to reach IPv4 hosts, there is no easy way for an IPv4 host to use NAT64 to originate communication with an IPv6 host. Therefore, this document enables IPv6 hosts on the SNAC network to discover and reach with IPv4 hosts on infrastructure, but does not provide a way for IPv4-only hosts on infrastructure to communicate to IPv6 hosts on the SNAC network. This should be acceptable because hosts on the infrastructure network should not be IPv4-only, since the SNAC router is providing IPv6 service on the infrastructure network that is suitable for communicating using IPv6 to hosts on the SNAC network--there should not be any hosts on the infrastructure network that can't communicate with hosts on the stub network unless such hosts do not have an IPv6 stack at all. So the purpose of providing IPv4 connectivity for SNAC hosts is to enable communication with arbitrary IPv4 hosts which may not be on the AIL. This is accomplished by providing NAT64 address translation in the stub router, and by enabling service discovery using a Discovery Proxy. <\/ins> Stub Network routers must be capable of providing NAT64 themselves, and must be capable of discovering the availability of NAT64 service on the infrastructure network and providing it when it is available"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-052b7c5983ef38321239d85b55dc7ddcfbb1b5d58771c31871130f6bc1d4b0e3","title":"","text":"stub router MUST treat the prefix as unsuitable and allocate a ULA Link Prefix out of its ULA Site Prefix instead. 5.3. <\/del> A DHCPv6-PD client can request a particular lease interval for the DHCPv6-delegated prefix. However, there is no particular reason for a SNAC router to specify this interval. 5.2.3.1. It is possible that a SNAC router might obtain a prefix from a DHCPv6 server using prefix delegation and then something about the infrastructure network attachment might change that affects the validity of that prefix for use on the stub network. The section of I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis titled \"Refreshing Configuration Information\" discusses the various scenarios that can occur. We assume that the DHCPv6 prefix delegation client being used by the SNAC router conforms to this specification. Situations that can occur include (but are not limited to): The SNAC router MUST NOT use a prefix once the DHCPv6-PD client has determined that it is no longer valid. If the DHCPv6-PD client provides a new prefix, and the old prefix is still valid, the SNAC router SHOULD explicitly deprecate the old prefix at the same time that it first advertises the new prefix. If the DHCPv6-PD client determines that the prefix it provided to use as the OSNR prefix is no longer valid, and no replacement prefix is provided by the DHCPv6 server, then the SNAC router MUST switch to the ULA link prefix that it has allocated for use on the SNAC network. In the case that the DHCPv6-PD client is unable to renew its lease on the current OSNR prefix, and time between the T2 interval for the prefix assignment draft-ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis and the end of the lease has been reached, then the SNAC router MUST deprecate the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix and begin advertising the ULA link prefix. A failure to renew the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix could be because the SNAC network has been disconnected from one AIL and moved to a different AIL. In this situation, if the new AIL also has IPv6 service and DHCPv6-PD service, the DHCPv6 client will get a clear indication that the old prefix is no longer valid. However, it may be that no DHCPv6-PD service is available on the new link, either because it is an IPv4-only link or because it's an IPv6-capable link that doesn't provide DHCPv6 service. In this situation, if the SNAC network remains connected to the link and no DHCPv6 service appears, the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix will eventually time out and be replaced. The SNAC router SHOULD NOT attempt to replace it prior to this normal timeout process, because there is no benefit to changing the OSNR prefix on the SNAC network in such a situation, and it's possible that the SNAC router will return to the other link before the OSNR prefix expires. 5.2.4. <\/ins> Stub routers MUST advertise reachability to stub network OSNR prefixes on any AIL to which they are connected. If the stub router"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-01e05b13065b4cbde5273f5382467d3dbcda5bf4aafdbf19a099ef5d2e6cecba","title":"","text":"for example, it may be the home router providing connectivity to an ISP. 5.4. <\/del> 5.2.5. <\/ins> The stub router MAY advertise itself as a default router on the stub network, if it itself has a default route on the AIL. In some cases"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-5efca5c07d8305051a0c0c6aeafc0d94b1ec179c28e8324347e33aa5f32c7da5","title":"","text":"presence of such routes, and MUST advertise reachability to them on interfaces connected to stub networks. 5.5. <\/del> 5.2.6. <\/ins> Since DNS-SD is in wide use, and provides for ad-hoc, self- configuring advertising using the mDNS transport, this is a suitable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-56932082a879981873fcb8804892ea4da0fb6aa5e711a0753337d2ec530216c5","title":"","text":"mechanisms provided by the infrastructure. Therefore, stub routers MUST provide DNS-SD service as described in this section. 5.5.1. <\/del> 5.2.6.1. <\/ins> The adjacent infrastructure can be assumed to already enable some service discovery mechanism between hosts on the infrastructure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-8edf3e3098923636cd0e08ed05756fc73da7f7fd98e1909837562f03b5dc3de9","title":"","text":"infrastructure network, and is therefore out of scope for this document. 5.5.2. <\/del> 5.2.6.2. <\/ins> Hosts on the stub network may need to discover hosts on the AIL, or on the stub network. In the IoT network example we've been using,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-61ca5afb2c864e4bd50cd2afb7a2501ad4a89f16a9a08dad66517be5052e2264","title":"","text":"specific mechanism, the details of which are out of scope for this document. 6. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> SNAC networks rely on IPv6 to enable routing between links, which would not be possible with IPv4 due to the lack of a standard"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-fa4f397f7c61a5c7bf994a6d8cc6bcb1462ad7e24dc0d5fbe12d033a944d394a","title":"","text":"preference, the stub router SHOULD deprecate the prefix it is advertising. 6.1. <\/del> 5.3.1. <\/ins> Stub networks are defined to be IPv6-only because it would be difficult to implement a stub network using IPv4 technology."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-4ddd8ad228b9823cf0c6c79122833830a1a2ff6378099ae6c6970873f2267a34","title":"","text":"NAT64 service on the stub network if it has not acquired the OSNR prefix through DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation. 6.2. <\/del> 5.3.2. <\/ins> Most infrastructure networks at present do not provide NAT64 service. Many infrastructure networks do not provide DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a916ae119a8f90614be06a04b179b8d1f6855d9a3dc8de7a18289558c99e0e0d","title":"","text":"Additional section. The resolver should also include an ipv4only.arpa record in the Additional section. 7. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> Some technologies used for stub networks, for example Thread or 6LoWPAN mesh networks, can produce partitioned networks, where what"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-ba66fe852ab4ebb05c5bab1b676014100aa7d859c0418897fcdd2781f4b8bf2d","title":"","text":"and the others deprecated. By using this approach, it is not necessary for the routers to coordinate in advance. 8. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> In order to provide network access, stub routers must provide some network services to the stub network. We have previously discussed the following services: 9. <\/del> 5.6. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions. 10. <\/del> 5.7. <\/ins> Because a SNAC router operates as an IPv6 router that sends and receives IPv6 Neighbor Discovery protocol messages, the security"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-6d5e9034df555c8fb52de1625e7a4470625a53cd608d974429865a71ed5f6bcf","title":"","text":"link in a Prefix Information option (RFC4861) with the following Prefix Information option header values: A prefix is not considered a suitable on-link prefix if the 'L' bit is set, but the 'A' bit is not set. This indicates that node addressability is being managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"suitable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/del> A prefix is not considered a suitable on-link prefix if the 'L' flag bit is set, but the 'A' flag bit is not set. This indicates that node addressability is being managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"suitable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/ins> Note: there can be layer two networks where neighbor discovery is not supported and therefore we cannot set the 'L' bit, but could set the 'A' bit. The behavior of stub networks when connecting to such networks is out of scope for this document. <\/del> supported and therefore we cannot set the 'L' flag bit, but could set the 'A' flag bit. The behavior of stub networks when connecting to such networks is out of scope for this document. <\/ins> A prefix is considered to be advertised on the link if, when a Router Solicit message (RFC4861) is sent, a Router Advertisement message is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-c03b0609de5493acbfd51d0d5c8048ccab1ac66859771ac6e62ad2276c264c88","title":"","text":"STUB_PROVIDED_PREFIX_LIFETIME seconds. The stub router sends a router advertisement (RA) containing this prefix in a Prefix Information Option (PIO). In the PIO, the 'A' flag bit (autonomous configuration) flag RFC4861 MUST be set and the 'L' flag bit (on-link prefix) MUST be set. Link-layer technologies that require the 'L' flag bit to be cleared are out of scope of this document. The Stub Router flag (I-D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the RA flags field. The values of the M and O flags MUST be copied from the respective M\/O flag values seen in the most recent (unicast or multicast) RA received from a non-stub-router. For the selection of the most recent RA, the following RAs MUST be excluded: If there is no recent RA from a non-stub-router, both M and O flags MUST be cleared, unless the stub router rebooted recently. After a reboot, if no recent RA is received from a non-stub router, but a recent RA has been received from a stub router, the values for the M and O flags provided by that stub router MUST be copied. After MAX_FLAGS_COPY_TIME after reboot, the stub router MUST go back to the regular behavior defined above. This avoids a situation where a stub router that has rebooted starts to advertise different M\/O flag values than other stub routers present on the same link. <\/del> configuration) RFC4861 MUST be set and the 'L' flag bit (on-link prefix) MUST also be set. Link-layer technologies that require the 'L' flag bit to be cleared are out of scope of this document. The 'Stub Router' flag bit (I-D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the RA flags field. The values of the 'M' and 'O' flag bits MUST be copied from the respective 'M' and 'O' flag bit values seen in the most recent (unicast or multicast) RA received from a non-stub- router. For the selection of the most recent RA, the following RAs MUST be excluded: If there is no recent RA from a non-stub-router, both 'M' and 'O' flag bits MUST be cleared, unless the stub router rebooted recently. After a reboot, if no recent RA is received from a non-stub router, but a recent RA has been received from a stub router, the values for the 'M' and 'O' flag bits provided by that stub router MUST be copied. After MAX_FLAGS_COPY_TIME after reboot, the stub router MUST go back to the regular behavior defined above. This avoids a situation where a stub router that has rebooted starts to advertise different 'M' and 'O' flag bit values than other stub routers present on the same link. <\/ins> The sent router advertisement MUST also include a Route Information option (RFC4191) for each routable prefix advertised on the stub"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-63d759a000802b4d283e17cf17eedb3bdfdb417391f6ee38def120ba3e4ec563","title":"","text":"The stub router may receive a router advertisement containing one or more suitable on-link prefixes on the AIL. If any of these prefixes are different than the prefix the stub router is advertising as the on-link suitable prefix, and the Stub Router flag is not set in in the Router Advertisement flags field, the stub router moves the <\/del> on-link suitable prefix, and the 'Stub Router' flag bit is not set in in the Router Advertisement flags field, the stub router moves the <\/ins> interface to STATE-DEPRECATING (state-deprecating). If the stub router bit is set in the RA header flags field, then one of the following must be true in order for that prefix to be <\/del> If the 'Stub Router' flag bit is set in the RA header flags field, then one of the following must be true in order for that prefix to be <\/ins> considered suitable: 5.1.2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-d17b4f2d0b709fac0b4aa412b688031b369792b437004d6919e4910b29af3482","title":"","text":"A stub network that services a Wi-Fi stub network SHOULD provide DNS64 translation: hosts on the stub network cannot be assumed to be able to do DNS64 synthesis in the stub resolver. In this case the DNS resolver on the stub router MUST honor the CD and DO bits if received in a request, since this indicates that the stub resolver on the requestor intends to do DNSSEC validation. In this case, the resolver on the stub router MUST NOT perform DNS64 synthesis. <\/del> DNS resolver on the stub router MUST honor the 'CD' and 'DO' flag bits if received in a request, since this indicates that the stub resolver on the requestor intends to do DNSSEC validation. In this case, the resolver on the stub router MUST NOT perform DNS64 synthesis. <\/ins> On specific stub networks it may be desirable to require the stub network device to perform DNS64 synthesis. Stub network routers for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-8a2a0431ab8ec9a009d79b42672bb2b8e563ed6e2c5cff385e68866c07a198c7","title":"","text":"Automatically Connecting Stub Networks to Unmanaged Infrastructure draft-ietf-snac-simple-04 <\/del> draft-ietf-snac-simple-05 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-5c0163f5bafcb663e88580b57cac16b2fb0a97854baa8ebd80a8e3ea6bac8415","title":"","text":"prefix) MUST also be set. Link-layer technologies that require the 'L' flag bit to be cleared are out of scope of this document. The 'Stub Router' flag bit (I-D.hui-stub-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the RA flags field. The values of the 'M' and 'O' flag bits MUST be copied from the respective 'M' and 'O' flag bit values seen in the most recent (unicast or multicast) RA received from a non-SNAC- router. For the selection of the most recent RA, the following RAs MUST be excluded: <\/del> The 'SNAC Router' flag bit (I-D.ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag) MUST be set in the RA flags field. The values of the 'M' and 'O' flag bits MUST be copied from the respective 'M' and 'O' flag bit values seen in the most recent (unicast or multicast) RA received from a non-SNAC-router. For the selection of the most recent RA, the following RAs MUST be excluded: <\/ins> If there is no recent RA from a non-SNAC-router, both 'M' and 'O' flag bits MUST be cleared, unless the SNAC router rebooted recently."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-c33169bf704281e51a87dc7ada54bc0d0c148d37f17fac92634db7aa0ac21b89","title":"","text":"The SNAC router may receive a Router Advertisement message containing one or more suitable on-link prefixes on the AIL. If any of these prefixes are different than the prefix the SNAC router is advertising as the on-link suitable prefix, and the 'Stub Router' flag bit is not <\/del> as the on-link suitable prefix, and the 'SNAC Router' flag bit is not <\/ins> set in in the Router Advertisement flags field, the SNAC router moves the interface to STATE-DEPRECATING (state-deprecating). If the 'Stub Router' flag bit is set in the RA header flags field, <\/del> If the 'SNAC Router' flag bit is set in the RA header flags field, <\/ins> then one of the following must be true in order for that prefix to be considered suitable:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a3c59344f1340debf3d2220dae3b3bfa2d2befae0139a010c9a6ec882c3c74fa","title":"","text":"5.2. How addressability is managed on stub networks depends on the nature of the stub network. For some stub networks, the stub router can be <\/del> of the stub network. For some stub networks, the SNAC router can be <\/ins> sure that it is the only router. For example, a SNAC router that is providing a Wi-Fi network for tethering will advertise its own SSID and use its own joining credentials; in this case, it can assume that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-d8852802207bc29c228040076905fffd0449cde832b760a09850a985bfa51dc0","title":"","text":"and on-link prefix just like any other router. However, some stub networks are more cooperative in nature, for example IP mesh networks. On such networks, multiple stub routers <\/del> example IP mesh networks. On such networks, multiple SNAC routers <\/ins> may be present and be providing addressability and reachability. In either case, some SNAC router connected to the stub network MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a9b4593980a4f2a9643d37447782a5aa602d827bd77fb2a976955359452607b3","title":"","text":"5.2.2. In order to be able to provide addressability either on the stub network or on an adjacent infrastructure network, a stub router MUST <\/del> network or on an adjacent infrastructure network, a SNAC router MUST <\/ins> allocate its own ULA Site Pefix. ULA prefixes, described in Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses (RFC4193) are randomly allocated prefixes. A SNAC router MUST allocate a single ULA Site Prefix for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-17612c9676a02e8ae95aaf62d2beaf56eec08f52679b85b7672999b4037053aa","title":"","text":"5.3. SNAC routers MUST advertise reachability to stub network OSNR prefixes on any AIL to which they are connected. If the stub router <\/del> prefixes on any AIL to which they are connected. If the SNAC router <\/ins> is advertising a suitable prefix on any interface, any such prefixes MUST be advertised on that interface in the same Router Advertisement message that is advertising the suitable prefix, to avoid unnecessary"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-b46ce4c9390d0090dfa7ad83faf75cac8dbf5b41c935a5071817274231d56233","title":"","text":"The SNAC router MAY advertise itself as a default router on the stub network, if it itself has a default route on the AIL. In some cases it may not be desirable to advertise reachability to the Internet as a whole; in this case the stub router is not required to advertise <\/del> a whole; in this case the SNAC router is not required to advertise <\/ins> itself as a default router. If the SNAC router is not advertising itself as a default router on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-e7ab3e13ce1951d1c8efed7ff4c8703b641b5e4a4c3bb158f1c498339f4f0ea6","title":"","text":"that received it. Consequently, SNAC routers SHOULD be configurable to not advertise themselves as default routers on the stub network. Stub routers <\/del> themselves as default routers on the stub network. SNAC routers <\/ins> SHOULD be configurable to explicitly advertise AIL prefixes on the stub network even if they are advertising as a default router. The mechanisms by which such configuration can be accomplished are out of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a0b7c151f3b05b95087fbd356a33d7b43d1fdfca9d4cd4304392f9383ff13911","title":"","text":"to be advertised. Whether or not such a prefix is advertised, and what exactly is advertised regarding that prefix, is determined by the state machine. The other set of information is a set of routes to prefixes on the SNAC network. Whenever we know of a reachable (scope is not link-local) prefix on the SNAC network, we include an <\/del> to prefixes on the stub network. Whenever we know of a reachable (scope is not link-local) prefix on the stub network, we include an <\/ins> RIO option in the RA on the infrastructure network indicating that that prefix is reachable through the SNAC router. It is important to note that it is possible for an on-link, routable prefix to be advertised and then withdrawn on the SNAC network, but <\/del> prefix to be advertised and then withdrawn on the stub network, but <\/ins> for it to still be valid, and for there to still be some communication occurring using that prefix. In order to avoid prematurely interrupting such communication, the SNAC router MUST maintain a list of prefixes known to be valid on the SNAC network, <\/del> maintain a list of prefixes known to be valid on the stub network, <\/ins> even if those prefixes have been deprecated, and MUST include RIO options for all such prefixes in the RAs that it sends on the adjacent infrastructure link."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-083845686a84a1253c87942a0d62c703f46a77b163ab5564f2219c3d723daa44","title":"","text":"If the DHCPv6-PD client determines that the prefix it provided to use as the OSNR prefix is no longer valid, and no replacement prefix is provided by the DHCPv6 server, then the SNAC router MUST switch to the ULA link prefix that it has allocated for use on the SNAC <\/del> the ULA link prefix that it has allocated for use on the stub <\/ins> network. In the case that the DHCPv6-PD client is unable to renew its lease on the current OSNR prefix, and time between the T2 interval for the prefix assignment I-D.ietf-dhc-rfc8415bis and the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-3200c20058fe87a61b3a5c93f66e6f9f2503dd85258079531100e9c9cf199546","title":"","text":"the ULA link prefix. A failure to renew the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix could be because the SNAC network has been disconnected from one AIL and moved <\/del> because the stub network has been disconnected from one AIL and moved <\/ins> to a different AIL. In this situation, if the new AIL also has IPv6 service and DHCPv6-PD service, the DHCPv6 client will get a clear indication that the old prefix is no longer valid. However, it may be that no DHCPv6-PD service is available on the new link, either because it is an IPv4-only link or because it's an IPv6-capable link that doesn't provide DHCPv6 service. In this situation, if the SNAC <\/del> that doesn't provide DHCPv6 service. In this situation, if the stub <\/ins> network remains connected to the link and no DHCPv6 service appears, the DHCPv6-PD-provided OSNR prefix will eventually time out and be replaced. The SNAC router SHOULD NOT attempt to replace it prior to this normal timeout process, because there is no benefit to changing the OSNR prefix on the SNAC network in such a situation, and it's <\/del> the OSNR prefix on the stub network in such a situation, and it's <\/ins> possible that the SNAC router will return to the other link before the OSNR prefix expires."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-7737ff083852dd7fb3890e9fa3b340fc6bffe5c70899d6f2ac45fe0d7081da59","title":"","text":"6. SNAC networks rely on IPv6 to enable routing between links, which <\/del> stub networks rely on IPv6 to enable routing between links, which <\/ins> would not be possible with IPv4 due to the lack of a standard mechanism similar to Router Advertisements in IPv4. However, it can stll be useful for hosts on the SNAC network to establish <\/del> stll be useful for hosts on the stub network to establish <\/ins> communications with IPv4-only hosts on the infrastructure network. Although NAT64 provides IPv6-only hosts with a way to reach IPv4 hosts, there is no easy way for an IPv4 host to use NAT64 to originate communication with an IPv6 host. Therefore, this document enables IPv6 hosts on the SNAC network to discover and reach with <\/del> enables IPv6 hosts on the stub network to discover and reach with <\/ins> IPv4 hosts on infrastructure, but does not provide a way for IPv4-only hosts on infrastructure to communicate to IPv6 hosts on the SNAC network. <\/del> stub network. <\/ins> This should be acceptable because hosts on the infrastructure network should not be IPv4-only, since the SNAC router is providing IPv6"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-0050a39203a3fac292dbdad077dd73af9e7f2e12ca047d380ee9078f4f39944e","title":"","text":"Prefix Information option header values: A prefix is not considered a suitable on-link prefix if the 'L' flag bit is set, but the 'A' flag bit is not set. This indicates that node addressability is being managed using DHCPv6. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 can't be considered \"suitable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/del> bit is not set, or if neither the 'A' flag bit nor the 'P' flag bit is set. When the 'A' flag bit is not set, this indicates that individual node addresses within the prefix are being managed using DHCPv6. If the 'P' flag bit is set, then hosts that wish to allocate their own addresses can do so by acquiring a prefix from which to allocate them using DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation RFC 9663. Nodes are not required to use DHCPv6 to acquire individual addresses, so a prefix that requires the use of DHCPv6 for that purpose can't be considered \"suitable\"—not all hosts can actually use it. <\/ins> Note: there can be layer two networks where neighbor discovery is not supported and therefore we cannot set the 'L' flag bit, but could set"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-a6a68bf982a08fe963246f5aab090bc2995f48e662774667264077bcce00a781","title":"","text":"it MUST use DHCPv6 PD rather than the ULA Link prefix it allocated for the stub network out of its ULA Site Prefix. A SNAC router SHOULD request stub network prefixes with length 64. If the SNAC router obtains a prefix with length less than 64, it SHOULD generate a \/64 from the obtained prefix by padding with zeros. If the SNAC router obtains a prefix with length greater than 64, the SNAC router MUST treat the prefix as unsuitable and allocate a ULA Link Prefix out of its ULA Site Prefix instead. <\/del> A SNAC router MUST request stub network prefixes with length 64. It does so by sending an IA_PD option for each prefix, each with a different IAID, containing an IA_PREFIX with a hint of 64 as described in RFC8415. If the SNAC router obtains a prefix with length less than 64, it SHOULD generate a \/64 from the obtained prefix by padding with zeros. If the SNAC router obtains a prefix with length greater than 64, the SNAC router MUST treat the prefix as unsuitable and allocate a ULA Link Prefix out of its ULA Site Prefix instead. <\/ins> A DHCPv6-PD client can request a particular lease interval for the DHCPv6-delegated prefix. However, there is no particular reason for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-cd6a8e73b0388ed61388c8104f9d8f094d22a2b9ecd126f2c54b566a39cf253f","title":"","text":"able to interoperate with hosts on other network links in the same infrastructure as well as hosts on the global internet. It may be noted that just as you can plug several Home Gateway devices together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing <\/del> It may be noted that just as you can plug several CE Router devices together in series to form multi-layer NATs, there is nothing <\/ins> preventing the owner of a stub network router from attaching it to a stub network as if that network were its infrastructure network. In the case of an IoT wireless network, there may be no way to do this,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-d3d545e7985851ed3d283903ad8183cb22e91067fc329c39197629d5323322b5","title":"","text":"The sent Router Advertisement message MUST also include a Route Information option (RFC4191) for each routable prefix advertised on the stub network. If the SNAC router is also a normal router (e.g. a home WiFi router), it SHOULD include all other routes that it is advertising in the RA, if there is space. <\/del> the stub network. <\/ins> After having sent the initial Router Advertisement, the SNAC router moves the interface into the STATE-ADVERTISING-SUITABLE state (state-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-snac-simple-29bed371692a3c110b5950080ce58f74d3e551fd3c060e7b087c1e692e7dafc6","title":"","text":"network SHOULD advertise reachability to all such prefixes on any AIL to which it is attached using router advertisements. A SNAC router SHOULD NOT advertise itself as a default router on an AIL by setting a non-zero Router Lifetime value in the header of its Router Advertisements. The exception to this rule is the case where the SNAC router itself is the default router for a particular AIL: for example, it may be the home router providing connectivity to an ISP. <\/del> A SNAC router MUST NOT advertise itself as a default router on an AIL by setting a non-zero Router Lifetime value in the header of its Router Advertisements. <\/ins> 5.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-3f8c139820b6d0342453246b5798a0847f8d1d1b0184ad33e73d4f451a1f257e","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2.1. Workload A workload is a running instance of software executing for a specific purpose that interacts with other parts of a larger system. A workload may exist for a very short durations of time (nanoseconds) and run for a specific purpose such as to provide a response to an API request. Other kinds of workloads may execute for a very long duration such as months or years - examples include database services and machine learning training jobs. <\/ins> 3. Basic Service Authentication"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-9888630d820afb55098c43a112088fe7be4d5ec125887f461c53682ef22657d4","title":"","text":"3.2. The server issues workload identity credentials when requested by the Agent. <\/ins> 3.3. The identity is provisioned to the workload as a set of credentials. There are two main types of workload credentials: bearer tokens and X.509 certificates. <\/del> The Agent performs the function of transmitting the initial workload identity to the Server to obtain the workload identity credentials. The Agent makes the workload identity credentials available to the workload. A task scheduler installs and starts a task containing the Agent on the Host Operating System. A Host Operating System function performs attestation of the Agent-identity and issues a corresponding Agent- credential to the Agent. The Agent presents the Agent-credential together with the Workload Identity to the Server to obtain the Workload's Identity Credentials. 3.4. Attestation is the function through which a task verifies the identity of a separate Workload or task. During Workload Attestation, the Server verifies the Agent- credential, Workload Identity, and the permission of the Agent to receive Credentials authenticating the Workload Identity. The Server can use a variety of means to verify that permission, including a Policy decision based on the contents of a Workload Registration database or requesting assistance from a trusted Identity Provider. 3.5. The Agent provisions the identity credentials to the workload. There are two main types of workload credentials: bearer tokens and X.509 certificates. <\/ins> Bearer tokens are tokens presented to another party as proof of identity. They are typically signed to prevent forgery, however"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-799ab71ea80070b9f18223175ee57210b43e5423de41291d94b2214f1c01fe73","title":"","text":"the presenter has access to the private key that corresponds to the public key in the certificate. 3.4. <\/del> 3.6. <\/ins> One of the most basic use cases for workload identity is for authenticating one workload to another such as in the case where one"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-0e60d5d4137784f5d9c0be598b76e859b665cf1acc5b44893f84f6d552759b72","title":"","text":"TLS authentication of the server and HTTP request signing using a secret key. 3.5. <\/del> 3.7. <\/ins> In a typical system of workloads additional information is needed in order for the workload to perform its function. For example, it is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-6304564fd9258b041b4f5f5c40e28069c5dfdb206b1f4e22d96f9ebb0860722b","title":"","text":"only be used by an authorized workload and that the context information originated from an authorized workload. 3.6. <\/del> 3.8. <\/ins> TBD. 3.7. <\/del> 3.9. <\/ins> TBD. 3.8. <\/del> 3.10. <\/ins> As workloads often need to communicate across administrative boundaries, extra care needs to be taken when it comes to identity communication to ensure scalability and privacy. 3.8.1. <\/del> 3.10.1. <\/ins> A workload communicating with a service, or another workload provided by an external organization may need to provide more generic identity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-86a74587a5361b62ca8ffcaa0dc86cd99236044b66a56e89422336ff8e5da11a","title":"","text":"workload specific identity with a generalized one for a given administrative domain. 3.8.2. <\/del> 3.10.2. <\/ins> Inbound security gateway is a common design pattern for service protection. This functionality is often found in CDN services, API"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-191ab129ef280167029337b28ba1b03e1494e8afd1b4e18dafdf7687829c7a92","title":"","text":"One of the most basic use cases for workload identity is authentication of one workload to another, such as in the case where one service is making a request to another service within a larger application. Even in this simple case the identity of a workload is <\/del> one service is making a request to another service as part of a larger, more complex application. Following authentication, the request to the service offered by the workload it needs to be authorized. Even in this simple case the identity of a workload is <\/ins> often composed of many attributes such as: Trigger Information"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-89543fb917bc449eff3f9c7f40382303e408ba862baa5753ad8d30d998b75eac","title":"","text":"TLS authentication of the server and HTTP request signing using a secret key. arch-chain illustrates the communication between different workloads. Two aspects are important to highlight: First, there is a need to consider the interaction with workloads that are external to the trust domain (sometimes called cross-domain). Second, the interaction does not only occur between workloads that directly interact with each other but instead may also take place across intermediate workloads (in an end-to-end style). <\/ins> 3.2.2. In a typical system of workloads additional information is needed in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-8b759799adc48807b0e7a4e852e716c6dfc211a0ddea1d7fd3726eaa716a1af9","title":"","text":"3.1. Workload identity often comprises multiple attributes that describe various aspects of a workload. These attributes can encompass diverse sets of information, including the workload's role within a system, the software it operates, and the hardware environment it utilizes. Different authorities across various parts of the system define these attribute sets. This architecture introduces a Workload Identifier for representing and referencing workloads, enabling diverse authorities with distinct identity attribute sets to consistently reference the workload. The Workload Identifier consists of a concise string allocated within a namespace defined by a Trust Domain. This Workload Identifier is present in Workload Identity Tokens and X.509 certificates issued by the authority for the Trust Domain. The Workload Identifier is used to associate additional identity attributes to the workload through the use of tokens (workload attribute tokens?) or online look up services. It may also be used directly in authorization calculations and audit logs. The Trust Domain consists of a string that matches the format of a fully qualified domain name. It is the intent that a Trust Domain is actually a domain name registered to the organization defining the Trust Domain, but this may not be true in all cases. The Trust Domain also maps to the issuer of cryptographically signed Workload Identity Tokens (WIT) or X.509 Certificate. The association between a Trust Domain and the cryptographic root of the signing authority for that Trust Domain must be made securely through an out-of-band mechanisms. [TODO: where should mechanisms be defined?] The Trust Domain also defines how the rest of the Workload Identifier is constructed. The Workload Identifier may represent a type of workload such that the same identifier may be used by many instances of the same service. A Trust Domain may choose identifiers to represent a specific instance of a workload such that each workload of the same type will have a specific identity. The Trust Domain could choose a naming scheme that allows for both objects by imposing a hierarchical structure on the naming format. The Trust Domain also defines which mechanisms are used to initially bootstrap a workload with a Workload Identifier and the mechanisms for a workload to obtain its workload identity credentials in the form of X.509 certificates and Workload Identity Tokens. <\/ins> 3.1.1. [TODO: this section will need to be updated to discuss workload identifier as a concept as well] <\/ins> A workload needs to obtain its identity early in its lifecycle. This identity is sometimes referred to as the \"bottom turtle\" on which further identity and security context is built."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-9a6636efb538304ab2e7e208bae6d5bc3525cfdc2b6d94b10918d3af63ae5357","title":"","text":"identifier as a concept as well] A workload needs to obtain its identity early in its lifecycle. This identity is sometimes referred to as the \"bottom turtle\" on which further identity and security context is built. <\/del> identity is the base identity upon which further identity and security context are built. <\/ins> Identity bootstrapping often utilizes identity information provisioned through mechanisms specific to hosting platforms and orchestration services. This initial bootstrapping information is used to obtain specific identity credentials for a workload. This process may use attestation to ensure the workload receives correct identity credentials. An example of a bootstrapping process follows. <\/del> process may use attestation to ensure the workload receives the correct identity credentials. An example of a bootstrapping process follows. <\/ins> arch-fig provides an example of software layering at a host running workloads. During startup, workloads bootstrap their identity with the help of an agent. The agent may be associated with one or more workloads to help ensure that workloads are provisioned with the correct identity. The agent provides attestation evidence and other relevant information to a server. After obtaining identity credentials from the Server it passes them to the workload. The server validates this information and provides the agent with identity credentials for the workloads it is associated with. The server can use a variety of internal and external means to validate the request against policy. <\/del> relevant information to a server. The server validates this information and provides the agent with identity credentials for the workloads it is associated with. The server can use a variety of internal and external means to validate the request against policy. After obtaining identity credentials from the Server, the agent passes them to the workload. <\/ins> How the workload obtains its identity credentials and interacts with the agent is subject to different implementations. Some common"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-6facb0fc3d7e14d44645983c16ba7a4de5f27f0204a8296cfbdc397031a95e0e","title":"","text":"authentication of one workload to another, such as in the case where one service is making a request to another service as part of a larger, more complex application. Following authentication, the request to the service offered by the workload it needs to be <\/del> request to the service offered by the workload needs to be <\/ins> authorized. Even in this simple case the identity of a workload is often composed of many attributes such as:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-a395d0090369472f189bdf475e52c77d976bc01aad83db9c272e1f7ef2cb3204","title":"","text":"Some of the most common include: TLS authentication of the server using X.509 certificates and bearer token, encoded as JWTs. <\/del> client bearer token, encoded as JWTs. <\/ins> Mutual TLS authentication using X.509 certificate for both client and server."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-arch-9fe320ae4007cef3742bcb7a508f97935de429723ba16afa346facf8c541d134","title":"","text":"authorization by verifying that the authenticated identity has the appropriate permissions to access the requested resources and perform required actions. This process involves evaluating the security context described previously. The workload validates security context, checks validity of permissions against its security policies to ensure that only authorized actions are allowed. <\/del> context described previously. The workload validates the security context, and checks the validity of permissions against its security policies to ensure that only authorized actions are allowed. <\/ins> 3.2.4. TBD. <\/del> When source workloads send authenticated requests to destination workloads, those destination workloads may rely on upstream dependencies to fulfill such requests. Such access patterns are increasingly common in a microservices architecture. While X.509 certificates can be used for point-to-point authentication, such services relying on upstream microservices for answers, may use delegation and\/or impersonation semantics as described in RFC 8693 OAuth 2.0 Access Token Exchange. WIMSE credentials constrain the subjects and actors identified in delegation and impersonation tokens to be bound by TrustDomains, and to follow their issuing authorities' trust configurations. Upstream workloads should consider the security context of delegation and\/or impersonation tokens within and across Trust Domains, when arriving at authorization decisions. <\/ins> 3.2.5. TBD. <\/del> Source workloads may send authenticated asynchronous and batch requests to destination workloads. A destination workload may need to fulfill such requests with requests to authorized upstream protected resources and workloads, after the source workload credentials have expired. Credentials identifying the original source workload as subject may need to be obtained from the credential issuing authority with appropriately-downscoped context needed access to upstream workloads. These credentials should identify the workload as the actor in the actor chain, but may also identify other principals that the action is taken on behalf. To mitigate risks associated with long-duration credentials, these credentials should be bound to the workload identity credential such as an X.509 certificate or Workload Identity Token (WIT) of the acting service performing asynchronous computation on the source workload's behalf. <\/ins> 3.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-d9ff5f8f91078d61d7e7cf8722cfc92e9f305d7553fcb160acbf0002f9fb3276","title":"","text":"3.2. This option, inspired by the OAuth DPoP specification RFC9449, uses a DPoP-like mechanism to authenticate the calling workload in the context of the request. The WIMSE Identity Token to-wit is sent in the request as described in wit-http-header. An additional JWT, the Workload Proof Token (WPT), is signed by the private key corresponding to the public key in the WIT. The WPT is sent in the \"Workload-Proof-Token\" header field of the request. A WPT contains the following: in the JOSE header: \"alg\": An identifier for an appropriate JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithm corresponding to the confirmation key in the associated WIT. \"typ\": the WPT is explicitly typed, as recommended in RFC8725, using the \"application\/wimse-proof+jwt\" media type. in the JWT claims: \"iss\": The issuer of the token, which is the calling workload, represented by the same value as the \"sub\" claim of the associated WIT. \"aud\": The audience of the token contains the HTTP target URI (RFC9110) of the request to which the WPT is attached, without query or fragment parts. \"exp\": The expiration time of the WIT (as defined in RFC7519). WPT lifetimes MUST be short, e.g., on the order of minutes or seconds. \"jti\": A unique identifier for the token. \"ath\": Hash of the OAuth access token, if present in the request, which might convey end-user identity and authorization context of the request. The value, as per RFC9449, is the base64url encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the access token's value. \"tth\": Hash of the Txn-Token I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens, if present in the request, which might convey end-user identity and authorization context of the request. The value MUST be the result of a base64url encoding (as defined in RFC7515) of the SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the associated token's value. \"oth\": Hash of any other token in the request that might convey end-user identity and authorization context of the request. The value MUST be the result of a base64url encoding (as defined in RFC7515) of the SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the associated token's value. (note: this is less than ideal but seems we need something like this for extensibility) An example WPT might look like the following: The decoded JOSE header of the WPT from the example above is shown here: The decoded JWT claims of the WPT from the example above are shown here: An example of an HTTP request with both the WIT and WPT from prior examples is shown below: To validate the WPT in the request, the recipient MUST ensure the following: There is exactly one \"Workload-Proof-Token\" header field in the request. The \"Workload-Proof-Token\" header field value is a single and well-formed JWT. The WPT signature is valid using the public key from the confirmation claim of the WIT. The \"typ\" JOSE header parameter of the WPT conveys a media type of \"wimse-proof+jwt\". The \"iss\" claim of the WPT matches the \"sub\" claim of the WIT. (note: not sure \"iss\" in the WPT is useful or necessary) The \"aud\" claim of the WPT matches the target URI, or an acceptable alias or normalization thereof, of the HTTP request in which the WPT was received, ignoring any query and fragment parts. The \"exp\" claim is present and conveys a time that has not passed. WPTs with an expiration time unreasonably far in the future SHOULD be rejected. Optionally, check that the value of the \"jti\" claim has not been used before in the time window in which the respective WPT would be considered valid. If presented in conjunction with an OAauth access token, the value of the \"ath\" claim matches the hash of that token's value. If presented in conjunction with a Txn-Token, the value of the \"tth\" claim matches the hash of that token's value. If presented in conjunction with a token conveying end-user identity or authorization context, the value of the \"oth\" claim matches the hash of that token's value. <\/ins> 3.3. This option uses the WIMSE Identity Token (ref TBD) to sign the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-986ed5e6e896117a0e0364bd7d84bca5dab8eb7692a65a52eab76d35099710df","title":"","text":"URN Namespace for IETF Use [2] somehow. Or maybe nothing. Or maybe something else. TODO: \"tth\" and maybe \"oth\" claim in JSON Web Token Claims Registry [3] <\/ins> 6.1. TODO: \"application\/wimse-id+jwt\" or appropriately bikeshedded media type name (despite my ongoing unease with using media types for typing JWTs) in Media Types [3]. <\/del> typing JWTs) in Media Types [4]. TODO: \"application\/wimse-proof+jwt\" ... <\/ins> 6.2. TODO: \"Workload-Identity-Token\" from TODO: \"Workload-Proof-Token\" from <\/ins> 7. References 7.1. URIs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-fea9172895380d05b194c20740b5198af472845f3197e175366c7f831694b496","title":"","text":"[2] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/params\/params.xhtml [3] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/media-types\/media-types.xhtml <\/del> [3] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/jwt\/jwt.xhtml [4] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/media-types\/media-types.xhtml <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-79036e750b7992d4feb3ac8ca5c131a6e904f96de8c1a4aa3bfb8a8f29f4f743","title":"","text":"of interaction between two workloads. This is the core component of the WIMSE architecture I-D.ietf-wimse-arch. Assume that Service A needs to call Service B. For simplicity, this document focuses on REST services, and the service-to-service call consists of a single HTTP request and its response. We define the credentials that both services should possess and how they are used to protect the HTTP exchange. <\/del> HTTP-based services, and the service-to-service call consists of a single HTTP request and its response. We define the credentials that both services should possess and how they are used to protect the HTTP exchange. <\/ins> There are multiple deployment styles in use today, and they result in different security properties. We propose to address them"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-537d72582c0fc0bfeb8319a7ee8dfb6b363245b04d5c4f8e35a5c595de3f6c9d","title":"","text":"Many use cases have various middleboxes inserted between pairs of services, resulting in a transport layer that is not end-to-end encrypted. We propose to address these use cases by protecting the REST messages at the application level (app-level). <\/del> the HTTP messages at the application level (app-level). <\/ins> The other commonly deployed architecture has a mutual-TLS connection between each pair of services. This setup can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-72571c04c9f1c737850a509477fd5e307e677491638f518032e464929c5adfef","title":"","text":"Workload A obtains a credential from the Identity Server. This happens periodically, e.g. once every 24 hours. Workload A makes a REST call into Workload B. This is a regular REST call, with the additional protection mechanisms defined <\/del> Workload A makes an HTTP call into Workload B. This is a regular HTTP request, with the additional protection mechanisms defined <\/ins> below. Workload B now authenticates Workload A and decides whether to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-a1a0a7e8e6a992af02ce0346fc7ba62cc58553e630778f9ac8c7ab8f44b56f7f","title":"","text":"defined by the issuer. Using a WIMSE ID without taking into account the trust domain could allow one domain to issue tokens to spoof identities in another domain. Additionally, the trust domain must be tied to an authorized issuer cryptographic trust root through some <\/del> tied to an authorized issuer cryptographic trust anchor through some <\/ins> mechanism such as a JWKS or X.509 certificate chain. The association of an issuer, trust domain and a cryptographic trust root MUST be <\/del> of an issuer, trust domain and a cryptographic trust anchor MUST be <\/ins> communicated securely out of band. 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-6aeb78bd9374acec82f4b339e6250956e7113c34d7fe9dd7c24708beaee2d658","title":"","text":"WIMSE certificate may contain SubjectAltName extensions of other types such as DNSName. WIMSE identities may be used to validate server and client connections. When validating a WIMSE identity the relying party MUST validate that the CA issuer for the WIMSE identity is authorized to issue certificates for the trust domain of the WIMSE identity in the certificate. Other PKIX path validation rules apply. Servers wishing to use the WIMSE identity for authorizing the client MUST require client certificate authentication in the TLS handshake. Other methods of post handshake authentication are not specified by this document. <\/del> WIMSE certificates may be used to secure both server and client connections. When validating a WIMSE certificate, the relying party MUST validate that the CA issuer for the WIMSE certificate is authorized to issue certificates for the trust domain of the WIMSE workload identified by the certificate. Other PKIX path validation rules apply. Servers wishing to use the WIMSE certificate for authorizing the client MUST require client certificate authentication in the TLS handshake. Other methods of post handshake authentication are not specified by this document. <\/ins> WIMSE clients and servers MUST validate that the trust domain portion of the WIMSE certificate matches the expected trust domain for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-374f00e91440a0fc49c871c1f611056bf75a7abcba91f097547f1bb2ffab9002","title":"","text":"It is RECOMMENDED that the server certificate contain a DNS SAN that the client can use to perform standard host name validation (RFC9525). The client SHOULD also extract the WIMSE identity from <\/del> (RFC9525). The client SHOULD also extract the WIMSE identifier from <\/ins> the certificate if it is present and validate that the WIMSE trust domain matches the intended trust domain for the server. The client MAY then further use the WIMSE identity in applying authorization <\/del> MAY then further use the WIMSE identifier in applying authorization <\/ins> policy to the server. If the client does not use the DNS SAN then the client MUST match the WIMSE identity in the certificate against <\/del> the client MUST match the WIMSE identifier in the certificate against <\/ins> the WIMSE identity of the workload of the intended server according to a locally defined policy. The host portion of the WIMSE URI is NOT treated as a host name as specified in section 6.4 of RFC9525 but rather as a trust domain. The server identity is encoded in the path portion of the WIMSE identity in a deployment specific way. <\/del> portion of the WIMSE identifier in a deployment specific way. <\/ins> 5.2. The client or server application may retrieve the WIMSE identity from the TLS layer for use in authorization, accounting and auditing. For example, the full URI may be matched against ACLs and other policy constructs to authorize actions requested by the peer. <\/del> The client or server application may retrieve the WIMSE identifier from the TLS layer for use in authorization, accounting and auditing. For example, the full URI may be matched against ACLs and other policy constructs to authorize actions requested by the peer. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-bf70ec98abd688478cc2b2c2ed9bc3dc0a6e4bf4f9faf0f65b45eb492eefa38e","title":"","text":"3.2. This document defines a workload identity as a URI RFC3986. This URI is used in the subject fields in the certificates and tokens defined later in this document. This specification treats the URI as opaque. The format of the URI and the namespace for the URI are at the discretion of the deployment at large. Other specifications may define specific URI structures for particular use cases. An example of a defined identity format is the SPIFFE ID [1]. A workload identity only has meaning within the scope of a specific issuer. Two identities of the same value issued by different issuers may or may not refer to the same workload. In order to avoid collisions identity URIs SHOULD specify, in the URI's \"authority\" field, the trust domain associated with an issuer that is selected from a global name space such as host domains. However, the validator of an identity credential MUST make sure that they are using the correct issuer credential to verify the identity credential and that the issuer is trusted to issue tokens for the defined trust domain. <\/del> This document defines a workload identifier as a URI RFC3986. This URI is used in the subject fields in the certificates and tokens defined later in this document. The URI MUST meet the criteria for the URI type of Subject Alternative Name defined in Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC5280. In addition the URI MUST include an authority that identifies the trust domain within which the identifier is scoped. The trust domain SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name belonging to the organization defining the trust domain to help provide uniqueness for the trust domain identifier. The scheme and scheme specific part are not defined by this specification. An example of an identifier format that conforms to this definition is SPIFFE ID [1]. While the URI encoding rules allow host names to be specified as IP addresses, IP addresses MUT NOT be used to represent trust domains except in the case where they are needed for compatibility with existing naming schemes. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-af781ad51502c751b6ae305ebbe2e03d8df6d2138d84b33ae8c9cd61beda8c31","title":"","text":"The WIMSE workload identity may be carried within an X.509 certificate. The WIMSE workload identity MUST be encoded in a SubjectAltName extension of type URI. There MUST be only one SubjectAltName extension of type URI in a WIMSE certificate. The WIMSE certificate may contain SubjectAltName extensions of other types such as DNSName. WIMSE certificates may be used to secure both server and client connections. When validating a WIMSE certificate, the relying party MUST validate that the CA issuer for the WIMSE certificate is authorized to issue certificates for the trust domain of the WIMSE workload identified by the certificate. Other PKIX path validation rules apply. <\/del> SubjectAltName extension of type URI in a WIMSE certificate. If the workload will act as a TLS server for clients that do not understand WIMSE workload identities it is RECOMMENDED that WIMSE certificate contain a SubjectAltName of type DNSName with the appropriate DNS names for the server. The certificate may contain SubjectAltName extensions of other types. WIMSE certificates may be used to authenticate both the server and client side of the connections. When validating a WIMSE certificate, the relying party MUST use the trust anchors configured for the trust domain in the WIMSE identity to validate the peer's certificate. Other PKIX RFC5280 path validation rules apply. WIMSE clients and servers MUST validate that the trust domain portion of the WIMSE certificate matches the expected trust domain for the other side of the connection. <\/ins> Servers wishing to use the WIMSE certificate for authorizing the client MUST require client certificate authentication in the TLS handshake. Other methods of post handshake authentication are not specified by this document. WIMSE clients and servers MUST validate that the trust domain portion of the WIMSE certificate matches the expected trust domain for the other side of the connection. <\/del> WIMSE server certificates SHOULD have the id-kp-serverAuth extended key usage RFC5280 field set and WIMSE client certificates SHOULD have the id-kp-clientAuth extended key usage field set. A certificate that is used for both client and server connections may have both fields set. This specification does not make any other requirements beyond RFC5280 on the contents of WIMSE certificates or on the certification authorities that issue WIMSE certificates. <\/ins> 5.1. It is RECOMMENDED that the server certificate contain a DNS SAN that the client can use to perform standard host name validation (RFC9525). The client SHOULD also extract the WIMSE identifier from the certificate if it is present and validate that the WIMSE trust domain matches the intended trust domain for the server. The client MAY then further use the WIMSE identifier in applying authorization policy to the server. If the client does not use the DNS SAN then the client MUST match the WIMSE identifier in the certificate against the WIMSE identity of the workload of the intended server according to a locally defined policy. The host portion of the WIMSE URI is NOT treated as a host name as specified in section 6.4 of RFC9525 but rather as a trust domain. The server identity is encoded in the path portion of the WIMSE identifier in a deployment specific way. <\/del> If the WIMSE client uses a hostname to connect to the server and the server certificate contain a DNS SAN the client MUST perform standard host name validation (RFC9525) unless it is configured with the information necessary to validate the peer's WIMSE identity. If the client did not perform standard host name validation then the WIMSE client SHOULD further use the WIMSE workload identifier to validate the server. The host portion of the WIMSE URI is NOT treated as a host name as specified in section 6.4 of RFC9525 but rather as a trust domain. The server identity is encoded in the path portion of the WIMSE workload identifier in a deployment specific way. Validating the WIMSE workload identity could be a simple match on the trust domain and path portions of the identifier or validation may be based on the specific details on how the identifier is constructed. The path portion of the WIMSE identifier MUST always be considered in the scope of the trust domain. <\/ins> 5.2. The client or server application may retrieve the WIMSE identifier from the TLS layer for use in authorization, accounting and auditing. For example, the full URI may be matched against ACLs and other policy constructs to authorize actions requested by the peer. <\/del> The server application retrieves the client certificate WIMSE URI subjectAltName from the TLS layer for use in authorization, accounting and auditing. For example, the full WIMSE URI may be matched against ACLs to authorize actions requested by the peer and the URI may be included in log messages to associate actions to the client workload for audit purposes. A deployment may specify other authorization policies based on the specific details of how the WIMSE identifier is constructed. The path portion of the WIMSE identifier MUST always be considered in the scope of the trust domain. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-32c85d37c1a52231be787c8f80d478628c3b24c37a39d216aefac91dd694f622","title":"","text":"A signed response would be: 4.4. The two options for protecting the workload's traffic vary with respect to implementation complexity, extensibility and security. Here is a summary of the main differences between dpop-esque-auth and http-sig-auth. The DPoP-inspired solution is less HTTP-specific, making it easier to adapt for other protocols beyond HTTP. This flexibility is particularly valuable for asynchronous communication scenarios, such as event-driven systems. Message Signatures, on the other hand, benefit from an existing HTTP specific RFC with some established implementations. This existing groundwork means that this option could be simpler to deploy, to the extent such implementations are available and easily integrated. Given that the WIT (Workload Identity Token) is a type of JWT, the DPoP-inspired approach that also uses JWT is less complex and technology-intensive than Message Signatures. In contrast, Message Signatures introduce additional layers of technology, potentially increasing the complexity of the overall system. Message Signatures offer superior integrity protection, particularly by mitigating message modification by middleboxes. A key advantage of Message Signatures is that they support response signing. This opens up the possibility for future decisions about whether to make response signing mandatory, allowing for flexibility in the specification and\/or in specific deployment scenarios. In general, Message Signatures provide greater flexibility compared to the DPoP-inspired approach. The draft (and subsequent implementations) can decide whether specific aspects of message signing, such as coverage of particular fields, should be mandatory or optional. Covering more fields will constrain the proof so it cannot be easily reused in another context, which is often a security improvement. The DPoP inspired approach could be designed to include extensibility to sign other fields, but this would make it closer to trying to reinvent Message Signatures. <\/ins> 5. The WIMSE workload identity may be carried within an X.509"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-829d99869be25f7895c0fdd52a49f35ade3588885692fe2e8a486ab18abdaf08","title":"","text":"\"jti\": A unique identifier for the token. \"wth\": Hash of the Workload Identity Token, defined in to-wit. The value is the base64url encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the token's value. <\/ins> \"ath\": Hash of the OAuth access token, if present in the request, which might convey end-user identity and authorization context of the request. The value, as per RFC9449, is the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-b4cc1724a01b62ead8cf7b448af6d8a96b74d14c35f562f86c3af7527361e926","title":"","text":"WPTs with an expiration time unreasonably far in the future SHOULD be rejected. The \"wth\" claim is present and matches the hash of the token value conveyed in the \"Workload-Identity-Token\" header. <\/ins> Optionally, check that the value of the \"jti\" claim has not been used before in the time window in which the respective WPT would be considered valid."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-895d1dd6bed985708af92e421d0cafa945fbc000e340f634e93514a3f59cbbbe","title":"","text":"URN Namespace for IETF Use [3] somehow. Or maybe nothing. Or maybe something else. TODO: \"tth\" and maybe \"oth\" claim in JSON Web Token Claims Registry [4] <\/del> TODO: \"tth\", \"wth\" and maybe \"oth\" claim in JSON Web Token Claims Registry [4] <\/ins> 7.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices-2cecd7d91e20bd642a2fc40adcfadadadbf816f1d3ebdfab4023a08aeb4e5da3","title":"","text":"Abstract The use of the OAuth 2.0 framework for workload orchestration systems poses a challenge as managing secrets, such as client_id and <\/del> The use of the OAuth 2.0 framework for container orchestration systems poses a challenge as managing secrets, such as client_id and <\/ins> client_secret, can be complex and error-prone. \"Service account token volume projection\", a term introduced by Kubernetes, provides a way of injecting JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) to workloads. This document specifies the use of JWTs for client credentials in workload orchestration systems to improve interoperability in orchestration systems, to reduce complexity for developers, and motivates authorization server to support RFC 7523. <\/del> This document describes the current best practices to avoid client_secret provisioning and leverage platform attestation to receive access tokens from an OAuth 2.0 authorization server via RFC 7523. <\/ins> 1. In workload scenarios dedicated management entities, also called \"control plane\" entities, are used to start, monitor and stop workloads dynamically. These workloads typically run micro services that interact with each other and with other entities on the corporate network or on the Internet. When one workload, acting as an OAuth client, wants to gain access to a protected resource hosted on another workload or on the Internet (referred here generically as a resource server) then authorization is typically required. OAuth has been designed to offer help in scenarios where access to protected resources needs to be managed dynamically in a distributed system. Each workload instance has to be provisioned with unique credentials. However, these credentials have to be configured prior and are then attached to the workload. In addition, these credentials do not have an automated rotation mechanism and are valid for an unspecified amount of time. This requires manual configuration effort and the missing automated rotation mechanism introduce inconvenience and increase the attack surface. \"Service account token volume projection\" is a feature of workload orchestration systems that allows users to create JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) for their workloads. These JWTs, referred as Service Account Tokens, can be used as client credentials, as specified in RFC 7523 RFC7523. As these tokens are managed by the \"control plane\" and simply mounted to the filesystem, a workload just needs to consume this file and present it to the authorization server. In addition, service account token volume projection allows an expiration time on these JWTs to be set, allowing automated rotation of these credentials. Finally, the private key for signing these tokens is managed by the \"control plane\", hence removing the manual effort of configuring the client_id and client_secret. However, there is currently no standardized way to manage these Service Account Tokens across workload orchestrators. This leads to inconsistencies, and additional effort for developers as they need to support different client authentication mechanisms. In the worst case, this approach is ignored in favor of client_id and client_secret. <\/del> workloads dynamically. These workloads often communicate with one another and with other entities within the company network or online. When one workload, acting as an OAuth client, wants to gain access to a protected resource hosted on another workload or on the Internet (referred here generically as a resource server) then authorization is typically required. In order to authenticate workloads accessing resources, each workload instance has to be provisioned with unique credentials. This is a challenge in environments where workloads start, stop, relocate and scale dynamically. Manual configuration, rotation and overall management comes with at best management overhead, at worst results in security risks such as credential exposure. \"Service account token volume projection\" is a feature of the container orchestration system Kubernetes that allows users to attach platform attestated tokens to their workloads. Workloads can use this token to authenticate themselves towards APIs of the platform control plane. Even though this token is used for access it can be more considered an ID Token rather than an Access Token in the OAuth context. Workloads don't get issued a refresh token nor does authorization or consent play a role. It is merely a proof that the workloads is who it claims to be. Workloads have various options available to retrieve such token from the Kubernetes platform, for example via a \"TokenRequest\" API invoked by business logic or \"Token volume projection\" which mounts the token into the file system of the workloads and keeps it up to date there. \"Token volume projection\" having the advantage of not requiring any manual effort by the application besides reading a file. Whilst the original purpose of the service account token was to authenticate access to the control plane API the industry has recognized its low maintainance and platform attestation capabilities and started using it as a JWT client assertion as specified in RFC7523. The token is presented to a authorization server as a client assertion. The authorization servers validates the signature of the presented assertion via OIDC metadata or RFC8414 and leverages the claims in the token to authenticate the client. Overall, the authorization server trusts the platform control plane with the issuance and delivery of these credentials. The authorization server responds with an Access Token the workload can use to access a OAuth2 protected resource on a resource server. fig-arch illustrates the interaction in the architecture graphically. <\/ins> This specification specifies the use of Service Account Tokens in workload orchestration systems, which provides a secure and scalable <\/del> container orchestration systems, which provides a secure and scalable <\/ins> way to create and manage these tokens, and ensures interoperability with existing OAuth-based authorization systems. When OAuth is used as part of the control plane entities, a Service Account Token is provisioned to the workload via the Agent. This interaction is shown in fig-arch. <\/del> To distinguish the entities, we use the term \"Control Plane\" to refer to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server that is part of the cluster's control plane. Since there are also two access tokens in play, we"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices-7b203ab79e2c304124fee3cf61802e041d3c14f83f4e31a42e330604715b4f04","title":"","text":"token issued to an OAuth 2.0 client running inside the workload by the second authorization server. It is important to note that the workload does not use the Service Account Token with resource servers directly but instead obtains access tokens from this second authorization server. To obtain these access tokens, the OAuth 2.0 client running in the workload uses the JWT client authentication grant, as defined in RFC7523, with the Service Account Token as input. The obtained access token may be a bearer token, or a proof-of-possession token. fig-arch illustrates the interaction in the architecture graphically. <\/del> In recommendations we provide more details about how the content of the tokens and the offered security properties."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-e243612cfeadb31bb26a4d06d39f5873466cd412015ef4b232e67d0e1296ff88","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary use in COSE envelopes. A format for Merkle Tree Root Signatures with metadata, a format for Inclusions Paths, and a format for disclosure of a single hadh tree leaf payload (Merkle Tree Proofs). <\/del> use in COSE envelopes. A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads. A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-3e5936b9e621d3dc4ad412c73484409f2bc55677565ba6821c6d17a7a4e7c401","title":"","text":"compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. In case of RFC9162, this is defined in Section 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree. <\/ins> 3.1. RFC6962 defines a merkle audit path for a leaf in a merkle tree as the shortest list of additional nodes in the merkle tree required to compute the merkle root for that tree. RFC9162 changed the term from \"merkle audit path\" to \"merkle inclusion proof\". We prefer to use the term \"inclusion path\" to avoid confusion with Signed Inclusion Proof. For tree algorithm \"RFC9162_SHA256\", we define the following compact encoding of an inclusion proof for a leaf: Leaf index is also sometimes referred to as sequence number. 3.2. <\/ins> A Merkle root is signed with COSE_Sign1: Protected header parameters: alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm. Value type: int \/ tstr. tree alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm. Value <\/del> alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm identifier. Value <\/ins> type: int \/ tstr. A COSE profile of this specification may add further header parameters, for example to identify the signer or add a timestamp. <\/del> tree_alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. <\/ins> Envelope Payload: A Merkle tree root according to the tree alg. <\/del> crit (label: 2): REQUIRED. Criticality marker. Value type: [ +label ] <\/ins> The envelope payload can be detached, since it can be recomputed by the verifier. <\/del> The criticality header MUST contain the tree_alg label. <\/ins> Forcing a verifier to perform re-computation can prevent faulty implementations. <\/del> The envelope payload MUST be computed by the process defined for the tree_alg. The envelope payload MUST be detached, and recomputed by the verifier. <\/ins> One example of a Signed Inclusion Proof is a \"transparent statement\" as defined in I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture. 3.2. <\/del> 3.2.1. <\/ins> RFC6962 defines a merkle audit path for a leaf in a merkle tree as the shortest list of additional nodes in the merkle tree required to compute the merkle root for that tree. <\/del> 3.3. <\/ins> RFC9162 changed the term from \"merkle audit path\" to \"merkle inclusion proof\". <\/del> 3.3.1. <\/ins> We prefer to use the term \"inclusion path\" to avoid confusion with Signed Inclusion Proof. <\/del> 4. This document establishes a registry of merkle tree algorithms with the following initial contents: <\/ins> Editors note: We may want to move inclusion path representations to the specification that is required to register a new algorithm in the proposed tree algorithms registry. <\/del> Each tree algorithm defines: <\/ins> Editors note: We recommend tree algorithm simple take the inclusion path as opaque bytes. <\/del> How to compute a leaf from a payload and extra data, such as the current size of the tree. <\/ins> If the tree size and leaf index is known, then a compact inclusion path variant can be used: <\/del> How to compute the merkle root from a sequence of leaves. <\/ins> Leaf index is also sometimes referred to as sequence number. <\/del> How to compute an inclusion-proof for a leaf. <\/ins> Otherwise, the direction each path step must be included: <\/del> How to compute a consistency-proof for a leaf. <\/ins> FIXME bit vector: 0 right, 1 left, so no bit labels <\/del> Each specification MUST define how to encode each of these parameters in CBOR, and map them to: <\/ins> For some tree algorithms, the direction is derived from the hashes themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: <\/del> TBD_1 - (tree alg) <\/ins> Presence of leaf index, and whether it is an input or an output is tree algorithm specific. <\/del> TBD_2 - (inclusion proof) <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> TBD_3 - (consistency proof) <\/ins> An inclusion proof is a CBOR array containing a merkle tree root, an inclusion path, extra data for the tree algorithm, and the payload. <\/del> See sec-rfc-9162-tree-alg-definition as an example. <\/ins> 3.4. <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> A signed inclusion proof is a CBOR array containing a signed tree root, an inclusion path, extra data for the tree algorithm, and the payload. <\/del> This section defines how to map the data structures described in RFC9162 to the terminology defined in this document, using cbor and cose. <\/ins> \"extra-data\" is an additional input to the tree algorithm and is used together with the payload to compute the leaf hash. See sec-leaf- blinding-example for an example use case for this field to enable leaf blinding as described in sec-leaf-blinding. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> 3.5. <\/del> The integer identifier for \"tree-alg\" is 1. The string identifier for \"tree-alg\" is \"RFC9162_SHA256\". <\/ins> 3.5.1. <\/del> 4.1.2. <\/ins> This signed mulitple inclusion proof representation relies on 2 lists to enable proof of inclusion for multiple payloads in a given signed merkle root. <\/del> See RFC9162, 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree. <\/ins> Note that the extra-data may be ommited if not required by the tree algorithm, and that leaf payloads may be detached. <\/del> 4.1.2.1. <\/ins> TODO: refine multi-leaf variant of a signed inclusion proof like in: <\/del> The cbor representation of a merkle root is the bytestring represenation of MTH. <\/ins> https:\/\/github.com\/transmute-industries\/merkle-proof <\/del> 4.1.2.2. <\/ins> https:\/\/transmute-industries.github.io\/merkle-disclosure-proof- 2021\/ <\/del> See RFC9162, 2.1.3.1. Generating an Inclusion Proof. <\/ins> TODO: consider using sparse multiproofs, see https:\/\/medium.com\/@jgm.orinoco\/understanding-sparse-merkle- multiproofs-9b9f049e8f08 and https:\/\/arxiv.org\/pdf\/2002.07648.pdf <\/del> The cbor representation of the inclusion proof is: <\/ins> 4. <\/del> 4.1.2.3. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry of merkle tree algorithms with the following initial contents: <\/del> See RFC9162, 2.1.4.1. Generating a Consistency Proof. The cbor representation of the consistency proof is: Editors note: tree-size-1, could be ommited, if an inclusion-proof is always present, since the inclusion proof contains, tree-size-1. <\/ins> Each tree algorithm defines how to compute the root node from a sequence of leaves each represented by payload and extra data. Extra data is algorithm-specific and should be considered opaque. <\/del> 4.2. In a signed inclusion proof, the previous merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-1, and is a detached payload. In a signed consistency proof, the latest merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-2, and is an attached payload. <\/ins> 5. TBD <\/del> See the privacy considerations section of: <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-d17acf95e64099a4976ffca6474dc2241bf6481895a7810ec30f71b7b61a02c8","title":"","text":"inclusion proof which increases the size of multiple payload signed inclusion proofs. Tree algorithm designers are encouraged to comment on this property of their leaf construction algorithm. <\/ins> 6. TBD <\/del> See the privacy considerations section of: <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-0faff21e9b984b94d7c95fa18cf31ca674f30a09fab07fdcdcc2720b8c6253a2","title":"","text":"7.1.1. IANA will be requested to register the new COSE Header parameters defined below in the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry at some point. <\/del> This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Algorithm Parameters' registries in the 'Standards Action With Expert Review category. 7.1.1.1. <\/ins> Name: tree_alg Label: TBD <\/del> Label: TBD_1 <\/ins> Value type: tree_alg"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-c8b96de153915e78fe4636d4aefe1430c67924da07ef19ca87648a17dcb0ec79","title":"","text":"Description: Merkle tree algorithm used to produce a COSE Sign1 payload. 7.2. <\/del> Name: inclusion_proof Label: TBD_2 Value type: inclusion_proof Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given tree_alg. <\/ins> IANA will be asked to add a new registry \"TBD\" to the list that appears at IANA Assignments [1]. <\/del> Name: consistency_proof <\/ins> The rest of this section defines the subregistries that are to be created within the new \"TBD\" registry. <\/del> Label: TBD_2 <\/ins> 7.2.1. <\/del> Value type: consistency_proof Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given tree_alg. 7.1.2. <\/ins> IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named \"Tree Algorithms\" to be administered under a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-6b0d4e06b1a5a49626af47d1a7439acb40f9610bacb02a36066df53608429541","title":"","text":"Reference: Where this algorithm is defined Initial contents: Provided in 8. References 8.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/ <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-db4df7e5f74fc3e504ebfffa92ba8e7aff0e6faaca768170ed5624a143a4ce8a","title":"","text":"One example of a Signed Inclusion Proof is a \"transparent statement\" as defined in I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture. 3.2.1. <\/del> 3.3. 3.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-e5efe61a97bd33efb33be4e3619660d6a627d9e3918e0aede1c16d2716800e46","title":"","text":" Although the word transparency implies to some degree read access, it is important to note that transparency logs might include sensitive information. Depending on the leaf algorithm used, a log operator might be able to count unique entries. In the case that a leaf is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, adding information to the unprotected header can be used to produce a unique leaf entry. However, this could impact privacy, and some transparency service operators might prefer only integrity protected content be made transparent. <\/ins> 5.1. In cases where a single merkle root and multiple inclusion paths are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-12ea52341d39d19592d9504c9c5aff0acd470222a8b46815ff8a44af8879364c","title":"","text":"6. See the privacy considerations section of: <\/del> See the security considerations section of: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-75a4f1d6c814b20df1c4ee9c644ed3b93609af555aad3394dd9fe79426f79d79","title":"","text":"alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. tree_alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. <\/del> verifiable_data_structure (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. <\/ins> crit (label: 2): REQUIRED. Criticality marker. Value type: [ +label ] The criticality header MUST contain the tree_alg label. <\/del> The criticality header MUST contain the verifiable_data_structure label. <\/ins> The envelope payload MUST be computed by the process defined for the tree_alg. <\/del> verifiable_data_structure. <\/ins> The envelope payload MUST be detached, and recomputed by the verifier."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-ce596437ab988426bd72addb6d99a867e8e34ed6cad878f580c1db3b66041d68","title":"","text":"3.3. 3.3.1. <\/del> 4. This document establishes a registry of merkle tree algorithms with the following initial contents: <\/del> This document establishes a registry of verifiable data structure algorithms values for TBD_1, with the following initial contents: Each algorithm defines: How to identify the data structures supported. How to identify the proof types supported. How to produce and consume the proof types supported. <\/ins> Each tree algorithm defines: <\/del> Each specification MUST define how to encode the algorithm and proof types in CBOR. <\/ins> How to compute a leaf from a payload and extra data, such as the current size of the tree. <\/del> For example, RFC9162_SHA256 requires the following: <\/ins> How to compute the merkle root from a sequence of leaves. <\/del> TBD_1, the verifiable data structure algorithm (binary merkle tree using sha256) <\/ins> How to compute an inclusion-proof for a leaf. <\/del> TBD_2, the inclusion proof type (binary merkle tree using sha256, inclusion proof) <\/ins> How to compute a consistency-proof for a leaf. <\/del> TBD_3, the consistency proof type (binary merkle tree using sha256, consistency proof) <\/ins> Each specification MUST define how to encode each of these parameters in CBOR, and map them to: <\/del> See sec-rfc-9162-verifiable-data-structure-definition as an example. <\/ins> TBD_1 - (tree alg) <\/del> Proof types are specific to their associated \"verifiable data structure\", for example, different merkle trees might support different representations of \"inclusion proof\" or \"consistency proof\". <\/ins> TBD_2 - (inclusion proof) <\/del> Implementers should not expect interoperability accross \"verifiable data structures\", but they should expect conceptually similar properties across registered proof types. <\/ins> TBD_3 - (consistency proof) <\/del> For example, 2 different merkle tree based verifiable data structures might both support proofs of inclusion. Protocols requireing proof of inclusion ought to be able to preserve their functionality, while switching from one verifiable data structure to another, so long as both structures upport the same proof types. 5. This document establishes a registry of verifiable data structure proof types tags, with the following initial contents: 5.1. <\/ins> See sec-rfc-9162-tree-alg-definition as an example. <\/del> Inclusion proofs provide a mechanism for a verifier to validate set membership. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure-proof- type\" is TBD_2. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data- structure-proof-type\" is \"inclusion proof\". sec-rfc9162-sha256-inclusion-proof provides a concrete example. 5.2. Consistency proofs provide a mechanism for a verifier to validate the consistency of a verifiable data structure. The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure-proof- type\" is TBD_3. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data- structure-proof-type\" is \"consistency proof\". sec-rfc9162-sha256-consistency-proof provides a concrete example. 5.3. <\/ins> This section defines how to map the data structures described in RFC9162 to the terminology defined in this document, using cbor and cose. 4.1.1. <\/del> 5.3.1. <\/ins> The integer identifier for \"tree-alg\" is 1. The string identifier for \"tree-alg\" is \"RFC9162_SHA256\". <\/del> The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure\" is 1. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure\" is \"RFC9162_SHA256\". <\/ins> 4.1.2. <\/del> 5.3.2. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree. 4.1.2.1. <\/del> 5.3.2.1. <\/ins> The cbor representation of a merkle root is the bytestring represenation of MTH. 4.1.2.2. <\/del> 5.3.2.2. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.3.1. Generating an Inclusion Proof. The cbor representation of the inclusion proof is: 4.1.2.3. <\/del> 5.3.2.3. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.4.1. Generating a Consistency Proof."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-60453d5c3ae86519785d77a6090c0c9329ec46619890024dd1b8cc81834469a0","title":"","text":"Editors note: tree-size-1, could be ommited, if an inclusion-proof is always present, since the inclusion proof contains, tree-size-1. 4.2. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> In a signed inclusion proof, the previous merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-1, and is a detached payload. In a signed consistency proof, the latest merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-2, and is an attached payload. 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> See the privacy considerations section of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-8dbeb560f58f47b52342b80e15c88eaf48bf866cf02feb12f148d2012f6f6a8c","title":"","text":"operators might prefer only integrity protected content be made transparent. 5.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> In cases where a single merkle root and multiple inclusion paths are used to prove inclusion for multiple payloads. There is a risk that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-4479295557083cd8cd90ce82b8aff808f7893557b1d05d07ed7e60a7c046f5ad","title":"","text":"Tree algorithm designers are encouraged to comment on this property of their leaf construction algorithm. 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> See the security considerations section of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-ebc1c31b8d44fe6ca0af184606b8157ef28f1b3a491422c1c9f4cb824169a3f0","title":"","text":" 6.1. <\/del> 7.1. <\/ins> The choice of cryptographic hash function is the primary primitive impacting the security of authenticating payload inclusion in a merkle root. Tree algorithm designers should review the latest guidance on selecting a suitable cryptographic hash function. 7. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> 7.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> 7.1.1. <\/del> 8.1.1. <\/ins> This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Algorithm Parameters' registries in the 'Standards Action With Expert Review category. 7.1.1.1. <\/del> 8.1.1.1. <\/ins> Name: tree_alg <\/del> Name: verifiable_data_structure <\/ins> Label: TBD_1 Value type: tree_alg <\/del> Value type: verifiable_data_structure <\/ins> Value registry: See"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-9e302e81361acae72fe81f1dd6fa37403add21d5924aa6417c678056246487ec","title":"","text":"Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given tree_alg. <\/del> Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. <\/ins> Name: consistency_proof"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-be7603d65c809135a5fd2a6fb4d95b65ef8f56fc103a33177d70ff6583aace0e","title":"","text":"Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given tree_alg. <\/del> Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. 8.1.2. IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named \"Verifiable Data Structures\" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. Template: Identifier: The two-byte identifier for the algorithm Algorithm: The name of the data structure Reference: Where the data structure is defined Initial contents: Provided in <\/ins> 7.1.2. <\/del> 8.1.3. <\/ins> IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named \"Tree Algorithms\" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. <\/del> identifiers, named \"Verifiable Data Structures Proof Types\" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. <\/ins> Template: Identifier: The two-byte identifier for the algorithm Tree Algorithm: The name of the algorithm <\/del> Algorithm: The name of the proof type algorithm <\/ins> Reference: Where this algorithm is defined <\/del> Reference: Where the algorithm is defined <\/ins> Initial contents: Provided in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-e3c28011598e2656e009d1587e3a8754ca851f657e0006fd0061a00797f8ccd1","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary use in COSE envelopes. A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads. A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. <\/del> This specification describes verifiable data structures and associated proof types for use with COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for RFC9162. <\/ins> 1. Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications. Differences in the representation of a merkle tree, merkle leaf and merkle inclusion proof can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges. This document describes the three data structures necessary to use merkle proofs with COSE envelopes. <\/del> Merkle trees are one of many verifiable data structures that enable tamper evident secure information storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. Merkle trees can be constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function, however, more advanced constructions enable proofs of different properties of the underlying verifiable data structure. Verifiable data structure proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), that a database is append only (proof of consistency), that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure, a special case of proof of inclusion), or proof that certain data is not yet present in a database (proofs of non inclusion). Differences in the representation of verifiable data structures, and verifiable data structure proof types, can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges for transparency services. This document describes how to convey verifiable data structures, and associated proof types in COSE envelopes. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-69a9b688aa967e74a2b400d523bf7b3a76f47ecf3d4b46ac88194e16bb5d70b1","title":"","text":"4.1. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is computed as: with extra data defined as: 4.2. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.3. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is computed as: with extra data defined as: 4.4. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.5. <\/del> The \"RFC9162_SHA256\" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from RFC9162 with SHA-256 hash algorithm. <\/ins> For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-4febf3d401e98d70f9ca7c159a60e03485ed7aae1b87e39568bea40e009bc1f7","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes three CBOR data structures for primary use in COSE envelopes. A CBOR encoding of Merkle Roots for use in COSE payloads. A CBOR encoding of Inclusions Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. A CBOR encoding of Consistency Proofs for use in COSE unprotected headers. <\/del> This specification describes verifiable data structures and associated proof types for use with COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for RFC9162. <\/ins> 1. Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. <\/del> Merkle trees are one of many verifiable data structures that enable tamper evident secure information storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. <\/ins> A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. <\/del> Merkle trees can be constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function, however, more advanced constructions enable proofs of different properties of the underlying verifiable data structure. <\/ins> Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). <\/del> Verifiable data structure proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), that a database is append only (proof of consistency), that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure, a special case of proof of inclusion), or proof that certain data is not yet present in a database (proofs of non inclusion). <\/ins> Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. <\/del> Differences in the representation of verifiable data structures, and verifiable data structure proof types, can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges for transparency services. <\/ins> The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications. Differences in the representation of a merkle tree, merkle leaf and merkle inclusion proof can increase the burden for implementers, and create interoperability challenges. This document describes the three data structures necessary to use merkle proofs with COSE envelopes. <\/del> This document describes how to convey verifiable data structures, and associated proof types in COSE envelopes. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-99bb5149f67793572f75e3e926b80eb6ade824edaaedc4df290d90277c1ddec7","title":"","text":"3. This section describes representations of merkle proof structures in CBOR. Some of the structures such as the construction of a merkle tree leaf, or an inclusion proof from a leaf to a merkle root, might have several different representations. Some differences in representations are necessary to support efficient verification of different kinds of inclusion proofs and for compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. In case of RFC9162, this is defined in Section 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree. 3.1. RFC6962 defines a merkle audit path for a leaf in a merkle tree as the shortest list of additional nodes in the merkle tree required to compute the merkle root for that tree. RFC9162 changed the term from \"merkle audit path\" to \"merkle inclusion proof\". We prefer to use the term \"inclusion path\" to avoid confusion with Signed Inclusion Proof. For tree algorithm \"RFC9162_SHA256\", we define the following compact encoding of an inclusion proof for a leaf: Leaf index is also sometimes referred to as sequence number. 3.2. A Merkle root is signed with COSE_Sign1: Protected header parameters: alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. verifiable_data_structure (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. crit (label: 2): REQUIRED. Criticality marker. Value type: [ +label ] <\/del> This section describes representations of verifiable data structure proofs structures in CBOR. <\/ins> The criticality header MUST contain the verifiable_data_structure label. <\/del> Different verifiable data structures support the same proof types, but the representations of the proofs varies greatly. <\/ins> The envelope payload MUST be computed by the process defined for the verifiable_data_structure. <\/del> For example, construction of a merkle tree leaf, or an inclusion proof from a leaf to a merkle root, might have several different representations, depending on the verifiable data structure used. <\/ins> The envelope payload MUST be detached, and recomputed by the verifier. <\/del> Some differences in representations are necessary to support efficient verification of different kinds of proofs and for compatibility with specific implementations. <\/ins> One example of a Signed Inclusion Proof is a \"transparent statement\" as defined in I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture. <\/del> Some proof types benefit from standard envelope formats for signing and encryption. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> In order to improve interoperability we define two extension points for enabling verifiable data structures with COSE, and we provide concrete examples for the structures and proofs defined in RFC9162. <\/ins> 4. <\/del> 3.1. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry of verifiable data structure algorithms values for TBD_1, with the following initial contents: Each algorithm defines: How to identify the data structures supported. How to identify the proof types supported. <\/del> algorithms, with the following initial contents: <\/ins> How to produce and consume the proof types supported. <\/del> 3.1.1. <\/ins> Each specification MUST define how to encode the algorithm and proof types in CBOR. For example, RFC9162_SHA256 requires the following: TBD_1, the verifiable data structure algorithm (binary merkle tree using sha256) TBD_2, the inclusion proof type (binary merkle tree using sha256, inclusion proof) TBD_3, the consistency proof type (binary merkle tree using sha256, consistency proof) <\/del> Each specification MUST define how to produce and consume the supported proof types. <\/ins> See sec-rfc-9162-verifiable-data-structure-definition as an example. 4. <\/ins> Proof types are specific to their associated \"verifiable data structure\", for example, different merkle trees might support <\/del> structure\", for example, different Merkle trees might support <\/ins> different representations of \"inclusion proof\" or \"consistency proof\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-6a14adef877e211c8e22205196be73f94c0212aa6cd1f08172978ee500f1cefa","title":"","text":"properties across registered proof types. For example, 2 different merkle tree based verifiable data structures might both support proofs of inclusion. Protocols requireing proof of inclusion ought to be able to preserve their functionality, while <\/del> might both support proofs of inclusion. Protocols requiring proof of inclusion ought to be able to preserve their functionality, while <\/ins> switching from one verifiable data structure to another, so long as both structures upport the same proof types. <\/del> both structures support the same proof types. <\/ins> 5. <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry of verifiable data structure proof types tags, with the following initial contents: 5.1. <\/del> Editors note: The registry requirements needs to address the case of multiple proofs of a given type. 4.2. <\/ins> Inclusion proofs provide a mechanism for a verifier to validate set membership. The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure-proof- type\" is TBD_2. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data- structure-proof-type\" is \"inclusion proof\". <\/del> The integer identifier for this Proof Type is TBD_2. The string identifier for this Proof Type is \"inclusion\". <\/ins> sec-rfc9162-sha256-inclusion-proof provides a concrete example. 5.2. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> Consistency proofs provide a mechanism for a verifier to validate the consistency of a verifiable data structure. The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure-proof- type\" is TBD_3. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data- structure-proof-type\" is \"consistency proof\". <\/del> The integer identifier for this Proof Type is TBD_3. The string identifier for this Proof Type is \"consistency\". <\/ins> sec-rfc9162-sha256-consistency-proof provides a concrete example. 5.3. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This section defines how to map the data structures described in RFC9162 to the terminology defined in this document, using cbor and <\/del> This section defines how the data structures described in RFC9162 are mapped to the terminology defined in this document, using cbor and <\/ins> cose. 5.3.1. <\/del> RFC9162_SHA256 requires the following: TBD_1 (verifiable-data-structure): 1, the integer representing the RFC9162_SHA256 verifiable data structure algorithm. TBD_2 (inclusion-proof): a bstr representing the RFC9162_SHA256 inclusion proof TBD_3 (consistency-proof): a bstr representing the RFC9162_SHA256 consistency proof 5.1. <\/ins> The integer identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure\" is 1. The string identifier for this \"verifiable-data-structure\" is <\/del> The integer identifier for this Verifiable Data Structure is 1. The string identifier for this Verifiable Data Structure is <\/ins> \"RFC9162_SHA256\". 5.3.2. <\/del> See sec-verifiable-data-structure-algorithms. See RFC9162, 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree, for a complete description of this verifiable data structure. 5.2. See RFC9162, 2.1.3.1. Generating an Inclusion Proof, for a complete description of this verifiable data structure proof type. The cbor representation of an inclusion proof for RFC9162_SHA256 is: 5.2.1. In a signed inclusion proof, the previous merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-1, and is a detached payload. Other specifications refer to signed inclusion proofs as \"receipts\", profiles of proof signatures are encouraged to make additional protected header parameters mandatory. TODO: reference to scitt receipts. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.1. Definition of the Merkle Tree. <\/del> The protected header for an RFC9162_SHA256 inclusion proof signature is: <\/ins> 5.3.2.1. <\/del> alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. verifiable-data-structure (label: TBD_1): REQUIRED. verifiable data structure algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. crit (label: 2): OPTIONAL. Criticality marker. Value type: [ +label ] Editors note: Recommend removing \"crit\" and mandating \"kid\". See issue 21 [1]. <\/ins> The cbor representation of a merkle root is the bytestring represenation of MTH. <\/del> The unprotected header for an RFC9162_SHA256 inclusion proof signature is: <\/ins> 5.3.2.2. <\/del> inclusion-proof (label: TBD_2): REQUIRED. proof type identifier. Value type: bstr. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.3.1. Generating an Inclusion Proof. <\/del> The payload of an RFC9162_SHA256 inclusion proof signature is: <\/ins> The cbor representation of the inclusion proof is: <\/del> A previous merkle tree hash as defined in RFC9162. <\/ins> 5.3.2.3. <\/del> The payload MUST be detached. <\/ins> See RFC9162, 2.1.4.1. Generating a Consistency Proof. <\/del> Detaching the payload forces verifiers to recompute the root from the inclusion proof signature, this protects against implementation errors where the signature is verified but to root does not match the inclusion proof. <\/ins> The cbor representation of the consistency proof is: <\/del> The following example needs to be converted to proper CDDL: 5.3. See RFC9162, 2.1.4.1. Generating a Consistency Proof, for a complete description of this verifiable data structure proof type. The cbor representation of a consistency proof for RFC9162_SHA256 is: <\/ins> Editors note: tree-size-1, could be ommited, if an inclusion-proof is always present, since the inclusion proof contains, tree-size-1. 5.4. <\/del> 5.3.1. In a signed consistency proof, the latest merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-2, and is an attached payload. <\/ins> In a signed inclusion proof, the previous merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-1, and is a detached payload. In a signed consistency proof, the latest merkle tree root, maps to tree-size-2, and is an attached payload. <\/del> The protected header for an RFC9162_SHA256 consistency proof signature is: alg (label: 1): REQUIRED. Signature algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. verifiable-data-structure (label: TBD_1): REQUIRED. verifiable data structure algorithm identifier. Value type: int \/ tstr. crit (label: 2): OPTIONAL. Criticality marker. Value type: [ +label ] Editors note: Recommend removing \"crit\" and mandating \"kid\". See issue 21 [2]. The unprotected header for an RFC9162_SHA256 consistency proof signature is: consistency-proof (label: TBD_2): REQUIRED. proof type identifier. Value type: bstr. The payload of an RFC9162_SHA256 consistency proof signature is: The latest merkle tree hash as defined in RFC9162. The payload MUST be attached. The following example needs to be converted to proper CDDL: <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-63df11d47e644a868d0a72ea5a4074b18dac737f0570e0db13b8a336b5737d29","title":"","text":"is important to note that transparency logs might include sensitive information. Depending on the leaf algorithm used, a log operator might be able to count unique entries. <\/del> Depending on the verifiable data structure used, a service provider might be able to count unique entries. <\/ins> In the case that a leaf is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, <\/del> In the case that an entry is produced from a cose sign 1 envelope, <\/ins> adding information to the unprotected header can be used to produce a unique leaf entry. <\/del> unique entry. <\/ins> However, this could impact privacy, and some transparency service operators might prefer only integrity protected content be made"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-121b85b3bb058e9afd1dd70d43cccb85b61d9639da26b1711af258363ea750f8","title":"","text":"Tree algorithm designers are encouraged to comment on this property of their leaf construction algorithm. 6.1.1. Implementers wishing to leverage multiple inclusion proofs to support selective disclosure, can prepend each payload with extra data before computing the inclusion proof, where extra data is a cryptographic nonce. <\/ins> 7. See the security considerations section of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-0f56c0bf54bea2ee18dc50105c9736ff2d5397680f46b128a585acf34118f1ec","title":"","text":"8.1.1.1. Name: verifiable_data_structure <\/del> Name: verifiable-data-structure <\/ins> Label: TBD_1 <\/del> Label: TBD_1 (requested assignment 12) <\/ins> Value type: verifiable_data_structure <\/del> Value type: int \/ tstr <\/ins> Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree algorithm used to produce a COSE Sign1 payload. <\/del> Description: Tag indicating the Verifiable Data Structure, see sec-generic-verifiable-data-structures. <\/ins> Name: inclusion_proof <\/del> Editors note: Authors are discussing how to avoid flooding the cose header parameters registry with new proof types. <\/ins> Label: TBD_2 <\/del> Name: inclusion-proof <\/ins> Value type: inclusion_proof <\/del> Label: TBD_2 (requested assignment 13) Value type: bstr <\/ins> Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree inclusion proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. <\/del> Description: Tag indicating the \"inclusion\" Proof Type, see sec- generic-inclusion-proof. <\/ins> Name: consistency_proof <\/del> Name: consistency-proof <\/ins> Label: TBD_2 <\/del> Label: TBD_2 (requested assignment 14) <\/ins> Value type: consistency_proof <\/del> Value type: bstr <\/ins> Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree consistency proof for the given verifiable_data_structure. <\/del> Description: Tag indicating the \"consistency\" Proof Type, see sec- generic-consistency-proof. <\/ins> 8.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-62af674a6cc784eb2033642b14575febff710abffb5d9203ba761ba766974267","title":"","text":"Reference: Where the algorithm is defined Initial contents: Provided in 9. References 9.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-scitt\/draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs\/issues\/21 [2] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-scitt\/draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree- proofs\/issues\/21 <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-04b3d795ae0e296f9ddbf85102cec1f04bd4603db02f592809cc4b82eafd6331","title":"","text":"where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.2. The \"CCF_SHA256\" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from TBD with SHA-256 hash algorithm. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is computed as: with extra data defined as: <\/ins> 5. TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-c71b00d1e227a6cf88147698aa9d3084831915053157a3131123caedecf4f778","title":"","text":"where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.2. The \"QLDB_SHA256\" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from TBD with SHA-256 hash algorithm. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. <\/ins> 5. TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-0d1412e17960120024c0b1743aadf6102fd5821a188f0877e623455b94dbd2a3","title":"","text":"FIXME bit vector: 0 right, 1 left, so no bit labels For some tree algorithms, like Quantum Ledger Data Base (QLDB), the direction is derived from the hashes themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: <\/del> For some tree algorithms, the direction is derived from the hashes themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: <\/ins> Note: Including the tree size and leaf index may not be appropriate in certain privacy-focused applications as an attacker may be able to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-47ac6fbc6324575c57319ca8e17ad906f0090b492bafc4d8d855395670d6f345","title":"","text":"where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. 4.2. The \"QLDB_SHA256\" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from TBD with SHA-256 hash algorithm. For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. <\/del> 5. TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-1164ac9c784677f9edca4f98281b33c04e79e252fad8a91b7de6db113c479ecf","title":"","text":"7.1.1. IANA will be requested to register the new COSE Header parameters defined below in the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry at some point <\/del> defined below in the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry at some point. <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-80b4cb1bf9d0b3bce1dac3d29fc07c78a1ab218e6d1b96568586d7e1c7e7d75f","title":"","text":"The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as [TBD]. 7.2.2. IANA might be asked to establish a registry of signature algorithm identifiers, named \"Signature Algorithms\", with the following registration procedures: TBD The \"Signature Algorithms\" registry initially consists of: The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as a cryptographic signature algorithm. <\/del> 8. References 8.1. URIs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-d053e192f85b33ffc330e3125a290e3db3059f0695f5972e008b0ce75efdba95","title":"","text":"1. Merkle proofs are verifiable data structures that support secure data <\/del> Merkle trees are verifiable data structures that support secure data <\/ins> storage, through their ability to protect the integrity of batches of documents or collections of statements. Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of existence), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (proof of disclosure). <\/del> A merkle proof is a path from a leaf to a root in a merkle tree. Merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. <\/del> Merkle proofs can be used to prove a document is in a database (proof of inclusion), or that a smaller set of statements are contained in a large set of statements (selective disclosure proofs). Typically, merkle trees are constructed from simple operations such as concatenation and digest via a cryptographic hash function. <\/ins> The simple design and valuable cryptographic properties of merkle trees have been leveraged in many network and database applications."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-b628e8a7650a70e25e0e1a92d43d01e99096b042070eca63f6a1edf960a276e0","title":"","text":"3. This section describes representations of merkle tree structures in <\/del> This section describes representations of merkle proof structures in <\/ins> CBOR. Some of the structures such as the construction of a merkle tree"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-cfeb724892c56c48d499a300fb3d4ab39380ec682dbbf6f0a8e95e517074274c","title":"","text":"several different representations. Some differences in representations are necessary to support efficient verification of proofs and compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. <\/del> efficient verification of different kinds of inclusion proofs and for compatibility with deployed tree algorithms used in specific implementations. <\/ins> 3.1. A Merkle tree root is signed with COSE_Sign1, creating a Signed Merkle Tree Root: <\/del> A Merkle root is signed with COSE_Sign1: <\/ins> Protected header parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-0f72f43b3ab145a6ce33d4c79f93d9c5d9665400992b29a4c2ac9c5c1e36788f","title":"","text":"tree alg (label: TBD): REQUIRED. Merkle tree algorithm. Value type: int \/ tstr. tree size (label: TBD): OPTIONAL. Merkle tree size as the number of leaves. Value type: uint. <\/del> A COSE profile of this specification may add further header parameters, for example to identify the signer. <\/del> parameters, for example to identify the signer or add a timestamp. Envelope Payload: A Merkle tree root according to the tree alg. <\/ins> Payload: Merkle tree root hash bytes according to tree alg (i.e., header params tell you what the alg id is here) <\/del> The envelope payload can be detached, since it can be recomputed by the verifier. <\/ins> Note: The payload is just a byte string representing the Merkle tree root hash (and not some wrapper structure) so that it can be detached (see defintion of payload in https:\/\/www.rfc-editor.org\/rfc\/ rfc9052#section-4.1) and easily re-computed from an inclusion path and leaf bytes. This allows to design other structures that force re-computation and prevent faulty implementations (forgetting to match a computed root with one embedded in a signature). <\/del> Forcing a verifier to perform re-computation can prevent faulty implementations. <\/ins> One example of a Signed Merkle Tree Proof is a \"transparent signed statement\" or \"claim\" as defined in I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture. <\/del> One example of a Signed Inclusion Proof is a \"transparent statement\" as defined in I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-4e5deb10f238f4df6db52bfb36360776a283d7e88353e8166da641ee09abff8d","title":"","text":"inclusion proof\". We prefer to use the term \"inclusion path\" to avoid confusion with Signed Merkle Tree Proof. <\/del> Signed Inclusion Proof. Editors note: We may want to move inclusion path representations to the specification that is required to register a new algorithm in the proposed tree algorithms registry. Editors note: We recommend tree algorithm simple take the inclusion path as opaque bytes. <\/ins> If the tree size and leaf index is known, then a compact inclusion path variant can be used: Otherwise, the direction for each path step must be included: <\/del> Leaf index is also sometimes referred to as sequence number. Otherwise, the direction each path step must be included: <\/ins> FIXME bit vector: 0 right, 1 left, so no bit labels"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-4eb53908885987a47735028df59265638e0185b3f0666e4960f8ef0dd5135978","title":"","text":"themselves and both the index and direction can be left out in the path: Note: Including the tree size and leaf index may not be appropriate in certain privacy-focused applications as an attacker may be able to derive private information from them. TODO: Should leaf index be part of inclusion path (IndexAwareInclusionPath) or outside? <\/del> Presence of leaf index, and whether it is an input or an output is tree algorithm specific. <\/ins> TODO: Define root computation algorithm for each inclusion path type TODO: Do we need both inclusion path types? what properties does each type have? [1] <\/del> 3.3. <\/ins> TODO: Should the inclusion path be opaque (bstr) and fixed by the tree algorithm? It seems this is orthogonal and the choice of inclusion path type should be application-specific. <\/del> An inclusion proof is a CBOR array containing a merkle tree root, an inclusion path, extra data for the tree algorithm, and the payload. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> 3.4. <\/ins> A signed Merkle tree proof is a CBOR array containing a signed tree <\/del> A signed inclusion proof is a CBOR array containing a signed tree <\/ins> root, an inclusion path, extra data for the tree algorithm, and the payload. \"extra_data\" is an additional input to the tree algorithm and is used together with the payload to compute the leaf hash. A use case for this field is to implement blinding. <\/del> \"extra-data\" is an additional input to the tree algorithm and is used together with the payload to compute the leaf hash. See sec-leaf- blinding-example for an example use case for this field to enable leaf blinding as described in sec-leaf-blinding. <\/ins> TODO: maybe rename \"extra_data\" <\/del> 3.5. <\/ins> 3.4. <\/del> 3.5.1. This signed mulitple inclusion proof representation relies on 2 lists to enable proof of inclusion for multiple payloads in a given signed merkle root. <\/ins> TODO: define a multi-leaf variant of a signed Merkle tree proof like in: <\/del> Note that the extra-data may be ommited if not required by the tree algorithm, and that leaf payloads may be detached. TODO: refine multi-leaf variant of a signed inclusion proof like in: <\/ins> https:\/\/github.com\/transmute-industries\/merkle-proof"} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-e4a47025e65fffcb3d970a02a59ad840a3fc117ec229619cc0456c16a36416c9","title":"","text":"4. This document establishes a registry of Merkle tree algorithms with <\/del> This document establishes a registry of merkle tree algorithms with <\/ins> the following initial contents: [FIXME] exploration table, what should go into -00? <\/del> Each tree algorithm defines how to compute the root node from a sequence of leaves each represented by payload and extra data. Extra data is algorithm-specific and should be considered opaque. 4.1. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> The \"RFC9162_SHA256\" tree algorithm uses the Merkle tree definition from RFC9162 with SHA-256 hash algorithm. <\/del> TBD <\/ins> For n > 1 inputs, let k be the largest power of two smaller than n. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> where \"d(0)\" is the payload. This algorithm takes no extra data. <\/del> In cases where a single merkle root and multiple inclusion paths are used to prove inclusion for multiple payloads. There is a risk that an attacker may be able to learn the content of undisclosed payloads, by brute forcing the values adjacent to the disclosed payloads through application of the cryptographic hash function and comparison to the the disclosed inclusion paths. This kind of attack can be mitigated by including a cryptographic nonce in the construction of the leaf, however this nonce must then disclosed along side an inclusion proof which increases the size of multiple payload signed inclusion proofs. <\/ins> 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> TBD 6. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> TBD <\/del> The choice of cryptographic hash function is the primary primitive impacting the security of authenticating payload inclusion in a merkle root. Tree algorithm designers should review the latest guidance on selecting a suitable cryptographic hash function. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-7049a0ff56d4de11ce2b705c419acc75b3fb22d8ede81515ae2b6fdc340c259f","title":"","text":"IANA will be requested to register the new COSE Header parameters defined below in the \"COSE Header Parameters\" registry at some point. Name: tree_alg Label: TBD Value type: tree_alg Value registry: See Description: Merkle tree algorithm used to produce a COSE Sign1 payload. <\/ins> 7.2. IANA will be asked to add a new registry \"TBD\" to the list that appears at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/. <\/del> appears at IANA Assignments [1]. <\/ins> The rest of this section defines the subregistries that are to be created within the new \"TBD\" registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-draft-steele-cose-merkle-tree-proofs-e6f598d80ea28c2f8426219dac7fa498b574e0ff1dd39d98556b138327bb36c9","title":"","text":"7.2.1. IANA will be asked to establish a registry of tree algorithm identifiers, named \"Tree Algorithms\", with the following registration procedures: TBD <\/del> identifiers, named \"Tree Algorithms\" to be administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. Template: Identifier: The two-byte identifier for the algorithm Tree Algorithm: The name of the algorithm <\/ins> The \"Tree Algorithms\" registry initially consists of: <\/del> Reference: Where this algorithm is defined <\/ins> The designated expert(s) should ensure that the proposed algorithm has a public specification and is suitable for use as [TBD]. <\/del> Initial contents: Provided in <\/ins> 8. References 8.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/github.com\/ietf-scitt\/cose-merkle-tree-proofs\/issues\/6 <\/del> [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/ <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-135db950fbbae626b997c06248f73ee81f52815bbe392cb64f9e24e35b027135","title":"","text":"The \"Connection\" header field allows the sender to list desired control options for the current connection. Connection options are case-insensitive. <\/ins> When a field aside from Connection is used to supply control information for or about the current connection, the sender MUST list the corresponding field name within the Connection header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f4595c63dadb2b290afe4671590f9dfa7f8d5affde0a966487b1fa6554c7f375","title":"","text":"message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field, remove any header or trailer field(s) from the message with the same name as the connection-option, and then remove the Connection header field itself (or replace it with the intermediary's own connection <\/del> field itself (or replace it with the intermediary's own control <\/ins> options for the forwarded message). Hence, the Connection header field provides a declarative way of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2544d6f423d30f1e88ae85a5a316071e03c82f99d1077a2d20bdeb8421d4781e","title":"","text":"to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly forwarded by older intermediaries. Furthermore, intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace field(s) whose semantics are known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they appear as a Connection option, after applying those fields' <\/del> Furthermore, intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace fields that are known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they appear as a connection-option, after applying those fields' <\/ins> semantics. This includes but is not limited to: The Connection header field's value has the following grammar: Connection options are case-insensitive. <\/del> A sender MUST NOT send a connection option corresponding to a field that is intended for all recipients of the content. For example,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-198b91892808071ff09b516e830bc5336e12de7b27e6ebc821a713464ffd6ec0","title":"","text":"status code indicates that the server is successfully fulfilling a range request for the target resource by transferring one or more parts of the selected representation that correspond to the satisfiable ranges found in the request's header field (header.range). <\/del> parts of the selected representation. <\/ins> When a 206 response is generated, the server MUST generate the following header fields, in addition to those required in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bf18454e48b1e37cbeed2cce5c42498ceb352df0548ca2155fb37bb9588e646b","title":"","text":"If the request method is GET, the response status code is , and the entire response header section has been received, a cache MAY store a response body that is not complete (message.framing) if the stored response is recorded as being incomplete. Likewise, a <\/del> MAY store a response that is not complete (message.framing) provided that the stored response is recorded as being incomplete. Likewise, a <\/ins> response MAY be stored as if it were an incomplete"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9c4c387ec2c9d828167a9bed0b531057cfcb87cd4ce71919f0f4b3ceed40dde5","title":"","text":"7.1. Storing a malicious payload in a cache can extend the reach of an <\/del> Storing malicious content in a cache can extend the reach of an <\/ins> attacker to affect multiple users. Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks happen when an attacker uses implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert a response into a cache."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-329dcc43607517285a56e22ea42ca16f24bad7c3cba4f8a2418a2db7c7fca529","title":"","text":"identical, as is the case for the compression codings defined in compression.codings. The header field (header.te) uses a pseudo parameter named \"q\" as rank value when multiple transfer codings are acceptable. Future registrations of transfer codings SHOULD NOT define parameters called \"q\" (case-insensitively) in order to avoid ambiguities. <\/ins> Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see RFC8126), and MUST conform to the purpose of transfer coding defined in this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-32080a43e11075ff808a84f4e76a62b29dafc190c3fe59204a73831f1126e2f7","title":"","text":"sufficiently backwards-compatible to be safely processed by any implementation of the same major version. When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the minor version \"0\" is implied and is used when referring to that protocol within a protocol element that requires sending a minor version. <\/ins> 4. Each major version of HTTP defines its own syntax for the inclusion"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8816c897a4d8511db90e8ce9e69a54878b47e01d08e88d110cf37bb48b49648d","title":"","text":"9.5.19. The 422 (Unprocessable Entity) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request entity (hence a status code is inappropriate), and the syntax of the request entity is correct but was unable to process the contained instructions. For example, this error condition may occur if an XML request body contains well-formed (i.e., syntactically correct), but semantically erroneous, XML instructions. 9.5.20. <\/ins> The status code indicates that the server refuses to perform the request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b19a226e491c917d4076985f35384ec424e3acab488f52c72a418e463453d3ee","title":"","text":"415 Unsupported Media Type (status code) 416 Range Not Satisfiable (status code) 417 Expectation Failed (status code) 422 Unprocessable Entity (status code) <\/ins> 426 Upgrade Required (status code) 4xx Client Error (status code class)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-70a46ce84e44d64e28afbb5338f2e0a92ddb4347439152aa45612a5e5d6fddb6","title":"","text":"9.5.19. RFC2324 was an April 1 RFC that lampooned the various ways HTTP was abused; one such abuse was the definition of an application-specific 418 status code. In the intervening years, this status code has been widely implemented as an \"Easter Egg\", and therefore is effectively consumed by this use. Therefore, the 418 status code is reserved in the IANA HTTP Status Code registry. This indicates that the status code cannot be assigned to other applications currently. If future circumstances require its use (e.g., exhaustion of 4NN status codes), it can be re- assigned to another use. 9.5.20. <\/ins> The 422 (Unprocessable Entity) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request entity (hence a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1b5e02f6ce9d5164ea2771125b61c6c046742335064827b2dc05f3fcc3e4b154","title":"","text":"contains well-formed (i.e., syntactically correct), but semantically erroneous, XML instructions. 9.5.20. <\/del> 9.5.21. <\/ins> The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4f7f96e59a5da1470e008b96bfc46145753b6d2ac53d6a3a6ca19cb925ece535","title":"","text":"status code values summarized in the table of overview.of.status.codes. Additionally, please update the following entry in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code Registry: <\/ins> 13.4. Please update the \"Message Headers\" registry of \"Permanent Message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-501bb102d5b08780f2468b6583d9a77028ba06cc83221b3c4125a1039f5900c0","title":"","text":"415 Unsupported Media Type (status code) 416 Range Not Satisfiable (status code) 417 Expectation Failed (status code) 418 (Unused) (status code) <\/ins> 422 Unprocessable Entity (status code) 426 Upgrade Required (status code) 4xx Client Error (status code class)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e1eda70e9ece78f3a2c2f68bd9590d589a2dca1d66c8b37c2640f34c45e7e35d","title":"","text":"5.2.2.1. The \"must-revalidate\" response directive indicates that once it has become stale, a cache MUST NOT use the response to satisfy subsequent requests without successful validation on the origin server. <\/del> become stale, the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. <\/ins> The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features. In all circumstances a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-174535334edda1d913378da47b9c596e6c608bc1c222c1ef16004853ef69209d","title":"","text":"The \"no-cache\" response directive indicates that the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy a subsequent request without successful validation on the origin server. This allows an origin server to prevent a cache from using it to satisfy a request without contacting it, even by caches that have been configured to send stale responses. <\/del> NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. This allows an origin server to prevent a cache from using it to satisfy a request without contacting it, even by caches that have been configured to send stale responses. <\/ins> If the no-cache response directive specifies one or more field-names, then a cache MAY use the response to satisfy a subsequent request,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-28875ccc767596bfd26dedb31b8d7d9d191f74049dc6b7e284cbff39199e9950","title":"","text":"5.2.2.3. The \"no-store\" response directive indicates that a cache MUST NOT store any part of either the immediate request or response. This directive applies to both private and shared caches. \"MUST NOT <\/del> store any part of either the immediate request or response, and MUST NOT use the response to satisfy any other request. This directive applies to both private and shared caches. \"MUST NOT <\/ins> store\" in this context means that the cache MUST NOT intentionally store the information in non-volatile storage, and MUST make a best- effort attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-70121edc6bb2f63ab9cbaf91f03a565d4a20a973dc24a03230a8ed8f7871d69a","title":"","text":"The request method is understood by the cache and defined as being cacheable, and the response status code is final (see associating.response.to.request), and <\/ins> the response status code is understood by the cache, and the \"no-store\" cache directive (see header.cache-control) does not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-709f36ef036bbbb56de389c34f7693c3351b77318fd14e5cb95fa364d693dbe7","title":"","text":"requirements in combining.byte.ranges. When combining the new response with one or more stored responses, a cache MUST: <\/del> cache MUST use the header fields provided in the new response, aside from <\/ins> delete any header fields in the stored response with warn-code 1xx (see header.warning); retain any header fields in the stored response with warn-code 2xx; and, use other header fields provided in the new response, aside from , to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response. <\/del> , to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5091542acf4abbb246898429c1e7fe6ecc7765e2931adeaa9922b735fd53719d","title":"","text":"interval since that time. A typical setting of this fraction might be 10%. When a heuristic is used to calculate freshness lifetime, a cache SHOULD generate a header field with a 113 warn-code (see warn.113) in the response if its current_age is more than 24 hours and such a warning is not already present. <\/del> 4.2.3. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9d3e60b9b766613230cc627192b362451ba25e3e9929c7422d2a24d68cf1c3e4","title":"","text":"forward path) or doing so is explicitly allowed (e.g., by the max- stale request directive; see cache-request-directive). A cache SHOULD generate a header field with the 110 warn-code (see warn.110) in stale responses. Likewise, a cache SHOULD generate a 112 warn-code (see warn.112) in stale responses if the cache is disconnected. A cache SHOULD NOT generate a new header field when forwarding a response that does not have an header field, even if the response is already stale. A cache need not validate a response that merely became stale in transit. <\/del> 4.3. When a cache has one or more stored responses for a requested URI,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-eda1216472566d06b2ea546cc96a48c0b73801592e31fdc7fe9da54b9e1bbd8a","title":"","text":"response also lacks a validator, then that stored response is identified for update. For each stored response identified for update, the cache MUST: delete any header fields in the stored response with warn-code 1xx (see header.warning); retain any header fields in the stored response with warn-code 2xx; and, <\/del> For each stored response identified for update, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the <\/ins> use other header fields provided in the response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response. <\/del> response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response. <\/ins> 4.3.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c68b1b778ddb631eeacfcc56ca2368e41c62c0a5c3f2cd4054d015dd9d3bc07f","title":"","text":"consider the stored response to be stale. If a cache updates a stored response with the metadata provided in a HEAD response, the cache MUST: delete any header fields in the stored response with warn-code 1xx (see header.warning); retain any <\/del> HEAD response, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the HEAD response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response and append new header fields to the stored response's header section unless otherwise restricted by the <\/ins> header fields in the stored response with warn-code 2xx; and, use other header fields provided in the HEAD response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response and append new header fields to the stored response's header section unless otherwise restricted by the header field. <\/del> header field. <\/ins> 4.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-cc6352be24e08de8fcb3a520900c9737250f6d7db18491f903f3163869b2d2ae","title":"","text":"5.5. The \"Warning\" header field is used to carry additional information <\/del> The \"Warning\" header field was used to carry additional information <\/ins> about the status or transformation of a message that might not be reflected in the status code. This information is typically used to warn about possible incorrectness introduced by caching operations or transformations applied to the payload of the message. Warnings can be used for other purposes, both cache-related and otherwise. The use of a warning, rather than an error status code, distinguishes these responses from true failures. Warning header fields can in general be applied to any message, however some warn-codes are specific to caches and can only be applied to response messages. Multiple warnings can be generated in a response (either by the origin server or by a cache), including multiple warnings with the same warn-code number that only differ in warn-text. A user agent that receives one or more Warning header fields SHOULD inform the user of as many of them as possible, in the order that they appear in the response. Senders that generate multiple Warning header fields are encouraged to order them with this user agent behavior in mind. A sender that generates new Warning header fields MUST append them after any existing Warning header fields. Warnings are assigned three digit warn-codes. The first digit indicates whether the Warning is required to be deleted from a stored response after validation: 1xx warn-codes describe the freshness or validation status of the response, and so they MUST be deleted by a cache after validation. They can only be generated by a cache when validating a cached entry, and MUST NOT be generated in any other situation. 2xx warn-codes describe some aspect of the representation that is not rectified by a validation (for example, a lossy compression of the representation) and they MUST NOT be deleted by a cache after validation, unless a full response is sent, in which case they MUST be. If a sender generates one or more 1xx warn-codes in a message to be sent to a recipient known to implement only HTTP\/1.0, the sender MUST include in each corresponding warning-value a warn-date that matches the header field in the message. For example: Warnings have accompanying warn-text that describes the error, e.g., for logging. It is advisory only, and its content does not affect interpretation of the warn-code. <\/del> reflected in the status code. This specification obsoletes it, as it is not widely generated or surfaced to users. The information it carried can be gleaned from examining other header fields, such as <\/ins> If a recipient that uses, evaluates, or displays Warning header fields receives a warn-date that is different from the value in the same message, the recipient MUST exclude the warning- value containing that warn-date before storing, forwarding, or using the message. This allows recipients to exclude warning-values that were improperly retained after a cache validation. If all of the warning-values are excluded, the recipient MUST exclude the Warning header field as well. The following warn-codes are defined by this specification, each with a recommended warn-text in English, and a description of its meaning. The procedure for defining additional warn codes is described in warn.code.registry. 5.5.1. A cache SHOULD generate this whenever the sent response is stale. 5.5.2. A cache SHOULD generate this when sending a stale response because an attempt to validate the response failed, due to an inability to reach the server. 5.5.3. A cache SHOULD generate this if it is intentionally disconnected from the rest of the network for a period of time. 5.5.4. A cache SHOULD generate this if it heuristically chose a freshness lifetime greater than 24 hours and the response's age is greater than 24 hours. 5.5.5. The warning text can include arbitrary information to be presented to a human user or logged. A system receiving this warning MUST NOT take any automated action, besides presenting the warning to the user. 5.5.6. This Warning code MUST be added by a proxy if it applies any transformation to the representation, such as changing the content- coding, media-type, or modifying the representation data, unless this Warning code already appears in the response. 5.5.7. The warning text can include arbitrary information to be presented to a human user or logged. A system receiving this warning MUST NOT take any automated action. 5.5.8. The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Warn Codes\" registry defines the namespace for warn codes. It has been created and is now maintained at . A registration MUST include the following fields: Warn Code (3 digits) Short Description Pointer to specification text Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see RFC8126). <\/del> . <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-49965d0cf8e5554d1fc2c8ae29306e16796ae0c4a117556a316e57c99546fe59","title":"","text":"8.3. Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Warn Codes\" registry at with the registration procedure of warn.code.registry and the warn code values summarized in the table of header.warning. <\/del> Please add a note to the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Warn Codes\" registry at to the effect that Warning is obsoleted. <\/ins> Index 1 110 (warn-code) 111 (warn-code) 112 (warn-code) 113 (warn-code) 199 (warn-code) 2 214 (warn-code) 299 (warn-code) <\/del> A Age header field age"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d5dc8a659acbba5f5f785c4cb379e6ed7b52ecc7f7e5edebe081ab0cfa34ccb2","title":"","text":"cache entry cache key D Disconnected Operation (warn-text) <\/del> E Expires header field explicit expiration time"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7c4b3175d06669796915e9999c4ff93cb029b24eb6d23b6bae26d433e8a139a6","title":"","text":"VCHAR H Heuristic Expiration (warn-text) <\/del> heuristic expiration time M Miscellaneous Persistent Warning (warn-text) Miscellaneous Warning (warn-text) <\/del> max-age (cache directive) max-stale (cache directive) min-fresh (cache directive)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-415bf5531a57694314e151db90eaf7c418bd52acb40ad269f308e4b4d248d04f","title":"","text":"proxy-revalidate (cache directive) public (cache directive) R Response is Stale (warn-text) Revalidation Failed (warn-text) <\/del> S s-maxage (cache directive) shared cache stale strong validator T Transformation Applied (warn-text) <\/del> V validator"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d735a918c3fac38c4ba7a801ac518ed5cc6e911d3d602f313e090c78c8bdec66","title":"","text":"6. User agents often have history mechanisms, such as \"Back\" buttons and history lists, that can be used to redisplay a representation <\/del> Applications using HTTP often specify additional forms of caching. For example, Web browsers often have history mechanisms such as \"Back\" buttons that can be used to redisplay a representation <\/ins> retrieved earlier in a session. The freshness model (expiration.model) does not necessarily apply to history mechanisms. That is, a history mechanism can display a previous representation even if it has expired. <\/del> Likewise, some Web browsers implement caching of images and other assets within a page view; they may or may not honor HTTP caching semantics. <\/ins> This does not prohibit the history mechanism from telling the user that a view might be stale or from honoring cache directives (e.g., Cache-Control: no-store). <\/del> The requirements in this specification do not necessarily apply to how applications use data after it is retrieved from a HTTP cache. That is, a history mechanism can display a previous representation even if it has expired, and an application can use cached data in other ways beyond its freshness lifetime. This does not prohibit the application from taking HTTP caching into account; for example, a history mechanism might tell the user that a view is stale, or it might honor cache directives (e.g., Cache- Control: no-store). <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a4d4340cfd97fba972ab464ac0e76396f423d916e8d80a186b3e41796b35912f","title":"","text":"4.3.1. When sending a conditional request for cache validation, a cache sends one or more precondition header fields containing metadata from its stored response(s), which is then compared by recipients to determine whether a stored response is equivalent to a current representation of the resource. <\/del> When generating a conditional request for validation, a cache starts with either a request it is attempting to satisfy, or -- if it is initiating the request independently -- it synthesises a request using a stored response by copying the method, request-target, and request header fields used for identifying the secondary cache key caching.negotiated.responses. It then updates that request with one or more precondition header fields. These contain validator metadata sourced from stored response(s) that have the same cache key (both primary and secondary, as applicable). The precondition header fields are then compared by recipients to determine whether any stored response is equivalent to a current representation of the resource. <\/ins> One such validator is the timestamp given in a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-74672da7062cd50690d798f502badd6c3cc435efd318d30a4636c6189be11791","title":"","text":"A client sends an HTTP request to a server in the form of a message, beginning with a request-line that includes a method, URI, and protocol version (request.line), followed by header fields containing request modifiers, client information, and representation metadata (header.fields), an empty line to indicate the end of the header section, and finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, message.body). <\/del> message, beginning with a method (methods) and URI, followed by header fields containing request modifiers, client information, and representation metadata (header.fields), and finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, message.body). <\/ins> A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more HTTP messages, each beginning with a status line that includes the protocol version, a success or error code, and textual reason phrase (status.line), possibly followed by header fields containing server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata (header.fields), an empty line to indicate the end of the header section, and finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, message.body). <\/del> messages, each beginning with a success or error code (status.codes), possibly followed by header fields containing server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata (header.fields), and finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, message.body). A connection might be used for multiple request\/response exchanges. <\/ins> The mechanism used to correlate between request and response messages is version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of messages, while others use an explicit identifier. A connection might be used for multiple request\/response exchanges, as defined in persistent.connections. <\/del> Responses (both final and non-final) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if it is not yet complete. However, clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8b950e259d87779f2bf51746ac9cc53d6ba14c41053fde0f89cabfb3d1d93290","title":"","text":"negotiation. This document obsoletes RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7235, RFC 7615, and portions of RFC 7230. <\/del> 7538, RFC 7615, and portions of RFC 7230. <\/ins> Editorial Note"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-57f33a89baaa257fc6c50986a80562ca905443ff8a17a78a0c1344f7937d4126","title":"","text":"changes being summarized in changes.from.rfc.7230. The other parts of RFC7230 are obsoleted by \"HTTP\/1.1 Messaging\" Messaging. This document also obsoletes RFC7231 (see changes.from.rfc.7231), RFC7232 (see changes.from.rfc.7232), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7233), and RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7235), and RFC7615 (see changes.from.rfc.7615). <\/del> (see changes.from.rfc.7232), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7233), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7235), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7538), and RFC7615 (see changes.from.rfc.7615). <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a046271144070e14c363fd386d853a390213f97d5fa41fc3e6fff76fdc51cd4c","title":"","text":"contains a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the different URI(s). 9.4.9. The status code indicates that the has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs. Clients with link editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the effective request URI to one or more of the new references sent by the server, where possible. The server SHOULD generate a header field in the response containing a preferred URI reference for the new permanent URI. The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection. The server's response payload usually contains a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s). A 308 response is cacheable by default; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see heuristic.freshness). <\/ins> 9.5. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d779466ad9357c66553d4942d04b4bee53baae2ff99d67bd797acac95012b151","title":"","text":"305 Use Proxy (status code) 306 (Unused) (status code) 307 Temporary Redirect (status code) 308 Permanent Redirect (status code) <\/ins> 3xx Redirection (status code class) 4"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c77824c17d047e387f871040a99567c6d1367900edee9ec934b2072a295a7f7b","title":"","text":"authentication credentials, or deliberately misleading duplicate header fields that would impact request processing. A sender MUST NOT generate multiple header fields with the same field name in a message unless either the entire field value for that header field is defined as a comma-separated list [i.e., #(values)] or the header field is a well-known exception (as noted below). <\/del> Aside from the well-known exception noted below, a sender MUST NOT generate multiple header fields with the same field name in a message, or append a header field when a field of the same name already exists in the message, unless that field's definition allows multiple field values to be recombined as a comma-separated list [i.e., at least one alternative of the field's definition allows a comma-separated list, such as an ABNF rule of #(values)]. <\/ins> A recipient MAY combine multiple header fields with the same field name into one \"field-name: field-value\" pair, without changing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b087fed11efa3764e6774610f1f9cf2e7a41686a4f76ca26d3b2bff5e6981368","title":"","text":"5.4. The \"Pragma\" header field allows backwards compatibility with HTTP\/1.0 caches, so that clients can specify a \"no-cache\" request that they will understand (as <\/del> The \"Pragma\" header field was defined for HTTP\/1.0 caches, so that clients could specify a \"no-cache\" request (as <\/ins> was not defined until HTTP\/1.1). When the Cache-Control header field is also present and understood in a request, Pragma is ignored. <\/del> was not defined until HTTP\/1.1). <\/ins> In HTTP\/1.0, Pragma was defined as an extensible field for implementation-specified directives for recipients. This specification deprecates such extensions to improve interoperability. When the header field is not present in a request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request pragma-directive as having the same effect as if \"Cache-Control: no-cache\" were present (see cache-request-directive). When sending a no-cache request, a client ought to include both the pragma and cache-control directives, unless Cache-Control: no-cache is purposefully omitted to target other request directives at HTTP\/1.1 or greater caches. For example: will constrain HTTP\/1.1 and greater caches to serve a response no older than 30 seconds, while precluding implementations that do not understand from serving a cached response. <\/del> However, support for Cache-Control is now widespread. As a result, this specification deprecates Pragma. <\/ins> 5.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d7e891c21c65e8c5eba12665e4c724aecd8608b4e776473174050c69fafd92e4","title":"","text":"by a secondary key for the values of the original request's selecting header fields (caching.negotiated.responses). A cache is when it cannot contact the origin server or otherwise find a forward path for a given request. A disconnected cache can serve stale responses in some circumstances (serving.stale.responses). <\/ins> 3. A cache MUST NOT store a response to any request, unless:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-64be8be21144877fc4dc8fb4b29780923da58ff14b0dab1af90febc0ca101652","title":"","text":"applicable \"s-maxage\" or \"proxy-revalidate\" cache-response-directive; see cache-response-directive). A cache MUST NOT send stale responses unless it is disconnected (i.e., it cannot contact the origin server or otherwise find a forward path) or doing so is explicitly allowed (e.g., by the max- stale request directive; see cache-request-directive). <\/del> A cache MUST NOT send stale responses unless it is disconnected or doing so is explicitly allowed (e.g., by the max-stale request directive; see cache-request-directive). <\/ins> 4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9fe41cee819d076882f5cf8016a1c963268665b038cf457d37862de5d0691d1a","title":"","text":"The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features. In all circumstances a cache MUST obey the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a cache cannot reach the origin server for any reason, it MUST generate a <\/del> cache is disconnected, it MUST generate a <\/ins> response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-70bed213e78885ba9d3910b7dcfaff9bd2a8598bd64f5bc1ff2ef7678a6eed7f","title":"","text":"12.1. Please update the \"Message Headers\" registry of \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" at with the header field names listed in the two tables of <\/del> Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Header Field Registry\" registry at with the header field names listed in the two tables of <\/ins> header.fields. 12.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7723548dc7bd7f19a0778a5d7fc19f58700c5fecf5cadcbbaabcdc00d971718d","title":"","text":"4.1.1. HTTP header fields are registered within the \"Message Headers\" registry located at , as defined by BCP90, with the protocol \"http\". <\/del> The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Header Field Registry\" defines the namespace for HTTP header field names Any party can request registration of a HTTP header field. See considerations.for.new.header.fields for considerations to take into account when creating a new HTTP header field. The \"HTTP Header Field Name\" registry is located at \"https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-headers\/\". Registration requests can be made by following the instructions located there or by sending an email to the \"ietf-http-wg@ietf.org\" mailing list. Header field names are registered on the advice of a Designated Expert (appointed by the IESG or their delegate). Header fields with the status 'permanent' are Specification Required (using terminology from RFC8126). Registration requests consist of at least the following information: The Expert(s) can define additional fields to be collected in the registry, in consultation with the community. Standards-defined names have a status of \"permanent\". Other names can also be registered as permanent, if the Expert(s) find that they are in use, in consultation with the community. Other names should be registered as \"provisional\". Provisional entries can be removed by the Expert(s) if -- in consultation with the community -- the Expert(s) find that they are not in use. The Experts can change a provisional entry's status to permanent at any time. Note that names can be registered by third parties (including the Expert(s)), if the Expert(s) determines that an unregistered name is widely deployed and not likely to be registered in a timely manner otherwise. <\/ins> 4.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b7bbe48d9955c53ad5b708c5feaf8cb579bf0791e431525b3c050eeb446d5312","title":"","text":"requiring prior update of deployed intermediaries. All defined header fields ought to be registered with IANA in the \"Message Headers\" registry. <\/del> \"HTTP Header Field Name\" registry. <\/ins> 4.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-508d19da1fd28322f200c85d73a4a3ea48716d49e783e3876354a4efd1d52b18","title":"","text":"13.4. Please update the \"Message Headers\" registry of \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" at with the header field names listed in the table of field.names. <\/del> Please create a new registry as outlined in field.name.registry. After creating the registry, all entries in the Permanent and Provisional Message Header Registries with the protocol 'http' are to be moved to it, with the following changes applied: Please annotate the Permanent and Provisional Message Header registries to indicate that HTTP header field registrations have moved, with an appropriate link. After that is complete, please update the registry with the header field names listed in the table of field.names. <\/ins> 13.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8ad339737a5a8976384b815e7d07d9fadd09f69b3f1e346041ab60c52d632e1b","title":"","text":"8.1. Please update the \"Message Headers\" registry of \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" at with the header field names listed in the table of <\/del> Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Header Field Registry\" registry at with the header field names listed in the two tables of <\/ins> header.field.definitions. 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-954bc758475fb3d116b37671bad0503c5f3e3d14b7d1546f75de1670781d565b","title":"","text":") response. If an HTTP\/1.1 client receives data on a connection that doesn't have any outstanding requests, it MUST NOT consider them to be a response to a not-yet-issued request; it SHOULD close the connection, since message delimitation is now ambiguous, unless the data consists only of one or more CRLF (which can be discarded, as per message.parsing). <\/ins> 9.4. HTTP\/1.1 defaults to the use of \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5f7313cf443178b1df069a0c7fbf168aee9dbd140c28d933ffc515160ff084a2","title":"","text":"1.2. This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 with a list extension, defined in abnf.extension, that allows for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a '#' operator (similar to how the '*' operator indicates repetition). <\/del> notation of RFC5234, extended with the notation for case-sensitivity in strings defined in RFC7405. It also uses a list extension, defined in abnf.extension, that allows for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a '#' operator (similar to how the '*' operator indicates repetition). <\/ins> collected.abnf shows the collected grammar with all list operators expanded to standard ABNF notation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4efee4ef617d6bff310ea3359fcf8d073229538198db7bb3552a0a683bf161bf","title":"","text":"representations of error or processing status, and potentially even the miscellaneous text strings that might appear within the protocol. For each of these header fields, a request that does not contain it implies that the user agent has no preference on that axis of negotiation. If the header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response can be considered acceptable according to it, the origin server can either honor the header field by sending a response or disregard the header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation for that request header field. This does not imply, however, that the client will be able to use the representation. Sending these header fields makes it easier for a server to identify an individual by virtue of the user agent's request characteristics (fingerprinting). Each of these header fields defines a wildcard value (often, \"*\") to select unspecified values. If no wildcard is present, all values not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered \"not acceptable\" to the client. In practice, using wildcards in content negotiation has limited practical value, because it is seldom useful to say, for example, \"I prefer image\/* more or less than (some other specific value)\". Clients can explicitly request a response if a more preferred format is not available by sending Accept: *\/*;q=0, but they still need to be able to handle a different response, since the server is allowed to ignore their preference. <\/ins> 8.4.1. Many of the request header fields for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8d7400a48a082890a1ed52d980124b2f1a8314304aec33d0ab8f2ee88b7423e7","title":"","text":"8.4.2. The \"Accept\" header field can be used by user agents to specify response media types that are acceptable. Accept header fields can be used to indicate that the request is specifically limited to a small set of desired types, as in the case of a request for an in- line image. <\/del> The \"Accept\" header field can be used by user agents to specify their preferences regarding response media types. For example, Accept header fields can be used to indicate that the request is specifically limited to a small set of desired types, as in the case of a request for an in-line image. <\/ins> The asterisk \"*\" character is used to group media types into ranges, with \"*\/*\" indicating all media types and \"type\/*\" indicating all"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-aac559bf8ae024b874f3e07676251fe3c4fe8f144f3896e3a019e35c6d6b98de","title":"","text":"is interpreted as \"I prefer audio\/basic, but send me any audio type if it is the best available after an 80% markdown in quality\". A request without any Accept header field implies that the user agent will accept any media type in response. If the header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a media type that is listed as acceptable, the origin server can either honor the header field by sending a response or disregard the header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation. <\/del> A more elaborate example is Verbally, this would be interpreted as \"text\/html and text\/x-c are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-16a027a56ba5f14b96881526be47a76ed7fb7a57a35f7603847ec68de3736577","title":"","text":"8.4.3. The \"Accept-Charset\" header field can be sent by a user agent to indicate what charsets are acceptable in textual response content. This field allows user agents capable of understanding more comprehensive or special-purpose charsets to signal that capability to an origin server that is capable of representing information in those charsets. <\/del> indicate its preferences for charsets in textual response content. For example, this field allows user agents capable of understanding more comprehensive or special-purpose charsets to signal that capability to an origin server that is capable of representing information in those charsets. <\/ins> Charset names are defined in charset. A user agent MAY associate a quality value with each charset to indicate the user's relative"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d747d7c0b6ed59289abe884a13744c34ad430021b50204ac323b25df134c6aab","title":"","text":"The special value \"*\", if present in the Accept-Charset field, matches every charset that is not mentioned elsewhere in the Accept- Charset field. If no \"*\" is present in an Accept-Charset field, then any charsets not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered \"not acceptable\" to the client. A request without any Accept-Charset header field implies that the user agent will accept any charset in response. Most general-purpose user agents do not send Accept-Charset, unless specifically configured to do so, because a detailed list of supported charsets makes it easier for a server to identify an individual by virtue of the user agent's request characteristics (fingerprinting). If an Accept-Charset header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response has a charset that is listed as acceptable, the origin server can either honor the header field, by sending a response, or disregard the header field by treating the resource as if it is not subject to content negotiation. <\/del> Charset field. <\/ins> 8.4.4. The \"Accept-Encoding\" header field can be used by user agents to indicate what response content-codings (content.codings) are acceptable in the response. An \"identity\" token is used as a synonym for \"no encoding\" in order to communicate when no encoding is preferred. <\/del> indicate their preferences regarding response content-codings (content.codings). An \"identity\" token is used as a synonym for \"no encoding\" in order to communicate when no encoding is preferred. <\/ins> Each codings value MAY be given an associated quality value representing the preference for that encoding, as defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0d6bf72c46ea1a7ad280b2b103a7cb95189e5f4929bd5e5312e278e29c63887a","title":"","text":"For example, A request without an Accept-Encoding header field implies that the user agent has no preferences regarding content-codings. Although this allows the server to use any content-coding in a response, it does not imply that the user agent will be able to correctly process all encodings. <\/del> A server tests whether a content-coding for a given representation is acceptable using these rules:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5a027358110d12d970b7e4dd9ea6013e3cc42c1bcc51f86f641d1b830dc8476e","title":"","text":"would mean: \"I prefer Danish, but will accept British English and other types of English\". A request without any Accept-Language header field implies that the user agent will accept any language in response. If the header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a matching language tag, the origin server can either disregard the header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation or honor the header field by sending a response. However, the latter is not encouraged, as doing so can prevent users from accessing content that they might be able to use (with translation software, for example). <\/del> Note that some recipients treat the order in which language tags are listed as an indication of descending priority, particularly for tags that are assigned equal quality values (no value is the same as q=1)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6d17fc15ced82d22c5587056bdb12905dea6f80f7d4c6e9e290bd536759d783e","title":"","text":"A recipient MUST be able to parse and decode the chunked transfer coding. The chunked encoding does not define any parameters. Their presence SHOULD be treated as an error. <\/ins> 7.1.1. The chunked encoding allows each chunk to include zero or more chunk"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a2e2b7b3fe4677671661e813f18b72d31ccd09c08d7658c0c1097f38574fd386","title":"","text":"The following transfer coding names for compression are defined by the same algorithm as their corresponding content coding: The compression codings do not define any parameters. Their presence SHOULD be treated as an error. <\/ins> 7.3. The \"HTTP Transfer Coding Registry\" defines the namespace for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9dd5ab8d50aac9ecf6165edfca6459059d5528832e41987f87ac626a145a9b73","title":"","text":"sending a payload body on a DELETE request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request. Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a DELETE request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for the effective request URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see invalidation). <\/del> Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a successful DELETE request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for the effective request URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see invalidation). <\/ins> 7.3.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-90f3b4bda77d6b815814fe8bafd364ec3e02acac207d44a1ec09dc2101fde6ff","title":"","text":"registries to indicate that HTTP header field registrations have moved, with an appropriate link. After that is complete, please update the registry with the header field names listed in the table of field.names. <\/del> After that is complete, please update the new registry with the header field names listed in the table of field.names. Finally, please update the \"Content-MD5\" entry in the new registry to have a status of 'obsoleted' with references to RFC2616 (for the definition of the header field) and RFC7231 (which removed the field definition from the updated specification). <\/ins> 13.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1f5a302b245f6bb3815fec28063f16ae31c6f17ef2881f8f2c4371480fbcb56f","title":"","text":"Content-Language header field Content-Length header field Content-Location header field Content-MD5 header field <\/ins> Content-Range header field Content-Type header field cache"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-721128732e0bfaa4a2f6bb05a0ba88737894ccbd778f5beb88e036e25a899eed","title":"","text":"A client that generates an OPTIONS request containing a payload body MUST send a valid header field describing the representation media type. Although this specification does not define any use for such a payload, future extensions to HTTP might use the OPTIONS body to make more detailed queries about the target resource. <\/del> header field describing the representation media type. Note that this specification does not define any use for such a payload. <\/ins> Responses to the OPTIONS method are not cacheable."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2aa1a5aa76d05474de506e3fb2702a7254ff8b65fcf48562f9d8c62c95c7c2ad","title":"","text":"and for n >= 1 and m > 1: For compatibility with legacy list rules, a recipient MUST parse and ignore a reasonable number of empty list elements: enough to handle common mistakes by senders that merge values, but not so much that they could be used as a denial-of-service mechanism. In other words, a recipient MUST accept lists that satisfy the following syntax: <\/del> Empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present. A recipient MUST parse and ignore a reasonable number of empty list elements: enough to handle common mistakes by senders that merge values, but not so much that they could be used as a denial-of- service mechanism. In other words, a recipient MUST accept lists that satisfy the following syntax: Note that because of the potential presence of empty list elements, the RFC 5234 ABNF cannot enforce the cardinality of list elements, and consequently all cases are mapped is if there was no cardinality specified. <\/ins> Empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present. <\/del> For example, given these ABNF productions: Then the following are valid values for example-list (not including"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f1a1a3b7a7bb8f6244f472fbf8b298a69e6c45e3811d2c90c051fae21e99be06","title":"","text":"source code and issues list for this draft can be found at . The changes in this draft are summarized in changes.since.04. <\/del> The changes in this draft are summarized in changes.since.05. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8831d6f193aa3815f182ca81acd42ff7ade0d00c50f4ab76724acfed08332d24","title":"","text":"3.1. A response message is considered complete when all of the octets indicated by the message framing (Messaging) are received prior to the connection being closed. If the request method is GET, the response status code is <\/del> indicated by its framing are available. Note that this includes a message that is ended by the connection's close (see Messaging). Although caches are encouraged to consider such a response incomplete when the connection termination was irregular, that is not always possible to detect; therefore, servers wishing to avoid caching of partial responses due to connection termination will need to use explicit framing. If the request method is GET, the response status code is <\/ins> , and the entire response header section has been received, a cache MAY store an incomplete response message body if the cache entry is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4bdbbc8048e4a6fe3d9183d2c6a148f46ff62fdd6cb9d9be404813acbc77ac14","title":"","text":"finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, message.body). Some requests can be retried by clients in the event of failure; see idempotent.methods. <\/ins> A connection might be used for multiple request\/response exchanges. The mechanism used to correlate between request and response messages is version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-088df3bd767a2cb67a16159948e2a3d3be901f7e8bca50ff7ec821c13b8613be","title":"","text":". This \" \" is used to provide the data and metadata for evaluating conditional requests preconditions and constructing the payload for <\/del> requests (preconditions) and constructing the payload for <\/ins> and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9cd186bceea4fc53f3a1ad56ed4a8bdf6a063d21ee2501e8d4d3015148cf8284","title":"","text":"the request will have the same intended effect, even if the original request succeeded, though the response might differ. A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a request with a non- idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the request semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some means to detect that the original request was never applied. For example, a user agent that knows (through design or configuration) that a POST request to a given resource is safe can repeat that request automatically. Likewise, a user agent designed specifically to operate on a version control repository might be able to recover from partial failure conditions by checking the target resource revision(s) after a failed connection, reverting or fixing any changes that were partially applied, and then automatically retrying the requests that failed. Some clients use weaker signals to initiate automatic retries. For example, when a POST request is sent, but the underlying transport connection is closed before any part of the response is received. Although this is commonly implemented, it is not recommended. Proxies MUST NOT automatically retry non-idempotent requests. Clients SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry. <\/ins> 7.2.3. Request methods can be defined as \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3567636288edd2b3985b14203494ff406f6b2e022ae318ef8155af793475f658","title":"","text":"9.5.20. The 422 (Unprocessable Entity) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request entity (hence a <\/del> The 422 (Unprocessable Payload) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request payload (hence a <\/ins> status code is inappropriate), and the syntax of the request entity is correct but was unable to process the contained instructions. For example, this error condition may occur if an XML request body <\/del> status code is inappropriate), and the syntax of the request payload is correct, but was unable to process the contained instructions. For example, this status code can be sent if an XML request payload <\/ins> contains well-formed (i.e., syntactically correct), but semantically erroneous, XML instructions. <\/del> erroneous XML instructions. <\/ins> 9.5.21."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7b48b0114a789607263a76da3b026fbc96252ca6f54d73307236ba4902d0681b","title":"","text":"416 Range Not Satisfiable (status code) 417 Expectation Failed (status code) 418 (Unused) (status code) 422 Unprocessable Entity (status code) <\/del> 422 Unprocessable Payload (status code) <\/ins> 426 Upgrade Required (status code) 4xx Client Error (status code class)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-cc23945c5af29e603466bc14874619a52e6cacdeb7b4cdd01a57c2611f084e37","title":"","text":"the request will have the same intended effect, even if the original request succeeded, though the response might differ. A user agent MUST NOT automatically retry a request with a non- idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the request semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some means to detect that the original request was never applied. For example, a user agent that knows (through design or configuration) that a POST request to a given resource is safe can repeat that request automatically. Likewise, a user agent designed specifically to operate on a version control repository might be able to recover from partial failure conditions by checking the target resource revision(s) after a failed connection, reverting or fixing any changes that were partially applied, and then automatically retrying the requests that failed. A proxy MUST NOT automatically retry non-idempotent requests. A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry. <\/ins> 7.2.3. Request methods can be defined as \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-64162e51f0713808b298739cb3607dbc23c032f3de85fa0a0184ed3c34ac2c91","title":"","text":"7.2.3. Request methods can be defined as \" \" to indicate that responses to them are allowed to be stored for future reuse; for specific requirements see Caching. In general, safe methods that do not depend on a current or authoritative response are defined as cacheable; this specification defines GET, HEAD, and POST as cacheable, although the overwhelming majority of cache implementations only support GET and HEAD. <\/del> For a cache to store and use a response, the associated method needs to explicitly allow caching, and detail under what conditions a response can be used to satisfy subsequent requests; a method definition which does not do so cannot be cached. For additional requirements see Caching. This specification defines caching semantics for GET, HEAD, and POST, although the overwhelming majority of cache implementations only support GET and HEAD. <\/ins> 7.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4ab92ff8765eeb14aa0313b2da39fe3e440f3f0f7f6e22d8aa5c5bbbc8f0a77d","title":"","text":"The status code indicates that the server understood the request but refuses to authorize it. A server that wishes to make public why the <\/del> refuses to fulfill it. A server that wishes to make public why the <\/ins> request has been forbidden can describe that reason in the response payload (if any)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-940efb3b9da5341fc91bf1b8627775e155c29a07ef8d211f60b7661bbad9e5c4","title":"","text":"The response payload, if any, might also describe the communication options in a machine or human-readable representation. A standard format for such a representation is not defined by this specification, but might be defined by future extensions to HTTP. A server MUST generate a field with a value of \"0\" if no payload body is to be sent in the response. <\/del> specification, but might be defined by future extensions to HTTP. <\/ins> A client MAY send a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4ddbe7318324ec068fa9c4d6223be80dbbda1a183525ce4d12e88f9dde4e51e1","title":"","text":"explicit expiration time is present in the stored response. Because of the requirements in response.cacheability, this means that, effectively, heuristics can only be used on responses without explicit freshness whose status codes are defined as cacheable by default (see overview.of.status.codes), and those responses without <\/del> explicit freshness whose status codes are defined as \" \" (e.g., see overview.of.status.codes), and those responses without <\/ins> explicit freshness that have been marked as explicitly cacheable (e.g., with a \"public\" response directive). Note that in previous specifications heuristically cacheable response status codes were called \"cacheable by default.\" <\/ins> If the response has a header field (header.last-modified), caches are encouraged to use a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3281a74ad368a8657d94d58ab19dd7ac2fa3e16047466aec1c8d8de24e4227b5","title":"","text":", and response.cacheability for details of how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as cacheable by default; see <\/del> codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see <\/ins> heuristic.freshness.) 5.2.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3ea9ee73d8d70bc4b71c8398d1ee461e058c7c5a1e87d94ec6f9421fa1b5a73e","title":"","text":"network. Therefore, cache contents need to be protected as sensitive information. In particular, various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache; such \"cache poisoning\" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit <\/del> 7.1. Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit <\/ins> differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see message.body.length for the relevant requirements. <\/del> message.body.length for the relevant requirements regarding HTTP\/1.1. 7.2. Because one of the primary uses of a cache is to optimise performance, its use can \"leak\" information about what resources have been previously requested. For example, if a user visits a site and their browser caches some of its responses, and then navigates to a second site, that site can attempt to load responses that it knows exists on the first site. If they load very quickly, it can be assumed that the user has visited that site, or even a specific page on it. Such \"timing attacks\" can be mitigated by adding more information to the cache key, such as the identity of the referring site (to prevent the attack described above). This is sometimes called \"double keying.\" <\/ins> Likewise, implementation flaws (as well as misunderstanding of cache operation) might lead to caching of sensitive information (e.g., authentication credentials) that is thought to be private, exposing it to unauthorized parties. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> Furthermore, the very use of a cache can bring about privacy concerns. For example, if two users share a cache, and the first one browses to a site, the second may be able to detect that the other has been to that site, because the resources from it load more quickly, thanks to the cache. <\/del> Implementation and deployment flaws (as well as misunderstanding of cache operation) might lead to caching of sensitive information (e.g., authentication credentials) that is thought to be private, exposing it to unauthorized parties. <\/ins> Note that the Set-Cookie response header field RFC6265 does not inhibit caching; a cacheable response with a Set-Cookie header field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a79028361d94f215152bbfd2575fd1a46ebdc187ba7517c652e64e88a6ad534e","title":"","text":"H heuristic expiration time heuristically cacheable <\/ins> M max-age (cache directive)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-27f7147b7997aecfa0ce4a7410e5a0e0936ee042139769c8e55c171f8dae5668","title":"","text":"2.1. All HTTP\/1.1 messages consist of a start-line followed by a CRLF and a sequence of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format RFC5322: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as the \"headers\" or the \"header section\"), an empty line indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body. An HTTP message can be either a request from client to server or a response from server to client. Syntactically, the two types of message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining the length of the message body (message.body). <\/del> An HTTP\/1.1 message consists of a start-line followed by a CRLF and a sequence of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format RFC5322: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as the \"headers\" or the \"header section\"), an empty line indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body. A message can be either a request from client to server or a response from server to client. Syntactically, the two types of message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining the length of the message body (message.body). <\/ins> In theory, a client could receive requests and a server could receive responses, distinguishing them by their different start-line formats."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-21b4e418e19399d459564286f68552c8c86a231223ae5b7bdbf65683fc7001e2","title":"","text":"2.2. HTTP uses a \".\" numbering scheme to indicate versions of the protocol. This specification defines version \"1.1\". protocol.version specifies the semantics of HTTP version numbers. The version of an HTTP\/1.x message is indicated by an HTTP-version field in the . HTTP-version is case-sensitive. When an HTTP\/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP\/1.0 recipient RFC1945 or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP\/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP\/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored. This specification places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP\/1.1. Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages. In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of messages. Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream recipients use the message sender's version to determine what features are safe to use for later communication with that sender. A server MAY send an HTTP\/1.0 response to an HTTP\/1.1 request if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor version of the protocol. Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or more of the request header fields (e.g., ) uniquely match the values sent by a client known to be in error. 2.3. <\/del> The normal procedure for parsing an HTTP message is to read the start-line into a structure, read each header field into a hash table by field name until the empty line, and then use the parsed data to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-38a64a1fc6947087b8f230b131cd73352b1f523705ab391d895b3cf193dc992d","title":"","text":"response. 2.3. HTTP uses a \".\" numbering scheme to indicate versions of the protocol. This specification defines version \"1.1\". protocol.version specifies the semantics of HTTP version numbers. The version of an HTTP\/1.x message is indicated by an HTTP-version field in the . HTTP-version is case-sensitive. When an HTTP\/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP\/1.0 recipient RFC1945 or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP\/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP\/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored. This specification places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP\/1.1. Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages. In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of messages. Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream recipients use the message sender's version to determine what features are safe to use for later communication with that sender. A server MAY send an HTTP\/1.0 response to an HTTP\/1.1 request if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor version of the protocol. Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or more of the request header fields (e.g., ) uniquely match the values sent by a client known to be in error. <\/ins> 3. A request-line begins with a method token, followed by a single space"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-911a6059d1d88fa9f3733d97ce9792b77c4e4c503dd9238c9b4dcf8ffbe1b870","title":"","text":"Connections can be closed at any time, with or without intention. Implementations ought to anticipate the need to recover from asynchronous close events. When an inbound connection is closed prematurely, a client MAY open a new connection and automatically retransmit an aborted sequence of requests if all of those requests have idempotent methods (idempotent.methods). <\/del> asynchronous close events. The conditions under which a client can automatically retry a sequence of outstanding requests are defined in idempotent.methods. <\/ins> 9.4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f4fc550b39438fa6505b903d1e3437245d7347324d898cc2cc25672959b464e7","title":"","text":"2.5.1. The \"http\" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for TCP (RFC0793) connections on a given port. <\/del> The \"http\" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers within the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for TCP (RFC0793) connections on a given port. <\/ins> The origin server for an \"http\" URI is identified by the component, which includes a host identifier and optional TCP port (RFC3986). The hierarchical path component and optional query component serve as an identifier for a potential target resource within that origin server's name space. <\/del> component, which includes a host identifier and optional port number (RFC3986). If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 80 (the reserved port for WWW services) is the default. The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify the target resource within that origin server's name space. <\/ins> A sender MUST NOT generate an \"http\" URI with an empty host identifier. A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST reject it as invalid. If the host identifier is provided as an IP address, the origin server is the listener (if any) on the indicated TCP port at that IP address. If host is a registered name, the registered name is an indirect identifier for use with a name resolution service, such as DNS, to find an address for that origin server. If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 80 (the reserved port for WWW services) is the default. Note that the presence of a URI with a given authority component does not imply that there is always an HTTP server listening for connections on that host and port. Anyone can mint a URI. What the authority component determines is who has the right to respond authoritatively to requests that target the identified resource. The delegated nature of registered names and IP addresses creates a federated namespace, based on control over the indicated host and port, whether or not an HTTP server is present. See establishing.authority for security considerations related to establishing authority. <\/del> When an \"http\" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message (http.message) containing the URI's identifying data to the server. If the server responds to that request with a non-interim HTTP <\/del> host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message to the server containing the URI's identifying data (http.message). If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP <\/ins> response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is considered an authoritative answer to the client's request. Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the \"http\" scheme is specific to TCP-based services because the name delegation process depends on TCP for establishing authority. An HTTP service based on some other underlying connection protocol would presumably be identified using a different URI scheme, just as the \"https\" scheme (below) is used for resources that require an end-to-end secured connection. Other protocols might also be used to provide access to \"http\" identified resources -- it is only the authoritative interface that is specific to TCP. The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its \"@\" delimiter) when an \"http\" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an \"http\" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the authority for the sake of phishing attacks. <\/del> Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative response is always necessary (see Caching). The \"http\" scheme merely uses this relationship as its reference point for establishing and verifying authority, as defined in http.origin. <\/ins> 2.5.2. The \"https\" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening to a given TCP port for TLS-secured connections (RFC8446). All of the requirements listed above for the \"http\" scheme are also requirements for the \"https\" scheme, except that TCP port 443 is the default if the port subcomponent is empty or not given, and the user agent MUST ensure that its connection to the origin server is secured through the use of strong encryption, end-to-end, prior to sending the first HTTP request. Note that the \"https\" URI scheme depends on both TLS and TCP for establishing authority. Resources made available via the \"https\" scheme have no shared identity with the \"http\" scheme even if their resource identifiers indicate the same authority (the same host listening to the same TCP port). They are distinct namespaces and are considered to be distinct origin servers. However, an extension to HTTP that is defined to apply to entire host domains, such as the Cookie protocol RFC6265, can allow information set by one service to impact communication with other services within a matching group of host domains. 2.5.2.1. Conceptually, HTTP\/TLS is very simple. Simply use HTTP over TLS precisely as you would use HTTP over TCP. <\/del> The \"https\" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers within the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential origin server listening for TCP connections on a given port and capable of establishing a TLS (RFC8446) connection on behalf of the identified authority that has been secured for HTTP communication. By \"secured\" in this section, we specifically mean that the server has been authenticated as as acting on behalf of the identified authority and all HTTP communication is encrypted for confidentiality and integrity protection. <\/ins> The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished. The client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data MUST be sent as TLS \"application data\". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections should be followed. 2.5.2.2. In general, HTTP\/TLS requests are generated by dereferencing a URI. As a consequence, the hostname for the server is known to the client. If the hostname is available, the client MUST check it against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. If the client has external information as to the expected identity of the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. (For instance, a client may be connecting to a machine whose address and hostname are dynamic but the client knows the certificate that the server will present.) In such cases, it is important to narrow the scope of acceptable certificates as much as possible in order to prevent man in the middle attacks. In special cases, it may be appropriate for the client to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this leaves the connection open to active attack. If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead. <\/del> The origin server for an \"https\" URI is identified by the <\/ins> Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by RFC5280. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com. <\/del> component, which includes a host identifier and optional port number (RFC3986). If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 443 (the reserved port for HTTP over TLS) is the default. <\/ins> In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI. <\/del> The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify the target resource within that origin server's name space. <\/ins> If the hostname does not match the identity in the certificate, user oriented clients MUST either notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate error. Automated clients MUST log the error to an appropriate audit log (if available) and SHOULD terminate the connection (with a bad certificate error). Automated clients MAY provide a configuration setting that disables this check, but MUST provide a setting which enables it. <\/del> A sender MUST NOT generate an \"https\" URI with an empty host identifier. A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST reject it as invalid. <\/ins> Note that in many cases the URI itself comes from an untrusted source. The above-described check provides no protection against attacks where this source is compromised. For example, if the URI was obtained by clicking on an HTML page which was itself obtained without using HTTP\/TLS, a man in the middle could have replaced the URI. In order to prevent this form of attack, users should carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets their expectations. <\/del> A client MUST ensure that its HTTP requests for an \"https\" resource are secured, prior to being communicated, and that it only accepts secured responses to those requests. <\/ins> 2.5.2.3. <\/del> When an \"https\" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, securing the connection end-to- end by successfully initiating TLS over TCP with confidentiality and integrity protection, and sending an HTTP request message to the server over that secured connection containing the URI's identifying data (http.message). If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is considered an authoritative answer to the client's request. <\/ins> Typically, the server has no external knowledge of what the client's identity ought to be and so checks (other than that the client has a certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA) are not possible. If a server has such knowledge (typically from some source external to HTTP or TLS) it SHOULD check the identity as described above. <\/del> Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative response is always necessary (see Caching). The \"https\" scheme merely uses this relationship as its reference point for establishing and verifying authority, as defined in http.origin. <\/ins> 2.5.3. Fragment identifiers allow for indirect identification of a secondary resource, independent of the URI scheme, as defined in RFC3986. Some protocol elements that refer to a URI allow inclusion of a fragment, while others do not. They are distinguished by use of the ABNF rule for elements where fragment is allowed; otherwise, a specific rule that excludes fragments is used (see target.resource). 2.5.4. <\/del> Since the \"http\" and \"https\" schemes conform to the URI generic syntax, such URIs are normalized and compared according to the algorithm defined in RFC3986, using the defaults described above for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a9b19080dff22b5ad161aaf302fc2d5b67a79197586f3b1f4ef9c513e57f8893","title":"","text":"For example, the following three URIs are equivalent: 2.5.4. The origin for a given URI is the triple of scheme, host, and port after normalizing the scheme and host to lowercase and normalizing the port to remove any leading zeros. If port is elided from the URI, the default port for that scheme is used. For example, the URI would have the origin which can also be described as the normalized URI prefix with port always present: The notion of an origin for any given URI is central to the semantics of HTTP. Each origin defines its own namespace and controls how identifiers within that namespace are mapped to resources. In turn, how the origin responds to valid requests, consistently over time, determines the semantics that users will associate with a URI, and the usefulness of those semantics is what ultimately transforms these mechanisms into a \"resource\" for users to reference and access in the future. The general term \"authority\" is also used as an abstract reference to whatever entity controls a given resource. A single authority might control only parts of an origin, an entire origin, or many different origins. Two origins are distinct if they differ in scheme, host, or port. Even when it can be verified that the same authority controls two origins that might differ only by scheme name, the two namespaces under those origins are distinct unless explicitly aliased by that authority. Note that the presence of a URI does not imply that there is always an HTTP server at the identified origin listening for connections on the identified host and port. Anyone can mint a URI. What the origin determines is who has the right to respond authoritatively to requests that target the identified resource. The delegated nature of registered names and IP addresses creates a federated namespace whether or not an HTTP server is present. Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the \"http\" scheme is specific to associating authority with whomever controls the origin server listening for TCP connections on the indicated port of whatever host is identified within the authority component. This is a very weak sense of authority because it depends on both client- specific name resolution mechanisms and communication that might not be secured from man-in-the-middle attacks. Nevertheless, it is a sufficient minimum for binding \"http\" identifiers to an origin server for consistent resolution within a trusted environment. If the host identifier is provided as an IP address, the origin server is the listener (if any) on the indicated TCP port at that IP address. If host is a registered name, the registered name is an indirect identifier for use with a name resolution service, such as DNS, to find an address for an appropriate origin server. Access to \"http\" services is not limited to the authority mechanism. For example, the Alt-Svc header field RFC7838 allows an origin server to explicitly alias its own namespace to an alternative service at a different origin. Access to \"http\" identified resources might also be provided by other protocols outside the scope of this document. The \"https\" scheme, in contrast, associates authority based on the ability of a server to use the private key associated with a certificate that the client considers to be trustworthy for the identified host. If a server presents a certificate that verifiably applies to the host, along with proof that it controls the private key, then a client will accept a secured connection to that server as being authoritative for all origins with the same host. However, each origin remains distinct (from origins with a different scheme or port) unless explicitly aliased by an origin server verified to be under the same authority. What the client is relying on for \"https\" authority is that there exists some chain of trust (possibly configured by exception) that verifies the certificate provided. Hence, the authority is defined only by the host, the port impacts which certificate is chosen (assuming that certificate matches the host identifier), and the client trusts that match according to the secure handshake and certificate validation described in https.initiation. Note that the \"https\" scheme does not rely on TCP and the port number for establishing authority, even though it provides for use of HTTP over TLS over TCP via that port as the default mechanism for obtaining a certificate that can be used for verifying authority and providing access to the origin's resources. The peers establishing a secure connection cannot trust transport parameters outside the secured channel, but the port number remains useful (beyond the default mechanism) as an identifier to distinguish different origin namespaces on the same host. The port identifier is therefore applicable even when the protocols being used for access do not include TCP. In HTTP\/1.1 and earlier, the only URIs for which the client will assign authority are those that contain a TLS server_name extension matching the origin's host. In HTTP\/2, the client will assign authority to all names that are present in the certificate. However, a client will only do that if it concludes that it could open a connection to the origin for that URL. In practice, a client will make a DNS query and see that it contains the same server IP address. A server sending the ORIGIN frame removes this restriction RFC8336. In addition to the client's verification, the origin server is responsible for verifying that that requests it receives over a connection correspond to resources for which it actually wants to be the origin. If a network attacker causes connections for port N to be received at port Q, checking the Host header field is necessary to ensure that the attacker can't cause \"https:\/\/example.com:N\/foo\" to be replaced by \"https:\/\/example.com:Q\/foo\" without consent. Likewise, a server might be unwilling to serve as the origin for some hosts even when they have the authority to do so. Resources made available via the \"https\" scheme have no shared identity with the \"http\" scheme. They are distinct origins with separate namespaces. However, an extension to HTTP that is defined to apply to all origins with the same host, such as the Cookie protocol RFC6265, can allow information set by one service to impact communication with other services within a matching group of host domains. See establishing.authority for security considerations related to establishing authority. 2.5.5. The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its \"@\" delimiter) when an \"http\" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an \"http\" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the authority for the sake of phishing attacks. 2.5.6. Fragment identifiers allow for indirect identification of a secondary resource, independent of the URI scheme, as defined in RFC3986. Some protocol elements that refer to a URI allow inclusion of a fragment, while others do not. They are distinguished by use of the ABNF rule for elements where fragment is allowed; otherwise, a specific rule that excludes fragments is used (see target.resource). <\/ins> 3. 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a9274e38dfc8f412a4c8de30e3e90825ba1aa892cb7b541953ccd1ecc923b00c","title":"","text":"5.3. Conceptually, HTTP\/TLS is very simple. Simply use HTTP over TLS precisely as you would use HTTP over TCP. The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished. The client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data MUST be sent as TLS \"application data\". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections should be followed. 5.3.1. In general, HTTP\/TLS requests are generated by dereferencing a URI. As a consequence, the hostname for the server is known to the client. If the hostname is available, the client MUST check it against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. If the client has external information as to the expected identity of the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. (For instance, a client may be connecting to a machine whose address and hostname are dynamic but the client knows the certificate that the server will present.) In such cases, it is important to narrow the scope of acceptable certificates as much as possible in order to prevent man in the middle attacks. In special cases, it may be appropriate for the client to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this leaves the connection open to active attack. If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead. Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by RFC5280. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com. In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI. If the hostname does not match the identity in the certificate, user oriented clients MUST either notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate error. Automated clients MUST log the error to an appropriate audit log (if available) and SHOULD terminate the connection (with a bad certificate error). Automated clients MAY provide a configuration setting that disables this check, but MUST provide a setting which enables it. Note that in many cases the URI itself comes from an untrusted source. The above-described check provides no protection against attacks where this source is compromised. For example, if the URI was obtained by clicking on an HTML page which was itself obtained without using HTTP\/TLS, a man in the middle could have replaced the URI. In order to prevent this form of attack, users should carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets their expectations. 5.3.2. Typically, the server has no external knowledge of what the client's identity ought to be and so checks (other than that the client has a certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA) are not possible. If a server has such knowledge (typically from some source external to HTTP or TLS) it SHOULD check the identity as described above. 5.4. <\/ins> Once an inbound connection is obtained, the client sends an HTTP request message (http.message)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9ac1b43a8f32014b6cd3fac9657dd9ef232f8a7a99ca4ab905a0130e04b8baba","title":"","text":"non-public content, or poison a cache. See security.considerations for security considerations regarding message routing. 5.4. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> The \"Host\" header field in a request provides the host and port information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-335285e70021f1da971bd66b99d4e776dd34d92aba0754b9acb4a8de7d1a4b1e","title":"","text":"field and to any request message that contains more than one Host header field or a Host header field with an invalid field-value. 5.5. <\/del> 5.6. <\/ins> As described in intermediaries, intermediaries can serve a variety of roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses. Some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f1e34625bd37a968270b616eedce193a8aed743e4bf467bab8c7e52d3004fd8a","title":"","text":"will buffer or delay message forwarding for the sake of network efficiency, security checks, or payload transformations. 5.5.1. <\/del> 5.6.1. <\/ins> The \"Via\" header field indicates the presence of intermediate protocols and recipients between the user agent and the server (on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a427f9b97299d9f2a2fc8f3d490e4ecbc14ad7e2627df7237707c50e4b5cced0","title":"","text":"replaced by pseudonyms. A sender MUST NOT combine entries that have different received-protocol values. 5.5.2. <\/del> 5.6.2. <\/ins> Some intermediaries include features for transforming messages and their payloads. A proxy might, for example, convert between image"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bbd6a4305dba53715a2a3e93802b4d4ba08aaa05c210e229e2ca8ccedd0a6a92","title":"","text":"header field. The s-maxage directive also implies the semantics of the proxy-revalidate response directive. The must-revalidate directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. <\/del> The s-maxage directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. <\/ins> This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax: e.g., 's-maxage=10' not 's-maxage=\"10\"'. A sender SHOULD NOT generate the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-fc0b3d35ed94b6645897b7526836c0b14b49218b3521159ec6c5fcd6357cff42","title":"","text":"2.5.4. The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its \"@\" delimiter) when an \"http\" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an \"http\" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the <\/del> The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a userinfo subcomponent (RFC3986) for including user authentication information in the URI. In that subcomponent, the use of the format \"user:password\" is deprecated. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its \"@\" delimiter) when an \"http\" or \"https\" URI reference is generated within a message as a request target or header field value. Before making use of an \"http\" or \"https\" URI reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being used to obscure the <\/ins> authority for the sake of phishing attacks. 2.5.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-41cd21609b8224b3e9e37e9d7a8bcd43cd02732f0cff2efbd231c162f0d04906","title":"","text":"5.2.2.6. The \"public\" response directive indicates that any cache MAY store the response, even if the response would normally be non-cacheable or cacheable only within a private cache. (See caching.authenticated.responses for additional details related to the use of public in response to a request containing <\/del> The \"public\" response directive overrides certain conditions that would otherwise make a cache unable to store the response. Specifically, see caching.authenticated.responses regarding the use of public in response to a request containing <\/ins> , and response.cacheability for details of how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see heuristic.freshness.) <\/del> , and response.cacheability for how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see heuristic.freshness. <\/ins> 5.2.2.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7dcf775b05f953bb5071b1fafef0378b603901bcde4b67970b4755a3498b1358","title":"","text":"The \"private\" response directive indicates that the response message is intended for a single user and MUST NOT be stored by a shared cache. A private cache MAY store the response and reuse it for later requests, even if the response would normally be non-cacheable. <\/del> cache. <\/ins> If the private response directive specifies one or more field names, this requirement is limited to the field values associated with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d9953df520e8b132c1a421663c2cd8a6508e07f552c72ce2dba191448d6c3201","title":"","text":"Desc\"; \"Description\" is too generic, and \"Foo-Description\" is needlessly long. While the field-name syntax is defined to allow any token character, in practice some implementations place limits on the characters they accept in field-names. To be interoperable, new field names SHOULD constrain themselves to alphanumeric characters, \"-\", \"_\", \".\" and \".\", and SHOULD begin with an alphanumeric character. <\/ins> Field names ought not be prefixed with \"X-\"; see BCP178 for further information."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5ee3788ef2fd9330d472c8c90a7efa19dafc4229c92e1c0505bc95829bcd9532","title":"","text":"trailing whitespace in values is significant will have to use a container syntax such as quoted-string (quoted.strings). Because commas (\",\") are used as a generic delimiter between field values, they need to be treated with care if they are allowed in the field value. Typically, components that might contain a comma are protected with double-quotes using the quoted-string ABNF production. <\/del> Because commas (\",\") are used as a generic delimiter between members of a list-based field value, they need to be treated with care if they are allowed as data within those members. Typically, list members that might contain a comma are enclosed in a quoted-string. <\/ins> For example, a textual date and a URI (either of which might contain a comma) could be safely carried in field values like these: <\/del> a comma) could be safely carried in list-based field values like these: <\/ins> Note that double-quote delimiters almost always are used with the quoted-string production; using a different syntax inside double-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5fddbaf987b254b46690ad5c763e2b3190877b95a9cfd50b6bda626403e3c436","title":"","text":"4.5. A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of RFC5234 is used to improve readability in the definitions of some header field values. <\/del> readability in the definitions of some list-based field values. <\/ins> A construct \"#\" is defined, similar to \"*\", for defining comma- delimited lists of elements. The full form is \"#element\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-61a62513c3376a0fbc8f7580915ac73607f2f36b21f481707cb3ec6a6f8db1ad","title":"","text":"identifying the protocol capabilities of senders along the request\/ response chain. Multiple Via field values represent each proxy or gateway that has forwarded the message. Each intermediary appends its own information about how the message was received, such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients. <\/del> Each member of the Via field value represents a proxy or gateway that has forwarded the message. Each intermediary appends its own information about how the message was received, such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients. <\/ins> A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field, as described below, in each message that it forwards. An HTTP-to-HTTP gateway"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-dd831e1afc37347568985ca56c82541e929049b2446045d825fca47302b55924","title":"","text":"protocol.version. For brevity, the protocol-name is omitted when the received protocol is HTTP. The received-by portion of the field value is normally the host and optional port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message. However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym. If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for the received-protocol. <\/del> The received-by portion is normally the host and optional port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message. However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym. If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for the received-protocol. <\/ins> A sender MAY generate comments in the Via header field to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the <\/del> A sender MAY generate comments to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the <\/ins> and header fields. However, all comments in the Via field are optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the message. <\/del> header fields. However, comments in Via are optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the message. <\/ins> For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP\/1.0 user agent to an internal proxy code-named \"fred\", which uses HTTP\/1.1 to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-fc91c104091ea1516dc35b18253b1232dc1ecb191f8c540e7c2bf077376b897a","title":"","text":"the firewall by an appropriate pseudonym for that host. An intermediary MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header field entries into a single such entry if the entries have identical <\/del> field list members into a single member if the entries have identical <\/ins> received-protocol values. For example, could be collapsed to A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple entries unless they are all <\/del> A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple list members unless they are all <\/ins> under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been replaced by pseudonyms. A sender MUST NOT combine entries that have <\/del> replaced by pseudonyms. A sender MUST NOT combine members that have <\/ins> different received-protocol values. 5.6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4f6f86738732a31ecdcc5ab90e901a18ee3928e28bc568621ee7edb03cf009fa","title":"","text":"the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate a Vary field with a \"*\" value. A Vary field value consisting of a comma-separated list of names indicates that the named request header fields, known as the selecting header fields, might have a role in selecting the representation. The potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. <\/del> A Vary field value consisting of a list of field names indicates that the named request header fields, known as the selecting header fields, might have a role in selecting the representation. The potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. <\/ins> For example, a response that contains"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-07883d336d811211533144f3fcbcccfcc83a1b5f508ae7df1d6ecb87561f2d16","title":"","text":"If a DELETE method is successfully applied, the origin server SHOULD send A payload within a DELETE request message has no defined semantics; sending a payload body on a DELETE request might cause some existing <\/del> A client SHOULD NOT generate a body in a DELETE request. A payload received in a DELETE request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some <\/ins> implementations to reject the request. Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a successful"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-de66737d95ddceaeb79f99fd8369df0dff0a45cd41f758c75ec023daf13e80b8","title":"","text":"A header field-value of \"*\" always fails to match. <\/del> header field value containing a member \"*\" always fails to match. <\/ins> The stored response with matching selecting header fields is known as the selected response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a52fc873de91582c32ff20ed06a27a3403a6b1e49daf2a137e68643bdfa117ef","title":"","text":"A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines with the same field name into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field line value in order, separated by a comma. The order in which field lines with the same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line values when forwarding a message. <\/del> line value in order, separated by a comma and optional whitespace. For consistency, use comma SP. The order in which field lines with the same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line values when forwarding a message. <\/ins> This means that, aside from the well-known exception noted below, a sender MUST NOT generate multiple field lines with the same name in a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8312c039f9e83bbedbff08dc03bff60b44d7c5f90e2f5d2e47888beb8c8c859b","title":"","text":"by the recipient. When defining new connection options, specification authors ought to survey existing field names and ensure that the new connection option does not share the same name as an already deployed field. Defining a new connection option essentially reserves that potential field name for carrying additional information related to the connection option, since it would be unwise for senders to use that field name for anything else. <\/del> document it as reserved field name and register that definition in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry (field.name.registry), to avoid collisions. <\/ins> The \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-54af14575dca86252ed4509ebb96fb4339e4ea794d80321d204d3015988ed961","title":"","text":"12.1. Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Registry\" registry at with the <\/del> Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" at with the <\/ins> field names listed in the two tables of header.field.syntax. 12.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5c9c7c7c1ab483a247ba05bdbfa8c29d09670f912cdee60617f30bd372eebc7e","title":"","text":"E effective request URI F Fields Connection TE Transfer-Encoding Upgrade <\/ins> G Grammar ALPHA"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7bc071d63e8a92e27d49e781a0b9029edb5440f3f8fc18962c16b4228896d502","title":"","text":"gzip (transfer coding) H Header Fields Connection TE Transfer-Encoding Upgrade <\/ins> header line header section headers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c9b03b6a7dec11f2594d78ec269509b1fc0aafa4caae8a9a8c160d0471f01446","title":"","text":"A shared cache MUST NOT use a cached response to a request with an header field (header.authorization) to satisfy any subsequent request unless a response directive that allows such responses to be stored is present. <\/del> unless the response contains a <\/ins> In this specification, the following <\/del> field with a response directive (cache-response-directive) that allows it to be stored by a shared cache and the cache conforms to the requirements of that directive for that response. <\/ins> response directives (cache-response-directive) have such an effect: must-revalidate, public, and s-maxage. <\/del> In this specification, the following response directives have such an effect: must-revalidate (cache-response-directive.must-revalidate), public (cache-response-directive.public), and s-maxage (cache- response-directive.s-maxage). <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-814b0f12ce013a17a8e24fcdb69d84d88988597401311283cdf5a2952f448da6","title":"","text":"5.2.2.1. The \"must-revalidate\" response directive indicates that once it has become stale, the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. <\/del> The \"must-revalidate\" response directive indicates that once the response has become stale, a cache MUST NOT reuse that response to satisfy another request until it has been successfully validated by the origin, as defined by validation.model. <\/ins> The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features. In all circumstances a cache MUST obey the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a cache is disconnected, it MUST generate a <\/del> cache is unable to validate a stale response containing must- revalidate, for any reason, the cache MUST generate a <\/ins> response. <\/del> response rather than reuse the stale response. <\/ins> The must-revalidate directive ought to be used by servers if and only if failure to validate a request on the representation could result in incorrect operation, such as a silently unexecuted financial transaction. The must-revalidate directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. <\/del> The must-revalidate directive also permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field, subject to the above requirement on revalidation (caching.authenticated.responses). <\/ins> 5.2.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c3bdd03199c1aeaad3183551abe43919f80e978338206558509e60edd8644ac1","title":"","text":"Argument syntax: The \"no-cache\" response directive indicates that the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. This allows an origin server to prevent a cache from using it to satisfy a request without contacting it, even by caches that have been configured to send stale responses. If the no-cache response directive specifies one or more field names, then a cache MAY use the response to satisfy a subsequent request, subject to any other restrictions on caching. However, any header fields in the response that have the field name(s) listed MUST NOT be sent in the response to a subsequent request without successful revalidation with the origin server. This allows an origin server to prevent the re-use of certain header fields in a response, while still allowing caching of the rest of the response. <\/del> The \"no-cache\" response directive, in its unqualified form (without an argument), indicates that the response MUST NOT be used to satisfy any other request without forwarding it for validation and receiving a successful response; see validation.model. This allows an origin server to prevent a cache from using the response to satisfy a request without contacting it, even by caches that have been configured to send stale responses. The qualified form of no-cache response directive, with an argument that lists one or more field names, indicates that a cache MAY use the response to satisfy a subsequent request, subject to any other restrictions on caching, if the listed header fields are excluded from the subsequent response or the subsequent response has been successfully revalidated with the origin server (updating or removing those fields). This allows an origin server to prevent the re-use of certain header fields in a response, while still allowing caching of the rest of the response. <\/ins> The field names given are not limited to the set of header fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-insensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bfbd9a2ef8f934bbad63dff8393de73670181d298b2739a7fe5bc3d16f5acf4a","title":"","text":"not to be needed for single-entry lists). Although it has been back-ported to many implementations, some HTTP\/1.0 caches will not recognize or obey this directive. Also, no- cache response directives with field names are often handled by caches as if an unqualified no-cache directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified form is not widely implemented. <\/del> HTTP\/1.0 caches will not recognize or obey this directive. Also, the qualified form of the directive is often handled by caches as if an unqualified no-cache directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified form is not widely implemented. <\/ins> 5.2.2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9f6f9a23a6e9c65ae5ac57c860bc91a1f9e5118431be43d38a5982a518525108","title":"","text":"5.2.2.6. The \"public\" response directive overrides certain conditions that would otherwise make a cache unable to store the response. Specifically, see caching.authenticated.responses regarding the use of public in response to a request containing <\/del> The \"public\" response directive indicates that a cache MAY store the response even if it would otherwise be prohibited, subject to the constraints of any other response directives present. In other words, public explicitly marks the response as cacheable. For example, public permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field (caching.authenticated.responses). <\/ins> , and response.cacheability for how public affects responses that would normally not be stored, due to their status codes not being defined as heuristically cacheable; see heuristic.freshness. <\/del> If no explicit freshness information is provided, the response is is heuristically cacheable (heuristic.freshness). <\/ins> 5.2.2.7. Argument syntax: The \"private\" response directive indicates that the response message is intended for a single user and MUST NOT be stored by a shared <\/del> The unqualified \"private\" response directive indicates that a shared cache MUST NOT store the response (i.e., the response is intended for a single user). It also indicates that a private cache MAY store the response, subject to any other cache directives present, even if the response would not otherwise be heuristically cacheable by a private <\/ins> cache. If the private response directive specifies one or more field names, this requirement is limited to the field values associated with the listed response header fields. That is, a shared cache MUST NOT store the specified field names(s), whereas it MAY store the remainder of the response message. <\/del> If a qualified private response directive is present, with an argument that lists one or more field names, then only the listed fields are limited to a single user: a shared cache MUST NOT store the listed fields if they are present in the original response, but MAY store the remainder of the response message without those fields. <\/ins> The field names given are not limited to the set of header fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-insensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2bef73f61e37522e761bbcebc5e68c9b7405f23eab7ef7d5d5cc589a005ff9df","title":"","text":"This usage of the word \"private\" only controls where the response can be stored; it cannot ensure the privacy of the message content. Also, private response directives with field names are often handled by caches as if an unqualified private directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified form is not widely implemented. <\/del> Also, the qualified form of the directive is often handled by caches as if an unqualified private directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified form is not widely implemented. <\/ins> 5.2.2.8. The \"proxy-revalidate\" response directive has the same meaning as the must-revalidate response directive, except that it does not apply to private caches. <\/del> The \"proxy-revalidate\" response directive indicates that once the response has become stale, a shared cache MUST NOT reuse that response to satisfy another request until it has been successfully validated by the origin, as defined by validation.model. This is analogous to must-revalidate (cache-response-directive.must- revalidate), except that proxy-revalidate does not apply to private caches. Note that \"proxy-revalidate\" on its own does not imply that a response is cacheable. For example, it might be combined with the public directive (cache-response-directive.public), allowing the response to be cached while requiring only a shared cache to revalidate when stale. <\/ins> 5.2.2.9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-970413b926585733229e0be0e9d4e9231e56476b03981445683b5e439e8a5168","title":"","text":"Argument syntax: The \"s-maxage\" response directive indicates that, in shared caches, <\/del> The \"s-maxage\" response directive indicates that, for a shared cache, <\/ins> the maximum age specified by this directive overrides the maximum age specified by either the max-age directive or the header field. The s-maxage directive also implies the semantics of the proxy-revalidate response directive. <\/del> header field. <\/ins> The s-maxage directive also has the effect of allowing a stored response to be used to satisfy a request with an Authorization header field; see caching.authenticated.responses. <\/del> The s-maxage directive incorporates the proxy-revalidate (cache- response-directive.proxy-revalidate) response directive's semantics for a shared cache. A shared cache MUST NOT reuse a stale response with s-maxage to satisfy another request until it has been successfully validated by the origin, as defined by validation.model. This directive also permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field, subject to the above requirements on maximum age and revalidation (caching.authenticated.responses). <\/ins> This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax: e.g., 's-maxage=10' not 's-maxage=\"10\"'. A sender MUST NOT generate the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-836a0c6ef7b0373ac0ba9df6ee16ae7c86cca0e8a64472e856b7fc1de10b1b21","title":"","text":"8.1. Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Registry\" registry at with the <\/del> Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" at with the <\/ins> field names listed in the two tables of header.field.definitions. 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6b8a164cd3b135a5029700eecdd5ffe6f8ee6d3f6a4fa1c9d5defe5ab9b02b72","title":"","text":"explicit expiration time F Fields Age Cache-Control Expires Pragma Warning <\/ins> fresh freshness lifetime"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-43810f3a34bf81fe626e861d25477103159e5695c6e18fed5460de760c2d7dee","title":"","text":"VCHAR H Header Fields Age Cache-Control Expires Pragma Warning <\/ins> heuristic expiration time heuristically cacheable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-69fde8cf3e8fa867d149455c1b8bb7c08d7f363f4b3f85bd06e046b813be87cb","title":"","text":"environment, though of particular interest here is the set of unique characteristics that might be communicated via HTTP. Fingerprinting is considered a privacy concern because it enables tracking of a user agent's behavior over time without the corresponding controls that the user might have over other forms of data collection (e.g., cookies). Many general-purpose user agents (i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to reduce their fingerprints. <\/del> agent's behavior over time (Bujlow) without the corresponding controls that the user might have over other forms of data collection (e.g., cookies). Many general-purpose user agents (i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to reduce their fingerprints. <\/ins> There are a number of request header fields that might reveal information to servers that is sufficiently unique to enable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e221519c32c48f0499713e119f9d03bc7978f84bc839f06a1d51be599ba11a35","title":"","text":"The \"public\" response directive indicates that a cache MAY store the response even if it would otherwise be prohibited, subject to the constraints of any other response directives present. In other words, public explicitly marks the response as cacheable. For example, public permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field (caching.authenticated.responses). <\/del> constraints defined in response.cacheability. In other words, public explicitly marks the response as cacheable. For example, public permits a shared cache to reuse a response to a request containing an Authorization header field (caching.authenticated.responses). Note that it is not necessary to add the public directive to a response that is already cacheable according to response.cacheability. <\/ins> If no explicit freshness information is provided, the response is is heuristically cacheable (heuristic.freshness). <\/del> If no explicit freshness information is provided on a response with the public directive, it is heuristically cacheable (heuristic.freshness). <\/ins> 5.2.2.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1f5b77f2b7e14322b9fccfb847ab31a3bcf984eb165592454270bb49688c5590","title":"","text":"The unqualified \"private\" response directive indicates that a shared cache MUST NOT store the response (i.e., the response is intended for a single user). It also indicates that a private cache MAY store the response, subject to any other cache directives present, even if the response would not otherwise be heuristically cacheable by a private cache. <\/del> response, subject the constraints defined in response.cacheability, even if the response would not otherwise be heuristically cacheable by a private cache. <\/ins> If a qualified private response directive is present, with an argument that lists one or more field names, then only the listed fields are limited to a single user: a shared cache MUST NOT store the listed fields if they are present in the original response, but MAY store the remainder of the response message without those fields. <\/del> MAY store the remainder of the response message without those fields, subject the constraints defined in response.cacheability. <\/ins> The field names given are not limited to the set of header fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-insensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-14c218f3871c894625c0db36b7da61c15ecf8eed854202e93a57b3e2bbe3834d","title":"","text":"request: i.e., a response to a GET request, which contains a representation of the resource identified by the request target (GET). However, it is also possible to store redirects, negative results (e.g., <\/del> target resource (GET). However, it is also possible to store redirects, negative results (e.g., <\/ins> ), incomplete results (e.g.,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b46f18ee8b14711c7a92847c23fa6c25962350ff61aaa7ece863dc11e2b6451d","title":"","text":"3.1. A response message is considered complete when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is provided, a response message that is ended by the connection's close is considered complete even though it might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response (see Messaging). A cache SHOULD consider a close-terminated response incomplete if the connection termination is detected to be an error. A server that wishes to avoid premature termination resulting in an incorrect cached response SHOULD send the response with explicit framing. <\/del> If the request method is GET, the response status code is , and the entire response header section has been received, a cache MAY store an incomplete response message body if the stored response is recorded as incomplete. Likewise, a <\/del> MAY store a response body that is not complete (operation) if the stored response is recorded as being incomplete. Likewise, a <\/ins> response MAY be stored as if it were an incomplete"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b7713b102be9d2a3abaf747385f7e113b73914f502cafbca24c337989c08db4e","title":"","text":"When generating a conditional request for validation, a cache starts with either a request it is attempting to satisfy, or -- if it is initiating the request independently -- it synthesises a request using a stored response by copying the method, request-target, and <\/del> using a stored response by copying the method, target URI, and <\/ins> request header fields identified by the Vary header field caching.negotiated.responses."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-04d84eaaee5f68ad12ee6fb03dc146889c7208272a5d6dff2f2b36ab5f08dba1","title":"","text":"stored response) or if transmission of the representation body is not desired even if it has changed. When a cache makes an inbound HEAD request for a given request target and receives a <\/del> When a cache makes an inbound HEAD request for a given target URI and receives a <\/ins> response, the cache SHOULD update or invalidate each of its stored GET responses that could have been selected for that request (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-58e0cd3400dbd7fc44083d9a687d686a67e06d508877914fbfd44fcb533fb564","title":"","text":"Because unsafe request methods (safe.methods) such as PUT, POST or DELETE have the potential for changing state on the origin server, intervening caches can use them to keep their contents up to date. <\/del> intervening caches are required to invalidate stored responses to keep their contents up to date. means that the cache will either remove all stored responses whose target URI matches the given URI, or will mark them as \"invalid\" and in need of a mandatory validation before they can be sent in response to a subsequent request. Note that this does not guarantee that all appropriate responses are invalidated globally; a state-changing request would only invalidate responses in the caches that it travels through. <\/ins> A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI (effective.request.uri) as well as the URI(s) in the <\/del> A cache MUST invalidate the target URI (target.resource) as well as the URI(s) in the <\/ins> and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d05ebe42d4e0b02b38b23c010fe6635a98c65212dbca78335046a6db60a57667","title":"","text":"or response header field if the host part of that URI differs from the host part in the effective request URI (effective.request.uri). This helps prevent denial-of-service attacks. <\/del> host part in the target URI (target.resource). This helps prevent denial-of-service attacks. <\/ins> A cache MUST invalidate the effective request URI (effective.request.uri) when it receives a non-error response to a request with a method whose safety is unknown. <\/del> A cache MUST invalidate the target URI (target.resource) when it receives a non-error response to a request with a method whose safety is unknown. <\/ins> Here, a \"non-error response\" is one with a or status code. \"Invalidate\" means that the cache will either remove all stored responses related to the effective request URI or will mark these as \"invalid\" and in need of a mandatory validation before they can be sent in response to a subsequent request. Note that this does not guarantee that all appropriate responses are invalidated. For example, a state-changing request might invalidate responses in the caches it travels through, but relevant responses still might be stored in other caches that it has not. <\/del> status code. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-77a6b041a984291378043662d9497626c416bc2be8e98934946371c1646eaf68","title":"","text":"A recipient cache or origin server MUST evaluate the request preconditions defined by this specification in the following order: Any extension to HTTP\/1.1 that defines additional conditional request <\/del> Any extension to HTTP that defines additional conditional request <\/ins> header fields ought to define its own expectations regarding the order for evaluating such fields in relation to those defined in this document and other conditionals that might be found in practice."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2011434ea219756a0b4860bab69389c634e7595990959eccd9a98528fc83ea61","title":"","text":"The CONNECT method requests that the recipient establish a tunnel to the destination origin server identified by the request-target and, if successful, thereafter restrict its behavior to blind forwarding of packets, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed. Tunnels are commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection, through one or more proxies, which can then be secured using TLS (Transport Layer Security, RFC8446). <\/del> of data, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed. Tunnels are commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection, through one or more proxies, which can then be secured using TLS (Transport Layer Security, RFC8446). <\/ins> CONNECT is intended only for use in requests to a proxy. An origin server that receives a CONNECT request for itself MAY respond with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-232daf2f8434f74d7605a4f04260754cf193b130b2ca64e228736c5aa5b9ab85","title":"","text":"request. An origin server that receives an If-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). If the field value is \"*\", the condition is false if the origin server does not have a current representation for the target resource. If the field value is a list of entity-tags, the condition is false if none of the listed tags match the entity-tag of the selected representation. <\/del> the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). To evaluate a received If-Match header field: <\/ins> An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if a received If-Match condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0291e589880e6007895f03ad15526d63272da2670a6d9f77259ad30cfcba4bba","title":"","text":"An origin server that receives an If-None-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). If the field value is \"*\", the condition is false if the origin server has a current representation for the target resource. If the field value is a list of entity-tags, the condition is false if one of the listed tags match the entity-tag of the selected representation. <\/del> To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field: <\/ins> An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e88c80d8108539deb350ab445caf89414f9fe37d0cf2d5c95d900a826192c557","title":"","text":"status code is similar to , but it indicates that the client needs to authenticate itself in order to use a proxy. The proxy MUST send a <\/del> order to use a proxy for this request. The proxy MUST send a <\/ins> header field (field.proxy-authenticate) containing a challenge applicable to that proxy for the target resource. The client MAY repeat the request with a new or replaced <\/del> applicable to that proxy for the request. The client MAY repeat the request with a new or replaced <\/ins> header field (field.proxy-authorization)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-77d994058e36dffc87ac24d1ce2ae78c0ae5e31e08a4f7ce6fc1b1a1a6c020e8","title":"","text":"The \"Proxy-Authenticate\" header field consists of at least one challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters applicable to the proxy for this target URI (target.resource). A proxy MUST send at least one Proxy-Authenticate header field in each <\/del> applicable to the proxy for this request. A proxy MUST send at least one Proxy-Authenticate header field in each <\/ins> response that it generates."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e3d78af9b99fda17922b0d09a35a1f51e3da1cc973c75b1e8d8223fe40d3ce68","title":"","text":"response would contain the same representation that is enclosed as payload in this message. The field value is either an or a . In the latter case (uri), the referenced URI is relative to the target URI (RFC3986). <\/ins> The Content-Location value is not a replacement for the target URI (target.resource). It is representation metadata. It has the same syntax and semantics as the header field of the same name defined for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a909fc2c04f64aac12d79e4ef5bf90c8c153c8c2fc41b6c74fa05f8f9f1a4f2c","title":"","text":"components of the URI reference RFC3986, if any, when generating the Referer field value. The field value is either an or a . In the latter case (uri), the referenced URI is relative to the target URI (RFC3986). <\/ins> The Referer header field allows servers to generate back-links to other resources for simple analytics, logging, optimized caching, etc. It also allows obsolete or mistyped links to be found for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2f46e01c7fafeef89be8f3cc78497833ca4698fedc79dbd156fa03e6413c7065","title":"","text":"with an appropriate link. After that is complete, please update the new registry with the field names listed in the table of field.names. <\/del> names listed in the table of field.definitions. <\/ins> Finally, please update the \"Content-MD5\" entry in the new registry to have a status of 'obsoleted' with references to RFC2616 (for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9e99ef54d7d8f0d5b6e44c1837cab8a41f31bbbeb960b8f627d45b59749b36d3","title":"","text":"source code and issues list for this draft can be found at . The changes in this draft are summarized in changes.since.07. <\/del> The changes in this draft are summarized in changes.since.08. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-93a6c1941054ef70acf4bbca4c289ce5b99489b53a99c43090efb06ddbe52ae8","title":"","text":"the sequence CRLF, a recipient MAY recognize a single LF as a line terminator and ignore any preceding CR. A sender MUST NOT generate a bare CR (a CR character not immediately followed by LF) within any protocol elements other than the payload body. A recipient of such a bare CR MUST consider that element to be invalid or replace each bare CR with SP before processing the element or forwarding the message. <\/ins> Older HTTP\/1.0 user agent implementations might send an extra CRLF after a POST request as a workaround for some early server applications that failed to read message body content that was not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f774114fe4fc24704966af8de2721213a858aaa118aba82f0192dac338ec58ad","title":"","text":"that implementations advertising only HTTP\/1.0 support will not understand how to process a transfer-encoded payload. A client MUST NOT send a request containing Transfer-Encoding unless it knows the server will handle HTTP\/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge might be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. A server MUST NOT send a response containing Transfer-Encoding unless the corresponding request indicates HTTP\/1.1 (or later). <\/del> server will handle HTTP\/1.1 requests (or later minor revisions); such knowledge might be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. A server MUST NOT send a response containing Transfer-Encoding unless the corresponding request indicates HTTP\/1.1 (or later minor revisions). <\/ins> A server that receives a request message with a transfer coding it does not understand SHOULD respond with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-631ed824e27c38536f9bedb91880d6a5bce4b5b36d3a8ea39c18d44b8b2e633e","title":"","text":"9.1. The \"Connection\" header field allows the sender to list desired control options for the current connection. In order to avoid confusing downstream recipients, a proxy or gateway MUST remove or replace any received connection options before forwarding the message. <\/del> control options for the current connection. <\/ins> When a field aside from Connection is used to supply control information for or about the current connection, the sender MUST list the corresponding field name within the Connection header field. A proxy or gateway MUST parse a received Connection header field before a message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field, <\/del> the corresponding field name within the Connection header field. Intermediaries MUST parse a received Connection header field before a message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field, <\/ins> remove any header or trailer field(s) from the message with the same name as the connection-option, and then remove the Connection header field itself (or replace it with the intermediary's own connection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-573ee19ea8cd2556b4449b54ddcb6fac313f05b06deea0068090605fb3f23f87","title":"","text":"to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly forwarded by older intermediaries. Furthermore, intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace field(s) whose semantics are known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they appear as a Connection option, after applying those fields' semantics. This includes but is not limited to: <\/ins> The Connection header field's value has the following grammar: Connection options are case-insensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5d9634698bbcb51154b87be397c6110eec09e11053a689473c1a2c941708af09","title":"","text":"account when creating a new HTTP field. The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" is located at \"https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-fields\/\". <\/del> located at . <\/ins> Registration requests can be made by following the instructions located there or by sending an email to the \"ietf-http-wg@ietf.org\" mailing list. Field names are registered on the advice of a Designated Expert (appointed by the IESG or their delegate). Fields with the status 'permanent' are Specification Required (using terminology from RFC8126). <\/del> 'permanent' are Specification Required (RFC8126). <\/ins> Registration requests consist of at least the following information: And, optionally: <\/ins> The Expert(s) can define additional fields to be collected in the registry, in consultation with the community."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0066e171f75f491f1b41a05b0b2b0857f0685dd0ab7147dd7d32477cdbb2f8b9","title":"","text":"limit their values to US-ASCII octets. A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. Field values containing control ( ) characters such as CR or LF are invalid; recipients MUST either reject a field value containing control characters, or convert them to SP before processing or forwarding the message. <\/ins> Leading and trailing whitespace in raw field values is removed upon field parsing (field.parsing). Field definitions where leading or trailing whitespace in values is significant will have to use a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-64cbddc85ece78326ab2f6d647ef1f477598ccaf78ad2003d876c115d3a60dcf","title":"","text":"request. An origin server that receives an If-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). <\/del> the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. <\/ins> To evaluate a received If-Match header field:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3592d068365f0bdd2528d6d14ec00d7913e2a73056d35f83c31aee22247dbc22","title":"","text":"initial representation for the target resource. An origin server that receives an If-None-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). <\/del> evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. <\/ins> To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-40d140a18062c8c478c7770dd47b63e3920942bdd5c376f099f1a2829398ccb9","title":"","text":"transfers to only those changed during the specified window. An origin server that receives an If-Modified-Since header field SHOULD evaluate the condition prior to performing the method (evaluation). The origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested <\/del> SHOULD evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. The origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested <\/ins> method if the selected representation's last modification date is earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value; instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-35155ff4eea49b9da5575c283560ec350ff0303f1177c827dbb28e2e2f891ff1","title":"","text":"request. An origin server that receives an If-Unmodified-Since header field MUST evaluate the condition (evaluation) prior to performing the <\/del> MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the <\/ins> method. If the selected representation has a last modification date, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-326055b6232e9c21d76061f90cd5b3d74c55ae4f0839954019481e60e20784c9","title":"","text":"replaced by local equivalents without affecting the protocol. Responses with status codes that are defined as heuristically cacheable (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206, 300, 301, 404, 405, 410, 414, and 501 in this specification) can be reused by a cache with <\/del> cacheable (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206, 300, 301, 308, 404, 405, 410, 414, and 501 in this specification) can be reused by a cache with <\/ins> heuristic expiration unless otherwise indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls Caching; all other status codes are not heuristically cacheable."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b77a51c3060fceed7c9cae8c8c6ff10d49dce764f39d395fe22952266aa4aabd","title":"","text":"If one or more encodings have been applied to a representation, the sender that applied the encodings MUST generate a Content-Encoding header field that lists the content codings in the order in which they were applied. Additional information about the encoding parameters can be provided by other header fields not defined by this specification. <\/del> they were applied. Note that the coding named \"identity\" is reserved for its special role in , and thus SHOULD NOT be included. Additional information about the encoding parameters can be provided by other header fields not defined by this specification. <\/ins> Unlike Transfer-Encoding (field.transfer-encoding), the codings listed in Content-Encoding are a characteristic of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-069cf6a12f8b5a8686c5a1458bc45c2bea0afbeb28a21b780ebd8edfe786b479","title":"","text":"7.4. The \"TE\" header field in a request indicates what transfer codings, besides chunked, the client is willing to accept in response, and whether or not the client is willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer coding. <\/del> The TE field (field.te) is used in HTTP\/1.1 to indicate what transfer-codings, besides chunked, the client is willing to accept in the response, and whether or not the client is willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer coding. <\/ins> The TE field-value consists of a list of transfer coding names, each allowing for optional parameters (as described in transfer.codings), and\/or the keyword \"trailers\". A client MUST NOT send the chunked transfer coding name in TE; chunked is always acceptable for HTTP\/1.1 recipients. <\/del> A client MUST NOT send the chunked transfer coding name in TE; chunked is always acceptable for HTTP\/1.1 recipients. <\/ins> Three examples of TE use are below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f10e5f08be34fafdc82fdf7bd4248b3026990ba7a2781131e20e3be1a885c8c8","title":"","text":"connection after sending the closure alert, thus generating an incomplete close on the client side. 9.9. The \"Upgrade\" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism for transitioning from HTTP\/1.1 to some other protocol on the same connection. A client MAY send a list of protocol names in the Upgrade header field of a request to invite the server to switch to one or more of the named protocols, in order of descending preference, before sending the final response. A server MAY ignore a received Upgrade header field if it wishes to continue using the current protocol on that connection. Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol change. Although protocol names are registered with a preferred case, recipients SHOULD use case-insensitive comparison when matching each protocol-name to supported protocols. A server that sends a response MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the new protocol(s) to which the connection is being switched; if multiple protocol layers are being switched, the sender MUST list the protocols in layer-ascending order. A server MUST NOT switch to a protocol that was not indicated by the client in the corresponding request's Upgrade header field. A server MAY choose to ignore the order of preference indicated by the client and select the new protocol(s) based on other factors, such as the nature of the request or the current load on the server. A server that sends a response MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the acceptable protocols, in order of descending preference. A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to advertise that it implements support for upgrading to the listed protocols, in order of descending preference, when appropriate for a future request. The following is a hypothetical example sent by a client: The capabilities and nature of the application-level communication after the protocol change is entirely dependent upon the new protocol(s) chosen. However, immediately after sending the response, the server is expected to continue responding to the original request as if it had received its equivalent within the new protocol (i.e., the server still has an outstanding request to satisfy after the protocol has been changed, and is expected to do so without requiring the request to be repeated). For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request and the server decides to switch protocols, it first responds with a message in HTTP\/1.1 and then immediately follows that with the new protocol's equivalent of a response to a GET on the target resource. This allows a connection to be upgraded to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the latency cost of an additional round trip. A server MUST NOT switch protocols unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol. The following is an example response to the above hypothetical request: When Upgrade is sent, the sender MUST also send a header field (field.connection) that contains an \"upgrade\" connection option, in order to prevent Upgrade from being accidentally forwarded by intermediaries that might not implement the listed protocols. A server MUST ignore an Upgrade header field that is received in an HTTP\/1.0 request. A client cannot begin using an upgraded protocol on the connection until it has completely sent the request message (i.e., the client can't change the protocol it is sending in the middle of a message). If a server receives both an Upgrade and an header field with the \"100-continue\" expectation (field.expect), the server MUST send a response before sending a response. The Upgrade header field only applies to switching protocols on top of the existing connection; it cannot be used to switch the underlying connection (transport) protocol, nor to switch the existing communication to a different connection. For those purposes, it is more appropriate to use a response (status.3xx). 9.9.1. This specification only defines the protocol name \"HTTP\" for use by the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP version rules of protocol.version and future updates to this specification. Additional protocol names ought to be registered using the registration procedure defined in upgrade.token.registry. 9.9.2. The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry\" defines the namespace for protocol-name tokens used to identify protocols in the header field. The registry is maintained at . Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection will be processed after it has been upgraded. Registrations happen on a \"First Come First Served\" basis (see RFC8126) and are subject to the following rules: <\/del> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-896921854e3bdbf1600b3a223347f719c944ae9fdb3fcdddf0d8a57bdbeda34c","title":"","text":"F Fields Connection TE <\/del> Transfer-Encoding Upgrade <\/del> G Grammar"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7a3083a0d4cf408e72cce4c26ed0ba99c455bd22dbf7ace472026b0e6626715a","title":"","text":"H Header Fields Connection TE <\/del> Transfer-Encoding Upgrade <\/del> header line header section headers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-46e46280b14d2633e7d01db12a3cbc53cf781cfe05ca3c5afdfdc842ca22bf1e","title":"","text":"request-target T TE header field <\/del> Transfer-Encoding header field U Upgrade header field <\/del> X x-compress (transfer coding) x-gzip (transfer coding)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ac2d8349c8b2b7f1b90a46a9726ba331f31a7a9034b9e375d4df0b76eae36003","title":"","text":"field.components defines some generic syntactic components for field values. The rules below are defined in Messaging: <\/del> The rule below is defined in Messaging; <\/ins> This specification uses the terms \"character\", \"character encoding scheme\", \"charset\", and \"protocol element\" as they are defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d1d59dc9f3cbc9917253cb478834f71115010ca47c0ed98dd8cf1cf3705f16a7","title":"","text":"header field in the header section of that message to indicate which fields might be present in the trailers. 4.6.4. The \"TE\" header field in a request can be used to indicate that the sender will not discard trailer fields when it contains a \"trailers\" member, as described in trailer.fields. Additionally, specific HTTP versions can use it to indicate the transfer codings the client is willing to accept in the response. The TE field-value consists of a list of tokens, each allowing for optional parameters (as described in parameter). <\/ins> 4.7. See field.names for a general requirements for field names, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b8eb66fd4ea907e0b5c5abe7c647e17d13f6b6f49b37c343c1cf54c77b0a635a","title":"","text":"allows such modification or the modification is deemed necessary for privacy or security. 5.8. The \"Upgrade\" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism for transitioning from HTTP\/1.1 to some other protocol on the same connection. A client MAY send a list of protocol names in the Upgrade header field of a request to invite the server to switch to one or more of the named protocols, in order of descending preference, before sending the final response. A server MAY ignore a received Upgrade header field if it wishes to continue using the current protocol on that connection. Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol change. Although protocol names are registered with a preferred case, recipients SHOULD use case-insensitive comparison when matching each protocol-name to supported protocols. A server that sends a response MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the new protocol(s) to which the connection is being switched; if multiple protocol layers are being switched, the sender MUST list the protocols in layer-ascending order. A server MUST NOT switch to a protocol that was not indicated by the client in the corresponding request's Upgrade header field. A server MAY choose to ignore the order of preference indicated by the client and select the new protocol(s) based on other factors, such as the nature of the request or the current load on the server. A server that sends a response MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the acceptable protocols, in order of descending preference. A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to advertise that it implements support for upgrading to the listed protocols, in order of descending preference, when appropriate for a future request. The following is a hypothetical example sent by a client: The capabilities and nature of the application-level communication after the protocol change is entirely dependent upon the new protocol(s) chosen. However, immediately after sending the response, the server is expected to continue responding to the original request as if it had received its equivalent within the new protocol (i.e., the server still has an outstanding request to satisfy after the protocol has been changed, and is expected to do so without requiring the request to be repeated). For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request and the server decides to switch protocols, it first responds with a message in HTTP\/1.1 and then immediately follows that with the new protocol's equivalent of a response to a GET on the target resource. This allows a connection to be upgraded to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the latency cost of an additional round trip. A server MUST NOT switch protocols unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol. The following is an example response to the above hypothetical request: When Upgrade is sent, the sender MUST also send a header field (field.connection) that contains an \"upgrade\" connection option, in order to prevent Upgrade from being accidentally forwarded by intermediaries that might not implement the listed protocols. A server MUST ignore an Upgrade header field that is received in an HTTP\/1.0 request. A client cannot begin using an upgraded protocol on the connection until it has completely sent the request message (i.e., the client can't change the protocol it is sending in the middle of a message). If a server receives both an Upgrade and an header field with the \"100-continue\" expectation (field.expect), the server MUST send a response before sending a response. The Upgrade header field only applies to switching protocols on top of the existing connection; it cannot be used to switch the underlying connection (transport) protocol, nor to switch the existing communication to a different connection. For those purposes, it is more appropriate to use a response (status.3xx). 5.8.1. This specification only defines the protocol name \"HTTP\" for use by the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP version rules of protocol.version and future updates to this specification. Additional protocol names ought to be registered using the registration procedure defined in upgrade.token.registry. 5.8.2. The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry\" defines the namespace for protocol-name tokens used to identify protocols in the header field. The registry is maintained at . Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection will be processed after it has been upgraded. Registrations happen on a \"First Come First Served\" basis (see RFC8126) and are subject to the following rules: <\/ins> 6. Considering that a resource could be anything, and that the uniform"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-830f696bdfcd1f941df12993ba78602fae432624101dd5fad2b919eb2f0748ed","title":"","text":"Referer Retry-After Server TE <\/ins> Trailer Upgrade <\/ins> User-Agent Vary Via"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-79c6ac113ec3870237fc63943d29bc7f80c863c2399f0e2cb3159fbcd5cbac7a","title":"","text":"URI scheme http https Upgrade header field <\/ins> User-Agent header field upstream user agent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bf59a71042f375aebd78378938c5cea3c3cf8b8fa1d5bbd02b0ab8b87ebffe06","title":"","text":"with a value that is one less than the current length of the selected representation). A client can request the last N bytes of the selected representation using a <\/del> A client can request the last N bytes (N > 0) of the selected representation using a <\/ins> . If the selected representation is shorter than the specified"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c2c6263b0ee9a51f75328a9824cdb5822b6cb74a45c9c5e488f12234172d96cd","title":"","text":"is unsatisfiable. If the selected representation has zero length, the only satisfiable form of is a with a non-zero . <\/ins> In the byte-range syntax, ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0232e3880daf24af516370ab02f949351860f68567516fa263c52a6158758818","title":"","text":"request multiple ranges that are inherently less efficient to process and transfer than a single range that encompasses the same data. A server that supports range requests MAY ignore a header field when the selected representation has no body (i.e., the selected representation data is of zero length). <\/ins> A client that is requesting multiple ranges SHOULD list those ranges in ascending order (the order in which they would typically be received in a complete representation) unless there is a specific"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-45ada9d7ea5164ffe13f932730765969a4a9b1dbc2ac45e58b697e710c6c2459","title":"","text":"The status code indicates that none of the ranges in the request's header field (field.range) overlap the current extent of the or that the set of ranges requested has been rejected due to invalid ranges or an excessive request of small or overlapping ranges. <\/del> status code indicates that the set of ranges in the request's <\/ins> For byte ranges, failing to overlap the current extent means that the <\/del> header field (field.range) has been rejected either because none of the requested ranges are satisfiable or because the client has requested an excessive number of small or overlapping ranges (a potential denial of service attack). <\/ins> of all of the <\/del> Each range unit defines what is required for its own range sets to be satisfiable. For example, byte.ranges defines what makes a bytes range set satisfiable. <\/ins> values were greater than or equal to the current length of the selected representation. When this status code is generated in response to a byte-range request, the sender SHOULD generate a <\/del> When this status code is generated in response to a byte-range request, the sender SHOULD generate a <\/ins> header field specifying the current length of the selected representation (field.content-range)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d76684a40af192dff51a6c9f90970f5c0de2154098b4f6543c529cb0c5da10cc","title":"","text":"production can be transmitted either as a token or within a quoted- string. The quoted and unquoted values are equivalent. 4.4.1.5. Prior to 1995, there were three different formats commonly used by servers to communicate timestamps. For compatibility with old implementations, all three are defined here. The preferred format is a fixed-length and single-zone subset of the date and time specification used by the Internet Message Format RFC5322. An example of the preferred format is Examples of the two obsolete formats are A recipient that parses a timestamp value in an HTTP field MUST accept all three HTTP-date formats. When a sender generates a field that contains one or more timestamps defined as HTTP-date, the sender MUST generate those timestamps in the IMF-fixdate format. An HTTP-date value represents time as an instance of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The first two formats indicate UTC by the three-letter abbreviation for Greenwich Mean Time, \"GMT\", a predecessor of the UTC name; values in the asctime format are assumed to be in UTC. A sender that generates HTTP-date values from a local clock ought to use NTP (RFC5905) or some similar protocol to synchronize its clock to UTC. Preferred format: Obsolete formats: HTTP-date is case sensitive. A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar. The semantics of , , , , and are the same as those defined for the Internet Message Format constructs with the corresponding name (RFC5322). Recipients of a timestamp value in rfc850-date format, which uses a two-digit year, MUST interpret a timestamp that appears to be more than 50 years in the future as representing the most recent year in the past that had the same last two digits. Recipients of timestamp values are encouraged to be robust in parsing timestamps unless otherwise restricted by the field definition. For example, messages are occasionally forwarded over HTTP from a non- HTTP source that might generate any of the date and time specifications defined by the Internet Message Format. <\/ins> 4.5. A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of RFC5234 is used to improve"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d54bd1a94f113914709dbca9ef55dc17bf6689ea4608d79594f51f636f9a73c3","title":"","text":"10.1.1. 10.1.1.1. Prior to 1995, there were three different formats commonly used by servers to communicate timestamps. For compatibility with old implementations, all three are defined here. The preferred format is a fixed-length and single-zone subset of the date and time specification used by the Internet Message Format RFC5322. An example of the preferred format is Examples of the two obsolete formats are A recipient that parses a timestamp value in an HTTP field MUST accept all three HTTP-date formats. When a sender generates a field that contains one or more timestamps defined as HTTP-date, the sender MUST generate those timestamps in the IMF-fixdate format. An HTTP-date value represents time as an instance of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The first two formats indicate UTC by the three-letter abbreviation for Greenwich Mean Time, \"GMT\", a predecessor of the UTC name; values in the asctime format are assumed to be in UTC. A sender that generates HTTP-date values from a local clock ought to use NTP (RFC5905) or some similar protocol to synchronize its clock to UTC. Preferred format: Obsolete formats: HTTP-date is case sensitive. A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar. The semantics of , , , , and are the same as those defined for the Internet Message Format constructs with the corresponding name (RFC5322). Recipients of a timestamp value in rfc850-date format, which uses a two-digit year, MUST interpret a timestamp that appears to be more than 50 years in the future as representing the most recent year in the past that had the same last two digits. Recipients of timestamp values are encouraged to be robust in parsing timestamps unless otherwise restricted by the field definition. For example, messages are occasionally forwarded over HTTP from a non- HTTP source that might generate any of the date and time specifications defined by the Internet Message Format. 10.1.1.2. <\/del> The \"Date\" header field represents the date and time at which the message was originated, having the same semantics as the Origination Date Field (orig-date) defined in RFC5322. The field value is an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0fddf9d4e6bc3059532f3dd3e90b4f6e0f58f9becc40dff16ca8a41a451bdfba","title":"","text":"The If-Match header field can be ignored by caches and intermediaries because it is not applicable to a stored response. Note that an If-Match header field with a list value containing \"*\" and other values (including other instances of \"*\") is unlikely to be interoperable. <\/ins> 8.2.4. The \"If-None-Match\" header field makes the request method conditional"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2f06bc89ce7ddc416b8b61ba694c08838258f71d075ae822d8929a7a221cd631","title":"","text":"Requirements on cache handling of a received If-None-Match header field are defined in validation.received. Note that an If-None-Match header field with a list value containing \"*\" and other values (including other instances of \"*\") is unlikely to be interoperable. <\/ins> 8.2.5. The \"If-Modified-Since\" header field makes a GET or HEAD request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e2f2c21a5565a84b065874fb67cb45df65cfede1334348d6a532bf470ca023a6","title":"","text":"The \"Vary\" header field in a response describes what parts of a request message, aside from the method, Host header field, and target URI, might influence the origin server's process for selecting and representing this response. The value consists of either a single asterisk (\"*\") or a list of header field names (case-insensitive). A Vary field value of \"*\" signals that anything about the request might play a role in selecting the response representation, possibly including elements outside the message syntax (e.g., the client's network address). A recipient will not be able to determine whether this response is appropriate for a later request without forwarding the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate a Vary field with a \"*\" value. A Vary field value consisting of a list of field names indicates that the named request header fields, known as the selecting header fields, might have a role in selecting the representation. The potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. <\/del> representing this response. A Vary field value is a list of request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might have a role in selecting the representation for this response. Potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. If the list contains \"*\", it signals that other aspects of the request might play a role in selecting the response representation, possibly including elements outside the message syntax (e.g., the client's network address). A recipient will not be able to determine whether this response is appropriate for a later request without forwarding the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate \"*\" in a Vary field value. <\/ins> For example, a response that contains"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4ba612ecaa941b45dd0b35ade068f554fe69a6a38a3c0999efcfa018fb3aa2c0","title":"","text":"1. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application- level request\/response protocol that uses extensible semantics and self-descriptive messages for flexible interaction with network-based hypertext information systems. HTTP is defined by a series of documents that collectively form the HTTP\/1.1 specification: HTTP is a generic interface protocol for information systems. It is designed to hide the details of how a service is implemented by presenting a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of resources provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of each client's purpose: an HTTP request can be considered in isolation rather than being associated with a specific type of client or a predetermined sequence of application steps. The result is a protocol that can be used effectively in many different contexts and for which implementations can evolve independently over time. HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol for translating communication to and from non-HTTP information systems. HTTP proxies and gateways can provide access to alternative information services by translating their diverse protocols into a hypertext format that can be viewed and manipulated by clients in the same way as HTTP services. <\/del> 1.1. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a family of stateless, application-level, request\/response protocols that use a generic interface, extensible semantics, and self-descriptive messages to enable flexible interaction with network-based hypertext information systems. HTTP hides the details of how a service is implemented by presenting a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of resources provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of each client's purpose: a request can be considered in isolation rather than being associated with a specific type of client or a predetermined sequence of application steps. This allows general- purpose implementations to be used effectively in many different contexts, reduces interaction complexity, and enables independent evolution over time. HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol, wherein proxies and gateways can translate non-HTTP information systems into a more generic interface. <\/ins> One consequence of this flexibility is that the protocol cannot be defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface. Instead, we"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ab0076abbf05470ba7e789885dd06f194cf2f210a65a360d7d9e21d2079ec7e5","title":"","text":"act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we cannot require that such changes be observable beyond the scope of a single response. Each HTTP message is either a request or a response. A server listens on a connection for a request, parses each message received, interprets the message semantics in relation to the identified target resource, and responds to that request with one or more response messages. A client constructs request messages to communicate specific intentions, examines received responses to see if the intentions were carried out, and determines how to interpret the results. <\/del> 1.2. HTTP has been the primary information transfer protocol for the World Wide Web since its introduction in 1990. It began as a trivial mechanism for low-latency requests, with a single method (GET) to request transfer of a presumed hypertext document identified by a given pathname (HTTP\/0.9). As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through intermediaries, eventually being defined as HTTP\/1.0 RFC1945. HTTP\/1.1 was designed to refine the protocol's features while retaining compatibility with the existing text-based messaging syntax, improving its interoperability, scalability, and robustness across the Internet. This included length-based payload delimiters for both fixed and dynamic (chunked) content, a consistent framework for content negotiation, opaque validators for conditional requests, cache controls for better cache consistency, range requests for partial updates, and default persistent connections. HTTP\/1.1 was introduced in 1995 and published on the standards track in 1997 RFC2068, 1999 RFC2616, and 2014 (RFC7230 - RFC7235). HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) introduced a multiplexed session layer on top of the existing TLS and TCP protocols for exchanging concurrent HTTP messages with efficient header field compression and server push. HTTP\/3 (HTTP3) has gone even further, guiding the development of QUIC as a secure multiplexing transport over UDP. All three major versions of HTTP rely on the semantics defined by this document. They have not obsoleted each other because each one has specific benefits and limitations depending on the context of use. Implementations are expected to choose the most appropriate transport and messaging syntax for their particular context. This revision of HTTP separates the definition of semantics (this document) and caching (Caching) from the current HTTP\/1.1 messaging syntax (Messaging) to allow each major protocol version to progress independently while referring to the same core semantics. 1.3. <\/ins> HTTP provides a uniform interface for interacting with a resource (resources), regardless of its type, nature, or implementation, via the manipulation and transfer of representations (representations). This document defines semantics that are common to all versions of HTTP. HTTP semantics include the intentions defined by each request method (methods), extensions to those semantics that might be described in request header fields (request.header.fields), the meaning of status codes to indicate a machine-readable response (status.codes), and the meaning of other control data and resource metadata that might be given in response header fields <\/del> (resources), regardless of its type, nature, or implementation, by sending messages that manipulate or transfer representations (representations). Each message is either a request or a response. A client constructs request messages that communicate its intentions and routes those messages toward an identified origin server. A server listens for requests, parses each message received, interprets the message semantics in relation to the identified target resource, and responds to that request with one or more response messages. The client examines received responses to see if its intentions were carried out, determining what to do next based on the received status and payloads. HTTP semantics include the intentions defined by each request method (methods), extensions to those semantics that might be described in request header fields (request.header.fields), status codes that describe the response (status.codes), and other control data and resource metadata that might be given in response fields <\/ins> (response.header.fields). This document also defines representation metadata that describe how a payload is intended to be interpreted by a recipient, the request header fields that might influence content selection, and the various <\/del> Semantics also include representation metadata that describe how a payload is intended to be interpreted by a recipient, request header fields that might influence content selection, and the various <\/ins> selection algorithms that are collectively referred to as \" \" (content.negotiation). This document defines HTTP range requests, partial responses, and the multipart\/byteranges media type. <\/del> 1.4. <\/ins> This document obsoletes the portions of RFC7230 that are independent of the HTTP\/1.1 messaging syntax and connection management, with the changes being summarized in changes.from.rfc.7230. The other parts of RFC7230 are obsoleted by \"HTTP\/1.1 Messaging\" Messaging. This document also obsoletes RFC2818 (see changes.from.rfc.2818), RFC7231 (see changes.from.rfc.7231), RFC7232 (see changes.from.rfc.7232), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7233), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7235), RFC7233 (see changes.from.rfc.7538), RFC7615 (see changes.from.rfc.7615), and RFC7615 (see changes.from.rfc.7694). <\/del> This document obsoletes the following specifications: <\/ins> 1.1. <\/del> [*] This document only obsoletes the portions of RFC7230 that are independent of the HTTP\/1.1 messaging syntax and connection management; the remaining bits of RFC7230 are obsoleted by \"HTTP\/1.1 Messaging\" Messaging. 1.5. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8b90ccf1a229b74c6d2aefc0c92f44d729ba231776e6c7b02e62fb4d01292000","title":"","text":"Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in conformance. 1.2. <\/del> 1.6. <\/ins> This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234, extended with the notation for case-sensitivity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9cabee4d2f9bdf88c5e13db1ee6ab641bb659a0aa784c9a7b053b1404053c3d3","title":"","text":"scheme\", \"charset\", and \"protocol element\" as they are defined in RFC6365. 1.2.1. <\/del> 1.6.1. <\/ins> This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e68b69ba3c26c23dc6465d817aa3128a57f0ff1911a273ea49c778d75174015e","title":"","text":"11.1.4. The \"Vary\" header field in a response describes what parts of a request message, aside from the method, Host header field, and target URI, might influence the origin server's process for selecting and representing this response. <\/del> request message, aside from the method and target URI, might influence the origin server's process for selecting and representing this response. <\/ins> A Vary field value is a list of request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might have a role in selecting the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0e42ef09d11fde7f7726a8afdeefafc8f28adea35d0482194223826f5ca9bc46","title":"","text":"RFC8126) and MUST conform to the purpose of content coding defined in content.codings. New content codings ought to be self-descriptive whenever possible, with optional parameters discoverable within the coding format itself, rather than rely on external metadata that might be lost during transit. <\/ins> 7.1.3. A language tag, as defined in RFC5646, identifies a natural language"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9ad5735958535dd3349dc7a72b99505dfa4ea64cdc9d56f2035d43b9209fff25","title":"","text":"(in order of precedence): Since there is no way to distinguish a successfully completed, close- delimited message from a partially received message interrupted by network failure, a server SHOULD generate encoding or length- delimited messages whenever possible. The close-delimiting feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP\/1.0. <\/del> delimited response message from a partially received message interrupted by network failure, a server SHOULD generate encoding or length-delimited messages whenever possible. The close-delimiting feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP\/1.0. <\/ins> A server MAY reject a request that contains a message body but not a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-93162cc3e9f921910cd3179763c0d5771d8b0c81949f4d1299e502c445e69f38","title":"","text":"It is unknown whether the reset problem is exclusive to TCP or might also be found in other transport connection protocols. Note that a TCP connection that is half-closed by the client does not delimit a request message, nor does it imply that the client is no longer interested in a response. In general, transport signals cannot be relied upon to signal edge cases, since HTTP\/1.1 is independent of transport. <\/ins> 9.7. TLS provides a facility for secure connection closure. When a valid"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-459b0da6e033801145f6a551df0a21cbc66d810943fc68ff0f24585b1cdaa919","title":"","text":"If-Match is most often used with state-changing methods (e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when multiple user agents might be acting in parallel on the same resource (i.e., to prevent the \"lost update\" problem). It can also be used with safe methods to abort a request if the <\/del> prevent the \"lost update\" problem). It can also be used with any method to abort a request if the <\/ins> does not match one already stored (or partially stored) from a prior request. <\/del> does not match one that the client has already stored (or partially stored) from a prior request. <\/ins> An origin server that receives an If-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-44bd808dbfc0c984641dbc1ee5ed77702b140932d4c88ec375672aea194dc492","title":"","text":"To evaluate a received If-Match header field: An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if a received If-Match condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the status code or b) one of the status codes if the origin server has verified that a state change is being requested and the final state is already reflected in the current state of the target resource (i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the prior response was lost or a compatible change was made by some other user agent). In the latter case, the origin server MUST NOT send a validator header field in the response unless it can verify that the request is a duplicate of an immediately prior change made by the same user agent. <\/del> If-Match condition evaluates to false. Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a status code. Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that appears to have already been applied to the selected representation, the origin server MAY respond with a status code (i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the prior response was lost or an equivalent change was made by some other user agent). Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change request appears to have already been applied is more efficient for many authoring use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user agents are making change requests that are very similar but not cooperative. For example, multiple user agents writing to a common resource as a semaphore (e.g., a non-atomic increment) are likely to collide and potentially lose important state transitions. For those kinds of resources, an origin server is better off being stringent in sending 412 for every failed precondition on an unsafe method. In other cases, excluding the ETag field from a success response might encourage the user agent to perform a GET as its next request to eliminate confusion about the resource's current state. <\/ins> The If-Match header field can be ignored by caches and intermediaries because it is not applicable to a stored response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d5491659e61d187aa6120d425e4c2bba19133f4e28f4b79811e058ea1f48b94f","title":"","text":". A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the received field value is not a valid HTTP-date, or if the field value has more than one member. <\/del> received field value is not a valid HTTP-date (including when the field value appears to be a list of dates). <\/ins> A recipient MUST interpret an If-Unmodified-Since field value's timestamp in terms of the origin server's clock."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-15b5e339a879c99fa34584017e44d7ede938980ef36c21b438509144b53d7e3e","title":"","text":"(e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when multiple user agents might be acting in parallel on a resource that does not supply entity-tags with its representations (i.e., to prevent the \"lost update\" problem). It can also be used with safe methods to abort a request if the <\/del> prevent the \"lost update\" problem). It can also be used with any method to abort a request if the <\/ins> does not match one already stored (or partially stored) from a prior request. <\/del> does not match one that the client already stored (or partially stored) from a prior request. <\/ins> An origin server that receives an If-Unmodified-Since header field MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-dc80dd362939800b39703571b4121ce832d33f55433fa007cf2ec3954fae177f","title":"","text":"If the selected representation has a last modification date, the origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if that date is more recent than the date provided in the field value. Instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the status code or b) one of the status codes if the origin server has verified that a state change is being requested and the final state is already reflected in the current state of the target resource (i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but the user agent might not be aware of that because the prior response message was lost or a compatible change was made by some other user agent). In the latter case, the origin server MUST NOT send a validator header field in the response unless it can verify that the request is a duplicate of an immediately prior change made by the same user agent. <\/del> origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a status code. Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that appears to have already been applied to the selected representation, the origin server MAY respond with a status code (i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the prior response was lost or an equivalent change was made by some other user agent). Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change request appears to have already been applied is more efficient for many authoring use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user agents are making change requests that are very similar but not cooperative. In those cases, an origin server is better off being stringent in sending 412 for every failed precondition on an unsafe method. <\/ins> The If-Unmodified-Since header field can be ignored by caches and intermediaries because it is not applicable to a stored response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6bb2913091e7f20091c1d621d6fb3bdd05f19e1bd3356ab6055d41c924600552","title":"","text":"7.2.4. The \"Content-Length\" header field indicates the associated representation's data length as a decimal non-negative integer number of octets. When transferring a representation in a message, Content- Length refers specifically to the amount of data enclosed so that it can be used to delimit framing of the message body (e.g., body.content-length). In other cases, Content-Length indicates the selected representation's current length, which can be used by recipients to estimate transfer time or compare to previously stored representations. <\/ins> An example is A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1732af468b14fa5b2f35c8ec6fbf771ca3f1338f681810dc2090a4000c06406f","title":"","text":". A field present in a 206 response indicates the number of octets in the body of this message, which is usually not the complete length of the selected representation. Each field includes information about the selected representation's complete length. <\/ins> If a 206 is generated in response to a request with an header field, the sender SHOULD NOT generate other representation"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c3a43ac258b0158a01b1d7907006160929574fe1c3438788a7655be7ea77a1f4","title":"","text":"\"type\" and \"title\", and another one for the \"Basic\" scheme with a realm value of \"simple\". Some user agents do not recognise this form, however. As a result, sending a WWW-Authenticate field value with more than one member on the same field line might not be interoperable. <\/ins> 11.3.2. The \"Proxy-Authenticate\" header field consists of at least one"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-aecd9d073170c1a0dbb320a1d9175ee0d3a62f67d795d3aff9da169e69de9e0b","title":"","text":"connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O). Each major version of HTTP defines its own syntax for the inclusion of information in messages. Nevertheless, a common abstraction is that a message includes some form of envelope\/framing, a potential set of named fields up front (a header section), a potential body, and a potential following set of named fields (a trailer section). <\/del> Each major version of HTTP defines its own syntax for the communication of messages. Nevertheless, a common abstraction is that each message contains some form of envelope\/framing with self- descriptive control data that indicates its semantics and routing, a potential set of named fields up front (a header section), a potential body, and potential fields sent after the body begins (trailer sections). <\/ins> A client sends an HTTP request to a server in the form of a <\/del> A client sends requests to a server in the form of a <\/ins> message with a method (methods) and request target. The request might also contain header fields for request modifiers, client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0b3b2de808c7724059b8732f3d0428077a4c55c6fb1c2ae5eb2f41886a816738","title":"","text":"method, and trailer fields for metadata collected while sending the payload. A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more HTTP <\/del> A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more <\/ins> messages, each including a success or error code (status.codes). The response might also contain header fields for server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata (header.and.trailer.fields), a payload body (payload.body) to be interpreted in accordance with the status code, and trailer fields for metadata collected while sending the payload. <\/del> messages, each including a status code (status.codes). The response might also contain header fields for server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata (header.and.trailer.fields), a payload body (payload.body) to be interpreted in accordance with the status code, and trailer fields for metadata collected while sending the payload. <\/ins> One of the functions of the message framing mechanism is to assure that messages are <\/del> One of the functions of message framing is to assure that messages are <\/ins> . A message is considered complete when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-33946dc931162d0ebbef6a8251aa64cadf39fc94e4e949047113df74fad9c09a","title":"","text":"5. HTTP messages use key\/value pairs to convey data about the message, its payload, the target resource, or the connection (i.e., control data). They are called \"HTTP fields\" or just \" <\/del> its payload, the target resource, or the connection. They are called \"HTTP fields\" or just \" <\/ins> \". Every message can have two separate areas that such fields can occur within; the \" <\/del> Fields that are sent\/received before the message body are referred to as \"header fields\" (or just \"headers\", colloquially) and are located within the \" <\/ins> \" (or just \"header section\") preceding the message body and containing \"header fields\" (or just \"headers\", colloquially) and the \" <\/del> \" of a message. We refer to some named fields specifically as a \"header field\" when they are only allowed to be sent in the header section. Fields that are sent\/received after the header section has ended (usually after the message body begins to stream) are referred to as \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\", colloquially) and located within a \" <\/ins> \" (or just \"trailer section\") after the message body containing \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\" colloquially). Header fields are more common; see trailer.fields for discussion of the applicability and limitations of trailer fields. <\/del> \". One or more trailer sections are only possible when supported by the version of HTTP in use and enabled by an extensible mechanism for framing message sections. <\/ins> Both sections are composed of any number of \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ab991672991700ab93ed065946a1ffefb8cdcb9139efc1905006c20e4629a30a","title":"","text":"5.2. HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of each field line, field value, or on the length of the header or trailer section as a whole, as described in conformance. Various ad hoc limitations on individual lengths are found in practice, often depending on the <\/del> line, field value, or on the length of a header or trailer section as a whole, as described in conformance. Various ad hoc limitations on individual lengths are found in practice, often depending on the <\/ins> specific field's semantics. A server that receives a request header field line, field value, or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-58824269e2d093b10ebba1baf249ee744aed1d97d704ddd723c394f9bb3398e0","title":"","text":"willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response. Note that the presence of \"trailers\" does not mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only that the trailer section as a whole will not be dropped by any of the clients. <\/del> trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients. <\/ins> Because of the potential for trailer fields to be discarded in transit, a server SHOULD NOT generate trailer fields that it believes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9ffd26f48d02c9b4956c853aedd02479f74ffc83ca278fdb43f5cb5446e8e886","title":"","text":"5.6.3. Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed in the order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same name have the equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values as a list of members, even when the field lines are received in separate trailer sections. Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list value even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. Trailer fields are expected (but not required) to be processed one trailer section at a time. That is, for each trailer section received, a recipient that is looking for trailer fields will parse the received section into fields, invoke any associated processing for those fields at that point in the message processing, and then append those fields to the set of trailer fields received for the overall message. This behavior allows for iterative processing of trailer fields that contain incremental signatures or mid-stream status information, and fields that might refer to each other's values within the same section. However, there is no guarantee that trailer sections won't shift in relation to the message body stream, or won't be recombined (or dropped) in transit, so trailer fields that refer to data outside the present trailer section need to use self-descriptive references (i.e., refer to the data by name, ordinal position, or an octet range) rather than assume it is the data most recently received. Likewise, at the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the entire set of received trailer fields as one data structure to be considered as the message concludes. Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. 5.6.4. <\/ins> The \"Trailer\" header field provides a list of field names that the sender anticipates sending as trailer fields within that message. This allows a recipient to prepare for receipt of the indicated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-358c7c11c7fd9646e6adcbb7b132d13b9df33dc15da9fee45234162e12981a26","title":"","text":"header field in the header section of that message to indicate which fields might be present in the trailers. 5.6.4. <\/del> 5.6.5. <\/ins> The \"TE\" header field in a request can be used to indicate that the sender will not discard trailer fields when it contains a \"trailers\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-066e0361090f95b28336175fbd216f230c5da19c89f58152f92267d7d4481efa","title":"","text":"A proxy forwarding a response is not allowed to modify the field value in any way. Authentication-Info can be used inside trailers (trailer.fields) when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this. <\/del> Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field (trailer.fields) when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this. <\/ins> 11.3.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5839d80c48d25bcd450276f25d50201f6df643110748a8211826144e87428ce4","title":"","text":"Except when excluded below, a recipient cache or origin server MUST evaluate received request preconditions after it has successfully performed its normal request checks and just before it would perform the action associated with the request method. A server MUST ignore all received preconditions if its response to the same request without those conditions would have been a status code other than a <\/del> performed its normal request checks and just before it would process the request body (if any) or perform the action associated with the request method. A server MUST ignore all received preconditions if its response to the same request without those conditions, prior to processing the request body, would have been a status code other than a <\/ins> or . In other words, redirects and failures take precedence over the evaluation of preconditions in conditional requests. <\/del> . In other words, redirects and failures that can be detected before significant processing occurs take precedence over the evaluation of preconditions. <\/ins> A server that is not the origin server for the target resource and cannot act as a cache for requests on the target resource MUST NOT"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f062db057c4b4e97eaca5b0b33f8fdfdbe3c53d1800a46f28be3376465fcb035","title":"","text":"doing so (e.g., qvalues on and similar request header fields), that mechanism MAY be used to select preferred responses; of the remainder, the most recent response (as determined by the <\/del> select a preferred response. If such a mechanism is not available, or leads to equally preferred responses, the most recent response (as determined by the <\/ins> header field) is used, as per constructing.responses.from.caches. Note that in practice, some resources might send the Vary header field on responses inconsistently. When a cache has multiple responses for a target URI, and one or more omits the Vary header field, it SHOULD use the most recent non-empty value available to select an appropriate response for the request. <\/del> Some resources mistakenly omit the Vary header field from their default response (i.e., the one sent when no more preferable response is available), selecting it for requests to that resource even when more preferable responses are available. When a cache has multiple responses for a target URI and one or more omits the Vary header field, it SHOULD use the most recent (see age.calculations) valid Vary field value available to select an appropriate response for the request. <\/ins> If no selected response is available, the cache cannot satisfy the presented request. Typically, it is forwarded to the origin server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-76e5527d6ae644ce8fbb441156111017e51a56bc46f1c4c39e0058c90b51495d","title":"","text":"3.1. Caches MUST include all received header fields -- including <\/del> Caches MUST include all received response header fields -- including <\/ins> unrecognised ones -- when storing a response; this assures that new HTTP header fields can be successfully deployed. However, the following exceptions are made:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-74c5b35a778c54d0004321333c5ae32d8008db1236440bb703bc5cc86673752d","title":"","text":"When there is more than one value present for a given directive (e.g., two header fields, multiple Cache-Control: max-age directives), the directive's value is considered invalid. Caches are encouraged to consider responses that have invalid freshness information to be stale. <\/del> header field lines or multiple Cache-Control: max-age directives), either the first occurrence should be used, or the response should be considered stale. If directives conflict (e.g., both max-age and no- cache are present), the most restrictive directive should be honored. Caches are encouraged to consider responses that have invalid freshness information (e.g., a max-age directive with non-integer content) to be stale. <\/ins> 4.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4fd8e602610d5e78a2db9a7f8c91b504e975d415487bb14b1e6fc7b7a3c86682","title":"","text":"according to the calculations in expiration.model. A cache MUST NOT generate a stale response if it is prohibited by an explicit in-protocol directive (e.g., by a \"no-store\" or \"no-cache\" cache directive, a \"must-revalidate\" cache-response-directive, or an <\/del> explicit in-protocol directive (e.g., by a \"no-cache\" cache directive, a \"must-revalidate\" cache-response-directive, or an <\/ins> applicable \"s-maxage\" or \"proxy-revalidate\" cache-response-directive; see cache-response-directive)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2022088189f08efb661c67d97d6b1b86c2c99b9b01427fe071e0f2525562eac7","title":"","text":"intervening caches are required to invalidate stored responses to keep their contents up to date. means that the cache will either remove all stored responses whose target URI matches the given URI, or will mark them as \"invalid\" and in need of a mandatory validation before they can be sent in response to a subsequent request. Note that this does not guarantee that all appropriate responses are invalidated globally; a state-changing request would only invalidate responses in the caches it travels through. <\/del> A cache MUST invalidate the target URI (target.resource) and the URI(s) in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1886b25a326d05421beaf17443f3b658cbd9229538640cdc6f696e9ecd465b74","title":"","text":"receives a non-error response to a request with a method whose safety is unknown. Here, a \"non-error response\" is one with a <\/del> means that the cache will either remove all stored responses whose target URI matches the given URI, or will mark them as \"invalid\" and in need of a mandatory validation before they can be sent in response to a subsequent request. A \"non-error response\" is one with a <\/ins> or status code. Note that this does not guarantee that all appropriate responses are invalidated globally; a state-changing request would only invalidate responses in the caches it travels through. <\/ins> 5. This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP fields related"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bae98baae336f53dc80414d17a2fa9675635ebfbee18e709eaccf94a41dc4e8d","title":"","text":"age.calculations. The Age field value is a non-negative integer, representing time in seconds (see delta-seconds). A cache SHOULD consider a response to be stale if an Age field is present and its value is invalid (i.e., contains a list or something other than a non-negative integer). <\/del> seconds (see delta-seconds). Although it is defined as a singleton header field, a cache encountering a message with multiple Age field lines SHOULD use the first field line, discarding subsequent ones. If the field value (after discarding additional lines, as per above) is invalid (e.g., it contains a list or something other than a non- negative integer), a cache SHOULD consider the response to be stale. <\/ins> The presence of an Age header field implies that the response was not generated or validated by the origin server for this request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-48ead2dc181e5c48bcef9c27c8e8439bafdd42d8636b83a10a70a5d504ed1e73","title":"","text":"Please update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" at with the field names listed in the two tables of header.field.definitions. <\/del> field names listed in the table in header.field.definitions. <\/ins> 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2d26b530ac05159a0d862fbb0705ba506986e2fb2e832c0827491aacfde4a34d","title":"","text":"mechanism for low-latency requests, with a single method (GET) to request transfer of a presumed hypertext document identified by a given pathname. This original protocol is now referred to as HTTP\/0.9. <\/del> HTTP\/0.9 (see HTTP09). <\/ins> HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a \".\" (period or decimal point). The first digit (\"major version\")"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a33dad6aba1ae87f85efc61b19ec1e78a747495a4c85dd3ff5f1c63ed2711f51","title":"","text":"its payload, the target resource, or the connection. They are called \"HTTP fields\" or just \" \". <\/del> \". Fields occur in groups called \" \" or just \"sections\". <\/ins> Fields that are sent\/received before the message body are referred to as \"header fields\" (or just \"headers\", colloquially) and are located"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ceb75dcf48609174da5fa0bec5981b256c34419263bcfbac7404184f2e6d26a2","title":"","text":"authentication credentials, or deliberately misleading duplicate header fields that would impact request processing. A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines with the same field name into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field line value in order, separated by a comma and <\/del> A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines within a field section that have the same field name into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field line value in order, separated by a comma and <\/ins> (optional whitespace). For consistency, use comma SP."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-26036af36c74d1323328f6d834e8f2efeca017ffa81dc5347bede681e41e77b7","title":"","text":"Obsolete formats: HTTP-date is case sensitive. A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar. The semantics of <\/del> HTTP-date is case sensitive. Note that Caching relaxes this for cache recipients. A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar. The semantics of <\/ins> ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f1bbd87dfa6b34e6a21e17b134149eb7cd9af7815de6e738b4eb3375d9c040d0","title":"","text":"After that is complete, please update the new registry with the field names listed in the following table. Furthermore, the field name \"*\" is reserved, since using that name as an HTTP header field might conflict with its special semantics in the <\/del> The field name \"*\" is reserved, since using that name as an HTTP header field might conflict with its special semantics in the <\/ins> header field (field.vary)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1b501e2414c56849500db436318017f90d2e94e955f3e5e0b16890a57c0a89c9","title":"","text":"4xx Client Error 5xx Server Error safe section <\/ins> secured selected representation sender"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8f3e518d7199f4d13f7facb9f9b4297ff90218ddb5ebcba565c095ffeb5c25fe","title":"","text":"Also, note that unsafe requests might invalidate already-stored responses; see invalidation. A response that is stored or storable can be used to satisfy multiple requests, provided that it is allowed to reuse that response for the requests in question. This enables caches to \"collapse\" multiple incoming requests into a single forward request upon a cache miss, thereby reducing load on the origin server and network. However, note that if the response returned is not able to be used for some or all of the collapsed requests, additional latency might be introduced, because they will need to be forwarded to be satisfied. <\/ins> When more than one suitable response is stored, a cache MUST use the most recent one (as determined by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b3393962761758fb8ce2030edc460ddeb427c2f3e67006bf8e88201d8e01c0ef","title":"","text":"The requirements in this specification do not necessarily apply to how applications use data after it is retrieved from a HTTP cache. That is, a history mechanism can display a previous representation even if it has expired, and an application can use cached data in other ways beyond its freshness lifetime. This does not prohibit the application from taking HTTP caching into account; for example, a history mechanism might tell the user that a view is stale, or it might honor cache directives (e.g., Cache- Control: no-store). <\/del> For example, a history mechanism can display a previous representation even if it has expired, and an application can use cached data in other ways beyond its freshness lifetime. This specification does not prohibit the application from taking HTTP caching into account; for example, a history mechanism might tell the user that a view is stale, or it might honor cache directives (e.g., Cache-Control: no-store). In particular, when an application caches data and does not make this apparent to or easily controllable by the user, it is strongly encouraged to honour basic control mechanisms like Cache-Control: no-store, as they indicate the resource's intent regarding caching. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5a3d28a258430ededd6990ead28354a7280b42c7545b27c29198f847b30b767a","title":"","text":"15.3. HTTP's most widely used extensibility point is the definition of new header and trailer fields. New fields can be defined such that, when they are understood by a recipient, they override or enhance the interpretation of previously defined fields, define preconditions on request evaluation, or refine the meaning of responses. However, defining a field doesn't guarantee its deployment or recognition by recipients. Most fields are designed with the expectation that a recipient can safely ignore (but forward downstream) any field not recognized. In other cases, the sender's ability to understand a given field might be indicated by its prior communication, perhaps in the protocol version or fields that it sent in prior messages, or its use of a specific media type. Likewise, direct inspection of support might be possible through an OPTIONS request or by interacting with a defined well-known URI RFC8615 if such inspection is defined along with the field being introduced. <\/ins> 15.3.1. The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" defines"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-528a415d144c10d997f7116f4b19e767e8da537955b75bc134c05192148a09bd","title":"","text":"15.3.2. There is no limit on the introduction of new field names, each presumably defining new semantics. New fields can be defined such that, when they are understood by a recipient, they might override or enhance the interpretation of previously defined fields, define preconditions on request evaluation, or refine the meaning of responses. <\/del> Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to choose a short but descriptive field name. Short names avoid needless data transmission; descriptive names avoid confusion and \"squatting\" on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e900fee766a0a288c28e89263dddd826eda82fbab117788564ca7b305c706b2a","title":"","text":"5.2. One of the functions of message framing is to assure that messages are . A message is considered complete when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is used, a response message that is ended by the transport connection's close is considered complete even though it might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a transport- level error indicates that it is not complete. <\/del> Message framing indicates how each message begins and ends, such that each message can be distinguished from other messages or noise on the same connection. Each major version of HTTP defines its own framing mechanism. HTTP\/0.9 and early deployments of HTTP\/1.0 used closure of the underlying connection to end each response. For backwards compatibility, this implicit framing is also allowed in HTTP\/1.1. However, implicit framing can fail to distinguish an incomplete response if the connection closes early. For that reason, almost all modern implementations use explicit framing in the form of length- delimited sequences of message data. A message is considered when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is used, a response message that is ended by the underlying connection's close is considered complete even though it might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a transport-level error indicates that it is not complete. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f1a88dcc0f1897c4a3b31f8603c5f1ec25ff26231931731d25f7d34608112775","title":"","text":"response with a payload containing one or more partial representations that correspond to the satisfiable ranges requested. The above does not imply that a server will send all requested ranges. In some cases, it may only be possible (or efficient) to send a portion of the requested ranges first, while expecting the client to re-request the remaining portions later if they are still desired (see status.206). <\/ins> If all of the preconditions are true, the server supports the Range header field for the target resource, and the specified range(s) are invalid or unsatisfiable, the server SHOULD send a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4bbc10a3e5c1674e0d591875339c5ff85289aa391fcd37e8ebea1a5c76c28324","title":"","text":". A server that supports range requests (range.requests) will usually attempt to satisfy all of the requested ranges, since sending less data will likely result in another client request for the remainder. However, a server might want to send only a subset of the data requested for reasons of its own, such as temporary unavailability, cache efficiency, load balancing, etc. Since a 206 response is self- descriptive, the client can still understand a response that only partially satisfies its range request. A client MUST inspect a 206 response's and field(s) to determine what parts are enclosed and whether additional requests are needed. <\/ins> When a 206 response is generated, the server MUST generate the following header fields, in addition to those required in the subsections below, if the field would have been sent in a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ae5dfef30df45e3736647888c7e7e7aa8b9cc553a0f8a96923ff7eb8d9fe4ef0","title":"","text":"class of status code indicates an interim response for communicating connection status or request progress prior to completing the requested action and sending a final response. 1xx responses are terminated by the end of the header section. Since HTTP\/1.0 did not define any 1xx status codes, a server MUST NOT send a 1xx response to an HTTP\/1.0 client. <\/del> requested action and sending a final response. Since HTTP\/1.0 did not define any 1xx status codes, a server MUST NOT send a 1xx response to an HTTP\/1.0 client. A 1xx response is terminated by the end of the header section because it cannot contain a message body or trailers. <\/ins> A client MUST be able to parse one or more 1xx responses received prior to a final response, even if the client does not expect one. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-24101e5e4d40e3f55451cd5bf691cf0b7dd6227b17fd6c8ad73627bc600d8fa8","title":"","text":"17.4. This specification updates the HTTP related aspects of the existing registration procedures for message header fields defined in RFC3864. It defines both a new registration procedure and moves HTTP field definitions into a separate registry. <\/ins> Please create a new registry as outlined in field-name.registry. After creating the registry, all entries in the Permanent and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5c4990817e52c0b994363c8c4c7440d4862983a1d90888c52e70afa365820f41","title":"","text":"same Last-Modified time, then at least one of those responses would have a value equal to its Last-Modified time. The arbitrary 60-second limit guards against the possibility that the Date and Last-Modified values are generated from different clocks or at somewhat different times during the preparation of the response. An implementation MAY use a value larger than 60 seconds, if it is believed that 60 seconds is too short. <\/del> value equal to its Last-Modified time. <\/ins> 7.9.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f95b6bf053a8d0cbbefd14888251f4bfd3e7c1f3d2b5f48ca17a581c1e82a300","title":"","text":"5.1. Message framing indicates how each message begins and ends, such that each message can be distinguished from other messages or noise on the same connection. Each major version of HTTP defines its own framing mechanism. HTTP\/0.9 and early deployments of HTTP\/1.0 used closure of the underlying connection to end each response. For backwards compatibility, this implicit framing is also allowed in HTTP\/1.1. However, implicit framing can fail to distinguish an incomplete response if the connection closes early. For that reason, almost all modern implementations use explicit framing in the form of length- delimited sequences of message data. A message is considered when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is used, a response message that is ended by the underlying connection's close is considered complete even though it might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a transport-level error indicates that it is not complete. 5.2. <\/ins> Every HTTP message has a protocol version. Depending on the version in use, it might be carried in the message explicitly, or it might be inferred by the connection that the message is carried on. A message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-213e04c0f3116da37b5abd7b01829df9721f5c3156f8f94409a61ebe2bc5f41d","title":"","text":"protocol within a protocol element that requires sending a minor version. 5.2. Message framing indicates how each message begins and ends, such that each message can be distinguished from other messages or noise on the same connection. Each major version of HTTP defines its own framing mechanism. HTTP\/0.9 and early deployments of HTTP\/1.0 used closure of the underlying connection to end each response. For backwards compatibility, this implicit framing is also allowed in HTTP\/1.1. However, implicit framing can fail to distinguish an incomplete response if the connection closes early. For that reason, almost all modern implementations use explicit framing in the form of length- delimited sequences of message data. A message is considered when all of the octets indicated by its framing are available. Note that, when no explicit framing is used, a response message that is ended by the underlying connection's close is considered complete even though it might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a transport-level error indicates that it is not complete. <\/del> 5.3. HTTP messages use key\/value pairs to convey data about the message,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c83b5246d32e585c931176e6b4ddb1bf8749314d32f612ef46c67797d132c97a","title":"","text":"5.1. Every HTTP message has a protocol version. Depending on the version in use, it might be carried in the message explicitly, or it might be inferred by the connection that the message is carried on. A message can change versions as it passes through intermediaries, because the semantics of a HTTP message are independent of its version. <\/ins> While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, the expression of them \"on the wire\" can change, and so the HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1571ce236dfe0c9eb0b5475d73f696414a9260bdd1e9a10be7bade7a076c2f34","title":"","text":"3.2. Caches are required to update a stored response's header fields from another (typically newer) response in several situations; for example, see combining.responses, freshening.responses and head.effects. When doing so, the cache MUST add each header field in the provided response to the stored response, replacing field values that are already present, with the following exceptions: In some cases, caches (especially in user agents) store processed representations of the received response, rather than the response itself, and updating header fields that affect that processing can result in inconsistent behavior and security issues. Caches in this situation MAY omit these header fields from updating stored representations on an exceptional basis, but SHOULD limit such omission to those fields necessary to assure integrity of the stored representation. For example, a browser might store a response's body after removing content-codings, thereby making its metadata inaccurate. Updating that stored metadata with a different Content-Encoding header field would be problematic. Likewise, a browser might store a post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the body received in the response; updating the Content-Type header field would not be workable in this case, because any assumptions about the format made in parsing would now be invalid. Furthermore, some fields are automatically processed and removed by the HTTP implementation; for example, the Content-Range header field. Implementations MAY automatically omit such header fields from updates, even when the processing does not actually occur. Note that the Content-* prefix is not a signal that a header field is omitted from update; it is a convention for MIME header fields, not HTTP. 3.3. <\/ins> If the request method is GET, the response status code is , and the entire response header section has been received, a cache"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-17c0ada4df8d810cb81fa79e943da32346dc0cb082db3b7423bcf6060f765056","title":"","text":"status code. 3.3. <\/del> 3.4. <\/ins> A shared cache MUST NOT use a cached response to a request with an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c53b7c24997de83c48642d30ab2fce678a438a2e2c689dbffbebe0b4a62973ee","title":"","text":"public (cache-response-directive.public), and s-maxage (cache- response-directive.s-maxage). 3.4. <\/del> 3.5. <\/ins> A response might transfer only a partial representation if the connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7aaa84323766dce08b32864283f97a0630ba6413b7df0c74ac413de0be2063a3","title":"","text":"requirements in combining.byte.ranges. When combining the new response with one or more stored responses, a cache MUST use the header fields provided in the new response, aside from , to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response. <\/del> cache MUST update the stored response header fields using the header fields provided in the new response, as per update. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-80ffb6aca25f8e6d734238bb55c0cc47c14856aac50da3edfd9338a658e85ee2","title":"","text":"The stored response(s) to update are identified by using the first match (if any) of: For each stored response identified for update, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response, with the following exceptions: In some cases, caches (especially in user agents) store processed representations of the received response, rather than the response itself, and updating header fields that affect that processing can result in inconsistent behavior and security issues. Caches in this situation MAY omit these header fields from updating stored representations on an exceptional basis, but SHOULD limit such omission to those fields necessary to assure integrity of the stored representation. For example, a browser might store a response's body after removing content-codings, thereby making its metadata inaccurate. Updating that stored metadata with a different Content-Encoding header field would be problematic. Likewise, a browser might store a post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the body received in the response; updating the Content-Type header field would not be workable in this case, because any assumptions about the format made in parsing would now be invalid. Furthermore, some fields are automatically processed and removed by the HTTP implementation; for example, the Content-Range header field. Implementations MAY automatically omit such header fields from updates, even when the processing does not actually occur. <\/del> For each stored response identified, the cache MUST update its header fields with the header fields provided in the <\/ins> Note that the Content-* prefix is not a signal that a header field is omitted from update; it is only a convention for naming content- related fields. <\/del> response, as per update. <\/ins> 4.3.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-83a19413ce073c3beaaac844098b6ee73fabf453e12312f95d4716c350936ebe","title":"","text":"If a cache updates a stored response with the metadata provided in a HEAD response, the cache MUST use the header fields provided in the HEAD response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response (subject to the exceptions in freshening.responses) and append new header fields to the stored response's header section unless otherwise restricted by the header field. <\/del> HEAD response to update the stored response (see update). <\/ins> 4.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-657abb1f950c640a53e2130d565bac97d14096fcbb52102382fa1d4d41dfdbcc","title":"","text":"collected.abnf shows the collected grammar with all list operators expanded to standard ABNF notation. The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in RFC5234: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9\/A-F\/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible USASCII character). <\/del> The following core rule is included by reference, as defined in RFC5234: DIGIT (decimal 0-9). <\/ins> Semantics defines the following rules:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-23ce65c5ffc416789063ef3f51d1bd3ef00f251fa127dec094fd90294e3ad6ee","title":"","text":"G Grammar ALPHA CR CRLF CTL <\/del> DIGIT DQUOTE HEXDIG HTAB LF OCTET SP VCHAR <\/del> H Header Fields"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ce8879901689a240b1621653ff9e90e42b7d8260787c6f76a3a8be8bce3584e0","title":"","text":"feeds, traffic cameras, real-time ad selectors, and video-on-demand platforms. 3.6. <\/del> Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for a representation of some resource identified by a URI. In the simplest case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O). The following example illustrates a typical message exchange for a GET request (GET) on the URI \"http:\/\/www.example.com\/hello.txt\": Client request: Server response: 3.7. <\/del> 3.6. <\/ins> HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through a chain of connections. There are three common forms of HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e085fce95d6987f9b4a7a02cb4d4b37d799e124b755134cefe12f49988c49ed0","title":"","text":"RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. 3.8. <\/del> 3.7. <\/ins> A \""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f2a1d806f2e338ab46ce0bbbf862e8c34c40a38a5fbe2dfdcb76bb3fd9640f80","title":"","text":"multicast cache entries, archives of pre-fetched cache entries for use in off-line or high-latency environments, and so on. 3.8. The following example illustrates a typical HTTP\/1.1 message exchange for a GET request (GET) on the URI \"http:\/\/www.example.com\/ hello.txt\": Client request: Server response: <\/ins> 4. Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) RFC3986 are used throughout HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4159f07f708ba0cdc3ff4cf891bb301b14f84bbf8bf824038d92fdf6a969685b","title":"","text":"response to indicate successful completion of the request. An origin server SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and trailer fields received in a PUT request (i.e., do not save them as part of the resource state). <\/del> An origin server SHOULD verify that the PUT representation is consistent with any constraints the server has for the target resource that cannot or will not be changed by the PUT. This is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0a22ec014d662e30422fb1b0abb8e369c2eabb65e4ac32ca4d9b7b0819594834","title":"","text":"all implementation details behind the resource interface are intentionally hidden by the server. This extends to how header and trailer fields are stored; while common header fields like will typically be stored and returned upon subsequent GET requests, header and trailer field handling is specific to the resource that received the request. As a result, an origin server SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and trailer fields received in a PUT request (i.e., do not save them as part of the resource state). <\/ins> An origin server MUST NOT send a validator field (response.validator), such as an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-750c9a79d5bba9788083625e6279beea1d2a62af190716f3cd53e76312036192","title":"","text":"A sender MUST NOT generate a bare CR (a CR character not immediately followed by LF) within any protocol elements other than the payload body. A recipient of such a bare CR MUST consider that element to be <\/del> data. A recipient of such a bare CR MUST consider that element to be <\/ins> invalid or replace each bare CR with SP before processing the element or forwarding the message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-19bd87e1e4473e0de6eb55d37bd78ee852371bc75b72fd31f89b7602f99ce139","title":"","text":"6. The message body (if any) of an HTTP message is used to carry the payload body (payload.body) of that request or response. The message body is identical to the payload body unless a transfer coding has been applied, as described in field.transfer-encoding. <\/del> The message body (if any) of an HTTP\/1.1 message is used to carry payload data (payload) for the request or response. The message body is identical to the payload data unless a transfer coding has been applied, as described in field.transfer-encoding. <\/ins> The rules for determining when a message body is present in an HTTP\/1.1 message differ for requests and responses."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6a963996052dfe536e5043f2f87aa0faa989758b54dc5c4a7e091af34a261aef","title":"","text":"or header field. Request message framing is independent of method semantics, even if the method does not define any use for a message body. <\/del> semantics. <\/ins> The presence of a message body in a response depends on both the request method to which it is responding and the response status code (status.line), and corresponds to when a payload body is allowed; see payload.body. <\/del> (status.line), and corresponds to when payload data is allowed; see payload. <\/ins> 6.1. The Transfer-Encoding header field lists the transfer coding names corresponding to the sequence of transfer codings that have been (or will be) applied to the payload body in order to form the message <\/del> will be) applied to the payload data in order to form the message <\/ins> body. Transfer codings are defined in transfer.codings. Transfer-Encoding is analogous to the Content-Transfer-Encoding field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-664c5f1036b742b1f5717c9f1c7f3bfdef5ab0253387764204e21b9780fb6695","title":"","text":"A recipient MUST be able to parse the chunked transfer coding (chunked.encoding) because it plays a crucial role in framing messages when the payload body size is not known in advance. A <\/del> messages when the payload data size is not known in advance. A <\/ins> sender MUST NOT apply chunked more than once to a message body (i.e., chunking an already chunked message is not allowed). If any transfer coding other than chunked is applied to a request payload body, the <\/del> coding other than chunked is applied to a request's payload data, the <\/ins> sender MUST apply chunked as the final transfer coding to ensure that the message is properly framed. If any transfer coding other than chunked is applied to a response payload body, the sender MUST either apply chunked as the final transfer coding or terminate the message by closing the connection. <\/del> chunked is applied to a response's payload data, the sender MUST either apply chunked as the final transfer coding or terminate the message by closing the connection. <\/ins> For example, indicates that the payload body has been compressed using the gzip <\/del> indicates that the payload data has been compressed using the gzip <\/ins> coding and then chunked using the chunked coding while forming the message body."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4c7fa1edc32900e7526eee76504aa8fc0af8280bcdcb5223f477472b538c5d90","title":"","text":"When a message does not have a header field, a Content-Length header field can provide the anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for a potential payload body. For messages that do include a payload body, the <\/del> anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for potential payload data. For messages that do include payload data, the <\/ins> Content-Length field value provides the framing information necessary for determining where the body (and message) ends. For messages that do not include a payload body, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected representation (field.content-length). <\/del> for determining where the data (and message) ends. For messages that do not include payload data, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected representation (field.content-length). <\/ins> 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9046f87e811daa75abe9d1a926b9baa43476902d5f2c9572e0538ea95412e9d3","title":"","text":"If the final response to the last request on a connection has been completely received and there remains additional data to read, a user agent MAY discard the remaining data or attempt to determine if that data belongs as part of the prior response body, which might be the <\/del> data belongs as part of the prior message body, which might be the <\/ins> case if the prior message's Content-Length value is incorrect. A client MUST NOT process, cache, or forward such extra data as a separate response, since such behavior would be vulnerable to cache"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bf9c6d941d1cfdb43dd47897bff279517877cd6c220e25c690cf219d5fa58679","title":"","text":"7. Transfer coding names are used to indicate an encoding transformation that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body in order to ensure \"safe transport\" through the network. This <\/del> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload's data in order to ensure \"safe transport\" through the network. This <\/ins> differs from a content coding in that the transfer coding is a property of the message rather than a property of the representation that is being transferred. Parameters are in the form of a name=value pair. <\/del> All transfer-coding names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered within the HTTP Transfer Coding registry, as defined in transfer.coding.registry. They are used in the (field.te) and <\/del> (field.transfer-encoding) and <\/ins> (field.transfer-encoding) header fields. <\/del> (field.te) header fields (the latter also defining the \"transfer- coding\" grammar). <\/ins> 7.1. The chunked transfer coding wraps the payload body in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to <\/del> The chunked transfer coding wraps payload data in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to <\/ins> retain connection persistence and the recipient to know when it has received the entire message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4d51e942144f66685cde15c9720f2c67f6e9b80dcf1162037d43862c3ae34378","title":"","text":"A trailer section allows the sender to include additional fields at the end of a chunked message in order to supply metadata that might be dynamically generated while the message body is sent, such as a <\/del> be dynamically generated while the payload data is sent, such as a <\/ins> message integrity check, digital signature, or post-processing status. The proper use and limitations of trailer fields are defined in trailer.fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-99a04a12a54779773b3c0d9361510fcaa4f8f2eba294edde8a5958af7cecabc4","title":"","text":"This section is meant to inform developers, information providers, and users of known security considerations relevant to HTTP message syntax, parsing, and routing. Security considerations about HTTP semantics and payloads are addressed in Semantics. <\/del> syntax and parsing. Security considerations about HTTP semantics, payloads, and routing are addressed in Semantics. <\/ins> 11.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0e75a22db021a0ca84204b11e41491061a4f4f98a729488f4ba287df2f56a654","title":"","text":"This specification does not prohibit the application from taking HTTP caching into account; for example, a history mechanism might tell the user that a view is stale, or it might honor cache directives (e.g., Cache-Control: no-store). In particular, when an application caches data and does not make this apparent to or easily controllable by the user, it is strongly encouraged to honour basic control mechanisms like Cache-Control: no-store, as they indicate the resource's intent regarding caching. <\/del> Cache-Control: no-store). However, when an application caches data and does not make this apparent to or easily controllable by the user, it is strongly encouraged to define its operation with respect to HTTP cache directives, so as not to surprise authors who expect caching semantics to be honoured. For example, while it might be reasonable to define an application cache \"above\" HTTP that allows a response containing Cache-Control: no-store to be reused for requests that are directly related to the request that fetched it (such as those created during the same page load), it would likely be surprising and confusing to users and authors if it were allowed to be reused for requests unrelated in any way to the one from which it was obtained. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6309a4ac129a69004014fed113472d9c5a29188a6c4495e22c615e90c6e5e071","title":"","text":"given pathname. This original protocol is now referred to as HTTP\/0.9 (see HTTP09). HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a \".\" (period or decimal point). The first digit (\"major version\") indicates the messaging syntax, whereas the second digit (\"minor version\") indicates the highest minor version within that major version to which the sender is conformant (able to understand for future communication). <\/del> As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through intermediaries, eventually"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-310560627584dbbc9e57f0c0583dea71d0b6ff4bfeb2d3a88c496ed64368e3de","title":"","text":"of an underlying connection failure, as described in idempotent.methods. 2.5. HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a \".\" (period or decimal point). The first digit (\"major version\") indicates the messaging syntax, whereas the second digit (\"minor version\") indicates the highest minor version within that major version to which the sender is conformant (able to understand for future communication). While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, the expression of them \"on the wire\" can change, and so the HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire format. Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible changes to be made to the protocol without changing its version through the use of defined extension points (extending). The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding specification of HTTP. For example, the version \"HTTP\/1.1\" is defined by the combined specifications of this document, \"HTTP Caching\" Caching, and \"HTTP\/1.1\" Messaging. HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible message syntax is introduced. The minor number is incremented when changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients). When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the minor version \"0\" is implied and is used when referring to that protocol within a protocol element that requires sending a minor version. <\/ins> 3. HTTP was created for the World Wide Web (WWW) architecture and has"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-68a89f3d88d2fdda7307b3e74488b7a314cf659c8587406a7f6679f3935cbf18","title":"","text":"can change versions as it passes through intermediaries, because the semantics of a HTTP message are independent of its version. While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, the expression of them \"on the wire\" can change, and so the HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire format. Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible changes to be made to the protocol without changing its version through the use of defined extension points (extending). The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding specification of HTTP. For example, the version \"HTTP\/1.1\" is defined by the combined specifications of this document, \"HTTP Caching\" Caching, and \"HTTP\/1.1\" Messaging. HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible message syntax is introduced. The minor number is incremented when changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients). <\/del> A client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest version to which the client is conformant and whose major version is no higher than the highest version supported by the server, if this is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3d5da3bc72bc4e6e4329b8ff104341353a0ec5ec40367efdd93395715ca982a3","title":"","text":"sufficiently backwards-compatible to be safely processed by any implementation of the same major version. When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the minor version \"0\" is implied and is used when referring to that protocol within a protocol element that requires sending a minor version. <\/del> 5.3. HTTP messages use key\/value pairs to convey data about the message,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ef29108edc677f18c24057aa34ce1eb0578cac56a98ebf1b26df96a420ea21ef","title":"","text":"7. Transfer coding names are used to indicate an encoding transformation that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body in order to ensure \"safe transport\" through the network. This <\/del> that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload's data in order to ensure \"safe transport\" through the network. This <\/ins> differs from a content coding in that the transfer coding is a property of the message rather than a property of the representation that is being transferred."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-44b5d2b87fbfb485dce1c66b47d9d2dda892c4c265cfc09c59be9973fb02243c","title":"","text":"7.1. The chunked transfer coding wraps the payload body in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to <\/del> The chunked transfer coding wraps payload data in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer section containing trailer fields. Chunked enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to <\/ins> retain connection persistence and the recipient to know when it has received the entire message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7c60538f76881b1dc8f38839ac6ec02298b5f7ba18eedd0e3cc6b223cd8c85de","title":"","text":"The request target's host and port value are passed within each HTTP request, identifying the origin and distinguishing it from other namespaces that might be controlled by the same server. It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services provided with control over its certificate's private key are equally responsible for managing the corresponding \"https\" namespaces, or at least prepared to reject requests that appear to have been misdirected. A server might be unwilling to serve as the origin for some hosts even when they have the authority to do so. <\/del> namespaces that might be controlled by the same server (field.host). It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services provided with control over its certificate's private key are equally responsible for managing the corresponding \"https\" namespaces, or at least prepared to reject requests that appear to have been misdirected. A server might be unwilling to serve as the origin for some hosts even when they have the authority to do so. <\/ins> For example, if a network attacker causes connections for port N to be received at port Q, checking the target URI is necessary to ensure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2fe61df35a80bde7f937fe56951423702a5f9d433e8c35346b2b3768002d6fbd","title":"","text":"and fields ought to be implemented by all HTTP\/1.x implementations whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP\/1.1. <\/del> fields ought to be recognized by all HTTP implementations whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP\/1.1. <\/ins> New fields can be introduced without changing the protocol version if their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by recipients"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-dfc59e3bc28eb6e64a3954a8b66f6152c34bff8bb41ec300b71b4594b504c10d","title":"","text":"The \"Host\" header field in a request provides the host and port information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to distinguish among resources while servicing requests for multiple host names on a single IP address. <\/del> host names. <\/ins> Since the Host field value is critical information for handling a request, a user agent SHOULD generate Host as the first field in the header section. <\/del> In HTTP\/2 RFC7540 and HTTP\/3 HTTP3, the Host header field is, in some cases, supplanted by the \":authority\" pseudo-header field of a request's control data. The target URI's authority information is critical for handling a request. A user agent SHOULD generate Host as the first field in the header section of a request unless it has already generated that information as an \":authority\" pseudo-header field. <\/ins> For example, a GET request to the origin server for would begin with: Since the Host header field acts as an application-level routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server. An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the Host field value for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that host. <\/del> Since the host and port information acts as an application-level routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server. An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the host and port information for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that host. <\/ins> 7.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-11409483aa8973336c40ed23316a5cbb34d22dc9519c796e7c872f1d987120bf","title":"","text":"implementing such verification can be difficult (see Georgiev). Authority for a given origin server can be delegated through protocol extensions; for example, RFC7838. Likewise, the set of servers that a connection is considered authoritative for can be changed with a <\/del> extensions; for example, RFC7838. Likewise, the set of servers for which a connection is considered authoritative can be changed with a <\/ins> protocol extension like RFC8336. Providing a response from a non-authoritative source, such as a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f17247402424d3a30fbe32f551cd875720d2a2051982ee081580c5419fa3edb0","title":"","text":"validation requests for the content might only be applicable along the same request path (through the same proxies). The 203 response is similar to the Warning code of 214 Transformation Applied (field.warning), which has the advantage of being applicable to responses with any status code. <\/del> A 203 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see heuristic.freshness)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b898c5af2790b0323213aec401fe1c99cc0e9887c9c4d5992e952d1d48092a7a","title":"","text":"with the registration procedure of status.code.registry and the status code values summarized in the following table. Additionally, please update the following entry in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code Registry: <\/del> 18.4. This specification updates the HTTP related aspects of the existing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3155af4b97594759db21f656b6ee0313e1bc78addcd030d36a3e55457ef71611","title":"","text":"HTTP depends on the security properties of the underlying transport- or session-level connection to provide confidential transmission of fields. In other words, if a server limits access to authenticated users using this framework, the server needs to ensure that the connection is properly secured in accordance with the nature of the authentication scheme used. For example, services that depend on individual user authentication often require a connection to be secured with TLS (\"Transport Layer Security\", RFC8446) prior to exchanging any credentials. <\/del> fields. Services that depend on individual user authentication require a connection prior to exchanging credentials (https.uri). <\/ins> 17.15.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-278af1f87ecd9b1531b1da9e822d119ec9024bda2734ae74f99f788997b162a0","title":"","text":"This section is meant to inform developers, information providers, and users of known security concerns relevant to HTTP semantics and its use for transferring information over the Internet. Considerations related to message syntax, parsing, and routing are discussed in Messaging-security.considerations. <\/del> Considerations related to caching are discussed in Caching- security.considerations and considerations related to HTTP\/1.1 message syntax and parsing are discussed in Messaging- security.considerations. <\/ins> The list of considerations below is not exhaustive. Most security concerns related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-db19e283a72ff291ca71cdddca346f34f96277e99930dfb1037dec733c31f978","title":"","text":"The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application- level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines the semantics of HTTP: its architecture, terminology, the \"http\" and \"https\" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, core request methods, request header fields, response status codes, response header fields, and content negotiation. <\/del> systems. This document defines the semantics shared by all versions of HTTP, including its architecture, terminology, core protocol elements, and extensibility mechanisms, along with the \"http\" and \"https\" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. <\/ins> This document obsoletes RFC 2818, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7235, RFC 7538, RFC 7615, RFC 7694, and portions of RFC 7230."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7b5a7372d4fe7738e650e054f7fda85c197c8934e206a64b255cdaa16a5fae59","title":"","text":"provides a list of representations for the user agent to choose from, and \"request payload\" negotiation, where the user agent selects the representation for a future request based upon the server's stated preferences in past responses. Other patterns of content negotiation include \"conditional content\", where the representation consists of multiple parts that are selectively rendered based on user agent parameters, \"active content\", where the representation contains a script that makes additional (more specific) requests based on the user agent characteristics, and \"Transparent Content Negotiation\" (RFC2295), where content selection is performed by an intermediary. These patterns are not mutually exclusive, and each has trade-offs in <\/del> preferences in past responses. Other patterns of content negotiation include \"conditional content\", where the representation consists of multiple parts that are selectively rendered based on user agent parameters, \"active content\", where the representation contains a script that makes additional (more specific) requests based on the user agent characteristics, and \"Transparent Content Negotiation\" (RFC2295), where content selection is performed by an intermediary. These patterns are not mutually exclusive, and each has trade-offs in <\/ins> applicability and practicality. Note that, in all cases, HTTP is not aware of the resource semantics."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b5d664f0b29a291a36417552d219de546d794a60bfc7f1e2a153dffd429e8ee1","title":"","text":"proactive negotiation to indicate what parts of the request information were used in the selection algorithm. The request header fields below can be sent by a user agent to engage in <\/del> The request header fields <\/ins> of the response content, as defined in proactive.negotiation. The preferences sent in these fields apply to any content in the response, including representations of the target resource, representations of error or processing status, and potentially even the miscellaneous text strings that might appear within the protocol. <\/del> , , , and are defined below for a user agent to engage in of the response content. The preferences sent in these fields apply to any content in the response, including representations of the target resource, representations of error or processing status, and potentially even the miscellaneous text strings that might appear within the protocol. 12.2. With (a.k.a., ), selection of the best response representation (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response from the origin server that contains a list of resources for alternative representations. If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response representation, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources, selected based on metadata included in the list, to obtain a different form of representation for that response. Selection of alternatives might be performed automatically by the user agent or manually by the user selecting from a generated (possibly hypertext) menu. Note that the above refers to representations of the response, in general, not representations of the resource. The alternative representations are only considered representations of the target resource if the response in which those alternatives are provided has the semantics of being a representation of the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request) or has the semantics of providing links to alternative representations for the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request). A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other than the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive negotiation by the user agent is preferred. For example, the alternatives listed in responses with the <\/ins> 12.1.1. <\/del> and status codes include information about the available representations so that the user or user agent can react by making a selection. Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary over commonly used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding), when the origin server is unable to determine a user agent's capabilities from examining the request, and generally when public caches are used to distribute server load and reduce network usage. Reactive negotiation suffers from the disadvantages of transmitting a list of alternatives to the user agent, which degrades user-perceived latency if transmitted in the header section, and needing a second request to obtain an alternate representation. Furthermore, this specification does not define a mechanism for supporting automatic selection, though it does not prevent such a mechanism from being developed as an extension. <\/ins> 12.1.1.1. <\/del> 12.3. When content negotiation preferences are sent in a server's response, the listed preferences are called because they intend to influence selection of an appropriate payload for subsequent requests to that resource. For example, the (field.accept) and (field.accept-encoding) header fields can be sent in a response to indicate preferred media types and content codings for subsequent requests to that resource. Similarly, RFC5789 defines the \"Accept-Patch\" response header field which allows discovery of which content types are accepted in PATCH requests. <\/ins> For each of these header fields, a request that does not contain the field implies that the user agent has no preference on that axis of negotiation. If the header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response can be considered acceptable according to it, the origin server can either honor the header field by sending a <\/del> 12.4. 12.4.1. For each of the content negotiation fields, a request that does not contain the field implies that the sender has no preference on that axis of negotiation. If a content negotiation header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response can be considered acceptable according to it, the origin server can either honor the header field by sending a <\/ins> response or disregard the header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation for that request header field. This does not imply, however, that the client will be able to use the representation. 12.1.1.2. <\/del> 12.4.2. <\/ins> The content negotiation fields defined by this specification use a common parameter, named \"q\" (case-insensitive), to assign a relative"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-83a596cdf7e7d6610e935d460293c16ba2e14ef2fb98f826d8e34ea825532116","title":"","text":"decimal point. User configuration of these values ought to be limited in the same fashion. 12.1.1.3. <\/del> 12.4.3. <\/ins> Most of these header fields, where indicated, define a wildcard value (\"*\") to select unspecified values. If no wildcard is present, all values not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered \"not acceptable\" to the client. <\/del> (\"*\") to select unspecified values. If no wildcard is present, values that are not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered unacceptable, except for within where it means the variance is unlimited. 12.5. <\/ins> 12.1.2. <\/del> 12.5.1. <\/ins> The \"Accept\" header field can be used by user agents to specify their preferences regarding response media types. For example, Accept"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-caee8814d9d90259b10adc8005a8d7d3c735d2e58a31c4979da78ca545b8cfa8","title":"","text":"would cause the following values to be associated: 12.1.3. <\/del> 12.5.2. <\/ins> The \"Accept-Charset\" header field can be sent by a user agent to indicate its preferences for charsets in textual response content."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a3e1480bc5572fc7c9773d3e0a077abf037f9c74cd0035e5b8b8e19ac7ce6d10","title":"","text":"The special value \"*\", if present in the Accept-Charset header field, matches every charset that is not mentioned elsewhere in the field. 12.1.4. <\/del> 12.5.3. <\/ins> The \"Accept-Encoding\" header field can be used to indicate preferences regarding the use of content codings (content.codings)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7d386db70505e8647d288a325d07150b77f11ad64bc3811c00ec66573f8922bf","title":"","text":"response when the request payload was big enough to justify use of a compression coding but the client failed do so. 12.1.5. <\/del> 12.5.4. <\/ins> The \"Accept-Language\" header field can be used by user agents to indicate the set of natural languages that are preferred in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b1832e344be0ecb2ec6915da3b0978fe945dba2bb33f48d72ff7844e22391762","title":"","text":"does not provide such control to the user MUST NOT send an Accept- Language header field. 12.2. With (a.k.a., ), selection of the best response representation (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response from the origin server that contains a list of resources for alternative representations. If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response representation, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources, selected based on metadata included in the list, to obtain a different form of representation for that response. Selection of alternatives might be performed automatically by the user agent or manually by the user selecting from a generated (possibly hypertext) menu. Note that the above refers to representations of the response, in general, not representations of the resource. The alternative representations are only considered representations of the target resource if the response in which those alternatives are provided has the semantics of being a representation of the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request) or has the semantics of providing links to alternative representations for the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request). A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other than the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive negotiation by the user agent is preferred. For example, the alternatives listed in responses with the and status codes include information about the available representations so that the user or user agent can react by making a selection. Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary over commonly used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding), when the origin server is unable to determine a user agent's capabilities from examining the request, and generally when public caches are used to distribute server load and reduce network usage. Reactive negotiation suffers from the disadvantages of transmitting a list of alternatives to the user agent, which degrades user-perceived latency if transmitted in the header section, and needing a second request to obtain an alternate representation. Furthermore, this specification does not define a mechanism for supporting automatic selection, though it does not prevent such a mechanism from being developed as an extension. 12.2.1. <\/del> 12.5.5. <\/ins> The \"Vary\" header field in a response describes what parts of a request message, aside from the method and target URI, might"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bfa11e1c2abf2f161fddd684df148712f464dd517a25226032318c05c1d59e1a","title":"","text":"it considers the variance less significant than the performance cost of Vary's impact on caching. 12.3. When content negotiation preferences are sent in a server's response, the listed preferences are called because they intend to influence selection of an appropriate payload for subsequent requests to that resource. For example, the (field.accept) and (field.accept-encoding) header fields can be sent in a response to indicate preferred media types and content codings for subsequent requests to that resource. Similarly, RFC5789 defines the \"Accept-Patch\" response header field which allows discovery of which content types are accepted in PATCH requests. <\/del> 13. A conditional request is an HTTP request with one or more request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a010ced70bf3d88dd5719d029a5e9059bc2fa92962bca10a152b609269558b97","title":"","text":"can be distinguished from a valid by examining the first two characters for a DQUOTE. <\/del> by examining the first three characters for a DQUOTE. <\/ins> If the validator given in the If-Range header field matches the current validator for the selected representation of the target"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a94457811200d1c391470c891b4f19758ee45be8c9f0a660da0b4e1e69925c34","title":"","text":"The status codes listed below are defined in this specification. The reason phrases listed here are only recommendations -- they can be replaced by local equivalents without affecting the protocol. <\/del> replaced by local equivalents or left out altogether without affecting the protocol. <\/ins> Responses with status codes that are defined as heuristically cacheable (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206, 300, 301, 308, 404, 405, 410,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e3f4868dcf4abe6f41fab3531bb732e7c491815a29a508f0afd301feb58e355f","title":"","text":"10.1. A client sends request header fields to provide more information about the request context, make the request conditional based on the target resource state, suggest preferred formats for the response, supply authentication credentials, or modify the expected request processing. These fields act as request modifiers, similar to the parameters on a programming language method invocation. <\/del> The request header fields below provide additional information about the request context, including information about the user, user agent, and resource behind the request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c3c07aabe449d2d1d98395639666d6bb177a02ae091e1c8a81bb5595ff224a54","title":"","text":"The status code indicates that the server did not receive a complete request message within the time that it was prepared to wait. If the client has an outstanding request in transit, the client MAY repeat that request on a new connection. <\/del> request message within the time that it was prepared to wait. If the client has an outstanding request in transit, it MAY repeat that request. If the current connection is not usable (e.g., as it would be in HTTP\/1.1, because request delimitation is lost), a new connection will be used. <\/ins> 15.5.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c4088b63ec5ff46c910007c7ddef1eb8373c106b085189b9b90865530ddbe378","title":"","text":"field-components defines some generic syntactic components for field values. The rule below is defined in Messaging; <\/del> This specification uses the terms \"character\", \"character encoding scheme\", \"charset\", and \"protocol element\" as they are defined in RFC6365."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1b97628550ca2c22c3b1b9e6b3337289b9887e0da728b0fade7c4c2364609061","title":"","text":"transfer codings the client is willing to accept in the response. The TE field value consists of a list of tokens, each allowing for optional parameters (as described in parameter). <\/del> optional parameters (except for the special case \"trailers\"). <\/ins> 10.1.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d8a4be2eccf8bd56abb92ec463076dba0a1eb180f7598d24ea609e648e14a53f","title":"","text":"A server MAY ignore the Range header field. However, origin servers and intermediate caches ought to support byte ranges when possible, since they support efficient recovery from partially failed transfers and partial retrieval of large representations. A server MUST ignore a Range header field received with a request method other than GET. <\/del> and partial retrieval of large representations. A server MUST ignore a Range header field received with a request method which is unrecognized or for which range handling is not defined. For this specification, is the only method for which range handling is defined. <\/ins> An origin server MUST ignore a Range header field that contains a range unit it does not understand. A proxy MAY discard a Range"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-33db2ca57a2de8b34bf3abc5232c897f53f99f4389fb0697d246a0d010336d72","title":"","text":"9.3.2. The HEAD method is identical to GET except that the server MUST NOT send payload data in the response (i.e., the response terminates at the end of the header section). The server SHOULD send the same header fields in response to a HEAD request as it would have sent if the request had been a GET, except that header fields that describe message body encoding or transmission (e.g., <\/del> send payload data in the response and the response always terminates at the end of the header section. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about the without transferring its representation data, often for the sake of testing hypertext links or finding recent modifications. The server SHOULD send the same header fields in response to a HEAD request as it would have sent if the request method had been GET. However, a server MAY omit header fields for which a value is determined only while generating the payload data. For example, some servers buffer a dynamic response to GET until a minimum amount of data is generated so that they can more efficiently delimit small responses or make late decisions with regard to content selection. Such a response to GET might contain <\/ins> ) MAY be omitted. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about the <\/del> and <\/ins> without transferring the representation data. It is often used to test hypertext links for validity, accessibility, and recent modification. <\/del> fields, for example, that are not generated within a HEAD response. These minor inconsistencies are considered preferable to generating and discarding the payload data for a HEAD request, since HEAD is usually requested for the sake of efficiency. <\/ins> A payload within a HEAD request message has no defined semantics; sending payload data in a HEAD request might cause some existing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2c4d545da243194a64e9805b642e98031dc1c46f8b831cec9b74672d3b91e66d","title":"","text":"effort attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as promptly as possible after forwarding it. This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. <\/del> This directive is a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. <\/ins> Note that if a request containing this directive is satisfied from a cache, the no-store request directive does not apply to the already"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4693fa27664c8e732b652ab8189e061f8327a354359ab70a3ef9e45ea3429024","title":"","text":"effort attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as promptly as possible after forwarding it. This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. <\/del> This directive is a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. <\/ins> 5.2.2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2b89df6ad49b2d8421193a38d07853bd433014ae5eb11a0d2eafdd76cd1d00b0","title":"","text":"member, as described in trailer.fields. Additionally, specific HTTP versions can use it to indicate the transfer codings the client is willing to accept in the response. <\/del> transfer codings the client is willing to accept in the response. As of publication, only HTTP\/1.1 uses transfer codings (see transfer.codings). <\/ins> The TE field value consists of a list of tokens, each allowing for optional parameters (except for the special case \"trailers\")."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-210bb75cd9997bb19232569cbef213c9e89a6bd673ac6faa1d56a515f2ecb0b4","title":"","text":"Wide Web since its introduction in 1990. It began as a trivial mechanism for low-latency requests, with a single method (GET) to request transfer of a presumed hypertext document identified by a given pathname. This original protocol is now referred to as HTTP\/0.9 (see HTTP09). As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through intermediaries, eventually being defined as HTTP\/1.0 RFC1945. <\/del> given pathname. As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and route requests through intermediaries. These protocols were eventually defined as HTTP\/0.9 and HTTP\/1.0 (see RFC1945). <\/ins> HTTP\/1.1 was designed to refine the protocol's features while retaining compatibility with the existing text-based messaging"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-25fb7160f7d26a7250d9b9c1ee4c6c1d5b76fb21a2a9ddb8332143dbe2a2102a","title":"","text":"subtypes of that type. The media-range can include media type parameters that are applicable to that range. Each media-range might be followed by zero or more applicable media type parameters (e.g., <\/del> Each media-range might be followed by optional applicable media type parameters (e.g., ), followed by an optional \"q\" parameter for indicating a relative weight (quality.values). <\/ins> ), an optional \"q\" parameter for indicating a relative weight (quality.values), and then zero or more extension parameters. The \"q\" parameter is necessary if any extensions (accept-ext) are present, since it acts as a separator between the two parameter sets. <\/del> This specification does not define \"accept parameters\" following the special \"q\" parameter, as was done in earlier editions. Senders using weights SHOULD send \"q\" last (after all media-range parameters). Recipients SHOULD process any parameter named \"q\" as weight, regardless of parameter ordering. <\/ins> The example"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-613462104bcae060f8dc24d995c29f028db6fc1fd0c30fb74b4929da1aed112e","title":"","text":"The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features. In all circumstances a cache MUST obey the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a cache is disconnected, the cache MUST generate a <\/del> cache MUST NOT ignore the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a cache is disconnected, the cache MUST generate an error response rather than reuse the stale response. The generated status code SHOULD be <\/ins> response rather than reuse the stale response. <\/del> unless another error status code is more applicable. <\/ins> The must-revalidate directive ought to be used by servers if and only if failure to validate a request on the representation could cause"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-470c9388140b5aad741e5a57aa72089425a61e4d06d62efc12b8673d25887299","title":"","text":"MUST NOT attempt to recombine it with a stored representation. A proxy that receives such a message SHOULD forward it downstream. A server MUST ignore a Content-Range header field received in a request with a method for which Content-Range support is not defined. No request method in this specification is defined to support Content-Range in a request. <\/ins> For byte ranges, a sender SHOULD indicate the complete length of the representation from which the range has been extracted, unless the complete length is unknown or difficult to determine. An asterisk"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1e96101a72cb1c0300a515e6b3eca86066e1aaee53f5a60d6afb602a48f99173","title":"","text":"the namespace for HTTP field names. Any party can request registration of a HTTP field. See considerations.for.new.field.values for considerations to take into account when creating a new HTTP field. <\/del> considerations.for.new.fields for considerations to take into account when creating a new HTTP field. <\/ins> The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" is located at ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-477253bb9948d4a3ffdaaed05b207b6d21900796a35c2ce13ff00dcbaeaa7bf4","title":"","text":"16.3.2. HTTP header and trailer fields are a widely-used extension point for the protocol. While they can be (and often are) used in an ad hoc fashion, fields that are widely used need to be more carefully documented, to ensure interoperability. In particular, authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to consider and, where appropriate, document the following aspects: Request header fields have additional considerations that need to be documented if the default behaviour is not appropriate: 16.3.2.1. <\/ins> Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to choose a short but descriptive field name. Short names avoid needless data transmission; descriptive names avoid confusion and \"squatting\" on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-37f5400acae344a1466fed3fd9f316c385d6b5ebb3b31bb6efcbcf7ad5f7587f","title":"","text":"To that end, limited-use fields (such as a header confined to a single application or use case) are encouraged to use a name that includes its name (or an abbreviation) as a prefix; for example, if <\/del> includes that use (or an abbreviation) as a prefix; for example, if <\/ins> the Foo Application needs a Description field, it might use \"Foo- Desc\"; \"Description\" is too generic, and \"Foo-Description\" is needlessly long."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-be0197d389a3003fb36e6a8bf51d528f8f8be1dc3aba235fdc6ac927f8bf9e9e","title":"","text":"prefixes are only an aid to recognizing the purpose of a field, and do not trigger automatic processing. 16.3.3. <\/del> 16.3.2.2. A major task in the definition of a new HTTP field is the specification of the field value syntax: what senders should generate, and how recipients should infer semantics from what is received. Authors are encouraged (but not required) to use either the ABNF rules in this specification or those in RFCSTRF to define the syntax of new field values. Authors are advised to carefully consider how the combination of multiple field lines will impact them (see field-order). Because senders might send erroneously send multiple values, and both intermediaries and HTTP libraries can perform combination automatically, this applies to all field values -- even when only a single value is anticipated. Therefore, authors are advised to either delimit values that contain commas (e.g., with the rule; see quoted.strings, or the String data type in RFCSTRF), or encode or escape them. This ensures that commas in the payload of the field value are not confused with those used to delimit list values. For example, the field value only allows commas inside quoted strings, and so can be reliably parsed, even when multiple values are present. The field value provides a counter-example that should not be emulated: because URIs can include commas, it is not possible to reliably distinguish between a single value that includes a comma from two values. <\/ins> Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to consider documenting: <\/del> Authors of fields with a singleton value (see field-values) are additionally advised to document how to treat messages where the multiple members are present (a sensible default would be to ignore the field, but this might not always be the right choice). <\/ins> 16.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a01864d12eae54e293e11575403aec29ddb23fe058eb9e50c2d973581f322cf5","title":"","text":"content, or poison a cache. See security.considerations for security considerations regarding message routing. The status code in a response indicates that the origin server has rejected the request because it appears to have been misdirected (status.421). <\/ins> 7.5. A connection might be used for multiple request\/response exchanges."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-36db340593f971670fb6c35db292fbfef2cf60b67da8a4b06078c1e9fcd17012","title":"","text":"15.5.20. The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code indicates that the request was directed at a server that is unable or unwilling to produce an authoritative response for the target URI. A 421 is sent when an origin server (or gateway acting on behalf of the origin server) rejects a target URI that does not match an for which the server has been configured (origin) or does not match the connection context over which the request was received (routing.reject). A client that receives a 421 (Misdirected Request) response MAY retry the request, whether or not the request method is idempotent, over a different connection, such as a fresh connection specific to the target resource's origin, or via an alternative service RFC7838. A proxy MUST NOT generate a 421 response. A 421 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see heuristic.freshness). 15.5.21. <\/ins> The 422 (Unprocessable Payload) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request payload (hence a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9ceb31558d51c12930ddbc7d4ea323e8951cb65fe8175932612a929d0749594c","title":"","text":"contains well-formed (i.e., syntactically correct), but semantically erroneous XML instructions. 15.5.21. <\/del> 15.5.22. <\/ins> The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-58d351512c322ce1fdf1d4fcdfbd8651284a7a20f79f6e07e81117029e87ff5d","title":"","text":"416 Range Not Satisfiable (status code) 417 Expectation Failed (status code) 418 (Unused) (status code) 421 Misdirected Request (status code) <\/ins> 422 Unprocessable Payload (status code) 426 Upgrade Required (status code) 4xx Client Error (status code class)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d11909e1c6514f89ba00ef6f477221caf64e5fba9b0b0b0aae5e54130e6aeb4a","title":"","text":"15.5.20. The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code indicates that the request was directed at a server that is unable or unwilling to produce an authoritative response for the target URI. A 421 is sent when an origin server (or gateway acting on behalf of the origin server) rejects a target URI that does not match an for which the server has been configured (origin) or does not match the connection context over which the request was received (routing.reject). A client that receives a 421 (Misdirected Request) response MAY retry the request, whether or not the request method is idempotent, over a different connection, such as a fresh connection specific to the target resource's origin, or via an alternative service RFC7838. A proxy MUST NOT generate a 421 response. 15.5.21. <\/ins> The 422 (Unprocessable Payload) status code indicates that the server understands the content type of the request payload (hence a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-070b147e2d2eac093f26dba2f9bc9467e9d19d095f43b165edf90f81a5c64855","title":"","text":"The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application- level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines the semantics shared by all versions of HTTP, including its architecture, terminology, core protocol elements, and extensibility mechanisms, along with the \"http\" and <\/del> systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the \"http\" and <\/ins> \"https\" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document obsoletes RFC 2818, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-82187cd72fc85fe08368503a93827ca0a279670eb141158e2c741095e56d0f8e","title":"","text":"that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache cannot be used by a server while it is acting as a tunnel. <\/del> client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache cannot be used while acting as a tunnel. <\/ins> The effect of a cache is that the request\/response chain is shortened if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8bf25e43fb383d19d7816b1cf92f1ae670d24f5c95535fa59af179b8e7cc5fcc","title":"","text":"3.4. A response might transfer only a partial representation if the connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more Range specifiers (field.range). After several such transfers, a cache might have received several ranges of the same representation. A cache MAY combine these ranges into a single stored response, and reuse that response to satisfy later requests, if they all share the same strong validator and the cache complies with the client requirements in combining.byte.ranges. When combining the new response with one or more stored responses, a cache MUST update the stored response header fields using the header fields provided in the new response, as per update. 3.5. <\/ins> A shared cache MUST NOT use a cached response to a request with an header field (field.authorization) to satisfy any subsequent request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-769e40c17b86b0c15d415e77decb74730329693e8afbd068d45891f550c07e0d","title":"","text":"public (cache-response-directive.public), and s-maxage (cache- response-directive.s-maxage). 3.5. A response might transfer only a partial representation if the connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more Range specifiers (field.range). After several such transfers, a cache might have received several ranges of the same representation. A cache MAY combine these ranges into a single stored response, and reuse that response to satisfy later requests, if they all share the same strong validator and the cache complies with the client requirements in combining.byte.ranges. When combining the new response with one or more stored responses, a cache MUST update the stored response header fields using the header fields provided in the new response, as per update. <\/del> 4. When presented with a request, a cache MUST NOT reuse a stored"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-18a2d90904c2bfcc8506fc620429d144e0eba5815e82f1d1741bf6a4cb849f3a","title":"","text":"RFC3040 (also commonly known as a RFC1919 or ) differs from an HTTP proxy because it is not chosen by the client. Instead, an interception proxy filters or redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets (and occasionally other common port traffic). <\/del> RFC1919) differs from an HTTP proxy because it is not chosen by the client. Instead, an interception proxy filters or redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets (and occasionally other common port traffic). <\/ins> Interception proxies are commonly found on public network access points, as a means of enforcing account subscription prior to allowing use of non-local Internet services, and within corporate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-137707fb2c24cfa98659e76a0840b4a36325835f0b250f5969bf2f4e0ef30bc6","title":"","text":"Content-Type header field cache cacheable captive portal <\/del> client close complete"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-eff82c28ca811ccbc5d2ec3157b0fd3579f2a128ae8dfcd896fe123fd191ee6e","title":"","text":"payload data is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of \"0\". Likewise, new methods cannot use the special host:port and asterisk forms of request target that are allowed for and , respectively (target.resource). A full URI in absolute form is needed for the target URI, which means either the request target needs to be sent in absolute form or the target URI will be reconstructed from the request context in the same way it is for other methods. <\/ins> A new method definition needs to indicate whether it is safe (safe.methods), idempotent (idempotent.methods), cacheable (cacheable.methods), what semantics are to be associated with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-10611404aa3025598a90d0c3301cb1130a8d066a5a73c85647889ab4522ec888","title":"","text":"2.3. When a received protocol element is parsed, the recipient MUST be able to parse any value of reasonable length that is applicable to the recipient's role and that matches the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules. Note, however, that some received protocol elements might not be parsed. For example, an intermediary forwarding a message might parse a field into generic field name and field value components, but then forward the field without further parsing inside the field value. <\/del> A recipient SHOULD parse a received protocol element defensively, with only marginal expectations that the element will conform to its ABNF grammar and fit within a reasonable buffer size. <\/ins> HTTP does not have specific length limitations for many of its protocol elements because the lengths that might be appropriate will"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f858bda5aaf9d4c343dbf180fc087aa24a6e98eab054dcb65257a8349c875e48","title":"","text":"its own resources needs to be able to parse and process those same references when received as a target URI. Many received protocol elements are only parsed to the extent necessary to identify and forward that element downstream. For example, an intermediary might parse a received field into its field name and field value components, but then forward the field without further parsing inside the field value. <\/ins> 2.4. A recipient MUST interpret a received protocol element according to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1b2a63b31b5043e2d7ce887673234d2c1a44fec7d15ed82c007ac3463099c0d5","title":"","text":"likely intended for some other (inbound) server. The proper evaluation of conditional requests by a cache depends on the received precondition header fields and their precedence, as defined in precedence. The <\/del> the received precondition header fields and their precedence. In summary, the <\/ins> and conditional header fields are not applicable to a cache. <\/del> conditional header fields are not applicable to a cache, and takes precedence over . See precedence for a complete specification of precondition precedence. <\/ins> A request containing an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-871c1ff2197bbb88230e3ad4179cc7455ff89ad050f89741c2b95297f6de0e48","title":"","text":"The \"must-understand\" response directive limits caching of the response to a cache that understands and conforms to the requirements for that response's status code. A cache MUST NOT store a response containing the must-understand directive if the cache does not understand the response status code. <\/del> for that response's status code. Responses containing \"must-understand\" SHOULD also contain the \"no- store\" directive; caches that implement \"must-understand\" SHOULD ignore the \"no-store\" directive in responses that contain both directives and a status code that the cache understands and conforms to any related caching requirements. <\/ins> 5.2.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d2118d5525bc41039976a97742e6cd3d6c46bc9d8b5a8ed360b9348ae165e522","title":"","text":"obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. Note that the \"must-understand\" cache directive overrides \"no-store\" in certain circumstances; see cache-response-directive.must- understand. <\/ins> 5.2.2.5. The \"no-transform\" response directive indicates that an intermediary"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5f8d04311c4dd9336998f72fd88bfb8ded6d836ed65e03186658499ac706512d","title":"","text":"representation. For example, a browser might decode the content coding of a response payload while it is being received, creating a disconnect between the data it has stored and the response payload's original metadata. Updating that stored metadata with a different <\/del> while it is being received, creating a disconnect between the data it has stored and the response's original metadata. Updating that stored metadata with a different <\/ins> header field would be problematic. Likewise, a browser might store a post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the payload <\/del> post-parse tree representation of HTML, rather than the content <\/ins> received in the response; updating the header field would not be workable in this case, because any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bf86282cbdce76a73e54cec93b94fd93cfcaf04881b7fe3679ff7c879f26519b","title":"","text":"A response's age can be calculated in two entirely independent ways: These are combined as <\/del> The corrected_age_value MAY be used as the corrected_initial_age. In circumstances where very old cache implementations that might not correctly insert <\/ins> unless the cache is confident in the value of the header field (e.g., because there are no HTTP\/1.0 hops in the header field), in which case the corrected_age_value MAY be used as the corrected_initial_age. <\/del> are present, corrected_initial_age can be calculated more conservatively as <\/ins> The current_age of a stored response can then be calculated by adding the time (in seconds) since the stored response was last validated by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f8b88f36b912c95fe1f34df787b3746a967fdddb12eb3b4b4421c577078b3410","title":"","text":"4.3.5. A response to the HEAD method is identical to what an equivalent request made with a GET would have been, except it lacks payload data. This property of HEAD responses can be used to invalidate or update a cached GET response if the more efficient conditional GET request mechanism is not available (due to no validators being present in the stored response) or if transmission of the payload data is not desired even if it has changed. <\/del> request made with a GET would have been, without sending the content. This property of HEAD responses can be used to invalidate or update a cached GET response if the more efficient conditional GET request mechanism is not available (due to no validators being present in the stored response) or if transmission of the content is not desired even if it has changed. <\/ins> When a cache makes an inbound HEAD request for a target URI and receives a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6c567ef5d1958391ddf8fde2b24f091595b032f8ad371b9a834885fcc43bcd21","title":"","text":"The presence of an Age header field implies that the response was not generated or validated by the origin server for this request. However, lack of an Age header field does not imply the origin was contacted, since the response might have been received from an HTTP\/1.0 cache that does not implement Age. <\/del> contacted. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f459b74fc8d36fa59d6115f9350e9aacf7ca1e555f75e14dfb7532ae3d624a90","title":"","text":"5.2.1.6. The \"no-transform\" request directive indicates that the client is asking for intermediaries to avoid transforming the payload, as <\/del> asking for intermediaries to avoid transforming the content, as <\/ins> defined in message.transformations. 5.2.1.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b63f62773f1130e95553c63b9c266cf5740a859bd7d9921cbab6c6f4a2632146","title":"","text":"obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping. Note that the \"must-understand\" cache directive overrides \"no-store\" in certain circumstances; see cache-response-directive.must- understand. <\/ins> 5.2.2.5. The \"no-transform\" response directive indicates that an intermediary (regardless of whether it implements a cache) MUST NOT transform the payload, as defined in message.transformations. <\/del> content, as defined in message.transformations. <\/ins> 5.2.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2d7602cef907a1459f62578aab12bd73590146949d717b56ad8b3d5de6931f91","title":"","text":"7.1. Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks use the cache to distribute a malicious payload to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. <\/del> Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks use the cache to distribute malicious content to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. <\/ins> One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ebf094d043191388f24bc265ee4dc3a5dd3f7307592f2c021510904744a11789","title":"","text":"corresponding Date header field to the message's header section if it is cached or forwarded downstream. A recipient with a clock that receives a response with an invalid Date header field value MAY replace that value with the time that response was received. <\/ins> A user agent MAY send a Date header field in a request, though generally will not do so unless it is believed to convey useful information to the server. For example, custom applications of HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f81791d17b7616dd64dffc7db13a206f7bc9c46fbc2dedea4350bd7390038e75","title":"","text":"A conditional request is an HTTP request with one or more request header fields that indicate a precondition to be tested before applying the request method to the target resource. evaluation defines when preconditions are applied. precedence defines the order of evaluation when more than one precondition is present. <\/del> defines when to evaluate preconditions and their order of precedence when more than one precondition is present. <\/ins> Conditional GET requests are the most efficient mechanism for HTTP cache updates Caching. Conditionals can also be applied to state-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-fdd33278c516badb84fc7930d27e962ab7233bdd4b13dde74395c289f428c4d6","title":"","text":"To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field: An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the <\/del> An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if a received If-None-Match condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server MUST respond with either a) the <\/ins> status code if the request method is GET or HEAD or b) the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2b774f9f5d9ef3097e1c5b9361ad328097e0129fcfea72ddc960ce8bce11a5ad","title":"","text":"An origin server that receives an If-Modified-Since header field SHOULD evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. The origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested method if the selected representation's last modification date is earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value; instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a <\/del> the method. To evaluate a received If-Modified-Since header field: An origin server SHOULD NOT perform the requested method if a received If-Modified-Since condition evaluates to false; instead, the origin server SHOULD generate a <\/ins> response, including only those metadata that are useful for identifying or updating a previously cached response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4c189887aee4d903aa26e6a2ef8346c1f0dee583e6f73556e5d0363a2a5f757e","title":"","text":"stored) from a prior request. An origin server that receives an If-Unmodified-Since header field MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. <\/del> without an If-Match header field MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. <\/ins> If the selected representation has a last modification date, the origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if that date is more recent than the date provided in the field value. Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a <\/del> To evaluate a received If-Unmodified-Since header field: An origin server MUST NOT perform the requested method if an If- Unmodified-Since condition evaluates to false. Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a <\/ins> status code. Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation that appears to have already been applied to the selected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7ca7e760354e66c5966cf4b051e5f1a37f973a92b4212fda265650054db7775d","title":"","text":"representation is unchanged, send me the part(s) that I am requesting in Range; otherwise, send me the entire representation. A valid can be distinguished from a valid by examining the first three characters for a DQUOTE. <\/ins> A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field in a request that does not contain a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c46ceff495868eff8a8d572192c92ae48f69a81322d9584a5bfe1ddc7a6cd4e2","title":"","text":"representation and the date is a strong validator in the sense defined by lastmod.comparison. A server that evaluates an If-Range precondition MUST use the strong comparison function when comparing entity-tags (entity.tag.comparison) and MUST evaluate the condition as false if an <\/del> A server that receives an If-Range header field on a Range request MUST evaluate the condition as per evaluation prior to performing the method. <\/ins> validator is provided that is not a strong validator in the sense defined by lastmod.comparison. A valid <\/del> To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an <\/ins> can be distinguished from a valid <\/del> : <\/ins> by examining the first three characters for a DQUOTE. <\/del> To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an : <\/ins> If the validator given in the If-Range header field matches the current validator for the selected representation of the target resource, then the server SHOULD process the <\/del> A recipient of an If-Range header field MUST ignore the <\/ins> header field as requested. If the validator does not match, the server MUST ignore the <\/del> header field if the If-Range condition evaluates to false. Otherwise, the recipient SHOULD process the <\/ins> header field. Note that this comparison by exact match, including when the validator is an <\/del> header field as requested. Note that the If-Range comparison by exact match, including when the validator is an <\/ins> , differs from the \"earlier than or equal to\" comparison used when evaluating an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-369b88264369245fb45a6282eb957f3df9de4f78e5f12d0ec25f63c7ca7c4fcf","title":"","text":"13.2. 13.2.1. <\/ins> Except when excluded below, a recipient cache or origin server MUST evaluate received request preconditions after it has successfully performed its normal request checks and just before it would process"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5ae1156242474967af109e1b931401ca290a6ec80cfcd6c5a12f6f721eca107f","title":"","text":"response. 13.3. <\/del> 13.2.2. <\/ins> When more than one conditional request header field is present in a request, the order in which the fields are evaluated becomes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9eb38b8d2cdf6cbabac913e1e4e2c6fd900f39aff19986778fe9693f0a507465","title":"","text":"with a set of trust anchors. In general, a client MUST verify the service identity using the verification process defined in RFC6125 (for a reference identifier of type URI-ID) unless the client has been specifically configured to accept some other form of verification. For example, a client might be connecting to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with an expectation that the service will present a specific certificate (or a certificate matching some externally defined reference identity) rather than one matching the dynamic URI's origin server identifier. <\/del> verification process defined in RFC6125. The client MUST construct a reference identity from the service's host: if the host is a literal IP address (https.ip-id), the reference identity is an IP-ID, otherwise the host is a name and the reference identity is a DNS-ID. A reference identity of type CN-ID MUST NOT be used by clients. As noted in RFC6125 a reference identity of type CN-ID might be used by older clients. A client might be specially configured to accept an alternative form of server identity verification. For example, a client might be connecting to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with an expectation that the service will present a specific certificate (or a certificate matching some externally defined reference identity) rather than one matching the dynamic URI's origin server identifier. <\/ins> In special cases, it might be appropriate for a client to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be understood that this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2247d4c916313026112a7cabf848d08c3e689906468623a1d42a0ff0596eb0ff","title":"","text":"clients MAY provide a configuration setting that disables this check, but MUST provide a setting which enables it. 4.3.5. A server that is identified using an IP address literal in the \"host\" field of an \"https\" URI has a reference identity of type IP-ID. An IP version 4 address uses the \"IPv4address\" ABNF rule and an IP version 6 address uses the \"IP-literal\" production with the \"IPv6address\" option; see RFC3986. A reference identity of IP-ID contains the decoded bytes of the IP address. An IP version 4 address is 4 octets and an IP version 6 address is 16 octets. Use of IP-ID is not defined for any other IP version. The iPAddress choice in the certificate subjectAltName extension does not explicitly include the IP version and so relies on the length of the address to distinguish versions; see RFC5280. A reference identity of type IP-ID matches if the address is identical to an iPAddress value of the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. <\/ins> 5. HTTP uses"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-60a6e6fab81c55ab03706ba122d9327c0adf93a023eacccea0684ae4dcbf1103","title":"","text":"the reserved port for SMTP traffic; if allowed, that could trick the proxy into relaying spam email. Proxies that support CONNECT SHOULD restrict its use to a limited set of known ports or a configurable whitelist of safe request targets. <\/del> list of safe request targets. <\/ins> A server MUST NOT send any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-15db67f555c4f9896e9b4f74c434ef8a4dbceee92a2612eebb29d831e369c92d","title":"","text":"might be strongly correlated to membership in a particular ethnic group. An approach that limits such loss of privacy would be for a user agent to omit the sending of Accept-Language except for sites that have been whitelisted, perhaps via interaction after detecting a <\/del> that have been explicitly permitted, perhaps via interaction after detecting a <\/ins> header field that indicates language negotiation might be useful."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9749e9c9f19044e2c23da360e6a83be25bedeba3333dff6465eff2826f0cb280","title":"","text":"inbound servers using any protocol that it desires, including private extensions to HTTP that are outside the scope of this specification. However, an HTTP-to-HTTP gateway that wishes to interoperate with third-party HTTP servers ought to conform to user agent requirements <\/del> third-party HTTP servers needs to conform to user agent requirements <\/ins> on the gateway's inbound connection. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1acb7791760c6ecf3489d2c873878f4c2f48431717032e53e5eebf68215be9fd","title":"","text":"specifically means that the server has been authenticated as acting on behalf of the identified authority and all HTTP communication with that server has been protected for confidentiality and integrity through the use of strong encryption. <\/del> that server has confidentiality and integrity protection that is acceptable to both client and server. <\/ins> The origin server for an \"https\" URI is identified by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7bfb4b0ebbe44cd701a143e278ea65deb8f4d993bc69ae4284a9f2f2ace58cdb","title":"","text":"A client MUST ensure that its HTTP requests for an \"https\" resource are secured, prior to being communicated, and that it only accepts secured responses to those requests. <\/del> secured responses to those requests. Note that the definition of what cryptographic mechanisms are acceptable to client and server are usually negotiated and can change over time. <\/ins> Resources made available via the \"https\" scheme have no shared identity with the \"http\" scheme. They are distinct origins with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-89affe08ed591e9dd547a0bb994fcb46b119dd475dd5fad2390d7a52d8bbfbe0","title":"","text":"how trailer field values can be safely merged. The presence of the keyword \"trailers\" in the TE header field (field.te) indicates that the client is willing to accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients. For requests from an intermediary, this implies that all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response. Note that the presence of \"trailers\" does not mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients. <\/del> (field.te) of a request indicates that the client is willing to accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients. For requests from an intermediary, this implies that all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response. Note that the presence of \"trailers\" does not mean that the client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients. <\/ins> Because of the potential for trailer fields to be discarded in transit, a server SHOULD NOT generate trailer fields that it believes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-03d658610993616f8af805e7b2fa115a78169d939ac2832b7fd2635a24478276","title":"","text":"9.3.2. The HEAD method is identical to GET except that the server MUST NOT send content in the response and the response always terminates at the end of the header section. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about <\/del> send content in the response. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about <\/ins> the without transferring its representation data, often for the sake of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-dfaf0e50ac7795d34c9b45b838b0844aa3a12f416e00c7da20de8b6e463336d6","title":"","text":"mapping its semantics into the protocol's wire format. CONNECT is intended only for use in requests to a proxy. An origin server that receives a CONNECT request for itself MAY respond with a status code to indicate that a connection is established. However, most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. <\/del> server MAY accept a CONNECT request, but most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. <\/ins> The recipient proxy can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to the request target or, if configured to use another"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2241e277e45745fc3ae449dc2138855afc11c39c1e8c46ec93aed357d60b2a3e","title":"","text":"5.6.2. Tokens are short textual identifiers that do not include whitespace or delimiters. <\/ins> Many HTTP field values are defined using common syntax components, separated by whitespace or specific delimiting characters. Delimiters are chosen from the set of US-ASCII visual characters not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-54c9638c267fbdcece2ad37aa5a6c8b0ecfce1c887c35c09c3a73b4691ecbd73","title":"","text":"(DQUOTE and \"(),\/:;<=>?@[\\]{}\"). Tokens are short textual identifiers that do not include whitespace or delimiters. <\/del> 5.6.3. This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-cf4ccf875f336e0b154cdf02f1031ffe7a22166b5df611706b57bc771d12a76e","title":"","text":"charset ISO-8859-1, supporting other charsets only through use of RFC2047 encoding. In practice, most HTTP field values use only a subset of the US-ASCII charset USASCII. Newly defined fields SHOULD limit their values to US-ASCII octets. A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. <\/del> limit their values to visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB. A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. <\/ins> Field values containing control ("} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-32ee1178e87a32ec803a30e4d0e46ce6aca80cdf41c0eff0254aeeee32b05b29","title":"","text":"A server tests whether a content-coding for a given representation is acceptable using these rules: A representation could be encoded with multiple content codings. However, most content codings are alternative ways to accomplish the same purpose (e.g., data compression). When selecting between multiple content codings that have the same purpose, the acceptable content coding with the highest non-zero qvalue is preferred. <\/ins> An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty implies that the user agent does not want any content-coding in response. If an Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-289a4d6506af6b3fee9b2aedf2aab2b0afd63d8f09bf60e9bd41c4829dd096a5","title":"","text":"The status code indicates that one or more conditions given in the request header fields evaluated to false when tested on the server. This response status code allows the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and, thus, prevent the request method from being applied if the target resource is in an unexpected state. <\/del> request header fields evaluated to false when tested on the server (conditional.requests). This response status code allows the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and, thus, prevent the request method from being applied if the target resource is in an unexpected state. <\/ins> 15.5.14."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b58215329ca2ba00e11bd275d2544d4f6dfabea6df11a3e61ae355c9078e8e91","title":"","text":"allow the underlying transport's flow-control mechanisms to resolve temporary overloads, rather than terminate connections with the expectation that clients will retry. The latter technique can exacerbate network congestion. <\/del> exacerbate network congestion or server load. <\/ins> A client sending a message body SHOULD monitor the network connection for an error response while it is transmitting the request. If the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-721a366cd689b0394d8e1e22aeeb13bf88bc9b8107015be334dfd56b746f370b","title":"","text":"\" (content.negotiation). This document defines HTTP\/1.1 range requests, partial responses, and the multipart\/byteranges media type. <\/del> This document defines HTTP range requests, partial responses, and the multipart\/byteranges media type. <\/ins> This document obsoletes the portions of RFC7230 that are independent of the HTTP\/1.1 messaging syntax and connection management, with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b1ce5f7fa9bea247bb6574b359d2ce9a4f6049cae15c2896652a42a9e3dc6341","title":"","text":"server is unable or unwilling to buffer the entire request before processing. A user agent that sends a request containing a message body MUST send a valid header field if it does not know the server will handle HTTP\/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. <\/del> A user agent that sends a request that contains a message body MUST send either a valid header field or use the chunked transfer coding. A client MUST NOT use the chunked transfer encoding unless it knows the server will handle HTTP\/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. <\/ins> If the final response to the last request on a connection has been completely received and there remains additional data to read, a user"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5805e5398d7c18d2ecdd508b03d7b27bc16f74e49c825d61a7ea2ecaf6a124ef","title":"","text":"neither chunked transfer coding nor Content-Length is terminated by closure of the connection and, thus, is considered complete regardless of the number of message body octets received, provided that the header section was received intact. <\/del> that the header section was received intact. When using TLS, an incomplete close cannot be used to terminate a response this way; such a response is incomplete (see tls.connection.closure). <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b7850ffcda24dc0b7b0fd4af279a3637ca4fb95fe336c64a2a10f0f3548b686a","title":"","text":"implementations MUST initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation MAY, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an \"incomplete close\". Note that an implementation which does this MAY choose to reuse the session. This SHOULD only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all <\/del> send its closure alert, generating an \"incomplete close\". This SHOULD only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has sent or received all <\/ins> the message data that it cares about. As specified in RFC8446, any implementation which receives a connection close without first receiving a valid closure alert (a \"premature close\") MUST NOT reuse that session. Note that a premature close does not call into question the security of the data already received, but simply indicates that subsequent data might have been truncated. Because TLS is oblivious to HTTP request\/ response boundaries, it is necessary to examine the HTTP data itself (specifically the Content-Length header) to determine whether the truncation occurred inside a message or between messages. When encountering a premature close, a client SHOULD treat as <\/del> An incomplete close does not call into question the security of the data already received, but it could indicate that subsequent data might have been truncated. As TLS is not directly aware of HTTP message framing, it is necessary to examine the HTTP data itself to determine whether messages were complete. Handing of incomplete messages is defined in incomplete.messages. When encountering an incomplete close, a client SHOULD treat as <\/ins> completed all requests for which it has received as much data as specified in the Content-Length header. <\/del> specified in the header or, when a of chunked is used, for which the terminal zero-length chunk has been received. A response that has neither chunked transfer coding nor Content-Length is complete only if a valid closure alert has been received. Treating an incomplete message as complete could expose implementations to attack. <\/ins> A client detecting an incomplete close SHOULD recover gracefully. It MAY resume a TLS session closed in this fashion. <\/del> A client detecting an incomplete close SHOULD recover gracefully. <\/ins> Clients MUST send a closure alert before closing the connection. Clients which are unprepared to receive any more data MAY choose not to wait for the server's closure alert and simply close the connection, thus generating an incomplete close on the server side. <\/del> Clients that do not expect to receive any more data MAY choose not to wait for the server's closure alert and simply close the connection, thus generating an incomplete close on the server side. <\/ins> Servers SHOULD be prepared to receive an incomplete close from the client, since the client can often determine when the end of server data is. Servers SHOULD be willing to resume TLS sessions closed in this fashion. <\/del> data is. <\/ins> Servers MUST attempt to initiate an exchange of closure alerts with the client before closing the connection. Servers MAY close the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e530f6c437ce59bb17229b1fbf834dfb639efa8a9ae7817fc45034949091a059","title":"","text":"HTTP does not define a specific mechanism for ensuring message integrity, instead relying on the error-detection ability of underlying transport protocols and the use of length or chunk- delimited framing to detect completeness. Additional integrity mechanisms, such as hash functions or digital signatures applied to the content, can be selectively added to messages via extensible metadata fields. Historically, the lack of a single integrity mechanism has been justified by the informal nature of most HTTP communication. However, the prevalence of HTTP as an information access mechanism has resulted in its increasing use within environments where verification of message integrity is crucial. User agents are encouraged to implement configurable means for detecting and reporting failures of message integrity such that those means can be enabled within environments for which integrity is necessary. For example, a browser being used to view medical history <\/del> delimited framing to detect completeness. Historically, the lack of a single integrity mechanism has been justified by the informal nature of most HTTP communication. However, the prevalence of HTTP as an information access mechanism has resulted in its increasing use within environments where verification of message integrity is crucial. The mechanisms provided with the \"https\" scheme, such as authenticated encryption, provide protection against modification of messages. Care is needed however to ensure that connection closure cannot be used to truncate messages (see tls.connection.closure). User agents might refuse to accept incomplete messages or treat them specially. For example, a browser being used to view medical history <\/ins> or drug interaction information needs to indicate to the user when such information is detected by the protocol to be incomplete, expired, or corrupted during transfer. Such mechanisms might be selectively enabled via user agent extensions or the presence of message integrity metadata in a response. At a minimum, user agents ought to provide some indication that allows a user to distinguish between a complete and incomplete response message (incomplete.messages) when such verification is desired. <\/del> message integrity metadata in a response. The \"http\" scheme provides no protection against accidental or malicious modification of messages. Extensions to the protocol might be used to mitigate the risk of unwanted modification of messages by intermediaries, even when the \"https\" scheme is used. Integrity might be assured by using hash functions or digital signatures that are selectively added to messages via extensible metadata fields. <\/ins> 11.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-87ea08cd1357bc8a062cbf435059ee915fee59b7e6dd24bef8ca2a3a9b43336b","title":"","text":"there might be additional constraints placed by the client or by the origin server on when that cached response can be used for a particular request. HTTP requirements for cache behavior and cacheable responses are defined in caching.overview. <\/del> cacheable responses are defined in Caching. <\/ins> There is a wide variety of architectures and configurations of caches deployed across the World Wide Web and inside large organizations."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1cb70a61d31eb8427fecba4ecf157c5113956d091bf0e4187197ea2ce51675f1","title":"","text":"not include content, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected representation (field.content-length). A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message that contains a header field. <\/ins> 6.3. The length of a message body is determined by one of the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ee32a34bb142dd06c41d718363ffccd3a6a2d6e59b5abbe14f98fdfbcebabd19","title":"","text":"An example is A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message that contains a header field. <\/del> A user agent SHOULD send a Content-Length in a request message when no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2f977b765953d43d299412664dd9fc2d180a4cf0b06f2443f48cca2d1a71f1e8","title":"","text":"HTTP uses names to indicate or negotiate the character encoding scheme of a textual representation RFC6365. A charset is identified by a case- insensitive token. <\/del> names to indicate or negotiate the character encoding scheme (RFC6365) of a textual representation. In the fields defined by this document, charset names appear either in parameters ( ), or, for , in the form of a plain . In both cases, charset names are matched case-insensitively. <\/ins> Charset names ought to be registered in the IANA \"Character Sets\" registry ()"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3cfedb18e20506bca66e09ba472c9794a0c9e7cdf9e922b6ab0b68b27028abbf","title":"","text":"The is comprised of, at a minimum, the request method and target URI used to retrieve the stored response; the method determines under which circumstances that response can be used to satisfy a subsequent request. However, many HTTP caches in common use today only cache GET responses, and therefore only use the URI as the cache key, forwarding other methods. <\/del> is the information a cache uses to select a response and is comprised of, at a minimum, the request method and target URI used to retrieve the stored response; the method determines under which circumstances that response can be used to satisfy a subsequent request. However, many HTTP caches in common use today only cache GET responses, and therefore only use the URI as the cache key, forwarding other methods. <\/ins> If a request target is subject to content negotiation, the cache might store multiple responses for it. Caches differentiate these"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7d651453940a2bd027772c95a918b5380da1d07a02b0a3feacb31cad0b5eb028","title":"","text":"7.1. Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a shared cache. Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks use the cache to distribute malicious content to many clients, and are especially effective when an attacker can use implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert such a response into a cache. <\/del> Various attacks might be amplified by being stored in a cache. Such \"cache poisoning\" attacks happen when an attacker uses implementation flaws, elevated privileges, or other techniques to insert a response into a cache. This is especially effective when shared caches are used to distribute malicious content to many clients. <\/ins> One common attack vector for cache poisoning is to exploit differences in message parsing on proxies and in user agents; see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9772d665f2d1d59a019765cff92fc3203cfa299b1b92102fc1907a47c4e9b2a1","title":"","text":"programs perform for a particular connection. The same program might act as a client on some connections and a server on others. HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. <\/ins> 3.4. HTTP is a stateless request\/response protocol for exchanging"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1f56466a928e22b8dab3a3bca776bb0c71f293257b562f20d4a95bb14fc8352e","title":"","text":"allowing use of non-local Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce network usage policies. HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. <\/del> 3.8. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-48dd28467fa457ee659ca63abbbd50549a2e743a4491958fb64cbf8df38f9bba","title":"","text":"grammar aside from the robustness exceptions listed above, the server SHOULD respond with a response. <\/del> response and close the connection. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4a89d5c5acd58170723152b736e8fa533a2039510d56656f3aa41e6c84416a04","title":"","text":"prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows (attack.protocol.element.length). If a message is received that has a Content-Length header field value consisting of the same decimal value as a comma-separated list (abnf.extension) -- for example, \"Content-Length: 42, 42\" -- <\/del> Because Content-Length is used for message delimitation in HTTP\/1.1, its field value can impact how the message is parsed by downstream recipients even when the immediate connection is not using HTTP\/1.1. If the message is forwarded by a downstream intermediary, a Content- Length field value that is inconsistent with the received message framing might cause a security failure due to request smuggling or response splitting. As a result, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content- Length header field value that is known to be incorrect. Likewise, a sender MUST NOT forward a message with a Content-Length header field value that does not match the ABNF above, with one exception: If a message is received that has a Content-Length header field value consisting of the same decimal value as a comma-separated list (abnf.extension) -- for example, \"Content-Length: 42, 42\" -- <\/ins> indicating that duplicate Content-Length header fields have been generated or combined by an upstream message processor, then the recipient MUST either reject the message as invalid or replace the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2563e778673e126a38c0306912af5fa2177cf07eff5e1b5872378ebb92796af8","title":"","text":"One design goal of HTTP is to separate resource identification from request semantics, which is made possible by vesting the request semantics in the request method (methods) and a few request-modifying header fields. If there is a conflict between the method semantics and any semantic implied by the URI itself, as described in safe.methods, the method semantics take precedence. <\/del> header fields. A resource cannot treat a request in a manner inconsistent with the semantics of the method of the request. For example, though the URI of a resource might imply semantics that are not safe, a client can expect the resource to avoid actions that are unsafe when processing a request with a safe method (see safe.methods). <\/ins> HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) standard RFC3986 to indicate the target resource (target.resource) and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6df2fc34c777b3b9cef8b7d539b13c5716ab4ed35ea65e4bb87d6afa448a51a5","title":"","text":"unwanted, or invalid requests. A server SHOULD NOT use the From header field for access control or authentication, since most recipients will assume that the field value is public information. <\/del> authentication. <\/ins> 10.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-333ddd78cb54fb24bce76321e88892cf33f732c4c26d9784748fa7851f8d0243","title":"","text":"act as a client on some connections and a server on others. HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. Hence, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. <\/del> message's semantics can be understood in isolation, and that the relationship between connections and messages on them has no impact on the interpretation of those messages. For example, a CONNECT request (CONNECT) or a request with the Upgrade header field (field.upgrade) can occur at any time, not just in the first message on a connection. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. As a result, a server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., RFC4559) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e5999bb8df0287dcef935731dc7188e763f746f357597fb4b5dc14e559c3e3e4","title":"","text":"is version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of messages, while others use an explicit identifier. Responses (both <\/del> All responses, regardless of the status code (including <\/ins> and <\/del> responses) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if the request is not yet complete. A response can complete before its corresponding request is complete. Likewise, clients are not expected to wait any specific amount of time for a response. Clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. <\/ins> ) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if it is not yet complete. However, clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. <\/del> A client that receives a response while the associated request is still being sent SHOULD continue sending that request, unless it receives an explicit indication to the contrary (see, e.g., persistent.failures and RFC7540). <\/ins> 7.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c7cd51ea7704b39d7f13550f8cdad697b439dc015cf663f5c7444f5e484e68d1","title":"","text":"8.3.3. Media types are registered with a canonical form in order to be interoperable among systems with varying native encoding formats. Representations selected or transferred via HTTP ought to be in canonical form, for many of the same reasons described by the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) RFC2045. However, the performance characteristics of email deployments (i.e., store and forward messages to peers) are significantly different from those common to HTTP and the Web (server-based information services). Furthermore, MIME's constraints for the sake of compatibility with older mail transfer protocols do not apply to HTTP (see differences.between.http.and.mime). MIME's canonical form requires that media subtypes of the \"text\" type use CRLF as the text line break. HTTP allows the transfer of text media with plain CR or LF alone representing a line break, when such line breaks are consistent for an entire representation. An HTTP sender MAY generate, and a recipient MUST be able to parse, line breaks in text media that consist of CRLF, bare CR, or bare LF. In addition, text media in HTTP is not limited to charsets that use octets 13 and 10 for CR and LF, respectively. This flexibility regarding line breaks applies only to text within a representation that has been assigned a \"text\" media type; it does not apply to \"multipart\" types or HTTP elements outside the content (e.g., header fields). If a representation is encoded with a content-coding, the underlying data ought to be in a form defined above prior to being encoded. 8.3.4. <\/del> MIME provides for a number of \"multipart\" types -- encapsulations of one or more representations within a single message body. All multipart types share a common syntax, as defined in RFC2046, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-709c82eb1754ec2aedeb9c4d207031893bb033c8b19618d0ed4ce1b1c3b28731","title":"","text":"A recipient MUST be able to parse and decode the chunked transfer coding. Note that HTTP\/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a chunked response such that an intermediary can be assured of buffering the entire response. <\/del> HTTP\/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a chunked response such that an intermediary can be assured of buffering the entire response. Additionally, very large chunk sizes may cause overflows or loss of precision if their values are not represented accurately in a receiving implementation. Therefore, recipients MUST anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows or precision loss due to integer representation. <\/ins> The chunked encoding does not define any parameters. Their presence SHOULD be treated as an error."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-92242b0bbf8ade0196fcd7e1f46bf3a58b6ba09e87af46a1140566be660b2897","title":"","text":"most origin servers do not implement CONNECT. A client sending a CONNECT request MUST send the authority component (described in Section 3.2 of RFC3986) as the request target; i.e., the request target consists of only the host name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon. For example, <\/del> (described in RFC3986) as the request target, excluding userinfo but always with a port; i.e., the request target consists of only the host name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon. For example, If the port is missing or invalid in the request target of a CONNECT request, the request MUST be rejected (typically, with a 400 (Bad Request) response). <\/ins> The recipient proxy can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to the request target or, if configured to use another"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7b0520d18d7ebc7465030fea128a8f2dd1d7cc28c37f607ddac564cccad2996f","title":"","text":"intermediary can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the stream. Intermediaries are expected to forward messages even when protocol elements are not recognized (e.g., new methods, status codes, or field names), since that preserves extensibility for downstream recipients. <\/ins> An intermediary not acting as a tunnel MUST implement the header field, as specified in field.connection, and exclude fields"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a93bcce8c0814978c20988e586e72228d9947dac654dab8bb031fbb524deaec9","title":"","text":"Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages. In other words, they are not allowed to blindly forward the <\/del> in forwarded messages, unless it is purposefully downgraded as a workaround for an upstream issue. In other words, an intermediary is not allowed to blindly forward the <\/ins> without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-747d26eef1304c3dd1e20f79d098e49d263ee93f65a339c864ed9faa65ccc17e","title":"","text":"seconds (see delta-seconds). Although it is defined as a singleton header field, a cache encountering a message with multiple Age field lines SHOULD use the first field line, discarding subsequent ones. <\/del> encountering a message with a list-based Age field value SHOULD use the first member of the field value, discarding subsequent ones. <\/ins> If the field value (after discarding additional lines, as per above) is invalid (e.g., it contains a list or something other than a non- negative integer), a cache SHOULD consider the response to be stale. <\/del> If the field value (after discarding additional members, as per above) is invalid (e.g., it contains something other than a non- negative integer), a cache SHOULD ignore the field. <\/ins> The presence of an Age header field implies that the response was not generated or validated by the origin server for this request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c2e0ca46c79bbad8a2cd93497b78bee9bb79bc43c8a323eda02105e6b1eb51ee","title":"","text":"that time. The Expires field value is an HTTP-date timestamp, as defined in http.date. <\/del> http.date. See also expiration.model for parsing requirements specific to caches. <\/ins> For example"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-cb395d36bb22074b7f33b363e85e58da397a8d157577dcfcb63cc1d7bbb035d3","title":"","text":"A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. Field values containing control ( ) characters such as CR or LF are invalid; recipients MUST either reject a field value containing control characters, or convert them to SP before processing or forwarding the message. <\/del> Field values containing CR or NUL characters are invalid and dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message. Field values containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however, recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake of robustness if they only appear within safe field value contexts (e.g., data not required by HTTP). <\/ins> Leading and trailing whitespace in raw field values is removed upon field parsing (e.g., field.parsing). Field definitions where leading"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-036824bd3a3a26d5b48234b7a548b92355ed68325525252cf3a590b46ca9fa45","title":"","text":"user's bookmarks\/favorites), the user agent MUST either exclude the Referer header field or send it with a value of \"about:blank\". The Referer header field value need not convey the full URI of the referring resource; a user agent MAY truncate parts other than the referring origin. <\/ins> The Referer header field has the potential to reveal information about the request context or browsing history of the user, which is a privacy concern if the referring resource's identifier reveals"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9c7844f521189e18abfa1a62630b3bc232c79fffa017d7e0245d71f754963b12","title":"","text":"supposed to be confidential (such as behind a firewall or internal to a secured service). Most general-purpose user agents do not send the Referer header field when the referring resource is a local \"file\" or \"data\" URI. A user agent MUST NOT send a <\/del> \"data\" URI. A user agent SHOULD NOT send a header field if the referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol and the request target has an origin differing from that of the referring resource, unless the referring resource explicitly allows Referer to be sent. A user agent MUST NOT send a <\/ins> header field in an unsecured HTTP request if the referring page was received with a secure protocol. See sensitive.information.in.uris for additional security considerations. <\/del> header field in an unsecured HTTP request if the referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol. See sensitive.information.in.uris for additional security considerations. <\/ins> Some intermediaries have been known to indiscriminately remove Referer header fields from outgoing requests. This has the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-943800c7d577d8a7f3396408bd079b908888b22f4f3dada5e46f0be66c6c3deb","title":"","text":"the user agent MAY reuse the same credentials for all other requests within that protection space for a period of time determined by the authentication scheme, parameters, and\/or user preferences (such as a configurable inactivity timeout). Unless specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server. <\/del> configurable inactivity timeout). The extent of a protection space, and therefore the requests to which credentials might be automatically applied, is not necessarily known to clients without additional information. An authentication scheme might define parameters that describe the extent of a protection space. Unless specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server. <\/ins> For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string syntax. Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-957a8039c42efd32fde09c17287056b2ba837b47df39cd6b2d21b8f067e88017","title":"","text":"An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of the requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP. Conformance includes both the syntax and semantics of protocol elements. A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that convey a meaning that is known by that sender to be false. A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules. Within a given message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or syntax alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that message). <\/del> A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by the corresponding ABNF rules. Within a given message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or syntax alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that message). Conformance to HTTP includes both conformance to the particular messaging syntax of the protocol version in use and conformance to the semantics of protocol elements sent. For example, a client that claims conformance to HTTP\/1.1 but fails to recognize the features required of HTTP\/1.1 recipients will fail to interoperate with servers that adjust their responses in accordance with those claims. Features that reflect user choices, such as content negotiation and user-selected extensions, can impact application behavior beyond the protocol stream; sending protocol elements that inaccurately reflect a user's choices will confuse the user and inhibit choice. When an implementation fails semantic conformance, recipients of that implementation's messages will eventually develop workarounds to adjust their behavior accordingly. A recipient MAY employ such workarounds while remaining conformant to this protocol if the workarounds are limited to the implementations at fault. For example, servers often scan portions of the User-Agent field value, and user agents often scan the Server field value, to adjust their own behavior with respect to known bugs or poorly chosen defaults. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a8a5649f34eea4a0a2d12ba54c563d6729701ab2dc7ee1f93e17000c00b1ff1c","title":"","text":"Framing and control data is sent first, followed by a header section containing fields for the headers table. When a message includes content, the content is sent after the header section and potentially interleaved with zero or more trailer sections containing fields for the trailers table. <\/del> content, the content is sent after the header section, potentially followed by a trailer section that might contain fields for the trailers table. <\/ins> Messages are expected to be processed as a stream, wherein the purpose of that stream and its continued processing is revealed while"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-68f6b2d649b73dbbf544bfc34d0635afd77ff6ee201b08127516672a321e5e48","title":"","text":"to know immediately, header fields describe what needs to be known before receiving content, the content (when present) presumably contains what the recipient wants or needs to fulfill the message semantics, and trailer fields provide additional metadata that can be dropped (safely ignored) when not desired. <\/del> semantics, and trailer fields provide optional metadata that was unknown prior to sending the content. <\/ins> Messages are intended to be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-48bab251b1bbb8aa6a827c5972572d51a53bf60f15f281ea35a37205214ecefe","title":"","text":"Note that this message abstraction is a generalization across many versions of HTTP, including features that might not be found in some versions. For example, trailers were introduced within the HTTP\/1.1 chunked transfer coding as a single trailer section after the content. An equivalent feature is present in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3 within the header block that terminates each stream. However, multiple trailer sections interleaved with content have only been deployed as frame extensions. <\/del> chunked transfer coding as a trailer section after the content. An equivalent feature is present in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3 within the header block that terminates each stream. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9f834543975756cb9e22dc1bb689833bc21f4049e24e7b212136eb275163e75b","title":"","text":"(protocol.version). Response message control data includes a status code (status.codes), optional reason phrase, and protocol version. In HTTP\/1.1 Messaging and earlier, control data is sent as the first line of a message. In HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) and HTTP\/3 (HTTP3), control data is sent as pseudo-header fields with a reserved name prefix (e.g., \":authority\"). <\/del> In HTTP\/1.1 (Messaging) and earlier, control data is sent as the first line of a message. In HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) and HTTP\/3 (HTTP3), control data is sent as pseudo-header fields with a reserved name prefix (e.g., \":authority\"). <\/ins> Every HTTP message has a protocol version. Depending on the version in use, it might be identified within the message explicitly or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-961cf14f8e44b9c204f78e1958470f869353ea6c7d992792304ce1047ffbd0d0","title":"","text":"6.5. Fields (fields) that are sent\/received after the header section has ended (usually after the content begins to stream) are referred to as \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\", colloquially) and located within a <\/del> Fields (fields) that are located within a <\/ins> . Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post-processing status information. <\/del> are are referred to as \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\", colloquially). Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post- processing status information. <\/ins> Trailer fields ought to be processed and stored separately from the fields in the header section to avoid contradicting message semantics"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-94d281ad699abb7f94eb45e0d9d6766528b042e4e2f6bfcabb1157e9cc01b3ce","title":"","text":"6.5.1. Trailer sections are only possible when supported by the version of <\/del> A trailer section is only possible when supported by the version of <\/ins> HTTP in use and enabled by an explicit framing mechanism. For example, the chunked coding in HTTP\/1.1 allows a trailer section to be sent after the content (chunked.trailer.section)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c84dc34aa66d1fd5fd4ef4ff05363f1dc678f115e75be90928d802cc4fa8c8fc","title":"","text":"6.5.2. The \"Trailer\" header field (field.trailer) can be sent to indicate fields likely to be sent in the trailer section, which allows recipients to prepare for their receipt before processing the content. For example, this could be useful if a field name indicates that a dynamic checksum should be calculated as the content is received and then immediately checked upon receipt of the trailer field value. <\/ins> Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed in the order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same name have the equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values as a list of members, even when the field lines are received in separate trailer sections. Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. <\/del> as a list of members. Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. <\/ins> Trailer fields are expected (but not required) to be processed one trailer section at a time. That is, for each trailer section received, a recipient that is looking for trailer fields will parse the received section into fields, invoke any associated processing for those fields at that point in the message processing, and then append those fields to the set of trailer fields received for the overall message. This behavior allows for iterative processing of trailer fields that contain incremental signatures or mid-stream status information, and fields that might refer to each other's values within the same section. However, there is no guarantee that trailer sections won't shift in relation to the content stream, or won't be recombined (or dropped) in transit. Trailer fields that refer to data outside the present trailer section need to use self-descriptive references (i.e., refer to the data by name, ordinal position, or an octet range) rather than assume it is the data most recently received. Likewise, at the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the entire set of received trailer fields as one data structure to be considered as the message concludes. Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. <\/del> At the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the set of received trailer fields as a data structure of key\/value pairs, similar to (but separate from) the header fields. Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e297e36daedcd311425ff53694a1d36fa0d31795eba3a195c19c0b716e96e365","title":"","text":"reflect the message received, excluding some fields described below, back to the client as the content of a response with a of \"message\/http\" (media.type.message.http). The final recipient is either the origin server or the first server to receive a <\/del> response. The \"message\/http\" (media.type.message.http) format is one way to do so. The final recipient is either the origin server or the first server to receive a <\/ins> value of zero (0) in the request (field.max-forwards)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-372713c0564ca230d2f719f00edec5eb5b46fa303fe9d44eae3ee39295c00a4c","title":"","text":"application or data format, since orthogonal technologies deserve orthogonal specification. Since message parsing (message.body) needs to be independent of method semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of content on either the request or the response message. <\/del> Since message parsing (message.abstraction) needs to be independent of method semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of content on either the request or the response message. <\/ins> Definitions of new methods can specify that only a zero-length content is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of \"0\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ef4b8bfcb3d3acb69eece0e95e4f3b213024488b7725be747143f252e1e018d7","title":"","text":"Content coding registrations MUST include the following fields: Names of content codings MUST NOT overlap with names of transfer codings (transfer.codings), unless the encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in content.codings). <\/del> codings (as per the \"HTTP Transfer Coding registry\", located at ), unless the encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in content.codings). <\/ins> Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see RFC8126) and MUST conform to the purpose of content coding defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-34babc6d23e5ae0a860d2af5b689513aaa780804c707c45c1d655173a6aa91e7","title":"","text":"The TE field (field.te) is used in HTTP\/1.1 to indicate what transfer-codings, besides chunked, the client is willing to accept in the response, and whether or not the client is willing to accept <\/del> the response, and whether or not the client is willing to preserve <\/ins> trailer fields in a chunked transfer coding. A client MUST NOT send the chunked transfer coding name in TE;"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-844caca8ef0b87fb93c8f350db9afe776fe45a30b1b13bd0af6232bacb30fb52","title":"","text":"6.5.2. The \"Trailer\" header field (field.trailer) can be sent to indicate fields likely to be sent in the trailer section, which allows recipients to prepare for their receipt before processing the content. For example, this could be useful if a field name indicates that a dynamic checksum should be calculated as the content is received and then immediately checked upon receipt of the trailer field value. <\/ins> Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed in the order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same name have the equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values as a list of members, even when the field lines are received in separate trailer sections. Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. Trailer fields are expected (but not required) to be processed one trailer section at a time. That is, for each trailer section received, a recipient that is looking for trailer fields will parse the received section into fields, invoke any associated processing for those fields at that point in the message processing, and then append those fields to the set of trailer fields received for the overall message. This behavior allows for iterative processing of trailer fields that contain incremental signatures or mid-stream status information, and fields that might refer to each other's values within the same section. However, there is no guarantee that trailer sections won't shift in relation to the content stream, or won't be recombined (or dropped) in transit. Trailer fields that refer to data outside the present trailer section need to use self-descriptive references (i.e., refer to the data by name, ordinal position, or an octet range) rather than assume it is the data most recently received. Likewise, at the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the entire set of received trailer fields as one data structure to be considered as the message concludes. Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. <\/del> as a list of members. Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only processed once per field line received. At the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the set of received trailer fields as a data structure of key\/value pairs, similar to (but separate from) the header fields. Additional processing expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-73f4f539bcb0b2dae2baa105abf78ce66ef996f36c85fd93c39e0365cddaba0e","title":"","text":"determined by looking at the message itself, after decoding or reconstituting parts that have been compressed or elided in transit, without requiring an understanding of the sender's current application state (established via prior messages). <\/del> application state (established via prior messages). However, a client MUST retain knowledge of the request when parsing, interpreting, or caching a corresponding response. For example, responses to the method look just like the beginning of a response to , but cannot be parsed in the same manner. <\/ins> Note that this message abstraction is a generalization across many versions of HTTP, including features that might not be found in some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-83d3b78651bf4fb8726638740ebebc81c8331c6def3a36fc15adcbbee6faf532","title":"","text":"(a.k.a., ), selection of the best response representation (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response from the origin server that contains a list of resources for alternative representations. If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response representation, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources, selected based on metadata included in the list, to obtain a different form of representation for that response. Selection of alternatives might be performed automatically by the user agent or manually by the user selecting from a generated (possibly hypertext) menu. Note that the above refers to representations of the response, in general, not representations of the resource. The alternative representations are only considered representations of the target resource if the response in which those alternatives are provided has the semantics of being a representation of the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request) or has the semantics of providing links to alternative representations for the target resource (e.g., a <\/del> ), selection of content (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response. The mechanism for reactive negotiation might be as simple as a list of references to alternative representations. <\/ins> response to a GET request). <\/del> If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response content, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources to obtain a different representation. Selection of such alternatives might be performed automatically (by the user agent) or manually (e.g., by the user selecting from a hypertext menu). <\/ins> A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other than the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1ec2e15d06c15c6666bf5f6d91cdd5d7d99ee0ddb44106d04f5d55a15699ed15","title":"","text":"and status codes include information about the available representations so that the user or user agent can react by making a selection. <\/del> status codes include information about available representations so that the user or user agent can react by making a selection. <\/ins> Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary over commonly used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding),"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9ae58863e7a06d39081e68639a62cad76116b7c475a2c191c80fcbc846041efc","title":"","text":"(a.k.a., ), selection of the best response representation (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response from the origin server that contains a list of resources for alternative representations. If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response representation, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources, selected based on metadata included in the list, to obtain a different form of representation for that response. Selection of alternatives might be performed automatically by the user agent or manually by the user selecting from a generated (possibly hypertext) menu. Note that the above refers to representations of the response, in general, not representations of the resource. The alternative representations are only considered representations of the target resource if the response in which those alternatives are provided has the semantics of being a representation of the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request) or has the semantics of providing links to alternative representations for the target resource (e.g., a response to a GET request). <\/del> ), selection of content (regardless of the status code) is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response. The mechanism for reactive negotiation might be as simple as a list of references to alternative representations. If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response content, it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources to obtain a different representation. Selection of such alternatives might be performed automatically (by the user agent) or manually (e.g., by the user selecting from a hypertext menu). <\/ins> A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other than the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2c17c225e4ee866f2f257f6529543859f535f3dccbaf9cf69ec44705a987320e","title":"","text":"as shown here. Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Semantics-conformance. <\/del> defined in Semantics. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-708b58974da5bd614adeed2325ea56503eb5868003f87bc734fc82ac393ed236","title":"","text":"robustness (see request.smuggling). HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of a request- line, as described in Semantics-conformance. A server that receives a method longer than any that it implements SHOULD respond with a <\/del> line, as described in Semantics. A server that receives a method longer than any that it implements SHOULD respond with a <\/ins> status code. A server that receives a request-target longer than any URI it wishes to parse MUST respond with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-bccbb617f474ed1707a02db99f037bd558348fe056269b5dbe6450ddbd156788","title":"","text":"The of request-target is only used for CONNECT requests (CONNECT). <\/del> of request-target is only used for CONNECT requests (CONNECT). It consists of only the and number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon (\":\"). <\/ins> When making a CONNECT request to establish a tunnel through one or more proxies, a client MUST send only the target URI's authority component (excluding any userinfo and its \"@\" delimiter) as the request-target. For example, <\/del> more proxies, a client MUST send only the host and port of the tunnel destination as the request-target. The client obtains the host and port from the target URI's component, except that the scheme's default port is sent if the target URI elides the port. For example, a CONNECT request to \"http:\/\/www.example.com\" looks like <\/ins> 3.2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-670a7a0eb68673121ef9d0848bd9b5f6ebf80f3725651e3a7645653ac4bacc6a","title":"","text":"3.3. Since the request-target often contains only part of the user agent's target URI, a server constructs its value to properly service the request (target.resource). <\/del> The target URI is the <\/ins> If the <\/del> when the request-target is in <\/ins> is in <\/del> . In that case, a server will parse the URI into its generic components for further evaluation. <\/ins> , the target URI is the same as the request-target. Otherwise, the target URI is constructed as follows: <\/del> Otherwise, the server reconstructs the target URI from the connection context and various parts of the request message in order to identify the target resource (target.resource): <\/ins> Example 1: the following message received over an insecure TCP connection <\/del> Example 1: the following message received over a secure connection <\/ins> has a target URI of Example 2: the following message received over a secured connection <\/del> Example 2: the following message received over an insecure connection <\/ins> has a target URI of Recipients of an HTTP\/1.0 request that lacks a header field might need to use heuristics (e.g., examination of the URI path for something unique to a particular host) in order to guess the target URI's authority component. <\/del> If the target URI's authority component is empty and its URI scheme requires a non-empty authority (as is the case for \"http\" and \"https\"), the server can reject the request or determine whether a configured default applies that is consistent with the incoming connection's context. Context might include connection details like address and port, what security has been applied, and locally-defined information specific to that server's configuration. An empty authority is replaced with the configured default before further processing of the request. Supplying a default name for authority within the context of a secured connection is inherently unsafe if there is any chance that the user agent's intended authority might differ from the selected default. A server that can uniquely identify an authority from the request context MAY use that identity as a default without this risk. Alternatively, it might be better to redirect the request to a safe resource that explains how to obtain a new client. Note that reconstructing the client's target URI is only half of the process for identifying a target resource. The other half is determining whether that target URI identifies a resource for which the server is willing and able to send a response, as defined in routing.reject. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-0afc01b13c9adca369b69db3521a2c5424356448eb3a00d0e64482aad429a744","title":"","text":"When a message does not have a header field, a Content-Length header field can provide the anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for potential content. For messages that do include content, the Content-Length field value provides the framing information necessary for determining where the data (and message) ends. For messages that do not include content, the Content-Length indicates the size of the <\/del> header field, a Content-Length header field (field.content-length) can provide the anticipated size, as a decimal number of octets, for potential content. For messages that do include content, the Content-Length field value provides the framing information necessary for determining where the data (and message) ends. For messages that do not include content, the Content-Length indicates the size of the <\/ins> selected representation (field.content-length). A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3baf84a976796cf9fb18865051471250044720d5381c0c762213aaa6d64948c6","title":"","text":"Transfer-Encoding header fields received in a successful response to CONNECT. Content within a CONNECT request message has no defined semantics; sending content in a CONNECT request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request. <\/del> A CONNECT request message does not have content. The interpretation of and allowability of data sent after the header section of the CONNECT request message is specific to the version of HTTP in use. <\/ins> Responses to the CONNECT method are not cacheable."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-803ecbb8465263a6c9be120c2d432f4d5da939d1dc9f2e9e87e7029447e8110c","title":"","text":"4.2.3. Since the \"http\" and \"https\" schemes conform to the URI generic syntax, such URIs are normalized and compared according to the algorithm defined in RFC3986, using the defaults described above for each scheme. If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal form is to omit the port subcomponent. When not being used as the target of an OPTIONS request, an empty path component is equivalent to an absolute path of \"\/\", so the normal form is to provide a path of \"\/\" instead. The scheme and host are case-insensitive and normally provided in lowercase; all other components are compared in a case-sensitive manner. Characters other than those in the \"reserved\" set are equivalent to their percent-encoded octets: the normal form is to not encode them (see Sections RFC3986 and RFC3986 of RFC3986). <\/del> The \"http\" and \"https\" URI are normalized and compared according to the methods defined in RFC3986, using the defaults described above for each scheme. HTTP does not require use of a specific method for determining equivalence. For example, a cache key might be compared as a simple string, after syntax-based normalization, or after scheme-based normalization. Two HTTP URIs that are equivalent after normalization (using any method) can be assumed to identify the same resource, and any HTTP component MAY perform normalization. As a result, distinct resources SHOULD NOT be identified by HTTP URIs that are equivalent after normalization (using any method defined in RFC3986). Scheme-based normalization (RFC3986) of \"http\" and \"https\" URIs involves the following additional rules: <\/ins> For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1a345f3e85335a66e5654b5ae4f235a1b7b30c9733a9010a01b0105d6c9c66d2","title":"","text":"HTTP\/1.1 defaults to the use of , allowing multiple requests and responses to be carried over a single connection. The \" \" connection option is used to signal that a connection will not persist after the current request\/response. HTTP implementations SHOULD support persistent connections. <\/del> single connection. HTTP implementations SHOULD support persistent connections. <\/ins> A recipient determines whether a connection is persistent or not based on the most recently received message's protocol version and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-72791b4d52aed1b3079adaf7f65c6a1d89e519149abdf71de2182ead47587d51","title":"","text":"A client that does not support MUST send the \"close\" connection option in every request message. <\/del> MUST send the connection option in every request message. <\/ins> A server that does not support MUST send the \"close\" connection option in every response message that does not have a <\/del> MUST send the connection option in every response message that does not have a <\/ins> status code. A client MAY send additional requests on a persistent connection until it sends or receives a \" <\/del> until it sends or receives a <\/ins> \" connection option or receives an HTTP\/1.0 response without a \"keep- <\/del> connection option or receives an HTTP\/1.0 response without a \"keep- <\/ins> alive\" connection option. In order to remain persistent, all messages on a connection need to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-17100fe681fea876443fb84852229c78c62f84f40bff2e9c8bc1df5f853dc953","title":"","text":"problems with the Keep-Alive header field implemented by many HTTP\/1.0 clients). Note that the field name \"Close\" is reserved, since using that name as an HTTP header field might conflict with the \"close\" connection defined above. <\/del> See compatibility.with.http.1.0.persistent.connections for more information on backwards compatibility with HTTP\/1.0 clients."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ed0cdfe8677ea2cd9f4f65b72957af6a66cc8c437504391e522061bd903b4e22","title":"","text":"9.6. The header field (field.connection) provides a \" <\/del> The \"close\" connection option is defined as a signal that the sender will close this connection after completion of the response. A sender SHOULD send a <\/ins> \" connection option that a sender SHOULD send when it wishes to close the connection after the current request\/response pair. <\/del> header field (field.connection) containing the close connection option when it intends to close a connection. For example, <\/ins> A client that sends a \" <\/del> as a request header field indicates that this is the last request that the client will send on this connection, while in a response the same field indicates that the server is going to close this connection after the response message is complete. <\/ins> \" connection option MUST NOT send further requests on that connection (after the one containing \"close\") and MUST close the connection after reading the final response message corresponding to this request. A server that receives a \" \" connection option MUST initiate a close of the connection (see below) after it sends the final response to the request that contained \"close\". The server SHOULD send a \"close\" connection option in its final response on that connection. The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that connection. A server that sends a \" \" connection option MUST initiate a close of the connection (see below) after it sends the response containing \"close\". The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that connection. A client that receives a \" \" connection option MUST cease sending requests on that connection and close the connection after reading the response message containing the \"close\"; if additional pipelined requests had been sent on the connection, the client SHOULD NOT assume that they will be processed by the server. <\/del> Note that the field name \"Close\" is reserved, since using that name as a header field might conflict with the close connection option. A client that sends a close connection option MUST NOT send further requests on that connection (after the one containing the close) and MUST close the connection after reading the final response message corresponding to this request. A server that receives a close connection option MUST initiate closure of the connection (see below) after it sends the final response to the request that contained the close connection option. The server SHOULD send a close connection option in its final response on that connection. The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that connection. A server that sends a close connection option MUST initiate closure of the connection (see below) after it sends the response containing the close connection option. The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that connection. A client that receives a close connection option MUST cease sending requests on that connection and close the connection after reading the response message containing the close connection option; if additional pipelined requests had been sent on the connection, the client SHOULD NOT assume that they will be processed by the server. <\/ins> If a server performs an immediate close of a TCP connection, there is a significant risk that the client will not be able to read the last"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3bda76f0ef4d031a685323c45b2179cec1aa7baac52981fdf0d4a2739d9acc96","title":"","text":"update\" problem: one client accidentally overwriting the work of another client that has been acting in parallel. Conditional request preconditions are based on the state of the <\/del> 13.1. Preconditions are usually defined with respect to a state of the <\/ins> target resource as a whole (its current value set) or the state as observed in a previously obtained representation (one value in that set). A resource might have multiple current representations, each with its own observable state. The conditional request mechanisms assume that the mapping of requests to a <\/del> set). If a resource has multiple current representations, each with its own observable state, a precondition will assume that the mapping of each request to a (representations) is consistent over time. Regardless, if the mapping is inconsistent or the server is unable to select an appropriate representation, then no harm will result when the precondition evaluates to false. Each precondition defined below consists of a comparison between a set of validators obtained from prior representations of the target resource to the current state of validators for the selected representation (response.validator). Hence, these preconditions evaluate whether the state of the target resource has changed since a given state known by the client. The effect of such an evaluation depends on the method semantics and choice of conditional, as defined in evaluation. Other preconditions, defined by other specifications as extension fields, might place conditions on all recipients, on the state of the target resource in general, or on a group of resources. For instance, the \"If\" header field in WebDAV can make a request conditional on various aspects of multiple resources, such as locks, if the recipient understands and implements that field (RFC4918). <\/ins> (representations) will be consistent over time if the server intends to take advantage of conditionals. Regardless, if the mapping is inconsistent and the server is unable to select the appropriate representation, then no harm will result when the precondition evaluates to false. <\/del> Extensibility of preconditions is only possible when the precondition can be safely ignored if unknown (like <\/ins> 13.1. The request header fields below allow a client to place a precondition on the state of the target resource, so that the action corresponding to the method semantics will not be applied if the precondition evaluates to false. Each precondition defined by this specification consists of a comparison between a set of validators obtained from prior representations of the target resource to the current state of validators for the selected representation (response.validator). Hence, these preconditions evaluate whether the state of the target resource has changed since a given state known by the client. The effect of such an evaluation depends on the method semantics and choice of conditional, as defined in evaluation. <\/del> ), when deployment can be assumed for a given use case, or when implementation is signaled by some other property of the target resource. This encourages a focus on mutually agreed deployment of common standards. <\/ins> 13.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d339ad7a8e7a8dedb8726862627657875dc23b02c775a07b73d61e7174b08a6d","title":"","text":"directive (defined by RFC8246) instructs caches to forgo revalidation of fresh responses even when requested by the client. Conditional request header fields that are defined by extensions to HTTP might place conditions on all recipients, on the state of the target resource in general, or on a group of resources. For instance, the \"If\" header field in WebDAV can make a request conditional on various aspects of multiple resources, such as locks, if the recipient understands and implements that field (RFC4918). <\/del> Although conditional request header fields are defined as being usable with the HEAD method (to keep HEAD's semantics consistent with those of GET), there is no point in sending a conditional HEAD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-40e7f492819a1d106d36978786b4feb0af886eb604a2522ac955022f3f6047b9","title":"","text":"changes that were partially applied, and then automatically retrying the requests that failed. Some clients use weaker signals to initiate automatic retries. For example, when a POST request is sent, but the underlying transport connection is closed before any part of the response is received. Although this is commonly implemented, it is not recommended. <\/del> Some clients take a riskier approach and attempt to guess when an automatic retry is possible. For example, a client might automatically retry a POST request if the underlying transport connection closed before any part of a response is received, particularly if an idle persistent connection was used. <\/ins> A proxy MUST NOT automatically retry non-idempotent requests. A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-516d1186004243fd468403377c65423cb4eb9ea306718c054a700ee69984dd20","title":"","text":"protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the \"http\" and \"https\" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document obsoletes RFC 2818, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7235, RFC 7538, RFC 7615, RFC 7694, and portions of RFC 7230. <\/del> This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFC 2818, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7235, RFC 7538, RFC 7615, RFC 7694, and portions of RFC 7230. <\/ins> Editorial Note"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-597ef0dbe5b89af7081b20e5e32a8677a34b13121d55686c89062732471d871f","title":"","text":"and discarding the content for a HEAD request, since HEAD is usually requested for the sake of efficiency. A content within a HEAD request message has no defined semantics; sending content in a HEAD request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request. <\/del> A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a HEAD request. Content received in a HEAD request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). <\/ins> The response to a HEAD request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to satisfy subsequent HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2e074397a6bb8207b7cb679f99b17655228c3c5dc2e82cdbc54221bc3873a1aa","title":"","text":"that have the same field name into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field line value in order, separated by a comma and <\/del> (\",\") and optional whitespace ( <\/ins> (optional whitespace). For consistency, use comma SP. <\/del> , defined in whitespace). For consistency, use comma SP. <\/ins> The order in which field lines with the same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the field value; a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4e3a2d18d2f1e420effc7aab128d6f587142c8daaaa083c5fa42e79e6c3ef119","title":"","text":"A construct \"#\" is defined, similar to \"*\", for defining comma- delimited lists of elements. The full form is \"#element\" indicating at least and at most elements, each separated by a single comma (\",\") and optional whitespace (OWS). <\/del> single comma (\",\") and optional whitespace ( , defined in whitespace). <\/ins> 5.6.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9e4dec536bf409dfc65501f9f0dd893c9129ebb87a98fdbd1be229e4abf512bb","title":"","text":"these: Note that double-quote delimiters are almost always used with the quoted-string production; using a different syntax inside double- quotes will likely cause unnecessary confusion. <\/del> quoted-string production (quoted.strings); using a different syntax inside double-quotes will likely cause unnecessary confusion. <\/ins> Many fields (such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-800490adfe391b7c2c19ff45a48dc0821b15179d931c3ef5eb9a1b94ee6d71cb","title":"","text":"Fields (fields) that are located within a are are referred to as \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\", <\/del> are referred to as \"trailer fields\" (or just \"trailers\", <\/ins> colloquially). Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital signatures, delivery metrics, or post- processing status information."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-54fe9eef03999b62a07b2a68f7b938e9ba17bf92a25b43e2cc446b4d42397abb","title":"","text":"responses) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if the request is not yet complete. A response can complete before its corresponding request is complete. Likewise, clients are not expected to wait any specific amount of time for a response. Clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. <\/del> its corresponding request is complete (message.framing). Likewise, clients are not expected to wait any specific amount of time for a response. Clients (including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. <\/ins> A client that receives a response while it is still sending the associated request SHOULD continue sending that request, unless it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2f9b5e3722289d801d336252a9c6440960f0407720b53a9eaf99c138c6379fd3","title":"","text":"Authors are advised to carefully consider how the combination of multiple field lines will impact them (see fields.order). Because senders might send erroneously send multiple values, and both <\/del> senders might erroneously send multiple values, and both <\/ins> intermediaries and HTTP libraries can perform combination automatically, this applies to all field values -- even when only a single value is anticipated."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5b35c1f90ae595761619a64c90a2822401d311dc67ebc6cafddef8fa0ffeefce","title":"","text":"Therefore, authors are advised to delimit or encode values that contain commas (e.g., with the rule of quoted.strings, the String data type of RFC8941), or a field- <\/del> rule of quoted.strings, the String data type of RFC8941, or a field- <\/ins> specific encoding). This ensures that commas within field data are not confused with the commas that delimit a list value."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-90a8fbb23083204fd821d20e9c35c783ff8273d42e3965532cc2914281d290b5","title":"","text":"11.1. Response splitting (a.k.a, CRLF injection) is a common technique, <\/del> Response splitting (a.k.a., CRLF injection) is a common technique, <\/ins> used in various attacks on Web usage, that exploits the line-based nature of HTTP message framing and the ordered association of requests to responses on persistent connections Klein. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-30fcca1d96c918d0cf74a0b7a06b5e0694b238f3deca0d5dba4b4da6fd1ec5b7","title":"","text":"Ranges are expressed in terms of a range unit paired with a set of range specifiers. The range unit name determines what kinds of range-spec are applicable to its own specifiers. Hence, the following gramar is generic: each range unit is expected to specify <\/del> following grammar is generic: each range unit is expected to specify <\/ins> requirements on when ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c5949dfc170ee5e8891f0f606eabc3251a7bea4a08490decfd56ce4a3e0ec51a","title":"","text":"options they provide to operators (especially the default configuration). Users need to be aware that intermediaries are no more trustworthy than the people who run them; HTTP itself cannot solve this problem. <\/del> Intermediaries are no more trustworthy than the people and policies under which they operate; HTTP cannot solve this problem. <\/ins> 17.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1cb4ce1b05247ee8d3f8eaf1143733e807ccbae9b65b2aece4df7115f647b0d2","title":"","text":"for the . <\/del> . A successful response reflects the quality of \"sameness\" identified by the target URI (RFC3986). Hence, retrieving identifiable information via HTTP is usually performed by making a GET request on an identifier associated with the potential for providing that information in a response. <\/ins> GET is the primary mechanism of information retrieval and the focus of almost all performance optimizations. Hence, when people speak of retrieving some identifiable information via HTTP, they are generally referring to making a GET request. A successful response reflects the quality of \"sameness\" identified by the target URI. In turn, constructing applications such that they produce a URI for each important resource results in more resources being available for other applications, producing a network effect that promotes further expansion of the Web. <\/del> of almost all performance optimizations. Applications that produce a URI for each important resource can benefit from those optimizations while enabling their reuse by other applications, creating a network effect that promotes further expansion of the Web. <\/ins> It is tempting to think of resource identifiers as remote file system pathnames and of representations as being a copy of the contents of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d6e9b57ff80ac6b86777a28b95d9999e72bb3a7c0d26145c8b55892cf77aba28","title":"","text":"information. Other prefixes are sometimes used in HTTP field names; for example, \"Accept-\" is used in many content negotiation headers. These prefixes are only an aid to recognizing the purpose of a field, and do not trigger automatic processing. <\/del> \"Accept-\" is used in many content negotiation headers, and \"Content-\" is used as explained in content. These prefixes are only an aid to recognizing the purpose of a field, and do not trigger automatic processing. <\/ins> 16.3.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4dc6b483d3dde475dba717970652ace73455f681b72217d765dabdd411dc1c67","title":"","text":"message. However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym. If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for the received-protocol. <\/del> received on the default port, if any, for the received-protocol. <\/ins> A sender MAY generate comments to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-567f22c89fef692d7876e17cc8fd5f29ae1a82ad64734a179b18ab56349332c0","title":"","text":"header field includes information about the selected representation's complete length. A sender that generates a 206 response with an <\/del> A sender that generates a 206 response to a request with an <\/ins> header field SHOULD NOT generate other representation header fields beyond those required, because the client already has a prior"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-fc0b6edae8dd0d9eeec79fc1efb964b3064f3ff9f672a9d760bc16191f0e954a","title":"","text":"Browser fingerprinting is a set of techniques for identifying a specific user agent over time through its unique set of characteristics. These characteristics might include information related to its TCP behavior, feature capabilities, and scripting environment, though of particular interest here is the set of unique characteristics that might be communicated via HTTP. Fingerprinting is considered a privacy concern because it enables tracking of a user agent's behavior over time (Bujlow) without the corresponding controls that the user might have over other forms of data collection (e.g., cookies). Many general-purpose user agents (i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to reduce their fingerprints. <\/del> related to how it uses the underlying transport protocol, feature capabilities, and scripting environment, though of particular interest here is the set of unique characteristics that might be communicated via HTTP. Fingerprinting is considered a privacy concern because it enables tracking of a user agent's behavior over time (Bujlow) without the corresponding controls that the user might have over other forms of data collection (e.g., cookies). Many general-purpose user agents (i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to reduce their fingerprints. <\/ins> There are a number of request header fields that might reveal information to servers that is sufficiently unique to enable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-537a64e232f21b6ced5af6194e169ef519db968abaed13088bfc45873433be03","title":"","text":"When a cache receives a response and already has one or more stored <\/del> response, it needs to identify stored responses that are suitable for updating with the new information provided, and then do so. <\/ins> responses for the applicable request URI, the cache needs to identify which (if any) are to be updated by the new information provided, and then do so. <\/del> The initial set of stored responses to update are those that could have been selected for that request -- i.e., those that meet the requirements in constructing.responses.from.caches, except the last requirement to be fresh, able to be served stale or just validated. <\/ins> The stored response(s) to update are identified by using the first match (if any) of: <\/del> Then, that initial set of stored response(s) is further filtered by the first match of: <\/ins> For each stored response identified, the cache MUST update its header fields with the header fields provided in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6f8d52d2e186a6750e8d9e501d16a40670bb79c5fd6715a11ca3f85801c1ca68","title":"","text":"content, or poison a cache. See security.considerations for security considerations regarding message routing. Unless the caveat above applies, an origin server MUST reject a request if any scheme-specific requirements are not met. In particular, a request for an \"https\" resource MUST be rejected unless it has been received over a connection that has been secured via a certificate valid for that target URI's origin, as defined by https.uri. <\/ins> The status code in a response indicates that the origin server has"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7708733fd0590ad3a7d25c42a5592d90a0bc5341dbc0734b8e655324a26e3b6d","title":"","text":"4.1. When a cache receives a request that can be satisfied by a stored response that has a <\/del> response and that stored response contains a <\/ins> header field (field.vary), it MUST NOT use that response unless all the selecting header fields nominated by the Vary header field match in both the original request (i.e., that associated with the stored response), and the presented request. <\/del> header field (field.vary), the cache MUST NOT use that stored response without revalidation unless all the selecting header fields (nominated by that Vary field value) in the present request match those fields in the original request (i.e., the request that caused the cached response to be stored). <\/ins> The selecting header fields from two requests are defined to match if and only if those in the first request can be transformed to those in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-cb81925f9d5e6621b3e9c7ab560543270dd5a3e5f2aeb28a903813b205f6b7c8","title":"","text":"absent from a request, it can only match another request if it is also absent there. A <\/del> A stored response with a <\/ins> header field value containing a member \"*\" always fails to match."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5fbca0195007a6de8849ee42ef590c1c801fb8c109ab0f98ead03e20cabeb0e0","title":"","text":"current_age is defined in age.calculations. Clients can send the max-age or min-fresh request directives (cache- request-directive) to constrain or relax freshness calculations for the corresponding response. However, caches are not required to <\/del> request-directive) to suggest limits on the freshness calculations for the corresponding response. However, caches are not required to <\/ins> honor them. When calculating freshness, to avoid common problems in date parsing:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-338e9658987f5a7d56f928558e6f765925d281149f6ec601915d370da1a028cd","title":"","text":"A cache can calculate the freshness lifetime (denoted as freshness_lifetime) of a response by using the first match of: Note that this calculation is not vulnerable to clock skew, since all of the information comes from the origin server. <\/del> Note that this calculation is intended to reduce clock skew by using the clock information provided by the origin server whenever possible. <\/ins> When there is more than one value present for a given directive (e.g., two"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ae0050e5f26ee495ec320d69ea3fb7f2abddd851dfcd61ed4e1ac8d054f722f6","title":"","text":"authority component, an empty Host header field will be sent in this case. To allow for the possibility of a transition to the absolute-form for all requests in some future version of HTTP, a server MUST accept the absolute-form in requests, even though HTTP\/1.1 clients will only send them in requests to proxies. <\/del> A server MUST accept the absolute-form in requests even though most HTTP\/1.1 clients will only send the absolute-form to a proxy. <\/ins> 3.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b65699fc05a16df66a07385bf3c1e8f5a6461646606c31865e0e9c5b2434cb6e","title":"","text":"14.3. The \"Accept-Ranges\" header field allows a server to indicate that it supports range requests for the target resource. <\/del> The \"Accept-Ranges\" field in a response indicates whether an upstream server supports range requests for the target resource. <\/ins> An origin server that supports byte-range requests for a given target resource MAY send <\/del> For example, a server that supports byte.ranges can send the field <\/ins> to indicate what range units are supported. A client MAY generate range requests without having received this header field for the resource involved. Range units are defined in range.units. <\/del> to indicate that it supports byte range requests for that target resource, thereby encouraging its use by the client for future partial requests on the same request path. Range units are defined in range.units. A client MAY generate range requests regardless of having received an Accept-Ranges field. The information only provides advice for the sake of improving performance and reducing unnecessary network transfers. Conversely, a client MUST NOT assume that receiving an Accept-Ranges field means that future range requests will return partial responses. The content might change, the server might only support range requests at certain times or under certain conditions, or a different intermediary might process the next request. <\/ins> A server that does not support any kind of range request for the target resource MAY send to advise the client not to attempt a range request. <\/del> to advise the client not to attempt a range request on the same request path. The range unit \"none\" is reserved for this purpose. The Accept-Ranges field MAY be sent in a trailer section, but is preferred to be sent as a header field because the information is particularly useful for restarting large information transfers that have failed in mid-content (before the trailer section is received). <\/ins> 14.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5581860b0016e811c52f4ca9c8c8b14f1743d7c714fac2ad92691e86a8753164","title":"","text":"header field in the request (field.range). A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request. Content received in a GET request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). <\/del> Although request message framing is independent of the method used, content received in a GET request has no generally defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often unaware of intermediaries along the request chain. <\/ins> The response to a GET request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to satisfy subsequent GET and HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-60e855b09c96c4ab3d4fda40ebd254bfb267453ab14ad582cbe88a43321b9fa5","title":"","text":"and discarding the content for a HEAD request, since HEAD is usually requested for the sake of efficiency. A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a HEAD request. Content received in a HEAD request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). <\/del> Although request message framing is independent of the method used, content received in a HEAD request has no generally defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a HEAD request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often unaware of intermediaries along the request chain. <\/ins> The response to a HEAD request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to satisfy subsequent HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f910f56af621c2f04ce9c119480d6bdd1b03b49c71c437c9d6171380559ad335","title":"","text":"If a DELETE method is successfully applied, the origin server SHOULD send A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a DELETE request. Content received in a DELETE request has no defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request. <\/del> Although request message framing is independent of the method used, content received in a DELETE request has no generally defined semantics, cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of its potential as a request smuggling attack (request.smuggling). A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a DELETE request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often unaware of intermediaries along the request chain. <\/ins> Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a successful DELETE request passes through a cache that has one or more stored"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-275c23de13a1b9680b3e49413f06a048287359b1f3dee523aff0be89e98949c7","title":"","text":"CONNECT. A CONNECT request message does not have content. The interpretation of and allowability of data sent after the header section of the CONNECT request message is specific to the version of HTTP in use. <\/del> of data sent after the header section of the CONNECT request message is specific to the version of HTTP in use. <\/ins> Responses to the CONNECT method are not cacheable."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-97b02dad48f873f149ececd537962ecf43945ddd55c65e070f58abe654c6e991","title":"","text":"publication, only HTTP\/1.1 uses transfer codings (see transfer.codings). The TE field value consists of a list of tokens, each allowing for optional parameters (except for the special case \"trailers\"). <\/del> The TE field value is a list of members, with each member (aside from \"trailers\") consisting of a transfer coding name token with an optional weight indicating the client's relative preference for that transfer coding (quality.values) and optional parameters for that transfer coding. <\/ins> A sender of TE MUST also send a \"TE\" connection option within the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-805df8dd1595b9487f42addaeb0f270c2842d5e67d07f20c7ee3acd27045dff3","title":"","text":"This allows a recipient to prepare for receipt of the indicated metadata before it starts processing the content. For example, a sender might indicate that a message integrity check will be computed as the content is being streamed and provide the final signature as a trailer field. This allows a recipient to perform the same check on the fly as it receives the content. <\/del> For example, a sender might indicate that a signature will be computed as the content is being streamed and provide the final signature as a trailer field. This allows a recipient to perform the same check on the fly as it receives the content. <\/ins> Because the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-562112862dd13f737dee3881ac5225ffdda3ed9a5cc02216c4413d781d03bfb1","title":"","text":"matches any available content coding not explicitly listed in the field. For example, <\/del> Examples: <\/ins> A server tests whether a content coding for a given representation is acceptable using these rules:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-61c0ed0eec1021c8d2835dc65691e0c828ed2d85ce168511eb973818e2753aa7","title":"","text":"pragma and cache-control directives, unless Cache-Control: no-cache is purposefully omitted to target other response directives at HTTP\/1.1 caches. For example: <\/del> request directives at HTTP\/1.1 caches. For example: <\/ins> will constrain HTTP\/1.1 caches to serve a response no older than 30 seconds, while precluding implementations that do not understand"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6bf1a2decaea5c660c2f9e570115a4771521cd74c6a3950fae1a778053b23d93","title":"","text":"consumes server resources. Furthermore, using multiple connections can cause undesirable side effects in congested networks. Using larger number of multiple connections can also cause side effects in otherwise uncongested networks, because their aggregate and initially synchronized sending behavior can cause congestion that would not have been present if fewer parallel connections had been used. <\/del> effects in congested networks. Using larger numbers of connections can also cause side effects in otherwise uncongested networks, because their aggregate and initially synchronized sending behavior can cause congestion that would not have been present if fewer parallel connections had been used. <\/ins> Note that a server might reject traffic that it deems abusive or characteristic of a denial-of-service attack, such as an excessive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a05fdb5db256eb243db0f8e4e1ed39e77f6370b21de4050431a9f75b61256be3","title":"","text":"The status-code element is a 3-digit integer code describing the result of the server's attempt to understand and satisfy the client's corresponding request. The rest of the response message is to be interpreted in light of the semantics defined for that status code. See status.codes for information about the semantics of status codes, including the classes of status code (indicated by the first digit), the status codes defined by this specification, considerations for the definition of new status codes, and the IANA registry. <\/del> corresponding request. A recipient parses and interprets the remainder of the response message in light of the semantics defined for that status code, if it is understood, or in accordance with the class of that status code indicated by its first digit if it is not. HTTP's core status codes are defined in status.codes, along with the classes of status codes, considerations for the definition of new status codes, and the IANA registry for collecting such definitions. <\/ins> The reason-phrase element exists for the sole purpose of providing a textual description associated with the numeric status code, mostly"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3076a82a9da9662d6d6ff4414f7b289a58b31039d051d68e0c9752e93740ea5e","title":"","text":"received prior to the request-line. A sender MUST NOT send whitespace between the start-line and the first header field. A recipient that receives whitespace between the start-line and the first header field MUST either reject the message as invalid or consume each whitespace-preceded line without further processing of it (i.e., ignore the entire line, along with any subsequent lines preceded by whitespace, until a properly formed header field is received or the header section is terminated). The presence of such whitespace in a request might be an attempt to trick a server into ignoring that field line or processing the line after it as a new request, either of which might result in a security vulnerability if other implementations within the request chain interpret the same message differently. Likewise, the presence of such whitespace in a response might be ignored by some clients or cause others to cease parsing. <\/del> first header field. A recipient that receives whitespace between the start-line and the first header field MUST either reject the message as invalid or consume each whitespace-preceded line without further processing of it (i.e., ignore the entire line, along with any subsequent lines preceded by whitespace, until a properly formed header field is received or the header section is terminated). Rejection or removal of invalid whitespace-preceded lines is necessary to prevent their misinterpretation by downstream recipients that might be vulnerable to request smuggling (request.smuggling) or response splitting (response.splitting) attacks. <\/ins> When a server listening only for HTTP request messages, or processing what appears from the start-line to be an HTTP request message,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7400f31a7a7ae936cb7c50259074dc4b6564def252e082d757ddfa8a2362337a","title":"","text":"host name if the target URI contains a fully qualified domain name. A proxy MUST NOT modify the \"absolute-path\" and \"query\" parts of the received target URI when forwarding it to the next inbound server, except as noted above to replace an empty path with \"\/\" or \"*\". <\/del> received target URI when forwarding it to the next inbound server except as required by that forwarding protocol. For example, a proxy forwarding a request to an origin server via HTTP\/1.1 will replace an empty path with \"\/\" (origin-form) or \"*\" (asterisk-form), depending on the request method. <\/ins> A proxy MUST NOT transform the content (content) of a message that contains a no-transform cache-control response directive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-e4664ab1eb68bc9a659b0f9c8e3549e96c25c0ff4c086eecdf9918fc4205b5fb","title":"","text":"expectations, if any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended for use in trailers. 6.6. Fields that describe the message itself, such as when and how the message has been generated, can appear in both requests and responses. 6.6.1. The \"Date\" header field represents the date and time at which the message was originated, having the same semantics as the Origination Date Field (orig-date) defined in RFC5322. The field value is an HTTP-date, as defined in http.date. An example is A sender that generates a Date header field SHOULD generate its field value as the best available approximation of the date and time of message generation. In theory, the date ought to represent the moment just before generating the message content. In practice, a sender can generate the date value at any time during message origination. An origin server MUST NOT send a Date header field if it does not have a clock capable of providing a reasonable approximation of the current instant in Coordinated Universal Time. An origin server MAY send a Date header field if the response is in the or class of status codes. An origin server MUST send a Date header field in all other cases. A recipient with a clock that receives a response message without a Date header field MUST record the time it was received and append a corresponding Date header field to the message's header section if it is cached or forwarded downstream. A recipient with a clock that receives a response with an invalid Date header field value MAY replace that value with the time that response was received. A user agent MAY send a Date header field in a request, though generally will not do so unless it is believed to convey useful information to the server. For example, custom applications of HTTP might convey a Date if the server is expected to adjust its interpretation of the user's request based on differences between the user agent and server clocks. 6.6.2. The \"Trailer\" header field provides a list of field names that the sender anticipates sending as trailer fields within that message. This allows a recipient to prepare for receipt of the indicated metadata before it starts processing the content. For example, a sender might indicate that a signature will be computed as the content is being streamed and provide the final signature as a trailer field. This allows a recipient to perform the same check on the fly as it receives the content. A sender that intends to generate one or more trailer fields in a message SHOULD generate a header field in the header section of that message to indicate which fields might be present in the trailers. If an intermediary discards the trailer section in transit, the field could provide a hint of what metadata was lost, though there is no guarantee that a sender of Trailer will always follow through by sending the named fields. <\/ins> 7. HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-06ed05f04acd10b8fa04316d1c72c55e4864ea3e14c7870d05cd7effa6f49dbd","title":"","text":"10.1.5. The \"Trailer\" header field provides a list of field names that the sender anticipates sending as trailer fields within that message. This allows a recipient to prepare for receipt of the indicated metadata before it starts processing the content. For example, a sender might indicate that a signature will be computed as the content is being streamed and provide the final signature as a trailer field. This allows a recipient to perform the same check on the fly as it receives the content. A sender that intends to generate one or more trailer fields in a message SHOULD generate a header field in the header section of that message to indicate which fields might be present in the trailers. If an intermediary discards the trailer section in transit, the field could provide a hint of what metadata was lost, though there is no guarantee that a sender of Trailer will always follow through by sending the named fields. 10.1.6. <\/del> The \"User-Agent\" header field contains information about the user agent originating the request, which is often used by servers to help identify the scope of reported interoperability problems, to work"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-f8035e0dde0f36227c650af5baaaeead08274aca9bf375d3078556a6487e8ad0","title":"","text":"10.2.2. The \"Date\" header field represents the date and time at which the message was originated, having the same semantics as the Origination Date Field (orig-date) defined in RFC5322. The field value is an HTTP-date, as defined in http.date. An example is A sender that generates a Date header field SHOULD generate its field value as the best available approximation of the date and time of message generation. In theory, the date ought to represent the moment just before generating the message content. In practice, a sender can generate the date value at any time during message origination. An origin server MUST NOT send a Date header field if it does not have a clock capable of providing a reasonable approximation of the current instant in Coordinated Universal Time. An origin server MAY send a Date header field if the response is in the or class of status codes. An origin server MUST send a Date header field in all other cases. A recipient with a clock that receives a response message without a Date header field MUST record the time it was received and append a corresponding Date header field to the message's header section if it is cached or forwarded downstream. A recipient with a clock that receives a response with an invalid Date header field value MAY replace that value with the time that response was received. A user agent MAY send a Date header field in a request, though generally will not do so unless it is believed to convey useful information to the server. For example, custom applications of HTTP might convey a Date if the server is expected to adjust its interpretation of the user's request based on differences between the user agent and server clocks. 10.2.3. <\/del> The \"Location\" header field is used in some responses to refer to a specific resource in relation to the response. The type of relationship is defined by the combination of request method and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3b78c73c9a52438bdc6e1b9c6aceab74f04d2815e734d3f9d84ed809f165972f","title":"","text":"response is supposed to provide a URI that is specific to the created resource. 10.2.4. <\/del> 10.2.3. <\/ins> Servers send the \"Retry-After\" header field to indicate how long the user agent ought to wait before making a follow-up request. When"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-d2f7d8e94508e054cc9ea9033c88682d0f127951cec2f54afd85f427b3e45335","title":"","text":"In the latter example, the delay is 2 minutes. 10.2.5. <\/del> 10.2.4. <\/ins> The \"Server\" header field contains information about the software used by the origin server to handle the request, which is often used"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-5acec743c951fbb339a4d1fecb0f4e7cd99a0c04c3d843a6e5a91acd90ed3f25","title":"","text":"12.5.5. The \"Vary\" header field in a response describes what parts of a request message, aside from the method and target URI, might influence the origin server's process for selecting and representing <\/del> request message, aside from the method and target URI, might have influenced the origin server's process for selecting the content of <\/ins> this response. A Vary field value is a list of request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might have a role in selecting the representation for this response. Potential selecting header fields are not limited to those defined by this specification. <\/del> A Vary field value is either the wildcard member \"*\" or a list of request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might have had a role in selecting the representation for this response. Potential selecting header fields are not limited to fields defined by this specification. <\/ins> If the list contains \"*\", it signals that other aspects of the request might play a role in selecting the response representation, possibly including elements outside the message syntax (e.g., the client's network address). A recipient will not be able to determine whether this response is appropriate for a later request without forwarding the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate \"*\" in a Vary field value. <\/del> A list containing the member \"*\" signals that other aspects of the request might have played a role in selecting the response representation, possibly including aspects outside the message syntax (e.g., the client's network address). A recipient will not be able to determine whether this response is appropriate for a later request without forwarding the request to the origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate \"*\" in a Vary field value. <\/ins> For example, a response that contains"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1ee148613a32abc2d249882e39554e89ad59e9085913a11ba434cdc65e53b014","title":"","text":"header fields (or lack thereof) as determining factors while choosing the content for this response. An origin server might send Vary with a list of header fields for two purposes: An origin server SHOULD send a Vary header field when its algorithm for selecting a representation varies based on aspects of the request message other than the method and target URI, unless the variance cannot be crossed or the origin server has been deliberately configured to prevent cache transparency. For example, there is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because reuse across users is constrained by the field definition (field.authorization). Likewise, an origin server might use Cache- Control response directives (field.cache-control) to supplant Vary if it considers the variance less significant than the performance cost of Vary's impact on caching. <\/del> A Vary field containing selecting field names has two purposes: An origin server SHOULD generate a Vary header field on a cacheable response when it wishes that response to be selectively reused for subsequent requests. Generally, that is the case when the response content has been tailored to better fit the preferences expressed by those selecting header fields, such as when an origin server has selected the response's language based on the request's header field. Vary might be elided when an origin server considers variance in content selection to be less significant than Vary's performance impact on caching, particularly when such variance is already being limited by Cache-Control response directives (field.cache-control). Cached content selection is only improved by Vary if there is some chance that the origin server's selection algorithm might prefer a different representation for the recipient in a subsequent request. For example, there is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because reuse of that response for a different user is prohibited by the field definition (field.authorization). Likewise, if the response content has been selected by network region but the origin server wants the cached response to be reused even if recipients move from one region to another, then there is no need for the origin server to indicate such variance in Vary. <\/ins> 13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-4cc66c11d6316a94baeee4dc2235250eb315ac2c1a255d530c7645ea7a492aab","title":"","text":"more than one member, or if the request method is neither GET nor HEAD. A recipient MUST ignore the If-Modified-Since header field if the resource does not have a modification date available. <\/ins> A recipient MUST interpret an If-Modified-Since field value's timestamp in terms of the origin server's clock."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-24c24f3e08e394b95ff4cbf328145c1519f4e269cf8de28df772a55567275a01","title":"","text":"received field value is not a valid HTTP-date (including when the field value appears to be a list of dates). A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the resource does not have a modification date available. <\/ins> A recipient MUST interpret an If-Unmodified-Since field value's timestamp in terms of the origin server's clock."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7baf4bc684f5ecd6086871e6c2a6db8e5d6c327a6c03b8b112c87d430e457c4a","title":"","text":"When an \"http\" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message to the server containing the URI's identifying data. <\/del> that address on the indicated port, and sending over that connection an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI (target.resource). <\/ins> If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-83f34b26c70c7ab885e9b233c2710ede936157c2de608a13a487d8b22558e177","title":"","text":"host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, securing the connection end-to- end by successfully initiating TLS over TCP with confidentiality and integrity protection, and sending an HTTP request message over that connection containing the URI's identifying data. <\/del> integrity protection, and sending over that connection an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI (target.resource). <\/ins> If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response message, as described in status.codes, then that response is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b35f86fbd67f776e1d5ecb504e12f964dab787c33062bc8556994ad913508cb5","title":"","text":"used to satisfy the request. Proxy configuration is implementation- dependent, but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective authority matching, or both, and the proxy itself is usually identified by an \"http\" or \"https\" URI. If a proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy. <\/del> identified by an \"http\" or \"https\" URI. If an \"http\" or \"https\" proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. <\/ins> 7.3.3. If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler routine, usually specific to the target URI's scheme, to connect directly to an origin for the target resource. How that is accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification. <\/del> routine (specific to the target URI's scheme) to obtain access to the identified resource. How that is accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification. http.origin defines how to obtain access to an \"http\" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound connection to the identified origin server and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. https.origin defines how to obtain access to an \"https\" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound secured connection to an origin server that is authoritative for the identified origin and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target that matches the client's target URI. <\/ins> 7.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-c9c96170970e49c0635dbeaa7bb95ade2ba10c7e8c1a65f3cbe89839581db738","title":"","text":"(appointed by the IESG or their delegate). Fields with the status 'permanent' are Specification Required (RFC8126). Registration requests consist of at least the following information: <\/del> Registration requests consist of the following information: <\/ins> And, optionally:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6b42fa3a28b09f7daaf3f1a50e88aaf721c96d6898c5504b631148703575ad6b","title":"","text":"configuration, it will appear as if Proxy-Authentication-Info is being forwarded because each proxy will send the same field value. Proxy-Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field (trailer.fields) when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this. <\/ins> 12. When responses convey content, whether indicating a success or an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ed0810bb9a6ad9387c7788bcc28841a3d37ec1bb6a8f9c3430cfec325c3b842d","title":"","text":"header field value containing a member \"*\" always fails to match. The stored response with matching selecting header fields is known as the . If multiple selected responses are available (potentially including responses without a Vary header field), the cache will need to choose one to use. When a selecting header field has a known mechanism for doing so (e.g., qvalues on <\/del> If multiple stored responses match the selecting header fields (potentially including responses without a Vary header field), the cache will need to choose one to use. When a selecting header field has a known mechanism for ranking preference (e.g., qvalues on <\/ins> and similar request header fields), that mechanism MAY be used to select a preferred response. If such a mechanism is not available, <\/del> choose a preferred response. If such a mechanism is not available, <\/ins> or leads to equally preferred responses, the most recent response (as determined by the header field) is used, as per constructing.responses.from.caches. <\/del> header field) is chosen, as per constructing.responses.from.caches. <\/ins> Some resources mistakenly omit the Vary header field from their default response (i.e., the one sent when no more preferable response is available), with the effect of selecting it for requests to that resource even when more preferable responses are available. When a cache has multiple responses for a target URI and one or more omits the Vary header field, it SHOULD use the most recent (see age.calculations) valid Vary field value available to select an appropriate response for the request. <\/del> cache has multiple stored responses for a target URI and one or more omits the Vary header field, the cache SHOULD choose the most recent see age.calculations) stored response with a valid Vary field value. <\/ins> If no selected response is available, the cache cannot satisfy the presented request. Typically, it is forwarded to the origin server in a (possibly conditional; see validation.model) request. <\/del> If no stored response matches, the cache cannot satisfy the presented request. Typically, the request is forwarded to the origin server, potentially with preconditions added to describe what responses the cache has already stored (validation.model). <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1d66f1c8c2709d7ad90e62d713386cc20db332ebee2fe5392d4a85c6f36eae45","title":"","text":"When a cache has one or more stored responses for a requested URI, but cannot serve any of them (e.g., because they are not fresh, or one cannot be selected; see caching.negotiated.responses), it can use <\/del> one cannot be chosen; see caching.negotiated.responses), it can use <\/ins> the conditional request mechanism (preconditions) in the forwarded request to give the next inbound server an opportunity to select a <\/del> request to give the next inbound server an opportunity to choose a <\/ins> valid stored response to use, updating the stored metadata in the process, or to replace the stored response(s) with a new response. This process is known as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-894317d42f389b733e42da4af466b3d70a970b7ed276abac11ef67fa9eb876e7","title":"","text":"response, as per constructing.responses.from.caches, the cache SHOULD evaluate any applicable conditional header field preconditions received in that request with respect to the corresponding validators contained within the selected response. <\/del> contained within the stored response. <\/ins> A cache MUST NOT evaluate conditional header fields that only apply to an origin server, occur in a request with semantics that cannot be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-946899a00b7fe4b0e013d73f774fd54338cf839f8a0ef2ccb587453b43a8a51e","title":"","text":"header field (field.if-none-match) indicates that the client wants to validate one or more of its own stored responses in comparison to the stored response selected by the cache (as per <\/del> stored response chosen by the cache (as per <\/ins> constructing.responses.from.caches). If an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-568339a2298429dfd36bc63999da805b608adb6a1ac559b917702c096f53ae15","title":"","text":"header field and the header field is not present in a selected stored response, a cache SHOULD use the stored response's <\/del> header field is not present in a stored response, a cache SHOULD use the stored response's <\/ins> field value (or, if no Date field is present, the time that the stored response was received) to evaluate the conditional."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-40acf472f88add06eb5fa96ed3ce8b0c8a984079fa8bf41f55e67261a4beca02","title":"","text":"A cache that implements partial responses to range requests, as defined in field.range, also needs to evaluate a received header field (field.if-range) regarding its selected stored response. <\/del> header field (field.if-range) with respect to the cache's chosen response. <\/ins> When a cache decides to forward a request to revalidate its own stored responses for a request that contains an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2d0a31b664c877644bb7283b5f2557379ba6586d80788d0ce51c2ea118c32aee","title":"","text":"updating with the new information provided, and then do so. The initial set of stored responses to update are those that could have been selected for that request -- i.e., those that meet the <\/del> have been chosen for that request -- i.e., those that meet the <\/ins> requirements in constructing.responses.from.caches, except the last requirement to be fresh, able to be served stale or just validated."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-42b5cd3307a4431ed883713c65d18aa55e0415dc5fe854a077b9ec18afefaa3a","title":"","text":"receives a response, the cache SHOULD update or invalidate each of its stored GET responses that could have been selected for that request (see <\/del> GET responses that could have been chosen for that request (see <\/ins> caching.negotiated.responses). For each of the stored responses that could have been selected, if the stored response and HEAD response have matching values for any <\/del> For each of the stored responses that could have been chosen, if the stored response and HEAD response have matching values for any <\/ins> received validator fields ( and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-42d03da309cf58b7f364735cc11fc1ad46dd088b64b5c2db2c4739d1f592877e","title":"","text":"S s-maxage (cache directive) selected response <\/del> shared cache stale"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-ce39e0799c9d5a95274ab7a0c1e38e3cc20886ab103bc19b8465f202c60e4860","title":"","text":"5.2. Historically, HTTP field line values could be extended over multiple <\/del> Historically, HTTP\/1.x field values could be extended over multiple <\/ins> lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space or horizontal tab (obs-fold). This specification deprecates such line folding except within the message\/http media type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-07c3fc04625a129073283ea37f4c8390daa9dac351ab88c4a6a2b3ef24297e60","title":"","text":"The message\/http media type can be used to enclose a single HTTP request or response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for all \"message\" types regarding line length and encodings. <\/del> encodings. Because of the line length limitations, field values within message\/http are allowed to use line folding ( ), as described in line.folding, to convey the field value over multiple lines. A recipient of message\/http data MUST replace any obsolete line folding with one or more SP characters when the message is consumed. <\/ins> 10.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6fe7079087279278d6512f1dc3e7e3c2e9244713d17da1ea6d2319d0047c7f09","title":"","text":"8859-1, supporting other charsets only through use of RFC2047 encoding. Specifications for newly defined fields SHOULD limit their values to visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB. A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field content (obs-text) as opaque data. <\/del> SHOULD treat other allowed octets in field content (i.e., <\/ins> Field values containing CR or NUL characters are invalid and <\/del> ) as opaque data. Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and <\/ins> dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those <\/del> and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR, LF, or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those <\/ins> characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message. Field values containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however, recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake of robustness if they only appear within safe field value contexts (e.g., opaque data). <\/del> of robustness when they appear within a safe context (e.g., an application-specific quoted string that will not be processed by any downstream HTTP parser). <\/ins> Fields that only anticipate a single member as the field value are referred to as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-161d5bfed3fbaa9bfc6d1796447fd7ef5c5bdb425397a225135526163f7e0eb8","title":"","text":"forms, the meaning of a parameter value ought to be the same whether it was received as a token or a quoted string. Historically, HTTP field values could be extended over multiple lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space or horizontal tab ( ). This document assumes that any such obsolete line folding has been removed prior to interpreting the field value (e.g., as described in line.folding). <\/del> 5.6. 5.6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-2f3758fe39f28be820cc767b56a7b2c77e6bcdb5dc8c45f2e2c18aa588fb3f58","title":"","text":"8.8. Validator fields convey metadata about the <\/del> Resource metadata is referred to as a if it can be used within a precondition (preconditions) to make a conditional request (conditional.requests). Validator fields convey a current validator for the (representations). <\/ins> (representations). In responses to safe requests, validator fields describe the selected representation chosen by the origin server while handling the response. Note that, depending on the status code <\/del> In responses to safe requests, validator fields describe the selected representation chosen by the origin server while handling the response. Note that, depending on the method and status code <\/ins> semantics, the for a given response is not necessarily the same as the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-6bb654b0c10dcba4028c9293aecc42f8114278279b22e1a75ea37d9c194f082b","title":"","text":"For example, an ETag field in a response communicates the entity-tag of the newly created resource's representation, so that it can be used in later conditional requests to prevent the \"lost update\" problem (preconditions). <\/del> representation, so that the entity-tag can be used as a validator in later conditional requests to prevent the \"lost update\" problem. <\/ins> This specification defines two forms of metadata that are commonly used to observe resource state and test for preconditions:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b16e6bd724e11057784a319e4328e4fca0debb60daf48691cf2d9d6dac52523d","title":"","text":"(field.etag). Additional metadata that reflects resource state has been defined by various extensions of HTTP, such as Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning WEBDAV, that are beyond the scope of this specification. A resource metadata value is referred to as a when it is used within a precondition. <\/del> specification. <\/ins> 8.8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-301f2a2f5caa8727f4f278f6c6ef489a1cedd2c35e34cd5cec5b9a22b1b5990f","title":"","text":">> Response: 8.8.4. In responses to GET or HEAD, an origin server: In other words, the preferred behavior for an origin server is to send both a strong entity-tag and a value in successful responses to a retrieval request. A client: <\/del> 9. 9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-1ef5145b83ace6f85919a0dda127d0ffccd689c342d42b9a789ad8d7feb5c0ec","title":"","text":"indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls (see heuristic.freshness). In 200 responses to GET or HEAD, an origin server SHOULD send any available validator fields (response.validator) for the , with both a strong entity-tag and a date being preferred. In 200 responses to state-changing methods, any validator fields (response.validator) sent in the response convey the current validators for the new representation formed as a result of successfully applying the request semantics. Note that the PUT method (PUT) has additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators. <\/ins> 15.3.2. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7f0d1af5624ae75540e0747571afcdcc874c783d1dc398f0e41e63bb48e35651","title":"","text":"header field is received, by the target URI. The 201 response content typically describes and links to the resource(s) created. See response.validator for a discussion of the meaning and purpose of validator fields, such as and , in a 201 response. <\/del> resource(s) created. Any validator fields (response.validator) sent in the response convey the current validators for a new representation created by the request. Note that the PUT method (PUT) has additional requirements that might preclude sending such validators. <\/ins> 15.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-56fa30ad97b00ef74c1d8602b2132210cf2c0633e17f2f6bd201a5c916ae40e0","title":"","text":"deliberately crafted to bypass security filters along the request chain. A client MUST send a Host header field in all HTTP\/1.1 request messages. If the target URI includes an authority component, then a client MUST send a field value for Host that is identical to that authority component, excluding any userinfo subcomponent and its \"@\" delimiter (http.uri). If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI, then a client MUST send a Host header field with an empty field value. <\/del> A client MUST send a header field (field.host) in all HTTP\/1.1 request messages. If the target URI includes an authority component, then a client MUST send a field value for Host that is identical to that authority component, excluding any userinfo subcomponent and its \"@\" delimiter (http.uri). If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI, then a client MUST send a Host header field with an empty field value. <\/ins> A server MUST respond with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-7e78846f0e1d72f44c0c419386876058fa566c4596335b3e7e44319dd15b36bb","title":"","text":"information in multipart.byteranges for the media type \"multipart\/ byteranges\". Furthermore please update the registry note about \"q\" parameters with a link to field.accept of this document. <\/ins> 18.9. Please update the \"Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-db8d0405c2038d612efad8190dc52d828d472040daf79ef63719dd7f47d25431","title":"","text":"9.8. TLS provides a facility for secure connection closure through an exchange of closure alerts prior to closing a connection TLS13. When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured that no further data will be received on that connection. <\/del> TLS uses an exchange of closure alerts prior to (non-error) connection closure to provide secure connection closure; see TLS13. When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured that no further data will be received on that connection. <\/ins> When an implementation knows that it has sent or received all the message data that it cares about, typically by detecting HTTP message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8dd898d4dc2a19758767362bb20a7e15acb85c576f5cab21021843b8b2aa05c3","title":"","text":"This specification updates the HTTP related aspects of the existing registration procedures for message header fields defined in RFC3864. It defines both a new registration procedure and moves HTTP field definitions into a separate registry. <\/del> It replaces the old procedures as they relate to HTTP, by defining a new registration procedure and moving HTTP field definitions into a separate registry. <\/ins> Please create a new registry as outlined in fields.registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-248d1b363c238181fa885e39866e2f731ad59bee29c6503b2f7259a117b017bc","title":"","text":"for proxy requests for \"http\" URIs, whereas other requests might require translation to and from entirely different application-level protocols. Proxies are often used to group an organization's HTTP requests through a common intermediary for the sake of security, annotation services, or shared caching. Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected messages or content while they are being forwarded, as described in message.transformations. <\/del> requests through a common intermediary for the sake of security services, annotation services, or shared caching. Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected messages or content while they are being forwarded, as described in message.transformations. <\/ins> A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-b0f469947febea3e045e9d943f467fe886bd756e7de5b6b123e549ef3e44fd13","title":"","text":"request to obtain an alternate representation. Furthermore, this specification does not define a mechanism for supporting automatic selection, though it does not prevent such a mechanism from being developed as an extension. <\/del> developed. <\/ins> 12.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-172c3a17c1a475e9c73670aadd9b36b5a35566b1df438f6ce3557d4fe8eb3bd9","title":"","text":"status code indicates that the has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs. Clients with link-editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the target URI to one or more of the new references sent by the server, where possible. <\/del> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs. The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the new references sent by the server. However, this suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited. <\/ins> The server SHOULD generate a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-feec6f7064138dae831955aed911c5a24cf420225aba02a92f3ffd056372ea40","title":"","text":"status code indicates that the has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs. Clients with link editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the target URI to one or more of the new references sent by the server, where possible. <\/del> this resource ought to use one of the enclosed URIs. The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the new references sent by the server. However, this suggestion is usually ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references (e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited. <\/ins> The server SHOULD generate a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-3c7154addcc1e17a5e4cd141e4986ebaa19317e844842df7d29c3f04088f906d","title":"","text":"concerns related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side applications (code behind the HTTP interface), securing user agent processing of content received via HTTP, or secure use of the Internet in general, rather than security of the protocol. Various organizations maintain topical information and links to current research on Web application security (e.g., OWASP). <\/del> Internet in general, rather than security of the protocol. The security considerations for URIs, which are fundamental to HTTP operation, are discussed in URI. Various organizations maintain topical information and links to current research on Web application security (e.g., OWASP). <\/ins> 17.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-a2d0fc6671ff20d29a4c79f9d1295f423269cc27fe28247b5fcdc948b32d83da","title":"","text":"new registration procedure and moving HTTP field definitions into a separate registry. Please create a new registry as outlined in fields.registry. <\/del> Please create a new registry as outlined in fields.registry, and let that registry link to this specification (e.g., \"See section fields.extensibility of [this document] for information on defining and registering new HTTP Header Fields.\"). <\/ins> After creating the registry, all entries in the Permanent and Provisional Message Header Registries with the protocol 'http' are to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-9a91f46d128bea0402e961feaa3d5cfad26e6ec43d81af1a841dec219368ec94","title":"","text":"Please annotate the Permanent and Provisional Message Header registries to indicate that HTTP field name registrations have moved, with an appropriate link. <\/del> with an appropriate link (such as: \"HTTP field name registrations have been moved to per [this document].\") and furthermore remove the existing note pointing to RFC7231 (\"See section 8.3.1 of [RFC7231] for information on registering new HTTP Header Fields.\"). <\/ins> After that is complete, please update the new registry with the field names listed in the following table."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-core-8e9f91d7e9fc019a88d68930aa323182bb21220d6a6ebbcfb0f8c28aecede68a","title":"","text":"An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty implies that the user agent does not want any content coding in response. If an Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a content coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response without any content coding. <\/del> response. If a non-empty Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a content coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response without any content coding unless the identity coding is indicated as unacceptable. <\/ins> When the Accept-Encoding header field is present in a response, it indicates what content codings the resource was willing to accept in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cdbb260a883fa5858be79a80f763b1e555110a4d265058d19ee283487c1515e4","title":"","text":"Implementers SHOULD support Client Hints opt-in mechanisms and MUST clear persisted opt-in preferences when any one of site data, browsing history, browsing cache, or similar, are cleared. <\/del> browsing history, browsing cache, cookies, or similar, are cleared. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-94f29d88c701e9500f79cf55c42269b85744611126e5f77292a6a247a6cbc58a","title":"","text":"behaviours, and the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 to illustrate expected syntax in HTTP header fields. In doing so, uses the VCHAR, SP, DIGIT, ALPHA and DQUOTE rules from RFC5234. It also includes the OWS and tchar rules from RFC7230. <\/del> RFC5234. It also includes the tchar rule from RFC7230. <\/ins> When parsing from HTTP header fields, implementations MUST follow the algorithms, but MAY vary in implementation so as the behaviours are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-01ac7640c6afd6b7ac1587e3a47b0088fb572f650248bb57a70f969a5e75527d","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. If more values remain in inner_list, append a single WS to <\/del> If more values remain in inner_list, append a single SP to <\/ins> output. Append \")\" to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bb40891efb8e1b7d52e8b78fd8a431ff867f95582f67c0430060bb46883a2b14","title":"","text":"Append a COMMA to output. Append a single WS to output. <\/del> Append a single SP to output. <\/ins> Return output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-495814e666e70b4ced8ac173fc3bdfb376b73795d26d708468ace5710f7e80ac","title":"","text":"Convert input_bytes into an ASCII string input_string; if conversion fails, fail parsing. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If header_type is \"list\", let output be the result of running Parsing a List (parse-list) with input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dbeb1674bc65ab28938f59d7853ece2c59101580d14ac81d23dd8dd63f1b3971","title":"","text":"If header_type is \"item\", let output be the result of running Parsing an Item (parse-item) with input_string. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is not empty, fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-38297115718cec6b386579cb81d8a14bb523a2b231e3e9def57152347d4071e5","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Parsing an Item or Inner List (parse-item-or-list) with input_string to members. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, return members. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4b3cc4378629ea5fc91b32410ffd37d4c2c865a0bacc681e81ac6c6f1f650091","title":"","text":"While input_string is not empty: Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If the first character of input_string is \")\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-73c41e88ed934c32ec6fa751e74612a22e5a1bd0a4509d992b1a293f2cec63ff","title":"","text":"Add name this_key with value member to dictionary. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c002a3a9a25c75b2ffdc3ad493c08248a06becb5f18f47ebc606d2ddf2782fc1","title":"","text":"Consume a \";\" character from the beginning of input_string. Discard any leading OWS from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/ins> let param_name be the result of running Parsing a Key (parse- key) with input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-197600b444d50893af28a2821d083a2dd131b8f996795a3bc5417075232fb76e","title":"","text":"Note that a Structured Header token allows the characters as the \"token\" ABNF rule defined in RFC7230, with the exceptions that the first character is required to be ALPHA, and \":\" and \"\/\" are also allowed. <\/del> first character is required to be either ALPHA or \"*\", and \":\" and \"\/\" are also allowed in subsequent characters. <\/ins> 3.3.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-52d1f0f99310a77e7c76b94641bcfc6aea07b9711d210a80cc28255b33826748","title":"","text":"The ABNF for a byte sequence in HTTP headers is: In HTTP headers, a byte sequence is delimited with asterisks and encoded using base64 (RFC4648, Section 4). For example: <\/del> In HTTP headers, a byte sequence is delimited with colons and encoded using base64 (RFC4648, Section 4). For example: <\/ins> Parsers MUST support byte sequences with at least 16384 octets after decoding."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-de1ea351945991e1b3cbf948059a45f3f3c779f625911dd4fa91edecc5074fb8","title":"","text":"Given a token as input_token, return an ASCII string suitable for use in a HTTP header value. If input_token is not a sequence of characters, or contains a <\/del> If input_token is not a sequence of characters, the first character is not ALPHA or \"*\", or the remaining contain a <\/ins> character not in tchar, \":\" or \"\/\", fail serialisation. Let output be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-233b275d0269b374a6013b836fdd9db673e5fac3ffea6449c748ee92f7de4289","title":"","text":"Let output be an empty string. Append \"*\" to output. <\/del> Append \":\" to output. <\/ins> Append the result of base64-encoding input_bytes as per RFC4648, Section 4, taking account of the requirements below. Append \"*\" to output. <\/del> Append \":\" to output. <\/ins> Return output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-22050704ad560a629a237cd46bd9ec2817809088a313f9c570a2f41aca5e74ca","title":"","text":"Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a token. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. If the first character of input_string is not ALPHA, fail parsing. <\/del> If the first character of input_string is not ALPHA or \"*\", fail parsing. <\/ins> Let output_string be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-76a005b6b4fdb3823fe39769f48ef089c086656e9cf4776524159a9099b78e31","title":"","text":"Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a byte sequence. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. If the first character of input_string is not \"*\", fail parsing. <\/del> If the first character of input_string is not \":\", fail parsing. <\/ins> Discard the first character of input_string. If there is not a \"*\" character before the end of input_string, <\/del> If there is not a \":\" character before the end of input_string, <\/ins> fail parsing. Let b64_content be the result of consuming content of input_string up to but not including the first instance of the character \"*\". <\/del> up to but not including the first instance of the character \":\". <\/ins> Consume the \"*\" character at the beginning of input_string. <\/del> Consume the \":\" character at the beginning of input_string. <\/ins> If b64_content contains a character not included in ALPHA, DIGIT, \"+\", \"\/\" and \"=\", fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-784509ed8206c9e603821d85f038537b050404fa56774d2f2d802a96a9b8daa0","title":"","text":"Note that a header field definition cannot relax the requirements of this specification because doing so would preclude handling by generic software; they can only add additional constraints (for example, on the numeric range of integers and floats, the format of <\/del> example, on the numeric range of integers and decimals, the format of <\/ins> strings and tokens, the types allowed in a dictionary's values, or the number of items in a list). Likewise, header field definitions can only use Structured Headers for the entire header field value,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b556100ccce644771c6b18598ee0fd6a7b9b5bacb22ec1a7122403c59e08bcc2","title":"","text":"3.3. An item is can be a integer (integer), float (float), string <\/del> An item is can be a integer (integer), decimal (decimal), string <\/ins> (string), token (token), byte sequence (binary), or Boolean (boolean). It can have associated parameters (param)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f96a17daa735d0fa4c7a8f100c1b9925f096c28f75080d232099fbdf575769af","title":"","text":"3.3.2. Floats are decimal numbers with an integer and a fractional component. The fractional component has at most six digits of precision. Additionally, like integers, it can have no more than fifteen digits in total, which in some cases further constrains its precision. <\/del> Decimals are numbers with an integer and a fractional component. The Integer component has at most 12 digits; the fractional component has at most three digits. <\/ins> The ABNF for floats in HTTP headers is: <\/del> The ABNF for decimals in HTTP headers is: <\/ins> For example, a header whose value is defined as a float could look <\/del> For example, a header whose value is defined as a decimal could look <\/ins> like: 3.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fe4cf8570425f664ddfb4f7d2b8bb4b4b95eec3da6214e039f710eb74ae1007c","title":"","text":"If input_item is an integer, return the result of running Serializing an Integer (ser-integer) with input_item. If input_item is a float, return the result of running Serializing a Float (ser-float) with input_item. <\/del> If input_item is a decimal, return the result of running Serializing a Decimal (ser-decimal) with input_item. <\/ins> If input_item is a string, return the result of running Serializing a String (ser-string) with input_item."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec9cfdf9c691c3d924f56612f62b3e0f1846435ccb2f1b959a8719b0a8c22176","title":"","text":"4.1.5. Given a float as input_float, return an ASCII string suitable for use in a HTTP header value. <\/del> Given a decimal_number as input_decimal, return an ASCII string suitable for use in a HTTP header value. <\/ins> Let output be an empty string. If input_float is less than (but not equal to) 0, append \"-\" to <\/del> If input_decimal is less than (but not equal to) 0, append \"-\" to <\/ins> output. Append input_float's integer component represented in base 10 <\/del> Append input_decimal's integer component represented in base 10 <\/ins> (using only decimal digits) to output; if it is zero, append \"0\". Let integer_digits be the number of characters appended in the previous step. If integer_digits is greater than 14, fail serialisation. Let digits_avail be 15 minus integer_digits. Let fractional_digits_avail be the minimum of digits_avail and 6. <\/del> If the number of characters appended in the previous step is greater than 12, fail serialisation. <\/ins> Append \".\" to output. If input_float's fractional component is 0, append \"0\" to output. <\/del> If input_decimal's fractional component is zero, append \"0\" to output. <\/ins> Else if input_float's fractional component has fractional_digits_avail or less digits, append input_float's fractional component represented in base 10 to output. <\/del> Else if input_decimal's fractional component has up to three digits, append them represented in base 10 (using only decimal digits) to output. <\/ins> Else append fractional_digits_avail digits of input_float's fractional component represented in base 10 to output, rounding to the nearest value, or to the even value if it is equidistant. <\/del> Otherwise, append the first three digits of input_decimal's fractional component (represented in base 10, using only decimal digits) to output, rounding the final digit to the nearest value, or to the even value if it is equidistant. <\/ins> Return output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9f495ba51b6e1181614ec2aa205a9e6c37e9161adada39526ff5cfa80dd22839","title":"","text":"Since concatenation might be done by an upstream intermediary, the results are not under the control of the serializer or the parser. Tokens, Integers, Floats and Byte Sequences cannot be split across <\/del> Tokens, Integers, Decimals and Byte Sequences cannot be split across <\/ins> multiple headers because the inserted commas will cause parsing to fail."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d31b7e99b75059018460c3aeb8e2629cb1b783f37f77886d90a9465f37c4b8b","title":"","text":"Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a number. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. NOTE: This algorithm parses both Integers (integer) and Floats (float), and returns the corresponding structure. <\/del> NOTE: This algorithm parses both Integers (integer) and Decimals (decimal), and returns the corresponding structure. <\/ins> Let type be \"integer\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-511a97aa0f45bb09ce9eaf0eb4cf023339dcd43a66b998b287e503e650c5d49d","title":"","text":"If char is a DIGIT, append it to input_number. Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\", append char to input_number and set type to \"float\". <\/del> Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\": If input_number contains more than 12 characters, fail parsing. Otherwise, append char to input_number and set type to \"decimal\". <\/ins> Otherwise, prepend char to input_string, and exit the loop. If type is \"integer\" and input_number contains more than 15 characters, fail parsing. If type is \"float\" and input_number contains more than 16 <\/del> If type is \"decimal\" and input_number contains more than 16 <\/ins> characters, fail parsing. If type is \"integer\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05524e52cd4fa474da38612a19aab74757f88f03d4ccb1c551baf28923283937","title":"","text":"If the final character of input_number is \".\", fail parsing. If the number of characters after \".\" in input_number is greater than six, fail parsing. <\/del> greater than three, fail parsing. <\/ins> Parse input_number as a float and let output_number be the product of the result and sign. <\/del> Parse input_number as a decimal number and let output_number be the product of the result and sign. <\/ins> Return output_number."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-48b0611b4ad51ef65cf1cc883662f0957f679a6804f3f3a47a2031310d2f88bd","title":"","text":"result of running Parsing a String (parse-string) with input_string. If the first character of input_string is \"*\", return the result <\/del> If the first character of input_string is \":\", return the result <\/ins> of running Parsing a Byte Sequence (parse-binary) with input_string. If the first character of input_string is \"?\", return the result of running Parsing a Boolean (parse-boolean) with input_string. If the first character of input_string is an ALPHA, return the result of running Parsing a Token (parse-token) with input_string. <\/del> If the first character of input_string is an ALPHA or \"*\", return the result of running Parsing a Token (parse-token) with input_string. <\/ins> Otherwise, the item type is unrecognized; fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2ba69f23aed855330c02ecfe33e729a85deb87d0002d2f22445b61daabf56a01","title":"","text":"If char is a DIGIT, append it to input_number. Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\", append char to input_number and set type to \"decimal\". <\/del> Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\": If input_number contains more than 12 characters, fail parsing. Otherwise, append char to input_number and set type to \"decimal\". <\/ins> Otherwise, prepend char to input_string, and exit the loop."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c1a0c10f0cfa48b0a71e8fbbdf3bba48d354d1d79c591d04032c4eceed57d347","title":"","text":"The term \"public suffix\" is defined in a note in Section 5.3 of RFC6265 as \"a domain that is controlled by a public registry\", and are also known as \"effective top-level domains\" (eTLDs). For example, \"example.com\"'s public suffix is \"com\". User agents SHOULD <\/del> example, \"site.example\"'s public suffix is \"com\". User agents SHOULD <\/ins> use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by Mozilla at PSL. An origin's \"registered domain\" is the origin's host's public suffix plus the label to its left. That is, for \"https:\/\/www.example.com\", the public suffix is \"com\", and the registered domain is \"example.com\". This concept is defined more rigorously in PSL, and <\/del> plus the label to its left. That is, for \"https:\/\/www.site.example\", the public suffix is \"example\", and the registered domain is \"site.example\". This concept is defined more rigorously in PSL, and <\/ins> is also known as \"effective top-level domain plus one\" (eTLD+1). The term \"request\", as well as a request's \"client\", \"current url\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c6908da656f3f3ce4467f6f0679c3d671b3ee8cd79ff4db3b0886577504e00b4","title":"","text":"The server can alter the default scope of the cookie using the Path and Domain attributes. For example, the server can instruct the user agent to return the cookie to every path and every subdomain of example.com. <\/del> site.example. <\/ins> As shown in the next example, the server can store multiple cookies at the user agent. For example, the server can store a session"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d744c35fe042ac9d943af1935ca394ecbd92fcc2cfcac5dc90b04d081b89c1b","title":"","text":"The Domain attribute specifies those hosts to which the cookie will be sent. For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is \"example.com\", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie header when making HTTP requests to example.com, www.example.com, and www.corp.example.com. (Note that a leading %x2E (\".\"), if present, is ignored even though that character is not permitted, but a trailing %x2E (\".\"), if present, will cause the user agent to ignore the attribute.) If the server omits the Domain attribute, the user agent will return the cookie only to the origin server. <\/del> \"site.example\", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie header when making HTTP requests to site.example, www.site.example, and www.corp.site.example. (Note that a leading %x2E (\".\"), if present, is ignored even though that character is not permitted, but a trailing %x2E (\".\"), if present, will cause the user agent to ignore the attribute.) If the server omits the Domain attribute, the user agent will return the cookie only to the origin server. <\/ins> WARNING: Some existing user agents treat an absent Domain attribute as if the Domain attribute were present and contained the current host name. For example, if example.com returns a Set-Cookie header <\/del> host name. For example, if site.example returns a Set-Cookie header <\/ins> without a Domain attribute, these user agents will erroneously send the cookie to www.example.com as well. <\/del> the cookie to www.site.example as well. <\/ins> The user agent will reject cookies unless the Domain attribute specifies a scope for the cookie that would include the origin server. For example, the user agent will accept a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"example.com\" or of \"foo.example.com\" from foo.example.com, but the user agent will not accept a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"bar.example.com\" or of \"baz.foo.example.com\". <\/del> Domain attribute of \"site.example\" or of \"foo.site.example\" from foo.site.example, but the user agent will not accept a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"bar.site.example\" or of \"baz.foo.site.example\". <\/ins> NOTE: For security reasons, many user agents are configured to reject Domain attributes that correspond to \"public suffixes\". For example,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a5e7f802a715ae1d59544b4274a64129ef8a70f8bb73abaabecc10d1875e1160","title":"","text":"The \"SameSite\" attribute limits the scope of the cookie such that it will only be attached to requests if those requests are same-site, as defined by the algorithm in same-site-requests. For example, requests for \"https:\/\/example.com\/sekrit-image\" will attach same-site cookies if and only if initiated from a context whose \"site for cookies\" is \"example.com\". <\/del> requests for \"https:\/\/site.example\/sekrit-image\" will attach same- site cookies if and only if initiated from a context whose \"site for cookies\" is \"site.example\". <\/ins> If the \"SameSite\" attribute's value is \"Strict\", the cookie will only be sent along with \"same-site\" requests. If the value is \"Lax\", the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bab16a9ca58dcdeb717cf9b7c8fdaa8ea948cf28bb67b0afef3302e5378aa993","title":"","text":"For example, the following cookies would always be rejected: While the would be accepted if set from a secure origin (e.g. \"https:\/\/example.com\/\"), and rejected otherwise: <\/del> \"https:\/\/site.example\/\"), and rejected otherwise: <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ace9e281e9fdc6c653602ee0e97ed1640fc64dfc0031359f546be8ca3dc7e2dc","title":"","text":"NOTE: A \"public suffix\" is a domain that is controlled by a public registry, such as \"com\", \"co.uk\", and \"pvt.k12.wy.us\". This step is essential for preventing attacker.com from disrupting the integrity of example.com by setting a cookie with a Domain <\/del> integrity of site.example by setting a cookie with a Domain <\/ins> attribute of \"com\". Unfortunately, the set of public suffixes (also known as \"registry controlled domains\") changes over time. If feasible, user agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d9e501ad7d00dbaa17cbd6b1896b37caf73ddad2ce7b6da8bc6004153c927c1e","title":"","text":"8.6. Cookies do not provide integrity guarantees for sibling domains (and their subdomains). For example, consider foo.example.com and bar.example.com. The foo.example.com server can set a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"example.com\" (possibly overwriting an existing \"example.com\" cookie set by bar.example.com), and the user agent will include that cookie in HTTP requests to bar.example.com. In the worst case, bar.example.com will be unable to distinguish this cookie from a cookie it set itself. The foo.example.com server might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against bar.example.com. <\/del> their subdomains). For example, consider foo.site.example and bar.site.example. The foo.site.example server can set a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"site.example\" (possibly overwriting an existing \"site.example\" cookie set by bar.site.example), and the user agent will include that cookie in HTTP requests to bar.site.example. In the worst case, bar.site.example will be unable to distinguish this cookie from a cookie it set itself. The foo.site.example server might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against bar.site.example. <\/ins> Even though the Set-Cookie header supports the Path attribute, the Path attribute does not provide any integrity protection because the user agent will accept an arbitrary Path attribute in a Set-Cookie header. For example, an HTTP response to a request for http:\/\/example.com\/foo\/bar can set a cookie with a Path attribute of <\/del> http:\/\/site.example\/foo\/bar can set a cookie with a Path attribute of <\/ins> \"\/qux\". Consequently, servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually distrusting services on different paths of the same host and use cookies to store security-sensitive information. An active network attacker can also inject cookies into the Cookie header sent to https:\/\/example.com\/ by impersonating a response from http:\/\/example.com\/ and injecting a Set-Cookie header. The HTTPS server at example.com will be unable to distinguish these cookies <\/del> header sent to https:\/\/site.example\/ by impersonating a response from http:\/\/site.example\/ and injecting a Set-Cookie header. The HTTPS server at site.example will be unable to distinguish these cookies <\/ins> from cookies that it set itself in an HTTPS response. An active network attacker might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against example.com even if example.com uses HTTPS <\/del> attack against site.example even if site.example uses HTTPS <\/ins> exclusively. Servers can partially mitigate these attacks by encrypting and signing the contents of their cookies. However, using cryptography does not mitigate the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or she received from the authentic example.com server in <\/del> a cookie he or she received from the authentic site.example server in <\/ins> the user's session, with unpredictable results. Finally, an attacker might be able to force the user agent to delete"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4b1982ad3e149e43e1f2c08caa0ef202ff9cf8dc055840d2188718816bc2e3bf","title":"","text":"top-level navigations. Consider the scenario in which a user reads their email at MegaCorp Inc's webmail provider \"https:\/\/example.com\/\". They might expect that clicking on an emailed link to \"https:\/\/projects.com\/secret\/ <\/del> Inc's webmail provider \"https:\/\/site.example\/\". They might expect that clicking on an emailed link to \"https:\/\/projects.example\/secret\/ <\/ins> project\" would show them the secret project that they're authorized to see, but if \"projects.com\" has marked their session cookies as <\/del> to see, but if \"projects.example\" has marked their session cookies as <\/ins> \"SameSite\", then this cross-site navigation won't send them along with the request. \"projects.com\" will render a 404 error to avoid leaking secret information, and the user will be quite confused."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78573d4d60ea2922efa1b2a07b6774d2111e01ac5016da05d62dca9a0b2a9fc3","title":"","text":"contained in the set-cookie-string, and the unparsed-attributes is the empty string. If the name-value-pair string lacks a %x3D (\"=\") character, ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/del> If the name-value-pair string lacks a %x3D (\"=\") character, then the name string is empty, and the value string is the value of name-value-pair. <\/ins> The (possibly empty) name string consists of the characters up to, but not including, the first %x3D (\"=\") character, and the (possibly empty) value string consists of the characters after the first %x3D (\"=\") character. <\/del> Otherwise, the name string consists of the characters up to, but not including, the first %x3D (\"=\") character, and the (possibly empty) value string consists of the characters after the first %x3D (\"=\") character. <\/ins> Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the name string and the value string. If the name string is empty, ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/del> If both the name string and the value string are empty, ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/ins> The cookie-name is the name string, and the cookie-value is the value string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bf3db06d12a1c30814ccd6aaf864eda99607598eed98aea814c7239eac139d99","title":"","text":"3.1.2. Parameters are an ordered map of key-values pairs that are associated with an item (item) or inner-list (inner-list). The keys are required to be unique within the scope of a map of parameters, and the values are bare items (i.e., they themselves cannot be parameterised; see item). <\/del> with an item (item) or inner-list (inner-list). The keys are unique within the scope of a map of parameters, and the values are bare items (i.e., they themselves cannot be parameterised; see item). <\/ins> The ABNF for parameters in HTTP headers is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-521d0734063329eea1439d0ce47f8273616cd28fc11d0f6bd165b076c4066d4e","title":"","text":"Dictionaries are ordered maps of name-value pairs, where the names are short, textual strings and the values are items (item) or arrays of items, both of which can be parameterised (param). There can be zero or more members, and their names are required to be unique in the scope of the dictionary they occur within. <\/del> zero or more members, and their names are unique in the scope of the dictionary they occur within. <\/ins> Implementations MUST provide access to dictionaries both by index and by name. Specifications MAY use either means of accessing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2e8436b0b555ec2c5ba353e7dfb5c47a4c019af30d62bffaf15ca2c30e09f38e","title":"","text":"Let this_key be the result of running Parsing a Key (parse-key) with input_string. If dictionary already contains the name this_key, there is a duplicate; fail parsing. <\/del> If the first character of input_string is \"=\": Consume the first character of input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0d4ba48ddca376d9505916ed858a3848ec4ccc86246d9bc38ad7256ebeab51dd","title":"","text":"Let member be the tuple (value, parameters). Add name this_key with value member to dictionary. <\/del> Add name this_key with value member to dictionary. If dictionary already contains a name this_key (comparing character-for-character), overwrite its value. <\/ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1025da7a7942859f5a83ef7433e1c7659ce99ae9561b06f90defa4d86fbe41df","title":"","text":"let param_name be the result of running Parsing a Key (parse- key) with input_string. If param_name is already present in parameters, there is a duplicate; fail parsing. <\/del> Let param_value be Boolean true. If the first character of input_string is \"=\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-906db0d3bdde3db29c00f0e13493ac0ab8b54091dbec33ce04dc0f1f4e036820","title":"","text":"Let param_value be the result of running Parsing a Bare Item (parse-bare-item) with input_string. Append key param_name with value param_value to parameters. <\/del> Append key param_name with value param_value to parameters. If parameters already contains a name param_name (comparing character-for-character), overwrite its value. <\/ins> Return parameters."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e353b2e38f4a8218646b47772d6705d15b5aadb0a67718c880c29dcb0b73a401","title":"","text":"The term \"public suffix\" is defined in a note in Section 5.3 of RFC6265 as \"a domain that is controlled by a public registry\", and are also known as \"effective top-level domains\" (eTLDs). For example, \"site.example\"'s public suffix is \"com\". User agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by Mozilla at PSL. <\/del> example, \"site.example\"'s public suffix is \"example\". User agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by Mozilla at PSL. <\/ins> An origin's \"registered domain\" is the origin's host's public suffix plus the label to its left. That is, for \"https:\/\/www.site.example\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-26a6ea182b7e77af0e7e5c3a4bb7f68a037112c071a86a348ee20c5f4ea51754","title":"","text":"NOTE: A \"public suffix\" is a domain that is controlled by a public registry, such as \"com\", \"co.uk\", and \"pvt.k12.wy.us\". This step is essential for preventing attacker.com from disrupting the integrity of site.example by setting a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"com\". Unfortunately, the set of public suffixes <\/del> is essential for preventing \"attacker.example\" from disrupting the integrity of \"site.example\" by setting a cookie with a Domain attribute of \"example\". Unfortunately, the set of public suffixes <\/ins> (also known as \"registry controlled domains\") changes over time. If feasible, user agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by the Mozilla project at"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7d3f4633db9950c9a912f796024e3a5fe03d41133db822ad9f7f8452ab417735","title":"","text":"project\" would show them the secret project that they're authorized to see, but if \"projects.example\" has marked their session cookies as \"SameSite\", then this cross-site navigation won't send them along with the request. \"projects.com\" will render a 404 error to avoid <\/del> with the request. \"projects.example\" will render a 404 error to avoid <\/ins> leaking secret information, and the user will be quite confused. Developers can avoid this confusion by adopting a session management"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-adac9a665ee835bfb7e4e66df615918c4407bcea45556a402ec254b82ce91a09","title":"","text":"a HTTP header value. If input_key is not a sequence of characters, or contains characters not in lcalpha, DIGIT, \"*\", \"_\", or \"-\", fail <\/del> characters not in lcalpha, DIGIT, \"_\", \"-\", \".\", or \"*\" fail <\/ins> serialisation. Let output be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cb24896033e826318d040e605b141cefc26e3dedd37b0a1ed8b59a82bdd55eee","title":"","text":"While input_string is not empty: If the first character of input_string is not one of lcalpha, DIGIT, \"*\", \"_\", or \"-\", return output_string. <\/del> DIGIT, \"_\", \"-\", \".\", or \"*\", return output_string. <\/ins> Let char be the result of removing the first character of input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-abf1f14271f15a1124603809b0641b8f5f8b3cf8969b85994f3d5758c9d5b6f6","title":"","text":"types, and constraints upon them. For example, a header defined as a List might have all Integer members, or a mix of types; a header defined as an Item might allow only Strings, and additionally only strings beginning with the letter \"Q\". <\/del> strings beginning with the letter \"Q\". Likewise, inner lists are only valid when a header definition explicitly allows them. <\/ins> When Structured Headers parsing fails, the header is ignored (see text-parse); in most situations, violating header-specific"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-57d8ca92bd390806e8fe7cadc326e0e15c0f6025065f1ba19210f28518917120","title":"","text":"received, it will by default be ignored. If the header requires different error handling, this should be explicitly specified. However, both Items and Inner Lists allow parameters as an <\/del> However, both items and inner lists allow parameters as an <\/ins> extensibility mechanism; this means that values can later be extended to accommodate more information, if need be. As a result, header specifications are discouraged from defining the presence of an unrecognised parameter as an error condition. Conversely, inner lists are only valid when a header definition explicitly allows them. <\/del> To help assure that this extensibility is available in the future, and to encourage consumers to use a fully capable Structured Headers parser, a header definition can specify that \"grease\" parameters be added by senders. For example, a specification could stipulate that all parameters beginning with the letter 'q' are reserved for this use. <\/ins> Note that a header field definition cannot relax the requirements of this specification because doing so would preclude handling by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-29dcb7843ed28cb3251c7905f8cdf4cc554bfe3e84479d66db4252519390c983","title":"","text":"4.1.5. Given a decimal_number as input_decimal, return an ASCII string <\/del> Given a decimal number as input_decimal, return an ASCII string <\/ins> suitable for use in a HTTP field value. If input_decimal is not a decimal number, fail serialisation. If input_decimal has more than three significant digits to the right of the decimal point, round it to three decimal places, rounding the final digit to the nearest value, or to the even value if it is equidistant. If input_decimal has more than 12 significant digits to the left of the decimal point after rounding, fail serialisation. <\/ins> Let output be an empty string. If input_decimal is less than (but not equal to) 0, append \"-\" to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3d191b3e1aed1301eabda1d04e093136e13ea5d035f0a450e2b970eb4cd1a46d","title":"","text":"Append input_decimal's integer component represented in base 10 (using only decimal digits) to output; if it is zero, append \"0\". If the number of characters appended in the previous step is greater than 12, fail serialisation. <\/del> Append \".\" to output. If input_decimal's fractional component is zero, append \"0\" to output. Else if input_decimal's fractional component has up to three digits, append them represented in base 10 (using only decimal <\/del> Otherwise, append the significant digits of input_decimal's fractional component represented in base 10 (using only decimal <\/ins> digits) to output. Otherwise, append the first three digits of input_decimal's fractional component (represented in base 10, using only decimal digits) to output, rounding the final digit to the nearest value, or to the even value if it is equidistant. <\/del> Return output. 4.1.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-646ea239988c601d01e15f86088883fb282f4b89e8b5a3a3f3801dbc55f47efa","title":"","text":"3.3. An item is can be a integer (integer), decimal (decimal), string <\/del> An item can be a integer (integer), decimal (decimal), string <\/ins> (string), token (token), byte sequence (binary), or Boolean (boolean). It can have associated parameters (param)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-83f78c1753ac053a285bbe2dbcb4ad4d998c162223174e42340948b58c964656","title":"","text":"Attackers can still pop up new windows or trigger top-level navigations in order to create a \"same-site\" request (as described in section 2.1), which is only a speedbump along the road to <\/del> in section 5.2.1), which is only a speedbump along the road to <\/ins> exploitation. Features like \"\" prerendering can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9a4e86eb0b50c219f350342d130a29d038ad728a2675ec2de1fe838b6f6b3db0","title":"","text":"Attackers can still pop up new windows or trigger top-level navigations in order to create a \"same-site\" request (as described in section 5.2.1), which is only a speedbump along the road to <\/del> in document-requests), which is only a speedbump along the road to <\/ins> exploitation. Features like \"\" prerendering can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88ee7380947a98872b9861a14308136afba7c385051af5180faadc9d900ce2d5","title":"","text":"If more member_values remain in input_list: Append a COMMA to output. <\/del> Append \",\" to output. <\/ins> Append a single SP to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4d96f90a7b0244df5b7a73e421a75559a054465999ad550b54b2a4ba4b2d9e8f","title":"","text":"If more members remain in input_dictionary: Append a COMMA to output. <\/del> Append \",\" to output. <\/ins> Append a single SP to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-25d4d99228f161d2fc9e05c6fd6c20d4e11f488d5efe758c13a5a885468a7ca7","title":"","text":"If input_string is empty, return members. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. <\/del> Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \",\", fail parsing. <\/ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f5ddd48c7e1e084139d3bcc297bfdfeebb2b1466a21fab02616919f745854d50","title":"","text":"If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not COMMA, fail parsing. <\/del> Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \",\", fail parsing. <\/ins> Discard any leading SP characters from input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e77790286b5c346e81ea8c4cc11d9a93a0e2c7cc0cdf12316cec71209a1f41c6","title":"","text":"HTTP Client Hints draft-ietf-httpbis-client-hints-08 <\/del> draft-ietf-httpbis-client-hints-10 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-62a3f63bf3d00158a2dbe9a9f9847fcd1e6b2a2baf47f32c6e7089eef88a9038","title":"","text":"clear persisted opt-in preferences when any one of site data, browsing history, browsing cache, cookies, or similar, are cleared. 5. While HTTP header compression schemes reduce the cost of adding HTTP header fields, sending Client Hints to the server incurs an increase in request byte size. Servers SHOULD take that into account when opting in to receive Client Hints, and SHOULD NOT opt-in to receive hints unless they are to be used for content adaptation purposes. Due to request byte size increase, features relying on this document to define Client Hints MAY consider restricting sending those hints to certain request destinations FETCH, where they are more likely to be useful. 5.1. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> Deployment of new request headers requires several considerations:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-36440a856313b9efa73ef36765a9eaa2cd7716562f9fde391fd56f0d102f89e3","title":"","text":"Doing so makes them easier to identify programmatically (e.g., for stripping unrecognised hints from requests by privacy filters). 5.2. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> A user agent that tracks access to active fingerprinting information SHOULD consider emission of Client Hints headers similarly to the way"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b7298e5fac45ee3bc580b2e2dd39448c1cb69065cdb1b5d92cefddb659d7a68","title":"","text":"and from those without. This might be used to reveal which Client Hints are in use, allowing researchers to further analyze that use. 5. While HTTP header compression schemes reduce the cost of adding HTTP header fields, sending Client Hints to the server incurs an increase in request byte size. Servers SHOULD take that into account when opting in to receive Client Hints, and SHOULD NOT opt-in to receive hints unless they are to be used for content adaptation purposes. Due to request byte size increase, features relying on this document to define Client Hints MAY consider restricting sending those hints to certain request destinations FETCH, where they are more likely to be useful. <\/ins> 6. This document defines the \"Accept-CH\" HTTP response field, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93e1e6c679e15b49df8dbb14bf50eb193738cff1733024ae7d28162d45e08813","title":"","text":"the server. An origin can use the Priority response header field to indicate its view on how an HTTP response should be prioritized. When forwarding an HTTP response with the Priority response header field, an intermediary can use the parameters being found in that response instead of those found in the request. <\/del> view on how an HTTP response should be prioritized. An intermediary that forwards an HTTP response can use the parameters found in the Priority response header field, in combination with the client Priority request header field, as input to its prioritization process. No guidance is provided for merging priorities, this is left as an implementation decision. <\/ins> Absence of a priority parameter in an HTTP response indicates the server's disinterest in changing the client-provided value. This is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd5d12c7a537aceeda46122b510692d381a1b3aad31cd47ef140ac45dc3192b8","title":"","text":"in which omission of a priority parameter implies the use of their default values (see #parameters). For example, when the client sends an HTTP request with <\/del> As a non-normative example, when the client sends an HTTP request with <\/ins> and the origin responds with the intermediary might alter its understanding of the urgency from \"5\" to \"1\", because the server-provided value overrides the value provided by the client. The incremental value continues to be \"1\", the value specified by the client, as the server did not specify the <\/del> \"5\" to \"1\", because it prefers the server-provided value over the client's. The incremental value continues to be \"1\", the value specified by the client, as the server did not specify the <\/ins> incremental(\"i\") parameter. 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-49f767b812523b7c3d9c5a9ae23c0990c4363e3e75144076c3feb9f66283d504","title":"","text":"configuration, or by consulting if that request contains one of the following header fields: CDN-Loop (RFC8586) <\/del> Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For (RFC7239) Via (RFC7230, Section 5.7.1)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-848226de27a96f1044092ac36db8fa479d3b4cfb13a6388895de6212ea56f045","title":"","text":"than needing to subvert DNS or IP routing in order to use a compromised certificate, a malicious server now only needs a client to connect to _some_ HTTPS site under its control in order to present the compromised certificate. As recommended in RFC8336, clients opting not to consult DNS ought to employ some alternative means to increase confidence that the certificate is legitimate. <\/del> the compromised certificate. Clients SHOULD consult DNS for hostnames presented in secondary certificates if they would have done so for the same hostname if it were present in the primary certificate. As recommended in RFC8336, clients opting not to consult DNS ought to employ some alternative means to increase confidence that the certificate is legitimate. <\/ins> One such means is the Required Domain certificate extension defined in {extension}. Clients MUST require that server certificates"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-81f5f77cc4f97f79da3c1da7c9e1b210c5e749ce67759a4cf778adc1137797d3","title":"","text":"send only the extensions that narrowly specify which certificates would be acceptable. Servers can also learn information about clients using this mechanism. The hostnames a user agent finds interesting and retrieves certificates for might indicate origins the user has previously accessed. <\/ins> 6.3. Failure to provide a certificate for a stream after receiving"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-84cc4a35174fed8bda3255d92c525c56a1e293436c9380938216378f1b8cae8d","title":"","text":"3.1. The urgency parameter (\"u\") takes an integer between 0 and 7, in descending order of priority. <\/del> descending order of priority. This range provides sufficient granularity for prioritizing responses for ordinary web browsing, at minimal complexity. <\/ins> The value is encoded as an sh-integer. The default value is 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8d27a45be0abd50af993542483a52ba8b5609da9b90f7d0f739f37a92ac1ec5b","title":"","text":"way that is backwards compatible for peers that are unaware of the extended meaning. For example, if there is a need to provide more granularity than eight urgency levels, it would be possible to subdivide the range using an additional parameter. Implementations that do not recognize the parameter can safely continue to use the less granular eight levels. Alternatively, the urgency can be augmented. For example, a graphical user-agent could send a \"visible\" parameter to indicate if the resource being requested is within the viewport. <\/ins> 4. The Priority HTTP header field can appear in requests and responses."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1e79b9ee2bedee908d974f68b98f1104bc0f19d0a8442b5ce1b5aa28f708763a","title":"","text":"6. It is not always the case that the client has the best understanding of how the HTTP responses deserve to be prioritized. For example, use of an HTML document might depend heavily on one of the inline images. Existence of such dependencies is typically best known to the server. <\/del> of how the HTTP responses deserve to be prioritized. The server might have additional information that can be combined with the client's indicated priority in order to improve the prioritization of the response. For example, use of an HTML document might depend heavily on one of the inline images; existence of such dependencies is typically best known to the server. Or, a server that receives requests for a font RFC8081 and images with the same urgency might give higher precedence to the font, so that a visual client can render textual information at an early moment. <\/ins> An origin can use the Priority response header field to indicate its view on how an HTTP response should be prioritized. An intermediary"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-102d05c510bc810bbb5e332602cf95c8c84fdc5a5308c9741e203b19abf68e6b","title":"","text":"textual value makes the prioritization scheme extensible; see the discussion below. 8.2. One of the aims of this specification is to define a mechanism for merging client- and server-provided hints for prioritizing the responses. For that to work, each urgency level needs to have a well-defined meaning. As an example, a server can assign the highest precedence among the supplementary responses to an HTTP response carrying an icon, because the meaning of \"u=2\" is shared among the endpoints. This specification restricts itself to defining a minimum set of urgency levels in order to provide sufficient granularity for prioritizing responses for ordinary web browsing, at minimal complexity. However, that does not mean that the prioritization scheme would forever be stuck to the eight levels. The design provides extensibility. If deemed necessary, it would be possible to subdivide any of the eight urgency levels that are currently defined. Or, a graphical user-agent could send a \"visible\" parameter to indicate if the resource being requested is within the viewport. A server can combine the hints provided in the Priority header field with other information in order to improve the prioritization of responses. For example, a server that receives requests for a font RFC8081 and images with the same urgency might give higher precedence to the font, so that a visual client can render textual information at an early moment. <\/del> 9. This specification registers the following entry in the Permanent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5cb96f4c8b4f32244e51b773b9f1f90afd3930663d4ceccaab8365b8ebbbff8e","title":"","text":"set of parameters when a request or a response is issued. In order to reprioritize a request, HTTP-version-specific frames are used by clients to transmit the same information on a single hop. If intermediaries want to specify prioritizaton on a multiplexed HTTP <\/del> intermediaries want to specify prioritization on a multiplexed HTTP <\/ins> connection, it SHOULD use a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame and SHOULD NOT change the Priority header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5c8491016953491198e1bbf6cb2803c820257bb8909e08c743ec3d217de59739","title":"","text":"The following example shows a request for a JPEG file with the urgency parameter set to \"5\" and the incremental parameter set to \"1\". <\/del> \"true\". <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a3ca9fedf8df9d69363a387c844286c827e3f04672801c27bb0c02686d4e1376","title":"","text":"server's disinterest in changing the client-provided value. This is different from the logic being defined for the request header field, in which omission of a priority parameter implies the use of their default values (see #parameters). <\/del> default values (see parameters). <\/ins> As a non-normative example, when the client sends an HTTP request with <\/del> with the urgency parameter set to \"5\" and the incremental parameter set to \"true\" <\/ins> and the origin responds with the intermediary might alter its understanding of the urgency from \"5\" to \"1\", because it prefers the server-provided value over the client's. The incremental value continues to be \"1\", the value <\/del> client's. The incremental value continues to be \"true\", the value <\/ins> specified by the client, as the server did not specify the incremental(\"i\") parameter."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9170070ff749adca2c654e0671670d62d6ad72f4cccfd8cc18188c0b4875c36b","title":"","text":"In order to mitigate this fairness problem, when a server responds to a request that is known to have come through an intermediary, the server SHOULD prioritize the response as if it was assigned the priority of \"u=1, i=?1\" (i.e. round-robin) regardless of the value of <\/del> priority of \"u=1, i\" (i.e. round-robin) regardless of the value of <\/ins> the Priority header field being transmitted, unless the server knows the intermediary is not coalescing requests from multiple clients."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3cbb7b68f24524fb8cd94994d6cc563515a7646815903c01b5c79e24e88bf52b","title":"","text":"If input_key contains characters not in lcalpha, DIGIT, \"_\", \"-\", \".\", or \"*\" fail serialisation. If the first character of input_key is not lcalpha, fail <\/del> If the first character of input_key is not lcalpha or \"*\", fail <\/ins> serialisation. Let output be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f3c2613120d7ae4023e12b16783db2e73975560a4f6c16549ac2956b7567d0f","title":"","text":"Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a key. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. If the first character of input_string is not lcalpha, fail <\/del> If the first character of input_string is not lcalpha or \"*\", fail <\/ins> parsing. Let output_string be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f540b0dc183aaf1687453dbbbc28339feabe01d667188ff351f5f3ad928fb4f","title":"","text":"Status: standard Description: The sha-256 digest of the representation-data of the resource when no content coding is applied (eg. \"Content- Encoding: identity\") Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. Status: standard <\/del> ID-SHA-256: : * Description: The sha-256 digest of the representation-data of the resource when no content coding is applied (eg. \"Content-Encoding: identity\") * Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. * Status: standard <\/ins> If other digest-algorithm values are defined, the associated encoding MUST either be represented as a quoted string, or MUST NOT include"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-58b0e7418b44f30cd38d9c4b09756d3bb5b97a594a034f82ea4bd1e3a8bb2bce","title":"","text":"example: Members whose value is Boolean true MUST omit that value when serialised, unless it has Parameters. For example, here both \"b\" and \"c\" are true, but \"c\"'s value is serialised because it has Parameters: <\/del> serialised. For example, here both \"b\" and \"c\" are true: <\/ins> Note that this requirement is only on serialisation; parsers are still required to correctly handle the true value when it appears in Dictionary values. <\/del> still required to correctly handle the true Boolean value when it appears in Dictionary values. <\/ins> A Dictionary with a member whose value is an Inner List of tokens:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e659c16d1abea5bae1de12a96bc4567033462e9620d68b77bafd77cf5a5f49a7","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Serializing a Key (ser-key) with member's member_name to output. If member_value is not Boolean true or parameters is not empty: <\/del> If member_value is Boolean true: Append the result of running Serializing Parameters (ser- params) with parameters to output. Otherwise: <\/ins> Append \"=\" to output. If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_dictionary:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-307547ccf0caabe35247515819701d13f86ce36aa65189daead6426169d1b038","title":"","text":"Let value be Boolean true. Let parameters be an empty, ordered map. <\/del> Let parameters be the result of running Parsing Parameters parse-param with input_string. <\/ins> Let member be the tuple (value, parameters)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e59b69fb9404d702f41dd181a8b2c8085121c77671ae730d651fd62aadb82fae","title":"","text":"There are thousands of different devices accessing the web, each with different device capabilities and preference information. These device capabilities include hardware and software characteristics, as well as dynamic user and client preferences. Applications that want to allow the server to optimize content delivery and user experience based on such capabilities have, historically, had to rely on passive identification (e.g., by matching User-Agent (Section 5.5.3 of RFC7231) header field against an established database of client signatures), used HTTP cookies RFC6265 and URL parameters, or use some combination of these and similar mechanisms to enable ad hoc content negotiation. Such techniques are expensive to setup and maintain, are not portable across both applications and servers, and make it hard to reason for both client and server about which data is required and is in use during the negotiation: <\/del> well as dynamic user and client preferences. Historically, applications that wanted to allow the server to optimize content delivery and user experience based on such capabilities had to rely on passive identification (e.g., by matching User-Agent (Section 5.5.3 of RFC7231) header field against an established database of client signatures), used HTTP cookies RFC6265 and URL parameters, or use some combination of these and similar mechanisms to enable ad hoc content negotiation. Such techniques are expensive to setup and maintain, and are not portable across both applications and servers. They also make it hard for both client and server to reason about which data is required and is in use during the negotiation: <\/ins> User agent detection cannot reliably identify all static variables, cannot infer dynamic client preferences, requires"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-08cdfcf8f3a9ef664333f58e27e38641f297d548037ff17d5911a31bd8138918","title":"","text":"requests. It also defines guidelines for content negotiation mechanisms that use it, colloquially referred to as Client Hints. Client Hints mitigate the performance concerns by assuring that clients will only send the request headers when they're actually going to be used, and the privacy concerns of passive fingerprinting by requiring explicit opt-in and disclosure of required headers by the server through the use of the Accept-CH response header. <\/del> Client Hints mitigate performance concerns by assuring that clients will only send the request headers when they're actually going to be used, and privacy concerns of passive fingerprinting by requiring explicit opt-in and disclosure of required headers by the server through the use of the Accept-CH response header. <\/ins> This document defines the Client Hints infrastructure, a framework that enables servers to opt-in to specific proactive content negotiation features, which will enable them to adapt their content accordingly. However, it does not define any specific features that will use that infrastructure. Those features will be defined in their respective specifications. <\/del> This document defines Client Hints, a framework that enables servers to opt-in to specific proactive content negotiation features, adapting their content accordingly. However, it does not define any specific features that will use that infrastructure. Those features will be defined in their respective specifications. <\/ins> One example of such a feature is the User Agent Client Hints feature UA-CH."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f8358f395651a255d5fede6dc15e0f8ea88002475af82f618833c89338c1772","title":"","text":"2.1. Clients control which Client Hints are sent in requests, based on their default settings, user configuration, and server preferences. The client and server can use an opt-in mechanism outlined below to negotiate which header fields need to be sent to allow for efficient content adaption, and optionally use additional mechanisms to negotiate delegation policies that control access of third parties to same header fields. <\/del> Clients choose what Client Hints to send in a request based on their default settings, user configuration, and server preferences expressed in \"Accept-CH\". The client and server can use an opt-in mechanism outlined below to negotiate which header fields need to be sent to allow for efficient content adaption, and optionally use additional mechanisms to negotiate delegation policies that control access of third parties to same header fields. <\/ins> Implementers SHOULD be aware of the passive fingerprinting implications when implementing support for Client Hints, and follow"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-08bbfe3f5de4548abbe897431dd6dbba366496ab56c7226943fe269f45bd310f","title":"","text":"selected response and whether the selected response is appropriate for a later request. Further, depending on the hint used, the server can generate additional response header fields to convey related values to aid client processing. <\/del> Furthermore, the server can generate additional response header fields (as specified by the hint or hints in use) that convey related values to aid client processing. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6160009e739c1e66a301c6fa7bb5721e185e3b1c428c738d2d54e4701332d4e5","title":"","text":"3.1. The Accept-CH response header field or the equivalent HTML meta element with http-equiv attribute (Section 4.2.5.3 of HTML) indicate server support for particular hints indicated in its value. <\/del> The Accept-CH response header field indicates server support for the hints indicated in its value. <\/ins> Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh-list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0fcbfa1a07c6c7cac0bbcbba7f03a2b31fadbca7ca23ef122f2b4e3484cf0bc9","title":"","text":"For example: When a client receives an HTTP response advertising support for provided list of Clients Hints, it SHOULD process it as origin (RFC6454) opt-in to receive Client Hint header fields advertised in the field-value, for subsequent same-origin requests. The opt-in MUST be delivered over a secure transport. The opt-in SHOULD be persisted and bound to the origin to enable delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to the server's origin, and MUST NOT be persisted for an origin that isn't HTTPS. For example, based on the Accept-CH example above, which is received in response to a user agent navigating to \"https:\/\/example.com\", and delivered over a secure transport: a user agent will have to persist an Accept-CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and use it for user agent navigations to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and any same-origin <\/del> When a client receives an HTTP response containing \"Accept-CH\", it indicates that the origin opts-in to receive the indicated request header fields for subsequent same-origin requests. The opt-in MUST be ignored if delivered over non-secure transport or for an origin with a scheme different from HTTPS. It SHOULD be persisted and bound to the origin to enable delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to the server's origin. For example: Based on the Accept-CH example above, which is received in response to a user agent navigating to \"https:\/\/example.com\", and delivered over a secure transport: a user agent will have to persist an Accept- CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and use it for user agent navigations to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and any same-origin <\/ins> resource requests initiated by the page constructed from the navigation's response. This preference will not extend to resource requests initiated to \"https:\/\/example.com\" from other origins. 3.2. When selecting an optimized response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate a Vary response header field (RFC7234) to indicate which hints can affect the selected response and whether the selected response is <\/del> When selecting a response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate a Vary response header field (RFC7234) to indicate which hints can affect the selected response and whether the selected response is <\/ins> appropriate for a later request. Above example indicates that the cache key needs to include the Sec-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f3cbadd6f7047345e8987b262745100509b5e6d36aa13a748a2acd1bc64ed521","title":"","text":"interoperability. The rich flexibility of client-driven HTTP\/2 prioritization tree building is rarely exercised; experience shows that clients either choose a single model optimized for a web use case (and don't vary it) or do nothing at all. But every client builds their prioritization tree in a different way, which makes it difficult for servers to understand their intent and act or intervene accordingly. <\/del> building is rarely exercised. Experience has shown that clients tend to choose a single model optimized for a web use case and experiment within the model constraints, or do nothing at all. Furthermore, many clients build their prioritization tree in a unique way, which makes it difficult for servers to understand their intent and act or intervene accordingly. <\/ins> Many HTTP\/2 server implementations do not include support for the priority scheme, some favoring instead bespoke server-driven schemes based on heuristics and other hints, like the content type of resources and the order in which requests arrive. For example, a server, with knowledge of the document structure, might want to prioritize the delivery of images that are critical to user experience above other images, but below the CSS files. Since client trees vary, it is impossible for the server to determine how such images should be prioritized against other responses. <\/del> resources and the request generation order. For example, a server, with knowledge of the document structure, might want to prioritize the delivery of images that are critical to user experience above other images, but below the CSS files. Since client trees vary, it is impossible for the server to determine how such images should be prioritized against other responses. <\/ins> The HTTP\/2 scheme allows intermediaries to coalesce multiple client trees into a single tree that is used for a single upstream HTTP\/2"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34950a676f7329e494349cabf100c582ffd739ec56579fbbaee65c70a8199ccd","title":"","text":"the client learns that the HTTP\/2 priority scheme is deprecated, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the client learns that the HTTP\/2 priority scheme is not deprecated, it SHOULD stop sending PRIORITY_UPDATE frames, but MAY continue sending the Priority header field, as it is an end-to-end signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the client is directly connected to. <\/del> stop sending PRIORITY_UPDATE frames (h2-update-frame), but MAY continue sending the Priority header field (header-field), as it is an end-to-end signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the client is directly connected to. <\/ins> The SETTINGS frame precedes any priority signal sent from a client in HTTP\/2, so a server can determine if it should respect the HTTP\/2"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0c728f41a2505265cf3777941e3064e009f811f45e89f7b1fcc59927fc41cdcd","title":"","text":"room for future extensions. Each key-value pair represents a priority parameter. The Priority HTTP header field is an end-to-end way to transmit this set of parameters when a request or a response is issued. In order to reprioritize a request, HTTP-version-specific frames are used by clients to transmit the same information on a single hop. If intermediaries want to specify prioritization on a multiplexed HTTP connection, it SHOULD use a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame and SHOULD NOT change the Priority header field. <\/del> The Priority HTTP header field (header-field) is an end-to-end way to transmit this set of parameters when a request or a response is issued. In order to reprioritize a request, HTTP-version-specific frames (h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame) are used by clients to transmit the same information on a single hop. If intermediaries want to specify prioritization on a multiplexed HTTP connection, they SHOULD use a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame and SHOULD NOT change the Priority header field. <\/ins> In both cases, the set of priority parameters is encoded as a Structured Headers Dictionary (STRUCTURED-HEADERS)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eb36bb3d6eb4d1c40c4db438d3c10ceb48dea3ae79de90d87c8a4cc6b1d7356e","title":"","text":"providing those responses in parallel would be more helpful to the client than delivering the responses one by one. There is no benefit in providing multiple responses with their incremental parameters set to false in parallel, as the client is not going to process those responses incrementally. Serving non- incremental responses one by one, in the order in which those requests were generated is considered to be the best strategy. <\/del> If a client makes concurrent requests with the incremental parameter set to false, there is no benefit serving responses in parallel because the client is not going to process those responses incrementally. Serving non-incremental responses one by one, in the order in which those requests were generated is considered to be the best strategy. <\/ins> The following example shows a request for a JPEG file with the urgency parameter set to \"5\" and the incremental parameter set to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7dd7013b31dfc07626da609f4d27926d9c6a2be9e93bf94e2d64d73f47fe6f0f","title":"","text":"the Priority request header field set to \"u=7\" (background). Then, when the user navigates to a page which references the new JavaScript file, while the prefetch is in progress, the browser would send a reprioritization frame with the priority field value set to \"u=0\" (prerequisite). <\/del> reprioritization frame with the priority field value set to \"u=0\". <\/ins> In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, after a request message is sent on a stream, the stream transitions to a state that prevents the client from"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-46c0da97bd35dca73f3e302691ccbf6415a1d62fec8f7eb74003c3a32aa66a22","title":"","text":"Response: 2.1. A representation digest is the value of the output of a digest algorithm, together with an indication of the algorithm used (and any parameters). As explained in resource-representation the digest is computed on the entire selected \"representation data\" of the resource defined in RFC7231: The encoded digest output uses the encoding format defined for the specific digest-algorithm. 2.1.1. The \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm uses base64 encoding. Note that digest-algorithm values are case insensitive. The \"UNIXsum\" digest-algorithm uses ASCII string of decimal digits. <\/ins> 3. The Want-Digest message header field indicates the sender's desire to receive a representation digest on messages associated with the request URI and representation metadata. If a digest-algorithm is not accompanied by a qvalue, it is treated as if its associated qvalue were 1.0. The sender is willing to accept a digest-algorithm if and only if it is listed in a Want-Digest header field of a message, and its qvalue is non-zero. If multiple acceptable digest-algorithm values are given, the sender's preferred digest-algorithm is the one (or ones) with the highest qvalue. Two examples of its use are 4. The Digest header field provides a digest of the representation data. \"Representation data\" might be: fully contained in the message body, partially-contained in the message body, or not at all contained in the message body. The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator\" contained in the message. For example, in a response to a HEAD request, the digest is calculated using the representation data that would have been enclosed in the payload body if the same request had been a GET. Digest can be used in requests too. The \"Digest\" value depends on the representation metadata. A Digest header field MAY contain multiple representation-data-digest values. This could be useful for responses expected to reside in caches shared by users with different browsers, for example. A recipient MAY ignore any or all of the representation-data-digests in a Digest header field. This allows the recipient to chose which digest-algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of verifying every received representation-data-digest. A sender MAY send a representation-data-digest using a digest- algorithm without knowing whether the recipient supports the digest- algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. Two examples of its use are 5. <\/ins> Digest algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest computation. For some algorithms, one or more parameters may be supplied."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d8b9824b7394af8fe44aa5740502c953139c8a0204d1d048ee55f295a6552096","title":"","text":"MUST either be represented as a quoted string, or MUST NOT include \";\" or \",\" in the character sets used for the encoding. 3.1. A representation digest is the value of the output of a digest algorithm, together with an indication of the algorithm used (and any parameters). As explained in resource-representation the digest is computed on the entire selected \"representation data\" of the resource defined in RFC7231: The encoded digest output uses the encoding format defined for the specific digest-algorithm. 3.1.1. The \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm uses base64 encoding. Note that digest-algorithm values are case insensitive. The \"UNIXsum\" digest-algorithm uses ASCII string of decimal digits. 4. The Want-Digest message header field indicates the sender's desire to receive a representation digest on messages associated with the request URI and representation metadata. If a digest-algorithm is not accompanied by a qvalue, it is treated as if its associated qvalue were 1.0. The sender is willing to accept a digest-algorithm if and only if it is listed in a Want-Digest header field of a message, and its qvalue is non-zero. If multiple acceptable digest-algorithm values are given, the sender's preferred digest-algorithm is the one (or ones) with the highest qvalue. Two examples of its use are 5. The Digest header field provides a digest of the representation data. \"Representation data\" might be: fully contained in the message body, partially-contained in the message body, or not at all contained in the message body. The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator\" contained in the message. For example, in a response to a HEAD request, the digest is calculated using the representation data that would have been enclosed in the payload body if the same request had been a GET. Digest can be used in requests too. The \"Digest\" value depends on the representation metadata. A Digest header field MAY contain multiple representation-data-digest values. This could be useful for responses expected to reside in caches shared by users with different browsers, for example. A recipient MAY ignore any or all of the representation-data-digests in a Digest header field. This allows the recipient to chose which digest-algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of verifying every received representation-data-digest. A sender MAY send a representation-data-digest using a digest- algorithm without knowing whether the recipient supports the digest- algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. Two examples of its use are <\/del> 6. POST and PATCH requests may appear to convey partial representations"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ccdbbe9a92d6bc3741f372cb1f1b9e49f44691122f2d5e48fa2c9563e933891e","title":"","text":"3. The Digest header field provides a digest of the representation data. <\/del> The Digest header field contains a list of one or more representation digest values as defined in representation-digest. It can be used in both request and response. <\/ins> The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator\" contained in the message. For example, in a response to a HEAD request, the digest is calculated using the representation data that would have been enclosed in the payload body if the same request had been a GET. Digest can be used in requests too. The \"Digest\" value depends on the representation metadata. <\/del> See post-not-request-uri for an example of how digest relates to header fields such as Content-Location (see RFC7231 Section 3.1.4.2) while a comprehensive set of examples showing the impacts of representation metadata, payload transformations and HTTP methods on digest is provided in examples-solicited and examples-unsolicited. <\/ins> A Digest header field MAY contain multiple representation-data-digest values. This could be useful for responses expected to reside in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0786589325363d8926c77e7ab1749ae9750b056c5b5be9219a79363eea154ab9","title":"","text":"strings beginning with the letter \"Q\". Likewise, Inner Lists are only valid when a field definition explicitly allows them. When parsing fails, the field is ignored (see text-parse); in most situations, violating field-specific constraints should have the same effect. Thus, if a header is defined as an Item and required to be an Integer, but a String is received, it will by default be ignored. If the field requires different error handling, this should be explicitly specified. However, both Items and Inner Lists allow parameters as an extensibility mechanism; this means that values can later be extended to accommodate more information, if need be. As a result, field specifications are discouraged from defining the presence of an unrecognized Parameter as an error condition. To help assure that this extensibility is available in the future, <\/del> When parsing fails, the entire field is ignored (see text-parse); in most situations, violating field-specific constraints should have the same effect. Thus, if a header is defined as an Item and required to be an Integer, but a String is received, the field will by default be ignored. If the field requires different error handling, this should be explicitly specified. Both Items and Inner Lists allow parameters as an extensibility mechanism; this means that values can later be extended to accommodate more information, if need be. To preserve forward compatibility, field specifications are discouraged from defining the presence of an unrecognized Parameter as an error condition. To further assure that this extensibility is available in the future, <\/ins> and to encourage consumers to use a complete parser implementation, a field definition can specify that \"grease\" Parameters be added by senders. For example, a specification could stipulate that all Parameters beginning with the letter \"h\" are reserved for this use, and then encourage them to be sent on some portion of requests. This helps to discourage recipients from writing a parser that does not account for Parameters. Note that a field definition cannot relax the requirements of this <\/del> senders. A specification could stipulate that all Parameters that fit a defined pattern are reserved for this use and then encourage them to be sent on some portion of requests. This helps to discourage recipients from writing a parser that does not account for Parameters. Specifications that use Dictionaries can also allow for forward compatibility by requiring that the presence of - as well as value and type associated with - unknown members be ignored. Later specifications can then add additional members, specifying constraints on them as appropriate. An extension to a structured field can then require that an entire field value be ignored by a recipient that understands the extension if constraints on the value it defines are not met. A field definition cannot relax the requirements of this <\/ins> specification because doing so would preclude handling by generic software; they can only add additional constraints (for example, on the numeric range of Integers and Decimals, the format of Strings and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-47bb6b881d0167b62ff06d16b9f26271cf2d842129148c49946e845fa128426b","title":"","text":"7.11. PR 1072: LC feedback from Julian Reschke <\/del> PR 1072: LC feedback from Julian Reschke. PR 1080: Improve list style. PR 1082: Remove section mentioning Variants. PR 1097: Editorial feedback from mnot. <\/ins> 8. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dde576d216490b0f473e6dc789882a8ac5e09e9bf9524819ab68a9630d683337","title":"","text":"Such features SHOULD take into account the following aspects of the information exposed: Exposing highly granular data can be used to help identify users across multiple requests to different origins. Reducing the set of header field values that can be expressed, or restricting them to an enumerated range where the advertised value is close but is not an exact representation of the current value, can improve privacy and reduce risk of linkability by ensuring that the same value is sent by multiple users. The feature SHOULD NOT expose user sensitive information. To that end, information available to the application, but gated behind specific user actions (e.g. a permission prompt or user activation) SHOULD NOT be exposed as a Client Hint. The feature SHOULD NOT expose user information that changes over time, unless the state change itself is also exposed (e.g. through JavaScript callbacks). <\/del> Entropy - Exposing highly granular data can be used to help identify users across multiple requests to different origins. Reducing the set of header field values that can be expressed, or restricting them to an enumerated range where the advertised value is close but is not an exact representation of the current value, can improve privacy and reduce risk of linkability by ensuring that the same value is sent by multiple users. Sensitivity - The feature SHOULD NOT expose user sensitive information. To that end, information available to the application, but gated behind specific user actions (e.g. a permission prompt or user activation) SHOULD NOT be exposed as a Client Hint. Change over time - The feature SHOULD NOT expose user information that changes over time, unless the state change itself is also exposed (e.g. through JavaScript callbacks). <\/ins> Different features will be positioned in different points in the space between low-entropy, non-sensitive and static information (e.g."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3581e473ae64a1d809ff49aa809f4c012c16d26e6ceb03529f3a84ec4d044cfb","title":"","text":"PR 1082: Remove section mentioning Variants. PR 1097: Editorial feedback from mnot. PR 1131: Remove unused references. PR 1132: Remove nested list. <\/ins> 8. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6992bc738af3ff4490653da9dc87f0e1aef2e3ccdfb97cbe7e93dfd0bb634570","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): accept-ch of this document Related information: for Client Hints 7. <\/del> 7. References <\/ins> 7.1. Issue 168 (make Save-Data extensible) updated ABNF. Issue 163 (CH review feedback) editorial feedback from httpwg list. Issue 153 (NetInfo API citation) added normative reference. 7.2. Issue 200: Moved Key reference to informative. Issue 215: Extended passive fingerprinting and mitigation considerations. Changed document status to experimental. 7.3. Issue 239: Updated reference to CR-css-values-3 Issue 240: Updated reference for Network Information API Issue 241: Consistency in IANA considerations Issue 250: Clarified Accept-CH 7.4. Issue 284: Extended guidance for Accept-CH Issue 308: Editorial cleanup Issue 306: Define Accept-CH-Lifetime 7.5. Issue 361: Removed Downlink Issue 361: Moved Key to appendix, plus other editorial feedback 7.6. Issue 372: Scoped CH opt-in and delivery to secure transports Issue 373: Bind CH opt-in to origin 7.7. Issue 524: Save-Data is now defined by NetInfo spec, dropping PR 775: Removed specific features to be defined in other specifications 7.8. Issue 761: Clarified that the defined headers are response headers. Issue 730: Replaced Key reference with Variants. Issue 700: Replaced ABNF with structured headers. PR 878: Removed Accept-CH-Lifetime based on feedback at IETF 105 7.9. PR 985: Describe the bytesize cost of hints. PR 776: Add Sec- and CH- prefix considerations. PR 1001: Clear CH persistence when cookies are cleared. 7.10. PR 1064: Fix merge issues with \"cost of sending hints\". 7.11. PR 1072: LC feedback from Julian Reschke. PR 1080: Improve list style. PR 1082: Remove section mentioning Variants. PR 1097: Editorial feedback from mnot. PR 1131: Remove unused references. PR 1132: Remove nested list. 8. References 8.1. URIs <\/del> 7.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3ffc7fd981fdcff8c9d846327465f33fae2cb67217177a40e713ba1192142c51","title":"","text":"in this document are to be interpreted as described in I-D.ietf- httpbis-semantics. The definition \"validator\" in this document is to be interpreted as described in Section 10.2 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics. <\/del> The definition \"validator fields\" in this document is to be interpreted as described in Section 10.2 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e3587f39f03c7813985add4d4dc752af8515596c1ab054fa2c1acf8912662501","title":"","text":"request and response. The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator\" contained in the message. <\/del> \"validator field\" contained in the message. <\/ins> The relationship between Content-Location (see Section 6.2.5 of I- D.ietf-httpbis-semantics) and Digest is demonstrated in post-not-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-100e509f8baf32a29bc2fdaba53295bca964473508c925daa5fb2c3c3f134494","title":"","text":"Serialize the cookie-list into a cookie-string by processing each cookie in the cookie-list in order: Output the cookie's name, the %x3D (\"=\") character, and the cookie's value. <\/del> If the cookies' name is not empty, output the cookie's name followed by the %x3D (\"=\") character. If the cookies' value is not empty, output the cookie's value. <\/ins> If there is an unprocessed cookie in the cookie-list, output the characters %x3B and %x20 (\"; \")."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0b1c827f55c3fb4a3206b9680473420aac89d99e740c31ded6687f87e833500f","title":"","text":"http-only-flag is true, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. If the cookie's secure-only-flag is not set, and the scheme <\/del> If the cookie's secure-only-flag is false, and the scheme <\/ins> component of request-uri does not denote a \"secure\" protocol, then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely if the cookie store contains one or more cookies that meet all of the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f1e1aa89d28fe8dda6ff6e3f70785d84f67a04b6d449d01e026bc7ab2ac71d47","title":"","text":"Expired cookies. Cookies whose secure-only-flag is not set, and which share a domain field with more than a predetermined number of other cookies. <\/del> Cookies whose secure-only-flag is false, and which share a domain field with more than a predetermined number of other cookies. <\/ins> Cookies that share a domain field with more than a predetermined number of other cookies."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-839c6c53b0fc4250eb593fdb3bee9334db3c54db7cf3a004fbd82e3790e7573f","title":"","text":"This document describes a set of data types and associated algorithms that are intended to make it easier and safer to define and handle HTTP header and trailer fields, known as \"Structured Fields\", or \"Structured Headers\". It is intended for use by specifications of new HTTP fields that wish to use a common syntax that is more restrictive than traditional HTTP field values. <\/del> HTTP header and trailer fields, known as \"Structured Fields\", \"Structured Headers\", or \"Structured Trailers\". It is intended for use by specifications of new HTTP fields that wish to use a common syntax that is more restrictive than traditional HTTP field values. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bafd019bd8a72452ed0cad41433d3b28f5bf1e831f704985e388c44190a33dc3","title":"","text":"Identify whether the field is a Structured Header (i.e., it can only be used in the header section - the common case), a Structured Field (only in the trailer section), or a Structured <\/del> Structured Trailer (only in the trailer section), or a Structured <\/ins> Field (both). Specify the type of the field value; either List (list),"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6c7b117e96c594400acbd991cdba23f52f1cbe043625e0eaeddab77abf168c49","title":"","text":"Clients and servers that will accept requests for HTTP-layer certificate authentication indicate this using the HTTP\/2 \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH\" (0xSETTING-TBD) setting. The initial value for the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH\" setting is 0, indicating that the peer does not support HTTP-layer certificate authentication. If a peer does support HTTP-layer certificate authentication, the value is non-zero. <\/del> \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\" (0xSETTING-TBD1) and \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" (0xSETTING-TBD2) settings. The initial value for both settings is 0, indicating that the peer does not support HTTP-layer certificate authentication. If a peer does support HTTP-layer certificate authentication, one or both of the values is non-zero. \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\" indicates that servers can use certificates for client authentication, while \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" indicates that servers are able to offer additional certificates to demonstrate control over other origin hostnames. <\/ins> In order to ensure that the TLS connection is direct to the server, rather than via a TLS-terminating proxy, each side will separately compute and confirm the value of this setting. The setting is derived from a TLS exporter (see Section 7.5 of RFC8446 and RFC5705 for more details on exporters). Clients MUST NOT use an early exporter during their 0-RTT flight, but MUST send an updated SETTINGS frame using a regular exporter after the TLS handshake completes. <\/del> compute and confirm the value of these settings. The setting values are derived from a TLS exporter (see Section 7.5 of RFC8446 and RFC5705 for more details on exporters). Clients MUST NOT use an early exporter during their 0-RTT flight, but MUST send an updated SETTINGS frame using a regular exporter after the TLS handshake completes. <\/ins> The exporter is constructed with the following input:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fd02979b4a7a9e2b563d4cf3ba923310aa7c1da27c743857efdd4d81832f621e","title":"","text":"Context: Empty Length: Four bytes <\/del> Length: Eight bytes The value of the exporter is split into two four-byte values. The first four bytes are used for the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\" value, while the following four bytes are used for the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" value. <\/ins> The resulting exporter is converted to a setting value as: <\/del> Each is converted to a setting value as: <\/ins> That is, the most significant bit will always be set, regardless of the value of the exporter. Each endpoint will compute the expected value from their peer. If the setting is not received, or if the <\/del> values from their peer. If the setting is not received, or if the <\/ins> value received is not the expected value, the frames defined in this document SHOULD NOT be sent. <\/del> document SHOULD NOT be sent in the indicated direction. <\/ins> 2.2. When both peers have advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates as in setting, either party can supply additional certificates into the connection at any time. This means that clients or servers which predict a certificate will be required could supply the certificate before being asked. These certificates are available for reference by future \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frames. <\/del> in a given direction as in setting, the indicated endpoint can supply additional certificates into the connection at any time. That is, if both endpoints have sent \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" and validated the value received from the peer, the server may send certificates. If both endpoints have sent \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\" and validated the value received from the peer, the client may send certificates. Implementations which predict a certificate will be required could supply the certificate before being asked. These certificates are available for reference by future \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frames. <\/ins> Certificates supplied by servers can be considered by clients without further action by the server. A server SHOULD NOT send certificates"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f835fa5956866d65169d293f2f39ea11b4eca2710e01c36832bebe0ccc4279c2","title":"","text":"current connection, but MAY use the ORIGIN frame RFC8336 to indicate that not all covered origins will be served. Likewise, either party can supply a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" that outlines parameters of a certificate they might request in the future. Upon receipt of a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\", endpoints SHOULD provide a corresponding certificate in anticipation of a request shortly being blocked. Clients MAY wait for a \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame to assist in associating the certificate request with a particular HTTP transaction. <\/del> Likewise, a party can supply a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" that outlines parameters of a certificate they might request in the future. Upon receipt of a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\", endpoints SHOULD provide a corresponding certificate in anticipation of a request shortly being blocked. Clients MAY wait for a \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame to assist in associating the certificate request with a particular HTTP transaction. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-99df1b3640e5feaf64d5b9c63672ab37761d9c915bcf338940ee296f36d1bb97","title":"","text":"If the TLS certificate does not contain the new origin, but the server has claimed support for that origin (with an ORIGIN frame, see RFC8336) and advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates (see setting), the client MAY send a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame <\/del> RFC8336) and advertised support for HTTP-layer server certificates (see setting), the client MAY send a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame <\/ins> describing the desired origin. The client then sends a \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame for stream zero referencing the request, indicating that the connection cannot be used for that origin until"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e90fe90970a71bd10ce51a786ce1bd608f0a435531e8cc4b033c0fe7bbcc3274","title":"","text":"stream zero. Multiple \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frames on any other stream MUST be considered a stream error of type \"PROTOCOL_ERROR\". The \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame MUST NOT be sent to a peer which has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificate authentication. <\/del> The \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame MUST NOT be sent to a client which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\", or to a server which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" setting. <\/ins> The \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame MUST NOT reference a stream in the \"half-closed (local)\" or \"closed\" states RFC7540. A client that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec57e4b3558c09875603c01e644bd059b363c42ff4af7522c77e486cac5d1ddc","title":"","text":"to a request that has not yet been received, servers SHOULD cache the indication briefly in anticipation of the request. Receipt of more than one unsolicited \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frames or an <\/del> Receipt of more than one unsolicited \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame or an <\/ins> unsolicited \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame which is not the first in reference to a given stream MUST be treated as a stream error of type \"CERTIFICATE_OVERUSED\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a376ae838afa7c104b96ac4aea1a3839ca892cd083c53440c2fc7bb4935defb9","title":"","text":"specifies a desired certificate. This describes the certificate the sender wishes to have presented. The \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame SHOULD NOT be sent to a peer which has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificate authentication. <\/del> The \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame SHOULD NOT be sent to a client which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\", or to a server which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" setting. <\/ins> The \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame MUST be sent on stream zero. A \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame received on any other stream MUST be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-22a72c53c243b409a8bdad17d72cbca98ae3c687ea16e44c73c0404988319453","title":"","text":"This draft adds entries in three registries. The HTTP\/2 \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH\" setting is registered in iana- setting. Four frame types are registered in iana-frame. Six error codes are registered in iana-errors. <\/del> The feature negotiation settings is registered in iana-setting. Four frame types are registered in iana-frame. Six error codes are registered in iana-errors. <\/ins> 7.1. The SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH setting is registered in the \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry established in RFC7540. SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH 0xSETTING-TBD 0 This document. <\/del> The SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH and SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH settings are registered in the \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry established in RFC7540. <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d3ae8258d4b0444ae9033316b93757f29c6c6da46cf815eb9408a2d259919e79","title":"","text":"Empty Authenticator, as described in Section 5 of I-D.ietf-tls- exported-authenticator, in a \"CERTIFICATE\" frame in response to the request, followed by a \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame for stream zero which references the Empty Authenticator. In this case, or if the server has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates, the client MUST NOT send any requests for resources in that origin on the current connection. <\/del> references the Empty Authenticator. If a server has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates, fails to provide a requested certificate, or provides a certificate which is unacceptable to the client, the client MUST NOT send any requests for resources in that origin on the current connection. The client MAY open a new connection in an effort to reach an authoritative server. <\/ins> If a client receives a \"PUSH_PROMISE\" referencing an origin for which it has not yet received the server's certificate, this is a fatal connection error (see section 8.2 of RFC7540). To avoid this, servers MUST supply the associated certificates before pushing resources from a different origin. <\/del> it has not yet received the server's certificate, this is a stream error (see section 8.2 of RFC7540). To avoid this, servers MUST supply the associated certificates before pushing resources from a different origin. <\/ins> 2.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5336a1e6e3e0fc064703f334ef44c2098bf55f4f4b98742c172f0946648ac5fb","title":"","text":"an Empty Authenticator, as described in Section 5 of I-D.ietf-tls- exported-authenticator, in a \"CERTIFICATE\" frame in response to the request, followed by a \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame which references the Empty Authenticator. In this case, or if the client has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates, the server processes the request based solely on the certificate provided during the TLS handshake, if any. This might result in an error response via HTTP, such as a status code 403 (Not Authorized). <\/del> Empty Authenticator. If the client has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates, fails to provide a requested certificate, or provides a certificate the server is unable to verify, the server processes the request based solely on the certificate provided during the TLS handshake, if any. This might result in an error response via HTTP, such as a status code 403 (Not Authorized). <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6de088c331a30861d2a67c9d1d7d84da9c878c83538e30214723d309fc41214a","title":"","text":"The \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame MUST NOT be sent to a client which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_CLIENT_CERT_AUTH\", or to a server which has not advertised the \"SETTINGS_HTTP_SERVER_CERT_AUTH\" setting. <\/del> setting. An endpoint which receives a \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame but did not advertise support MAY treat this as a connection error of type \"CERTIFICATE_WITHOUT_CONSENT\". <\/ins> The \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frame MUST NOT reference a stream in the \"half-closed (local)\" or \"closed\" states RFC7540. A client that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6ffb625418f94f11e77eaca181064b55cbd9c71f41fbbd9cdbd19c619cf49390","title":"","text":"Use the \"validate\" API to confirm the validity of the authenticator with regard to the generated request (if any). If the authenticator cannot be validated, this SHOULD be treated as a connection error of type \"CERTIFICATE_UNREADABLE\". <\/ins> Once the authenticator is accepted, the endpoint can perform any other checks for the acceptability of the certificate itself. Clients MUST NOT accept any end-entity certificate from an exported"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88878a76b98c06e532ddb7b3cadf4e8f8a408e1f02a686779c6f7e27120b7867","title":"","text":"Because this draft permits certificates to be exchanged at the HTTP framing layer instead of the TLS layer, several certificate-related errors which are defined at the TLS layer might now occur at the HTTP framing layer. In this section, those errors are restated and added to the HTTP\/2 error code registry. <\/del> framing layer. <\/ins> A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc. <\/del> There are two classes of errors which might be encountered, and they are handled differently. <\/ins> A certificate was of an unsupported type or did not contain required extensions <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> A certificate was revoked by its signer <\/del> This category of errors could indicate a peer failing to follow restrictions in this document, or might indicate that the connection is not fully secure. These errors are fatal to stream or connection, as appropriate. <\/ins> A certificate has expired or is not currently valid <\/del> More certificates were used on a request than were requested <\/ins> Any other certificate-related error <\/del> A CERTIFICATE_NEEDED frame was received by a peer which did not indicate support for this extension. <\/ins> More certificates were used on a request than were requested <\/del> An exported authenticator could not be validated. 4.2. <\/ins> As described in RFC7540, implementations MAY choose to treat a stream error as a connection error at any time. Of particular note, a stream error cannot occur on stream 0, which means that implementations cannot send non-session errors in response to \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\", and \"CERTIFICATE\" frames. Implementations which do not wish to terminate the connection MAY either send relevant errors on any stream which references the failing certificate in question or process the requests as unauthenticated and provide error information at the HTTP semantic layer. <\/del> Unacceptable certificates (expired, revoked, or insufficient to satisfy the request) are not treated as stream or connection errors. This is typically not an indication of a protocol failure. Servers SHOULD process requests with the indicated certificate, likely resulting in a \"4XX\"-series status code in the response. Clients SHOULD establish a new connection in an attempt to reach an authoritative server. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e76eb977b04b0ef46d65f82b4b9f20eacfb443b037941ad1d5c6fc1b6734048d","title":"","text":"current connection, but MAY use the ORIGIN frame RFC8336 to indicate that not all covered origins will be served. Certificates supplied by clients MUST NOT be considered by servers when processing a request unless the client explicitly authorizes their use. Clients MAY send \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame with the \"UNSOLICITED\" flag set to indicate that an available certificate should be considered on a new request. <\/ins> Likewise, a party can supply a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" that outlines parameters of a certificate they might request in the future. Upon receipt of a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\", endpoints SHOULD provide a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-17f3d6e2ba180a8f7d362ba545b99d532c5866315dce12a8b6adc6a6e18afdcf","title":"","text":"If a client receives a \"PUSH_PROMISE\" referencing an origin for which it has not yet received the server's certificate, this is a stream error (see section 8.2 of RFC7540). To avoid this, servers MUST supply the associated certificates before pushing resources from a different origin. <\/del> error on the push stream; see section 8.2 of RFC7540. To avoid this, servers MUST supply the associated certificates before pushing resources from a different origin. <\/ins> 2.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-55e14e84faa632093c3c6648c5452ec89f7fab95da0cac1ffb3e2e587090ba5c","title":"","text":"Some algorithms, although registered, have since been found vulnerable: the MD5 algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks CMU-836068 and the SHA algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED due to collision attacks IACR-2019-459. <\/del> attacks CMU-836068 and the SHA algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4fa0ff6d024e8c1adee49d0bddfafff4d7520f7162d124c3fb6503c1d4a447e2","title":"","text":"Description: The SHA-1 algorithm RFC3174. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. The SHA algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks IACR-2019-459. <\/del> SHA algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/ins> Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. Status: obsoleted <\/del> Status: deprecated <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c05a3e48be628c6ed772776798205270454ae43076e24cc1cb9fe2381bd72966","title":"","text":"However, these rely on collision-resistance for their security proofs CMU-836068. The MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are vulnerable to collisions attacks, so MD5 MUST NOT be used and SHA-1 is NOT RECOMMENDED for use with \"Digest\". <\/del> collisions attacks, so they MUST NOT be used with \"Digest\". <\/ins> 11.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d1394d155a8a2994d3b20f20244862202b3590a09d4eb58bc75b885d418be21","title":"","text":"9.2. Requests without a payload body can still send a Digest field applying the digest algorithm to an empty representation. <\/ins> As there is no content coding applied, the \"sha-256\" and the \"id-sha- 256\" digest-values are the same. <\/del> 256\" digest-values in the response are the same. <\/ins> Request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-14ed5fe557d371da843d60231cfbe7874aefac8373789c58168e2223b3514c0f","title":"","text":"A \"Digest\" field using NOT RECOMMENDED digest-algorithms SHOULD NOT be used in signatures. Using signatures to protect the Digest of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. <\/ins> 11.7. When used in trailers, the receiver gets the digest value after the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-669bf40e3315addd64ac36e3a42ba28bfb1bc79717d6a9dd37c9840c99d63c0c","title":"","text":"1.2. The concept of \"selected representation\" defined in Section 6 of I- D.ietf-httpbis-semantics makes RFC3230 definitions inconsistent with current HTTP semantics. This document updates the \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions to align with I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics concepts. <\/del> The concept of \"selected representation\" defined in Section 6 of SEMANTICS makes RFC3230 definitions inconsistent with current HTTP semantics. This document updates the \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions to align with SEMANTICS concepts. <\/ins> Basing \"Digest\" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the transferred data does require some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation, or conveys a partial representation of a resource eg. Range Requests (see Section 8.3 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics). <\/del> Range Requests (see Section 8.3 of SEMANTICS). <\/ins> Changes are semantically compatible with existing implementations and better cover both the request and response cases."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-35913d3c690e549d8364101307681ae5761138206c58b0c99c7ee06590591e9d","title":"","text":"different digest values. To allow both parties to exchange a Digest of a representation with no content codings (see Section 6.1.2 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics) two more algorithms are added (\"ID-SHA-256\" and \"ID-SHA-512\"). <\/del> no content codings (see Section 6.1.2 of SEMANTICS) two more algorithms are added (\"ID-SHA-256\" and \"ID-SHA-512\"). <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c6b0220fdc7111048c69a6c301fc38da9b38546f7f00a1a6b53ab4c7a11c73ed","title":"","text":"This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in RFC5234 and updated by RFC7405 along with the \"#rule\" extension defined in Section 4 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics. <\/del> SEMANTICS. <\/ins> The definitions \"representation\", \"selected representation\", \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", and \"payload body\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in I-D.ietf- httpbis-semantics. <\/del> in this document are to be interpreted as described in SEMANTICS. <\/ins> The definition \"validator fields\" in this document is to be interpreted as described in Section 10.2 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics. <\/del> interpreted as described in Section 10.2 of SEMANTICS. <\/ins> 2. The representation digest is an integrity mechanism for HTTP resources which uses a checksum that is calculated independently of the payload body and message body. It uses the representation data (see Section 6.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics), that can be fully or partially contained in the message body, or not contained at all: <\/del> (see Section 6.1 of SEMANTICS), that can be fully or partially contained in the message body, or not contained at all: <\/ins> This takes into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on the messages; for example the payload body can be affected by Range"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ad6c0d4988034debd928ea69effdf71178d02ba0b61fde8276bc17bd584e030b","title":"","text":"The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator field\" contained in the message. The relationship between Content-Location (see Section 6.2.5 of I- D.ietf-httpbis-semantics) and Digest is demonstrated in post-not- request-uri. A comprehensive set of examples showing the impacts of representation metadata, payload transformations and HTTP methods on Digest is provided in examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited. <\/del> The relationship between Content-Location (see Section 6.2.5 of SEMANTICS) and Digest is demonstrated in post-not-request-uri. A comprehensive set of examples showing the impacts of representation metadata, payload transformations and HTTP methods on Digest is provided in examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited. <\/ins> A Digest field MAY contain multiple representation-data-digest values. This could be useful for responses expected to reside in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4e4884604c3e0f52e192e4fb911e60cf6381a2ad87517b7bdb99b664e8eb62fc","title":"","text":"computation. For some algorithms, one or more parameters can be supplied. The BNF for \"parameter\" is defined in Section 4.4.1.4 of I-D.ietf- httpbis-semantics. All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive. <\/del> The BNF for \"parameter\" is defined in Section 4.4.1.4 of SEMANTICS. All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive. <\/ins> The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for digest-algorithm values. The registry contains the tokens listed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c53593bc35c2db8b47a39c18cc6787f17d8571adf14ed1c4a4f292c54c4fd354","title":"","text":"(see acting-on-resources). The representation enclosed in the response refers to the resource identified by \"Content-Location\" (see I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics Section 6.3.2). <\/del> identified by \"Content-Location\" (see SEMANTICS Section 6.3.2). <\/ins> \"Digest\" is thus computed on the enclosed representation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0b6e60b11c118e1fa7df8cb34a6b620dedd397c1c329b66c6b9ebc8f5854c5e1","title":"","text":"12.10. This section registers the \"Want-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics. <\/del> Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. <\/ins> Field name: \"Want-Digest\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-714ab67de828ce8b732958a1a5909a417d4953f460c385d12890cdafa9d050a9","title":"","text":"12.11. This section registers the \"Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics. <\/del> Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. <\/ins> Field name: \"Digest\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8b56121f439813e823e0a97de0de17ed68fd4c50d3f4c5ab569c121e0b6c7db2","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Serializing a Key (ser-key) with member's member_name to output. If member_value is Boolean true: <\/del> If member_value is Boolean true: <\/ins> Append the result of running Serializing Parameters (ser- params) with parameters to output. <\/del> Append the result of running Serializing Parameters (ser- params) with parameters to output. <\/ins> Otherwise: <\/del> Otherwise: <\/ins> Append \"=\" to output. <\/del> Append \"=\" to output. <\/ins> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serializing an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serializing an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_dictionary: <\/del> If more members remain in input_dictionary: <\/ins> Append \",\" to output. <\/del> Append \",\" to output. <\/ins> Append a single SP to output. <\/del> Append a single SP to output. <\/ins> Return output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f601065a32e4620b7f1212f95768ba3aefc06e48800641fe59160f72ca5bad2","title":"","text":"granularity for prioritizing responses for ordinary web browsing, at minimal complexity. The value is encoded as an sh-integer. The default value is 1. <\/del> The value is encoded as an sh-integer. The default value is 3. <\/ins> This parameter indicates the sender's recommendation, based on the expectation that the server would transmit HTTP responses in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-25aaa0e9f0f4c8b6cb960389752bd7fc7106c6cdf0585486323131464568c441","title":"","text":"behaviors, and the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 to illustrate expected syntax in HTTP header fields. In doing so, it uses the VCHAR, SP, DIGIT, ALPHA and DQUOTE rules from RFC5234. It also includes the tchar rule from RFC7230. <\/del> RFC5234. It also includes the tchar and OWS rules from RFC7230. <\/ins> When parsing from HTTP fields, implementations MUST have behavior that is indistinguishable from following the algorithms. If there is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4247523e60363e922964c0190e28adda9c1272fef0b017209d0180618c703ca1","title":"","text":"Convert input_bytes into an ASCII string input_string; if conversion fails, fail parsing. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If field_type is \"list\", let output be the result of running Parsing a List (parse-list) with input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-06e4aa2729702e992e030878c19d9d76e10ee1475f4a145a1e40d2845a38fbef","title":"","text":"If field_type is \"item\", let output be the result of running Parsing an Item (parse-item) with input_string. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is not empty, fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fff9f5e8e0abcda438ea48d76a625fe6d34f7d696e8c733b0dce1c526e83460e","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Parsing an Item or Inner List (parse-item-or-list) with input_string to members. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, return members. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \",\", fail parsing. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-837a8894de1128b91340f550af1e94fe8ffd7ff3873ce895688a8d095756e800","title":"","text":"dictionary already contains a name this_key (comparing character-for-character), overwrite its value. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, return dictionary. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \",\", fail parsing. Discard any leading SP characters from input_string. <\/del> Discard any leading OWS characters from input_string. <\/ins> If input_string is empty, there is a trailing comma; fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-41e11d2c1d0f9419e80d3d952b36233a85e7bb02ce7e0eae3844776b070d870d","title":"","text":"For example, the following cookies would always be rejected: While the would be accepted if set from a secure origin (e.g. \"https:\/\/site.example\/\"), and rejected otherwise: <\/del> While the following would be accepted if set from a secure origin (e.g. \"https:\/\/site.example\/\"), and rejected otherwise: <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bb9d75604b5eac8b8b781337ab82de7c663b303fabb87cc270752b0e57f30736","title":"","text":"7. 7.1. <\/del> A client MAY use priority values to make local scheduling choices about the requests it initiates. 8. <\/ins> As a general guideline, a server SHOULD NOT use priority information for making schedule decisions across multiple connections, unless it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-95d262e9db1b0c048cc11d2bb6134f659e86125ea12ef7a100376a7fa690888a","title":"","text":"next hop that the connection is NOT coalesced (see https:\/\/github.com\/kazuho\/draft-kazuho-httpbis-priority\/issues\/99). 7.1.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> When an intermediary coalesces HTTP requests coming from multiple clients into one HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 connection going to the backend"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3611a9b588a62dfa157d7ca3ccfa75fd15fdfb3109d5993c4281e3b295391df1","title":"","text":"would receive less bandwidth in case the bottleneck exists between the server and the intermediary. 7.1.2. <\/del> 8.2. <\/ins> It is common for CDN infrastructure to support different HTTP versions on the front end and back end. For instance, the client-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f3924e456526fd2c2abf12c9991f1b36c1f2096256967046713739a182641de9","title":"","text":"can be scoped to individual end clients. Authentication and other session information might provide this linkability. 7.1.3. <\/del> 8.3. <\/ins> It is sometimes beneficial to deprioritize the transmission of one connection over others, knowing that doing so introduces a certain"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6640db47b10ea765c72807e385c09737d878f952d0fa2488f0f3eb1c37a73010","title":"","text":"software update images. Doing so improves responsiveness of other connections at the cost of delaying the delivery of updates. Also, a client MAY use the priority values for making local scheduling choices for the requests it initiates. 8. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> Contrary to the prioritization scheme of HTTP\/2 that uses a hop-by- hop frame, the Priority header field is defined as end-to-end."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f4a5688ceb4e96e7267e4a3ddd25c94a6ac5541d213775c5248d07b0f46214b8","title":"","text":"textual value makes the prioritization scheme extensible; see the discussion below. 9. <\/del> 10. TBD 11. <\/ins> This specification registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Header Field Names registry established by RFC3864:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-231c7b56ab2b5fb49aad2fbaba5c2449f0a84a56567333a0a216664980add619","title":"","text":"This document 10. References <\/del> 12. References <\/ins> 10.1. URIs <\/del> 12.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a5127f406c9d230f8cdf73f2bcf0347f09bced521a03f5b87b13ade09e3c250c","title":"","text":"state. This state can be limited by adopting the guidance about concurrency limits described above. Extensible priorities is subject to a similar consideration because PRIORITY_UPDATE frames may arrive before the request that they reference. A server could retain the information in order to apply the most up-to-date signal to the request. However, HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical <\/del> before the request that they reference. A server is required to store the information in order to apply the most up-to-date signal to the request. However, HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical <\/ins> barriers to determining reasonable stream concurrency limits depending on the information that is available to them from the QUIC transport layer. TODO: so what can we suggest?"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2436923ac88b3958153bdc9ed9b4b4d1f44be2201305cc3a064b87d6f887488c","title":"","text":"2.1. An HTTP header field value is identified by its header field name. While HTTP header field names are case-insensitive, implementations SHOULD use lowercased field names (e.g., \"content-type\", \"date\", \"etag\") when using them as content identifiers. <\/del> An HTTP header field is identified by its header field name. While HTTP header field names are case-insensitive, implementations MUST use lowercased field names (e.g., \"content-type\", \"date\", \"etag\") when using them as content identifiers. <\/ins> An HTTP header field value is canonicalized as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-77c93227b2c9aaabdbaa479670554145ac72bebb4708ebb73a9b233fe44f286a","title":"","text":"The signer creates an ordered list of content identifiers representing the message content and signature metadata to be covered by the signature, and assigns this list as the signature's Covered Content. Each identifier MUST be one of those defined in Section 2. This list MUST NOT be empty, as this would result in creating a signature over the empty string. If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include (created) and (request-target) in the list. If the signature's Algorithm starts with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include date and (request-target) in the list. Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what order is out of scope for this document. However, the list order is significant and once established for a given signature it MUST be preserved for that signature. <\/del> Covered Content. Each identifier MUST be one of those defined in Section 2. This list MUST NOT be empty, as this would result in creating a signature over the empty string. If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include (created) and (request- target) in the list. If the signature's Algorithm starts with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include date and (request-target) in the list. Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what order is out of scope for this document. However, the list order is significant and once established for a given signature it MUST be preserved for that signature. <\/ins> For example, given the following HTTP message:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-10641d2dab2d0c725749926e7c02f76ca2fccb7f98e9c423019e55cb4b5da8b0","title":"","text":"Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the name string and the value string. If both the name string and the value string are empty, ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/del> The cookie-name is the name string, and the cookie-value is the value string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7acd4bfc6ce9d6b9d89bbcda16b8f9195a41766acb9ca93ba2a10b330e9a3c2a","title":"","text":"\"third-party\" responses or the user agent might not wish to store cookies that exceed some size. If cookie-name is empty and cookie-value is empty, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/ins> Create a new cookie with name cookie-name, value cookie-value. Set the creation-time and the last-access-time to the current date and time."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ce969b450db6b2a7f26190748fa924310ce63fb3bfa65cb0dfdd4319125dcac7","title":"","text":"2.3.21. Name: tls_handshake_error <\/del> Name: tls_protocol_error <\/ins> Description: The intermediary encountered an error during TLS handshake with the next hop. Extra Parameters: <\/del> Description: The intermediary encountered a TLS error when communicating with the next hop, either during handshake or afterwards. <\/ins> alert_message: a sf-token containing the applicable description string from the TLS Alerts registry. <\/del> Extra Parameters: None. <\/ins> Recommended HTTP status code: 502 2.3.22. Name: tls_untrusted_peer_certificate <\/del> Name: tls_certificate_error <\/ins> Description: The intermediary received an untrusted peer certificate during TLS handshake with the next hop. <\/del> Description: The intermediary encountered an error when verifying the certificate presented by the next hop. <\/ins> Extra Parameters: None."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4dca6dbf16036e8fe46df886dfb3284135fa0e399b7bb38027973fa374aa56d9","title":"","text":"2.3.23. Name: tls_expired_peer_certificate Description: The intermediary received an expired peer certificate during TLS handshake with the next hop. Extra Parameters: None. Recommended HTTP status code: 502 2.3.24. Name: tls_unexpected_peer_certificate Description: The intermediary received an unexpected peer certificate (e.g., SPKI doesn't match) during the TLS handshake with the next hop. Extra Parameters: identity: a sf-string containing a comma-separated list of Subject Alternative Names from the certificate received from the next hop. sha256: a sf-string containing the hex-encoded SHA-256 of the certificate received from the next hop. spki: a sf-string containing the base64-encoded SHA-256 of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) from the certificate received from the next hop. Recommended HTTP status code: 502 2.3.25. Name: tls_missing_proxy_certificate Description: The next hop requested a client certificate from the intermediary during TLS handshake, but it wasn't configured with one. <\/del> Name: tls_alert_received <\/ins> Extra Parameters: None. Recommended HTTP status code: 500 2.3.26. Name: tls_rejected_proxy_certificate Description: The next hop rejected the client certificate provided by the intermediary during TLS handshake. Extra Parameters: None. Recommended HTTP status code: 500 2.3.27. Name: tls_error Description: The intermediary encountered a TLS error when communicating with the next hop. <\/del> Description: The intermediary received a TLS alert from the next hop. <\/ins> Extra Parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ab7a44794246ce0bd792e2b962e635001d1b99dbb3623f4cea3d1767f5aa2b49","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 502 2.3.28. <\/del> 2.3.24. <\/ins> Name: http_request_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e3120858bd64feb65197f363052ddb78fa054757f483fd083566b5be0be09774","title":"","text":"This type helps distinguish between responses generated by intermediaries from those generated by the origin. 2.3.29. <\/del> 2.3.25. <\/ins> Name: http_request_denied"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fc6df95cc3d780f05f5c43e4cf21d3bebaf11d28a72c2a4b075fec33bf64623c","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 400 2.3.30. <\/del> 2.3.26. <\/ins> Name: http_upgrade_failed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-da8c9c6aa0f8326052d1131db7e433fc2e6e0f652928f3bfd53b113a66c09136","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 502 2.3.31. <\/del> 2.3.27. <\/ins> Name: proxy_internal_response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e0acab41a5536869bfeeeaa744c4cbc909a6d27f98483f042a611b9efe56cac3","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 2.3.32. <\/del> 2.3.28. <\/ins> Name: proxy_internal_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3faea932a8900e627a522fe4e98a210ee58ed3cbd76ae246831e6576fa7c94ed","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 500 2.3.33. <\/del> 2.3.29. <\/ins> Name: proxy_configuration_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-58443fa36eb053afac8415f18d24b23bc29c43d96af066ca7bb14058ff115a29","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 500 2.3.34. <\/del> 2.3.30. <\/ins> Name: proxy_loop_detected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8bfc42a3a5d08a3e73c9b2cdfe1e9521f61a5486b2520889590ef1efcf32eee","title":"","text":"The representation digest is an integrity mechanism for HTTP resources which uses a checksum that is calculated independently of the payload body and message body. It uses the representation data (see Section 7.1 of SEMANTICS), that can be fully or partially contained in the message body, or not contained at all: <\/del> the payload body (see Section 7.3.3 of SEMANTICS). It uses the representation data (see Section 7.1 of SEMANTICS), that can be fully or partially contained in the payload body, or not contained at all: <\/ins> This takes into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on the messages; for example the payload body can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the message body is dependent on transfer codings and other transformations: resource- <\/del> Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the payload body is transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (eg. transfer codings for HTTP\/1.1 see 6.1 of HTTP11): resource- <\/ins> representation contains several examples to help illustrate those effects."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-df7428cd386ec0105daed0febbb8da0d788ac6bd3e55c308a2836314b73b3746","title":"","text":"after validating the Digest. If received in trailers, Digest MUST NOT be discarded; instead it MAY be merged in the header section (See Section 7.1.2 of !MESSAGING=I- D.ietf-httpbis -messaging). <\/del> be merged in the header section (See Section 5.6.2 of SEMANTICS). <\/ins> Not every digest-algorithm is suitable for trailers, as they may require to pre-process the whole payload before sending a message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-af3de5e48888e22a4b6f9caf8a189e93a7f5d1a47f76a8719983a73a39ffe2ca","title":"","text":"different digest values. To allow both parties to exchange a Digest of a representation with no content codings (see Section 7.1.2 of SEMANTICS) two more <\/del> no content codings (see Section 7.1.2 of SEMANTICS) two more digest- <\/ins> algorithms are added (\"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\"). 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4382f51f1babb9eaca8f155767a56f963e5877815026de4371f3983538e36796","title":"","text":"Digest coverage for either the resource's \"representation data\" or \"selected representation data\" communicated via HTTP. Support for multiple digest algorithms. <\/del> Support for multiple digest-algorithms. <\/ins> Negotiation of the use of digests."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f3e1ca7a9c7bccc00478c4667799fb3153830b05c141186c68d11760ae745e72","title":"","text":"SEMANTICS together with an indication of the algorithm used (and any parameters) The checksum is computed using one of the \"digest-algorithms\" listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format. <\/del> The checksum is computed using one of the digest-algorithms listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format. <\/ins> The example below shows the \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm which uses base64 encoding."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7ff9841c9465e8c83e1ba0631443bb6e14451de8b718393a9b2d79417eecc2e2","title":"","text":"5. Digest algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest computation. For some algorithms, one or more parameters can be supplied. <\/del> Digest-algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest computation. For some digest-algorithms, one or more parameters can be supplied. <\/ins> The BNF for \"parameter\" is defined in Section 5.4.1.4 of SEMANTICS. All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d2c0be053778ac4a7096ec57be02613ad024eacd59d8af68d3999751d7bbc793","title":"","text":"digest-algorithm values. The registry contains the tokens listed below. Some algorithms, although registered, have since been found vulnerable: the \"MD5\" algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks CMU-836068 and the \"SHA\" algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/del> Some digest-algorithms, although registered, rely on vulnerable algorithms: the \"MD5\" digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks CMU-836068 and the \"SHA\" digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-60950f29c324ee4f3f5818ea1293174248dad63684f20ba0477ed6c9078a0a07","title":"","text":"9.2. Requests without a payload body can still send a \"Digest\" field applying the digest algorithm to an empty representation. <\/del> applying the digest-algorithm to an empty representation. <\/ins> As there is no content coding applied, the \"sha-256\" and the \"id-sha- 256\" digest-values in the response are the same."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fa782d25add0f4db43c1ce7e26abf5269165c65bb6fe5e9856357af365f21767","title":"","text":"12.3. This memo updates the \"MD5\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/del> This memo updates the \"MD5\" digest-algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/ins> Algorithm Values [5] registry: Digest Algorithm: MD5"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-64adddfb2b8822a34239933ac444ca447e9396e7862599f3f4570e243c9602d1","title":"","text":"12.4. This memo updates the \"CRC32c\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/del> This memo updates the \"CRC32c\" digest-algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/ins> Algorithm Values [6] registry: Digest Algorithm: CRC32c"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c17a51185a7804e94b385f8fa0997a4dd980e791f8b2764bf7f447e934c4060c","title":"","text":"12.5. This memo updates the \"SHA\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/del> This memo updates the \"SHA\" digest-algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/ins> Algorithm Values [7] registry: Digest Algorithm: SHA"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-02e2a1dc11a1041fbfb8af22b88a032509ac71306082afd9f70c73d588b2afb2","title":"","text":"12.6. This memo updates the \"ADLER32\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/del> This memo updates the \"ADLER32\" digest-algorithm in the HTTP Digest <\/ins> Algorithm Values [8] registry: Digest Algorithm: ADLER32"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-09692b37ba4d1e8a38cd34dc5d90b49775721c1f643e11cf0ac38823129a0271","title":"","text":"The status of \"MD5\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and its description states that this algorithm MUST NOT be used. The status of \"SHA\" has been updated to \"obsoleted\", and its description states that this algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED. <\/del> The status of \"SHA\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and its description states that this algorithm MUST NOT be used. <\/ins> The status for \"CRC32c\" has been updated to \"standard\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23872fae2f9fe1fa31ecc087850fe51707b265884a749e8700d7bc7e49b3c10b","title":"","text":"transmission of software update files that would have the background urgency being associated. However, in the worst case, the asymmetry between the precedence declared by multiple clients might cause responses going to one end client to be delayed totally after those <\/del> responses going to one user agent to be delayed totally after those <\/ins> going to another. In order to mitigate this fairness problem, when a server responds to a request that is known to have come through an intermediary, the server SHOULD prioritize the response as if it was assigned the priority of \"u=1, i\" (i.e. round-robin) regardless of the value of the Priority header field being transmitted, unless the server knows the intermediary is not coalescing requests from multiple clients. <\/del> In order to mitigate this fairness problem, a server could use knowledge about the intermediary as another signal in its prioritization decisions. For instance, if a server knows the intermediary is coalescing requests, then it could serve the responses in round-robin manner. This can work if the constrained resource is network capacity between the intermediary and the user agent, as the intermediary buffers responses and forwards the chunks based on the prioritization scheme it implements. <\/ins> A server can determine if a request came from an intermediary through configuration, or by consulting if that request contains one of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7a77549dc2cb40ff299da58f3d8772cb91055aeca95536e566eef14fd0565c28","title":"","text":"Via (RFC7230, Section 5.7.1) Responding to requests coming through an intermediary in a round- robin manner works well when the network bottleneck exists between the intermediary and the end client, as the intermediary would be buffering the responses and then be forwarding the chunks of those buffered responses based on the prioritization scheme it implements. A sophisticated server MAY use a weighted round-robin reflecting the urgencies expressed in the requests, so that less urgent responses would receive less bandwidth in case the bottleneck exists between the server and the intermediary. <\/del> 8.2. It is common for CDN infrastructure to support different HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e2c8bec3787d1b6a961f9133c864168734947eb52fc084accfe96403104a30d5","title":"","text":"A PRIORITY_UPDATE frame communicates a complete set of all parameters in the Priority Field Value field. Omitting a parameter is a signal to use the parameter's default value. Failure to parse the Priority Field Value MUST be treated as a connection error of type FRAME_ENCODING_ERROR. <\/del> Field Value MUST be treated as a connection error. In HTTP\/2 the error is of type PROTOCOL_ERROR; in HTTP\/3 the error is of type H3_FRAME_ERROR. <\/ins> A client MAY send a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame before the stream that it references is open. Furthermore, HTTP\/3 offers no guaranteed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6340808e3fd459de530057d8066cdbc9b6693a755521b34175a368debd714b7c","title":"","text":"\"Digest\" may expose information details of encrypted payload when the checksum is computed on the unencrypted data. An example of that is the use of the \"id-sha-256\" digest-algorithm in conjuction with the <\/del> the use of the \"id-sha-256\" digest-algorithm in conjunction with the <\/ins> encrypted content-coding RFC8188. The representation-data-digest of an encrypted payload can change between different messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases its value could not be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) payload body is persisted. <\/ins> 11.9. ..."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4b4f6573611eed9a5b0a252c4054cbc7df9dc37afed175f8237e2a664c02ef8f","title":"","text":"However, there are cases where relying on this alone is insufficient. An HTTP-level integrity mechanism that operates independent of transfer can be used to detect programming errors and\/or corruption of data at rest, be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, aid fault diagnosis across hops and system boundaries, and can be used to validate integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections. <\/del> of data in flight or at rest, be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, aid fault diagnosis across hops and system boundaries, and can be used to validate integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections. <\/ins> This document defines a mechanism that acts on HTTP representation- data. It can be combined with other mechanisms that protect"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a0501d7c6ebe0b644d61b9b7cf9e7ad3537aea7903fd3c890142acd1f1bd76a","title":"","text":"not the \"representation metadata\". Besides, it allows to protect \"representation data\" from buggy manipulation, buggy compression, etc. <\/del> manipulation, undesired \"transforming proxies\" (see Section 6.5 of SEMANTICS), etc. <\/ins> Moreover, identity digest-algorithms (eg. \"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha- 512\") allow piecing together a resource from different sources (e.g."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-de85d31355022ba484c930c2e49b434b47b42c964f5be94a96bda4d4ed20d2e1","title":"","text":"2.2. An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is identified by the lowercased field name, followed by a semicolon \"\":\"\", followed by the member name. An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in Section 4.1.2 of StructuredFields on a Dictionary containing only that member. 2.2.1. This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values for Dictionary Structured Field Members given the following example header field, whose value is assumed to be a Dictionary: The following table shows example canonicalized values for different content identifiers, given that field: 2.3. A prefix of a List Structured Field consisting of the first N members in the field's value (where N is an integer greater than 0 and less than or equal to the number of members in the List) is identified by the lowercased field name, followed by a semicolon \"\":\"\", followed by N expressed as an Integer String. A list prefix is canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in Section 4.1.1 of StructuredFields on a List containing only the first N members as specified in the list prefix, in the order they appear in the original List. 2.3.1. This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values for list prefixes given the following example header fields, whose values are assumed to be Dictionaries: The following table shows example canonicalized values for different content identifiers, given those fields: 2.4. <\/ins> The signature's Creation Time (signature-metadata) is identified by the \"(created)\" identifier. <\/del> the \"*created\" identifier. <\/ins> Its canonicalized value is an Integer String containing the signature's Creation Time expressed as the number of seconds since"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-73ed35a078e3d04c32a6d5a377df047108b6ae3102965b9d30b584b38c2f4110","title":"","text":"simplifies processing and avoids timezone management required by specifications such as RFC3339. 2.3. <\/del> 2.5. <\/ins> The signature's Expiration Time (signature-metadata) is identified by the \"(expired)\" identifier. <\/del> the \"*expires\" identifier. <\/ins> Its canonicalized value is a Decimal String containing the signature's Expiration Time expressed as the number of seconds since the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16 [4] of POSIX.1. 2.4. <\/del> 2.6. <\/ins> The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the \"(request-target)\" identifier. <\/del> \"*request-target\" identifier. <\/ins> Its value is canonicalized as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e37a697029eda8052232e762fce9a246f6bb47eafe678af3df46fb8b1ab9cd68","title":"","text":"header in HTTP2, Section 8.1.2.3. The resulting string is the canonicalized value. 2.4.1. <\/del> 2.6.1. <\/ins> The following table contains non-normative example HTTP messages and their canonicalized \"(request-target)\" values. <\/del> their canonicalized \"*request-target\" values. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e07361ffd0c2ab6500fd3a525eead66706a6a855cfdb6be2ec477bcf5d53e0cb","title":"","text":"signature over the empty string. If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include (created) and (request- target) in the list. <\/del> hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include \"*created\" and \"*request-target\" in the list. <\/ins> If the signature's Algorithm starts with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include date and (request-target) in the list. <\/del> signers SHOULD include \"date\" and \"*request-target\" in the list. <\/ins> Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what order is out of scope for this document. However, the list"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2741d3bc10691f87b911aeebecd77e1ee89cb54ebdb42cac8d034c02b4fb3261","title":"","text":"lowercased identifier followed with a colon \"\":\"\", a space \"\" \"\", and the identifier's canonicalized value (described below). If Covered Content contains \"(created)\" and the signature's Creation <\/del> If Covered Content contains \"*created\" and the signature's Creation <\/ins> Time is undefined or the signature's Algorithm name starts with \"rsa\", \"hmac\", or \"ecdsa\" an implementation MUST produce an error. If Covered Content contains \"(expires)\" and the signature does not <\/del> If Covered Content contains \"*expires\" and the signature does not <\/ins> have an Expiration Time or the signature's Algorithm name starts with \"rsa\", \"hmac\", or \"ecdsa\" an implementation MUST produce an error."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-38ccc6c40f753ef364d5026538cfba771d371b2ee074662cecc60649871cbcda","title":"","text":"not present or malformed in the message, the implementation MUST produce an error. If Covered Content contains an identifier for a Dictionary member that references a header field that is not present, is malformed in the message, or is not a Dictionary Structured Field, the implementation MUST produce an error. If the header field value does not contain the specified member, the implementation MUST produce an error. If Covered Content contains an identifier for a List Prefix that references a header field that is not present, is malformed in the message, or is not a List Structured Field, the implementation MUST produce an error. If the header field value contains fewer than the specified number of members, the implementation MUST produce an error. <\/ins> For the non-normative example Signature metadata in example-metadata, the corresponding Signature Input is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-992e6f25e8f650cf4ce9138958b90e7fe1965c16dc31683d9fd6212347414073","title":"","text":"4. The \"Signature\" HTTP header provides a mechanism to attach a signature to the HTTP message from which it was generated. The header field name is \"Signature\" and its value is a list of parameters and values, formatted according to the \"signature\" syntax defined below, using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation defined in RFC5234 notation, with extensions defined in HTTP. Each \"sig-param\" is the name of a parameter defined in the param- registry defined in this document. The initial contents of this registry are described in params. <\/del> Message signatures can be included within an HTTP message via the \"Signature-Input\" and \"Signature\" HTTP header fields, both defined within this specification. The \"Signature\" HTTP header field contains signature values, while the \"Signature-Input\" HTTP header field identifies the Covered Content and metadata that describe how each signature was generated. <\/ins> 4.1. The \"Signature-Input\" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured Header StructuredFields containing the metadata for zero or more message signatures generated from content within the HTTP message. Each member describes a single message signature. The member's name is an identifier that uniquely identifies the message signature within the context of the HTTP message. The member's value is the message signature's Covered Content, expressed as a List of Tokens. Further signature metadata is expressed in parameters on the member value, as described below. 4.1.1. <\/ins> RECOMMENDED. The algorithm parameter contains the name of the signature's Algorithm, as registered in the HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry defined by this document. Verifiers MUST determine the signature's Algorithm from the \"keyId\" parameter rather than from \"algorithm\". If \"algorithm\" is provided and differs from or is incompatible with the algorithm or key material identified by \"keyId\" (for example, \"algorithm\" has a value of \"rsa-sha256\" but \"keyId\" identifies an EdDSA key), then implementations MUST produce an error. Implementers should note that previous versions of this specification determined the signature's Algorithm using the algorithm parameter only, and thus could be utilized by attackers to expose security vulnerabilities. The default value for this parameter is \"hs2019\". RECOMMENDED. The created parameter contains the signature's Creation Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the \"(created)\" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If not specified, the signature's Creation Time is undefined. This parameter is useful when signers are not capable of controlling the Date HTTP Header such as when operating in certain web browser environments. <\/del> The parameters on each \"Signature-Input\" member value contain metadata about the signature. Each parameter name MUST be a parameter name registered in the IANA HTTP Signatures Metadata Parameters Registry defined in param-registry of this document. This document defines the following parameters, and registers them as the initial contents of the registry: <\/ins> OPTIONAL. The expires parameter contains the signature's Expiration Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the \"(expires)\" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If the signature does not have an Expiration Time, this parameter MUST be omitted. If not specified, the signature's Expiration Time is undefined. <\/del> RECOMMENDED. The \"alg\" parameter is a Token containing the name of the signature's Algorithm, as registered in the HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry defined by this document. Verifiers MUST determine the signature's Algorithm from the \"keyId\" parameter rather than from \"alg\". If \"alg\" is provided and differs from or is incompatible with the algorithm or key material identified by \"keyId\" (for example, \"alg\" has a value of \"rsa-sha256\" but \"keyId\" identifies an EdDSA key), then implementations MUST produce an error. <\/ins> OPTIONAL. The headers parameter contains the signature's Covered Content, expressed as a string containing a quoted list of the identifiers in the list, in the order they occur in the list, with a space \" \" between each identifier. If specified, identifiers for header fields SHOULD be lowercased and all others MUST be lowercased. The default value for this parameter is \"(created)\". <\/del> RECOMMENDED. The \"created\" parameter is a Decimal containing the signature's Creation Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the \"*created\" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If not specified, the signature's Creation Time is undefined. This parameter is useful when signers are not capable of controlling the Date HTTP Header such as when operating in certain web browser environments. <\/ins> REQUIRED. The \"keyId\" parameter is a US-ASCII string whose value can be used by a verifier to identify and\/or obtain the signature's Verification Key Material. The format and semantics of this value are out of scope for this document. <\/del> OPTIONAL. The \"expires\" parameter is a Decimal containing the signature's Expiration Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the \"*expires\" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If the signature does not have an Expiration Time, this parameter MUST be omitted. If not specified, the signature's Expiration Time is undefined. <\/ins> REQUIRED. The signature parameter contains the signature value, as described in sign-sig-input. <\/del> REQUIRED. The \"keyId\" parameter is a String whose value can be used by a verifier to identify and\/or obtain the signature's Verification Key Material. Further format and semantics of this value are out of scope for this document. <\/ins> 4.2. The following is a non-normative example Signature header field representing the signature in example-sig-value: <\/del> The \"Signature\" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured Header StructuredFields containing zero or more message signatures generated from content within the HTTP message. Each member's name is a signature identifier that is present as a member name in the \"Signature-Input\" Structured Header within the HTTP message. Each member's value is a Byte Sequence containing the signature value for the message signature identified by the member name. Any member in the \"Signature\" HTTP header field that does not have a corresponding member in the HTTP message's \"Signature-Input\" HTTP header field MUST be ignored. 4.3. The following is a non-normative example of \"Signature-Input\" and \"Signature\" HTTP header fields representing the signature in example- sig-value: Since \"Signature-Input\" and \"Signature\" are both defined as Dictionary Structured Headers, they can be used to easily include multiple signatures within the same HTTP message. For example, a signer may include multiple signatures signing the same content with different keys and\/or algorithms to support verifiers with different capabilities, or a reverse proxy may include information about the client in header fields when forwarding the request to a service host, and may also include a signature over those fields and the client's signature. The following is a non-normative example of header fields a reverse proxy might add to a forwarded request that contains the signature in the above example: <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2632f6e0a0ec5f0732e7f9e4309dc1d88ad13aebf3fe92a82154d2ad06dc00df","title":"","text":"5.2. This document defines the Signature header field, whose value contains a list of named parameters. IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled \"HTTP Signature Parameters\" to record and maintain the set of named parameters defined for use within the Signature header field. Initial values for this registry are given in iana-param-contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-param-template. <\/del> This document defines the \"Signature-Input\" Structured Header, whose member values may have parameters containing metadata about a message signature. IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled \"HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters\" to record and maintain the set of parameters defined for use with member values in the \"Signature-Input\" Structured Header. Initial values for this registry are given in iana-param-contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-param-template. <\/ins> 5.2.1. 5.2.2. The table below contains the initial contents of the HTTP Signature Parameters Registry. Each row in the table represents a distinct entry in the registry. <\/del> Metadata Parameters Registry. Each row in the table represents a distinct entry in the registry. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-914c605d972a7aa03980b24001e7a324ff14628f5c4eb3dea848fb2693fa0f7e","title":"","text":"context: Re-ordering of header fields with different header field names (HTTP, Section 3.2.2). <\/del> (MESSAGING, Section 3.2.2). <\/ins> Combination of header fields with the same field name (HTTP, <\/del> Combination of header fields with the same field name (MESSAGING, <\/ins> Section 3.2.2). Removal of header fields listed in the \"Connection\" header field (HTTP, Section 6.1). <\/del> (MESSAGING, Section 6.1). <\/ins> Addition of header fields that indicate control options (HTTP, Section 6.1). <\/del> Addition of header fields that indicate control options (MESSAGING, Section 6.1). <\/ins> Addition or removal of a transfer coding (HTTP, Section 5.7.2). <\/del> Addition or removal of a transfer coding (MESSAGING, Section 5.7.2). <\/ins> Addition of header fields such as \"Via\" (HTTP, Section 5.7.1) and \"Forwarded\" (RFC7239, Section 4). <\/del> Addition of header fields such as \"Via\" (MESSAGING, Section 5.7.1) and \"Forwarded\" (RFC7239, Section 4). <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7e5c28d2624ec28d39bc857c2c8b98e5d382d552bfc6e00e91a42245bf265c77","title":"","text":"Changes to the \"request-target\" and \"Host\" header field that when applied together do not result in a change to the message's effective request URI, as defined in Section 5.5 of HTTP. <\/del> effective request URI, as defined in Section 5.5 of MESSAGING. <\/ins> Additionally, all changes to content not covered by the signature are considered safe."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-15cd0cd1ab03a935a396477fe9b0cf4dcaf19b4ce2b3262627f949db76210ea4","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The terms \"HTTP message\", \"HTTP method\", \"HTTP request\", \"HTTP response\", \"absolute-form\", \"absolute-path\", \"effective request URI\", \"gateway\", \"header field\", \"intermediary\", \"request-target\", \"sender\", and \"recipient\" are used as defined in RFC7230. <\/del> The terms \"HTTP message\", \"HTTP request\", \"HTTP response\", \"absolute- form\", \"absolute-path\", \"effective request URI\", \"gateway\", \"header field\", \"intermediary\", \"request-target\", \"sender\", and \"recipient\" are used as defined in MESSAGING. The term \"method\" is to be interpreted as defined in Section 4 of SEMANTICS. <\/ins> For brevity, the term \"signature\" on its own is used in this document to refer to both digital signatures and keyed MACs. Similarly, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-46c9afb0059feef57bb5a44266e563bff328f193fce51100cb3b24b33714e139","title":"","text":"This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split into multiple lines, using the \"obs-fold\" syntax. This syntax is deprecated in RFC7230, and senders MUST NOT generate messages that <\/del> deprecated in MESSAGING, and senders MUST NOT generate messages that <\/ins> include it. 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-49a0f2650c3099113c74dccb29de9fa810da6401a7ba9181f77be436bb24477d","title":"","text":"Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different entities. The term \"Unix time\" is defined by POSIX.1 section 4.16 [2]. <\/ins> This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split into multiple lines, using the \"obs-fold\" syntax. This syntax is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fe165ed8f026e326f674324b1a18a4283f6846b6aa5526ed23deffd0b78126e1","title":"","text":"the \"*created\" identifier. Its canonicalized value is an Integer String containing the signature's Creation Time expressed as the number of seconds since the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16 [2] of POSIX.1. <\/del> signature's Creation Time expressed in \"Unix time\". <\/ins> The use of seconds since the Epoch to canonicalize a timestamp simplifies processing and avoids timezone management required by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2ff566a42900a98394c4a26cb726efd820766521f130534a967de54de6bdaa2f","title":"","text":"the \"*expires\" identifier. Its canonicalized value is a Decimal String containing the signature's Expiration Time expressed as the number of seconds since the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16 [3] of POSIX.1. <\/del> signature's Expiration Time expressed in \"Unix time\". <\/ins> 2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cc4f45a8809bb3d941dcc9f478c48d24b33d11f7f0ac44627a84de946645f68d","title":"","text":"[1] https:\/\/openjdk.java.net\/groups\/net\/httpclient\/intro.html [2] https:\/\/pubs.opengroup.org\/onlinepubs\/9699919799\/basedefs\/ V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16 [3] https:\/\/pubs.opengroup.org\/onlinepubs\/9699919799\/basedefs\/ <\/del> [2] http:\/\/pubs.opengroup.org\/onlinepubs\/9699919799\/basedefs\/ <\/ins> V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-00b9a650a960f15eeb64595c327fed330e1261cb2d2069502f90d64267a74e94","title":"","text":"This list MUST NOT be empty, as this would result in creating a signature over the empty string. If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include \"*created\" and \"*request-target\" in the list. <\/del> Signers SHOULD include \"*request-target\" in the list. <\/ins> If the signature's Algorithm starts with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include \"date\" and \"*request-target\" in the list. <\/del> Signers SHOULD include a date stamp, such as the \"date\" header or the \"*created\" field in the list. <\/ins> Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what order is out of scope for this document. However, the list"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f2d872a4befa1f7fe99e997a209cea4c8d77dfc21cadfd0af391b53a0f0ba27b","title":"","text":"the identifier's canonicalized value (described below). If Covered Content contains \"*created\" and the signature's Creation Time is undefined or the signature's Algorithm name starts with \"rsa\", \"hmac\", or \"ecdsa\" an implementation MUST produce an error. <\/del> Time is undefined an implementation MUST produce an error. <\/ins> If Covered Content contains \"*expires\" and the signature does not have an Expiration Time or the signature's Algorithm name starts with \"rsa\", \"hmac\", or \"ecdsa\" an implementation MUST produce an error. <\/del> have an Expiration Time an implementation MUST produce an error. <\/ins> If Covered Content contains an identifier for a header field that is not present or malformed in the message, the implementation MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b5a055b95e0297cc84ef1c1ffff6fd97ac313f1a72567cf4dde6f995b06e76db","title":"","text":"checksum comparison and, based on the intersection of those results, conditionally pass or fail digest validation. 12.10. \"Digest\" validation consumes computational resources. In order to avoid resource exhaustion, implementations can restrict validation of the algorithm types, number of validations, or the size of content. <\/ins> 13. 13.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b179dc02d2696a3ed1623b73dbb8db466630b102797147e0901fe88e2be9f813","title":"","text":"attribute-name of \"SameSite\" and an attribute-value of \"enforcement\". Note: This algorithm maps the \"None\" value, as well as any unknown value, to the \"None\" behavior, which is helpful for backwards compatibility when introducing new variants. <\/del> 5.3.7.1. Same-site cookies in \"Strict\" enforcement mode will not be sent along"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ea5030f748b8b107c2350a885e64f27e95df6c5bc0fd371b1b1eab027518db35","title":"","text":"stripped or added. Any mangling of \"Digest\", including de-duplication of representation- data-digest values or combining different field values (see 5.3.1 of SEMANTICS) might affect signature validation. <\/del> data-digest values or combining different field values (see Section 5.2 of SEMANTICS) might affect signature validation. <\/ins> 12.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-09167391e05aca078b206637c4446539e38e057805f3fe25c37f471ed444a5ff","title":"","text":"An HTTP-level integrity mechanism that operates independent of transfer can be used to detect programming errors and\/or corruption of data in flight or at rest, be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, aid fault diagnosis <\/del> to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, can aid fault diagnosis <\/ins> across hops and system boundaries, and can be used to validate integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7156725199a0ed6e2fa07cc83f71a39c8cdd3b4685ad74b313598d971c278ab3","title":"","text":"representation, or conveys a partial representation of a resource eg. Range Requests (see Section 14.2 of SEMANTICS). Changes are semantically compatible with existing implementations and better cover both the request and response cases. <\/del> This document replaces RFC3230 to better align with SEMANTICS and to provide more detailed description of \"Digest\" usage in request and response cases. Changes are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations but note that negotiation of \"Content- MD5\" is deprecated deprecate-contentMD5, \"Digest\" field parameters are obsoleted obsolete-parameters, \"md5\" and \"sha\" digest-algorithms are obsoleted broken-algorithms and the \"adler32\" algorithm is deprecated deprecated-algorithms. <\/ins> The value of \"Digest\" is calculated on selected representation, which is tied to the value contained in any \"Content-Encoding\" or \"Content-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3124e464aa20999590af7fc003b4e511cd9f066bc5d75a189755620f10dd836b","title":"","text":"The goals do not include: The digest mechanism described here does not cover the full HTTP message nor its semantic, as representation metadata are not included in the checksum. <\/del> Digest mechanisms do not cover the full HTTP message nor its semantic, as representation metadata is not included in the checksum. <\/ins> The digest mechanisms described here cover only representation and selected representation data, and do not protect the integrity of <\/del> Digest mechanisms cover only representation and selected representation data, and do not protect the integrity of <\/ins> associated representation metadata or other message fields. The digest mechanisms described here are not meant to support authentication of the source of a digest or of a message or anything else. These mechanisms, therefore, are not a sufficient defense against many kinds of malicious attacks. <\/del> Digest mechanisms do not support authentication of the source of a digest, message or anything else. These mechanisms, therefore, are not a sufficient defense against many kinds of malicious attacks. <\/ins> Digest mechanisms do not provide message privacy. The digest mechanisms described here are not meant to support authorization or other kinds of access controls. <\/del> Digest mechanisms do not support authorization or other kinds of access controls. <\/ins> 1.4. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC2119 and RFC8174) when, and only when, they appear in all <\/del> \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all <\/ins> capitals, as shown here. This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in RFC5234 and updated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1ba2ca9cb765f08680a8e1d1cdef66ba87f9e0d83dafc53c9229ced2eb014de8","title":"","text":"This takes into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on the messages; for example, the payload data can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the payload data is transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (eg. transfer codings for HTTP\/1.1 - see Section 6.1 of HTTP11): resource- representation contains several examples to help illustrate those effects. <\/del> transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer codings for HTTP\/1.1 - see Section 6.1 of HTTP11). To help illustrate how such things affect \"Digest\", several examples are provided in resource-representation. <\/ins> A representation digest consists of the value of a checksum computed on the entire selected \"representation data\" (see Section 8 of SEMANTICS) of a resource identified according to Section 6.4.2 of SEMANTICS together with an indication of the algorithm used <\/del> SEMANTICS together with an indication of the algorithm used: <\/ins> The checksum is computed using one of the digest-algorithms listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format. The example below shows the \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm which uses <\/del> The example below shows the \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm that uses <\/ins> base64 encoding. 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a3167da87b8e2f42092039f49bab4378c80ad236675d53b1e22a6372ee5beee","title":"","text":"digest values as defined in representation-digest. It can be used in both requests and responses. For example: <\/ins> The relationship between \"Content-Location\" (see Section 8.8 of SEMANTICS) and \"Digest\" is demonstrated in post-not-request-uri. A comprehensive set of examples showing the impacts of representation"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0139b909489e86011d061138178e07c80d29e74012a51dc70d3ddec7bebce719","title":"","text":"algorithm without knowing whether the recipient supports the digest- algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. \"Digest\" can be sent in a trailer section. When using incremental digest-algorithms this allows the sender and the receiver to <\/del> \"Digest\" can be sent in a trailer section. When an incremental digest-algorithms is used, the sender and the receiver can <\/ins> dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the content. Two examples of its use are <\/del> 4. The \"Want-Digest\" field indicates the sender's desire to receive a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7795941108313f17bfc11361f9f2d9f660b052c259532c90695c6a3ad783cc6f","title":"","text":"sender's preferred digest-algorithm is the one (or ones) with the highest \"qvalue\". Two examples of its use are <\/del> Two examples of its use are: <\/ins> 5. Digest-algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest computation. All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive but the lower case is preferred. <\/del> All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive but lower case is preferred. <\/ins> The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for digest-algorithm values. The registry contains the tokens listed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a5956faaf5c3e2c96ad93d9673a5bf44309102694d5df847ae17a5b6338ead9d","title":"","text":"6.1. In PATCH requests the representation digest MUST be computed on the <\/del> In PATCH requests, the representation digest MUST be computed on the <\/ins> patch document because the representation metadata refers to the patch document and not to the target resource (see Section 2 of PATCH). In PATCH responses the representation digest MUST be computed on the <\/del> In PATCH responses, the representation digest MUST be computed on the <\/ins> selected representation of the patched resource. \"Digest\" usage with PATCH is thus very similar to the POST one, but with the resource's own semantic partly implied by the method and by the patch document. <\/del> \"Digest\" usage with PATCH is thus very similar to POST, but with the resource's own semantic partly implied by the method and by the patch document. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-67a84b3e1c527b557041aa5a343e303d94836e49ffda35b15123e3ed17015c56","title":"","text":"8. This document obsoletes the usage of parameters with \"Digest\" introduced in Section 4.1.1 and 4.2 of RFC3230 because this feature has not been widely deployed and complicates field-value processing. <\/del> Section 4.1.1 and 4.2 of RFC3230 defined field parameters. This document obsoletes the usage of parameters with \"Digest\" because this feature has not been widely deployed and complicates field-value processing. <\/ins> Field parameters provided a common way to attach additional information to a representation-data-digest, but if they are used as an input to validate the checksum, an attacker could alter them to steer the validation behavior. <\/del> RFC3230 intended field parameters to provide a common way to attach additional information to a representation-data-digest. However, if parameters are used as an input to validate the checksum, an attacker could alter them to steer the validation behavior. <\/ins> A digest-algorithm can still be parameterized defining its own way to encode parameters into the representation-data-digest in such a way as to mitigate security risks related to its computation. <\/del> A digest-algorithm can still be parameterized by defining its own way to encode parameters into the representation-data-digest, in such a way as to mitigate security risks related to its computation. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-991480b877155ae757cd8aad84d8d9020bdf80ea92a38d192168ee279f4df3c7","title":"","text":"contain at least one byte of padding and a 16 octet authentication tag. Each record contains between 1 and 256 octets of padding, inserted <\/del> Each record contains between 2 and 65537 octets of padding, inserted <\/ins> into a record before the enciphered content. Padding consists of a length byte, followed that number of zero-valued octets. A receiver MUST fail to decrypt if any padding octet other than the first is non-zero, or a record has more padding than the record size can accommodate. <\/del> two octet unsigned integer in network byte order, followed that number of zero-valued octets. A receiver MUST fail to decrypt if any padding octet other than the first two are non-zero, or a record has more padding than the record size can accommodate. <\/ins> The nonce for each record is a 96-bit value constructed from the record sequence number and the input keying material. Nonce"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-61e4dd204a744ab19492edf9f0cb1ba0f62f47cdc4aa79b681ee55ffe3b93fef","title":"","text":"problematic and presents possible mitigations, or where unfairness is desirable. TODO: Discuss if we should add a signal that mitigates this issue. For example, we might add a SETTINGS parameter that indicates the next hop that the connection is NOT coalesced (see https:\/\/github.com\/kazuho\/draft-kazuho-httpbis-priority\/issues\/99). <\/del> 10.1. When an intermediary coalesces HTTP requests coming from multiple"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-537f67595036b84233316e0056f20e0b616ef6a950980ad225d2748bba4d09b6","title":"","text":"2. The \"aesgcm128\" HTTP content-coding indicates that a payload has been <\/del> The \"aesgcm\" HTTP content-coding indicates that a payload has been <\/ins> encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois\/Counter Mode (GCM) as identified as AEAD_AES_128_GCM in RFC5116, Section 5.1. The AEAD_AES_128_GCM algorithm uses a 128 bit content encryption key."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-028571b88a4c5f03982f0f49548690bdd3df4473a527941d79825e5a991de00e","title":"","text":"Key header field (crypto-key) can be included to describe how the content encryption key is derived or retrieved. The \"aesgcm128\" content-coding uses a single fixed set of encryption <\/del> The \"aesgcm\" content-coding uses a single fixed set of encryption <\/ins> primitives. Cipher suite agility is achieved by defining a new content-coding scheme. This ensures that only the HTTP Accept- Encoding header field is necessary to negotiate the use of encryption. The \"aesgcm128\" content-coding uses a fixed record size. The resulting encoding is a series of fixed-size records, with a final record that is one or more octets shorter than a fixed sized record. <\/del> The \"aesgcm\" content-coding uses a fixed record size. The resulting encoding is a series of fixed-size records, with a final record that is one or more octets shorter than a fixed sized record. <\/ins> The record size determines the length of each portion of plaintext that is enciphered, with the exception of the final record, which is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-13892428f3c51cdb8a06b394c718c3452f6dc202743f0f43989f5675aac0f289","title":"","text":"header field (crypto-key). The first step of HKDF is therefore: The info parameter to HKDF is set to the ASCII-encoded string \"Content-Encoding: aesgcm128\", a single zero octet and an optional <\/del> \"Content-Encoding: aesgcm\", a single zero octet and an optional <\/ins> context string: Unless otherwise specified, the context is a zero length octet"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1aaf344c48b4dd7008119f875dc37ef4bc0e6d201fc55fa54dbbdb640c313648","title":"","text":"The \"keyid\" parameter corresponds to the \"keyid\" parameter in the Encryption header field. The \"aesgcm128\" parameter contains the URL-safe base64 RFC4648 octets of the input keying material. <\/del> The \"aesgcm\" parameter contains the URL-safe base64 RFC4648 octets of the input keying material. <\/ins> The \"dh\" parameter contains an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share. This form of the header field can be used to encrypt content for a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6838e8ee71821695b17509e8750821080602b5f8bf8b53a438f8144ce5e7d991","title":"","text":"4.1. The \"aesgcm128\" parameter is decoded and used as the input keying material for the \"aesgcm128\" content encoding. The \"aesgcm128\" parameter MUST decode to at least 16 octets in order to be used as input keying material for \"aesgcm128\" content encoding. <\/del> The \"aesgcm\" parameter is decoded and used as the input keying material for the \"aesgcm\" content encoding. The \"aesgcm\" parameter MUST decode to at least 16 octets in order to be used as input keying material for \"aesgcm\" content encoding. <\/ins> Other key determination parameters can be ignored if the \"aesgcm128\" <\/del> Other key determination parameters can be ignored if the \"aesgcm\" <\/ins> parameter is present. 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fc4dfd55d9cc65bac7133a6071fd2088fc02cdbfc809eb63aa907055ee5a87dd","title":"","text":"7.1. This memo registers the \"encrypted\" HTTP content-coding in the HTTP Content Codings Registry, as detailed in aesgcm128. <\/del> Content Codings Registry, as detailed in aesgcm. <\/ins> Name: aesgcm128 <\/del> Name: aesgcm <\/ins> Description: AES-GCM encryption with a 128-bit content encryption key"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f4f52b2445e73dacc01b7a86c71df3e06c15ba080d0d4dc04fb1f4fd4c044c11","title":"","text":"7.4.2. Parameter Name: aesgcm128 <\/del> Parameter Name: aesgcm <\/ins> Purpose: Provide an explicit input keying material value for the aesgcm128 content encoding. <\/del> aesgcm content encoding. <\/ins> Reference: this document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f27034ae0b83700e3c612d20305f697e0e2e9df3a67b3f98521ad9b5d5aa79a2","title":"","text":"3.3. When attempting to extend priorities, care must be taken to ensure any use of existing parameters leaves them either unchanged or modified in a way that is backwards compatible for peers that are unaware of the extended meaning. <\/del> When attempting to define new parameters, care must be taken so that they do not adversely interfere with prioritization performed by existing endpoints or intermediaries that do not understand the newly defined parameter. Since unknown parameters are ignored, new parameters should not change the interpretation of or modify the predefined parameters in a way that is not backwards compatible or fallback safe. <\/ins> For example, if there is a need to provide more granularity than eight urgency levels, it would be possible to subdivide the range"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2a7bc83357fca63cee53ded2d655158141bb1bdf53b7dae5484d54364effab84","title":"","text":"graphical user agent could send a \"visible\" parameter to indicate if the resource being requested is within the viewport. Generic parameters are preferred over vendor-specific, application- specific or deployment-specific values. If a generic value cannot be agreed upon in the community, the parameter's name should be correspondingly specific (e.g., with a prefix that identifies the vendor, application or deployment). 3.3.1. New Priority parameters can be defined by registering them in the HTTP Priority Parameters Registry. Registration requests are reviewed and approved by a Designated Expert, as per RFC8126, Section 4.5. A specification document is appreciated, but not required. The Expert(s) should consider the following factors when evaluating requests: Community feedback If the parameters are sufficiently well-defined and adhere to the guidance provided in new-parameters. Registration requests should use the following template: Name: [a name for the Priority Parameter that matches key] Description: [a description of the parameter semantics and value] Reference: [to a specification defining this parameter] See the registry at https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority [4] for details on where to send registration requests. <\/ins> 4. The Priority HTTP header field can appear in requests and responses."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b28a965e2549e3d9bbbbc9d65b2aee3ae0cc35b5bbb4675514f00491b4aa8b5","title":"","text":"This document Upon publication, please create the HTTP Priority Parameters registry at https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority [5] and populate it with the types defined in parameters; see register for its associated procedures. <\/ins> 14. References 14.1. URIs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-97ff4ed6b0d8aa6e7e35fe2fa9da0b3d1701d9f023a05994a8bb83001dee6cd0","title":"","text":"[2] https:\/\/httpwg.org\/ [3] https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/priorities [4] https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority [5] https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-605146eaa51ddb02f3d51c78a4fcbd6900416ed41d7839ec26ed745d0f75584d","title":"","text":"SEMANTICS) of a resource identified according to Section 6.4.2 of SEMANTICS together with an indication of the algorithm used: When a message has no representation data it is still possible to assert that no representation data was sent computing the representation digest on an empty string (see usage-in-signatures). <\/ins> The checksum is computed using one of the digest-algorithms listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-50188b7786e33bc27bf418de2347268eebbb843479f8d9ee97c307cf8e13f9a4","title":"","text":"10.2. Requests without content can still send a \"Digest\" field applying the digest-algorithm to an empty representation. <\/del> In this example, a HEAD request is used to retrieve the checksum of a resource. <\/ins> The response \"Digest\" field-value is calculated over the JSON object \"{\"hello\": \"world\"}\", which is not shown because there is no payload data. In this example there is no content coding applied, so the \"sha-256\" and the \"id-sha-256\" digest-values in the response would be the same. <\/del> Request: Response:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1cc1c793ebb8994121e8fe529b46fcd33a05ea8f3c1e227e11e525edf860cd35","title":"","text":"below. Some digest-algorithms, although registered, rely on vulnerable algorithms: the \"md5\" digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks CMU-836068 and the \"sha\" digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used due to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/del> algorithms and MUST not be used: \"md5\", see CMU-836068 and NO-MD5; \"sha\", see IACR-2020-014 and NO-SHA1. See the references above for further information. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf08ae5f4ace2944579132381a18237f848fda398296fcdd129b8ecca1d9ddac","title":"","text":"Description: The MD5 algorithm, as specified in RFC1321. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks CMU-836068. <\/del> vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-MD5 and CMU-836068. <\/ins> Reference: RFC1321, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cefca812fef1e75a5356ed54a17423fb8816257adbfc049254526a73bbbde07a","title":"","text":"Description: The SHA-1 algorithm RFC3174. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks IACR-2020-014. <\/del> collision attacks. See NO-SHA1 and IACR-2020-014. <\/ins> Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93a3178cea9a78f71dfca601ff0f2c7a0dcf721f7a4629753a8e68093f3292b6","title":"","text":" HTTP Connect - Tunnel Protocol For WebRTC <\/del> The Tunnel-Protocol HTTP Request Header Field <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-tunnel-protocol Abstract This document describes a mechanism to enable HTTP Clients to provide an indication within a HTTP Connect request as to which protocol will be used within the tunnel established to the Server identified by the target resource. The tunneled protocol is declared using the Tunnel- Protocol HTTP Request header field. Label usage relating to the use of HTTP Connect by WebRTC clients (e.g. turn, webrtc) are described in this document. <\/del> This specification allows HTTP CONNECT requests to indicate what protocol will be used within the tunnel once established, using the Tunnel-Protocol request header field. <\/ins> 1. The HTTP Connect method (Section 4.3.6 of RFC7231) requests that the recipient establish a tunnel to the destination origin server identified by the request-target and thereafter forward packets, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed. Such tunnels are commonly used to create end-to-end virtual connections, through one or more proxies, which may then be secured using TLS (Transport Layer Security, RFC5246). The RTCWEB use cases and requirements document I-D.ietf-rtcweb-use- cases-and-requirements includes a requirement that a WebRTC Client must be able to send streams and data to a peer in the presence of Firewalls that only allow traffic via a HTTP Proxy, when Firewall policy allows WebRTC traffic. To facilitate this and to allow such a HTTP Proxy to be provided with an indication that WebRTC related real-time media is to be included in the tunnel this specification defines the Tunnel-Protocol Request header field and associated labels. This allows the proxy to identify the protocol being used in the tunnel as early as possible therefore enabling the proxy to make informed policy decisions. The type of policy decisions the proxy may make is not specified here but may include rejecting the request with a HTTP status code responses or prioritizing connections. As described in Section 4.3.6 of RFC7231 and 2xx response indicates consent for the client to switch to tunnel mode. The HTTP Tunnel-Protocol header field may be used in conjunction with and complements the application layer next protocol extension I- D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg specified for TLS RFC5246\". In the scenario where the HTTP Connect is used to establish a TLS tunnel then the HTTP Tunnel-Protocol may be used to carry the same next protocol label as carried within the TLS handshake. However, the HTTP-Protocol is an indication rather a negotiation since the HTTP Proxy does not implement the tunneled protocol. ALPN Labels are already defined for TURN in I-D.patil-tram-alpn and WebRTC I- D.thomson-rtcweb-alpn and are re-used here. <\/del> The HTTP CONNECT method (Section 4.3.6 of RFC7231) requests that the recipient establish a tunnel to the identified origin server and thereafter forward packets, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed. Such tunnels are commonly used to create end-to-end virtual connections, through one or more proxies, which may then be secured using TLS (Transport Layer Security, RFC5246). The HTTP Tunnel-Protocol header field identifies the protocol that will be spoken within the tunnel, using the application layer next protocol identifier I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg specified for TLS RFC5246\". When CONNECT is used to establish a TLS tunnel, the Tunnel-Protocol header field may be used to carry the same next protocol label as was carried within the TLS handshake. However, the HTTP-Protocol is an indication rather a negotiation since HTTP proxies do not implement the tunneled protocol. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d0500f038e806ed7af395843b7d404e4d15c663511fb62becf36b8555445858d","title":"","text":"2. The following two use cases are considered: The WebRTC Client issues a HTTP CONNECT request to the HTTP proxy with the TURN server address in the Request URI. The WebRTC Client issues a HTTP CONNECT request to the HTTP proxy with the TCP address of a WebRTC peer in the Request URI. This is used in the case of establishing ICE-TCP RFC6544 with a WebRTC Peer. 3. The client MAY include the Tunnel-Protocol Request Header field in a HTTP Connect request to indicate the application layer protocol <\/del> Clients include the Tunnel-Protocol Request Header field in a HTTP Connect request to indicate the application layer protocol used <\/ins> within the tunnel. 3.1. <\/del> 2.1. <\/ins> Valid values for the protocol field are taken from the registry established in I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg. For the purposes of WebRTC, the values \"webrtc\" I-D.thomson-rtcweb-alpn and \"turn\" I- D.patil-tram-alpn are applicable. <\/del> established in I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg. <\/ins> 3.2. <\/del> 2.2. <\/ins> The ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) syntax for the Tunnel-Protocol header field is given below. It is based on the Generic Grammar defined in Section 2 of RFC7230. Tunnel-Protocol = \"Tunnel-Protocol\":\" protocol | protocol-extension <\/del> Tunnel-Protocol = \"Tunnel-Protocol\":\" protocol-id <\/ins> protocol = \"webrtc\" | \"turn\" <\/del> protocol-id = token ; percent-encoded ALPN protocol identifier <\/ins> protocol-extension = token <\/del> ALPN protocol names are octet sequences with no additional constraints on format. Octets not allowed in tokens (RFC7230, Section 3.2.6) must be percent-encoded as per Section 2.1 of RFC3986. Consequently, the octet representing the percent character \"%\" (hex 25) must be percent-encoded as well. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> In order to have precisely one way to represent any ALPN protocol name, the following additional constraints apply: <\/ins> The RTCWEB transports specification I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports requires that a WebRTC client support the modes of TURN that uses TCP and TLS between the client and the TURN server in order to deal with firewalls blocking UDP traffic. In the case where HTTP Connect is used to establish a tunnel to the TURN server the client SHOULD include the \"Tunnel-Protocol\" header field with the value \"turn\" I- D.patil-tram-alpn as shown in the example below. <\/del> Octets in the ALPN protocol must not be percent-encoded if they are valid token characters except \"%\", and <\/ins> 3.4. <\/del> When using percent-encoding, uppercase hex digits must be used. <\/ins> I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports also requires that a WebRTC client support ICE-TCP RFC6544 as a mechanism to allow webrtc applications to communicate to peers with public IP addresses across UDP-blocking firewalls without using a TURN server. In this case the client SHOULD include the \"Tunnel-Protocol\" header field with the value \"webrtc\" I-D.thomson-rtcweb-alpn as shown in the example below. <\/del> With these constraints, recipients can apply simple string comparison to match protocol identifiers. <\/ins> Note: The protocol \"c_webrtc\" described in I-D.thomson-rtcweb-alpn is not relevent in this context and when used at the TLS layer the client SHOULD use \"webrtc\" in the Tunnel-Protocol header. OPEN ISSUE - Is this correct? <\/del> For example: <\/ins> 4. <\/del> 3. <\/ins> To Be Added 5. <\/del> 4. <\/ins> In case of using HTTP CONNECT to a TURN server the security consideration of RFC7231, Section-4.3.6] apply. It states that there"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c38bcf4823ed461ae56e732c1d7baa4a9fe4a1ac4f5f4788a6307dccbb245f35","title":"","text":"Name: connection_terminated Description: The intermediary's connection to the next hop was closed before any part of the response was received. If some part was received, see http_response_incomplete. <\/del> closed before complete response was received. <\/ins> Extra Parameters: None. Recommended HTTP status code: 502 Notes: Responses with this error type might not have been generated by the intermediary. <\/ins> 2.4.9. Name: connection_timeout"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-02144ac858b7ff53e0622d849bf283793a2476207fedb8d76aa6abe4cda3a735","title":"","text":"_RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_ This work was originally based on draft-cavage-http-signatures-12, but has since diverged from it, to reflect discussion since adoption by the HTTP Working Group. In particular, it addresses issues that have been identified, and adds features to support new use cases. It is a work-in-progress and not yet suitable for deployment. <\/del> Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/ [1]. Working Group information can be found at https:\/\/httpwg.org\/ [2]; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/signatures [3]. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8d43c6e555b9a56f0d8df1246c22ee9f6225dc3b318f81401fbb60860c14a0f2","title":"","text":"complete access to or control over HTTP messages (such as a web browser's JavaScript environment), or may be using libraries that abstract away the details of the protocol (such as the Java HTTPClient library [1]). These applications need to be able to <\/del> HTTPClient library [4]). These applications need to be able to <\/ins> generate and verify signatures despite incomplete knowledge of the HTTP message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2bff0c0de89d38db6fbe3e88768055bc0c4847fefe8e5131be0002c100ff5e1c","title":"","text":"Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different entities. The term \"Unix time\" is defined by POSIX.1 section 4.16 [2]. <\/del> The term \"Unix time\" is defined by POSIX.1 section 4.16 [5]. <\/ins> This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f940b3b9164c99d6e245eac9c072d95e7a0a22726fd1cf8b0a662ede0b8c98d","title":"","text":"7.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/openjdk.java.net\/groups\/net\/httpclient\/intro.html <\/del> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/ [2] https:\/\/httpwg.org\/ [3] https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/signatures [4] https:\/\/openjdk.java.net\/groups\/net\/httpclient\/intro.html <\/ins> [2] http:\/\/pubs.opengroup.org\/onlinepubs\/9699919799\/basedefs\/ <\/del> [5] http:\/\/pubs.opengroup.org\/onlinepubs\/9699919799\/basedefs\/ <\/ins> V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ca31f3a81bc43cc0d5114c28cd3c95d65dc5f7aa5d5035ed7978a0146e9c87bf","title":"","text":"of SEMANTICS. The definitions \"representation\", \"selected representation\", \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", and \"payload data\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in SEMANTICS. <\/del> \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", and \"content\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in SEMANTICS. <\/ins> Algorithm names respect the casing used in their definition document (eg. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas digest-algorithm tokens are quoted (eg."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e9f9d43c4e01bd7a16b4fbea33a35d0e1976247d2f3f40f832bb48eefb25b60","title":"","text":"The representation digest is an integrity mechanism for HTTP resources which uses a checksum that is calculated independently of the payload data (see Section 6.4 of SEMANTICS). It uses the <\/del> the content (see Section 6.4 of SEMANTICS). It uses the <\/ins> representation data (see Section 8.1 of SEMANTICS), that can be fully or partially contained in the payload data, or not contained at all: <\/del> or partially contained in the content, or not contained at all: <\/ins> This takes into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on the messages; for example, the payload data can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the payload data is transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer codings for HTTP\/1.1 - see Section 6.1 of HTTP11). To help <\/del> messages; for example, the content can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the content is transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer codings for HTTP\/1.1 - see Section 6.1 of HTTP11). To help <\/ins> illustrate how such things affect \"Digest\", several examples are provided in resource-representation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2ceef04339fe015e482910ecdc9a71b16209f0882b94b35ede7de60bdd499841","title":"","text":"responds with a \"Digest\" field even though the client did not solicit one using \"Want-Digest\". Some examples include JSON objects in the payload data. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line- length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. <\/del> Some examples include JSON objects in the content. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. <\/ins> \"Digest\" is media-type agnostic and does not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific formats. Examples of \"Digest\" are calculated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-789c6b0b15975b4854abcad1f2a1f3e0fac82bc5a3b937c7802ca57d47be1e4b","title":"","text":"10.2. Requests without payload data can still send a \"Digest\" field applying the digest-algorithm to an empty representation. <\/del> Requests without content can still send a \"Digest\" field applying the digest-algorithm to an empty representation. <\/ins> The response \"Digest\" field-value is calculated over the JSON object \"{\"hello\": \"world\"}\", which is not shown because there is no payload"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fefe6582964c1d2b4c7164415f45b3dc45398f4a81b0bf78e89802f61adf7d30","title":"","text":"The response \"Digest\" field-value depends on the representation metadata header fields, including \"Content-Encoding: br\" even when the response does not contain payload data. <\/del> the response does not contain content. <\/ins> Request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-96afb75446839519281b4aa4e36416a3b9e9fb73836022f9bdbd8cfaeec26c37","title":"","text":"Response: Note that a \"204 No Content\" response without payload data but with the same \"Digest\" field-value would have been legitimate too. <\/del> Note that a \"204 No Content\" response without content but with the same \"Digest\" field-value would have been legitimate too. <\/ins> 10.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9c9951d685323813b9106fb4d6ca442fdecec58a6616b8df1622bce471de3056","title":"","text":"Response: Note that a \"204 No Content\" response without payload data but with the same \"Digest\" field-value would have been legitimate too. <\/del> Note that a \"204 No Content\" response without content but with the same \"Digest\" field-value would have been legitimate too. <\/ins> 10.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-29776945c4c368d9cc53c5444bfda0c570b078cb6bb513cb8123dbd5cb64ef8c","title":"","text":"The following examples demonstrate interactions where a client solicits a \"Digest\" using \"Want-Digest\". Some examples include JSON objects in the payload data. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line- length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. <\/del> Some examples include JSON objects in the content. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. <\/ins> \"Digest\" is media-type agnostic and does not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific formats. Examples of \"Digest\" are calculated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b20b08d7edfa39d0ed268c8bf952038f89f7374c6f08a3b47dfbe0cd657fffc1","title":"","text":"12.7. When \"Digest\" is used in trailer fields, the receiver gets the digest value after the payload data and may thus be tempted to process the data before validating the digest value. It is prefereable that data is only be processed after validating the Digest. <\/del> value after the content and may thus be tempted to process the data before validating the digest value. It is prefereable that data is only be processed after validating the Digest. <\/ins> If received in trailers, \"Digest\" MUST NOT be discarded; instead, it MAY be merged in the header section (See Section 6.5.1 of SEMANTICS)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a7dbddc754cfa41416ca6e59ef40b55873567d6c7c9710acc97d2616010fa4f7","title":"","text":"The representation-data-digest of an encrypted payload can change between different messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases its value could not be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) payload data is persisted. <\/del> of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) content is persisted. <\/ins> 12.9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05fdc8d2a00afd54da02460d476822eaf88357ef8faba8791f7d9eb5317534a8","title":"","text":"required. Certificates - Applications using HTTP should specify that TLS certificates are to be checked according to I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics, Section 4.3.4 when HTTPS is used. <\/del> certificates are to be checked according to Section 4.3.4 of I- D.ietf-httpbis-semantics when HTTPS is used. <\/ins> Applications using HTTP should not statically require HTTP features that are usually negotiated to be supported by clients. For example,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ff538a8e3d201c23db852197c3629fd156d894a170a79b7aa300613f86699af9","title":"","text":"validation first because it does not always require a conversion into identity encoding. There is a chance that a user agent supporting both mechanisms may find one validates successfully while the other fails. This document specifies no requirements or guidance for user agents that experience such cases. <\/del> A user agent supporting both mechanisms: - can legitimately ignore \"Digest\" when using SRI, because digest specifies that \"a recipient MAY ignore any or all of the representation-data-digests\"; - enforce both \"Digest\" and SRI: in this case it can be useful to provide enough information to identify whether the mismatch happened at the \"Digest\" or the SRI level. <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fb55992643eac8db99c4b47b4de4916bac71288cfb058c7703475ee9e35b94dc","title":"","text":"The SEARCH method is used to initiate a server-side search. Unlike the HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the SEARCH method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a SEARCH cannot be assumed to be a <\/ins> representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI (as defined by RFC7230), the SEARCH method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a SEARCH cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request <\/del> URI. The body payload of the request defines the query. Implementations MAY use a request body of any content type with the SEARCH method; however, for backwards compatibility with existing WebDAV implementations, SEARCH requests that use the text\/xml or application\/xml content types MUST be processed per the requirements <\/del> application\/xml media types MUST be processed per the requirements <\/ins> established by RFC5323. SEARCH requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c83684ef83c8af151f5b9d13e9d6b29d1f5533f65871af03e6a105ca0a4aec6e","title":"","text":"indication as to the final disposition of the search operation. For instance, a successful search that yields no results can be represented by a 204 No Content response. If the response includes a body payload, the payload is expected to describe the results of the search operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond <\/del> content, it is expected to describe the results of the search operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond <\/ins> indirectly to the SEARCH request by returning a 3xx Redirection with a Location header specifying an alternate Request URI from which the search results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful SEARCH responses are illustrated in examples. <\/del> a Location header field specifying an alternate Request URI from which the search results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful SEARCH responses are illustrated in examples. <\/ins> The response to a SEARCH request is not cacheable. It ought to be noted, however, that because SEARCH requests are safe and idempotent,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ea0b7491483d9fd83c887cda5ba5c076e408a0f75faf3af6b6c061d7522ad5ab","title":"","text":"The semantics of the SEARCH method change to a \"conditional SEARCH\" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified- Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field (RFC7232). <\/del> Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field (RFCHTTP). <\/ins> A conditional SEARCH requests that the query be performed only under the circumstances described by the conditional header field(s). It is important to note, however, that such conditions are evaluated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5fe6b6b8de8d2bb28b20912d498884655efca90456e2d606253e61782a3344be","title":"","text":"The \"Accept-Search\" response header field MAY be used by a server to directly signal support for the SEARCH method while identifying the specific query format Content-Type's that may be used. <\/del> specific query format media types that may be used. <\/ins> The Accept-Search header specifies a comma-separated listing of media types (with optional parameters) as defined by RFC7231. <\/del> The Accept-Search header field specifies a comma-separated listing of media types (with optional parameters) as defined by RFCHTTP. <\/ins> The order of types listed by the Accept-Search header is <\/del> The order of types listed by the Accept-Search header field is <\/ins> insignificant. 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b44baad784ae1d4ba83c846ee36c26fb2d5377fa6064f8e90d421388426e9330","title":"","text":"5. The SEARCH method is subject to the same general security considerations as all HTTP methods as described in RFC7231. <\/del> considerations as all HTTP methods as described in RFCHTTP. <\/ins> 6. IANA is requested to update the registration of the SEARCH method in the permanent registry at methods> (see RFC7231). <\/del> methods> (see RFCHTTP). <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-530ff13bdfcfc2dda13a55717f5dab2a4f34fc46cf833ace93ff17457eb063d6","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines the HTTP Digest and Want-Digest fields, thus allowing client and server to negotiate an integrity checksum of the <\/del> This document defines the HTTP Digest and Want-Digest fields, which allows client and server to negotiate an integrity checksum of the <\/ins> exchanged resource representation data. This document obsoletes RFC 3230. It replaces the term \"instance\" with \"representation\", which makes it consistent with the HTTP Semantic and Context defined in draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics. <\/del> This document obsoletes RFC 3230. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5e83b68258bbb3f76f731f5b15f4913225fe84d4151c2673c2042e672b3ed884","title":"","text":"1. The core specification of HTTP does not define a means to protect the integrity of resources. When HTTP messages are transferred between <\/del> HTTP does not define a means to protect the integrity of representations. When HTTP messages are transferred between <\/ins> endpoints, the protocol might choose to make use of features of the lower layer in order to provide some integrity protection; for instance TCP checksums or TLS records RFC2818. However, there are cases where relying on this alone is insufficient. An HTTP-level integrity mechanism that operates independent of transfer can be used to detect programming errors and\/or corruption of data in flight or at rest, be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, can aid fault diagnosis across hops and system boundaries, and can be used to validate <\/del> This document defines the Digest HTTP integrity mechanism that acts on representation data. It operates independent of transport integrity, offering the potential to detect programming errors and corruption of data in flight or at rest. It can be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, which can aid fault diagnosis when resources are transferred across hops and system boundaries. Finally, it can be used to validate <\/ins> integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections. This document defines a mechanism that acts on HTTP representation- data. It can be combined with other mechanisms that protect representation-metadata, such as digital signatures, in order to protect the desired parts of an HTTP exchange in whole or in part. <\/del> This document obsoletes RFC3230. <\/ins> 1.1. The Content-MD5 header field was originally introduced to provide integrity, but HTTP\/1.1 (RFC7231, Appendix B) obsoleted it: <\/del> This document describes Digest integrity for HTTP and is structured as follows: <\/ins> The Content-MD5 header field has been removed because it was inconsistently implemented with respect to partial responses. <\/del> representation-digest describes concepts related to representation digests, <\/ins> RFC3230 provided a more flexible solution introducing the concept of \"instance\", and the fields \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\". <\/del> digest defines the Digest request and response header and trailer field, <\/ins> 1.2. The concept of \"selected representation\" defined in Section 3.2 of SEMANTICS makes RFC3230 definitions inconsistent with current HTTP semantics. This document updates the \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions to align with SEMANTICS concepts. Basing \"Digest\" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the transferred data does require some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation, or conveys a partial representation of a resource eg. Range Requests (see Section 14.2 of SEMANTICS). This document replaces RFC3230 to better align with SEMANTICS and to provide more detailed description of \"Digest\" usage in request and response cases. Changes are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations but note that negotiation of \"Content- MD5\" is deprecated deprecate-contentMD5, \"Digest\" field parameters are obsoleted obsolete-parameters, \"md5\" and \"sha\" digest-algorithms are obsoleted broken-algorithms and the \"adler32\" algorithm is deprecated deprecated-algorithms. The value of \"Digest\" is calculated on selected representation, which is tied to the value contained in any \"Content-Encoding\" or \"Content- Type\" header fields. Therefore, a given resource may have multiple different digest values. To allow both parties to exchange a Digest of a representation with no content codings (see Section 8.4.1 of SEMANTICS) two more digest- algorithms are added (\"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\"). 1.3. <\/del> want-digest defines the Want-Digest request and response header and trailer field, <\/ins> The goals of this proposal are: <\/del> algorithms, broken-algorithms, deprecated-algorithms and deprecate-contentMD5 and describe algorithms and their relation to Digest, <\/ins> Digest coverage for either the resource's \"representation data\" or \"selected representation data\" communicated via HTTP. <\/del> acting-on-resources details computing representation digests, <\/ins> Support for multiple digest-algorithms. <\/del> obsolete-parameters obsoletes Digest field parameters, <\/ins> Negotiation of the use of digests. <\/del> sri describes the relationship between Digest and Subresource Integrity, and <\/ins> The goals do not include: <\/del> examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited provide examples of using Digest and Want-Digest. <\/ins> Digest mechanisms do not cover the full HTTP message nor its semantic, as representation metadata is not included in the checksum. Digest mechanisms cover only representation and selected representation data, and do not protect the integrity of associated representation metadata or other message fields. Digest mechanisms do not support authentication of the source of a digest, message or anything else. These mechanisms, therefore, are not a sufficient defense against many kinds of malicious attacks. <\/del> 1.2. <\/ins> Digest mechanisms do not provide message privacy. <\/del> This document defines the \"Digest\" request and response header and trailer field. At a high level the value contains a checksum, computed over \"selected representation data\" (Section 3.2; SEMANTICS), that the recipient can use to validate integrity. \"Digest\" supports algorithm agility. The \"Want-Digest\" field allows endpoints to express interest in \"Digest\" and preference of algorithms. <\/ins> Digest mechanisms do not support authorization or other kinds of access controls. <\/del> Basing \"Digest\" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the transferred data requires some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation, or conveys a partial representation of a resource, for example Range Requests (see Section 14.2 of SEMANTICS). Historically, the Content-MD5 header field provided an HTTP integrity mechanism but HTTP\/1.1 (RFC7231, Appendix B) obsoleted it due to inconsistent handling of partial responses. RFC3230 defined the concept of \"instance\" digests and a more flexible integrity scheme to help address issues with Content-MD5. It first introduced the \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" fields. HTTP terminology has evolved since RFC3230 was published. The concept of \"instance\" has been superseded by \"selected representation\". This document replaces RFC3230. The \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions are updated to align with the terms and notational conventions in SEMANTICS. Changes are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations but note that negotiation of \"Content-MD5\" is deprecated deprecate-contentMD5, \"Digest\" field parameters are obsoleted obsolete-parameters, \"md5\" and \"sha\" digest- algorithms are obsoleted broken-algorithms, and the \"adler32\" algorithm is deprecated deprecated-algorithms. Calculating the value of \"Digest\" using selected representation means it is tied to the \"Content-Encoding\" and \"Content-Type\" header fields. Therefore, a given resource may have multiple different digest values. To allow both parties to exchange a Digest of a representation with no content codings (see Section 8.4.1 of SEMANTICS) two more digest-algorithms are added (\"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\"). \"Digest\" is used for representation integrity. It does not provide integrity for HTTP messages or fields. However, it can be combined with other mechanisms that protect representation metadata, such as digital signatures, in order to protect the phases of an HTTP exchange in whole or in part. \"Digest\" does not define means for authentication, authorization or privacy. <\/ins> 1.4. <\/del> 1.3. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-773c48c6556965e7d131a2d73136cb7b0ccdbd3defe80795d72bdbda65f3112d","title":"","text":"resources which uses a checksum that is calculated independently of the content (see Section 6.4 of SEMANTICS). It uses the representation data (see Section 8.1 of SEMANTICS), that can be fully or partially contained in the content, or not contained at all: <\/del> or partially contained in the content, or not contained at all. <\/ins> This takes into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on the messages; for example, the content can be affected by Range Requests"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-21f1d764661693aa49e12c267104ea29d1fdc3448428b039d951b6a6f8ce4152","title":"","text":"The checksum is computed using one of the digest-algorithms listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format. The example below shows the \"sha-256\" digest-algorithm that uses base64 encoding. <\/del> 3. The \"Digest\" field contains a comma-separated list of one or more"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5ddcdc6d88bca473413904a5f6d64025ee93f096576cea807ba9228b4366ce06","title":"","text":"Digest-algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest computation. All digest-algorithm values are case-insensitive but lower case is preferred. <\/del> All digest-algorithm token values are case-insensitive but lower case is preferred; digest-algorithm token values MUST be compared in a case-insensitive fashion. <\/ins> The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for digest-algorithm values. The registry contains the tokens listed below. <\/del> The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) maintains a registry for digest-algorithm values. The registry is initialized with the tokens listed below. <\/ins> Some digest-algorithms, although registered, rely on vulnerable algorithms and MUST not be used: <\/del> Deprecated digest algorithms MUST NOT be used: <\/ins> \"md5\", see CMU-836068 and NO-MD5;"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8be42449aab0c47bde0fdb2a70e16646d78385cc4c05f08dc609f77e771bcb53","title":"","text":"Description: The MD5 algorithm, as specified in RFC1321. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-MD5 and CMU-836068. <\/del> RFC4648. This digest-algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-MD5 and CMU-836068. <\/ins> Reference: RFC1321, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c5ef29636bdada240c199eba54923472d003bbb807581ea556cf40af5e13913","title":"","text":"Description: The SHA-1 algorithm RFC3174. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-SHA1 and IACR-2020-014. <\/del> digest-algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-SHA1 and IACR-2020-014. <\/ins> Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d958000aaa32517bfe47142cb76c4c51d1e8d297c4577ec3073d1dc9324bcfe","title":"","text":"3. The \"Digest\" field contains a list of one or more representation digest values as defined in representation-digest. It can be used in both requests and responses. <\/del> The \"Digest\" field contains a comma-separated list of one or more representation digest values as defined in representation-digest. It can be used in both requests and responses. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-69185a4b12ed0dc695f508d8abbdbe1bacd714ffaf3c2d0b82e1528e671a03e1","title":"","text":"algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. \"Digest\" can be sent in a trailer section. When an incremental digest-algorithms is used, the sender and the receiver can dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the content. <\/del> digest-algorithm is used, the sender and the receiver can dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the content. <\/ins> 4. The \"Want-Digest\" field indicates the sender's desire to receive a representation digest on messages associated with the request URI and representation metadata. <\/del> representation metadata. It can be used in both requests and responses. <\/ins> If a digest-algorithm is not accompanied by a \"qvalue\", it is treated as if its associated \"qvalue\" were 1.0. <\/del> If a digest-algorithm is not accompanied by a \"qvalue\" (see Section 12.4.2 ofSEMANTICS), it is treated as if its associated \"qvalue\" were 1.0. <\/ins> The sender is willing to accept a digest-algorithm if and only if it is listed in a \"Want-Digest\" field of a message, and its \"qvalue\" is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f592ac451d8d75b4b2c25584d7e57675b1fb684efa9f926f0684278de87fcfa0","title":"","text":"algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. \"Digest\" can be sent in a trailer section. In this case, \"Digest\" MAY be merged in the header section (See Section 6.5.1 of SEMANTICS). <\/del> MAY be merged in to the header section (See Section 6.5.1 of SEMANTICS). <\/ins> When an incremental digest-algorithm is used, the sender and the receiver can dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4b64c85637ab7c9e06cbc63b0898e131b8f8cb0d2730abdad153d40a4b652c6d","title":"","text":"Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. Endpoints MUST send this SETTINGS parameter as part of the first SETTINGS frame. When the peer receives the first SETTINGS frame, it learns the sender has deprecated the HTTP\/2 priority scheme if it receives the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES parameter with the value of 1. A sender MUST NOT change the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES parameter value after the first SETTINGS frame. Detection of a change by a receiver MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> SETTINGS frame. A sender MUST NOT change the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES parameter value after the first SETTINGS frame. Detection of a change by a receiver MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> Until the client receives the SETTINGS frame from the server, the client SHOULD send both the priority signal defined in the HTTP\/2 priority scheme and also that of this prioritization scheme. Once the client learns that the HTTP\/2 priority scheme is deprecated, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the client learns that the HTTP\/2 priority scheme is not deprecated, it SHOULD stop sending PRIORITY_UPDATE frames (h2-update-frame), but MAY continue sending the Priority header field (header-field), as it is an end-to-end signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the client is directly connected to. <\/del> priority scheme and also that of this prioritization scheme. When the client receives the first SETTINGS frame that contains the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES parameter with value of 1, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the value was 0 or if the settings parameter was absent, it SHOULD stop sending PRIORITY_UPDATE frames (h2-update-frame), but MAY continue sending the Priority header field (header-field), as it is an end-to-end signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the client is directly connected to. <\/ins> The SETTINGS frame precedes any priority signal sent from a client in HTTP\/2, so a server can determine if it should respect the HTTP\/2 scheme before building state. A server that receives SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. <\/del> SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES with value of 1 MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. <\/ins> Where both endpoints disable HTTP\/2 priorities, the client is expected to send this scheme's priority signal. Handling of omitted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-19bb57cf69a1d3e127236056afadc12815c0901723e4718954a6028eb7d54ecf","title":"","text":"9.3. The \"Cookie Attribute Registry\" defines the name space of attribute used to control cookies' behavior. The registry is maintained at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/cookie-attribute-names [4]. <\/del> IANA is requested to create the \"Cookie Attribute Registry\", defining the name space of attribute used to control cookies' behavior. The registry should be maintained at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/ cookie-attribute-names [4]. <\/ins> 9.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-84f9a6aaa358c0dda20f11cc5e6b3a544459f5e2fff9641cbdb8f9b9a8ada966","title":"","text":"9.3.2. The \"Cookie Attribute Registry\" will be updated with the <\/del> The \"Cookie Attribute Registry\" should be created with the <\/ins> registrations below: 10. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1fba7c233fe6a8b830df7184b17d9d4173b99548d4a6355bfb06edf66355d679","title":"","text":"Working Group information can be found at http:\/\/httpwg.github.io\/ [2]; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/client-cert-header <\/del> https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/client-cert-field <\/ins> [3]. 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-69ab2930f16e715880406d9d41652819f655a235d1a86e952f20138113571575","title":"","text":"deployments to work in practice, the reverse proxy needs to convey information about the client certificate to the origin application server. A common way this information is conveyed in practice today is by using non-standard headers to carry the certificate (in some <\/del> is by using non-standard fields to carry the certificate (in some <\/ins> encoding) or individual parts thereof in the HTTP request that is dispatched to the origin server. This solution works but interoperability between independently developed components can be cumbersome or even impossible depending on the implementation choices respectively made (like what header names are used or are <\/del> respectively made (like what field names are used or are <\/ins> configurable, which parts of the certificate are exposed, or how the certificate is encoded). A well-known predictable approach to this commonly occurring functionality could improve and simplify"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7957415ce4a2c65fd83970d9025d959707ed6e64fe364bc256eddf745bb06af3","title":"","text":"This document aspires to standardize an HTTP header field named \"Client-Cert\" that a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) adds to requests that it sends to the backend origin servers. The header <\/del> requests that it sends to the backend origin servers. The field <\/ins> value contains the client certificate from the mutually-authenticated TLS connection between the originating client and the TTRP. This enables the backend origin server to utilize the client certificate information in its application logic. While there may be additional proxies or hops between the TTRP and the origin server (potentially even with mutually-authenticated TLS connections between them), the scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header is intentionally limited to <\/del> scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header field is intentionally limited to <\/ins> exposing to the origin server the certificate that was presented by the originating client in its connection to the TTRP."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-48c596f9ca3b5eab4029bcd35be5519100f131d20ee99b47467c0bd96baaeffe","title":"","text":"2.1. The field-values of the HTTP header defined herein utilize the <\/del> The field-values of the HTTP header field defined herein utilize the <\/ins> following encoded form. A certificate is represented in text as an \"EncodedCertificate\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-028638e6390b90f9eeb5f7bc8ee692d0b4fdd8ee43160fb1753788eff5dbadfc","title":"","text":"The \"Client-Cert\" header field defined herein is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a single HTTP header field-value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST <\/del> header field value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST <\/ins> NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9034bb5518c4ada1fd4ba6c9ba01713e2c3b13a64b944cf651e5de1a2f85da32","title":"","text":"The client certificate is be placed in the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the dispatched request as defined in header. Any occurrence of the \"Client-Cert\" header in the original <\/del> Any occurrence of the \"Client-Cert\" header field in the original <\/ins> incoming request MUST be removed or overwritten before forwarding the request. An incoming request that has a \"Client-Cert\" header MAY be rejected with an HTTP 400 response. <\/del> field MAY be rejected with an HTTP 400 response. <\/ins> Requests made over a TLS connection where the use of client certificate authentication was not negotiated MUST be sanitized by removing any and all occurrences \"Client-Cert\" header field prior to dispatching the request to the backend server. Backend origin servers may then use the \"Client-Cert\" header of the request to determine if the connection from the client to the TTRP was mutually-authenticated and, if so, the certificate thereby <\/del> Backend origin servers may then use the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the request to determine if the connection from the client to the TTRP was mutually-authenticated and, if so, the certificate thereby <\/ins> presented by the client. Forward proxies and other intermediaries MUST NOT add the \"Client- Cert\" header to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" header. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" header in requests. <\/del> Cert\" header field to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" header field in requests. <\/ins> A server that receives a request with a \"Client-Cert\" header value that it considers to be too large can respond with an HTTP 431 status code per Section 5 of RFC6585. <\/del> A server that receives a request with a \"Client-Cert\" header field value that it considers to be too large can respond with an HTTP 431 status code per Section 5 of RFC6585. <\/ins> 3. The header described herein enable a TTRP and backend or origin <\/del> The header field described herein enable a TTRP and backend or origin <\/ins> server to function together as though, from the client's perspective, they are a single logical server side deployment of HTTPS over a mutually-authenticated TLS connection. Use of the \"Client-Cert\" header outside that intended use case, however, may undermine the protections afforded by TLS client certificate authentication. <\/del> header field outside that intended use case, however, may undermine the protections afforded by TLS client certificate authentication. <\/ins> Therefore steps MUST be taken to prevent unintended use, both in sending the header and in relying on its value. <\/del> sending the header field and in relying on its value. <\/ins> Producing and consuming the \"Client-Cert\" header SHOULD be a <\/del> Producing and consuming the \"Client-Cert\" header field SHOULD be a <\/ins> configurable option, respectively, in a TTRP and backend server (or individual application in that server). The default configuration for both should be to not use the \"Client-Cert\" header thus requiring an \"opt-in\" to the functionality. <\/del> for both should be to not use the \"Client-Cert\" header field thus requiring an \"opt-in\" to the functionality. <\/ins> In order to prevent header injection, backend servers MUST only accept the \"Client-Cert\" header from a trusted TTRP (or other proxy in a trusted path from the TTRP). A TTRP MUST sanitize the incoming <\/del> In order to prevent field injection, backend servers MUST only accept the \"Client-Cert\" header field from a trusted TTRP (or other proxy in a trusted path from the TTRP). A TTRP MUST sanitize the incoming <\/ins> request before forwarding it on by removing or overwriting any existing instances of the header. Otherwise arbitrary clients can control the header value as seen and used by the backend server. It is important to note that neglecting to prevent header injection does <\/del> existing instances of the field. Otherwise arbitrary clients can control the field value as seen and used by the backend server. It is important to note that neglecting to prevent field injection does <\/ins> not \"fail safe\" in that the nominal functionality will still work as expected even when malicious actions are possible. As such, extra care is recommended in ensuring that proper header sanitation is in <\/del> care is recommended in ensuring that proper field sanitation is in <\/ins> place. The communication between a TTRP and backend server needs to be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8bcfc955520ea6494f5d7666252b784e3eaccb31e4e44e4ee3c8ca16a03e2c44","title":"","text":"be met in a number of ways, which will vary based on specific deployments. The communication between a TTRP and backend or origin server, for example, might be authenticated in some way with the insertion and consumption of the \"Client-Cert\" header occurring only <\/del> insertion and consumption of the \"Client-Cert\" field occurring only <\/ins> on that connection. Alternatively the network topology might dictate a private network such that the backend application is only able to accept requests from the TTRP and the proxy can only make requests to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-41c25aa8103b1d6c780f1033ebbc06345f731117825414dbf2d8397df6e13d14","title":"","text":"[2] http:\/\/httpwg.github.io\/ [3] https:\/\/github.com\/httpwg\/http-extensions\/labels\/client-cert- header <\/del> field <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-50e536fa2d2e9d8f2cc65cf1a9b30c031bd290b4da81e6fce56bb83d7bf8a1ee","title":"","text":"messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. TODO: HTTP2 forbids TLS renegotiation and post-handshake authentication but it's possible with HTTP1.1 and maybe needs to be discussed explicitly here or somewhere in this document? Naively I'd say that the \"Client-Cert\" header will be sent with the data of the most recent client cert anytime after renegotiation or post-handshake auth. And only for requests that are fully covered by the cert but that in practice making the determination of where exactly in the application data the cert messages arrived is hard to impossible so it'll be a best effort kind of thing. <\/del> 2. 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74339e9f1742f8330e892be7cfbf9b4f8b203fc0f338995ca3f93fa5b2c8f06c","title":"","text":"4. TODO: register the \"Client-Cert\" HTTP header field in the registry defined by http-core. <\/del> The \"Client-Cert\" HTTP header field will be added to the registry defined by http-core. <\/ins> 5. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b9c1d8e45a9db4c64a3aa77e6a84f770771f91739e751e8cdf27297ab937267e","title":"","text":"To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the \"RSASSA-PSS-SIGN (K, M)\" function RFC8017 with the signer's private signing key (\"K\") and the signature input string (\"M\") (create-sig-input). The hash SHA-512 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The resulting signed content byte array (\"S\") is the HTTP message signature output used in sign. <\/del> and the signature input string (\"M\") (create-sig-input). The mask generation function is \"MGF1\" as specified in RFC8017 with a hash function of SHA-512 RFC6234. The salt length (\"sLen\") is 64 bytes. The hash function (\"Hash\") SHA-512 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The resulting signed content byte array (\"S\") is the HTTP message signature output used in sign. <\/ins> To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the \"RSASSA-PSS- VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)\" function RFC8017 using the public key portion of the verification key material (\"(n, e)\") and the signature input string (\"M\") re-created as described in verify. The hash function SHA-512 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/del> string (\"M\") re-created as described in verify. The mask generation function is \"MGF1\" as specified in RFC8017 with a hash function of SHA-512 RFC6234. The salt length (\"sLen\") is 64 bytes. The hash function (\"Hash\") SHA-512 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/ins> 3.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a97d10fc68bb12cc9828e701d83be06b20141d5617a881ff3f974037a7ed7c5c","title":"","text":"applied. The resulting signed content byte array (\"S\") is the HTTP message signature output used in sign. To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the \"RSASSA-PSS- VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)\" function RFC8017 using the public key portion of the verification key material (\"(n, e)\") and the signature input string (\"M\") re-created as described in verify. The hash function SHA-256 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/del> To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the \"RSASSA- PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)\" function RFC8017 using the public key portion of the verification key material (\"(n, e)\") and the signature input string (\"M\") re-created as described in verify. The hash function SHA-256 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/ins> 3.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7abdeaff615354ca0b4cbe324ddf50d115ecd44d4be2c79c06fcb14f5bc40de0","title":"","text":"policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-hsa- template. Algorithms referenced by algorithm identifiers have to be fully defined with all parameters fixed. Algorithm identifiers in this registry are to be interpreted as whole string values and not as a combination of parts. That is to say, it is expected that implementors understand \"rsa-pss-sha512\" as referring to one specific algorithm with its hash, mask, and salt values set as defined here. Implementors do not parse out the \"rsa\", \"pss\", and \"sha512\" portions of the identifier to determine parameters of the signing algorithm from the string. <\/ins> 5.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f7d623b629a0015b136cc37a45504681a3c38a2fdb3b6ef7a54932d129eaf5b1","title":"","text":"2.3. A prefix of a List Structured Field consisting of the first N members in the field's value (where N is an integer greater than 0 and less than or equal to the number of members in the List) is identified by the parameter \"prefix\" with the value of N as an integer. A list prefix value is canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in RFC8941 on a List containing only the first N members as specified in the list prefix, in the order they appear in the original List. 2.3.1. This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values for list prefixes given the following example header fields, whose values are assumed to be Dictionaries: The following table shows example canonicalized values for different content identifiers, given those fields: 2.4. <\/del> Content not found in an HTTP header can be included in the signature base string by defining a content identifier and the canonicalization method for its content."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d9573be9021f497315ecf98f4b1a2aa009767b780cc8937febf796902cea665","title":"","text":"registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier Registry. (content-registry) 2.4.1. <\/del> 2.3.1. <\/ins> The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-474a67090d24ea38e142ba94ac87595c6d4aa3551bb0a0edddd19ff23c4966e2","title":"","text":"header in HTTP2, Section 8.1.2.3. The resulting string is the canonicalized value. 2.4.1.1. <\/del> 2.3.1.1. <\/ins> The following table contains non-normative example HTTP messages and their canonicalized \"@request-target\" values. 2.4.2. <\/del> 2.3.2. <\/ins> HTTP Message Signatures have metadata properties that provide information regarding the signature's generation and\/or verification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74bc57d2b09488ee5aab99456d157343d993a7c7115133178d978a35527b2880","title":"","text":"the signature parameters used for the current signature are included in this field. 2.5. <\/del> 2.4. <\/ins> The signature input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that is covered by the signature. To create the signature input string,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8fe282b165fc858f133329fac34cb3f5842e84d5124c389ae6a2896abf562b38","title":"","text":"header field that is not present in the message, is not a Dictionary Structured Field, or whose value is malformed. The identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that references a header field that is not present in the message, is not a List Structured Field, or whose value is malformed. <\/del> The identifier is a Dictionary member identifier that references a member that is not present in the header field value, or whose value is malformed. E.g., the identifier is \"\"x-dictionary\";key=c\" and the value of the \"x-dictionary\" header field is \"a=1, b=2\" The identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that specifies more List members than are present the header field. E.g., the identifier is \"\"x-list\";prefix=3\" and the value of the \"x-list\" header field is \"(1, 2)\". <\/del> In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9ae0a3a124b302f1c08d0e50c559cc27b734669ef4af8071cccf9f398d0170ec","title":"","text":"associated registry. Signers SHOULD include \"@request-target\" in the covered content list list. <\/del> list. <\/ins> Signers SHOULD include a date stamp in some form, such as using the \"date\" header. Alternatively, the \"created\" signature"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5a63854e17837d7ef5e4e4f431d843d931f08fdce21f41f4aae3c582c7d8bdac","title":"","text":"MAY use a request body of any content type with the SEARCH method; however, for backwards compatibility with existing WebDAV implementations, SEARCH requests that use the text\/xml or application\/xml media types MUST be processed per the requirements <\/del> application\/xml media types with a root element (XML) in the \"DAV:\" XML namespace (XMLNS) MUST be processed per the requirements <\/ins> established by RFC5323. SEARCH requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d33fd7139908c1d931718abc78a37f5bc26fa18f7e4c3fcef302f4bc3d287eda","title":"","text":"suboptimal, particularly if one endpoint operates in ignorance of the needs of its peer. HTTP\/2 introduced a complex prioritization signaling scheme that used a combination of dependencies and weights, formed into an unbalanced tree. This scheme has suffered from poor deployment and <\/del> HTTP\/2 introduced a complex prioritization scheme that uses a combination of stream dependencies and weights to describe an unbalanced tree. This scheme has suffered from poor deployment and <\/ins> interoperability. The rich flexibility of client-driven HTTP\/2 prioritization tree building is rarely exercised. Experience has shown that clients tend to choose a single model optimized for a web use case and experiment within the model constraints, or do nothing at all. Furthermore, many clients build their prioritization tree in a unique way, which makes it difficult for servers to understand their intent and act or intervene accordingly. <\/del> Clients build an HTTP\/2 prioritization tree through a series of individual stream relationships, which are transferred to the server using HTTP\/2 priority signals in either of three forms. First, a HEADERS frame with the PRIORITY flag set is an explicit signal that includes an Exclusive flag, Stream Dependency field, and Weight field. Second, a HEADERS frame with no PRIORITY flag is an implicit signal to use the default priority. Third, the PRIORITY frame, which is always explicit since it always contains an Exclusive flag, Stream Dependency field, and Weight field. The rich flexibility of tree building is rarely exercised. Experience has shown that clients tend to choose a single model optimized for a web use case and experiment within the model constraints, or do nothing at all. Furthermore, many clients build their prioritization tree in a unique way, which makes it difficult for servers to understand their intent and act or intervene accordingly. <\/ins> Many HTTP\/2 server implementations do not include support for the priority scheme. Some instead favor custom server-driven schemes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ff9ef21268a618dd4ccbb6328a150dd89bd98a7c85c48ba4d9e6b277ef953531","title":"","text":"as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. Until the client receives the SETTINGS frame from the server, the client SHOULD send both the priority signal defined in the HTTP\/2 priority scheme and also that of this prioritization scheme. When the client receives the first SETTINGS frame that contains the <\/del> client SHOULD send the signals of the HTTP\/2 priority scheme (see motivation) and the signals of this prioritization scheme (see header-field and h2-update-frame). When the client receives the first SETTINGS frame that contains the <\/ins> SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_HTTP2_PRIORITIES parameter with value of 1, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the value was 0 or if the settings parameter was absent, it SHOULD stop sending"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c0946bbdb0764ca2484ce5565dcb6f3b7253df1861cd6fb62c38b6ac35942658","title":"","text":"A successful response to a SEARCH request is expected to provide some indication as to the final disposition of the search operation. For instance, a successful search that yields no results can be represented by a 204 No Content response. If the response includes a <\/del> represented by a 204 No Content response. If the response includes <\/ins> content, it is expected to describe the results of the search operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond indirectly to the SEARCH request by returning a 3xx Redirection with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b73adfe4ffcfe33a3bc078239562657511bd06f4cfc4f1a7fee7ecbc6ca2c514","title":"","text":"the intended priority to the client by including the Priority field in a PUSH_PROMISE or HEADERS frame. 9.1. An intermediary serving an HTTP connection might split requests over multiple backend connections. When it applies prioritization rules strictly, low priority requests cannot make progress while requests with higher priorities are inflight. This blocking can propagate to backend connections, which the peer might interpret as a connection stall. Endpoints often implement protections against stalls, such as abruptly closing connections after a certain time period. To reduce the possibility of this occurring, intermediaries can avoid strictly following prioritization and instead allocate small amounts of bandwidth for all the requests that they are forwarding, so that every request can make some progress over time. Similarly, servers SHOULD allocate some amount of bandwidths to streams acting as tunnels. <\/ins> 10. Transport protocols such as TCP and QUIC provide reliability by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05f30a237716abf215e31352f54d6b60abfa70da991581cba66bc03537ab4970","title":"","text":"reject any RSA signatures, or a server expecting asymmetric cryptography should know to reject any symmetric cryptography. An application using signatures also has to ensure that the verifier will have access to all required information to re-create the signature input string. For example, a server behind a reverse proxy would need to know the original request URI to make use of identifiers like \"@target-uri\". Additionally, an application using signatures in responses would need to ensure that clients receiving signed responses have access to all the signed portions, including any portions of the request that were signed by the server. <\/ins> The details of this kind of profiling are the purview of the application and outside the scope of this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3466b401b47b17350d68cecba0b058769f9aaa4827183bd4aaf2b2b359489308","title":"","text":"covered by a signature, this document defines content identifiers for data items covered by an HTTP Message Signature as well as the means for combining these canonicalized values into a signature input string. <\/del> string. The values for these items MUST be accessible to both the sender and the receiver of the message, which means these are usually derived from aspects of the HTTP message or signature itself. <\/ins> Some content within HTTP messages can undergo transformations that change the bitwise value without altering meaning of the content (for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-025a532fb5df74f2ab34d80ebe52cadc862f6d60c71b7f303f195dd1db02212b","title":"","text":"such a canonical form. Content identifiers are defined using production grammar defined by RFC8941. The content identifier is an \"sf-string\" value. The <\/del> RFC8941. The content identifier itself is an \"sf-string\" value. The <\/ins> content identifier type MAY define parameters which are included using the \"parameters\" rule."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-50b1e2e1c8b363443b3f98dfabdea8e96c5c7bf4e71027f2e3de5bed44d76459","title":"","text":"This specification defines the following specialty content identifiers: The target request endpoint. (content-request-target) <\/del> The signature metadata parameters for this signature. (signature- params) Additional specialty content identifiers MAY be defined and registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier Registry. (content-registry) <\/del> The method used for a request. (content-request-method) <\/ins> 2.3.1. <\/del> The full target URI for a request. (content-target-uri) <\/ins> The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the \"@request-target\" identifier. <\/del> The authority of the target URI for a request. (content-request- authority) <\/ins> Its value is canonicalized as follows: <\/del> The scheme of the target URI for a request. (content-request- scheme) <\/ins> Take the lowercased HTTP method of the message. <\/del> The request target. (content-request-target) <\/ins> Append a space \" \". <\/del> The absolute path portion of the target URI for a request. (content-request-path) <\/ins> Append the path and query of the request target of the message, formatted according to the rules defined for the :path pseudo- header in HTTP2, Section 8.1.2.3. The resulting string is the canonicalized value. <\/del> The query portion of the target URI for a request. (content- request-query) <\/ins> 2.3.1.1. <\/del> The parsed query parameters of the target URI for a request. (content-request-query-params) <\/ins> The following table contains non-normative example HTTP messages and their canonicalized \"@request-target\" values. <\/del> The status code for a response. (content-status-code). <\/ins> 2.3.2. <\/del> Additional specialty content identifiers MAY be defined and registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier Registry. (content-registry) 2.3.1. <\/ins> HTTP Message Signatures have metadata properties that provide information regarding the signature's generation and\/or verification. <\/del> information regarding the signature's generation and\/or verification, such as the list of covered content, a timestamp, identifiers for verification key material, and other utilities. <\/ins> The signature parameters specialty content is identified by the \"@signature-params\" identifier."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6501e40902e9eb392a389bb4aa14aa314a9d45593478fa2601d304805eecd861","title":"","text":"parameters for this signature, including the covered content list with all associated parameters. \"alg\": The HTTP message signature algorithm from the HTTP Message Signature Algorithm Registry, as an \"sf-string\" value. \"keyid\": The identifier for the key material as an \"sf-string\" value. <\/del> \"created\": Creation time as an \"sf-integer\" UNIX timestamp value. Sub-second precision is not supported."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8e6c5a3e5a59de63365772d8384645d0da480ec1a466f8fc5c9a9d7e18d5767d","title":"","text":"\"nonce\": A random unique value generated for this signature. \"alg\": The HTTP message signature algorithm from the HTTP Message Signature Algorithm Registry, as an \"sf-string\" value. \"keyid\": The identifier for the key material as an \"sf-string\" value. <\/ins> Additional parameters can be defined in the iana-param-contents. The signature parameters are serialized using the rules in RFC8941 as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-32ee4da4efe10426755e28ba17c3ef1b93c85c2cb0a21a80b5f3286ace09e1e5","title":"","text":"Note that an HTTP message could contain multiple signatures, but only the signature parameters used for the current signature are included in this field. <\/del> in this entry. 2.3.2. The \"@method\" identifier refers to the HTTP method of a request message. The value of is canonicalized by taking the value of the method as a string. Note that the method name is case-sensitive as per SEMANTICS Section 9.1, and conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII. If used, the \"@method\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following request message: Would result in the following \"@method\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@method\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.3. The \"@target-uri\" identifier refers to the target URI of a request message. The value is the full absolute target URI of the request, potentially assembled from all available parts including the authority and request target as described in SEMANTICS Section 7.1. If used, the \"@target-uri\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following message sent over HTTPS: Would result in the following \"@target-uri\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@target-uri\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.4. The \"@authority\" identifier refers to the authority component of the target URI of the HTTP request message, as defined in SEMANTICS Section 7.2. In HTTP 1.1, this is usually conveyed using the \"Host\" header, while in HTTP 2 and HTTP 3 it is conveyed using the \":authority\" pseudo-header. The value is the fully-qualified authority component of the request, comprised of the host and, optionally, port of the request target, as a string. The Authority value MUST be normalized according to the rules in SEMANTICS Section 4.2.3. Namely, the host name is normalized to lowercase and the default port is omitted. If used, the \"@authority\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following request message: Would result in the following \"@authority\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@authority\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.5. The \"@scheme\" identifier refers to the scheme of the target URL of the HTTP request message. The value is the scheme as a string as defined in SEMANTICS Section 4.2. While the scheme itself is case- insensitive, it MUST be normalized to lowercase for inclusion in the signature input string. For example, the following request message requested over plain HTTP: Would result in the following \"@scheme\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@scheme\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.6. The \"@request-target\" identifier refers to the full request target of the HTTP request message, as defined in SEMANTICS Section 7.1. The value of the request target can take different forms, depending on the type of request. For HTTP 1.1, the value is equivalent to the request target portion of the request line. If used, the \"@request- target\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. The origin form value is combination of the absolute path and query components of the request URL. For example, the following request message: Would result in the following \"@request-target\" value: The following request to an HTTP proxy with the absolute-form value, containing the fully qualified target URI: Would result in the following \"@request-target\" value: The following CONNECT request with an authority-form value, containing the host and port of the target: Would result in the following \"@request-target\" value: The following OPTIONS request message with the asterisk-form value, containing a single asterisk \"*\" character: Would result in the following \"@request-target\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@request-target\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.7. The \"@path\" identifier refers to the target path of the HTTP request message. The value is the absolute path of the request target defined by RFC3986, with no query component and no trailing \"?\" character. The value is normalized according to the rules in SEMANTICS Section 4.2.3. Namely, an empty path string is normalized as a single slash \"\/\" character, and path components are represented by their values after decoding any percent-encoded octets. If used, the \"@path\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following request message: Would result in the following \"@path\" value: 2.3.8. The \"@query\" identifier refers to the query component of the HTTP request message. The value is the entire normalized query string defined by RFC3986, including the leading \"?\" character. The value is normalized according to the rules in SEMANTICS Section 4.2.3. Namely, percent-encoded octets are decoded. If used, the \"@query\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following request message: Would result in the following \"@query\" value: The following request message: Would result in the following \"@query\" value: 2.3.9. If a request target URI uses HTML form parameters in the query string as defined in HTMLURL Section 5, the \"@query-params\" identifier allows addressing of individual query parameters. The query parameters MUST be parsed according to HTMLURL Section 5.1, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each input identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter. Several named query parameters MAY be included in a single signature input. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the signature input string. The value of a single named parameter is the the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by HTMLURL Section 5.1, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded. Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" are included with an empty string as the covered content value. If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all values of that name MUST be included in separate signature input lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. For example for the following request: Indicating the \"baz\", \"qux\" and \"param\" named query parameters in would result in the following \"@query-param\" value: If used in a response message, the \"@query-params\" identifier refers to the associated value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. 2.3.10. The \"@status\" identifier refers to the three-digit numeric HTTP status code of a response message as defined in SEMANTICS Section 15. The value is the serialized three-digit integer of the HTTP response code, with no descriptive text. If used, the \"@status\" identifier MUST occur only once in the signature input. For example, the following response message: Would result in the following \"@status\" value: The \"@status\" identifier MUST NOT be used in a request message. <\/ins> 2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3f04a5f05879f59a4f46f726343ced535632fc9ce69264c3b4fd25a179d50ce4","title":"","text":"In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request: The covered content consists of the \"@request-target\" specialty content followed by the \"Host\", \"Date\", \"Cache-Control\", \"X-Empty- Header\", \"X-Example\" HTTP headers, in order. The signature creation timestamp is \"1618884475\" and the key identifier is \"test-key-rsa- pss\". The signature input string for this message with these <\/del> The covered content consists of the \"@method\", \"@path\", and \"@authority\" specialty content followed by the \"Cache-Control\", \"X- Empty-Header\", \"X-Example\" HTTP headers, in order. The signature creation timestamp is \"1618884475\" and the key identifier is \"test- key-rsa-pss\". The signature input string for this message with these <\/ins> parameters is: 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b98eb43f84adba763b0577ccd99435f969125eee8df0a06a01c88f1e9152c138","title":"","text":"specialty content field listed in specialty-content or its associated registry. Signers SHOULD include \"@request-target\" in the covered content list. <\/del> Signers of a request SHOULD include some or all of the control data in the covered content list, such as the \"@method\", \"@authority\", \"@target-uri\", or some combination thereof. <\/ins> Signers SHOULD include a date stamp in some form, such as using the \"date\" header. Alternatively, the \"created\" signature metadata parameter can fulfil this role. <\/del> Signers SHOULD include the \"created\" signature metadata parameter to indicate when the signature was created. <\/ins> Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what order is out of scope for this document. However, note that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-366b5088d101edf21f6422336dcd1bfc486688a7d95a8e0e4940767a6709fb3c","title":"","text":"The status code for a response. (content-status-code). A signature from a request message that resulted in this response message. (content-request-response) <\/ins> Additional specialty content identifiers MAY be defined and registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier Registry. (content-registry)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-aa7a126c9edba23f325ef87aa1d57073dbb28636b90671627501d2f4d8fd9c1c","title":"","text":"The \"@status\" identifier MUST NOT be used in a request message. 2.3.11. When a signed request message results in a signed response message, the \"@request-response\" identifier can be used to cryptographically link the request and the response to each other by including the identified request signature value in the response. This identifier has a single REQUIRED parameter: Identifies which signature from the response to sign. The value is the \"sf-binary\" representation of the signature value of the referenced request identified by the \"key\" parameter. For example, when serving this signed request: This would result in the following unsigned response message: The server signs the response with its own key and includes the signature of \"sig1\" from the request in the signed content of the response. The signature input string for this example is: The signed response message is: Since the request's signature value itself is not repeated in the response, the requester MUST keep the original signature value around long enough to validate the signature of the response. The \"@request-response\" identifier MUST NOT be used in a request message. <\/ins> 2.4. The signature input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5cb350ad2ec27beca096db475c3ca7d87b02dcbc40ba034ef00371617c2fd8a","title":"","text":"5.1. An insecure origin can commit to providing a secured alternative by including a \"commit\" member in the http-opportunistic well-known resource (see well-known), whose value is a number representing an <\/del> An origin can reduce the risk of attacks on opportunistically secured connections by committing to provide an secured, authenticated alternative service. This is done by including the optional \"commit\" member in the http-opportunistic well-known resource (see well- known). This feature is optional due to the requirement for server authentication and the potential risk entailed (see pinrisks). The value of the \"commit\" member is the duration of the commitment <\/ins> interval in seconds. The value of the \"commit\" member MUST be ignored unless the alternative service can be strongly authenticated. Minimum authentication requirements for HTTP over TLS are described in Section 2.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc and Section 3.1 of RFC2818. As noted in I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc, clients can impose other checks in addition to this minimum set. For instance, a client might choose to apply key pinning RFC7469. If a client is able to obtain a valid http-opportunistic resource (as per well-known) containing a \"commit\" member and a strongly authenticated alternative service is available, it can assume that such an alternative will remain available for the indicated number of seconds past the current time, less the current age of the http- opportunistic response (as defined in Section 4.2.3 of RFC7234). A client SHOULD NOT fall back to cleartext protocols prior to that interval elapsing. Note however that relying on a commitment creates some potential operational hazards (see pinrisks). A commitment only applies to the origin of the http-opportunistic well-known resource that was retrieved; all origins listed in the \"origins\" member need to independently discovered and validated. Note that the commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients can and SHOULD use alternative services that they become aware of. However, once a valid and authenticated commitment has been received, clients SHOULD NOT use an unauthenticated alternative service. Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services. <\/del> Including \"commit\" creates a commitment to provide a secured alternative service for the advertised period. Clients that receive this commitment can assume that a secured alternative service will be available for the indicated period. Clients might however choose to limit this time (see pinrisks). <\/ins> 5.2. To avoid situations where a commitment to use authenticated TLS causes a client to be unable to contact a site, clients MAY limit the time over which a commitment is respected for a given origin. A lower limit might be appropriate for initial commitments; the certainty that a site has set a correct value - and the corresponding limit on persistence - might increase as a commitment is renewed multiple times. <\/del> The value of the \"commit\" member MUST be ignored unless the alternative service can be strongly authenticated. The same requirements that apply to \"https:\/\/\" resources SHOULD be applied to authenticating the alternative. Minimum authentication requirements for HTTP over TLS are described in Section 2.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- alt-svc and Section 3.1 of RFC2818. As noted in I-D.ietf-httpbis- alt-svc, clients can impose other checks in addition to this minimum set. For instance, a client might choose to apply key pinning RFC7469. A client that receives a commitment and that successfully authenticates the alternative service can assume that a secured alternative will remain available for the commitment interval. The commitment interval starts when the commitment is received and authenticated and runs for a number of seconds equal to value of the \"commit\" member, less the current age of the http-opportunistic response (as defined in Section 4.2.3 of RFC7234. A client SHOULD avoid sending requests via cleartext protocols or to unauthenticated alternative services for the duration of the commitment interval, except to discover new potential alternatives. A commitment only applies to the origin of the http-opportunistic well-known resource that was retrieved; other origins listed in the \"origins\" member MUST be independently discovered and authenticated. A commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients are able to use alternative services that they become aware of. However, once a valid and authenticated commitment has been received, clients SHOULD NOT use an unauthenticated alternative service. Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services. A client MAY send requests to an unauthenticated origin in an attempt to discover potential alternative services, but these requests SHOULD be entirely generic and avoid including credentials. 5.3. Errors in configuration of commitments has the potential to render even the unsecured origin inaccessible for the duration of a commitment. Initial deployments are encouraged to use short duration commitments so that errors can be detected without causing the origin to become inaccessible to clients for extended periods. To avoid situations where a commitment causes errors, clients MAY limit the time over which a commitment is respected for a given origin. A lower limit might be appropriate for initial commitments; the certainty that a site has set a correct value - and the corresponding limit on persistence - might increase as a commitment is renewed multiple times. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fa574fa441fb698ff6fc96aa902ed06834cd9a38f3e14e418f754068aa8a7e92","title":"","text":"manipulation of the HTTP\/2 priority tree. Extensible priorities does not use stream dependencies, which mitigates this vulnerability. TBD: depending on the outcome of reprioritization discussions, following paragraphs may change or be removed. <\/del> HTTP2, Section 5.3.4 describes a scenario where closure of streams in the priority tree could cause suboptimal prioritization. To avoid this, HTTP2 states that \"an endpoint SHOULD retain stream"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d70f5cb866ef49f46ab03a1173bbbe79b7c2a89223b2466c3c2c312a39cc722","title":"","text":"and the value string. If the sum of the lengths of the name string and the value string is more than 4096 bytes, abort these steps and ignore the set- <\/del> is more than 4096 octets, abort these steps and ignore the set- <\/ins> cookie-string entirely. The cookie-name is the name string, and the cookie-value is the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6af777428213c599d8b8db11e4a0f3138c143dd397fa49fa2dad25e753415c7d","title":"","text":"Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the attribute- name string and the attribute-value string. If the attribute-value is longer than 1024 bytes, ignore the <\/del> If the attribute-value is longer than 1024 octets, ignore the <\/ins> cookie-av string and return to Step 1 of this algorithm. Process the attribute-name and attribute-value according to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-616fb59c29080246a275684c3826e97085634e922fc0bc067a237843eb0e4393","title":"","text":"If the cookie-name or the cookie-value contains a %x00-1F \/ %x7F (CTL) character, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. If the sum of the lengths of cookie-name and cookie-value is more than 4096 octets, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/ins> Create a new cookie with name cookie-name, value cookie-value. Set the creation-time and the last-access-time to the current date and time."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7a2dba59fe0273e80d5aec53265e882a973f0cad78931a046c814ab1aece8980","title":"","text":"attribute-name of \"Domain\": Let the domain-attribute be the attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of \"Domain\". <\/del> attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with both an attribute- name of \"Domain\" and an attribute-value whose length is no more than 1024 octets. <\/ins> Otherwise:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2f078d731a911cdbc1ab29ca137ac6a00c3055e46613648c91c11e02ea781423","title":"","text":"If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of \"Path\", set the cookie's path to attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of \"Path\". Otherwise, set the cookie's path to the <\/del> of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with both an attribute-name of \"Path\" and an attribute-value whose length is no more than 1024 octets. Otherwise, set the cookie's path to the <\/ins> default-path of the request-uri. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d09483ecb81f7aaf1087bf17d14e14f7c0859ecc6c71d7e098a52fd1e50cbbdb","title":"","text":"server-scheduling, and connect-scheduling. Where HTTP extensions change stream behavior or define new data carriage mechanisms, they MAY also define how this priority scheme <\/del> carriage mechanisms, they can also define how this priority scheme <\/ins> can be applied. 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5495c6b8575a5a912e845b037506fb114fdb27d26bea94152637e96986c3161","title":"","text":"NOTE: As set-cookie-string may originate from a non-HTTP API, it is not guaranteed to be free of CTL characters, so this algorithm handles them explicitly. <\/del> handles them explicitly. Horizontal tab (%x09) is excluded from the CTL characters that lead to set-cookie-string rejection, as it is considered whitespace, which is handled separately. <\/ins> A user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following algorithm to parse a set-cookie-string: If the set-cookie-string contains a %x00-1F \/ %x7F (CTL) character: Abort these steps and ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/del> If the set-cookie-string contains a %x00-08 \/ %x0A-1F \/ %x7F character (CTL characters excluding HTAB): Abort these steps and ignore the set-cookie-string entirely. <\/ins> If the set-cookie-string contains a %x3B (\";\") character:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ddcc0a5115a79dadb27c88190741618639f4c89d7a5d9cbff8a122219636b7e","title":"","text":"If cookie-name is empty and cookie-value is empty, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. If the cookie-name or the cookie-value contains a %x00-1F \/ %x7F (CTL) character, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/del> If the cookie-name or the cookie-value contains a %x00-08 \/ %x0A- 1F \/ %x7F character (CTL characters excluding HTAB), abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/ins> If the sum of the lengths of cookie-name and cookie-value is more than 4096 octets, abort these steps and ignore the cookie"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cd9bc4a7ac5db1ea1a3b1245f632388c897d9b515c88ebe4765cc90c189ec078","title":"","text":"client's original signature values. The following is a non-normative example of header fields a reverse proxy sets in addition to the examples in the previous sections. The original signature is included under the identifier \"sig1\", and the reverse proxy's signature is included under \"proxy_sig\". The proxy uses the key \"rsa-test-key\" to create its signature using the \"rsa- v1_5-sha256\" signature value. This results in a signature input string of: <\/del> proxy sets in addition to the examples in the previous sections. The client's request includes a signature value under the label \"sig1\", which the proxy signs in addition to the \"Forwarded\" header defined in RFC7239. Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's \"Signature-Input\" value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. This results in a signature input string of: <\/ins> And a signature output value of: These values are added to the HTTP request message by the proxy. The different signature values are wrapped onto separate lines to increase human-readability of the result. <\/del> original signature is included under the identifier \"sig1\", and the reverse proxy's signature is included under the label \"proxy_sig\". The proxy uses the key \"test-key-rsa\" to create its signature using the \"rsa-v1_5-sha256\" signature algorithm, while the client's original signature was made using the key id of \"test-key-rsa-pss\" and an RSA PSS signature algorithm. <\/ins> The proxy's signature and the client's original signature can be verified independently for the same message, depending on the needs of the application. <\/del> verified independently for the same message, based on the needs of the application. Since the proxy's signature covers the client signature, the backend service fronted by the proxy can trust that the proxy has validated the incoming signature. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7013699eea52c65719f54c5644297cf918c821cab5c90d2148795948848db4db","title":"","text":"with the types defined in params and error-types respectively; see register-param and register-error for its associated procedures. Additionally, please register the following entry in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry: Field name: Proxy-Status Status: permanent Specification document(s): [this document] Comments: <\/ins> 4. One of the primary security concerns when using Proxy-Status is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-401e339ed0435cb8fdf1ea5af22a046d290f45b1234ca4e11e64eae2f24c0b58","title":"","text":"2.3. HTTP caching has a single, end-to-end freshness model defined in Section 4.2 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-cache. When additional freshness mechanisms are only available to some caches along a request path (for example, using targeted fields), their interactions need to be carefully considered. In particular, a targeted cache might have longer freshness lifetimes available to it than other caches, causing it to serve responses that appear to be prematurely (or even immediately) stale to them, negatively impacting cache efficiency. For example, a response stored by a CDN cache might be served with the following headers: From the CDN's perspective, this response is still fresh after being cached for 30 minutes, while from other caches' standpoint, this response is already stale. See AGE-PENALTY for more discussion. When the targeted cache has a strong coherence mechanism (e.g., the origin server has the ability to proactively invalidate cached responses), it is often desirable to mitigate these effects. Some techniques seen in deployments include: Removing the Age header field Updating the Date header field value to the current time Updating the Expires header field value to the current time, plus any Cache-Control: max-age value This specification does not place any specific requirements on implementations to mitigate these effects, but definitions of targeted fields can do so. 2.4. <\/ins> A targeted field for a particular class of cache can be defined by requesting registration in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-fields\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1b43ec8981206b68591c4b371626449373d2473e47d63d7a331c392e7ebb05c5","title":"","text":"This document describes a use of HTTP Alternative Services I-D.ietf- httpbis-alt-svc to decouple the URI scheme from the use and configuration of underlying encryption, allowing a \"http\" URI RFC7230 to be accessed using TLS RFC5246 opportunistically. <\/del> to be accessed using Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC5246 opportunistically. <\/ins> Serving \"https\" URIs require acquiring and configuring a valid certificate, which means that some deployments find supporting TLS"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4e2df7f128aaf4f70107c98941d622afe0f5afe52636114ced480153b9d0b73a","title":"","text":"Normally, users will not be able to tell that it is in use (i.e., there will be no \"lock icon\"). By its nature, this technique is vulnerable to active attacks. A mechanism for partially mitigating them is described in commit. <\/del> A mechanism for partially mitigating active attacks is described in commit. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6cf61ce5396ed530bfc60acff958351f1b492a2b04516b1482758b57686e7eb7","title":"","text":"As defined in that specification, one way of establishing this is using a TLS-based protocol with the certificate checks defined in RFC2818. Clients MAY impose additional criteria for establishing reasonable assurances. <\/del> RFC2818. Clients are permitted to impose additional criteria for establishing reasonable assurances. <\/ins> For the purposes of this specification, an additional way of establishing reasonable assurances is available when the alternative"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a6f815a3cabfd1f529a10c10f5fcb7696edab43958a4d534bb54c42af7c6e2cd","title":"","text":"the alternative service can provide any certificate, or even select TLS cipher suites that do not include authentication. When the client has a valid http-opportunistic response for an origin, it MAY consider there to be reasonable assurances when: <\/del> A client acquires an http-opportunistic response by making a GET request to the \"http-opportunistic\" well-known URI. When the client has a valid http-opportunistic response for an origin, it MAY consider there to be reasonable assurances when: <\/ins> The origin and alternative service's hostnames are the same when compared in a case-insensitive fashion, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-02d409a23ac8cbd5f0a3b817d699f81046fd6df394c2cb03d2dba4b61744fcfe","title":"","text":"is initially created for \"http\" URIs without authenticating the server cannot be used for \"https\" URIs until the server certificate is successfully authenticated. Section 3.1 of RFC2818 describes the basic mechanism, though the authentication considerations in I- D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc also apply. <\/del> basic mechanism, though the authentication considerations in Section 2.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc also apply. <\/ins> Connections that are established without any means of server authentication (for instance, the purely anonymous TLS cipher suites), cannot be used for \"https\" URIs. <\/del> authentication (for instance, the purely anonymous TLS cipher suites) cannot be used for \"https\" URIs. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72c33cd09fe0348608add803806c5b05eb162d1fd1a6d52d532f18d1108e2686","title":"","text":"5.1. An origin can reduce the risk of attacks on opportunistically secured connections by committing to provide an secured, authenticated <\/del> connections by committing to provide a secured, authenticated <\/ins> alternative service. This is done by including the optional \"commit\" member in the http-opportunistic well-known resource (see well- known). This feature is optional due to the requirement for server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-addd52c9df453c49481d91ce329d7c7a08e54d59e2d3970eb1e4e77a0295dc0c","title":"","text":"The \"origins\" member of the root object has a value of an array of strings, one of which is a case-insensitive character-for- character match for the origin in question, serialised into Unicode as per RFC6454, Section 6.1, and <\/del> Unicode as per Section 6.1 of RFC6454. <\/ins> This specification defines one additional, optional member of the root object, \"commit\" in commit. Unrecognised members MUST be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5d75deaaec9adb27a330c3535ce7cf98f2d6664300a9fd1479260243c4632e0d","title":"","text":"7. This specification registers a Well-known URI RFC5785: <\/del> This specification registers a Well-Known URI RFC5785: <\/ins> URI Suffix: http-opportunistic Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): [this specification] <\/del> Specification Document(s): well-known of [this specification] <\/ins> Related Information:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-81ec5015a46e1377117e920e99386ca52c2e188ba3848409e1255d7c43be541e","title":"","text":"8.2. A downgrade attack against the negotiation for TLS is possible. With commitment commit, this is limited to occasions where clients have no prior information (see privacy), or when persisted commitments have expired. <\/del> commitment (see commit), this is limited to occasions where clients have no prior information (see privacy), or when persisted commitments have expired. <\/ins> For example, because the \"Alt-Svc\" header field I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt- svc likely appears in an unauthenticated and unencrypted channel, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a41bc2ff76b14759b073f2cfccc220e1a7f2ed074f582d24bc1eee177820f99b","title":"","text":"8.4. Many existing HTTP\/1.1 implementations use the presence or absence of TLS in the stack to determine whether requests are for \"http\" or \"https\" resources. This is necessary in many cases because the most common form of an HTTP\/1.1 request does not carry an explicit indication of the URI scheme. HTTP\/1.1 MUST NOT be used for opportunistically secured requests. <\/del> Some HTTP\/1.1 implementations use ambient signals to determine if a request is for an \"https\" resource. For example, implementations might look for TLS on the stack or a port number of 443. An implementation that supports opportunistically secured requests SHOULD suppress these signals if there is any potential for confusion. <\/del> might look for TLS on the stack or a port number of 443. This is necessary in many cases because the most common form of an HTTP\/1.1 request does not carry an explicit indication of the URI scheme. An implementation that is serving an opportunistically secured request SHOULD suppress these signals for \"http\" resources. HTTP\/1.1 MUST NOT be used to serve opportunistically secured requests. HTTP\/1.1 can be used to discover an opportunistically secured alternative service. <\/ins> 9. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-73cce784cedc36bd166ec755ea9d7b1e6b04dfca672f2cadad11bb549bebe436","title":"","text":"The \"error\" parameter's value is an sf-token that is a Proxy Error Type. When present, it indicates that the intermediary encountered an issue when obtaining a response. <\/del> an issue when obtaining this response. <\/ins> The presence of some Proxy Error Types indicates that the response was generated by the intermediary itself, rather than being forwarded"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f748aab71f99a113608ae4d87ef94bd354626f4cc61aa866d3722030d335a68b","title":"","text":"The \"next-hop\" parameter's value is an sf-string or sf-token that identifies the intermediary or origin server selected (and used, if contacted) for this response. It might be a hostname, IP address, or alias. <\/del> contacted) to obtain this response. It might be a hostname, IP address, or alias. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-806ee0d91a424fb1919b06f50e2c0d1336b25dedf999ebab35efd82009806c15","title":"","text":"The \"next-protocol\" parameter's value indicates the ALPN protocol identifier RFC7301 of the protocol used by the intermediary to connect to the next hop. This is only applicable when that connection was actually established. <\/del> connect to the next hop when obtaining this response. <\/ins> The value MUST be either an sf-token or sf-binary, representing a TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol ID (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f505f59064ed4b59167506865183ebd5417556fef91be5c040dc383aa380381","title":"","text":"2.1.4. The \"received-status\" parameter's value indicates the HTTP status code that the intermediary received from the next hop server. <\/del> code that the intermediary received from the next hop server when obtaining this response. <\/ins> The value MUST be an sf-integer."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d20b4acc15fd50a61758c05441613894b3d35083f678db5e953c45ccc199916","title":"","text":"location that is more local to the client. An origin server might wish to offer access to its resources using a new protocol, such as HTTP\/2 HTTP2, or one using improved <\/del> a new protocol, such as HTTP\/3 HTTP3, or one using improved <\/ins> security, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC5246. An origin server might wish to segment its clients into groups of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c28c9d48b754849c704dddcb97cd3d7bb774c656d4ed5ebf06d428c7c266d7d","title":"","text":"There are many ways that a client could discover the alternative service(s) associated with an origin. This document describes two such mechanisms: the \"Alt-Svc\" HTTP header field (alt-svc-field) and the \"ALTSVC\" HTTP\/2 frame type (ALTSVC-frame). <\/del> the \"ALTSVC\" frame type for HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3 (ALTSVC-frame). <\/ins> The remainder of this section describes requirements that are common to alternative services, regardless of how they are discovered."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec38de8c74b39c2d1ed3930db675b05f73b77b03ebd4634566327037aba91bce","title":"","text":"4. The ALTSVC HTTP\/2 frame (Section 4 of HTTP2) advertises the availability of an alternative service to an HTTP\/2 client. <\/del> The ALTSVC frame advertises the availability of an alternative service to an HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 client. <\/ins> The ALTSVC frame is a non-critical extension to HTTP\/2. Endpoints that do not support this frame will ignore it (as per the extensibility rules defined in Section 4.1 of HTTP2). <\/del> The ALTSVC frame is a separate non-critical extension in each protocol. Endpoints that do not support this frame will ignore it (as per the extensibility rules defined in Section 4.1 of HTTP2 and Section 4.1 of HTTP3). <\/ins> An ALTSVC frame from a server to a client on a stream other than stream 0 indicates that the conveyed alternative service is <\/del> An ALTSVC frame from a server to a client on a request stream or a push stream indicates that the conveyed alternative service is <\/ins> associated with the origin of that stream. An ALTSVC frame from a server to a client on stream 0 indicates that <\/del> An ALTSVC frame from a server to a client on the control stream (stream 0 in HTTP\/2 or a stream of type 0 in HTTP\/3) indicates that <\/ins> the conveyed alternative service is associated with the origin contained in the Origin field of the frame. An association with an origin that the client does not consider authoritative for the current connection MUST be ignored. The ALTSVC frame type is 0xa (decimal 10). <\/del> The ALTSVC frame type is 0xa (decimal 10) in both protocols. <\/ins> The ALTSVC frame contains the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ae6a4c5281ba56fda493d000ed172e14bdf7484d1f5b7b586b9fb30dd24f8cb6","title":"","text":"identical to the Alt-Svc field value defined in alt-svc-field (ABNF production \"Alt-Svc\"). The ALTSVC frame does not define any flags. <\/del> The ALTSVC frame does not define any flags in HTTP\/2; there is no generic flag field for HTTP\/3 frames. <\/ins> The ALTSVC frame is intended for receipt by clients. A device acting as a server MUST ignore it. An ALTSVC frame on stream 0 with empty (length 0) \"Origin\" <\/del> An ALTSVC frame on the control stream with empty (length 0) \"Origin\" <\/ins> information is invalid and MUST be ignored. An ALTSVC frame on a stream other than stream 0 containing non-empty \"Origin\" information is invalid and MUST be ignored. <\/del> request or push stream containing non-empty \"Origin\" information is invalid and MUST be ignored. <\/ins> The ALTSVC frame is processed hop-by-hop. An intermediary MUST NOT forward ALTSVC frames, though it can use the information contained in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b3c34309f95abba47ebc27121b2185c8a7df4dc2775df7ab2f63a08abec9d52","title":"","text":"7.3. This document registers the ALTSVC frame type in the \"HTTP\/3 Frame Type\" registry (Section 11.2.1 of HTTP3). ALTSVC 0xa ALTSVC-frame of this document 7.4. <\/ins> The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Alt-Svc Parameter Registry\" defines the name space for parameters. It has been created and will be maintained at . 7.3.1. <\/del> 7.4.1. <\/ins> A registration MUST include the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dfc106f7cb5d8651a0d8fe59de788fb43c5f751e305188cead3619e842285a82","title":"","text":"Values to be added to this name space require Expert Review (see Section 4.1 of RFC5226). 7.3.2. <\/del> 7.4.2. <\/ins> The \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Alt-Svc Parameter Registry\" has been populated with the registrations below:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-202bd0eefedb5cfa7ea439a90fb7de58d3e31d1a62e678eb97c7d56ef03dfdbe","title":"","text":"representation digest on an empty string (see usage-in-signatures). The checksum is computed using one of the digest-algorithms listed in algorithms and then encoded in the associated format. <\/del> the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values Registry (see algorithms) and then encoded in the associated format. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-55ce458ac559bd808bbcea9a843840bcb3ce7c772905e6418b8be15ce34e3e43","title":"","text":"is preferred; digest-algorithm token values MUST be compared in a case-insensitive fashion. Every digest-algorithm defines its computation procedure and encoding output. Unless specified otherwise, comparison of encoded output is case-sensitive. <\/ins> The \"HTTP Digest Algorithm Values Registry\", maintained by IANA at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/ [3] registers digest- algorithm values. Registrations MUST include the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-83879bb079775cfe82ffee6dfe9457a4d6de52448c2a0379d9df36631a0770e7","title":"","text":"This memo sets this specification to be the establishing document for the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values [4] registry. IANA is asked to update the \"Reference\" for this registry to refer this document and to inizialize the registry with the tokens defined in algorithms. This registry uses the Specification Required policy (Section 4.6 of RFC8126). <\/ins> 13.2. This memo adds the \"contentMD5\" token in the HTTP Digest Algorithm"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f0ef4876d1c1b110b8c0c71b0f764a06c7f099f816d8d1f77d997c5dc72f2ce6","title":"","text":"13.3.  The \"contentMD5\" digest-algorithm token defined in Section 5 of RFC3230 is removed from the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values Registry. <\/del> The \"contentMD5\" digest-algorithm token defined in Section 5 of RFC3230 has been added to the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values Registry with the \"obsoleted\" status. <\/ins> All digest-algorithms defined in RFC3230 are now \"deprecated\". 13.4. The digest-algorithm values for \"MD5\", \"SHA\", \"SHA-256\", \"SHA-512\" <\/del> The digest-algorithm tokens for \"MD5\", \"SHA\", \"SHA-256\", \"SHA-512\" <\/ins> have been updated to lowercase. The status of \"MD5\" and \"SHA\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and their description states that they MUST NOT be used. <\/del> their description has been modified accordingly. <\/ins> The \"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\" algorithms have been added to the registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e3aa374229921f8c01b6c34452972ba61227b2bd4c393cba719bba5e59916e08","title":"","text":"2. A Targeted Cache-Control Header Field (hereafter, \"targeted field\") is a HTTP response header field that has the same syntax and semantics as the Cache-Control response header field I-D.ietf- httpbis-cache, Section 5.2. However, it has a distinct field name that indicates the target for its directives. <\/del> is a HTTP response header field that has the same semantics as the Cache-Control response header field (HTTP-CACHING, Section 5.2). However, it has a distinct field name that indicates the target for its directives. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec92489ee35e4e9c7ff09724872f162e5d85f441b275454a20d17ce1ab4c8f75","title":"","text":"Note that this occurs on a response-by-response basis; if no member of the cache's target list is present, valid and non-empty, a cache falls back to other cache control mechanisms as required by HTTP I- D.ietf-httpbis-cache. <\/del> falls back to other cache control mechanisms as required by HTTP HTTP-CACHING. <\/ins> Targeted fields that are not on a cache's target list MUST NOT change that cache's behaviour, and MUST be passed through."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-669095a663b73e20ff27f0f86bb71340c4b29ce8e700df78a38400acb35fccdc","title":"","text":"2.2. Targeted fields MAY be parsed as a Dictionary Structured Field RFC8941, and implementations are encouraged to use a parser for that format in the interests of robustness, interoperability and security. When an implementation parses a targeted field as a Structured Field, each cache directive will be assigned a value. For example, max-age has an integer value; no-store's value is boolean true, and no- cache's value can either be boolean true or a list of field names. Implementations SHOULD NOT accept other values (e.g. coerce a max-age with a decimal value into an integer). Likewise, implementations SHOULD ignore parameters on directives, unless otherwise specified. However, implementers MAY reuse a Cache-Control parser for simplicity. If they do so, they SHOULD observe the following points, to aid in a smooth transition to a full Structured Field parser and prevent interoperability issues: <\/del> Targeted fields are defined as Dictionary Structured Fields (Section 3.2 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS). Each member of the dictionary is a cache directive from the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Cache Directive Registry. Because cache directives are not defined in terms of structured data types, it is necessary to map their values into the appropriate types. Typically, they are mapped into a Boolean (Section 3.3.6 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS) when the member has no separate value, a Token (Section 3.3.4 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS) for alphanumeric values, a String (Section 3.3.3 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS) for quote-delimited values, or an Integer (Section 3.3.1 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS) for purely numeric values. For example, the max-age directive (Section 5.2.2.1 of HTTP-CACHING) has an integer value; no-store (Section 5.2.2.5 of HTTP-CACHING) always has a boolean true value, and no-cache (Section 5.2.2.4 of HTTP-CACHING) has a value that can either be boolean true or a string containing a comma-delimited list of field names. Implementations SHOULD NOT generate or consume values that violate these inferred constraints on the directive's value (e.g. coerce a max-age with a decimal value into an integer). Likewise, implementations SHOULD ignore parameters on directives, unless otherwise specified. Sending implementations MUST generate valid Structured Fields. Receiving implementations SHOULD use a Structured Fields parser, but MAY reuse an existing parser for the Cache-Control field value (Section 5.2 of HTTP-CACHING). In doing so, they SHOULD implement the following constraints, to aid in a smooth transition to a full Structured Field parser and prevent interoperability issues: Directive names are all lowercase (e.g., \"MAX-AGE=60\" is considered an error). <\/ins> If a directive is repeated in the field value (e.g., \"max-age=30, max-age=60\"), the last value 'wins' (60, in this case) <\/del> max-age=60\"), the last value 'wins' (60, in this case). <\/ins> Members of the directives can have parameters (e.g., \"max- age=30;a=b;c=d\"), which should be ignored unless specified. If a targeted field in a given response is empty, or a parsing error is encountered (when being parsed as a Structured Field), that field SHOULD be ignored by the cache (i.e., it should behave as if the field were not present, likely falling back to other cache control mechanisms present). <\/del> is encountered, that field SHOULD be ignored by the cache (i.e., it should behave as if the field were not present, likely falling back to other cache control mechanisms present). <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c427b430b6d86f62a3db13671d326f1ed38b081fd24341e705d2049191caf97d","title":"","text":"4. Please register the following entry in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry defined by I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics: <\/del> Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry defined by HTTP: <\/ins> Field Name: CDN-Cache-Control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-24e83971895bd9d9e97a7a1e5c66af5b59c751f750b90e7a81edc1c16806033d","title":"","text":"5. The security considerations of HTTP caching I-D.ietf-httpbis-cache apply. <\/del> The security considerations of HTTP caching HTTP-CACHING apply. <\/ins> The ability to carry multiple caching policies on a response can result in confusion about how a response will be cached in different"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-61375ba7ac8f5299f6b29e3239d6452ac6c905c3ce01da48268e13807af2fcf6","title":"","text":"uses HTTPS exclusively. Servers can partially mitigate these attacks by encrypting and signing the contents of their cookies. However, using cryptography does not mitigate the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or she received from the authentic site.example server in the user's session, with unpredictable results. <\/del> signing the contents of their cookies, or by naming the cookie with the \"__Secure-\" prefix. However, using cryptography does not mitigate the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or she received from the authentic site.example server in the user's session, with unpredictable results. <\/ins> Finally, an attacker might be able to force the user agent to delete cookies by storing a large number of cookies. Once the user agent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-59d36876bbafc6a979ad8e55087531932aa7b3e2bc9d65a2fa6de17bc16fd312","title":"","text":"Formally, an alternative service is identified by the combination of: An Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) protocol name, as <\/del> An Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) protocol name, as <\/ins> per A host, as per"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd44e67dda486a8ceb4b79f699ec43d289039478cd23b56c7733d7d8c7252fee","title":"","text":"RFC6455 over a single stream of an HTTP\/2 connection. It defines an Extended CONNECT method which specifies a new \":protocol\" pseudo header field and new semantics for the \":path\" and \":authority\" pseudo header fields. It also defines a new HTTP\/2 SETTING sent by a <\/del> pseudo header fields. It also defines a new HTTP\/2 setting sent by a <\/ins> server to allow the client to use Extended CONNECT. The HTTP\/3 stream closure is also analogous to the TCP connection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-96d647ab8e14bd700ee816f389607b1a84cd65f8da09f3b5a581aaf8c438f846","title":"","text":"FIN bit on the stream (HTTP3). RST exceptions are represented with an stream error (HTTP3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP3) The semantics of the headers and SETTING are identical to those in <\/del> The semantics of the headers and setting are identical to those in <\/ins> HTTP\/2 as defined RFC8441. HTTP3 requires that HTTP\/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d3cb75a158e91e03daa39a172daf10f0c3ef180efde693811ac78dc805a0844a","title":"","text":"Abstract The mechanism for running the WebSocket Protocol over a single stream of an HTTP\/2 connection is equally applicable to HTTP\/3, but needs to be separately registered. This document describes the mechanism for HTTP\/3. <\/del> of an HTTP\/2 connection is equally applicable to HTTP\/3, but the HTTP version-specific details need to be specified. This document describes how the mechanism is adapted for HTTP\/3. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-22668306a4e4a2fcecd2d8759090f498981291c6b6177ff9be32164f1d68a8a1","title":"","text":"The SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES setting is defined by this document in order to allow endpoints to explicitly opt out of using HTTP\/2 priority signals (see Section 5.3.2 of HTTP2). Endpoints are expected to use an alternative, such as the scheme defined in this specification. <\/del> encouraged to use alternative priority signals (for example, header- field or h2-update-frame) but there is no requirement to use a specific signal type. <\/ins> The value of SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES MUST be 0 or 1. Any value other than 0 or 1 MUST be treated as a connection error (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d60ce589084cbb3d9356992c69df6d1a7cd4f321fcb6cb3a16c78ff331946748","title":"","text":"SETTINGS frame. Detection of a change by a receiver MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. The SETTINGS frame precedes any HTTP\/2 priority signal sent from a client, so a server can determine if it needs to allocate any resource to signal handling before they arrive. A server that receives SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES with value of 1 MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. 2.1.1. <\/ins> Until the client receives the SETTINGS frame from the server, the client SHOULD send both the HTTP\/2 priority signals and the signals of this prioritization scheme (see header-field and h2-update-frame)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cc16b8cbcf134b497d25938d9b87052f9db3af8dcc16953d2109cadc9d75cd02","title":"","text":"signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the client is directly connected to. The SETTINGS frame precedes any HTTP\/2 priority signal sent from a client, so a server can determine if it needs to allocate any resource to signal handling before they arrive. A server that receives SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES with value of 1 MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. Where both endpoints disable RFC 7540 stream priority, the client is expected to send this scheme's priority signal. Handling of omitted signals is described in parameters. <\/del> 3. The priority scheme defined by this document considers only the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71a948c643fe6384381d0d42aa21a13f4a7b4679f403c6e308ba8f23e00ac424","title":"","text":"The problems and insights set out above provided the motivation for deprecating RFC 7540 stream priority (see Section 5.3 of RFC7540). The SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES setting is defined by this <\/del> The SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES setting is defined by this <\/ins> document in order to allow endpoints to explicitly opt out of using HTTP\/2 priority signals (see Section 5.3.2 of HTTP2). Endpoints are expected to use an alternative, such as the scheme defined in this specification. The value of SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES MUST be 0 or 1. Any value other than 0 or 1 MUST be treated as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of HTTP2) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> The value of SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES MUST be 0 or 1. Any value other than 0 or 1 MUST be treated as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of HTTP2) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> Endpoints MUST send this SETTINGS parameter as part of the first SETTINGS frame. A sender MUST NOT change the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES parameter value after the first <\/del> SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES parameter value after the first <\/ins> SETTINGS frame. Detection of a change by a receiver MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ca51a20480ef45d9a5f0c4466862fe6084c02dd7b6df886fcc5a2044b8b01918","title":"","text":"client SHOULD send both the HTTP\/2 priority signals and the signals of this prioritization scheme (see header-field and h2-update-frame). When the client receives the first SETTINGS frame that contains the SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES parameter with value of 1, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the value was 0 or if the settings parameter was absent, it SHOULD stop sending <\/del> SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES parameter with value of 1, it SHOULD stop sending the HTTP\/2 priority signals. If the value was 0 or if the settings parameter was absent, it SHOULD stop sending <\/ins> PRIORITY_UPDATE frames (h2-update-frame), but MAY continue sending the Priority header field (header-field), as it is an end-to-end signal that might be useful to nodes behind the server that the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4da8de2a332bd7272f672c74e2e2f2019e12004bdc0c59f48b6a55a4216111f9","title":"","text":"The SETTINGS frame precedes any HTTP\/2 priority signal sent from a client, so a server can determine if it needs to allocate any resource to signal handling before they arrive. A server that receives SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES with value of 1 MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. <\/del> receives SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES with value of 1 MUST ignore HTTP\/2 priority signals. <\/ins> Where both endpoints disable RFC 7540 stream priority, the client is expected to send this scheme's priority signal. Handling of omitted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8fbca9c65a07a96503e80301e81c945fcaa677d05777341a483112e8c4b0e8c","title":"","text":"This specification registers the following entry in the HTTP\/2 Settings registry established by HTTP2: SETTINGS_DEPRECATE_RFC7540_PRIORITIES <\/del> SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES <\/ins> 0x9"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-12218b0238f3163595a60828480913edcd48a48108f7316f014b0f69c4797935","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes a scheme for prioritizing HTTP responses. This scheme expresses the priority of each HTTP response using absolute values, rather than as a relative relationship between a group of HTTP responses. <\/del> This document defines the Priority header field for communicating the initial priority in an HTTP version-independent manner, as well as HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3 frames for reprioritizing the responses. These"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6a669f171609ed34317ed3966bb1f77cac80e1967ba0184817fb8bae74ef22c6","title":"","text":"Endpoints MUST send this SETTINGS parameter as part of the first SETTINGS frame. A sender MUST NOT change the SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES parameter value after the first SETTINGS frame. Detection of a change by a receiver MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> SETTINGS frame. Receivers that detect a change MAY treat it as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> The SETTINGS frame precedes any HTTP\/2 priority signal sent from a client, so a server can determine if it needs to allocate any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c67b8bba366482b946485f165d8a5b1ad6a50a4295109fd43eef4fcad4aa7465","title":"","text":"4.1. The urgency parameter (\"u\") takes an integer between 0 and 7, in descending order of priority. This range provides sufficient granularity for prioritizing responses for ordinary web browsing, at minimal complexity. <\/del> descending order of priority. <\/ins> The value is encoded as an sf-integer. The default value is 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-39a43f56c1b0b3b2e02a64c274ded51f7b6bee8e17331a999dfd57c906be6763","title":"","text":"The default value of the incremental parameter is false (\"0\"). A server might distribute the bandwidth of a connection between incremental responses that share the same urgency, hoping that providing those responses in parallel would be more helpful to the client than delivering the responses one by one. <\/del> If a client makes concurrent requests with the incremental parameter set to false, there is no benefit serving responses with the same urgency in parallel because the client is not going to process those responses incrementally. Serving non-incremental responses with the same urgency one by one, in the order in which those requests were generated is considered to be the best strategy. <\/ins> If a client makes concurrent requests with the incremental parameter set to false, there is no benefit serving responses in parallel because the client is not going to process those responses incrementally. Serving non-incremental responses one by one, in the order in which those requests were generated is considered to be the best strategy. <\/del> set to true, serving requests with the same urgency in parallel might be beneficial. Doing this distributes the connection bandwidth, meaning that responses take longer to complete. Incremental delivery is most useful where multiple partial responses might provide some value to clients ahead of a complete response being available. <\/ins> The following example shows a request for a JPEG file with the urgency parameter set to \"5\" and the incremental parameter set to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23f22ff083ff39791329d9e5fee9ebab430daae8253c0827c3d120f7c36601f7","title":"","text":" HTTP SEARCH Method <\/del> The HTTP QUERY Method <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-safe-method-w-body-latest Abstract This specification updates the definition and semantics of the HTTP SEARCH request method originally defined by RFC 5323. <\/del> This specification defines a new HTTP method, QUERY, as a safe, idempotent request method that can carry request content. <\/ins> Editorial Note"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-01c0cf6c86efcd94d0c42379c538750311488b001fc336b842b3ab409a4172a1","title":"","text":"1. This specification updates the HTTP SEARCH method originally defined in RFC5323. <\/del> This specification defines the HTTP QUERY request method as a means of making a safe, idempotent request that contains content. <\/ins> Many existing HTTP-based applications use the HTTP GET and POST methods in various ways to implement the functionality provided by SEARCH. <\/del> Most often, this is desirable when the data conveyed in a request is too voluminous to be encoded into the request's URI. For example, while this is an common and interoperable query: <\/ins> Using a GET request with some combination of query parameters included within the request URI (as illustrated in the example below) is arguably the most common mechanism for implementing search in web applications. With this approach, implementations are required to parse the request URI into distinct path (everything before the '?') and query elements (everything after the '?'). The path identifies the resource processing the query (in this case 'http:\/\/example.org\/ feed') while the query identifies the specific parameters of the search operation. <\/del> if the query parameters extend to several kilobytes or more of data it may not be, because many implementations place limits on their size. Often these limits are not known or discoverable ahead of time, because a request can pass through many uncoordinated systems. Additionally, expressing some data in the target URI is inefficient, because it needs to be encoded to be a valid URI. <\/ins> A typical use of HTTP GET for requesting a search While there are definite advantages to using GET requests in this manner, the disadvantages should not be overlooked. Specifically: <\/del> Encoding query parameters directly into the request URI also effectively casts every possible combination of query inputs as distinct resources. Depending on the application, that may not be desirable. <\/ins> As an alternative to using GET, many implementations make use of the HTTP POST method to perform queries, as illustrated in the example"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cd2db6717ef9f547e6b1f0d93063f6685224d1fdc0ff1d16c1658ce61c8f5bf1","title":"","text":"This variation, however, suffers from the same basic limitation as GET in that it is not readily apparent -- absent specific knowledge of the resource and server to which the request is being sent -- that a search operation is what is being requested. Web applications use the POST method for a wide variety of uses including the creation or modification of existing resources. Sending the request above to a different server, or even repeatedly sending the request to the same server could have dramatically different effects. <\/del> a safe, idempotent query is being performed. <\/ins> The SEARCH method provides a solution that spans the gap between the <\/del> The QUERY method provides a solution that spans the gap between the <\/ins> use of GET and POST. As with POST, the input to the query operation is passed along within the payload of the request rather than as part of the request URI. Unlike POST, however the semantics of the SEARCH method are specifically defined. <\/del> of the request URI. Unlike POST, however, the method is explicitly safe and idempotent, allowing functions like caching and automatic retries to operate. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a95c16c39f4b0f0631321a83663d33311131e2a529c5ee326c49b6738514a4b0","title":"","text":"2. The SEARCH method is used to initiate a server-side search. Unlike the HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the SEARCH method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a SEARCH cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. <\/del> The QUERY method is used to initiate a server-side query. Unlike the HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the QUERY method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a QUERY cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. <\/ins> The body payload of the request defines the query. Implementations MAY use a request body of any content type with the SEARCH method; however, for backwards compatibility with existing WebDAV implementations, SEARCH requests that use the text\/xml or application\/xml media types with a root element (XML) in the \"DAV:\" XML namespace (XMLNS) MUST be processed per the requirements established by RFC5323. SEARCH requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the resource identified by the request URI. That is, SEARCH requests do <\/del> MAY use a request body of any content type with the QUERY method, provided that it has appropriate query semantics. QUERY requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the resource identified by the request URI. That is, QUERY requests do <\/ins> not alter the state of the targeted resource. However, while processing a search request, a server can be expected to allocate <\/del> processing a QUERY request, a server can be expected to allocate <\/ins> computing and memory resources or even create additional HTTP resources through which the response can be retrieved. A successful response to a SEARCH request is expected to provide some indication as to the final disposition of the search operation. For instance, a successful search that yields no results can be <\/del> A successful response to a QUERY request is expected to provide some indication as to the final disposition of the operation. For instance, a successful query that yields no results can be <\/ins> represented by a 204 No Content response. If the response includes content, it is expected to describe the results of the search operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond indirectly to the SEARCH request by returning a 3xx Redirection with a Location header field specifying an alternate Request URI from which the search results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful SEARCH responses are illustrated in examples. The response to a SEARCH request is not cacheable. It ought to be noted, however, that because SEARCH requests are safe and idempotent, responses to a SEARCH MUST NOT invalidate previously cached responses to other requests directed at the same effective request URI. The semantics of the SEARCH method change to a \"conditional SEARCH\" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified- <\/del> content, it is expected to describe the results of the operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond indirectly to the QUERY request by returning a 3xx Redirection with a Location header field specifying an alternate Request URI from which the results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful QUERY responses are illustrated in examples. The semantics of the QUERY method change to a \"conditional QUERY\" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified- <\/ins> Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field (RFCHTTP). A conditional SEARCH requests that the query be performed only under <\/del> A conditional QUERY requests that the query be performed only under <\/ins> the circumstances described by the conditional header field(s). It is important to note, however, that such conditions are evaluated against the state of the target resource itself as opposed to the collected results of the search operation. 2.1. The response to a QUERY method is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to satisfy subsequent QUERY requests as per HTTP-CACHING). The cache key for a query (see HTTP-CACHING) MUST incorporate the request content. When doing so, caches SHOULD first normalize request content to remove semantically insignificant differences, thereby improving cache efficiency, by: Note that any such normalization is performed solely for the purpose of generating a cache key; it does not change the request itself. <\/ins> 3. The \"Accept-Search\" response header field MAY be used by a server to directly signal support for the SEARCH method while identifying the specific query format media types that may be used. <\/del> The \"Accept-Query\" response header field MAY be used by a server to directly signal support for the QUERY method while identifying the specific query format media type(s) that may be used. <\/ins> The Accept-Search header field specifies a comma-separated listing of <\/del> The Accept-Query header field specifies a comma-separated listing of <\/ins> media types (with optional parameters) as defined by RFCHTTP. The order of types listed by the Accept-Search header field is <\/del> The order of types listed by the Accept-Query header field is <\/ins> insignificant. 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8c0a4034087982c92cd189516a8d9eefb401cabe2720be8f3e546e6f0a46ce5","title":"","text":"5. The SEARCH method is subject to the same general security <\/del> The QUERY method is subject to the same general security <\/ins> considerations as all HTTP methods as described in RFCHTTP. 6. IANA is requested to update the registration of the SEARCH method in the permanent registry at (see RFCHTTP). <\/del> IANA is requested to add QUERY method in the permanent registry at (see RFCHTTP). <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5aa55b0e169968fec09cc7e4a3689b928ade5e80b06c23f10e8ce0e3fbc7c7d3","title":"","text":"2. The SEARCH method is used to initiate a server-side search. Unlike the HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the SEARCH method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a SEARCH cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. <\/del> The QUERY method is used to initiate a server-side query. Unlike the HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the QUERY method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in response to a QUERY cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. <\/ins> The body payload of the request defines the query. Implementations MAY use a request body of any content type with the SEARCH method; however, for backwards compatibility with existing WebDAV implementations, SEARCH requests that use the text\/xml or application\/xml media types with a root element (XML) in the \"DAV:\" XML namespace (XMLNS) MUST be processed per the requirements established by RFC5323. SEARCH requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the resource identified by the request URI. That is, SEARCH requests do <\/del> MAY use a request body of any content type with the QUERY method, provided that it has appropriate query semantics. QUERY requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the resource identified by the request URI. That is, QUERY requests do <\/ins> not alter the state of the targeted resource. However, while processing a search request, a server can be expected to allocate <\/del> processing a QUERY request, a server can be expected to allocate <\/ins> computing and memory resources or even create additional HTTP resources through which the response can be retrieved. A successful response to a SEARCH request is expected to provide some indication as to the final disposition of the search operation. For instance, a successful search that yields no results can be <\/del> A successful response to a QUERY request is expected to provide some indication as to the final disposition of the operation. For instance, a successful query that yields no results can be <\/ins> represented by a 204 No Content response. If the response includes content, it is expected to describe the results of the search operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond indirectly to the SEARCH request by returning a 3xx Redirection with a Location header field specifying an alternate Request URI from which the search results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful SEARCH responses are illustrated in examples. The response to a SEARCH request is not cacheable. It ought to be noted, however, that because SEARCH requests are safe and idempotent, responses to a SEARCH MUST NOT invalidate previously cached responses <\/del> content, it is expected to describe the results of the operation. In some cases, the server may choose to respond indirectly to the QUERY request by returning a 3xx Redirection with a Location header field specifying an alternate Request URI from which the results can be retrieved using an HTTP GET request. Various non-normative examples of successful QUERY responses are illustrated in examples. The response to a QUERY request is not cacheable. It ought to be noted, however, that because QUERY requests are safe and idempotent, responses to a QUERY MUST NOT invalidate previously cached responses <\/ins> to other requests directed at the same effective request URI. The semantics of the SEARCH method change to a \"conditional SEARCH\" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified- <\/del> The semantics of the QUERY method change to a \"conditional QUERY\" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified- <\/ins> Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field (RFCHTTP). A conditional SEARCH requests that the query be performed only under <\/del> A conditional QUERY requests that the query be performed only under <\/ins> the circumstances described by the conditional header field(s). It is important to note, however, that such conditions are evaluated against the state of the target resource itself as opposed to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1bcceef5ba778cca91b973b9e3a2851f4a6f6e74b1255adde758f5eb143d0147","title":"","text":"3. The \"Accept-Search\" response header field MAY be used by a server to directly signal support for the SEARCH method while identifying the specific query format media types that may be used. <\/del> The \"Accept-Query\" response header field MAY be used by a server to directly signal support for the QUERY method while identifying the specific query format media type(s) that may be used. <\/ins> The Accept-Search header field specifies a comma-separated listing of <\/del> The Accept-Query header field specifies a comma-separated listing of <\/ins> media types (with optional parameters) as defined by RFCHTTP. The order of types listed by the Accept-Search header field is <\/del> The order of types listed by the Accept-Query header field is <\/ins> insignificant. 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cccec135f30ee96c9b704f95ebb28d02fd7d9dce77df79eab0d41e6e548dfcdc","title":"","text":"15. CVE-2019-9513 aka \"Resource Loop\", is a DoS attack based on manipulation of the RFC 7540 priority tree. Extensible priorities does not use stream dependencies, which mitigates this vulnerability. Section 5.3.4 of RFC7540 describes a scenario where closure of streams in the priority tree could cause suboptimal prioritization. To avoid this, RFC7540 states that \"an endpoint SHOULD retain stream prioritization state for a period after streams become closed\". Retaining state for streams no longer counted towards stream concurrency consumes server resources. Furthermore, RFC7540 identifies that reprioritization of a closed stream could affect dependents; it recommends updating the priority tree if sufficient state is stored, which will also consume server resources. To limit this commitment, it is stated that \"The amount of prioritization state that is retained MAY be limited\" and \"If a limit is applied, endpoints SHOULD maintain state for at least as many streams as allowed by their setting for SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS.\". Extensible priorities does not use stream dependencies, which minimizes most of the resource concerns related to this scenario. Section 5.3.4 of RFC7540 also presents considerations about the state required to store priority information about streams in an \"idle\" state. This state can be limited by adopting the guidance about concurrency limits described above. Extensible priorities is subject to a similar consideration because PRIORITY_UPDATE frames may arrive before the request that they reference. A server is required to store the information in order to apply the most up-to-date signal to the request. However, HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical <\/del> RFC7540 stream prioritization relies on dependencies. Considerations are presented to implementations, describing how limiting state or work commitments can avoid some types of problems. In addition, CVE- 2019-9513 aka \"Resource Loop\", is an example of a DoS attack that abuses stream dependencies. Extensible priorities does not use dependencies, which avoids these issues. frame describes considerations for server buffering of PRIORITY_UPDATE frames. HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical <\/ins> barriers to determining reasonable stream concurrency limits depending on the information that is available to them from the QUIC transport layer. server-scheduling presents examples where servers that prioritize responses in a certain way might be starved of the ability to transmit payload. The security considerations from STRUCTURED-FIELDS apply to processing of priority parameters defined in parameters. <\/ins> 16. This specification registers the following entry in the Permanent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-85e7fc9ace73d47f003ba4ee10ed679c69efcdec6e0deb8b5117030479a4d09f","title":"","text":"parameter (urgency), sending higher urgency responses before lower urgency responses. It is RECOMMENDED that, when possible, servers respect the incremental parameter (incremental). Non-incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served one-by-one based on the Stream ID, which corresponds to the order in which clients make requests. Doing so ensures that clients can use request ordering to influence response order. Incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served in round-robin manner. <\/del> The incremental parameter indicates how a client processes response bytes as they arrive. Non-incremental resources are only used when all of the response payload has been received. Incremental resources are used as parts, or chunks, of the response payload are received. Therefore, the timing of response data reception at the client, such as the time to early bytes or the time to receive the entire payload, plays an important role in perceived performance. Timings depend on resource size but this scheme provides no explicit guidance about how a server should use size as an input to prioritization. Instead, the following examples demonstrate how a server that strictly abides the scheduling guidance based on urgency and request generation order <\/del> bytes as they arrive. It is RECOMMENDED that, when possible, servers respect the incremental parameter (incremental). Non-incremental resources can only be used when all of the response payload has been received. Therefore, non-incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served in their entirety, one-by-one, based on the stream ID, which corresponds to the order in which clients make requests. Doing so ensures that clients can use request ordering to influence response order. Incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served by sharing bandwidth amongst them. Incremental resources are used as parts, or chunks, of the response payload are received. A client might benefit more from receiving a portion of all these resources rather than the entirety of a single resource. How large a portion of the resource is needed to be useful in improving performance varies. Some resource types place critical elements early, others can use information progressively. This scheme provides no explicit mandate about how a server should use size, type or any other input to decide how to prioritize. The following examples demonstrate how a server that strictly abides the scheduling guidance based on urgency and request generation order <\/ins> could find that early requests prevent serving of later requests. At the same urgency level, a non-incremental request for a large"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-94b20382fca2b7ea7dcd0dc95da8a8cf8b79449c9bc0fd909b33873090e73f12","title":"","text":"In order to mitigate this fairness problem, a server could use knowledge about the intermediary as another signal in its prioritization decisions. For instance, if a server knows the intermediary is coalescing requests, then it could serve the responses in round-robin manner. This can work if the constrained <\/del> intermediary is coalescing requests, then it could avoid serving the responses in their entirety and instead distribute bandwidth (for example, in a round-robin manner). This can work if the constrained <\/ins> resource is network capacity between the intermediary and the user agent, as the intermediary buffers responses and forwards the chunks based on the prioritization scheme it implements."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e42261d8ce8c76b0768a36f25171e4843542da6bb3a5bed526c8f2587e8e11ea","title":"","text":"\"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. 1.2. <\/del> 2. <\/ins> The ORIGIN HTTP\/2 frame (RFC7540, Section 4) indicates what origin(s) RFC6454 the sender considers this connection authoritative for (in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5bc096f4d62f3b6c41e904de11913f43d48236619eeaad5aad9282ad694d131","title":"","text":"The ORIGIN frame contains the following fields, sets of which may be repeated within the frame to indicate multiple origins: Origin-Len: An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the length, in octets, of the Origin field. Origin: An optional sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the sender believes this connection is authoritative for. <\/del> An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the length, in octets, of the Origin field. An optional sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the sender believes this connection is authoritative for. <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame does not define any flags. It can contain one or more Origin-Len\/Origin pairs."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6672acf4ca0ebd8e9e2efbb079854a3c325ac42e684e231b5d6a455bafd84f55","title":"","text":"Clients configured to use a proxy MUST ignore any ORIGIN frames received from it. 2. <\/del> 3. <\/ins> Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame's contents will be vulnerable to a large number of attacks; hence the reinforcement that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6ff826597b2a18bcc931dddc758a15782a60197296c07959158b63a1a2ee78fd","title":"","text":"1. It is common for an HTTP HTTP resource representation to have <\/del> It is common for representations of an HTTP HTTP resource to have <\/ins> relationships to one or more other resources. Clients will often discover these relationships while processing a retrieved representation, leading to further retrieval requests. Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship determines whether the client is blocked from continuing to process locally available resources. For example, visual rendering of an HTML document could be blocked by the retrieval of a CSS file that the document refers to. In contrast, inline images do not block rendering and get drawn incrementally as the chunks of the images arrive. To provide meaningful presentation of a document at the earliest <\/del> representation, which may lead to further retrieval requests. Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship determines whether the client is blocked from continuing to process locally available resources. An example of this is visual rendering of an HTML document, which could be blocked by the retrieval of a CSS file that the document refers to. In contrast, inline images do not block rendering and get drawn incrementally as the chunks of the images arrive. HTTP\/2 HTTP2 and HTTP\/3 HTTP3 support multiplexing of requests and responses in a single connection. An important feature of any implementation of a protocol that provides multiplexing is the ability to prioritize the sending of information. For example, to provide meaningful presentation of an HTML document at the earliest <\/ins> moment, it is important for an HTTP server to prioritize the HTTP responses, or the chunks of those HTTP responses, that it sends. <\/del> responses, or the chunks of those HTTP responses, that it sends to a client. A server that operates in ignorance of how clients issue requests and consume responses can cause suboptimal client application performance. Priority signals allow clients to communicate their view of request priority. Servers have their own needs that are independent from client needs, so they often combine priority signals with other available information in order to inform scheduling of response data. <\/ins> RFC 7540 RFC7540 stream priority allowed a client to send a series of priority signals that communicate to the server a \"priority tree\";"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a072b093d1d79a19f6d09ed000b2f602a1641929a8252c3c2143001f5e6884c6","title":"","text":"responses that uses absolute values. parameters defines priority parameters, which are a standardized and extensible format of priority information. header-field defines the Priority HTTP header field that can be used by both client and server to exchange parameters in order to specify the precedence of HTTP responses in a protocol-version-independent and end-to-end manner. h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame define version-specific frames that carry parameters for reprioritization. This prioritization scheme and its signals can act as a substitute for RFC 7540 stream priority. <\/del> field, a protocol-version-independent and end-to-end priority signal. Clients can use this header to signal priority to servers in order to specify the precedence of HTTP responses. Similarly, servers behind an intermediary can use it to signal priority to the intermediary. h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame define version-specific frames that carry parameters, which clients can use for reprioritization. Header field and frame priority signals are input to a server's response prioritization process. They are only a suggestion and do not guarantee any particular processing or transmission order for one response relative to any other response. server-scheduling and retransmission-scheduling provide consideration and guidance about how servers might act upon signals. The prioritization scheme and priority signals defined herein can act as a substitute for RFC 7540 stream priority. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ffe5df0556a3c769fbda635bd7871657614f0d12e994cefaadbfbae833979e6f","title":"","text":"2. An important feature of any implementation of a protocol that provides multiplexing is the ability to prioritize the sending of information. Prioritization is a difficult problem, so it will always be suboptimal, particularly if one endpoint operates in ignorance of the needs of its peer. Priority signalling allows endpoints to communicate their own view of priority, which can be combined with information the peer has to inform scheduling. <\/del> RFC 7540 stream priority (see Section 5.3 of RFC7540) is a complex system where clients signal stream dependencies and weights to describe an unbalanced tree. It suffered from limited deployment and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f7604ec1dedc70ee02ee392e5c4c677b4f32bb16542fdf76654df45a4095f5da","title":"","text":"Many RFC 7540 server implementations do not act on HTTP\/2 priority signals. Some instead favor custom server-driven schemes based on heuristics or other hints, such as resource content type or request generation order. For example, a server, with knowledge of the <\/del> generation order. For example, a server, with knowledge of an HTML <\/ins> document structure, might want to prioritize the delivery of images that are critical to user experience above other images, but below the CSS files. Since client trees vary, it is impossible for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42f8b78466b3b73b384be512168d9dafecdfb9e4c70743bcdb1505364ae1b081","title":"","text":"they do not adversely interfere with prioritization performed by existing endpoints or intermediaries that do not understand the newly defined parameter. Since unknown parameters are ignored, new parameters should not change the interpretation of or modify the predefined parameters in a way that is not backwards compatible or fallback safe. <\/del> parameters should not change the interpretation of, or modify, the urgency (see urgency) or incremental (see incremental) parameters in a way that is not backwards compatible or fallback safe. <\/ins> For example, if there is a need to provide more granularity than eight urgency levels, it would be possible to subdivide the range"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34619fb2bcece0e58a221cc4ba0f5bbd9d6537a146baad6efcb288c7b7efc5a2","title":"","text":"4.3.1. New Priority parameters can be defined by registering them in the HTTP Priority Parameters Registry. Registration requests are reviewed and approved by a Designated Expert, as per Section 4.5 of RFC8126. A specification document is appreciated, but not required. The Expert(s) should consider the following factors when evaluating requests: Community feedback If the parameters are sufficiently well-defined and adhere to the guidance provided in new-parameters. <\/del> HTTP Priority Parameters Registry. The registry governs the keys (short textual strings) used in Structured Fields Dictionary (see Section 3.2 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS). Since each HTTP request can have associated priority signals, there is value in having short key lengths, especially single-character strings. In order to encourage extension while avoiding unintended conflict among attractive key values, the HTTP Priority Parameters Registry operates two registration policies depending on key length. Registration requests for parameters with a key length of one use the Specification Required policy, as per Section 4.6 of RFC8126. Registration requests for parameters with a key length greater than one use the Expert Review policy, as per Section 4.5 of RFC8126. A specification document is appreciated, but not required. When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) can consider the additional guidance provided in new-parameters but cannot use it as a basis for rejection. <\/ins> Registration requests should use the following template: Name: [a name for the Priority Parameter that matches key] <\/del> [a name for the Priority Parameter that matches key] <\/ins> Description: [a description of the parameter semantics and value] <\/del> [a description of the parameter semantics and value] <\/ins> Reference: [to a specification defining this parameter] <\/del> [to a specification defining this parameter] <\/ins> See the registry at https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority [4] for details on where to send registration requests."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-59742aa58de08e974be68cb15e5176cbc4eee997ab469c9cd4bbb01e2e4de4cf","title":"","text":"Stream ID MUST be within the client-initiated bidirectional stream limit. If a server receives a PRIORITY_UPDATE (type=0xF0700) with a Stream ID that is beyond the stream limits, this SHOULD be treated as a connection error of type H3_ID_ERROR. <\/del> a connection error of type H3_ID_ERROR. Generating an error is not mandatory because HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical barriers to determining the active stream concurrency limit that is applied by the QUIC layer. <\/ins> The push-stream variant PRIORITY_UPDATE (type=0xF0701) MUST reference a promised push stream. If a server receives a PRIORITY_UPDATE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-adeae112998f9386f8f4e4feba9aee313d4a13e4cc167a2123cb7ecd43f32757","title":"","text":"dependencies, which avoids these issues. frame describes considerations for server buffering of PRIORITY_UPDATE frames. HTTP\/3 implementations might have practical barriers to determining reasonable stream concurrency limits depending on the information that is available to them from the QUIC transport layer. <\/del> PRIORITY_UPDATE frames. <\/ins> server-scheduling presents examples where servers that prioritize responses in a certain way might be starved of the ability to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-86be6bbfc0668528f4be6439ad706805c1d3d87331ebc86986850d49badf89ca","title":"","text":"A PRIORITY_UPDATE frame communicates a complete set of all parameters in the Priority Field Value field. Omitting a parameter is a signal to use the parameter's default value. Failure to parse the Priority Field Value MUST be treated as a connection error. In HTTP\/2 the <\/del> Field Value MAY be treated as a connection error. In HTTP\/2 the <\/ins> error is of type PROTOCOL_ERROR; in HTTP\/3 the error is of type H3_FRAME_ERROR. <\/del> H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> A client MAY send a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame before the stream that it references is open (except for HTTP\/2 push streams; see h2-update-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6140d64a846644321276244d521e4f31d0e79b5da958434f78c04f01194e53e2","title":"","text":"some other appropriate value e.g. according to the type and status of the primary document in which the algorithm is defined; \"deprecated\" when the algorithm is insecure or otherwise undesirable; \"reserved\" when Digest algorithm references a reserved token value <\/del> in which the algorithm is defined; \"insecure\" when the algorithm is insecure; \"reserved\" when Digest algorithm references a reserved token value <\/ins> Description: the description of the digest-algorithm and its encoding"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8fe09cf9dbb771990c8144897078de144a6748c657c64ffebd50fbe534095ad1","title":"","text":"represented as a quoted string or MUST NOT include \";\" or \",\" in the character sets used for the encoding. Deprecated digest algorithms MUST NOT be used. <\/del> Insecure digest algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against accidental change, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial setting; for example, when signing the digest of content for authenticity. <\/ins> The registry is initialized with the tokens listed below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f093993b4f0f530f67f32d9f517f589e9e573d9a6f82835c01959f4ee318190","title":"","text":"Reference: RFC1321, RFC4648, this document. Status: deprecated <\/del> Status: insecure <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-16dcd0e0d02b531408a2dec6a4b2a5fe1fa48cc9fa54d1a73401cc6214c9fba6","title":"","text":"Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. Status: deprecated <\/del> Status: insecure <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d5a5859513d5380d2f0ed1c54aacab04911bd59a960e72cc23ac6c71d9b4bdb","title":"","text":"Reference: UNIX, this document. Status: deprecated <\/del> Status: insecure <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-787ac1a8a9a48b2f571ff5daaf241653f7b957fd8796a3ebeca4df08db5a6b95","title":"","text":"Reference: RFC1950, this document. Status: deprecated <\/del> Status: insecure <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2bcf5b13a3a06f25033398f2dd55134926efadbff7d57eb454bcb109321a58d2","title":"","text":"Reference: RFC4960 appendix B, this document. Status: deprecated. <\/del> Status: insecure <\/ins> To allow sender and recipient to provide a checksum which is independent from \"Content-Encoding\", the following additional digest-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-534af7bba0813b4f5b3bef3264ceb5841107d1eb333c60886ced34dea6ad932c","title":"","text":"algorithm. An endpoint might have a preference for algorithms, such as preferring \"standard\" algorithms over \"deprecated\" ones. Transition <\/del> preferring \"standard\" algorithms over \"insecure\" ones. Transition <\/ins> from weak algorithms is supported by negotiation of digest-algorithm using \"Want-Digest\" or \"Want-Content-Digest\" (see want-fields) or by sending multiple representation-data-digest values from which the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-47788d51e6068d83796da0d0f5492307d033e0ec4ed720065a040bb84a10a24a","title":"","text":"RFC3230 has been added to the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values Registry with the \"obsoleted\" status. All digest-algorithms defined in RFC3230 are now \"deprecated\". <\/del> All digest-algorithms defined in RFC3230 are now \"insecure\". <\/ins> 9.4. The digest-algorithm tokens for \"MD5\", \"SHA\", \"SHA-256\", \"SHA-512\" have been updated to lowercase. The status of \"MD5\" and \"SHA\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and <\/del> The status of \"MD5\" and \"SHA\" has been updated to \"insecure\", and <\/ins> their description has been modified accordingly. The \"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\" algorithms have been added to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f504b9d6e8d78d32a650923a353349ed3c78f6ae37eed2aeaebd1c1243b02372","title":"","text":"The problems and insights set out above provided the motivation for deprecating RFC 7540 stream priority (see Section 5.3 of RFC7540). The SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES setting is defined by this <\/del> The SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES HTTP\/2 setting is defined by this <\/ins> document in order to allow endpoints to explicitly opt out of using HTTP\/2 priority signals (see Section 5.3.2 of HTTP2). Endpoints are encouraged to use alternative priority signals (for example, header-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c9a71eaf83c97cd507c3833469a36eeb6f48de2e3493dffe6f87c72cf6143238","title":"","text":"The value of SETTINGS_NO_RFC7540_PRIORITIES MUST be 0 or 1. Any value other than 0 or 1 MUST be treated as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of HTTP2) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> Section 5.4.1 of HTTP2) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. The initial value is 0. <\/ins> Endpoints MUST send this SETTINGS parameter as part of the first SETTINGS frame. A sender MUST NOT change the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-60f7790ea65f08bbac9b72cde6f755f859ac646f6194c0165757161e39d8bc0c","title":"","text":"The Priority HTTP header field (header-field) is an end-to-end way to transmit this set of parameters when a request or a response is issued. In order to reprioritize a request, HTTP-version-specific frames (h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame) are used by clients to transmit the same information on a single hop. If intermediaries want to specify prioritization on a multiplexed HTTP connection, they SHOULD use a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame and SHOULD NOT change the Priority header field. <\/del> PRIORITY_UPDATE frames (h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame) are used by clients to transmit the same information on a single hop. If intermediaries want to specify prioritization on a multiplexed HTTP connection, they SHOULD use a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame and SHOULD NOT change the Priority header field. <\/ins> In both cases, the set of priority parameters is encoded as a Structured Fields Dictionary (see Section 3.2 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2fabc0511e6147cc328e10a8c190865bd7b6bfebe21d3ea95bb705ac9b8ccde6","title":"","text":"4.2. The incremental parameter (\"i\") takes an sf-boolean as the value that indicates if an HTTP response can be processed incrementally, i.e. <\/del> indicates if an HTTP response can be processed incrementally, i.e., <\/ins> provide some meaningful output as chunks of the response arrive. The default value of the incremental parameter is false (\"0\")."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71c74f3d30089474e46d457b289980bba4ed9ad7466771701c999df63e82208b","title":"","text":"combine the priority information from client requests and server responses to correct or amend the precedence. Clients cannot interpret the appearance or omission of a Priority response header as acknowledgement that any prioritization has occurred. <\/del> acknowledgement that any prioritization has occurred. Guidance for how endpoints can act on Priority header values is given in server- scheduling and client-scheduling. <\/ins> Priority is a Dictionary (Section 3.2 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1749b2896333dbff2005ed488b0b79f8ac2ba11db3ee3796707f34ea604c3b81","title":"","text":"the priority update. The priority update value in ASCII text, encoded using Structured Fields. <\/del> Fields. This is the same representation as the Priority header field value. <\/ins> When the PRIORITY_UPDATE frame applies to a request stream, clients SHOULD provide a Prioritized Stream ID that refers to a stream in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4e9507fd6cf5373cef6eb8a5b8b9e1e7204e5dbf07ca7e4ff0f7f9e38c684fc4","title":"","text":"update. The priority update value in ASCII text, encoded using Structured Fields. <\/del> Fields. This is the same representation as the Priority header field value. <\/ins> The request-stream variant of PRIORITY_UPDATE (type=0xF0700) MUST reference a request stream. If a server receives a PRIORITY_UPDATE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c6bfb5fbebb9c01b3236d3abefaf13cec51eea3f1e50d959d8abba5cb3a31ff","title":"","text":"because there is no explicit client-signalled initial priority. A server can apply priority signals provided in an origin response; see the merging guidance given in merging. In the absence of origin signals, applying default parameter values could be suboptimal. How ever a server decides to schedule a pushed response, it can signal the intended priority to the client by including the Priority field in a PUSH_PROMISE or HEADERS frame. <\/del> signals, applying default parameter values could be suboptimal. By whatever means a server decides to schedule a pushed response, it can signal the intended priority to the client by including the Priority field in a PUSH_PROMISE or HEADERS frame. <\/ins> 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d2fb491b7f307a230c65f063bd308cd3915de247b3414174e7ec145d67683a5d","title":"","text":"Section 6.2.4 of QUIC-RECOVERY, also highlights consideration of application priorities when sending probe packets after Probe Timeout timer expiration. An QUIC implementation supporting application- <\/del> timer expiration. A QUIC implementation supporting application- <\/ins> indicated priorities might use the relative priority of streams when choosing probe data. 13. As a general guideline, a server SHOULD NOT use priority information for making schedule decisions across multiple connections, unless it knows that those connections originate from the same client. Due to this, priority information conveyed over a non-coalesced HTTP <\/del> for making scheduling decisions across multiple connections, unless it knows that those connections originate from the same client. Due to this, priority information conveyed over a non-coalesced HTTP <\/ins> connection (e.g., HTTP\/1.1) might go unused. The remainder of this section discusses scenarios where unfairness is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-90206293efdf7d00688ddd254fff069d2e553f2bf484e9de1757f6a3480396d5","title":"","text":"facing edge might support HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3 while communication to back end servers is done using HTTP\/1.1. Unlike with connection coalescing, the CDN will \"de-mux\" requests into discrete connections to the back end. As HTTP\/1.1 and older do not provide a way to concurrently transmit multiple responses, there is no immediate fairness issue in protocol. However, back end servers MAY still use client headers for request scheduling. Back end servers SHOULD only schedule based on client priority information where that information can be scoped to individual end clients. Authentication and other session information might provide this linkability. <\/del> to the back end. HTTP\/1.1 and older do not support response multiplexing in a single connection, so there is not a fairness problem. However, back end servers MAY still use client headers for request scheduling. Back end servers SHOULD only schedule based on client priority information where that information can be scoped to individual end clients. Authentication and other session information might provide this linkability. <\/ins> 13.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9e1f6cd8b6ed1f7ecdbb7f9c8e72d71c8d7d418d4c6113343e108e658596b735","title":"","text":"The value is encoded as an sf-integer. The default value is 3. This parameter indicates the sender's recommendation, based on the expectation that the server would transmit HTTP responses in the order of their urgency values if possible. The smaller the value, the higher the precedence. <\/del> Endpoints use this parameter to communicate their view of the precedence of HTTP responses. The chosen value of urgency can be based on the expectation that servers might use this information to transmit HTTP responses in the order of their urgency. The smaller the value, the higher the precedence. <\/ins> The following example shows a request for a CSS file with the urgency set to \"0\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b1cf333787316fab9ffb08585e1982df4156f29fb56872a4d1b817648e289b84","title":"","text":"If a client makes concurrent requests with the incremental parameter set to false, there is no benefit serving responses with the same urgency in parallel because the client is not going to process those <\/del> urgency concurrently because the client is not going to process those <\/ins> responses incrementally. Serving non-incremental responses with the same urgency one by one, in the order in which those requests were generated is considered to be the best strategy. If a client makes concurrent requests with the incremental parameter set to true, serving requests with the same urgency in parallel might be beneficial. Doing this distributes the connection bandwidth, meaning that responses take longer to complete. Incremental delivery is most useful where multiple partial responses might provide some value to clients ahead of a complete response being available. <\/del> set to true, serving requests with the same urgency concurrently might be beneficial. Doing this distributes the connection bandwidth, meaning that responses take longer to complete. Incremental delivery is most useful where multiple partial responses might provide some value to clients ahead of a complete response being available. <\/ins> The following example shows a request for a JPEG file with the urgency parameter set to \"5\" and the incremental parameter set to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2b2e5ca75734750b77dce846964fb625b476a920c8b650331d1b457949c8526e","title":"","text":"about how a server should use size, type or any other input to decide how to prioritize. The following examples demonstrate how a server that strictly abides the scheduling guidance based on urgency and request generation order could find that early requests prevent serving of later requests. <\/del> There can be scenarios where a server will need to schedule multiple incremental and non-incremental responses at the same urgency level. Strictly abiding the scheduling guidance based on urgency and request generation order might lead to sub-optimal results at the client, as early non-incremental responses might prevent serving of incremental responses issued later. The following are examples of such challenges. <\/ins> At the same urgency level, a non-incremental request for a large resource followed by an incremental request for a small resource."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c85b8857799c0cb91799b471cd16660afc97b4f3b2f84a5bf749ab2fb59ab437","title":"","text":"Digest field calculations are tied to the \"Content-Encoding\" and \"Content-Type\" header fields. Therefore, a given resource may have multiple different checksum values when transferred with HTTP. To allow both parties to exchange a simple checksum with no content codings (see Section 8.4.1 of SEMANTICS), two more digest-algorithms are added (\"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\"). <\/del> multiple different checksum values when transferred with HTTP. <\/ins> Digest fields do not provide integrity for HTTP messages or fields. However, they can be combined with other mechanisms that protect"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1b7c0388f8959dac5413fead80ceebc3f2ac2aabaaf28afbcecb42c576bb124b","title":"","text":"Status: insecure To allow sender and recipient to provide a checksum which is independent from \"Content-Encoding\", the following additional digest- algorithms are defined: Description: The sha-512 digest of the representation data of the resource when no content coding is applied Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. Status: standard Description: The sha-256 digest of the representation data of the resource when no content coding is applied Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. Status: standard <\/del> 7. When the representation enclosed in a state-changing request does not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f789b5d804b5e329379dd79a019cbb040055444c525af7aa0053115c14a06af6","title":"","text":"because user-agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing. Identity digest-algorithms (e.g. \"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\") are particularly useful for end-to-end integrity because they allow piecing together a resource from different sources with different HTTP messaging characteristics. For example, different servers that apply different content codings. <\/del> Note that using digest fields alone does not provide end-to-end integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, since metadata could be manipulated at any stage. Methods to protect metadata are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-64778f993c39fa198ef06191e46daef3a18fc9bf01876dbe27d53f57ca035af2","title":"","text":"8.5. Digest fields may expose details of encrypted payload when the checksum is computed on the unencrypted data. For example, the use of the \"id-sha-256\" digest-algorithm in conjunction with the encrypted content-coding RFC8188. <\/del> checksum is computed on the unencrypted data. <\/ins> The checksum of an encrypted payload can change between different messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-69890aa668d9059f4ffd96d49408a0dcc71aeccc5e5ab5672ae05107442e9941","title":"","text":"The status of \"MD5\" and \"SHA\" has been updated to \"insecure\", and their description has been modified accordingly. The \"id-sha-256\" and \"id-sha-512\" algorithms have been added to the registry. <\/del> 9.5. This section registers the \"Want-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9b8dcac1d51b66fe9f66f1253f6cb73565354085c3ed472724df20c111b76c48","title":"","text":"Intermediaries can consume and produce priority signals in a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame or Priority header field. Sending a PRIORITY_UPDATE frame preserves the signal from the client, but provides a signal that overrides for the next hop; see header-field- rationale. Replacing or adding a Priority header field overrides any signal from a client and can affect prioritization for all subsequent recipients. <\/del> provides a signal that overrides that for the next hop; see header- field-rationale. Replacing or adding a Priority header field overrides any signal from a client and can affect prioritization for all subsequent recipients. <\/ins> For both the Priority header field and the PRIORITY_UPDATE frame, the set of priority parameters is encoded as a Structured Fields"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a985dcdd9bf55211ae0f22304c127835f24891f103c59293eccb3239371efe75","title":"","text":"clients signal stream dependencies and weights to describe an unbalanced tree. It suffered from limited deployment and interoperability and was deprecated in a revision of HTTP\/2 HTTP2. However, in order to maintain wire compatibility, HTTP\/2 priority signals are still mandatory to handle (see HTTP2). <\/del> HTTP\/2 retains these protocol elements in order to maintain wire compatibility (see HTTP2), which means that they might still be used in the absence of alternative signaling, such as the scheme this document describes. <\/ins> Clients can build RFC 7540 trees with rich flexibility but experience has shown this is rarely exercised. Instead they tend to choose a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d5f5b9983c0a1547ac5063eaec6ecc7eeab626c260810e8a31456d4bc7e4021a","title":"","text":"want-fields defines the Want-Digest and Want-Content-Digest request and response header and trailer field, algorithms and deprecate-contentMD5 describe algorithms and their relation to Digest, <\/del> algorithms describes algorithms and their relation to Digest, <\/ins> state-changing-requests details computing representation digests, obsolete-parameters obsoletes Digest field parameters, and <\/del> examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited provide examples of using Digest and Want-Digest."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d81d59d33d9d8dc0b8031ee25d5d792d22baa99159be32c01e8a6db0d375384f","title":"","text":"has evolved since RFC3230 was published. The concept of \"instance\" has been superseded by \"selected representation\". This document replaces RFC3230. The \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions are updated to align with the terms and notational conventions in SEMANTICS. Changes are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations but note that negotiation of \"Content-MD5\" is deprecated deprecate-contentMD5 and has been replaced by \"Content-Digest\" negotiation via \"Want-Content-Digest\". \"Digest\" field parameters are obsoleted obsolete-parameters and the algorithm table has been updated to reflect the current state of the art. <\/del> This document replaces RFC3230. The changes described in the following paragraphs are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations where possible. The \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions are updated to align with the terms and notational conventions in SEMANTICS. Negotiation of \"Content-MD5\" is deprecated and has been replaced by \"Content-Digest\" negotiation via \"Want-Content-Digest\". Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2 of RFC3230 defined field parameters. This document obsoletes the usage of parameters with \"Digest\" because this feature has not been widely deployed and complicates field-value processing. RFC3230 intended field parameters to provide a common way to attach additional information to a representation-data-digest. However, if parameters are used as an input to validate the checksum, an attacker could alter them to steer the validation behavior. A digest-algorithm can still be parameterized by defining its own way to encode parameters into the representation-data-digest, in such a way as to mitigate security risks related to its computation. The algorithm table has been updated to reflect the current state of the art, (see algorithms). <\/ins> 1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c4bbb3013434f2884adc8952e095268b30d89ea49cb945d7be60956b3dfd591a","title":"","text":"client's preference for reduced data usage, due to high transfer costs, slow connection speeds, or other reasons. The token is a signal indicating explicit user opt-in into a reduced data usage mode on the client, and when communicated to origins allows them to deliver alternate content honoring such preference - e.g. smaller image and video resources, alternate markup, and so on. <\/del> This document defines the \"on\" sd-token value, which is used as a signal indicating explicit user opt-in into a reduced data usage mode on the client, and when communicated to origins allows them to deliver alternate content honoring such preference - e.g. smaller image and video resources, alternate markup, and so on. New token and extension token values can only be defined by revisions of this specification. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-06023f23fd8c548b2023c47115d79cd25dc329633badda429e1d3662102ef654","title":"","text":"Active RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 <\/del> RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 <\/ins> [[This document]],"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a40bc555853dbe2a57ddb0aad5f3ce3340078aaa00752936b6b8d617d4816ae4","title":"","text":"Upon publication, please create the HTTP Priority Parameters registry at https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-priority [2] and populate it with the types defined in parameters; see register for its associated procedures. <\/del> with the entries in iana-parameter-table; see register for its associated procedures. <\/ins> 17. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4405111d7450fbffac1a1ca23c76beeb03d9e72bc21e41ee7e5d7b1ce0a236f6","title":"","text":"interoperability and was deprecated in a revision of HTTP\/2 HTTP2. HTTP\/2 retains these protocol elements in order to maintain wire compatibility (see HTTP2), which means that they might still be used in the absence of alternative signaling, such as the scheme this document describes. <\/del> even in the presence of alternative signaling, such as the scheme this document describes. <\/ins> Many RFC 7540 server implementations do not act on HTTP\/2 priority signals."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-90537c6dd9c0c2f3a2f6bec6cd43e2a95aaf04b492017828862d214483109c7d","title":"","text":"3. The priority scheme defined by this document considers only the prioritization of HTTP messages and tunnels, see client-scheduling, server-scheduling, and connect-scheduling. Where HTTP extensions change stream behavior or define new data carriage mechanisms, they can also define how this priority scheme can be applied. <\/del> The priority scheme defined by this document is primarily focused on the prioritization of HTTP response messages (see HTTP). It defines new priority parameters (parameters) and their conveyors (header- field and frame) intended to communicate the priority of responses to a server that is responsible for prioritizing them. server-scheduling provides considerations for servers about acting on those signals in combination with other inputs and factors. The CONNECT method (see HTTP) can be used to establish tunnels. Signaling applies similarly to tunnels; additional considerations for server prioritization are given in connect-scheduling. client-scheduling describes how clients can optionally apply elements of this scheme locally to the request messages that they generate. Some forms of HTTP extensions might change HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 stream behavior or define new data carriage mechanisms. Such extensions can define themselves how this priority scheme is to be applied. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c7ad3b3a2a06ac3fae6f1edec59ceb1a18c8aabbe07cc44f236ad190675366e","title":"","text":"This document defines the urgency(\"u\") and incremental(\"i\") parameters. When receiving an HTTP request that does not carry these priority parameters, a server SHOULD act as if their default values were specified. Note that handling of omitted parameters is different when processing an HTTP response; see merging. <\/del> were specified. An intermediary can combine signals from requests and responses that it forwards. Note that omission of parameters in responses is handled differently from omission in requests; see merging. <\/ins> Receivers parse the Dictionary as defined in STRUCTURED-FIELDS. Where the Dictionary is successfully parsed, this document places the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2e58d558ca67459b0530fe3fd802e9f311e1bed5ed3b7a2fa2cf03b38edc9c1e","title":"","text":"commitment interval starts when the commitment is received and authenticated and runs for a number of seconds equal to value of the \"tls-commit\" member, less the current age of the http-opportunistic response (as defined in Section 4.2.3 of RFC7234). A client SHOULD avoid sending requests via cleartext protocols or to unauthenticated alternative services for the duration of the commitment interval, except to discover new potential alternatives. <\/del> response (as defined in Section 4.2.3 of RFC7234). Note that the commitment interval MAY exceed the freshness lifetime of the \"http- opportunistic\" resource. A client SHOULD avoid sending requests via cleartext protocols or to unauthenticated alternative services for the duration of the commitment interval, except to discover new potential alternatives. <\/ins> A commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients are able to use alternative services that they become aware"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93d6166e54fa8a4b9f0ee4d39e27278fdc79c60c3cda3bcfe39c8a75c5f182fe","title":"","text":"In contrast to the prioritization scheme of HTTP\/2 that uses a hop- by-hop frame, the Priority header field is defined as end-to-end. The rationale is that the Priority header field transmits how each response affects the client's processing of those responses, rather than how relatively urgent each response is to others. The way a client processes a response is a property associated to that client generating that request. Not that of an intermediary. Therefore, it is an end-to-end property. How these end-to-end properties carried by the Priority header field affect the prioritization between the responses that share a connection is a hop-by-hop issue. <\/del> The way that a client processes a response is a property associated with the client generating that request. Not that of an intermediary. Therefore, it is an end-to-end property. How these end-to-end properties carried by the Priority header field affect the prioritization between the responses that share a connection is a hop-by-hop issue. <\/ins> Having the Priority header field defined as end-to-end is important for caching intermediaries. Such intermediaries can cache the value"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3a6b088b8408392756dcf81bf7ddfad1e1dc7b5c77080bc78ab74d8dad98a8d1","title":"","text":"only because the header field is defined as end-to-end rather than hop-by-hop. It should also be noted that the use of a header field carrying a textual value makes the prioritization scheme extensible; see the discussion below. <\/del> 15. RFC7540 stream prioritization relies on dependencies. Considerations"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2df570df83d1a766d6eaf4859d285d71420be2cdb0faa3e0dbd5e88ecce10939","title":"","text":"priority. Expressing priority is therefore only a suggestion. A server can use priority signals along with other inputs to make scheduling decisions. No guidance is provided about how this can or should be done. Factors such as implementation choices or deployment environment also play a role. Any given connection is likely to have many dynamic permutations. For these reasons, there is no unilateral perfect scheduler and this document only provides some basic recommendations for implementations. <\/del> scheduling decisions. Factors such as implementation choices or deployment environment also play a role. Any given connection is likely to have many dynamic permutations. For these reasons, there is no unilateral perfect scheduler. This document provides some basic, non-exhaustive, recommendations for how servers might act on priority parameters. It does not describe in detail how servers might combine priority signals with other factors. <\/ins> Clients cannot depend on particular treatment based on priority signals. Servers can use other information to prioritize responses."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3796b69c2b18a52c5b1d86edd6ce60ca2dce95596ad89dabdb2888f1da39fbe0","title":"","text":"The incremental parameter indicates how a client processes response bytes as they arrive. It is RECOMMENDED that, when possible, servers respect the incremental parameter (incremental). Non-incremental resources can only be used when all of the response payload has been received. Therefore, non-incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served in their entirety, one-by-one, based on the stream <\/del> respect the incremental parameter (incremental). Non-incremental responses of the same urgency SHOULD be served by prioritizing bandwidth allocation in ascending order of the stream <\/ins> ID, which corresponds to the order in which clients make requests. Doing so ensures that clients can use request ordering to influence response order."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-99708643474887ed92f18959d6c5a9310c94be9ff1c58501404cdb4889612878","title":"","text":"15. RFC7540 stream prioritization relies on dependencies. Considerations are presented to implementations, describing how limiting state or work commitments can avoid some types of problems. In addition, CVE- 2019-9513 aka \"Resource Loop\", is an example of a DoS attack that abuses stream dependencies. Extensible priorities does not use dependencies, which avoids these issues. <\/del> frame describes considerations for server buffering of PRIORITY_UPDATE frames."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9154bc93f18b45349518bebd37c9e34de9d2d944eed0ea12fcd678805d0aed55","title":"","text":"12. Transport protocols such as TCP and QUIC provide reliability by detecting packet losses and retransmitting lost information. While this document specifies HTTP-layer prioritization, its effectiveness can be further enhanced if the transport layer factors priority into scheduling both new data and retransmission data. The remainder of <\/del> detecting packet losses and retransmitting lost information. In addition to the considerations in server-scheduling, scheduling of retransmission data could compete with new data. The remainder of <\/ins> this section discusses considerations when using QUIC. QUIC states \"Endpoints SHOULD prioritize retransmission of data over"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-56808e0969cc7b42edbb7164f1e8cebb053dbabfde44849f00a0b64e1e52f8a3","title":"","text":"SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP\/2. If a server which advertises support for Extended CONNECT but receives an Extended CONNECT request with a \":protocol\" value that is unknown or is not supported, the server SHOULD respond to the request with a 501 (Not Implemented) status code (HTTP). A server MAY provide more information via a Problem Details resoponse RFC7807. <\/ins> 4. This document introduces no new security considerations beyond those"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-916d755d69a87cec0566d125a0deb9f80f0876db2c185319e2597e1f30abeee6","title":"","text":"13. As a general guideline, a server SHOULD NOT use priority information for making scheduling decisions across multiple connections, unless it knows that those connections originate from the same client. Due to this, priority information conveyed over a non-coalesced HTTP connection (e.g., HTTP\/1.1) might go unused. The remainder of this section discusses scenarios where unfairness is problematic and presents possible mitigations, or where unfairness is desirable. <\/del> Typically, HTTP implementations depend on the underlying transport to maintain fairness between connections competing for bandwidth. When HTTP requests are forwarded through intermediaries, progress made by each connection originating from end clients can become different over time, depending on how intermediaries coalesce or split requests into backend connections. This unfairness can expand if priority signals are used. coalescing and h1-backends discuss mitigations against this expansion of unfairness. Conversely, intentional-unfairness discusses how servers might intentionally allocate unequal bandwidth to some connections depending on the priority signals. <\/ins> 13.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c823a05af5e5ba595bf3fc1c3c19b135db2a96eab976c7692bb7497a86a4fa44","title":"","text":"When an intermediary coalesces HTTP requests coming from multiple clients into one HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 connection going to the backend server, requests that originate from one client might have higher precedence than those coming from others. <\/del> server, requests that originate from one client might carry priority signals indicating higher precedence than those coming from others. <\/ins> It is sometimes beneficial for the server running behind an intermediary to obey Priority header field values. As an example, a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6bf43d2ca0482cd11d8d8b8a79aec1410bc66979dd56c3c26fddda9768b9b211","title":"","text":"parameters, which are a standardized and extensible format of priority information. header-field defines the Priority HTTP header field, a protocol-version-independent and end-to-end priority signal. Clients can use this header to signal priority to servers in order to specify the precedence of HTTP responses. Similarly, servers behind an intermediary can use it to signal priority to the intermediary. <\/del> Clients can send this header field to signal their view of how responses should be prioritized. Similarly, servers behind an intermediary can use it to signal priority to the intermediary. <\/ins> After sending a request, a client can change the priority of the response (see reprioritization) using HTTP-version-specific frames defined in h2-update-frame and h3-update-frame."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-763f152600a55d69ac2f1ed97d9dc80e8ba758e3efb3fd042db1a72267c96ca8","title":"","text":"parameters). It can appear in requests and responses. It is an end- to-end signal of the request priority from the client or the response priority from the server. merging describes how intermediaries can combine the priority information from client requests and server responses to correct or amend the precedence. Clients cannot interpret the appearance or omission of a Priority response header as acknowledgement that any prioritization has occurred. Guidance for how endpoints can act on Priority header values is given in server- scheduling and client-scheduling. <\/del> combine the priority information sent from clients and servers. Clients cannot interpret the appearance or omission of a Priority response header field as acknowledgement that any prioritization has occurred. Guidance for how endpoints can act on Priority header values is given in server-scheduling and client-scheduling. <\/ins> Priority is a Dictionary (STRUCTURED-FIELDS):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ce4a5db9f5bc39e1fae66c9b559942a1b14827141817ebbc0ab735bcd193bfa4","title":"","text":"When an intermediary coalesces HTTP requests coming from multiple clients into one HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 connection going to the backend server, requests that originate from one client might carry priority signals indicating higher precedence than those coming from others. <\/del> server, requests that originate from one client might carry signals indicating higher priority than those coming from others. <\/ins> It is sometimes beneficial for the server running behind an intermediary to obey Priority header field values. As an example, a resource-constrained server might defer the transmission of software update files that would have the background urgency being associated. However, in the worst case, the asymmetry between the precedence <\/del> However, in the worst case, the asymmetry between the priority <\/ins> declared by multiple clients might cause responses going to one user agent to be delayed totally after those going to another."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-86ff6c6d0b8d405fb3ff0a36b41df075159a663ec001f2fe47d5e761c01c46b9","title":"","text":"Trailer section. This contains zero or more trailer fields. Optional padding. Any amount of zero-valued bytes. <\/ins> All lengths and numeric values are encoded using the variable-length integer encoding from QUIC."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-66e2b327125104a2307f486e3fbbc4c887b72d25a47de5f08ea13b45ce179a4e","title":"","text":"Omitting content by truncating a message is only possible if the content is zero-length. 3.8. Messages can be padded with any number of zero-valued bytes. Non- zero padding bytes cause a message to be invalid (see invalid). Unlike other parts of a message, a processor MAY decide not to validate the value of padding bytes. Padding is compatible with truncation of empty parts of the messages. Zero-valued bytes will be interpreted as zero-length part, which is semantically equivalent to the part being absent. <\/ins> 4. This document describes a number of ways that a message can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5b3ec1cb76eb7677387f702136c86d1ccc996b68d23fa1f8304a70b3b9a67db0","title":"","text":"shown in ex-bini-request. As the content of this message is empty, the difference in formats is negligible. This indefinite-length encoding can be truncated by two bytes in the same way. <\/del> This indefinite-length encoding contains 10 bytes of padding. As two additional bytes can be truncated in the same way as the known-length example, anything up to 12 bytes can be removed from this message without affecting its meaning. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-99bcb87704ee4f3cc4cc6734891e93acca6934ff7bf5cb2e66c1cc8d1dd2066c","title":"","text":"8.5. Digest fields may expose details of encrypted payload when the checksum is computed on the unencrypted data. <\/del> The checksum of an encrypted payload can change between different messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases its value could not be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-223f0d7a5c401c3e579d934beca9ef6869fe16d5b6ee698145b7bda7e6818f44","title":"","text":"has been superseded by \"selected representation\". This document replaces RFC3230. The changes described in the following paragraphs are intended to be semantically compatible with existing implementations where possible. <\/del> following paragraphs are intended to be syntactically and semantically compatible with existing implementations where possible. <\/ins> The \"Digest\" and \"Want-Digest\" field definitions are updated to align with the terms and notational conventions in SEMANTICS."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1e5bf873cec60f8268979f0be92ffcde56b87789a726ca7a902832710084c67a","title":"","text":"This document defines two digest integrity mechanisms for HTTP. First, representation data integrity, which acts on representation data (Section 3.2 of SEMANTICS). Second, content digest integrity, which acts on conveyed content (Section 6.4 of SEMANTICS). Both mechanisms operate independent of transport integrity, offering the potential to detect programming errors and corruption of data in flight or at rest. They can be used across multiple hops in order to provide end-to-end integrity guarantees, which can aid fault diagnosis when resources are transferred across hops and system boundaries. Finally, they can be used to validate integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections. <\/del> data (Section 3.2 of SEMANTICS). Second, content integrity, which acts on conveyed content (Section 6.4 of SEMANTICS). Both mechanisms operate independent of transport integrity, offering the potential to detect programming errors and corruption of data in flight or at rest. They can be used across multiple hops in order to provide end- to-end integrity guarantees, which can aid fault diagnosis when resources are transferred across hops and system boundaries. Finally, they can be used to validate integrity when reconstructing a resource fetched using different HTTP connections. <\/ins> This document obsoletes RFC3230."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b963192c0a5451dd129a8d686c4088413f7abfdd4c86832edccdb36b39da77a4","title":"","text":"(e.g. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas digest-algorithm tokens are quoted (e.g. \"sha\", \"crc32c\"). The term \"checksum\" describes the output of the application of an algorithm to a sequence of bytes, whereas digest is only used in relation to the value of the fields. <\/ins> 2. The representation digest is an integrity mechanism for HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f6dd6ab911bcf4e96f63a5bc4f65aa56acba1b0155fa030f508418cea95affad","title":"","text":"SEMANTICS. When an incremental digest-algorithm is used, the sender and the receiver can dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the <\/del> receiver can dynamically compute a checksum while streaming the <\/ins> content. A non-comprehensive set of examples showing the impacts of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-313b153b145eaac61bc3e5350d7e15de6673e9f99bd45d9b178300d334a1e370","title":"","text":"Section 6.5.1 of SEMANTICS. When an incremental digest-algorithm is used, the sender and the receiver can dynamically compute the digest value while streaming the <\/del> receiver can dynamically compute the checksum while streaming the <\/ins> content. 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a91ad6427b149714fe7ea21a0335c057c9e22ece0c663819d734c4af5dbf989","title":"","text":"e.g. according to the type and status of the primary document in which the algorithm is defined; \"insecure\" when the algorithm is insecure; \"reserved\" when Digest algorithm references a reserved token value <\/del> algorithm is insecure; \"reserved\" when the algorithm references a reserved token value <\/ins> Description: the description of the digest-algorithm and its encoding"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5e0fede5ea0af26eecac0879112fcbf21bbdcc92264b56389e0481e179dec327","title":"","text":"Insecure digest algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial setting; for example, when signing the digest of content for <\/del> setting; for example, when signing digest fields' values for <\/ins> authenticity. The registry is initialized with the tokens listed below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b964dd03d32252d4b73b2706304915d88abcb36c7c3f136211c12428f63dfa8c","title":"","text":"Such signatures can protect one or more HTTP fields and there are additional considerations when \"Digest\" is included in this set. Since digest fields are hashes of resource representations, they <\/del> Since digest fields are checksums of resource representations, they <\/ins> explicitly depend on the \"representation metadata\" (e.g. the values of \"Content-Type\", \"Content-Encoding\" etc). A signature that protects \"Digest\" but not other \"representation metadata\" can expose"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5a19debe3ce4a043a88acf50e6a54cb636bfddba405bfebd154d111d82873b58","title":"","text":"character sets used for the encoding. Insecure digest algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against accidental change, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial <\/del> corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial <\/ins> setting; for example, when signing the digest of content for authenticity."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-252fd16d0675a07fb455adee441f1ecc7ae6cc1e418a8a71c6a91dc62584d2a5","title":"","text":"This document specifies a data integrity mechanism that protects HTTP \"representation data\" or content, but not HTTP header and trailer fields, from certain kinds of accidental corruption. <\/del> fields, from certain kinds of corruption. <\/ins> Digest fields are not intended to be a general protection against malicious tampering with HTTP messages. This can be achieved by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9fa72a903e5434658fbdb4edc44b132c157ae197b9fb5c2d3754d993c0b99b71","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: sha-512 Description: The SHA-512 algorithm RFC6234. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/del> algorithm is encoded using base64 RFC4648. <\/ins> Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-438fc5f5a1dbdb5a0a3aa27a84a4dfbd160249693d0f919a842aa361ee0f90ed","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: sha-256 Description: The SHA-256 algorithm RFC6234. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/del> algorithm is encoded using base64 RFC4648. <\/ins> Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-225cf2e113ce6398e3bae5e26a134f7fc8eb19a63a5234e28fd14e03fd823535","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: md5 Description: The MD5 algorithm, as specified in RFC1321. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-MD5 and CMU-836068. <\/del> Description: The MD5 algorithm RFC1321. The output of this algorithm is encoded using base64 RFC4648. This digest- algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-MD5 and CMU-836068. <\/ins> Reference: RFC1321, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9b20c9541aa8d22ca0e7a34d9ae8aa70023c21b0d8b291d16e8a8074d2b1728a","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: sha Description: The SHA-1 algorithm RFC3174. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. This digest-algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-SHA1 and IACR-2020-014. <\/del> algorithm is encoded using base64 RFC4648. This digest- algorithm is now vulnerable to collision attacks. See NO-SHA1 and IACR-2020-014. <\/ins> Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dfff5f7c7c3a44408b4c559a7ad069d6fc207715ac25645e43f91df7b65a3fd1","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: unixsum Description: The algorithm computed by the UNIX \"sum\" command, as defined by the Single UNIX Specification, Version 2 UNIX. <\/del> Description: The algorithm used by the UNIX \"sum\" command UNIX. <\/ins> The output of this algorithm is an ASCII decimal-digit string representing the 16-bit checksum, which is the first word of the output of the UNIX \"sum\" command."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72cdbb8b42e04d4713b2ca889d841a79a458ed6f43d76d9849ed6e3a429daa88","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: unixcksum Description: The algorithm computed by the UNIX \"cksum\" command, as defined by the Single UNIX Specification, Version 2 <\/del> Description: The algorithm used by the UNIX \"cksum\" command <\/ins> UNIX. The output of this algorithm is an ASCII digit string representing the 32-bit CRC, which is the first word of the output of the UNIX \"cksum\" command."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c8b01f9d5bc0cc6e6e7ebf1d6b4050adc630f66896bf48bd6504a56212530ccf","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: adler32 Description: The ADLER32 algorithm is a checksum specified in RFC1950 \"ZLIB Compressed Data Format\". The 32-bit output is encoded in hexadecimal (using between 1 and 8 ASCII characters from 0-9, A-F, and a-f; leading 0's are allowed). For example, adler32=03da0195 and adler32=3DA0195 are both valid checksums for the 4-byte message \"Wiki\". This algorithm is obsoleted and SHOULD NOT be used. <\/del> Description: The ADLER32 algorithm RFC1950. The 32-bit output is encoded in hexadecimal (using between 1 and 8 ASCII characters from 0-9, A-F, and a-f; leading 0's are allowed). For example, adler32=03da0195 and adler32=3DA0195 are both valid checksums for the 4-byte message \"Wiki\". This algorithm is obsoleted and SHOULD NOT be used. <\/ins> Reference: RFC1950, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-088443ad451f546748734baf9743c09202fa0df2142f9c6af9dcfc20763f02b6","title":"","text":"Digest Algorithm: crc32c Description: The CRC32c algorithm is a 32-bit cyclic redundancy check. It achieves a better hamming distance (for better error-detection performance) than many other 32-bit CRC functions. Other places it is used include iSCSI and SCTP. The 32-bit output is encoded in hexadecimal (using between 1 and 8 ASCII characters from 0-9, A-F, and a-f; leading 0's are allowed). For example, crc32c=0a72a4df and crc32c=A72A4DF are both valid checksums for the 3-byte message \"dog\". <\/del> Description: The CRC32c algorithm RFC4960. The 32-bit output is encoded in hexadecimal (using between 1 and 8 ASCII characters from 0-9, A-F, and a-f; leading 0's are allowed). For example, crc32c=0a72a4df and crc32c=A72A4DF are both valid checksums for the 3-byte message \"dog\". <\/ins> Reference: RFC4960 appendix B, this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cafc8b29d6b4e03cb057f4c73e1963d509db4df5aa018abdf0a34429535cfbb1","title":"","text":"protocols that do not have strong ordering guarantees across streams, like HTTP\/3 HTTP3. Multiple experiments from independent research (MARX, MEENAN) have shown that simpler schemes can reach at least equivalent performance characteristics compared to the more complex RFC 7540 setups seen in practice, at least for the web use case. <\/del> Experiments from independent research (MARX) have shown that simpler schemes can reach at least equivalent performance characteristics compared to the more complex RFC 7540 setups seen in practice, at least for the web use case. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ad113d81d5f634e2f082590e529a17d43865fd455498193cd2c8f2ba3bb222e5","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines the HTTP header field \"Client-Cert\" that allows a TLS terminating reverse proxy to convey the client certificate of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection to the origin server in a common and predictable manner. <\/del> This document defines HTTP extension header fields that allow a TLS terminating reverse proxy to convey the client certificate information of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection to the origin server in a common and predictable manner. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fe1029167f5f9da6abf4244874965716e9dec876647e4532e85c39a2dcaec935","title":"","text":"commonly occurring functionality could improve and simplify interoperability between independent implementations. This document aspires to standardize an HTTP header field named \"Client-Cert\" that a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) adds to requests that it sends to the backend origin servers. The field value contains the client certificate from the mutually-authenticated TLS connection between the originating client and the TTRP. This enables the backend origin server to utilize the client certificate information in its application logic. While there may be additional proxies or hops between the TTRP and the origin server (potentially even with mutually-authenticated TLS connections between them), the scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header field is intentionally limited to exposing to the origin server the certificate that was presented by the originating client in its connection to the TTRP. <\/del> This document aspires to standardize two HTTP header fields, \"Client- Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\", which a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) adds to requests sent to the backend origin servers. The \"Client-Cert\" field value contains the end-entity client certificate from the mutually-authenticated TLS connection between the originating client and the TTRP. Optionally, the \"Client-Cert-Chain\" field value contains the certificate chain used for validation of the end-entity certificate. This enables the backend origin server to utilize the client certificate information in its application logic. While there may be additional proxies or hops between the TTRP and the origin server (potentially even with mutually-authenticated TLS connections between them), the scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header field is intentionally limited to exposing to the origin server the certificate that was presented by the originating client in its connection to the TTRP. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e8b92ec3e466eae03b1fa34e6666469a0742e98ea736cd4ca20f605bad6f38ed","title":"","text":"2.1. The field-values of the HTTP header field defined herein utilize the following encoded form. <\/del> The headers in this document encode certificates as Structured Field Byte Sequences (Section 3.3.5 of RFC8941) where the value of the binary data is a DER encoded ITU.X690.1994 X.509 certificate RFC5280. In effect, this means that the binary DER certificate is encoded using base64 (without line breaks, spaces, or other characters outside the base64 alphabet) and delimited with colons on either side. <\/ins> A certificate is represented in text as an \"EncodedCertificate\", which is the base64-encoded (Section 4 of RFC4648) DER ITU.X690.1994 PKIX certificate. The encoded value MUST NOT include any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional characters. ABNF RFC5234 syntax for \"EncodedCertificate\" is shown in the figure below. <\/del> Note that certificates are often stored encoded in a textual format, such as the one described in Section 5.1 of RFC7468, which is already nearly compatible with a Structured Field Byte Sequence; if so, it will be sufficient to replace \"---(BEGIN|END) CERTIFICATE---\" with \":\" and remove line breaks in order to generate an appropriate item. <\/ins> 2.2. In the context of a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) deployment, the TTRP makes the TLS client certificate available to the backend application with the following header field. <\/del> the proxy makes the TLS client certificate available to the backend application with the Client-Cert HTTP header field. This field contains the end-entity certificate used by the client in the TLS handshake. <\/ins> The end-entity client certificate as an \"EncodedCertificate\" value. <\/del> Client-Cert is an Item Structured Header RFC8941. Its value MUST be a Byte Sequence (Section 3.3.5 of RFC8941). Its ABNF is: <\/ins> The \"Client-Cert\" header field defined herein is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a single HTTP header field value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. <\/del> The value of the header is encoded as described in encoding. The \"Client-Cert\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a single HTTP header field value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. <\/ins> 2.3. In the context of a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) deployment, the proxy MAY make the certificate chain used for validation of the end-entity certificate available to the backend application with the Client-Cert-Chain HTTP header field. This field contains certificates used by the proxy to validate the certificate used by the client in the TLS handshake. These certificates might or might not have been provided by the client during the TLS handshake. Client-Cert-Chain is a List Structured Header RFC8941. Each item in the list MUST be a Byte Sequence (Section 3.3.5 of RFC8941) encoded as described in encoding. The header's ABNF is: The \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It MAY have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. For header compression purposes, it might be advantageous to split lists into multiple instances. The first certificate in the list SHOULD directly certify the end- entity certificate provided in the \"Client-Cert\" header; each following certificate SHOULD directly certify the one immediately preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that the server is known to possess any omitted certificates. However, for maximum compatibility, servers SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings. 2.4. <\/ins> This section outlines the applicable processing rules for a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) that has negotiated a mutually- authenticated TLS connection to convey the client certificate from"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-29529dbbebd31da7fd987cd7d796fbb1a32ec4b75a31cac4b341b79c45b1bcee","title":"","text":"connection are dispatched to the origin server with the following modifications: The client certificate is be placed in the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the dispatched request as defined in header. <\/del> The client certificate is placed in the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the dispatched request, as described in header. <\/ins> Any occurrence of the \"Client-Cert\" header field in the original incoming request MUST be removed or overwritten before forwarding the request. An incoming request that has a \"Client-Cert\" header field MAY be rejected with an HTTP 400 response. <\/del> If so configured, the validation chain of the client certificate is placed in the \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field of the request, as described in chain-header. Any occurrence of the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields in the original incoming request MUST be removed or overwritten before forwarding the request. An incoming request that has a \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field MAY be rejected with an HTTP 400 response. <\/ins> Requests made over a TLS connection where the use of client certificate authentication was not negotiated MUST be sanitized by removing any and all occurrences \"Client-Cert\" header field prior to dispatching the request to the backend server. <\/del> removing any and all occurrences of the \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client- Cert-Chain\" header fields prior to dispatching the request to the backend server. <\/ins> Backend origin servers may then use the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the request to determine if the connection from the client to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-53e5318cef425b10f1d590e267c1303921b619c4e7be57264b339b9004f70693","title":"","text":"presented by the client. Forward proxies and other intermediaries MUST NOT add the \"Client- Cert\" header field to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" header field in requests. A server that receives a request with a \"Client-Cert\" header field value that it considers to be too large can respond with an HTTP 431 status code per Section 5 of RFC6585. <\/del> Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. A server that receives a request with a \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client- Cert-Chain\" header field value that it considers to be too large can respond with an HTTP 431 status code per Section 5 of RFC6585. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-088bc70965d7acd42635680b70842e2840b00f9d3e2a45f2e750781a0521f70c","title":"","text":" Client-Cert HTTP Header Field: Conveying Client Certificate Information from TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies to Origin Server Applications <\/del> Client-Cert HTTP Header Field <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-client-cert-field-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-225e22af5defe03db5bc2a038045430900ef74ee694a437d06ea879c91ebcc29","title":"","text":"Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. A server that receives a request with a \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client- Cert-Chain\" header field value that it considers to be too large can respond with an HTTP 431 status code per RFC6585. <\/del> 3. 3.1. If the client certificate header field is generated by an intermediary on a connection that compresses fields (e.g., using HPACK RFC7541 or QPACK I-D.ietf-quic-qpack) and more than one client's requests are multiplexed into that connection, it can reduce compression efficiency significantly, due to the typical size of the field value and its variation between clients. Recipients that anticipate connections with these characteristics can mitigate the efficiency loss by increasing the size of the dynamic table. If a recipient does not do so, senders may find it beneficial to always send the field value as a literal, rather than entering it into the dynamic table. 3.2. A server in receipt of a larger header block than it is willing to handle can send an HTTP 431 (Request Header Fields Too Large) status code per RFC6585. Due to the typical size of the field values containing certificate data, recipients may need to be configured to allow for a larger maximum header block size. An intermediary generating client certificate header fields on connections that allow for advertising the maximum acceptable header block size (e.g. HTTP\/2 RFC7540 or HTTP\/3 I-D.ietf-quic-http) should account for the additional size of header block of the requests it sends vs. requests it receives by advertising a value to its clients that is sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. 4. <\/ins> The header fields described herein enable a TTRP and backend or origin server to function together as though, from the client's perspective, they are a single logical server side deployment of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cff12c3fda665f661914b7398fbd9f3f42e9a1277355d3c787c6b3e5b484edc7","title":"","text":"Other deployments that meet the requirements set forth herein are also possible. 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> The \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\" HTTP header fields will be added to the registry defined by http-core."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-962b9f09d903f0a0ff803e836d27d572de0d490600c9343a541b719476d5f849","title":"","text":"SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP\/2. If a server which advertises support for Extended CONNECT but receives an Extended CONNECT request with a \":protocol\" value that is unknown or is not supported, the server SHOULD respond to the request with a 501 (Not Implemented) status code (HTTP). A server MAY provide more information via a Problem Details response RFC7807. <\/del> If a server advertises support for Extended CONNECT but receives an Extended CONNECT request with a \":protocol\" value that is unknown or is not supported, the server SHOULD respond to the request with a 501 (Not Implemented) status code (HTTP). A server MAY provide more information via a Problem Details response RFC7807. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2d157d401e60389476ab708e249ed7a744595230b57c8ffb1722e8a197cd8adf","title":"","text":"Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. When the value of the \"Client-Cert\" request header field is used to select a response (e.g., the response content is access-controlled), the response MUST either be uncacheable (e.g., by sending \"Cache- Control: no-store\") or be designated for selective reuse only for subsequent requests with the same \"Client-Cert\" header value by sending a \"Vary: Client-Cert\" response header. If a TTRP encounters a response with a \"client-cert\" field name in the \"Vary\" header field, it SHOULD prevent the user agent from caching the response by transforming the value of the \"Vary\" response header field to \"*\". <\/ins> 3. 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7197b49ef4c21dd7d6fafa06ee419e4558defb69a552f187ebd27bd469b04973","title":"","text":"messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. HTTP\/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC7540) and prohibits TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication RFC8740. However, they are sometimes used to implement reactive client certificate authentication in HTTP\/1.1 RFC7230 where the server decides whether to request a client certificate based on the HTTP request. HTTP application data sent on such a connection after receipt and verification of the client certificate is also mutually-authenticated and thus suitable for the mechanisms described in this document. <\/ins> 2. This document designates the following headers, defined further in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1be4a60b3f1471b6c5b72044c3799c9a073f9bdcd9e7f9f4b51960e2f4abdeb","title":"","text":"5. The \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\" HTTP header fields will be added to the registry defined by http-core. <\/del> 5.1. Please register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" defined by I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics: Field name: Client-Cert Status: permanent Specification document: headers of [this document] Field name: Client-Cert-Chain Status: permanent Specification document: headers of [this document] <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5b22c13965e730ba1c3f037de007b371421f9c16846419306726b160b82e10be","title":"","text":"and the RSA PSS algorithm described in method-rsa-pss-sha512, giving the following message signature output value, encoded in Base64: Note that the RSA PSS algorithm in use here is non-deterministic, meaning a different signature value will be created every time the algorithm is run. The signature value provided here can be validated against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example. See security-nondeterministic. <\/ins> 3.2. Verification of an HTTP message signature is a process that takes as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-accd5b6b08dbfac18f8385858f6dc5388ab0fa28f18105605dbe66feeabf348d","title":"","text":"string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/del> of the verification function indicate if the signature presented is valid. Note that the output of RSA PSS algorithms are non-deterministic, and therefore it is not correct to re-calculate a new signature on the signature input and compare the results to an existing signature. Instead, the verification algorithm defined here needs to be used. See security-nondeterministic. <\/ins> Use of this algorithm can be indicated at runtime using the \"rsa-pss- sha512\" value for the \"alg\" signature parameter."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0bbc5106784a1e030482a227d34a41e6cb0d6b2fab3dde68a40d774fcd2239b9","title":"","text":"algorithm FIPS186-4 using curve P-256 with the signer's private signing key and the signature input string (create-sig-input). The hash SHA-256 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The resulting signed content byte array is the HTTP message signature output used in sign. <\/del> create the digest content to which the digital signature is applied, (\"M\"). The signature algorithm returns two integer values, \"r\" and \"s\". These are both encoded in big-endian unsigned integers, zero- padded to 32-octets each. These encoded values are concatenated into a single 64-octet array consisting of the encoded value of \"r\" followed by the encoded value of \"s\". The resulting concatenation of \"(r, s)\" is byte array of the HTTP message signature output used in sign. <\/ins> To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the \"ECDSA\" algorithm FIPS186-4 using the public key portion of the verification key material and the signature input string re-created as described in verify. The hash function SHA-256 RFC6234 is applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. The results of the verification function are compared to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is valid. <\/del> signature verification function is applied, (\"M\"). The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. This value is a 64-octet array consisting of the encoded values of \"r\" and \"s\" concatenated in order. These are both encoded in big-endian unsigned integers, zero-padded to 32-octets each. The resulting signature value \"(r, s)\" is used as input to the signature verification function. The results of the verification function indicate if the signature presented is valid. Note that the output of ECDSA algorithms are non-deterministic, and therefore it is not correct to re-calculate a new signature on the signature input and compare the results to an existing signature. Instead, the verification algorithm defined here needs to be used. See security-nondeterministic. <\/ins> Use of this algorithm can be indicated at runtime using the \"ecdsa- p256-sha256\" value for the \"alg\" signature parameter. 3.3.5. To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the \"Ed25519\" algorithm RFC8032 with the signer's private signing key and the signature input string (create-sig-input). The signature input string is taken as the input message (\"M\") with no pre-hash function. The signature is a 64-octet concatenation of \"R\" and \"S\" as specified in RFC8032, and this is taken as a byte array for the HTTP message signature output used in sign. To verify using this algorithm, the signer applies the \"Ed25519\" algorithm RFC8032 using the public key portion of the verification key material (\"A\") and the signature input string re-created as described in verify. The signature input string is taken as the input message (\"M\") with no pre-hash function. The signature to be verified is processed as the 64-octet concatenation of \"R\" and \"S\" as specified in RFC8032. The results of the verification function indicate if the signature presented is valid. Use of this algorithm can be indicated at runtime using the \"ed25519\" value for the \"alg\" signature parameter. 3.3.6. <\/ins> If the signing algorithm is a JOSE signing algorithm from the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry established by RFC7518, the JWS algorithm definition determines the signature and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd23d34c926aa93ef5f29994fa8c735dcf99d5fb88b360f7e7f0ceb0966ecf6a","title":"","text":"it be taken from the fields of the message. The algorithm discussed in create-sig-input provides a safe order of operations. 7.19. Some cryptographic primitives such as RSA PSS and ECDSA have non- deterministic outputs, which include some amount of entropy within the algorithm. For such algorithms, multiple signatures generated in succession will not match. A lazy implementation of a verifier could ignore this distinction and simply check for the same value being created by re-signing the signature input. Such an implementation would work for deterministic algorithms such as HMAC and EdDSA but fail to verify valid signatures made using non-deterministic algorithms. It is therefore important that a verifier always use the correctly-defined verification function for the algorithm in question and not do a simple comparison. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-30f98124c2fa01536d1077ca480c75156e00aede283af5cf4e87f35db8562cd0","title":"","text":"This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 with the list rule extension defined in RFC7230, Appendix B. It includes by reference the DIGIT rule from RFC5234; the OWS, field- name and quoted-string rules from RFC7230; and the parameter rule from RFC7231. <\/del> It includes by reference the DIGIT rule from RFC5234 and the OWS and field-name rules from RFC7230. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5d4a4840ef0533731f36693a3bd2b572beb173f578ae800803c041006f9a4929","title":"","text":"received hints from the client. When doing so, and if the resource is cacheable, the server MUST also emit a Vary response header field (Section 7.1.4 of RFC7231), and optionally Key (I-D.ietf-httpbis- key), to indicate which hints were used and whether the selected response is appropriate for a later request. <\/del> key), to indicate which hints can affect the selected response and whether the selected response is appropriate for a later request. <\/ins> Further, depending on the used hint, the server can emit additional response header fields to confirm the property of the response, such"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c3540c0445960dfbe8832bea51fd99ad0ba14d25f6e11748b59cffe8373ef6b","title":"","text":"For example: When a client receives Accept-CH, it SHOULD append the Client Hint header fields that match the advertised field-values. For example, based on Accept-CH example above, the client would append DPR, Width, Viewport-Width, and Downlink header fields to all subsequent requests. <\/del> When a client receives Accept-CH, or if it is capable of processing the HTML response and finds an equivalent HTML meta element, it SHOULD append the Client-Hint header fields that match the advertised field-values to the header list of all subsequent requests. For example, based on Accept-CH example above, a user agent could append DPR, Width, Viewport-Width, and Downlink header fields to all subresource requests initiated by the page constructed from the response. Alternatively, a client can treat advertised support as a persistent origin preference and append same header fields on all future requests initiated to and by the resources associated with that origin. <\/ins> 2.2.2. When selecting an optimized response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to emit a Vary response header field (RFC7234) to indicate which hints were used and whether the selected response is appropriate for a later request. <\/del> Vary response header field (RFC7234) to indicate which hints can affect the selected response and whether the selected response is appropriate for a later request. <\/ins> Above example indicates that the cache key needs to include the DPR header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fa063d27bcaca3872dcacdd949d6a657bb28bcb230cdcf2ef39b634f8bbce0e6","title":"","text":"The \"Width\" request header field is a number that indicates the desired resource width in physical px (i.e. intrinsic size of an image). The provided physical px value is a number rounded to the largest smallest following integer (i.e. ceiling value). <\/del> smallest following integer (i.e. ceiling value). <\/ins> If the desired resource width is not known at the time of the request or the resource does not have a display width, the Width header field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5ffbbb08fa9edaca5ff4cd2613e09a7a5f7e794466be8838fdbd858f820a2a9e","title":"","text":"The \"Viewport-Width\" request header field is a number that indicates the layout viewport width in CSS px. The provided CSS px value is a number rounded to the largest smallest following integer (i.e. ceiling value). <\/del> number rounded to the smallest following integer (i.e. ceiling value). <\/ins> If Viewport-Width occurs in a message more than once, the last value overrides all previous occurrences."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5656ce5e76400db28527e6af5bdb0720d817aa5e73c177d8fc00afea75db9721","title":"","text":"7. The \"Save-Data\" request header field is a token that indicates client's preference for reduced data usage, due to high transfer costs, slow connection speeds, or other reasons. <\/del> The \"Save-Data\" request header field consists of one or more tokens that indicate client's preference for reduced data usage, due to high transfer costs, slow connection speeds, or other reasons. <\/ins> This document defines the \"on\" sd-token value, which is used as a signal indicating explicit user opt-in into a reduced data usage mode"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2bbc6ddfcf716662f922cb711987c6328564aeb565f6c75c91015b484696bccf","title":"","text":"CTL characters that lead to set-cookie-string rejection, as it is considered whitespace, which is handled separately. NOTE: The set-cookie-string may contain octet sequences that appear percent-encoded as per Section 2.1 of RFC3986. However, a user agent MUST NOT decode these sequences and instead parse the individual octets as specified in this algorithm. <\/ins> A user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following algorithm to parse a set-cookie-string:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b59a5b0bbed059d115c3cc26e49ddaf7befb018353bb2c4dfda3ee88d3b99091","title":"","text":"type\", \"date\", \"etag\") when using them as component identifiers. Unless overridden by additional parameters and rules, the HTTP field value MUST be canonicalized with the following steps: <\/del> value MUST be canonicalized as a single combined value as defined in SEMANTICS. If the combined value is not available for a given header, the following algorithm will produce canonicalized results for an implementation: <\/ins> Create an ordered list of the field values of each instance of the field in the message, in the order that they occur (or will occur) in the message. Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list. Note that since HTTP field values are not allowed to contain leading and trailing whitespace, this will be a no-op in a compliant implementation. Remove any obsolete line-folding within the line and replace it with a single space (\"\"), as discussed in MESSAGING. Note that this behavior is specific to MESSAGING and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification. <\/ins> Concatenate the list items together, with a single comma \"\",\"\" and space \"\" \"\" between each item. <\/del> Concatenate the list of values together with a single comma (\",\") and a single space (\"\") between each item. <\/ins> The resulting string is the canonicalized component value. Following are non-normative examples of canonicalized values for header fields, given the following example HTTP message fragment: The following example shows canonicalized values for these example header fields, presented using the signature input string format discussed in create-sig-input: Since empty HTTP header fields are allowed, they are also able to be signed when present in a message. The canonicalized value is the empty string. This means that the following empty header: Is serialized by the create-sig-input with an empty string value following the colon and space added after the content identifier. Note: these are shown here using the line wrapping algorithm in RFC8792 due to limitations in the document format that strips trailing spaces from diagrams. <\/ins> 2.1.1. If value of the the HTTP field in question is a structured field (RFC8941), the component identifier MAY include the \"sf\" parameter. If this parameter is included, the HTTP field value MUST be canonicalized using the rules specified in RFC8941. For example, this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character. <\/del> (RFC8941), the component identifier MAY include the \"sf\" parameter to indicate it is a known structured field. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the rules specified in RFC8941 applicable to the type of the HTTP field. Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. <\/ins> The resulting string is used as the component value in http-header. <\/del> For example, the following dictionary field is a valid serialization: <\/ins> 2.1.2. <\/del> If included in the input string as-is, it would be: <\/ins> Following are non-normative examples of canonicalized values for header fields, given the following example HTTP message: <\/del> However, if the \"sf\" parameter is added, the value is re-serialized as follows: <\/ins> The following example shows canonicalized values for these example header fields, presented using the signature input string format discussed in create-sig-input: <\/del> The resulting string is used as the component value in http-header. <\/ins> 2.1.3. <\/del> 2.1.2. <\/ins> An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is identified by using the parameter \"key\" to indicate the member key as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a2347044cce8ab98b584be35ae84b69f5ebfe0b8341c9cc1f8fdf2b890f342f2","title":"","text":"An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in RFC8941 on a Dictionary containing only that item. <\/del> RFC8941 on the member value and its parameters, without the dictionary key. <\/ins> Each parameterized key for a given field MUST NOT appear more than once in the signature input. Parameterized keys MAY appear in any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b4b09cdbaf8203f98b9ca59ed19b04afce1c2d1875d884c22a99f99b3fe1ff62","title":"","text":"component identifiers of this field, presented using the signature input string format discussed in create-sig-input: Note that the value for \"key=\"c\"\" has been re-serialized. <\/ins> 2.2. In addition to HTTP fields, there are a number of different"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f84421a347fdf138fc2960fbaa761cbb47a5cf45b2a96bb04336f6e7567e66c6","title":"","text":"This would result in the following unsigned response message: The server signs the response with its own key and includes the signature of \"sig1\" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature input string for this example is: <\/del> To cryptographically link the response to the request, the server signs the response with its own key and includes the signature of \"sig1\" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature input string for this example is: <\/ins> The signed response message is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-db39103862014a7419eb768be0a3859057364e9c5a7c4809c94464ccc5bc7dbf","title":"","text":"long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier. Note that the ECDSA algorithm in use here is non-deterministic, meaning a different signature value will be created every time the algorithm is run. The signature value provided here can be validated against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example. See security-nondeterministic. <\/ins> The \"@request-response\" component identifier MUST NOT be used in a request message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-63896d2cd0287b7fd4f997d32f34a450ca750fb6fe0a5d23e6f14d83a940e3a1","title":"","text":"produce an error and not create an input string. Such situations are included but not limited to: The signer or verifier does not understand the component <\/del> The signer or verifier does not understand the derived component <\/ins> identifier. The component identifier identifies a field that is not present in the message or whose value is malformed. The component identifier indicates that a structured field serialization is used, but the field in question is known to not be a structured field or the type of structured field is not known to the verifier. <\/del> serialization is used (via the \"sf\" parameter), but the field in question is known to not be a structured field or the type of structured field is not known to the implementation. <\/ins> The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier that references a field that is not present in the message, is not a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5160aca57ac01d0bfc5ea46cb87dd43a4bfe9797ecfc11630c6b2e585282aabd","title":"","text":"The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier or a named query parameter identifier that references a member that is not present in the component value, or whose value is malformed. E.g., the identifier is \"\"x-dictionary\";key=\"c\"\" and the value of the \"x-dictionary\" header field is \"a=1, b=2\" <\/del> E.g., the identifier is \"\"example-dictionary\";key=\"c\"\" and the value of the \"Example-Dictionary\" header field is \"a=1, b=2\", which does not have the \"c\" value. <\/ins> In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request: The covered components consist of the \"@method\", \"@path\", and \"@authority\" derived component identifiers followed by the \"Cache- Control\", \"X-Empty-Header\", \"X-Example\" HTTP headers, in order. The signature parameters consist of a creation timestamp is \"1618884475\" and the key identifier is \"test-key-rsa-pss\". The signature input string for this message with these parameters is: <\/del> \"@authority\" derived component identifiers followed by the \"Content- Digest\", \"Content-Length\", and \"Content-Type\" HTTP header fields, in order. The signature parameters consist of a creation timestamp of \"1618884473\" and a key identifier of \"test-key-rsa-pss\". Note that no explicit \"alg\" parameter is given here since the verifier is assumed by the application to correctly use the RSA PSS algorithm based on the identified key. The signature input string for this message with these parameters is: Note that the example signature input here, or anywhere else within this specification, does not include the final newline that ends the example. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-da432c4dbf92abe3e7d3310c03b506661893bb8f237d0397e7aaa8cebd8e61b6","title":"","text":"HTTP Message signatures MAY use any cryptographic digital signature or MAC method that is appropriate for the key material, environment, and needs of the signer and verifier. All signatures are generated from and verified against the byte values of the signature input string defined in create-sig-input. <\/del> and needs of the signer and verifier. <\/ins> Each signature algorithm method takes as its input the signature input string as a set of byte values (\"I\"), the signing key material (\"Ks\"), and outputs the signature output as a set of byte values (\"S\"): <\/del> input string defined in create-sig-input as a byte array (\"M\"), the signing key material (\"Ks\"), and outputs the signature output as a byte array (\"S\"): <\/ins> Each verification algorithm method takes as its input the recalculated signature input string as a set of byte values (\"I\"), the verification key material (\"Kv\"), and the presented signature to be verified as a set of byte values (\"S\") and outputs the verification result (\"V\") as a boolean: <\/del> recalculated signature input string defined in create-sig-input as a byte array (\"M\"), the verification key material (\"Kv\"), and the presented signature to be verified as a byte array (\"S\") and outputs the verification result (\"V\") as a boolean: <\/ins> This section contains several common algorithm methods. The method to use can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1afcf6f127797463ed0883104486bd278a3b58e2ab3f90e71672b73275e7f69","title":"","text":"client in fields when forwarding the request to a service host, including a signature over the client's original signature values. The following is a non-normative example of header fields a reverse proxy sets in addition to the examples in the previous sections. <\/del> The following is a non-normative example starts with a signed request from the client. The proxy takes this request validates the client's signature. <\/ins> The client's request includes a signature value under the label \"sig1\", which the proxy signs in addition to the \"Forwarded\" header defined in RFC7239. Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's \"Signature-Input\" value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. This results in a signature input string of: <\/del> The proxy then alters the message before forwarding it on to the origin server, changing the target host and adding the \"Forwarded\" header defined in RFC7239. The proxy includes the client's signature value under the label \"sig1\", which the proxy signs in addition to the \"Forwarded\" header. Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's \"Signature-Input\" value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature input string of: <\/ins> And a signature output value of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d49c3e7a7d9b79404592af15009a325f42e9269ce7a342859742f1a12d991c2e","title":"","text":"RFC8441 defines a mechanism for running the WebSocket Protocol RFC6455 over a single stream of an HTTP\/2 connection. It defines an Extended CONNECT method which specifies a new \":protocol\" pseudo <\/del> Extended CONNECT method which specifies a new \":protocol\" pseudo- <\/ins> header field and new semantics for the \":path\" and \":authority\" pseudo header fields. It also defines a new HTTP\/2 setting sent by a <\/del> pseudo-header fields. It also defines a new HTTP\/2 setting sent by a <\/ins> server to allow the client to use Extended CONNECT. The HTTP\/3 stream closure is also analogous to the TCP connection"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8b648560eabad0c888a8ed6b8eabbad510fa72e3b434f338fc22658654f72068","title":"","text":"FIN bit on the stream (HTTP3). RST exceptions are represented with an stream error (HTTP3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP3). The semantics of the headers and setting are identical to those in HTTP\/2 as defined RFC8441. HTTP3 requires that HTTP\/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The <\/del> The semantics of the pseudo-header fields and setting are identical to those in HTTP\/2 as defined RFC8441. HTTP3 requires that HTTP\/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The <\/ins> SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP\/2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-58dfe59d86637cb14712528b8d0e27b15e9533c2a001cacbdc2dbb9ad632a105","title":"","text":"The component identifier is a dictionary member identifier or a named query parameter identifier that references a member that is not present in the component value, or whose value is malformed. E.g., the identifier is \"\"example-dictionary\";key=\"c\"\" and the value of the \"Example-Dictionary\" header field is \"a=1, b=2\", which does not have the \"c\" value. <\/del> E.g., the identifier is \"\"example-dict\";key=\"c\"\" and the value of the \"Example-Dict\" header field is \"a=1, b=2\", which does not have the \"c\" value. <\/ins> In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed is the following request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-539fb32a9b153548dba90530d3cf7c0fe2c84046d75551e4dab34996bc10520b","title":"","text":"As an alternative to using GET, many implementations make use of the HTTP POST method to perform queries, as illustrated in the example below. In this case, the input parameters to the search operation are passed along within the request payload as opposed to using the <\/del> are passed along within the request content as opposed to using the <\/ins> request URI. A typical use of HTTP POST for requesting a search"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-62b7070204e2a9beaec2b1f035473b0dae2511610237004b28f9a66b436df593","title":"","text":"The QUERY method provides a solution that spans the gap between the use of GET and POST. As with POST, the input to the query operation is passed along within the payload of the request rather than as part <\/del> is passed along within the content of the request rather than as part <\/ins> of the request URI. Unlike POST, however, the method is explicitly safe and idempotent, allowing functions like caching and automatic retries to operate."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-288a6204519918fa8493a9a1d6efeee0cff840a7749a0915d33dda9666a4ab11","title":"","text":"HTTP GET method, which requests that a server return a representation of the resource identified by the target URI (as defined by RFCHTTP), the QUERY method is used to ask the server to perform a query operation (described by the request payload) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The payload returned in <\/del> operation (described by the request content) over some set of data scoped to the effective request URI. The content returned in <\/ins> response to a QUERY cannot be assumed to be a representation of the resource identified by the effective request URI. The body payload of the request defines the query. Implementations MAY use a request body of any content type with the QUERY method, <\/del> The content of the request defines the query. Implementations MAY use a request content of any media type with the QUERY method, <\/ins> provided that it has appropriate query semantics. QUERY requests are both safe and idempotent with regards to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a312fad0c8b5a2e81d851c2d6f5c2cad8fc9ebcd18bfb319696cd622950a00a","title":"","text":"including either header compression (HPACK, QPACK) or a generic framing layer. This format provides an alternative to the \"message\/http\" content type defined in MESSAGING. A binary format permits more efficient encoding and processing of messages. A binary format also reduces exposure to security problems related to processing of HTTP messages. <\/del> This format defines \"message\/bhttp\", a binary alternative to the \"message\/http\" content type defined in MESSAGING. A binary format permits more efficient encoding and processing of messages. A binary format also reduces exposure to security problems related to processing of HTTP messages. <\/ins> Two modes for encoding are described:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9821f0a244e6d8ef81420749414e05ff906789a3a15131f8b46cb070d5e450b8","title":"","text":"5.1. The example HTTP\/1.1 message in ex-request shows the content of a \"message\/http\". <\/del> The example HTTP\/1.1 message in ex-request shows the content in the \"message\/http\" format. <\/ins> Valid HTTP\/1.1 messages require lines terminated with CRLF (the two bytes 0x0a and 0x0d). For simplicity and consistency, the content of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-70cd4635bc66063662b755dbd91361138f0c63003f1d3755a72472dee9f12669","title":"","text":"7. The message\/http media type can be used to enclose a single HTTP <\/del> The \"message\/bhttp\" media type can be used to enclose a single HTTP <\/ins> request or response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for all \"message\" types regarding line length and encodings."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b2879bdb074ce452c0ac1def4dc4906d9b2fb29d5c92b9296dbbe88a3861fa1a","title":"","text":"A commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients are able to use alternative services that they become aware of. However, once a valid and authenticated commitment has been received, clients SHOULD NOT use an unauthenticated alternative service. Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services. A client MAY send requests to an unauthenticated origin in an attempt to discover potential alternative services, but these requests SHOULD be entirely generic and avoid including credentials. <\/del> received, clients SHOULD NOT use an alternative service without both reasonable assurances (see auth) and strong authentication. Where there is an active commitment, clients SHOULD ignore advertisements for unsecured alternative services. A client MAY send requests to an unauthenticated origin in an attempt to discover potential alternative services, but these requests SHOULD be entirely generic and avoid including credentials. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fba9a5e34bcc765828db574e6430331e381e4e3f1a072f48ea567731bd7edbd8","title":"","text":"Many of these same restrictions are shared by HTTP\/2 H2 and HTTP\/3 H3. Note that while some messages - CONNECT or upgrade requests in particular - can be represented using this format, doing so serves no purpose as these requests are used to affect protocol behavior, which this format cannot do without additional mechanisms. <\/ins> 7. The \"message\/bhttp\" media type can be used to enclose a single HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-60a1caa79552adf955fa38c1538b0f433a27e50308f796a1b602c3e5ec9240d9","title":"","text":"For field names, byte values that are not permitted in an HTTP field name cause the message to be invalid; see HTTP for a definition of what is valid and invalid for handling of invalid messages. Field names and values MUST be constructed and validated according to the rules of H2. A recipient MUST treat a message that contains field values that would cause an HTTP\/2 message to be malformed (H2) as invalid; see invalid. <\/del> what is valid and invalid for handling of invalid messages. A recipient MUST treat a message that contains field values that would cause an HTTP\/2 message to be malformed according to H2 as invalid; see invalid. <\/ins> The same field name can be repeated in multiple field lines; see HTTP for the semantics of repeated field names and rules for combining values. Fields that relate to connections (HTTP) cannot be used to produce the effect on a connection in this context. These fields SHOULD be removed when constructing a binary message. However, they do not cause a message to be invalid (invalid); permitting these fields allows a binary message to capture the content of a messages that are exchanged in a protocol context. <\/ins> Like HTTP\/2, this format has an exception for the combination of multiple instances of the \"Cookie\" field. Instances of fields with the ASCII-encoded value of \"cookie\" are combined using a semicolon"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-568a13c34ef05e59dce3277a31235c5390d344682203a74688da7570638caf61","title":"","text":"an indefinite-length encoding enables efficient generation of messages where lengths are not known when encoding starts. This format is designed to convey the semantics of valid HTTP messages as simply and efficiently as possible. It is not designed to capture all of the details of the encoding of messages from specific HTTP versions (MESSAGING, H2, H3). As such, this format is unlikely to be suitable for applications that depend on an exact recording of the encoding of messages. <\/ins> 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c1c93b1fa99f4f09208b78437646af1e120ee32032843049c0d4dd1c075d959","title":"","text":"framing of responses that depends on the corresponding request (such as HEAD) or the value of the status code (such as 204 or 304) <\/del> 304); these responses use the same framing as all other messages <\/ins> Some of these features are also absent in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-924de5c0b146f6438f78bebbfd2528eff80f9ede2dc4debd68bfeacb90657c7b","title":"","text":"Optional padding. Any amount of zero-valued bytes. All lengths and numeric values are encoded using the variable-length integer encoding from QUIC. <\/del> integer encoding from QUIC. Integer values do not need to be encoded on the minimum number of bytes necessary. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-403850c4fa74fcc59071411056f7c7d91b6333642329bdde85dbe5e71dc9ea91","title":"","text":"different structure; see informational. Fields in the header and trailer sections consist of a length- prefixed name and length-prefixed value. Both name and value are sequences of bytes that cannot be zero length. <\/del> prefixed name and length-prefixed value; see fields. <\/ins> The format allows for the message to be truncated before any of the length prefixes that precede the field sections or content. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-30707bbd276ff809761cedda1aaa01aa6a48620130ed9aa1e493b66929999580","title":"","text":"prefixed name and length-prefixed value; see fields. The format allows for the message to be truncated before any of the length prefixes that precede the field sections or content. This reduces the overall message size. A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. <\/del> length prefixes that precede the field sections or content; see padding. <\/ins> The variable-length integer encoding means that there is a limit of 2^62-1 bytes for each field section and the message content."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-13d97e0cfb4d67f7edd28f28c2e193d6f29e42fc30243a510071497f00554bc2","title":"","text":"indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. Indeterminate-length messages can be truncated in a similar way as known-length messages. Truncation occurs after the control data, or after the Content Terminator field that ends a field section or sequence of content chunks. A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. <\/del> known-length messages; see padding. <\/ins> Indeterminate-length messages use the same encoding for field lines as known-length messages; see fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e4ca2b75c4a8faf39124ff73b2cb8e918b79bd5c5a0593fae94333b338fe9bda","title":"","text":"it is unlikely to be a practical limitation. There is no limit to the size of content in an indeterminate length message. Omitting content by truncating a message is only possible if the content is zero-length. <\/del> 3.8. Messages can be padded with any number of zero-valued bytes. Non-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f405beddf42bba8155a03dbc05602fd6a4d9f2d133da365da537ca33022120d8","title":"","text":"Unlike other parts of a message, a processor MAY decide not to validate the value of padding bytes. Truncation can be used to reduce the size of messages that have no data in trailing field sections or content. If the trailers of a message is empty, it MAY be omitted by the encoder in place of adding a length field equal to zero. An encoder MAY omit empty content in the same way if the trailers are also empty. A message that is truncated at any other point is invalid; see invalid. Decoders MUST treat missing truncated fields as equivalent to having been sent with the length field sent to zero. <\/ins> Padding is compatible with truncation of empty parts of the messages. Zero-valued bytes will be interpreted as zero-length part, which is semantically equivalent to the part being absent."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0d5df13a8b5259c8b7b65429d340884ac66c202a7488dfd134a294bcc5b251dc","title":"","text":"prefix. Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. <\/del> different structure; see informational. Note that while the Known- Length Informational Response field is shown in format-known-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/ins> Fields in the header and trailer sections consist of a length- prefixed name and length-prefixed value; see fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b08077b48802fb5d9cf9fb84403c78692276537ba4e263692be301ca3627e1f3","title":"","text":"value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. <\/del> different structure; see informational. Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format- indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/ins> Indeterminate-length messages can be truncated in a similar way as known-length messages. Truncation occurs after the control data, or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-92d0dd6c2c5dc342dd7ba45578a462e6267e8c9f73c428f53d65503b8d1c28a4","title":"","text":"arise from receiving large messages, particularly those with large numbers of fields. The format is designed to allow for minimal state when translating for use with HTTP proper. However, producing a combined value for fields, which might be necessary for the \"Cookie\" field when translating this format (like HTTP\/1.1 MESSAGING), can require the commitment of resources. Implementations need to ensure that they aren't subject to resource exhaustion attack from a maliciously crafted message. <\/del> Implementations need to ensure that they aren't subject to resource exhaustion attack from a maliciously crafted message. Overall, the format is designed to allow for minimal state when processing messages. However, producing a combined field value (HTTP) for fields might require the commitment of resources. In particular, combining might be necessary for the \"Cookie\" field when translating this format for use in other contexts, such as use in an API or translation to HTTP\/1.1 MESSAGING, where the recipient of the field might not expect multiple values. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1746267326427f6ed3aa3e12a16e94d91de589ceff425cb49330de1774f84b8b","title":"","text":"compliant implementation. Remove any obsolete line-folding within the line and replace it with a single space (\"\"), as discussed in MESSAGING. Note that <\/del> with a single space (\" \"), as discussed in MESSAGING. Note that <\/ins> this behavior is specific to MESSAGING and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification. Concatenate the list of values together with a single comma (\",\") and a single space (\"\") between each item. <\/del> and a single space (\" \") between each item. <\/ins> The resulting string is the canonicalized component value."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-75fdb49720ec10bb5544438c5cc478da06ac0399304cffcabca2ae8ff350f003","title":"","text":"once in the signature input. Parameterized keys MAY appear in any order. If a dictionary key is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the dictionary, this MUST cause an error in the signature input string generation. <\/ins> Following are non-normative examples of canonicalized values for Dictionary Structured Field Members given the following example header field, whose value is known to be a Dictionary:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c3c5a0d8a8a522680299f2d23d124628bfa07a9474d3f189b8dc971dcb3fafe","title":"","text":"refers to the associated component value of the request that triggered the response message being signed. The \"@authority\" derived component SHOULD be used instead signing the \"Host\" header directly, see security-not-fields. <\/ins> 2.2.5. The \"@scheme\" component identifier refers to the scheme of the target"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-33afb3a3a45dfcbb591c3309d63d882d7600acc6cd1aa3c915eccb952612e534","title":"","text":"Would result in the following \"@query\" value: If the query string is absent from the request message, the value is the leading \"?\" character alone: <\/ins> If used in a related-response, the \"@query\" component identifier refers to the associated component value of the request that triggered the response message being signed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f97c1f479fc0a20fe5c5fe5fea626276ffd1bc5232b6af2bb068440048b2a7f3","title":"","text":"empty \"valueString\" are included with an empty string as the component value. If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all parameter values of that name MUST be included in separate signature input lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. <\/del> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the signature input string generation. <\/ins> For example for the following request: Indicating the \"baz\", \"qux\" and \"param\" named query parameters in would result in the following \"@query-param\" value: If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all parameter values of that name MUST be included in separate signature input lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. Note that in some implementations, the order of parsed query parameters is not stable, and this situation could lead to unexpected results. If multiple parameters are common within an application, it is RECOMMENDED to sign the entire query string using the \"@query\" component identifier defined in content-request-query. <\/ins> If used in a related-response, the \"@query-params\" component identifier refers to the associated component value of the request that triggered the response message being signed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-815102d3565524451ad1cb57f6e3b6a2c5ab56f5ff938d21931b35e892cdb2f9","title":"","text":"Note that the example signature input here, or anywhere else within this specification, does not include the final newline that ends the example. <\/del> displayed example. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1b21b0f30a16deb0bc54bd1a9850c813aeb8006a6b2281603fb52c82f0a4f708","title":"","text":"the verification result (\"V\") as a boolean: This section contains several common algorithm methods. The method to use can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter defined in signature-params, by reference to the key material, or through mutual agreement between the signer and verifier. <\/del> to use can be communicated through the explicit algorithm signature parameter \"alg\" defined in signature-params, by reference to the key material, or through mutual agreement between the signer and verifier. <\/ins> 3.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ea3b5c581fb3e85da2a9596c69505ce57b9f3543d6827a215faef7df577806f5","title":"","text":"The JWS algorithm MUST NOT be \"none\" and MUST NOT be any algorithm with a JOSE Implementation Requirement of \"Prohibited\". There is no use of the explicit \"alg\" signature parameter when using JOSE signing algorithms, as they can be signaled using JSON Web Keys or other mechanisms. <\/del> JWA algorithm values from the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry are not included as signature parameters. In fact, the explicit \"alg\" signature parameter is not used at all when using JOSE signing algorithms, as the JWS algorithm can be signaled using JSON Web Keys or other mechanisms common to JOSE implementations. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-84b8134805f108b87b5403b84c9339a96f2a3964aa86fc2fd8af3d149ef0c71a","title":"","text":"correctly-defined verification function for the algorithm in question and not do a simple comparison. 7.20. Some HTTP fields have values and interpretations that are similar to HTTP signature parameters or derived components. In most cases, it is more desirable to sign the non-field alternative. In particular, the following fields should usually not be included in the signature unless the application specifically requires it: <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7d3f540e6e75d97c03a0cbc32a8e5334b2e75ef201bf2d4934b134ea268178fe","title":"","text":"how those content encoding(s) can be removed. The \"Encryption\" header field uses the extended ABNF syntax defined in Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the \"parameter\" rule from <\/del> in Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the \"parameter\" and \"OWS\" rules from RFC7231. <\/ins> If the payload is encrypted more than once (as reflected by having multiple content-codings that imply encryption), each application of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cce317c45cd44e0d2760d16727c4b69caa60a1901441fe05e489b77bc559abb0","title":"","text":"material used in the Encryption header field. The Crypto-Key header field uses the extended ABNF syntax defined in Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the \"parameter\" rule from RFC7231. <\/del> Section 1.2 of RFC7230 and the \"parameter\" and \"OWS\" rules from RFC7231. <\/ins> The \"keyid\" parameter corresponds to the \"keyid\" parameter in the Encryption header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eb4acfe1a278a797d9b3e55d060e4c7fd1e534cde43d71c2b31b59c821be4654","title":"","text":"consumes the resources of both endpoints. See also digest-and- content-location. Digest fields SHOULD always be used over a connection that provides integrity at the transport layer that protects HTTP fields. A \"Representation-Digest\" field using NOT RECOMMENDED hashing algorithms SHOULD NOT be used in signatures. Using signatures to protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. <\/del> Signatures are likely to be deemed an adversarial setting when applying Integrity fields; see algorithms. Using signatures to protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. <\/ins> Any mangling of digest fields, including de-duplication of representation-data-digest values or combining different field values"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e097f0099c0dd0584cd8ad29e193a03a87ca429e4f9b8c596c89c00073e47f2b","title":"","text":"7.1. IANA is asked to update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" registry (SEMANTICS) according to the table below: 7.2. <\/ins> This memo sets this specification to be the establishing document for the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields [2] registry defined in algorithms."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d017354a8027375727ed83ea3a61485d8ec5bdacbd7dda85bbc70327c97a758b","title":"","text":"IANA is asked to initialize the registry with the entries in iana- hash-algorithm-table. 7.2. This section registers the \"Representation-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. Field name: \"Representation-Digest\" Status: permanent Specification document(s): representation-digest of this document 7.3. This section registers the \"Content-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. Field name: \"Content-Digest\" Status: permanent Specification document(s): content-digest of this document 7.4. This section registers the \"Want-Representation-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. Field name: \"Want-Representation-Digest\" Status: permanent Specification document(s): want-fields of this document 7.5. This section registers the \"Want-Content-Digest\" field in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" SEMANTICS. Field name: \"Want-Content-Digest\" Status: permanent Specification document(s): want-fields of this document <\/del> 8. References 8.1. URIs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4587f51b5e21d5c57d07f4230c5f77d3e7ca53ea1d785372ad96fc08b5a9502c","title":"","text":"The resulting string is the canonicalized component value. Note that some HTTP fields have values with multiple valid serializations that have equivalent semantics. Applications signing and processing such fields MUST consider how to handle the values of such fields to ensure that the signer and verifier can derive the same value, as discussed in security-field-values. <\/ins> Following are non-normative examples of canonicalized values for header fields, given the following example HTTP message fragment:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-37147bdec0d48fb1d532f7d4cf92edb332abb5b88b275b1865c7f8914fc4a98b","title":"","text":"RFC8792 due to limitations in the document format that strips trailing spaces from diagrams. Any HTTP field component identifiers MAY have the following parameters in specific circumstances. <\/ins> 2.1.1. If value of the the HTTP field in question is a structured field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0e2cdf23fc3e67a28ab2f9a0da04d41b7a79107344579f9658f0ac1d1a9ef6be","title":"","text":"the following fields should usually not be included in the signature unless the application specifically requires it: 7.21. The create-sig-input uses the value of an HTTP field as its component value. In the common case, this amounts to taking the actual bytes of the field value as the component value for both the signer and verifier. However, some field values allow for transformation of the values in semantically equivalent ways that alter the bytes used in the value itself. For example, a field definition can declare some or all of its value to be case-insensitive, or to have special handling of internal whitespace characters. Other fields have expected transformations from intermediaries, such as the removal of comments in the \"Via\" header field. In such cases, a verifier could be tripped up by using the equivalent transformed field value, which would differ from the byte value used by the signer. The verifier would have have a difficult time finding this class of errors since the value of the field is still acceptable for the application, but the actual bytes required by the signature base would not match. When processing such fields, the signer and verifier have to agree how to handle such transformations, if at all. One option is to not sign problematic fields, but care must be taken to ensure that there is still security-coverage for the application. Another option is to define an application-specific canonicalization value for the field before it is added to the HTTP message, such as to always remove internal comments before signing, or to always transform values to lowercase. Since these transformations are applied prior to the field being used as input to the signature base generation algorithm, the signature base will still simply contain the byte value of the field as it appears within the message. If the transformations were to be applied after the value is extracted from the message but before it is added to the signature base, different attack surfaces such as value substitution attacks could be launched against the application. All application-specific additional rules are outside the scope of this specification, and by their very nature these transformations would harm interoperability of the implementation outside of this specific application. It is recommended that applications avoid the use of such additional rules wherever possible. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dfde33a1bb30c9033ce1463dc8dd3bcd6874e89a096c123a2bacbe1cc0e2d0bc","title":"","text":"content with a length prefix, and a trailer section with a length prefix. For a known-length encoding, the length prefix on field sections and content is a variable-length encoding of an integer. This integer is the number of bytes in the field section or content. <\/ins> Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Known- Length Informational Response field is shown in format-known-length,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f263c2b59bf2a465718120d77d90575e86c8a36fa9ccc3c75cf2ba4414eae6df","title":"","text":"value, any number of non-zero-length chunks of binary content, a zero value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. The indeterminate-length encoding only uses length prefixes for content blocks. Multiple length-prefixed portions of content can be included, each prefixed by a non-zero Chunk Length integer describing the number of bytes in the block. The Chunk Length is encoded as a variable-length integer. Each Field Line in an Indeterminate-Length Field Section starts with a Name Length field. An Indeterminate-Length Field Section ends with a Content Terminator field. The zero value of the Content Terminator distinguishes it from the Name Length field, which cannot contain a value of 0. <\/ins> Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4c58d6c62186d5f5ac6182e3ce7994f43c8cfb71147df9ec8931cc57985e5742","title":"","text":"control data rather than using pseudo-fields. Messages are invalid (invalid) if they contain fields named \":method\", \":scheme\", \":authority\", \":path\", or \":status\". Other pseudo-fields that are defined by protocol extensions MAY be included. Field lines containing pseudo-fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/del> defined by protocol extensions MAY be included; pseudo-fields cannot be included in trailers (see H2). Field lines containing pseudo- fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/ins> Note that while some messages - CONNECT or upgrade requests in particular - can be represented using this format, doing so serves no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88c97e3c9686e00c0ed3e45a6344f44e8e1308f1a72e6348c227df540915f0c2","title":"","text":"2.2.9. If a request target URI uses HTML form parameters in the query string as defined in HTMLURL, the \"@query-params\" component identifier allows addressing of individual query parameters. The query parameters MUST be parsed according to HTMLURL, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each input identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as an \"sf-string\" value. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. <\/del> as defined in HTMLURL, the \"@query-param\" component identifier allows addressing of individual query parameters. The query parameters MUST be parsed according to HTMLURL, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each input identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as an \"sf-string\" value. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. <\/ins> The component value of a single named parameter is the the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by HTMLURL, which"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-91ee49342ebf2c21fd753b22a64cbf42fcd82d6c0864a01d5e1332aee13ada7c","title":"","text":"RECOMMENDED to sign the entire query string using the \"@query\" component identifier defined in content-request-query. If used in a related-response, the \"@query-params\" component <\/del> If used in a related-response, the \"@query-param\" component <\/ins> identifier refers to the associated component value of the request that triggered the response message being signed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7948d9308806647bc348a036148f199aa4a2a1fd36e3086ce2b4b30c3c20deb8","title":"","text":"need to be signed, avoiding problematic components. For example, a web application framework that relies on rewriting query parameters might avoid use of the \"@query\" content identifier in favor of sub- indexing the query value using \"@query-params\" content identifier <\/del> indexing the query value using \"@query-param\" content identifier <\/ins> instead. Some components are expected to be changed by intermediaries and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-55e57154dd9b82feac2581c162dd963dd92b7fa23e2afdaf17630717a024ae99","title":"","text":"A consequence of this record structure is that range requests RFC7233 and random access to encrypted payload bodies are possible at the granularity of the record size. However, without data from adjacent ranges, partial records cannot be used. Thus, it is best if records start and end on multiples of the record size, plus the 16 octet authentication tag size. <\/del> ranges, partial records cannot be used. Thus, it is best if range requests start and end on multiples of the record size, plus the 16 octet authentication tag size. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b2c41817d89a34523fd9be03d9ba46492b86f183024bd0267baef88e35f6d3e4","title":"","text":"1. \"Bootstrapping WebSockets with HTTP\/2\" RFC8441 defines an extension to HTTP\/2 HTTP2 which is also useful in HTTP\/3 HTTP3. This extension makes use of an HTTP\/2 setting. HTTP3 gives some guidance on what changes (if any) are appropriate when porting settings from HTTP\/2 to HTTP\/3. <\/del> to HTTP\/2 HTTP\/2 which is also useful in HTTP\/3 HTTP\/3. This extension makes use of an HTTP\/2 setting. HTTP\/3 gives some guidance on what changes (if any) are appropriate when porting settings from HTTP\/2 to HTTP\/3. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0669899a14ad7ca70bd8d80ed8c5a113999a379225e26dcd69f68e54323f9057","title":"","text":"server to allow the client to use Extended CONNECT. The semantics of the pseudo-header fields and setting are identical to those in HTTP\/2 as defined RFC8441. HTTP3 requires that HTTP\/3 <\/del> to those in HTTP\/2 as defined RFC8441. HTTP\/3 requires that HTTP\/3 <\/ins> settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP\/2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-402f552d8235a08aa3591479b268ebad1218b9db710d0916c2a5b836283fa2ce","title":"","text":"The HTTP\/3 stream closure is also analogous to the TCP connection closure of RFC6455. Orderly TCP-level closures are represented as a FIN bit on the stream (HTTP3). RST exceptions are represented with a stream error (HTTP3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP3). <\/del> FIN bit on the stream (HTTP\/3). RST exceptions are represented with a stream error (HTTP\/3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP\/3). <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5dbae637d282c3fe92b8a1fca97dddd3c10e33fa844cb8cca50c7da9aa6e0be3","title":"","text":"5. This document registers a new setting in the \"HTTP\/3 Settings\" registry (HTTP3). <\/del> registry (HTTP\/3). <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-40e05db2508acfe4e09caee849cc22ca3247454c6000b334a6892680b0e02f6b","title":"","text":"1. \"Bootstrapping WebSockets with HTTP\/2\" RFC8441 defines an extension to HTTP\/2 HTTP\/2 that is also useful in HTTP\/3 HTTP\/3. This extension makes use of an HTTP\/2 setting. HTTP\/3 gives some guidance on what changes (if any) are appropriate when porting settings from HTTP\/2 to HTTP\/3. <\/del> to HTTP\/2 HTTP2 that is also useful in HTTP\/3 HTTP3. This extension makes use of an HTTP\/2 setting. HTTP3 gives some guidance on what changes (if any) are appropriate when porting settings from HTTP\/2 to HTTP\/3. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-64dd271dfca06757b0f7f98bf570792fabb85fb340e35b09760ab329c70c6164","title":"","text":"server to allow the client to use Extended CONNECT. The semantics of the pseudo-header fields and setting are identical to those in HTTP\/2 as defined in RFC8441. HTTP\/3 requires that HTTP\/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The <\/del> to those in HTTP\/2 as defined in RFC8441. HTTP3 requires that HTTP\/3 settings be registered separately for HTTP\/3. The <\/ins> SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL value is 0x08 (decimal 8), as in HTTP\/2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-54f4178984613f39eb0f562a826ef94476f43bc403e57ce2d052d545a75fd238","title":"","text":"The HTTP\/3 stream closure is also analogous to the TCP connection closure of RFC6455. Orderly TCP-level closures are represented as a FIN bit on the stream (HTTP\/3). RST exceptions are represented with a stream error (HTTP\/3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP\/3). <\/del> FIN bit on the stream (HTTP3). RST exceptions are represented with a stream error (HTTP3) of type H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED (HTTP3). <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-08d561bdcff1fad9d6d146306b86e7da420f71c28fef9064b5379489cc6ad975","title":"","text":"5. This document registers a new setting in the \"HTTP\/3 Settings\" registry (HTTP\/3). <\/del> registry (HTTP3). <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5c1ab3c583102fcf1dad9a71d431bf5b9f5bed1f917f7a23f633e006300bd76a","title":"","text":"Some of these features are also absent in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3. Unlike HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, this format uses a a fixed format for control data rather than using pseudo-fields. Messages are invalid (invalid) if they contain fields named \":method\", \":scheme\", \":authority\", \":path\", or \":status\". Other pseudo-fields that are defined by protocol extensions MAY be included; pseudo-fields cannot be included in trailers (see H2). Field lines containing pseudo- fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/del> Unlike HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, this format uses a fixed format for control data rather than using pseudo-fields. Messages are invalid (invalid) if they contain fields named \":method\", \":scheme\", \":authority\", \":path\", or \":status\". Other pseudo-fields that are defined by protocol extensions MAY be included; pseudo-fields cannot be included in trailers (see H2). Field lines containing pseudo-fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/ins> Note that while some messages - CONNECT or upgrade requests in particular - can be represented using this format, doing so serves no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6b8ad3a19e01b4b150d78849abe6c03bc6894c3aa8ebd25e4c7a0f3b9240b641","title":"","text":"For more advanced use-cases, the \"Repr-Digest\" request and response header and trailer field (representation-digest) is defined. It contains a digest value computed by applying a hashing algorithm to \"selected representation data\" (SEMANTICS). Basing \"Repr-Digest\" on <\/del> selected representation data (SEMANTICS). Basing \"Repr-Digest\" on <\/ins> the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the transferred data requires some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation or conveys a partial"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-651c432a8f1e00235589dfdd552a46a1f27fed162e7a9122339bc505f0452722","title":"","text":"integrity. It also coined the term \"instance\" and \"instance manipulation\" in order to explain concepts that are now more universally defined, and implemented, as HTTP semantics such as \"selected representation data\" (SEMANTICS). <\/del> selected representation data (SEMANTICS). <\/ins> Experience has shown that implementations of RFC3230 have interpreted the meaning of \"instance\" inconsistently, leading to interoperability"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ebc5b67b163439f2c2fa170feb65f198f2e5351adfc976a4d3397e82846238c1","title":"","text":"The \"Repr-Digest\" HTTP field can be used in requests and responses to communicate digests that are calculated using a hashing algorithm applied to the entire \"selected representation data\" (see SEMANTICS). <\/del> applied to the entire selected representation data (see SEMANTICS). <\/ins> Representations take into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on messages. For example, the content can be affected by Range Requests"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a7fc3de6c0ccf1ee5910bf71bd5ac491510911fa5899dbd597780d1ef9330ca6","title":"","text":"representation concepts, several examples are provided in resource- representation. When a message has no \"representation data\" it is still possible to assert that no \"representation data\" was sent by computing the digest <\/del> When a message has no representation data it is still possible to assert that no representation data was sent by computing the digest <\/ins> on an empty string (see usage-in-signatures). \"Repr-Digest\" is a \"Dictionary\" (see STRUCTURED-FIELDS) where each:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-175dd48e581cfc06af123794c125a603e63af214fac47b712d65c4a473ba2d48","title":"","text":"6.1. This document specifies a data integrity mechanism that protects HTTP \"representation data\" or content, but not HTTP header and trailer <\/del> representation data or content, but not HTTP header and trailer <\/ins> fields, from certain kinds of corruption. Integrity fields are not intended to be a general protection against"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b3068cb2e569c501026af6f64c776b9e0da6700545a63761c4cd21d6dc475040","title":"","text":"6.2. Integrity fields can help detect \"representation data\" or content <\/del> Integrity fields can help detect representation data or content <\/ins> modification due to implementation errors, undesired \"transforming proxies\" (see SEMANTICS) or other actions as the data passes across multiple hops or system boundaries. Even a simple mechanism for end- to-end \"representation data\" integrity is valuable because a user agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing. <\/del> to-end representation data integrity is valuable because a user agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing. <\/ins> Note that using these mechanisms alone does not provide end-to-end integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, since metadata could"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-66af1ec13397def29caf1dd013eeeafffa3a5a849431c98d8bd9488443cb5c23","title":"","text":"application data sent on such a connection after receipt and verification of the client certificate is also mutually-authenticated and thus suitable for the mechanisms described in this document. With post-handshake authentication there is also the possibility, though unlikely in practice, of multiple certificates and certificate chains from the client on a connection, in which case only the certificate and chain of the last post-handshake authentication are to be utilized for the header fields described herein. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5232ababbda03b6535972ba36c955a9064c99ae6a942bbd40d1a14a13546757c","title":"","text":"sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. 3.3. Some TLS implementations do not retain client certificate information when resuming. Providing inconsistent values of Client-Cert and Client-Cert-Chain when resuming might lead to errors, so implementations that are unable to provide these values SHOULD either disable resumption for connections with client certificates or initially omit a \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" field if it might not be available after resuming. <\/ins> 4. The header fields described herein enable a TTRP and backend or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f37bb6d79658c4241c60adaf6194385b76284f43062ca72fc8bc4902e280d664","title":"","text":"a known-length encoding includes length prefixes for all major message components; and an indefinite-length encoding enables efficient generation of <\/del> an indeterminate-length encoding enables efficient generation of <\/ins> messages where lengths are not known when encoding starts. This format is designed to convey the semantics of valid HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9cc341b030b3c2bf8360b284918c541fbee6ef4bc9082c2c68ce4d0cb98f492d","title":"","text":"content with a length prefix, and a trailer section with a length prefix. For a known-length encoding, the length prefix on field sections and content is a variable-length encoding of an integer. This integer is the number of bytes in the field section or content. <\/del> Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Known- Length Informational Response field is shown in format-known-length, it can only appear in response messages. For a known-length encoding, the length prefix on field sections and content is a variable-length encoding of an integer. This integer is the number of bytes in the field section or content, not including the length field itself. <\/ins> Fields in the header and trailer sections consist of a length- prefixed name and length-prefixed value; see fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a794054a4a3057abeba259611c219d75b14ce265653f9e0bccd21920e5896e35","title":"","text":"A message that is constructed without encoding a known length for each section uses the format shown in format-indeterminate-length: That is, an indeterminate length consists of a framing indicator, a block of control data that is formatted according to the value of the framing indicator, a header section that is terminated by a zero value, any number of non-zero-length chunks of binary content, a zero value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. <\/del> That is, an indeterminate-length message consists of a framing indicator, a block of control data that is formatted according to the value of the framing indicator, a header section that is terminated by a zero value, any number of non-zero-length chunks of binary content, a zero value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format- indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/ins> The indeterminate-length encoding only uses length prefixes for content blocks. Multiple length-prefixed portions of content can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a7c2cd6b8a770296a37101acffbe0ef12876c9873f67d1906bc7edd7b0c8d26d","title":"","text":"distinguishes it from the Name Length field, which cannot contain a value of 0. Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format- indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/del> Indeterminate-length messages can be truncated in a similar way as known-length messages; see padding."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d7dfb5de2b1981bf2954785b4d7e3a72582e43a3329ec5f5119761747e44dfd5","title":"","text":"3.5. The control data for a response message consists of the status code. The status code is encoded as a variable length integer, not a <\/del> The status code (HTTP) is encoded as a variable length integer, not a <\/ins> length-prefixed decimal string. The format of final response control data is shown in format-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-481d3807526af0ef2a626612d47944194c058610379abee558ce4c7c594b985a","title":"","text":"3.5.1. Responses that include information status codes (see HTTP) are <\/del> Responses that include informational status codes (see HTTP) are <\/ins> encoded by repeating the response control data and associated header section until the final status code is encoded."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5cc7f73c2478c4a1db49749330c3298bf7a102d2b06810b111fbff6716ec37ba","title":"","text":"format-informational. A response message can include any number of informational responses that precede a final status code. These convey an information status code and a header block. <\/del> that precede a final status code. These convey an informational status code and a header block. <\/ins> If the response control data includes an informational status code (that is, a value between 100 and 199 inclusive), the control data is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8634bf0b323136762f7bff9feb711e2b2877d66a46afa6cd54ea955950a47051","title":"","text":"Header and trailer sections consist of zero or more field lines; see HTTP. The format of a field section depends on whether the message is known- or intermediate-length. <\/del> is known- or indeterminate-length. <\/ins> Each field line includes a name and a value. Both the name and value are length-prefixed sequences of bytes. The field name length is at"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-85966a32ef9f6a4a62c0b78b82bbfb6392c736bd367122b6deabbf3958a32722","title":"","text":"Responses that include informational status codes (see HTTP) are encoded by repeating the response control data and associated header section until the final status code is encoded. <\/del> section until a final response control data is encoded. The status code distinguishes between informational and final responses. <\/ins> The format of the informational response control data is shown in format-informational."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-82fc1e05e4bda1a8ef5e882c058ece33a098beaddb09ab7ea0d9b23ed29f3287","title":"","text":"3.1. A message that has a known length at the time of construction uses the format shown in format-known-length. <\/del> A request or response that has a known length at the time of construction uses the format shown in format-known-length. <\/ins> That is, a known-length message consists of a framing indicator, a block of control data that is formatted according to the value of the framing indicator, a header section with a length prefix, binary content with a length prefix, and a trailer section with a length prefix. <\/del> A known-length request consists of a framing indicator (framing), request control data (request-control), a header section with a length prefix, binary content with a length prefix, a trailer section with a length prefix, and padding. <\/ins> Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Known- Length Informational Response field is shown in format-known-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/del> A known-length response contains the same fields, with the exception that request control data is replaced by zero or more informational responses (informational) followed by response control data (response-control). <\/ins> For a known-length encoding, the length prefix on field sections and content is a variable-length encoding of an integer. This integer is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-24b955cf2b98fcb932c48e057f47aeaed3dde93f5775daef9a4970cea366fc48","title":"","text":"3.2. A message that is constructed without encoding a known length for each section uses the format shown in format-indeterminate-length: <\/del> A request or response that is constructed without encoding a known length for each section uses the format shown in format- indeterminate-length: <\/ins> That is, an indeterminate-length message consists of a framing indicator, a block of control data that is formatted according to the value of the framing indicator, a header section that is terminated by a zero value, any number of non-zero-length chunks of binary content, a zero value, and a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value. <\/del> An indeterminate-length request consists of a framing indicator (framing), request control data (request-control), a header section that is terminated by a zero value, any number of non-zero-length chunks of binary content, a zero value, a trailer section that is terminated by a zero value, and padding. <\/ins> Response messages that contain informational status codes result in a different structure; see informational. Note that while the Indeterminate-Length Informational Response field is shown in format- indeterminate-length, it can only appear in response messages. <\/del> An indeterminate-length response contains the same fields, with the exception that request control data is replaced by zero or more informational responses (informational) and response control data (response-control). <\/ins> The indeterminate-length encoding only uses length prefixes for content blocks. Multiple length-prefixed portions of content can be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4ee678420e5c7ab9b057d04be48339e0b254ef8ef41fb8e0a7dafe001cfc92f0","title":"","text":"contains a digest value computed by applying a hashing algorithm to selected representation data (SEMANTICS). Basing \"Repr-Digest\" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the transferred data requires some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation or conveys a partial representation of a resource, such as Range Requests (see SEMANTICS). <\/del> use-cases where the message content requires some sort of manipulation to be considered as representation of the resource or content conveys a partial representation of a resource, such as Range Requests (see SEMANTICS). <\/ins> \"Content-Digest\" and \"Repr-Digest\" support hashing algorithm agility. The \"Want-Content-Digest\" and \"Want-Repr-Digest\" fields allow endpoints to express interest in \"Content-Digest\" and \"Repr-Digest\" respectively, and preference of algorithms in either. <\/del> respectively, and to express algorithm preferences in either. <\/ins> \"Content-Digest\" and \"Repr-Digest\" are collectively termed Integrity fields. \"Want-Content-Digest\" and \"Want-Repr-Digest\" are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-caae4d916166cfe353ba46954f49bcd106a88b0d814d6307a50db29ac2717b49","title":"","text":"framing, which describes whether the message is a request or response and how subsequent sections are formatted; see framing. For a response, any number of interim responses, each consisting of an informational status code and header section. <\/del> For a response, any number of informational responses, each consisting of an informational status code and header section. <\/ins> Control data. For a request, this contains the request method and target. For a response, this contains the status code."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c66d3cfe33b47403970b221beaef289b19c20601d09becf2a7d5aeddc8ddeef6","title":"","text":"for the semantics of repeated field names and rules for combining values. Messages are invalid (invalid) if they contain fields named \":method\", \":scheme\", \":authority\", \":path\", or \":status\". Other pseudo-fields that are defined by protocol extensions MAY be included; pseudo-fields cannot be included in trailers (see H2). Field lines containing pseudo-fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/ins> Fields that relate to connections (HTTP) cannot be used to produce the effect on a connection in this context. These fields SHOULD be removed when constructing a binary message. However, they do not cause a message to be invalid (invalid); permitting these fields allows a binary message to capture the content of a messages that are exchanged in a protocol context. <\/del> allows a binary message to capture messages that are exchanged in a protocol context. <\/ins> Like HTTP\/2, this format has an exception for the combination of multiple instances of the \"Cookie\" field. Instances of fields with the ASCII-encoded value of \"cookie\" are combined using a semicolon octet (0x3b) rather than a comma; see H2. <\/del> Like HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3, this format has an exception for the combination of multiple instances of the \"Cookie\" field. Instances of fields with the ASCII-encoded value of \"cookie\" are combined using a semicolon octet (0x3b) rather than a comma; see H2. <\/ins> 3.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c984578c129a667a7fe7c77bcd6adb242ee3e0808855c4471ea31f74e1174d71","title":"","text":"4. This document describes a number of ways that a message can be invalid. Invalid messages MUST NOT be processed except to log an error and produce an error response. <\/del> invalid. Invalid messages MUST NOT be processed further except to log an error and produce an error response. <\/ins> The format is designed to allow incremental processing. Implementations need to be aware of the possibility that an error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-404d8c4eb1a208a1076d611df43e2858bea3496171e396716ed8046d8ca75267","title":"","text":"This can be expressed as a binary message (type \"message\/bhttp\") using a known-length encoding as shown in hexadecimal in ex-bink- request. ex-bink-request view includes some of the text alongside to show that most of the content is not modified. <\/del> request. ex-bink-request includes text alongside to show that most of the content is not modified. <\/ins> This example shows that the Host header field is not replicated in the :authority field, as is required for ensuring that the request is reproduced accurately; see H2. <\/del> the \":authority\" field, as is required for ensuring that the request is reproduced accurately; see H2. <\/ins> The same message can be truncated with no effect on interpretation. In this case, the last two bytes - corresponding to content and a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bfff6943230698117a97be40937fb5e03eb7afb51b090e245b0ab118f53d7216","title":"","text":"Some of these features are also absent in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3. Unlike HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, this format uses a fixed format for control data rather than using pseudo-fields. Messages are invalid (invalid) if they contain fields named \":method\", \":scheme\", \":authority\", \":path\", or \":status\". Other pseudo-fields that are defined by protocol extensions MAY be included; pseudo-fields cannot be included in trailers (see H2). Field lines containing pseudo-fields MUST precede other field lines. A message that contains a pseudo-field after any other field is invalid; see invalid. <\/del> data rather than using pseudo-fields. <\/ins> Note that while some messages - CONNECT or upgrade requests in particular - can be represented using this format, doing so serves no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd4295eda047461282d99e087b5108c2c0eff728dae4a74a40e43353a70ba063","title":"","text":"Structured Field (a Dictionary), respectively. In each case, cookie names are Tokens. Their values are Strings, unless they can be represented accurately and unambiguously using the textual representation of another structured types (e.g., an Integer or Decimal). <\/del> unless the value can be successfully parsed as the textual representation of another, bare Item structured type (e.g., Byte Sequence, Decimal, Integer, Token, or Boolean). <\/ins> Set-Cookie parameters map to Parameters on the appropriate SF-Set- Cookie member, with the parameter name being forced to lowercase."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d9638aed1965ee69a268d243b08960c1838df00026e4fd22cfb74f116afdc62c","title":"","text":"that use different grammatical notations than this document (which uses ABNF from RFC5234). NOTE: The name of an attribute-value pair is not case sensitive. So while they are presented here in CamelCase, such as \"HttpOnly\" or \"SameSite\", any case is accepted. E.x.: \"httponly\", \"Httponly\", \"hTTPoNLY\", etc. <\/ins> The semantics of the cookie-value are not defined by this document. To maximize compatibility with user agents, servers that wish to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1d5389be02182f201c58dd44c62536b48f4031b039c81b06e97eb21f60faef57","title":"","text":"it also defines mappings of their semantics into new Structured Fields. It does not specify how to negotiate their use. One of those mappings requires introduction of a new Structured Fields data type, Date. <\/ins> 1. Structured Field Values for HTTP STRUCTURED-FIELDS introduced a data"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e838cbbe56ca2184921dc460deb9104615cbbf21c8a1bc2025c1ead1ea1c0e05","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the date-time, time-offset, and time-secfrac rules from RFC3339. <\/ins> 2. The HTTP fields listed in compatible-fields can usually have their"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c2b8b1ff671e86d94695f94d8b327a3bcfd9c7671315c26dda5533714a56ec82","title":"","text":"For example, the Date HTTP header field carries a date: Its value is more efficiently represented as an Integer number of delta seconds from the Unix epoch (00:00:00 UTC on 1 January 1970, minus leap seconds). Thus, the example above would be mapped to: <\/del> Its value would be mapped to: <\/ins> As in compatible, these fields are unable to carry values that are not valid Structured Fields, and so an application using this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-15dfab0a0afa0e9208416b5f562ab4515a1fff521004a201bdb4b261c11b0b32","title":"","text":"have values that can be mapped into Structured Fields by parsing their payload according to HTTP and representing the result as an Integer number of seconds delta from the Unix Epoch (00:00:00 UTC on 1 January 1970, excluding leap seconds). <\/del> 1 January 1970, excluding leap seconds), using the Date Structured Fields data type defined in date-type. <\/ins> For example, an Expires field could be mapped as:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-61205610046c16e0c787d931c04f25703c6f2bdabdcd596836a4d0dde8f482de","title":"","text":"specification defines types for existing cookie attributes in cookie- params. The Expires attribute is mapped to an Integer representation of parsed-cookie-date (see COOKIES) expressed as a number of seconds delta from the Unix Epoch (00:00:00 UTC on 1 January 1970, excluding leap seconds). <\/del> The Expires attribute is mapped to a Date representation of parsed- cookie-date (see COOKIES). <\/ins> For example, these unstructured fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e156046af3efe95061d7081732827cfd86125d68b647a631678a5e151b151f96","title":"","text":"Therefore, applications should not rely on specific labels being present, and applications should not put semantic meaning on the labels themselves. Instead, additional signature parmeters can be <\/del> labels themselves. Instead, additional signature parameters can be <\/ins> used to convey whatever additional meaning is required to be attached to and covered by the signature."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e1bc33b77d27c1bfe76958ab866fe410b38d0d2c7114c00f7f08d52b474edbad","title":"","text":"\"content\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC9110. This document uses the line folding strategies described in FOLDING. <\/ins> Hashing algorithm names respect the casing used in their definition document (e.g. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas hashing algorithm keys are quoted (e.g. \"sha\", \"crc32c\")."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f92adbf47c4d45aceb227ff84d232226167296d724039b4877c9636e7afe4b8","title":"","text":"inputs. However, the canonicalized component value is never parsed by the message signature process, merely used as part of the signature base in create-sig-input. Even so, caution needs to be taken when including such fields in signatures, see security-non-list for more discussion of this issue. <\/del> taken when including such fields in signatures, and the \"bs\" parameter defined in http-header-byte-sequence provides a method for wrapping such problematic fields. See security-non-list for more discussion of this issue. <\/ins> If the combined value is not available for a given header, the following algorithm will produce canonicalized results for an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-29bdc3b20e67cbd7c2cc15eb9118d2c05ab7310d0b7e35a255d70840e26e5e85","title":"","text":"parameters in specific circumstances, each described in detail in their own sections: Multiple parameters MAY be specified together, though some combinations are redundant or incompatible. For example, the \"sf\" parameter's functionality is already covered when the \"key\" parameter is used on a dictionary item. The \"bs\" parameter, which requires the raw field values from the message, is not compatible with use of the \"sf\" or \"key\" parameters, which require the parsed data structures of the field values after combination. <\/ins> Additional parameters MAY be defined in a registry established in param-registry. 2.1.1. If the value of the the HTTP field in question is known by the application to be a structured field (STRUCTURED-FIELDS), the component identifier MAY include the \"sf\" parameter to indicate it is a known structured field. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the rules specified in STRUCTURED-FIELDS applicable to the type of the HTTP field. Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. <\/del> application to be a structured field (STRUCTURED-FIELDS), and the expected type of the structured field is known, the signer MAY include the \"sf\" parameter in the component identifier. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the rules specified in STRUCTURED- FIELDS applicable to the type of the HTTP field. Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. Processing of this parameter MUST occur after multiple field values have been combined into a single List or Dictionary structure. <\/ins> For example, the following dictionary field is a valid serialization:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-da0d6c2930990baabd056748e5da78829d3a468c23609793768475252627869e","title":"","text":"Dictionary is identified by using the parameter \"key\" and the Dictionary member key as a String value. Processing of this parameter MUST occur after multiple field values have been combined into a single List or Dictionary structure. <\/ins> An individual member value of a Dictionary Structured Field is canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in STRUCTURED-FIELDS on the \"member_value\" and its parameters, without"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72cd7d5bf8cfef56fc6c3389e561fe6b7730785ee6462717070a37438af59ef2","title":"","text":"Note that the value for \"key=\"c\"\" has been re-serialized according to the strict \"member_value\" algorithm. 2.1.3. If the value of the the HTTP field in question is known by the application to cause problems with serialization, particularly with combination of multiple values as discussed in security-non-list, the signer MAY include the \"bs\" parameter in a component identifier to indicate the values of the fields need to be wrapped as binary structures before being combined. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the component value is calculated using the following algorithm: Let the input be the ordered set of values for a field For each field value in the set: Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list. Note that since HTTP field values are not allowed to contain leading and trailing whitespace, this will be a no-op in a compliant implementation. Remove any obsolete line-folding within the line and replace it with a single space (\" \"), as discussed in HTTP1. Note that this behavior is specific to HTTP1 and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification. Encode the string as a Byte Sequence Add the Byte Sequence to a List accumulator The intermediate result is a List of Byte Sequence values Follow the strict serialization of a List as described in STRUCTURED-FIELDS and return this output For example, the following field with internal commas prevents the distinct field values from being safely combined: If included in the signature base without parameters, its value would be: This is problematic because the same component value is created with the semantically distinct single field: However, if the \"bs\" parameter is added, the value is encoded and serialized as follows: For the single-instance field above, the encoding with the \"bs\" parameter is: This component value is distinct from the multiple-instance field above. <\/ins> 2.2. In addition to HTTP fields, there are a number of different"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c78e3523afefed6e2154940b37d6aba161a601adbae086688777c90a75ea9bbb","title":"","text":"base by adding the \"req\" parameter to the component identifier. This parameter can be applied to both HTTP fields and derived components with the same semantics. The component value for a message component using this parameter is calculated in the same manner as it is normally, but data is pulled from the request message. <\/del> components that target the request, with the same semantics. The component value for a message component using this parameter is calculated in the same manner as it is normally, but data is pulled from the request message instead of the target response message to which the signature is applied. <\/ins> Note that the same component name MAY be included with and without the \"req\" parameter in a single signature base, indicating the same"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42a8d8828087c8c407c33650d481764c16621d9ee785d5679edea4c698d984b5","title":"","text":"Since two semantically distinct inputs can create the same output in the signature base, special care has to be taken when handling such values. <\/del> values. Signers can make use of the \"bs\" parameter to armor such fields, as described in http-header-byte-sequence. <\/ins> Specifically, the Set-Cookie field COOKIE defines an internal syntax that does not conform to the List syntax in STRUCTURED-FIELDS. In"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1e92e42f1ccdb4ee3e7dd75eec25e16f6fda66b1a958b162ac947b2481a09121","title":"","text":"This document is structured as follows: content-digest defines the Content-Digest request and response header and trailer field, <\/del> New request and response header and trailer field definitions. <\/ins> representation-digest defines the Repr-Digest request and response header and trailer field, <\/del> content-digest (Content-Digest), <\/ins> want-fields defines the Want-Repr-Digest and Want-Content-Digest request and response header and trailer field, <\/del> representation-digest (Repr-Digest), and <\/ins> algorithms describes algorithms and their relation to the fields defined in this document, <\/del> want-fields (Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest). <\/ins> state-changing-requests details computing representation digests, <\/del> Considerations specific to representation data integrity. <\/ins> examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited provide examples of using Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest. <\/del> state-changing-requests (State-changing requests), digest-and-content-location (Content-Location), resource-representation contains worked examples of Representation data in message exchanges, and examples-unsolicited and examples-solicited contain worked examples of Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest fields in message exchanges. algorithms bootstraps a new IANA registry hash algorithms and defines registration procedures for future entries. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f4e9b73e760fcdaeecc70ce90abac98aa5995412a707441e15b90a1dd3a64cb2","title":"","text":"If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string \"Max- Age\", the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows. If the first character of the attribute-value is not a DIGIT or a \"-\" character, ignore the cookie-av. <\/del> If the attribute-value is empty, ignore the cookie-av. If the first character of the attribute-value is neither a DIGIT, nor a \"-\" character followed by a DIGIT, ignore the cookie-av. <\/ins> If the remainder of attribute-value contains a non-DIGIT character, ignore the cookie-av. Let delta-seconds be the attribute-value converted to an integer. <\/del> Let delta-seconds be the attribute-value converted to a base 10 integer. <\/ins> Let cookie-age-limit be the maximum age of the cookie (which SHOULD be 400 days or less, see attribute-max-age)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c4f77a23565253b46eccc9fb2e5f482a0abf3b03b7fd75bd06e3ddf19946e9ae","title":"","text":"that use different grammatical notations than this document (which uses ABNF from RFC5234). NOTE: The name of an attribute-value pair is not case sensitive. So while they are presented here in CamelCase, such as \"HttpOnly\" or \"SameSite\", any case is accepted. E.x.: \"httponly\", \"Httponly\", \"hTTPoNLY\", etc. <\/del> Per the grammar above, servers SHOULD NOT produce nameless cookies (i.e.: an empty cookie-name) as such cookies may be unpredictably serialized by UAs when sent back to the server. <\/ins> The semantics of the cookie-value are not defined by this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2f8b35679698e27df5fe1de350181752eb1457d90d2a907e152c010a236217fc","title":"","text":"store arbitrary data in a cookie-value SHOULD encode that data, for example, using Base64 RFC4648. The domain-value is a subdomain as defined by RFC1034, Section 3.5, and as enhanced by RFC1123, Section 2.1. Thus, domain-value is a string of USASCII characters, such as one obtained by applying the \"ToASCII\" operation defined in Section 4 of RFC3490. <\/del> Per the grammar above, the cookie-value MAY be wrapped in DQUOTE characters. Note that in this case, the initial and trailing DQUOTE characters are not stripped. They are part of the cookie-value, and will be included in Cookie header fields sent to the server. The domain-value is a subdomain as defined by RFC1034, Section 3.5, and as enhanced by RFC1123, Section 2.1. Thus, domain-value is a string of USASCII characters, such as one obtained by applying the \"ToASCII\" operation defined in Section 4 of RFC3490. <\/ins> The portions of the set-cookie-string produced by the cookie-av term are known as attributes. To maximize compatibility with user agents, servers SHOULD NOT produce two attributes with the same name in the same set-cookie-string. (See storage-model for how user agents handle this case.) NOTE: The name of an attribute-value pair is not case sensitive. So while they are presented here in CamelCase, such as \"HttpOnly\" or \"SameSite\", any case is accepted. E.x.: \"httponly\", \"Httponly\", \"hTTPoNLY\", etc. <\/ins> Servers SHOULD NOT include more than one Set-Cookie header field in the same response with the same cookie-name. (See set-cookie for how user agents handle this case.)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0d6092a9bcac51836def6c5e334638deca497a91f2d38d79fa4015f12769738d","title":"","text":"Signatures, an application or profile of this specification MUST specify all of the following items: The set of covered-content that are expected and required to be included in the covered components list. For example, an authorization protocol could mandate that the Authorization field be covered to protect the authorization credentials and mandate the signature parameters contain a \"created\" parameter, while an API expecting semantically relevant HTTP message content could require the Content-Digest header to be present and covered. <\/del> The set of covered-content and signature-params that are expected and required to be included in the covered components list. For example, an authorization protocol could mandate that the Authorization field be covered to protect the authorization credentials and mandate the signature parameters contain a \"created\" parameter, while an API expecting semantically relevant HTTP message content could require the Content-Digest header to be present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"context\" that is specific to the API being protected. <\/ins> A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the signature. An application will usually use the \"keyid\" parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b8c4e798c8f463f7efea1060fda3654731bcc13248793daddcd651e2c05f1aa9","title":"","text":"\"keyid\": The identifier for the key material as a String value. \"context\": An application-specific context for the signature as a String value. This value is used by applications to help identify signatures relevant for specific applications or protocols. <\/ins> Additional parameters can be defined in the iana-param-contents. Note that there is no general ordering to the parameters, but once an ordering is chosen for a given set of parameters, it cannot be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d73aa9e5970f68a1dfb1b76608cf755288dcc494252d1130f7abccfa020d8748","title":"","text":"Requiring keys to be of a certain size (e.g., 2048 bits vs. 1024 bits). Enforcing uniqueness of a \"nonce\" value. <\/del> Enforcing uniqueness of the \"nonce\" parameter. Requiring an application-specific value for the \"context\" parameter. <\/ins> Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d258b3884bf3c769ff765de0c5b0e22ac72d2c8a971e587faafacf632d9aee1b","title":"","text":"padding attack would be rejected by the field value processor, even in the case where the attacker could force a signature collision. 7.25. Multiple applications and protocols could apply HTTP signatures on the same message simultaneously. A naive verifier could become confused in processing multiple signatures, either accepting or rejecting a message based on an unrelated or irrelevant signature. In order to help an application select which signatures apply to its own processing, the application can declare a specific value for the \"context\" signature parameter. For example, a signature targeting an application gateway could require \"context=\"app-gateway\"\" as part of the signature parameters for that application. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ba8ed2567290c68c47e5a643ebe899adae863b5c837542e129c044b6c413bb48","title":"","text":"the Origin Set (Section 2.3 of ORIGIN) for the connection within which it occurs. Where HTTP\/2 reserves Stream 0 for frames related to the state of the connection, HTTP\/3 defines a pair of unidirectional streams called \"control streams\" for this purpose. Where ORIGIN indicates that the ORIGIN frame should be sent on Stream 0, this should be interpreted to mean the HTTP\/3 control stream. The ORIGIN frame is sent from servers to clients on the server's control stream. The layout and semantics of the frame payload are identical to those of the HTTP\/2 frame defined in ORIGIN. The ORIGIN frame type is 0xc (decimal 12), as in HTTP\/2. <\/del> The semantics of the frame payload are identical to those of the HTTP\/2 frame defined in ORIGIN. Where HTTP\/2 reserves Stream 0 for frames related to the state of the connection, HTTP\/3 defines a pair of unidirectional streams called \"control streams\" for this purpose. Where ORIGIN indicates that the ORIGIN frame should be sent on Stream 0, this should be interpreted to mean the HTTP\/3 control stream. The ORIGIN frame is sent from servers to clients on the server's control stream. 2.1. The ORIGIN frame has a nearly identical layout to that used in HTTP\/2, restated here for clarity. The ORIGIN frame type is 0xc (decimal 12) as in HTTP\/2. The payload contains zero or more instances of the Origin-Entry field. An Origin-Entry is a length-delimited string. Specifically, it contains two fields: An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the length, in octets, of the ASCII-Origin field. An OPTIONAL sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the sender asserts this connection is or could be authoritative for. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88bc64223467ec128d029db7a2d3af76dfc19f79e6ba8231e6d7ee69534faa3a","title":"","text":"3.3.5. To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the \"ECDSA\" algorithm defined in FIPS186-4 using curve P-384 with the signer's private signing key and the signature base (create-sig-input). The hash SHA-384 RFC6234 is applied to the signature base to create the digest content to which the digital signature is applied, (\"M\"). The signature algorithm returns two integer values, \"r\" and \"s\". These are both encoded as big-endian unsigned integers, zero-padded to 48-octets each. These encoded values are concatenated into a single 96-octet array consisting of the encoded value of \"r\" followed by the encoded value of \"s\". The resulting concatenation of \"(r, s)\" is byte array of the HTTP message signature output used in sign. To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the \"ECDSA\" algorithm defined in FIPS186-4 using the public key portion of the verification key material and the signature base re-created as described in verify. The hash function SHA-384 RFC6234 is applied to the signature base to create the digest content to which the signature verification function is applied, (\"M\"). The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be verified (\"S\") as described in verify. This value is a 96-octet array consisting of the encoded values of \"r\" and \"s\" concatenated in order. These are both encoded in big-endian unsigned integers, zero-padded to 48-octets each. The resulting signature value \"(r, s)\" is used as input to the signature verification function. The results of the verification function indicate if the signature presented is valid. Note that the output of ECDSA algorithms are non-deterministic, and therefore it is not correct to re-calculate a new signature on the signature base and compare the results to an existing signature. Instead, the verification algorithm defined here needs to be used. See security-nondeterministic. Use of this algorithm can be indicated at runtime using the \"ecdsa- p384-sha384\" value for the \"alg\" signature parameter. 3.3.6. <\/ins> To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the \"Ed25519\" algorithm defined in RFC8032 with the signer's private signing key and the signature base (create-sig-input). The signature base is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-49f48f7e7950812f417f9ab2c4b2513c13cbad86766bb19e4effd2c5699100f2","title":"","text":"Use of this algorithm can be indicated at runtime using the \"ed25519\" value for the \"alg\" signature parameter. 3.3.6. <\/del> 3.3.7. <\/ins> If the signing algorithm is a JOSE signing algorithm from the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry established by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a2814cd62ebac5957a376f9f716c8b2165a48458524401542c7fba4a65405cde","title":"","text":"credentials and mandate the signature parameters contain a \"created\" parameter, while an API expecting semantically relevant HTTP message content could require the Content-Digest header to be present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"context\" that is specific to the API being protected. <\/del> present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"tag\" that is specific to the API being protected. <\/ins> A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the signature. An application will usually use the \"keyid\" parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c51f420a15a1483c21cd35aa75495c1765739427aaf3ca9b3d22d5e2d1e2b33e","title":"","text":"\"keyid\": The identifier for the key material as a String value. \"context\": An application-specific context for the signature as a String value. This value is used by applications to help identify <\/del> \"tag\": An application-specific tag for the signature as a String value. This value is used by applications to help identify <\/ins> signatures relevant for specific applications or protocols. Additional parameters can be defined in the iana-param-contents."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ba2daab4b9656a6f3eeac91a17f91ebe71e740d09be8069741e5cfe2585deed5","title":"","text":"Enforcing uniqueness of the \"nonce\" parameter. Requiring an application-specific value for the \"context\" parameter. <\/del> Requiring an application-specific value for the \"tag\" parameter. <\/ins> Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a850821d5791dcbe6615d3bd7e54c6fd72db2a0d2484b2cd2e591d5dc7e6c5ad","title":"","text":"present, and applications should not put semantic meaning on the labels themselves. Instead, additional signature parameters can be used to convey whatever additional meaning is required to be attached to and covered by the signature. In particular, the \"context\" parameter can be used to define an application-specific value as described in security-signature-context. <\/del> to and covered by the signature. In particular, the \"tag\" parameter can be used to define an application-specific value as described in security-signature-tag. <\/ins> 7.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c2e494ec9ff1f16669200d819b60f3d8f9967b6e9e67930b8ddc5eaa9481b0f5","title":"","text":"either accepting or rejecting a message based on an unrelated or irrelevant signature. In order to help an application select which signatures apply to its own processing, the application can declare a specific value for the \"context\" signature parameter as defined in <\/del> specific value for the \"tag\" signature parameter as defined in <\/ins> signature-params. For example, a signature targeting an application gateway could require \"context=\"app-gateway\"\" as part of the signature parameters for that application. The use of the \"context\" parameter does not prevent an attacker from also using the same value as a target application, since the parameter's value is public and otherwise unrestricted. As a consequence, a verifier should only use value of the \"context\" parameter to limit which signatures to check. Each signature still needs to be examined by the verifier to ensure that sufficient coverage is provided, as discussed in security-coverage. <\/del> gateway could require \"tag=\"app-gateway\"\" as part of the signature parameters for that application. The use of the \"tag\" parameter does not prevent an attacker from also using the same value as a target application, since the parameter's value is public and otherwise unrestricted. As a consequence, a verifier should only use value of the \"tag\" parameter to limit which signatures to check. Each signature still needs to be examined by the verifier to ensure that sufficient coverage is provided, as discussed in security-coverage. <\/ins> 7.2.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-61f88f98475d2a43017376288a66b0cdb9ea8045f075169cab5fcddf6daa00c5","title":"","text":"with a certificate, a client presents its X.509 certificate RFC5280 and proves possession of the corresponding private key to a server when negotiating a TLS connection or the resumption of such a connection. In contemporary versions of TLS RFC8446 RFC5246 this requires that the client send the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the <\/del> connection. In contemporary versions of TLS TLS TLS1.2 this requires that the client send the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages during the handshake and for the server to verify the <\/ins> CertificateVerify and Finished messages. HTTP\/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC7540) and prohibits TLS <\/del> HTTP\/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC9113) and prohibits TLS <\/ins> 1.3 post-handshake authentication RFC8740. However, they are sometimes used to implement reactive client certificate authentication in HTTP\/1.1 RFC7230 where the server decides whether <\/del> authentication in HTTP\/1.1 RFC9112 where the server decides whether <\/ins> to request a client certificate based on the HTTP request. HTTP application data sent on such a connection after receipt and verification of the client certificate is also mutually-authenticated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bdde5a06fffe90d6f9a7fb8c1b581c7ea14f130d88913f6d373840a40e24e8dd","title":"","text":"The value of the header is encoded as described in encoding. The \"Client-Cert\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a single HTTP header field value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST NOT have a <\/del> MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a singleton header field value as defined in Section 5.5 of RFC9110, which MUST NOT have a <\/ins> list of values or occur multiple times in a request. 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7e26fb474c26691048d452fd1eb4b80460ab015e42599827ea5d24198f659694","title":"","text":"enabled. A TTRP negotiates the use of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection with the client, such as is described in RFC8446 or RFC5246, and <\/del> with the client, such as is described in TLS or RFC5246, and <\/ins> validates the client certificate per its policy and trusted certificate authorities. Each HTTP request on the underlying TLS connection are dispatched to the origin server with the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-03b2e1f59e9064a62df66e32d670f9d6de6cb6e56ddcf8dfb093fa540a84e866","title":"","text":"Backend origin servers may then use the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the request to determine if the connection from the client to the TTRP was mutually-authenticated and, if so, the certificate thereby presented by the client. Forward proxies and other intermediaries MUST NOT add the \"Client- Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. <\/del> presented by the client. Access control decisions based on the client certificate (or lack thereof) can be conveyed by selecting response content as appropriate or with an HTTP 403 response, if the certificate is deemed unacceptable for the given context. Note that TLS clients that rely on error indications at the TLS layer for an unacceptable certificate will not receive those signals. <\/ins> When the value of the \"Client-Cert\" request header field is used to select a response (e.g., the response content is access-controlled),"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-288d417fce98206160571c04e8849ead25ec3937940d60cb3dbbd5bdda605521","title":"","text":"field, it SHOULD prevent the user agent from caching the response by transforming the value of the \"Vary\" response header field to \"*\". Forward proxies and other intermediaries MUST NOT add the \"Client- Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. <\/ins> 3. 3.1. If the client certificate header field is generated by an intermediary on a connection that compresses fields (e.g., using HPACK RFC7541 or QPACK I-D.ietf-quic-qpack) and more than one client's requests are multiplexed into that connection, it can reduce compression efficiency significantly, due to the typical size of the field value and its variation between clients. Recipients that anticipate connections with these characteristics can mitigate the efficiency loss by increasing the size of the dynamic table. If a recipient does not do so, senders may find it beneficial to always send the field value as a literal, rather than entering it into the dynamic table. <\/del> HPACK HPACK or QPACK QPACK) and more than one client's requests are multiplexed into that connection, it can reduce compression efficiency significantly, due to the typical size of the field value and its variation between clients. Recipients that anticipate connections with these characteristics can mitigate the efficiency loss by increasing the size of the dynamic table. If a recipient does not do so, senders may find it beneficial to always send the field value as a literal, rather than entering it into the dynamic table. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e5a7a7e2ca27861cf95f9c6842db5eca20aca83a0a192aa1d7df75a79775e064","title":"","text":"allow for a larger maximum header block size. An intermediary generating client certificate header fields on connections that allow for advertising the maximum acceptable header block size (e.g. HTTP\/2 RFC7540 or HTTP\/3 I-D.ietf-quic-http) should account for the additional size of header block of the requests it sends vs. requests it receives by advertising a value to its clients that is sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. <\/del> HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114) should account for the additional size of the header block of the requests it sends vs. requests it receives by advertising a value to its clients that is sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-883528ed91e6016af90437714c34de1e216e0b4ea248baecc6409f90da8657c3","title":"","text":"5.1. Please register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" defined by I-D.ietf-httpbis- semantics: <\/del> Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" defined by HTTP Semantics RFC9110: <\/ins> Field name: Client-Cert"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a30a7ea20246c393e0d4e42cf0ea159c1fe78ae27ee20a773c2a440ac7b05cb3","title":"","text":"field, it SHOULD prevent the user agent from caching the response by transforming the value of the \"Vary\" response header field to \"*\". Forward proxies and other intermediaries MUST NOT add the \"Client- Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields to requests, or modify an existing \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field. Similarly, clients MUST NOT employ the \"Client-Cert\" or \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field in requests. <\/ins> 3. 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-27074301e7a9ae383951b3c31d940d6113b55c8590d1bf4afe38d5b0ee45e60f","title":"","text":"This document designates the following headers, defined further in header and chain-header respectively, to carry the client certificate information of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection from a reverse proxy to origin server. <\/del> information of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection. The headers convey the information from the reverse proxy to the origin server. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf125a0aa5aaf8932c3490b1a00f3d8b822d42e14d3ce56cce1c24263ada2a53","title":"","text":"The value of the header is encoded as described in encoding. The \"Client-Cert\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a single HTTP header field value as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7230, which MUST NOT have a <\/del> MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a singleton header field value as defined in Section 5.5 of RFC9110, which MUST NOT have a <\/ins> list of values or occur multiple times in a request. 2.3. In the context of a TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment, the proxy MAY make the certificate chain used for validation of the end- entity certificate available to the backend application with the Client-Cert-Chain HTTP header field. This field contains certificates used by the proxy to validate the certificate used by the client in the TLS handshake. These certificates might or might not have been provided by the client during the TLS handshake. <\/del> proxy MAY make the certificate chain available to the backend application with the Client-Cert-Chain HTTP header field. <\/ins> Client-Cert-Chain is a List Structured Header RFC8941. Each item in the list MUST be a Byte Sequence (RFC8941) encoded as described in encoding. <\/del> encoding. The order is the same as the ordering in TLS (such as described in TLS). <\/ins> The header's ABNF is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8970b1cdbbfb42b11c36a11e00754ea8e5c1652939841acc90014dcfc30e2094","title":"","text":"purposes, it might be advantageous to split lists into multiple instances. The first certificate in the list SHOULD directly certify the end- entity certificate provided in the \"Client-Cert\" header; each following certificate SHOULD directly certify the one immediately preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that the server is known to possess any omitted certificates. However, for maximum compatibility, servers SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings. <\/del> 2.4. This section outlines the applicable processing rules for a TLS"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a5e1f9a0c85d1f3334edf7994848bfb058e4c59fd07cf4e08cb61b18077c0d84","title":"","text":"The QUERY method is subject to the same general security considerations as all HTTP methods as described in HTTP. The QUERY method can be used as an alternative to passing query information in the query portion of a URI. This is preferred in some cases, as the URI is more likely to be logged than the request content. If a server creates a temporary resource to represent the results of a QUERY request (e.g., for use in the Location or Content- Location field) and the request contains sensitive information that cannot be logged, then the URI of this resource SHOULD be chosen such that it does not include any sensitive portions of the original request content. <\/del> The QUERY method can be used as an alternative to passing request information in the URI (e.g., in the query section). This is preferred in some cases, as the URI is more likely to be logged or otherwise processed by intermediaries than the request content. If a server creates a temporary resource to represent the results of a QUERY request (e.g., for use in the Location or Content-Location field) and the request contains sensitive information that cannot be logged, then the URI of this resource SHOULD be chosen such that it does not include any sensitive portions of the original request content. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3f4c044c347ef055b718b6bebe39673578dc4a2735388e94e51ec07921a3031a","title":"","text":"Authorization field be covered to protect the authorization credentials and mandate the signature parameters contain a \"created\" parameter, while an API expecting semantically relevant HTTP message content could require the Content-Digest header to be present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"tag\" that is specific to the API being protected. <\/del> HTTP message content could require the Content-Digest header defined in DIGEST to be present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"tag\" that is specific to the API being protected. <\/ins> A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the signature. An application will usually use the \"keyid\" parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f7a763264c537fe0300e3168cb298b890099ab542758273d12e73821a20dc371","title":"","text":"The details of this kind of profiling are the purview of the application and outside the scope of this specification, however some additional considerations are discussed in security. <\/del> additional considerations are discussed in security. In particular, when choosing the required set of component identifiers, care has to be taken to make sure that the coverage is sufficient for the application, as discussed in security-coverage and security-message- content. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3d9ee0cf5698ab1bada782693ee94c0083f3691f9ca32456d59969ae3cda146b","title":"","text":"The \"Client-Cert\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a singleton header field value as defined in Section 5.5 of RFC9110, which MUST NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. <\/del> value as defined in RFC9110, which MUST NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e4296c63269acb02d5c726416bf42d74f477b78b9c1e3032e15abe52666ba1d7","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines HTTP extension header fields that allow a TLS <\/del> This document describes HTTP extension header fields that allow a TLS <\/ins> terminating reverse proxy to convey the client certificate information of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection to the origin server in a common and predictable manner."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-259597fb2e09502d5e01653125ec22152acf88e78ffd90aa072d5fdd42a06630","title":"","text":"commonly occurring functionality could improve and simplify interoperability between independent implementations. This document aspires to standardize two HTTP header fields, \"Client- Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\", which a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) adds to requests sent to the backend origin servers. The \"Client-Cert\" field value contains the end-entity client certificate from the mutually-authenticated TLS connection between the originating client and the TTRP. Optionally, the \"Client-Cert-Chain\" field value contains the certificate chain used for validation of the end-entity certificate. This enables the backend origin server to utilize the client certificate information in its application logic. While there may be additional proxies or hops between the TTRP and the origin server (potentially even with mutually-authenticated TLS connections between them), the scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header field is intentionally limited to exposing to the origin server the <\/del> This document describes two HTTP header fields, \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\", which a TLS terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) adds to requests sent to the backend origin servers. The \"Client- Cert\" field value contains the end-entity client certificate from the mutually-authenticated TLS connection between the originating client and the TTRP. Optionally, the \"Client-Cert-Chain\" field value contains the certificate chain used for validation of the end-entity certificate. This enables the backend origin server to utilize the client certificate information in its application logic. While there may be additional proxies or hops between the TTRP and the origin server (potentially even with mutually-authenticated TLS connections between them), the scope of the \"Client-Cert\" header field is intentionally limited to exposing to the origin server the <\/ins> certificate that was presented by the originating client in its connection to the TTRP."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3d72be0bc7798928a15a33f88dc2e01ecee0e33a8a3494968021b9c0c5f6905c","title":"","text":"value as defined in RFC9110, which MUST NOT have a list of values or occur multiple times in a request. example-header in example has an example of the \"Client-Cert\" header field. <\/ins> 2.3. In the context of a TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f4033859848c6260e96b25f5c6dc9343cea815beef450d694a90ff7d48fd6d98","title":"","text":"purposes, it might be advantageous to split lists into multiple instances. example-chain-header in example has an example of the \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header field. <\/ins> 2.4. This section outlines the applicable processing rules for a TLS"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6f9076661fbbfd988b38e45febcab787da41120efa4115a5bfc3ce0c6f7b0b3f","title":"","text":"application requirements. In order for these types of application deployments to work in practice, the reverse proxy needs to convey information about the client certificate to the origin application server. A common way this information is conveyed in practice today is by using non-standard fields to carry the certificate (in some encoding) or individual parts thereof in the HTTP request that is dispatched to the origin server. This solution works but <\/del> server. At the time of writing, a common way this information is conveyed is by using non-standard fields to carry the certificate (in some encoding) or individual parts thereof in the HTTP request that is dispatched to the origin server. This solution works but <\/ins> interoperability between independently developed components can be cumbersome or even impossible depending on the implementation choices respectively made (like what field names are used or are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c6e38a353bc53e473ac91100e7c186caa73d2003fb9180768d11ce45705f9a2d","title":"","text":"3.1. If the client certificate header field is generated by an intermediary on a connection that compresses fields (e.g., using HPACK HPACK or QPACK QPACK) and more than one client's requests are multiplexed into that connection, it can reduce compression efficiency significantly, due to the typical size of the field value and its variation between clients. Recipients that anticipate connections with these characteristics can mitigate the efficiency loss by increasing the size of the dynamic table. If a recipient does not do so, senders may find it beneficial to always send the field value as a literal, rather than entering it into the dynamic table. <\/del> If the connection between the TTRP and origin is capable of field compression (e.g., HPACK HPACK or QPACK QPACK), and the TTRP multiplexes more than one client's requests into that connection, the size and variation of \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\" field values can reduce compression efficiency significantly. An origin could mitigate the efficiency loss by increasing the size of the dynamic table. If the TTRP determines that the origin dynamic table is not sufficiently large, it may find it beneficial to always send the field value as a literal, rather than entering it into the table. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5f627db1ebdd39f5c59aa6ef47e60f8a5ab25827e61107f4fc1699392528559","title":"","text":"3.2. A server in receipt of a larger header block than it is willing to <\/del> A server in receipt of a larger message header than it is willing to <\/ins> handle can send an HTTP 431 (Request Header Fields Too Large) status code per RFC6585. Due to the typical size of the field values containing certificate data, recipients may need to be configured to allow for a larger maximum header block size. An intermediary generating client certificate header fields on connections that allow for advertising the maximum acceptable header block size (e.g. HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114) should account for the additional size of the header block of the requests it sends vs. requests it receives by advertising a value to its clients that is sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. <\/del> allow for a larger maximum header size. An intermediary generating client certificate header fields on connections that allow for advertising the maximum acceptable header size (e.g. HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114) should account for the additional size of the header of the requests it sends vs. requests it receives by advertising a value to its clients that is sufficiently smaller so as to allow for the addition of certificate data. <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-af5f7a8034d5c10398f18b9a0fdf9a1ed21a414a2b55be9518d70b7b59f42b24","title":"","text":"deployments. The communication between a TTRP and backend or origin server, for example, might be authenticated in some way with the insertion and consumption of the \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert- Chain\" header fields occurring only on that connection. Alternatively the network topology might dictate a private network such that the backend application is only able to accept requests from the TTRP and the proxy can only make requests to that server. Other deployments that meet the requirements set forth herein are also possible. <\/del> Chain\" header fields occurring only on that connection. I-D.ietf- httpbis-message-signatures gives one example of this with an application of HTTP Message Signatures. Alternatively the network topology might dictate a private network such that the backend application is only able to accept requests from the TTRP and the proxy can only make requests to that server. Other deployments that meet the requirements set forth herein are also possible. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dedb95c8c4561cd297f7e2d88b1f6efcc083198514067fab37ebf5f806bbcf93","title":"","text":"1.2. This document uses the following terminology from RFC8941 to specify syntax and parsing: List and Byte Sequence. <\/ins> Phrases like TLS client certificate authentication or mutually- authenticated TLS are used throughout this document to refer to the process whereby, in addition to the normal TLS server authentication"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e7e727e9a202e199177d35af605021730f80fdf67a680eb51f48a2fb4dab87dd","title":"","text":"2.1. The headers in this document encode certificates as Structured Field Byte Sequences (RFC8941) where the value of the binary data is a DER encoded ITU.X690.1994 X.509 certificate RFC5280. In effect, this means that the binary DER certificate is encoded using base64 (without line breaks, spaces, or other characters outside the base64 alphabet) and delimited with colons on either side. <\/del> The headers in this document encode certificates as Byte Sequences (RFC8941) where the value of the binary data is a DER encoded ITU.X690.1994 X.509 certificate RFC5280. In effect, this means that the binary DER certificate is encoded using base64 (without line breaks, spaces, or other characters outside the base64 alphabet) and delimited with colons on either side. <\/ins> Note that certificates are often stored encoded in a textual format, such as the one described in RFC7468, which is already nearly compatible with a Structured Field Byte Sequence; if so, it will be sufficient to replace \"---(BEGIN|END) CERTIFICATE---\" with \":\" and remove line breaks in order to generate an appropriate item. <\/del> compatible with a Byte Sequence; if so, it will be sufficient to replace \"---(BEGIN|END) CERTIFICATE---\" with \":\" and remove line breaks in order to generate an appropriate item. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7456bfc9e8766b64f604c7e1be90ab56fdc284ec4bff69d0a9540d851d90de9d","title":"","text":"contains the end-entity certificate used by the client in the TLS handshake. Client-Cert is an Item Structured Header RFC8941. Its value MUST be a Byte Sequence (RFC8941). Its ABNF is: The value of the header is encoded as described in encoding. <\/del> Client-Cert is a Byte Sequence with the value of the header encoded as described in encoding. <\/ins> The \"Client-Cert\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It is a singleton header field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-105db9fd29c118a15fbde6ef1fe7abed3daac412d242637682772129175b9137","title":"","text":"proxy MAY make the certificate chain available to the backend application with the Client-Cert-Chain HTTP header field. Client-Cert-Chain is a List Structured Header RFC8941. Each item in the list MUST be a Byte Sequence (RFC8941) encoded as described in encoding. The order is the same as the ordering in TLS (such as described in TLS). The header's ABNF is: <\/del> Client-Cert-Chain is a List (RFC8941). Each item in the list MUST be a Byte Sequence encoded as described in encoding. The order is the same as the ordering in TLS (such as described in TLS). <\/ins> The \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header field is only for use in HTTP requests and MUST NOT be used in HTTP responses. It MAY have a list of values"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-30a3de2ec996d4cdbdff530eacaf0d82d389f3185a82dccb3c04c2de78543015","title":"","text":"For example, given the following message: ```http-message HTTP\/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text\/plain Transfer- Encoding: chunked Trailer: Expires 4 HTTP 7 Message 10 Signatures 0 Expires: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 07:28:00 GMT ``` <\/del> The signer decides to add both the Trailer header field as well as the Expires trailer to the signature base: \"\"@status\": 200 \"trailer\": Expires \"expires\";tr: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 07:28:00 GMT \" <\/del> the Expires trailer to the signature base, along with the status code derived component: <\/ins> IF a field is available as both a header and trailer in a message, both values MAY be signed separately. The values of header fields and trailer fields of the same name MUST NOT be combined. <\/del> If a field is available as both a header and trailer in a message, both values MAY be signed, but the values MUST be signed separately. The values of header fields and trailer fields of the same name MUST NOT be combined for purposes of the signature. <\/ins> Since trailer fields could be merged into the header fields or dropped entirely by intermediaries as per HTTP, it is NOT RECOMMENDED"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7164fb66a040347ac2fa06000cfded3fe40217d814028191c1cbbf7ede3059e9","title":"","text":"ORIGIN frame is sent from servers to clients on the server's control stream. HTTP\/3 does not define a Flags field in the generic frame layout. As no flags have been defined for the ORIGIN frame, this specification does not define a mechanism for communicating such flags in HTTP\/3. <\/ins> 2.1. The ORIGIN frame has a nearly identical layout to that used in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2f3cb03d21bcf49ce7eeefc72f7b1de4a8280403c8997555d9501e04aed4fce2","title":"","text":"CertificateVerify and Finished messages. HTTP\/2 restricts TLS 1.2 renegotiation (RFC9113) and prohibits TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication RFC8740. However, they are <\/del> 1.3 post-handshake authentication (RFC9113). However, they are <\/ins> sometimes used to implement reactive client certificate authentication in HTTP\/1.1 RFC9112 where the server decides whether to request a client certificate based on the HTTP request. HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d452e06d6f00c964b96ab026951038c582f2fff128932fea5115359d779a503","title":"","text":"enabled. A TTRP negotiates the use of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection with the client, such as is described in TLS or RFC5246, and validates the client certificate per its policy and trusted certificate authorities. Each HTTP request on the underlying TLS connection are dispatched to the origin server with the following modifications: <\/del> with the client, such as is described in TLS or TLS1.2, and validates the client certificate per its policy and trusted certificate authorities. Each HTTP request on the underlying TLS connection are dispatched to the origin server with the following modifications: <\/ins> The client certificate is placed in the \"Client-Cert\" header field of the dispatched request, as described in header."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93aaf14a7996c08faad82d7fb21b653895f8d561636a33bf998ffb956bd480d8","title":"","text":"indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address \"2001:db8::1\" as the next hop for this request, encountered the CNAMEs \"tracker.example.com.\" and \"service1.example-cdn.com\" in the <\/del> CNAMEs \"tracker.example.com\" and \"service1.example-cdn.com\" in the <\/ins> DNS resolution chain. Note that while this example includes both the \"next-hop\" and \"next-hop-aliases\" parameters, \"next-hop-aliases\" can be included without including \"next-hop\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ef877ccc90e93e52c2c51d6e1471c259ded783ddc25c24f7c41fd14685a78e1a","title":"","text":"1. Existing RFCs define extensions to HTTP\/2 HTTP2 which remain useful in HTTP\/3. Section A.2.3 of HTTP3 describes the required updates for HTTP\/2 frames to be used with HTTP\/3. <\/del> in HTTP\/3. HTTP3 describes the required updates for HTTP\/2 frames to be used with HTTP\/3. <\/ins> ORIGIN defines the HTTP\/2 ORIGIN frame, which indicates what origins are available on a given connection. It defines a single HTTP\/2 frame type. 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Frame diagrams in this document use the format defined in QUIC- TRANSPORT to illustrate the order and size of fields. <\/ins> 2. The ORIGIN HTTP\/3 frame allows a server to indicate what origin(s) (RFC6454) the server would like the client to consider as members of the Origin Set (Section 2.3 of ORIGIN) for the connection within which it occurs. <\/del> the Origin Set (ORIGIN) for the connection within which it occurs. <\/ins> The semantics of the frame payload are identical to those of the HTTP\/2 frame defined in ORIGIN. Where HTTP\/2 reserves Stream 0 for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-02e51f0bef4c8f333e427a0c3c2a19287abea0a4e875b6a363e9278f4803bcc7","title":"","text":"An Origin-Entry is a length-delimited string. Specifically, it contains two fields: An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the length, in octets, of the ASCII-Origin field. An OPTIONAL sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the sender asserts this connection is or could be authoritative for. <\/del> 3. This document introduces no new security considerations beyond those"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7a371405678b63e6f983a2fabbe19eb3647524f8f26e4b7ea41fa0ce0b918126","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines an HTTP Proxy-Status Parameter that contains a list of aliases received over DNS when establishing a connection to the next hop. <\/del> list of aliases and canonical names received over DNS when establishing a connection to the next hop. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b575f8657d935badae7b7daa8a42026a6939602bf1e1f4cf2efce8326c620c97","title":"","text":"chain of aliases encountered during DNS resolution when connecting to the next hop. Knowing the full chain of aliases that were used during DNS resolution is particularly useful for clients of forward proxies, in which the client is requesting to connect to a specific target hostname using the CONNECT method HTTP or UDP proxying CONNECT-UDP. DNS aliases can be used to \"cloak\" hosts that perform tracking or malicious activity behind more innocuous hostnames, and clients such as web browsers use the chain of DNS aliases to influence behavior like cookie usage policies COOKIES or blocking of malicious hosts. This document allows clients to receive the chain of DNS aliases for the next hop by including the list of names in a new \"next-hop- <\/del> Knowing the full chain of names that were used during DNS resolution via CNAME records DNS is particularly useful for clients of forward proxies, in which the client is requesting to connect to a specific target hostname using the CONNECT method HTTP or UDP proxying CONNECT-UDP. CNAME records can be used to \"cloak\" hosts that perform tracking or malicious activity behind more innocuous hostnames, and clients such as web browsers use the chain of DNS names to influence behavior like cookie usage policies COOKIES or blocking of malicious hosts. This document allows clients to receive the CNAME chain of DNS names for the next hop by including the list of names in a new \"next-hop- <\/ins> aliases\" Proxy-Status parameter. 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-abd19a6780529987e124e1475e0290d775776153f0809d93feb13c4d9bc99ada","title":"","text":"The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter's value is a String that contains one or more DNS names in a comma-separated list. The items in the list include all names received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS. Since DNS names can include comma (\",\") characters in them, any commas that appear in a DNS names MUST be represented using a percent-encoded \"%2C\" value instead. The aliases SHOULD appear in the order in which they were received in DNS; that is, if a name has a CNAME record with a first alias, which has a CNAME record for a second alias, the aliases should appear in that order. For example: indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address \"2001:db8::1\" as the next hop for this request, encountered the CNAMEs \"tracker.example.com\" and \"service1.example-cdn.com\" in the DNS resolution chain. Note that while this example includes both the <\/del> list include all alias names and canonical names received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS, not including the original requested hostname itself. The names SHOULD appear in the order in which they were received in DNS. If there are multiple CNAME records in the chain, the first name in the \"next-hop-aliases\" list would be the value in the CNAME record for the original hostname, and the final name in the \"next-hop- aliases\" list would be the name that ultimately resolved to one or more addresses. For example, consider a proxy \"proxy.example.net\" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop \"host.example.com\": The proxy could include the following proxy status in its response: This indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address \"2001:db8::1\" as the next hop for this request, encountered the names \"tracker.example.com\" and \"service1.example-cdn.com\" in the DNS resolution chain. Note that while this example includes both the <\/ins> \"next-hop\" and \"next-hop-aliases\" parameters, \"next-hop-aliases\" can be included without including \"next-hop\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7696e3449dfd198eab02043f8ef7e014958deef97ea814b9456e93090ec28a00","title":"","text":"next-hop-aliases A string containing one or more DNS alises used to establish a proxied connection to the next hop. <\/del> A string containing one or more DNS aliases or canonical names used to establish a proxied connection to the next hop. <\/ins> This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ba7259c0f04d641916c8b0c90816b4e81e6e1241a59beac478511688cb5c82c3","title":"","text":"aliases\" list would be the name that ultimately resolved to one or more addresses. The list of DNS names in \"next-hop-aliases\" use a comma (\",\") as a separator between names. DNS names normally just contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens (\"-\"), although they are allowed to contain any character RFC1035, Section 3.1, including a comma. To prevent commas or other special characters in names leading to incorrect parsing, any characters that appear in names in this list that do not belong to the set of URI Unreserved Characters RFC3986, Section 2.3 MUST be percent-encoded as defined in RFC3986, Section 2.1. <\/ins> For example, consider a proxy \"proxy.example.net\" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop \"host.example.com\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-001ff03ed93284c44a01b3fd0e3e52571017138e034499bb2131e4732a2fa7f2","title":"","text":"Algorithms\". Initial values for this registry are given in iana-hsa- contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-hsa- template. Algorithms referenced by algorithm identifiers have to be fully defined with all parameters fixed. Algorithm identifiers in this registry are to be interpreted as whole string values and not as a combination of parts. That is to say, it is expected that <\/del> policy RFC8126. The Designated Expert (DE) is expected to ensure that the algorithms referenced by a registered algorithm identifier are fully defined with all parameters (such as salt, hash, required key length, etc) are fixed by the defining text. The DE is expected to ensure that the algorithm definition fully specifies the \"HTTP_SIGN\" and \"HTTP_VERIFY\" primitive functions, including how all defined inputs and outputs map to the underlying cryptographic algorithm. The DE is expected to reject any registrations that are aliases of existing registrations. The DE is expected to ensure all registrations follow the template presented in iana-hsa-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable. When setting a registered item's status to \"Deprecated\", the DE should ensure that a reason for the deprecation is documented, along with instructions for moving away from the deprecated functionality. This specification creates algorithm identifiers by including major parameters in the identifier string. However, algorithm identifiers in this registry are to be interpreted as whole string values and not as a combination of parts. That is to say, it is expected that <\/ins> implementors understand \"rsa-pss-sha512\" as referring to one specific algorithm with its hash, mask, and salt values set as defined here. Implementors do not parse out the \"rsa\", \"pss\", and \"sha512\" portions of the identifier to determine parameters of the signing algorithm from the string, and the registry of one combination of parameters does not imply the registration of other combinations. Algorithms added to this registry MUST NOT be aliases for other entries in the registry. <\/del> algorithm with its hash, mask, and salt values set as defined in the defining text that establishes this identifier. Implementors do not parse out the \"rsa\", \"pss\", and \"sha512\" portions of the identifier to determine parameters of the signing algorithm from the string, and the registry of one combination of parameters does not imply the registration of other combinations. <\/ins> 6.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-162f0ba503b4f12393d480004f15bf04d013219927982f61c398e8de5181a6a1","title":"","text":"the signature parameters structure. Initial values for this registry are given in iana-param-contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-param-template. <\/del> Expert Review registration policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-param-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function. The DE is expected to ensure that the defined functionality is clear and does not conflict with other registered parameters. The DE is expected to ensure that the definition of the metadata parameter includes its behavior when used as part of the normal signature process as well as when used in an Accept-Signature field. <\/ins> 6.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bcf1a960f6ecd846c5b07761e86722f52edd7f6c1d69a0454b13cedaaba204a2","title":"","text":"values. Initial values for this registry are given in iana-content- contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana- content-template. <\/del> policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-content-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function. The DE is expected to ensure that the component value represented by the registration request can be deterministically derived from the target HTTP message. The DE is expected to ensure that any parameters defined for the registration request are clearly documented, along with their effects on the component value. The DE should also ensure that the registration request is not sufficiently distinct from existing derived component definitions to warrant its registration. When setting a registered item's status to \"Deprecated\", the DE should ensure that a reason for the deprecation is documented, along with instructions for moving away from the deprecated functionality. <\/ins> 6.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ede731d7668e842c2219c2bb12dccddc0e27f2be741751daa341fd2f4922a881","title":"","text":"are associated with, and the modifications these parameters make to the component value. Definitions of parameters MUST define the targets to which they apply (such as specific field types, derived components, or contexts) and any incompatibilities with other parameters known at the time of definition. Initial values for this registry are given in iana-component-param-contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126 and shall follow the template presented in iana-component-param-template. <\/del> components, or contexts). Initial values for this registry are given in iana-component-param-contents. Future assignments and modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the Expert Review registration policy RFC8126. The DE is expected to ensure that the name follows the template presented in iana-component-param-template, including that the length of the name is not excessive while still being unique and recognizable for its defined function. The DE is expected to ensure that the definition of the field sufficiently defines any interactions incompatibilities with other existing parameters known at the time of the registration request. If the parameter changes the component value, the DE is expected to ensure that the component value defined by the component identifier with the parameter applied can be deterministically derived from the target HTTP message. <\/ins> 6.5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4fa403d6ed6150c463f3b58b27c679047a7f733e83f88b282d014caba54ef640","title":"","text":"The \"@method\" derived component refers to the HTTP method of a request message. The component value is canonicalized by taking the value of the method as a string. Note that the method name is case- sensitive as per HTTP, and conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII. <\/del> sensitive as per HTTP. While conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII, no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. <\/ins> For example, the following request message:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-62715a69f1c05be4031054f7a024bde06169de778ea97413bc7ce691560ae420","title":"","text":"And the following signature base line: If the query string is absent from the request message, the value is the leading \"?\" character alone: <\/del> Just like including an empty path component, the signer can include an empty query component to indicate that this component is not used in the message. If the query string is absent from the request message, the component value is the leading \"?\" character alone: <\/ins> Resulting in the following signature base line:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dac8ff7ae25537c9b0ca7e40479d5849dd25c605cb7886d28d2e592a03d1a123","title":"","text":"chances of the field value remaining untouched through intermediaries. Where that approach is not possible and multiple instances of a field need to be sent separately, it is RECOMMENDED that signers and verifiers process any list-based fields by parsing out individual field values and combining them based on the strict <\/del> that signers and verifiers process any list-based fields taking all individual field values and combining them based on the strict <\/ins> algorithm below, to counter possible intermediary behavior. When the field in question is a structured field of type List or Dictionary, this effect can be accomplished more directly by using the strict <\/del> this effect can be accomplished more directly by requiring the strict <\/ins> structured field serialization of the field value, as described in http-field-structured. Note that some HTTP fields, such as Set-Cookie COOKIE, do not follow a syntax that allows for combination of field values in this manner (such that the combined output is unambiguous from multiple inputs). Even though the component value is never parsed by the message signature process and used only as part of the signature base in create-sig-input, caution needs to be taken when including such <\/del> Note that some HTTP fields, such as Set-Cookie (COOKIE), do not follow a syntax that allows for combination of field values in this manner (such that the combined output is unambiguous from multiple inputs). Even though the component value is never parsed by the message signature process and used only as part of the signature base in create-sig-input, caution needs to be taken when including such <\/ins> fields in signatures since the combined value could be ambiguous. The \"bs\" parameter defined in http-field-byte-sequence provides a method for wrapping such problematic fields. See security-non-list"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b54a40983c20930acf652d4285d9b9c374afdf764476ee3b041af0b444008466","title":"","text":"Create an ordered list of the field values of each instance of the field in the message, in the order that they occur (or will occur) in the message. If necessary, separate individual values found in a field instance. <\/del> in the message. <\/ins> Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list. Note that since HTTP field values are not allowed to contain"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-392d215b6b5fafaaa2951fa951c7e07f8a423ef2b54899aeed609358752b912b","title":"","text":"response, it indicates that the server would like the client to provide the respective Integrity field on future requests. Integrity preference fields are only a hint. The receiver of the field can ignore it and send an Integrity field using any algorithm or omit the field entirely, for example see ex-server-selects- unsupported-algorithm. It is not a protocol error if preferences are ignored. Applications that use Integrity fields and Integrity preferences can define expectations or constraints that operate in addition to this specification. How to deal with an ignored preferences is a scenario that should be considered. <\/ins> \"Want-Content-Digest\" and \"Want-Repr-Digest\" are of type \"Dictionary\" where each:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d039714700c4307ee54b4692c88d7f620d902baac7d367f5cd2fac19885cb647","title":"","text":"origin server, changing the target host and adding the Forwarded header field defined in RFC7239. The proxy includes the client's signature value from the original message under the label \"sig1\", which the proxy signs in addition to the Forwarded field. Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's Signature-Input value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/del> While the proxy is in a position to validate the client's signature, the changes the proxy makes to the message will invalidate the existing signature when the message is seen by the origin server. While it is possible for the origin server to have additional information in its signature context to account for the change in authority, this practice requires additional configuration and extra care (see further discussion in security-context-multiple- signatures). To counter this, the proxy adds its own signature over the new message before passing it along. The proxy includes the new \"@authority\" derived component and the Forwarded header, which it added to the message. The proxy's signature also includes the client's signature value from the original message in its covered components, as a dictionary field member under the label \"sig1\". Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's Signature-Input value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. While the origin server may not be able to directly verify this original signature, it can verify that the proxy has vouched for the signature's validity. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/ins> And a signature output value of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a4af6ebf2f4bf8a12f7148912437552008dcb0647ed2dc08ad9b3210ae29fb02","title":"","text":"2.2.8. If a request target URI uses HTML form parameters in the query string as defined in HTMLURL, the \"@query-param\" derived component allows addressing of individual query parameters. The query parameters MUST be parsed according to HTMLURL, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each component identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as a String value. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. <\/del> as defined in the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" section of HTMLURL, the \"@query-param\" derived component allows addressing of individual query parameters. The query parameters MUST be parsed according to the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each component identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as a String value. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. <\/ins> The component value of a single named parameter is the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded. Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" are included with an empty string as the component value. <\/del> of the named query parameter defined by \"application\/x-www-form- urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded. Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" are included with an empty string as the component value. <\/ins> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-350c3abe2750254a0025437c2acf5cff3deee89bbc8e7c611ca8599a1c750643","title":"","text":"could include additional information known to the application, such as an external host name. The error messages and codes that are returned from the verifier to the signer when the signature is invalid, the key material is inappropriate, the validity time window is out of specification, a component value cannot be calculated, or any other errors in the signature verification process. For example, if a signature is being used as an authentication mechanism, an HTTP status code of 401 Unauthorized or 403 Forbidden could be appropriate. If the response is from an HTTP API, a response with an HTTP status code of 400 Bad Request could include details as described in RFC7807, such as an indicator that the wrong key material was used. <\/ins> When choosing these parameters, an application of HTTP message signatures has to ensure that the verifier will have access to all required information needed to re-create the signature base. For"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f79d689a45f8361a3adb985cc8546e4308aee6cb6f90e350dff2020da7554220","title":"","text":"For example, a fictitious Foo-Example header field might be specified as: Note that because the definition of a Structured Field references a specific RFC for Structured Fields, the types available for use in its value are limited to those defined in that RFC. For example, a field whose definition references this document can have a value that uses the Date type (date), whereas a field whose definition references RFC 8941 cannot, because it will be treated as invalid (and therefore discarded) by implementations of that specification. Also note that this limitation also applies to future extensions to a field; for example, a field that is defined with reference to RFC 8941 cannot use the Date type, because some recipients might still be using an RFC 8941 parser to process it. However, this document is designed to be backwards-compatible with RFC 8941; a parser that implements the requirements here can also parse valid Structured Fields whose definitions reference RFC 8941. The effect of upgrading a Structured Fields implementation is that some field values that were invalid according to RFC 8941 might become valid when processed. For instance, though it would not be valid for a field defined against RFC 8941, a field might include include a Date value. An RFC 8941 implementation would reject the entire field, whereas an updated Structured Field implementation might permit the value. In some cases, the resulting Date value will be rejected by field-specific logic, but values in fields that are otherwise ignored (such as extension parameters) might not be detected and the field might subsequently be accepted and processed. <\/ins> 3. This section defines the abstract types for Structured Fields, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7ee7028e4adb3d764f26fa5e658d338f089e3fbc38709856e625ed4e7115b289","title":"","text":"defined in DIGEST to be present and covered as well as mandate a value for \"tag\" that is specific to the API being protected. The expected structured field types (STRUCTURED-FIELDS) of any required or expected covered component fields or parameters. <\/ins> A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the signature. An application will usually use the \"keyid\" parameter of the signature parameters (signature-params) and define rules"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1dd3c1e99b4bd8863c1b1ad0b7b094dad138b4c3f1064cc3cd9c6c11683b79fa","title":"","text":"2.1.1. If the value of an HTTP field is known by the application to be a structured field (STRUCTURED-FIELDS), and the expected type of the structured field is known, the signer MAY include the \"sf\" parameter in the component identifier. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the rules specified in STRUCTURED-FIELDS applicable to the type of the HTTP field. Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. <\/del> structured field type (as defined in STRUCTURED-FIELDS or its extensions or updates), and the expected type of the structured field is known, the signer MAY include the \"sf\" parameter in the component identifier. If this parameter is included with a component identifier, the HTTP field value MUST be serialized using the formal serialization rules specified in STRUCTURED-FIELDS (or the applicable formal serialization section of its extensions or updates) applicable to the type of the HTTP field. Note that this process will replace any optional internal whitespace with a single space character, among other potential transformations of the value. <\/ins> If multiple field values occur within a message, these values MUST be combined into a single List or Dictionary structure before serialization. If the application does not know the type of the field, or the application does not know how to serialize the type of the field, the use of this flag will produce an error. As a consequence, the signer can only reliably sign fields using this flag when the verifier's system knows the type as well. <\/ins> For example, the following dictionary field is a valid serialization: If included in the signature base without parameters, its value would"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c74356afa9e4dc2489ed47c8c4737660f90174a5044decbf6c88edf216e092d7","title":"","text":"STRUCTURED-FIELDS on the \"member_value\" and its parameters, not including the dictionary key itself. Specifically, the value is serialized as an Item or Inner List (the two possible values of a Dictionary member). <\/del> Dictionary member), with all parameters and possible sub-fields serialized using the strict serialization rules defined in STRUCTURED-FIELDS (or the applicable section of its extensions or updates). <\/ins> Each parameterized key for a given field MUST NOT appear more than once in the signature base. Parameterized keys MAY appear in any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7586d318c8d54ffb78a33be35491fcbf0ed19f5986addc86c7625b30f5d97479","title":"","text":"component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. Component identifiers are serialized using the production grammar defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS. The component identifier has a <\/del> Component identifiers are serialized using the strict serialization rules defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS. The component identifier has a <\/ins> component name, which is a String Item value serialized using the \"sf-string\" ABNF rule. The component identifier MAY also include defined parameters which are serialized using the \"parameters\" ABNF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-53f0cb9422a0d632b30820e9a34bed44a37f55de1bf2ab60e0f7583ea63c0c2e","title":"","text":"This specification intentionally defines strict parsing and serialization behaviors using step-by-step algorithms; the only error handling defined is to fail the operation altogether. <\/del> handling defined is to fail the entire operation altogether. <\/ins> It is designed to encourage faithful implementation and good interoperability. Therefore, an implementation that tried to be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-035859ce5758a0a0f5057010004cce1aec1d37ec277d7539fbc78484a8dc0fac","title":"","text":"most situations, violating field-specific constraints should have the same effect. Thus, if a header is defined as an Item and required to be an Integer, but a String is received, the field will by default be ignored. If the field requires different error handling, this should be explicitly specified. <\/del> ignored. If the field requires different handling for type mismatches it should be explicitly specified, but note that field definitions cannot override how parsing failures are handled. <\/ins> Both Items and Inner Lists allow parameters as an extensibility mechanism; this means that values can later be extended to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c89a55f9d7c577463d6988daa7515f59412fe5adefe3ee1b4a2675bd8722683d","title":"","text":"defined as an sf-string is allowed to fail when processing this field section: If parsing fails - including when calling another algorithm - the entire field value MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as if the field were not present in the section). This is intentionally strict, to improve interoperability and safety, and specifications referencing this document are not allowed to loosen this requirement. <\/del> If parsing fails, either the entire field value MUST be ignored (i.e., treated as if the field were not present in the section), or alternatively the complete HTTP message MUST be treated as malformed. This is intentionally strict to improve interoperability and safety, and field specifications that use Structured Fields are not allowed to loosen this requirement. <\/ins> Note that this requirement does not apply to an implementation that is not parsing the field; for example, an intermediary is not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-715d1e1ab7774b427dedf408f8bcc55cf8b18dc49d167f2c24543f15b628707a","title":"","text":"HTTPS over a mutually-authenticated TLS connection. Use of the header fields outside that intended use case, however, may undermine the protections afforded by TLS client certificate authentication. Therefore, steps MUST be taken to prevent unintended use, both in sending the header field and in relying on its value. <\/del> Therefore, steps such as those described below need to be taken to prevent unintended use, both in sending the header field and in relying on its value. <\/ins> Producing and consuming the \"Client-Cert\" and \"Client-Cert-Chain\" header fields SHOULD be configurable options, respectively, in a TTRP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f8a2eb6da5978ec6f1ee6ed709e1beef82454f5c5f6e02d804b01abda38edcf","title":"","text":"The communication between a TTRP and backend server needs to be secured against eavesdropping and modification by unintended parties. The configuration options and request sanitization are necessarily functionally of the respective servers. The other requirements can <\/del> The configuration options and request sanitization are necessary functionality of the respective servers. The other requirements can <\/ins> be met in a number of ways, which will vary based on specific deployments. The communication between a TTRP and backend or origin server, for example, might be authenticated in some way with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9787c74d6886ba42c90b905e31d4a0dbc1ba6f229e9ae4443dd07e304954ea72","title":"","text":" tus - Resumable Uploads Protocol <\/del> Resumable Uploads for HTTP <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-resumable-upload-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74b9b8fcbfb007867032203bb890311977c6049b1fde7e771c6ec55824f33613","title":"","text":"6.5. The checksum of an encrypted payload can change between different messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases its value could not be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) content is persisted. <\/del> Content coding mechanisms can support different encoding parameters, meaning that the same input content can produce different outputs. For example, GZIP supports mulitple compression levels. Such encoding parameters are generally not communicated as representation metadata, for instance different compression levels would all use the same \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" field. Other examples include where encoding relies on nonces or timestamps, such as the aes128gcm content coding defined RFC8188. Since it is possible for there to be variation within content coding, the checksum conveyed by the integrity field cannot be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) content is persisted. <\/ins> 6.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-258f1ef802a92e4cc9aeffc2ec977b70ce87c61866b0a24312d131578d55e8a9","title":"","text":"examples of Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest fields in message exchanges. algorithms bootstraps a new IANA registry hash algorithms and defines registration procedures for future entries. <\/del> algorithms presents hash algorithm considerations and defines registration procedures for future entries. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c601fb26d9a6b8b5fab6dab9a4108617d5f66114c25fbc6d4faea99def9049ff","title":"","text":"5. The \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\", maintained by IANA at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/ [1], registers algorithms for use with the Integrity and Integrity preference fields defined in this document. <\/del> There are a wide variety of hashing algorithms that can be used for the purposes of integrity. The choice of algorithm depends on several factors such as the integrity use case, implementation needs or constraints, or application design and workflows. An initial set of algorithms will be registered with IANA in the \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\" registry; see establish- hash-algorithm-registry. Additional algorithms can be registered in accordance with the policies set out in this section. Each algorithm has a status field, which is intended to provide an aid to implementation selection. Algorithms with a status value of \"standard\" are suitable for many purposes, including adversarial situations where hash functions might need to provide resistance to collision, first-preimage and second- preimage attacks. For adversarial situations, selecting which of the \"standard\" algorithms are acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances demand. As there is no negotiation, endpoints that depend on a digest for security will be vulnerable to attacks on the weakest algorithm they are willing to accept. Algorithms with a status value of \"insecure\" either provide none of these properties, or are known to be weak (see NO-MD5 and NO-SHA). These algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial setting; for example, when signing Integrity fields' values for authenticity. <\/ins> This registry uses the Specification Required policy (RFC8126). <\/del> Discussion of algorithm agility is presented in sec-agility. <\/ins> Registrations MUST include the following fields: <\/del> Registration requests for the \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\" registry use the Specification Required policy (RFC8126). Requests should use the following template: <\/ins> Algorithm Key: the Structured Fields key value used in \"Content- Digest\", \"Repr-Digest\", \"Want-Content-Digest\", or \"Want-Repr- Digest\" field Dictionary member keys Status: the status of the algorithm. Use \"standard\" for standardized algorithms without known problems; \"experimental\" or some other appropriate value <\/del> Status: the status of the algorithm. The options are: \"standard\" - for standardized algorithms without known problems, <\/ins> e.g. according to the type and status of the primary document in which the algorithm is defined; \"insecure\" when the algorithm is insecure; \"reserved\" when the algorithm references a reserved token value <\/del> \"provisional\" - for non-standard or unproven algorithms, \"insecure\" - for insecure algorithms, \"reserved\" - for algorithms that use a reserved token value that cannot be expressed in Structured Fields <\/ins> Description: a short description of the algorithm Reference(s): a set of pointers to the primary documents defining the algorithm and key <\/del> Reference(s): pointer(s) to the primary document(s) defining the technical details of the algorithm, and optionally the key <\/ins> Insecure hashing algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial setting; for example, when signing Integrity fields' values for authenticity. <\/del> When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) should pay attention to the requested status. The status value should reflect standardization status and the broad opinion of relevant interest groups such as the IETF or security-related SDOs. The \"standard\" status is not suitable for an algorithm that is known to be weak, broken or experimental. If a registration request attempts to register such an algorithm as \"standard\", the designated expert(s) should suggest an alternative status of \"insecure\" or \"provisional\". <\/ins> The entries in iana-hash-algorithm-table are registered by this document. <\/del> When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) cannot use a status of \"insecure\" or \"provisional\" as grounds for rejection. Requests to update or change the fields in an existing registration are permitted. For example, this could allow for the transition of an algorithm status from \"standard\" to \"insecure\" as the security environment evolves. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-59c1d944bf2f69ec9162e11a887eb3fb585d039b8d95ec7ab33be0e635b9715b","title":"","text":"the IANA Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields registry; see establish-hash-algorithm-registry. The \"standard\" algorithms listed in this document are suitable for many purposes, including adversarial situations where hash functions might need to provide resistance to collision, first-preimage and second-preimage attacks. Algorithms listed as \"insecure\" either provide none of these properties, or are known to be weak (see NO-MD5 and NO-SHA). For adversarial situations, which of the \"standard\" algorithms are acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances demand. As there is no negotiation, endpoints that depend on a digest for security will be vulnerable to attacks on the weakest algorithm they are willing to accept. <\/del> Transition from weak algorithms is supported by negotiation of hashing algorithm using \"Want-Content-Digest\" or \"Want-Repr-Digest\" (see want-fields) or by sending multiple digests from which the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d4165266ff0f59a9b23660fac1832f6c1814645eeeeb6ddb2c6e0500b125c322","title":"","text":"While algorithm agility allows the migration to stronger algorithms it does not prevent the use of weaker algorithms. Integrity fields do not provide any mitigiations for downgrade or substitution attacks <\/del> do not provide any mitigations for downgrade or substitution attacks <\/ins> (see Section 1 of RFC6211) of the hashing algorithm. To protect against such attacks, endpoints could restrict their set of supported algorithms to stronger ones and protect the fields value by using TLS"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f9c4b1732663fb76398b5bbda6b147d87fcccce2d6e0c13adcb861095111ac9","title":"","text":"7.2. This memo sets this specification to be the establishing document for the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields [2] registry defined in <\/del> IANA is requested to create the new \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\" registry at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-digest- hash-alg\/ [1] and populate it with the entries in iana-hash- algorithm-table. The procedure for new registrations is provided in <\/ins> algorithms. IANA is asked to initialize the registry with the entries in iana- hash-algorithm-table. <\/del> 8. References 8.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/ [2] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-structured-dig-alg\/ <\/del> [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-digest-hash-alg\/ <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9aca053d198e712cc8315d35d1bf099cff0c16027fe416d2fa69963369ade2e8","title":"","text":"insensitive components such as field names, request URI scheme, or host. Addition or removal of leading or trailing whitespace to a field value. Addition or removal of \"obs-fold\" from field values. <\/del> Changes to the request target and authority that when applied together do not result in a change to the message's target URI, as defined in HTTP. Additionally, there are some transformations that are either deprecated or otherwise not allowed, but still could occur in the wild. These transformations can still be handled without breaking the signature, and include things such as: Use, addition, or removal of leading or trailing whitespace in a field value. Use, addition, or removal of \"obs-fold\" in field values (HTTP1). <\/ins> We can identify these types of transformations as ones that should not prevent signature verification, even when performed on message components covered by the signature. Additionally, all changes to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-50851bb8cd94b6b732f1cd05344a23c5adf1b3d287635e99df06a97b270e6ab5","title":"","text":"Some examples of these kinds of transformations, and the effect they have on the message signature, are found in example-transform. Other transformations, such as parsing and re-serializing the field values of a covered component or changing the value of a derived component, can cause a signature to no longer validate against a target message. Applications of this specification need to take care to ensure that the transformations expected by the application are adequately handled by the choice of covered components. <\/ins> 1.4. HTTP Message Signatures are designed to be a general-purpose security"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-33dcc91abf227f847341579831ae110d033face7476508843a644c05d3b53e3d","title":"","text":"Remove any obsolete line-folding within the line and replace it with a single space (\" \"), as discussed in HTTP1. Note that this behavior is specific to HTTP1 and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification which do not allow internal line folding. <\/del> behavior is specific to HTTP\/1.1 and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification which do not allow internal line folding. <\/ins> Concatenate the list of values together with a single comma (\",\") and a single space (\" \") between each item."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-731136c38968422c992980ff5d5d2bc4a4be8aede53a4ffb78a11eaf3d9492a4","title":"","text":"use the connection established through the proxy, but need to gracefully handle situations in which this parameter is not present. The proxy MAY send the empty string (\"\") as the value of \"next-hop- aliases\" to indicate that no CNAME records were encountered when resolving the next hop's name. <\/ins> 3. The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter does not include any DNSSEC"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-38343e810f9a5120fbe12a67b70648e25467341779f53aa8bd8a861491a68b55","title":"","text":"client is behind a TLS Inspection appliance). In such cases, TLS cannot guarantee end-to-end message integrity or authenticity between the client and application. Additionally, some operating environments present obstacles that make it impractical to use TLS, or to use features necessary to provide message authenticity. Furthermore, some applications require the binding of an application- level key to the HTTP message, separate from any TLS certificates in use. Consequently, while TLS can meet message integrity and <\/del> environments present obstacles that make it impractical to use TLS (such as presentation of client certificates from a browser), or to use features necessary to provide message authenticity. Furthermore, some applications require the binding of a higher-level application- specific key to the HTTP message, separate from any TLS certificates in use. Consequently, while TLS can meet message integrity and <\/ins> authenticity needs for many HTTP-based applications, it is not a universal solution. Additionally, many applications need to be able to generate and verify signatures despite incomplete knowledge of the HTTP message as seen on the wire, due to the use of libraries, proxies, or application frameworks that alter or hide portions of the message from the application at the time of signing or verification. These applications need a means to protect the parts of the message that are most relevant to the application without having to violate layering and abstraction. Finally, object-based signature mechanisms such as JWS require the intact conveyance of the exact information that was signed. When applying such technologies to an HTTP message, elements of the HTTP message need to be duplicated in the object payload either directly or through inclusion of a hash. This practice introduces complexity since the repeated information needs to be carefully checked for consistency when the signature is verified. <\/ins> This document defines a mechanism for providing end-to-end integrity and authenticity for components of an HTTP message. The mechanism allows applications to create digital signatures or message authentication codes (MACs) over only the components of the message that are meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the signature even if the message has been transformed in any of the many ways permitted by HTTP. <\/del> and authenticity for components of an HTTP message by use of a detached signature. The mechanism allows applications to create digital signatures or message authentication codes (MACs) over only the components of the message that are meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the signature even if the message has been transformed in any of the many ways permitted by HTTP. <\/ins> The signing mechanism described in this document consists of three parts: A common nomenclature and canonicalization rule set for the different protocol elements and other components of HTTP messages, used to create the signature base. <\/del> used to create the signature base. (covered-components) <\/ins> Algorithms for generating and verifying signatures over HTTP message components using this signature base through application of cryptographic primitives. <\/del> of cryptographic primitives. (message-signatures) <\/ins> A mechanism for attaching a signature and related metadata to an HTTP message, and for parsing attached signatures and metadata from HTTP messages. To facilitate this, this document defines the \"Signature-Input\" and \"Signature\" fields. <\/del> \"Signature-Input\" and \"Signature\" fields. (attach-signature) <\/ins> This document also provides a mechanism for negotiation the use of signatures in one or more subsequent messages via the \"Accept- Signature\" field. This optional negotiation mechanism can be used along with opportunistic or application-driven message signatures by either party. <\/del> Signature\" field (request-signature). This optional negotiation mechanism can be used along with opportunistic or application-driven message signatures by either party. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1a406ed43ed80c7176eaee4a9abdf211240019a8dcd656f1367324ab3ee1e014","title":"","text":"material, or use some pre-configured algorithm agreed upon by the signer and verifier. A means of determining that a given key and algorithm presented in the request are appropriate for the request being made. For <\/del> A means of determining that a given key and algorithm used for a signature are appropriate for the context of the message. For <\/ins> example, a server expecting only ECDSA signatures should know to reject any RSA signatures, or a server expecting asymmetric cryptography should know to reject any symmetric cryptography."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3d859ab675f1b907a5eb58f8e87a3f43ab4c84bfb939c6cb96b2c396e340ce7b","title":"","text":"Within a single list of covered components, each component identifier MUST occur only once. One component identifier is distinct from another if either the component name or its parameters differ. Multiple component identifiers having the same component name MAY be included if they have parameters that make them distinct. The order of parameters MUST be preserved when processing a component identifier (such as when parsing during verification), but the order of parameters is not significant when comparing two component identifiers for equality. That is to say, \"\"foo\";bar;baz\" cannot be in the same message as \"\"foo\";baz;bar\", since these two component identifiers are equivalent, but a system processing one form is not allowed to transform it into the other form. <\/del> another if the component name differs, or if any of the parameters differ for the same component name. Multiple component identifiers having the same component name MAY be included if they have parameters that make them distinct, such as \"\"foo\";bar\" and \"\"foo\";baz\". The order of parameters MUST be preserved when processing a component identifier (such as when parsing during verification), but the order of parameters is not significant when comparing two component identifiers for equality checks. That is to say, \"\"foo\";bar;baz\" cannot be in the same message as \"\"foo\";baz;bar\", since these two component identifiers are equivalent, but a system processing one form is not allowed to transform it into the other form. <\/ins> The component value associated with a component identifier is defined by the identifier itself. Component values MUST NOT contain newline"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2eea3b6f023e2e7c831ced9b697e3cdc63b4be584234931b87889845a71382e2","title":"","text":"allowed to combine values of HTTP fields with any amount of whitespace between the commas, and if this behavior is not accounted for by the verifier, the signature can fail since the signer and verifier will be see a different component value in their respective <\/del> verifier will see a different component value in their respective <\/ins> signature bases. For robustness, it is RECOMMENDED that signed messages include only a single instance of any field covered under the signature, particularly with the value for any list-based fields"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4f40ca1ed682bab444b3a4f12e36547a0b7a533f268763f48b2a9df65a29de2f","title":"","text":"This would result in the following unsigned response message: The server signs the response with its own key, including the \"@status\" code and several header fields in the covered components. <\/ins> To cryptographically link the response to the request, the server signs the response with its own key and includes the method, authority, and the signature value \"sig1\" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature base for this example is: <\/del> includes the method, authority, and the signature and signature input labeled \"sig1\" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature base for this example is: <\/ins> The signed response message is: Since the request's signature value itself is not repeated in the response, the requester MUST keep the original signature value around long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier. <\/del> Note that the ECDSA algorithm in use here is non-deterministic, meaning a different signature value will be created every time the algorithm is run. The signature value provided here can be validated against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example. See security-nondeterministic. Since the signature component values from the request are not repeated in the response, the requester MUST keep the original message component values around long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier. In most cases, this means the requester needs to keep the original request message around, since the signer could choose to include any portions of the request in its response, according to the needs of the application. Since it is possible for an intermediary to alter a request message before it is processed by the server, applications need to take care not to sign such altered values as the client would not be able to validate the resulting signature. Applications needing this type of binding have to sign sufficient portion the request to ensure that it is uniquely tied to the response. Signing the signature value of a signed request alone does not provide sufficient coverage in most cases, as discussed in security-sign-signature. The response signature can only cover what is included in the request. Therefore, if an application needs to bind the message content of the request in its response, the client needs to include a means for covering that content, such as a Content-Digest field. See the discussion in security-message-content for more information. <\/ins> The \"req\" parameter MUST NOT be used in a signature that targets a request message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ddd5291bf1ebfb5e4c2476d2f5a3dfe03f64a24c3876e765759d5fc5d94301df","title":"","text":"For each message component item in the covered components set (in order): Check that the component identifier (including its parameters) has not already been added to the signature base. If this happens, produce an error. <\/ins> Append the component identifier for the covered component serialized according to the \"component-identifier\" ABNF rule. Note that this serialization places the component name in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cba22f1d219acf49fe2b99e37905550f0559e03c55d4f6b86ed44bc8357c0f29","title":"","text":"information in its signature context to account for the change in authority, this practice requires additional configuration and extra care (see further discussion in security-context-multiple- signatures). To counter this, the proxy adds its own signature over the new message before passing it along. The proxy includes the new \"@authority\" derived component and the Forwarded header, which it added to the message. The proxy's signature also includes the client's signature value from the original message in its covered components, as a dictionary field member under the label \"sig1\". Note that since the client's signature already covers the client's Signature-Input value for \"sig1\", this value is transitively covered by the proxy's signature and need not be added explicitly. While the origin server may not be able to directly verify this original signature, it can verify that the proxy has vouched for the signature's validity. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/del> signatures). The proxy is in a position to make its own statement to the origin server about the nature of the request that it is forwarding by adding its own signature over the new message before passing it along to the origin server. The proxy includes the new \"@authority\" derived component and the Forwarded header, which the proxy has added to the message. The proxy also includes elements from the original message that are relevant to the origin server's processing, such as the \"@method\", \"@path\", and \"@query\" in this example, even if those components were covered by the original signature. The proxy additionally includes the client's signature value and signature input from the original message in the new signature's covered components. In our example application, this is used as a way for the proxy to indicate to the origin server that the proxy has read and verified these values in their original context. While the origin server may not be able to directly verify this original signature, it can verify that the proxy has vouched for the signature's validity. The origin server also has assurance that the message has been forwarded intact from the trusted proxy. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/ins> And a signature output value of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0627f0e323c183f054bce7dd51854138e8231fbef8779a2dcca33426135da31d","title":"","text":"original signature was made using the key id of \"test-key-rsa-pss\" and an RSA PSS signature algorithm. The proxy's signature and the client's original signature can be verified independently for the same message, based on the needs of the application. Since the proxy's signature covers the client signature, the backend service fronted by the proxy can trust that the proxy has validated the incoming signature. <\/del> 5. While a signer is free to attach a signature to a request or response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-14ed0a97350ffb831042fc79e26f21911ccbddbf2f9e21f93f595b7b5bc7281f","title":"","text":"signature with the updated Content-Digest field value, similar to the reverse proxy use case discussed in signature-multiple. Applications that make use of content-request-response also need to be aware of the limitations in this functionality. Specifically, if a client does not include something like a Content-Digest header field in the request, the server is unable to include a signature that covers the request's content. <\/ins> 7.3. 7.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-06d9b9ad127c4f0064ad092d8bb24097426e73e8ff8c044f84aa79eee99cb70c","title":"","text":"level algorithm specification instead, preventing an attacker from substituting the algorithm specified. 7.3.7. When applying content-request-response or signature-multiple to a message, it is possible to sign the value of an existing Signature field, thereby covering the bytes of the existing signature output in the new signature's value. While it would seem that this practice would transitively cover the components under the original signature in a verifiable fashion, the attacks described in JACKSON2019 can be used to impersonate a signature output value on an unrelated message. In this example, Alice intends to send a signed request to Bob, and Bob wants to provide a signed response to Alice that includes a cryptographic proof that Bob is responding to Alice's incoming message. Mallory wants to intercept this traffic and replace Alice's message with her own, without Alice being aware that the interception has taken place. Alice creates a message, \"Req_A\" and applies a signature \"Sig_A\" using her private key \"Key_A_Sign\". Alice believes she is sending \"Req_A\" to Bob. Mallory intercepts \"Req_A\" and reads the value \"Sig_A\" from this message. Mallory generates a different message \"Req_M\" to send to Bob instead. Mallory crafts a signing key \"Key_M_Sign\" such that she can create a valid signature \"Sig_M\" over her request \"Req_M\" using this key, but the byte value of \"Sig_M\" exactly equals that of \"Sig_A\". Mallory sends \"Req_M\" with \"Sig_M\" to Bob. Bob validates \"Sig_M\" against Mallory's verification key, \"Key_M_Verify\". At no time does Bob think that he's responding to Alice. Bob responds with response message \"Res_B\" to \"Req_M\" and creates signature \"Sig_B\" over this message using his key, \"Key_B_Sign\". Bob includes the value of \"Sig_M\" under \"Sig_B\"'s covered components, but nothing elese from the request message. Mallory receives the response \"Res_B\" from Bob, including the signature \"Sig_B\" value. Mallory replays this response to Alice. Alice reads \"Res_B\" from Mallory and verifies \"Sig_B\" using Bob's verification key, \"Key_B_Verify\". Alice includes the bytes of her original signature \"Sig_A\" in the signature base, and the signature verifies. Alice is led to believe that Bob has responded to her message, and believes she has cryptographic proof of this happening, but in fact Bob responded to Mallory's malicious request and Alice is none the wiser. To mitigate this, Bob can sign more portions of the request message than just the Signature field, in order to more fully differentiate Alice's message from Mallory's. Applications using this feature, particularly for non-repudiation purposes, can stipulate that any components required in the original signature also be covered separately in the second signature. For signed messages, requiring coverage of the corresponding Signature-Input field of the first signature ensures that unique items such as nonces and timestamps are also covered sufficiently by the second signature. <\/ins> 7.4. 7.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8de4c433eb5e462630e0f5a670c6749b4235d31374e6f4667417962e6c3a8df2","title":"","text":"algorithm-table. The procedure for new registrations is provided in algorithms. 7.3. IANA is requested to deprecate the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Algorithm Values\" registry at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml [2]. <\/ins> 8. References 8.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-digest-hash-alg\/ [2] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78b7f6b2f9c3e6c73a9de7ef00847b0375b9f173b740b86b180f88a744c9ddec","title":"","text":"exporter is used to generate a 32-byte key which is then used as a nonce. Because the TLS keying material exporter is only secure for authentication when it is uniquely bound to the TLS session RFC7627, the Signature and HMAC authentication schemes require either one of the following properties: The TLS version in use is greater or equal to 1.3 TLS. The TLS version in use is greater or equal to 1.2 and the Extended Master Secret extension RFC7627 has been negotiated. Clients MUST NOT use the Signature and HMAC authentication schemes on connections that do not meet one of the two properties above. If a server receives a request that uses these authentication schemes on a connection that meets neither of the above properties, the server MUST treat the request as malformed. <\/ins> 3. The \"Unprompted-Authentication\" header field allows a user agent to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6f3f962525685a19e2df8de465f02d67daedd8793d39edbdfcdcea915cc7e139","title":"","text":"the corresponding key, so binding authentication to requests would not provide much benefit in practice. Key material used for authentication in unprompted authentication, whether symmetric or asymmetric MUST NOT be reused in other protocols. Doing so can undermine the security guarantees of the authentication. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-09ff2421afd8bc3cad05604ec1cc038135011c75dacb8aba89517c242472a3fe","title":"","text":"mechanism QUIC-TLS. The user agent leverages a TLS keying material exporter KEY-EXPORT to generate a nonce which can be signed using the user's key. The <\/del> generate a nonce which can be signed using the chosen key. The <\/ins> keying material exporter uses a label that starts with the characters \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-\" (see schemes for the labels and contexts used by each scheme). The TLS keying material"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-821f91d70c2499a41521f7bf71f61edebbbc9c2fee056f8ae17f923c4d911649","title":"","text":"4.1. The OPTIONAL \"u\" (user ID) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies the user ID that the user agent wishes to authenticate. <\/del> The OPTIONAL \"k\" (key ID) parameter is a byte sequence that identifies which key the user agent wishes to use to authenticate. This can for example be used to point to an entry into a server-side database of known keys. <\/ins> 4.2. The OPTIONAL \"p\" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies the proof that the user agent provides to attest to possessing the credential that matches its user ID. <\/del> credential that matches its key ID. <\/ins> 4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f35dac74c758646e5f813a597c0caf5757ff00a1c1e3e823e503f6e539159f4","title":"","text":"5.1. The \"Signature\" HTTP Authentication Scheme uses asymmetric cryptography. User agents possess a user ID and a public\/private key pair, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized user IDs to their associated public keys. When using this scheme, the \"u\", \"p\", <\/del> cryptography. User agents possess a key ID and a public\/private key pair, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized key IDs to their associated public keys. When using this scheme, the \"k\", \"p\", <\/ins> and \"s\" parameters are REQUIRED. The TLS keying material export label for this scheme is \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication- Signature\" and the associated context is empty. The nonce is then signed using the selected asymmetric signature algorithm and transmitted as the proof directive. For example, the user ID \"john.doe\" authenticating using Ed25519 <\/del> For example, the key ID \"basement\" authenticating using Ed25519 <\/ins> ED25519 could produce the following header field (lines are folded to fit): 5.2. The \"HMAC\" HTTP Authentication Scheme uses symmetric cryptography. User agents possess a user ID and a secret key, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized user IDs to their associated secret key. When using this scheme, the \"u\", \"p\", and \"h\" parameters are <\/del> User agents possess a key ID and a secret key, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized key IDs to their associated secret key. When using this scheme, the \"k\", \"p\", and \"h\" parameters are <\/ins> REQUIRED. The TLS keying material export label for this scheme is \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-HMAC\" and the associated context is empty. The nonce is then HMACed using the selected HMAC algorithm and transmitted as the proof directive. For example, the user ID \"john.doe\" authenticating using HMAC-SHA-512 <\/del> For example, the key ID \"basement\" authenticating using HMAC-SHA-512 <\/ins> SHA could produce the following header field (lines are folded to fit):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9150cbc58400fa6d20180ae61311e22fcfafb32a550888e1a23948704037fb58","title":"","text":"7. Unprompted Authentication allows a user-agent to authenticate to an <\/del> Unprompted Authentication allows a user agent to authenticate to an <\/ins> origin server while guaranteeing freshness and without the need for the server to transmit a nonce to the user agent. This allows the server to accept authenticated clients without revealing that it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8eb9c89cc54af284d0f5ffa39ff322b9c8e550d03ac7b8cae273cd50f46a56b2","title":"","text":"extensions. The authentication proofs described in this document are not bound to individual HTTP requests; if the same user sends an authentication proof on multiple requests they will all be identical. This allows <\/del> individual HTTP requests; if the key is used for authentication proofs on multiple requests they will all be identical. This allows <\/ins> for better compression when sending over the wire, but implies that client implementations that multiplex different security contexts over a single HTTP connection need to ensure that those contexts"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-90c6f74ae09be493487ecc1c743f36c31abe948a28096c02f1befb7866d2e4c2","title":"","text":"If type is \"integer\": Parse input_number as an integer and let output_number be the product of the result and sign. <\/del> Let output_number be an Integer that is the result of parsing input_number as an integer. <\/ins> Otherwise:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd996ca84c72394c1e6064acab263f87651cf5f7e9eb780e949dab5ac5e9644f","title":"","text":"If the number of characters after \".\" in input_number is greater than three, fail parsing. Parse input_number as a decimal number and let output_number be the product of the result and sign. <\/del> Let output_number be a Decimal that is the result of parsing input_number as a decimal number. Let output_number be the product of output_number and sign. <\/ins> Return output_number."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d2b6983f10c30101473f2962f6b338f2e33be26ac53d512041f19ad3434cf273","title":"","text":"protocols. Doing so can undermine the security guarantees of the authentication. Sites offering Unprompted Authentication are able to link requests that use the same key for the Authentication Schemes provided. However, requests are not linkable across other sites if the keys used are private to the individual sites using Unprompted Authentication. <\/ins> 9. 9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e1286cd0d6bfc7f1b846c40f56774be1e8f2157bde173da355a384178c2f2fb5","title":"","text":"that it serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme. Unprompted Authentication serves use cases in which a site wants to offer a service or capability only to \"those who know\" while all others are given no indication the service or capability exists. The conceptual model is that of a \"speakeasy\". \"Knowing\" is via an externally-defined mechanism by which keys are distributed. For example, a company might offer remote employee access to company services directly via its website using their employee credentials, or offer access to limited special capabilities for specific employees, while making discovering (probing for) such capabilities difficult. Members of less well-defined communities might use more ephemeral keys to acquire access to geography- or capability-specific resources, as issued by an entity whose user base is larger than the available resources can support (by having that entity metering the availability of keys temporally or geographically). Unprompted Authentication is also useful for cases where a service provider wants to distribute user-provisioning information for its resources without exposing the provisioning location to non-users. <\/ins> There are scenarios where servers may want to expose the fact that authentication is required for access to specific resources. This is left for future work."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3a7fac7a3ceaabc45bb496963508a0a19bfe3877507d4bd93302516771ecb9da","title":"","text":"Since the Signature and HMAC HTTP Authentication Schemes leverage TLS keying material exporters, their output cannot be transparently forwarded by HTTP intermediaries. HTTP intermediaries that support this specification will validate the authentication received from the client themselves, then inform the upstream HTTP server of the presence of valid authentication using some other mechanism. <\/del> this specification have two options: The intermediary can validate the authentication received from the client, then inform the upstream HTTP server of the presence of valid authentication. The intermediary can export the nonce (see compute-proof}), and forward it to the upstream HTTP server, then the upstream server performs the validation. The mechanism for the intermediary to communicate this information to the upstream HTTP server is out of scope for this document. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4adb68856e4243961908b10d35ae147aa2669249b72b08014a114b4e9aa5ecd9","title":"","text":"However, transport-oriented integrity provides a limited utility because it is opaque to the application layer and only covers the extent of a single connection. HTTP messages often travel over a chain of separate connections, in between connections there is a <\/del> chain of separate connections. In between connections there is a <\/ins> possibility for unintended or malicious data corruption. An HTTP integrity mechanism can provide the means for endpoints, or applications using HTTP, to detect data corruption and make a choice"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4b3a79cd4cb9cbf293e4a9168138373a8cd6a909734dfac3fcd61ecb2a8d7369","title":"","text":"The HTTP fields defined in this document can be used for HTTP integrity. Senders choose a hashing algorithm and calculate a digest from an input related to the HTTP message, the algorithm identifier <\/del> from an input related to the HTTP message. The algorithm identifier <\/ins> and digest are transmitted in an HTTP field. Receivers can validate the digest for integrity purposes. Hashing algorithms are registered in the \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\" (see algorithms). <\/del> in the \"Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields\" registry (see establish-hash-algorithm-registry). <\/ins> Selecting the data on which digests are calculated depends on the use case of HTTP messages. This document provides different fields for HTTP representation data and HTTP content. <\/del> case of the HTTP messages. This document provides different fields for HTTP representation data and HTTP content. <\/ins> There are use-cases where a simple digest of the HTTP content bytes <\/del> There are use cases where a simple digest of the HTTP content bytes <\/ins> is required. The \"Content-Digest\" request and response header and trailer field is defined to support digests of content (RFC9110); see content-digest. For more advanced use-cases, the \"Repr-Digest\" request and response <\/del> For more advanced use cases, the \"Repr-Digest\" request and response <\/ins> header and trailer field (representation-digest) is defined. It contains a digest value computed by applying a hashing algorithm to selected representation data (RFC9110). Basing \"Repr-Digest\" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use- <\/del> selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use <\/ins> cases where the message content requires some sort of manipulation to be considered as representation of the resource or content conveys a partial representation of a resource, such as Range Requests (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e9afd97f1f6e9e753c95cf54ad76250ca15ce1fed4041fb4d812f5fa65e7be0e","title":"","text":"thus providing coverage for HTTP content or representation data. This specification does not define means for authentication, authorization or privacy. <\/del> authorization, or privacy. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0b9c65e4e5ecb1ebbb0b644731962a4d2ae47b1c9636acfabea36e977b2ac1c9","title":"","text":"Integer, and List. The definitions \"representation\", \"selected representation\", \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", \"user agent\" and <\/del> \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", \"user agent\", and <\/ins> \"content\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC9110. This document uses the line folding strategies described in FOLDING. Hashing algorithm names respect the casing used in their definition document (e.g. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas hashing algorithm keys are quoted (e.g. \"sha\", \"crc32c\"). <\/del> document (e.g., SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas hashing algorithm keys are quoted (e.g., \"sha\", \"crc32c\"). <\/ins> The term \"checksum\" describes the output of the application of an algorithm to a sequence of bytes, whereas \"digest\" is only used in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1bd45ce414d1f64ad6ebd6066f963430039a2ddf6b16a8d6a3605dfa878c078e","title":"","text":"Representations take into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on messages. For example, the content can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the content is transferred \"on the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer <\/del> the wire\" is dependent on other transformations (e.g., transfer <\/ins> codings for HTTP\/1.1 - see RFC9112). To help illustrate HTTP representation concepts, several examples are provided in resource- representation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a773baff365c20ccf3c9e7756fc0b74cea8c0f21223b1cf0a5693b1e91d8bfc9","title":"","text":"reflect standardization status and the broad opinion of relevant interest groups such as the IETF or security-related SDOs. The \"standard\" status is not suitable for an algorithm that is known to be weak, broken or experimental. If a registration request attempts <\/del> be weak, broken, or experimental. If a registration request attempts <\/ins> to register such an algorithm as \"standard\", the designated expert(s) should suggest an alternative status of \"insecure\" or \"provisional\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d356d3e71a817f08adeac13dc3f783cb76c39b36f93417774557d11ea2104e2c","title":"","text":"multiple hops or system boundaries. Even a simple mechanism for end- to-end representation data integrity is valuable because a user agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing. <\/del> an HTML parser, video player, etc. for parsing. <\/ins> Note that using these mechanisms alone does not provide end-to-end integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, since metadata could"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c1e74d9c651033ef123af29a844422095aa149d91056233641b03f9afd3720df","title":"","text":"additional considerations when Integrity fields are included in this set. There are no restrictions placed on the type or format of digitial <\/del> There are no restrictions placed on the type or format of digital <\/ins> signature that Integrity fields can be used with. One possible approach is to combine them with HTTP Message Signatures SIGNATURES. Digests explicitly depend on the \"representation metadata\" (e.g. the <\/del> Digests explicitly depend on the \"representation metadata\" (e.g., the <\/ins> values of \"Content-Type\", \"Content-Encoding\" etc). A signature that protects Integrity fields but not other \"representation metadata\" can expose the communication to tampering. For example, an actor could"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e2124a3f70e2a9f0208358650722d107d213c210354b6d61dc2be74cf0b78f11","title":"","text":"processing of invalid data. Not every hashing algorithm is suitable for use in the trailer section, some may require to pre-process the whole payload before sending a message (e.g. see I-D.thomson-http-mice). <\/del> section, some may require to preprocess the whole payload before sending a message (e.g., see I-D.thomson-http-mice). <\/ins> 6.5. Content coding mechanisms can support different encoding parameters, meaning that the same input content can produce different outputs. For example, GZIP supports mulitple compression levels. Such <\/del> For example, GZIP supports multiple compression levels. Such <\/ins> encoding parameters are generally not communicated as representation metadata, for instance different compression levels would all use the same \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" field. Other examples include where encoding relies on nonces or timestamps, such as the aes128gcm <\/del> metadata. For instance, different compression levels would all use the same \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" field. Other examples include where encoding relies on nonces or timestamps, such as the aes128gcm <\/ins> content coding defined in RFC8188. Since it is possible for there to be variation within content coding, the checksum conveyed by the integrity field cannot be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g. <\/del> provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g., <\/ins> encoded) content is persisted. 6.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-21b179ed3e3a20d4b7e995ad63a092698290b3c20ed85a2aa792418f6853ed87","title":"","text":"3. In order to include the \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter, a proxy needs to have access to the chain of alias names and canonical names received in CNAME records. Implementations ought to note that the full chain of names might not available in common DNS resolution APIs, such as \"getaddrinfo\". \"getaddrinfo\" does have an option for \"AI_CANONNAME\", but this will only return the last name in the chain (the canonical name), not the alias names. An implementation MAY include incomplete information in the \"next- hop-aliases\" parameter to accommodate cases where it is unable to include the full chain, such as only including the canonical name if the implementation can only use \"getaddrinfo\" as described above. 4. <\/ins> The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter does not include any DNSSEC information or imply that DNSSEC was used. The information included in the parameter can only be trusted to be valid insofar as the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e8913ec0dd120101e0d6f8f9fe6bd38d7d4cd7aeb8c33adc64132c8ee6b0750e","title":"","text":"for making security decisions about the identity of a resource accessed through the proxy. 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This document registers the \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter in the \"HTTP Proxy-Status Parameters\" registry < https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml [2]. <\/del> https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml [2] and replace the note on this registry with the following text: <\/ins> 8. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88758e9cf472e9315f12a01e6ba7d99c1554c4a9a89b6aad415cb8fe436a01c4","title":"","text":"A means of determining the context for derivation of message components from an HTTP message and its application context. While this is normally the target HTTP message itself, the context could include additional information known to the application, such as an external host name. <\/del> could include additional information known to the application through configuration, such as an external host name. If binding between a request and response is needed using the mechanism in content-request-response, all elements of the request and response message that would be required to provide properties of such a binding. <\/ins> The error messages and codes that are returned from the verifier to the signer when the signature is invalid, the key material is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3fc68da046c60cd939db36568a3622563fb30257a68afd439e4ae6b0885c87d1","title":"","text":"Note that the same component name MAY be included with and without the \"req\" parameter in a single signature base, indicating the same named component from both the request and response message. <\/del> named component from both the request and response message, respectively. <\/ins> The \"req\" parameter MAY be combined with other parameters as appropriate for the component identifier, such as the \"key\" parameter for a dictionary field. For example, when serving a response for this signed request: <\/del> For example, when serving a response for this request: <\/ins> This would result in the following unsigned response message: The server signs the response with its own key, including the \"@status\" code and several header fields in the covered components. To cryptographically link the response to the request, the server includes the method, authority, and the signature and signature input labeled \"sig1\" from the request in the covered components of the response. The signature base for this example is: <\/del> While this covers a reasonable amount of the response for this application, the server additionally includes several components derived from the original request message that triggered this response. In this example, the server includes the method, authority, path, and content digest from the request in the covered components of the response. The Content-Digest for both the request and the response are included under the response signature. For the application in this example, the query is deemed not to be relevant to the response and is therefore not covered. Other applications would make different decisions based on application needs as discussed in application. The signature base for this example is: <\/ins> The signed response message is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c02128206f1fa4abb37d834b4abee0b2be67ffad07a2063bfaa2876b7097d800","title":"","text":"against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example. See security-nondeterministic. Since the signature component values from the request are not repeated in the response, the requester MUST keep the original message component values around long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier. In most cases, this means the requester needs to keep the original request message around, since the signer could choose to include any portions of the request in its response, according to the needs of the application. Since it is possible for an intermediary to alter a request message before it is processed by the server, applications need to take care not to sign such altered values as the client would not be able to validate the resulting signature. Applications needing this type of binding have to sign sufficient portion the request to ensure that it is uniquely tied to the response. Signing the signature value of a signed request alone does not provide sufficient coverage in most cases, as discussed in security-sign-signature. The response signature can only cover what is included in the request. Therefore, if an application needs to bind the message content of the request in its response, the client needs to include a means for covering that content, such as a Content-Digest field. See the discussion in security-message-content for more information. The \"req\" parameter MUST NOT be used in a signature that targets a request message. <\/del> Since the component values from the request are not repeated in the response message, the requester MUST keep the original message component values around long enough to validate the signature of the response that uses this component identifier parameter. In most cases, this means the requester needs to keep the original request message around, since the signer could choose to include any portions of the request in its response, according to the needs of the application. Since it is possible for an intermediary to alter a request message before it is processed by the server, applications need to take care not to sign such altered values as the client would not be able to validate the resulting signature. It is additionally possible for a server to create a signed response in response to a signed request. For example, this signed request: The server could choose to sign portions of this response, including several portions of the request resulting in this signature base: And the following signed response: Note that the ECDSA algorithm in use here is non-deterministic, meaning a different signature value will be created every time the algorithm is run. The signature value provided here can be validated against the given keys, but newly-generated signature values are not expected to match the example. See security-nondeterministic. Applications signing a response to a signed request SHOULD sign all of the components of the request signature value to provide sufficient coverage and protection against a class of collision attacks, as discussed in security-sign-signature. The server in this example has included all components listed in the Signature-Input of the client's signature on the request in the response signature, in addition to components of the response. While it is syntactically possible to include the Signature and Signature-Input fields of the request message in the signature components of a response a message using this mechanism, this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED. This is because signatures of signatures do not provide transitive coverage of covered components as one might expect and the practice is susceptible to several attacks as discussed in security-sign-signature. An application that needs to signal successful processing or receipt of a signature would need to carefully specify alternative mechanisms for sending such a signal securely. The response signature can only ever cover what is included in the request message when using this flag. Consequently, if an application needs to include the message content of the request under the signature of its response, the client needs to include a means for covering that content, such as a Content-Digest field. See the discussion in security-message-content for more information. The \"req\" parameter MUST NOT be used for any component in a signature that targets a request message. <\/ins> 2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-49589f93061f64b8978feea00a05ee8c0313a386dc2bfdf021db422c13ea4690","title":"","text":"origin server, changing the target host and adding the Forwarded header field defined in RFC7239. While the proxy is in a position to validate the client's signature, the changes the proxy makes to the message will invalidate the existing signature when the message is seen by the origin server. While it is possible for the origin server to have additional information in its signature context to account for the change in authority, this practice requires additional configuration and extra care (see further discussion in security-context-multiple- signatures). The proxy is in a position to make its own statement to the origin server about the nature of the request that it is forwarding by adding its own signature over the new message before passing it along to the origin server. The proxy includes the new \"@authority\" derived component and the Forwarded header, which the proxy has added to the message. The proxy also includes elements from the original message that are relevant to the origin server's processing, such as the \"@method\", \"@path\", and \"@query\" in this example, even if those components were covered by the original signature. The proxy additionally includes the client's signature value and signature input from the original message in the new signature's covered components. In our example application, this is used as a way for the proxy to indicate to the origin server that the proxy has read and verified these values in their original context. While the origin server may not be able to directly verify this original signature, it can verify that the proxy has vouched for the signature's validity. The origin server also has assurance that the message has been forwarded intact from the trusted proxy. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/del> The proxy is in a position to validate the incoming client's signature and make its own statement to the origin server about the nature of the request that it is forwarding by adding its own signature over the new message before passing it along to the origin server. The proxy also includes all the elements from the original message that are relevant to the origin server's processing. In many cases, the proxy will want to cover all the same components that were covered by the client's signature, which is the case in this example. Note that in this example, the proxy is signing over the new authority value, which it has changed. The proxy also adds the Forwarded header to its own signature value. The proxy identifies its own key and algorithm and, in this example, includes an expiration for the signature to indicate to downstream systems that the proxy will not vouch for this signed message past this short time window. This results in a signature base of: <\/ins> And a signature output value of:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f32bc4f960e32b57112bbdb80b0992852fe40f530beea505fec8fb45527c7e8e","title":"","text":"original signature was made using the key id of \"test-key-rsa-pss\" and an RSA PSS signature algorithm. While the proxy could additionally include the client's Signature value and Signature-Input fields from the original message in the new signature's covered components, this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED due to known weaknesses in signing signature values as discussed in security-sign-signature. The proxy is in a position to validate the client's signature, the changes the proxy makes to the message will invalidate the existing signature when the message is seen by the origin server. In this example, it is possible for the origin server to have additional information in its signature context to account for the change in authority, though this practice requires additional configuration and extra care as discussed in security-context- multiple-signatures. In other applications, the origin server will not be able to verify the original signature itself but will still want to verify that the proxy has done the appropriate validation of the client's signature. An application that needs to signal successful processing or receipt of a signature would need to carefully specify alternative mechanisms for sending such a signal securely. <\/ins> 5. While a signer is free to attach a signature to a request or response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-188f920370e262aa723d4de181f4476cbdd6f18b31769633da868b254f47ee7f","title":"","text":"signature with the updated Content-Digest field value, similar to the reverse proxy use case discussed in signature-multiple. Applications that make use of content-request-response also need to be aware of the limitations in this functionality. Specifically, if a client does not include something like a Content-Digest header <\/del> Applications that make use of the content-request-response also need to be aware of the limitations in this functionality. Specifically, if a client does not include something like a Content-Digest header <\/ins> field in the request, the server is unable to include a signature that covers the request's content."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-96ba0f8f608a58b17a94e1c76c7f9f87a16d1dde3a31075e33ab762019c318fc","title":"","text":"7.3.7. When applying content-request-response or signature-multiple to a <\/del> When applying the content-request-response or signature-multiple to a <\/ins> message, it is possible to sign the value of an existing Signature field, thereby covering the bytes of the existing signature output in the new signature's value. While it would seem that this practice"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3232485dab36456905c3e9a66a891202de96da710e9ffffb5f2ba47a94aa0b0c","title":"","text":"named field as defined in HTTP. The field value MUST be taken from the named header field of the target message unless this behavior is overridden by additional parameters and rules, such as the \"req\" and \"tr\" flags, below. <\/del> \"tr\" flags, below. For most fields, the field value is an ASCII string as recommended by HTTP, and the component value is exactly that string. Other encodings could exist in some implementations, and any characters outside the ASCII range MUST be encoded using the percent-encoding mechanism defined in URI. <\/ins> Unless overridden by additional parameters and rules, HTTP field values MUST be combined into a single value as defined in HTTP to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e774e146edcad016f4dc37c068e38f647b5fe1c32e43780c64008b81343391c3","title":"","text":"this behavior is specific to HTTP1 and does not apply to other versions of the HTTP specification. Encode the bytes of the resulting field value's ASCII representation as a Byte Sequence. <\/del> Encode the bytes of the resulting field value as a Byte Sequence. Note that most fields are restricted to ASCII characters, but other octets could be included in the value in some implementations. <\/ins> Add the Byte Sequence to the List accumulator."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-86b86a8158c8d8088aa510a00b47a4b8e1df9e935d943e7b1ae8b798b782e71d","title":"","text":"different single value: Both of these versions are treated differently by the application. however, if included in the signature base without parameters, the <\/del> However, if included in the signature base without parameters, the <\/ins> component value would be the same in both cases: However, if the \"bs\" parameter is added, the two separate instances"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e681a30cfc9a3cf7c1ad7438ecbe664433263cddb019e3773770c9cd3dc8d19c","title":"","text":"the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. The component value of a single named parameter is the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by \"application\/x-www-form- urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded. Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" are included with an empty string as the component value. <\/del> The component value of a single named parameter is calculated by the following process: Parse the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded Encode the \"valueString\" using the \"percent-encode after encoding\" process defined by the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded serializing\" section of HTMLURL, which results in an ASCII string This ASCII string is the component value Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" have an empty string as the component value. <\/ins> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a31f32b923709fda57765cd1882f4c9c78f91a0bc5931e2e9f99fbae46c1b62f","title":"","text":": \"value\" And the following signature base lines: <\/del> And the following signature base lines, with (SP) indicating a single trailing space character before the empty component value: <\/ins> If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, all parameter values of that name MUST be included in separate signature base lines in the order in which the parameters occur in the target URI. Note that in some implementations, the order of parsed query parameters is not stable, and this situation could lead to unexpected results. If multiple parameters are common within an application, it is <\/del> This derived component has some limitations. Specifically, the algorithm in HTMLURL only supports query parameters using percent- escaped UTF-8 encoding. Other encodings are not supported. Additionally, multiple instances of a named parameter are not reliably supported in the wild. If a parameter name occurs multiple times in a request, the named query parameter MUST NOT be included. If multiple parameters are common within an application, it is <\/ins> RECOMMENDED to sign the entire query string using the \"@query\" component identifier defined in content-request-query. The encoding process allows query parameters that include newlines or other problematic characters in their values, or with alternative encodings such as using the plus character to represent spaces. For the query parameters in this message: The resulting values are encoded as follows: If the encoding were not applied, the resultant value would be: This base string violates the constraints on component values, and is therefore invalid. <\/ins> 2.2.9. The \"@status\" derived component refers to the three-digit numeric"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-653695a77f14e099ca341d9c0689846c6870521be15db94e67ef8e4623c16920","title":"","text":"uses the following ABNF rules: \"VCHAR\", \"SP\", \"DQUOTE\", \"LF\". This document uses the following ABNF rules from STRUCTURED-FIELDS: \"sf- string\", \"inner-list\", \"parameters\". This document uses the following ABNF rules from HTTP: \"field-content\". <\/del> following ABNF rules from HTTP and HTTP1: \"field-content\", \"obs- fold\", \"obs-text\". <\/ins> In addition to those listed above, this document uses the following terms:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-345221467e977cbe7d5d64b4839782bab65205b93be088c013a4e709c784fc38","title":"","text":"request message. The component value is canonicalized by taking the value of the method as a string. Note that the method name is case- sensitive as per HTTP. While conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII, no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. <\/del> names are uppercase US-ASCII (STD80), no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. <\/ins> For example, the following request message:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8c9793085d3e0b5717154c7426820fb302e81b05dd9f08997c7283fdf188a503","title":"","text":"2.5. The signature base is a US-ASCII string containing the canonicalized HTTP message components covered by the signature. The input to the signature base creation algorithm is the ordered set of covered component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. <\/del> The signature base is a US-ASCII (STD80) string containing the canonicalized HTTP message components covered by the signature. The input to the signature base creation algorithm is the ordered set of covered component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. <\/ins> Component identifiers are serialized using the strict serialization rules defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS. The component identifier has a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c37f9f260e71784269b1c3d0949d234adf4b13e5fca42abcd0ba6311575898c0","title":"","text":"as defined in signature-params, i.e. an Inner List structured field value with parameters Produce an error if the output string contains any non-ASCII (STD80) characters. <\/ins> Return the output string. If covered components reference a component identifier that cannot be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c77a15830362e225ba65ca16c686c1ce581735df0b0f6110993604b5c6586682","title":"","text":"3. This section defines the abstract types for Structured Fields, and summarises how those types are serialised into textual HTTP fields. <\/del> summarizes how those types are serialized into textual HTTP fields. <\/ins> In summary:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23ba06c4c348e81c3758ff15aab136489cad40d4923efafb5ceae2428890bcfd","title":"","text":"An empty List is denoted by not serializing the field at all. This implies that fields defined as Lists have a default empty value. When serialised as a textual HTTP field, each member is separated by <\/del> When serialized as a textual HTTP field, each member is separated by <\/ins> a comma and optional whitespace. For example, a field whose value is defined as a List of Tokens could look like:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f6155df15015ec0efda67124cd2f89096845a4f16aca84ef7c3cfde9b16cb65e","title":"","text":"individual Items and the Inner List itself can be Parameterized (param). When serialised in a textual HTTP field, Inner Lists are denoted by <\/del> When serialized in a textual HTTP field, Inner Lists are denoted by <\/ins> surrounding parenthesis, and their values are delimited by one or more spaces. A field whose value is defined as a List of Inner Lists of Strings could look like:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c1301e16e2c5a2e38558d21c4f5f706d2e3b3d8fc8e59739d578ebcb451b09eb","title":"","text":"Note that parameters are ordered, and parameter keys cannot contain uppercase letters. When serialised in a textual HTTP field, a Parameter is separated <\/del> When serialized in a textual HTTP field, a Parameter is separated <\/ins> from its Item or Inner List and other Parameters by a semicolon. For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c9f29ebe98b2a3afbab4993bf911f5eba4ad1c06b779fbb46b8dda9dadb62a11","title":"","text":"undefined or unknown, unless the field's specification specifically disallows them. When serialised as a textual HTTP field, Members are ordered as <\/del> When serialized as a textual HTTP field, Members are ordered as <\/ins> serialized and separated by a comma with optional whitespace. Member keys cannot contain uppercase characters. Keys and values are separated by \"=\" (without whitespace). For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e1900a87b79d91e882ed6fbc82ff985e162ad1072d89c1b9cb01e6ffc119a783","title":"","text":"Byte Sequence (binary) can be specified, along with a character encoding (preferably UTF-8 STD63). When serialised in a textual HTTP field, Strings are delimited with <\/del> When serialized in a textual HTTP field, Strings are delimited with <\/ins> double quotes, using a backslash (\"\\\") to escape double quotes and backslashes. For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b96769d9bc7684c1ee3c8609c9819267aef98c1e47304f38ea7d6f9c4921479b","title":"","text":"Byte Sequences can be conveyed in Structured Fields. When serialised in a textual HTTP field, a Byte Sequence is delimited <\/del> When serialized in a textual HTTP field, a Byte Sequence is delimited <\/ins> with colons and encoded using base64 (RFC4648, Section 4). For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e23f30527037a47b83aaa8d9fa8dd5e6fd19f31af03d1c58b5115cdb2434f073","title":"","text":"Boolean values can be conveyed in Structured Fields. When serialised in a textual HTTP field, a Boolean is indicated with <\/del> When serialized in a textual HTTP field, a Boolean is indicated with <\/ins> a leading \"?\" character followed by a \"1\" for a true value or \"0\" for false. For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1a187378e42e1965f8a500dce2b51a90ec806b17db0e5676aeec44d56dba749e","title":"","text":"encryption. The \"aesgcm\" content coding uses a fixed record size. The resulting encoding is either a single record, or a series of fixed-size records. The final record, or a lone record, MUST be shorter than the fixed record size. <\/del> encoding is any number of fixed-size records - which could be zero records - followed by a single partial record. The partial record MUST be shorter than the fixed record size. <\/ins> The record size determines the length of each portion of plaintext that is enciphered, with the exception of the final record, which is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8e411da3d1d0e61ebabe84b4f00940a8601178809f41ef7fa83be9834a8a2242","title":"","text":"the content coding is reflected in a separate Encryption header field value in the order in which they were applied. Content codings that use the Encryption header field MUST always include a value for the header field when the content coding has been applied. If no parameters are needed, then a dummy value is necessary to avoid confusion about which set of parameters applies to which content coding. This requirement applies to uses of the \"aesgcm\" content coding. <\/ins> Encryption header field values with multiple instances of the same parameter name are invalid. <\/del> parameter name in a single encryption-params production are invalid. <\/ins> Servers processing PUT requests MUST persist the value of the Encryption header field, unless they remove the content coding by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e67a7ed15ce71b5725eb8b84b4a884bf39b374c01b6b1786378e52a48d80a0a3","title":"","text":"parameter can also be used to identify keys in an application- specific fashion. The \"salt\" parameter contains a base64url-encoded octets RFC7515 that is used as salt in deriving a unique content encryption key (see derivation). The \"salt\" parameter MUST be present, and MUST be exactly 16 octets long when decoded. The \"salt\" parameter MUST <\/del> The \"salt\" parameter contains a base64url-encoded octets that is used as salt in deriving a unique content encryption key (see derivation). The \"salt\" parameter MUST be present, and MUST be exactly 16 octets long when decoded. The \"salt\" parameter MUST <\/ins> NOT be reused for two different payload bodies that have the same input keying material; generating a random salt for every application of the content coding ensures that content encryption"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a0b6b14c987c0ef09e46dfbddb6a9c40146ec76d4b23b5d02a9d64d5b54b9c25","title":"","text":"\"Content-Encoding: aesgcm\", a single zero octet and an optional context string: Concatenation of octet sequences is represented by the \"||\" operator. <\/ins> Unless otherwise specified, the context is a zero length octet sequence. Specifications that use this content coding MAY specify the use of an expanded context to cover additional inputs in the key"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-87bb50978e89959e50d2eda348b9aeb1266e664d145fe8310281ccfc5d338ba9","title":"","text":"3.3. The nonce input to AEAD_AES_128_GCM is constructed for each record. The nonce for each record is a 12 octet (96 bit) value is produced from the record sequence number and a value derived from the input keying material. <\/del> The nonce for each record is a 12 octet (96 bit) value that is produced from the record sequence number and a value derived from the input keying material. <\/ins> The input keying material and salt values are input to HKDF with different info and length parameters. The length (L) parameter is 12 octets. The info parameter for the nonce is the ASCII-encoded string \"Content-Encoding: nonce\", a single zero octet and an context: <\/del> zero octet and a context: <\/ins> The context for nonce derivation is the same as is used for content encryption key derivation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d2481e8a50e84d3026f3a36fce35a83aff22c3e7af5f1b2d2a96fa5cee8cd608","title":"","text":"coding. Crypto-Key header field values with multiple instances of the same parameter name are invalid. <\/del> parameter name in a single crypto-key-params production are invalid. <\/ins> The input keying material used by the key derivation (see derivation) can be determined based on the information in the Crypto-Key header"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b1efe42449b1c97d9db3100a5c0fb9758e2653e095860704b1e4959302420373","title":"","text":"5.1. Here, a successful HTTP GET response has been encrypted using input keying material that is identified by a URI. <\/del> keying material that is identified by the string \"a1\". <\/ins> The encrypted data in this example is the UTF-8 encoded string \"I am the walrus\". The input keying material is included in the Crypto-Key"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2ef200485386275b9506d255abdd6584f27b041d3315251a260fef1ad22bae64","title":"","text":"Note that the media type has been changed to \"application\/octet- stream\" to avoid exposing information about the content. Alternatively (and equivalently), the Content-Type header field can be omitted. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-df7ef701c0a2c3b6acf8922172b1315419130fc965fe606a24665b943d444245","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification nominates a selection of existing HTTP fields as having syntax that is compatible with Structured Fields, so that they can be handled as such (subject to certain caveats). <\/del> This specification nominates a selection of existing HTTP fields whose values are compatible with Structured Fields syntax, so that they can be handled as such (subject to certain caveats). <\/ins> To accommodate some additional fields whose syntax is not compatible, it also defines mappings of their semantics into new Structured Fields. It does not specify how to negotiate their use. <\/del> it also defines mappings of their semantics into Structured Fields. It does not specify how to convey them in HTTP messages. <\/ins> 1. Structured Field Values for HTTP STRUCTURED-FIELDS introduced a data model with associated parsing and serialization algorithms for use by new HTTP field values. Fields that are defined as Structured Fields can realise a number of benefits, including: <\/del> can bring advantages that include: <\/ins> Improved interoperability and security: precisely defined parsing and serialisation algorithms are typically not available for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d33ae85fd11b4401b74d6b66bae634885d2515334de5d4db97eaf536cae17208","title":"","text":"transformed into an underlying data model which is then mapped into that defined by Structured Fields. Note that while implementations can parse and serialise compatible fields as Structured Fields subject to the caveats in compatible, a sender cannot generate mapped fields from mapped and expect them to be understood and acted upon by the recipient without prior negotiation. This specification does not define such a mechanism. <\/del> 1.1. Retrofitting data structures onto existing and widely-deployed HTTP fields requires careful handling to assure interoperability and security. This section highlights considerations for applications that use Retrofit Structured Fields. While the majority of field values seen in HTTP traffic should be able to be parsed or mapped successfully, some will not. An application using Retrofit Structured Fields will need to define how unsuccessful values will be handled. For example, an API that exposes field values using Structured Fields data types might make the field value available as a string in cases where the field did not successfully parse or map. The mapped field values described in mapped are not compatible with the original syntax of their fields, and so cannot be used unless parties processing them have explicitly indicated their support for that form of the field value. An application using Retrofit Structured Fields will need to define how to negotiate support for them. For example, an alternative serialization of fields that takes advantage of Structured Fields would need to establish an explicit negotiation mechanism to assure that both peers would handle that serialization appropriately before using it. See also the security considerations in security. 1.2. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-33f95dc98493e1d8e4b5f7f9dba2acdf19a5eb41ad82440e084495f678cd9a1d","title":"","text":"2. The HTTP fields listed in compatible-fields can usually have their values handled as Structured Fields according to the listed parsing and serialisation algorithms in STRUCTURED-FIELDS, subject to the listed caveats. <\/del> The HTTP fields listed in compatible-fields have values that can be handled as Structured Field Values according to the parsing and serialisation algorithms in STRUCTURED-FIELDS corresponding to the listed top-level type, subject to the caveats in compatible-caveats. <\/ins> The listed types are chosen for compatibility with the defined syntax of the field as well as with actual internet traffic. However, not all instances of these fields will successfully parse. This might be because the field value is clearly invalid, or it might be because it is valid but not parseable as a Structured Field. <\/del> The top-level types are chosen for compatibility with the defined syntax of the field as well as with actual internet traffic. However, not all instances of these fields will successfully parse as a Structured Field Value. This might be because the field value is clearly invalid, or it might be because it is valid but not parseable as a Structured Field. <\/ins> An application using this specification will need to consider how to handle such field values. Depending on its requirements, it might be advisable to reject such values, treat them as opaque strings, or attempt to recover a structured value from them in an ad hoc fashion. <\/del> attempt to recover a Structured Field Value from them in an ad hoc fashion. 2.1. <\/ins> Note the following caveats regarding compatibility: 3. Some HTTP field values have syntax that cannot be successfully parsed as Structured Fields. Instead, it is necessary to map them into a separate Structured Field with an alternative name. <\/del> as Structured Field values. Instead, it is necessary to map them into a Structured Field value. <\/ins> For example, the Date HTTP header field carries a date: Its value would be mapped to: As in compatible, these fields are unable to carry values that are not valid Structured Fields, and so an application using this specification will need to how to support such values. Typically, handling them using the original field name is sufficient. Each field name listed below indicates a replacement field name and a means of mapping its original value into a Structured Field. <\/del> Unlike those listed in compatible, these representations are not compatible with the original fields' syntax, and MUST NOT be used unless they are explicitly and unambiguously supported. For example, this means that sending them to a next-hop recipient in HTTP requires prior negotiation. This specification does not define how to do so. <\/ins> 3.1. The field names in url-fields (paired with their mapped field names) have values that can be mapped into Structured Fields by treating the original field's value as a String. <\/del> The field names in url-fields have values that can be mapped into Structured Field values by treating the original field's value as a String. <\/ins> For example, this Location field <\/del> For example, this Location field: <\/ins> could be mapped as: <\/del> would have a mapped value of: <\/ins> 3.2. The field names in date-fields (paired with their mapped field names) have values that can be mapped into Structured Fields by parsing their payload according to HTTP and representing the result as a Date. <\/del> The field names in date-fields have values that can be mapped into Structured Field values by parsing their payload according to HTTP and representing the result as a Date. <\/ins> For example, an Expires field could be mapped as: <\/del> For example, an Expires field's value could be mapped as: <\/ins> 3.3. The field value of the ETag header field can be mapped into the SF- ETag Structured Field by representing the entity-tag as a String, and the weakness flag as a Boolean \"w\" parameter on it, where true <\/del> The field value of the ETag header field can be mapped into a Structured Field value by representing the entity-tag as a String, and the weakness flag as a Boolean \"w\" parameter on it, where true <\/ins> indicates that the entity-tag is weak; if 0 or unset, the entity-tag is strong. For example, this: <\/del> For example, this ETag header field: would have a mapped value of: If-None-Match's field value can be mapped into a Structured Field value which is a List of the structure described above. When a field value contains \"*\", it is represented as a Token. <\/ins> If-None-Match's field value can be mapped into the SF-If-None-Match Structured Field, which is a List of the structure described above. When a field value contains \"*\", it is represented as a Token. <\/del> Likewise, If-Match's field value can be mapped into a Structured Field value in the same manner. <\/ins> Likewise, If-Match's field value can be mapped into the SF-If-Match Structured Field in the same manner. <\/del> For example, this If-None-Match field: <\/ins> For example: <\/del> would have a mapped value of: <\/ins> 3.4. The field values of the Cookie and Set-Cookie fields COOKIES can be mapped into the SF-Cookie Structured Field (a List) and SF-Set-Cookie Structured Field (a List), respectively. <\/del> mapped into Structured Fields Lists. <\/ins> In each case, a cookie is represented as an Inner List containing two Items; the cookie name and value. The cookie name is always a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5b3f693aa4200f7efeb1425cefc393235c343bd03e3b2fc0bf654c95879ce4da","title":"","text":"The Expires attribute is mapped to a Date representation of parsed- cookie-date (see COOKIES). For example, these unstructured fields: <\/del> For example, this Set-Cookie field: <\/ins> can be mapped into: <\/del> would have a mapped value of: And this Cookie field: would have a mapped value of: <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23ffcef7c991b4e7a33b09ca737c34be7dff5b07877eb7cfe10c07b007675bbd","title":"","text":"compatible assigned to the nominated registrations, prefixing each with \"*\" to indicate that it is a retrofit type. Then, add the field names in new-fields, with the corresponding Structured Type as indicated, a status of \"permanent\" and referring to this document. <\/del> Finally, add a new column to the \"Cookie Attribute Registry\" established by COOKIES with the title \"Structured Type\", using information from cookie-params."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c4686ce19cf2332dcdbeec3f906013b23b9426d49853075db2b3f9582a5637db","title":"","text":"mapped defines alternative representations of existing fields. Because downstream consumers might interpret the message differently based upon whether they recognise the alternative representation, implementations are prohibited from generating such fields unless <\/del> implementations are prohibited from generating such values unless <\/ins> they have negotiated support for them with their peer. This specification does not define such a mechanism, but any such definition needs to consider the implications of doing so carefully."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-70ac02fb38574cf652347999a80b70501052aad92464fe6ba5a1271861aec3d9","title":"","text":"This document defines a mechanism for providing end-to-end integrity and authenticity for components of an HTTP message by use of a detached signature. The mechanism allows applications to create digital signatures or message authentication codes (MACs) over only the components of the message that are meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the signature even if the message has been transformed in any of the many ways permitted by HTTP. <\/del> detached signature on HTTP messages. The mechanism allows applications to create digital signatures or message authentication codes (MACs) over only the components of the message that are meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the signature even if the message has been transformed in many of the ways permitted by HTTP. <\/ins> The signing mechanism described in this document consists of three parts:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec2d739fee5ba5fddca30bf6461965f4b80dc699645dc687912ee32aaece7744","title":"","text":"mechanism can be used along with opportunistic or application-driven message signatures by either party. The mechanisms defined in this document are important tools that can be used to an overall security mechanism for an application. This toolkit provides some powerful capabilities, but does not sufficient in creating an overall security story. In particular, the requirements in application and the security considerations in security are of high importance to all implementors of this specification. For example, this specification does not define a means to directly cover HTTP message content (defined in HTTP), but relies on the DIGEST specification to provide a hash of the message content, as discussed in security-message-content. <\/ins> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7f86f8064b98907afcf6918e0f2305a6d1004e23a053951cd51823bac555e259","title":"","text":"1.4. HTTP Message Signatures are designed to be a general-purpose security mechanism applicable in a wide variety of circumstances and applications. In order to properly and safely apply HTTP Message Signatures, an application or profile of this specification MUST specify all of the following items: <\/del> HTTP Message Signatures are designed to be a general-purpose tool applicable in a wide variety of circumstances and applications. In order to properly and safely apply HTTP Message Signatures, an application or profile of this specification MUST specify at least all of the following items: <\/ins> The set of covered-components and signature-params that are expected and required to be included in the covered components"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dacde011fa581333fe749789400b78d3ed30774aac62231b49fffabfbef751d2","title":"","text":"when choosing the required set of component identifiers, care has to be taken to make sure that the coverage is sufficient for the application, as discussed in security-coverage and security-message- content. <\/del> content. This specification defines only part of a full security system for an application. When building a complete security system based on this tool, it is important to perform a security analysis of the entire system of which HTTP Message Signatures is a part. Historical systems, such as AWS-SIGv4, can provide inspiration and examples of how to apply similar mechanisms in a secure and trustable fashion. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b9077601a006610fed617544ed38ad8bae61d9bdbf2fafc1db8205fcfbd9450","title":"","text":"padding attack would be rejected by the field value processor, even in the case where the attacker could force a signature collision. 7.5.8. The HTML form parameters format defined in the \"application\/x-www- form-urlencoded\" section of HTMLURL, is widely deployed and supported by many application frameworks. For convenience, some of these frameworks in particular combine query parameters that are found in the HTTP query and those found in the message content, particularly for POST message with a Content-Type value of \"application\/x-www- form-urlencoded\". The \"@query-param\" derived component identifier defined in content-request-query-param draws its values only from the query section of the target URI of the request. As such, it would be possible for an attacker to shadow or replace query parameters in a request by overriding the signed query parameter with an unsigned form parameter, or vice versa. To counter this, an application needs to make sure that values used for the signature base and the application are drawn from a consistent context, in this case the query component of the target URI. Additionally, when the HTTP request has content, an application should sign the message content as well, as discussed in security- message-content. <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-584b3d122823ced5266432933f8635b711311060bd05d2b4a7e655326e5630a0","title":"","text":"\"tr\" flags, below. For most fields, the field value is an ASCII string as recommended by HTTP, and the component value is exactly that string. Other encodings could exist in some implementations, and any characters outside the ASCII range MUST be encoded using the percent-encoding mechanism defined in URI. <\/del> and all non-ASCII field values MUST be encoded to ASCII before being added to the signature base. The \"bs\" parameter defined in http- field-byte-sequence provides a method for wrapping such problematic field values. <\/ins> Unless overridden by additional parameters and rules, HTTP field values MUST be combined into a single value as defined in HTTP to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4e1394ec4e38d8f9446237b9cc7c6b7d56dc119e14ad683668c1e19680df55a1","title":"","text":"parameter's functionality is already covered when the \"key\" parameter is used on a dictionary item, since \"key\" requires strict serialization of the value. The \"bs\" parameter, which requires the raw field values from the message, is not compatible with use of the \"sf\" or \"key\" parameters, which require the parsed data structures of the field values after combination. <\/del> raw bytes of the field values from the message, is not compatible with use of the \"sf\" or \"key\" parameters, which require the parsed data structures of the field values after combination. <\/ins> Additional parameters can be defined in the HTTP Signature Component Parameters registry established in component-param-registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d4c7e53ec683724ae23a18c191031045d9c6e6825b008b778ae9a2a851697eb0","title":"","text":"request message. The component value is canonicalized by taking the value of the method as a string. Note that the method name is case- sensitive as per HTTP. While conventionally standardized method names are uppercase US-ASCII (STD80), no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. <\/del> names are uppercase ASCII, no transformation to the input method value's case is performed. <\/ins> For example, the following request message:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3cc381545ad274c64dbeedc8c6ae357675566ed8b994258fe33721b81aa309d6","title":"","text":"according to the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, resulting in a list of (\"nameString\", \"valueString\") tuples. The REQUIRED \"name\" parameter of each component identifier contains the \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as a String value. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components. The component value of a single named parameter is calculated by the following process: Parse the \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent-encoded octets are decoded Encode the \"valueString\" using the \"percent-encode after encoding\" process defined by the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded serializing\" section of HTMLURL, which results in an ASCII string This ASCII string is the component value Note that this value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" have an empty string as the component value. <\/del> contains the encoded \"nameString\" of a single query parameter as a String value. The component value of a single named parameter is the encoded \"valueString\" of that single query parameter. Several different named query parameters MAY be included in the covered components. Single named parameters MAY occur in any order in the covered components, regardless of the order they occur in the query string. The value of the \"name\" parameter and the component value of a single named parameter are calculated by the following process: Parse the \"nameString\" or \"valueString\" of the named query parameter defined by the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded parsing\" section of HTMLURL, which is the value after percent- encoded octets are decoded. Encode the \"nameString\" or \"valueString\" using the \"percent-encode after encoding\" process defined by the \"application\/x-www-form- urlencoded serializing\" section of HTMLURL, which results in an ASCII string. Output the ASCII string, Note that the component value does not include any leading \"?\" characters, equals sign \"=\", or separating \"&\" characters. Named query parameters with an empty \"valueString\" have an empty string as the component value. Note that due to inconsistencies in implementations, some query parameter parsing libraries drop such empty values. <\/ins> If a query parameter is named as a covered component but it does not occur in the query parameters, this MUST cause an error in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-65d0863b21b2a354f2e66fbc9cbd601b738db6551cdb0b993c603a5cef983f24","title":"","text":"The resulting values are encoded as follows: If the encoding were not applied, the resultant value would be: <\/del> If the encoding were not applied, the resultant values would be: <\/ins> This base string violates the constraints on component values, and is therefore invalid. <\/del> This base string contains characters that violate the constraints on component names and values, and is therefore invalid. <\/ins> 2.2.9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f319da6952d65e1e1bf9f68b57cc5e0e57c07e6659aa047efd0db677535c05fd","title":"","text":"2.5. The signature base is a US-ASCII (STD80) string containing the canonicalized HTTP message components covered by the signature. The input to the signature base creation algorithm is the ordered set of covered component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. <\/del> The signature base is a ASCII string containing the canonicalized HTTP message components covered by the signature. The input to the signature base creation algorithm is the ordered set of covered component identifiers and their associated values, along with any additional signature parameters discussed in signature-params. <\/ins> Component identifiers are serialized using the strict serialization rules defined by STRUCTURED-FIELDS. The component identifier has a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dbcff70c1b4b44fab72c90ebdbae88bbcf9a012797ab9a58b0568144d7359507","title":"","text":"field value with parameters Produce an error if the output string contains any non-ASCII (STD80) characters. <\/del> (ASCII) characters. <\/ins> Return the output string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d26c31425c08cab5f5058ddd0a1f6b011133c75de1341cd54580e0c837fd86b4","title":"","text":"the trailer section prevents digest validation, possibly leading to processing of invalid data. Not every hashing algorithm is suitable for use in the trailer section, some may require to preprocess the whole content before sending a message (e.g., see I-D.thomson-http-mice). <\/del> One of the benefits of using Integrity fields in a trailer section is that it allows hashing of bytes as they are sent. However, it is possible to design a hashing algorithm that requires processing of content in such a way that would negate these benefits. For example, Merkle Integrity Content Encoding I-D.thomson-http-mice requires content to be processed in reverse order. This means the complete data needs to be available, which means there is negligible processing difference in sending an Integrity field in a header or trailer section. <\/ins> 6.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-43ecc8ed32eac36c2ca0437a613ca40788059d48ebb6e90f55c1d0dd9cf731b1","title":"","text":"name in the \"next-hop-aliases\" list would be the name that ultimately resolved to one or more addresses. The list of DNS names in \"next-hop-aliases\" use a comma (\",\") as a separator between names. DNS names normally just contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens (\"-\"), although they are allowed to contain any character RFC1035, Section 3.1, including a comma. To prevent commas or other special characters in names leading to incorrect parsing, any characters that appear in names in this list that do not belong to the set of URI Unreserved Characters RFC3986, Section 2.3 MUST be percent-encoded as defined in RFC3986, Section 2.1. <\/del> The list of DNS names in \"next-hop-aliases\" uses a comma (\",\") as a separator between names. Note that if a comma is included in a name itself, the comma must be encoded as described in encoding. <\/ins> For example, consider a proxy \"proxy.example.net\" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-67f159f610c92d11c4775fd6acebe78ce4901388cf01fcff0da8caf45834452b","title":"","text":"aliases\" to indicate that no CNAME records were encountered when resolving the next hop's name. 2.1. DNS names commonly just contain alphanumeric characters and hyphens (\"-\"), although they are allowed to contain any character RFC1035, Section 3.1, including a comma. To prevent commas or other special characters in names leading to incorrect parsing, any characters that appear in names in this list that do not belong to the set of URI Unreserved Characters RFC3986, Section 2.3 MUST be percent-encoded as defined in RFC3986, Section 2.1. For example, consider the DNS name \"name,with,commas.example.com\". This name would be encoded within a \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter as follows: It is also possible for a DNS name to include a period character (\".\") within a label, instead of as a label separator. In this case, the period character MUST be first escaped as \"\\.\". Since the \"\\\" character itself will be percent-encoded, the name \"dot\\.label.example.com\" would be encoded within a \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter as follows: Upon parsing this name, \"dot%5C.label\" MUST be treated as a single label. Similarly the \"\\\" character in a label MUST be escaped as \"\\\\\". Other uses of \"\\\" MUST NOT appear in the label after percent- decoding. <\/ins> 3. In order to include the \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter, a proxy needs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72e21b0570b1e809652b779ba2873ba15c90cd12afb843bd2550331e7c085011","title":"","text":"The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter does not include any DNSSEC information or imply that DNSSEC was used. The information included in the parameter can only be trusted to be valid insofar as the client trusts its proxy to provide accurate information. This <\/del> client trusts the proxy to provide accurate information. This <\/ins> information is intended to be used as a hint, and SHOULD NOT be used for making security decisions about the identity of a resource accessed through the proxy. Inspecting CNAME chains can be used to detect cloaking of trackers or malicious hosts. However, the CNAME records could be omitted by a recursive or authoritative resolver that is trying to hide this form of cloaking. In particular, recursive or authoritative resolvers can omit these records for both clients directly performing DNS name resolution and proxies performing DNS name resolution on behalf of client. A malicious proxy could also choose to not report these CNAME chains in order to hide the cloaking. In general, clients can trust information included (or not included) in the \"next-hop- aliases\" parameter to the degree that the proxy and any resolvers used by the proxy are trusted. <\/ins> 5. This document registers the \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter in the \"HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bed752c00127fa815b0fda3d033b1325a155a27c3aa57486e5c1ef997112ba07","title":"","text":"An origin server that supports the resolution of \"http\" URIs can indicate support for this specification by providing an alternative service advertisement RFC7838 for a protocol identifier that uses TLS, such as \"h2\" RFC7540. <\/del> TLS, such as \"h2\" RFC7540, or \"http\/1.1\" RFC7301. Note that HTTP\/1.1 requests MUST use the absolute form (see Section 5.3.2 of RFC7230). <\/ins> A client that receives such an advertisement MAY make future requests intended for the associated origin (RFC6454) to the identified"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b6e67ee06ce5af54fbd79bc1d2dd4d882a2666c614a31bc6f55e3fba15956bde","title":"","text":"Client certificates are not meaningful for URLs with the \"http\" scheme, and therefore clients creating new TLS connections to alternative services for the purposes of this specification MUST NOT present them. Established connections with client certificates MAY be reused, however. <\/del> present them. Connections that use client certificates for other reasons MAY be reused, though client certificates MUST NOT affect the responses to requests for \"http\" resources. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-153be1dbaa5dd0026679f85ce2ad304b31cd04dd25cbbc6bd6a17cc74d3b0d60","title":"","text":"serving \"http\" URLs over TLS, clients are required to perform additional checks before directing \"http\" requests to it. Clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests over a connection with the \"h2\" protocol identifier, unless they have obtained a valid http- opportunistic response for an origin (as per well-known), and: <\/del> Clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests over a secured connection, unless the chosen alternative service presents a certificate that is valid for the origin - as per RFC2818 (this also establishes \"reasonable assurances\" for the purposes of {RFC7838}}) - and they have obtained a valid http-opportunistic response for an origin (as per well-known). <\/ins> The chosen alternative service presents a certificate that is valid for the origin, as per RFC2818 (this also establishes \"reasonable assurances\" for the purposes of {RFC7838}}), and The origin object of the http-opportunistic response has a `tls- ports' member, whose value is an array of numbers, one of which matches the port of the alternative service in question, and The chosen alternative service returns the same representation as the origin did for the http-opportunistic resource. For example, this request\/response pair would allow reqeusts for the origin \"http:\/\/www.example.com\" to be sent to an alternative service on port 443 or 8000 of the host \"www.example.com\": <\/del> For example, assuming the following request is made over a TLS connection that is successfully authenticated for those origins, the following request\/response pair would allow requests for the origins \"http:\/\/www.example.com\" or \"http:\/\/example.com\" to be sent using a secured connection: <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bb6b0341839b81e482615cc4eb88976517576e93f90ecca558e32412d392d57a","title":"","text":"both \"http\" and \"https\" URIs might use the same connection, because HTTP\/2 permits requests for multiple origins on the same connection. Because of the risk of server confusion about individual requests' schemes (see confuse), clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests on a connection that has previously been used for \"https\" requests, unless the http-opportunistic origin object well-known fetched over that connection has a \"mixed-scheme\" member whose value is \"true\". <\/del> Because of the potential for server confusion about the scheme of requests (see confuse), clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests on a connection prior to successfully retrieving a valid http- opportunistic resource that contains the origin (see well-known). The primary purpose of this check is to provide a client with some assurance that a server understands this specification and has taken steps to avoid being confused about request scheme. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8e0505b168f88d624ef2e3a89a00638ab16aef5dd8afc776eec0f6894b6cb465","title":"","text":"That response has the media type \"application\/json\", and That response's payload, when parsed as JSON RFC7159, contains an object as the root, and The root object contains a member whose name is a case-insensitive character-for-character match for the origin in question, serialised into Unicode as per Section 6.1 of RFC6454, and whose value is an object (hereafter, the \"origin object\"), The origin object has a \"lifetime\" member, whose value is a number indicating the number of seconds which the origin object is valid for (hereafter, the \"origin object lifetime\"), and <\/del> array as the root, and <\/ins> The origin object lifetime is greater than the \"current_age\" (as per RFC7234, Section 4.2.3). <\/del> The array contains a string that is a case-insensitive character- for-character match for the origin in question, serialised into Unicode as per Section 6.1 of RFC6454. <\/ins> Note that origin object lifetime might differ from the freshness lifetime of the response. <\/del> A client MAY treat an \"http-opportunistic\" resource as invalid if the contains values that are not strings. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93df96f273c5ec8e1c712926249df3b6e9a8da2638b6bb06c23b6fb2a0716df4","title":"","text":"The ORIGIN Extension in HTTP\/3 draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-h3-latest <\/del> Abstract The ORIGIN frame for HTTP\/2 is equally applicable to HTTP\/3, but <\/del> The ORIGIN frame for HTTP\/2 is equally applicable to HTTP\/3, but it <\/ins> needs to be separately registered. This document describes the ORIGIN frame for HTTP\/3. 1. Existing RFCs define extensions to HTTP\/2 HTTP2 which remain useful in HTTP\/3. HTTP3 describes the required updates for HTTP\/2 frames to be used with HTTP\/3. <\/del> Existing RFCs define extensions to HTTP\/2 RFC9113 that remain useful in HTTP\/3. RFC9114 describes the required updates for HTTP\/2 frames to be used with HTTP\/3. <\/ins> ORIGIN defines the HTTP\/2 ORIGIN frame, which indicates what origins are available on a given connection. It defines a single HTTP\/2"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2133978d4bfddc6d9be557220f4c8d8c70e5cf2e7566576d60553979e0412788","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Frame diagrams in this document use the format defined in QUIC- <\/del> The frame diagram in this document uses the format defined in QUIC- <\/ins> TRANSPORT to illustrate the order and size of fields. 2. The ORIGIN HTTP\/3 frame allows a server to indicate what origin(s) (RFC6454) the server would like the client to consider as members of the Origin Set (ORIGIN) for the connection within which it occurs. <\/del> The ORIGIN HTTP\/3 frame allows a server to indicate what origin or origins RFC6454 the server would like the client to consider as one or more members of the Origin Set (ORIGIN) for the connection within which it occurs. <\/ins> The semantics of the frame payload are identical to those of the HTTP\/2 frame defined in ORIGIN. Where HTTP\/2 reserves Stream 0 for <\/del> HTTP\/2 frame defined in ORIGIN. Where HTTP\/2 reserves stream 0 for <\/ins> frames related to the state of the connection, HTTP\/3 defines a pair of unidirectional streams called \"control streams\" for this purpose. Where ORIGIN indicates that the ORIGIN frame should be sent on Stream 0, this should be interpreted to mean the HTTP\/3 control stream. The ORIGIN frame is sent from servers to clients on the server's control stream. <\/del> Where ORIGIN indicates that the ORIGIN frame is sent on stream 0, this should be interpreted to mean the HTTP\/3 control stream: that is, the ORIGIN frame is sent from servers to clients on the server's control stream. <\/ins> HTTP\/3 does not define a Flags field in the generic frame layout. As no flags have been defined for the ORIGIN frame, this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-00d79d9c84904763807e375982d5a4c24f5a092fd27d8d56d8aaf280e20c17f9","title":"","text":"2.1. The ORIGIN frame has a nearly identical layout to that used in HTTP\/2, restated here for clarity. The ORIGIN frame type is 0xc (decimal 12) as in HTTP\/2. The payload contains zero or more instances of the Origin-Entry field. <\/del> The ORIGIN frame has a layout that is nearly identical to the layout used in HTTP\/2; the information is restated here for clarity. The ORIGIN frame type is 0x0c (decimal 12), as in HTTP\/2. The payload contains zero or more instances of the Origin-Entry field. <\/ins> An Origin-Entry is a length-delimited string. Specifically, it contains two fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eab534d32ad4cbf89b07b211d3c67285bb6320c67eb54a15988f7cb5e8b85b78","title":"","text":"3. This document introduces no new security considerations beyond those discussed in ORIGIN and HTTP3. <\/del> discussed in ORIGIN and RFC9114. <\/ins> 4. This document registers a frame type in the \"HTTP\/3 Frame Type\" registry (HTTP3). This allocation lists a change controller of the IETF and a contact of the HTTP working group (ietf-http-wg@w3.org). <\/del> This document registers a frame type in the \"HTTP\/3 Frame Types\" registry defined by RFC9114, located at . <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f9fa2d28bf699c353dc59f23dcd43e4611ad8b591bf2e4855a90ed75ac06f47a","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines an HTTP Proxy-Status Parameter that contains a list of aliases and canonical names received over DNS when establishing a connection to the next hop. <\/del> This document defines the \"next-hop-aliases\" HTTP Proxy-Status Parameter. This parameter carries the list of aliases and canonical names a proxy received during DNS resolution as part establishing a connection to the next hop. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-828c1ec9ed6f40207fc70f9bf74722cf41aed9a4e08796398d2cb2ac1833af4f","title":"","text":"The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter's value is a String STRUCTURED- FIELDS that contains one or more DNS names in a comma-separated list. The items in the list include all alias names an canonical names <\/del> The items in the list include all alias names and canonical names <\/ins> received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS, not including the original requested hostname itself. The names SHOULD appear in the order in which they"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-01ca03d46951f863aabe48a3bb42927fb85647a36cbbbaeefe256596a7341067","title":"","text":"fields, from certain kinds of corruption. Integrity fields are not intended to be a general protection against malicious tampering with HTTP messages. This can be achieved by combining it with other approaches such as transport-layer security or digital signatures (for example, HTTP Message Signatures SIGNATURES). <\/del> malicious tampering with HTTP messages. In the absence of additional security mechanisms, an on-path, malicious actor can remove or recalculate and substitute a digest value. This attack can be mitigated by combining mechanisms described in this document with other approaches such as transport-layer security or digital signatures (for example, HTTP Message Signatures SIGNATURES). <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-520bd2edbfdb2a9c4df3c891b60c6182a1c836d63d04de09c72e2e0864db40d1","title":"","text":"content coding defined in RFC8188. Since it is possible for there to be variation within content coding, the checksum conveyed by the integrity field cannot be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole (e.g., encoded) content is persisted. <\/del> the checksum conveyed by the integrity fields cannot be used to provide a proof of integrity \"at rest\" unless the whole content is persisted. <\/ins> 6.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fc82a83d7a282bf18df8a316898d05a8a16ecefc4e73e476a6d6b19c3881818b","title":"","text":"\"insecure\" - for insecure algorithms, \"reserved\" - for algorithms that use a reserved token value that cannot be expressed in Structured Fields <\/del> Description: a short description of the algorithm Reference(s): pointer(s) to the primary document(s) defining the technical details of the algorithm, and optionally the key <\/del> Algorithm Key and technical details of the algorithm <\/ins> When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) should pay attention to the requested status. The status value should"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8d9dcbd4d1b7d603fdc2172df6c5f0c5d3c004503f01c447c28ccc90290ea77d","title":"","text":"capabilities. Such an approach could support transitions away from weaker algorithms (see sec-agility). A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests. This allows the recipient to choose which hashing algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of verifying every digest. <\/del> A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests. Application-specific behavior or local policy MAY set additional constraints on the processing and validation practices of the conveyed digests. For example, validation of a subset of received digests is one approach to protection against resource exhaustion; see resource-exhaustion. <\/ins> A sender MAY send a digest without knowing whether the recipient supports a given hashing algorithm, or even knowing that the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72d2fcd8c83e366b41f3e60af06668e11c60fe6877d30fed4ab079b7ebab250c","title":"","text":"unsupported-algorithm. It is not a protocol error if preferences are ignored. Applications that use Integrity fields and Integrity preferences can define expectations or constraints that operate in addition to this specification. How to deal with ignored preferences is a scenario that should be considered. <\/del> addition to this specification. Ignored preferences are an application-specific concern. <\/ins> \"Want-Content-Digest\" and \"Want-Repr-Digest\" are of type \"Dictionary\" where each:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2596703126ed1fa907ddacdaa4c732e8511b991235159431533bdd8af81b64e5","title":"","text":"This indicates that proxy.example.net, which used the IP address \"2001:db8::1\" as the next hop for this request, encountered the names \"tracker.example.com\" and \"service1.example-cdn.com\" in the DNS <\/del> \"tracker.example.com\" and \"service1.example.com\" in the DNS <\/ins> resolution chain. Note that while this example includes both the \"next-hop\" and \"next-hop-aliases\" parameters, \"next-hop-aliases\" can be included without including \"next-hop\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-96ceed59fba921b6f455c32bfafd1eac8acae6196014462bdd711ccc562eca08","title":"","text":"Unreserved Characters (RFC3986, Section 2.3) MUST be percent-encoded as defined in RFC3986, Section 2.1. For example, consider the DNS name \"name,with,commas.example.com\". This name would be encoded within a \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter as <\/del> For example, consider the DNS name \"comma,name.example.com\". This name would be encoded within a \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter as <\/ins> follows: It is also possible for a DNS name to include a period character"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8e1b65aea5b939dfbafa15b99c4c83ea65fbc5d1a2d4b572462b053c6ae596be","title":"","text":" HTTP Unprompted Authentication <\/del> The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth-latest Abstract Existing HTTP authentication mechanisms are probeable in the sense that it is possible for an unauthenticated client to probe whether an <\/del> Existing HTTP authentication schemes are probeable in the sense that it is possible for an unauthenticated client to probe whether an <\/ins> origin serves resources that require authentication. It is possible for an origin to hide the fact that it requires authentication by not generating Unauthorized status codes, however that only works with non-cryptographic authentication schemes: cryptographic schemes (such as signatures or message authentication codes) require a fresh nonce to be signed, and there is no existing way for the origin to share such a nonce without exposing the fact that it serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme. <\/del> non-cryptographic authentication schemes: cryptographic signatures require a fresh nonce to be signed, and there is no existing way for the origin to share such a nonce without exposing the fact that it serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme. <\/ins> 1. Existing HTTP authentication mechanisms (see HTTP) are probeable in the sense that it is possible for an unauthenticated client to probe <\/del> Existing HTTP authentication schemes (see HTTP) are probeable in the sense that it is possible for an unauthenticated client to probe <\/ins> whether an origin serves resources that require authentication. It is possible for an origin to hide the fact that it requires authentication by not generating Unauthorized status codes, however that only works with non-cryptographic authentication schemes: cryptographic schemes (such as signatures or message authentication codes) require a fresh nonce to be signed, and there is no existing way for the origin to share such a nonce without exposing the fact that it serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme. Unprompted Authentication serves use cases in which a site wants to offer a service or capability only to \"those who know\" while all others are given no indication the service or capability exists. The conceptual model is that of a \"speakeasy\". \"Knowing\" is via an externally-defined mechanism by which keys are distributed. For example, a company might offer remote employee access to company <\/del> cryptographic signatures require a fresh nonce to be signed, and there is no existing way for the origin to share such a nonce without exposing the fact that it serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme. The Signature HTTP authentication scheme serves use cases in which a site wants to offer a service or capability only to \"those who know\" while all others are given no indication the service or capability exists. The conceptual model is that of a \"speakeasy\". \"Knowing\" is via an externally-defined mechanism by which keys are distributed. For example, a company might offer remote employee access to company <\/ins> services directly via its website using their employee credentials, or offer access to limited special capabilities for specific employees, while making discovering (probing for) such capabilities"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a132b13570e1a315be17da8d05fd0349522854a0fba3439c797462f35cb725d8","title":"","text":"ephemeral keys to acquire access to geography- or capability-specific resources, as issued by an entity whose user base is larger than the available resources can support (by having that entity metering the availability of keys temporally or geographically). Unprompted Authentication is also useful for cases where a service provider wants to distribute user-provisioning information for its resources without exposing the provisioning location to non-users. <\/del> availability of keys temporally or geographically). The Signature HTTP authentication scheme is also useful for cases where a service provider wants to distribute user-provisioning information for its resources without exposing the provisioning location to non-users. <\/ins> There are scenarios where servers may want to expose the fact that authentication is required for access to specific resources. This is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4cd82184b0020ebe1bd9b2e4d3dac019401d4eb15f5f8cdfcb422a634ba74ae3","title":"","text":"2. This document only defines the Signature and HMAC authentication schemes for uses of HTTP with TLS TLS. This includes any use of HTTP over TLS as typically used for HTTP\/2 H2, or HTTP\/3 H3 where the transport protocol uses TLS as its authentication and key exchange mechanism QUIC-TLS. <\/del> This document defines the \"Signature\" HTTP authentication scheme. It uses asymmetric cryptography. User agents possess a key ID and a public\/private key pair, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized key IDs to their associated public keys. <\/ins> The user agent leverages a TLS keying material exporter KEY-EXPORT to generate a nonce which can be signed using the chosen key. The keying material exporter uses a label that starts with the characters \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-\" (see schemes for the labels and contexts used by each scheme). The TLS keying material exporter is used to generate a 32-byte key which is then used as a nonce. <\/del> This authentication scheme is only defined for uses of HTTP with TLS TLS. This includes any use of HTTP over TLS as typically used for HTTP\/2 H2, or HTTP\/3 H3 where the transport protocol uses TLS as its authentication and key exchange mechanism QUIC-TLS. <\/ins> Because the TLS keying material exporter is only secure for authentication when it is uniquely bound to the TLS session RFC7627, the Signature and HMAC authentication schemes require either one of the following properties: <\/del> the Signature authentication scheme requires either one of the following properties: <\/ins> The TLS version in use is greater or equal to 1.3 TLS. The TLS version in use is greater or equal to 1.2 and the Extended Master Secret extension RFC7627 has been negotiated. <\/del> The TLS version in use is 1.2 and the Extended Master Secret extension RFC7627 has been negotiated. <\/ins> Clients MUST NOT use the Signature and HMAC authentication schemes on <\/del> Clients MUST NOT use the Signature authentication scheme on <\/ins> connections that do not meet one of the two properties above. If a server receives a request that uses these authentication schemes on a <\/del> server receives a request that uses this authentication scheme on a <\/ins> connection that meets neither of the above properties, the server MUST treat the request as malformed. 3. The \"Unprompted-Authentication\" header field allows a user agent to authenticate with an origin server. The authentication is scoped to the HTTP request associated with this header field. The value of the Unprompted-Authentication header field is a credentials object, as defined in HTTP. Credentials contain an authentication scheme followed by optional authentication parameters. <\/del> The user agent leverages a TLS keying material exporter KEY-EXPORT with the label \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Signature-Authentication\" to generate a 32-byte symmetric key. That symmetric key is then used as nonce which can be signed using the client's chosen asymmetric private key. The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the Authorization field. <\/ins> 4. This specification defines the following authentication parameters, they can be used by the authentication schemes defined in schemes. <\/del> This specification defines the following authentication parameters. These parameters use structured fields (STRUCTURED-FIELDS) in their definition, even though the Authorization field itself does not use structured fields. <\/ins> 4.1. The OPTIONAL \"k\" (key ID) parameter is a byte sequence that <\/del> The REQUIRED \"k\" (key ID) parameter is a byte sequence that <\/ins> identifies which key the user agent wishes to use to authenticate. This can for example be used to point to an entry into a server-side database of known keys. 4.2. The OPTIONAL \"p\" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies <\/del> The REQUIRED \"p\" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies <\/ins> the proof that the user agent provides to attest to possessing the credential that matches its key ID. 4.3. The OPTIONAL \"s\" (signature) parameter is an integer that specifies the signature algorithm used to compute the proof transmitted in the \"p\" directive. Its value is an integer between 0 and 255 inclusive from the IANA \"TLS SignatureAlgorithm\" registry maintained at <>. 4.4. The OPTIONAL \"h\" (hash) parameter is an integer that specifies the hash algorithm used to compute the proof transmitted in the \"p\" directive. Its value is an integer between 0 and 255 inclusive from the IANA \"TLS HashAlgorithm\" registry maintained at <>. 5. This document defines the \"Signature\" and \"HMAC\" HTTP authentication schemes. 5.1. The \"Signature\" HTTP Authentication Scheme uses asymmetric cryptography. User agents possess a key ID and a public\/private key pair, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized key IDs to their associated public keys. When using this scheme, the \"k\", \"p\", and \"s\" parameters are REQUIRED. The TLS keying material export label for this scheme is \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication- Signature\" and the associated context is empty. The nonce is then signed using the selected asymmetric signature algorithm and transmitted as the proof directive. <\/del> The REQUIRED \"s\" (signature) parameter is an integer that specifies the signature scheme used to compute the proof transmitted in the \"p\" directive. Its value is an integer between 0 and 65535 inclusive from the IANA \"TLS SignatureScheme\" registry maintained at <>. <\/ins> For example, the key ID \"basement\" authenticating using Ed25519 ED25519 could produce the following header field (lines are folded to fit): 5.2. The \"HMAC\" HTTP Authentication Scheme uses symmetric cryptography. User agents possess a key ID and a secret key, and origin servers maintain a mapping of authorized key IDs to their associated secret key. When using this scheme, the \"k\", \"p\", and \"h\" parameters are REQUIRED. The TLS keying material export label for this scheme is \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-HMAC\" and the associated context is empty. The nonce is then HMACed using the selected HMAC algorithm and transmitted as the proof directive. For example, the key ID \"basement\" authenticating using HMAC-SHA-512 SHA could produce the following header field (lines are folded to fit): 5.3. The HTTP Authentication Scheme registry maintained by IANA at <> contains entries not defined in this document. Those entries MAY be used with Unprompted Authentication. 6. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> Servers that wish to introduce resources whose existence cannot be probed need to ensure that they do not reveal any information about"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-312476626103efbf9125550c106135ddfa4aac1662c7171111a75d46c0fe45ca","title":"","text":"response that they would have used for non-existent resources. For example, this can mean using HTTP status code 404 (Not Found) instead of 401 (Unauthorized). Such authentication failures can be caused for example by: * absence of the Unprompted-Authentication field * failure to parse the Unprompted-Authentication field * use of Unprompted Authentication with an unknown key ID * failure to validate the signature or MAC. <\/del> for example by: * absence of the Authorization field * failure to parse the Authorization field * use of the Signature authentication scheme with an unknown key ID * failure to validate the signature. <\/ins> Such servers MUST also ensure that the timing of their request handling does not leak any information. This can be accomplished by delaying responses to all non-existent resources such that the timing of the authentication verification is not observable. 7. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> Since the Signature and HMAC HTTP Authentication Schemes leverage TLS keying material exporters, their output cannot be transparently forwarded by HTTP intermediaries. HTTP intermediaries that support this specification have two options: <\/del> Since the Signature HTTP authentication scheme leverages TLS keying material exporters, its output cannot be transparently forwarded by HTTP intermediaries. HTTP intermediaries that support this specification have two options: <\/ins> The intermediary can validate the authentication received from the client, then inform the upstream HTTP server of the presence of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-624737576a66b3179f27c1ba352ea47d189c026a562ac81bf58e284ced3ad9f8","title":"","text":"The mechanism for the intermediary to communicate this information to the upstream HTTP server is out of scope for this document. 8. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> Unprompted Authentication allows a user agent to authenticate to an origin server while guaranteeing freshness and without the need for the server to transmit a nonce to the user agent. This allows the server to accept authenticated clients without revealing that it supports or expects authentication for some resources. It also allows authentication without the user agent leaking the presence of authentication to observers due to clear-text TLS Client Hello extensions. <\/del> The Signature HTTP authentication scheme allows a user agent to authenticate to an origin server while guaranteeing freshness and without the need for the server to transmit a nonce to the user agent. This allows the server to accept authenticated clients without revealing that it supports or expects authentication for some resources. It also allows authentication without the user agent leaking the presence of authentication to observers due to clear-text TLS Client Hello extensions. <\/ins> The authentication proofs described in this document are not bound to individual HTTP requests; if the key is used for authentication proofs on multiple requests they will all be identical. This allows for better compression when sending over the wire, but implies that client implementations that multiplex different security contexts over a single HTTP connection need to ensure that those contexts cannot read each other's header fields. Otherwise, one context would be able to replay the unprompted authentication header field of another. This constraint is met by modern Web browsers. If an attacker were to compromise the browser such that it could access another context's memory, the attacker might also be able to access the corresponding key, so binding authentication to requests would not provide much benefit in practice. Key material used for authentication in unprompted authentication, whether symmetric or asymmetric MUST NOT be reused in other protocols. Doing so can undermine the security guarantees of the authentication. Origins offering Unprompted Authentication are able to link requests that use the same key for the Authentication Schemes provided. <\/del> proofs on multiple requests on the same connection, they will all be identical. This allows for better compression when sending over the wire, but implies that client implementations that multiplex different security contexts over a single HTTP connection need to ensure that those contexts cannot read each other's header fields. Otherwise, one context would be able to replay the Authorization header field of another. This constraint is met by modern Web browsers. If an attacker were to compromise the browser such that it could access another context's memory, the attacker might also be able to access the corresponding key, so binding authentication to requests would not provide much benefit in practice. Key material used for the Signature HTTP authentication scheme MUST NOT be reused in other protocols. Doing so can undermine the security guarantees of the authentication. Origins offering this scheme can link requests that use the same key. <\/ins> However, requests are not linkable across origins if the keys used are specific to the individual origins using Unprompted Authentication. 9. 9.1. <\/del> are specific to the individual origins using this scheme. <\/ins> This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Field Name\" registry maintained at <>: 9.2. This document, if approved, requests IANA to add two new entries to the \"HTTP Authentication Schemes\" Registry maintained at <>. Both entries have the Reference set to this document, and the Notes empty. The Authentication Scheme Name of the entries are: <\/del> 8. <\/ins> Signature <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> HMAC <\/del> This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Authentication Schemes\" Registry maintained at <>: <\/ins> 9.3. <\/del> 8.2. <\/ins> This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following entries in the \"TLS Exporter Labels\" registry maintained at <\/del> entry in the \"TLS Exporter Labels\" registry maintained at <\/ins> <>: EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-Signature EXPORTER-HTTP-Unprompted-Authentication-HMAC Both of these entries are listed with the following qualifiers: <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3bf149381954e55e5e91e71b682cd4054601700b7171e8c1f2dd82d07e94bce7","title":"","text":"3. The user agent leverages a TLS keying material exporter KEY-EXPORT with the label \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Signature-Authentication\" to generate a 32-byte symmetric key. That symmetric key is then used as nonce which can be signed using the client's chosen asymmetric private key. The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the Authorization field. <\/del> The user agent computes the authentication proof using a TLS keying material exporter KEY-EXPORT with the following parameters: the label is set to \"EXPORTER-HTTP-Signature-Authentication\" the context is set to the structure described in the exporter output length is set to 32 bytes (see output) 3.1. The TLS key exporter context is described in fig-context, using the notation from QUIC: The key exporter context contains the following fields: The Signature Algorithm and Port fields are encoded as unsigned 16-bit integers in network byte order. The Key ID, Scheme, Host, and Real fields are length prefixed strings; they are preceded by a Length field that represents their length in bytes. These length fields are encoded using the variable-length integer encoding from QUIC and MUST be encoded in the minimum number of bytes necessary. 3.2. The output of the exporter is a 32-byte symmetric key. That symmetric key is then used as nonce which can be signed using the client's chosen asymmetric private key. The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the Authorization field. <\/ins> 4. This specification defines the following authentication parameters: <\/del> This specification defines the following authentication parameters. These parameters use structured fields (STRUCTURED-FIELDS) in their definition, even though the Authorization field itself does not use structured fields. <\/ins> 4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cd4a5d2829be3b7d3d8e7d51927d20256270ee9433a00bff56009fe30484a2e6","title":"","text":"NOT be reused in other protocols. Doing so can undermine the security guarantees of the authentication. Origins offering this scheme are able to link requests that use the same key. However, requests are not linkable across origins if the keys used are specific to the individual origins using this scheme. <\/del> Origins offering this scheme can link requests that use the same key. However, requests are not linkable across origins if the keys used are specific to the individual origins using this scheme. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-856baf0d7bcea6329f95bb2b818961a68a9970eac30a60b4354952cc1555de89","title":"","text":"the context is set to the structure described in the exporter output length is set to 32 bytes (see output) <\/del> the exporter output length is set to 48 bytes (see output) <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-717468566abc77c7e82a7b16f36b958ae67710a72f68b746ba1309e9762a7d0c","title":"","text":"3.2. The output of the exporter is a 32-byte symmetric key. That symmetric key is then used as nonce which can be signed using the client's chosen asymmetric private key. The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the Authorization field. <\/del> The key exporter output is 48 bytes long. Of those, the first 32 bytes are input to the signature and the next 16 bytes are sent alongside the signature. This allows the recipient to confirm that the exporter produces the right values. This is described in fig- output: The key exporter context contains the following fields: <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-827fbedf07a2fdb294d90c26c0162dbd1b54f6599835a54ebf11c667b55284df","title":"","text":"<>. 4.4. The REQUIRED \"v\" (verification) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies the verification that the user agent provides to attest to possessing the key exporter output. This avoids issues with signature schemes where certain keys can generate signatures that are valid for multiple inputs (see SEEMS-LEGIT). <\/ins> For example, the key ID \"basement\" authenticating using Ed25519 ED25519 could produce the following header field (lines are folded to fit):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05124550fef186c0016cbc8e3dc1d699caf74eba3b40f6145c2144e5c969d3ea","title":"","text":"of 401 (Unauthorized). Such authentication failures can be caused for example by: * absence of the Authorization field * failure to parse the Authorization field * use of the Signature authentication scheme with an unknown key ID * failure to validate the signature. <\/del> scheme with an unknown key ID * failure to validate the verification parameter * failure to validate the signature. <\/ins> Such servers MUST also ensure that the timing of their request handling does not leak any information. This can be accomplished by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dea600d7afa87284dcb2b5357f5b7b18d48f1db5316b7ecf00298216b16201e1","title":"","text":"client, then inform the upstream HTTP server of the presence of valid authentication. The intermediary can export the nonce (see compute-proof}), and forward it to the upstream HTTP server, then the upstream server performs the validation. <\/del> The intermediary can export the nonce and verification (see compute-proof}), and forward it to the upstream HTTP server, then the upstream server performs the validation. <\/ins> The mechanism for the intermediary to communicate this information to the upstream HTTP server is out of scope for this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9407e114aa933db9c42c3fa24acd7e4a4eb64afaff969be4eaf5029ab2650139","title":"","text":"The key exporter context contains the following fields: 3.3. Once the nonce has been extracted from the key exporter output (see output), it is prefixed with static data before being signed to mitigate issues caused by key reuse. The signature is computed over the concatenation of: A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times The context string \"HTTP Signature Authentication\" A single 0 byte which serves as a separator The nonce extracted from the key exporter output (see output) For example, if the nonce has all its 32 bytes set to 01, the content covered by the signature (in hexadecimal format) would be: This constructions mirrors that of the TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify message defined in TLS. The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the \"p\" Parameter (see parameter-p). <\/ins> 4. This specification defines the following authentication parameters."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d86e13347bc52477123d3eb540fc34d2650a322ecd5ec0acd4c2aff088346e3","title":"","text":"Each algorithm has a status field, which is intended to provide an aid to implementation selection. Algorithms with a status value of \"standard\" are suitable for many <\/del> Algorithms with a status value of \"Active\" are suitable for many <\/ins> purposes and it is RECOMMENDED that applications use these algorithms. These can be used in adversarial situations where hash functions might need to provide resistance to collision, first- preimage and second-preimage attacks. For adversarial situations, selecting which of the \"standard\" algorithms are acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances demand. More <\/del> selecting which of the \"Active\" algorithms are acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances demand. More <\/ins> considerations are presented in sec-agility. Algorithms with a status value of \"insecure\" either provide none of <\/del> Algorithms with a status value of \"Deprecated\" either provide none of <\/ins> these properties, or are known to be weak (see NO-MD5 and NO-SHA). These algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-59d364147e8eec5b50f8c384eecd60e8ebdf78ed68e9efbf4e177e6c1feca624","title":"","text":"Such applications are not exempt from the requirements in this section. Furthermore, applications without such legacy or history ought to follow the guidance for using algorithms with the status value \"standard\". <\/del> value \"Active\". <\/ins> Discussion of algorithm agility is presented in sec-agility."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-203ec2667b2c0b92277b24055055ec11b18ed0ba146fdd59aaf44e52e70cabd0","title":"","text":"Status: the status of the algorithm. The options are: \"standard\" - for standardized algorithms without known problems, <\/del> \"Active\" - for algorithms without known problems, <\/ins> \"provisional\" - for non-standard or unproven algorithms, <\/del> \"Provisional\" - for unproven algorithms, <\/ins> \"insecure\" - for insecure algorithms, <\/del> \"Deprecated\" - for deprecated or insecure algorithms, <\/ins> Description: a short description of the algorithm"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-078eb18d936cc4358400f440fec0a807a42f1cce2b0b6a7b02b3665d6ab4489d","title":"","text":"pay attention to the requested status. The status value should reflect standardization status and the broad opinion of relevant interest groups such as the IETF or security-related SDOs. The \"standard\" status is not suitable for an algorithm that is known to be weak, broken, or experimental. If a registration request attempts to register such an algorithm as \"standard\", the designated expert(s) should suggest an alternative status of \"insecure\" or \"provisional\". <\/del> \"Active\" status is not suitable for an algorithm that is known to be weak, broken, or experimental. If a registration request attempts to register such an algorithm as \"Active\", the designated expert(s) should suggest an alternative status of \"Deprecated\" or \"Provisional\". <\/ins> When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) cannot use a status of \"insecure\" or \"provisional\" as grounds for rejection. <\/del> use a status of \"Deprecated\" or \"Provisional\" as grounds for rejection. <\/ins> Requests to update or change the fields in an existing registration are permitted. For example, this could allow for the transition of an algorithm status from \"standard\" to \"insecure\" as the security <\/del> an algorithm status from \"Active\" to \"Deprecated\" as the security <\/ins> environment evolves. 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-112d21c37605a3055c88e108be9c7ce6afb8fadce6093d5530d92b8cc1e41524","title":"","text":"Given a string of Unicode characters as input_string, return an ASCII string suitable for use in an HTTP field value. If input_string is not a string of Unicode characters, fail parsing. <\/ins> Let byte_array be the result of applying UTF-8 encoding UTF8 to input_string. If there is an error in doing so, fail parsing. <\/del> input_string. <\/ins> Let encoded_string be an empty string. For each byte in byte_array: If byte is %x25 (\"%\"), append \"%25\" to encoded_string. <\/del> If byte is %x25 (\"%\"), %x22 (DQUOTE), or in the ranges %x00-1f or %x7f-ff: <\/ins> If byte is in the ranges %x00-1f or %x7f-ff, apply the percent- encoding defined in Section 2.1 of URI to byte and append the result to encoded_string. <\/del> Append \"%\" to encoded_string. Let encoded_byte be the result of applying base16 encoding (Section 8 of RFC4648) to byte. Append encoded_byte to encoded_string. <\/ins> Otherwise, decode byte as an ASCII character and append the result to encoded_string. Let formatted_string be the result of running Serialising a String (ser-string) with encoded_string. <\/del> Let output be a string containing \"%\" followed by DQUOTE. <\/ins> Return the character \"%\" followed by formatted_string. <\/del> Append encoded_string to output. Append DQUOTE to output. Return output. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-877a5cbd3f95341d0e05c08e46684ba67c43553738ace2df3aa0c2af35801414","title":"","text":"Given an ASCII string as input_string, return a string of Unicode characters. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. If the first character of input_string is not \"%\", fail parsing. <\/del> If the first two characters of input_string are not \"%\" followed by DQUOTE, fail parsing. <\/ins> Discard the first character of input_string. <\/del> Discard the first two characters of input_string. <\/ins> Let parsed_string be the result of running Parsing a String (parse-string) with input_string. <\/del> Let byte_array be an empty byte array. <\/ins> Let byte_array be the result of applying ASCII encoding to input_string. <\/del> While input_string is not empty: <\/ins> For each sigil_byte in byte_array which is %25 (\"%\"): <\/del> Let char be the result of consuming the first character of input_string. If char is in the range %x00-1f or %x7f-ff (i.e., it is not in VCHAR or SP), fail parsing. If char is \"%\": Let octet_hex be the result of consuming two characters from input_string. If there are not two characters, fail parsing. <\/ins> Let octet_hex be the two bytes after sigil_byte in byte_string. If there are not two bytes, fail parsing. <\/del> Let octet be the result of hex decoding octet_hex (Section 8 of RFC4648), in a case-insensitive fashion. If decoding fails, fail parsing. <\/ins> Let octet be the result of decoding octet_hex as hexidecimal, in a case-insensitive fashion. <\/del> Append octet to byte_array. <\/ins> Replace sigil_byte and octet_hex in byte_array with octet. <\/del> If char is DQUOTE: <\/ins> Let unicode_string be the result of decoding byte_array as a UTF-8 string UTF8. Fail parsing if decoding fails. <\/del> Let unicode_string be the result of decoding byte_array as a UTF-8 string UTF8. Fail parsing if decoding fails. <\/ins> Return unicode_string. <\/del> Return unicode_string. Otherwise, if char is not \"%\" or DQUOTE: Let byte be the result of applying ASCII encoding to char. Append byte to byte_array. Reached the end of input_string without finding a closing DQUOTE; fail parsing. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ad25e9fd87199fc93dc0d2d053264d005dd5b17f7a63c1d0bc67cec61fa99b96","title":"","text":"MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header set to true. If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload a fixed-length resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the value of the \"Content-Length\" header field and the server MUST record the upload's final size to ensure its consistency with future Upload Appending Procedures. <\/ins> If the client received an informational repsonse with the upload URL, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status code between 500"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-95715fd39c7e57d5c602535733a450e289aad721b620b86e4eb56d1b9def7cad","title":"","text":"MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header set to true. If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload the remaining resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the sum of the upload's offset and the \"Content-Length\" header field. If the server does not have a record of the upload's final size from the Upload Creation or previous Upload Appending Procedures, the server MUST record the upload's final size to ensure its consistency with future Upload Appending Procedures. If the server does have a previous record, the upload's final size from a previous procedure MUST match the upload's final size from the current Upload Appending Procedure. If they do not match, the server MUST reject the request with the \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/ins> The client MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status code between 500 and 599 (inclusive) is received. The client SHOULD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a9ab4cc373651c781e58d78d97cd184cfe698ad31b55c2309cad12292da84490","title":"","text":"The key exporter context contains the following fields: The Signature Algorithm and Port fields are encoded as unsigned 16-bit integers in network byte order. The Key ID, Scheme, Host, and Real fields are length prefixed strings; they are preceded by a Length field that represents their length in bytes. These length fields are encoded using the variable-length integer encoding from QUIC and MUST be encoded in the minimum number of bytes necessary. <\/del> 16-bit integers in network byte order. The Key ID, Public Key, Scheme, Host, and Real fields are length prefixed strings; they are preceded by a Length field that represents their length in bytes. These length fields are encoded using the variable-length integer encoding from QUIC and MUST be encoded in the minimum number of bytes necessary. The encoding of the public key is determined by the Signature Algorithm in use as follows: This document does not define the public key encodings for other algorithms. In order for a SignatureScheme to be usable with the Signature HTTP authentication scheme, its public key encoding needs to be defined in a corresponding document. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf7203f30f10d29e5c8cff59088d8c99859c286fb39da79770233ddb86397b53","title":"","text":"5.2. The REQUIRED \"a\" (public key) parameter is a byte sequence that contains the public key used by the server to validate the signature provided by the client. This avoids key confusion issues (see SEEMS- LEGIT). The encoding of the public key is described in context. 5.3. <\/ins> The REQUIRED \"p\" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies the proof that the user agent provides to attest to possessing the credential that matches its key ID. 5.3. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> The REQUIRED \"s\" (signature) parameter is an integer that specifies the signature scheme used to compute the proof transmitted in the \"p\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c1e652cf360e88be4799d334ea6d65ece8d853c0cc22c29e6e50e9b15a02f19f","title":"","text":"<>. 5.4. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> The REQUIRED \"v\" (verification) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies the verification that the user agent provides to attest to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1b7a2c3f362205f79648b033295933e2ee1fc6b039bea4a0e42d2cbb561f994d","title":"","text":"use of the Signature authentication scheme with an unknown key ID mismatch between key ID and provided public key <\/ins> failure to validate the verification parameter failure to validate the signature."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f071c8325c0e2dfdd07a2b45c54dc21bc2bf87ee90bc1ce6cf49d71f992e8d1","title":"","text":"FIELDS that contains one or more DNS names in a comma-separated list. The items in the list include all alias names and canonical names received in CNAME records DNS during the course of resolving the next hop's hostname using DNS, not including the original requested <\/del> hop's hostname using DNS, and MAY include the original requested <\/ins> hostname itself. The names SHOULD appear in the order in which they were received in DNS. If there are multiple CNAME records in the chain, the first name in the \"next-hop-aliases\" list would be the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cee95547478b6b1383e4758ec4bedeaf814004d93e881df14b77ec83b69ebe30","title":"","text":"\"next-hop\" and \"next-hop-aliases\" parameters, \"next-hop-aliases\" can be included without including \"next-hop\". The proxy can also include the name of the next hop as the first item in the list. This is particularly useful for reverse proxies when clients would not otherwise know the name of the next hop, and the \"next-hop\" header is used to convey an IP address. For example, consider a proxy \"reverseproxy.example.net\" that receives the following records when performing DNS resolution for the next hop \"host.example.com\": The proxy could include the following proxy status in its response: <\/ins> The \"next-hop-aliases\" parameter only applies when DNS was used to resolve the next hop's name, and does not apply in all situations. Clients can use the information in this parameter to determine how to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b826735ba514e635ad8df2bf4b9e9d08162c041f62c9164a5547984cc6300c4c","title":"","text":"4.1. When using this specification in HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3, clients MAY start sending TCP stream content without waiting for an HTTP response. Proxies MUST buffer this \"false start\" content until the TCP stream becomes writable, and discard it if the TCP connection fails. (This \"false start\" behavior is not permitted in HTTP\/1.1 because it would prevent reuse of the connection after an error response such as 407 (Proxy Authentication Required).) <\/del> sending TCP stream content optimistically, subject to flow control limits (RFC9113)(RFC9000). Proxies MUST buffer this \"optimistic\" content until the TCP stream becomes writable, and discard it if the TCP connection fails. (This \"optimistic\" behavior is not permitted in HTTP\/1.1 because it would prevent reuse of the connection after an error response such as \"407 (Proxy Authentication Required)\".) <\/ins> Servers that host a proxy under this specification MAY offer support for TLS early data in accordance with RFC8470. Clients MAY send \"connect-tcp\" requests in early data, and MAY include \"false start\" content in early data (in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3). Proxies MAY accept, reject, or delay processing of this early data. For example, a proxy with limited anti-replay defenses might choose to perform DNS resolution of the \"target_host\" when a request arrives in early data, but delay the TCP connection until the TLS handshake completes. <\/del> \"connect-tcp\" requests in early data, and MAY include \"optimistic\" TCP content in early data (in HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3). At the TLS layer, proxies MAY ignore, reject, or accept the \"early_data\" extension (RFC8446). At the HTTP layer, proxies MAY process the request immediately, return a \"425 (Too Early)\" response (RFC8470), or delay some or all processing of the request until the handshake completes. For example, a proxy with limited anti-replay defenses might choose to perform DNS resolution of the \"target_host\" when a request arrives in early data, but delay the TCP connection until the TLS handshake completes. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f5b248416af1ab67d6c6efe86f4955933ffdc7fd1e5a973b33aeb20bbdea03c","title":"","text":"sequence of procedures. 1) If the client is aware that the server supports resumable upload, it can use the Upload Creation Procedure with the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header to start an upload. The client can include the first part of the file in the Upload Creation Procedure. <\/del> it can use the Upload Creation Procedure with the \"Upload-Complete: ?0\" header to start an upload. The client can include the first part of the file in the Upload Creation Procedure. <\/ins> 2) After creation, the following parts are sent using the Upload Appending Procedure (upload-appending), and the last part of the upload does not have the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header. <\/del> upload has the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header to indicate the complete transfer. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1d3db4a21a881ec3a8a9143ab8583e5b780d645c4d000521b05d40b2555f5d7b","title":"","text":"otherwise intended. The server MAY only support a limited number of methods. The request MUST include the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header field (upload-incomplete). It MUST be set to true if the end of the request body is not the end of the upload. Otherwise, it MUST be set to false. This header field can be used for request identification by a server. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header. <\/del> The request MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field (upload- complete). It MUST be set to false if the end of the request body is not the end of the upload. Otherwise, it MUST be set to true. This header field can be used for request identification by a server. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header. <\/ins> If the request is valid, the server SHOULD create an upload resource. If so, the server MUST include the \"Location\" header in the response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5925c6dfebf9958781c3cef77ad888c7995c2d9087707f5fb3da7dd18e5ccb46","title":"","text":"complete, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Server is RECOMMENDED to use \"201 (Created)\" response if not otherwise specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header with the value of true. <\/del> specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Complete\" header with the value of false. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully but the entire upload is not yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header set to true. <\/del> yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete: ?0\" header, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Complete\" header set to false. <\/ins> If the client received an informational repsonse with the upload URL, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6822810d527235f15944feb701df17c850da19e305891e6f7d8ffc2b5e732a8c","title":"","text":"If the client has no knowledge of whether the resource supports resumable uploads, the Upload Creation Procedure MAY be used with some additional constraints. In particular, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header field (upload-incomplete) MUST NOT be set to true if the server support is unclear. This allows the upload to function as if it is a regular upload. <\/del> some additional constraints. In particular, the \"Upload-Complete\" header field (upload-complete) MUST NOT be set to false if the server support is unclear. This allows the upload to function as if it is a regular upload. <\/ins> The server SHOULD send the \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response to the client, to indicate its support for a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e814782490cbb2f751da9ebc0fa80cd82e83288a7532050edc7bad266d9ffcde","title":"","text":"knowledge of server support. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header. The server MUST reject the request with the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" response. <\/del> \"Upload-Complete\" header. The server MUST reject the request with the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" response. <\/ins> If the server considers the upload associated with this upload URL active, it MUST send back a \"204 (No Content)\" response. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Offset\" header set to the current resumption offset for the client. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header which is set to true if and only if the upload is incomplete. An upload is considered complete if and only if the server completely and successfully received a corresponding <\/del> \"Upload-Complete\" header which is set to true if and only if the upload is complete. An upload is considered complete if and only if the server completely and successfully received a corresponding <\/ins> Upload Creation Procedure (upload-creation) or Upload Appending Procedure (upload-appending) request with the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header being omitted or set to false. <\/del> Procedure (upload-appending) request with the \"Upload-Complete\" header being set to true. <\/ins> The client MUST NOT perform the Offset Retrieving Procedure (offset- retrieving) while the Upload Creation Procedure (upload-creation) or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-21236fc7f4d98aa602c180bd11b1d5ea36cf06206bfb39b339aae4ab9b32f669","title":"","text":"set to the resumption offset. If the end of the request body is not the end of the upload, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header field (upload-incomplete) MUST be set to true. <\/del> \"Upload-Complete\" header field (upload-complete) MUST be set to false. <\/ins> The server SHOULD respect representation metadata received in the Upload Creation Procedure (upload-creation) and ignore any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d30df5f7f9f3fc1a05c19cdb686d02ebb3167f1ab99eb21b1dda721b65dc2ff9","title":"","text":"complete, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Server is RECOMMENDED to use \"201 (Created)\" response if not otherwise specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header with the value of true. <\/del> specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Complete\" header with the value of false. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully but the entire upload is not yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header, the server <\/del> yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete\" header, the server <\/ins> MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header set to true. <\/del> code, the \"Upload-Complete\" header set to true. <\/ins> The client MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a8021d16974e22ac321e17ebbf30e8cdbbf87ffe30e8dac0459406331e4d2dc","title":"","text":"knowledge of server support. The request MUST use the \"DELETE\" method. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header. <\/del> include the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header. <\/ins> The server MUST reject the request with the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Incomplete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" <\/del> the \"Upload-Complete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" <\/ins> response. If the server has successfully deactivated this upload URL, it MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78aed150e3319055e164ad7373c9abcffa3a6f4cd57e2c06a10be80f986a79d7","title":"","text":"9.2. The \"Upload-Incomplete\" request and response header field is an Item <\/del> The \"Upload-Complete\" request and response header field is an Item <\/ins> Structured Header indicating whether the corresponding upload is considered complete. Its value MUST be a boolean. Its ABNF is The \"Upload-Incomplete\" header field MUST only by used if support by <\/del> The \"Upload-Complete\" header field MUST only by used if support by <\/ins> the resource is known to the client (feature-detection). 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5176e680b7e99f42c2c7f02f6e841240be5a971161ac4a7f5ab5caa15299c7b3","title":"","text":"This specification registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Header Field Names registry established by RFC3864: Header field name: Upload-Offset, Upload-Incomplete <\/del> Header field name: Upload-Offset, Upload-Complete <\/ins> Applicable protocol: http"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-584a339027396494eebb5c36c228c4103bf69e077e1e6a2d50d17d201c919f28","title":"","text":"Append \"%\" to encoded_string. Let encoded_byte be the result of applying base16 encoding (Section 8 of RFC4648) to byte. <\/del> (Section 8 of RFC4648) to byte, with any alphabetic characters converted to lowercase. <\/ins> Append encoded_byte to encoded_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-922529ec8f42359f15291e7dc14749c7f6c25c1f96bc49ebbc9433b05630aab6","title":"","text":"input_string. If there are not two characters, fail parsing. If octet_hex contains characters outside the range %x30-39 or %x61-66 (i.e., it is not in 0-9 or lowercase a-f), fail parsing. <\/ins> Let octet be the result of hex decoding octet_hex (Section 8 of RFC4648), in a case-insensitive fashion. If decoding fails, fail parsing. <\/del> of RFC4648). <\/ins> Append octet to byte_array."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bf6a1164e69e009d422bd1f5c247c5bd087f2ec1adb3752a8fa4738e2d48e921","title":"","text":"An origin server that supports the resolution of \"http\" URIs can indicate support for this specification by providing an alternative service advertisement RFC7838 for a protocol identifier that uses TLS, such as \"h2\" RFC7540, or \"http\/1.1\" RFC7301. Note that HTTP\/1.1 requests MUST use the absolute form (see Section 5.3.2 of RFC7230). <\/del> TLS, such as \"h2\" RFC7540. Such a protocol MUST include an explicit indication of the scheme of the resource. This excludes HTTP\/1.1; HTTP\/1.1 clients are forbidden from including the absolute form of a URI in requests to origin servers (see Section 5.3.1 of RFC7230). <\/ins> A client that receives such an advertisement MAY make future requests intended for the associated origin (RFC6454) to the identified service (as specified by RFC7838), provided that the alternative service opts in as described in auth. <\/del> intended for the associated origin RFC6454 to the identified service (as specified by RFC7838), provided that the alternative service opts in as described in opt-in. <\/ins> A client that places the importance of protection against passive attacks over performance might choose to withhold requests until an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3c01696699cc046d70528f6f029a9fcf3cc17098169dc370295a9d7fe4f77190","title":"","text":"to determine if a request is for an \"https\" resource; for example, they might look for TLS on the stack, or a server port number of 443. This might be due to limitations in the protocol (the most common HTTP\/1.1 request form does not carry an explicit indication of the URI scheme), or it may be because how the server and application are <\/del> This might be due to expected limitations in the protocol (the most common HTTP\/1.1 request form does not carry an explicit indication of the URI scheme and the resource might have been developed assuming HTTP\/1.1), or it may be because how the server and application are <\/ins> implemented (often, they are two separate entities, with a variety of possible interfaces between them)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-de88625502f75dc41903a847cb8ab8355f6f102cfd227c0f69b5bf27f49fdb92","title":"","text":"When responding to a HTTP Request, a server can advertise that the response can be used as a dictionary for future requests for URLs that match the pattern specified in the Use-As-Dictionary response <\/del> that match the rules specified in the Use-As-Dictionary response <\/ins> header. The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"ttl\", \"type\" and \"hashes\". <\/del> STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match- query\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", \"type\" and \"hashes\". <\/ins> 2.1.1. The \"match\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides an URL-matching pattern for requests where the dictionary can be used. <\/del> value that provides the \"pathname\" of a URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#dom-urlpatterninit-pathname). <\/ins> The sf-string is parsed as a URL URL, and supports absolute URLs as well as relative URLs. When stored, any relative URLs MUST be expanded so that only absolute URL patterns are used for matching against requests. <\/del> The \"match\" is a URL path relative to the full request URL of the dictionary. The request URL for the dictionary itself is used as the \"baseURL\" for constructing the URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/) that is used for matching the dictionary to relevant requests when running dictionary-url-matching. <\/ins> The match URL supports using * as a wildcard within the match string for pattern-matching multiple URLs. URLs with a natural * in them are not directly supported unless they can rely on the behavior of * matching an arbitrary string. The Origin of the URL in the \"match\" pattern MUST be the same as the origin of the request that specifies the \"Use-As-Dictionary\" response and MUST not include a * wildcard. <\/del> The URLPattern used for request matching does not support regular expressions (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#token-type-regexp) in the \"match\". <\/ins> The \"match\" value is required and MUST be included in the Use-As- Dictionary sf-dictionary for the dictionary to be considered valid. 2.1.2. The \"match-query\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf- string value that provides the \"search\" of a URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#dom-urlpatterninit-search). The \"match-query\" is the match pattern for the searchpart of the request URL and does not support regular expressions. The \"match-query\" value is optional and defaults to the asterisk wildcard token \"*\". 2.1.3. The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides a request destination (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#concept-request-destination). An empty string for \"match-dest\" MUST match all destinations. For clients that do not support request destinations or if the value of \"match-dest\" is a value that is not supported by the client then the client MUST treat it as an empty string and match all destinations. The \"match-dest\" value is optional and defaults to the empty string. 2.1.4. <\/ins> The \"ttl\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-integer value that provides the time in seconds that the dictionary is valid for (time to live)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3456079f5ebf4e19a649723762da5295f141b1954c78b3e98956d45b416e43d7","title":"","text":"The \"ttl\" value is optional and defaults to 31536000 (1 year). 2.1.3. <\/del> 2.1.5. <\/ins> The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that describes the file format of the supplied dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5de01af57a3d347aa1d72627c6f120449d7832261e564daed142abb9470d31c5","title":"","text":"The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to \"raw\". 2.1.4. <\/del> 2.1.6. <\/ins> The \"hashes\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a inner-list value that provides a list of supported hash algorithms in order of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-de76c4454fa6e5047d26e71474455d49718c8eca496b997d4e3b2b79465d0e46","title":"","text":"The \"hashes\" value is optional and defaults to (sha-256). 2.1.5. <\/del> 2.1.7. <\/ins> 2.1.5.1. <\/del> 2.1.7.1. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header: Would specify matching any URL with a path prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request, expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource, and advertise support for both sha-256 and sha-512 hash algorithms. <\/del> Would specify matching any document request for a URL with a path prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request, expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource, and advertise support for both sha-256 and sha-512 hash algorithms. <\/ins> 2.1.5.2. <\/del> 2.1.7.2. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b10c31ff6bc7671ff7e79e7d823c224bfaa920e4e0a4b4dc2c3857edad33de36","title":"","text":"2.2.2. When a dictionary is stored as a result of a \"Use-As-Dictionary\" directive, it includes a \"match\" string with the URL pattern of request URLs that the dictionary can be used for. When comparing request URLs to the available dictionary match patterns, the comparison should account for the * wildcard when matching against request URLs. This can be accomplished with the following algorithm which returns TRUE for a successful match and FALSE for no-match: Let MATCH represent the absolute URL pattern from the \"match\" value for the given dictionary. LET URL represent the request URL being checked. If there are no * characters in MATCH: <\/del> directive, it includes \"match\", \"match-query\" and \"match-dest\" strings that are used to match an outgoing request from a client to the available dictionaries. <\/ins> If the MATCH and URL strings are identical, return TRUE. <\/del> To see if an outbound request matches a given dictionary, the following algorithm will return TRUE for a successful match and FALSE for no-match: <\/ins> Else, return FALSE. <\/del> If the current client supports request destinations: <\/ins> If there is a single * character in MATCH and it is at the end of the string: <\/del> Let DEST be the value of \"match-dest\" for the given dictionary. <\/ins> If the MATCH string is identical to the start of the URL string, return TRUE. <\/del> Let REQUEST_DEST be the value of the destination for the current request. <\/ins> Else, return FALSE. <\/del> If DEST is not an empty string and If DEST and REQUEST_DEST are not the same value, return FALSE <\/ins> Split the MATCH string by the * character into an array of MATCHES (excluding the * deliminator from the individual entries). <\/del> Let PATH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. <\/ins> If there is not a * character at the end of MATCH: <\/del> Let SEARCH be the value of \"match-query\" for the given dictionary. <\/ins> Pop the last entry in MATCHES from the end of the array into PATTERN. <\/del> Let BASEURL be the request URL of the given dictionary. <\/ins> If PATTERN is identical to the end of the URL string, remove the end of the URL string to the beginning of the match to PATTERN. <\/del> Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting pathname=PATH, search=SEARCH, baseURL=BASEURL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/ins> Else, return FALSE. Pop the first entry in MATCHES from the front of the array into PATTERN. If PATTERN is not identical to the start of the URL string, return FALSE. Pop each entry off of the front of the MATCHES array into PATTERN. For each PATTERN, in order: Search for the first match of PATTERN in URL, starting from the position of the end of the previous match. If no match is found, return FALSE. <\/del> LET URL represent the request URL being checked. <\/ins> Return TRUE. <\/del> Return the result of running the URLPattern \"match\" algorithm (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#match) <\/ins> 2.2.3. When there are multiple dictionaries that match a given request URL, the client MUST pick the dictionary with the longest match pattern string length. <\/del> the client MUST pick a single dictionary using the following rules: 1. For clients that support request destinations, a dictionary that specifies and matches a \"match-dest\" takes precedence over a match that does not use a destination. 1. Given equivalent destination precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match\" takes precedence. 1. Given equivalent destination and path precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match-query\" takes precedence. 1. Given equivalent destination, path and search precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f69379adafaf758a356e47803ae51ea3f36f4cbae8994addea9f15a6f6f5f32","title":"","text":"6.3.1. To make sure that a dictionary can only impact content from the same origin where the dictionary was served, the \"match\" pattern used for matching a dictionary to requests MUST be for the same origin that the dictionary is served from. <\/del> origin where the dictionary was served, the URLPattern used for matching a dictionary to requests is guaranteed to be for the same origin that the dictionary is served from. <\/ins> 6.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1deff309cb99b63a8f75fd3295df3f2d491bc3ed3b4238a96cb136f1e20911f1","title":"","text":"this will cause parsing to fail, but it is not possible to reliably fail in all such circumstances. The Display String type conveys a Unicode string without any form of sanitization. Applications using these values need to perform their own checks on their content; for example, they might contain escape sequences, or NUL. Mitigation strategies include escaping untrusted content before displaying it. <\/del> The Display String type can convey any possible Unicode code point without sanitization; for example, they might contain unassigned code points, control points (including NUL), or noncharacters. Therefore, applications consuming Display Strings need to consider strategies such as filtering or escaping untrusted content before displaying it. See also UNICODE-SECURITY and I-D.draft-bray-unichars. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-63c1dcc2544ae398672bd7e86495915a55c9e8db169d902b91a9655341d41d4e","title":"","text":"Parsers MUST support Tokens with at least 512 characters. Note that Tokens are defined largely for compatibility with the data model of existing HTTP fields, and may require additional steps to use in some implementations. As a result, new fields are encouraged to use Strings. <\/ins> 3.3.5. Byte Sequences can be conveyed in Structured Fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4e9dc5fb3cc532aeace1400931a883760e96f5ca37a746718f75418290b01b2e","title":"","text":"Date values can be conveyed in Structured Fields. Dates have a data model that is similar to Integers, representing a (possibly negative) delta in seconds from January 1, 1970 00:00:00 UTC, excluding leap seconds. <\/del> (possibly negative) delta in seconds from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z, excluding leap seconds. <\/ins> For example: Parsers MUST support Dates whose values include all days in years 1 to 9999 (i.e., -62,135,596,800 to 253,402,214,400 delta seconds from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z). <\/ins> 3.3.8. Display Strings are similar to Strings, in that they consist of zero"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-17bcbd8c4457f6a2022c7761b3ed910ef5c05256084e751ed04680008642b120","title":"","text":"The remainder of this section uses an example of a file upload to illustrate different interactions with the upload resource. Note, however, that HTTP message exchanges use representation data (see HTTP), which means that resumable uploads can used with many forms of content - not just static files. <\/del> HTTP), which means that resumable uploads can be used with many forms of content - not just static files. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c4d8a386a725fef91cf150ad6b650bb597db8504222f0df9e3adc936ec2e9752","title":"","text":"accept the upload from the client, and the client begins transferring the entire file in the request content. An informational response can be sent to the client to signal the support of resumable upload on the server and transmit the upload resource URL in the Location header. <\/del> An informational response can be sent to the client, which signals the server's support of resumable upload as well as the upload resource URL via the Location header field (HTTP). <\/ins> 2) If the connection to the server gets interrupted, the client may want to resume the upload. Before this is possible, the client must know the amount of data that the server was able to receive before the connection got interrupted. To achieve this, the client retrieves the offset (offset-retrieving) from the upload resource. <\/del> 2) If the connection to the server is interrupted, the client might want to resume the upload. However, before this is possible the client needs to know the amount of data that the server received before the interruption. It does so by retrieving the offset (offset-retrieving) from the upload resource. <\/ins> 3) Afterwards, the client can resume the upload by sending the remaining file content to the upload resource (upload-appending), appending to the already stored data in the upload. The \"Upload- Offset\" value is included to ensure that the client and server agree on the offset that the upload resumes from. <\/del> 3) The client can resume the upload by sending the remaining file content to the upload resource (upload-appending), appending to the already stored data in the upload. The \"Upload-Offset\" value is included to ensure that the client and server agree on the offset that the upload resumes from. <\/ins> 4) If the client is not interested in completing the upload anymore, it can instruct the upload resource to delete the upload and free all <\/del> 4) If the client is not interested in completing the upload, it can instruct the upload resource to delete the upload and free all <\/ins> related resources (upload-cancellation). 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-53d9c6dd7bdebd21c78e73c0e6c1b0695dd1d8a3e4e1cb922cc9d7294a2c024c","title":"","text":"incrementally. 1) If the client is aware that the server supports resumable upload, it can start an upload with the \"Upload-Complete: ?0\" and the first part of the file. <\/del> it can start an upload with the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to false and the first part of the file. <\/ins> 2) Afterwards, the following parts are appended (upload-appending), and the last part of the upload has the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header to indicate the complete transfer. <\/del> 2) Subsequently, parts are appended (upload-appending). The last part of the upload has a \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true to indicate the complete transfer. <\/ins> 4. When a resource supports resumable uploads, the first step is creating the upload resource. To be compatible with the widest range of resources, this is accomplished by adding a header field to the request that initiates the upload, \"Upload-Complete\". <\/del> of resources, this is accomplished by including the \"Upload-Complete\" header field in the request that initiates the upload. <\/ins> As a consequence, resumable uploads support all HTTP request methods that can carry content, such as \"POST\", \"PUT\", and \"PATCH\". Similarly, the response to the upload request can have any response status code. Both the method(s) and status code(s) supported are determined by the resource. <\/del> Similarly, the response to the upload request can have any status code. Both the method(s) and status code(s) supported are determined by the resource. <\/ins> \"Upload-Complete\" MUST be set to false if the end of the request content is not the end of the upload. Otherwise, it MUST be set to true. This header field can be used for request identification by a server. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header. <\/del> server. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field. <\/ins> If the request is valid, the server SHOULD create an upload resource. Then, the server MUST include the \"Location\" header in the response and set its value to the URL of the upload resource. The client MAY use this URL for offset retrieval (offset-retrieving), upload append (upload-appending), and upload cancellation (upload-cancellation). <\/del> Then, the server MUST include the \"Location\" header field in the response and set its value to the URL of the upload resource. The client MAY use this URL for offset retrieval (offset-retrieving), upload append (upload-appending), and upload cancellation (upload- cancellation). <\/ins> Once the upload resource is available, the target resource MAY send an informational response with \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" status to the client while the request content is being uploaded. In this informational response, the \"Location\" header field MUST be set to the upload resource. The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a success (e.g. \"201 (Created)\"), or when the response is a failure (e.g. \"409 (Conflict)\"). The value MUST be equal to the end offset of the entire upload, or the begin offset of the next chunk if the upload is still incomplete. The client SHOULD consider the upload failed if the response status code indicates a success but the offset in the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response does not equal to the begin offset plus the number of bytes uploaded in the request. <\/del> an informational response with a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" status code to the client while the request content is being uploaded. In this informational response, the \"Location\" header field MUST be set to the upload resource. The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a success (e.g. \"201 (Created)\"), or when the response is a failure (e.g. \"409 (Conflict)\"). The \"Upload-Offset\" field value MUST be equal to the end offset of the entire upload, or the begin offset of the next chunk if the upload is still incomplete. The client SHOULD consider the upload failed if the response has a status code that indicates a success but the offset indicated in the \"Upload-Offset\" field value does not equal the total of begin offset plus the number of bytes uploaded in the request. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully and the entire upload is complete, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Server is RECOMMENDED to use \"201 (Created)\" response if not otherwise specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Complete\" header with the value of false. <\/del> successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Servers are RECOMMENDED to use \"201 (Created)\" unless otherwise specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field with the value of false. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully but the entire upload is not yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete: ?0\" header, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Complete\" header set to false. If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload a fixed-length resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the value of the \"Content-Length\" header field and the server MUST record the upload's final size to ensure its consistency. If the client received an informational response with the upload URL, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status code between 500 and 599 (inclusive) is received. The client SHOULD NOT automatically retry if a client error status code between 400 and 499 (inclusive) is received. <\/del> yet complete, as indicated by an \"Upload-Complete\" field value of false in the request, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code and an \"Upload-Complete\" header value set to false. If the request includes an \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload a fixed-length resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the \"Content-Length\" field value and the server MUST record it to ensure its consistency. If the client received an informational response with the upload URL in the Location field value, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a 5xx status is received. The client SHOULD NOT automatically retry if it receives a 4xx status code. <\/ins> File metadata can affect how servers might act on the uploaded file. Clients can send representation metadata (see HTTP) in the request that starts an upload. Servers MAY interpret this metadata or MAY ignore it. The \"Content-Type\" header can be used to indicate the MIME type of the file. The \"Content-Disposition\" header can be used to transmit a filename. If included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/del> ignore it. The \"Content-Type\" header field (HTTP) can be used to indicate the MIME type of the file. The \"Content-Disposition\" header field (RFC6266) can be used to transmit a filename; if included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/ins> 4.1. If the client has no knowledge of whether the resource supports resumable uploads, a resumable request can be used with some additional constraints. In particular, the \"Upload-Complete\" header field (upload-complete) MUST NOT be set to false if the server support is unclear. This allows the upload to function as if it is a regular upload. <\/del> additional constraints. In particular, the \"Upload-Complete\" field value (upload-complete) MUST NOT be false if the server support is unclear. This allows the upload to function as if it is a regular upload. <\/ins> The server SHOULD send the \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response to the client, to indicate its support for a resumable upload. <\/del> Servers SHOULD use the \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response to indicate their support for a resumable upload request. <\/ins> The client MUST NOT attempt to resume an upload if it did not receive the \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response, and it does not have other signals of whether the server supports resumable uploads. <\/del> Clients MUST NOT attempt to resume an upload unless they receive \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response, or have other out-of-band methods to determine server support for resumable uploads. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bf8565a7d4155433095c222d376df164387384a867d776d55a5a98def50e2e41","title":"","text":"Client implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST send a header field \"Upload-Draft-Interop-Version\" with the interop version as its value to its requests. Its ABNF is <\/del> as its value to its requests. The \"Upload-Draft-Interop-Version\" field value is an Integer. <\/ins> Server implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST NOT send a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" informational response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d0475ebc8270119bce15c46ed0b717d76ced2cafba59720bbabae3c2937add7","title":"","text":"offset of the incomplete upload by sending a \"HEAD\" request to the upload resource. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header. The server MUST reject the request with the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" response. <\/del> The request MUST NOT include an \"Upload-Offset\" or \"Upload-Complete\" header field. The server MUST reject requests with either of these fields by responding with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/ins> If the server considers the upload resource to be active, it MUST send back a \"204 (No Content)\" response. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Offset\" header set to the current resumption offset for the target resource. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header which is set to true if and only if the upload is complete. <\/del> respond with a \"204 (No Content)\" status code. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field, with the value set to the current resumption offset for the target resource. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field; the value is set to true only if the upload is complete. <\/ins> An upload is considered complete only if the server completely and successfully received a corresponding creation (upload-creation) request or append (upload-appending) request with the \"Upload- Complete\" header being set to true. <\/del> successfully received a corresponding creation request (upload- creation) or append request (upload-appending) with the \"Upload- Complete\" header value set to true. <\/ins> The client MUST NOT perform offset retrieval while creation (upload- creation) or append (upload-appending) is in progress."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7fc7cb634e3eadfec006e8ea0f97e198f2bf0788ca9fe8ed5a3869c7e1a73bad","title":"","text":"based on the resumption offset from a single offset retrieving (offset-retrieving) request. The response SHOULD include \"Cache-Control: no-store\" header to prevent HTTP caching. <\/del> In order to prevent HTTP caching, the response SHOULD include a \"Cache-Control\" header field with the value \"no-store\". <\/ins> If the server does not consider the upload resource to be active, it MUST respond with \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/del> MUST respond with a \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/ins> The resumption offset can be less than or equal to the number of bytes the client has already sent. The client MAY reject an offset"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f9136e7333de3c2c89cf9afd5b071db415934d76a51683f2ec6f0728e864296","title":"","text":"Upload appending is used for resuming an existing upload. The request MUST use the \"PATCH\" method and be sent to the upload resource. The \"Upload-Offset\" header field (upload-offset) MUST be <\/del> resource. The \"Upload-Offset\" field value (upload-offset) MUST be <\/ins> set to the resumption offset. If the end of the request content is not the end of the upload, the \"Upload-Complete\" header field (upload-complete) MUST be set to false. <\/del> \"Upload-Complete\" field value (upload-complete) MUST be set to false. <\/ins> The server SHOULD respect representation metadata received during creation (upload-creation) and ignore any representation metadata received from appending (upload-appending). If the server does not consider the upload associated with the upload resource active, it MUST respond with \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/del> resource active, it MUST respond with a \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/ins> The client MUST NOT perform multiple upload transfers for the same upload resource in parallel to avoid race conditions and data loss or corruption. The server is RECOMMENDED to take measures to avoid parallel upload transfers: The server MAY terminate any creation (upload-creation) or append (upload-appending) for the same upload URL. Since the client is not allowed to perform multiple transfers in parallel, the server can assume that the previous attempt has already failed. Therefore, the server MAY abruptly terminate the previous HTTP connection or stream. If the offset in the \"Upload-Offset\" header field does not match the offset provided by the immediate previous offset retrieval (offset- retrieving), or the end offset of the immediate previous incomplete successful transfer, the server MUST respond with \"409 (Conflict)\" status code. The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a success (e.g. \"201 (Created)\"), or when the response is a failure (e.g. \"409 (Conflict)\"). The value MUST be equal to the end offset of the entire upload, or the begin offset of the next chunk if the upload is still incomplete. The client SHOULD consider the upload failed if the response status code indicates a success but the offset in the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response does not equal to the begin offset plus the number of bytes uploaded in the request. <\/del> upload resource in parallel. This helps avoid race conditions, and data loss or corruption. The server is RECOMMENDED to take measures to avoid parallel upload transfers: The server MAY terminate any creation (upload-creation) or append (upload-appending) for the same upload URL. Since the client is not allowed to perform multiple transfers in parallel, the server can assume that the previous attempt has already failed. Therefore, the server MAY abruptly terminate the previous HTTP connection or stream. If the offset indicated by the \"Upload-Offset\" field value does not match the offset provided by the immediate previous offset retrieval (offset-retrieving), or the end offset of the immediate previous incomplete successful transfer, the server MUST respond with a \"409 (Conflict)\" status code. The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a success (e.g. \"201 (Created)\"), or when the response is a failure (e.g. \"409 (Conflict)\"). The value MUST be equal to the end offset of the entire upload, or the begin offset of the next chunk if the upload is still incomplete. The client SHOULD consider the upload failed if the status code indicates a success but the offset indicated by the \"Upload-Offset\" field value does not equal the total of begin offset plus the number of bytes uploaded in the request. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully and the entire upload is complete, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Server is RECOMMENDED to use \"201 (Created)\" response if not otherwise <\/del> successful status code between 200 and 299 (inclusive). Servers are RECOMMENDED to use a \"201 (Created)\" response if not otherwise <\/ins> specified. The response MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Complete\" header with the value of false. <\/del> header field with the value set to false. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully but the entire upload is not yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete\" header, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with the \"201 (Created)\" status code, the \"Upload-Complete\" header set to true. If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload the remaining resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the sum of the upload's offset and the \"Content-Length\" header field. If the server does not have a record of the upload's final size from creation or the previous append, the server MUST record the upload's final size to ensure its consistency. If the server does have a previous record, that value MUST match the <\/del> yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to false, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a \"201 (Created)\" status code and the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true. If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload the remaining resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the sum of the upload's offset and the \"Content-Length\" header field. If the server does not have a record of the upload's final size from creation or the previous append, the server MUST record the upload's final size to ensure its consistency. If the server does have a previous record, that value MUST match the <\/ins> upload's final size. If they do not match, the server MUST reject the request with the \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/del> the request with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/ins> The client MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fc4ab10ef3eb5557c87a392441327fb4a8d1b05e89ca013d07ee52f74dee5242","title":"","text":"server support. The request MUST use the \"DELETE\" method. The request MUST NOT include the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header. The server MUST reject the request with the \"Upload-Offset\" header or the \"Upload-Complete\" header by sending a \"400 (Bad Request)\" response. <\/del> include an \"Upload-Offset\" or \"Upload-Complete\" header field. The server MUST reject the request with a \"Upload-Offset\" or \"Upload- Complete\" header field with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/ins> If the server successfully deactivates the upload resource, it MUST send back a \"204 (No Content)\" response. <\/del> respond with a \"204 (No Content)\" status code. <\/ins> The server MAY terminate any in-flight requests to the upload resource before sending the response by abruptly terminating their HTTP connection(s) or stream(s). If the server does not consider the upload resource to be active, it MUST respond with \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/del> MUST respond with a \"404 (Not Found)\" status code. <\/ins> If the server does not support cancellation, it MUST respond with <\/del> If the server does not support cancellation, it MUST respond with a <\/ins> \"405 (Method Not Allowed)\" status code. 8. 8.1. The \"Upload-Offset\" request and response header field is an Item Structured Header indicating the resumption offset of corresponding upload, counted in bytes. Its value MUST be an integer. Its ABNF is <\/del> The \"Upload-Offset\" request and response header field indicates the resumption offset of corresponding upload, counted in bytes. The \"Upload-Offset\" field value is an Integer. <\/ins> 8.2. The \"Upload-Complete\" request and response header field is an Item Structured Header indicating whether the corresponding upload is considered complete. Its value MUST be a boolean. Its ABNF is <\/del> The \"Upload-Complete\" request and response header field indicates whether the corresponding upload is considered complete. The \"Upload-Complete\" field value is a Boolean. <\/ins> The \"Upload-Complete\" header field MUST only by used if support by the resource is known to the client (feature-detection). 9. The \"301 (Moved Permanently)\" status code and the \"302 (Found)\" status code MUST NOT be used in offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) and upload cancellation (upload-cancellation) responses. For other responses, the upload resource MAY send a \"308 (Permanent Redirect)\" response which clients SHOULD use for subsequent requests to it. If client receives a \"307 (Temporary Redirect)\" response to an offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) request, it MAY apply the redirection directly in an immediate subsequent upload append (upload-appending). <\/del> The \"301 (Moved Permanently)\" and \"302 (Found)\" status codes MUST NOT be used in offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) and upload cancellation (upload-cancellation) responses. For other responses, the upload resource MAY return a \"308 (Permanent Redirect)\" status code and clients SHOULD use new permanent URI for subsequent requests. If the client receives a \"307 (Temporary Redirect)\" response to an offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) request, it MAY apply the redirection directly in an immediate subsequent upload append (upload-appending). <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9ff97146129ac7c3fab24c364db114ea6897f2e51c9804e2dee814fcef942646","title":"","text":"4.2. The current interop version is 3. <\/del> The current interop version is 4. <\/ins> Client implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST send a header field \"Upload-Draft-Interop-Version\" with the interop version"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4bcb0bcfff5abb49ebdf29b6565acf3a8cca2dacedad48d6571d104dfb01823f","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the following terminology from STRUCTURED-FIELDS to specify syntax and parsing: Integer and Byte Sequence. This document uses the notation from QUIC. <\/del> This document uses the notation from QUIC. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a059e4eb71c8e1afdcb9d91c37df57cb7a6657c5c3e4c7663f2a2a4a536f1863","title":"","text":"5. This specification defines the following authentication parameters. These parameters use structured fields (STRUCTURED-FIELDS) in their definition, even though the Authorization field itself does not use structured fields. Due to the syntax requirements for authentication parameters, the byte sequences defined below SHALL be enclosed in double-quotes (the base64-encoded data and colon delimeters are enclosed in double-quotes, see example in example). <\/del> All of the byte sequences below are encoded using base64url (see BASE64) without quotes and without padding. In other words, these byte sequence authentication parameters values MUST NOT include any characters other then ASCII letters, digits, dash and underscore. The integer below is encoded without a minus and without leading zeroes. In other words, the integer authentication parameters value MUST NOT include any characters other than digits, and MUST NOT start with a zero unless the full value is \"0\". Using the syntax from ABNF: <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6307e908b59d3aa488ee700bc5c1c4c97d6fe86b8670b76b234e9aed0af6dfa9","title":"","text":"upload append (upload-appending), and upload cancellation (upload- cancellation). Once the upload resource is available, the target resource MAY send an informational response with a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" status code to the client while the request content is being uploaded. In this informational response, the \"Location\" header field MUST be set to the upload resource. <\/del> Once the upload resource is available and while the request content is being uploaded, the target resource MAY send one or more informational responses with a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" status code to the client. In the first informational response, the \"Location\" header field MUST be set to the URL pointing to the upload resource. In subsequent informational responses, the \"Location\" header field MUST NOT be set. An informational response MAY contain the \"Upload-Offset\" header field with the current upload offset as the value to inform the client about the upload progress. In subsequent informational responses, the upload offset MUST NOT be smaller than in previous informational responses. In addition, later offset retrievals (offset-retrieving) MUST NOT receive an upload offset that is less than the offset reported in the latest informational response, allowing the client to free associated resources. <\/ins> The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2439d77138c75b57e18d90934522884b72bf56f18649b8f67b588da412fc2276","title":"","text":"incomplete successful transfer, the server MUST respond with a \"409 (Conflict)\" status code. While the request content is being uploaded, the target resource MAY send one or more informational responses with a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" status code to the client. These informational responses MUST NOT contain the \"Location\" header field. They MAY include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field with the current upload offset as the value to inform the client about the upload progress. The same restrictions on the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in informational responses from the upload creation (upload-creation) apply. <\/ins> The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a success (e.g. \"201 (Created)\"), or when the response is a failure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2a3ab8195a2a853d5c619e49933aa2e221e48b5e603a085e2c98bb03b0697c03","title":"","text":"Upon parsing this name, \"dot%5C.label\" MUST be treated as a single label. Similarly the \"\\\" character in a label MUST be escaped as \"\\\\\". Other uses of \"\\\" MUST NOT appear in the label after percent- decoding. <\/del> Similarly the \"\\\" character in a label MUST be escaped as \"\\\\\" and then percent-encoded. Other uses of \"\\\" MUST NOT appear in the label after percent-decoding. For example, if there is a DNS name \"backslash\\name.example.com\", it would first be escaped as \"backslash\\\\name.example.com\", and then percent-encoded as follows: <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9efcc5a5ca8138b10aa4bb7ddc02b083322ce35e2a48a223df0ad69ef7ddf5fd","title":"","text":"Implementations ought to note that the full chain of names might not be available in common DNS resolution APIs, such as \"getaddrinfo\". \"getaddrinfo\" does have an option for \"AI_CANONNAME\", but this will only return the last name in the chain (the canonical name), not the alias names. <\/del> \"getaddrinfo\" does have an option for \"AI_CANONNAME\" (Section 6.1 of RFC3493), but this will only return the last name in the chain (the canonical name), not the alias names. <\/ins> An implementation MAY include incomplete information in the \"next- hop-aliases\" parameter to accommodate cases where it is unable to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fe7b988285bde74406d292760c4c07db418128147c5d21abf46dcc619af715c9","title":"","text":"11. This specification registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Header Field Names registry established by RFC3864: <\/del> IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\": <\/ins> Header field name: Upload-Offset, Upload-Complete Applicable protocol: http Status: standard Author\/change controller: IETF Specification: This document Related information: n\/a This specification registers the following entry in the \"HTTP Status <\/del> IANA is asked to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Status <\/ins> Codes\" registry: Code: 104 (suggested value) Description: Upload Resumption Supported Specification: This document <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-db17a02e810d10322f293682b008f68d533ce6d8400a5aa37ce65567869bbce9","title":"","text":"The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match- query\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", \"type\" and \"hashes\". <\/del> query\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", and \"type\". <\/ins> 2.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d1c0b570aee2018c5118d7769c5f37bb97abc2ae290918d57566001c2d460fc1","title":"","text":"2.1.6. The \"hashes\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a inner-list value that provides a list of supported hash algorithms in order of server preference. The dictionaries are identified by the hash of their contents and this value allows for negotiation of the algorithm to use. The \"hashes\" value is optional and defaults to (sha-256). 2.1.7. 2.1.7.1. <\/del> 2.1.6.1. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header: Would specify matching any document request for a URL with a path prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request, <\/del> prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request, and <\/ins> expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource, and advertise support for both sha-256 and sha-512 hash algorithms. <\/del> of the resource. <\/ins> 2.1.7.2. <\/del> 2.1.6.2. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header: Would match main.js in any directory under \/app\/, expiring as a dictionary in one year and support using the sha-256 hash algorithm. <\/del> Would match main.js in any directory under \/app\/ and expiring as a dictionary in one year. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e31dc3819dc848fa99c26de3ff9218c97ad99d11cb90f579e9c12aab1d9f9f02","title":"","text":"dictionary available to use for compression. The \"Available-Dictionary\" request header is a lowercase Base16-encoded RFC4648 hash of the contents of a single available dictionary calculated using one of the algorithms advertised as being supported by the server. <\/del> Base16-encoded RFC4648 SHA-256 hash of the contents of a single available dictionary. <\/ins> Its syntax is defined by the following ABNF:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7ad65e4b3951ceb085c01cb13e005099480b3a0596dee1bb5379f41a83385da0","title":"","text":"the content, because a change to the dictionary can result in a change to the decompressed content. The dictionary is validated using a SHA-256 hash of the content to make sure that the client and server are both using the same dictionary. The strength of the SHA-256 hash algorithm isn't explicitly needed to counter attacks since the dictionary is being served from the same origin as the content. That said, if a weakness is discovered in SHA-256 and it is determined that the dictionary negotiation should use a different hash algorithm, the \"Use-As- Dictionary\" response header can be extended to specify a different algorithm and the server would just ignore any \"Available-Dictionary\" requests that do not use the updated hash. <\/ins> 6.2. The CRIME attack shows that it's a bad idea to compress data from"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-369011ac44df64d1dd3f992ebb97875cacc18b51be7f90ea7270ab38f7bff212","title":"","text":"dictionary is updated frequently which can help limit the number of possible incoming dictionary variations. The \"ttl\" value is optional and defaults to 31536000 (1 year). <\/del> The \"ttl\" value is optional and defaults to 1209600 (14 days). <\/ins> 2.1.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d73514e093af6552aa1850deb608d17991a9c351cf73f8cf4b2249917275b428","title":"","text":"To be considered as a match, the dictionary must not yet be expired as a dictionary. When iterating through dictionaries looking for a match, the expiration time of the dictionary is calculated by taking the last time the dictionary was written and adding the \"ttl\" seconds <\/del> the last time the dictionary was fetched and adding the \"ttl\" seconds <\/ins> from the \"Use-As-Dictionary\" response. If the current time is beyond the expiration time of the dictionary, it MUST be ignored."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0339eef1880157912dc021067754f0e57c8eed64556e68855ca9d067d9483feb","title":"","text":"header to the request to indicate to the server that it has a dictionary available to use for compression. The \"Available-Dictionary\" request header is a lowercase Base16-encoded RFC4648 SHA-256 hash of the contents of a single <\/del> The \"Available-Dictionary\" request header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-binary SHA-256 hash of the contents of a single <\/ins> available dictionary. Its syntax is defined by the following ABNF: <\/del> The client MUST only send a single \"Available-Dictionary\" request header with a single hash value for the best available match that it has available."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-105b9bd35e2f94b7855b76817da686f14df4e1655b0e6de9ad68fb744d499a0f","title":"","text":"equivalent destination, path and search precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. 2.3. When a HTTP server responds with a resource that is encoded with a dictionary the server MUST send the hash of the dictionary that was used in the \"Content-Dictionary\" response header. The \"Content-Dictionary\" response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary SHA-256 hash of the contents of the dictionary that was used to encode the response. If the HTTP response contains a \"Content-Dictionary\" response header with the hash of a dictionary that the client does not have available then the client cannot decode or use the HTTP response. For example: <\/ins> 3. When a compression dictionary is available for use for a given"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fdef1072610d4a2b88e55800088c359de695107a4723bea8603025c34a5225ca","title":"","text":"The upload resource URL is the identifier used for modifying the upload. Without further protection of this URL, an attacker may obtain information about an upload, append data to it, or cancel it. To prevent this, the server SHOULD ensure that only authorized clients can access the upload resource. In addition, the upload resource URL SHOULD be generated in such a way that makes it hard to be guessed by unauthorized clients. Some servers or intermediaries provide scanning of content uploaded by clients. Any scanning mechanism that relies on receiving a complete file in a single request message can be defeated by resumable uploads because content can be split across multiple messages. Servers or intermediaries wishing to perform content scanning SHOULD consider how resumable uploads can circumvent scanning and take appropriate measures. Possible strategies include waiting for the upload to complete before scanning a full file, or disabling resumable uploads. <\/ins> 11. IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71a5ceb29407c914608d74b485099495a7a9656ce8bcc3e9f5d66390982bd02d","title":"","text":"The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match- search\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", and \"type\". <\/del> search\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/ins> 2.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c1342d17a2eda9e7436757e4e546d2320b61690464d3ee17ecc3cfbc5fe8348","title":"","text":"2.1.5. The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\" value is present then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary- ID\" request header when the dictionary is advertised as being available. The server identifier MUST be treated as an opaque string by the client. The server identifier MUST NOT be relied upon by the server to guarantee the contents of the dictionary. The dictionary hash MUST be validated before use. The \"id\" value string length (after any decoding) supports up to 1024 characters. The \"id\" value is optional. 2.1.6. <\/ins> The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that describes the file format of the supplied dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-aa7b0c62742452e3a78e9818150a8352c1dcc4945bb3cdeadaa1cce294184c99","title":"","text":"The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to \"raw\". 2.1.6. <\/del> 2.1.7. <\/ins> 2.1.6.1. <\/del> 2.1.7.1. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5e0ff9b67eab75bda1f8017dc681fa272d5d999668c01fed6f0218866f6ce897","title":"","text":"expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource. 2.1.6.2. <\/del> 2.1.7.2. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-75bcb9b9134df6a605f86835e8b3f1cb09005b8d2b08396a95a1dbf237f321dd","title":"","text":"2.3. When a HTTP client makes a request for a resource for which it has an appropriate dictionary and the dictionary was stored with a server- provided \"id\" in the Use-As-Dictionary response then the client MUST echo the stored \"id\" in a \"Dictionary-ID\" request header. The \"Dictionary-ID\" request header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED- FIELDS sf-string of up to 1024 characters (after any decoding) and MUST be identical to the server-provided \"id\". For example: 2.4. <\/ins> When a HTTP server responds with a resource that is encoded with a dictionary the server MUST send the hash of the dictionary that was used in the \"Content-Dictionary\" response header."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7eb808810f029d11575e71d3712787b2fdf18486b173e35e82c66c94d404bf2c","title":"","text":"The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match- search\", \"match-dest\", \"ttl\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/del> dest\", \"ttl\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/ins> 2.1.1. The \"match\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides the \"pathname\" of a URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#dom-urlpatterninit-pathname). <\/del> value that provides the URLPattern to use for request matching (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/ins> The \"match\" is a URL path relative to the full request URL of the dictionary. The request URL for the dictionary itself is used as the \"baseURL\" for constructing the URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/) that is used for matching the dictionary to relevant requests when running dictionary-url-matching. <\/del> The URLPattern used for matching does not support using Regular expressions. <\/ins> The URLPattern used for request matching does not support regular expressions (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#token-type-regexp) in the \"match\". <\/del> The following algorithm will return TRUE for a valid match pattern and FALSE for an invalid pattern that MUST NOT be used: <\/ins> The \"match\" value is required and MUST be included in the Use-As- Dictionary sf-dictionary for the dictionary to be considered valid. <\/del> Let MATCH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. <\/ins> 2.1.2. <\/del> Let URL be the URL of the dictionary request. <\/ins> The \"match-search\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf- string value that provides the \"search\" of a URLPattern (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#dom-urlpatterninit-search). <\/del> Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=URL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/ins> The \"match-search\" is the match pattern for the searchpart of the request URL and does not support regular expressions. <\/del> If PATTERN has regexp groups then return FALSE (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#urlpattern-has-regexp- groups). <\/ins> The \"match-search\" value is optional and defaults to the asterisk wildcard token \"*\". <\/del> Return True. <\/ins> 2.1.3. <\/del> The \"match\" value is required and MUST be included in the Use-As- Dictionary sf-dictionary for the dictionary to be considered valid. 2.1.2. <\/ins> The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides a request destination"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c3b7831bd7eb3b5b4a5f076267588a789c4d573182ebea62a7cd120dd286a75","title":"","text":"The \"match-dest\" value is optional and defaults to the empty string. 2.1.4. <\/del> 2.1.3. <\/ins> The \"ttl\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-integer value that provides the time in seconds that the dictionary is valid for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-84d8de5b9509eb521381cab51e1b8e61fb48102ce2bb9640f01356993fd6be9d","title":"","text":"The \"ttl\" value is optional and defaults to 1209600 (14 days). 2.1.5. <\/del> 2.1.4. <\/ins> The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9a7a50c456de40d8df2e1d94a872c64acb2abeb448e709564f650fb9829af0d3","title":"","text":"The \"id\" value is optional. 2.1.6. <\/del> 2.1.5. <\/ins> The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that describes the file format of the supplied dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ef07dd923931dabb50f2809dd1bb19c0dec729b3ba8c05048a3cf762b5ff8df5","title":"","text":"The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to \"raw\". 2.1.7. <\/del> 2.1.6. <\/ins> 2.1.7.1. <\/del> 2.1.6.1. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9442d16187d84cccdc9fccfd19056cc834a17f83b3880b082d6297574af61449","title":"","text":"expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource. 2.1.7.2. <\/del> 2.1.6.2. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4daedb4588c0447d7cfa0327056dc8ff21405271ba37f3f33cd196fbb351555d","title":"","text":"2.2.2. When a dictionary is stored as a result of a \"Use-As-Dictionary\" directive, it includes \"match\", \"match-search\" and \"match-dest\" strings that are used to match an outgoing request from a client to the available dictionaries. <\/del> directive, it includes \"match\" and \"match-dest\" strings that are used to match an outgoing request from a client to the available dictionaries. Dictionaries MUST have been served from the same {Origin} as the outgoing request to match. <\/ins> To see if an outbound request matches a given dictionary, the following algorithm will return TRUE for a successful match and FALSE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-933a07c683539e58ef8aac15d965396ad60c8b780741dce281be1fb2999dd50a","title":"","text":"If DEST is not an empty string and If DEST and REQUEST_DEST are not the same value, return FALSE Let PATH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. <\/del> Let BASEURL be the URL of the dictionary request. <\/ins> Let SEARCH be the value of \"match-search\" for the given dictionary. <\/del> Let URL represent the URL of the outbound request being checked. <\/ins> Let BASEURL be the request URL of the given dictionary. <\/del> If the {Origin} of BASEURL and the {Origin} of URL are not the same, return FALSE. <\/ins> Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting pathname=PATH, search=SEARCH, baseURL=BASEURL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/del> Let MATCH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. <\/ins> LET URL represent the request URL being checked. <\/del> Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=BASEURL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/ins> Return the result of running the URLPattern \"match\" algorithm (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#match) <\/del> Return the result of running the \"test\" method of PATTERN with input=URL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#ref-for-dom- urlpattern-test) <\/ins> 2.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1ae94299075ebeb33f19d315ba1336dce76f43734753301aaa57e7557ea4119c","title":"","text":"specifies and matches a \"match-dest\" takes precedence over a match that does not use a destination. 1. Given equivalent destination precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match\" takes precedence. 1. Given equivalent destination and path precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match-search\" takes precedence. 1. Given equivalent destination, path and search precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. <\/del> 1. Given equivalent destination and match length precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1cc7eadf3ad3426955356a6d58132e65f283521fac91c229791e9a46485ee56b","title":"","text":"1.2. Classic HTTP CONNECT proxies are identified by an origin. The proxy does not have a path of its own. This prevents any origin from hosting multiple distinct proxy services. Ordinarily, HTTP allows multiple origin hostnames to share a single server IP address and port number (i.e., virtual-hosting), by specifying the applicable hostname in the \"Host\" or \":authority\" header field. However, classic HTTP CONNECT proxies use these fields to indicate the CONNECT request's destination (RFC9112), leaving no way to determine the proxy's origin from the request. As a result, classic HTTP CONNECT proxies cannot be deployed using virtual- hosting, nor can they apply the usual defenses against server port misdirection attacks (see RFC9110). <\/del> HTTP clients can be configured to use proxies by selecting a proxy hostname, a port, and whether to use a security protocol. However, CONNECT requests using the proxy do not carry this configuration information. Instead, they only indicate the hostname and port of the target. This prevents any HTTP server from hosting multiple distinct proxy services, as the server cannot distinguish them by path (as with distinct resources) or by origin (as in \"virtual hosting\"). The absence of an explicit origin for the proxy also rules out the usual defenses against server port misdirection attacks (see RFC9110) and creates ambiguity about the use of origin-scoped response header fields (e.g., \"Alt-Svc\" RFC7838, \"Strict-Transport-Security\" RFC6797). <\/ins> Classic HTTP CONNECT proxies can be used to reach a target host that is specified as a domain name or an IP address. However, because"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b6ac934cbf23f489002231681b353ef1849eba3edcd3813f447d4b42f5a09fb3","title":"","text":"usual requirements for classic CONNECT proxies in this HTTP version (see RFC9113 and RFC9114). 3.3. A templated TCP proxy has an unambiguous origin of its own. Origin- scoped HTTP header fields such as \"Alt-Svc\" RFC7838 and \"Strict- Transport-Security\" RFC6797 apply to this origin when they are associated with a templated TCP proxy request or response. <\/ins> 4. This section discusses some behaviors that are permitted or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-15bbaef910f368b81bd6da5122edf5cf20e82cf64a5220b40f5a8925a287d5f4","title":"","text":"3.3. A templated TCP proxy has an unambiguous origin of its own. Origin- scoped HTTP header fields such as \"Alt-Svc\" RFC7838 and \"Strict- Transport-Security\" RFC6797 apply to this origin when they are associated with a templated TCP proxy request or response. <\/del> 3.3.1. Ordinary HTTP headers apply only to the single resource identified in the request or response. An origin-scoped HTTP header is a special response header that is intended to change the client's behavior for subsequent requests to any resource on this origin. Unlike classic HTTP CONNECT proxies, a templated TCP proxy has an unambiguous origin of its own. Origin-scoped headers apply to this origin when they are associated with a templated TCP proxy response. Here are some origin-scoped headers that could potentially be sent by a templated TCP proxy: \"Alt-Svc\" \"Strict-Transport-Security\" \"Public-Key-Pins\" \"Accept-CH\" \"Set-Cookie\" RFC6265, which has configurable scope. \"Clear-Site-Data\" 3.3.2. Authentication to a templated TCP proxy normally uses ordinary HTTP authentication via the \"401 (Unauthorized)\" response code, the \"WWW- Authenticate\" response header field, and the \"Authorization\" request header field (RFC9110). A templated TCP proxy does not use the \"407 (Proxy Authentication Required)\" response code and related header fields (RFC9110) because they do not traverse HTTP gateways (see operational-considerations). Clients SHOULD assume that all proxy resources generated by a single template share a protection space (i.e., a realm) (RFC9110). For many authentication schemes, this will allow the client to avoid waiting for a \"401 (Unauthorized)\" response before each new connection through the proxy. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1f339d7bbb16afe3af42c7db83f84acf2a47fb8c1048372210045aaa2b76b1ec","title":"","text":"infrastructure. However, current gateways might need modifications to support TCP proxy services. To be compatible, a gateway must: support Extended CONNECT. <\/del> support Extended CONNECT (if acting as an HTTP\/2 or HTTP\/3 server). support HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade to \"connect-tcp\" (if acting as an HTTP\/1.1 server) only after forwarding the upgrade request to the origin and observing a success response. <\/ins> convert HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade requests into Extended CONNECT. <\/del> forward the \"connect-tcp\" protocol to the origin. <\/ins> allow the Extended CONNECT method to pass through to the origin. <\/del> convert \"connect-tcp\" requests between all supported HTTP server and client versions. <\/ins> forward Proxy-* request headers to the origin. <\/del> allow any \"Proxy-Status\" headers to traverse the gateway. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ed925bbbdb30b0c2a7ffc9ae3747e96e044933f5f7221a5302b02c8441b50831","title":"","text":"2.2. Clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests and \"https\" requests on the same connection. <\/del> same connection. Similarly, clients MUST NOT send \"http\" requests for multiple origins on the same connection. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-57951c05b36b50f4dc60feeda4f193e12393eb1417ff58140a4436ea53341ef9","title":"","text":"header. The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match- dest\", \"ttl\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/del> STRUCTURED-FIELDS with values for \"match\", \"match-dest\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/ins> 2.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-16ea34b046eb72c99ed24228bb92ce7a94c150c92cb24a37366d381ab2d6f104","title":"","text":"2.1.3. The \"ttl\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-integer value that provides the time in seconds that the dictionary is valid for (time to live). The \"ttl\" is independent of the cache lifetime of the resource being used for the dictionary. If the underlying resource is evicted from cache then it is also removed but this allows for setting an explicit time to live for use as a dictionary independent of the underlying resource in cache. Expired resources can still be useful as dictionaries while they are in cache and can be used for fetching updates of the expired resource. It can also be useful to artificially limit the life of a dictionary in cases where the dictionary is updated frequently which can help limit the number of possible incoming dictionary variations. The \"ttl\" value is optional and defaults to 1209600 (14 days). 2.1.4. <\/del> The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\" value is present then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74dfd1b408d4f300266bbd212806a62064936d7fe6daa13f5982cef83113863d","title":"","text":"The \"id\" value is optional. 2.1.5. <\/del> 2.1.4. <\/ins> The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that describes the file format of the supplied dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d2fa407d08e624c227d233c7840fc62f744b32f7df61a3eab953df617b8d249f","title":"","text":"The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to \"raw\". 2.1.6. <\/del> 2.1.5. <\/ins> 2.1.6.1. <\/del> 2.1.5.1. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header: Would specify matching any document request for a URL with a path prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request, and expiring as a dictionary in 7 days independent of the cache lifetime of the resource. <\/del> prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request. <\/ins> 2.1.6.2. <\/del> 2.1.5.2. <\/ins> A response that contained a response header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5bbbdad5da1f9bca54d8be71639bc9d0dfbc4e87ea8a0d383ebe2a59401db52d","title":"","text":"2.2.1. To be considered as a match, the dictionary must not yet be expired as a dictionary. When iterating through dictionaries looking for a match, the expiration time of the dictionary is calculated by taking the last time the dictionary was fetched and adding the \"ttl\" seconds from the \"Use-As-Dictionary\" response. If the current time is beyond the expiration time of the dictionary, it MUST be ignored. <\/del> To be considered as a match, the dictionary resource MUST be either fresh HTTP-CACHING or allowed to be served stale (see eg RFC5861). <\/ins> 2.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9922da18e483535c3dbb4ac5d5521e8932527ceafd7679df175171f2851d6b66","title":"","text":"serialization. Let byte_array be the result of applying UTF-8 encoding (Section 3 of UTF8) to input_sequence. <\/del> of UTF8) to input_sequence. If encoding fails, fail serialization. <\/ins> Let encoded_string be a string containing \"%\" followed by DQUOTE."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74917f3257737d1a23552fcf17260c575a3910e9b545e1e9e3de984920eee7af","title":"","text":"confirms receipt of a request at the proxy without waiting for the proxy-destination TCP handshake to succeed or fail. This might be particularly helpful when the destination host is not responding, as TCP handshakes can hang for several minutes before failing. Implementation of \"100 (Continue)\" support is OPTIONAL for clients and REQUIRED for proxies. <\/del> TCP handshakes can hang for several minutes before failing. Clients MAY send \"Expect: 100-continue\", and proxies MUST respect it by returning \"100 (Continue)\" if the request is not immediately rejected. <\/ins> Proxies implementing this specification SHOULD include a \"Proxy- Status\" response header RFC9209 in any success or failure response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-348519e57039b351d2650743c15c0b373538c692bf27a7e18647b8d654090c19","title":"","text":"The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\" value is present then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary- ID\" request header when the dictionary is advertised as being available. <\/del> value is present and has a string length longer than zero then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary-ID\" request header when the dictionary is advertised as being available. <\/ins> The server identifier MUST be treated as an opaque string by the client."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34c2943da8516b1c2bd8121b9bae519e4261f6de81e7b9c68e3e0faaece2806d","title":"","text":"The \"id\" value string length (after any decoding) supports up to 1024 characters. The \"id\" value is optional. <\/del> The \"id\" value is optional and defaults to the empty string. <\/ins> 2.1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0d852c1da23f716f6e08d62067e677b0a885a3ac6062a528f58271bc15011d8e","title":"","text":"2.1.2. The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides a request destination (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#concept-request-destination). <\/del> The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is an inner list of sf-string values that provides a list of request destinations for the dictionary to match (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#concept- request-destination). <\/ins> An empty string for \"match-dest\" MUST match all destinations. <\/del> An empty list for \"match-dest\" MUST match all destinations. <\/ins> For clients that do not support request destinations or if the value of \"match-dest\" is a value that is not supported by the client then the client MUST treat it as an empty string and match all destinations. <\/del> For clients that do not support request destinations, the client MUST treat it as an empty list and match all destinations. <\/ins> The \"match-dest\" value is optional and defaults to the empty string. <\/del> The \"match-dest\" value is optional and defaults to an empty list. <\/ins> 2.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7bea130d0597bf200c5155af26b6c2b20df814f7f9baba9f6cc3a2e374225e58","title":"","text":"Let REQUEST_DEST be the value of the destination for the current request. If DEST is not an empty string and If DEST and REQUEST_DEST are not the same value, return FALSE <\/del> If DEST is not an empty list and if REQUEST_DEST is not in the DEST list of destinations, return FALSE <\/ins> Let BASEURL be the URL of the dictionary request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e5a564734a44aaff402c3a0cb711bed53b2a814dac817fb81ad8a8dcce1616af","title":"","text":"dictionary usage and registers media types for content encoding Brotli and Zstandard using a negotiated dictionary. 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the following terminology from STRUCTURED-FIELDS to specify syntax and parsing: Dictionary, String, Inner List, Token, and Byte Sequence. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. <\/ins> This document uses the line folding strategies described in FOLDING. This document also uses terminology from HTTP and HTTP-CACHING. <\/ins> 2. 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5bc49ad680964080432b8a5c5ece8966673682af242f68a769e2dcec4504b9d0","title":"","text":"header. The Use-As-Dictionary response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS with values for \"match\", \"match-dest\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/del> STRUCTURED-FIELDS Dictionary with values for \"match\", \"match-dest\", \"id\", and \"type\". <\/ins> 2.1.1. The \"match\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that provides the URLPattern to use for request matching <\/del> The \"match\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a String value that provides the URLPattern to use for request matching <\/ins> (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). The URLPattern used for matching does not support using Regular"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-00ea4914186655e5c762f31b9d8d283b7ad997c0ef325c12bda6007e29916835","title":"","text":"Return True. The \"match\" value is required and MUST be included in the Use-As- Dictionary sf-dictionary for the dictionary to be considered valid. <\/del> Dictionary Dictionary for the dictionary to be considered valid. <\/ins> 2.1.2. The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is an inner list of sf-string values that provides a list of request destinations <\/del> The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is an Inner List of String values that provides a list of request destinations <\/ins> for the dictionary to match (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#concept- request-destination)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-deb0f89ba5673773f03ea51df28e8e4f5ed93d901342cd36d352f01bb2212278","title":"","text":"2.1.3. The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\" value is present and has a string length longer than zero then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary-ID\" request header when the dictionary is advertised as being available. <\/del> The \"id\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a String value that specifies a server identifier for the dictionary. If an \"id\" value is present and has a string length longer than zero then it MUST be sent to the server in a \"Dictionary-ID\" request header when the dictionary is advertised as being available. <\/ins> The server identifier MUST be treated as an opaque string by the client."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-844dddee87b01623619890a0509ab88e323eae4c1cc6fe178ff49c45f7d4956e","title":"","text":"2.1.4. The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a sf-string value <\/del> The \"type\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a Token value <\/ins> that describes the file format of the supplied dictionary. \"raw\" is the only defined dictionary format which represents an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f4de5f3798f0674fddb8ac847918266bc5e8bc002ac3ee9bb6d30e7c36fd8644","title":"","text":"If a client receives a dictionary with a type that it does not understand, it MUST NOT use the dictionary. The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to \"raw\". <\/del> The \"type\" value is optional and defaults to raw. <\/ins> 2.1.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eba26262f6ce1eefe69b05e3a78da626a6e134133f52e0b31266520d0badaf3c","title":"","text":"dictionary available to use for compression. The \"Available-Dictionary\" request header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-binary SHA-256 hash of the contents of a single available dictionary. <\/del> STRUCTURED-FIELDS Byte Sequence containing the SHA-256 hash of the contents of a single available dictionary. <\/ins> The client MUST only send a single \"Available-Dictionary\" request header with a single hash value for the best available match that it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1ee9b85f4b55c6d4bca11e859c627f335cc7cc728a19792385b93231ab220beb","title":"","text":"echo the stored \"id\" in a \"Dictionary-ID\" request header. The \"Dictionary-ID\" request header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED- FIELDS sf-string of up to 1024 characters (after any decoding) and MUST be identical to the server-provided \"id\". <\/del> FIELDS String of up to 1024 characters (after any decoding) and MUST be identical to the server-provided \"id\". <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b835fee7014ddc24f2672119989f93f1e31790eb7f99ae4b3d244b7316ae86f0","title":"","text":"used in the \"Content-Dictionary\" response header. The \"Content-Dictionary\" response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS sf-dictionary SHA-256 hash of the contents of the dictionary that was used to encode the response. <\/del> STRUCTURED-FIELDS Byte Sequence containing the SHA-256 hash of the contents of the dictionary that was used to encode the response. <\/ins> If the HTTP response contains a \"Content-Dictionary\" response header with the hash of a dictionary that the client does not have available"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9eb8163cf330702828ce6ad799020c671aa2936ba321125ecaf67fab13bd964e","title":"","text":"HTTP clients can be configured to use proxies by selecting a proxy hostname, a port, and whether to use a security protocol. However, CONNECT requests using the proxy do not carry this configuration information. Instead, they only indicate the hostname and port of the target. This prevents any HTTP server from hosting multiple distinct proxy services, as the server cannot distinguish them by path (as with distinct resources) or by origin (as in \"virtual hosting\"). <\/del> Classic HTTP CONNECT requests using the proxy do not carry this configuration information. Instead, they only indicate the hostname and port of the target. This prevents any HTTP server from hosting multiple distinct proxy services, as the server cannot distinguish them by path (as with distinct resources) or by origin (as in \"virtual hosting\"). <\/ins> The absence of an explicit origin for the proxy also rules out the usual defenses against server port misdirection attacks (see RFC9110)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-aa1fe96e33158a9fbec97723dbd76bce05ef30ecdcc852c0bffb00f889b23277","title":"","text":"fields (e.g., \"Alt-Svc\" RFC7838, \"Strict-Transport-Security\" RFC6797). Classic HTTP CONNECT proxies can be used to reach a target host that is specified as a domain name or an IP address. However, because only a single target host can be specified, proxy-driven Happy Eyeballs and cross-IP fallback can only be used when the host is a domain name. For IP-targeted requests to succeed, the client must know which address families are supported by the proxy via some out- of-band mechanism, or open multiple independent CONNECT requests and abandon any that prove unnecessary. <\/del> 1.3. This specification describes an alternative mechanism for proxying"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-663e5bb87f35079be0a5f5929ac1865825a6058ab44a103a737dbd8b1e293661","title":"","text":"A template-driven TCP transport proxy for HTTP is identified by a URI Template RFC6570 containing variables named \"target_host\" and \"tcp_port\". The client substitutes the destination host and port number into these variables to produce the request URI. The \"target_host\" variable MUST be a domain name, an IP address literal, or a list of IP addresses. The \"tcp_port\" variable MUST be a single integer. If \"target_host\" is a list (as in RFC6570), the server SHOULD perform the same connection procedure as if these IP addresses had been returned in response to A and AAAA queries for a domain name. <\/del> \"target_port\". This URI Template and its variable values MUST meet all the same requirements as for UDP proxying (RFC9298), and are subject to the same validation rules. The client MUST substitute the destination host and port number into this template to produce the request URI. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23958e3cb4031a6ac21d95e8b3168fd0f27336ac9d33a4f02d36f2a7ca723618","title":"","text":"expansion of the proxy's URI Template. If the request is well-formed and permissible, the proxy MUST attempt the TCP connection before sending any response status code other than \"100 (Continue)\" (see conveying-metadata). If the TCP connection is successful, the response SHALL be as follows: <\/del> to establish the TCP connection before sending any response status code other than \"100 (Continue)\" (see conveying-metadata). If the TCP connection is successful, the response SHALL be as follows: <\/ins> The HTTP status code SHALL be \"101 (Switching Protocols)\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-99628e6786fbf5db6412a43bdbb1b24f2297ce7ece579ede24e8080c448a2c32","title":"","text":"SHOULD send a TCP RST to the target. If the proxy observes a connection error from the target, it SHOULD send a TLS \"internal_error\" alert to the client, or set the TCP RST bit if TLS is not in use. <\/del> is not in use. These behaviors avoid truncation of transfers between the client and the target on vulnerable protocols (e.g., HTTP\/1.1 without TLS) while preserving the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of the \"https\" scheme. <\/ins> 3.2. In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, the client uses the proxy by issuing an \"extended CONNECT\" request as follows: <\/del> In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, the proxy MUST include SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL in its SETTINGS frame RFC9220. The client uses the proxy by issuing an \"extended CONNECT\" request as follows: <\/ins> The :method pseudo-header field SHALL be \"CONNECT\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-03464a8bdbb1aa0a3c7262c4a7085111829ee340ce7bbf5315fd07a1a39d930c","title":"","text":"waiting for a \"401 (Unauthorized)\" response before each new connection through the proxy. 3.4. Unlike the datagram-oriented templated HTTP proxying specifications CONNECT-IP, this specification does not make use of the Capsule Protocol RFC9297. A future specification could define a procedure for performing TCP proxying using the Capsule Protocol, but no such procedure is defined here. When implementing this specification, clients and servers MUST NOT send a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header field. <\/ins> 4. This section discusses some behaviors that are permitted or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-92061746c1ee9af82b4df9a2c90d76c22071114c111713f1e11f7cd739b06439","title":"","text":"sending TCP stream content optimistically, subject to flow control limits (RFC9113 or RFC9000). Proxies MUST buffer this \"optimistic\" content until the TCP stream becomes writable, and discard it if the TCP connection fails. (This \"optimistic\" behavior is not permitted in HTTP\/1.1 because it would interfere with reuse of the connection after an error response such as \"401 (Unauthorized)\".) <\/del> TCP connection fails. (Clients MUST NOT use \"optimistic\" behavior in HTTP\/1.1, as this would interfere with reuse of the connection after an error response such as \"401 (Unauthorized)\".) <\/ins> Servers that host a proxy under this specification MAY offer support for TLS early data in accordance with RFC8470. Clients MAY send"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-55ffc726814f2d56bf3d7ef2787432ffbad1247f71190a484506931309d24dd0","title":"","text":"In some cases, it is valuable to allow \"connect-tcp\" clients to reach \"connect-tcp\"-only proxies when using a legacy configuration method that cannot convey a URI template. To support this arrangement, <\/del> that cannot convey a URI Template. To support this arrangement, <\/ins> clients SHOULD treat certain errors during classic HTTP CONNECT as indications that the proxy might only support \"connect-tcp\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93e8f0a55b4c34210a76a986990a22ed743297a3fdbaca50ceaa8cb16ca85c2d","title":"","text":"If this request succeeds, the client SHOULD record a preference for \"connect-tcp\" to avoid further retry delays. 5.3. The names of the variables in the URI Template uniquely identify the capabilities of the proxy. Undefined variables are permitted in URI Templates, so a single template can be used for multiple purposes. Multipurpose templates can be useful when a single client may benefit from access to multiple complementary services (e.g., TCP and UDP), or when the proxy is used by a variety of clients with different needs. <\/del> 6. Template-driven TCP proxying is largely subject to the same security"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-59b9751c461877a3985dd97b60d0168f6c1efe83fe8d41f75889c7021657756d","title":"","text":"upload's final size is the \"Content-Length\" field value and the server MUST record it to ensure its consistency. The following example shows an upload creation. The client transfers the entire 100 bytes in the first request. The server generates two informational responses to transmit the upload resource's URL and progress information, and one final response to acknowledge the completed upload: The next example shows an upload creation, where only the first 25 bytes are transferred. The server acknowledges the received data and that the upload is not complete yet: <\/ins> If the client received an informational response with the upload URL in the Location field value, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-86a108d54447782616c00ef2a56e8ffcb9489bb072f9edf34f5c395ec7ae3c6f","title":"","text":"The client MAY cancel the upload (upload-cancellation) after rejecting the offset. The following example shows an offset retrieval request. The server indicates the new offset and that the upload is not complete yet: <\/ins> The client SHOULD NOT automatically retry if a client error status code between 400 and 499 (inclusive) is received."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ce169e42203f4cbcd9f522d5f9408c6b3d4a221169870f1b7b602533dd2dca0c","title":"","text":"upload's final size. If they do not match, the server MUST reject the request with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. The following example shows an upload append. The client transfers the next 100 bytes at an offset of 100 and does not indicate that the upload is then completed. The server acknowledges the new offset: <\/ins> The client MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status code between 500 and 599 (inclusive) is received. The client SHOULD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cec0c6fbcbe169055446a389000f5e7f58c122116b14908f013429e4f74be93c","title":"","text":"If the server does not support cancellation, it MUST respond with a \"405 (Method Not Allowed)\" status code. The following example shows an upload cancellation: <\/ins> 8. 8.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8f23a15b36a9439ff2ee2253bbafd975dc96cbe557657d82edfeb040783991d","title":"","text":"upload's final size is the \"Content-Length\" field value and the server MUST record it to ensure its consistency. The request content MAY be empty. If the \"Upload-Complete\" header field is then set to true, the client intends to upload an empty entity. An \"Upload-Complete\" header field is set to false is also valid. This can be used to create an upload resource URL before transferring data, which can save client or server resources. Since informational responses are optional, this technique provides another mechanism to learn the URL, at the cost of an additional round-trip before data upload can commence. The following example shows an upload creation. The client transfers the entire 100 bytes in the first request. The server generates two informational responses to transmit the upload resource's URL and progress information, and one final response to acknowledge the completed upload: The next example shows an upload creation, where only the first 25 bytes are transferred. The server acknowledges the received data and that the upload is not complete yet: <\/ins> If the client received an informational response with the upload URL in the Location field value, it MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-211f70594ade81113fd529696647fe57ffe036f5c88467c90938177475804d27","title":"","text":"upload's final size. If they do not match, the server MUST reject the request with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. The request content MAY be empty. If the \"Upload-Complete\" field is then set to true, the client wants to complete the upload without appending additional data. The following example shows an upload append. The client transfers the next 100 bytes at an offset of 100 and does not indicate that the upload is then completed. The server acknowledges the new offset: <\/ins> The client MAY automatically attempt upload resumption when the connection is terminated unexpectedly, or if a server error status code between 500 and 599 (inclusive) is received. The client SHOULD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c9098be5644011059110e16b6e0f50b66914327b5dc85cd425069837b421e0b4","title":"","text":"waiting for the upload to complete before scanning a full file, or disabling resumable uploads. Resumable uploads are vulnerable to Slowloris-style attacks SLOWLORIS. A malicious client may create upload resources and keep them alive by regularly sending \"PATCH\" requests with no or small content to the upload resources. This could be abused to exhaust server resources by creating and holding open uploads indefinately with minimal work. Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for Slowloris attacks, such as increasing the maximum number of clients the server will allow, limiting the number of uploads a single client is allowed to make, imposing restrictions on the minimum transfer speed an uploads is allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist. <\/ins> 11. IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8065bc4ed461fe369230957a39cab0f9b2cf93d002cd632be2762db01c031b3","title":"","text":"fields by responding with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. If the server considers the upload resource to be active, it MUST respond with a \"204 (No Content)\" status code. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field, with the value set to the current resumption offset for the target resource. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field; the value is set to true only if the upload is complete. <\/del> respond with a \"204 (No Content)\" or \"200 (OK)\" status code. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field, with the value set to the current resumption offset for the target resource. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field; the value is set to true only if the upload is complete. <\/ins> An upload is considered complete only if the server completely and successfully received a corresponding creation request (upload-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c8f7a4a2fe4de78602db2f49305b639396adbee6047d814401114e5fdbba3371","title":"","text":"4.2. The current interop version is 4. <\/del> The current interop version is 5. <\/ins> Client implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST send a header field \"Upload-Draft-Interop-Version\" with the interop version"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-545a32d0e4337eb70d823024ba6a11bab58bdca894c87a69f523ba2136259467","title":"","text":"cookie when sending it to the user agent. The scope indicates the maximum amount of time in which the user agent should return the cookie, the servers to which the user agent should return the cookie, and the URI schemes for which the cookie is applicable. <\/del> and the connection types for which the cookie is applicable. <\/ins> For historical reasons, cookies contain a number of security and privacy infelicities. For example, a server can indicate that a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05a76f479b5aa8d93e28b2a436e1b89f0c8053d82127b85f1df389c969b3b2e5","title":"","text":"ua-requirements), the user agent will send a Cookie header field that conforms to the following grammar: Servers MUST be tolerant of multiple cookie headers. For example, an HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114 connection might split a cookie header to improve compression. <\/ins> 4.2.2. Each cookie-pair represents a cookie stored by the user agent. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-623ab0d7895ad4a1503c75a26a67af15583acaeb95536a3c57ae29ee0c2e1fe8","title":"","text":"defined in SAMESITE. A request is \"same-site\" if the following criteria are true: The request is not the result of a cross-site redirect. That is, the origin of every url in the request's url list is same-site with the request's current url's origin. <\/del> The request is not the result of a reload navigation triggered through a user interface element (as defined by the user agent; e.g., a request triggered by the user clicking a refresh button on"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8b6a85dddfd7b6fb9a21e0b2a9c35cdd33d3ba43a9d3a3731efcef3ff57c38e9","title":"","text":"attribute-name of \"Secure\", set the cookie's secure-only-flag to true. Otherwise, set the cookie's secure-only-flag to false. If the scheme component of the request-uri does not denote a \"secure\" protocol (as defined by the user agent), and the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/del> If the request-uri does not denote a \"secure\" connection (as defined by the user agent), and the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. <\/ins> If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of \"HttpOnly\", set the cookie's http-only-flag to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-366f112fc3e30311b0f1555e7224e0691cf40c21120d5ec5b248c92e9c8cab5c","title":"","text":"http-only-flag is true, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely. If the cookie's secure-only-flag is false, and the scheme component of request-uri does not denote a \"secure\" protocol, then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely if the cookie store contains one or more cookies that meet all of the following criteria: <\/del> If the cookie's secure-only-flag is false, and the request-uri does not denote a \"secure\" connection, then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely if the cookie store contains one or more cookies that meet all of the following criteria: <\/ins> Their name matches the name of the newly-created cookie."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-426366dc4f46273ff389ae870918ae1135f49226371b2928e7b97db8cfd75191","title":"","text":"The user agent includes stored cookies in the Cookie HTTP request header field. When the user agent generates an HTTP request, the user agent MUST NOT attach more than one Cookie header field. <\/del> A user agent MAY omit the Cookie header field in its entirety. For example, the user agent might wish to block sending cookies during \"third-party\" requests from setting cookies (see third-party- cookies). If the user agent does attach a Cookie header field to an HTTP request, the user agent MUST compute the cookie-string following the algorithm defined in retrieval-algorithm, where the retrieval's URI is the request-uri, the retrieval's same-site status is computed for the HTTP request as defined in same-site-requests, and the retrieval's type is \"HTTP\". <\/del> request, the user agent MUST generate a single cookie-string and the user agent MUST compute the cookie-string following the algorithm defined in retrieval-algorithm, where the retrieval's URI is the request-uri, the retrieval's same-site status is computed for the HTTP request as defined in same-site-requests, and the retrieval's type is \"HTTP\". <\/ins> 5.7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec11aa19d04e028b3871f10295296014270b058b8517432916f700ae06c7781c","title":"","text":"The retrieval's URI's path path-matches the cookie's path. If the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then the retrieval's URI's scheme must denote a \"secure\" protocol (as defined by the user agent). <\/del> URI must denote a \"secure\" connection (as defined by the user agent). <\/ins> NOTE: The notion of a \"secure\" protocol is not defined by this document. Typically, user agents consider a protocol secure if the protocol makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol. <\/del> NOTE: The notion of a \"secure\" connection is not defined by this document. Typically, user agents consider a connection secure if the connection makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS, or if host is trusted. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol and \"localhost\" to be trusted host. <\/ins> If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the cookie if the retrieval's type is \"non-HTTP\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e272a7b180ef7eedbf7d54312208ef4751becc394f274d32a59b7f288a4e9713","title":"","text":"however, prudent to ensure that this designation is not the extent of a site's defense against CSRF, as same-site navigations and submissions can certainly be executed in conjunction with other attack vectors such as cross-site scripting. <\/del> attack vectors such as cross-site scripting or abuse of page redirections. Understanding how and when a request is considered same-site is also important in order to properly design a site for SameSite cookies. For example, if a top-level request is made to a sensitive page that request will be considered cross-site and SameSite cookies won't be sent; that page's sub-resources requests, however, are same-site and would receive SameSite cookies. Sites can avoid inadvertently allowing access to these sub-resources by returning an error for the initial page request if it doesn't include the appropriate cookies. <\/ins> Developers are strongly encouraged to deploy the usual server-side defenses (CSRF tokens, ensuring that \"safe\" HTTP methods are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-837bbdcd1d3175ab0db3b2bc6c16cf85e22902e96958a2efbb21d8cb8a89cecd","title":"","text":"malicious) request. Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site, like the request that initially navigated to the page. Because requests issued for, non-user initiated, reloads attach all SameSite cookies, developers should be careful and thoughtful about when to initiate a reload in order to avoid a CSRF attack. For example, the page could only initiate a reload if a CSRF token is present on the initial request. <\/ins> 8.8.6. The \"Lax\" enforcement mode described in strict-lax allows a cookie to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a6a18d50996c8e45ca99a3338ca7a72f7142022866f45f8a9fb4216a22061ba5","title":"","text":"The retrieval's URI's path path-matches the cookie's path. If the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then the retrieval's URI's scheme must denote a \"secure\" protocol (as defined by the user agent). NOTE: The notion of a \"secure\" protocol is not defined by this document. Typically, user agents consider a protocol secure if the protocol makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol. <\/del> URI must denote a \"secure\" connection (as defined by the user agent). NOTE: The notion of a \"secure\" connection is not defined by this document. Typically, user agents consider a connection secure if the connection makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS, or if host is trusted. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol and \"localhost\" to be trusted host. <\/ins> If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the cookie if the retrieval's type is \"non-HTTP\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f73cdac21afd8fb68e41760acaecd7b22a2615c64f66fc4bf7d8ead61f2f717","title":"","text":"The client MUST NOT start more than one append (upload-appending) based on the resumption offset from a single offset retrieving (offset-retrieving) request. <\/del> request. <\/ins> In order to prevent HTTP caching, the response SHOULD include a \"Cache-Control\" header field with the value \"no-store\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd45dc5ea54d969754aa53d3743d19410159959dffc43270b799d513b00ab0c1","title":"","text":"The server SHOULD respect representation metadata received during creation (upload-creation) and ignore any representation metadata received from appending (upload-appending). <\/del> received from appending. <\/ins> If the server does not consider the upload associated with the upload resource active, it MUST respond with a \"404 (Not Found)\" status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8a85b20a30aebb4c77f3004f3c2e04cb50bb07b7581950faaa7f1d700055ef05","title":"","text":"upload resource in parallel. This helps avoid race conditions, and data loss or corruption. The server is RECOMMENDED to take measures to avoid parallel upload transfers: The server MAY terminate any creation (upload-creation) or append (upload-appending) for the same upload URL. Since the client is not allowed to perform multiple transfers in parallel, the server can assume that the previous attempt has already failed. Therefore, the server MAY abruptly terminate the previous HTTP connection or stream. <\/del> creation (upload-creation) or append for the same upload URL. Since the client is not allowed to perform multiple transfers in parallel, the server can assume that the previous attempt has already failed. Therefore, the server MAY abruptly terminate the previous HTTP connection or stream. <\/ins> If the offset indicated by the \"Upload-Offset\" field value does not match the offset provided by the immediate previous offset retrieval"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1fa1644d12ee5a2e0a1a69230d34a5e1ed282d6df0f6c37200f8b65063099c7c","title":"","text":"(see output}), and forward it to the upstream HTTP server, then the upstream server performs the validation. The mechanism for the intermediary to communicate this information to the upstream HTTP server is out of scope for this document. <\/del> This document defines the \"Signature-Auth-Context\" request header field for this latter purpose. The Signature-Auth-Context header field's value is a Structured Field Byte Sequence (see STRUCTURED- FIELDS) that contains the 48-byte key exporter output (see output), without any parameters. For example: <\/ins> Note that both of these mechanisms require the upstream HTTP server to trust the intermediary. This is usually the case because the intermediary already needs access to the TLS certificate private key in order to respond to requests. <\/del> in order to respond to requests. HTTP servers that parse the Signature-Auth-Context header field MUST ignore it unless they have already established that they trust the sender. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ed1713bc6a44f2de4732d7dac14ac21cad591d29c400abdb4e5b604445b6526f","title":"","text":"This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following entry in the \"TLS Exporter Labels\" registry maintained at <>: 10.3. This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following entry in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name\" registry maintained at <>: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-20706062bf7e4b131902aaf1a07e724b2014f2cc8806b067e9ae254d47cc5d62","title":"","text":"request, the algorithm to be used is negotiated through the regular mechanism for negotiating content encoding in HTTP. This document introduces two new content encoding algorithms: <\/del> The dictionary to use is negotiated separately and advertised in the \"Available-Dictionary\" request header. 3.1. This document introduces two new content encoding algorithms: br-d: Brotli RFC7932 using an external compression dictionary and a compression window of not more than 16 MB. zstd-d: Zstandard RFC8878 using an external compression dictionary and a compression window of not more than 8 MB. 3.2. <\/ins> The client adds the algorithms that it supports to the \"Accept- Encoding\" request header. e.g.: 3.2. <\/del> 3.3. <\/ins> If a server supports one of the dictionary algorithms advertised by the client and chooses to compress the content of the response using"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9cdbc25b8a34b2d9d3ffe5cb1c715bf76e6ff903e4c918ac090a7372d5fc969c","title":"","text":"4.1. IANA is asked to update the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP) according to the table below: <\/del> IANA is asked to enter the following into the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP): Name: br-d Description: A stream of bytes compressed using the Brotli protocol with an external dictionary of not more than 16 MB. Reference: This document Notes: IANA is asked to enter the following into the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP): Name: zstd-d Description: A stream of bytes compressed using the Zstandard protocol with an external dictionary of not more than 8 MB. Reference: This document Notes: <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9f74e2387adb965d90f5214ea35f230f48d88a437231910d2b2b6f56d2fd3e17","title":"","text":"2.1.1. The \"match\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is a String value that provides the URLPattern to use for request matching (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/del> that provides the URL Pattern URLPattern to use for request matching. <\/ins> The URLPattern used for matching does not support using Regular <\/del> The URL Pattern used for matching does not support using Regular <\/ins> expressions. The following algorithm will return TRUE for a valid match pattern"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b420641f5d2829c62ceba632b654236d3f707a5a57c949e35195a0f782778cc","title":"","text":"Let URL be the URL of the dictionary request. Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=URL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/del> Let PATTERN be a URL Pattern URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=URL. <\/ins> If PATTERN has regexp groups then return FALSE (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#urlpattern-has-regexp- groups). <\/del> If PATTERN has regexp groups then return FALSE. <\/ins> Return True."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d5dabb79b9265bd1ae3eec66a81e84959ed4ac4a16af9965d7b3f01ca82b3d06","title":"","text":"Let MATCH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. Let PATTERN be a URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=BASEURL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/). <\/del> Let PATTERN be a URL Pattern URLPattern constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=BASEURL. <\/ins> Return the result of running the \"test\" method of PATTERN with input=URL (https:\/\/urlpattern.spec.whatwg.org\/#ref-for-dom- urlpattern-test) <\/del> input=URL. <\/ins> 2.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d39600b851b312b71cafd8fdf2b7c6c29d4d053dfa4423b8bdc7d953a40b4e4a","title":"","text":"6.3.1. To make sure that a dictionary can only impact content from the same origin where the dictionary was served, the URLPattern used for matching a dictionary to requests is guaranteed to be for the same origin that the dictionary is served from. <\/del> origin where the dictionary was served, the URL Pattern used for matching a dictionary to requests (match) is guaranteed to be for the same origin that the dictionary is served from. <\/ins> 6.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-67a767435b41b018f6fb3ec652574e1f04fb780be78fc4e6ea6b29f590937ea8","title":"","text":"3.2. In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, the client uses the proxy by issuing an \"extended CONNECT\" request as follows: <\/del> In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, the proxy MUST include SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL in its SETTINGS frame RFC9220. The client uses the proxy by issuing an \"extended CONNECT\" request as follows: <\/ins> The :method pseudo-header field SHALL be \"CONNECT\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-013b5df45ef2da9a5f7c516be43838f1419f1bd4534a44e5c95cee488e686eea","title":"","text":"When there are multiple dictionaries that match a given request URL, the client MUST pick a single dictionary using the following rules: 1. For clients that support request destinations, a dictionary that specifies and matches a \"match-dest\" takes precedence over a match that does not use a destination. 1. Given equivalent destination precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match\" takes precedence. 1. Given equivalent destination and match length precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. <\/del> For clients that support request destinations, a dictionary that specifies and matches a \"match-dest\" takes precedence over a match that does not use a destination. Given equivalent destination precedence, the dictionary with the longest \"match\" takes precedence. Given equivalent destination and match length precedence, the most recently fetched dictionary takes precedence. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78413f96028b28d95a7550bd1938c7aec3ccfdffb79e9205e8394d7a093a14f1","title":"","text":"3. When a compression dictionary is available for use for a given request, the algorithm to be used is negotiated through the regular mechanism for negotiating content encoding in HTTP. <\/del> The \"br-d\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" stream. <\/ins> The dictionary to use is negotiated separately and advertised in the \"Available-Dictionary\" request header. <\/del> A \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" stream is a Brotli RFC7932 stream for a response that has been compressed with an external dictionary using a compression window not larger than 16 MB. Clients that announce support for br-d content encoding MUST be able to decompress resources that were compressed with a window size of up to 16 MB. With Brotli compression, the full dictionary is available during compression and decompression independent of the compression window, allowing for delta-compression of resources larger than the compression window. <\/ins> 3.1. <\/del> 4. The \"zstd-d\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" stream. <\/ins> This document introduces two new content encoding algorithms: <\/del> A \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" stream is a Zstandard RFC8878 stream for a response that has been compressed with an external dictionary. <\/ins> br-d: Brotli RFC7932 using an external compression dictionary and a compression window of not more than 16 MB. <\/del> Clients that announce support for zstd-d content encoding MUST be able to decompress resources that were compressed with a window size of at least 8 MB or 1.25 times the size of the dictionary, which ever is greater, up to a maximum of 128 MB. <\/ins> zstd-d: Zstandard RFC8878 using an external compression dictionary and a compression window of not more than 8 MB. <\/del> The window size used will be encoded in the content (currently, this can be expressed in powers of two only) and it MUST be lower than this limit. An implementation MAY treat a window size that exceeds the limit as a decoding error. <\/ins> 3.2. <\/del> With Zstandard compression, the full dictionary is available during compression and decompression until the size of the input exceeds the compression window. Beyond that point the dictionary becomes unavailable. Using a compression window that is 1.25 times the size of the dictionary allows for full delta compression of resources that have grown by 25% between releases while still giving the client control over the memory it will need to allocate for a given response. <\/ins> The client adds the algorithms that it supports to the \"Accept- Encoding\" request header. e.g.: <\/del> 5. <\/ins> 3.3. <\/del> When a compression dictionary is available for use for a given request, the encoding to be used is negotiated through the regular mechanism for negotiating content encoding in HTTP through the \"Accept-Encoding\" request header and \"Content-Encoding\" response header. The dictionary to use is negotiated separately and advertised in the \"Available-Dictionary\" request header and \"Content-Dictionary\" response header. <\/ins> If a server supports one of the dictionary algorithms advertised by <\/del> 5.1. The client adds the content encodings that it supports to the \"Accept-Encoding\" request header. e.g.: 5.2. If a server supports one of the dictionary encodings advertised by <\/ins> the client and chooses to compress the content of the response using the dictionary that the client has advertised then it sets the \"Content-Encoding\" response header to the appropriate value for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-228538b81aa1b2c708dacf63ab7337c17b7ced5756bdd9989f0d0c43e2bf8a3b","title":"","text":"that don't support them or serving the response compressed with the wrong dictionary: 4. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> 4.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> IANA is asked to enter the following into the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP): Name: br-d Description: A stream of bytes compressed using the Brotli protocol with an external dictionary of not more than 16 MB. <\/del> Description: \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" data format. <\/ins> Reference: This document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-55d2fbb6ace33970d16ee96877e36304636c51171bbf0de9992a22da37702099","title":"","text":"Name: zstd-d Description: A stream of bytes compressed using the Zstandard protocol with an external dictionary of not more than 8 MB. <\/del> Description: \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" data format. <\/ins> Reference: This document Notes: 4.2. <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> IANA is asked to update the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" registry (HTTP) according to the table below: 5. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> To minimize the risk of middle-boxes incorrectly processing dictionary-compressed responses, compression dictionary transport MUST only be used in secure contexts (HTTPS). 6. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> The security considerations for Brotli RFC7932 and Zstandard RFC8878 apply to the dictionary-based versions of the respective algorithms. 6.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> The dictionary must be treated with the same security precautions as the content, because a change to the dictionary can result in a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-82fa787cf47a231b2170aff99e3cccacda59a680c6144eda812acc2359895812","title":"","text":"algorithm and the server would just ignore any \"Available-Dictionary\" requests that do not use the updated hash. 6.2. <\/del> 8.2. <\/ins> The CRIME attack shows that it's a bad idea to compress data from mixed (e.g. public and private) sources - the data sources include"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf0fd75c3ee12d796b8e0110aec60c94bd040fc3d3b9f58c0876d981bb9610c8","title":"","text":"the adversary can control the dictionary, the adversary can learn information about the compressed data. 6.3. <\/del> 8.3. <\/ins> If any of the mitigations do not pass, the client MUST drop the response and return an error. 6.3.1. <\/del> 8.3.1. <\/ins> To make sure that a dictionary can only impact content from the same origin where the dictionary was served, the URL Pattern used for matching a dictionary to requests (match) is guaranteed to be for the same origin that the dictionary is served from. 6.3.2. <\/del> 8.3.2. <\/ins> For clients, like web browsers, that provide additional protection against the readability of the payload of a response and against user"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42425bca1338c80e45500b9e7c9942e6362283aa88df63c099d9882f36e77c91","title":"","text":"origin and passes the CORS check (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#cors-check). 6.3.2.1. <\/del> 8.3.2.1. <\/ins> On the client-side, same-origin determination is defined in the fetch spec (https:\/\/html.spec.whatwg.org\/multipage\/browsers.html#origin)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-262d31633931f4640906defab9291d3966383955a33c70810ad72f0cc3c7631e","title":"","text":"Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. 6.3.2.2. <\/del> 8.3.2.2. <\/ins> For requests that are not same-origin (same-origin), the \"mode\" of the request can be used to determine the readability of the response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-db39a19947233f805d8152285d3e67376ef34de14a9243887a22e822eed4ed80","title":"","text":"Response MUST NOT be compressed by an available dictionary. 7. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> Since dictionaries are advertised in future requests using the hash of the content of the dictionary, it is possible to abuse the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ad2866e207b17cf936f795eef1f2a38f73c944d4e90e6d88b553c3618eaa348d","title":"","text":"For example: 2.4. When a HTTP server responds with a resource that is encoded with a dictionary the server MUST send the hash of the dictionary that was used in the \"Content-Dictionary\" response header. The \"Content-Dictionary\" response header is a Structured Field STRUCTURED-FIELDS Byte Sequence containing the SHA-256 hash of the contents of the dictionary that was used to encode the response. If the HTTP response contains a \"Content-Dictionary\" response header with the hash of a dictionary that the client does not have available then the client cannot decode or use the HTTP response. For example: <\/del> 3. This specification defines the 'compression-dictionary' link relation"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5a1dc78592e60ff3e6b931e0d95a68b362d3222811af047e2f82a9ad36062147","title":"","text":"4. The \"br-d\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a <\/del> The \"dcb\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a <\/ins> \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" stream. A \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" stream is a Brotli RFC7932 stream for a response that has been compressed with an external dictionary using a compression window not larger than 16 MB. <\/del> A \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" stream has a fixed header that is followed by a Shared Brotli SHARED-BROTLI stream. The header consists of a fixed 4 byte sequence and a 32 byte hash of the external dictionary that was used. The Shared Brotli stream is created using the referenced external dictionary and a compression window that is at most 16 MB in size. The 36-byte fixed header is as follows: <\/ins> Clients that announce support for br-d content encoding MUST be able <\/del> Clients that announce support for dcb content encoding MUST be able <\/ins> to decompress resources that were compressed with a window size of up to 16 MB."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f445b414ed077995dcf276475343c4546621f2181797fb76436ed962090ac48a","title":"","text":"5. The \"zstd-d\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a <\/del> The \"dcz\" content encoding identifies a resource that is a <\/ins> \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" stream. A \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" stream is a Zstandard RFC8878 stream for a response that has been compressed with an external dictionary. <\/del> A \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" stream is a binary stream that starts with a 40-byte fixed header and is followed by a Zstandard RFC8878 stream of the response that has been compressed with an external dictionary. The 40-byte header consists of a fixed 8-byte sequence followed by the 32-byte SHA-256 hash of the external dictionary that was used to compress the resource: The 40-byte header is a Zstandard skippable frame (little-endian 0x184D2A5E) with a 32-byte length (little-endian 0x00000020) that is compatible with existing Zstandard decoders. <\/ins> Clients that announce support for zstd-d content encoding MUST be able to decompress resources that were compressed with a window size of at least 8 MB or 1.25 times the size of the dictionary, which ever is greater, up to a maximum of 128 MB. <\/del> Clients that announce support for dcz content encoding MUST be able to decompress resources that were compressed with a window size of at least 8 MB or 1.25 times the size of the dictionary, which ever is greater, up to a maximum of 128 MB. <\/ins> The window size used will be encoded in the content (currently, this can be expressed in powers of two only) and it MUST be lower than"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8413f804aa62cf87d110816d833afa9ffe4afe5ad47f5660c2cd0a8ca6f3a935","title":"","text":"header. The dictionary to use is negotiated separately and advertised in the \"Available-Dictionary\" request header and \"Content-Dictionary\" response header. <\/del> \"Available-Dictionary\" request header. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1d69ee8ca900c0270e29f8261c8cd828c779904922c2f7211340d96a4e5480f2","title":"","text":"IANA is asked to enter the following into the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP): Name: br-d <\/del> Name: dcb <\/ins> Description: \"Dictionary-Compressed Brotli\" data format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-aeb834441d99425c4a3b952caf606b6ade010d27601a4090a261b18db5b9f74e","title":"","text":"IANA is asked to enter the following into the \"HTTP Content Coding Registry\" registry (HTTP): Name: zstd-d <\/del> Name: dcz <\/ins> Description: \"Dictionary-Compressed Zstandard\" data format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ddbe29ed9ef199a0cc027ef0d7715da55fa19fd2d6e0ff2b548885a57ecd1f3","title":"","text":"9. The security considerations for Brotli RFC7932 and Zstandard RFC8878 apply to the dictionary-based versions of the respective algorithms. <\/del> The security considerations for Brotli RFC7932, Shared Brotli SHARED- BROTLI and Zstandard RFC8878 apply to the dictionary-based versions of the respective algorithms. <\/ins> 9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0df5e504419b3f80959a375ba9e09162e4e9732df6e555fd51419ed5ba498ad9","title":"","text":"6.1. The client adds the content encodings that it supports to the \"Accept-Encoding\" request header. e.g.: <\/del> When a dictionary is available for use on a given request, and the client chooses to make dictionary-based content-encoding available, the client adds the dictionary-aware content encodings that it supports to the \"Accept-Encoding\" request header. e.g.: When a client does not have a stored dictionary that matches the request, or chooses not to use one for the request, the client MUST NOT send its dictionary-aware content-encodings in the \"Accept- Encoding\" request header. <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6c6cefb8aa709f565db03cba2ec0cfe0456d05e4132ba730ea4d588adfbf40db","title":"","text":"origin and passes the CORS check (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#cors-check). 9.3.2.1. <\/del> 9.3.3. <\/ins> On the client-side, same-origin determination is defined in the fetch spec (https:\/\/html.spec.whatwg.org\/multipage\/browsers.html#origin). <\/del> As with any usage of compressed content in a secure context, a potential timing attack exists if the attacker can control any part of the dictionary, or if it can read the dictionary and control any part of the content being compressed, while performing multiple requests that vary the dictionary or injected content. Under such an attack, the changing size or processing time of the response reveals information about the content, which might be sufficient to read the supposedly secure response. <\/ins> On the server-side, a request with a \"Sec-Fetch-Site:\" request header with a value of \"same-origin\" is to be considered a same-origin request. <\/del> In general, a server can mitigate such attacks by preventing variations per request, as in preventing active use of multiple dictionaries for the same content, disabling compression when any portion of the content comes from uncontrolled sources, and securing access and control over the dictionary content in the same way as the response content. In addition, the following requirements on a server are intended to disable dictionary-aware compression when the client provides CORS request header fields that indicate a cross- origin request context. <\/ins> For any request that is same-origin: <\/del> The following algorithm will return FALSE for cross-origin requests where precautions such as not using dictionary-based compression should be considered: <\/ins> Response MAY be used as a dictionary. <\/del> If there is no \"Sec-Fetch-Site\" request header then return TRUE. <\/ins> Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. <\/del> if the value of the \"Sec-Fetch-Site\" request header is \"same- origin\" then return TRUE. <\/ins> 9.3.2.2. <\/del> If there is no \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\" request header then return TRUE. <\/ins> For requests that are not same-origin (same-origin), the \"mode\" of the request can be used to determine the readability of the response. <\/del> If the value of the \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\" request header is \"navigate\" or \"same-origin\" then return TRUE. <\/ins> For clients that conform to the fetch spec, the mode of the request is stored in the RequestMode attribute of the request (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#requestmode). <\/del> If the value of the \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\" request header is \"cors\": <\/ins> For servers responding to clients that expose the request mode information, the value of the mode is sent in the \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\" request header. <\/del> If the response does not include an \"Access-Control-Allow- Origin\" response header then return FALSE. <\/ins> If a \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\" request header is not present, the server SHOULD allow for the dictionary compression to be used. <\/del> If the request does not include an \"Origin\" request header then return FALSE. <\/ins> If the mode is \"navigate\" or \"same-origin\": <\/del> If the value of the \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" response header is \"*\" then return TRUE. <\/ins> Response MAY be used as a dictionary. <\/del> If the value of the \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" response header matches the value of the \"Origin\" request header then return TRUE. <\/ins> Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. If the mode is \"cors\": For clients, apply the CORS check from the fetch spec (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#cors-check) which includes credentials checking restrictions that may not be possible to check on the server. If the CORS check passes: Response MAY be used as a dictionary. Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. Else: Response MUST NOT be used as a dictionary. Response MUST NOT be compressed by an available dictionary. For servers: If the response does not include an \"Access-Control-Allow- Origin\" response header: Response MUST NOT be used as a dictionary. Response MUST NOT be compressed by an available dictionary. If the request does not include an \"Origin\" request header: Response MUST NOT be used as a dictionary. Response MUST NOT be compressed by an available dictionary. If the value of the \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" response header is \"*\": Response MAY be used as a dictionary. Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. If the value of the \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" response header matches the value of the \"Origin\" request header: Response MAY be used as a dictionary. Response MAY be compressed by an available dictionary. If the mode is any other value (including \"no-cors\"): Response MUST NOT be used as a dictionary. Response MUST NOT be compressed by an available dictionary. <\/del> return FALSE. <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1bbbb028ec9de9fcf63ea20bebe1de38ecbfa9f5dc59887a023f2e2a268ef0e5","title":"","text":"USASCII character), and WSP (whitespace). The OWS (optional whitespace) and BWS (bad whitespace) rules are defined in Section 5.6.3 of HTTPSEM. <\/del> defined in Section 5.6.3 of RFC9110. <\/ins> 2.3. The terms \"user agent\", \"client\", \"server\", \"proxy\", and \"origin server\" have the same meaning as in the HTTP\/1.1 specification (HTTPSEM, Section 3). <\/del> (RFC9110, Section 3). <\/ins> The request-host is the name of the host, as known by the user agent, to which the user agent is sending an HTTP request or from which it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-200a0aa1c72cf66289291507d2c75c67a855755f55df9f44d34fb2e4fa53245a","title":"","text":"sent the corresponding HTTP request). The term request-uri refers to \"target URI\" as defined in Section 7.1 of HTTPSEM. <\/del> of RFC9110. <\/ins> Two sequences of octets are said to case-insensitively match each other if and only if they are equivalent under the i;ascii-casemap"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b35c0dd56807318a6b0fcc871a4dc26863f25abf77b7e8b27745dfc3504de28","title":"","text":"RFC6454. \"Safe\" HTTP methods include \"GET\", \"HEAD\", \"OPTIONS\", and \"TRACE\", as defined in Section 9.2.1 of HTTPSEM. <\/del> defined in Section 9.2.1 of RFC9110. <\/ins> A domain's \"public suffix\" is the portion of a domain that is controlled by a public registry, such as \"com\", \"co.uk\", and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-351d39e0bc8b28ebd8b70be2e9614a4fde99de292b70afe493280731b4f6c776","title":"","text":"Origin servers SHOULD NOT fold multiple Set-Cookie header fields into a single header field. The usual mechanism for folding HTTP headers fields (i.e., as defined in Section 5.3 of HTTPSEM) might change the <\/del> fields (i.e., as defined in Section 5.3 of RFC9110) might change the <\/ins> semantics of the Set-Cookie header field because the %x2C (\",\") character is used by Set-Cookie in a way that conflicts with such folding."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e32c3b8e5be83ea4f1154da270dc30ccd44067625b34e277f513785c593b93c","title":"","text":"risk of CSRF attacks, developers may set the \"SameSite\" attribute in a \"Lax\" enforcement mode that carves out an exception which sends same-site cookies along with cross-site requests if and only if they are top-level navigations which use a \"safe\" (in the HTTPSEM sense) <\/del> are top-level navigations which use a \"safe\" (in the RFC9110 sense) <\/ins> HTTP method. (Note that a request's method may be changed from POST to GET for some redirects (see Sections 15.4.2 and 15.4.3 of HTTPSEM); in these cases, a request's \"safe\"ness is determined based <\/del> RFC9110); in these cases, a request's \"safe\"ness is determined based <\/ins> on the method of the current redirect hop.) Lax enforcement provides reasonable defense in depth against CSRF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5cca58bf567cca8d967e3759e1bcb0432b43bc4ab51d27b1dd7c90d69a465eca","title":"","text":"9.1. The permanent message header field registry (see RFC3864) needs to be <\/del> The HTTP Field Name Registry (see HttpFieldNameRegistry) needs to be <\/ins> updated with the following registration: Cookie"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-43bed6b091fc577148ced93abd8c0db6ab2e46ce35ef33d863bfb93b0f256fe1","title":"","text":"9.2. The permanent message header field registry (see RFC3864) needs to be updated with the following registration: <\/del> The permanent message header field registry (see HttpFieldNameRegistry) needs to be updated with the following registration: <\/ins> Set-Cookie"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1213aca4b9bb00acb784cf583ae96b209ff460f730c76c8b9b53d35fda202e3","title":"","text":"9.3. IANA is requested to create the \"Cookie Attribute Registry\", defining <\/del> IANA is requested to create the \"Cookie Attribute\" registry, defining <\/ins> the name space of attribute used to control cookies' behavior. The registry should be maintained at https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/ cookie-attribute-names [1]."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d3de631bcad10234a0f37e055a9bec57c9356fab8e75c03a787420d4db63466","title":"","text":"ua-requirements), the user agent will send a Cookie header field that conforms to the following grammar: While Section 5.4 of RFC9110 does not define a length limit for header fields it is likely that the web server's implementation does impose a limit; many popular implementations have default limits of 8K. Servers SHOULD avoid setting a large number of large cookies such that the final cookie-string would exceed their header field limit. Not doing so could result in requests to the server failing. <\/ins> Servers MUST be tolerant of multiple cookie headers. For example, an HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114 connection might split a cookie header to improve compression. <\/del> HTTP\/2 RFC9113 or HTTP\/3 RFC9114 client or intermediary might split a cookie header to improve compression. Servers are free to determine what form this tolerance takes. For example, the server could process each cookie header individually or the server could concatenate all the cookie headers into one and then process that final, single, header. The server should be mindful of any header field limits when deciding which approach to take. Note: Since intermediaries can modify cookie headers they should also be mindful of common server header field limits in order to avoid sending servers headers that they cannot process. For example, concatenating multiple cookie headers into a single header might exceed a server's size limit. <\/ins> 4.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ee27cb9951461bf638a393cbacbc4f7540c4b65488d4b7e90529e114101ec41d","title":"","text":"HTTP request as defined in same-site-requests, and the retrieval's type is \"HTTP\". Note: Previous versions of this specification required that only one Cookie header field be sent in requests. This is no longer a requirement. While this specification requires that a single cookie- string be produced, some user agents may split that string across multiple cookie header fields. For examples, see Section 8.2.3 of RFC9113 and Section 4.2.1 of RFC9114. <\/ins> 5.8.2. The user agent MAY implement \"non-HTTP\" APIs that can be used to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42aa14eeb09a7f782c2921096a0577cd6f516a902289f63a3fdec8b910319eaf","title":"","text":"encoding from QUIC and MUST be encoded in the minimum number of bytes necessary. The encoding of the public key is determined by the Signature <\/del> 3.1.1. Both the \"Public Key\" field of the TLS key exporter context (see above) and the \"a\" Parameter (see parameter-a) carry the same public key. The encoding of the public key is determined by the Signature <\/ins> Algorithm in use as follows: This document does not define the public key encodings for other"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a63d0d847a2e95b0edfa8848835bd112a6799731bca65aeb8c75ca875589f694","title":"","text":"4.2. The REQUIRED \"a\" (public key) parameter is a byte sequence that contains the public key used by the server to validate the signature <\/del> specifies the public key used by the server to validate the signature <\/ins> provided by the client. This avoids key confusion issues (see SEEMS- LEGIT). The encoding of the public key is described in context. <\/del> LEGIT). The encoding of the public key is described in public-key- encoding. <\/ins> 4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d84834afa5de55df63e9429b51e32eff45c6bfd300ed4a95542dc1a0095c22d4","title":"","text":"4.1. The REQUIRED \"k\" (key ID) parameter is a byte sequence that <\/del> The REQUIRED \"k\" (key ID) Parameter is a byte sequence that <\/ins> identifies which key the client wishes to use to authenticate. This can, for example, be used to point to an entry in a server-side database of known keys. 4.2. The REQUIRED \"a\" (public key) parameter is a byte sequence that <\/del> The REQUIRED \"a\" (public key) Parameter is a byte sequence that <\/ins> specifies the public key used by the server to validate the signature provided by the client. This avoids key confusion issues (see SEEMS- LEGIT). The encoding of the public key is described in public-key-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5b2a41222051fda7bf8abcfe21fbefcedee6a6aa5159c0df087915be30a95635","title":"","text":"4.3. The REQUIRED \"p\" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies <\/del> The REQUIRED \"p\" (proof) Parameter is a byte sequence that specifies <\/ins> the proof that the client provides to attest to possessing the credential that matches its key ID. 4.4. The REQUIRED \"s\" (signature) parameter is an integer that specifies <\/del> The REQUIRED \"s\" (signature) Parameter is an integer that specifies <\/ins> the signature scheme used to compute the proof transmitted in the \"p\" directive. Its value is an integer between 0 and 65535 inclusive <\/del> Parameter. Its value is an integer between 0 and 65535 inclusive <\/ins> from the IANA \"TLS SignatureScheme\" registry maintained at <>. 4.5. The REQUIRED \"v\" (verification) parameter is a byte sequence that <\/del> The REQUIRED \"v\" (verification) Parameter is a byte sequence that <\/ins> specifies the verification that the client provides to attest to possessing the key exporter output (see output for details). This avoids issues with signature schemes where certain keys can generate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-31ba1cb7e3678da3549b2328295d59ad8a62755591b8e71cd78851f3ac8dbe28","title":"","text":"the presence of authentication to observers due to clear-text TLS Client Hello extensions. Since the freshness described above is provided by a TLS key exporter, it can be as old as the underlying TLS connection. Servers can require better freshness by forcing clients to create new connections using mechanisms such as the GOAWAY frame (see H3). <\/ins> The authentication proofs described in this document are not bound to individual HTTP requests; if the key is used for authentication proofs on multiple requests on the same connection, they will all be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5988fb9c921290e12d174d2b33a6a32c1bca3aa2d2ae94271ad74a4db6abe7f","title":"","text":"requests with \"unsafe\" HTTP methods (as was the case prior to the introduction of the \"SameSite\" attribute). For example, a login flow may involve a cross-site top-level \"POST\" request to an endpoint which expects a cookie with login information. For such a cookie, \"Lax\" enforcement is not appropriate, as it would cause the cookie to be excluded due to the unsafe HTTP request method. On the other hand, \"None\" enforcement would allow the cookie to be sent with all cross-site requests, which may not be desirable due to the cookie's sensitive contents. <\/del> For example, the concluding step of a login flow may involve a cross- site top-level \"POST\" request to an endpoint; this endpoint expects a recently created cookie containing transactional state information, necessary to securely complete the login. For such a cookie, \"Lax\" enforcement is not appropriate, as it would cause the cookie to be excluded due to the unsafe HTTP request method, resulting in an unrecoverable failure of the whole login flow. <\/ins> The \"Lax-allowing-unsafe\" enforcement mode described in lax-allowing- unsafe retains some of the protections of \"Lax\" enforcement (as compared to \"None\") while still allowing cookies to be sent cross- site with unsafe top-level requests. <\/del> compared to \"None\") while still allowing recently created cookies to be sent cross-site with unsafe top-level requests. <\/ins> As a more permissive variant of \"Lax\" mode, \"Lax-allowing-unsafe\" mode necessarily provides fewer protections against CSRF."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1fb39a187b7ef97d6d2cf084063a250174645f333ea326bb341c21ff94be907e","title":"","text":"Clients can send representation metadata (see HTTP) in the request that starts an upload. Servers MAY interpret this metadata or MAY ignore it. The \"Content-Type\" header field (HTTP) can be used to indicate the media type of the file. The \"Content-Disposition\" header field (RFC6266) can be used to transmit a filename; if included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/del> indicate the media type of the file. The content coding of the representation is specified using the \"Content-Encoding\" header field and is retained throughout the entire upload. When resuming an interrupted upload, the same content coding is used for appending to the upload, producing a representation of the upload resource with one consistent content coding. The \"Content-Disposition\" header field (RFC6266) can be used to transmit a filename; if included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/ins> 4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-82e257ddadb380b3a313d862f3b0f0ee435ebc81b3daf4b4afe17b9e0f0cdf6b","title":"","text":"\"Upload-Complete\" field value (upload-complete) MUST be set to false. The server SHOULD respect representation metadata received during creation (upload-creation) and ignore any representation metadata received from appending. <\/del> creation (upload-creation). An upload append request continues uploading the same representation as used in the upload creation (upload-creation) and thus uses the same content coding, if one was applied. For example, if the initial upload creation included the \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" header field, the upload append request resumes the transfer of the gzipped data without indicating again that the gzip coding is applied. <\/ins> If the server does not consider the upload associated with the upload resource active, it MUST respond with a \"404 (Not Found)\" status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f621ee7044449a84fa448e72f826b89fb32051193638fa2425e1adad2007e205","title":"","text":"match the offset provided by the immediate previous offset retrieval (offset-retrieving), or the end offset of the immediate previous incomplete successful transfer, the server MUST respond with a \"409 (Conflict)\" status code. <\/del> (Conflict)\" status code. The server MAY use the problem type PROBLEM of \"https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-problem-types#mismatching- upload-offset\" in the response; see mismatching-offset. <\/ins> The server applies the patch document of the \"application\/partial- upload\" media type by appending the request content to the targeted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f6f348149f2ae5c8593b5310c3ef18190ab8e94684a60acc703ff2739fe66448","title":"","text":"10. 10.1. This section defines the \"https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-problem- types#mismatching-upload-offset\" problem type PROBLEM. A server MAY use this problem type when responding to an upload append request (upload-appending) to indicate that the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the request does not match the upload resource's offset. Two problem type extension members are defined: the \"expected-offset\" and \"provided-offset\" members. A response using this problem type SHOULD populate both members, with the value of \"expected-offset\" taken from the upload resource and the value of \"provided-offset\" taken from the upload append request. The following example shows an example response, where the resource's offset was 100, but the client attempted to append at offset 200: 10.2. This section defines the \"https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-problem- types#completed-upload\" problem type PROBLEM. A server MAY use this problem type when responding to an upload append request (upload- appending) to indicate that the upload has already been completed and cannot be modified. The following example shows an example response: 11. <\/ins> The \"301 (Moved Permanently)\" and \"302 (Found)\" status codes MUST NOT be used in offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) and upload cancellation (upload-cancellation) responses. For other responses,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3bbc66222e9dec849786ee2ff4cd49b9d1b23ffdfe9b1762fb7a2cef82873048","title":"","text":"apply the redirection directly in an immediate subsequent upload append (upload-appending). 11. <\/del> 12. A message might have a content coding, indicated by the \"Content- Encoding\" header field, and\/or a transfer coding, indicated by the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field (RFC9112), applied, which modify the representation of uploaded data in a message. For correct interoperability, the client and server must share the same logic when counting bytes for the upload offset. From the client's perspective, the offset is counted after content coding but before transfer coding is applied. From the server's perspective, the offset is counted after the content's transfer coding is reversed but before the content coding is reversed. 13. <\/ins> The server might process the uploaded data and make its results available in another resource during or after the upload. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b6af3d1551231706ef22dec064df3be909db3231c58cdbcc5e3a4ef173c1721","title":"","text":"an upload. For example, a subsequent resource could allow the client to fetch information extracted from the uploaded data. 12. <\/del> 14. <\/ins> The upload resource URL is the identifier used for modifying the upload. Without further protection of this URL, an attacker may"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-db781d589afef78f8497362a5dcd15e290f6b95d624da3c654c22d2b230dffba","title":"","text":"allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist. 13. <\/del> 15. <\/ins> IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ef2a9f2c5e460b54444192ab22eb6d2dd66a0571f3c8b8691a722209ab3e504","title":"","text":"Macintosh file type code(s): N\/A Windows Clipboard Name: N\/A IANA is asked to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Problem Types\" registry: IANA is asked to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Problem Types\" registry: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-52cbcbd7d00b6b67fdfece1819adeec4e5093bf49ad8107a1a83f1d441ef6c54","title":"","text":"indicated by the \"Upload-Offset\" field value does not equal the total of begin offset plus the number of bytes uploaded in the request. If the upload is already complete, the server MUST NOT modify the upload resource and MUST respond with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. The server MAY use the problem type PROBLEM of \"https:\/\/iana.org\/assignments\/http-problem-types#completed-upload\" in the response; see completed-upload. <\/ins> If the request completes successfully and the entire upload is complete, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a 2xx (Successful) status code. Servers are RECOMMENDED to use a \"201"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0be86f631807737643633ac9842ddd59d8fa47a5fa2386e226d4aeab38c88df0","title":"","text":"unnecessary delay in this case, this text is hereby updated as follows: 5.5. RFC9484 forbids clients from using optimistic upgrade, avoiding this issue. <\/ins> 6. There are now several good examples of designs that prevent the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4f755f3a81557302bcbcafc27bb0ae900aa74aebcd326287a49c168080cf5d75","title":"","text":" Security Considerations for Optimistic Use of HTTP Upgrade <\/del> Security Considerations for Optimistic Protocol Transitions in HTTP\/1.1 <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-optimistic-upgrade-latest Abstract The HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade mechanism allows the client to request a change to a new protocol. This document discusses the security <\/del> In HTTP\/1.1, the client can request a change to a new protocol on the existing connection. This document discusses the security <\/ins> considerations that apply to data sent by the client before this request is confirmed, and updates RFC 9298 to avoid related security issues."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-24f205ef59adc7e68ff60fbec6cb7c0747b1a8c29bd94eb81ef20c46d91d633e","title":"","text":"2. In HTTP\/1.1, a client is permitted to send an \"Upgrade\" request header field (RFC9110) to indicate that it would like to use this connection for a protocol other than HTTP\/1.1. The server replies with a \"101 (Switching Protocols)\" status code if it accepts the protocol change. However, that specification also permits the server to reject the upgrade request: <\/del> In HTTP\/1.1, a single connection is often used for many requests, one after another. After each request, the connection is returned to its initial state, ready to send more HTTP requests. However, HTTP\/1.1 also contains two mechanisms that allow the client to change the protocol used for the remainder of the connection. <\/ins> This rejection of the upgrade is common, and can happen for a variety of reasons: <\/del> One such mechanism is the \"Upgrade\" request header field (RFC9110), which indicates that the client would like to use this connection for a protocol other than HTTP\/1.1. The server replies with a \"101 (Switching Protocols)\" status code if it accepts the protocol change. The other mechanism is the HTTP \"CONNECT\" method. This method indicates that the client wishes to establish a TCP connection to the specified host and port. The server replies with a 2xx (Successful) response to indicate that the request was accepted and a TCP connection was established. After this point, the TCP connection is acting as a TCP tunnel, not an HTTP\/1.1 connection. Both of these mechanisms also permit the server to reject the request. For example, RFC9110 says: and Rejections are common, and can happen for a variety of reasons. An \"upgrade\" request might be rejected if: <\/ins> The server does not support any of the client's indicated Upgrade Tokens (i.e., the client's proposed new protocols), so it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8efd8760b37862c370ce99d078d76b9e2a7765f4abf4d8f29b625f16747ee166","title":"","text":"The resource has moved, so the server replies with a 3XX redirect status code (RFC9110). After rejecting the upgrade, the server will continue to interpret <\/del> Similarly, a CONNECT request might be rejected if: The server does not support HTTP CONNECT. The specified destination is not allowed under server policy. The destination cannot be resolved, is unreachable, or does not accept the connection. The proxy requires the client to authenticate before proceeding. After rejecting a request, the server will continue to interpret <\/ins> subsequent bytes on that connection in accordance with HTTP\/1.1. RFC9110 also states: However, because of the possibility of rejection, the converse is not true: a client cannot necessarily begin using an upgraded protocol merely because it has finished sending the upgrade request message. <\/del> true: a client cannot necessarily begin using a new protocol merely because it has finished sending the corresponding request message. <\/ins> In some cases, the client might expect that the upgrade will succeed. If this expectation is correct, the client might be able to reduce delay by immediately sending the first bytes of the upgraded protocol \"optimistically\", without waiting for the server's response. This document explores the security implications of this \"optimistic\" behavior. <\/del> In some cases, the client might expect that the protocol transition will succeed. If this expectation is correct, the client might be able to reduce delay by immediately sending the first bytes of the new protocol \"optimistically\", without waiting for the server's response. This document explores the security implications of this \"optimistic\" behavior. <\/ins> 3. When there are only two distinct parties involved in an HTTP\/1.1 connection (i.e., the client and the server), HTTP Upgrade introduces no new security issues: each party must already be prepared for the other to send arbitrary data on the connection at any time. However, HTTP connections often involve more than two parties, if the requests or responses include third-party data. For example, a browser (party 1) might send an HTTP request to an origin (party 2) with path, headers, or body controlled by a website from a different origin (party 3). Post-upgrade protocols such as WebSocket similarly are often used to convey data chosen by a third party. <\/del> connection (i.e., the client and the server), protocol transitions introduce no new security issues: each party must already be prepared for the other to send arbitrary data on the connection at any time. However, HTTP connections often involve more than two parties, if the requests or responses include third-party data. For example, a browser (party 1) might send an HTTP request to an origin (party 2) with path, headers, or body controlled by a website from a different origin (party 3). Post-transition protocols such as WebSocket similarly are often used to convey data chosen by a third party. <\/ins> If the third-party data source is untrusted, we call the data it provides \"attacker-controlled\". The combination of attacker- controlled data and optimistic HTTP Upgrade results in two <\/del> controlled data and optimistic protocol transitions results in two <\/ins> significant security issues. 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7a7126923941bc7fd84c31a697a31098f8b3c26ecc74c8a4c8590ca45e4c9a86","title":"","text":"client and server have distinct interpretations of the data that flows between them. If the server accepts an HTTP Upgrade, it interprets the subsequent bytes in accordance with the new protocol. If it rejects the upgrade, it interprets those bytes as HTTP\/1.1. However, the client doesn't know which interpretation the server will take until it receives the server's response status code. If it uses the new protocol optimistically, this creates a risk that the server will interpret attacker-controlled data in the upgraded protocol as an <\/del> If the server accepts a protocol transition request, it interprets the subsequent bytes in accordance with the new protocol. If it rejects the request, it interprets those bytes as HTTP\/1.1. However, the client doesn't know which interpretation the server will take until it receives the server's response status code. If it uses the new protocol optimistically, this creates a risk that the server will interpret attacker-controlled data in the new protocol as an <\/ins> additional HTTP request issued by the client. As a trivial example, consider an upgraded protocol in which the entire post-upgrade content might be freely attacker-controlled (e.g., \"connect-tcp\" I-D.ietf-httpbis-connect-tcp). If the client is authenticated to the server using a connection-level authentication method such as TLS Client Certificates, the attacker could send an HTTP\/1.1 POST request in the post-upgrade payload. If the client delivers this payload optimistically, and the upgrade request fails, the server would interpret the payload as a subsequent authenticated <\/del> As a trivial example, consider an HTTP CONNECT client providing connectivity to an untrusted application. If the client is authenticated to the proxy server using a connection-level authentication method such as TLS Client Certificates, the attacker could send an HTTP\/1.1 POST request for the proxy server at the beginning of its TCP connection. If the client delivers this data optimistically, and the CONNECT request fails, the server would misinterpret the application's data as a subsequent authenticated <\/ins> request issued by the client. 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5d0cb7dd72f099c4e68eea9ab7896c815f8bf17dd85f89310be5b479986078d","title":"","text":"A related category of attacks use protocol disagreement to exploit vulnerabilities in the server's request parsing logic. These attacks apply when the HTTP client is trusted by the server, but the post- upgrade data source is not. If the server software was developed <\/del> transition data source is not. If the server software was developed <\/ins> under the assumption that some or all of the HTTP request data is not attacker-controlled, optimistic use of HTTP Upgrade can cause this <\/del> attacker-controlled, optimistic transmission can cause this <\/ins> assumption to be violated, exposing vulnerabilities in the server's HTTP request parser. 4. If the server rejects the upgrade, the connection can continue to be used for HTTP\/1.1. There is no requirement to close the connection in response to an upgrade rejection, and keeping the connection open has performance advantages if additional HTTP requests to this server are likely. Thus, it is normally inappropriate to close the connection in response to a rejected upgrade. <\/del> If the server rejects the transition request, the connection can continue to be used for HTTP\/1.1. There is no requirement to close the connection in response to a rejected transition, and keeping the connection open has performance advantages if additional HTTP requests to this server are likely. Thus, it is normally inappropriate to close the connection in response to a rejected transition. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-56c7fb81ce5cd407b1b4d19cc9924a875c29157192824764709fc8ba14a96072","title":"","text":"7. Clients that send HTTP CONNECT requests on behalf of untrusted TCP clients MUST wait for a 2xx (Successful) response before sending any TCP payload data. To mitigate vulnerabilities from any clients that do not conform to this requirement, proxy servers MAY close the underlying connection when rejecting an HTTP CONNECT request, without processing any further data sent to the proxy server on that connection. Note that this behavior may impair performance, especially when returning a \"407 (Proxy Authentication Required)\" response. 8. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1bf42a920b44ccf0685b44a8a6dab01ccd51cd49c4aa8989ec8005eef4c9b2e","title":"","text":"4.2. The current interop version is 5. <\/del> The current interop version is 6. <\/ins> Client implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST send a header field \"Upload-Draft-Interop-Version\" with the interop version"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8e01c7a80c2b413887ec2c8a730faea217cdc21dd3c4396732f43f1a499f7505","title":"","text":"resource. In subsequent informational responses, the \"Location\" header field MUST NOT be set. An informational response MAY contain the \"Upload-Offset\" header field with the current upload offset as the value to inform the client about the upload progress. In subsequent informational responses, the upload offset MUST NOT be smaller than in previous informational responses. In addition, later offset retrievals (offset-retrieving) MUST NOT receive an upload offset that is less than the offset reported in the latest informational response, allowing the client to free associated resources. <\/del> the value to inform the client about the upload progress. <\/ins> The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-931b1db355b2343d5f7afb8a326862dcc5dc14be52522ec3bdea15a39173f84d","title":"","text":"informational responses MUST NOT contain the \"Location\" header field. They MAY include the \"Upload-Offset\" header field with the current upload offset as the value to inform the client about the upload progress. The same restrictions on the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in informational responses from the upload creation (upload-creation) apply. <\/del> progress. <\/ins> The server MUST send the \"Upload-Offset\" header field in the response if it considers the upload active, either when the response is a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9f0b12d3cf16824e93b3ad4e981383ec83533be8cf7048545a87ee6d2b89032f","title":"","text":"11. The offset of an upload resource is the number of bytes that have been appended to the upload resource. Appended data cannot be removed from an upload and, therefore, the upload offset MUST NOT decrease. A server MUST NOT generate responses containing an \"Upload-Offset\" header field with a value that is smaller than was included in previous responses for the same upload resource. This includes informational and final responses for upload creation (upload-creation), upload appending (upload-appending), and offset retrieval (offset-retrieving). If a server loses data that has been appended to an upload, it MUST consider the upload resource invalid and reject further use of the upload resource. The \"Upload-Offset\" header field in responses serves as an acknowledgement of the append operation and as a guarantee that no retransmission of the data will be necessary. Client can use this guarantee to free resources associated to already uploaded data while the upload is still ongoing. 12. <\/ins> The \"301 (Moved Permanently)\" and \"302 (Found)\" status codes MUST NOT be used in offset retrieval (offset-retrieving) and upload cancellation (upload-cancellation) responses. For other responses,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0ab928609e04f6015042fb6cd43609f2419d7044e097a2a980ea8ecaab4d4bd7","title":"","text":"apply the redirection directly in an immediate subsequent upload append (upload-appending). 12. <\/del> 13. <\/ins> A message might have a content coding, indicated by the \"Content- Encoding\" header field, and\/or a transfer coding, indicated by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f2be94b63436f93617edc701bf05e18cf54e04c7ad6b6e2b0e0ff19b04306291","title":"","text":"offset is counted after the content's transfer coding is reversed but before the content coding is reversed. 13. <\/del> 14. <\/ins> The integrity of an entire upload or individual upload requests can be verifying using digests from DIGEST-FIELDS."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-09836d1504b373a9fc14efed978c00ec01b133189cce5e7a4ec53a5c6e53169c","title":"","text":"resource. This way, the integrity of an individual request can be protected. 14. <\/del> 15. <\/ins> The server might process the uploaded data and make its results available in another resource during or after the upload. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6ec970c84de43927e7e2bcf1c8720ac66f9cd21eb8e36195b4b2b1a7b397ab65","title":"","text":"an upload. For example, a subsequent resource could allow the client to fetch information extracted from the uploaded data. 15. <\/del> 16. <\/ins> The upload resource URL is the identifier used for modifying the upload. Without further protection of this URL, an attacker may"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1fa3ba15339642007c1538ca91f97a1e47dbb001a6aca286487e8b741ca53bf1","title":"","text":"allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist. 16. <\/del> 17. <\/ins> IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ff05badedcbf8e58aa424a1229d035048fd49033801b0528a69be49ca8d1d6db","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the following terminology from STRUCTURED-FIELDS to specify syntax and parsing: Dictionary, String, Inner List, Token, and Byte Sequence. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. <\/del> This document uses the following terminology from Section 3 of STRUCTURED-FIELDS to specify syntax and parsing: Dictionary, String, Inner List, Token, and Byte Sequence. <\/ins> This document uses the line folding strategies described in FOLDING."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-824de33c56636ce44ccff58a6e1085a5642ae099c3f6f89c07f9047d1d0828e1","title":"","text":"2.1.2. The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is an Inner List of String values that provides a list of request destinations for the dictionary to match (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#concept- request-destination). <\/del> List of String values that provides a list of FETCH request destinations for the dictionary to match. <\/ins> An empty list for \"match-dest\" MUST match all destinations."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-40683aac8ef8ee32c7426d6cb9c1795d9d0c0af67a5c2aa509ddf34d50d6d5c1","title":"","text":"A response that contained a response header: Would specify matching any document request for a URL with a path prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin as the original request. <\/del> prefix of \/product\/ on the same Origin RFC6454 as the original request. <\/ins> 2.1.5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2ccb6c023e7a79b0e7c29d6cae60533b45a77c8a756b117816c45e96f922b23f","title":"","text":"to match an outgoing request from a client to the available dictionaries. Dictionaries MUST have been served from the same {Origin} as the outgoing request to match. <\/del> Dictionaries MUST have been served from the same Origin RFC6454 as the outgoing request to match. <\/ins> To see if an outbound request matches a given dictionary, the following algorithm will return TRUE for a successful match and FALSE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ef2cf974bd27fc72382a3187969edc81a956c03eaca3d48a7dc34f6626698388","title":"","text":"Let URL represent the URL of the outbound request being checked. If the {Origin} of BASEURL and the {Origin} of URL are not the same, return FALSE. <\/del> If the Origin of BASEURL and the Origin of URL are not the same, return FALSE. <\/ins> Let MATCH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6bd89a8168357088a7fae59199148ed2f17a810c9cea8da3e1b49f2e48ba0f80","title":"","text":"9.2. The CRIME attack shows that it's a bad idea to compress data from mixed (e.g. public and private) sources - the data sources include not only the compressed data but also the dictionaries. For example, if you compress secret cookies using a public-data-only dictionary, you still leak information about the cookies. <\/del> The compression attacks in RFC7457 show that it's a bad idea to compress data from mixed (e.g. public and private) sources - the data sources include not only the compressed data but also the dictionaries. For example, if you compress secret cookies using a public-data-only dictionary, you still leak information about the cookies. <\/ins> Not only can the dictionary reveal information about the compressed data, but vice versa, data compressed with the dictionary can reveal"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6a0e447c89d48ee300f921feda67630fe2411789783ec6ed225755fa53842fc1","title":"","text":"In browser terms, that means that both are either same-origin to the context they are being fetched from or that the response is cross- origin and passes the CORS check (https:\/\/fetch.spec.whatwg.org\/#cors-check). <\/del> origin and passes the CORS check as defined in FETCH. <\/ins> 9.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5c965a6484a15f231b362a7c91805a55d203c5c5841cd49914f033a48db39278","title":"","text":"dictionary to turn it into a tracking cookie. To mitigate any additional tracking concerns, clients MUST treat dictionaries in the same way that they treat cookies. This includes partitioning the storage as cookies are partitioned as well as clearing the dictionaries whenever cookies are cleared. <\/del> dictionaries in the same way that they treat cookies RFC6265. This includes partitioning the storage as cookies are partitioned as well as clearing the dictionaries whenever cookies are cleared. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-68ee826d1c199e20ea9a46677f6580a6e0d9fc86cfeb3c0d002c0fb6cf9a5633","title":"","text":"security issues discussed here and provide clear guidance on how clients can avoid them. 6.1. Some Upgrade Tokens, such as \"TLS\", are defined for use with any ordinary HTTP Method. The upgraded protocol continues to provide HTTP semantics, and will convey the response to this HTTP request. The other Upgrade Tokens mentioned in existing do not preserve HTTP semantics, so the method is not relevant. All of these Upgrade Tokens are specified only for use with the \"GET\" method. Future specifications for Upgrade Tokens should restrict their use to \"GET\" requests if the HTTP method is otherwise irrelevant and a request body is not required. This improves consistency with other Upgrade Tokens and reduces the likelihood that a faulty server implementation might process the request body as the new protocol. <\/ins> 7. Clients that send HTTP CONNECT requests on behalf of untrusted TCP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-579038209a9881951bc50ef93df08b2cc52d483479c37fb60038d9dab160c78a","title":"","text":"policy\" used by web browsers isolates content retrieved via different ports. There are two audiences for this specification: developers of cookie- generating servers and developers of cookie-consuming user agents. <\/del> This specification applies to developers of both cookie-producing servers and cookie-consuming user agents. implementation-advisory helps to clarify the intended target audience for each implementation type. <\/ins> To maximize interoperability with user agents, servers SHOULD limit themselves to the well-behaved profile defined in sane-profile when"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f7698459cc786d933bf624576c1542587fbdda85e7fda5cc4038e5b8d9d8274b","title":"","text":"An implementer should choose sane-profile whenever cookies are created and will be sent to a user agent, such as a web browser. These implementations are frequently referred to as Servers by the <\/del> These implementations are frequently referred to as servers by the <\/ins> spec but that term includes anything which primarily produces cookies. Some potential examples:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5ed1ff5199e1b2965a094e526d82573ae212f902f3eecfe23d8a920ffab40fe6","title":"","text":"requests. If the \"SameSite\" attribute's value is something other than these three known keywords, the attribute's value will be subject to a default enforcement mode that is equivalent to \"Lax\". If a user agent uses \"Lax-allowing-unsafe\" enforcement (See lax- allowing-unsafe) then this default enforcement mode will instead be equivalent to \"Lax-allowing-unsafe\". <\/ins> The \"SameSite\" attribute affects cookie creation as well as delivery. Cookies which assert \"SameSite=Lax\" or \"SameSite=Strict\" cannot be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-98af02d6893f22e2bbbb3e491c007f37a15ec1e3bb3e05979dc3968a52d1e571","title":"","text":"The normative requirements for the prefixes are detailed in the storage model algorithm defined in storage-model. This is because some servers will process cookie case-insensitively, <\/del> This is because some servers will process cookies case-insensitively, <\/ins> resulting in them unintentionally miscapitalizing and accepting miscapitalized prefixes."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0546054ebb9a9a358f391658aafb4e828ac01206dabb2881b1add7da9b54f4d7","title":"","text":"attribute-name of \"Path\", and the cookie's path is \"\/\". If the cookie-name is empty and either of the following conditions are true, abort these steps and ignore the cookie: <\/del> are true, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely: <\/ins> the cookie-value begins with a case-insensitive match for the string \"__Secure-\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-86202b909d37c1519d3a44948364c17a4a89118101c709c0521f4eb6b04bb6e9","title":"","text":"NOTE: The notion of a \"secure\" connection is not defined by this document. Typically, user agents consider a connection secure if the connection makes use of transport-layer security, such as SSL or TLS, or if host is trusted. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a <\/del> such as SSL or TLS, or if the host is trusted. For example, most user agents consider \"https\" to be a scheme that denotes a <\/ins> secure protocol and \"localhost\" to be trusted host. If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the cookie"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cebb8af3fa075e259bf31e1e3595a6bc41c13b45e54b1b40873adce3228a3247","title":"","text":"be enforced in set-cookie. Servers SHOULD use as few and as small cookies as possible to avoid reaching these implementation limits and to minimize network bandwidth due to the Cookie header field being included in every request. <\/del> reaching these implementation limits, minimize network bandwidth due to the Cookie header field being included in every request, and to avoid reaching server header field limits (See server-syntax). <\/ins> Servers SHOULD gracefully degrade if the user agent fails to return one or more cookies in the Cookie header field because the user agent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71b71b43bbbefefa5d0954a025d8522308e51b723dca04aa3459a6b8f7441491","title":"","text":"Understanding how and when a request is considered same-site is also important in order to properly design a site for SameSite cookies. For example, if a top-level request is made to a sensitive page that request will be considered cross-site and SameSite cookies won't be sent; that page's sub-resources requests, however, are same-site and would receive SameSite cookies. Sites can avoid inadvertently allowing access to these sub-resources by returning an error for the initial page request if it doesn't include the appropriate cookies. <\/del> For example, if a cross-site top-level request is made to a sensitive page that request will be considered cross-site and \"SameSite=Strict\" cookies won't be sent; that page's sub-resources requests, however, are same-site and would receive \"SameSite=Strict\" cookies. Sites can avoid inadvertently allowing access to these sub-resources by returning an error for the initial page request if it doesn't include the appropriate cookies. <\/ins> Developers are strongly encouraged to deploy the usual server-side defenses (CSRF tokens, ensuring that \"safe\" HTTP methods are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-94cb544fdfb1fa9e4f719846998420857afb5f9b819a1ab5213b07fe06025336","title":"","text":"Integer. The \"min-size\" key specifies a minimum size for a resumable upload, counted in bytes. The server will not create an upload <\/del> upload, counted in bytes. The server MAY NOT create an upload <\/ins> resource if the client indicates that the uploaded data is smaller than the minimum size. The value is an Integer. <\/del> than the minimum size by including the \"Content-Length\" and \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" fields, but the server MAY still accept the uploaded data. The value is an Integer. <\/ins> The \"max-append-size\" key specifies a maximum size counted in bytes for the request content in a single upload append request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b081bfcabad7a562f96c74007f534705ac0d3a375fa060243bdef7428c286cac","title":"","text":"The \"min-append-size\" key specifies a minimum size counted in bytes for the request content in a single upload append request (upload-appending). The server MAY reject requests below this limit and a client SHOULD NOT send smaller upload append requests. The value is an Integer. <\/del> (upload-appending) that does not complete the upload by setting the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" field. The server MAY reject non- completing requests below this limit and a client SHOULD NOT send smaller non-completing upload append requests. A server MUST NOT reject an upload append request due to smaller size if the request includes the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" field. The value is an Integer. <\/ins> The \"expires\" key specifies the remaining lifetime of the upload resource in seconds counted from the generation of the response by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cd09b34438b8fa2d24b0078f1de7f1331ff52c04a872ba629cbda77c063934ae","title":"","text":"5. At the time of writing, there are four distinct Upgrade Tokens that are registered, associated with published documents, and not marked obsolete. This section considers the impact of this document's considerations on each registered Upgrade Token. <\/del> This section describes the impact of this document's considerations on some registered Upgrade Tokens that are believed to be in use at the time of writing. <\/ins> 5.1. RFC9110 is the source of the requirement quoted in background. It also defines the \"HTTP\/*.*\" family of Upgrade Tokens. In HTTP\/1.1, the only potentially applicable versions of this token are \"0.9\", \"1.0\", \"1.1\", and \"2.0\". Versions \"0.9\" and \"1.0\" are sufficiently syntactically similar to HTTP\/1.1 that any such \"downward upgrade\" would be unlikely to result in the security concerns discussed here. (An \"upgrade\" to version 1.1 has no effect at all.) A version number of \"2.0\" corresponds to HTTP\/2. Every HTTP\/2 connection begins with a Client Connection Preface (RFC9113) that was selected to ensure that a compliant HTTP\/1.1 server will not process further data on this connection. This avoids security issues if an \"HTTP\/2.0\" Upgrade Token is used optimistically. 5.2. <\/del> RFC2817 defines the \"TLS\/ \" family of Upgrade Tokens, and correctly highlights the possibility"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f9e96615255a1cf8665a9b3041887341dc63a193f880e14de50ca2293b4b35c9","title":"","text":"documented here are applicable to any use of the \"TLS\" Upgrade Token, but no change is required in RFC2817. 5.3. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> RFC6455 says:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f486613b07e1351c01f6a9f4a3cfa066ec5a700744d04d027d6350773ac69a0e","title":"","text":"WebSocket protocol. Additionally, the WebSocket protocol requires high-entropy masking of client-to-server frames (RFC6455). 5.4. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> RFC9298 says:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-17c3f408d050a3bd0afc350ffb762d664326f9fdd84991e9478d9682bdd3d7ba","title":"","text":"unnecessary delay in this case, this text is hereby updated as follows: 5.5. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> The \"connect-ip\" Upgrade Token is defined in RFC9484. RFC9484 forbids clients from using optimistic upgrade, avoiding this issue."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-486487ea00e43ee8bed09aeb740d90eeb1edacf0d7a38dc98385a4b6ccaba4f0","title":"","text":"\"ORIGIN\", to allow servers to indicate what origins a connection is usable for. Additionally, experience has shown that HTTP\/2's requirement to establish server authority using both DNS and the server's certificate is onerous. This specification relaxes the requirement to check DNS when the ORIGIN frame is in use. <\/ins> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c6a7adaabade71baa074bf939ea54e1a7bd3e260ae87b91acd02fcaa3108fa6","title":"","text":"consider as members of the Origin Set (set) for the connection it occurs within. 2.1. <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame type is 0xb (decimal 11). The ORIGIN frame's payload contains the following fields, sets of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34465e5e458216781d407db385b58e46ea27e224828ad08a5bb001cb678167da","title":"","text":"serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the sender believes this connection is or could be authoritative for. The ORIGIN frame defines the following flags: <\/del> The ORIGIN frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> Indicates that the Origin Set MUST be reset to an empty set before processing the contents of the frame it occurs upon. <\/del> 2.2. <\/ins> Indicates that the origin(s) carried in the payload must be removed from the Origin Set, if present; if not present, it\/they have no effect. <\/del> The ORIGIN frame is a non-critical extension to HTTP\/2. Endpoints that do not support this frame can safely ignore it upon receipt. <\/ins> 2.1. <\/del> When received by an implementing client, it is used to manipulate the Origin Set (see set), thereby changing how the client establishes authority for origin servers (see authority). <\/ins> The set of origins (as per RFC6454) that a given connection might be used for is known in this specification as the Origin Set. <\/del> The origin frame MUST be sent on stream 0; an ORIGIN frame on any other stream is invalid and MUST be ignored. <\/ins> When a connection is first established, its Origin Set is defined to be those origins that the client would normally consider the connection authoritative for; see RFC7540, Section 10.1. <\/del> Likewise, the ORIGIN frame is only valid on connections with the \"h2\" protocol identifier, or when specifically nominated by the protocol's definition; it MUST be ignored when received on a connection with the \"h2c\" protocol identifier. <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame allows the server to modify the Origin Set. In particular: <\/del> The ORIGIN frame is processed hop-by-hop. An intermediary MUST NOT forward ORIGIN frames. Clients configured to use a proxy MUST ignore any ORIGIN frames received from it. <\/ins> A server can add to its members by sending an ORIGIN frame (without any flags set); <\/del> Each ASCII-Origin field in the frame's payload MUST be parsed as an ASCII serialisation of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2). If parsing fails, the field MUST be ignored. <\/ins> A server can prune one or more origins from it by sending an ORIGIN frame with the REMOVE flag set; <\/del> Senders should note that, as per RFC6454 Section 4, the values in an ORIGIN header need to be case-normalised before serialisation. <\/ins> A server can remove all its members and then add zero or more members by sending an ORIGIN frame with the CLEAR flag set and a payload containing the new origins. <\/del> Once parsed, the value MUST have: <\/ins> Adding to the Origin Set (cases 1 and 3 above) does not imply that the connection is authoritative for the added origins (in the sense of RFC7540, Section 10.1) on its own; this MUST be established by some other mechanism. <\/del> a scheme of \"https\", <\/ins> A client that implements this specification MUST NOT use a connection for a given origin unless that origin appears in the Origin Set for the connection, regardless of whether or not it believes that the connection is authoritative for that origin. <\/del> a host that is reflected in a \"subjectAltName\" of the connection's TLS certificate (using the wildcard rules defined in RFC2818, Section 3.1), and <\/ins> 2.2. <\/del> a port that reflects the connection's remote port on the client. <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame is a non-critical extension to HTTP\/2. Endpoints that do not support this frame can safely ignore it upon receipt. <\/del> If any of these requirements are violated, the client MUST ignore the field. <\/ins> When received by a client, it can be used to inform HTTP\/2 connection coalescing (see set), but does not relax the requirement there that the server is authoritative. <\/del> See algo for an illustrative algorithm for processing ORIGIN frames. <\/ins> The origin frame MUST be sent on stream 0; an ORIGIN frame on any other stream is invalid and MUST be ignored. <\/del> 2.3. <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame is processed hop-by-hop. An intermediary MUST NOT forward ORIGIN frames. Clients configured to use a proxy MUST ignore any ORIGIN frames received from it. <\/del> The set of origins (as per RFC6454) that a given connection might be used for is known in this specification as the Origin Set. When an ORIGIN frame is first received by a client, the connection's Origin Set is defined to contain a single origin, composed from: Scheme: \"https\" Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (RFC6066 Section 3), converted to lower case <\/ins> The following algorithm illustrates how a client can handle received ORIGIN frames: <\/del> Port: the local port of the connection on the server <\/ins> If the client is configured to use a proxy, ignore the frame and stop processing. <\/del> The contents of that ORIGIN frame (and subsequent ones) allows the server to incrementally add new origins to the Origin Set, as described in process. <\/ins> If the frame occurs upon any stream except stream 0, ignore the frame and stop processing. <\/del> The Origin Set is also affected by the 421 (Misdirected Request) response status code, defined in RFC7540 Section 9.1.2. Upon receipt of a response with this status code, implementing clients MUST create the ASCII serialisation of the corresponding request's origin (as per RFC6454, Section 6.2) and remove it from the connection's Origin Set, if present. <\/ins> If the CLEAR flag is set, remove all members from the Origin Set. <\/del> 2.4. <\/ins> For each Origin field \"origin_raw\" in the frame payload: <\/del> RFC7540, Section 10.1 uses both DNS and the presented TLS certificate to establish the origin server(s) that a connection is authoritative for, just as HTTP\/1.1 does in RFC7230. Furthermore, RFC7540 Section 9.1.1 explicitly allows a connection to be used for more than one origin server, if it is authoritative. <\/ins> Parse \"origin_raw\" as an ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) and let the result be \"parsed_origin\". <\/del> Upon receiving an ORIGIN frame on a connection, clients that implement this specification change these behaviors in the following ways: <\/ins> If the REMOVE flag is set, remove any member of the Origin Set that is the same as \"parsed_origin\" (as per RFC6454, Section 5), and continue to the next \"parsed_origin\". <\/del> They MUST NOT consult DNS to establish authority for origins in the Origin Set. The TLS certificate MUST be used to do so, as described in RFC7540 Section 9.1.1. <\/ins> Otherwise, add \"parsed_origin\" to the Origin Set. <\/del> Requests SHOULD use an existing connection if their origin is in that connection's Origin Set, unless there are operational reasons for creating a new connection. <\/ins> 3. TBD. 4. <\/ins> Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame's contents will be vulnerable to a large number of attacks; hence the reinforcement that this specification does not relax the requirement for server authority in RFC7540, Section 10.1. <\/del> vulnerable to a large number of attacks. See authority for mitigations. Relaxing the requirement to consult DNS when determining authority for an origin means that an attacker who possesses a valid certificate no longer needs to be on-path to redirect traffic to them; instead of modifying DNS, they need only convince the user to visit another Web site, in order to coalesce connections to the target onto their existing connection. <\/ins> 4. References <\/del> 5. References <\/ins> 4.1. URIs <\/del> 5.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5634617c0a9b8cae3c22051bc9682362d16e242e5fa686d1b523a0c3f62d785c","title":"","text":"This document introduces no new security considerations beyond those discussed in RFC8878. Note that decoders still need to take into account that they can receive oversized frames that do not follow the window size limit specified in this document and fail decoding when such invalid frames are received. <\/ins> 5. 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-944528e326358e919f54f805dd95cc490356370d5ff2eaad325812ba640a9a69","title":"","text":"header field as a set-cookie-string (defined below). NOTE: The algorithm below is more permissive than the grammar in sane-set-cookie. For example, the algorithm strips leading and trailing whitespace from the cookie name and value (but maintains internal whitespace), whereas the grammar in sane-set-cookie forbids whitespace in these positions. In addition, the algorithm below accommodates some characters that are not cookie-octets according to the grammar in sane-set-cookie. User agents use this algorithm so as <\/del> sane-set-cookie. For example, the algorithm allows cookie-name to be comprised of cookie-octets instead of being a token as specified in sane-set-cookie and the algorithm accommodates some characters that are not cookie-octets according to the grammar in sane-set-cookie. In addition, the algorithm below also strips leading and trailing whitespace from the cookie name and value (but maintains internal whitespace), whereas the grammar in sane-set-cookie forbids whitespace in these positions. User agents use this algorithm so as <\/ins> to interoperate with servers that do not follow the recommendations in sane-profile."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-50a4e0ee40c56722fb40bfe03215ebb1d875040e1fba2f7302ad5c066421dc71","title":"","text":"1. The HTTP freshness lifetime RFC7234 caching attribute specifies that a client may safely reuse a response to satisfy future requests over a specific period of time. It does not specify that the resource will be not be modified during that period. <\/del> HTTP's freshness lifetime mechanism RFC7234 allows a client to safely reuse a stored response to satisfy future requests for a specified period of time. However, it is still possible that the resource will be modified during that period. <\/ins> For instance, a front page newspaper photo with a freshness lifetime of one hour would mean that no user should see a photo more than one hour old. However, the photo could be updated at any time resulting in different users seeing different photos depending on the contents of their caches for up to one hour. This is compliant with the caching mechanism defined in RFC7234. Users that need to confirm there have been no updates to their current cached resources typically invoke the reload (or refresh) mechanism in the user agent. This in turn generates a conditional request RFC7232 and either a new representation or, if unmodified, a 304 response RFC7231 is returned. A user agent that manages HTML and its dependent sub-resources may issue hundreds of conditional requests to refresh all portions of a common HTML page REQPERPAGE. Through the use of the versioned URL design pattern some content providers never create more than one variant of a sub-resource. When these resources need an update they are simply published under a new URL, typically embedding a variant identifier in the path, and references to the sub-resource are updated with the new path information. For example, https:\/\/www.example.com\/101016\/main.css might be updated and republished as https:\/\/www.example.com\/102026\/main.css and the html that references it is changed at the same time. This design pattern allows a very large freshness lifetime to be applied to the sub-resource without guessing when it will be updated in the future. Unfortunately, the user-agent is not aware of the versioned URL design pattern. User driven refresh events still translate into wasted conditional requests for each sub-resource as each will return 304 responses. The immutable HTTP response Cache-Control extension allows servers to identify resources that will not be updated during their freshness lifetime. This effectively instructs the client that any conditional request for a previously served variant of that resource may be safely skipped without worrying that it has been updated. <\/del> of one hour would mean that no user would see a cached photo more than one hour old. However, the photo could be updated at any time resulting in different users seeing different photos depending on the contents of their caches for up to one hour. This is compliant with the caching mechanism defined in RFC7234. Users that need to confirm there have been no updates to their cached responses typically use the reload (or refresh) mechanism in their user agents. This in turn generates a conditional request RFC7232 and either a new representation or, if unmodified, a 304 (Not Modified) response RFC7232 is returned. A user agent that understands HTML and fetches its dependent sub-resources might issue hundreds of conditional requests to refresh all portions of a common page REQPERPAGE. However some content providers never create more than one variant of a sub-resource, because they use \"versioned\" URLs. When these resources need an update they are simply published under a new URL, typically embedding an identifier unique to that version of the resource in the path, and references to the sub-resource are updated with the new path information. For example, \"https:\/\/www.example.com\/101016\/main.css\" might be updated and republished as \"https:\/\/www.example.com\/102026\/main.css\", with any links that references it being changed at the same time. This design pattern allows a very large freshness lifetime to be used for the sub-resource without guessing when it will be updated in the future. Unfortunately, the user agent does not know when this versioned URL design pattern is used. As a result, user-driven refreshes still translate into wasted conditional requests for each sub-resource as each will return 304 responses. The \"immutable\" HTTP response Cache-Control extension allows servers to identify responses that will not be updated during their freshness lifetimes. This effectively informs clients that any conditional request for that response can be safely skipped without worrying that it has been updated. <\/ins> 2. When present in an HTTP response, the immutable Cache-Control <\/del> When present in an HTTP response, the \"immutable\" Cache-Control <\/ins> extension indicates that the origin server will not update the representation of that resource during the freshness lifetime of the response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3004787bcaa2956d2ecbe4faa4ade06602fa9fb474b0a23a6ea0d9eeef529ddd","title":"","text":"by the user (e.g. a force reload). The immutable extension only applies during the freshness lifetime of the response. Stale responses SHOULD be revalidated as they normally would be in the absence of immutable. <\/del> the stored response. Stale responses SHOULD be revalidated as they normally would be in the absence of immutable. <\/ins> The immutable extension takes no arguments and if any arguments are present they have no meaning. Multiple instances of the immutable extension are equivalent to one instance. The presence of an immutable Cache-Control extension in a request has no effect. <\/del> The immutable extension takes no arguments. If any arguments are present, they have no meaning, and MUST be ignored. Multiple instances of the immutable extension are equivalent to one instance. The presence of an immutable Cache-Control extension in a request has no effect. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1cba9123186c4967cc86e01ed15bb3141bf5550bee251e0667059e6e45eb835e","title":"","text":"corruption incidents. These incidents include cache poisoning attacks. Three mechanisms are suggested for mitigation of this risk: Clients should ignore immutable for resources that are not part of an authenticated context such as HTTPS. Authenticated resources are less vulnerable to cache poisoning. <\/del> Clients SHOULD ignore immutable from resources that are not part of an authenticated context such as HTTPS. Authenticated resources are less vulnerable to cache poisoning. <\/ins> User-Agents often provide two different refresh mechanismss: reload and some form of force-reload. The latter is used to rectify interrupted loads and other corruption. These reloads, typically indicated through no-cache request attributes, should ignore immutable as well. <\/del> User-Agents often provide two different refresh mechanisms: reload and some form of force-reload. The latter is used to rectify interrupted loads and other corruption. These reloads, typically indicated through no-cache request attributes, SHOULD ignore immutable as well. <\/ins> Clients should ignore immutable for resources that do not provide <\/del> Clients SHOULD ignore immutable for resources that do not provide <\/ins> a strong indication that the stored response size is the correct response size such as responses delimited by connection close."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-de59d3a6a49ad6fcbe12252286a689ae4df06434279f47c5811685f74fa822fd","title":"","text":"Let URL be the URL of the dictionary request. Let PATTERN be an instance of the URLPattern class constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=URL (see URLPATTERN-CLASS). <\/del> setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=URL (see URLPATTERN). <\/ins> If the hasRegExpGroups attribute of PATTERN is TRUE then return FALSE (see URLPATTERN-REGEXP). <\/del> FALSE (see URLPATTERN). <\/ins> Return TRUE."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-02ab4d5af08b51aa2f0d845ea98b6717703b18863949f7d787a82f37b4b50f11","title":"","text":"The \"match-dest\" value of the Use-As-Dictionary header is an Inner List of String values that provides a list of Fetch request destinations for the dictionary to match (see REQUEST-DESTINATION). <\/del> destinations for the dictionary to match (see FETCH). <\/ins> An empty list for \"match-dest\" MUST match all destinations."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-592cf62228177f3f9676e46884c69701c92a1d1ef3193dfe2df7c8782f82e5c5","title":"","text":"Let MATCH be the value of \"match\" for the given dictionary. Let PATTERN be an instance of the URLPattern class constructed by setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=BASEURL (see URLPATTERN-CLASS). <\/del> setting input=MATCH, and baseURL=BASEURL (see URLPATTERN). <\/ins> Return the result of running the \"test\" method of PATTERN with input=URL which will check for a match between the request URL and the supplied \"match\" URL Pattern (see URLPATTERN-TEST). <\/del> the supplied \"match\" URL Pattern (see URLPATTERN). <\/ins> 2.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-00cee51b357a8af5db044a8cbbb057b8c865a8003eb79eb0ea33db44734679e6","title":"","text":"In browser terms, that means that both are either same-origin to the context they are being fetched from or that the response is cross- origin and passes the CORS check (see CORS-CHECK). <\/del> origin and passes the CORS check (see FETCH). <\/ins> 9.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-76269c7e538dff9d0a20a7915086036a35d33a13cc8e2648a7428b93bff5c501","title":"","text":"The terms Byte Sequence, Item, String, Token, Integer, and Boolean are imported from STRUCTURED-FIELDS. The terms client and server are from HTTP. <\/del> The terms \"representation\", \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", \"content\", \"client\" and \"server\" are from HTTP. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5954b9fed12c141af57a642fd0387de7cae09b29cff0c48a10c4b303cfc0edb1","title":"","text":"13. A message might have a content coding, indicated by the \"Content- Encoding\" header field, and\/or a transfer coding, indicated by the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field (RFC9112), applied, which modify the representation of uploaded data in a message. For correct interoperability, the client and server must share the same logic when counting bytes for the upload offset. From the client's perspective, the offset is counted after content coding but before transfer coding is applied. From the server's perspective, the offset is counted after the content's transfer coding is reversed but before the content coding is reversed. <\/del> Since the codings listed in \"Content-Encoding\" are a characteristic of the representation (see HTTP), both the client and the server always compute the upload offset on the content coded data (that is, the representation data). Moreover, the content codings are retained throughout the entire upload, meaning thats that the server is not required to decode the representation data to support resumable uploads. See DIGEST-FIELDS for more information. <\/ins> 14. Unlike \"Content-Encoding\" (see HTTP), \"Transfer-Encoding\" (see RFC9112) is a property of the message, not of the representation. Moreover. transfer codings can be applied in transit (e.g., by proxies). This means that a client does not have to consider the transfer codings to compute the upload offset, while a server is responsible for transfer decoding the message before computing the upload offset. Please note that the \"Content-Length\" header field cannot be used in conjunction with the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field. 15. <\/ins> The integrity of an entire upload or individual upload requests can be verifying using digests from DIGEST-FIELDS."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-62063ee666eb4a87012905f4c08adb3ee0713ff1b95dddb944dfc7b84d9dcdca","title":"","text":"resource. This way, the integrity of an individual request can be protected. 15. <\/del> 16. <\/ins> The server might process the uploaded data and make its results available in another resource during or after the upload. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e691afd0b90368324559f85f8085839a73fe42a27189f05ff91382bd55698996","title":"","text":"an upload. For example, a subsequent resource could allow the client to fetch information extracted from the uploaded data. 16. <\/del> 17. <\/ins> The upload resource URL is the identifier used for modifying the upload. Without further protection of this URL, an attacker may"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9813bd2e202d7d10b759765b254ee36638684c2748acf1bd46753821979cde07","title":"","text":"allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist. 17. <\/del> 18. <\/ins> IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d0c1775eb321c5c1cb0781fa183b87ebf1baa0a22c71fb615239a271f4bc4810","title":"","text":"new connection to one or more alternative services immediately, or simultaneously with subsequent requests on the same connection. To reduce the ability of servers to track individual clients over time (see tracking), an alternative service indication sent by a client include any alternative service information other than the protocol, host and port. <\/del> When using HTTP\/2 (HTTP2), clients instead send an ALTSVC frame. A single ALTSVC frame can be sent for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5505ec7683fa781c93d086f3acea2edff54b6e5016a3f28765c6c90bb59033d3","title":"","text":"cases, as the URI is more likely to be logged than the request content. If a server creates a temporary resource to represent the results of a QUERY request (e.g., for use in the Location or Content- Location field), the URI of this resource SHOULD NOT expose the original request content in plaintext. <\/del> Location field) and the request contains sensitive information that cannot be logged, then the URI of this resource SHOULD be chosen such that it does not include any sensitive portions of the original request content. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ce3a7473f2e05bdf58da21807f6357ba8ed934dd0289077f1658289037fce348","title":"","text":"Clients can send representation metadata (see HTTP) in the request that starts an upload. Servers MAY interpret this metadata or MAY ignore it. The \"Content-Type\" header field (HTTP) can be used to indicate the media type of the file. The content coding of the representation is specified using the \"Content-Encoding\" header field and is retained throughout the entire upload. When resuming an interrupted upload, the same content coding is used for appending to the upload, producing a representation of the upload resource with one consistent content coding. The \"Content-Disposition\" header field (RFC6266) can be used to transmit a filename; if included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/del> indicate the media type of the file. The applied content codings are specified using the \"Content-Encoding\" header field and are retained throughout the entire upload. When resuming an interrupted upload, the same content codings are used for appending to the upload, producing a representation of the upload resource. The \"Content- Disposition\" header field (RFC6266) can be used to transmit a filename; if included, the parameters SHOULD be either \"filename\", \"filename*\" or \"boundary\". <\/ins> 4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bba8fb4bde687dd40a86357486e080acade87cc31d125296ad087c2bd50cf729","title":"","text":"The server SHOULD respect representation metadata received during creation (upload-creation). An upload append request continues uploading the same representation as used in the upload creation (upload-creation) and thus uses the same content coding, if one was applied. For example, if the initial upload creation included the \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" header field, the upload append request <\/del> (upload-creation) and thus uses the same content codings, if they were applied. For example, if the initial upload creation included the \"Content-Encoding: gzip\" header field, the upload append request <\/ins> resumes the transfer of the gzipped data without indicating again that the gzip coding is applied."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2f7c47b1d41c258ab0ddb1e69eccdbadc3793198f315596d2cf76cb4968a6377","title":"","text":"MUST NOT fail the parsing to facilitate the addition of new limits in the future. A server that supports the creation of a resumable upload resource (upload-creation) under a target URI MUST include the \"Upload-Limit\" header field with the corresponding limits in a response to an \"OPTIONS\" request sent to this target URI. If a server supports the creation of upload resources for any target URI, it MUST include the \"Upload-Limit\" header field with the corresponding limits in a response to an \"OPTIONS\" request with the \"*\" target. The limits announced in an \"OPTIONS\" response SHOULD NOT be less restrictive than the limits applied to an upload once the upload resource has been created. If the server does not apply any limits, it MUST use \"min-size=0\" instead of an empty header value. A client can use an \"OPTIONS\" request to discover support for resumable uploads and potential limits before creating an upload resource. <\/ins> 8.3. The \"Upload-Complete\" request and response header field indicates"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93391327d1f9ae552b96e3da6e6067beee290c36741e2ac5ff39c423b388f35d","title":"","text":"13. A message might have a content coding, indicated by the \"Content- Encoding\" header field, and\/or a transfer coding, indicated by the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field (RFC9112), applied, which modify the representation of uploaded data in a message. For correct interoperability, the client and server must share the same logic when counting bytes for the upload offset. From the client's perspective, the offset is counted after content coding but before transfer coding is applied. From the server's perspective, the offset is counted after the content's transfer coding is reversed but before the content coding is reversed. <\/del> Since the codings listed in \"Content-Encoding\" are a characteristic of the representation (see HTTP), both the client and the server always compute the upload offset on the content coded data (that is, the representation data). Moreover, the content codings are retained throughout the entire upload, meaning that the server is not required to decode the representation data to support resumable uploads. See DIGEST-FIELDS for more information. <\/ins> 14. Unlike \"Content-Encoding\" (see HTTP), \"Transfer-Encoding\" (see RFC9112) is a property of the message, not of the representation. Moreover, transfer codings can be applied in transit (e.g., by proxies). This means that a client does not have to consider the transfer codings to compute the upload offset, while a server is responsible for transfer decoding the message before computing the upload offset. Please note that the \"Content-Length\" header field cannot be used in conjunction with the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field. 15. <\/ins> The integrity of an entire upload or individual upload requests can be verifying using digests from DIGEST-FIELDS."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fcbc2478ff2ffc3a59cb4b34373fd634358e179247ae1e039ad418edd6cd8fdb","title":"","text":"an upload. For example, a subsequent resource could allow the client to fetch information extracted from the uploaded data. 16. <\/del> 17. The definition of the upload creation request (upload-creation) provides the client with flexibility to choose whether the file is fully or partially transferred in the first request, or if no file data is included at all. Which behavior is best largely depends on the client's capabilities, its intention to avoid data re- transmission, and its knowledge about the server's support for resumable uploads. The following subsections describe two typical upload strategies that are suited for common environments. Note that these modes are never explicitly communicated to the server and clients are not required to stick to one strategy, but can mix and adapt them to their needs. 17.1. An \"optimistic upload creation\" can be used independent of the client's knowledge about the server's support for resumable uploads. However, the client must be capable of handling and processing interim responses. An upload creation request then includes the full file because the client anticipates that the file will be transferred without interruptions or resumed if an interruption occurs. The benefit of this method is that if the upload creation request succeeds, the file was transferred in a single request without additional round trips. A possible drawback is that the client might be unable to resume an upload. If an upload is interrupted before the client received a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" intermediate response with the upload URL, the client cannot resume that upload due to the missing upload URL. The intermediate response might not be received if the interruption happens too early in the message exchange, the server does not support resumable uploads at all, the server does not support sending the \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" intermediate response, or an intermediary dropped the intermediate response. Without a 104 response, the client needs to either treat the upload as failed or retry the entire upload creation request if this is allowed by the application. 17.1.1. Optimistic upload creation allows clients and servers to automatically upgrade non-resumable uploads to resumable ones. In a non-resumable upload, the file is transferred in a single request, usually \"POST\" or \"PUT\", without any ability to resume from interruptions. The client can offer the server to upgrade such a request to a resumable upload (see feature-detection) by adding the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field to the original request. The request is not changed otherwise. A server that supports resumable uploads at the target URI can create a resumable upload resource and send its upload URL in a \"104 (Upload Resumption Supported)\" intermediate response for the client to resume the upload after interruptions. A server that does not support resumable uploads or does not want to upgrade to a resumable upload for this request ignores the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header. The transfer then falls back to a non-resumable upload without additional cost. This upgrade can also be performed transparently by the client without the user taking an active role. When a user asks the client to send a non-resumable request, the client can perform the upgrade and handle potential interruptions and resumptions under the hood without involving the user. The last response received by the client is considered the response for the entire file upload and should be presented to the user. 17.2. For a \"careful upload creation\" the client knows that the server supports resumable uploads and sends an empty upload creation request without including any file data. Upon successful response reception, the client can use the included upload URL to transmit the file data (upload-appending) and resume the upload at any stage if an interruption occurs. The client should inspect the response for the \"Upload-Limit\" header field, which would indicate limits applying to the remaining upload procedure. The retransmission of file data or the ultimate upload failure that can happen with an \"optimistic upload creation\" is therefore avoided at the expense of an additional request that does not carry file data. This approach best suited if the client cannot receive intermediate responses, e.g. due to a limitation in the provided HTTP interface, or if large files are transferred where the cost of the additional request is miniscule compared to the effort of transferring the large file itself. 18. <\/ins> The upload resource URL is the identifier used for modifying the upload. Without further protection of this URL, an attacker may"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cec3cd71c104597b61b05b7943a27506bca3cad0cdace09b14bc1bb8f2554e08","title":"","text":"allowed to have, and restricting the length of time an upload resource can exist. 17. <\/del> 19. <\/ins> IANA is asked to register the following entries in the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\":"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1073133c9a68b031aa2842625a9a9d7e146dcec5d8e9478d634023c9995d244","title":"","text":"with the \"201 (Created)\" status code and an \"Upload-Complete\" header value set to false. If the request includes an \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload a fixed-length resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the \"Content-Length\" field value and the server MUST record it to ensure its consistency. <\/del> The request can indicate the upload's final size in two different ways. Both indicators may be present in the same request as long as they convey the same size. If the sizes are inconsistent, the server MUST reject the request by responding with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. If the request includes an \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to upload a fixed-length resource in one request. In this case, the upload's final size is the \"Content-Length\" field value and the server MUST record it to ensure its consistency. The value can therefore not be used if the upload is split across multiple requests. If the request includes the \"Upload-Length\" header field, the server MUST record its value as the upload's final size. A client SHOULD provide this header field if the upload length is known at the time of upload creation. The upload is not automatically completed if the offset reaches the upload's final size. Instead, a client MUST indicate the completion of an upload through the \"Upload-Complete\" header field. Indicating an upload's final size can help the server allocate necessary resources for the upload and provide early feedback if the size does not match the server's limits (upload-limit). <\/ins> The server MAY enforce a maximum size of an upload resource. This limit MAY be equal to the upload's final size, if \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" and \"Content-Length\" are present in the upload creation request, or an arbitrary value. The limit's value or its existence MUST NOT change throughout the lifetime of the upload resource. The server MAY indicate such a limit to the client by including the \"Upload- Limit\" header field in the informational or final response to upload <\/del> limit MAY be equal to the upload's final size, if available, or an arbitrary value. The limit's value or its existence MUST NOT change throughout the lifetime of the upload resource. The server MAY indicate such a limit to the client by including the \"Upload-Limit\" header field in the informational or final response to upload <\/ins> creation. If the client receives an \"Upload-Limit\" header field indicating that the maximum size is less than the amount of bytes it intends to upload to a resource, it SHOULD stop the current upload"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-185d5fefd2b0da0b9473029d15079e1b696a634c95513f6ceb5d186cc6352246","title":"","text":"considered complete. The next example shows an upload creation, where only the first 25 bytes are transferred. The server acknowledges the received data and that the upload is not complete yet: <\/del> bytes of a 100 bytes upload are transferred. The server acknowledges the received data and that the upload is not complete yet: <\/ins> If the client received an informational response with the upload URL in the Location field value, it MAY automatically attempt upload"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9bc4e0895a0c26bb6b38c8adbc6f4dad39cf81f03bca939aed63d7654188934c","title":"","text":"offset of the incomplete upload by sending a \"HEAD\" request to the upload resource. The request MUST NOT include an \"Upload-Offset\" or \"Upload-Complete\" header field. The server MUST reject requests with either of these fields by responding with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/del> The request MUST NOT include an \"Upload-Offset\", \"Upload-Complete\", or \"Upload-Length\" header field. The server MUST reject requests with either of these fields by responding with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. <\/ins> If the server considers the upload resource to be active, it MUST respond with a \"204 (No Content)\" or \"200 (OK)\" status code. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-169d96e780b6ecbcc5beb29ec7aa2a27cfa3d88dfa443eaa1965fb4182d2f664","title":"","text":"value set to the current resumption offset for the target resource. The response MUST include the \"Upload-Complete\" header field; the value is set to true only if the upload is complete. The response MAY include the \"Upload-Limit\" header field if corresponding limits on the upload resource exist. <\/del> MUST include the \"Upload-Length\" header field set to the upload's final size if one was recorded during the upload creation (upload- creation). The response MAY include the \"Upload-Limit\" header field if corresponding limits on the upload resource exist. <\/ins> An upload is considered complete only if the server completely and successfully received a corresponding creation request (upload-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2377c45538f2b2d602a9cca0a327a2a93afb5bb152b541ae4145fa305f6cc925","title":"","text":"upload's final size. If they do not match, the server MUST reject the request with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. The server MUST prevent that the offset exceeds the upload's final size when appending. If a final size has been recorded and the upload append request exceeds this value, the server MUST stop appending bytes to the upload once the offset reaches the final size and reject the request with a \"400 (Bad Request)\" status code. It is not sufficient to rely on the \"Content-Length\" header field for enforcement because the header field might not be present. <\/ins> The request content MAY be empty. If the \"Upload-Complete\" field is then set to true, the client wants to complete the upload without appending additional data."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6d19a6a0cb26b0df56d60f78b4ecbb5f70d9c370ab9e30083d6134eaf950f75b","title":"","text":"The \"Upload-Complete\" header field MUST only be used if support by the resource is known to the client (feature-detection). 8.4. The \"Upload-Length\" request and response header field indicates the number of bytes to be uploaded for the corresponding upload resource, counted in bytes. The \"Upload-Length\" field value is an Integer. <\/ins> 9. The \"application\/partial-upload\" media type describes a contiguous"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0055bc1d4fb46716163fe05ee420e1b3292fd586940cf962d14a870531fd5f27","title":"","text":"Since the codings listed in \"Content-Encoding\" are a characteristic of the representation (see HTTP), both the client and the server always compute the upload offset on the content coded data (that is, the representation data). Moreover, the content codings are retained throughout the entire upload, meaning that the server is not required to decode the representation data to support resumable uploads. See DIGEST-FIELDS for more information. <\/del> always compute the values for \"Upload-Offset\" and optionally \"Upload- Length\" on the content coded data (that is, the representation data). Moreover, the content codings are retained throughout the entire upload, meaning that the server is not required to decode the representation data to support resumable uploads. See DIGEST-FIELDS for more information. <\/ins> 14."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-19e08222592239d6619ae542dd8969941c9ddde713eb8b5fac684f2624ea1449","title":"","text":"proxies). This means that a client does not have to consider the transfer codings to compute the upload offset, while a server is responsible for transfer decoding the message before computing the upload offset. Please note that the \"Content-Length\" header field cannot be used in conjunction with the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field. <\/del> upload offset. The same applies to the value of \"Upload-Length\". Please note that the \"Content-Length\" header field cannot be used in conjunction with the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header field. <\/ins> 15. The integrity of an entire upload or individual upload requests can be verifying using digests from DIGEST-FIELDS. 15.1. Representation digests help verify the integrity of the entire data that has been uploaded so far, which might strech across multiple requests. <\/ins> If the client knows the integrity digest of the entire data before creating an upload resource, it MAY include the \"Repr-Digest\" header field when creating an upload (upload-creation). Once the upload is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d0a1c69fdc5a94ac2c3f07348a3e69594ff204a305790d55e297ada03fedd399","title":"","text":"failed and not process the uploaded data further. This way, the integrity of the entire uploaded data can be protected. Alternatively, when creating an upload (upload-creation), the client MAY ask the server to compute and return the integrity digests using a \"Want-Repr-Digest\" field conveying the preferred algorithms. The response SHOULD include at least one of the requested digests, but MAY not include it. The server SHOULD compute the representation digests using the preferred algorithms once the upload is complete and include the corresponding \"Repr-Digest\" header field in the response. Alternatively, the server MAY compute the digest continuously during the upload and include the \"Repr-Digest\" header field in responses to upload creation (upload-creation) and upload appending requests (upload-appending) even when the upload is not completed yet. This allows the client to simultaneously compute the digest of the transmitted upload data, compare its digest to the server's digest, and spot data integrity issues. If an upload is spread across multiple requests, data integrity issues can be found even before the upload is fully completed. 15.2. Content digests help verify the integrity of the content in an individual request. <\/ins> If the client knows the integrity digest of the content from an upload creation (upload-creation) or upload appending (upload- appending) request, it MAY include the \"Content-Digest\" header field"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1569a2eeb2ac42fcde99c4debdb5cfda9618c528dc788ef921947ef55b9cabf4","title":"","text":"interruptions. The client can offer the server to upgrade such a request to a resumable upload (see feature-detection) by adding the \"Upload-Complete: ?1\" header field to the original request. The request is not changed otherwise. <\/del> \"Upload-Length\" header field SHOULD be added if the upload's final size is known upfront. The request is not changed otherwise. <\/ins> A server that supports resumable uploads at the target URI can create a resumable upload resource and send its upload URL in a \"104 (Upload"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b229ad9afa6c923c5fe9dca125ae40236da61b9549a3699c2a9e72379139b32","title":"","text":"3.3.3. In this specification, use of the Capsule Protocol RFC9297 is OPTIONAL. Clients MAY request use of the Capsule Protocol by including a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header field in the request. Server support for the Capsule Protocol is also OPTIONAL. If the request includes \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\", and the server does not support the Capsule Protocol, the server MUST respond with a 4xx (Client Error) status and a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?0\" response header field, and MUST discard any data received on this request stream. Upon receiving such a response, the client MUST retry the request without the Capsule Protocol and MAY disable use of the Capsule Protocol with this URI Template for the remainder of the session. <\/del> In this specification, support for the Capsule Protocol RFC9297 is OPTIONAL for clients. Clients MAY request use of the Capsule Protocol by including a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header field in the request. Server support for the Capsule Protocol is REQUIRED. Servers MUST confirm use of the Capsule Protocol by echoing the \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header in their response. <\/ins> When using the Capsule Protocol, TCP payload data is sent in the payload of a new Capsule Type named DATA (data-capsule). The ordered"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4cf296999b598b7884a9b68f89f6c46e15d77e1361422a4472d918ae5e9c62e1","title":"","text":"waiting for a \"401 (Unauthorized)\" response before each new connection through the proxy. 3.3.3. <\/del> 3.4. <\/ins> In this specification, support for the Capsule Protocol RFC9297 is OPTIONAL for clients. Clients MAY request use of the Capsule Protocol by including a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header field in the request. <\/del> When using the \"connect-tcp\" Upgrade Token, templated TCP proxies do not use the Capsule Protocol RFC9297. Clients MAY request use of the Capsule Protocol by offering the Upgrade Token \"connect-tcp-capsule\" instead. When offering or accepting the \"connect-tcp-capsule\" Upgrade Token, clients and servers SHOULD including a \"Capsule- Protocol: ?1\" header to facilitate processing by intermediaries. <\/ins> Server support for the Capsule Protocol is REQUIRED. Servers MUST confirm use of the Capsule Protocol by echoing the \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header in their response. <\/del> Clients of this specification MAY implement \"connect-tcp\", \"connect- tcp-capsule\", or both. Accordingly, a templated TCP proxy server MUST implement both Upgrade Tokens unless its use is restricted to a subset of compatible clients. <\/ins> When using the Capsule Protocol, TCP payload data is sent in the <\/del> When using \"connect-tcp-capsule\", TCP payload data is sent in the <\/ins> payload of a new Capsule Type named DATA (data-capsule). The ordered concatenation of DATA capsule payloads has the same semantics as what would have been sent on the data stream if the Capsule Protocol were not in use. It is applicable whenever use of the Capsule Protocol is optional. <\/del> concatenation of DATA capsule payloads represents the main payload data stream in any protocol where this is well-defined. Intermediaries MAY split or merge DATA capsules. Endpoints MAY indicate a TCP connection error by sending an incomplete DATA capsule, as an alternative to using TCP, TLS, or HTTP stream errors. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-410e4ee92a5d4d152e11c35c4191ed1e4f220bdc04af463745ddc8fe0bf919ed","title":"","text":"8.1. IF APPROVED, IANA is requested to add the following entry to the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry: Value: \"connect-tcp\" Description: Proxying of TCP payloads Reference: (This document) <\/del> IF APPROVED, IANA is requested to add the following entries to the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry: <\/ins> For interoperability testing of this draft version, implementations SHALL use the value \"connect-tcp-05\". <\/del> SHALL use the values \"connect-tcp-06\" and \"connect-tcp-capsule-06. <\/ins> 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34fab98d298d766ccbffaa4e1bd3433c5546af101a10daefe325b5aa54134a18","title":"","text":"fields (e.g., \"Alt-Svc\" RFC7838, \"Strict-Transport-Security\" RFC6797). Classic HTTP CONNECT requests cannot carry in-stream metadata. For example, the WRAP_UP capsule I-D.schinazi-httpbis-wrap-up cannot be used with Classic HTTP CONNECT. <\/ins> 1.3. This specification describes an alternative mechanism for proxying"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7158d550d6bc059fc15e80451371fa56943cc3dcfbec10448c7b6900bf5167d9","title":"","text":"all the same requirements as for UDP proxying (RFC9298), and are subject to the same validation rules. The client MUST substitute the destination host and port number into this template to produce the request URI. <\/del> request URI. The derived URI serves as the destination of a Capsule Protocol connection using the Upgrade Token \"connect-tcp\" (see registration in new-upgrade-token). When using \"connect-tcp\", TCP payload data is sent in the payload of a new Capsule Type named DATA (see registration in data-capsule). The ordered concatenation of DATA capsule payloads represents the TCP payload data. An intermediary MAY merge and split successive DATA capsules, subject to the following requirements: There are no intervening capsules of other types. The order of payload content is preserved. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b930c51e3c7120125f243a65e5136bbf9722aceafc5c8cfa14c746da1f02e8a6","title":"","text":"The method SHALL be \"GET\". The request's target SHALL correspond to the URI derived from expansion of the proxy's URI Template. <\/ins> The request SHALL include a single \"Host\" header field containing the origin of the proxy."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b4fac086cc1d26d0394a2654b1917b38aafb217ada4ed8775355ea665c9a8a3","title":"","text":"The request SHALL include an \"Upgrade\" header field with the value \"connect-tcp\". The request's target SHALL correspond to the URI derived from expansion of the proxy's URI Template. <\/del> The request SHOULD include a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header. <\/ins> If the request is well-formed and permissible, the proxy MUST attempt to establish the TCP connection before sending any response status"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8625a87d0d2ef6566eb61389e92964cbdc5868e95fe020e5733c2c8e501aba28","title":"","text":"The response SHALL include a single \"Upgrade\" header field with the value \"connect-tcp\". The response SHOULD include a \"Capsule-Protocol: ?1\" header. <\/ins> If the request is malformed or impermissible, the proxy MUST return a 4XX error code. If a TCP connection was not established, the proxy MUST NOT switch protocols to \"connect-tcp\", and the client MAY reuse this connection for additional HTTP requests. After a success response is returned, the connection SHALL conform to all the usual requirements for classic CONNECT proxies in HTTP\/1.1 (RFC9110). Additionally, if the proxy observes a connection error from the client (e.g., a TCP RST, TCP timeout, or TLS error), it SHOULD send a TCP RST to the target. If the proxy observes a connection error from the target, it SHOULD send a TLS \"internal_error\" alert to the client, or set the TCP RST bit if TLS is not in use. These behaviors avoid truncation of transfers between the client and the target on vulnerable protocols (e.g., HTTP\/1.1 without TLS) while preserving the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of the \"https\" scheme. <\/del> 3.2. In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, the proxy MUST include"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d51fefc399d1f6dd032b1cf1fb59c177a99cd58ffce78cad7b08e7999f31edbe","title":"","text":"and scheme of the request URI derived from the proxy's URI Template. From this point on, the request and response SHALL conform to all the usual requirements for classic CONNECT proxies in this HTTP version (see RFC9113 and RFC9114). <\/del> A templated TCP proxying request that does not conform to all of these requirements represents a client error (see RFC9110) and may be malformed (see RFC9113 and RFC9114)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1be1f69eac4f516ebb0992a9a929c7fdfb092faea5c1fe14eebd4520aab383f8","title":"","text":"3.4. When using the \"connect-tcp\" Upgrade Token, templated TCP proxies do not use the Capsule Protocol RFC9297. Clients MAY request use of the Capsule Protocol by offering the Upgrade Token \"connect-tcp-capsule\" instead. When offering or accepting the \"connect-tcp-capsule\" Upgrade Token, clients and servers SHOULD include a \"Capsule- Protocol: ?1\" header to facilitate processing by intermediaries. Clients of this specification MAY implement \"connect-tcp\", \"connect- tcp-capsule\", or both. Accordingly, a templated TCP proxy server MUST implement both Upgrade Tokens unless its use is restricted to a subset of compatible clients. When using \"connect-tcp-capsule\", TCP payload data is sent in the payload of a new Capsule Type named DATA (data-capsule). The ordered concatenation of DATA capsule payloads represents the main payload data stream in any protocol where this is well-defined. Intermediaries MAY split or merge DATA capsules. Endpoints MAY indicate a TCP connection error by sending an incomplete DATA capsule, as an alternative to using TCP, TLS, or HTTP stream errors. <\/del> In each HTTP version, any requirements related to closing connections in Classic HTTP CONNECT also apply to \"connect-tcp\", with the following modifications: In HTTP\/1.1, endpoints SHOULD close the connection in an error state to indicate receipt of a TCP connection error (e.g., a TCP RST or timeout). Acceptable error states include sending an incomplete DATA capsule (as defined in RFC9297), a TLS Error Alert (RFC8446), or a TCP RST (if TLS is not in use). When a connection is terminated in an error state, the receiving endpoint SHOULD send a TCP RST if the underlying TCP implementation permits it. In HTTP\/2 and HTTP\/3, senders MAY use an incomplete DATA capsule to indicate a TCP connection error, instead of (or in addition to) the signals defined for TCP connection errors in Classic HTTP CONNECT. Recipients MUST recognize any incomplete capsule as a TCP connection error. Intermediaries MUST propagate connection shutdown errors, including when translating between different HTTP versions. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d7a9dc5281d3ce8928b10313c5336f987adc10115fb33e9edcf041b586ad5946","title":"","text":"8.1. IF APPROVED, IANA is requested to add the following entries to the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry: <\/del> IF APPROVED, IANA is requested to add the following entry to the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry: <\/ins> For interoperability testing of this draft version, implementations SHALL use the values \"connect-tcp-06\" and \"connect-tcp-capsule-06. <\/del> SHALL use the value \"connect-tcp-07\". <\/ins> 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c84ea27f559f3820922e37d9d404c940980178aa7600bc8f547e3cb3b03504ab","title":"","text":"\"HTTP Capsule Types\" registry: For this draft version of the protocol, the Capsule Type value \"0xb739a6d0\" shall be used provisionally for testing, under the name \"DATA-05\". <\/del> \"0x2028d7ee\" shall be used provisionally for testing, under the name \"DATA-07\". <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec52079e7340e19213745cd5d394021af523fc1c42b0baa9961b80d3789b0c06","title":"","text":"7. Clients that send HTTP CONNECT requests on behalf of untrusted TCP clients MUST wait for a 2xx (Successful) response before sending any TCP payload data. <\/del> In HTTP\/1.1, clients that send CONNECT requests on behalf of untrusted TCP clients MUST wait for a 2xx (Successful) response before sending any TCP payload data. <\/ins> To mitigate vulnerabilities from any clients that do not conform to this requirement, proxy servers MAY close the underlying connection when rejecting an HTTP CONNECT request, without processing any <\/del> when rejecting an HTTP\/1.1 CONNECT request, without processing any <\/ins> further data sent to the proxy server on that connection. Note that this behavior may impair performance, especially when returning a \"407 (Proxy Authentication Required)\" response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8b1cca6a3a1f0efe8f72272b3352eda47e4aed4da12543da81b7f9b3515fc4f2","title":"","text":"semantics). Notice that the Cookie header field above contains two cookies, one named SID and one named lang. If the server wishes the user agent to persist the cookie over multiple \"sessions\" (e.g., user agent restarts), the server can specify an expiration date in the Expires attribute. Note that the user agent might delete the cookie before the expiration date if the user agent's cookie store exceeds its quota or if the user manually deletes the server's cookie. <\/del> named SID and one named lang. Cookie names are case-sensitive, meaning that if a server sends the user agent two Set-Cookie header fields that differ only in their name's case the user agent will store and return both of those cookies in subsequent requests. If the server wishes the user agent to persist the cookie over multiple \"sessions\" (e.g., user agent restarts), the server can specify an expiration date in the Expires attribute. Note that the user agent might delete the cookie before the expiration date if the user agent's cookie store exceeds its quota or if the user manually deletes the server's cookie. <\/ins> Finally, to remove a cookie, the server returns a Set-Cookie header field with an expiration date in the past. The server will be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-941d9ca3243e570925f4bb18a8338ea7ec5cae0f3da69150004aaa72225e6ec4","title":"","text":"the name string is empty, and the value string is the value of name-value-pair. Otherwise, the name string consists of the characters up to, but not including, the first %x3D (\"=\") character, and the (possibly empty) value string consists of the characters after the first %x3D (\"=\") character. <\/del> Otherwise, the (possibly empty) name string consists of the characters up to, but not including, the first %x3D (\"=\") character, and the (possibly empty) value string consists of the characters after the first %x3D (\"=\") character. <\/ins> Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the name string and the value string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42242b9fc7ccb5a152ad2b62475cfd577faa5cce8e937d0a54cf2718d65bfd92","title":"","text":"yet complete indicated by the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to false, the server MUST acknowledge it by responding with a \"201 (Created)\" status code and the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true. <\/del> false. <\/ins> If the request includes the \"Upload-Complete\" field value set to true and a valid \"Content-Length\" header field, the client attempts to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-488ac4a9bd51606a9c76938d77f2e8612c497a0fdf1325293fbc9bac091361fe","title":"","text":"1.1. This document uses terminology defined in HTTP. 1.2. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-72b15ce579d3e3015d24e0b85f6ae1f1efc1ddbd37165d8bb10d831670c80a11","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes how \"http\" URIs can be accessed using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to mitigate pervasive monitoring attacks. <\/del> Transport Layer Security (TLS) in HTTP\/2 to mitigate pervasive monitoring attacks. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fff36d90bcbb1976248a7cce97f10b00c5fdea93bf03b8074f094852b047bf4b","title":"","text":"This document describes a use of HTTP Alternative Services RFC7838 to decouple the URI scheme from the use and configuration of underlying encryption, allowing a \"http\" URI RFC7230 to be accessed using Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC5246 opportunistically. <\/del> encryption. It allows HTTP\/2 RFC7540 to access a \"http\" URI RFC7230 using Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC5246 with Opportunistic Security RFC7435. <\/ins> Serving \"https\" URIs requires avoiding Mixed Content W3C.CR-mixed- content-20160802, which is problematic in many deployments. This document describes a usage model whereby sites can serve \"http\" URIs over TLS, thereby avoiding these issues, while still providing <\/del> This document describes a usage model whereby sites can serve \"http\" URIs over TLS, thereby avoiding the problem of serving Mixed Content (describe in W3C.CR-mixed-content-20160802) while still providing <\/ins> protection against passive attacks. Opportunistic Security RFC7435 does not provide the same guarantees as using TLS with \"https\" URIs; it is vulnerable to active attacks, and does not change the security context of the connection. <\/del> Opportunistic Security does not provide the same guarantees as using TLS with \"https\" URIs; Opportunistic Security is vulnerable to active attacks, and does not change the security context of the connection. <\/ins> Normally, users will not be able to tell that it is in use (i.e., there will be no \"lock icon\")."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b261e7543c1910ffca068d4191c41000f8af0e3274c2301d934170711721ab29","title":"","text":"2.1. Clients control which Client Hint headers and their respective header fields are communicated, based on their default settings, user configuration and\/or preferences. The user can be given the choice to enable, disable, or override specific hints. <\/del> Clients control which Client Hints are sent in requests, based on their default settings, user configuration and\/or preferences. Implementers might provide user choice mechanisms so that users may balance privacy concerns with bandwidth limitations. Implementations specific to certain use cases or threat models might avoid transmitting these headers altogether, or limit them to secure contexts or authenticated sessions. Implementers should be aware that explaining the privacy implications of passive fingerprinting or network information disclosure may be challenging. <\/ins> The client and server, or an intermediate proxy, can use an opt-in mechanism to negotiate which fields should be reported to allow for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a05d42ad27488acd3084f1e9f075f3bd0d92ceb50ef05bbcbbb9c746844b74e","title":"","text":"6. The \"Downlink\" request header field is a number that indicates the client's maximum downlink speed in megabits per second (Mbps), as defined by the \"downlinkMax\" attribute in the W3C Network Information API (NETINFO). <\/del> client's maximum downlink speed in megabits per second (Mbps). <\/ins> If Downlink occurs in a message more than once, the minimum value should be used to override other occurrences."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eef26824613888df5b6859e7c6d87217d3f3cea31ba1db388e0a7dbe4f69cd20","title":"","text":"2. Clients include the Tunnel-Protocol Request Header field in a HTTP Connect request to indicate the application layer protocol or protocols that will be used within the tunnel. <\/del> Clients include the `Tunnel-Protocol` Request Header field in an HTTP CONNECT request to indicate the application layer protocol will be used within the tunnel, or the set of protocols that might be used within the tunnel. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a89bc4448763b0e0a303e36c9e8cda6e97a33abbc130d264f619a8bab89520ce","title":"","text":"2.2. The ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) syntax for the Tunnel-Protocol header field is given below. It is based on the Generic Grammar defined in RFC7230. <\/del> The ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) syntax for the `Tunnel- Protocol` header field is given below. It is based on the Generic Grammar defined in RFC7230. <\/ins> ALPN protocol names are octet sequences with no additional constraints on format. Octets not allowed in tokens (RFC7230) must"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-73606b677b0b78d82e89333f2ae8206a636807413d96e7cd94204cc04de6d632","title":"","text":"4. In case of using HTTP CONNECT to a TURN server the security consideration of RFC7231 apply. It states that there \"are <\/del> considerations of RFC7231 apply. It states that there \"are <\/ins> significant risks in establishing a tunnel to arbitrary servers, particularly when the destination is a well-known or reserved TCP port that is not intended for Web traffic. Proxies that support CONNECT SHOULD restrict its use to a limited set of known ports or a configurable whitelist of safe request targets.\" The Tunnel-Protocol request header field described in this document is an optional header and HTTP Proxies may of course not support the header and therefore ignore it. If the header is not present or ignored then the proxy has no explicit indication as to the purpose of the tunnel on which to provide consent, this is the generic case that exists without the Tunnel-Protocol header. <\/del> The `Tunnel-Protocol` request header field described in this document is an optional header. Clients and HTTP Proxies could choose to not support the header and therefore fail to provide it, or ignore it when present. If the header is not available or ignored, a proxy cannot identify the purpose of the tunnel and use this as input to any authorization decision regarding the tunnel. This is indistinguishable from the case where either client or proxy does not support the `Tunnel-Protocol` header. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf658a75e771ac407a7506d8c0eb03c4ea743902866017e5ad16f36d3fa1eb49","title":"","text":"2.2. When presented with a request that contains one or more client hint headers, servers can optimise the response based upon the information <\/del> headers, servers can optimize the response based upon the information <\/ins> in them. When doing so, and if the resource is cacheable, the server MUST also generate a Vary response header field (Section 7.1.4 of RFC7231), and optionally Key (I-D.ietf-httpbis-key), to indicate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5f844b9e4d9c5fae3ab8300a927d08bf5ef9b968c569abbe6621eeb8b622a936","title":"","text":"When a client receives Accept-CH, or if it is capable of processing the HTML response and finds an equivalent HTML meta element, it can treat it as a signal that the server is interested in receiving <\/del> treat it as a signal that the application is interested in receiving <\/ins> specified request header fields that match the advertised field- values; subsequent requests initiated to the same server and, optionally any subresource requests initiated as a result of processing the response from the server that includes the Accept-CH opt-in, can include the request header fields that match the advertised field-values. <\/del> values; subresource requests initiated as a result of processing the response from the server that includes the Accept-CH opt-in can include the request header fields that match the advertised field- values. <\/ins> For example, based on Accept-CH example above, a user agent could append DPR, Width, Viewport-Width, and Downlink header fields to all <\/del> append DPR, Width, and Viewport-Width header fields to all <\/ins> subresource requests initiated by the page constructed from the response. Alternatively, a client can treat advertised support as a persistent origin preference and append same header fields on all future requests initiated to and by the resources associated with that origin. <\/del> response. <\/ins> 2.2.2. Servers can ask the client to remember an origin-wide Accept-CH preference for a specified period of time to enable delivery of Client Hints on all subsequent requests to the origin, and on subresource requests initiated as a result of processing a response from the origin. The field-value indicates that the Accept-CH preference should be considered stale after its age is greater than the specified number of seconds. For example, based on the Accept-CH and Accept-CH-Lifetime example above, a user agent could persist an origin-wide Accept-CH preference for up to 86400 seconds (1 day). Then, if a request is initiated to the same origin before the preference is stale (e.g. as a result of a navigation to the origin, or fetching a subresource from the origin) the client could append the requested header fields (DPR and Viewport-Width in this example) to the request and any subresource requests initiated as a result of processing a response from same origin. 2.2.3. <\/ins> When selecting an optimized response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate a Vary response header field (RFC7234) to indicate which hints can"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-430b3b299199c395c16a341f69b92757678e06be6ffcbe942c87ed7aa8ddaeb4","title":"","text":"Implementers ought to provide mechanisms and policies to control how and when such hints are advertised. For example, they could require origin opt-in; restrict delivery to same origin subrequests; limit delivery to requests that already carry indentifying information (e.g. cookies); modify delivery policy when in an \"incognito\" or a similar privacy mode; enable user configuration and opt in, and so on. <\/del> origin opt-in via Accept-CH; clear remembered opt-in, as set by Accept-CH-Lifetime, when site data, browsing history, browsing cache, or similar, are cleared; restrict delivery to same origin subrequests; limit delivery to requests that already carry identifying information (e.g. cookies); modify delivery policy when in an \"incognito\" or a similar privacy mode; enable user configuration and opt in, and so on. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6ecfdb26d4cbb54ee80651f9837ca8af79754a4b13c1252dc9d3d47b8e1639d4","title":"","text":"6.2. Header field name: Accept-CH-Lifetime Applicable protocol: HTTP Status: standard Author\/Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): accept-ch-lifetime of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.3. <\/ins> Header field name: Content-DPR Applicable protocol: HTTP Status: standard"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dbded95ae7d0c0f1af3a7195809a84ad8f6830c8e012993d25150ac6a3815168","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): content-dpr of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.3. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> Header field name: Downlink Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e50cf03b7f205ab663f316a4772b0c4eb56b43fa9209c67e3b0603ba48032ef","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): downlink of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.4. <\/del> 6.5. <\/ins> Header field name: DPR Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-af67c3c15fad9cf42bad2a556b4e92529fa468f5e3a9665a0416af78755c430b","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): dpr of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.5. <\/del> 6.6. <\/ins> Header field name: Save-Data Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-284a44a7cd9bd654394fb0598792138006cc975429d20511d20c1d627a448ec9","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): save-data of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.6. <\/del> 6.7. <\/ins> Header field name: Viewport-Width Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78acd68a2a96a00fa84b0d0b29595aff45f9937ee0fa7b5ec606856606f3a53b","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): viewport-width of this document Related information: for Client Hints 6.7. <\/del> 6.8. <\/ins> Header field name: Width Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2121cf9022a81d6bf56230ae7efbbb30b5c75ee88e7d0d5962215a6c2665db78","title":"","text":"2.1. The ORIGIN frame type is 0xb (decimal 11). <\/del> The ORIGIN frame type is 0xc (decimal 12). <\/ins> The ORIGIN frame's payload contains the following fields, sets of which may be repeated within the frame to indicate multiple origins:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3f2035b27d2ace0269a6061887b692374acec2f342a485e2693d895887f01be0","title":"","text":"Frame Type: ORIGIN Code: 0xb <\/del> Code: 0xc <\/ins> Specification: [this document]"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f0e4271aed572899bda808c05148f4a1ed738daa00481a8aca001eeed5fe6356","title":"","text":"\"delta-seconds\" is used as defined in Section 1.2.1 of RFC 7234 RFC7234. 2.1.4. The following examples demonstrate valid Expect-CT response header fields: <\/ins> 2.2. This section describes the processing model that Expect-CT Hosts"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cb285540ae21166eaa431eb640307f841135a96dcd66ea78c4e00df7b93f42ee","title":"","text":"report to the specified \"report-uri\" as specified in reporting- expect-ct-failure. If a UA receives more than one Expect-CT header field in an HTTP response message over secure transport, then the UA MUST process only the first Expect-CT header field. <\/del> The UA MUST ignore any Expect-CT header field not conforming to the grammar specified in response-header-field-syntax."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-51d275d289b2366cff2ab39ec495c3274ee3ae2e05c8a787a3954ab6c27b1899","title":"","text":"Abstract This memo introduces an informational status code for HTTP that can be used for indicating hints to help a client start making preparations for processing the final response. <\/del> This memo introduces an informational HTTP status code that can be used to convey hints that help a client make preparations for processing the final response. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fbaa193adb49e76ba412e32cc45c16c1d1681e0313bb40883a0567b4b38cedb1","title":"","text":"1. Most if not all of the web pages processed by a web browser contain links to external resources that need to be fetched prior to rendering the documents. Therefore, it is beneficial to send such links as early as possible in order to minimize the time spent until the browser becomes possible to render the document. Link header of type \"preload\" (Preload) can be used to indicate such links within the response headers of an HTTP response. However, it is not always possible for an origin server to send a response immediately after receiving a request. In fact, it is often the contrary. There are many deployments in which an origin server needs to query a database before generating a response. It is also not unusual for an origin server to delegate a request to an upstream HTTP server running at a distant location. <\/del> It is common for HTTP responses to contain links to external resources that need to be fetched prior to their use; for example, rendering HTML by a Web browser. Having such links available to the client as early as possible helps to minimize perceived latency. The \"preload\" (Preload) link relation can be used to convey such links in the Link header field of an HTTP response. However, it is not always possible for an origin server to generate a response header block immediately after receiving a request. For example, the origin server might need to query a database before generating a response, or it might delegate a request to an upstream HTTP server running at a distant location. <\/ins> The dilemma here is that even though it is preferable for an origin server to send some headers as soon as it receives a request, it cannot do so until the status code and the headers of the final HTTP response is determined. HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) push can be used as a solution to the issue, but has its own limitations. The resources that can be pushed using HTTP\/2 are limited to those belonging to the same origin. Also, it is impossible to send only the links of the resources using HTTP\/2 push. Sending HTTP responses for every resource is an inefficient way of <\/del> cannot do so until the status code and the full headers of the final HTTP response are determined. HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) server push can be used as a solution to this issue, but has its own limitations. The responses that can be pushed using HTTP\/2 are limited to those belonging to the same origin. Also, it is impossible to send only the links using server push. Finally, sending HTTP responses for every resource is an inefficient way of <\/ins> using bandwidth, especially when a caching server exists as an intermediary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f6331f8650bb8508821907ec31948ba23d528564df1970d7e3a9dc66a91594a1","title":"","text":"making preparations for processing the final response, and then run time-consuming operations to generate the final response. The informational response can also be used by an origin server to trigger HTTP\/2 push at an caching intermediary. <\/del> trigger HTTP\/2 server push at a caching intermediary. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f871d8355319db23cad3970254fc72b15097ca7db0de9eea940dc85fa661ec7f","title":"","text":"2. This informational status code indicates the client that the server is likely to send a final response with the headers included in the informational response. <\/del> The 103 (Early Hints) informational status code indicates the client that the server is likely to send a final response with the headers included in the informational response. <\/ins> A server MUST NOT include Content-Length, Transfer-Encoding, or any hop-by-hop headers (RFC7230, section 6.1) in the informational response using the status code. A client MAY speculatively evaluate the headers included in the informational response while waiting for the final response. For example, a client may recognize the link header of type preload and start fetching the resource. However, the evaluation MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed; the client must behave as if it had not seen the informational response. A client MUST NOT process the headers included in the response as if they belonged to the informational response. <\/del> hop-by-hop header fields (RFC7230, section 6.1) in a 103 (Early Hints) response. A client MAY speculatively evaluate the headers included in a 103 (Early Hints) response while waiting for the final response. For example, a client might recognize a Link header field value containing the relation type \"preload\" and start fetching the target resource. However, this MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed; when handling it, the client MUST behave as if it had not seen the informational response. In particular, a client MUST NOT process the headers included in the final response as if they belonged to the informational response, or vice versa. <\/ins> An intermediary MAY drop the informational response. It MAY send HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) push responses using the information found in the informational response. <\/del> HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) server pushes using the information found in the 103 (Early Hints) response. <\/ins> 3. Clients may have issues handling Early Hints, since informational response is rarely used for requests not including an Expect header (RFC7231, section 5.1.1). <\/del> Some clients may have issues handling 103 (Early Hints), since informational responses are rarely used in reply to requests not including an Expect header (RFC7231, section 5.1.1). <\/ins> An HTTP\/1.1 client that mishandles the informational response as a final response is likely to consider all the responses to the succeeding requests sent over the same connection to be part of the final response. Such behavior may constitute a cross-origin <\/del> In particular, an HTTP\/1.1 client that mishandles an informational response as a final response is likely to consider all responses to the succeeding requests sent over the same connection to be part of the final response. Such behavior may constitute a cross-origin <\/ins> information disclosure vulnerability in case the client multiplexes requests to different origins onto a single persistent connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8c2fdee14ce7c86be6f0ced5e102f2ac9e4c404a45704187e514bcfbe7934678","title":"","text":"4. If Early Hints is standardized, the HTTP Status Codes Registry should be updated with the following entries: <\/del> The HTTP Status Codes Registry will be updated with the following entry: <\/ins> Code: 103 Description: Early Hints Specification: this document <\/del> Specification: [this document] <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7d7f20a28114e8b34c6c2cc1e24002290ac68284c78601ef05ac3dbddb2b19f5","title":"","text":"following ways: Clients MUST NOT consult DNS to establish the connection's authority for new requests. The TLS certificate MUST stil be used to do so, as described in RFC7540 Section 9.1.1. <\/del> authority for new requests. The TLS certificate MUST still be used to do so, as described in RFC7540 Section 9.1.1. <\/ins> Clients sending a new request SHOULD use an existing connection if the request's origin is in that connection's Origin Set, unless"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-74b28e150f7d765e4ab80029c26299444c7b0f506ccea97dfc7480028b69973d","title":"","text":"over time, it is possible that a client might have more than one viable connection to an origin open at any time. When this occurs, clients SHOULD not emit new requests on any connection whose Origin Set is a subset of another connection's Origin Set, and SHOULD close it once all outstanding requests are satisfied. <\/del> Set is a proper subset of another connection's Origin Set, and SHOULD close it once all outstanding requests are satisfied. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-46fa3a885298f90dcee483e068ea0f05082b91e57893c252825dedd344f4c5d8","title":"","text":"3. A server can notify its support for CACHE_DIGEST frame by sending the ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST (0x7) SETTINGS parameter. If the server is tempted to making optimizations based on CACHE_DIGEST frames, it SHOULD send the SETTINGS parameter immediately after the connection is established. The value of the parameter is a bit-field of which the following bits are defined: FRESH (0x1): When set, it indicates that the server is willing to make use of a digest of freshly-cached responses. STALE (0x2): When set, it indicates that the server is willing to make use of a digest of stale-cached responses. Rest of the bits MUST be ignored and MUST be left unset when sending. The initial value of the parameter is zero (0x0) meaning that the server is not interested in seeing a CACHE_DIGEST frame. Some underlying transports allow the server's first flight of application data to reach the client at around the same time when the client sends it's first flight data. When such transport (e.g., TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-tls13 in full-handshake mode) is used, a client can postpone sending the CACHE_DIGEST frame until it receives a ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST settings value. When the underlying transport does not have such property (e.g., TLS 1.3 in 0-RTT mode), a client can reuse the settings value found in previous connections to that origin RFC6454 to make assumptions. 4. <\/ins> This document registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Headers Registry, as per RFC3864:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e39adcc57028ccb4e6869e2e1be93f34e566858bd36f899e9fbffd1564aadee","title":"","text":"Specification: [this document] 4. <\/del> This document registers the following entry in the HTTP\/2 Settings Registry, as per RFC7540: Code: 0x7 Name: ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST Initial Value: 0x0 Reference: [this document] 5. <\/ins> The contents of a User Agent's cache can be used to re-identify or \"fingerprint\" the user over time, even when other identifiers (e.g.,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ecaae729802f12c1a2dea2ac9ad006967403a927f51bc824e33003f8c8673e8","title":"","text":"Additionally, User Agents SHOULD NOT send CACHE_DIGEST when in \"privacy mode.\" 5. References <\/del> 6. References <\/ins> 5.1. URIs <\/del> 6.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-39803590c34dc20c9cfd13511332365011170280adb0d3f82fc44ed2b19db668","title":"","text":"3. This draft currently has no requirements for IANA. If the CACHE_DIGEST frame is standardised, it will need to be assigned a frame type. <\/del> specification is standardised, the CACHE_DIGEST frame will need to be assigned a frame type and the Cache-Digest header will need to be registered. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-be3fdb496ff1ab565f4d20e56fd20904bed917b69e3a199810452c9a3a7648e7","title":"","text":"The set of origins (as per RFC6454) that a given connection might be used for is known in this specification as the Origin Set. By default, a connection's Origin Set is uninitialised. When an ORIGIN frame is first received and successfully processed by a client, the connection's Origin Set is defined to contain a single origin, composed from: <\/del> By default, the Origin Set for a connection is uninitialised. When an ORIGIN frame is first received and successfully processed by a client, the connection's Origin Set is defined to contain an initial origin. The initial origin is composed from: <\/ins> Scheme: \"https\" Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (RFC6066 <\/del> Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (SNI, RFC6066 <\/ins> Section 3), converted to lower case Port: the remote port of the connection (i.e., the server's port)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-349fb35698d61384a4eca314bab84a10efb89497e4b7f0f078055e6736b1d2f4","title":"","text":"RFC6454, Section 6.2) and remove it from the connection's Origin Set, if present. When sending an ORIGIN frame to a connection that is initialised as an Alternative Service RFC7838, the initial origin set set will contain an origin with the appropriate scheme and hostname (since Alternative Services specifies that the origin's hostname be sent in SNI). However, it is possible that the port will be different than that of the intended origin, since the initial origin set is calculated using the actual port in use, which can be different for the alternative service. In this case, the intended origin needs to be sent in the ORIGIN frame explicitly. For example, a client making requests for \"https:\/\/example.com\" is directed to an alternative service at (\"h2\", \"x.example.net\", \"8443\"). If this alternative service sends an ORIGIN frame, the initial origin will be \"https:\/\/example.com:8443\". The client will not be able to use the alternative service to make requests for \"https:\/\/example.com\" unless that origin is explicitly included in the ORIGIN frame. <\/ins> 2.4. RFC7540, Section 10.1 uses both DNS and the presented TLS certificate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-47c21b53779b99f0fb0384e3cdc1dcf3ab3410585aa77a6631d819f66f07e39f","title":"","text":"Set is a proper subset of another connection's Origin Set, and SHOULD close it once all outstanding requests are satisfied. The Origin Set is unaffected by any alternative services RFC7838 advertisements made by the server. Advertising an alternative service does not affect whether a server is authoritative. <\/ins> 3. This specification adds an entry to the \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d8f78000314a4081dfcc7310962250416b3d9940e1173fe3224a4475d2f4b684","title":"","text":"2. The CACHE_DIGEST frame type is 0xf1. NOTE: This is an experimental value; if standardised, a permanent value will be assigned. <\/del> The CACHE_DIGEST frame type is 0xd (decimal 13). <\/ins> The CACHE_DIGEST frame payload has the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-61b1983d48f54f6252f088df7461fa998c7fb3da039ea5ee3335281ef48c21c0","title":"","text":"3. This draft currently has no requirements for IANA. If the specification is standardised, the CACHE_DIGEST frame will need to be assigned a frame type and the Cache-Digest header will need to be registered. <\/del> This document registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Headers Registry, as per RFC3864: Header field name: Cache-Digest Applicable protocol: http Status: experimental Author\/Change controller: IESG Specification document(s): [this document] This document registers the following entry in the HTTP\/2 Frame Type Registry, as per RFC7540: Frame Type: CACHE_DIGEST Code: 0xd Specification: [this document] <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a94d1e7380fefbe9526d4608203c870678c1b979d2d69a945e87b8b18bbce1a5","title":"","text":"containing the relation type \"preload\" and start fetching the target resource. However, this MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed; when handling it, the client MUST behave as if it had not seen the informational response. In particular, a client MUST NOT process the header fields included in the final response as if they belonged to the informational response, or vice versa. <\/del> However, these header fields only provide hints to the client; they do not replace the header fields on the final response. Aside from performance optimizations, such evaluation of the 103 (Early Hints) response's header fields MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed. A client MUST NOT interpret the 103 (Early Hints) response header fields as if they applied to the informational response itself (e.g., as metadata about the 103 (Early Hints) response). <\/ins> An intermediary MAY drop the informational response. It MAY send HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) server pushes using the information found in the 103"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e13376f82a2c4b20b703c31991a7bc5a9f0302ec9f88052e725d0f94445edc0c","title":"","text":"client that the server is likely to send a final response with the header fields included in the informational response. A server MUST NOT include Content-Length, Transfer-Encoding, or any hop-by-hop header fields (RFC7230, Section 6.1) in a 103 (Early Hints) response. <\/del> Typically, a server will include the header fields sent in a 103 (Early Hints) response in the final response as well. However, there might be cases when this is not desirable, such as when the server learns that they are not correct before the final response is sent. <\/ins> A client can speculatively evaluate the header fields included in a 103 (Early Hints) response while waiting for the final response. For example, a client might recognize a Link header field value containing the relation type \"preload\" and start fetching the target resource. However, these header fields only provide hints to the client; they do not replace the header fields on the final response. Aside from performance optimizations, such evaluation of the 103 (Early Hints) response's header fields MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed. A client MUST NOT interpret the 103 (Early Hints) response header fields as if they applied to the informational <\/del> resource. However, these header fields only provide hints to the client; they do not replace the header fields on the final response. Aside from performance optimizations, such evaluation of the 103 (Early Hints) response's header fields MUST NOT affect how the final response is processed. A client MUST NOT interpret the 103 (Early Hints) response header fields as if they applied to the informational <\/ins> response itself (e.g., as metadata about the 103 (Early Hints) response). An intermediary MAY drop the informational response. It MAY send HTTP\/2 (RFC7540) server pushes using the information found in the 103 (Early Hints) response. <\/del> The following example illustrates a typical message exchange that involves a 103 (Early Hints) response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cec3a32a7f907b100f54af192be0133678c980e6e327dc9cefef5eff5a56661a","title":"","text":"Server response: As is the case with any informational response, a server might emit more than one 103 (Early Hints) response prior to sending a final response. This can happen for example when a caching intermediary generates a 103 (Early Hints) response based on the header fields of a stale-cached response, then forwards a 103 (Early Hints) response and a final response that were sent from the origin server in response to a revalidation request. <\/ins> 3. Some clients might have issues handling 103 (Early Hints), since"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4bd7c256f690dcbf1d1a8d4d946bf1a51b48777482ef4382629a0eff717e5aff","title":"","text":"requests to different origins onto a single persistent connection. Therefore, a server might refrain from sending Early Hints over HTTP\/1.1 unless when the client is known to handle informational responses correctly. <\/del> HTTP\/1.1 unless the client is known to handle informational responses correctly. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 clients are less likely to suffer from incorrect framing since handling of the response header fields does not affect how the end of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5245606a03e4cb104f0552843131da9239076cc2a68624491b2dfb07b429889","title":"","text":"response itself (e.g., as metadata about the 103 (Early Hints) response). A server MAY use a 103 (Early Hints) response to indicate only some of the header fields that are expected to be found in the final response. A client SHOULD NOT interpret the nonexistence of a header field in a 103 (Early Hints) response as a speculation that the header field is unlikely to be part of the final response. <\/ins> The following example illustrates a typical message exchange that involves a 103 (Early Hints) response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42ce5406bcf63a69daf03fb9fb4e99e0c625ad238d68de5e5a0d13169a565daf","title":"","text":"and a final response that were sent from the origin server in response to a revalidation request. A server MAY emit multiple 103 (Early Hints) responses with additional header fields as new information becomes available while the request is being processed. It does not need to repeat the fields that were already emitted, though it doesn't have to exclude them either. The client can consider any combination of header fields received in multiple 103 (Early Hints) responses when anticipating the list of header fields expected in the final response. The following example illustrates a series of responses that a server might emit. In the example, the server uses two 103 (Early Hints) responses to notify the client that it is likely to send three Link header fields in the final response. Two of the three expected header fields are found in the final response. The other header field is replaced by another Link header field that contains a different value. <\/ins> 3. Some clients might have issues handling 103 (Early Hints), since"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-281c4f76058355f200cf548b45a03c97945bb2a151e049841ed1224a487d4941","title":"","text":"The terms \"user agent\", \"client\", \"server\", \"proxy\", and \"origin server\" have the same meaning as in the HTTP\/1.1 specification (RFC2616, Section 1.3). <\/del> (RFC7230, Section 2). <\/ins> The request-host is the name of the host, as known by the user agent, to which the user agent is sending an HTTP request or from which it is receiving an HTTP response (i.e., the name of the host to which it sent the corresponding HTTP request). The term request-uri is defined in Section 5.1.2 of RFC2616. <\/del> The term request-uri refers to \"request-target\" as defined in Section 5.3 of RFC7230. <\/ins> Two sequences of octets are said to case-insensitively match each other if and only if they are equivalent under the i;ascii-casemap"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9ec95e94a6d8c660a4ab4e085dabae7411063479655516ac42de23851c6c2ca4","title":"","text":"Origin servers SHOULD NOT fold multiple Set-Cookie header fields into a single header field. The usual mechanism for folding HTTP headers fields (i.e., as defined in RFC2616) might change the semantics of the Set-Cookie header field because the %x2C (\",\") character is used by Set-Cookie in a way that conflicts with such folding. <\/del> fields (i.e., as defined in Section 3.2.2 of RFC7230) might change the semantics of the Set-Cookie header field because the %x2C (\",\") character is used by Set-Cookie in a way that conflicts with such folding. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4ee71c52f64121ec7128c2d365296770a8df62afd8d2e11af8d6b63532bfd76f","title":"","text":"HTTP\/1.1. The server can cause a client to retry a request and not use early data by responding with the 4NN (Too Early) status code (status), <\/del> data by responding with the 425 (Too Early) status code (status), <\/ins> in cases where the risk of replay is judged too great. For a given request, the level of tolerance to replay risk is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d203f9eb5b279d859f26b34502238268995459f8869b37048bfed10c7bbddde0","title":"","text":"the TLS layer. TLS only permits a server to accept all early data, or none of it. Once a server has decided to accept early data, it MUST process all requests in early data, even if the server rejects the request by sending a 4NN (Too Early) response. <\/del> the request by sending a 425 (Too Early) response. <\/ins> A server can limit the amount of early data with the \"max_early_data_size\" field of the \"early_data\" TLS extension. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88d4251ed44749f190b4a0c94813e6946bd45c183b7c3e1eb28b7d5adbbc310a","title":"","text":"server accepts early data multiple times (though this would be in violation of requirements in TLS). Clients that use early data MUST retry requests upon receipt of a 4NN <\/del> Clients that use early data MUST retry requests upon receipt of a 425 <\/ins> (Too Early) status code; see status. An intermediary MUST NOT use early data when forwarding a request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-92f7ccac9fd9ec98ab6a9d5c476dbaba5ffea361fd1c2787d5d86808404a315a","title":"","text":"The \"Early-Data\" header field is included in requests that are received in early data. The 4NN (Too Early) status code is defined for a server to <\/del> The 425 (Too Early) status code is defined for a server to <\/ins> indicate that a request could not be processed due to the consequences of a possible replay attack."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dfe7b6ea39602c5ef19c3dcb4d2c8ee5ba4fb8344b566aabe22fc3cf6497c70c","title":"","text":"The \"Early-Data\" request header field indicates that the request has been conveyed in early data, and additionally indicates that a client understands the 4NN (Too Early) status code. <\/del> understands the 425 (Too Early) status code. <\/ins> It has just one valid value: \"1\". Its syntax is defined by the following ABNF ABNF:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dad2497f74e0917b80487eadff9e597deee0936ed3333820cfb3e9e1d92a5b97","title":"","text":"The \"Early-Data\" header field is not intended for use by user agents (that is, the original initiator of a request). Sending a request in early data implies that the client understands this specification and is willing to retry a request in response to a 4NN (Too Early) status <\/del> is willing to retry a request in response to a 425 (Too Early) status <\/ins> code. A user agent that sends a request in early data does not need to include the \"Early-Data\" header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e311bb82bae90976476ca24de4351f72c1be389cdd803316ea533b22f5e63e92","title":"","text":"field safe for processing by waiting for the handshake to complete. A request that is marked with Early-Data was sent in early data on a previous hop. Requests that contain the Early-Data field and cannot be safely processed MUST be rejected using the 4NN (Too Early) status <\/del> be safely processed MUST be rejected using the 425 (Too Early) status <\/ins> code. 5.2. A 4NN (Too Early) status code indicates that the server is unwilling <\/del> A 425 (Too Early) status code indicates that the server is unwilling <\/ins> to risk processing a request that might be replayed. Clients (user-agents and intermediaries) that sent the request in early data MUST automatically retry the request when receiving a 4NN <\/del> early data MUST automatically retry the request when receiving a 425 <\/ins> (Too Early) response status code. Such retries MUST NOT be sent in early data. Intermediaries that receive a 4NN (Too Early) status code MAY <\/del> Intermediaries that receive a 425 (Too Early) status code MAY <\/ins> automatically retry requests after allowing the handshake to complete unless the original request contained the \"Early-Data\" header field when it was received. Otherwise, an intermediary MUST forward the 4NN (Too Early) status code. <\/del> 425 (Too Early) status code. <\/ins> The server cannot assume that a client is able to retry a request unless the request is received in early data or the \"Early-Data\" header field is set to \"1\". A server SHOULD NOT emit the 4NN status <\/del> header field is set to \"1\". A server SHOULD NOT emit the 425 status <\/ins> code unless one of these conditions is met. The 4NN (Too Early) status code is not cacheable by default. Its <\/del> The 425 (Too Early) status code is not cacheable by default. Its <\/ins> payload is not the representation of any identified resource. 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-baa8a1d8052339794300ffb1b9d72573b504fee853afd9e92e19f5dbba48f41e","title":"","text":"A gateway that forwards requests that were received in early data MUST only do so if it knows that the server that receives those requests understands the \"Early-Data\" header field and will correctly generate a 4NN (Too Early) status code. A gateway that isn't certain <\/del> generate a 425 (Too Early) status code. A gateway that isn't certain <\/ins> about server support SHOULD either delay forwarding the request until the TLS handshake completes, or send a 4NN (Too Early) status code in <\/del> the TLS handshake completes, or send a 425 (Too Early) status code in <\/ins> response. A gateway that is uncertain about whether an origin server supports the \"Early-Data\" header field SHOULD disable early data."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71cef70479fa8a3921ab7e65f1756d19ada994ae14ad6c8864e61931ced2ea39","title":"","text":"through the replay of requests that are expensive to handle. A server that is under load SHOULD prefer rejecting TLS early data as a whole rather than accepting early data and selectively processing requests. Generating a 503 (Service Unavailable) or 4NN (Too Early) <\/del> requests. Generating a 503 (Service Unavailable) or 425 (Too Early) <\/ins> status code often leads to clients retrying requests, which could result in increased load."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-39382ef09b53c6d2e679f5c1288477719796c6799ac653e17c1b1c1b1d256352","title":"","text":"(empty) This document registers the 4NN (Too Early) status code in the <\/del> This document registers the 425 (Too Early) status code in the <\/ins> \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code\" registry established in RFC7231. 4NN <\/del> 425 <\/ins> Too Early"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4daf7ba1a23c3d64873dd56bd77955fe39477e3dd172e2e6e849f9522e000884","title":"","text":"Clients (user-agents and intermediaries) that sent the request in early data MUST automatically retry the request when receiving a 4NN (Too Early) response status code. Such retries MUST NOT be sent in early data, and SHOULD NOT be sent if the TLS handshake on the original connection does not successfully complete. <\/del> early data. <\/ins> Intermediaries that receive a 4NN (Too Early) status code MAY automatically retry requests after allowing the handshake to complete"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2815fda8dfb4b52a6c6f1a56f8a2e6e5ca33d2163f81138ba75c1b58207cc246","title":"","text":"status code often leads to clients retrying requests, which could result in increased load. 6.4. In protocols that deliver data out of order (such as QUIC HQ) early data can arrive after the handshake completes. This leads to potential ambiguity about the status of requests and could lead to inconsistent treatment (see be-consistent). Implementations MUST either ensure that any early data that is delivered late is either discarded or consistently identified and processed. <\/ins> 7. This document registers the \"Early-Data\" header field in the \"Message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-79f0140d37a90161befb9527ce10e7d8a2c010b67bcf02fd84db8243d16d374c","title":"","text":"TLS handshake completes, then all instances of the server need to agree and either reject the request or delay processing. A server MUST NOT act on early data before the handshake completes if it and any other server instance could make a different decision about how to handle the same data. <\/ins> 6.3. Accepting early data exposes a server to potential denial of service"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-034345cc973919368d0e190026a18d6fa20c799cb3b744e1257dc8276276d680","title":"","text":"capacity even then. This specification defines a HTTP\/2 frame type to allow clients to inform the server of their cache's contents using a Golomb-Rice Coded Set Rice. Servers can then use this to inform their choices of what to push to clients. <\/del> inform the server of their cache's contents using a Cuckoo-filter Cuckoo based digest. Servers can then use this to inform their choices of what to push to clients. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5adf37382245d6e628c0496bfdd6ab2924fee91b75caa4e3f9695de59214d5b7","title":"","text":"A sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the Digest-Value applies to. A sequence of octets containing the digest as computed in computing. <\/del> A sequence of octets containing the digest as computed in creating and adding. <\/ins> The CACHE_DIGEST frame defines the following flags:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c0b433d334fb32d341539fa775727aa68c60090d958a3dd3db5ed6dcd09e4f73","title":"","text":"representation of the cache's state regarding that origin, for the type of cached response indicated by the \"STALE\" flag. *VALIDATORS* (0x4): When set, indicates that the \"validators\" boolean in computing is true. *STALE* (0x8): When set, indicates that all cached responses represented in the digest-value are stale RFC7234 at the point in them that the digest was generated; otherwise, all are fresh. <\/del> 2.1. A CACHE_DIGEST frame MUST be sent from a client to a server on stream"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-44818510d3d0941d948950dca6c50ddcfaab9aa9a6b2acf6abc24965f768f98c","title":"","text":"that are not authoritative (as defined in RFC7540, 10.1) for the indicated origin. CACHE_DIGEST allows the client to indicate whether the set of URLs used to compute the digest represent fresh or stale stored responses, using the STALE flag. Clients MAY decide whether to only send CACHE_DIGEST frames representing their fresh stored responses, their stale stored responses, or both. <\/del> Clients can choose to only send a subset of the suitable stored responses of each type (fresh or stale). However, when the CACHE_DIGEST frames sent represent the complete set of stored responses of a given type, the last such frame SHOULD have a COMPLETE flag set, to indicate to the server that it has all relevant state of that type. Note that for the purposes of COMPLETE, responses cached since the beginning of the connection or the last RESET flag on a CACHE_DIGEST frame need not be included. CACHE_DIGEST can be computed to include cached responses' ETags, as indicated by the VALIDATORS flag. This information can be used by servers to decide what kinds of responses to push to clients; for example, a stale response that hasn't changed could be refreshed with a 304 (Not Modified) response; one that has changed can be replaced with a 200 (OK) response, whether the cached response was fresh or stale. <\/del> responses. However, when the CACHE_DIGEST frames sent represent the complete set of stored responses of a given type, the last such frame SHOULD have a COMPLETE flag set, to indicate to the server that it has all relevant state of that type. Note that for the purposes of COMPLETE, responses cached since the beginning of the connection or the last RESET flag on a CACHE_DIGEST frame need not be included. CACHE_DIGEST will also include the cached responses' ETags, if they were present in the response. This information can be used by servers to decide if a response needs to be pushed to clients; If a response is cached and was not changed at the origin server, the server calculating its hash will find it in the digest and therefore will not push it. If a response is cached but was modified at the origin server, the server calculating its hash will not find it in the digest, so the response will be pushed. <\/ins> CACHE_DIGEST has no defined meaning when sent from servers, and SHOULD be ignored by clients. 2.1.1. Given the following inputs: * \"P\", an integer smaller than 256, that indicates the probability of a false positive that is acceptable, expressed as \"1\/2\\*\\*P\". * \"N\", an integer that represents the number of entries - a prime number smaller than 2**32 Let \"f\" be the number of bits per fingerprint, calculated as \"P + 3\" Let \"b\" be the bucket size, defined as 4. Let \"bytes\" be \"f\"*\"N\"*\"b\"\/8 rounded up to the nearest integer Add 5 to \"bytes\" Allocate memory of \"bytes\" and set it to zero. Assign it to \"digest-value\". Set the first byte to \"P\" Set the second till fifth bytes to \"N\" in big endian form Return the \"digest-value\". 2.1.2. <\/ins> Given the following inputs: \"validators\", a boolean indicating whether validators (RFC7232) are to be included in the digest; <\/del> \"URL\" a string corresponding to the Effective Request URI (RFC7230, Section 5.5) of a cached response <\/ins> \"URLs'\", an array of (string \"URL\", string \"ETag\") tuples, each corresponding to the Effective Request URI (RFC7230, Section 5.5) of a cached response RFC7234 and its entity-tag RFC7232 (if \"validators\" is true and if the ETag is available; otherwise, <\/del> \"ETag\" a string corresponding to the entity-tag RFC7232 of a cached response RFC7234 (if the ETag is available; otherwise, <\/ins> null); \"P\", an integer that MUST be a power of 2 smaller than 2**32, that indicates the probability of a false positive that is acceptable, expressed as \"1\/P\". <\/del> \"maxcount\" - max number of cuckoo hops <\/ins> \"digest-value\" can be computed using the following algorithm: <\/del> \"digest-value\" <\/ins> Let N be the count of \"URLs\"' members, rounded to the nearest power of 2 smaller than 2**32. <\/del> Let \"f\" be the value of the first byte of \"digest-value\". <\/ins> Let \"hash-values\" be an empty array of integers. <\/del> Let \"b\" be the bucket size, defined as 4. <\/ins> For each (\"URL\", \"ETag\") in \"URLs\", compute a hash value (hash) and append the result to \"hash-values\". <\/del> Let \"N\" be the value of the second to fifth bytes of \"digest- value\" in big endian form. <\/ins> Sort \"hash-values\" in ascending order. <\/del> Let \"key\" be the return value of key with \"URL\" and \"ETag\" as inputs. <\/ins> Let \"digest-value\" be an empty array of bits. <\/del> Let \"h1\" be the return value of hash with \"key\" and \"N\" as inputs. <\/ins> Write log base 2 of \"N\" to \"digest-value\" using 5 bits. <\/del> Let \"fingerprint\" be the return value of fingerprint with \"key\" and \"f\" as inputs. <\/ins> Write log base 2 of \"P\" to \"digest-value\" using 5 bits. <\/del> Let \"fingerprint-string\" be the value of \"fingerprint\" in base 10, expressed as a string. <\/ins> Let \"C\" be -1. <\/del> Let \"h2\" be the return value of hash with \"fingerprint-string\" and \"N\" as inputs, XORed with \"h1\". <\/ins> For each \"V\" in \"hash-values\": <\/del> Let \"h\" be either \"h1\" or \"h2\", picked in random. <\/ins> If \"V\" is equal to \"C\", continue to the next \"V\". <\/del> Let \"position_start\" be 40 + \"h\" * \"f\" * \"b\". <\/ins> Let \"D\" be the result of \"V - C - 1\". <\/del> Let \"position_end\" be \"position_start\" + \"f\" * \"b\". <\/ins> Let \"Q\" be the integer result of \"D \/ P\". <\/del> While \"position_start\" < \"position_end\": <\/ins> Let \"R\" be the result of \"D modulo P\". <\/del> Let \"bits\" be \"f\" bits from \"digest_value\" starting at \"position_start\". <\/ins> Write \"Q\" '0' bits to \"digest-value\". <\/del> If \"bits\" is all zeros, set \"bits\" to \"fingerprint\" and terminate these steps. <\/ins> Write 1 '1' bit to \"digest-value\". <\/del> Add \"f\" to \"position_start\". <\/ins> Write \"R\" to \"digest-value\" as binary, using log2(\"P\") bits. <\/del> Substract \"f\" from \"position_start\". <\/ins> Let \"C\" be \"V\" <\/del> Let \"fingerprint\" be the \"f\" bits starting at \"position_start\". <\/ins> If the length of \"digest-value\" is not a multiple of 8, pad it with 0s until it is. <\/del> Let \"h1\" be \"h\" <\/ins> 2.1.2. <\/del> Substract 1 from \"maxcount\". <\/ins> Given: <\/del> If \"maxcount\" is zero, return an error. <\/ins> \"URL\", an array of characters <\/del> Go to step 7. <\/ins> \"ETag\", an array of characters <\/del> 2.1.3. Given the following inputs: <\/ins> \"validators\", a boolean <\/del> \"URL\" a string corresponding to the Effective Request URI (RFC7230, Section 5.5) of a cached response <\/ins> \"N\", an integer <\/del> \"ETag\" a string corresponding to the entity-tag RFC7232 of a cached response RFC7234 (if the ETag is available; otherwise, null); <\/ins> \"P\", an integer <\/del> \"digest-value\" <\/ins> \"hash-value\" can be computed using the following algorithm: <\/del> Let \"f\" be the value of the first byte of \"digest-value\". Let \"b\" be the bucket size, defined as 4. Let \"N\" be the value of the second to fifth bytes of \"digest- value\" in big endian form. Let \"key\" be the return value of key with \"URL\" and \"ETag\" as inputs. Let \"h1\" be the return value of hash with \"key\" and \"N\" as inputs. Let \"fingerprint\" be the return value of fingerprint with \"key\" and \"f\" as inputs. Let \"fingerprint-string\" be the value of \"fingerprint\" in base 10, expressed as a string. Let \"h2\" be the return value of hash with \"fingerprint-string\" and \"N\" as inputs, XORed with \"h1\". Let \"h\" be \"h1\". Let \"position_start\" be 40 + \"h\" * \"f\" * \"b\". Let \"position_end\" be \"position_start\" + \"f\" * \"b\". While \"position_start\" < \"position_end\": Let \"bits\" be \"f\" bits from \"digest_value\" starting at \"position_start\". If \"bits\" is \"fingerprint\", set \"bits\" to all zeros and terminate these steps. Add \"f\" to \"position_start\". If \"h\" is not \"h2\", set \"h\" to \"h2\" and return to step 9. 2.1.4. Given the following inputs: \"key\", an array of characters \"f\", an integer indicating the number of output bits Let \"hash-value\" be the SHA-256 message digest RFC6234 of \"key\", expressed as an integer. Let \"h\" be the number of bits in \"hash-value\" Let \"fingerprint-value\" be 0 While \"fingerprint-value\" is 0 and \"h\" > \"f\": Let \"fingerprint-value\" be the \"f\" least significant bits of \"hash-value\". Let \"hash-value\" be the \"h\"-\"f\" most significant bits of \"hash- value\". Substract \"f\" from \"h\". If \"fingerprint-value\" is 0, let \"fingerprint-value\" be 1. Return \"fingerprint-value\". Note: Step 5 is to handle the extremely unlikely case where a SHA-256 digest of \"key\" is all zeros. The implications of it means that there's an infitisimaly larger probability of getting a \"fingerprint- value\" of 1 compared to all other values. This is not a problem for any practical purpose. 2.1.5. Given the following inputs: \"URL\", an array of characters \"ETag\", an array of characters <\/ins> Let \"key\" be \"URL\" converted to an ASCII string by percent- encoding as appropriate RFC3986. If \"validators\" is true and \"ETag\" is not null: <\/del> If \"ETag\" is not null: <\/ins> Append \"ETag\" to \"key\" as an ASCII string, including both the \"weak\" indicator (if present) and double quotes, as per RFC7232, Section 2.3. Return \"key\" 2.1.6. Given the following inputs: \"key\", an array of characters. \"N\", an integer \"hash-value\" can be computed using the following algorithm: <\/ins> Let \"hash-value\" be the SHA-256 message digest RFC6234 of \"key\", expressed as an integer. <\/del> truncated to 32 bits, expressed as an integer. <\/ins> Truncate \"hash-value\" to log2( \"N\" * \"P\" ) bits. <\/del> Return \"hash-value\" modulo N. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3dcc46a6869040e4f2aee5c3c0c1ca378913aabb6e8c2e650e1925d88f3ed42e","title":"","text":"CACHE_DIGESTs received on a given connection to inform what it pushes to that client; If a given URL has a match in a current CACHE_DIGEST with the STALE flag unset, it need not be pushed, because it is fresh in cache; <\/del> If a given URL and ETag combination has a match in a current CACHE_DIGEST with the STALE flag set, the client has a stale copy in cache, and a validating response can be pushed; <\/del> CACHE_DIGEST, a complete response need not be pushed; The server MAY push a 304 response for that resource, indicating the client that it hasn't changed. <\/ins> If a given URL has no match in any current CACHE_DIGEST, the client does not have a cached copy, and a complete response can be pushed. <\/del> If a given URL and ETag has no match in any current CACHE_DIGEST, the client does not have a cached copy, and a complete response can be pushed. <\/ins> Servers MAY use all CACHE_DIGESTs received for a given origin as current, as long as they do not have the RESET flag set; a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e4f39b75003a6e58d4890784b68874eb366f5c931cd58c9de7f341f79f9d1122","title":"","text":"2.2.1. Given: <\/del> Given the following inputs: <\/ins> \"digest-value\", an array of bits <\/del> \"URL\" a string corresponding to the Effective Request URI (RFC7230, Section 5.5) of a cached response RFC7234. <\/ins> \"URL\", an array of characters <\/del> \"ETag\" a string corresponding to the entity-tag RFC7232 of a cached response RFC7234 (if the ETag is available; otherwise, null). <\/ins> \"ETag\", an array of characters <\/del> \"digest-value\", an array of bits. Let \"f\" be the value of the first byte of \"digest-value\". Let \"b\" be the bucket size, defined as 4. <\/ins> \"validators\", a boolean <\/del> Let \"N\" be the value of the second to fifth bytes of \"digest- value\" in big endian form. <\/ins> we can determine whether there is a match in the digest using the following algorithm: <\/del> Let \"key\" be the return value of key with \"URL\" and \"ETag\" as inputs. <\/ins> Read the first 5 bits of \"digest-value\" as an integer; let \"N\" be two raised to the power of that value. <\/del> Let \"h1\" be the return value of hash with \"key\" and \"N\" as inputs. <\/ins> Read the next 5 bits of \"digest-value\" as an integer; let \"P\" be two raised to the power of that value. <\/del> Let \"fingerprint\" be the return value of fingerprint with \"key\" and \"f\" as inputs. <\/ins> Let \"hash-value\" be the result of computing a hash value (hash). <\/del> Let \"fingerprint-string\" be the value of \"fingerprint\" in base 10, expressed as a string. <\/ins> Let \"C\" be -1. <\/del> Let \"h2\" be the return value of hash with \"fingerprint\" and \"N\" as inputs, XORed with \"h1\". <\/ins> Read '0' bits from \"digest-value\" until a '1' bit is found; let \"Q\" be the number of '0' bits. Discard the '1'. <\/del> Let \"h\" be \"h1\". <\/ins> Read log2(\"P\") bits from \"digest-value\" after the '1' as an integer; let \"R\" be its value. <\/del> Let \"position_start\" be 40 + \"h\" * \"f\" * \"b\". <\/ins> Let \"D\" be \"Q\" * \"P\" + \"R\". <\/del> Let \"position_end\" be \"position_start\" + \"f\" * \"b\". <\/ins> Increment \"C\" by \"D\" + 1. <\/del> While \"position_start\" < \"position_end\": <\/ins> If \"C\" is equal to \"hash-value\", return 'true'. <\/del> Let \"bits\" be \"f\" bits from \"digest_value\" starting at \"position_start\". <\/ins> Otherwise, return to step 5 and continue processing; if no match is found before \"digest-value\" is exhausted, return 'false'. <\/del> If \"bits\" is \"fingerprint\", return true Add \"f\" to \"position_start\". Return false. <\/ins> 3. A Client SHOULD notify its support for CACHE_DIGEST frames by sending the SENDING_CACHE_DIGEST (0xXXX) SETTINGS parameter. The value of the parameter is a bit-field of which the following bits are defined: DIGEST_PENDING (0x1): When set it indicates that the client has a digest to send, and the server may choose to wait for a digest in order to make server push decisions. Rest of the bits MUST be ignored and MUST be left unset when sending. The initial value of the parameter is zero (0x0) meaning that the client has no digest to send the server. 4. <\/ins> A server can notify its support for CACHE_DIGEST frame by sending the ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST (0x7) SETTINGS parameter. If the server is tempted to making optimizations based on CACHE_DIGEST frames, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e592da356d213aad4aa0cc673c7927999b6af10521ed7b3703dbc7c898528fcd","title":"","text":"The value of the parameter is a bit-field of which the following bits are defined: FRESH (0x1): When set, it indicates that the server is willing to make use of a digest of freshly-cached responses. STALE (0x2): When set, it indicates that the server is willing to make use of a digest of stale-cached responses. <\/del> ACCEPT (0x1): When set, it indicates that the server is willing to make use of a digest of cached responses. <\/ins> Rest of the bits MUST be ignored and MUST be left unset when sending."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-569a0430899e4456ad260969a24b1a85b014855cfb3b7cd6678d8440fbd751d7","title":"","text":"1.3 in 0-RTT mode), a client can reuse the settings value found in previous connections to that origin RFC6454 to make assumptions. 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This document registers the following entry in the Permanent Message Headers Registry, as per RFC3864:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4ac05399199eeac5f3bc3fa9cb960d1beea4cd5ad01264cff3c1f13fbd196e3d","title":"","text":"Reference: [this document] 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> The contents of a User Agent's cache can be used to re-identify or \"fingerprint\" the user over time, even when other identifiers (e.g.,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0ffbb81db1f77859c79b9f5311cf30e9226c6eedb09c3617debd2d0b7925cf00","title":"","text":"Additionally, User Agents SHOULD NOT send CACHE_DIGEST when in \"privacy mode.\" 6. References <\/del> 7. References <\/ins> 6.1. URIs <\/del> 7.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9a24916a011e73c06704de6f04016027de9bec8fa2aa1d5fb76ce0263b28945d","title":"","text":"\"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. 1.2. This document cites productions in Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) productions from RFC7233, using the notation defined in RFC5234. <\/ins> 2. This document recommends a two-step process for accessing resources"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ac1846b21cd936e49722c64c7b2ba81e297964cd40fb5649d8ffc97ffe6684a0","title":"","text":"It is RECOMMENDED that origin servers allow resources to explicitly configure whether early data is appropriate in requests. Absent such explicit information, they SHOULD mitigate against early data in requests that have unsafe methods, using the techniques outlined above. <\/del> explicit information, origin servers MUST either reject early data or implement the techniques described in this document for ensuring that requests are not processed prior to TLS handshake completion. <\/ins> A request might be sent partially in early data with the remainder of the request being sent after the handshake completes. This does not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-fd47cd82909c392eebc8eefa6a30550176e76d7bb899b25e08da768989615d62","title":"","text":"The \"Early-Data\" header field is included in requests that might have been forwarded by an intermediary prior to the TLS handshake completing. <\/del> with its client completing. <\/ins> The 425 (Too Early) status code is defined for a server to indicate that a request could not be processed due to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-58ef22e22570fc6aec294246ddef01b4beecccf564fdc0efd123097adb481f3c","title":"","text":"For example: An intermediary that forwards a request prior to the completion of the TLS handshake MUST send it with the \"Early-Data\" header field set to \"1\" (i.e., it adds it if not present in the request). An intermediary MUST use the \"Early-Data\" header field if it might have forwarded the request prior to handshake completion (see be- consistent for details). <\/del> the TLS handshake with its client MUST send it with the \"Early-Data\" header field set to \"1\" (i.e., it adds it if not present in the request). An intermediary MUST use the \"Early-Data\" header field if it might have forwarded the request prior to handshake completion (see be-consistent for details). <\/ins> An intermediary MUST NOT remove this header field if it is present in a request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7767658c201e026bc59879417ef8971a7455c9e08ffac9de2a08be234bc73db4","title":"","text":"Abstract This document explains the risks of using early data for HTTP and describes techniques for reducing them. In particular, it defines a mechanism that enables clients to communicate with servers about early data, to assure correct operation. <\/del> Using TLS early data creates an exposure to the possibility of a replay attack. This document defines mechanisms that allow clients to communicate with servers about HTTP requests that are sent in early data. Techniques are described that use these mechanisms to mitigate the risk of replay. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3053f791c419edf784979b47a8434bd1120e61cb03c52f4591d331cf5c644b89","title":"","text":"If the server receives multiple requests in early data, it can determine whether to defer HTTP processing on a per-request basis. This may require buffering the responses to preserve ordering in HTTP\/1.1. <\/del> The server can cause a client to retry a request and not use early data by responding with the 425 (Too Early) status code (status),"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c5811dd12b02909df8d7b7ef1180ec6a5a18f87ecb1c05420d920a5e0a2babe4","title":"","text":"If the server rejects early data at the TLS layer, a client MUST start sending again as though the connection was new. This could entail using a different negotiated protocol ALPN than the one optimistically used for the early data. If HTTP\/2 is selected after early data is rejected, a client sends another connection preface. Any requests sent in early data MUST be sent again, unless the client decides to abandon those requests. <\/del> optimistically used for the early data. Any requests sent in early data MUST be sent again, unless the client decides to abandon those requests. <\/ins> This automatic retry exposes the request to a potential replay attack. An attacker sends early data to one server instance that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-045c4d56a1911bae47b395a0a05177beb3aa2379090adb1fbfe3b9bde2807c17","title":"","text":"A gateway that forwards requests that were received in early data MUST only do so if it knows that the origin server that receives those requests understands the \"Early-Data\" header field and will correctly generate a 425 (Too Early) status code. A gateway that isn't certain about origin server support SHOULD either delay forwarding the request until the TLS handshake with its client completes, or send a 425 (Too Early) status code in response. A gateway that is uncertain about whether an origin server supports the \"Early-Data\" header field SHOULD disable early data. <\/del> correctly generate a 425 (Too Early) status code. A gateway that is uncertain about origin server support for a given request SHOULD either delay forwarding the request until the TLS handshake with its client completes, or send a 425 (Too Early) status code in response. A gateway without at least one potential origin server that supports \"Early-Data\" header field expends significant effort for what can at best be a modest performance benefit from enabling early data. If no origin server supports early data, disabling early data entirely is more efficient. <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e6f7291a88c588e796cba751dfccea856773b44a0a1b0bf07a76b9d6837aeb50","title":"","text":"gateways) need to agree and either reject the request or delay processing. Disabling early data, delaying requests, or rejecting requests with the 425 (Too Early) status code are all equally good measures for mitigating replay attacks on requests that might be vulnerable to replay. Server instances can implement any of these measures and be considered to be consistent, even if different instances use different methods. Critically, this means that it is possible to employ different mitigations in reaction to other conditions, such as server load. <\/ins> A server MUST NOT act on early data before the handshake completes if it and any other server instance could make a different decision about how to handle the same data."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0a2e15d07bd0aaf3edc068f5c4dcc22ac44b30f926ee470da281c8da04beeba7","title":"","text":"6.4. In protocols that deliver data out of order (such as QUIC HQ) early data can arrive after the handshake completes. This leads to potential ambiguity about the status of requests and could lead to inconsistent treatment (see be-consistent). Implementations MUST either ensure that any early data that is delivered late is either discarded or consistently identified and processed. <\/del> data can arrive after the handshake completes. A server MAY process requests received in early data after handshake completion if it can rely on other instances correctly handling replays of the same requests. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-22429879ad734216ba3a4d989acf1673105641559621f4a5bbb821108b59e880","title":"","text":"that have indeterminate length representations. Two steps are necessary because of limitations with the Range request header and the Content-Range response header fields. A server cannot know from a range request that a client wishes to receive a response that does not have a definite end. More critically, the header fields do not allow the server to signal that a resource has <\/del> header fields and the Content-Range response header fields. A server cannot know from a range request that a client wishes to receive a response that does not have a definite end. More critically, the header fields do not allow the server to signal that a resource has <\/ins> indeterminate length without also providing a fixed portion of the resource."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7709499642068ddf77d27d469b91be2e3aaf0f0408de0c2732f39f0b3d276794","title":"","text":"and leave last-byte-pos absent. A server that receives a satisfiable byte-range request (with first-byte-pos smaller than the current representation length) may respond with a 206 status code (Partial Content) with a Content-Range header indicating the currently <\/del> Content) with a Content-Range header field indicating the currently <\/ins> satisfiable byte range. For example: returns a response of the form:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2fc84e482787c5339742f87dcded88941b418525f8d490c12cda50e9b9b2e3f8","title":"","text":"a live video stream. Unlike a byte-range Range request, a byte-range Content-Range response header cannot be \"open ended\", per RFC7233: <\/del> response header field cannot be \"open ended\", per RFC7233: <\/ins> Specifically, last-byte-pos is required in byte-range. So in order to preserve interoperability with existing HTTP clients, servers,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1882eedb339bf0c0aeb77bcd7e5a3508791ad3fb156ee30f4bac3dedd07eb1a","title":"","text":"In response, a server may indicate that it is supplying a continuously aggregating (\"live\") response by supplying the client request's last-byte-pos in the Content-Range response header. <\/del> request's last-byte-pos in the Content-Range response header field. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b8f2f0d650561725bc0e68149e0b59060293877c477bb58ed289e953af956d07","title":"","text":"A server that does return a continuously aggregating (\"live\") response should return data using chunked transfer coding and not provide a Content-Length header. A 0-length chunk indicates the end of the transfer, per RFC7230. <\/del> provide a Content-Length header field. A 0-length chunk indicates the end of the transfer, per RFC7230. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-418bc6ea1715aaff7d7f4de6135cf182d7a25539eb5b6c13d7dbff584d364b0f","title":"","text":"learn what range the server has currently available and initiate an indeterminate-length transfer. For example: With the Content-Range response header indicating the (or ranges) available. For example: <\/del> With the Content-Range response header field indicating the (or ranges) available. For example: <\/ins> The client can then issue a request for a range starting at the end value (using a very large value for the end of a range) and receive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-491ad22f3664913e10490b3176a9203fea9837caa495ff33698288e66a2b300b","title":"","text":"learn what range the server has currently available and initiate an indeterminate-length transfer. For example: With the Content-Range response header field indicating the (or <\/del> With the Content-Range response header field indicating the range (or <\/ins> ranges) available. For example: The client can then issue a request for a range starting at the end"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-923ab50edcd211d02844610c6c5e39683694f8e6dec1b833438a5f7b7eb27c8f","title":"","text":"This document adds a new SETTINGS Parameter to those defined by RFC7540, Section 6.5.2. The new parameter is ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL (type = 0x8). The value of the parameter MUST be 0 or 1. <\/del> The new parameter name is SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL. The value of the parameter MUST be 0 or 1. <\/ins> Upon receipt of ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL with a value of 1 a client MAY use the Extended CONNECT definition of this document when <\/del> Upon receipt of SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL with a value of 1 a client MAY use the Extended CONNECT definition of this document when <\/ins> creating new streams. Receipt of this parameter by a server does not have any impact. A sender MUST NOT send a ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL parameter with the value of 0 after previously sending a value of 1. <\/del> A sender MUST NOT send a SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL parameter with the value of 0 after previously sending a value of 1. <\/ins> The use of a SETTINGS Parameter to opt-in to an otherwise incompatible protocol change is a use of \"Extending HTTP\/2\" defined by Section 5.5 of RFC7540. If a client were to use the provisions of the extended CONNECT method defined in this document without first receiving a ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL parameter with the value of 1 it would be a protocol violation. <\/del> receiving a SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL parameter with the value of 1 it would be a protocol violation. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-75af2ec4ef7cd54b295554c520657422ce1c88b31c38cee269430c82f7277b58","title":"","text":"9. This document establishes a entry for the HTTP\/2 Settings Registry <\/del> This document establishes an entry for the HTTP\/2 Settings Registry <\/ins> that was established by Section 11.3 of RFC7540. Name: ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL <\/del> Name: SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL <\/ins> Code: 0x8"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-46227d87cb0d6c39f91456625ceff73e47974d8cb1a8e71b75f6a8ecd5d55a3f","title":"","text":"This specification defines the \"Authentication-Info\" and \"Proxy- Authentication-Info\" response header fields for use in HTTP authentication schemes which need to return additional information during or after authentication. <\/del> authentication schemes which need to return information once the client's authentication credentials have been accepted. <\/ins> Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6c8454a6c23e616ff5624ba150a5d7dd9a52c1117783cf6245bdf23caadcd85a","title":"","text":"This specification defines the \"Authentication-Info\" and \"Proxy- Authentication-Info\" response header fields for use in HTTP authentication schemes (RFC7235) which need to return additional information during or after authentication. <\/del> authentication schemes (RFC7235) which need to return information once the client's authentication credentials have been accepted. <\/ins> Both were previously defined in RFC2617, defining the HTTP \"Digest\" authentication scheme. This document generalizes the description for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bbd4e72778230e871b7783787c625e0ba1c3488420a2f38cc8e6615f823efd6f","title":"","text":"3. HTTP authentication schemes can use the Authentication-Info response header field to communicate additional information regarding the successful authentication. <\/del> header field to communicate information after the client's authentication credentials have been accepted. This information can include a finalization message from the server (e.g., it can contain the server authentication). <\/ins> The field value is a list of parameters (name\/value pairs), using the \"auth-param\" syntax defined in RFC7235. This specification only"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3772a035cfeef0c129ba3fa8782282a17812fda2ef7f67d0676a83871bb7d484","title":"","text":"Furthermore, applications using HTTP MUST NOT re-specify the semantics of HTTP status codes, even if it is only by copying their definition. They MUST NOT require specific status phrases to be used; the status phrase has no function in HTTP, and is not guaranteed to be preserved by implementations. <\/del> definition. They MUST NOT require specific reason phrases to be used; the reason phrase has no function in HTTP, and is not guaranteed to be preserved by implementations. The reason phrase is not carried in the RFC7540 message format. <\/ins> Typically, applications using HTTP will convey application-specific information in the message body and\/or HTTP header fields, not the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-39c110602042a9195ab5364f3992160cb9642b28522f8fae8f4f67dd91aebf11","title":"","text":"This document specifies best practices for these protocols' use of HTTP. This document obsoletes RFC 3205. <\/ins> Note to Readers Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f68b78c71cc15e5608f25b556b1f473f37fbe498393fe836e86a69c861bca551","title":"","text":"3. A Client SHOULD notify its support for CACHE_DIGEST frames by sending the SENDING_CACHE_DIGEST (0xXXX) SETTINGS parameter. <\/del> the SETTINGS_SENDING_CACHE_DIGEST (0xXXX) SETTINGS parameter. <\/ins> The value of the parameter is a bit-field of which the following bits are defined:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-188db0376d2bf01301fbd1613217cb333d5840c86334338ecc0d53ecde684b2d","title":"","text":"4. A server can notify its support for CACHE_DIGEST frame by sending the ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST (0x7) SETTINGS parameter. If the server is tempted to making optimizations based on CACHE_DIGEST frames, it <\/del> SETTINGS_ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST (0x7) SETTINGS parameter. If the server is tempted to making optimizations based on CACHE_DIGEST frames, it <\/ins> SHOULD send the SETTINGS parameter immediately after the connection is established."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d17a14df85f6194bac7e5a21cdce99c9f8a1382f95d82faa55082ca0ce16e885","title":"","text":"client sends it's first flight data. When such transport (e.g., TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-tls13 in full-handshake mode) is used, a client can postpone sending the CACHE_DIGEST frame until it receives a ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST settings value. <\/del> SETTINGS_ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST settings value. <\/ins> When the underlying transport does not have such property (e.g., TLS 1.3 in 0-RTT mode), a client can reuse the settings value found in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3102a91e9028d1d9d92388c039dfbace9957ee4f3ea3f5631c9f58406815d264","title":"","text":"Code: 0x7 Name: ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST <\/del> Name: SETTINGS_ACCEPT_CACHE_DIGEST <\/ins> Initial Value: 0x0"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e56c73146dd4942c377ad8f90836342e4d58cb25d82f0f0bffba3e1994cc9c1e","title":"","text":"support the Tunnel-Protocol header field. The value of the Tunnel-Protocol header field could be falsified by a client. The use of protocols like RFC5246 make it very difficult or impossible to verify that the header field is correct even after a connection is established. A proxy therefore cannot rely on the value of the Tunnel-Protocol header field as a policy input in all cases. <\/del> client. If the data being sent through the tunnel is encrypted (for example, with RFC5246), then the proxy might not be able to directly inspect the data to verify that the claimed protocol is the one which is actually being used, though a proxy might be able to perform traffic analysis TRAFFIC. A proxy therefore cannot rely on the value of the Tunnel-Protocol header field as a policy input in all cases. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-81d3a4df17f1f77884aa0cfdbf34b6720461bdb13595c21aa375ddea655483fe","title":"","text":"configuration of underlying encryption, allowing a \"http\" URI to be accessed using TLS RFC5246 opportunistically. Currently, \"https\" URIs require acquiring and configuring a valid <\/del> Serving \"https\" URIs require acquiring and configuring a valid <\/ins> certificate, which means that some deployments find supporting TLS difficult. Therefore, this document describes a usage model whereby sites can serve \"http\" URIs over TLS without being required to support strong server authentication. <\/del> difficult. This document describes a usage model whereby sites can serve \"http\" URIs over TLS without being required to support strong server authentication. <\/ins> Opportunistic Security RFC7435 does not provide the same guarantees as using TLS with \"https\" URIs; it is vulnerable to active attacks,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23d0f5185fc03c9c9adf04a1699a2943c734abf3d8910d3c4948e288358dd30c","title":"","text":"there will be no \"lock icon\"). By its nature, this technique is vulnerable to active attacks. A mechanism for partially mitigating them is described in http-tls. It does not offer the same level of protection as afforded to \"https\" URIs, but increases the likelihood that an active attack be detected. <\/del> mechanism for partially mitigating them is described in http-tls. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-68a43f32260d8c837e46e69e4d0df9ceb2e67f7e8c3d535b99e963ad6f2b371f","title":"","text":"attack can be detected. A final (but significant) goal is to provide for ease of implementation, deployment and operation. This mechanism should have a minimal impact upon performance, and should not require extensive <\/del> implementation, deployment and operation. This mechanism is expected to have a minimal impact upon performance, and a trivial <\/ins> administrative effort to configure. 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ecce101d755d2e77ba4410887092fa7b0533082b1031ccce21b9295e386e71b","title":"","text":"A client that places the importance of protection against passive attacks over performance might choose to withhold requests until an encrypted connection is available. However, if such a connection cannot be successfully established, the client MAY resume its use of <\/del> cannot be successfully established, the client can resume its use of <\/ins> the cleartext connection. A client can also explicitly probe for an alternative service"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-95051abfd9258cf5a6093089d2d253958762304fe4856269fe0a123764a343cb","title":"","text":"is proffered by the alternative service, is not necessarily checked for validity, expiration, issuance by a trusted certificate authority or matched against the name in the URI. Therefore, the alternative service MAY provide any certificate, or even select TLS cipher suites <\/del> service can provide any certificate, or even select TLS cipher suites <\/ins> that do not include authentication. A client MAY perform additional checks on the offered certificate if"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d560e01a39363c44cf209373130d149703910c7f24ee32320a7fea7bae0151b","title":"","text":"4. When using alternative services, both \"http\" and \"https\" URIs might use the same connection, because HTTP\/2 permits requests for multiple origins on the same connection. <\/del> When using alternative services, requests for resources identified by both \"http\" and \"https\" URIs might use the same connection, because HTTP\/2 permits requests for multiple origins on the same connection. <\/ins> Since \"https\" URIs rely on server authentication, a connection that is initially created for \"http\" URIs without authenticating the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3c1216083d1beb323841e027b68a61cbfea73cfd979b618eab7910e09e1312cd","title":"","text":"A client that doesn't perform authentication is an easy victim of server impersonation, through man-in-the-middle attacks. A client that is willing to use cleartext to resolve the resource will do so if access to any TLS-enabled alternative services is blocked at the network layer. <\/del> A client that is willing to use HTTP over cleartext to resolve the resource will do so if access to any TLS-enabled alternative services is blocked at the network layer. <\/ins> Given that the primary goal of this specification is to prevent passive attacks, these are not critical failings (especially"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-075235c977716d4130ee0688eb7c7752589993a6928552c516a64f23aba7181d","title":"","text":"5.1. A alternative service can make this commitment by sending a \"HTTP- TLS\" header field: <\/del> TLS\" header field, described here using the '#' ABNF extension defined in Section 7 of RFC7230: <\/ins> When it appears in a HTTP response from a strongly authenticated alternative service, this header field indicates that the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5691183d5e544b4046a60739ce846193df5b0ea4339e2a6f2002feec0849edc9","title":"","text":"creates some risks for clients (see pinrisks). Authentication for HTTP over TLS is described in Section 3.1 of RFC2818, noting the additional requirements in I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt- svc. The header field MUST be ignored if strong authentication fails; otherwise, an attacker could create a persistent denial of service by falsifying a commitment. <\/del> RFC2818, noting the additional requirements in Section 2.1 of I- D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc. The header field MUST be ignored if strong authentication fails; otherwise, an attacker could create a persistent denial of service by falsifying a commitment. <\/ins> The commitment to use authenticated TLS persists for a period determined by the value of the \"ma\" parameter. See Section 4.2.3 of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ea95f4ffdf8c820af5cd415a28276011f25b13c633097da617165dcab6b09a26","title":"","text":"The commitment made by the \"HTTP-TLS\" header field applies only to the origin of the resource that generates the \"HTTP-TLS\" header field. Requests for an origin that has a persisted, unexpired value for \"HTTP-TLS\" MUST fail if they cannot be made over an authenticated TLS connection. <\/del> field. Requests for an origin that has a persisted, unexpired value for \"HTTP-TLS\" MUST fail if they cannot be made over an authenticated TLS connection. <\/ins> Note that the commitment is not bound to a particular alternative service. Clients SHOULD use alternative services that they become"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ec1d367ebf6738bdacb49e457baebbaf7d2ab1986e521cf1ea2059433f64ab0a","title":"","text":"NOTE: This algorithm parses both Integers and Floats float, and returns the corresponding structure. If the first character of input_string is not \"-\" or a DIGIT, fail parsing. <\/del> Let type be \"integer\". Let sign be 1. Let input_number be an empty string. If the first character of input_string is \"-\", remove it from input_string and set sign to -1. <\/ins> Let input_number be the result of consuming input_string up to (but not including) the first character that is not in DIGIT, \"-\", and \".\". <\/del> If input_string is empty, fail parsing. <\/ins> If any character of input_number after the first is \"-\", fail <\/del> If the first character of input_string is not a DIGIT, fail <\/ins> parsing. If input_number contains \".\", parse it as a floating point number and let output_number be the result. <\/del> While input_string is not empty: Let char be the result of removing the first character of input_string. If char is a DIGIT, append it to input_number. Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\", append char to input_number and set type to \"float\". Otherwise, fail parsing. If type is \"integer\" and input_number contains more than 19 characters, fail parsing. If type is \"float\" and input_number contains more than 16 characters, fail parsing. If type is \"integer\", parse input_number as an integer and let output_number be the result. Otherwise: If the final character of input_number is \".\", fail parsing. <\/ins> Otherwise, parse input_number as an integer and let output_number be the result. <\/del> Parse input_number as a float and let output_number be the result. <\/ins> Return output_number. <\/del> Return the product of output_number and sign. <\/ins> 4.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-efc63c972048c86c41e3502655249b8f955645e4d2c85e7df66eeb8067782525","title":"","text":"syntactically, this is done only to allow parsers to be generic; as per RFC7231, Section 4.3.1, a body on a GET has no meaning, and will be either ignored or rejected by generic HTTP software. As a result, applications that use HTTP SHOULD NOT define GET to have any sde <\/del> applications that use HTTP SHOULD NOT define GET to have any side <\/ins> effects upon their resources. 4.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f0736b852e2eef293b29b2adfea4a6ec848bb5e56003a2d3ee23f240d44da4a0","title":"","text":"cache or by forwarding the request towards the origin - by following the algorithm defined in cache. Its companion the Variant-Key response header field (variant-key) indicates which representation was selected, so that it can be reliably reused in the future. When this specification is in use, the example above might become: <\/del> Its companion Variant-Key response header field (variant-key) indicates the applicable key(s) that the response is associated with, so that it can be reliably reused in the future. When this specification is in use, the example above might become: <\/ins> Proactive content negotiation mechanisms that wish to be used with Variants need to define how to do so explicitly; see define. As a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-23e4976492619796d5294fc3c444aeeff93dffa945b98d9e7a9c3fcd60b6446f","title":"","text":"3. The Variant-Key HTTP response header field is used to indicate the value(s) from the Variants header field that identify the <\/del> values from the Variants header field that identify the <\/ins> representation it occurs within. Each value indicates the selected available-value, in the same order as the variants listed in the Variants header field. <\/del> Each member of the list contains the selected available-value(s), in the same order as the variants listed in the Variants header field. <\/ins> Therefore, Variant-Key MUST be the same length (in comma-separated members) as Variants, and each member MUST correspond in position to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c8da4606e376ca0933fc737c52b137ca2db39ec43254165e95ae30fd8add3365","title":"","text":"This header pair indicates that the representation has a \"gzip\" content-coding and \"fr\" content-language. Note that Variant-Key is only used to indicate what request attributes are associated with the response containing it; this is different from headers like Content-Encoding, which indicate attributes of the response itself. In the example above, it might be that a gzip'd version of the French content is not available, in which case the response will include: <\/del> A more complex example involves listing multiple available-values in a list member, to indicate that the response can be used to satisfy requests with any of those values. For example: <\/ins> even though Content-Encoding does not contain \"gzip\". <\/del> indicates that this response can be used for requests whose Content- Encoding algorithm selects \"gzip\" or \"identity\", as long as the Content-Language algorithm selects \"fr\" - perhaps because there is no gzip-compressed French representation. This highlights an important aspect of Variant-Key; it is only used to indicate what request attributes are associated with the response containing it; this is different from headers like Content-Encoding, which indicate attributes of the response itself. <\/ins> 3.1. This algorithm generates a normalised string for Variant-Key, suitable for comparison with values generated by cache. <\/del> This algorithm generates a list of normalised strings from Variant- Key, suitable for comparison with values generated by cache. <\/ins> Given stored-headers, a set of headers from a stored response, a normalised variant-key for that message can be generated by: <\/del> normalised list of variant-keys for that message can be generated by: Let variant-keys be an empty list. <\/ins> Let variant-key-header be a string, the result of selecting all field-values of stored-headers whose field-name is \"Variant-Key\" and joining them with a comma (\",\"). Remove all whitespace from variant-key-header. <\/del> Let value-list be the result of splitting variant-key-header on commas (\",\"). For each value in value-list: Remove all whitespace from value. Let items be the result of splitting value on \";\". append items to variant-keys. <\/ins> Return variant-key-header. <\/del> Return the result of running Compute Possible Keys (find) on variant-keys, an empty string and an empty list. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b85a3f99038b1edb4fa015cf7a4ed7b20b8a07ef261fa66548f2dd5ea846b9b6","title":"","text":"indicating available-values that are acceptable to the client, in order of preference, greatest to least. Return result of running Find Available Keys (find) on sorted- <\/del> Return result of running Compute Possible Keys (find) on sorted- <\/ins> variants, an empty string and an empty list. This returns a list of strings suitable for comparing to normalised"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b0f4616378eb3344547ab57ea257e5496c66f1fcbab39df48f70fa41ca1b4f47","title":"","text":"4.1. Given sorted-variants, a list of lists, and key-stub, a string <\/del> Given key-facets, a list of lists, and key-stub, a string <\/ins> representing a partial key, and possible-keys, a list: Let sorted-values be the first member of sorted-variants. <\/del> Let values be the first member of key-facets. <\/ins> For each sorted-value in sorted-values: <\/del> For each value in values: <\/ins> If key-stub is an empty string, let this-key be a copy of sorted-value. <\/del> value. <\/ins> Otherwise:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-79cce6fe3b9df88984c04de38f38b4751f5d5627a79dc205c09e246a4c352b61","title":"","text":"Append a comma (\",\") to this-key. Append sorted-value to this-key. <\/del> Append value to this-key. <\/ins> Let remaining-variants be a copy of all of the members of sorted-variants except the first. <\/del> Let remaining-facets be a copy of all of the members of key- facets except the first. <\/ins> If remaining-variants is empty, append this-key to possible- keys. <\/del> If remaining-facets is empty, append this-key to possible-keys. <\/ins> Otherwise, run Find Available Keys on remaining-variants, this- <\/del> Otherwise, run Find Available Keys on remaining-facets, this- <\/ins> key and possible-keys. Return possible-keys."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4aad449d75c763e825e51318c77ce99f1cab3766020052518f7e957a35937e0e","title":"","text":"be sent along with \"same-site\" requests. If the value is \"Lax\", the cookie will be sent with same-site requests, and with \"cross-site\" top-level navigations, as described in strict-lax. If the \"SameSite\" attribute's value is neither of these, the cookie will be ignored. <\/del> attribute's value is neither of these, the attribute will be ignored. <\/ins> 4.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eb070bf015795450537d71a7a3fa829d30f713e034e0a93e238f82d6cbe85b15","title":"","text":"where the last-byte-pos in the Request is much larger than the last- byte-pos returned in response to an open-ended byte-range HEAD request, as described above. <\/del> request, as described above, and much larger than the expected maximum size of the representation. See Security for range value considerations. <\/ins> In response, a server may indicate that it is supplying a continuously aggregating (\"live\") response by supplying the client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b41b6c75643775812aea9f5b81661fd1443aff230b749bde1c19db416c1dbdc9","title":"","text":"(see be-consistent for details). An intermediary MUST NOT remove this header field if it is present in a request. <\/del> a request. \"Early-Data\" MUST NOT appear in a \"Connection\" header field. <\/ins> The \"Early-Data\" header field is not intended for use by user agents (that is, the original initiator of a request). Sending a request in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0fc411cbf0552b7d5dd9916f4d70b8490798ed9038e4a8bf30383cd02ea39398","title":"","text":"be safely processed MUST be rejected using the 425 (Too Early) status code. The \"Early-Data\" header field carries a single bit of information and clients MUST include at most one instance. Multiple instances MUST be treated as equivalent to a single instance by a server. A \"Early-Data\" header field MUST NOT be included in responses or request trailers. <\/ins> 5.2. A 425 (Too Early) status code indicates that the server is unwilling"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8be819980c369c70fc5864d200de20f0ff132708a598298238f6d81aa450060a","title":"","text":"eliminate the chance of data being replayed and ensure a fixed upper limit to the number of replays. The server can choose whether it will process early data before the TLS handshake completes. By deferring processing, it can ensure that only a successfully completed connection is used for the request(s) therein. This provides the server with some <\/del> The server can reject early data. A server cannot selectively reject early data, so this results in all requests sent in early data being discarded. The server can choose to delay processing of early data until after the TLS handshake completes. By deferring processing, it can ensure that only a successfully completed connection is used for the request(s) therein. This provides the server with some <\/ins> assurance that the early data was not replayed. If the server receives multiple requests in early data, it can"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f68dcccec8fd872317e3b35495bfd060944b0bdd6edebcb094ead084bef63e5f","title":"","text":"data MUST be sent again, unless the client decides to abandon those requests. This automatic retry exposes the request to a potential replay attack. An attacker sends early data to one server instance that accepts and processes the early data, but allows that connection to proceed no further. The attacker then forwards the same messages from the client to another server instance that will reject early data. The client then retries the request, resulting in the request being processed twice. Replays are also possible if there are multiple server instances that will accept early data, or if the same server accepts early data multiple times (though this would be in violation of requirements in Section 8 of TLS13). <\/del> Automatic retry creates the potential for a replay attack. An attacker intercepts a connection that uses early data and copies the early data to another server instance. The second server instance accepts and processes the early data. The attacker then allows the original connection to complete. Even if the early data is detected as a duplicate and rejected, the first server instance might allow the connection to complete. If the client then retries requests that were sent in early data, the request will be processed twice. Replays are also possible if there are multiple server instances that will accept early data, or if the same server accepts early data multiple times (though this would be in violation of requirements in Section 8 of TLS13). <\/ins> Clients that use early data MUST retry requests upon receipt of a 425 (Too Early) status code; see status."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e35879e299e723507555d447cf08abe19837a0d53edcf5a87fb2fa2bf48e69f","title":"","text":"2.1.4. The following examples demonstrate valid Expect-CT response header fields: <\/del> The following three examples demonstrate valid Expect-CT response header fields (where the second splits the directives into two field instances): <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a7cfaf50b515ee1d157f4860d5e4e1161f1e2e271ad9dcd5ee54b371a1c10155","title":"","text":" The Tunnel-Protocol HTTP Header Field <\/del> The ALPN HTTP Header Field <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-tunnel-protocol-latest Abstract This specification allows HTTP CONNECT requests to indicate what protocol will be used within the tunnel once established, using the Tunnel-Protocol header field. <\/del> ALPN header field. <\/ins> Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-298aa6619510e15f09c39d06d2bbc378e82935c7b57195443c8060521550aa7d","title":"","text":"Such tunnels are commonly used to create end-to-end virtual connections, through one or more proxies. The HTTP Tunnel-Protocol header field identifies the protocol that will be spoken within the tunnel, using the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation identifier (ALPN, RFC7301). <\/del> The HTTP ALPN header field identifies the protocol that will be spoken within the tunnel, using the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation identifier (ALPN, RFC7301). <\/ins> When the CONNECT method is used to establish a tunnel, the Tunnel- Protocol header field can be used to identify the protocol that the client intends to use with that tunnel. For a tunnel that is then secured using RFC5246, the header field carries the same application protocol label as will be carried within the TLS handshake. If there are multiple possible application protocols, all of those application <\/del> When the CONNECT method is used to establish a tunnel, the ALPN header field can be used to identify the protocol that the client intends to use with that tunnel. For a tunnel that is then secured using RFC5246, the header field carries the same application protocol label as will be carried within the TLS handshake. If there are multiple possible application protocols, all of those application <\/ins> protocols are indicated. The Tunnel-Protocol header field carries an indication of client intent only. In TLS, the final choice of application protocol is made by the server from the set of choices presented by the client. Other protocols could negotiate protocols differently. <\/del> The ALPN header field carries an indication of client intent only. In TLS, the final choice of application protocol is made by the server from the set of choices presented by the client. Other protocols could negotiate protocols differently. <\/ins> Proxies do not implement the tunneled protocol, though they might choose to make policy decisions based on the value of the header"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-53ff48cbe6b723878f4e7e6e632c61d3b442a4444bee1a6a3264a41d405eb56a","title":"","text":"2. Clients include the Tunnel-Protocol header field in an HTTP CONNECT request to indicate the application layer protocol that will be used within the tunnel, or the set of protocols that might be used within the tunnel. <\/del> Clients include the ALPN header field in an HTTP CONNECT request to indicate the application layer protocol that will be used within the tunnel, or the set of protocols that might be used within the tunnel. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-301fb038d23d28779a9a9aab0ee497cec7cd64234db318f7c736301c7cd15f30","title":"","text":"2.2. The ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) syntax for the Tunnel-Protocol header field is given below. It is based on the Generic Grammar defined in RFC7230. <\/del> The ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) syntax for the ALPN header field is given below. It is based on the Generic Grammar defined in RFC7230. <\/ins> ALPN protocol names are octet sequences with no additional constraints on format. Octets not allowed in tokens (RFC7230) MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7920c450df048178fd3f1a9ab26a1b0a5990bdf9fb6e2c063d25258d7b66fe19","title":"","text":"HTTP header fields are registered within the \"Message Headers\" registry maintained at headers>. This document defines and registers the Tunnel-Protocol header field, according to RFC3864 as follows: <\/del> headers>. This document defines and registers the ALPN header field, according to RFC3864 as follows: <\/ins> Tunnel-Protocol <\/del> ALPN <\/ins> http"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-15ceaf285f0f06072de4ad346e0aba65453f8c0de5124bd7707c6b17d10cd7b4","title":"","text":"Proxies that support CONNECT SHOULD restrict its use to a limited set of known ports or a configurable whitelist of safe request targets.\" The Tunnel-Protocol header field described in this document is an OPTIONAL header field. Clients and HTTP proxies could choose to not support the header and therefore fail to provide it, or ignore it when present. If the header is not available or ignored, a proxy cannot identify the purpose of the tunnel and use this as input to any authorization decision regarding the tunnel. This is <\/del> The ALPN header field described in this document is an OPTIONAL header field. Clients and HTTP proxies could choose to not support the header and therefore fail to provide it, or ignore it when present. If the header is not available or ignored, a proxy cannot identify the purpose of the tunnel and use this as input to any authorization decision regarding the tunnel. This is <\/ins> indistinguishable from the case where either client or proxy does not support the Tunnel-Protocol header field. The value of the Tunnel-Protocol header field could be falsified by a client. If the data being sent through the tunnel is encrypted (for example, with RFC5246), then the proxy might not be able to directly inspect the data to verify that the claimed protocol is the one which is actually being used, though a proxy might be able to perform traffic analysis TRAFFIC. A proxy therefore cannot rely on the value of the Tunnel-Protocol header field as a policy input in all cases. <\/del> support the ALPN header field. The value of the ALPN header field could be falsified by a client. If the data being sent through the tunnel is encrypted (for example, with RFC5246), then the proxy might not be able to directly inspect the data to verify that the claimed protocol is the one which is actually being used, though a proxy might be able to perform traffic analysis TRAFFIC. A proxy therefore cannot rely on the value of the ALPN header field as a policy input in all cases. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8b9785e095f9f1a3e82d12219f52f04f323d98d90634439a4f6818370b6d5209","title":"","text":"HTTP clients need to know that the content they receive on a connection comes from the origin that they intended to retrieve in from. The traditional form of server authentication in HTTP has been in the form of a single X.509 certificate provided during the TLS I- D.ietf-tls-tls13 handshake. <\/del> in the form of a single X.509 certificate provided during the TLS (RFC5246, I-D.ietf-tls-tls13) handshake. <\/ins> Many existing HTTP RFC7230 servers also have authentication requirements for the resources they serve. Of the bountiful"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bad5063bf817fc104a9f74df3bbbd0f8d12bf60e3af7fb7b06654be1c71251ff","title":"","text":"TLS 1.3 TLS13 introduces the concept of early data (also known as zero round trip data or 0-RTT data). Early data allows a client to send data to a server in the first round trip of a connection, without waiting for the TLS handshake to complete if the client has <\/del> without waiting for the TLS handshake to complete, if the client has <\/ins> spoken to the same server recently. When used with HTTP HTTP, early data allows clients to send requests"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e7db46787496b3b09d6bf4f0b0e393b05dc47a195f6d96fb5f579ea284d7bbe7","title":"","text":"request routing is likely to be safe from side-effects, but other actions might not be. Intermediary servers do not have sufficient information to make this determination, so status describes a way for the origin to signal to them that a particular request isn't appropriate for early data. Intermediaries that accept early data MUST implement that mechanism. <\/del> Intermediary servers do not have sufficient information to decide whether early data can be processed, so status describes a way for the origin to signal to them that a particular request isn't appropriate for early data. Intermediaries that accept early data MUST implement that mechanism. <\/ins> Note that a server cannot choose to selectively reject early data at the TLS layer. TLS only permits a server to accept all early data,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e34b5b0740b354d3d3568a4a95aee1956ad297fa470894ae61c87434ab1e0f54","title":"","text":"sent in early data - thereby giving the client control over risk of replay. Absent other information, clients MAY send requests with safe HTTP methods (see RFC7231, Section 4.2.1) in early data when it is available, and SHOULD NOT send unsafe methods (or methods whose <\/del> is available, and MUST NOT send unsafe methods (or methods whose <\/ins> safety is not known) in early data. If the server rejects early data at the TLS layer, a client MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d6ad664aba1b0ccdabc2d02df0b1c68d17d774ca6899601069404228957a1045","title":"","text":"Automatic retry creates the potential for a replay attack. An attacker intercepts a connection that uses early data and copies the early data to another server instance. The second server instance accepts and processes the early data. The attacker then allows the original connection to complete. Even if the early data is detected as a duplicate and rejected, the first server instance might allow the connection to complete. If the client then retries requests that <\/del> accepts and processes the early data, even though it will not complete the TLS handshake. The attacker then allows the original connection to complete. Even if the early data is detected as a duplicate and rejected, the first server instance might allow the connection to complete. If the client then retries requests that <\/ins> were sent in early data, the request will be processed twice. Replays are also possible if there are multiple server instances that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0f55c7206cf8bd2e2ed79ce6d7c01e2a7f0b5bc31cc10e9db7e1596a918b878f","title":"","text":"replayed. A retried or replayed request can produce different side effects on the server. In addition to those side effects, replays and retries might be used for traffic analysis to recover information about requests or the resources those requests target. <\/del> about requests or the resources those requests target. In particular, a request that is replayed might result in a different response, which might be observable from the length of protected data even if the content remains confidential. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-469c2e6349970f4b3571967ad6e5bd1eb1a9c37d691a3126f80652989c77333b","title":"","text":"eliminate the chance of data being replayed and ensure a fixed upper limit to the number of replays. The server can reject early data. A server cannot selectively reject early data, so this results in all requests sent in early data being discarded. <\/del> The server can reject early data at the TLS layer. A server cannot selectively reject early data, so this results in all requests sent in early data being discarded. <\/ins> The server can choose to delay processing of early data until after the TLS handshake completes. By deferring processing, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9cb036e65ac1a918b62f4d3fd3f3410cf76c0e3c103c6435d49a5073709f98db","title":"","text":"If the server receives multiple requests in early data, it can determine whether to defer HTTP processing on a per-request basis. The server can cause a client to retry a request and not use early data by responding with the 425 (Too Early) status code (status), in cases where the risk of replay is judged too great. <\/del> The server can cause a client to retry individual requests and not use early data by responding with the 425 (Too Early) status code (status), in cases where the risk of replay is judged too great. <\/ins> For a given request, the level of tolerance to replay risk is specific to the resource it operates upon (and therefore only known to the origin server). In general, if processing a request does not have state-changing side effects, the consequences of replay are not significant. <\/del> to the origin server). The primary risk associated with using early data is in the actions a server takes when processing a request; processing a duplicated request might result in duplicated effects and side effects. Appendix E.5 of TLS13 also describes other effects produced by processing duplicated requests. <\/ins> The request method's safety (RFC7231, Section 4.2.1) is one way to determine this. However, some resources do elect to associate side effects with safe methods, so this cannot be universally relied upon. <\/del> determine if a request is free from side effects. However, some resources do elect to associate side effects with safe methods, so this cannot be universally relied upon. <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED that origin servers allow resources to explicitly configure whether early data is appropriate in requests. Absent such"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-78fd95256f2dccc8a27d160868bd612f6c7fee49850faada948f5a8fabe830ab","title":"","text":"A server can limit the amount of early data with the \"max_early_data_size\" field of the \"early_data\" TLS extension. This can be used to avoid committing an arbitrary amount of memory for deferred requests. A server SHOULD ensure that when it accepts early data, it can defer processing of requests until after the TLS handshake completes. <\/del> requests that it might defer until the handshake completes. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a003efd17ed72fea1db2e60f76f393e67cbaffeadc6ef9a461fcde602c5e986e","title":"","text":"start sending again as though the connection was new. This could entail using a different negotiated protocol ALPN than the one optimistically used for the early data. Any requests sent in early data MUST be sent again, unless the client decides to abandon those requests. <\/del> data will need to be sent again, unless the client decides to abandon those requests. <\/ins> Automatic retry creates the potential for a replay attack. An attacker intercepts a connection that uses early data and copies the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e8ef6ad28cd4b8dc9ebbd8657915f4597ac702916dd1bdf7d875e02a3cd0e059","title":"","text":"Replays are also possible if there are multiple server instances that will accept early data, or if the same server accepts early data multiple times (though this would be in violation of requirements in Section 8 of TLS13). <\/del> multiple times (though the latter would be in violation of requirements in Section 8 of TLS13). <\/ins> Clients that use early data MUST retry requests upon receipt of a 425 (Too Early) status code; see status."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f01054317e29629bcf018b3ad2b0e7f902cbc2c68e5e29c6ce02c2734a786eb","title":"","text":"header field set to \"1\" (i.e., it adds it if not present in the request). An intermediary MUST use the \"Early-Data\" header field if it might have forwarded the request prior to handshake completion (see be-consistent for details). <\/del> (be-consistent describes considerations for clusters of servers). <\/ins> An intermediary MUST NOT remove this header field if it is present in a request. \"Early-Data\" MUST NOT appear in a \"Connection\" header"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a0547c8986c32a264ec9c18e8cf9ea79f941e65854564f5b2e23b795385cc490","title":"","text":"A server decides whether or not to offer a client the ability to send early data on future connections when sending the TLS session ticket. TLS TLS13 mandates the use of replay detection strategies that reduce the ability of an attacker to successfully replay early data. These anti-replay techniques reduce but don't completely eliminate the chance of data being replayed and ensure a fixed upper limit to the number of replays. <\/ins> When a server enables early data, there are a number of techniques it can use to mitigate the risks of replay: TLS TLS13 mandates the use of replay detection strategies that reduce the ability of an attacker to successfully replay early data. These anti-replay techniques reduce but don't completely eliminate the chance of data being replayed and ensure a fixed upper limit to the number of replays. <\/del> The server can reject early data at the TLS layer. A server cannot selectively reject early data, so this results in all requests sent in early data being discarded."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-372e24a9d5e6be82b57ee56fe651162e2e8156d2552626f23281717ee82ee8f6","title":"","text":"after the TLS handshake completes. By deferring processing, it can ensure that only a successfully completed connection is used for the request(s) therein. This provides the server with some assurance that the early data was not replayed. If the server receives multiple requests in early data, it can determine whether to defer HTTP processing on a per-request basis. <\/del> assurance that the early data was not replayed. If the server receives multiple requests in early data, it can determine whether to defer HTTP processing on a per-request basis. <\/ins> The server can cause a client to retry individual requests and not use early data by responding with the 425 (Too Early) status code (status), in cases where the risk of replay is judged too great. Any of these techniques is equally effective and a server can use the method that best suits it. <\/ins> For a given request, the level of tolerance to replay risk is specific to the resource it operates upon (and therefore only known to the origin server). The primary risk associated with using early"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4bb120b3bf32c8b4a390582670cab20f43bbeb024849a06b7a7c09c85f7a9748","title":"","text":"Because HTTP requests can span multiple \"hops\", it is necessary to explicitly communicate whether a request has been sent in early data on a previous connection. Likewise, some means of explicitly triggering a retry when early data is not desirable is necessary. Finally, it is necessary to know whether the client will actually perform such a retry. <\/del> on a previous hop. Likewise, some means of explicitly triggering a retry when early data is not desirable is necessary. Finally, it is necessary to know whether the client will actually perform such a retry. <\/ins> To meet these needs, two signalling mechanisms are defined:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d3594a2e2357e36f884753a460388dd0ecfa5bcab6c43d3c67c9ea115163b787","title":"","text":"A 425 (Too Early) status code indicates that the server is unwilling to risk processing a request that might be replayed. User agents that send a request in early data MUST automatically retry the request when receiving a 425 (Too Early) response status code. Such retries MUST NOT be sent in early data. <\/del> User agents that send a request in early data are expected to retry the request when receiving a 425 (Too Early) response status code. A user agent MAY do so automatically, but any retries MUST NOT be sent in early data. <\/ins> In all cases, an intermediary can forward a 425 (Too Early) status code. Intermediaries MUST forward a 425 (Too Early) status code if"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-51382916c8182177dcdf7431734ce96d308c51714da02251b787056af197cd15","title":"","text":"In protocols that deliver data out of order (such as QUIC HQ) early data can arrive after the handshake completes. A server MAY process requests received in early data after handshake completion if it can rely on other instances correctly handling replays of the same <\/del> requests received in early data after handshake completion only if it can rely on other instances correctly handling replays of the same <\/ins> requests. 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1c06bd47faa8f80e6a97b2f0750174e3ed39e3d441e57fa611f13189f6dd9f55","title":"","text":"certificate are not already available, they will need to be sent as described in cert-available as part of this exchange. If the client does not have the desired certificate, it instead sends an Empty Authenticator, as described in Section 5 of I-D.ietf-tls- exported-authenticator, in a \"CERTIFICATE\" frame in response to the request, followed by a \"USE_CERTIFICATE\" frame which references the Empty Authenticator. In this case, or if the client has not advertised support for HTTP-layer certificates, the server processes the request based solely on the certificate provided during the TLS handshake, if any. This might result in an error response via HTTP, such as a status code 403 (Not Authorized). <\/ins> 3. The \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" and \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" frames are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a1c5333580bba1eadae1b43908db409f0501cb58cbbb32750f2f76aaf6c276bb","title":"","text":"their default settings, user configuration, and server preferences. The client and server can use an opt-in mechanism outlined below to negotiate which fields should be sent to allow for efficient content adaption, and optinally use additional mechanisms to negotiate <\/del> adaption, and optionally use additional mechanisms to negotiate <\/ins> delegation policies that control access of third parties to same fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-618581a8c5952ab07b81b07a2dbf66c38ea16ba3b51e9180e0272287227e1cb9","title":"","text":"origin that isn't HTTPS. For example, based on the Accept-CH and Accept-CH-Lifetime example above, which is received from \"https:\/\/bar.example.com\" in response to a resource request initiated by \"https:\/\/foo.example.com\", both delivered over a secure transport: a user agent SHOULD persist an Accept-CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/foo.example.com\", for requests initiated to \"https:\/\/bar.example.com\" from \"https:\/\/foo.example.com\", for up to 86400 seconds (1 day). This preference SHOULD NOT extend to requests initiated to \"https:\/\/bar.example.com\" from other origins. <\/del> above, which is received in response to a user agent navigating to \"https:\/\/example.com\", and delivered over a secure transport: a user agent SHOULD persist an Accept-CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/example.com\" for up to 86400 seconds (1 day), and use it for user agent navigations to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and any same-origin resource requests initiated by the page constructed from the navigation's response. This preference SHOULD NOT extend to resource requests initiated to \"https:\/\/example.com\" from other origins. <\/ins> If Accept-CH-Lifetime occurs in a message more than once, the last value overrides all previous occurrences."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3a59f09f78155bacf29aae853995013ede4aa608c359c70e2b23a0d0a7590a7b","title":"","text":"as shown here. This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234, including the VCHAR, DIGIT, ALPHA and DQUOTE rules from that document. It also includes the OWS rule from RFC7230. <\/del> RFC5234, including the VCHAR, SP, DIGIT, ALPHA and DQUOTE rules from that document. It also includes the OWS rule from RFC7230. <\/ins> This document uses algorithms to specify parsing and serialisation behaviours, and ABNF to illustrate expected syntax."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-73a1e40e7dbec25ab98f7e98494f9703c59c48d99fcd21a5a57b17d5eed882ba","title":"","text":"Given a string as input: If input is not a sequence of characters, or contains characters outside the range allowed by VCHAR, fail serialisation. <\/del> outside the range allowed by VCHAR or SP, fail serialisation. <\/ins> Let output be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-13d028b45f23b17cf8b6de495e0a5e6fc9c458eb74fe668faf0a9ccd86c9e9ab","title":"","text":"Else, if char is DQUOTE, return output_string. Else, if char is in the range %x00-1f or %x7f (i.e., is not in VCHAR), fail parsing. <\/del> VCHAR or SP), fail parsing. <\/ins> Else, append char to output_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ba47f3ae4f1eabf4bacf414a661c3da63787ddd6933404f383e8002803a464a6","title":"","text":"Append value to output. If more members remain in input: Append a COMMA to output. Append a single WS to output. <\/ins> Return output. 4.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-11aa680eb67fa268ff447adee8830f076203de5bcd5304ed8253d82d9fb83e23","title":"","text":"Append value to output. If more members remain in input: Append a COMMA to output. Append a single WS to output. <\/ins> Return output. 4.1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-028a1b79c21618f700ba2ef994825e6079f2767a0a40cd24b057904bb5d0c6d4","title":"","text":"Else, if type is \"integer\" and char is \".\", append char to input_number and set type to \"float\". Otherwise, fail parsing. <\/del> Otherwise, prepend char to input_string, and exit the loop. <\/ins> If type is \"integer\" and input_number contains more than 19 characters, fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-abdd507f9550d71546883ca319bcf717121ff86b90884a9e73c68137634092aa","title":"","text":"If input is a type other than an integer, float, string or binary content, fail serialisation. Let output be an empty string. If input is an integer, let value be the result of applying Serialising an Integer ser-integer to input. <\/del> If input is an integer, return the result of applying Serialising an Integer ser-integer to input. <\/ins> If input is a float, let value be the result of applying Serialising a Float ser-float to input. <\/del> If input is a float, return the result of applying Serialising a Float ser-float to input. <\/ins> If input is a string, let value be the result of applying Serialising a String ser-string to input. <\/del> If input is a string, return the result of applying Serialising a String ser-string to input. <\/ins> If input is binary content, let value be the result of applying Serialising Binary Content ser-binary to input. Return output. <\/del> Otherwise, return the result of applying Serialising Binary Content ser-binary to input. <\/ins> 4.1.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ced1da222ff500d3633650439856835a1ed15d319e70a0b3c7ee55cfaeafbe0e","title":"","text":"If type is \"integer\": Parse input_number as an integer and let output_number be the result. <\/del> product of the result and sign. <\/ins> If output_number is outside the range defined in integer, fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-087b887efe705111ed050584c2a44de5cf021c43da16219842342f5907be878a","title":"","text":"If the final character of input_number is \".\", fail parsing. Parse input_number as a float and let output_number be the result. <\/del> product of the result and sign. <\/ins> Return the product of output_number and sign. <\/del> Return output_number. <\/ins> 4.2.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-60186e8499f38e4d6983df8d4bebf2abd2ed2123af31d295454670a87f192f11","title":"","text":"Else, append char to output_string. Otherwise, fail parsing. <\/del> Reached the end of input_string without finding a closing DQUOTE; fail parsing. <\/ins> 4.2.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e3d9362dd04f4309c2beb997c4756d4fa7e5ded231a6892ecac33bf30b88e03a","title":"","text":"attribute-name of \"Path\", and the cookie's path is \"\/\". If the cookie store contains a cookie with the same name, domain, and path as the newly-created cookie: <\/del> host-only-flag, and path as the newly-created cookie: <\/ins> Let old-cookie be the existing cookie with the same name, domain, and path as the newly-created cookie. (Notice that this algorithm maintains the invariant that there is at most one such cookie.) <\/del> domain, host-only-flag, and path as the newly-created cookie. (Notice that this algorithm maintains the invariant that there is at most one such cookie.) <\/ins> If the newly-created cookie was received from a \"non-HTTP\" API and the old-cookie's http-only-flag is true, abort these steps"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d30ee5fb5495df72b6e3724ad8f09c56982aef96995537a90f54a32c10e800f3","title":"","text":"values from the Variants header field that identify the representation it occurs within. Each member of the list contains the selected available-value(s), in the same order as the variants listed in the Variants header field. <\/del> Each member of the list contains a set of selected available-value(s) that identify this representation, in the same order as the variants listed in the Variants header field. <\/ins> Therefore, Variant-Key MUST be the same length (in comma-separated members) as Variants, and each member MUST correspond in position to its companion in Variants. <\/del> Therefore, each member of Variant-Key MUST be the same length (in semicolon-separated members) as Variants, and each member's available-values MUST correspond in position to their companions in Variants. <\/ins> For example: This header pair indicates that the representation has a \"gzip\" content-coding and \"fr\" content-language. A more complex example involves listing multiple available-values in a list member, to indicate that the response can be used to satisfy requests with any of those values. For example: <\/del> If the response can be used to satisfy more than one request), they can be listed in additional members. For example: <\/ins> indicates that this response can be used for requests whose Accept- Encoding algorithm selects \"gzip\" or \"identity\", as long as the Accept-Language algorithm selects \"fr\" - perhaps because there is no gzip-compressed French representation. This highlights an important aspect of Variant-Key; it is only used to indicate what request attributes are associated with the response containing it; this is different from headers like Content-Encoding, which indicate attributes of the response itself. <\/del> When more than one Variant-Key value is in a response, the first one present MUST indicate the variant-key for the response it occurs within. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e984453d0200314e7879bead3c0987c15f525967f22d54db5cb41244df408b42","title":"","text":"Remove all whitespace from value. Let items be the result of splitting value on \";\". <\/del> Append value to variant-keys. <\/ins> append items to variant-keys. Return the result of running Compute Possible Keys (find) on variant-keys, an empty string and an empty list. <\/del> Return variant-keys. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-deed0776dc1113a291e09dc950a5f18ca049292697a0380c0a038061922e511b","title":"","text":"Let this-key be a copy of key-stub. Append a comma (\",\") to this-key. <\/del> Append a semicolon (\";\") to this-key. <\/ins> Append value to this-key."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-943e2d6b96272082aa40a09c9d02f7060ba3b578d2f5a220ef799e539093d4fe","title":"","text":"both the two-octet Request-ID as well as at least 96 bits of additional entropy. Upon receipt of a \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame, the recipient MUST verify that the first two octets of the authenticator's \"certificate_request_context\" matches the Request-ID presented in the frame. <\/ins> The TLS library on the authenticating peer will provide mechanisms to select an appropriate certificate to respond to the transported request. TLS libraries on servers MUST be able to recognize the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2d284ed2d2b3b565106e3f995b3f19a918e2522f517d9f82ff5b0760aedce2ea","title":"","text":"Indicates that the exported authenticator spans more than one frame. Indicates that the exported authenticator does not contain a Request-ID. <\/ins> The frame contains the following fields: \"Cert-ID\" is a 16-bit opaque identifier used to correlate other certificate- related frames with this exported authenticator fragment. \"Request-ID\" is an optional 16-bit opaque identifier used to correlate this exported authenticator with the request which triggered it, if any. This field is present only if the \"UNSOLICITED\" flag is not set. <\/ins> A portion of the opaque data returned from the TLS connection exported authenticator \"authenticate\" API. See exp-auth for more details on the input to this API."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bf39b36e37d95ca932648a05af4157f6583597b0cada6ebff3acd4350b5f5967","title":"","text":"frame with \"TO_BE_CONTINUED\" unset MUST be treated as a connection error of type \"PROTOCOL_ERROR\". If the \"UNSOLICITED\" flag is not set, the \"CERTIFICATE\" frame also contains a Request-ID indicating the certificate request which caused this exported authenticator to be generated. The value of this flag and the contents of the Request-ID field MUST NOT differ between frames with the same Cert-ID. <\/ins> Upon receiving a complete series of \"CERTIFICATE\" frames, the receiver may validate the Exported Authenticator value by using the exported authenticator API. This returns either an error indicating"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5b586e3720d2f7bdd04d1c472bcf238d22e860e935417d8b92d0e7e33872f20e","title":"","text":"Upon receipt of a \"CERTIFICATE\" frame, an endpoint MUST perform the following steps to validate the token it contains: Verify that either the \"UNSOLICITED\" flag is set (clients only) or that the Request-ID field contains the Request-ID of a previously- sent \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame. <\/ins> Using the \"get context\" API, retrieve the \"certificate_request_context\" used to generate the authenticator, if any. Verify that the \"certificate_request_context\" is either empty (clients only) or contains the Request-ID of a previously-sent \"CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\" frame. <\/del> if any. Verify that the \"certificate_request_context\" begins with the supplied Request-ID, if any. <\/ins> Use the \"validate\" API to confirm the validity of the authenticator with regard to the generated request (if any)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-56dcf0356b79424629c212ec152988d7eb9368897f562f93122c844883b018b3","title":"","text":"6.4. CNAME records in the DNS are frequently used to delegate authority for an origin to a third-party provider. This delegation can be changed without notice, even to the third-party provider, simply by modifying the CNAME record in question. After the owner of the domain has redirected traffic elsewhere by changing the CNAME, new connections will not arrive for that origin, but connections which are properly directed to this provider for other origins would continue to claim control of this origin (via ORIGIN frame and Secondary Certificates). This is proper behavior based on the third-party provider's configuration, but would likely not be what is intended by the owner of the origin. This is not an issue which can be mitigated by the protocol, but something about which third-party providers SHOULD educate their customers before using the features described in this document. 6.5. <\/ins> Implementations need to be aware of the potential for confusion about the state of a connection. The presence or absence of a validated certificate can change during the processing of a request,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a3059245e7b18130298ebad040ca513f0111ea299a8737a99fb321dc871437e2","title":"","text":"For each member mem of input: Let name be the result of applying Serialising an Identifier (ser-identifier) to mem's member-name. <\/del> Let name be the result of applying Serialising an Key (ser-key) to mem's member-name. <\/ins> Append name to output. Append \"=\" to output. Let value be the result of applying Serialising a Key (ser-key) to mem's member-value. <\/del> Let value be the result of applying Serialising an Item (ser- item) to mem's member-value. <\/ins> Append value to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e6bb920817ff3e3fbf0f2073a9596443e2a9913687a71fb3217ce236d440515c","title":"","text":"Append \";\" to output. Let name be the result of applying Serialising an Identifier (ser-identifier) to parameter's param-name. <\/del> Let name be the result of applying Serialising a Key (ser- key) to parameter's param-name. <\/ins> Append name to output. If parameter has a param-value: Let value be the result of applying Serialising a Key (ser-key) to parameter's param-value. <\/del> Let value be the result of applying Serialising an Item (ser-item) to parameter's param-value. <\/ins> Append \"=\" to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-89a75018dc3a2afc6e3488a698e5db9adeda4ba564ca241089b78217706a4f20","title":"","text":"Abstract An increasing diversity of Web-connected devices and software capabilities has created a need to deliver optimized content for each device. <\/del> HTTP defines proactive content negotiation to allow servers to select the appropriate response for a given request, based upon the user agent's characteristics, as expressed in request headers. In practice, clients are often unwilling to send those request headers, because it is not clear whether they will be used, and sending them impacts both performance and privacy. <\/ins> This specification defines an extensible and configurable set of HTTP request header fields, colloquially known as Client Hints, to address this. They are intended to be used as input to proactive content negotiation; just as the Accept header field allows user agents to indicate what formats they prefer, Client Hints allow user agents to indicate device and agent specific preferences. <\/del> This specification defines a response header, Accept-CH, that servers can use to advertise their use of request headers for proactive content negotiation, along with a set of guidelines for the creation of such headers, colloquially known as \"Client Hints.\" It also defines an initial set of Client Hints. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f89dfe261aaa18cbe5ef3f2da401b8fa18ffb74c801371f492a8419a39c702c3","title":"","text":"A popular alternative strategy is to use HTTP cookies (RFC6265) to communicate some information about the user agent. However, this approach is also not cache friendly, bound by same origin policy, and imposes additional client-side latency by requiring JavaScript <\/del> often imposes additional client-side latency by requiring JavaScript <\/ins> execution to create and manage HTTP cookies. This document defines a set of new request header fields that allow user agent to perform proactive content negotiation (Section 3.4.1 of RFC7231) by indicating device and agent specific preferences, through a mechanism similar to the Accept header field which is used to indicate preferred response formats. Client Hints does not supersede or replace the User-Agent header field. Existing device detection mechanisms can continue to use both mechanisms if necessary. By advertising its capabilities within a request header field, Client Hints allows for cache friendly and proactive content negotiation. <\/del> Proactive content negotiation (Section 3.4.1 of RFC7231) offers an alternative approach; user agents use specified, well-defined request headers to advertise their capabilities and characteristics, so that servers can select (or formulate) an appropriate response. However, proactive content negotiation requires clients to send these request headers prolifically. This causes performance concerns (because it creates \"bloat\" in requests), as well as privacy issues (because these request headers can be used to \"fingerprint\" - i.e., uniquely identify - the user agent). This document defines a new response header, Accept-CH, that allows an origin server to explicitly ask that clients send these headers in requests, for a period of time bounded by the Accept-CH-Lifetime response header. It also defines guidelines for content negotiation mechanisms that use it, colloquially referred to as Client Hints. Client Hints mitigate the performance concerns by assuring that clients will only send the request headers when they're actually going to be used, and the privacy concerns by creating positive evicence of their use (the use of the response header). This document also defines an initial set of Client Hints. It does not supersede or replace the User-Agent header field. Existing device detection mechanisms can continue to use both mechanisms if necessary. By advertising user agent capabilities within a request header field, Client Hints allow for cache friendly and proactive content negotiation. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-519decf5c7997e68e8ca05f2c0e56eabd2d40263d246020a962037408e1b52d0","title":"","text":"field identified by a content negotiation mechanism that the implementation supports: Let request-value be the field-value(s) associated with field-name in incoming-request. <\/del> Let request-value be the field-value associated with field-name in incoming-request (after being combined as allowed by Section 3.2.2 of RFC7230), or null if field- name is not in incoming-request. <\/ins> Let available-values be a list containing all available- value for variant."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-71d902b6ecfba39a55735d803538f21fe827891452d3339a5ea607e88b45cd52","title":"","text":"MUST define an algorithm for selecting a result. It MUST return a list of available-values that are suitable for the request, in order of preference, given the value of the request header nominated above and an available-values list from the Variants header. If the result is an empty list, it implies that the cache cannot satisfy the request. <\/del> nominated above (or null if the request header is absent) and an available-values list from the Variants header. If the result is an empty list, it implies that the cache cannot satisfy the request. <\/ins> backports fulfils these requirements for some existing proactive content negotiation mechanisms in HTTP."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d80591ca239a96050cff67ced7604cb38b9cb35294a2d5e17396421833c31b15","title":"","text":"corresponding to the other keys could be returned, or the request could be forwarded towards the origin. 4.3.1. If the selected variants-header was: And a request comes in with the following headers: Then sorted-variants in cache is: If the cache contains responses with the following Variant-Keys: Then the cache needs to forward the request to the origin server, since Variants indicates that \"de\" is available, and that is acceptable to the client. 4.3.2. If the selected variants-header was: And a request comes in with the following headers: Then sorted-variants in cache are: This allows the cache to return a \"Variant-Key: en\" response even though it's not in the set the client prefers. <\/ins> 5. Origin servers that wish to take advantage of Variants will need to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-df51d2d8c0bf148bfd5758d13ac7940b43340ec0e61db616504135c13c1c43aa","title":"","text":"as shown here. This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234 with a list extension, defined in Section 7 of RFC7230, that allows for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a '#' operator (similar to how the '*' operator indicates repetition). <\/del> notation of RFC5234 but relies on Structured Headers from I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure for parsing. <\/ins> Additionally, it uses the \"field-name\", \"OWS\" and \"token\" rules from RFC7230, and \"type\", \"subtype\", \"content-coding\" and \"language-range\" from RFC7231. <\/del> Additionally, it uses the \"field-name\" rule from RFC7230, and \"type\", \"subtype\", \"content-coding\" and \"language-range\" from RFC7231. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c80fc795d384823b767a82efc94619e2f910eab1161ded2a6ff00e5df480ae54","title":"","text":"the response is produced, by enumerating the request header fields that it varies on, along with the values that are available for each. Each \"variant-item\" indicates a request header field that carries a value that clients might proactively negotiate for; each parameter on it indicates a value for which there is an available representation on the origin server. <\/del> Variants is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be a list-of-lists (Section 3.3 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- header-structure) whose members are strings (Section 3.8 of I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure) or tokens (Section 3.9 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- header-structure). Its ABNF is: If Structured Header parsing fails or a list-member has the wrong type, the client MUST treat the representation as having no Variants header field. The Variants header field represents an ordered list of \"variant- axes\", each of which consists of a request header \"field-name\" string and a list of \"available-value\" strings. Each inner-list in the Variants header field value is parsed into a variant-axis. The first list-member of the inner-list is interpreted as the field-name, and the remaining list-members are the available-values. Any list-member that is a token (Section 3.9 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) is interpreted as a string containing the same characters. Field-names in the Variants header field value MUST match the field- name production (Section 3.2 of RFC7230). Clients receiving an invalid field-name MUST NOT match it to any content negotiating mechanism. <\/ins> So, given this example header field:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7a7bb34ac057aeb045c5f5314e6313f068ea195e0449fee1706f2922a0c7e4a5","title":"","text":"Here, recipients can infer that two content-codings in addition to \"identity\" are available, as well as two content languages. Note that, as with all HTTP header fields that use the \"#\" list rule (see RFC7230, Section 7), they might occur in the same header field or separately, like this: <\/del> that, as with all Structured Header lists, they might occur in the same header field or separately, like this: <\/ins> The ordering of available-values after the field-name is significant, as it might be used by the header's algorithm for selecting a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3da4223763eb82d527436f01733e7445e0bcba387f236ed4ca146c8bca30e16c","title":"","text":"3. The Variant-Key HTTP response header field is used to indicate the values from the Variants header field that identify the representation it occurs within. Each member of the list contains a set of selected available-value(s) that identify this representation, in the same order as the variants listed in the Variants header field. Therefore, each member of Variant-Key MUST be the same length (in semicolon-separated members) as Variants, and each member's available-values MUST correspond in position to their companions in Variants. <\/del> The Variant-Key HTTP response header field identifies a set of variants provided by the representation it occurs within. A variant is identified by a selection of one available-value from each variant-axis from the Variants header field. Variant-Key is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be a list-of-lists (Section 3.3 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- header-structure) whose members are strings (Section 3.8 of I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure) or tokens (Section 3.9 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- header-structure). Its ABNF is: If Structured Header parsing fails or a list-member has the wrong type, the client MUST treat the representation as having no Variant- Key header field. Each inner-list MUST have the same number of list-members as there are variant-axes in the representation's Variants header field. If not, the client MUST treat the representation as having no Variant- Key header field. Each list-member is treated as identifying an available-value for the corresponding variant-axis' field-name. Any list-member that is a token (Section 3.9 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) is interpreted as a string containing the same characters. These available-values do not need to explicitly appear in the Variants header field. For example, Accept-Encoding defines an implicit \"identity\" available-value (content-encoding). <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-11cb2ea6dbd5195e7b1b304f0712e87bcf490e9df418055b5c8f5f5d258dd31a","title":"","text":"gzip-compressed French representation. When more than one Variant-Key value is in a response, the first one present MUST indicate the variant-key for the response it occurs within. 3.1. This algorithm generates a list of normalised strings from Variant- Key, suitable for comparison with values generated by cache. Given stored-headers (a set of headers from a stored response), a normalised list of variant-keys for that message can be generated by following this algorithm: Let variant-keys be an empty list. Let variant-key-header be a string, the result of selecting all field-values of stored-headers whose field-name is \"Variant-Key\" and joining them with a comma (\",\"). <\/del> present MUST correspond to the request that caused that response to be generated. <\/ins> Let value-list be the result of splitting variant-key-header on commas (\",\"). <\/del> Parsing is strict. For example: <\/ins> For each value in value-list: <\/del> is treated as if the Variant-Key header were completely absent, which will tend to disable caching for the representation that contains it. <\/ins> Remove all whitespace from value. <\/del> Note that in <\/ins> Append value to variant-keys. Return variant-keys. <\/del> The whitespace after \"gzip\" in the first header field value is excluded by the token parsing algorithm, but the whitespace in the second header field value is included by the string parsing algorithm. This will likely cause the second header field value to fail to match client requests. <\/ins> 4. Caches that implement the Variants header field and the relevant semantics of the field-name it contains can use that knowledge to <\/del> semantics of the field-names it contains can use that knowledge to <\/ins> either select an appropriate stored representation, or forward the request if no appropriate representation is stored."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-87b7d8a5b1772808d680cf554188148be133ee5f43d4a21a9767848ea28e6e0e","title":"","text":"Let sorted-variants be an empty list. If the freshest member of stored-responses (as per RFC7234, Section 4.2) has one or more \"Variants\" header field(s): <\/del> Section 4.2) has one or more \"Variants\" header field(s) that successfully parse according to variants: <\/ins> Select one member of stored-responses and let variants-header be its \"Variants\" header field-value(s). This SHOULD be the most recent response, but MAY be from an older one as long as it is still fresh. <\/del> Select one member of stored-responses with a \"Variants\" header field-value(s) that successfully parses according to variants and let variants-header be this parsed value. This SHOULD be the most recent response, but MAY be from an older one as long as it is still fresh. <\/ins> For each variant in variants-header, parsed according to the ABNF: <\/del> For each variant-axis in variants-header: <\/ins> If variant's field-name corresponds to the request header field identified by a content negotiation mechanism that the implementation supports: <\/del> If variant-axis' field-name corresponds to the request header field identified by a content negotiation mechanism that the implementation supports: <\/ins> Let request-value be the field-value associated with field-name in incoming-request (after being combined as allowed by Section 3.2.2 of RFC7230), or null if field- name is not in incoming-request. Let available-values be a list containing all available- value for variant. <\/del> Let sorted-values be the result of running the algorithm defined by the content negotiation mechanism with request-value and available-values. <\/del> request-value and variant-axis' available-values. <\/ins> Append sorted-values to sorted-variants. At this point, sorted-variants will be a list of lists, each member of the top-level list corresponding to a variant-item in <\/del> member of the top-level list corresponding to a variant-axis in <\/ins> the Variants header field-value, containing zero or more items indicating available-values that are acceptable to the client, in order of preference, greatest to least. Return result of running Compute Possible Keys (find) on sorted- variants, an empty string and an empty list. <\/del> variants, an empty list and an empty list. <\/ins> This returns a list of strings suitable for comparing to normalised Variant-Keys (gen-variant-key) that represent possible responses on the server that can be used to satisfy the request, in preference <\/del> This returns a list of lists of strings suitable for comparing to the parsed Variant-Keys (variant-key) that represent possible responses on the server that can be used to satisfy the request, in preference <\/ins> order, provided that their secondary cache key (after removing the headers covered by Variants) matches. check_vary illustrates one way to do this."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-229a9a1f998f332ef159d61632e5aad14839113944abd22f22535cae7edd2dbb","title":"","text":"This algorithm computes the cross-product of the elements of key- facets. Given key-facets (a list of lists), and key-stub (a string representing a partial key), and possible-keys (a list): <\/del> Given key-facets (a list of lists of strings), and key-stub (a list of strings representing a partial key), and possible-keys (a list of lists of strings): <\/ins> Let values be the first member of key-facets. For each value in values: If key-stub is an empty string, let this-key be a copy of value. <\/del> Let remaining-facets be a copy of all of the members of key-facets except the first. <\/ins> Otherwise: Let this-key be a copy of key-stub. Append a semicolon (\";\") to this-key. <\/del> For each value in values: <\/ins> Append value to this-key. <\/del> Let this-key be a copy of key-stub. <\/ins> Let remaining-facets be a copy of all of the members of key- facets except the first. <\/del> Append value to this-key. <\/ins> If remaining-facets is empty, append this-key to possible-keys."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7d6733cbbc24676f45959d68103790f0c6764261dae5eb6cf6b84db7bc0c8032","title":"","text":"Then the sorted-variants would be: Which means that the sorted-keys would be: <\/del> Which means that the result of the cache algorithm would be: <\/ins> Representing a first preference of a French, gzip'd response. Thus, if a cache has a response with:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-393e03349cc018c74db02bcd7573c132d9c72d895038e5bd650f143c5773704b","title":"","text":"More generally, application protocols using HTTP face a number of design decisions, including: Should it define a new URL scheme? Use new ports? <\/del> Should it define a new URI scheme? Use new ports? <\/ins> Should it use standard HTTP methods and status codes, or define new ones?"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bbffa3d79afb768e42076468be337d47e5eecfa6afa1c43f27d8f448a551909d","title":"","text":"the transport port in use is 80 or 443, the URL scheme \"http\" or \"https\" is used, <\/del> the URI scheme \"http\" or \"https\" is used, <\/ins> the ALPN protocol ID RFC7301 generically identifies HTTP (e.g., \"http\/1.1\", \"h2\", \"h2c\"), or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2225ed6b5e4ec480dee6c7c83948e3646d55eaa580585672913d158b6b22d3e4","title":"","text":"adaptable to these changes, and as the protocol diverges from HTTP, the benefit of mindshare will be lost. Protocols that are based upon HTTP MUST NOT reuse HTTP's URL schemes, <\/del> Protocols that are based upon HTTP MUST NOT reuse HTTP's URI schemes, <\/ins> transport ports, ALPN protocol IDs or IANA registries; rather, they are encouraged to establish their own."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88e7a07890389d583f891e7aee411d06c9dce4c5e84917e3c48cd7a65dab824c","title":"","text":"can cause deployment issues, and is therefore bad practice in standards. Instead of statically defining URL components like paths, it is <\/del> Instead of statically defining URI components like paths, it is <\/ins> RECOMMENDED that applications using HTTP define links in payloads, to allow flexibility in deployment."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cf5ffa49a1795bddcab56d162be0467704aa2dcc87351123d4507ac144957c50","title":"","text":"Instead, applications are encouraged to ensure that URLs are discovered at runtime, allowing HTTP-based services to describe their own capabilities. One way to do this is to use typed links RFC8288 to convey the URIs that are in use, as well as the semantics of the <\/del> to convey the URLs that are in use, as well as the semantics of the <\/ins> resources that they identify. See resource for details. 4.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0ebd4391bc7c0ffcfd96de08fdd8634b18ce0904174c8142a3c7227516d70c8e","title":"","text":"4.4.2. Applications that use HTTP will typically employ the \"http\" and\/or \"https\" URL schemes. \"https\" is RECOMMENDED to provide <\/del> \"https\" URI schemes. \"https\" is RECOMMENDED to provide <\/ins> authentication, integrity and confidentiality, as well as mitigate pervasive monitoring attacks RFC7258. However, application-specific schemes can also be defined. When defining an URL scheme for an application using HTTP, there are a <\/del> defining an URI scheme for an application using HTTP, there are a <\/ins> number of tradeoffs and caveats to keep in mind: Unmodified Web browsers will not support the new scheme. While it is possible to register new URL schemes with Web browsers (e.g. <\/del> is possible to register new URI schemes with Web browsers (e.g. <\/ins> registerProtocolHandler() in HTML5, as well as several proprietary approaches), support for these mechanisms is not shared by all browsers, and their capabilities vary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d8baeb0c59884e22bcdf7b4bacad0ac52ddc17f74f5e6be817bdf573e4c86bd4","title":"","text":"Web features that require a secure context SECCTXT will likely treat a new scheme as insecure. See RFC7595 for more information about minting new URL schemes. <\/del> See RFC7595 for more information about minting new URI schemes. <\/ins> 4.4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d3854a19e9245a87e5863589687c8318bcfdf4aac6e369f447fe7a6f500ec70c","title":"","text":"expensive process. In some cases, however, GET might be unwieldy for expressing queries, because of the limited syntax of the URL; in particular, if binary <\/del> because of the limited syntax of the URI; in particular, if binary <\/ins> data forms part of the query terms, it needs to be encoded to conform to URL syntax. <\/del> to URI syntax. <\/ins> While this is not an issue for short queries, it can become one for larger query terms, or ones which need to sustain a high rate of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8db35187e9dff3781e75790a4769878fc411c561a67432aa1a13506a74ed01a6","title":"","text":"to identify clients. The Basic authentication scheme RFC7617 MUST NOT be used unless the underlying transport is authenticated, integrity-protected and confidential (e.g., as provided the \"HTTPS\" URL scheme, or another using TLS). The Digest scheme RFC7616 MUST <\/del> URI scheme, or another using TLS). The Digest scheme RFC7616 MUST <\/ins> NOT be used unless the underlying transport is similarly secure, or the chosen hash algorithm is not \"MD5\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8f9a41906099468f790850b3131c4e15c0dbce8671198af377eede795fa2a7a2","title":"","text":"other than specified. Applications that use HTTP in a manner that involves modification of implementations - for example, requiring support for a new URL <\/del> implementations - for example, requiring support for a new URI <\/ins> scheme, or a non-standard method - risk having those implementations \"fork\" from their parent HTTP implementations, with the possible result that they do not benefit from patches and other security"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93ae1666515b8b5f79da17534c12628aa879d5fbea6bab8a3098545cbb95a310","title":"","text":"guidelines for the creation of such headers, colloquially known as \"Client Hints.\" It also defines an initial set of Client Hints. <\/del> Note to Readers Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-45375bb1e8dbc26f6062f619f4e89489b40185f1f656c9d0b4ea6f502304e7ea","title":"","text":"6.3. Failure to provide a certificate on a stream after receiving <\/del> Failure to provide a certificate for a stream after receiving <\/ins> \"CERTIFICATE_NEEDED\" blocks processing, and SHOULD be subject to standard timeouts used to guard against unresponsive peers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ad7a21548aa68f9a1a41f3ce02d3351c6aaef07fbcf8d8bbd6dbe334b8a4f9bb","title":"","text":"Name: http_response_status Description: The intermediary has received a 4xx or 5xx status code from the next hop and forwarded it to the client. <\/del> Description: The intermediary has received a response from the next hop and forwarded it to the client. <\/ins> Extra Parameters: None."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e1303f2f7af2d2bfc6ede8eaa9c73eaa77b393872b619e67e0df45d3078640d2","title":"","text":"3.1. Lists are arrays of items (item) with one or more members. Members <\/del> Lists are arrays of items (item) with zero or more members. Members <\/ins> can also be an \"inner list\", itself an array of items. The ABNF for lists in HTTP\/1 headers is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-723c9ebf9663b4bbcdd0121fe864d252bbcde928d8647a0c9863c2181eef5533","title":"","text":"Dictionaries are ordered maps of key-value pairs, where the keys are short, textual strings and the values are items (item) or arrays of items. There can be one or more members, and keys are required to be unique. <\/del> items. There can be zero or more members, and keys are required to be unique. <\/ins> Implementations MUST provide access to dictionaries both by index and by key. Specifications MAY use either means of accessing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-76012ed382d9715a936d51beea837591c98e8f0ca158b428f0675b2b4b9e1f1c","title":"","text":"3.3. Parameterized Lists are arrays of parameterized items, with one or <\/del> Parameterized Lists are arrays of parameterized items, with zero or <\/ins> more members. A parameterized item is an item (item) with associated parameters, an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ebaa652dd940d8b863f289e1e05e6a109037503bd1ff27696cb7e1e575cdeb84","title":"","text":"Given a structure defined in this specification: If the structure is a dictionary, list, or parameterized list, and its value is empty (i.e., it has no members), do not serialise the header field. <\/ins> If the structure is a dictionary, let output_string be the result of Serializing a Dictionary (ser-dictionary)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5cda131076db99150714d2970fd98a959316bb79b760d9d9dc076d13d43c668c","title":"","text":"This section specifies the algorithm for doing so. Given an array of bytes input_bytes that represents the chosen header's field-value, and header_type (one of \"dictionary\", \"list\", \"param-list\", or \"item\"), return the parsed header value. <\/del> header's field-value (which is an empty string if that header is not present), and header_type (one of \"dictionary\", \"list\", \"param-list\", or \"item\"), return the parsed header value. <\/ins> Convert input_bytes into an ASCII string input_string; if conversion fails, fail parsing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cb28f57e40114346218e0dcdb2175ab60d01684515d5ac73bd2e188042168e97","title":"","text":"If input_string is empty, fail parsing. No structured data has been found; fail parsing. <\/del> No structured data has been found; return dictionary (which is empty). <\/ins> 4.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ca8218bf3cc81c349088a91bbd8139e13c221597627c8ecbdfb1208a088c255","title":"","text":"If input_string is empty, fail parsing. No structured data has been found; fail parsing. <\/del> No structured data has been found; return items (which is empty). <\/ins> 4.2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b5aa25bce20b130d583ef600c16b1fa79c0b1ad64e44fe2547ae3110289f63ef","title":"","text":"3.3. Parameterized Lists are arrays of parameterized identifiers, with one or more members. <\/del> Parameterized Lists are arrays of parameterized items, with one or more members. <\/ins> A parameterized identifier is a primary identifier (a token}) with associated parameters, an ordered map of key-value pairs where the keys are short, textual strings and the values are items (item). There can be zero or more parameters, and keys are required to be unique. <\/del> A parameterized item is an item (item) with associated parameters, an ordered map of key-value pairs where the keys are short, textual strings and the values are items (item). There can be zero or more parameters, and keys are required to be unique. <\/ins> The ABNF for parameterized lists in HTTP\/1 headers is: In HTTP\/1, each param-id is separated by a comma and optional <\/del> In HTTP\/1, each param-item is separated by a comma and optional <\/ins> whitespace (as in Lists), and the parameters are separated by semicolons. For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9dada71693cdb9d50203605c9bf976b9317fbd4d790f901c38644c2c6b399569","title":"","text":"For each member mem of input_plist: Let id be the result of applying Serializing a Token (ser- token) to mem's token. <\/del> Let item be the result of applying Serializing an item (ser- item) to mem's primary-item. <\/ins> Append id to output. <\/del> Append item to output. <\/ins> For each parameter in mem's parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0ef1d6a5dc53176c1e4478723902a8e4a92e055daf29cc4e497650d8b6c53dda","title":"","text":"4.2.4. Given an ASCII string input_string, return a list of parameterized identifiers. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. <\/del> items. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. <\/ins> Let items be an empty array. While input_string is not empty: Let item be the result of running Parse Parameterized Identifier from Text (parse-param-id) with input_string. <\/del> Let item be the result of running Parse Parameterized Item from Text (parse-param-item) with input_string. <\/ins> Append item to items."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-841a7a124a6ec4e28d52bb0bb2508c00b1d3aeb3391871af20979c480db1c261","title":"","text":"map of parameters. input_string is modified to remove the parsed value. Let primary_identifier be the result of Parsing a Token from Text (parse-token) from input_string. <\/del> Let primary_item be the result of Parsing an item from Text (parse-item) from input_string. <\/ins> Let parameters be an empty, ordered map."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-28e0a1a0fff2e52e3282f3cdfa995d413435a21bf14aa45078f7433ed0e361ff","title":"","text":"Add key param_name with value param_value to parameters. Return the tuple (primary_identifier, parameters). <\/del> Return the tuple (primary_item, parameters). <\/ins> 4.2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-41935e5de0a9487da36c41ea54acbc271a5e398202473cd30564bc7aa428ac7f","title":"","text":"SHA algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks IACR-2019-459. Reference: [FIPS-180-3], RFC4648, this document. <\/del> Reference: FIPS180-3, RFC4648, this document. <\/ins> Status: obsoleted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6e57dcc5aba5c8f64de92dcf69893852f79256f23fb24e39dc4fc7ab3d532836","title":"","text":"1. Integrity protection for HTTP content is multi layered and is usually achieved across the protocol stack: TCP checksums and TLS record to name but some. <\/del> achieved across the protocol stack: TCP checksums and TLS RFC2818 record to name but some. <\/ins> The HTTP protocol does not provide means to protect the various message parts. Besides, it might be desirable to add additional"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8aeedb6a7ba6b7dfbd77866cb668dcd3c25ac0a04530080e7b34135363d8f5c6","title":"","text":"This approach can be easily adapted to use-cases where the transferred data does require some sort of manipulation to be considered a representation or conveys a partial representation of a resource (eg. Range Requests). <\/del> resource (eg. Range Requests RFC7233). <\/ins> Changes are semantically compatible with existing implementations and better cover both the request and response cases."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2301e0cbcb6f5c17c9910bf30d78d980a5f68fe79cbe9d4137d59523d988e830","title":"","text":"should decouple the checksum calculation: from the payload body - which may be altered by mechanism like Range Requests or the method (eg. HEAD); <\/del> Range Requests RFC7233 or the method (eg. HEAD); <\/ins> and from the message body - which depends on \"Transfer-Encoding\" and whatever tranformations the intermediaries may apply."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-36ed56e8cd3fd1c9f5380495e048caea1255fdbbe58227634b4b2f48e506a439","title":"","text":"Resource Digests for HTTP draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers <\/del> draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-latest <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-be402ef792304512deb3234293f0e24735ed826874be93bac36dffc010c20eab","title":"","text":"A final (but significant) goal is to provide for ease of implementation, deployment and operation. This mechanism is expected to have a minimal impact upon performance, and a trivial <\/del> to have a minimal impact upon performance, and require a trivial <\/ins> administrative effort to configure. 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-60288b0b85b0ff41089641d512a7fe10eb2f377c08227bb0c65767575a1c409e","title":"","text":"additional response header fields to convey related values to aid client processing. 2.2.1. <\/del> 3. Servers can advertise support for Client Hints using the mechnisms described below. 3.1. <\/ins> Servers can advertise support for Client Hints using the Accept-CH header field or an equivalent HTML meta element with http-equiv attribute (HTML5). Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh-list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) whose members are tokens (Section 3.7 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/del> The Accept-CH response header field or the equivalent HTML meta element with http-equiv attribute (HTML5) indicate server support for particular hints indicated in its value. Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh- list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) whose members are tokens (Section 3.7 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e66b361389fed3aedac18284c10f01476b502d1b099ca3fd488c9d76dc132dee","title":"","text":"same-origin resource requests initiated by the page constructed from the response. 2.2.2. <\/del> 3.2. <\/ins> Servers can ask the client to remember the set of Client Hints that the server supports for a specified period of time, to enable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-158b7473f7ca9c71842521c19032b7dd98db5f4f55520e8ef9934ec8a452f9c1","title":"","text":"If Accept-CH-Lifetime occurs in a message more than once, the last value overrides all previous occurrences. 2.2.3. <\/del> 3.2.1. <\/ins> When selecting an optimized response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8ddfaade847bfa9f6dd99e8113ed4dae778f8fc5ff30b4cab2a3c34bafc2a637","title":"","text":"Above example indicates that the cache key needs to include the Sec- CH-Example and Sec-CH-Example-2 header fields. 3. <\/del> 4. <\/ins> The request header fields defined in this document, and those that extend it, expose information about the user's environment to enable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f0b34c508df864af86c85fa781f902fe0d2caac8429dddbb2560711e03a28f3e","title":"","text":"clear persisted opt-in preferences when any one of site data, browsing history, browsing cache, or similar, are cleared. 4. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This document defines the \"Accept-CH\" and \"Accept-CH-Lifetime\" HTTP response fields, and registers them in the Permanent Message Header Fields registry. 4.1. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> Header field name: Accept-CH Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-faa4385b5c6d417179ce568b0406652544f09565d4cc4acb61cc6bff8d4583b9","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): accept-ch of this document Related information: for Client Hints 4.2. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> Header field name: Accept-CH-Lifetime Applicable protocol: HTTP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-88ec47ed18a9d9f9529a644e36e3f4315e4ceb6905f07904a7803d238c083cbe","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): accept-ch-lifetime of this document Related information: for Client Hints 5. References <\/del> 6. References <\/ins> 5.1. URIs <\/del> 6.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/lists.w3.org\/Archives\/Public\/ietf-http-wg\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-eb60d3288985674bcb8b4ffe2573d20463c50967108a4415824e4c285c1799a4","title":"","text":"Servers can advertise support for Client Hints using the Accept-CH header field or an equivalent HTML meta element with http-equiv attribute (HTML5). <\/del> attribute (HTML5). Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh-list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) whose members are tokens (Section 3.7 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c492f12c442c8b1232b82ad3de299c977b39cee20b4287d5bb0cf12890d86b8a","title":"","text":"delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to the server's origin (RFC6454). Accept-CH-Lifetime is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header- structure. Its value MUST be sh-integer (Section 3.4 of I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/ins> When a client receives an HTTP response that contains Accept-CH- Lifetime header field, the field-value indicates that the Accept-CH preference SHOULD be persisted and bound to the origin, and be"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-77b9689e8af8941fb51693216c9f6c23bfc77dd2e6b0a14ad3b360a4283b0dfc","title":"","text":"Extra Parameters: details: a sh-string containing the checksum or SPKI of the certificate received from the next hop. Recommended HTTP status code: 502 3.26. Name: tls_unexpected_peer_identity Description: The intermediary received peer certificate with unexpected identity (e.g., Subject Alternative Name doesn't match) during TLS handshake with the next hop. <\/del> identity: a sh-string containing a comma-separated list of Subject Alternative Names from the certificate received from the next hop. <\/ins> Extra Parameters: <\/del> sha256: a sh-string containing the hex-encoded SHA-256 of the certificate received from the next hop. <\/ins> details: a sh-string containing the identity of the next hop. <\/del> spki: a sh-string containing the base64-encoded SHA-256 of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) from the certificate received from the next hop. <\/ins> Recommended HTTP status code: 502 3.27. <\/del> 3.26. <\/ins> Name: tls_missing_proxy_certificate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ccb3843c92cb715810b6051bcc726cd81ef39573fe0826f03d159f314ba3ab4f","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 500 3.28. <\/del> 3.27. <\/ins> Name: tls_rejected_proxy_certificate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2079fbe9036fac46adbec3d25637a41b3330e5d6a8c2bde38cacc890eb104fb1","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 500 3.29. <\/del> 3.28. <\/ins> Name: tls_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dd27db526534862146e607a52d90c7252175870fd3bdac8bf711c25edcc4e24e","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 502 3.30. <\/del> 3.29. <\/ins> Name: http_request_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-70c18aa99f06cfe899624bc91552ed49c2a0c98bdc662df7c8a0f8021ba6991a","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: The applicable 4xx status code 3.31. <\/del> 3.30. <\/ins> Name: http_request_denied"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-1255ad9824d57d5de48dcee5cf26d0d66320851afef1b3b66a678886f98bfcfb","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 400 3.32. <\/del> 3.31. <\/ins> Name: http_upgrade_failed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d0165187d4afffd43cebc6c42cb375ab80f76d30b18a41c5fec8ae26635f713c","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 502 3.33. <\/del> 3.32. <\/ins> Name: proxy_internal_response"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-356d6aba415143abb78abc7f145f01284ee750776b9f9c7f82aa6ec01bd767a8","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 3.34. <\/del> 3.33. <\/ins> Name: proxy_internal_error"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-66e92457513ee8b116357368a6e7cf3251c567a31df57caef5f1d05813671dcb","title":"","text":"Recommended HTTP status code: 500 3.35. <\/del> 3.34. <\/ins> Name: proxy_loop_detected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5ccebd888c070f1bb42d88188fa4484fee46d8559330cdd2f48da7146af7abaf","title":"","text":"Description: The MD5 algorithm, as specified in RFC1321. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. The MD5 algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now <\/del> RFC4648. The MD5 algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now <\/ins> vulnerable to collision attacks CMU-836068. Reference: RFC1321, RFC4648, this document. Status: obsoleted <\/del> Status: deprecated <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-89d13fd4de6622a83f8c0416157d7e26322f655c1cc469aab59b9df8354e3683","title":"","text":"6. The MD5 algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now vulnerable to <\/del> The MD5 algorithm MUST NOT be used as it's now vulnerable to <\/ins> collision attacks CMU-836068. The SHA algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now vulnerable to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-584e6f85fbd83a8549eafdf06be16141a707549d8d7db0f1c2dfacbed4a18631","title":"","text":"However, these rely on collision-resistance for their security proofs CMU-836068. The MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are vulnerable to collisions attacks and they are NOT RECOMMENDED. <\/del> collisions attacks, so MD5 MUST NOT be used and SHA-1 is NOT RECOMMENDED. <\/ins> 8.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b072d8ebf6946e44e9d512456e2fe89fefe0a1a4020230609b9662f2e50f4f2","title":"","text":"9.7. The status has been updated to \"obsoleted\" for both \"SHA\" and \"MD5\", and their descriptions states that those algorithms are NOT RECOMMENDED. <\/del> The status of \"MD5\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and its description states that this algoritm MUST NOT be used. The status of \"SHA\" has been updated to \"obsoleted\", and its description states that this algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED. <\/ins> The status for all other algorithms have been updated to \"standard\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b3aaf71579131a67c9a5e575f4879a55949a40fa4779740249f836de50ba4354","title":"","text":" Description: The SHA-256 algorithm FIPS180-3. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/del> Description: The SHA-256 algorithm RFC6234. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/ins> Reference: FIPS180-3, RFC4648, this document. <\/del> Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. <\/ins> Status: standard Description: The SHA-512 algorithm FIPS180-3. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/del> Description: The SHA-512 algorithm RFC6234. The output of this algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. <\/ins> Reference: FIPS180-3, RFC4648, this document. <\/del> Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. <\/ins> Status: standard"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-bdfd8493e47039a4c5f62a75ea1d9fe1bf301d604f1b7233a0a1fbfcc764090b","title":"","text":" Description: The SHA-1 algorithm FIPS180-1. The output of this <\/del> Description: The SHA-1 algorithm RFC3174. The output of this <\/ins> algorithm is encoded using the base64 encoding RFC4648. The SHA algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED as it's now vulnerable to collision attacks IACR-2019-459. Reference: FIPS180-3, RFC4648, this document. <\/del> Reference: RFC3174, RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. <\/ins> Status: obsoleted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7c1671c456a491d48212b63cda0bb22f43a3d737c2ec186a21f950555e6258a0","title":"","text":"the resource when no content coding is applied (eg. \"Content- Encoding: identity\") Reference: FIPS180-3, RFC4648, this document. <\/del> Reference: RFC6234, RFC4648, this document. <\/ins> Status: standard"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-df94d7451e8ed0979a8d1a0a4dd216e8afc151183018c5e3dd297e17ba6ddd25","title":"","text":"8.3. The ADLER32 algorithm defined in RFC1950 has been deprecated by RFC3309 because under certain conditions it provides weak detection of errors and is now NOT RECOMMENDED. 8.4. <\/ins> \"Digest\" alone does not provide end-to-end integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, as it just covers the \"representation data\" and not the \"representation metadata\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-abc4f40e4bef136aa5e2038f7cb69f7417a850852a08c93902e9fa5b91ce1a05","title":"","text":"Even a simple mechanism for end-to-end validation is thus valuable. 8.4. <\/del> 8.5. <\/ins> Digital signatures are widely used together with checksums to provide the certain identification of the origin of a message NIST800-32."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2143036ce92c0dbf300423bde60c9e5d3ad4f28ebfaed741dc9d6257957cccc5","title":"","text":"A \"Digest\" header field using NOT RECOMMENDED digest-algorithms SHOULD NOT be used in signatures. 8.5. <\/del> 8.6. <\/ins> ... 8.6. <\/del> 8.7. <\/ins> ..."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-0893da65b6be78960d8f1ca12e7c8ce313745b39dd87cd1deeaf5ceac590e58d","title":"","text":"9.5. This memo updates the \"ADLER32\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values [8] registry: Digest Algorithm: ADLER32 Description: The ADLER32 algorithm is a checksum specified in RFC1950 \"ZLIB Compressed Data Format\". The 32-bit output is encoded in hexadecimal (using between 1 and 8 ASCII characters from 0-9, A-F, and a-f; leading 0's are allowed). For example, ADLER32=03da0195 and ADLER32=3DA0195 are both valid checksums for the 4-byte message \"Wiki\". This algorithm is obsoleted and SHOULD NOT be used. Status: obsoleted 9.6. <\/ins> This memo registers the \"ID-SHA-256\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values [8] registry: <\/del> Digest Algorithm Values [9] registry: <\/ins> Digest Algorithm: ID-SHA-256"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4c13805fd9f65f6d088bc6a937283c0aa4628610f5d1ffd82165d5224b4326f1","title":"","text":"Status: As specified in algorithms. 9.6. <\/del> 9.7. <\/ins> This memo registers the \"ID-SHA-512\" digest algorithm in the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values [9] registry: <\/del> Digest Algorithm Values [10] registry: <\/ins> Digest Algorithm: ID-SHA-512"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-89e2af43a26e809c1c12e6bd70f709dd62575d833ddbe516a87b991cac69c9a9","title":"","text":"Status: As specified in algorithms. 9.7. <\/del> 9.8. <\/ins> The status of \"MD5\" has been updated to \"deprecated\", and its description states that this algoritm MUST NOT be used."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-c937fb41203ef62251523e2469e78bec9b6f1a4a381e80d0f28d67152844d82c","title":"","text":"The \"ID-SHA-256\" and \"ID-SHA-512\" algorithms have been added to the registry. 9.8. <\/del> 9.9. <\/ins> This section registers the \"Want-Digest\" header field in the \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" registry (RFC3864)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-34b65708051bf6603dd947bc82f171573c9b0ed93d5e63ce910aca9870efb626","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): want-digest-header of this document 9.9. <\/del> 9.10. <\/ins> This section registers the \"Digest\" header field in the \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" registry (RFC3864)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-14dddfb738c0fb59d8c30b361cec3d937e72d0d76e82aae09b7c5266d8d9b42e","title":"","text":"[8] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml [9] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml [10] https:\/\/www.iana.org\/assignments\/http-dig-alg\/http-dig-alg.xhtml <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d11c72738398e1fc10dd69402768b5da081111bcad35f3c6ea0159ed3c5cfe9","title":"","text":"because it is not clear whether they will be used, and sending them impacts both performance and privacy. This document defines two response headers, Accept-CH and Accept-CH- Lifetime, that servers can use to advertise their use of request headers for proactive content negotiation, along with a set of guidelines for the creation of such headers, colloquially known as \"Client Hints.\" <\/del> This document defines an Accept-CH response header that servers can use to advertise their use of request headers for proactive content negotiation, along with a set of guidelines for the creation of such headers, colloquially known as \"Client Hints.\" <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-5243a0369cd1f5efe9c1e73b4112c909108ba80ab44a3be2b3dc6ba0f079ba1d","title":"","text":"There are thousands of different devices accessing the web, each with different device capabilities and preference information. These device capabilities include hardware and software characteristics, as well as dynamic user and client preferences. One way to infer some of these capabilities is through User-Agent (Section 5.5.3 of RFC7231) header field detection against an established database of client signatures. However, this technique requires acquiring such a database, integrating it into the serving path, and keeping it up to date. However, even once this infrastructure is deployed, user agent sniffing has numerous limitations: User agent detection cannot reliably identify all static variables User agent detection cannot infer any dynamic client preferences User agent detection requires an external device database User agent detection is not cache friendly A popular alternative strategy is to use HTTP cookies (RFC6265) to communicate some information about the user agent. However, this approach is also not cache friendly, bound by same origin policy, and often imposes additional client-side latency by requiring JavaScript execution to create and manage HTTP cookies. <\/del> well as dynamic user and client preferences. Applications that want to allow the server to optimize content delivery and user experience based on such capabilities have, historically, had to rely on passive identification (e.g., by matching User-Agent (Section 5.5.3 of RFC7231) header field against an established database of client signatures), used HTTP cookies and URL parameters, or use some combination of these and similar mechanisms to enable ad hoc content negotiation. Such techniques are expensive to setup and maintain, are not portable across both applications and servers, and make it hard to reason for both client and server about which data is required and is in use during the negotiation: User agent detection cannot reliably identify all static variables, cannot infer dynamic client preferences, requires external device database, is not cache friendly, and is reliant on a passive fingerprinting surface. Cookie based approaches are not portable across applications and servers, impose additional client-side latency by requiring JavaScript execution, and are not cache friendly. URL parameters, similar to cookie based approaches, suffer from lack of portability, and are hard to deploy due to a requirement to encode content negotiation data inside of the URL of each resource. <\/ins> Proactive content negotiation (Section 3.4.1 of RFC7231) offers an alternative approach; user agents use specified, well-defined request"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ca192982163a9d8d0df58dfac72b1efaa0d3b408fda34e83318bd9eb7701565c","title":"","text":"This document defines a new response header, Accept-CH, that allows an origin server to explicitly ask that clients send these headers in requests, for a period of time bounded by the Accept-CH-Lifetime response header. It also defines guidelines for content negotiation <\/del> requests. It also defines guidelines for content negotiation <\/ins> mechanisms that use it, colloquially referred to as Client Hints. Client Hints mitigate the performance concerns by assuring that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d6eb269cd2548050872e5bc924875b0e9c422a3b401ff8558ce956c6715b2ddb","title":"","text":"will use that infrastructure. Those features will be defined in their respective specifications. This document does not supersede or replace the User-Agent header field. Existing device detection mechanisms can continue to use both mechanisms if necessary. By advertising user agent capabilities within a request header field, Client Hints allow for cache friendly and proactive content negotiation. <\/del> 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-436de5bf47d5253102df215e13daa6c07578fd9a84f73cf2d949af000bc4ca01","title":"","text":"The Accept-CH response header field or the equivalent HTML meta element with http-equiv attribute (HTML5) indicate server support for particular hints indicated in its value. Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh- list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure) whose members are tokens (Section 3.7 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/del> particular hints indicated in its value. Accept-CH is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-structure. Its value MUST be an sh-list (Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-httpbis-header- structure) whose members are tokens (Section 3.7 of I-D.ietf-httpbis- header-structure). Its ABNF is: <\/ins> For example: When a client receives an HTTP response advertising support for Client Hints, it should process it as origin (RFC6454) opt-in to receive Client Hint header fields advertised in the field-value. The opt-in MUST be delivered over a secure transport. For example, based on Accept-CH example above, a user agent could append the Sec-CH-Example and Sec-CH-Example-2 header fields to all same-origin resource requests initiated by the page constructed from the response. 3.2. Servers can ask the client to remember the set of Client Hints that the server supports for a specified period of time, to enable delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to the server's origin (RFC6454). Accept-CH-Lifetime is a Structured Header I-D.ietf-httpbis-header- structure. Its value MUST be sh-integer (Section 3.4 of I-D.ietf- httpbis-header-structure). Its ABNF is: When a client receives an HTTP response that contains Accept-CH- Lifetime header field, the field-value indicates that the Accept-CH preference SHOULD be persisted and bound to the origin, and be considered stale after response's age (RFC7234, section 4.2) is greater than the specified number of seconds. The preference MUST be delivered over a secure transport, and MUST NOT be persisted for an origin that isn't HTTPS. For example, based on the Accept-CH and Accept-CH-Lifetime example above, which is received in response to a user agent navigating to \"https:\/\/example.com\", and delivered over a secure transport: a user agent SHOULD persist an Accept-CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/example.com\" for up to 86400 seconds (1 day), and use it for <\/del> provided list of Clients Hints, it SHOULD process it as origin (RFC6454) opt-in to receive Client Hint header fields advertised in the field-value, for subsequent same-origin requests. The opt-in MUST be delivered over a secure transport. The opt-in SHOULD be persisted and bound to the origin to enable delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to the server's origin, and MUST NOT be persisted for an origin that isn't HTTPS. For example, based on the Accept-CH example above, which is received in response to a user agent navigating to \"https:\/\/example.com\", and delivered over a secure transport: a user agent SHOULD persist an Accept-CH preference bound to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and use it for <\/ins> user agent navigations to \"https:\/\/example.com\" and any same-origin resource requests initiated by the page constructed from the navigation's response. This preference SHOULD NOT extend to resource requests initiated to \"https:\/\/example.com\" from other origins. If Accept-CH-Lifetime occurs in a message more than once, the last value overrides all previous occurrences. 3.2.1. <\/del> 3.1.1. <\/ins> When selecting an optimized response based on one or more Client Hints, and if the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4917a774bb8e8ed6a7f0b20fff9732dcf1ed6f8e2f47b195ffc555dc71c4a2b5","title":"","text":"5. This document defines the \"Accept-CH\" and \"Accept-CH-Lifetime\" HTTP response fields, and registers them in the Permanent Message Header Fields registry. <\/del> This document defines the \"Accept-CH\" HTTP response field, and registers it in the Permanent Message Header Fields registry. <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3e828df761a291dd08bf9782bfe61ae9ebec71b4c0c65fdf75bcabb571582fd9","title":"","text":"Specification document(s): accept-ch of this document Related information: for Client Hints 5.2. Header field name: Accept-CH-Lifetime Applicable protocol: HTTP Status: standard Author\/Change controller: IETF Specification document(s): accept-ch-lifetime of this document Related information: for Client Hints <\/del> 6. References 6.1. URIs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-43fc7a1f9321c04a5565a7c79e81f936b84f7e6df4c378b5f78cd070ac41147f","title":"","text":"algorithm without knowing whether the recipient supports the digest- algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. Examples: <\/ins> ... 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-93e24b151b46ca9c9e7e9ddb1eda6eeece7cec1c095c62a84c7e82e445da7653","title":"","text":"7.1.2. As there is no content coding applied, the \"id-sha\" and the \"id-sha- 256\" digest-values are the same. <\/ins> 7.1.3. 7.1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-30ff72d585fc07131dad8861e6270889147698870dac25cc20268dcf554fcfaa","title":"","text":"Digest can be used in requests too. Returned value depends on the representation metadata header fields. 7.1.5. The response contains two digest values: one with no content coding applied, which in this case accidentally matches the unencoded digest-value sent in the request; one taking into account the \"Content-Encoding\". <\/ins> 7.2. 7.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-067ed05777b1e70f5ec15a41365792bc6c655e3059ac754de50b39673f854f23","title":"","text":" Resource Digests for HTTP <\/del> Digest Headers <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ffd150a1bbd0224db532c68cf3307a322ab78d5f463c2a6af5e9f2713e5eb030","title":"","text":"required to be unique within the scope of the dictionary they occur within. Each member of the dictionary can also have associated parameters - an ordered map of key-value pairs where the keys are short, textual strings and the values are items (item). There can be zero or more parameters on a member, and their keys are required to be unique within that scope. <\/ins> Implementations MUST provide access to dictionaries both by index and by name. Specifications MAY use either means of accessing the members."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6567086d711dcc78551788ef015ed446da13d68189af58fcdb019e518ff2426c","title":"","text":"A dictionary with a member whose value is an inner-list of tokens: Typically, a header field specification will define the semantics of individual member names, as well as whether their presence is <\/del> A dictionary with a mix of singular and list values, some with parameters: Typically, a header field specification will define the semantics using individual member names, as well as whether their presence is <\/ins> required or optional. Recipients MUST ignore names that are undefined or unknown, unless the header field's specification specifically disallows them."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-885ba274452dfd0e51bb80e69158d6fcd12d3b62982cfde7a0137bc8e00d8c56","title":"","text":"Append mem_value to output. For each parameter in parameters: Append \";\" to output. Let name be the result of applying Serializing a Key (ser- key) to parameter's param-name. Append name to output. If parameter has a param-value: Let value be the result of applying Serializing an Item (ser-item) to parameter's param-value. Append \"=\" to output. Append value to output. <\/del> Append the result of Serializing Parameters ser-params with parameters to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_plist:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-321b43f78a41d471590cf34c08ed17130a8c5c899a0cb3515d0687b2d4f91645","title":"","text":"4.1.1.2. Given an ordered dictionary parameters: Let output be an empty string. For each parameter in parameters: Append \";\" to output. Let name be the result of applying Serializing a Key (ser-key) to parameter's param-name. Append name to output. If parameter has a param-value: Let value be the result of applying Serializing an Item (ser- item) to parameter's param-value. Append \"=\" to output. Append value to output. Return output. 4.1.1.3. <\/ins> Given a key as input_key: If input_key is not a sequence of characters, or contains"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f8f68d6d22a0ac9c84f346a4ede4b2ad4489ac8b598357d0c70d29a22a115ebb","title":"","text":"Let output be an empty string. For each member mem of input_dictionary: <\/del> For each (member, parameters) of input_dictionary: <\/ins> Let name be the result of applying Serializing a Key (ser-key) to mem's member-name. <\/del> to member's member-name. <\/ins> Append name to output. Append \"=\" to output. If mem is an array, let value be the result of applying Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) to mem. <\/del> If member is an array, let value be the result of applying Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) to member. <\/ins> Otherwise, let value be the result of applying Serializing an Item (ser-item) to mem. <\/del> Item (ser-item) to member. <\/ins> Append value to output. Append the result of Serializing Parameters ser-params with parameters to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_dictionary: Append a COMMA to output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9d2606e6c2f45c6a401ed949516cad9dc1d0ca351d7cfdead86a80f22b3b4f6c","title":"","text":"Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \"=\", fail parsing. If the first character of input_string is \"(\", let this_value be the result of running Parsing an Inner List (parse- innerlist) with input_string. Else, let this_value be the result of running Parsing an Item (parse-item) with input_string. <\/del> Let member be the result of running Parsing a Parameterized Member from Text (parse-param) with input_string. <\/ins> Add name this_key with value this_value to dictionary. <\/del> Add name this_key with value member to dictionary. <\/ins> Discard any leading OWS from input_string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-75a9000fa924c3fd8ed1cd5d7a0c787b57e8462ba543caef4f47aa71509f318f","title":"","text":"3.5. Floats are integers with a fractional part, that can be stored as IEEE 754 double precision numbers (binary64) (IEEE754). <\/del> Floats are decimal numbers with an integer and a fractional part. The fractional part has at most six digits of precision. Additionally, like integers, it can have no more than fifteen digits in total, which in some cases further constrains its precision. <\/ins> The ABNF for floats in textual HTTP headers is:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-66fa0e2f7f93c10cc3d75033ae5dcd961bfce9748acee611a3c8ea60fdacc95b","title":"","text":"Given a float as input_float: If input_float is not a IEEE 754 double precision number, fail serialisation. <\/del> If input_float's fractional part has more than six digits of precision, fail serialisation. If the number of digits of precision in input_float's fractional part plus those in its integer part add to more than fifteen digits, fail serialisation. <\/ins> Let output be an empty string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b94375aa2dd9acb7f4b796a5e3a30126442ff01f14e0528415cd82fb5abfeeaf","title":"","text":"If the final character of input_number is \".\", fail parsing. If the number of characters after \".\" in input_number is greater than six, fail parsing. <\/ins> Parse input_number as a float and let output_number be the product of the result and sign."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3e164d1d4771c7bd9dc4f0abb40ead8436f1d9a38246c8cac99fa3f29875f608","title":"","text":"The ABNF for a Boolean in textual HTTP headers is: In textual HTTP headers, a boolean is indicated with a leading \"?\" character. For example: <\/del> character followed by a \"1\" for a true value or \"0\" for false. For example: <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-2b32325cb04dd8b4e57fa220664809106e686a7334e177cf24cf5e438c8e1223","title":"","text":"Abstract This document clarifies the use of TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication and key update with HTTP\/2. <\/del> This document updates HTTP\/2 to prohibit TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication, as an analog to existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation restriction. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-f220f0b296d0dc6d527acb54ea68c373ef24a7084eb4df1e50f69a70be420b02","title":"","text":"TLS 1.3 RFC8446 updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but has a different name. This makes it ambiguous whether post-handshake authentication is allowed in TLS 1.3. <\/del> the prohibition in HTTP\/2 only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation. <\/ins> This document clarifies that the prohibition applies to post- handshake authentication but not to key updates. <\/del> This document updates HTTP\/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post- handshake authentication. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-afe54784ada015d74772841a2e130612e2747946c02112bf9824cad2ed73f4d2","title":"","text":"3. The prohibition on renegotiation in section 9.2.1 of RFC7540 additionally applies to TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication. <\/del> HTTP\/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages. HTTP\/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post- handshake authentication as a connection error (see section 5.4.1 of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-cedcb921fad13c38417a15715b054a29027764d121ebb818b84af14bd8c96b07","title":"","text":"4. Section 9.2.1 of RFC7540 does not extend to TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages. HTTP\/2 implementations MUST support key updates when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. <\/del> RFC8446 defines two other messages that are exchanged after the handshake is complete, KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket. KeyUpdate messages only affect TLS itself and do not require any interaction with the application protocol. HTTP\/2 implementations MUST support key updates when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. NewSessionTicket messages are also permitted. Though these interact with HTTP when early data is enabled, these interactions are defined in RFC8470 and allowed for in the design of HTTP\/2. Unless the use of a new type of TLS message depends on an interaction with the application layer protocol, that TLS message can be sent after the handshake completes. <\/ins> 5. This document clarifies how to use HTTP\/2 with TLS 1.3 and resolves a compatibility concern when supporting post-handshake authentication with HTTP\/1.1. This lowers the barrier for deploying TLS 1.3, a major security improvement over TLS 1.2. Permitting key updates allows key material to be refreshed in long-lived HTTP\/2 connections. <\/del> This document resolves a compatibility concern between HTTP\/2 and TLS 1.3 when supporting post-handshake authentication with HTTP\/1.1. This lowers the barrier for deploying TLS 1.3, a major security improvement over TLS 1.2. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-dc1ea946bf226796d1c0cdb9c1bc181d44fd27dc99f5918d823807e37ad710b4","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 RFC7540 multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above. Clients cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which triggered it. Thus, section 9.2.1 of RFC7540 forbids renegotiation. <\/del> triggered it. Thus, Section 9.2.1 of RFC7540 forbids renegotiation. <\/ins> TLS 1.3 RFC8446 updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e6d2d012b4f454e84c7e15bff34e8b3adca4a0e581260ed6556a8b57f39d5c92","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages. HTTP\/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post- handshake authentication as a connection error (see section 5.4.1 of <\/del> handshake authentication as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of <\/ins> RFC7540) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. RFC7540 permitted renegotiation before the HTTP\/2 connection preface"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-24d4aaf816c8a40be7282716793f779a9ac4df4cf385b1bfbd1dc691b6d9e46f","title":"","text":"Here is a gzip-compressed json object Request: <\/ins> Now the same payload body conveys a malformed json object. Request: <\/ins> A Range-Request alters the payload body, conveying a partial representation. Request: Response: <\/ins> Now the method too alters the payload body. Request: Response: <\/ins> 3. Digest algorithm values are used to indicate a specific digest"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3340a30ea6941be4c25b94726079aa541e0b641e1c2da0bed79195ff61522d3e","title":"","text":"7.1.1. Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.1.2. As there is no content coding applied, the \"sha-256\" and the \"id-sha- 256\" digest-values are the same. Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.1.3. Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.1.4. Digest can be used in requests too. Returned value depends on the representation metadata header fields. Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.1.5. Request \"Digest\" value is calculated on the enclosed payload."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-951262e0529ba682a7d7a0171c6874bc74baf569a6334c64dfdfdb2260802ba3","title":"","text":"one taking into account the \"Content-Encoding\". Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.2. 7.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-05d72eb7403aa3e098dcb466dafdf875ff1f9ddf8cded927e80322ffeb101fed","title":"","text":"The client requests a digest, preferring sha. The server is free to reply with sha-256 anyway. Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.2.2. The client requests a sha digest only. The server is currently free to reply with a Digest containing an unsupported algorithm Request: Response: <\/ins> 7.2.3. The client requests a sha Digest, the server advises for sha-256 and sha-512 Request: Response: <\/ins> ... 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-6673e6ae4f2f5e4cca9dd1d177f7356876bbbedd2a3428541a1d1c2050c17bff","title":"","text":"RFC7230. The definitions \"representation\", \"selected representation\", \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\" and \"payload body\" <\/del> \"representation data\", \"representation metadata\", and \"payload body\" <\/ins> in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC7230 and RFC7231. The definition \"validator\" in this document is to be interpreted as described in Section 7.2 of RFC7231. <\/ins> 2. To avoid inconsistencies, an integrity mechanism for HTTP messages"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-8abe2c84b8e62cc6c41d305c262f8150d85c2d55dfdd52daa3cd0d9c2011e111","title":"","text":"or not at all contained in the message body. The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any cache- validator contained in the message. <\/del> The resource is specified by the effective request URI and any \"validator\" contained in the message. <\/ins> For example, in a response to a HEAD request, the digest is calculated using the representation data that would have been"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-d7519074230fa3d367e4d60e8ddd52631ec9217ca21507dc27708222c061e9b4","title":"","text":"Extra Parameters: None. Recommended HTTP status code: <\/del> Recommended HTTP status code: 503 <\/ins> 3.13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-54b61cc57b5aab73d3e26d9d84b5b2dc6567d20359e90a97bab4ec3ead1e1bc6","title":"","text":"calculated using the representation data that would have been enclosed in the payload body if the same request had been a GET. Digest can be used in requests too. Returned value depends on the representation metadata header fields. <\/del> Digest can be used in requests too. The \"Digest\" value depends on the representation metadata. <\/ins> A Digest header field MAY contain multiple representation-data-digest values. This could be useful for responses expected to reside in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-ac6c7a6ec48a62f0f136d93c7c10bee788ebfc2d329b0d5a2ea1ad480a382757","title":"","text":"9.4. Digest can be used in requests too. Returned value depends on the representation metadata header fields. <\/del> The request contains a \"Digest\" header calculated on the enclosed representation. It also includes an \"Accept-Encoding: br\" header field that advertises the client supports brotli encoding. The response includes a \"Content-Encoding: br\" that indicates the selected representation is brotli encoded. The \"Digest\" field-value is therefore different compared to the request. <\/ins> Request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-511eec6d0bbe2acb47cda7b4b2c91c63ceb8fad15a976e6b763af666686b74ba","title":"","text":"HTTP Client Hints draft-ietf-httpbis-client-hints-07 <\/del> draft-ietf-httpbis-client-hints-08 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-b2c50248999472a8e62dd0d2ea6cc29c559f8ec3a8198f780c619502b07eb613","title":"","text":"service can be used for establishing new connections, not limiting the use of existing ones. Alternative services are fully authoritative for the origin in question, including the ability to clear or update cached alternative service entries, extend freshness lifetimes, and any other authority the origin server would have. <\/ins> When alternative services are used to send a client to the most optimal server, a change in network configuration can result in cached values becoming suboptimal. Therefore, clients"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-e1938c60f50662a28bbea3a21bcb748dd0ef2bd826c39b04c833d18f1652bc0d","title":"","text":"The following examples show how representation metadata, payload transformations and method impacts on the message and payload body. When the payload body contains non-printable characters (eg. when it is compressed) it is shown as base64-encoded string. <\/ins> Here is a gzip-compressed json object"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-42c23ac95cb2585bf0f841f132911ab4f965149db09755f7f9100df5846cc4b7","title":"","text":"selected representation is brotli encoded. The \"Digest\" field-value is therefore different compared to the request. The response body is displayed as a base64-encoded string because it contains non-printable characters. <\/ins> Request: Response:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3479bce75dd4487fede4bbbfa015b55117f6ddcb72bb718d18c5d8728e3b1292","title":"","text":"one taking into account the \"Content-Encoding\". As the response body contains non-printable characters, it is displayed as a base64-encoded string. <\/ins> Request: Response:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-3b2470bd5f921fc596e9e2eeffd52c4bf948c683793ea75b9639ff811f20ba3c","title":"","text":"3.2. Dictionaries are ordered maps of name-value pairs, where the names are short, textual strings and the values are items (item) or arrays of items, both of which can be parameterised (param). There can be zero or more members, and their names are required to be unique within the scope of the dictionary they occur within. <\/del> are short, textual strings and the values can be items (item) or arrays of items, both of which can be parameterised (param). There can be zero or more members, and their names are required to be unique within the scope of the dictionary they occur within. <\/ins> Implementations MUST provide access to dictionaries both by index and by name. Specifications MAY use either means of accessing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-9e1264c44576c29a3d080e3bea2bae615064f6026a9445fd7684c7a2dea980aa","title":"","text":"whitespace, while names and values are separated by \"=\" (without whitespace). For example: Members whose value is Boolean true MUST omit that value when serialised, unless it has parameters. For example, here both \"b\" and \"c\" are true, but \"c\"'s value is serialised because it has parameters: Note that this requirement is only on serialisation; parsers are still required to correctly handle the true value when it appears in dictionary values. <\/ins> A dictionary with a member whose value is an inner-list of tokens: A dictionary with a mix of singular and list values, some with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-4604f3a4082ff7fc7bfa5d3024a901ec5cb52beab0f60b02a5ac8d4c4c6a9b42","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Serializing a Key (ser-key) with member's member_name to output. Append \"=\" to output. <\/del> If member_value is not Boolean true or parameters is not empty: <\/ins> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> Append \"=\" to output. <\/ins> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_dictionary:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-a8d66713b535bcf7ed74e67b28feb3c6eb29fc9c88c704efdd65079acc0d29ed","title":"","text":"If dictionary already contains the name this_key, there is a duplicate; fail parsing. Consume the first character of input_string; if it is not \"=\", fail parsing. <\/del> If the first character of input_string is \"=\": Consume the first character of input_string. Let member be the result of running Parsing an Item or Inner List (parse-item-or-list) with input_string. Otherwise: Let value be Boolean true. Let parameters be an empty, ordered map. <\/ins> Let member be the result of running Parsing an Item or Inner List (parse-item-or-list) with input_string. <\/del> Let member be the tuple (value, parameters). <\/ins> Add name this_key with value member to dictionary."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http-extensions-7b07a37c60e5c232f92ea0659e91c05f69b2ac5f975e76fcf76aed4321f868de","title":"","text":"Append the result of running Serializing a Key (ser-key) with member's member_name to output. If member_value is not Boolean true or parameters is not empty: <\/ins> Append \"=\" to output. If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> If member_value is an array, append the result of running Serialising an Inner List (ser-innerlist) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/del> Otherwise, append the result of running Serializing an Item (ser-item) with (member_value, parameters) to output. <\/ins> If more members remain in input_dictionary: <\/del> If more members remain in input_dictionary: <\/ins> Append a COMMA to output. <\/del> Append a COMMA to output. <\/ins> Append a single WS to output. <\/del> Append a single WS to output. <\/ins> Return output."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-76f991ab3488e71e81301712f18f9704cde6642755e60633ed70630f8bdbe440","title":"","text":"A complete field section consists of either: Field compression is stateful. One compression context and one decompression context are used for the entire connection. A decoding error in a field block MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR. <\/del> Each field block is processed as a discrete unit. Field blocks MUST be transmitted as a contiguous sequence of frames, with no interleaved frames of any other type or from any other stream. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ba3bd33c2d20a47aff4d91b70211259ac7af4fe3e8fcadd31663b2b20728ee9c","title":"","text":"MUST terminate the connection with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR if it does not decompress a field block. A decoding error in a field block MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR. 4.3.1. Field compression is stateful. One compression context and one decompression context are used for the entire connection. COMPRESSION defines the dynamic table, which is the primary state that is used for field compression. The dynamic table has a maximum size that is set by a decoder using the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE setting; see SettingValues. The encoder can set the dynamic table to any size up to the maximum value set by the decoder. The encoder declares the size of the dynamic table with a Dynamic Table Size Update instruction (COMPRESSION). The encoder at both client and server is initialized with a dynamic table size of 4,096 bytes, the initial value of the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE setting. Any change to the maximum value set by the decoder takes effect when the encoder SettingsSync. The first field block sent by an encoder after a change in SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE starts with at least one Dynamic Table Size Update instruction; see COMPRESSION. An encoder sends a Dynamic Table Size Update instruction after acknowledging a change of SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE even if it is not changing the size of the dynamic table or an increase to the maximum size is subsequently reverted before the field block is sent. An encoder MAY treat the absence of Dynamic Table Size Update instructions in a field block following an acknowledgment of a change to SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR. <\/ins> 5. A \"stream\" is an independent, bidirectional sequence of frames"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-83d892ed615a195bf65aa54d26325c56fb54368958fd0cb0b00f505d4198875f","title":"","text":"MUST terminate the connection with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR if it does not decompress a field block. A decoding error in a field block MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR. 4.3.1. Field compression is stateful. Each endpoint has an HPACK encoder context and an HPACK decoder context that are used for encoding and decoding all field blocks. COMPRESSION defines the dynamic table, which is the primary state for each context. The dynamic table has a maximum size that is set by an HPACK decoder. An endpoint communicates the size chosen by its HPACK decoder context using the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE setting; see SettingValues. When a connection is established, the dynamic table size for the HPACK decoder and encoder at both endpoints starts at 4,096 bytes, the initial value of the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE setting. Any change to the maximum value set using SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE takes effect when the endpoint SettingsSync. The HPACK encoder at that endpoint can set the dynamic table to any size up to the maximum value set by the decoder. An HPACK encoder declares the size of the dynamic table with a Dynamic Table Size Update instruction (COMPRESSION). Once an endpoint acknowledges a change to SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that reduces the maximum below the current size of the dynamic table, its HPACK encoder MUST start the next field block with a Dynamic Table Size Update instruction that sets the dynamic table to a size that is less than or equal to the reduced maximum; see COMPRESSION. An endpoint MUST treat a field block that follows an acknowledgment of the reduction to the maximum dynamic table size as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type COMPRESSION_ERROR if it does not start with an conformant Dynamic Table Size Update instruction. <\/ins> 5. A \"stream\" is an independent, bidirectional sequence of frames"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7504d4b7a87cb98346ee69135af0ddb30b49ae3b886680deda96ead3d8c86d84","title":"","text":" Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP\/2) <\/del> HTTP\/2 <\/ins> draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-08210b5f007265a251c239f72c99c38ed603fa00d30afc723168a6a1a26cb2f2","title":"","text":"delimiters could be used to cause recipients to incorrectly interpret a message, which could be exploited by an attacker. HttpHeaders does not include specific rules for validation of pseudo- header fields. If the values of these fields are used, additional validation is necessary. This is particularly important where , , and are combined to form a single URI string (RFC3986). Similar problems might occur when that URI or just are combined with to construct a request line (as in HTTP11). Simple concatenation is not secure unless the input values are fully validated. <\/ins> An intermediary can reject fields that contain invalid field names or values for other reasons, in particular those that do not conform to the HTTP ABNF grammar from HTTP. Intermediaries that do not perform"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d709c351e97e47336ae15695229d00edc8264599be61ba8d3da108559d4941c5","title":"","text":"While some of the frame and stream layer concepts are isolated from HTTP, this specification does not define a completely generic frame layer. The frame and stream layers are tailored to the needs of the HTTP protocol. <\/del> layer. The frame and stream layers are tailored to the needs of HTTP. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0de83671dd0c74582db3826af1595cfc6eee152bcf79a0dd71c0bcf434bc925a","title":"","text":"9. This section outlines attributes of the HTTP protocol that improve <\/del> This section outlines attributes of HTTP that improve <\/ins> interoperability, reduce exposure to known security vulnerabilities, or reduce the potential for implementation variation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b3bc8e248af88a05970693bc802c8bfc3f722d4471b42054ae7c7fb3529ddaf7","title":"","text":"mandatory frame data. A frame size error in a frame that could alter the state of the entire connection MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler; this includes any frame carrying a FieldBlock (that is, HEADERS, PUSH_PROMISE, and CONTINUATION), SETTINGS, and any frame with a stream identifier of 0. <\/del> (that is, HEADERS, PUSH_PROMISE, and CONTINUATION), a SETTINGS frame, and any frame with a stream identifier of 0. <\/ins> Endpoints are not obligated to use all available space in a frame. Responsiveness can be improved by using frames that are smaller than"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-78d3aa29b789a2f952ccbf7f9a84da1208624d0e72712d6ae80222a64d9f0e4b","title":"","text":"employ flow control to limit the amount of memory a peer can consume. Note, however, that this can lead to suboptimal use of available network resources if flow control is enabled without knowledge of the bandwidth-delay product (see RFC7323). <\/del> bandwidth * delay product (see RFC7323). <\/ins> Even with full awareness of the current bandwidth-delay product, <\/del> Even with full awareness of the current bandwidth * delay product, <\/ins> implementation of flow control can be difficult. Endpoints MUST read and process HTTP\/2 frames from the TCP receive buffer as soon as data is available. Failure to read promptly could lead to a deadlock when"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a03dbb49d573cf1f6fb7af98b2968fcd3c5a7706d3700db772d41a41051c41c5","title":"","text":"5.2.3. If an endpoint cannot ensure that its peer always has available flow control window space that is greater than the peer's bandwidth-delay product on this connection, its receive throughput will be limited by HTTP\/2 flow control. This will result in degraded performance. <\/del> control window space that is greater than the peer's bandwidth * delay product on this connection, its receive throughput will be limited by HTTP\/2 flow control. This will result in degraded performance. <\/ins> Sending timely WINDOW_UPDATE frames can improve performance. Endpoints will want to balance the need to improve receive throughput"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a6a4966faf1277f4246540d0d3044864afede23dd4657fd843690777524d3794","title":"","text":"GOAWAY frame, the identified stream is the highest-numbered stream initiated by the client. Once sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on streams initiated by the receiver if the stream has an identifier higher than the included last stream identifier. Receivers of a GOAWAY frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. <\/del> Once the GOAWAY is sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on streams initiated by the receiver if the stream has an identifier higher than the included last stream identifier. Receivers of a GOAWAY frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. <\/ins> If the receiver of the GOAWAY has sent data on streams with a higher stream identifier than what is indicated in the GOAWAY frame, those"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b05ad54b91aaf180f9b4ab7d681fcd68b846327eb652b114561286741a020f1c","title":"","text":"8.2.3. The COOKIE uses a semicolon (\";\") to delimit cookie-pairs (or \"crumbs\"). This header field contains multiple values, but does not use a COMMA (\",\") as a separator, which prevents cookie-pairs from being sent on multiple field lines (see HTTP). This can <\/del> \"crumbs\"). This header field contains multiple values but does not use a COMMA (\",\") as a separator, thereby preventing cookie-pairs from being sent on multiple field lines (see HTTP). This can <\/ins> significantly reduce compression efficiency as updates to individual cookie-pairs would invalidate any field lines that are stored in the HPACK table."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ebd883bf878dbbb755adf1f5b3ab92e847d0c2a27699b11a533569ca658510a1","title":"","text":"The following pseudo-header fields are defined for HTTP\/2 requests: All HTTP\/2 requests MUST include exactly one valid value for the <\/del> All HTTP\/2 requests MUST include exactly one valid value for the \" <\/ins> , <\/del> \", \" <\/ins> , and <\/del> \", and \" <\/ins> pseudo-header fields, unless it is a CONNECT. An HTTP request that <\/del> \" pseudo-header fields, unless it is a CONNECT. An HTTP request that <\/ins> omits mandatory pseudo-header fields is malformed. Individual HTTP\/2 requests do not carry an explicit indicator of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fccfe0b4a60b859e1b0858cbbc2d05a5b198a2050b45fc40268bb286edfb5477","title":"","text":"8.3.2. For HTTP\/2 responses, a single <\/del> For HTTP\/2 responses, a single \" <\/ins> pseudo-header field is defined that carries the HTTP status code <\/del> \" pseudo-header field is defined that carries the HTTP status code <\/ins> field (see HTTP). This pseudo-header field MUST be included in all responses, including interim responses; otherwise, the response is malformed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c452634a7d827e825a730dfc37e898705539b5ac32ab4d520f6e149f0811e452","title":"","text":"HTTP cache. They MAY be made available to the application separately. The server MUST include a value in the <\/del> The server MUST include a value in the \" <\/ins> pseudo-header field for which the server is authoritative (see <\/del> \" pseudo-header field for which the server is authoritative (see <\/ins> authority). A client MUST treat a PUSH_PROMISE for which the server is not authoritative as a StreamErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b7902b39e40a51a0cf1e8d24560a93feb9c2199ecbe85761f5bf9ace97f44454","title":"","text":"The header fields in PUSH_PROMISE and any subsequent CONTINUATION frames MUST be a valid and complete set of HttpRequest. The server MUST include a method in the <\/del> MUST include a method in the \" <\/ins> pseudo-header field that is safe and cacheable. If a client receives a PUSH_PROMISE that does not include a complete and valid set of header fields or the <\/del> \" pseudo-header field that is safe and cacheable. If a client receives a PUSH_PROMISE that does not include a complete and valid set of header fields or the \" <\/ins> pseudo-header field identifies a method that is not safe, it MUST <\/del> \" pseudo-header field identifies a method that is not safe, it MUST <\/ins> respond on the promised stream with a StreamErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9cb1abf5c0c83a86ae90c92d7947c6fa2306c7ad87a79ab7510ee5b24c5054c2","title":"","text":"malformed. A proxy that supports CONNECT establishes a TCP to the host and port identified in the <\/del> identified in the \" <\/ins> pseudo-header field. Once this connection is successfully <\/del> \" pseudo-header field. Once this connection is successfully <\/ins> established, the proxy sends a HEADERS frame containing a 2xx series status code to the client, as defined in HTTP."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5093ff09074c4f539265dbac08055199271f50a8cbb4bf970e8737a5c3c7b02b","title":"","text":"HttpHeaders does not include specific rules for validation of pseudo- header fields. If the values of these fields are used, additional validation is necessary. This is particularly important where <\/del> validation is necessary. This is particularly important where \" <\/ins> , <\/del> \", \" <\/ins> , and <\/del> \", and \" <\/ins> are combined to form a single URI string (RFC3986). Similar problems might occur when that URI or just <\/del> \" are combined to form a single URI string (RFC3986). Similar problems might occur when that URI or just \" <\/ins> are combined with <\/del> \" are combined with \" <\/ins> to construct a request line (as in HTTP11). Simple concatenation is not secure unless the input values are fully validated. <\/del> \" to construct a request line (as in HTTP11). Simple concatenation is not secure unless the input values are fully validated. <\/ins> An intermediary can reject fields that contain invalid field names or values for other reasons, in particular those that do not conform to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3e74cda2b0e65c8fdf21ad0c43ce7999c59760b37955d40d274648c97cde3423","title":"","text":"For TCP connections without TLS, this depends on the host having resolved to the same IP address. For <\/del> For \" <\/ins> resources, connection reuse additionally depends on having a <\/del> \" resources, connection reuse additionally depends on having a <\/ins> certificate that is valid for the host in the URI. The certificate presented by the server MUST satisfy any checks that the client would perform when forming a new TLS connection for the host in the URI. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5bc7848f9d270785757d7ac76c5859621c2774a6c25dd01bf16f2aa4c5cd8079","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 relies on the HTTP definition of authority for determining whether a server is authoritative in providing a given response (see HTTP). This relies on local name resolution for the \"http\" URI scheme and the authenticated server identity for the \"https\" scheme. <\/del> HTTP). This relies on local name resolution for the \" \" URI scheme and the authenticated server identity for the \" \" scheme. <\/ins> 10.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-14c97f910aeb74adb832f2e55c6b8ef281bf4f9509754d58590228ca06deeed8","title":"","text":"the pushed response as a HttpResponse on a server-initiated stream that uses the promised stream identifier. The server uses this stream to transmit an HTTP response, using the same sequence of frames as defined in HttpFraming. This stream becomes StreamStates after the initial HEADERS frame is sent. <\/del> frames as that defined in HttpFraming. This stream becomes StreamStates after the initial HEADERS frame is sent. <\/ins> Once a client receives a PUSH_PROMISE frame and chooses to accept the pushed response, the client SHOULD NOT issue any requests for the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8dcc94e81cf1e3acab1ef10318973d4debe6f867e079d4c462c866c886082a1d","title":"","text":"In addition to these mechanisms, the PING frame provides a way for a client to easily test a connection. Connections that remain idle can become broken as some middleboxes (for instance, network address translators or load balancers) silently discard connection bindings. The PING frame allows a client to safely test whether a connection is still active without sending a request. <\/del> become broken, because some middleboxes (for instance, network address translators or load balancers) silently discard connection bindings. The PING frame allows a client to safely test whether a connection is still active without sending a request. <\/ins> 8.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a14f653e0f4fcdcdc0f745424fe6d5481304b2c52cd03712faf8518dd45e4362","title":"","text":"8.8.3. An HTTP POST request that includes control data and a request header and message content is transmitted as one HEADERS frame, followed by <\/del> with message content is transmitted as one HEADERS frame, followed by <\/ins> zero or more CONTINUATION frames containing the request header, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last CONTINUATION (or HEADERS) frame having the END_HEADERS flag set and the final DATA"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-16f89aaaef4d67d0b053d2dfcb82e666cf835f9e955db885e92449ca36e5781c","title":"","text":"8.8.4. A response that includes control data and a response header and <\/del> A response that includes control data and a response header with <\/ins> message content is transmitted as a HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last DATA frame in the sequence having the END_STREAM flag"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0c52e9b77efb2ea3a40acf6ae1b749ce7f4a01a4b2a047ecee1e38adb0993450","title":"","text":"The list of prohibited cipher suites includes the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory, which means that TLS 1.2 deployments could have non-intersecting sets of permitted cipher suites. To avoid this problem causing TLS handshake failures, deployments of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS- ECDHE with the P-256 elliptic curve RFC8422. <\/del> problem, which causes TLS handshake failures, deployments of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with the P-256 elliptic curve RFC8422. <\/ins> Note that clients might advertise support of cipher suites that are prohibited in order to allow for connection to servers that do not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-84b31b770f29ff94388ffa73e3882bf7fec04cc47d1dae3719cb2f044b6bcc9d","title":"","text":"An intermediary that receives any field that requires removal before forwarding (see HTTP) MUST remove or replace those header fields when forwarding messages. Additionally, intermediaries should take care when forwarding messages containing Content-Length fields to ensure that the message is malformed. This ensures that if the message is translated into HTTP\/1.1 at any point the framing will be correct. <\/del> when forwarding messages containing fields to ensure that the message is malformed. This ensures that if the message is translated into HTTP\/1.1 at any point the framing will be correct. <\/ins> 10.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bd086dbc51f837485c8c865f996aa71325c3ba2a2deb5d709db3875da6a094f8","title":"","text":"10.5. An HTTP\/2 connection can demand a greater commitment of resources to operate than an HTTP\/1.1 connection. The use of field section compression and flow control depend on a commitment of resources for storing a greater amount of state. Settings for these features ensure that memory commitments for these features are strictly bounded. <\/del> operate than an HTTP\/1.1 connection. Both field section compression and flow control depend on a commitment of a greater amount of state. Settings for these features ensure that memory commitments for these features are strictly bounded. <\/ins> The number of PUSH_PROMISE frames is not constrained in the same fashion. A client that accepts server push SHOULD limit the number"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c6f6bd85cc7049e99c65a74c2822eb77f99c5bb3455b6dc6bea954c9d1f66f67","title":"","text":"implementations might be subject to denial of service attack: Most of the features that might be exploited for denial of service -- i.e., SETTINGS changes, small frames, field section compression -- <\/del> such as SETTINGS changes, small frames, field section compression -- <\/ins> have legitimate uses. These features become a burden only when they are used unnecessarily or to excess."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-aae930a9ebb7ac98df41d78f158074205e68fb970eb0648a22e99d2c5b8ce926","title":"","text":"Several characteristics of HTTP\/2 provide an observer an opportunity to correlate actions of a single client or server over time. These include the value of settings, the manner in which flow-control <\/del> include the values of settings, the manner in which flow-control <\/ins> windows are managed, the way priorities are allocated to streams, the timing of reactions to stimulus, and the handling of any features that are controlled by settings."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f6f7c45742cc38a3fa3d7f228cd3048ecf51716776b46b866ad1dd6a1693211c","title":"","text":"delivery, leaving only request order and the delivery of responses as sources of timing variability. Ensuring that processing time is not dependent on the value of secrets is the best defense against any form of timing attack. <\/del> Ensuring that processing time is not dependent on the value of a secret is the best defense against any form of timing attack. <\/ins> 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-dd516a02ae7a030f342205da90231b407be3812a035f7c80f2b43a531ee157f7","title":"","text":"The PRIORITY frame is associated with an existing stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/del> recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> PROTOCOL_ERROR. 3.8.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3bb31bb467b91e24ea84c8520020bfcd752723065704ffa98a97349abb07307d","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame is associated with an existing stream. If a HEADERS frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/del> recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> PROTOCOL_ERROR. The HEADERS frame changes the connection state as defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-04e2ed87c866f8af44b062bb1dac45f6c3dc2353dc70eedc563ac4157f07ad86","title":"","text":"The endpoint detected that its peer violated the flow control protocol. The endpoint received a frame for an inactive stream. <\/del> The endpoint received a frame after a stream was half-closed. The endpoint received a frame that was larger than the maximum"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-de9a2f8ca6a27a66282d7fded93e9548c72384db7cec61566d33dab7537cb0fd","title":"","text":"idle connection is still functional. PING frames can be sent from any endpoint. PING frames consist of an arbitrary, variable-length sequence of octets. Receivers of a PING send a response PING frame with the PONG <\/del> In addition to the frame header, PING frames MUST contain 8 additional octets of opaque data. A sender can utilize this payload in any manner it wishes but MUST include the octets even if they are unused. Receivers of a PING send a response PING frame with the PONG <\/ins> flag set and precisely the same sequence of octets back to the sender as soon as possible."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-067be42834dff4b4a373300b04a976bdfe4d11543ab832d8df576bbd55069b12","title":"","text":"part of the connection header. Prior to receiving a SETTINGS frame that sets a value for SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE, a client can only use the default <\/del> SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE, an endpoint can only use the default <\/ins> initial window size when sending flow controlled frames. Similarly, the connection flow control window is set to the default initial window size until a WINDOW_UPDATE frame is received. A SETTINGS frame can alter the initial flow control window size for all current streams. When the value of SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE changes, a receiver MUST adjust the size of all flow control windows that it maintains by the difference between the new value and the old value. <\/del> changes, a receiver MUST adjust the size of all stream flow control windows that it maintains by the difference between the new value and the old value. A SETTINGS frame cannot alter the connection flow control window. <\/ins> A change to SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE could cause the available space in a flow control window to become negative. A sender MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8472de7f3dfe7c4622a7261ac19b8f986ba57d4456d888fbacff27bc8903374c","title":"","text":"not obligated to maintain the available flow control window for streams that it is no longer sending on. Flow control can be disabled for all streams or the connection using <\/del> Flow control can be disabled for all streams on the connection using <\/ins> the SETTINGS_FLOW_CONTROL_OPTIONS setting. An implementation that does not wish to perform flow control can use this in the initial SETTINGS exchange. <\/del> does not wish to perform stream flow control can use this in the initial SETTINGS exchange. <\/ins> Flow control can be disabled for an individual stream or the overall connection by sending a WINDOW_UPDATE with the END_FLOW_CONTROL flag"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9f2062ee8b9cf3c5093038b58c25faa0b0ee0fe2d8c6a5c293d633640eb70ca0","title":"","text":"The payload of a PRIORITY frame contains a single reserved bit and a 31-bit priority. The PRIORITY frame does not define any type-specific flags. <\/ins> The PRIORITY frame is associated with an existing stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2a38cfda102224629cee5f5b7386b0264b94615ce224f44338ca3a17146c622a","title":"","text":"An 8-bit field reserved for frame-type specific boolean flags. The least significant bit (0x1) - the FINAL bit - is defined for all frame types as an indication that this frame is the last the endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter the StreamHalfClose. Implementations MUST process the FINAL bit for all frames whose stream identifier field is not 0x0. The FINAL bit MUST NOT be set on frames that use a stream identifier of 0. <\/del> The least significant bit (0x1) - the END_STREAM bit - is defined for all frame types as an indication that this frame is the last the endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter the StreamHalfClose. Implementations MUST process the END_STREAM bit for all frames whose stream identifier field is not 0x0. The END_STREAM bit MUST NOT be set on frames that use a stream identifier of 0. <\/ins> The remaining flags can be assigned semantics specific to the indicated frame type. Flags that have no defined semantics for a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0be8901f50b403ce89066b0d21f96fa18df8d0f0886ec94694d675658a4fc8a9","title":"","text":"3.4.3. When an endpoint sends a frame for a stream with the FINAL flag set, the stream is considered to be half-closed for that endpoint. <\/del> When an endpoint sends a frame for a stream with the END_STREAM flag set, the stream is considered to be half-closed for that endpoint. <\/ins> Subsequent frames MUST NOT be sent by that endpoint for the half closed stream for the remaining duration of the HTTP\/2.0 connection. When both endpoints have sent frames with the FINAL flag set, the stream is considered to be fully closed. <\/del> When both endpoints have sent frames with the END_STREAM flag set, the stream is considered to be fully closed. <\/ins> If an endpoint receives additional frames for a stream that was previously half-closed by the sending peer, the recipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type STREAM_CLOSED. An endpoint that has not yet half-closed a stream by sending the FINAL flag can continue sending frames on the stream. <\/del> END_STREAM flag can continue sending frames on the stream. <\/ins> It is not necessary for an endpoint to half-close a stream for which it has not sent any frames. This allows endpoints to use fully"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ca497281c771cc14ba3366199dc29f8fc0bde9abee9f6d21eeca990e0c3f3b9f","title":"","text":"A stream that only has frames sent in one direction can be tentatively considered to be closed once a frame containing a FINAL flag is sent. The active sender on the stream MUST be <\/del> END_STREAM flag is sent. The active sender on the stream MUST be <\/ins> prepared to receive frames after closing the stream. Either peer can send a RST_STREAM control frame at any time to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-68c2ffd156200d3cffff1c4a42a2da30b97ec6428930a48668c5d514057e1ba4","title":"","text":"single reserved bit and a 31-bit priority; see StreamPriority. HEADERS+PRIORITY uses the same flags as the HEADERS frame, except that a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame with a CONTINUES bit MUST be followed by another HEADERS+PRIORITY frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/del> that a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame without the END_HEADERS flag set MUST be followed by another HEADERS+PRIORITY frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/ins> HEADERS+PRIORITY frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame is received whose stream identifier field is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0371619c513415e356728578345c8b515021ac9adbddc12ad00110a0de45a680","title":"","text":"promised streams fully close as well. PUSH_PROMISE uses the same flags as the HEADERS frame, except that a PUSH_PROMISE frame with a CONTINUES bit MUST be followed by another PUSH_PROMISE frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/del> PUSH_PROMISE frame without the END_HEADERS flag set MUST be followed by another PUSH_PROMISE frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/ins> Promised streams are not required to be used in order promised. The PUSH_PROMISE only reserves stream identifiers for later use."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-47d5a0962933a2affd0c68d732fe85400a53b4e99e4c45c885efb5ac0bd62721","title":"","text":"Additional type-specific flags for the HEADERS frame are: The CONTINUES bit indicates that this frame does not contain the entire payload necessary to provide a complete set of headers. <\/del> The END_HEADERS bit indicates that this frame contains the entire payload necessary to provide a complete set of headers. <\/ins> The payload for a complete set of headers is provided by a sequence of HEADERS frames, terminated by a HEADERS frame without the CONTINUES bit. Once the sequence terminates, the payload of all HEADERS frames are concatenated and interpreted as a single <\/del> sequence of HEADERS frames, terminated by a HEADERS frame with the END_HEADERS flag set. Once the sequence terminates, the payload of all HEADERS frames are concatenated and interpreted as a single <\/ins> block. A HEADERS frame that includes a CONTINUES bit MUST be followed by a HEADERS frame for the same stream. A receiver MUST treat the <\/del> A HEADERS frame without the END_HEADERS flag set MUST be followed by a HEADERS frame for the same stream. A receiver MUST treat the <\/ins> receipt of any other type of frame or a frame on a different stream as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2557e215d457a2247f005a2b5c1cb25a6773bf7c505fb50e362a567cfc4cba31","title":"","text":"window and the connection flow control window. The sender MUST NOT send a flow controlled frame with a length that exceeds the space available in either of the flow control windows advertised by the receiver. Frames with zero length with the FINAL flag set (for <\/del> receiver. Frames with zero length with the END_STREAM flag set (for <\/ins> example, an empty data frame) MAY be sent if there is no available space in either flow control window."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7b535f674b923032fabd16c24a55a898edc10b2e4057ca656e6070b0f263f943","title":"","text":"3.8.10.4. After a receiver reads in a frame that marks the end of a stream (for example, a data stream with a FINAL flag set), it MUST cease <\/del> example, a data stream with a END_STREAM flag set), it MUST cease <\/ins> transmission of WINDOW_UPDATE frames for that stream. A sender is not obligated to maintain the available flow control window for streams that it is no longer sending on."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ceb0f536deec7cb88cbcc1096a7cf3a7ccbcceb4fae5bb93ca8520e84936f439","title":"","text":"4.2.2. The client initiates a request by sending a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame. Requests that do not contain a body MUST set the FINAL flag, <\/del> Requests that do not contain a body MUST set the END_STREAM flag, <\/ins> indicating that the client intends to send no further data on this stream, unless the server intends to push resources (see PushResources). HEADERS+PRIORITY frame does not contain the FINAL flag for requests that contain a body. The body of a request follows as a series of DATA frames. The last DATA frame sets the FINAL flag to indicate the end of the body. <\/del> PushResources). HEADERS+PRIORITY frame does not contain the END_STREAM flag for requests that contain a body. The body of a request follows as a series of DATA frames. The last DATA frame sets the END_STREAM flag to indicate the end of the body. <\/ins> The header fields included in the HEADERS+PRIORITY frame contain all of the HTTP header fields associated with an HTTP request. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3ef4c4e06a773e7d3146d7f5e98fe0cbec4b6eed4fa53ef03f34bfb507a9fc6e","title":"","text":"The server responds to a client request using the same stream identifier that was used by the request. An HTTP response begins with a HEADERS frame. An HTTP response body consists of a series of DATA frames. The last data frame contains a FINAL flag to indicate the end of the response. A response that contains no body (such as a 204 or 304 response) consists only of a HEADERS frame that contains the FINAL flag to indicate no further data will be sent on the stream. <\/del> DATA frames. The last data frame contains a END_STREAM flag to indicate the end of the response. A response that contains no body (such as a 204 or 304 response) consists only of a HEADERS frame that contains the END_STREAM flag to indicate no further data will be sent on the stream. <\/ins> The response status line is unfolded into name-value pairs like other HTTP header fields and must be present:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5c67f0ebb0fe5f553c0afd3182308f8d413f713a2c0004e39be0422ba4405b3a","title":"","text":"An 8-bit field reserved for frame-type specific boolean flags. The least significant bit (0x1) - the END_STREAM bit - is defined for all frame types as an indication that this frame is the last the endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter the StreamHalfClose. Implementations MUST process the END_STREAM bit for all frames whose stream identifier field is not 0x0. The END_STREAM bit MUST NOT be set on frames that use a stream identifier of 0. The remaining flags can be assigned semantics specific to the indicated frame type. Flags that have no defined semantics for a particular frame type MUST be ignored, and MUST be left unset (0) when sending. <\/del> Flags are assigned semantics specific to the indicated frame type. Flags that have no defined semantics for a particular frame type MUST be ignored, and MUST be left unset (0) when sending. <\/ins> A reserved 1-bit field. The semantics of this bit are undefined and the bit MUST remain unset (0) when sending and MUST be ignored"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a36437253f77fdb0e82e777eab835ba6342e898ac1f429a55fed371004d87d17","title":"","text":"octets associated with a stream. One or more DATA frames are used, for instance, to carry HTTP request or response payloads. The DATA frame does not define any type-specific flags. <\/del> The DATA frame defines the following flags: Bit 1 being set indicates that this frame is the last that the endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter the StreamHalfClose. Bit 2 is reserved for future use. <\/ins> DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a DATA frame is received whose stream identifier field is 0x0, the recipient MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9def204b0ee549480abee77fabfbe96cffd81fa600f2b032f5d8ad357dd97aa6","title":"","text":"The payload of a PRIORITY frame contains a single reserved bit and a 31-bit priority. The PRIORITY frame does not define any type-specific flags. <\/del> The PRIORITY frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> The PRIORITY frame is associated with an existing stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f0c4dbb4d9551b5ca0a9adb5503edb7e5ef988e23b3d34a86a0ed23c7e9dfb4d","title":"","text":"values for parameters whose values have already been established. Only the most recent value provided setting value applies. The SETTINGS frame does not have any frame specific flags. <\/del> The SETTINGS frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> SETTINGS frames always apply to a connection, never a single stream. The stream identifier for a settings frame MUST be zero. If an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-13a7a578c81dbc396df1f966b4e3738e3d3aeece5c1e89a532d75539a6e4c8a9","title":"","text":"payload. PING responses SHOULD given higher priority than any other frame. The PING frame defines one type-specific flag: <\/del> The PING frame defines the following flags: <\/ins> Bit 2 being set indicates that this PING frame is a PING response. <\/del> Bit 1 being set indicates that this PING frame is a PING response. <\/ins> An endpoint MUST set this flag in PING responses. An endpoint MUST NOT respond to PING frames containing this flag."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-248f174ff1f13e4fe4560e2fd5361468b9b09ead7c6244ccd32662802865c9cc","title":"","text":"After sending a GOAWAY frame, the sender can ignore frames for new streams. The GOAWAY frame does not define any type-specific flags. <\/del> The GOAWAY frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> The GOAWAY frame applies to the connection, not a specific stream. The stream identifier MUST be zero."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2ad63cb8407f12d8bae2a984d1d2c6e5e8af2527b23ce1906d11b7d52c7d1c8c","title":"","text":"Any number of HEADERS frames can may be sent on an existing stream at any time. Additional type-specific flags for the HEADERS frame are: <\/del> The HEADERS frame defines the following flags: Bit 1 being set indicates that this frame is the last that the endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter the StreamHalfClose. Bit 2 is reserved for future use. <\/ins> The END_HEADERS bit indicates that this frame contains the entire payload necessary to provide a complete set of headers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3c7934bf06785018fce6cc77124c77c877f2812d14d1ba3c3a48c2708e4439d4","title":"","text":"respond with a StreamErrorHandler or ConnectionErrorHandler of type FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR if it is unable accept a frame. The following additional flags are defined for the WINDOW_UPDATE frame: <\/del> The WINDOW_UPDATE frame defines the following flags: <\/ins> Bit 2 being set indicates that flow control for the identified <\/del> Bit 1 being set indicates that flow control for the identified <\/ins> stream or connection has been ended; subsequent frames do not need to be flow controlled."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e261f152f488ea7ffd252e73930e4151cebc28e19b2c5e1cd3411632b5a81caa","title":"","text":"3.3. Once the HTTP\/2.0 connection is established, clients and servers can begin exchanging frames. <\/del> Once the HTTP\/2.0 connection is established, endpoints can begin exchanging frames. <\/ins> 3.3.1. HTTP\/2.0 frames share a common base format consisting of an 8-byte header followed by 0 to 65535 bytes of data. <\/del> All frames share a common base format consisting of an 8-byte header followed by 0 to 65,535 octets of payload data. <\/ins> The fields of the frame header are defined as:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-465ff50530efebd66fc87fd9c9c1148f90916a9a91eba498f47dcde389cc6b9a","title":"","text":"3.3.2. Implementations with limited resources might not be capable of processing large frame sizes. Such implementations MAY choose to place additional limits on the maximum frame size. However, all implementations MUST be capable of receiving and processing frames containing at least 8192 octets of data. An implementation MUST terminate a stream immediately if it is unable to process a frame due it's size. This is done by sending an RST_STREAM containing the FRAME_TOO_LARGE error code. <\/del> The maximum amount of payload data any frame can contain varies by frame type and use. The absolute maximum amount of payload data any individual frame can contain is 65,535 octets. All implementations SHOULD be capable of receiving and minimally processing frames up to this size. Certain frame types, such as PING (see PING), impose strict limits on the amount of payload data allowed. Likewise, additional size limits can be set by specific application uses. For instance, individual DATA and HEADERS frames used to express HTTP request and response messages (see HTTPLayer) are not permitted to exceed 16,383 octets of payload. Sending endpoints MUST NOT exceed such limits. If an endpoint is unable to process a frame due to the payload size, or if the size exceeds a strictly defined limit, the endpoint MUST send a FRAME_TOO_LARGE error. If the frame stream identifier is 0x0, this code MUST be sent as a connection error. If the stream identifier is anything other than 0x0, it is sent as a stream error. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5935b093e04cdae6dee52d7ef7eba3b8eb413fba01593af72b40ae0dfe7cff32","title":"","text":"The following terms are used: The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding described in RFC4648, Section 5, with the (non URL- safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by RFC 4648, Section 3.2. <\/ins> The endpoint initiating the HTTP connection. A transport-level connection between two endpoints."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e4a2df9f4c941cbaeecac3db4d722f618d4b0a1b7a0af80e54354012f6f07d31","title":"","text":"(HTTP-p1). The client makes an HTTP\/1.1 request that includes an Upgrade header field identifying HTTP\/2.0. Additional to the Upgrade request, anticipating that the server will likely respond with some HTTP\/2.0 frames, the client MUST send the payload of its SETTINGS frame within the HTTP\/1.1 header. In particular, if the server does not know the client's initial preferences (as expressed in a SETTINGS frame), it could send too much data in its response, or reserve multiple streams via PUSH_PROMISE despite the client's preference to the contrary. To avoid this situation, these SETTINGS MUST be communicated by the client to the server in advance of the first HTTP\/2.0 message from the server: SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS, SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE (SettingFormat). NOTE: There may be additional SETTINGS added later on, e.g., due to header compression (TBD). The SETTINGS are conveyed in the following hop-by-hop HTTP\/1.1 header: HTTP2-Settings = \"HTTP2-Settings\" \":\" token68 token68 is defined in HTTP-p7. The value of HTTP2-Settings is set to the base64url encoding of the payload of the SETTINGS frame as defined in SettingFormat. Other than the fact that these SETTINGS are communicated by the client via an HTTP\/1.1 header, they are otherwise indistinguishable from SETTINGS and their handling as detailed in SettingFormat. <\/ins> For example: Requests that contain a request entity body MUST be sent in their entirely before the client can send HTTP\/2.0 frames. This means that <\/del> entirety before the client can send HTTP\/2.0 frames. This means that <\/ins> a large request entity can block the use of the connection until it is completely sent."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-655441630bd9e4d332c113d8da6f1eecff3a0ca6d5eddb681c917165119182d6","title":"","text":"An initial set of settings registrations can be found in SettingValues. 8.4. 8.4.1. This section describes a header field for registration in the Permanent Message Header Field Registry. RFC3864 HTTP2-Settings http standard IETF RFC XXXX (this document) This header field is only used by the client in the Upgrade-based negotiation. The HTTP2-Settings header field is used in the Upgrade-based negotiation by the client. It is sent from the client to the server to provide the payload for its SETTINGS frame in anticipation of the server responding with HTTP\/2.0 frames. The HTTP2-Settings header field MUST NOT appear more than once in an HTTP request and MUST NOT appear at all in an HTTP response. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-dcd1cec0690e8ecb9471530c348f41f1fa4973ab3a38faab7e3563faaa4be8d7","title":"","text":"From this state either peer can send a frame with a END_STREAM flag set, which causes the stream to transition into one of the \"half closed\" states: a client sending a END_STREAM flag causes the stream state to become \"half closed (client)\"; a server sending a END_STREAM flag causes the stream state to become \"half closed (server)\". <\/del> \"half closed\" states: an endpoint sending a END_STREAM flag causes the stream state to become \"half closed (local)\"; an endpoind receiving a END_STREAM flag causes the stream state to become \"half closed (remote)\". <\/ins> An endpoint can send RST_STREAM from this state, causing it to transition immediately to \"closed\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f1d4c03e26f08a21da34d8d2171b07178e97b7c73ea924eb1c26efc0827e6c4e","title":"","text":"knowledge about support for HTTP\/2.0 uses the HTTP Upgrade mechanism (HTTP-p1). The client makes an HTTP\/1.1 request that includes an Upgrade header field identifying HTTP\/2.0. The HTTP\/1.1 request MUST include an Http2SettingsHeader header field. <\/del> include exactly one Http2SettingsHeader header field. <\/ins> Requests that contain a request entity body MUST be sent in their entirety before the client can send HTTP\/2.0 frames. This means that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5bb759fe11fd533c6eea2c33a3d02e25fc0d18c5b53252072da860a0b5880064","title":"","text":"3.2.1. A client that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1 to HTTP\/2.0 MUST include an \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field. The \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field is a hop-by-hop header field that includes settings that govern the <\/del> A client that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1 to HTTP\/2.0 MUST include exactly one \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field. The \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field is a hop-by-hop header field that includes settings that govern the <\/ins> HTTP\/2.0 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. A server MUST reject an attempt to upgrade if this header is not present."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-83a6c1173fee5df31cbdd41241d4a93d5a99e468f6c4347ffe0ad5e87f46bf67","title":"","text":"3.2.1. A client that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1 to HTTP\/2.0 MUST include exactly one \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field. The \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field is a hop-by-hop header field that includes settings that govern the HTTP\/2.0 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. A server MUST reject an attempt to upgrade if this header is not present. <\/del> A request that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1 to HTTP\/2.0 MUST include exactly one \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field. The \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field is a hop-by-hop header field that includes settings that govern the HTTP\/2.0 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. A server MUST reject an attempt to upgrade if this header is not present. <\/ins> The content of the \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field is the payload of a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-28d6547e95d60fc18b5a378331f9cb118d5f31df10eed6ff9651fcea714b48b0","title":"","text":"represented either literally or as a reference to an entry of the header table. The header value is represented literally. Three different literal representations are provided: <\/del> Two different literal representations are provided: <\/ins> A literal representation that does not add the header to the header table (see literal.header.without.indexing). A literal representation that adds the header at the end of the header table (see literal.header.with.incremental.indexing). A literal representation that uses the header to replace an existing entry of the header table (see literal.header.with.substitution.indexing). <\/del> A literal representation that adds the header at the beginning of the header table (see literal.header.with.incremental.indexing). <\/ins> The indexed representation defines a header as a reference in the header table (see indexed.header.representation)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-deb4a0ffc18564309017a58f03865e8d4d9b337aace0f663e2ad86fbbc3bc6fc","title":"","text":"or by replacing an existing one. Before doing such a modification, it has to be ensured that the header table size will stay lower than or equal to the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE limit (see parameter.negotiation). To achieve this, repeatedly, the first entry <\/del> parameter.negotiation). To achieve this, repeatedly, the last entry <\/ins> of the header table is removed, until enough space is available for the modification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5e7f7ec1478d0cac3916df5e89f5e6cdb7050c476401a96c75c2e081f75e85d8","title":"","text":"header table is that the remaining entries are renumbered. The first entry of the header table is always associated to the index 0. When the modification of the header table is the replacement of an existing entry, the replaced entry is the one indicated in the literal representation before any entry is removed from the header table. If the entry to be replaced is removed from the header table when performing the size adjustment, the replacement entry is inserted at the beginning of the header table. <\/del> The addition of a new entry with a size greater than the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE limit causes all the entries from the header table to be dropped and the new entry not to be added to the header table. The replacement of an existing entry with a new entry with a size greater than the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE has the same consequences. <\/del> header table. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a3c24575afef6f00b201ab0d20ae5cf4b8b7e698c4555694f4685e6fb6cdb1ed","title":"","text":"A literal header without indexing causes the emission of a header without altering the header table. This representation starts with the '011' 3-bit pattern. <\/del> This representation starts with the '01' 2-bit pattern. <\/ins> If the header name matches the header name of a (name, value) pair stored in the Header Table, the index of the pair increased by one (index + 1) is represented as an integer with a 5-bit prefix. Note that if the index is strictly below 31, one byte is used. <\/del> (index + 1) is represented as an integer with a 6-bit prefix. Note that if the index is strictly below 63, one byte is used. <\/ins> If the header name does not match a header name entry, the value 0 is represented on 5 bits followed by the header name <\/del> represented on 6 bits followed by the header name <\/ins> (header.name.representation). Header name representation is followed by the header value"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-17ceb11a63000b48bcbcfe7be44781762a607345543738bd55d9fce790425db3","title":"","text":"A literal header with incremental indexing adds a new entry to the header table. This representation starts with the '010' 3-bit pattern. If the header name matches the header name of a (name, value) pair stored in the Header Table, the index of the pair increased by one (index + 1) is represented as an integer with a 5-bit prefix. Note that if the index is strictly below 31, one byte is used. If the header name does not match a header name entry, the value 0 is represented on 5 bits followed by the header name (header.name.representation). Header name representation is followed by the header value represented as a literal string as described in string.literal.representation. 4.3.3. A literal header with substitution indexing replaces an existing header table entry. <\/del> This representation starts with the '00' 2-bit pattern. If the header name matches the header name of a (name, value) pair"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f886dc3ed1f8943f05800338ece605e7966ec2b6fd8a7df36735218ec8a7448b","title":"","text":"represented on 6 bits followed by the header name (header.name.representation). The index of the substituted (name, value) pair is inserted after the header name representation as a 0-bit prefix integer. The index of the substituted pair MUST correspond to a position in the header table containing a non-void entry. An index for the substituted pair that corresponds to empty position in the header table MUST be treated as an error. This index is followed by the header value represented as a literal string as described in string.literal.representation. <\/del> Header name representation is followed by the header value represented as a literal string as described in string.literal.representation. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c10485525e1fb769fc333414af07507d7e7942f6e2b5ecbbcf8ae74f424ff10f","title":"","text":"The algorithm to represent an integer I is as follows: This integer representation allows for values of indefinite size. It is also possible for an encoder to send a large number of zero values, which can waste bytes and could be used to overflow integer values. Excessively large integer encodings - in value or octet length - MUST be treated as a decoding error. Different limits can be set for each of the different uses of integers, based on implementation constraints. <\/ins> 4.1.1.1. The value 10 is to be encoded with a 5-bit prefix."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-26da5bbd0151f8e14c4c86c31d78984cccb7e6724686460eef9b6ad58b5cea89","title":"","text":"string comparisons is always a function of the total length of the strings, and not a function of the number of matched characters. A decoder needs to ensure that larger values or encodings of integers do not permit exploitation. Decoders MUST limit the size of integers, both in value and encoded length, that it accepts (see integer.representation). <\/ins> Another common security problem is when the remote endpoint successfully causes the local endpoint to exhaust its memory. This compressor attempts to deal with the most obvious ways that this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f1cdb4fb983b50c72618c9bf6edd8fc9e242f09d4feee16609ff964c4eb96e3e","title":"","text":"The header field corresponding to the referenced entry is emitted. The referenced header table entry is added to the header table. <\/del> The referenced header table entry is added to the reference set. <\/ins> A _literal representation_ that is _not added_ to the header table entails the following action:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-793dd942dcbcdbb0fb7e9d07eea097d7570089b0f889f828b2569c3a43012221","title":"","text":"triggered the push, plus resource identification information provided by the server. Request header fields are necessary for HTTP cache control validations (such as the Vary header field) to work. For this reason, caches MUST inherit request header fields from the associated stream for the push. This includes the Cookie header field. <\/del> this reason, caches MUST associate the request header fields from the PUSH_PROMISE frame with the response headers and content delivered on the pushed stream. This includes the Cookie header field. <\/ins> Caching resources that are pushed is possible, based on the guidance provided by the origin server in the Cache-Control header field."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8522ea9e2ef60809f05f6eee4d93ebbf1949d3d024f35ba18d829beb4501c456","title":"","text":"frame from this client to the remote and receive a response. The value is represented in milliseconds. 4 - SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint the maximum number of concurrent streams which it will allow. By default there is no limit. For <\/del> 4 - SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS indicates the maximum number of concurrent streams which the sender of the SETTINGS frame is willing to allow the peer to open. Note that this limit is directional. By default there is no limit. For <\/ins> implementors it is recommended that this value be no smaller than 100. <\/del> than 100, so as not to unnecessarily limit parallelism. <\/ins> 5 - SETTINGS_CURRENT_CWND allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint of the current TCP CWND value."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-74967051f81c102e82589ee0d816fb3c7518c31fedf9b0a7dce365501a20ea6b","title":"","text":"3.1. The protocol defined in this document is identified using the string \"HTTP\/2.0\". This identification is used in the HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade header field, in the TLSALPN field, and other places where protocol <\/del> \"h2\". This identification is used in the HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade header field, in the TLSALPN field, and other places where protocol <\/ins> identification is required. Negotiating \"HTTP\/2.0\" implies the use of the transport, security, framing and message semantics described in this document. <\/del> Negotiating \"h2\" implies the use of the transport, security, framing and message semantics described in this document. <\/ins> Only implementations of the final, published RFC can identify themselves as \"HTTP\/2.0\". Until such an RFC exists, implementations MUST NOT identify themselves using \"HTTP\/2.0\". <\/del> themselves as \"h2\". Until such an RFC exists, implementations MUST NOT identify themselves using \"h2\". <\/ins> Examples and text throughout the rest of this document use \"HTTP\/2.0\" as a matter of editorial convenience only. Implementations of draft versions MUST NOT identify using this string. The exception to this rule is the string included in the connection header sent by clients immediately after establishing an HTTP\/2.0 connection (see ConnectionHeader); this fixed length sequence of octets does not change. <\/del> Examples and text throughout the rest of this document use \"h2\" as a matter of editorial convenience only. Implementations of draft versions MUST NOT identify using this string. <\/ins> Implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST add the string \"-draft-\" and the corresponding draft number to the identifier before the separator ('\/'). For example, draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-03 is identified using the string \"HTTP-draft-03\/2.0\". <\/del> \"-\" and the corresponding draft number to the identifier. For example, draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-09 is identified using the string \"h2-09\". <\/ins> Non-compatible experiments that are based on these draft versions MUST instead replace the string \"draft\" with a different identifier. <\/del> MUST append the string \"-\" and a experiment name to the identifier. <\/ins> For example, an experimental implementation of packet mood-based encoding based on draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-07 might identify itself as \"HTTP-emo-07\/2.0\". Note that any label MUST conform to the \"token\" syntax defined in HTTP-p1. Experimenters are encouraged to <\/del> encoding based on draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-09 might identify itself as \"h2-09-emo\". Note that any label MUST conform to the \"token\" syntax defined in HTTP-p1. Experimenters are encouraged to <\/ins> coordinate their experiments on the ietf-http-wg@w3.org mailing list. 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9c5740ea5c73e78ca4903fbbe4ac6a158d722b858561cc86f5b97fbfbd76362c","title":"","text":"A client that makes a request to an \"http\" URI without prior knowledge about support for HTTP\/2.0 uses the HTTP Upgrade mechanism (HTTP-p1). The client makes an HTTP\/1.1 request that includes an Upgrade header field identifying HTTP\/2.0. The HTTP\/1.1 request MUST include exactly one Http2SettingsHeader header field. <\/del> Upgrade header field identifying HTTP\/2.0 with the h2 token. The HTTP\/1.1 request MUST include exactly one Http2SettingsHeader header field. <\/ins> Requests that contain an entity body MUST be sent in their entirety before the client can send HTTP\/2.0 frames. This means that a large"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-74a7e00c05f9a64289bac078bb005bf7b2bc94d4bef37187fd03392ada9429e1","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2.0 0x48 0x54 0x54 0x50 0x2f 0x32 0x2e 0x30 (\"HTTP\/2.0\") <\/del> 0x68 0x32 (\"h2\") <\/ins> This document (RFCXXXX)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-00479c045678be5a5fe07e8628729556885b9c6691c6d995da3595d506e70789","title":"","text":"A client can learn that a particular server supports HTTP\/2.0 by other means. A client MAY immediately send HTTP\/2.0 frames to a server that is known to support HTTP\/2.0, after the ConnectionHeader. This only affects the resolution of \"http\" URIs; servers supporting HTTP\/2.0 are required to support TLSALPN for \"https\" URIs. <\/del> A server can identify such a connection by the use of the \"PRI\" method in the connection header. This only affects the resolution of \"http\" URIs; servers supporting HTTP\/2.0 are required to support TLSALPN for \"https\" URIs. <\/ins> Prior support for HTTP\/2.0 is not a strong signal that a given server will support HTTP\/2.0 for future connections. It is possible for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-39975e088b11ea5af643529eb51b9bbea61227923972908a1d5bb5cb190691e2","title":"","text":"This document registers the \"HTTP2-Settings\" header field for use in HTTP. This document registers the \"PRI\" method for use in HTTP, to avoid collisions with the ConnectionHeader. <\/ins> 12.1. This document creates a registration for the identification of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2988ad427baa5f30b85687f466f88da3bd803c65634f85d33959a7b47e14e8b4","title":"","text":"This header field is only used by an HTTP\/2.0 client for Upgrade- based negotiation. 12.6. This section registers the \"PRI\" method in the HTTP-p2. PRI No No ConnectionHeader of this document This method is never used by an actual client. This method will appear to be used when an HTTP\/1.1 server or intermediary attempts to parse an HTTP\/2.0 connection known-http. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-254f24beae7f725010a1aebf3b676ca1a5af3fba0b2ed41cfa572448e3e1a8b3","title":"","text":"The HTTP pseudo-method CONNECT (HTTP-p2) is used to convert an HTTP\/1.1 connection into a tunnel to a remote host. CONNECT is primarily used with HTTP proxies to established a TLS session with a <\/del> primarily used with HTTP proxies to establish a TLS session with a <\/ins> server for the purposes of interacting with \"https\" resources. In HTTP\/2.0, the CONNECT method is used to establish a tunnel over a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-84a799b916e27b5983988a47a5baa6f66c7f9236e5dd50aebaeac95ae106f580","title":"","text":"Clients and servers MUST terminate the TCP connection if either peer does not begin with a valid connection header. A frame (GTFO) MAY be omitted if it is clear that the peer is not using HTTP\/2. <\/del> frame (GOAWAY) MAY be omitted if it is clear that the peer is not using HTTP\/2.0. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-db47017ecca4a1d5288215ea6504896391c21d099b105a8b094cc768d88a3b63","title":"","text":"An endpoint that encounters a connection error SHOULD first send a frame (GTFO) with the stream identifier of the last stream that it <\/del> frame (GOAWAY) with the stream identifier of the last stream that it <\/ins> successfully received from its peer. The frame includes an error code that indicates why the connection is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2eec653146cbdb3de2ef8c42ea9d4923b6f810f6ffea96cc3db44dfffa34d0b2","title":"","text":"6.8. A General Termination of Future Operations (GTFO) frame (type=0x7) informs the remote peer to stop creating streams on this connection. GTFO can be sent by either client or server. Once sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on new streams for the remainder of the connection. Receivers of a GTFO frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. The purpose of this frame is to allow an endpoint to gracefully stop accepting new streams (perhaps for a reboot or maintenance), while still finishing processing of previously established streams. <\/del> The GOAWAY frame (type=0x7) informs the remote peer to stop creating streams on this connection. It can be sent from the client or the server. Once sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on new streams for the remainder of the connection. Receivers of a GOAWAY frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. The purpose of this frame is to allow an endpoint to gracefully stop accepting new streams (perhaps for a reboot or maintenance), while still finishing processing of previously established streams. <\/ins> There is an inherent race condition between an endpoint starting new streams and the remote sending a GTFO frame. To deal with this case, the GTFO frame contains the stream identifier of the last stream <\/del> streams and the remote sending a GOAWAY frame. To deal with this case, the GOAWAY contains the stream identifier of the last stream <\/ins> which was processed on the sending endpoint in this connection. If the receiver of the GTFO frame used streams that are newer than the <\/del> the receiver of the GOAWAY used streams that are newer than the <\/ins> indicated stream identifier, they were not processed by the sender and the receiver may treat the streams as though they had never been created at all (hence the receiver may want to re-create the streams later on a new connection). Endpoints SHOULD always send a GTFO frame before closing a connection so that the remote can know whether a stream has been partially processed or not. For example, if an HTTP client sends a POST at the same time that a server closes a connection, the client cannot know if the server started to process that POST request if the server does not send a GTFO frame to indicate where it stopped working. An endpoint might choose to close a connection without sending GTFO for misbehaving peers. <\/del> Endpoints SHOULD always send a GOAWAY frame before closing a connection so that the remote can know whether a stream has been partially processed or not. For example, if an HTTP client sends a POST at the same time that a server closes a connection, the client cannot know if the server started to process that POST request if the server does not send a GOAWAY frame to indicate where it stopped working. An endpoint might choose to close a connection without sending GOAWAY for misbehaving peers. <\/ins> After sending a GTFO frame, the sender can discard frames for new <\/del> After sending a GOAWAY frame, the sender can discard frames for new <\/ins> streams. However, any frames that alter connection state cannot be completely ignored. For instance,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-82cf3c19e164ca17b4bb77f4473ef35f291f623c567ae3c09c06b1e5a31c65dc","title":"","text":"state (see HeaderBlock); similarly DATA frames MUST be counted toward the connection flow control window. The GTFO frame does not define any flags. <\/del> The GOAWAY frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> The GTFO frame applies to the connection, not a specific stream. An endpoint MUST treat a <\/del> The GOAWAY frame applies to the connection, not a specific stream. An endpoint MUST treat a <\/ins> frame with a stream identifier other than 0x0 as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . The last stream identifier (\"Last-Stream-ID\") in the GTFO frame contains the highest numbered stream identifier for which the sender of the GTFO frame has received frames on and might have taken some action on. All streams up to and including the identified stream might have been processed in some way. The last stream identifier is set to 0 if no streams were processed. <\/del> The last stream identifier in the GOAWAY frame contains the highest numbered stream identifier for which the sender of the GOAWAY frame has received frames on and might have taken some action on. All streams up to and including the identified stream might have been processed in some way. The last stream identifier is set to 0 if no streams were processed. <\/ins> Note: In this case, \"processed\" means that some data from the stream was passed to some higher layer of software that might have taken some action as a result. If a connection terminates without a GTFO frame, this value is <\/del> If a connection terminates without a GOAWAY frame, this value is <\/ins> effectively the highest stream identifier. On streams with lower or equal numbered identifiers that were not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7f8752074cf61f8ec368e7894070517db98afe245123e355f9e90cc6b2c23f50","title":"","text":"be safely retried using a new connection. Activity on streams numbered lower or equal to the last stream identifier might still complete successfully. The sender of a GTFO frame might gracefully shut down a connection by sending a GTFO <\/del> identifier might still complete successfully. The sender of a GOAWAY frame might gracefully shut down a connection by sending a GOAWAY <\/ins> frame, maintaining the connection in an open state until all in- progress streams complete."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a84f476b021d60509af15ad167b49e126cdd6eb7cf1e3ec10c564bedab29f17d","title":"","text":"HeaderBlock. Otherwise, flow control or header compression state can become unsynchronized. The GTFO frame also contains a 32-bit ErrorCodes that contains the reason for ending communication. <\/del> The GOAWAY frame also contains a 32-bit ErrorCodes that contains the reason for closing the connection. <\/ins> Endpoints MAY append opaque data to the payload of any GTFO frame. <\/del> Endpoints MAY append opaque data to the payload of any GOAWAY frame. <\/ins> Additional debug data is intended for diagnostic purposes only and carries no semantic value. Debug information could contain security- or privacy-sensitive data. Logged or otherwise persistently stored"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9fe9ee2f48097d378d95d513ff0efac6dac3de86eaafcde1d4256cbfb9775f94","title":"","text":"Servers are encouraged to maintain open connections for as long as possible, but are permitted to terminate idle connections if necessary. When either endpoint chooses to close the transport-level TCP connection, the terminating endpoint SHOULD first send a GTFO so that both endpoints can reliably determine whether previously sent frames have been processed and gracefully complete or terminate any necessary remaining tasks. <\/del> TCP connection, the terminating endpoint SHOULD first send a (GOAWAY) frame so that both endpoints can reliably determine whether previously sent frames have been processed and gracefully complete or terminate any necessary remaining tasks. <\/ins> 9.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f9062017054af465cccf6fde61adb87a95d6e201e50a6616e0f20e2ce35d16df","title":"","text":"Bit 2 is reserved for future use. Bit 3 being set indicates that the Pad High field is present. This bit MUST NOT be set unless the PAD_LOW flag is also set. <\/del> Bit 3 being set indicates that the Pad Low field is present. <\/ins> Bit 4 being set indicates that the Pad Low field is present. <\/del> Bit 4 being set indicates that the Pad High field is present. This bit MUST NOT be set unless the PAD_LOW flag is also set. <\/ins> DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a DATA frame is received whose stream identifier field is 0x0, the recipient MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d6127a6017de68bc0354cdec5b838086d71ff189e5c08c4bcf4889b547a2040d","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes HPACK, a format adapted to efficiently represent HTTP header fields in the context of HTTP\/2. <\/del> This specification defines HPACK, a compression format for efficiently representing HTTP header fields in the context of HTTP\/2. <\/ins> Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a548aebbe127d42769ff256ab4734ddceefb46a85d2b60ef1f535de9ed252f4e","title":"","text":"1. This document describes HPACK, a format adapted to efficiently represent HTTP header fields in the context of HTTP\/2 (see HTTP2). <\/del> This specification defines HPACK, a compression format for efficiently representing HTTP header fields in the context of HTTP\/2 (see HTTP2). <\/ins> 2. In HTTP (see HTTP-p1), header fields are sent without any form of <\/del> In HTTP (see HTTP-p1), header fields are encoded without any form of <\/ins> compression. As web pages have grown to include dozens to hundreds of requests, the redundant header fields in these requests now pose a problem of measurable latency and unnecessary bandwidth (see PERF1 and PERF2). <\/del> of requests, the redundant header fields in these requests now measurably increase latency and unnecessarily consume bandwidth (see PERF1 and PERF2). <\/ins> SPDY initially addressed this redundancy by compressing header fields with Deflate, which proved very effective at eliminating the redundant header fields. However, that approach exposed a security risk as demonstrated by the CRIME. <\/del> using the \"deflate\" format DEFLATE, which proved very effective at efficiently representing the redundant header fields. However, that approach exposed a security risk as demonstrated by the CRIME attack. <\/ins> This document describes HPACK, a new compressor for header fields which eliminates redundant header fields, is not vulnerable to known security attacks, and which also has a bounded memory cost for use in constrained environments. <\/del> security attacks, and which also has a bounded memory requirement for use in constrained environments. <\/ins> 2.1. The HTTP header field encoding described in this document is based on a header table that map name-value pairs to index values. Header tables are incrementally updated during the HTTP\/2 session. <\/del> The HTTP header field encoding defined in this document is based on a header table that maps name-value pairs to index values. The header table is incrementally updated during the HTTP\/2 connection. <\/ins> The encoder is responsible for deciding which header fields to insert as new entries in the header table. The decoder then does exactly what the encoder prescribes, ending in a state that exactly matches the encoder's state. This enables decoders to remain simple and understand a wide variety of encoders. <\/del> A set of header fields is treated as an unordered collection of name- value pairs. Names and values are considered to be opaque sequences of octets. The order of header fields is not guaranteed to be perserved after being compressed and decompressed. <\/ins> As two consecutive sets of header fields often have header fields in common, each set of header fields is coded as a difference from the previous set of header fields. The goal is to only encode the changes (header fields present in one of the set and not in the other) between the two sets of header fields. HTTP header field compression treats a set of header fields as an unordered collection of name-value pairs. Names and values are opaque sequences of octets. The order of header fields is not guaranteed to be preserved after being compressed and decompressed. <\/del> common, each set is coded as a difference from the previous set. The goal is to only encoded the changes (header fields present in one of the sets that are absent from the other) between the two sets of header fields. The encoder represents a header field either literally or with a reference to a name-value pair in the header table. A set of header fields is stored as a set of references to entries in the header table. Differences between consecutive sets of header fields are encoded as changes to the set of references. The encoder is responsible for deciding which header fields to insert as new entries in the header table. The decoder executes the modifications to the header table and reference set perscribed by the encoder, reconstructing the set of header fields in the process. This enables decoders to remain simple and understand a wide variety of encoders. <\/ins> Examples illustrating the use of these different mechanisms to represent header fields are available in examples."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-eea7495685a0dbc1b485dc6d9f26c907e4c8c4a352ead0524e4385e73d238586","title":"","text":"The encoding and decoding of header fields relies on some components and concepts: A name-value pair. Both name and value are sequences of octets. <\/del> A name-value pair. Both the name and value are treated as opaque sequences of octets. <\/ins> The header table (see header.table) is a component used to associate stored header fields to index values. The data stored in this table is in first-in, first-out order. <\/del> associate stored header fields to index values. <\/ins> The static table (see static.table) is a component used to associate static header fields to index values. This data is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2deda7d206e235a250b46e7a2025619cbf8032a31470a6fa0d3b5d8ea9f8a031","title":"","text":"unordered set of references to entries in the header table. This is used for the differential encoding of a new header set. A header set is a potentially ordered group of header fields that are encoded jointly. A complete set of key-value pairs contained in a HTTP request or response is a header set. <\/del> A header set is an unordered group of header fields that are encoded jointly. A complete set of key-value pairs contained in a HTTP request or response is a header set. <\/ins> A header field can be represented in encoded form either as a literal or as an index (see header.representation)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a671f82d3217580912a6a9d0fdf1f6bf8215e16f2985c710b14b24cafeee6668","title":"","text":"When decoding a set of header field representations, some operations emit a header field (see header.emission). Emitted header fields can be safely passed to the upper processing layers as part of the current Header Set. <\/del> header fields are added to the current header set and cannot be removed. <\/ins> 3.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e743fb22892f3659fa02ec0268cc1923414b5011d6f86c7eb37e790f5821e257","title":"","text":"a header table and a reference set. Everything else is either immutable or conceptual. Using HTTP, messages are exchanged between a client and a server in both direction. To keep the encoding of header fields in each direction independent from the other direction, there is one encoding context for each direction. The header fields contained in a PUSH_PROMISE frame sent by a server to a client are encoded within the same context as the header fields contained in the HEADERS frame corresponding to a response sent from the server to the client. <\/del> HTTP messages are exchanged between a client and a server in both directions. The encoding of header fields in each direction is independent from the other direction. There is a single encoding context for each direction used to encode all header fields sent in that direction. <\/ins> 3.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ea06ebd7b5d7c029722c02bb43709216ed07ab68bf4971c2e3c1192b7af21219","title":"","text":"The encoder decides how to update the header table and as such can control how much memory is used by the header table. To limit the memory requirements on the decoder side, the header table size is strictly bounded (see maximum.table.size). <\/del> memory requirements of the decoder, the header table size is strictly bounded (see maximum.table.size). <\/ins> The header table is updated during the processing of a set of header field representations (see header.representation.processing)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-cfe6bbcc50abdc2bcf021cb2e168c83baa95f8f1f1d05753f3724fc5411cd62c","title":"","text":"endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter one of StreamStates. Bit 2 is reserved for future use. <\/del> Bit 2 being set indicates that this frame is the last for the current segment. Intermediaries MUST NOT coalesce frames across a segment boundary and MUST preserve segment boundaries when forwarding frames. <\/ins> Bit 3 being set indicates that the Pad Low field is present."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1a1c2339dee1409339dc4d9c667222787e2616f5be3c9ce7b4197257c52d9b3c","title":"","text":"Implementations MUST support all of the settings defined by this specification and MAY support additional settings defined by extensions. Unsupported or unrecognized settings MUST be ignored. New settings MUST NOT be defined or implemented in a way that requires endpoints to understand them in order to communicate successfully. <\/del> extensions to this protocol. Unsupported or unrecognized settings MUST be ignored. New settings MUST NOT be defined or implemented in a way that requires endpoints to understand them in order to communicate successfully. <\/ins> Each setting in a SETTINGS frame replaces the existing value for that setting. Settings are processed in the order in which they appear,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e48a3556bbfc8b4db77c55e3d021b1de78d3e514622f6a43c613f75742a40389","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame payload has the following fields: Padding size high bits. This field is only present if the PAD_HIGH flag is set. Padding size low bits. This field is only present if the PAD_LOW flag is set. <\/ins> A single reserved bit. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY flag is set."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3101fe3e64ec52d0f7474437ddad7ea2afd8dcedc8c7aa8d2dfc5cb0c26642c1","title":"","text":"This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY flag is set. Padding size high bits. This field is only present if the PAD_HIGH flag is set. Padding size low bits. This field is only present if the PAD_LOW flag is set. <\/del> A HeaderBlock. Padding octets."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d25a02c25592368e63b9888d9a87c492b2ecd567e321ab80bfbc177697109e2e","title":"","text":"or frame, with the END_HEADERS or END_PUSH_PROMISE flag set, or <\/del> frame, with the END_HEADERS flag set, or <\/ins> a or frame with the END_HEADERS or END_PUSH_PROMISE flag cleared and one or more <\/del> frame with the END_HEADERS flag cleared and one or more <\/ins> frames, where the last"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-20bebe8f989c08a78db28329e1d7d4536a4d2173c896a6a6a834c3ea58a3eecb","title":"","text":"or frames MUST have the END_PUSH_PROMISE or END_HEADERS flag set (respectively). <\/del> frames MUST have the END_HEADERS flag set. <\/ins> Header block fragments can only be sent as the payload of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4ee5fd88dfa1b1a76a69749227fc586185683c41c58c185abc44b177a34ee14f","title":"","text":", or CONTINUATION without the END_HEADERS or END_PUSH_PROMISE flag set. <\/del> or CONTINUATION without the END_HEADERS flag set. <\/ins> The CONTINUATION frame payload has the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b20e2cb82d8e8beafca0c2951bbaf0143f0cee7ccd783333bc1e039b371836f2","title":"","text":"The HTTP\/2 specification is split into four parts: starting covers how a HTTP\/2 connection is initiated. <\/del> starting covers how an HTTP\/2 connection is initiated. <\/ins> The FramingLayer and StreamsLayer layers describe the way HTTP\/2 frames are structured and formed into multiplexed streams."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e57d8c2ae146956c9b1048f79921885d2925270a1d3ea5f0ad86564aa3e84884","title":"","text":"6.9.2. When a HTTP\/2 connection is first established, new streams are <\/del> When an HTTP\/2 connection is first established, new streams are <\/ins> created with an initial flow control window size of 65,535 bytes. The connection flow control window is 65,535 bytes. Both endpoints can adjust the initial window size for new streams by including a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fd41b6c9a8a846a456b77513a9a73e4c87a3de9414cbb5d7b222e5bb8c87a3c6","title":"","text":"conveyed by other means. As such, a HTTP\/2 message containing Connection MUST be treated as malformed. This means that an intermediary transforming a HTTP\/1.x message to <\/del> This means that an intermediary transforming an HTTP\/1.x message to <\/ins> HTTP\/2 will need to remove any header fields nominated by the Connection header field, along with the Connection header field itself. Such intermediaries SHOULD also remove other connection-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2c176d431fad01cd7463cc1bc20693ea1502acc0c7da1e033bd8cf274f611f80","title":"","text":"Connection. One exception to this is the TE header field, which MAY be present in a HTTP\/2 request, but when it is MUST NOT contain any value other <\/del> an HTTP\/2 request, but when it is MUST NOT contain any value other <\/ins> than \"trailers\". HTTP\/2 purposefully does not support upgrade to another protocol."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-df99c5885774016d8e003931ef6d31eaba7e0ee3bcbcc6e745156ca91c8fde59","title":"","text":"Clients receiving a pushed response MUST validate that the server is authorized to push it using the same-origin policy (RFC6454). For example, a HTTP\/2 connection to \"example.com\" is generally <\/del> example, an HTTP\/2 connection to \"example.com\" is generally <\/ins> \"www.example.org\". 8.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-011c9d45fb5b8629e900f97aa87f4296fe088927f9c8d5563642ea81272feaf8","title":"","text":"Due to implementation limitations, it might not be possible to fail TLS negotiation based on all of these requirements. An endpoint MUST terminate a HTTP\/2 connection that is opened on a TLS session that <\/del> terminate an HTTP\/2 connection that is opened on a TLS session that <\/ins> does not meet these minimum requirements with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b8b36fbcd05fe439c5110ad0fe5e5cd7aca97ecc16bcb6b67c386724f5fbfe08","title":"","text":"The PUSH_PROMISE frame defines the following flags: PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST be associated with an existing, peer- initiated stream. If the stream identifier field specifies the value 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> initiated stream. The stream identifier of a PUSH_PROMISE frame indicates the stream it is associated with. If the stream identifier field specifies the value 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-82b133a40dec11cf0b4f41924481485d5f5f1903df033cae55ac6003c93a0028","title":"","text":"segment boundary and MUST preserve segment boundaries when forwarding frames. Bit 5 being set indicates that the Pad Low field is present. <\/del> Bit 4 being set indicates that the Pad Low field is present. <\/ins> Bit 6 being set indicates that the Pad High field is present. <\/del> Bit 5 being set indicates that the Pad High field is present. <\/ins> This bit MUST NOT be set unless the PAD_LOW flag is also set. Endpoints that receive a frame with PAD_HIGH set and PAD_LOW cleared MUST treat this as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ae290d9712f71adecd3848da5f38d0f76cc093f3130830dca38ab1e1cca788d8","title":"","text":"setting of the peer endpoint is set to 0. The HEADERS frame payload has the following fields: <\/del> The PUSH_PROMISE frame payload has the following fields: <\/ins> Padding size high bits. This field is only present if the PAD_HIGH flag is set."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-51c12c4f9a3a8d87659b5867c6327ecb26263535f6d2535ed3517fa8246c2883","title":"","text":"requests can be highly redundant, so compression can reduce the size of requests and responses significantly. HTTP\/2 also supports HTTP Alternative Services (see AltSvc) using the alt-frame, to allow servers more control over traffic to them. <\/ins> 2.1. The HTTP\/2 specification is split into four parts:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-16350994061ee8148af567329430de0f5450304e4b50752b284177935254b3aa","title":"","text":"The CONTINUATION frame includes optional padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. 6.11. The ALTSVC frame (type=0xa) advertises the availability of an alternative service to the client. It can be sent at any time for an existing client-initiated stream or stream 0, and is intended to allow servers to load balance or otherwise segment traffic; see AltSvc for details (in particular, Section 2.4, which outlines client handling of alternative services). An ALTSVC frame on a client-initiated stream indicates that the conveyed alternative service is associated with the origin of that stream. An ALTSVC frame on stream 0 indicates that the conveyed alternative service is associated with the origin contained in the Origin field of the frame. An association with an origin that the client does not consider authoritative for the current connection MUST be ignored. The ALTSVC frame is intended for receipt by clients; a server that receives an ALTSVC frame MUST treat it as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. The ALTSVC frame contains the following fields: PID_LEN: An unsigned, 8-bit integer indicating the length, in bytes, of the PROTOCOL-ID field. Reserved: for future use. Port: An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the port that the alternative service is available upon. Max-Age: An unsigned, 32-bit integer indicating the freshness lifetime of the alternative service association, as per AltSvc, Section 2.2. Protocol-ID: A sequence of bytes (length determined by PID_LEN) containing the ALPN protocol identifier of the alternative service. HOST_LEN: An unsigned, 8-bit integer indicating the length, in 8-bit characters, of the Host field. Host: A sequence of characters (length determined by HOST_LEN) containing an ASCII string indicating the host that the alternative service is available upon. Origin: An optional sequence of characters (length determined by ORGN_LEN) containing ASCII serialisation of an origin (RFC6454, Section 6.2) that the alternate service is applicable to. The ALTSVC frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> 7. Error codes are 32-bit fields that are used in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-93b5ccd8558011ba91039e37916efaf0e920158338d408921660a13221c0b23c","title":"","text":"flag is set. An 8-bit weight for the identified priority group, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the <\/del> StreamPriority. Add one to the value to obtain a weight between 1 and 256. This field is optional and is only present if the <\/ins> PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. A single bit flag indicates that the stream dependency is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-735be13cf131dcf7890685a18eb53e5b849305360768390ac75c6472b1071374","title":"","text":"streams. Most importantly, priority can be used to select streams for transmitting frames when there is limited capacity for sending. Each stream is prioritized into a group. Each group is identified using an identifier that is selected by the client. Each group is <\/del> Stream can be prioritized by marking them as dependent on the completion of other streams (pri-depend). Each dependency is <\/ins> assigned a relative weight, a number that is used to determine the relative proportion of available resources that are assigned to that group. Within a priority group, streams can also be marked as being dependent on the completion of other streams. <\/del> dependency. <\/ins> Explicitly setting the priority for a stream is input to a prioritization process. It does not guarantee any particular"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-55ca1aa15b16be442a21e3b6c893cc7c559b2383062552f2657c3a6a2c725e8e","title":"","text":"frame. Providing prioritization information is optional, so default values are used if no explicit indicator is provided (pri-default). Explicit prioritization information can be provided for a stream to either allocate the stream to a priority group (pri-group), or to create a dependency on another stream (pri-depend). <\/del> 5.3.1. All streams are assigned a priority group. Each priority group is allocated a 31-bit identifier and an integer weight between 1 to 256 (inclusive). Specifying a priority group and weight for a stream causes the stream to be assigned to the identified priority group and for the weight for the group to be changed to the new value. Resources are divided proportionally between priority groups based on their weight. For example, a priority group with weight 4 ideally receives one third of the resources allocated to a stream with weight 12. 5.3.2. <\/del> Each stream can be given an explicit dependency on another stream. Including a dependency expresses a preference to allocate resources to the identified stream rather than to the dependent stream. A stream that is dependent on another stream becomes part of the priority group of the stream it depends on. It belongs to the same dependency tree as the stream it depends on. <\/del> to the identified stream rather than to the dependent stream. Each dependency is allocated an integer weight between 1 to 256 (inclusive). <\/ins> A stream that is assigned directly to a priority group is not dependent on any other stream. It is the root of a dependency tree inside its priority group. <\/del> The connection is the root of the dependency tree. A stream that is not dependent on any other stream is given a stream dependency of 0x0 to signify the connection. <\/ins> When assigning a dependency on another stream, by default, the stream is added as a new dependency of the stream it depends on. For"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a14e9e84508fa9fdfb6ae6de8da64b3493b6221dc7064d5bb85fa620085b5dcc","title":"","text":"stream A, this results in a dependency order of A followed by D followed by B and C. Streams are ordered into several dependency trees within their priority group. Each dependency tree within a priority group SHOULD be allocated the same amount of resources. Inside a dependency tree, a dependent stream SHOULD only be allocated resources if the streams that it depends on are either closed, or it is not possible to make progress on them. <\/del> Inside the dependency tree, a dependent stream SHOULD only be allocated resources if the streams that it depends on are either closed, or it is not possible to make progress on them. <\/ins> Streams with the same dependencies SHOULD be allocated the same amount of resources. Thus, if streams B and C depend on stream A, and if no progress can be made on A, streams B and C are given an equal share of resources. <\/del> Streams with the same dependencies SHOULD be allocated resources proportionally based on their weight. Thus, if stream B depends on stream A with weight 4, and C depends on stream A with weight 12, and if no progress can be made on A, stream B ideally receives one third of the resources allocated to stream C. <\/ins> A stream MUST NOT depend on itself. An endpoint MAY either treat this as a StreamErrorHandler of type , or assign pri-default to the stream. 5.3.3. <\/del> 5.3.2. <\/ins> Stream priorities are changed using the frame. Setting a priority group and weight causes a stream to become part of the identified group, and not dependent on any other stream. Setting a dependency causes a stream to become dependent on the identified stream, which can cause the reprioritized stream to move to a new priority group. All streams that are dependent on a reprioritized stream move with it. Setting a dependency with the exclusive flag for a reprioritized stream moves all the dependencies of the stream it depends on to become dependencies of the reprioritized stream. <\/del> frame. Setting a dependency causes a stream to become dependent on the identified stream. All streams that are dependent on a reprioritized stream move with it. Setting a dependency with the exclusive flag for a reprioritized stream moves all the dependencies of the stream it depends on to become dependencies of the reprioritized stream. <\/ins> 5.3.4. <\/del> 5.3.3. <\/ins> When a stream is closed, its dependencies can be moved to become dependent on the stream the closed stream depends on, if any, or to become new dependency tree roots otherwise. <\/del> become dependent on the connection otherwise. The weights of new dependencies SHOULD be assigned by distributing the weight of the dependency of the closed stream proportionally based on the weights of its dependencies. <\/ins> It is possible for a stream to become closed while prioritization information that creates a dependency on that stream is in transit."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2b1b06d8ab028fa43d7d9f12d8581728796f13fbd341eb6d66348e2d2cec19e5","title":"","text":"An endpoint receiving a frame that changes the priority of a closed stream SHOULD alter the weight of the priority group, or the dependencies of the streams that depend on it, if it has retained enough state to do so. Priority group information is part of the priority state of a stream. Priority groups that contain only closed streams can be assigned a weight of zero. <\/del> dependencies of the streams that depend on it, if it has retained enough state to do so. <\/ins> The number of priority groups cannot exceed the number of non-closed streams. This includes streams in the \"reserved\" state. Priority state size for peer-initiated streams is limited by the value of . Reserved streams do not count toward the concurrent stream limit of either peer, but only the endpoint that creates the reservation needs to maintain priority information. Thus, the total amount of priority state for non-closed streams can be limited by an endpoint. 5.3.5. <\/del> 5.3.4. <\/ins> Providing priority information is optional. Streams are assigned to a priority group with an identifier equal to the stream identifier and a weight of 16. <\/del> Providing priority information is optional. Streams are assigned a dependency on the connection with a weight of 16. <\/ins> PushResources initially depend on their associated stream. <\/del> PushResources initially depend on their associated stream with a weight of 16. <\/ins> 5.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c43ca59b9102ca30b76e2a4e0ceeb5fa24cfefdf3e4ccdb9b634ecf272ba22e6","title":"","text":"Padding size low bits. This field is only present if the PAD_LOW flag is set. A single reserved bit. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. A 31-bit identifier for a priority group, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. An 8-bit weight for the identified priority group, see StreamPriority. Add one to the value to obtain a weight between 1 and 256. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. <\/del> A single bit flag indicates that the stream dependency is exclusive, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flag is set. <\/del> present if the PRIORITY flag is set. <\/ins> A 31-bit stream identifier for the stream that this stream depends on, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flag is set. <\/del> present if the PRIORITY flag is set. An 8-bit weight for the identified stream dependency, see StreamPriority. Add one to the value to obtain a weight between 1 and 256. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY flag is set. <\/ins> A HeaderBlock."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bdb66832cbd4a145d415e8970a522a06d7189c930d898a902265eb3fe6cd6af9","title":"","text":". A HEADERS frame MUST NOT have both the PRIORITY_GROUP and PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flags set. Receipt of a HEADERS frame with both these flags set MUST be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type . <\/del> The HEADERS frame changes the connection state as described in HeaderBlock."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9975ce8380ab6c7894502e9968199351766560e8b75e7b47b1ded3b2926407cf","title":"","text":"The PRIORITY frame (type=0x2) specifies the StreamPriority. It can be sent at any time for an existing stream. This enables reprioritisation of existing streams. <\/del> reprioritization of existing streams. <\/ins> The payload of a PRIORITY frame contains the following fields: A single reserved bit. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. A 31-bit identifier for a priority group, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. An 8-bit weight for the identified priority group, see StreamPriority. Add one to the value to obtain a weight between 1 and 256. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_GROUP flag is set. <\/del> A single bit flag indicates that the stream dependency is exclusive, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flag is set. <\/del> exclusive, see StreamPriority. <\/ins> A 31-bit stream identifier for the stream that this stream depends on, see StreamPriority. This field is optional and is only present if the PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flag is set. The PRIORITY frame defines the following flags: <\/del> on, see StreamPriority. <\/ins> A PRIORITY frame MUST have exactly one of the PRIORITY_GROUP and PRIORITY_DEPENDENCY flags set. Receipt of a PRIORITY frame with either none or both these flags set MUST be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/del> An 8-bit weight for the identified stream dependency, see StreamPriority. Add one to the value to obtain a weight between 1 and 256. <\/ins> . <\/del> The PRIORITY frame does not define any flags. <\/ins> The PRIORITY frame is associated with an existing stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-772524ab45ea8409672ec80ef72d5dd4c40ba1af28d5aafaf237c92d09a850a7","title":"","text":". Bit 6 being set indicates that the data in the frame has been compressed with GZIP compression (RFC1952). The compression only applies to the frame in which it is signalled, and no compression state is carried over from frame to frame. An endpoint MUST NOT send a DATA frame with the COMPRESSED flag set unless it receives a parameter set to a value of 1. An endpoint that has not both set this parameter to 1 and had it acknowledged MUST treat the receipt of a DATA frame with the COMPRESSED flag set as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/ins> DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a DATA frame is received whose stream identifier field is 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2eaf92fc800c5737267c0ce20506e30184ecbe422fbe74b9e5e258f0f0b51ce2","title":"","text":"clients to abandon automatic retry of requests if a GOAWAY frame is lost. A client that is unable to retry requests loses all requests that are in flight when the server closes the connection. This is especially true for intermediaries that might not be serving clients using HTTP\/2. A server that is attempting to gracefully shut down a connection SHOULD send an initial GOAWAY frame with the last stream identifier set to 2 -1 and a code. This signals to the client that a shutdown is imminent and that no further requests can be initiated. After waiting at least one round trip time, the server can send another GOAWAY frame with an updated last stream identifier. This ensures that a connection can be cleanly shut down without losing requests. <\/ins> After sending a GOAWAY frame, the sender can discard frames for streams with identifiers higher than the identified last stream. However, any frames that alter connection state cannot be completely"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-24c391e5468eb6760aa5361b94853a836de13d227ff9e970f95fb89749a112d7","title":"","text":". 10.5.1. A large HeaderBlock can cause an implementation to commit a large amount of state. In servers and intermediaries, header fields that are critical to routing, such as \":authority\", \":path\", and \":scheme\" are not guaranteed to be present early in the header block. In particular, values that are in the reference set cannot be emitted until the header block ends. This can prevent streaming of the header fields to their ultimate destination, and forces the endpoint to buffer the entire header block. Since there is no hard limit to the size of a header block, an endpoint could be forced to exhaust available memory. A server that receives a larger header block than it is willing to handle can send an HTTP 431 (Request Header Fields Too Large) status code RFC6585. A client can discard responses that it cannot process. The header block MUST be processed to ensure a consistent connection state, unless the connection is closed. <\/ins> 10.6. HTTP\/2 enables greater use of compression for both header fields"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f6eb4a5aaa87bf83f051820b495cea57b123f303f25bd5a13ff176d4344cc31f","title":"","text":"6.3. The PRIORITY frame (type=0x2) specifies the StreamPriority. It can be sent at any time for an existing stream. This enables reprioritization of existing streams. <\/del> be sent at any time for an existing stream, including closed streams. This enables reprioritization of existing streams. <\/ins> The payload of a PRIORITY frame contains the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c77ece5d9760e4ae253d7c69370676922731053e6e44fa50b83499fe589fe4da","title":"","text":". The PRIORITY frame can be sent on a stream in any of the \"reserved (remote)\", \"open\", \"half closed (local)\", or \"half closed (remote)\" states, though it cannot be sent between consecutive frames that comprise a single HeaderBlock. Note that this frame could arrive after processing or frame sending has completed, which would cause it to have no effect. For a stream that is in the \"half closed (remote)\" state, this frame can only affect processing of the stream and not frame transmission. <\/del> (remote)\", \"open\", \"half closed (local)\", \"half closed (remote)\", or \"closed\" states, though it cannot be sent between consecutive frames that comprise a single HeaderBlock. Note that this frame could arrive after processing or frame sending has completed, which would cause it to have no effect on the current stream. For a stream that is in the \"half closed (remote)\" or \"closed\" - state, this frame can only affect processing of the current stream and not frame transmission. The PRIORITY frame is the only frame that can be sent for a closed stream. This allows for the reprioritization of a group of dependent streams by altering the priority of the parent stream. However, a PRIORITY frame sent on a closed stream risks being ignored due to the peer having discarded priority state information for that stream. <\/ins> 6.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-569f2bec91b8b76f85071632494c24dafec10f2e555e33125a2701c8b2ae5c72","title":"","text":"therefore likely to be more appropriate for use for performance, security or other reasons. Implementations MUST negotiate - and therefore use - ephemeral cipher suites, such as ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) or the elliptic curve variant (ECDHE) with a minimum size of 2048 bits (DHE) or security level of 128 bits (ECDHE). Clients MUST accept DHE sizes of up to 4096 bits. Implementations are encouraged not to negotiate TLS cipher suites with known vulnerabilities, such as RC4. An implementation that negotiates a TLS connection that does not meet the requirements in this section, or any policy-based constraints, SHOULD NOT negotiate HTTP\/2. Removing HTTP\/2 protocols from consideration could result in the removal of all protocols from the set of protocols offered by the client. This causes protocol negotiation failure, as described in TLSALPN. Due to implementation limitations, it might not be possible to fail TLS negotiation based on all of these requirements. An endpoint MUST terminate an HTTP\/2 connection that is opened on a TLS session that does not meet these minimum requirements with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> The set of TLS cipher suites that are permitted in HTTP\/2 is restricted. HTTP\/2 MUST only be used with cipher suites that have ephemeral key exchange, such as the TLS12 or the RFC4492. Ephemeral key exchange MUST have a minimum size of 2048 bits for DHE or security level of 128 bits for ECDHE. Clients MUST accept DHE sizes of up to 4096 bits. HTTP MUST NOT be used with cipher suites that use stream or block ciphers. Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) modes, such as the RFC5288 are acceptable. Clients MAY advertise support of other cipher suites in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2 to complete without the additional latency imposed by using a separate connection for fallback. An implementation SHOULD NOT negotiate a TLS connection for HTTP\/2 without also negotiating a cipher suite that meets these requirements. Due to implementation limitations, it might not be possible to fail TLS negotiation. An endpoint MUST immediately terminate an HTTP\/2 connection that does not meet these minimum requirements with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c4509e26c78a3eee8feb5d46483a93d809ddf7a772d9d492a34b6e399a40e357","title":"","text":". 9.3. Clients MUST support GZIP compression for HTTP response bodies. Regardless of the value of the accept-encoding header field, a server MAY send responses with GZIP encoding. A compressed response MUST still bear an appropriate content-encoding header field. This effectively changes the implicit value of the Accept-Encoding header field (HTTP-p2) from \"identity\" to \"identity, gzip\", however GZIP encoding cannot be suppressed by including \";q=0\". Intermediaries that perform translation from HTTP\/2 to HTTP\/1.1 MUST decompress payloads unless the request includes an Accept-Encoding value that includes \"gzip\". <\/del> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-661e49dc815720b0a59e751d2d7d20b0b1ef1bbfbed9114e7b880e41b15b7608","title":"","text":"Bit 4 being set indicates that the Pad Length field is present. Bit 6 being set indicates that the data in the frame has been compressed with GZIP compression (GZIP). Padding is not compressed. <\/del> DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a DATA frame is received whose stream identifier field is 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . Data frames are optionally compressed using GZIP. Each frame is individually compressed; the state of the compressor is reset for each frame. An endpoint MUST NOT send a DATA frame with the COMPRESSED flag set unless the setting is enabled, that is, set to 1. An endpoint that has not enabled DATA frame compression MUST treat the receipt of a DATA frame with the COMPRESSED flag set as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/del> DATA frames are subject to flow control and can only be sent when a stream is in the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" states. The entire DATA frame payload is included in flow control, including Pad Low,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9089ecc47fe066e6c3b2a402abc94f01c4674dde262b3d65e27c0031c82e6708","title":"","text":"instead send an ALTSVC frame. A single ALTSVC frame can be sent for a connection; a new frame is not required for every request. When using HTTP2, clients SHOULD instead send an ALTSVC frame. A single ALTSVC frame can be sent for a connection; a new frame is not required for every request. <\/ins> 3.1. When an alternative service is advertised using Alt-Svc, it is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-62bd8b66f93a71b2792367d6c7b4d5362b7b46fa2495dead1db57589fae38427","title":"","text":"be ignored. The ALTSVC frame type is 0xa (decimal 10). <\/ins> The ALTSVC frame contains the following fields: An unsigned, 32-bit integer indicating the freshness lifetime of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-372a088541c9ca77f1ffd6c6660242df4d29605b50a10ce6c5a406f969e97745","title":"","text":"ALTSVC [to be assigned] <\/del> 0xa <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bc6a5d1ed524935f8bef16f4598532f93b1121ea1b34e7b15538c489ce353708","title":"","text":"7.2.3. A literal header field never indexed representation causes the emission of a header field without altering the header table. It requires intermediaries to use the same representation for encoding this header field. <\/del> emission of a header field without altering the header table. Intermediaries MUST use the same representation for encoding this header field. <\/ins> A literal header field never indexed representation starts with the '0001' 4-bit pattern."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5cdf1ccadc77453a73005559a8a99930b7992b4c93e77507f60940299a79118c","title":"","text":"8. This section describes potential areas of security concern with HPACK: Use of compression as a length-based oracle for verifying guesses about secrets that are compressed into a shared compression context. Denial of service resulting from exhausting processing or memory capacity at a decompressor. <\/ins> 8.1. Compression can create a weak point allowing an attacker to recover secret data. For example, the CRIME attack (see CRIME) took advantage of the DEFLATE mechanism (see DEFLATE) of SPDY (see SPDY) to efficiently probe the compression context. The full-text compression mechanism of DEFLATE allowed the attacker to learn some information from each failed attempt at guessing the secret. For this reason, HPACK provides only limited compression mechanisms in the form of an indexing table and of a static Huffman encoding. The indexing table can still provide information to an attacker that would be able to probe the compression context. However, this information is limited to the knowledge of whether the attacker's guess is correct or not. Still, an attacker could take advantage of this limited information for breaking low-entropy secrets using a brute-force attack. A server usually has some protections against such brute-force attack. Here, the attack would target the client, where it would be harder to detect. The attack would be even more dangerous if the attacker is able to prevent the traffic generated by its brute-force attack from reaching the server. To offer some protection against such type of attacks, HPACK enables an endpoint to indicate that a header field must never be compressed, across any hop up to the other endpoint (see literal.header.never.indexed). An endpoint MUST use this feature to prevent the compression of any header field whose value contains a secret which could be put at risk by a brute-force attack. For optimal processing, a sensitive value (for example a cookie) needs to have an entropy high enough to not be endangered by a brute- force attack, in order to take advantage of HPACK indexing. <\/del> HPACK reduces the length of header field encodings by exploiting the redundancy inherent in protocols like HTTP. The ultimate goal of this is to reduce the amount of data that is required to send HTTP requests or responses. The header table that HPACK uses can be probed by an attacker that has the following capabilities: to encode and transmit header fields; and to observe the length of those fields as they are encoded. The allows an attacker to adaptively modify requests in order to confirm guesses about the header table state. If the HPACK encoder compresses a guess into a shorter length, the attacker can observe the encoded length and infer that the guess was correct. This is possible because while TLS provides confidentiality protection for content, it only provides a limited amount of protection for the length of that content. Padding schemes only provide limited protection against an attacker with these capabilities, potentially only forcing an increased number of guesses to learn the length associated with a given guess. Padding schemes also work directly against compression by increasing the number of bits that are transmitted. Attacks like CRIME demonstrated the existence of these general attacker capabilities. The specific attack exploited the fact that DEFLATE removes redundancy based on prefix matching. This permitted the attacker to confirm guesses a character at a time, reducing an exponential-time attack into a constant time attack. 8.1.1. HPACK mitigates but does not completely prevent attacks modelled on CRIME by forcing a guess to match an entire header field value, rather than individual characters. An attacker can only learn whether a guess is correct or not, so is reduced to a brute force guess for the header field values. The viability of recovering specific header field values therefore depends on the entropy of values. As a result, values with high entropy are unlikely to be recovered successfully. However, values with low entropy remain vulnerable. Attacks of this nature are possible any time that two mutually distrustful entities control requests or responses that are placed onto a single HTTP\/2 connection. If the shared HPACK compressor permits one entity to add entries to the header table, and the other to access those entries, then the state of the table can be learned. Having requests or responses from mutually distrustful entities occurs when an intermediary either: sends requests from multiple clients on a single connection toward an origin server, or takes responses from multiple origin servers and places them on a shared connection toward a client. Web browsers also need to assume that requests made on the same connection by different ORIGIN are made by mutually distrustful entities. Assuming no additional constraints, multiplexing in HTTP\/2 enables multiple attempts to guess values from the header table, up to the concurrency limit imposed by the peer in the SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS setting. This depends on the attacker being on the communications path so that they are able to see and block packets. Beyond this limit, or for an entirely passive attacker, attempts to guess header table state can be detected by a peer. 8.1.2. Users of HTTP that require confidentiality for header fields can use values with entropy sufficient to make guessing infeasible. However, this is impractical as a general solution because it forces all users of HTTP to take steps to mitigate attacks. It would impose new constraints on how HTTP is used. Rather than impose constraints on users of HTTP, an implementation of HPACK can instead constrain how compression is applied in order to limit the potential for header table probing. An ideal solution segregates access to the header table based on the entity that is constructing header fields. Header field values that are added to the table are attributed to an entity, and only the entity that created an particular value can extract that value. To improve compression performance of this option, certain entries might be tagged as being public. For example, a web browser might make the values of the Accept-Encoding header field available in all requests. An encoder without good knowledge of the provenance of header fields might instead introduce a penalty for bad guesses, such that attempts to guess a header field value results in all values being removed from consideration in all future requests, effectively preventing further guesses. Simply removing values from the header table can be ineffectual if the attacker has a reliable way of causing values to be reinstalled. For example, a request to load an image in a web browser typically includes the Cookie header field (a potentially highly valued target for this sort of attack), and web sites can easily force an image to be loaded, thereby refreshing the entry in the header table. This response might be made inversely proportional to the length of the header field. Marking as inaccessible might occur for shorter values more quickly or with higher probability than for longer values. Implementations might also choose to protect certain header fields that are known to be highly valued, such as the Authorization or Cookie header fields, by disabling or further limiting compression. 8.1.3. Refusing to generate an indexed representation for a header field is only effective if compression is avoided on all hops. The literal.header.never.indexed can be used to signal to intermediaries that a particular value was intentionally sent as a literal. An intermediary MUST NOT re-encode a value that uses the never indexed literal as an indexed representation. 8.2. <\/ins> There is currently no known threat taking advantage of the use of a fixed Huffman encoding. A study has shown that using a fixed Huffman"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2de6628cc47d44c2a38faa6b6bbb39331a74da915aeb626fc59eaa15abdf310c","title":"","text":"information leakage to recover any meaningful amount of information (see PETAL). 8.2. <\/del> 8.3. <\/ins> An attacker can try to cause an endpoint to exhaust its memory. HPACK is designed to limit both the peak and state amounts of memory"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-eb2f24f9b4a67df79e0634eec95ce66f7ab760ab093e84273879c3aba3f4ddff","title":"","text":"does not force this to occur, application constraints might make this necessary. 8.3. <\/del> 8.4. <\/ins> An implementation of HPACK needs to ensure that large values for integers, long encoding for integers, or long string literals do not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f85d74beb9d10ec2d3d0dbd742723667ad68fe825f2c52c2f690e634e863a358","title":"","text":"connection. Extensions are permitted to use new FrameHeader, SettingValues, ErrorCodes, header fields that start with a colon (:), or any reserved flags or fields in frames. Of these, registries are established for iana-frames, iana-settings and iana-errors. <\/del> ErrorCodes, or header fields that start with a colon (:). Of these, registries are established for iana-frames, iana-settings and iana- errors. <\/ins> Implementations MUST ignore unknown or unsupported values in all extensible protocol elements. Implementations MUST discard frames that have unknown or unsupported types. Note that only frames can be flow controlled, extensions cannot be flow controlled. This means that any of these extension points can be safely used by extensions without prior arrangement or negotiation. <\/del> that have unknown or unsupported types. This means that any of these extension points can be safely used by extensions without prior arrangement or negotiation. <\/ins> However, extensions can negotiate any use that could change to the semantics of existing protocol components. For example, an extension"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8a744b051c511f98fc7ad14eafb1b18f4250cfae5217f6cbeac3a511462fa76f","title":"","text":"frame cannot be used until the peer has given a positive signal that this is acceptable. In this case, it could also be necessary to coordinate when the revised layout comes into effect. <\/del> coordinate when the revised layout comes into effect. Note that treating any frame other than frames as flow controlled is such a change in semantics, and can only be done through negotiation. <\/ins> This document doesn't mandate a specific method for negotiating the use of an extension, but notes that a SettingValues could be used for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f882cfd5c3fd1a9e8b359521637cb70d853e7f5d858c6ce03ccab310041e0f3f","title":"","text":"4.3. A header field in HTTP\/2 is a name-value pair with one or more associated values. They are used within HTTP request and response messages as well as server push operations (see PushResources). <\/del> A header field in HTTP\/2 is a name with one or more associated values. They are used within HTTP request and response messages as well as server push operations (see PushResources). <\/ins> Header sets are collections of zero or more header fields. When transmitted over a connection, a header set is serialized into a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-558ea5da45bfda61d93a68ce581629d70664c68599605524f8eaad84f0fe1aa8","title":"","text":"Stream identifiers cannot be reused. Long-lived connections can result in an endpoint exhausting the available range of stream identifiers. A client that is unable to establish a new stream identifier can establish a new connection for new streams. <\/del> identifier can establish a new connection for new streams. A server that is unable to establish a new stream identifier may send a frame to require the client to establish a new connection. <\/ins> 5.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7b1ea7bd35c27d4e527993ed18f23034ff4ce80842dbfb52eb088e80b889cac8","title":"","text":"permitted to open. Streams in any of these three states count toward the limit advertised in the setting. <\/del> setting. Streams in either of the \"reserved\" states do not count as open. <\/ins> Endpoints MUST NOT exceed the limit set by their peer. An endpoint that receives a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0a5fbaf7e20b3afd908bd8b1a156b51ec03d53e0e6e523c2b267e68f3c61d683","title":"","text":"frame that causes their advertised concurrent stream limit to be exceeded MUST treat this as a StreamErrorHandler. Streams in either of the \"reserved\" states do not count as open. <\/del> 5.2. Using streams for multiplexing introduces contention over use of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b2f46d74a07c2cc7000efcf39c2bc0aecd7c7aa3da38c1041b59dd51fdb4ff44","title":"","text":"prioritization, since the stream could be given a priority that is higher than intended. To avoid these problems, endpoints SHOULD maintain prioritization state for closed streams for a period after streams close. An endpoint SHOULD retain stream prioritization state for a period after streams become closed. The longer state is retained, the lower the chance that streams are assigned incorrect or default priority values. <\/del> To avoid these problems, an endpoint SHOULD retain stream prioritization state for a period after streams become closed. The longer state is retained, the lower the chance that streams are assigned incorrect or default priority values. <\/ins> This could create a large state burden for an endpoint, so this state MAY be limited. An endpoint MAY apply a fixed upper limit on the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-85ab14c782eb49f696e0d42a9841a7a46956e70fad28519bf1353048cff6e2ff","title":"","text":"that requires immediate termination of the connection. The last stream identifier from the last GOAWAY frame received indicates which streams could have been acted upon. Endpoints MUST NOT increase the value they send in the last stream identifier, since this could cause their peers to erroneously retry streams if a GOAWAY frame is lost. <\/del> value they send in the last stream identifier, since the peers might already have retried unprocessed requests on another connection. <\/ins> A client that is unable to retry requests loses all requests that are in flight when the server closes the connection. This is especially"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4520f57196fecafc101f5548acbd9c2410d30617c820a1f5bebe022bafe1266c","title":"","text":"subject to flow control. Of the frame types defined in this document, this includes only frame. Frames that are exempt from flow control MUST be accepted and processed, unless the receiver is unable to assign resources to <\/del> frames. Frames that are exempt from flow control MUST be accepted and processed, unless the receiver is unable to assign resources to <\/ins> handling the frame. A receiver MAY respond with a StreamErrorHandler or ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-af9ed07ad692c491552e0ec66a4c2ef98b478eb058bc0c56691dfeda94eb24c4","title":"","text":"A server that does not wish clients to reuse connections can indicate that it is not authoritative for a request by sending a 421 (Not Authoritative) status code in response to request (see <\/del> Authoritative) status code in response to the request (see <\/ins> NotAuthoritative). 9.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-602c84b5a5ac108766c2072225b84be70f8c39ad9862dd7291397a0e0a01a7c8","title":"","text":"3.3. A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI without prior knowledge about support for HTTP\/2 uses TLS12 with the TLSALPN. <\/del> knowledge about support for HTTP\/2 uses TLS12 with the TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 over TLS uses the \"h2\" application token. The \"h2c\" token MUST NOT be sent by a client or selected by a server."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-dcf146dbb7692f62eb6810b77c19d18d92d962e5646272695b29a9fff10c88d8","title":"","text":"such a connection by the use of the \"PRI\" method in the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; implementations that support HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLSALPN. <\/del> use TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> Prior support for HTTP\/2 is not a strong signal that a given server will support HTTP\/2 for future connections. It is possible for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a860bbd67998e797fc59bceb3c1b18078e3bad236db145adbe073e6d04954915","title":"","text":"use stream or block ciphers. Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) modes, such as the RFC5288 are acceptable. Clients MAY advertise support of other cipher suites in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2 to complete without the additional latency imposed by using a separate connection for fallback. <\/del> The effect of these restrictions is that TLS 1.2 implementations could have non-intersecting sets of available cipher suites, since these prevent the use of the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory. To avoid this problem, implementations of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with P256 FIPS186. Clients MAY advertise support of cipher suites that are prohibited by the above restrictions in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2. This enables a fallback to protocols without these constraints without the additional latency imposed by using a separate connection for fallback. <\/ins> An implementation SHOULD NOT negotiate a TLS connection for HTTP\/2 without also negotiating a cipher suite that meets these"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-05da9b04f36d3cc00789132c4ddb4710c86dbc17b0371d2ce5ed4683eee5773f","title":"","text":"A string for identifying HTTP\/2 is entered into the \"Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs\" registry established in TLSALPN. <\/del> in TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry for frame types, settings, and error codes. These new registries are entered into a new \"Hypertext"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e666bc078bf5c2e5f8818d257f450a1976ad89f6bae2d8f6984e8105b9608ba9","title":"","text":"This document creates two registrations for the identification of HTTP\/2 in the \"Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs\" registry established in TLSALPN. <\/del> IDs\" registry established in TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> The \"h2\" string identifies HTTP\/2 when used over TLS:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1609af7796ca03f6c41d9e4f017edb1bb242cfc3b6fdf89f0ca564da5dae5f04","title":"","text":"values. They are used within HTTP request and response messages as well as server push operations (see PushResources). Header sets are collections of zero or more header fields. When transmitted over a connection, a header set is serialized into a <\/del> Header lists are collections of zero or more header fields. When transmitted over a connection, a header list is serialized into a <\/ins> header block using COMPRESSION. The serialized header block is then divided into one or more octet sequences, called header block fragments, and transmitted within the payload of HEADERS, PUSH_PROMISE or CONTINUATION frames. HTTP Header Compression does not preserve the relative ordering of header fields. Header fields with multiple values are encoded into a single header field using a special delimiter (see HeaderOrdering), this preserves the relative order of values for that header field. <\/del> The COOKIE is treated specially by the HTTP mapping (see CompressCookie). A receiving endpoint reassembles the header block by concatenating its fragments, then decompresses the block to reconstruct the header set. <\/del> list. <\/ins> A complete header block consists of either:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-543a8673438a0260b151189cefcac79ec6460a0ffc985e4e32af9f86ab020be4","title":"","text":"Field Registry maintained at . 8.1.2.1. <\/ins> While HTTP\/1.x used the message start-line (see RFC7230) to convey the target URI and method of the request, and the status code for the response, HTTP\/2 uses special pseudo-header fields beginning with ':'"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-02e2c76a09e51813f4f7e3232e90e70822cadc2a2a34dbf340b0dcf804c593fb","title":"","text":"encoding in HTTP\/2. A request or response containing uppercase header field names MUST be treated as malformed. All pseudo-header fields MUST appear in the header block before regular header fields. Any request or response that contains any pseudo-header field that appears in a header block after a regular header field MUST treated as malformed. 8.1.2.2. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 does not use the Connection header field to indicate \"hop-by- hop\" header fields; in this protocol, connection-specific metadata is conveyed by other means. As such, a HTTP\/2 message containing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-219c7b457094260cb7b7c017b9d70eb953ff807ff98c279549332beef42aed0b","title":"","text":"The handshake methods described in starting are believed sufficient to negotiate the use of alternative protocols. 8.1.2.1. <\/del> 8.1.2.3. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 defines a number of pseudo header fields starting with a colon ':' character that carry information about the request target:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e6dcf273dd1e8e15c392f36ea6bfb4bb3d307add2eca31de57cee3842bb37f27","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 does not define a way to carry the version identifier that is included in the HTTP\/1.1 request line. 8.1.2.2. <\/del> 8.1.2.4. <\/ins> A single \":status\" header field is defined that carries the HTTP status code field (see RFC7231). This header field MUST be included"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fd5f054124f24b66b9a98842c7166ba426bd772cd422e04bda79735a3b84369c","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 does not define a way to carry the version or reason phrase that is included in an HTTP\/1.1 status line. 8.1.2.3. COMPRESSION does not preserve the order of header fields, because the relative order of header fields with different names is not important. However, the same header field can be repeated to form a list (see RFC7230), where the relative order of header field values is significant. This repetition can occur either as a single header field with a comma-separated list of values, or as several header fields with a single value, or any combination thereof. Therefore, in the latter case, ordering needs to be preserved before compression takes place. To preserve the order of multiple occurrences of a header field with the same name, its ordered values are concatenated into a single value using a zero-valued octet (0x0) to delimit them. After decompression, header fields that have values containing zero octets (0x0) MUST be split into multiple header fields before being processed. For example, the following HTTP\/1.x header block: contains three Cache-Control directives; two directives in the first Cache-Control header field, and the third directive in the second Cache-Control field. Before compression, they would need to be converted to a form similar to this (with 0x0 represented as '\\0'): Note here that the ordering between Content-Type and Cache-Control is not preserved, but the relative ordering of the Cache-Control directives - as well as the fact that the first two were comma- separated, while the last was on a different line - is. Header fields containing multiple values MUST be concatenated into a single value unless the ordering of that header field is known to be not significant. The special case of \"set-cookie\" - which does not form a comma- separated list, but can have multiple values - does not depend on ordering. The \"set-cookie\" header field MAY be encoded as multiple header field values, or as a single concatenated value. 8.1.2.4. <\/del> 8.1.2.5. <\/ins> The COOKIE can carry a significant amount of redundant data."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-39058614aa873935818fd875a31ec1ec3d7902585b48a66e198cea4fd935eed4","title":"","text":"before being passed into a non-HTTP\/2 context, such as an HTTP\/1.1 connection, or a generic HTTP server application. The Cookie header field MAY be split using a zero octet (0x0), as defined in HeaderOrdering. When decoding, zero octets MUST be replaced with the cookie delimiter (\"; \"). 8.1.2.5. <\/del> 8.1.2.6. <\/ins> A malformed request or response is one that is an otherwise valid sequence of HTTP\/2 frames, but is otherwise invalid due to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6ffd781a173228e23827d2d18c80075017abb94e41f3377c08e316f2dfe054d8","title":"","text":"at the index corresponding to the number of entries in the header table. The header table is initially empty. <\/del> The header table is initially empty. Entries are added as each header block is decompressed. <\/ins> The header table can contain duplicate entries. Therefore, duplicate entries MUST NOT be treated as an error by a decoder."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-536b4d52875a28aa11d2d8288973bdcd18ac19ba2e59c0bfb3f6ffc4a8bf6572","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes an optimized expression of the syntax of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP\/2 enables a more <\/del> This specification describes an optimized expression of the semantics of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP\/2 enables a more <\/ins> efficient use of network resources and a reduced perception of latency by introducing header field compression and allowing multiple concurrent messages on the same connection. It also introduces"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-aa8b10e21440ae3eb613a5f02916657988a0878984091a7e51b0f1e835d783c6","title":"","text":"1. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a wildly successful protocol. However, the HTTP\/1.1 message format (RFC7230) was designed to be implemented with the tools at hand in the 1990s, not modern Web application performance. As such it has several <\/del> protocol. However, the HTTP\/1.1 message format (RFC7230) has several <\/ins> characteristics that have a negative overall effect on application performance today. In particular, HTTP\/1.0 only allows one request to be outstanding at a time on a given connection. HTTP\/1.1 pipelining only partially addressed request concurrency and suffers from head-of-line blocking. Therefore, clients that need to make many requests typically use multiple connections to a server in order to reduce latency. Furthermore, HTTP\/1.1 header fields are often repetitive and verbose, which, in addition to generating more or larger network packets, can cause the small initial TCP congestion window to quickly fill. This can result in excessive latency when multiple requests are made on a single new TCP connection. This specification addresses these issues by defining an optimized mapping of HTTP's semantics to an underlying connection. Specifically, it allows interleaving of request and response messages on the same connection and uses an efficient coding for HTTP header fields. It also allows prioritization of requests, letting more important requests complete more quickly, further improving performance. The resulting protocol is designed to be more friendly to the network, because fewer TCP connections can be used in comparison to HTTP\/1.x. This means less competition with other flows, and longer- lived connections, which in turn leads to better utilization of available network capacity. <\/del> In particular, HTTP\/1.0 allowed only one request to be outstanding at a time on a given TCP connection. HTTP\/1.1 added request pipelining, but this only partially addressed request concurrency and still suffers from head-of-line blocking. Therefore, HTTP\/1.1 clients that need to make many requests typically use multiple connections to a server in order to achieve concurrency and thereby reduce latency. Furthermore, HTTP header fields are often repetitive and verbose, causing unnecessary network traffic, as well as causing the initial TCP congestion window to quickly fill. This can result in excessive latency when multiple requests are made on a new TCP connection. HTTP\/2 addresses these issues by defining an optimized mapping of HTTP's semantics to an underlying connection. Specifically, it allows interleaving of request and response messages on the same connection and uses an efficient coding for HTTP header fields. It also allows prioritization of requests, letting more important requests complete more quickly, further improving performance. The resulting protocol is more friendly to the network, because fewer TCP connections can be used in comparison to HTTP\/1.x. This means less competition with other flows, and longer-lived connections, which in turn leads to better utilization of available network capacity. <\/ins> Finally, this encapsulation also enables more efficient processing of messages through use of binary message framing. <\/del> Finally, HTTP\/2 also enables more efficient processing of messages through use of binary message framing. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1c3dd89537b761e35091004683c8265ce9b9bfb0f42e00a050dee38ae37e0091","title":"","text":"are used in support of other HTTP\/2 features. Multiplexing of requests is achieved by having each HTTP request- response exchanged assigned to a single StreamsLayer. Streams are largely independent of each other, so a blocked or stalled request does not prevent progress on other requests. <\/del> response exchange associated with its own StreamsLayer. Streams are largely independent of each other, so a blocked or stalled request or response does not prevent progress on other streams. <\/ins> Flow control and prioritization ensure that it is possible to properly use multiplexed streams. FlowControl helps to ensure that only data that can be used by a receiver is transmitted. <\/del> efficiently use multiplexed streams. FlowControl helps to ensure that only data that can be used by a receiver is transmitted. <\/ins> StreamPriority ensures that limited resources can be directed to the most important requests first. <\/del> most important streams first. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 adds a new interaction mode, whereby a server can PushResources. Server push allows a server to speculatively send a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-603a043de00f5cb8e514c23135b9cc357f2bef54734067eaffa0d07d0d820ac6","title":"","text":"using frames and streams. While some of the frame and stream layer concepts are isolated from HTTP, the intent is not to define a completely generic framing layer. The framing and streams layers are tailored to the needs of the HTTP protocol and server push. <\/del> HTTP, this specification does not define a completely generic framing layer. The framing and streams layers are tailored to the needs of the HTTP protocol and server push. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f0cafd84edf7363cf462ad325469dde615c919cdf56b2b11cfbb5fa9bda66f9d","title":"","text":"The endpoint initiating the HTTP\/2 connection. A transport-level connection between two endpoints. <\/del> A transport-layer connection between two endpoints. <\/ins> An error that affects the entire HTTP\/2 connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5ec57d3132ef9b116eeaf333cbac1e7ae97c09e688f20356c1fa39ff4446df59","title":"","text":"8.2. HTTP\/2 allows a server to pre-emptively send (or \"push\") responses (along with corresponding requests) to a client in association with a previous client-initiated request. This can be useful when the server knows the client will need to have those responses available in order to fully process the response to the original request. <\/del> (along with corresponding \"promised\" requests) to a client in association with a previous client-initiated request. This can be useful when the server knows the client will need to have those responses available in order to fully process the response to the original request. <\/ins> Pushing additional message exchanges in this fashion is optional, and is negotiated between individual endpoints. The setting can be set to 0 to indicate that server push is disabled. Promised requests MUST be cacheable (see RFC7231), MUST be safe (see RFC7231) and MUST NOT include a request body. Clients that receive a promised request that is not cacheable, unsafe or that includes a request body MUST reset the stream with a StreamErrorHandler of type . Pushed responses that are cacheable (see RFC7234) SHOULD be stored by the client, if it implements a HTTP cache. Such responses MAY be considered successfully validated on the origin server (e.g., if the \"no-cache\" cache response directive RFC7234 is present) while the stream identified by the promised stream ID is still open. Pushed responses that are not cacheable MUST NOT be stored by any HTTP cache. They MAY be made available to the application separately. <\/ins> Because server push is effectively hop-by-hop, an intermediary could receive pushes from the server and choose not to forward them on to the client. In other words, how to make use of the pushed"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ca6930b827f932f79d8f65779a7d09c26f044c69fdb7df160bab9c844abc3516","title":"","text":". A server can only push responses that are cacheable (see RFC7234); promised requests MUST be safe (see RFC7231) and MUST NOT include a request body. <\/del> 8.2.1. Server push is semantically equivalent to a server responding to a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f8124de953ff8a23355af9550d811cae5a5fd74acb7bc4634d9f73637a200821","title":"","text":"frame. SettingsSync is not necessary, since a 101 response serves as implicit acknowledgment. Providing these values in the Upgrade request ensures that the protocol does not require default values for the above SETTINGS parameters, and gives a client an opportunity to provide other parameters prior to receiving any frames from the server. <\/del> request gives a client an opportunity to provide parameters prior to receiving any frames from the server. <\/ins> 3.3. A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI without prior knowledge about support for HTTP\/2 uses TLS12 with the TLS-ALPN. <\/del> A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI uses TLS12 with the TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 over TLS uses the \"h2\" application token. The \"h2c\" token MUST NOT be sent by a client or selected by a server."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8da5ebc6a69b5cd8bf012e2056ea043b10313834446d94339d51ee470ab3c977","title":"","text":"frame (WINDOW_UPDATE). This document does not stipulate how a receiver decides when to send this frame or the value that it sends. Nor does it specify how a sender chooses to send packets. <\/del> sends, nor does it specify how a sender chooses to send packets. <\/ins> Implementations are able to select any algorithm that suits their needs."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-09be6aaac65165cd31ea518cee179808062af2d3d0800a40aebdba1bc09157c0","title":"","text":"5.3.2. All dependent streams are allocated an integer weight between 1 to <\/del> All dependent streams are allocated an integer weight between 1 and <\/ins> 256 (inclusive). Streams with the same parent SHOULD be allocated resources"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-da58a40328e1b97de658ef3a29a9e5b808958e6a24ea56e82525b897fca3c9f5","title":"","text":"A HeaderBlock. Padding octets. <\/del> Padding octets that contain no application semantic value. Padding octets MUST be set to zero when sending and ignored when receiving. <\/ins> The HEADERS frame defines the following flags:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-70e3e81d5fc13f318f589db9ec1870cf6d32a8579332da88a28a7fc998e39233","title":"","text":"stream risks being ignored due to the peer having discarded priority state information for that stream. A PRIORITY frame with a length other than 5 octets MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/ins> 6.4. The RST_STREAM frame (type=0x3) allows for abnormal termination of a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-498ff557a4da1188cb60d40dff55a4111affe9bd1b25a03292f5e473ddd1c980","title":"","text":". A RST_STREAM frame with a length other than 4 octets MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/ins> 6.5. The SETTINGS frame (type=0x4) conveys configuration parameters that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-15be81be02ec20202f9912ce33418a0e325bc85476587b612438e98f4784aaa5","title":"","text":". A SETTINGS frame with a length other than a multiple of 6 octets MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/ins> 6.5.1. The payload of a SETTINGS frame consists of zero or more parameters,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e43aec386ce0ee971c36651fa6eacea6412f8b3b3600d2ab76bf046c35807b7d","title":"","text":"frame toward the flow control window, if the receiver does not, the flow control window at sender and receiver can become different. A WINDOW_UPDATE frame with a length other than 4 octets MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . <\/ins> 6.9.1. Flow control in HTTP\/2 is implemented using a window kept by each"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5dab41c74a79d9d6b36733babb5ffeb358dcef7232cda423e9108f9515b021af","title":"","text":"4. 4.1. <\/del> To limit the memory requirements on the decoder side, the dynamic table is constrained in size. 4.1. The size of the dynamic table is the sum of the size of its entries. The size of an entry is the sum of its name's length in octets (as defined in string.literal.representation), its value's length in octets (see string.literal.representation), plus 32. The size of an entry is calculated using the length of the name and value without any Huffman encoding applied. NOTE: The additional 32 octets account for the overhead associated with an entry. For example, an entry structure using two 64-bit pointers to reference the name and the value of the entry, and two 64-bit integers for counting the number of references to the name and value would have 32 octets of overhead. 4.2. <\/ins> Protocols that use HPACK determine the maximum size of table that the encoder is permitted to use. In HTTP\/2, this value is determined by the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE setting (see HTTP2)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1260f9b5a2793393b87abd74c63732a936d0d10d1ef32ab20bae6bb52bf92af9","title":"","text":"dynamic table by setting a maximum size of 0, which can subsequently be restored. The size of the dynamic table is the sum of the size of its entries. The size of an entry is the sum of its name's length in octets (as defined in string.literal.representation), its value's length in octets (see string.literal.representation), plus 32. The size of an entry is calculated using the length of the name and value without any Huffman encoding applied. NOTE: The additional 32 octets account for the overhead associated with an entry. For example, an entry structure using two 64-bit pointers to reference the name and the value of the entry, and two 64-bit integers for counting the number of references to the name and value would have 32 octets of overhead. 4.2. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> Whenever the maximum size for the dynamic table is reduced, entries are evicted from the end of the dynamic table until the size of the dynamic table is less than or equal to the maximum size. 4.3. <\/del> 4.4. <\/ins> Whenever a new entry is to be added to the dynamic table, entries are evicted from the end of the dynamic table until the size of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fca0a0d406a897fc495600fbdcb06261e739ac4df8db1e171c5c4e390b143329","title":"","text":"The underlying transport has properties that do not meet minimum security requirements (see TLSUsage). The endpoint requires that HTTP\/1.1 be used instead of HTTP\/2. <\/ins> Unknown or unsupported error codes MUST NOT trigger any special behavior. These MAY be treated by an implementation as being equivalent to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6e1ff895a18f94f266e6c93e6419da1ed0060c416c1133de6d1c3f3bed8d5f56","title":"","text":"This effectively prevents the use of renegotiation in response to a request for a specific protected resource. A future specification might provide a way to support this use case. <\/del> might provide a way to support this use case. Alternatively, a server might use a ConnectionErrorHandler of type to request the client use a protocol which supports renegotiation. <\/ins> 9.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d5226871f830dc369fc204fa7a6de5a3221d4504d60ab3b403bf68886d3feaf1","title":"","text":"A header list is an ordered collection of header fields that are encoded jointly, and can contain duplicate header fields. A complete list of key-value pairs contained in a HTTP\/2 header <\/del> complete list of key-value pairs contained in an HTTP\/2 header <\/ins> block is a header list. A header field can be represented in encoded form either as a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8878a7e8e5f1633254744cbdfad236978cb2b677489f6d41b28a36c95e437e15","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 does not use the \"Connection\" header field to indicate connection-specific header fields; in this protocol, connection- specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate a HTTP\/2 message containing connection-specific header <\/del> generate an HTTP\/2 message containing connection-specific header <\/ins> fields; any message containing connection-specific header fields MUST be treated as malformed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b7e20d58e755d62b365dbd47d0d8f3bde03edc20806db2cdc246a8cf10f7eecf","title":"","text":". Pushed responses that are cacheable (see RFC7234) can be stored by the client, if it implements a HTTP cache. Pushed responses are <\/del> the client, if it implements an HTTP cache. Pushed responses are <\/ins> considered successfully validated on the origin server (e.g., if the \"no-cache\" cache response directive RFC7234 is present) while the stream identified by the promised stream ID is still open."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b1102f727e3cd761ed220d30ed1fbf275b6f6be67f3de1835d6e524a8807d041","title":"","text":"The DATA frame defines the following flags: Bit 1 being set indicates that this frame is the last that the <\/del> Bit 0 being set indicates that this frame is the last that the <\/ins> endpoint will send for the identified stream. Setting this flag causes the stream to enter one of StreamStates. Bit 4 being set indicates that the Pad Length field and any <\/del> Bit 3 being set indicates that the Pad Length field and any <\/ins> padding that it describes is present. DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a DATA frame is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e975c62dead558385868b47ee26251a48a873823e186b6c529e05aeffb46396a","title":"","text":"SETTINGS parameters are acknowledged by the receiving peer. To enable this, the SETTINGS frame defines the following flag: Bit 1 being set indicates that this frame acknowledges receipt and <\/del> Bit 0 being set indicates that this frame acknowledges receipt and <\/ins> application of the peer's SETTINGS frame. When this bit is set, the payload of the SETTINGS frame MUST be empty. Receipt of a SETTINGS frame with the ACK flag set and a length field value"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c44f84778b1bb039784d4c1c7caef0de54103a1b496bfda01c3aafde32e11a32","title":"","text":"The PING frame defines the following flags: Bit 1 being set indicates that this PING frame is a PING response. <\/del> Bit 0 being set indicates that this PING frame is a PING response. <\/ins> An endpoint MUST set this flag in PING responses. An endpoint MUST NOT respond to PING frames containing this flag."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-782dd1c854c6232640e2d156f2d60c570d8665c67361d49ed1d6cd6561511669","title":"","text":"connections becoming unusable due to limits on the number of messages the underlying cipher suite can encipher. A client MAY use renegotiation to provide confidentiality protection for client credentials offered in the handshake, but any <\/del> An endpoint MAY use renegotiation to provide confidentiality protection for client credentials offered in the handshake, but any <\/ins> renegotiation MUST occur prior to sending the connection preface. A server SHOULD request a client certificate if it sees a renegotiation request immediately after establishing a connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8ebf42ee0bb89cece6b905a925b37d1ea40b3eaa0acf4ab6ad246f59d6bbed2f","title":"","text":"This effectively prevents the use of renegotiation in response to a request for a specific protected resource. A future specification might provide a way to support this use case. Alternatively, a server might use a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> server might use an ErrorHandler of type <\/ins> to request the client use a protocol which supports renegotiation."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0a9c6f9e41051fc1ea429ee2bb5dbe46fbb2f8bc3cc4089530338c7f23df0636","title":"","text":"assigned incorrect or default priority values. Similarly, streams that are in the \"idle\" state can be assigned priority or become a dependency for other streams. This allows for the creation of a grouping node in the dependency tree, which enables <\/del> priority or become a parent of other streams. This allows for the creation of a grouping node in the dependency tree, which enables <\/ins> more flexible expressions of priority. Idle streams that are made a dependency are assigned a pri-default. <\/del> parent of another stream are assigned a pri-default. <\/ins> The retention of priority information for streams that are not counted toward the limit set by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a0fbee961b413d5279a12cf3947261a607b933da0c128167e8873b5b9716a782","title":"","text":"(remote)\" or \"closed\" - state, this frame can only affect processing of the current stream and not frame transmission. The PRIORITY frame is the only frame that can be sent for a stream in the \"idle\" or \"closed\" states. This allows for the reprioritization of a group of dependent streams by altering the priority of an unused or closed parent stream. <\/del> The PRIORITY frame can be sent for a stream in the \"idle\" or \"closed\" states. This allows for the reprioritization of a group of dependent streams by altering the priority of an unused or closed parent stream. <\/ins> A PRIORITY frame with a length other than 5 octets MUST be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bfa77aa512593f0538af78fb3e943d21c4ecb1e2b0ad5f417bba8b0d60782ab7","title":"","text":"The general TLS usage guidance in TLSBCP SHOULD be followed, with some additional restrictions that are specific to HTTP\/2. An implementation of HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLS 1.2 or higher with the restrictions on feature set and cipher suite described in this section. Due to implementation limitations, it might not be possible to fail TLS negotiation. An endpoint MUST immediately terminate an HTTP\/2 connection that does not meet the TLS requirements described in this section with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> The TLS implementation MUST support the TLS-EXT extension to TLS. HTTP\/2 clients MUST indicate the target domain name when negotiating TLS. <\/ins> . <\/del> The restrictions in this and subsequent sections apply only to deployments of HTTP\/2. Implementations SHOULD provide defaults that comply, but it is recognized that deployments are ultimately responsible for compliance. <\/ins> 9.2.1. The TLS implementation MUST support the TLS-EXT extension to TLS. HTTP\/2 clients MUST indicate the target domain name when negotiating TLS. <\/del> A deployment of HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLS 1.2 or higher with the restrictions on feature set described in this section. Due to deployment limitations, it might not be possible to fail TLS negotiation when these restrictions are not met. An endpoint SHOULD immediately terminate an HTTP\/2 connection that does not meet these TLS requirements with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> The TLS implementation MUST disable compression. TLS compression can lead to the exposure of information that would not otherwise be <\/del> . A deployment of TLS 1.2 MUST disable compression. TLS compression can lead to the exposure of information that would not otherwise be <\/ins> revealed RFC3749. Generic compression is unnecessary since HTTP\/2 provides compression features that are more aware of context and therefore likely to be more appropriate for use for performance, security or other reasons. The TLS implementation MUST disable renegotiation. An endpoint MUST treat a TLS renegotiation as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> The TLS 1.2 implementation MUST disable renegotiation. An endpoint MUST treat a TLS renegotiation as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> . Note that disabling renegotiation can result in long-lived connections becoming unusable due to limits on the number of messages"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-322b28254ff2b183b0387b8d47419355bb7aa98b78b6d3d58ffb9aa322a2c084","title":"","text":"9.2.2. The set of TLS cipher suites that are permitted in HTTP\/2 is restricted. HTTP\/2 MUST only be used with cipher suites that have ephemeral key exchange, such as the TLS12 or the RFC4492. Ephemeral key exchange MUST have a minimum size of 2048 bits for DHE or security level of 128 bits for ECDHE. Clients MUST accept DHE sizes of up to 4096 bits. HTTP MUST NOT be used with cipher suites that use stream or block ciphers. Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) modes, such as the RFC5288 are acceptable. The effect of these restrictions is that TLS 1.2 implementations could have non-intersecting sets of available cipher suites, since these prevent the use of the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory. To avoid this problem, implementations of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with P256 FIPS186. Clients MAY advertise support of cipher suites that are prohibited by the above restrictions in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2. This enables a fallback to protocols without these constraints without the additional latency imposed by using a separate connection for fallback. <\/del> The set of TLS 1.2 cipher suites that are permitted in HTTP\/2 is restricted. HTTP\/2 MUST NOT be used with the cipher suites that are listed in BadCipherSuites. Implementations MAY choose to generate a ConnectionErrorHandler of type if one of the prohibited cipher suites are negotiated; implementations MUST NOT generate this error in reaction to the negotiation of a cipher suite that is not in the prohibited list. The effect of prohibiting these cipher suites is that TLS 1.2 implementations could have non-intersecting sets of available cipher suites, since the prohibited set includes the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory. To avoid this problem, implementations of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with P256 FIPS186. A corollary of prohibiting the use of for cipher suites that are not prohibited is that when clients offer a cipher suite that is not prohibited, they have to be prepared to use that cipher suite with HTTP\/2. <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5ac2653a0d8c0c31110b028fd2393ffb0ffce3d2f239a2ce92add0152d42a5eb","title":"","text":"unless separate compression dictionaries are used for each source of data. Compression MUST NOT be used if the source of data cannot be reliably determined. Generic stream compression, such as that provided by TLS MUST NOT be used with HTTP\/2 (TLSFeatures). <\/del> provided by TLS MUST NOT be used with HTTP\/2 (TLSUsage). <\/ins> Further considerations regarding the compression of header fields are described in COMPRESSION."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-aedb16cba114ee3953159b076d0a67e81f331d757ca56f6787aa9c636028229b","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2's preference for using a single TCP connection allows correlation of a user's activity on a site. If connections are reused for different origins, this allows tracking across those origins. While limited in practicality, this does constitute a new form of tracking. <\/del> origins. <\/ins> Because the PING and SETTINGS frames solicit immediate responses, they can be used by an endpoint to measure latency to their peer."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-269b9b45b61853a9fce565a922b027b61d104cceb637a19e0869834dabd67400","title":"","text":"that receives a frame that causes their advertised concurrent stream limit to be exceeded MUST treat this as a StreamErrorHandler. An endpoint that wishes to reduce the value of <\/del> exceeded MUST treat this as a StreamErrorHandler of type or . An endpoint that wishes to reduce the value of <\/ins> to a value that is below the current number of open streams can either close streams that exceed the new value or allow streams to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0db08febb2e25453719260129e62a875e6f92608824bfa7fee4b4a390d8199be","title":"","text":"The PRIORITY frame does not define any flags. The PRIORITY frame is associated with an existing stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> The PRIORITY frame always identifies a stream. If a PRIORITY frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-af2e0f2be17f6d4936d83069a07634227366c1f1db82d888a1b7e1855d9b07d6","title":"","text":"cannot be sent between consecutive frames that comprise a single HeaderBlock. Note that this frame could arrive after processing or frame sending has completed, which would cause it to have no effect on the current stream. For a stream that is in the \"half closed <\/del> on the identified stream. For a stream that is in the \"half closed <\/ins> (remote)\" or \"closed\" - state, this frame can only affect processing of the current stream and not frame transmission. <\/del> of the identified stream and its dependent streams and not frame transmission on that stream. <\/ins> The PRIORITY frame can be sent for a stream in the \"idle\" or \"closed\" states. This allows for the reprioritization of a group of dependent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4698a96163400ff047537d662dc6fa52385fd8f9f4ddbecf656562f0da2b0d8c","title":"","text":"The PUSH_PROMISE frame defines the following flags: PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST be associated with an existing, peer- initiated stream. The stream identifier of a PUSH_PROMISE frame indicates the stream it is associated with. If the stream identifier field specifies the value 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST be associated with a peer-initiated stream that is in either the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state. The stream identifier of a PUSH_PROMISE frame indicates the stream it is associated with. If the stream identifier field specifies the value 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ff6f3793400d8eab9c41e0c5de8f99044bf89fbe3b7a319b476e6e1e8004bbfc","title":"","text":"A frame can alter the initial flow control window size for all current streams. When the value of <\/del> frame can alter the initial flow control window size for all streams in the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state. When the value of <\/ins> changes, a receiver MUST adjust the size of all stream flow control windows that it maintains by the difference between the new value and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3daa72a072ac80fa3a93a177f842a83b1a1c44758b9125b722f49679b1e4b35c","title":"","text":"6.10. The CONTINUATION frame (type=0x9) is used to continue a sequence of HeaderBlock. Any number of CONTINUATION frames can be sent on an existing stream, as long as the preceding frame is on the same stream and is a <\/del> HeaderBlock. Any number of CONTINUATION frames can be sent, as long as the preceding frame is on the same stream and is a <\/ins> ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bb1e0f3569ac5f0c3c7daf32dd87bed6a34f8d29d213c8a2f0240e606521da17","title":"","text":"A large HeaderBlock can cause an implementation to commit a large amount of state. Header fields that are critical for routing can appear toward the end of a header block, which prevents streaming of header fields to their ultimate destination. For this an other <\/del> header fields to their ultimate destination. For this and other <\/ins> reasons, such as ensuring cache correctness, means that an endpoint might need to buffer the entire header block. Since there is no hard limit to the size of a header block, some endpoints could be forced"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3255990a374abd461da3d2469d7fb83c9116cac223310f4f9be484e0156f01f4","title":"","text":"Promised requests MUST be cacheable (see RFC7231), MUST be safe (see RFC7231) and MUST NOT include a request body. Clients that receive a promised request that is not cacheable, unsafe or that includes a request body MUST reset the stream with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/del> promised request that is not cacheable, is not known to be safe or that indicates the presence of a request body MUST reset the promised stream with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/ins> . <\/del> . Note this could result in the promised stream being reset if the client does not recognize a newly defined method as being safe. <\/ins> Pushed responses that are cacheable (see RFC7234) can be stored by the client, if it implements an HTTP cache. Pushed responses are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2164eff720294c28405c6fd3e4b7574e8d10dba8a1ec082f3924503ef6bd3286","title":"","text":"10.6. HTTP\/2 enables greater use of compression for both header fields (HeaderBlock) and entity bodies. Compression can allow an attacker to recover secret data when it is compressed in the same context as data under attacker control. <\/del> Compression can allow an attacker to recover secret data when it is compressed in the same context as data under attacker control. HTTP\/2 enables compression of header fields (HeaderBlock); the following concerns also apply to the use of HTTP compressed content- codings (RFC7231). <\/ins> There are demonstrable attacks on compression that exploit the characteristics of the web (e.g., BREACH). The attacker induces"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1f9763a67766e6e49b8e8f8fc5d7fa65623060fbc2b138b82446db39b6dd4a40","title":"","text":"unless separate compression dictionaries are used for each source of data. Compression MUST NOT be used if the source of data cannot be reliably determined. Generic stream compression, such as that provided by TLS MUST NOT be used with HTTP\/2 (TLSUsage). <\/del> provided by TLS MUST NOT be used with HTTP\/2 (see TLSUsage). <\/ins> Further considerations regarding the compression of header fields are described in COMPRESSION."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a3cb051cfb3bb5272ec0510ce2e8e25a7bf876751ede4a4f94e55e30b20269de","title":"","text":"streams in a particular order using priority. Expressing priority is therefore only ever a suggestion. Providing prioritization information is optional, so default values are used if no explicit indicator is provided (pri-default). <\/del> Prioritization information can be omitted from messages. Defaults are used prior to any explicit values being provided (pri-default). <\/ins> 5.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2db3f48896cfd1af94a3c5902a92ae66d6ad854a808097b9fe473c13a03753be","title":"","text":"5.3.5. Providing priority information is optional. Streams are assigned a non-exclusive dependency on stream 0x0 by default. PushResources initially depend on their associated stream. In both cases, streams are assigned a default weight of 16. <\/del> All streams are initially assigned a non-exclusive dependency on stream 0x0. PushResources initially depend on their associated stream. In both cases, streams are assigned a default weight of 16. <\/ins> 5.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-efe705a017be4aea06d0487a5f48a4540b2b1ccab26ccce711ab80eb7661fb5a","title":"","text":"The DATA frame contains the following fields: An 8-bit field containing the length of the frame padding in units of octets. This field is optional and is only present if the <\/del> of octets. This field is conditional and is only present if the <\/ins> PADDED flag is set. Application data. The amount of data is the remainder of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-51925133604379e181ab93f1e8891c96d36b226d60531e0aaf1e202156185239","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame changes the connection state as described in HeaderBlock. The HEADERS frame includes optional padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/del> The HEADERS frame can include padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/ins> Prioritization information in a HEADERS frame is logically equivalent to a separate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b0cdd3079294b0c562241895ea13c59b9d0296c73c0017c31d2e4888688c2e38","title":"","text":". The PUSH_PROMISE frame includes optional padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/del> The PUSH_PROMISE frame can include padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-82f387ce253c59dd9b5087a3e0a15e44708234792d72728c1859fe238fead80f","title":"","text":"responses available in order to fully process the response to the original request. Pushing additional message exchanges in this fashion is optional, and is negotiated between individual endpoints. The <\/del> A client can request that server push be disabled, though this is negotiated for each hop independently. The <\/ins> setting can be set to 0 to indicate that server push is disabled."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9c4f1d95e467524bb6bb2998c28ae8f113cb64d1d5e14f682619f5f0039dea6a","title":"","text":"to correlate actions of a single client or server over time. This includes the value of settings, the manner in which flow control windows are managed, the way priorities are allocated to streams, timing of reactions to stimulus, and handling of any optional features. <\/del> timing of reactions to stimulus, and handling of any features that are controlled by settings. <\/ins> As far as this creates observable differences in behavior, they could be used as a basis for fingerprinting a specific client, as defined"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-19f580b52b8314feede37abd782000992087cd0a13a5ab4b7568034c380fc88a","title":"","text":"PRI No <\/del> Yes <\/ins> No <\/del> Yes <\/ins> ConnectionHeader of this document"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-dd9cddb539d38fb7ade354b5fb3ed2388df8f813f28dcab23de53063af4f698b","title":"","text":"of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP\/2 enables a more efficient use of network resources and a reduced perception of latency by introducing header field compression and allowing multiple concurrent messages on the same connection. It also introduces <\/del> concurrent exchanges on the same connection. It also introduces <\/ins> unsolicited push of representations from servers to clients. This specification is an alternative to, but does not obsolete, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0270b29c19e3270b2d1195685b8db26590bf43bbcff6816650bc45f32df8ad9e","title":"","text":"Because HTTP header fields used in a connection can contain large amounts of redundant data, frames that contain them are HeaderBlock. This has especially advantageous impact upon request sizes in the common case, allowing many requests to be compressed into one TCP packet. <\/del> common case, allowing many requests to be compressed into one packet. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d28a47b1e4db25c828e74c947abf1101340b33c38ff27b8ff2e6b9c90ff7e0ff","title":"","text":"An error on the individual HTTP\/2 stream. Finally, the terms \"gateway\", \"intermediary\", \"proxy\", and \"tunnel\" are defined in RFC7230. <\/del> Finally, the terms \"gateway\", \"intermediary\", \"proxy\", \"tunnel\", \"message body\", and \"payload body\" are defined in RFC7230. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0b7df75f53545cbf0bf0f58779f426f7338573ae9cdf76bdc484218be64084d6","title":"","text":"token. Such an HTTP\/1.1 request MUST include exactly one Http2SettingsHeader header field. Requests that contain an entity body MUST be sent in their entirety <\/del> Requests that contain an payload body MUST be sent in their entirety <\/ins> before the client can send HTTP\/2 frames. This means that a large request entity can block the use of the connection until it is completely sent. <\/del> request can block the use of the connection until it is completely sent. <\/ins> If concurrency of an initial request with subsequent requests is important, an OPTIONS request can be used to perform the upgrade to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-beab2f853dc64965794e9f728815450ecd302bc971eb905d3c9ecae5e48fe30c","title":"","text":". Note that can be sent and received in any stream state. Frame of unknown types are ignored. <\/del> can be sent and received in any stream state. Frames of unknown types are ignored. <\/ins> An example of the state transitions for an HTTP request\/response exchange can be found in HttpSequence. An example of the state"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-487ffdd498b79b9caefd02ea45f9cac698287fd2e49d0dfa53939b0792a18f60","title":"","text":"octets associated with a stream. One or more DATA frames are used, for instance, to carry HTTP request or response payloads. DATA frames MAY also contain arbitrary padding. Padding can be added to DATA frames to obscure the size of messages. <\/del> DATA frames MAY also contain padding. Padding can be added to DATA frames to obscure the size of messages. <\/ins> The DATA frame contains the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f8494406545ee29b1f1d600c44fce3f03bd9fea099f189111198ab70febcf124","title":"","text":"zero or more frames containing the message payload (see RFC7230), and <\/del> frames containing the payload body (see RFC7230), and <\/ins> optionally, one"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7a195a40bbabdfb40a5c459e9a1d36df41ab4cdb087447dd0687625e2c6f04d0","title":"","text":"of mandatory header fields, or the inclusion of uppercase header field names. A request or response that includes an entity body can include a <\/del> A request or response that includes an payload body can include a <\/ins> \"content-length\" header field. A request or response is also malformed if the value of a \"content-length\" header field does not equal the sum of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d851b587d52a686c1430885c55f0eb4b0581e61eb2be61da99f456f449b75328","title":"","text":"This section shows HTTP\/1.1 requests and responses, with illustrations of equivalent HTTP\/2 requests and responses. An HTTP GET request includes request header fields and no body and is therefore transmitted as a single <\/del> An HTTP GET request includes request header fields and no payload body and is therefore transmitted as a single <\/ins> frame, followed by zero or more"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e9172a5f3eece5f76efdeed11479c0938a50bf3774f1fc17a12b97bc6c2b8902","title":"","text":"1. In HTTP\/1.1 (see RFC7230), header fields are not compressed. As Web pages have grown to include dozens to hundreds of requests, the <\/del> pages have grown to require dozens to hundreds of requests, the <\/ins> redundant header fields in these requests unnecessarily consume bandwidth, measurably increasing latency."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6d2c4a962762c9d2541f1b4c043418513f3587964421050f316e34666352298b","title":"","text":"known security attacks, and which has a bounded memory requirement for use in constrained environments. The HPACK format is intentionally simple and inflexible. Both characteristics reduce the risk of interoperability or security issues based by implementation error. No extensibility mechanisms are defined; changes to the format are only possible by defining a complete replacement. <\/ins> 1.1. The format defined in this specification treats a list of header"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9478c3f5aaac5cf44ba4abcb02cebf6817109b33e6728941218a320cf1364c10","title":"","text":"A name-value pair. Both the name and value are treated as opaque sequences of octets. The dynamic table (see dynamic.table) is a header table used to associate stored header fields to index values. This table is dynamic and specific to an encoding or decoding context. <\/del> The dynamic table (see dynamic.table) is a table that associates stored header fields with index values. This table is dynamic and specific to an encoding or decoding context. <\/ins> The static table (see static.table) is a header table used to associate static header fields to index values. This table is <\/del> The static table (see static.table) is a table that statically associates header fields with index values. This table is <\/ins> ordered, read-only, always accessible, and may be shared amongst all encoding or decoding contexts."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-57f77c044811af89437d426c629a20c6dad786f8b79ea8c6a03249f55a55d144","title":"","text":"To decompress header blocks, a decoder only needs to maintain a dynamic table (see dynamic.table) as a decoding context. No other state is needed. <\/del> dynamic state is needed. <\/ins> When used for bidirectional communication, such as in HTTP, the encoding and decoding dynamic tables maintained by an endpoint are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c09f736b48b6462260714a7571a75cf6387e20e681d623870ae08260a86f4e03","title":"","text":"original header list. Once a header field is decoded and added to the reconstructed header list, it cannot be removed from it. A header field added to the <\/del> list, the field cannot be removed. A header field added to the <\/ins> header list can be safely passed to the application. By passing the resulting header fields to the application, a decoder"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0209092f9f219dc017c21cef6967e3f2b0920d4a348995949b7d6a3db2d6265d","title":"","text":"acknowledgement (see HTTP2). Multiple updates to the maximum table size can occur between the sending of two header blocks. In the case that the value of this parameter is changed more than once, if any changed value is smaller than the new maximum size, the smallest value for the parameter MUST be sent in an encoding context update. The altered maximum size is always sent, resulting in at most two encoding context updates. This ensures that the decoder is able to perform eviction based on the decoder table size (see entry.eviction). <\/del> sending of two header blocks. In the case that this size is changed more than once in this interval, the smallest maximum table size that occurs in that interval MUST be sent in an encoding context update. The final maximum size is always sent, resulting in at most two encoding context updates. This ensures that the decoder is able to perform eviction based on reductions in decoder table size (see entry.eviction). <\/ins> This mechanism can be used to completely clear entries from the dynamic table by setting a maximum size of 0, which can subsequently"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fed1d09f32d715eaf1d211fed8521e5337f4eb155b9ba74ef2d3ebc37500ef46","title":"","text":"4.4. Whenever a new entry is to be added to the dynamic table, entries are evicted from the end of the dynamic table until the size of the dynamic table is less than or equal to (maximum size - new entry size), or until the table is empty. <\/del> Before a new entry is added to the dynamic table, entries are evicted from the end of the dynamic table until the size of the dynamic table is less than or equal to (maximum size - new entry size), or until the table is empty. <\/ins> If the representation of the added entry references the name of an entry in the dynamic table, the referenced name is cached prior to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-dd0b6a58e4913f44bcdf562706348edaa46216057abe2bc78ef7f4ebbe8219b3","title":"","text":"9.2.2. A deployment of HTTP\/2 over TLS 1.2 SHOULD NOT use any of the cipher suites that are listed in BadCipherSuites. <\/del> suites that are listed in the BadCipherSuites. <\/ins> Endpoints MAY choose to generate a ConnectionErrorHandler of type if one of the prohibited cipher suites are negotiated. A deployment that chooses to use a prohibited cipher suite risks triggering a connection error unless the set of potential peers is known to accept that cipher suite. <\/del> if one of the cipher suites from the black list are negotiated. A deployment that chooses to use a black-listed cipher suite risks triggering a connection error unless the set of potential peers is known to accept that cipher suite. <\/ins> Implementations MUST NOT generate this error in reaction to the negotiation of a cipher suite that is not in the prohibited list. Consequently, when clients offer a cipher suite that is not prohibited, they have to be prepared to use that cipher suite with <\/del> negotiation of a cipher suite that is not on the black list. Consequently, when clients offer a cipher suite that is not on the black list, they have to be prepared to use that cipher suite with <\/ins> HTTP\/2. The effect of prohibiting these cipher suites is that TLS 1.2 deployments could have non-intersecting sets of available cipher suites, since the prohibited set includes the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory. To avoid this problem, deployments of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with the P256 elliptic curve FIPS186. <\/del> The black list includes the cipher suite that TLS 1.2 makes mandatory, which means that TLS 1.2 deployments could have non- intersecting sets of permitted cipher suites. To avoid this problem causing TLS handshake failures, deployments of HTTP\/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS-ECDHE with the P256 elliptic curve FIPS186. <\/ins> Note that clients might advertise support of cipher suites that are prohibited by the above restrictions in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2 and support only prohibited cipher suites. This allows servers to select HTTP\/1.1 with a cipher suite that is prohibited for HTTP\/2. However, this can result in HTTP\/2 being negotiated with a prohibited cipher suite if the application protocol and cipher suite are independently selected. <\/del> on the black list in order to allow for connection to servers that do not support HTTP\/2. This allows servers to select HTTP\/1.1 with a cipher suite that is on the HTTP\/2 black list. However, this can result in HTTP\/2 being negotiated with a black-listed cipher suite if the application protocol and cipher suite are independently selected. <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e4ba0ef9c873c776ccd1e8e539dbd46492fdba79a377b63d8c5e549cfd4d19b5","title":"","text":"frame has the END_HEADERS flag set. Header compression is stateful. One compression context and one decompression context is used for the entire connection. Each header block is processed as a discrete unit. Header blocks MUST be transmitted as a contiguous sequence of frames, with no interleaved frames of any other type or from any other stream. The last frame in a sequence of <\/del> decompression context is used for the entire connection. A decoding error in a header block MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type . Each header block is processed as a discrete unit. Header blocks MUST be transmitted as a contiguous sequence of frames, with no interleaved frames of any other type or from any other stream. The last frame in a sequence of <\/ins> or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c07ff33ba6f2d0109dd850b1a3c1a6473a9292688c5dec308e35ecf41a2cd59e","title":"","text":"requests. An encoder without good knowledge of the provenance of header fields might instead introduce a penalty for bad guesses, such that attempts to guess a header field value results in all values being removed from consideration in all future requests, effectively preventing further guesses. Simply removing values from the dynamic table can be ineffectual if the attacker has a reliable way of causing values to be reinstalled. For example, a request to load an image in a web browser typically includes the Cookie header field (a potentially highly valued target for this sort of attack), and web sites can easily force an image to be loaded, thereby refreshing the entry in the dynamic table. <\/del> might instead introduce a penalty for a header field with many different values, such that a large number of attempts to guess a header field value results in the header field no more being compared to the dynamic table entries in future messages, effectively preventing further guesses. Simply removing entries corresponding to the header field from the dynamic table can be ineffectual if the attacker has a reliable way of causing values to be reinstalled. For example, a request to load an image in a web browser typically includes the Cookie header field (a potentially highly valued target for this sort of attack), and web sites can easily force an image to be loaded, thereby refreshing the entry in the dynamic table. <\/ins> This response might be made inversely proportional to the length of the header field. Marking as inaccessible might occur for shorter values more quickly or with higher probability than for longer values. Implementations might also choose to protect certain header fields that are known to be highly valued, such as the Authorization or Cookie header fields, by disabling or further limiting compression. <\/del> the header field value. Marking as inaccessible might occur for shorter values more quickly or with higher probability than for longer values. <\/ins> 7.1.3. Implementations can also choose to protect sensitive header fields by not compressing them and instead encoding their value as literals. <\/ins> Refusing to generate an indexed representation for a header field is only effective if compression is avoided on all hops. The never indexed literal (see literal.header.never.indexed) can be used to signal to intermediaries that a particular value was intentionally sent as a literal. An intermediary MUST NOT re-encode a value that uses the never indexed literal with a representation that would index it. <\/del> sent as a literal. An intermediary MUST NOT re-encode a value that uses the never indexed literal representation with another representation that would index it. If HPACK is used for re-encoding, the never indexed literal representation MUST be used. The choice to use a never indexed literal representation for a header field depends on several factors. Since HPACK doesn't protect against guessing an entire header field value, short or low-entropy values are more readily recovered by an adversary. Therefore, an encoder might choose not to index values with low entropy. An encoder might also choose not to index values for header fields that are considered to be highly valuable or sensitive to recovery, such as the Cookie or Authorization header fields. On the contrary, an encoder might prefer indexing values for header fields that have little or no value if they were exposed. For instance, a User-Agent header field does not commonly vary between requests and is sent to any server. In that case, confirmation that a particular User-Agent value has been used provides little value. Note that these criteria for deciding to use a never indexed literal representation will evolve over time as new attacks are discovered. <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-72b51db97668be61a0f84c0277508a35f494af215ed3fe59f91e16bcc2d217cb","title":"","text":"frame. The HTTP\/1.1 request that is sent prior to upgrade is assigned stream identifier 1 and is assigned pri-default. Stream 1 is implicitly half closed from the client toward the server, since the request is completed as an HTTP\/1.1 request. After commencing the HTTP\/2 connection, stream 1 is used for the response. <\/del> The HTTP\/1.1 request that is sent prior to upgrade is assigned a stream identifier of 1 (see StreamIdentifiers) with pri-default. Stream 1 is implicitly \"half closed\" from the client toward the server (see StreamStates), since the request is completed as an HTTP\/1.1 request. After commencing the HTTP\/2 connection, stream 1 is used for the response. <\/ins> 3.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-3e6d08dc338f7826e0952db16060dbfaf2a85e720764f7a981a21fd5c0204091","title":"","text":"Either the client or server of the connection. The smallest unit of communication, each containing a frame header. <\/del> The smallest unit of communication within an HTTP\/2.0 session, consisting of a header and a variable-length sequence of bytes structured according to the frame type. <\/ins> A complete sequence of frames."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-eb210c051d555b596721964e722d9fa8f028ffc82498ca9cc8cf4230625eb58a","title":"","text":"An error on the HTTP\/2.0 session. A bi-directional flow of bytes across a virtual channel within the HTTP\/2.0 session. <\/del> A bi-directional flow of frames across a virtual channel within the HTTP\/2.0 session. <\/ins> An error on the individual HTTP\/2.0 stream. 2. Just as HTTP\/1.1 does, HTTP\/2.0 uses the \"http:\" and \"https:\" URI schemes. An HTTP\/2.0-capable client is therefore required to discover whether the upstream server (including intermediaries) supports HTTP\/2.0. <\/del> HTTP\/2.0 uses the same \"http:\" and \"https:\" URI schemes used by HTTP\/1.1. As a result, implementations processing requests for a target resource URIs like \"http:\/\/example.org\/foo\" or \"https:\/\/example.com\/bar\" are required to first discover whether the upstream server (the immediate peer to which the client wishes to establish a connection) supports HTTP\/2.0. <\/ins> Different discovery mechanisms are defined for \"http:\" and \"https:\" URIs. Discovery for \"http:\" URIs is described in discover-http; discovery for \"https:\" URIs is described in discover-https. <\/del> The means by which support for HTTP\/2.0 is determined is different for \"http\" and \"https\" URIs. Discovery for \"https:\" URIs is described in discover-https. Discovery for \"http\" URIs is described here. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-67972091911527c6f29f7140d7c4e38059ade60a32c4c18caa2d439f91a0bdc4","title":"","text":"3.1. The HTTP\/2.0 session runs atop TCP (RFC0793). The client is the TCP connection initiator. <\/del> The HTTP\/2.0 session is an Application Level protocol running on top of a TCP connection (RFC0793). The client is the TCP connection initiator. <\/ins> HTTP\/2.0 connections are persistent. That is, for best performance, it is expected that clients will not close connections until the user navigates away from all Web pages referencing a connection, or until the server closes the connection. Servers are encouraged to leave connections open for as long as possible, but can terminate idle connections if necessary. When either endpoint closes the transport- level connection, it MUST first send a GOAWAY frame so that the endpoints can reliably determine if messages were processed beforehand. <\/del> it is expected a clients will not close connections until it is determined that no further communication with a server is necessary (for example, when a user navigates away from a particular web page), or until the server closes the connection. Servers are encouraged to maintain open connections for as long as possible, but are permitted to terminate idle connections if necessary. When either endpoint chooses to close the transport-level TCP connection, the terminating endpoint MUST first send a GOAWAY frame so that both endpoints can reliably determine whether previously sent frames have been processed and gracefully complete or terminate any necessary remaining tasks. <\/ins> 3.2. The first data sent on an HTTP\/2.0 session - after opening a TCP connection and performing either an HTTP\/1.1 Upgrade or TLS handshake - is a session header. The session header provides a final confirmation that both peers agree to use the HTTP\/2.0 protocol. The SETTINGS frame ensures that client or server configuration is known as quickly as possible. <\/del> Upon establishment of a TCP connection and determination that HTTP\/2.0 will be used by both peers to communicate, each endpoint MUST send a session header as a final confirmation and to establish the default parameters for the HTTP\/2.0 session. <\/ins> The client session header is a sequence of 25 octets (in hex notation)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ef34f8ad4f2bf3022dad06f9d05cf51f94654f4ccbcbacfb05c0c16ae9e3d5d6","title":"","text":"to process further frames. Note that this does not address the concerns raised in TALKING. The server session header is a SETTINGS. The server sends the server session header (i.e., a SETTINGS frame) as the first frame in a new session. <\/del> The server session header consists of just a SETTINGS that MUST be the first frame the server sends in the HTTP\/2.0 session. <\/ins> The client sends requests immediately after sending the session header, without waiting to receive a server session header. This ensures that confirming session headers does not add latency. <\/del> In order to avoid unnecessary latency, clients are permitted to send additional frames to the server immediately after sending the client session header, without waiting to receive the server session header. However, it is important to note that the server session header SETTINGS frame might include parameters that necessarily alter how a client is expected to communicate with the server. <\/ins> Both clients and servers MUST close the connection if it does not begin with a valid session header. A GOAWAY MAY be omitted if it is clear that the peer is not using HTTP\/2.0. <\/del> Clients and servers MUST terminate the TCP connection if either peer does not begin with a valid session header. A GOAWAY MAY be omitted if it is clear that the peer is not using HTTP\/2.0. <\/ins> 3.3. Once the connection is established, clients and servers exchange HTTP\/2.0 frames. Frames are the basic unit of communication. <\/del> Once the HTTP\/2.0 session is established, clients and servers can begin exchanging frames. <\/ins> 3.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4fce1320975acf3a09d3ecd51bfc6c51ec8ce5868a1fd7b7335d0bc9d7ba1edc","title":"","text":"to indicate the end of the body. The header fields included in the HEADERS+PRIORITY frame contain all of the HTTP header fields that are associated with an HTTP request. The header block in HTTP\/2.0 is mostly unchanged from today's HTTP header block, with the following differences: The following fields that are carried in the request line in HTTP\/1.1 (HTTP-p1) are defined as special-valued name-value pairs: the HTTP method for this request (e.g. \"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", etc) (HTTP-p2) \":path\" - the request-target for this URI with \"\/\" prefixed (see HTTP-p1). For example, for \"http:\/\/www.google.com\/ search?q=dogs\" the path would be \"\/search?q=dogs\". <\/del> of the HTTP header fields associated with an HTTP request. The definitions of these headers are largely unchanged relative to HTTP\/1.1, with a few notable exceptions: The HTTP\/1.1 request-line has been split into two separate header fields named :method and :path, whose values specify the HTTP method for the request and the request-target, respectively. The HTTP-version component of the request-line is removed entirely from the headers. The host and optional port portions of the request URI (see RFC3986, Section 3.2), is specified using the new :host header field. <\/ins> These header fields MUST be present in HTTP requests. <\/del> A new :scheme header field has been added to specify the scheme portion of the request-target (e.g. \"https\") <\/ins> In addition, the following two name-value pairs MUST be present in every request: <\/del> All header field names MUST be lowercased, and the definitions of all header fields names defined by HTTP\/1.1 are updated to be all lowercase. <\/ins> the host and optional port portions (see RFC3986) of the URI for this request (e.g. \"www.google.com:1234\"). This header field is the same as the HTTP 'Host' header field (HTTP-p1). <\/del> The Connection, Host, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Connection, and Transfer- Encoding header fields are no longer valid and MUST not be sent. <\/ins> the scheme portion of the URI for this request (e.g. \"https\") <\/del> All HTTP Requests MUST include the \":method\", \":path\", \":host\", and \":scheme\" header fields. <\/ins> All header field names starting with \":\" (whether defined in this document or future extensions to this document) MUST appear before any other header fields. <\/del> Header fields whose names begin with \":\" (whether defined in this document or future extensions to this document) MUST appear before any other header fields. <\/ins> Header field names MUST be all lowercase. The Connection, Host, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Connection, and Transfer- Encoding header fields are not valid and MUST not be sent. <\/del> If a client sends a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame that omits a mandatory header, the server MUST reply with a HTTP 400 Bad Request reply. <\/ins> User-agents MUST support gzip compression. Regardless of the Accept-Encoding sent by the user-agent, the server may always send content encoded with gzip or deflate encoding. <\/del> User-agents MUST support gzip compression. Regardless of the Accept- Encoding sent by the user-agent, the server may always send content encoded with gzip or deflate encoding. <\/ins> If a server receives a request where the sum of the data frame payload lengths does not equal the size of the Content-Length header field, the server MUST return a 400 (Bad Request) error. <\/del> If a server receives a request where the sum of the data frame payload lengths does not equal the size of the Content-Length header field, the server MUST return a 400 (Bad Request) error. <\/ins> Although POSTs are inherently chunked, POST requests SHOULD also be accompanied by a Content-Length header field. First, it informs the server of how much data to expect, which the server can used to track overall progress and provide appropriate user feedback. More importantly, some HTTP server implementations fail to correctly process requests that omit the Content-Length header field. Many existing clients send a Content-Length header field, which caused server implementations have come to depend upon its presence. <\/del> Although POSTs are inherently chunked, POST requests SHOULD also be accompanied by a Content-Length header field. First, it informs the server of how much data to expect, which the server can used to track overall progress and provide appropriate user feedback. More importantly, some HTTP server implementations fail to correctly process requests that omit the Content-Length header field. Many existing clients send a Content-Length header field, which caused server implementations have come to depend upon its presence. <\/ins> The user-agent is free to prioritize requests as it sees fit. If the user-agent cannot make progress without receiving a resource, it should attempt to raise the priority of that resource. Resources such as images, SHOULD generally use the lowest priority. If a client sends a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame that omits a mandatory header, the server MUST reply with a HTTP 400 Bad Request reply. <\/del> If the server receives a data frame prior to a HEADERS or HEADERS+PRIORITY frame the server MUST treat this as a StreamErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-62c9648a4d3d971f050a870cdf92d1e1727a7413f08023ebecb315cfca28274a","title":"","text":"A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI uses TLS12 with the TLS-ALPN. HTTP\/2 over TLS uses the \"h2\" application token. The \"h2c\" token MUST NOT be sent by a client or selected by a server. <\/del> HTTP\/2 over TLS uses the \"h2\" protocol identifier. The \"h2c\" protocol identifier MUST NOT be sent by a client or selected by a server; the \"h2c\" protocol identifier describes a protocol that does not use TLS. <\/ins> Once TLS negotiation is complete, both the client and the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-643b83c5e46c496eb0d82d19e25123e2699bb175eaf8c982413a5c79708a62f9","title":"","text":"HeaderBlock. The HEADERS frame can include padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/del> identical to those defined for DATA. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the header block fragment MUST be treated as a . <\/ins> Prioritization information in a HEADERS frame is logically equivalent to a separate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9a372ffdd91f21a594137729088edd7eda0de3c8bd126beecaac1208cd75c850","title":"","text":"6.3. The PRIORITY frame (type=0x2) specifies the StreamPriority. It can be sent at any time for any stream, including idle or closed streams. <\/del> be sent in any stream state, including idle or closed streams. <\/ins> The payload of a PRIORITY frame contains the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9bab1de61d575e7b11729b854406df2a31b606c71482e65d7156a7c23c18350f","title":"","text":"followed by the new maximum size, represented as an integer with a 5-bit prefix (see integer.representation). The new maximum size MUST be lower than or equal to the last value of the maximum size of the dynamic table. A value that exceeds this <\/del> The new maximum size MUST be lower than or equal to the limit determined by the protocol using HPACK. A value that exceeds this <\/ins> limit MUST be treated as a decoding error. In HTTP\/2, this limit is the last value of the SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE parameter (see HTTP2) received from the decoder and acknowledged by the encoder (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9d21ec488c9ae5a0d6fadb797c0ec33f9106ac67ae91ad86254ee751aa336b68","title":"","text":"6.8. The GOAWAY frame (type=0x7) informs the remote peer to stop creating streams on this connection. GOAWAY can be sent by either the client or the server. Once sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on any new streams with identifiers higher than the included last stream identifier. Receivers of a GOAWAY frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. The purpose of this frame is to allow an endpoint to gracefully stop accepting new streams, while still finishing processing of previously established streams. This enables administrative actions, like server maintenance. <\/del> The GOAWAY frame (type=0x7) is used to initiate shutdown of a connection or to signal serious error conditions. GOAWAY allows an endpoint to gracefully stop accepting new streams, while still finishing processing of previously established streams. This enables administrative actions, like server maintenance. <\/ins> There is an inherent race condition between an endpoint starting new streams and the remote sending a GOAWAY frame. To deal with this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1ba9e0f450ab6646981e71b9c0e27e1d112e4cebfab22ad7cf379465fe7e0b8d","title":"","text":"GOAWAY frame, the identified stream is the highest numbered stream initiated by the client. Once sent, the sender will ignore frames sent on streams initiated by the receiver if the stream has an identifier higher than the included last stream identifier. Receivers of a GOAWAY frame MUST NOT open additional streams on the connection, although a new connection can be established for new streams. <\/ins> If the receiver of the GOAWAY has sent data on streams with a higher stream identifier than what is indicated in the GOAWAY frame, those streams are not or will not be processed. The receiver of the GOAWAY"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ecd3c6ebc2222099fd056b3faef7b552f2b065fb935084951177afe9a32a91e6","title":"","text":"An endpoint might choose to close a connection without sending GOAWAY for misbehaving peers. A GOAWAY frame might not immediately precede closing of the connection; a receiver of a GOAWAY that has no more use for the connection SHOULD still send a GOAWAY frame before terminating the connection. <\/ins> The GOAWAY frame does not define any flags. The GOAWAY frame applies to the connection, not a specific stream."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-13b6c9d58fad894bb60919d4cbe3c918942824f4cc0a4aea036576d16c2ec082","title":"","text":"-1 and a code. This signals to the client that a shutdown is imminent and that no further requests can be initiated. After waiting at least one round trip time, the server can send another GOAWAY frame with an updated last stream identifier. This ensures that a connection can be cleanly shut down without losing requests. <\/del> that initiating further requests is prohibited. After allowing time for any in flight stream creation - at least one round trip time - the server can send another GOAWAY frame with an updated last stream identifier. This ensures that a connection can be cleanly shut down without causing clients to lose requests. <\/ins> After sending a GOAWAY frame, the sender can discard frames for streams with identifiers higher than the identified last stream. However, any frames that alter connection state cannot be completely ignored. For instance, <\/del> streams initiated by the receiver with identifiers higher than the identified last stream. However, any frames that alter connection state cannot be completely ignored. For instance, <\/ins> ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d510addd977f7c900c6e4e56c4ae94d227dc0fb247ecfb2c7b4d4810dde90000","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame (type=0x1) is used to StreamStates, and additionally carries a header block fragment. HEADERS frames can be sent on a stream in the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" states. <\/del> sent on a stream in the \"idle\", \"reserved (local)\", \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" states. <\/ins> The HEADERS frame payload has the following fields:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0d999110497b98c7d5e3c78de5b1061b76008072b252859bafea89d5d8f1c77c","title":"","text":"control window is set to the default initial window size until a WINDOW_UPDATE frame is received. A <\/del> In addition to changing the flow control window for streams that are not yet active, a <\/ins> frame can alter the initial flow control window size for all streams in the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state. When the value of <\/del> frame can alter the initial flow control window size for streams with active flow control windows (that is, streams in the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state). When the value of <\/ins> changes, a receiver MUST adjust the size of all stream flow control windows that it maintains by the difference between the new value and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a678de52d541c1bfd0fb38d29e55bdabf9da17a6d49d4a5670eff0d2a90c2e78","title":"","text":"The PUSH_PROMISE frame defines the following flags: PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST be associated with a peer-initiated stream that is in either the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state. The stream identifier of a PUSH_PROMISE frame indicates the stream it is <\/del> PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST only be sent on a peer-initiated stream that is in either the \"open\" or \"half closed (remote)\" state. The stream identifier of a PUSH_PROMISE frame indicates the stream it is <\/ins> associated with. If the stream identifier field specifies the value 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b713fe929978038a8f859d217fdf07e1276f6cb82029df656aef1ffb779efef4","title":"","text":"The server session header consists of just a SETTINGS that MUST be the first frame the server sends in the HTTP\/2.0 session. In order to avoid unnecessary latency, clients are permitted to send <\/del> To avoid unnecessary latency, clients are permitted to send <\/ins> additional frames to the server immediately after sending the client session header, without waiting to receive the server session header. However, it is important to note that the server session header <\/del> It is important to note, however, that the server session header <\/ins> SETTINGS frame might include parameters that necessarily alter how a client is expected to communicate with the server. <\/del> client is expected to communicate with the server. Upon receiving the SETTINGS frame, the client is expected to honor any parameters established. <\/ins> Clients and servers MUST terminate the TCP connection if either peer does not begin with a valid session header. A GOAWAY MAY be omitted"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-579263af7420ea3a9b4086f99606a21556936335a53b1e9a4c4c64f19ce2b8e2","title":"","text":"3.3.1. HTTP\/2.0 frames share a common format, consisting of 8 byte of header with between 0 and 65535 bytes of data. <\/del> HTTP\/2.0 frames share a common base format consisting of an 8-byte header followed by 0 to 65535 bytes of data. <\/ins> The fields of the frame header are defined as: The 16-bit length of the frame data in bytes. The length of the frame header is not included. <\/del> The length of the frame data expressed as an unsigned, 16-bit integer. The 8 bytes of the frame header are not included. <\/ins> The 8-bit type of the frame. The frame type determines how the remainder of the frame header and data are interpreted."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2af90ed5f174280070572dbab5e91453699529be42a30889cbb2fe6592b6c3e6","title":"","text":"defined. A 31-bit stream identifier (see StreamCreation). A value 0 is reserved for frames that are directed at the session as a whole instead of a single stream. Frames contain between 0 and 65535 bytes of data. <\/del> reserved for frames that are associated with the session as a whole as opposed to an individual stream. <\/ins> Reserved bits in the frame header MUST be set to zero when sending and MUST be ignored when receiving frames, unless the semantics of the bit are known. The structure and content of the remaining frame data is entirely dependent on the frame type. <\/ins> 3.3.2. A frame of the maximum size might be too large for implementations with limited resources to process. Implementations MAY choose to support frames smaller than the maximum possible size. However, implementations MUST be able to receive frames containing at least 8192 octets of data. <\/del> Implementatins with limited resources might not be capable of processing large frame sizes. Such implementations MAY choose to place additional limits on the maximum frame size. However, all implementations MUST be capable of receiving and processing frames containing at least 8192 octets of data. <\/ins> An implementation MUST immediately close a stream if it is unable to process a frame related to that stream due to it exceeding a size limit. The implementation MUST send a RST_STREAM containing FRAME_TOO_LARGE error code if the frame size limit is exceeded. <\/del> An implementation MUST terminate a stream immediately if it is unable to process a frame due it's size. This is done by sending an RST_STREAM containing the FRAME_TOO_LARGE error code. <\/ins> 3.4. Streams are independent sequences of bi-directional data divided into frames with several properties: <\/del> A \"stream\" is an independent, bi-directional sequence of frames exchanged between the client and server within an HTTP\/2.0 session. Streams have several important characteristics: Streams can be established and used unilaterally or shared by either the client or server. <\/ins> Streams can be created by either the client or server. <\/del> Streams can be rejected or cancelled by either endpoint. <\/ins> Streams optionally carry a set of name-value header pairs. <\/del> Multiple types of frames can be sent by either endpoint within a single stream. <\/ins> Streams can concurrently send data interleaved with other streams. <\/del> The order in which frames are sent within a stream is significant. Recipients are required to process frames in the order they are received. <\/ins> Streams can be established and used unilaterally. <\/del> Streams optionally carry a set of name-value header pairs that are expressed within the headers block of HEADERS+PRIORITY, HEADERS, or PUSH_PROMISE frames. <\/ins> Streams can be cancelled. <\/del> A single HTTP\/2.0 session can contain multiple concurrently active streams, with either endpoint interleaving frames from multiple streams. <\/ins> 3.4.1. Use of streams does not require negotiation. A stream is not created, streams are used by sending a frame on the stream. <\/del> There is no coordination or shared action between the client and server required to create a stream. Rather, new streams are established by sending a frame that references a previously unused stream identifier. <\/ins> Streams are identified by a 31-bit numeric identifier. Streams <\/del> All streams are identified by an unsigned 31-bit integer. Streams <\/ins> initiated by a client use odd numbered stream identifiers; those initiated by the server use even numbered stream identifiers. A stream identifier of zero MUST NOT be used to create a new stream. The stream identifier of a new stream MUST be greater than all previously streams from that endpoint, unless the stream identifier was reserved (such as the promised stream identifier in a PUSH_PROMISE frame). An endpoint that receives an unexpected stream identifier MUST handle it as a SessionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. An endpoint MUST NOT create a stream if there are open streams that exceed the SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS setting of its peer. The maximum concurrent streams setting only applies to streams that an endpoint initiates: a client cannot initiate an odd numbered streams that exceed the setting provided by a server; a server cannot initiate more even numbered streams than permitted by the setting provided by the client. Streams that are StreamHalfClose in any direction count toward this limit. A long-lived session can exhaust the available stream identifiers. An endpoint that is unable to create a new stream identifier can establish a new session for any new streams. <\/del> stream identifier of zero MUST NOT be used to establish a new stream. The identifier of a newly established stream MUST be numerically greater than all previously established streams from that endpoint within the HTTP\/2.0 session, unless the identifier has been reserved using a PUSH_PROMISE frame. An endpoint that receives an unexpected stream identifier MUST terminate the stream by responding with a SessionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. A peer can limit the total number of concurrently active streams using the SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS parameters within a SETTINGS frame. The maximum concurrent streams setting is specific to each endpoint and applies only to the peer. That is, clients specify the maximum number of concurrent streams the server can initiate, and servers specify the maximum number of concurrent streams the client can initiate. Peer endpoints MUST NOT exceed this limit. All concurrently active streams initiated by an endpoint, including streams that are StreamHalfClose in any direction, count toward that endpoint's limit. Stream identifiers cannot be reused within an HTTP\/2.0 session. Accordingly, long-lived sessions can cause an endpoint to exhaust the available range of stream identifiers. An endpoint that is unable to establish a new stream identifier can establish a new session for any new streams. <\/ins> An endpoint can request the early termination of an unwanted stream. Upon receipt of a frame, the receiver can terminate the corresponding"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-452b4f4a2bab432f05372c12f3e21b9127f7ed9b3a082c6c38d4e04513d2cb5c","title":"","text":"3.4.2. The creator of a stream can assign a priority for that stream. Priority is represented as a 31 bit integer. 0 represents the highest priority and 2 <\/del> The endpoint establishing a new stream can assign a priority for the stream. Priority is represented as an unsigned 31-bit integer. 0 represents the highest priority and 2 <\/ins> -1 represents the lowest priority. Senders and receivers SHOULD use best-effort to process streams in the order of highest priority to lowest priority. <\/del> The purpose of this value is to allow the initiating endpoint to request that frames for the stream be processed with higher priority relative to any other concurrently active streams. That is, if an endpoint receives interleaved frames for multiple streams, the endpoint ought to make a best-effort attempt at processing frames for higher priority streams before processing those for lower priority streams. Explicitly setting the priority for a stream does not guarantee any particular processing order for the stream relative to any other stream. Nor is there is any mechanism provided by which the initiator of a stream can force or require a receiving endpoint to process frames from one stream before processing frames from another. <\/ins> 3.4.3. When one side of the stream sends a frame with the FINAL flag set, the stream is half-closed from that endpoint. The sender of the FINAL flag MUST NOT send further frames on that stream. When both sides have half-closed, the stream is closed. <\/del> When an endpoint sends a frame for a stream with the FINAL flag set, the stream is considered to be half-closed for that endpoint. Subsequent frames MUST NOT be sent by that endpoint for the half closed stream for the remaining duration of the HTTP\/2.0 session. When both endpoints have sent frames with the FINAL flag set, the stream is considered to be fully closed. If an endpoint receives additional frames for a stream that was previously half-closed by the sending peer, the recipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type STREAM_CLOSED. <\/ins> Receivers of frames on a half-closed stream MUST handle them as a StreamErrorHandler of type STREAM_CLOSED. <\/del> An endpoint that has not yet half-closed a stream by sending the FINAL flag can continue sending frames on the stream. <\/ins> It is not necessary to half-close a stream if no frames have been sent. This allows an endpoint to create a unidirectional stream that does not require an explicit close from the peer that does not transmit frames. Endpoints can avoid committing resources for streams until the first frame is received. <\/del> It is not necessary for an endpoint to half-close a stream for which it has not sent any frames. This allows endpoints to utilize fully unidirectional streams that do not require explicit action or acknowledgement from the receiver. <\/ins> 3.4.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-464b47ab4de2e932ffbf2a014ed0cd1fb26d408869a8e9e2cb599c42e569f4e1","title":"","text":"FINAL flag is sent. The active sender on the stream MUST be prepared to receive frames after closing the stream. Either the peer can send a RST_STREAM control frame at any time to <\/del> Either peer can send a RST_STREAM control frame at any time to <\/ins> terminate an active stream. RST_STREAM contains an error code to indicate the reason for termination. A RST_STREAM indicates that the sender will transmit no further data on the stream and that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ba683a07cb9c3d20a1c292058184108fda47f7b6f584c778318162a38e23e015","title":"","text":"It is possible that the GOAWAY will not be reliably received by the receiving endpoint. In the event of a session error, GOAWAY only provides a best-effort attempt to communicate with the peer about why the session is going down. <\/del> the session is being terminated. <\/ins> An endpoint can end a session at any time. In particular, an endpoint MAY choose to treat a stream error as a session error if the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-837f846be84e06a1f31560e426528fe4895f94bf6bbaf5b5fbe2fabc760cc19d","title":"","text":"3.3. A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI uses TLS12 with the <\/del> A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI uses TLS13 with the <\/ins> TLS-ALPN. HTTP\/2 over TLS uses the \"h2\" protocol identifier. The \"h2c\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5bd308711a623eacb508d118d87be5dd19fb22f0a4e08c8a8f9eeded3c274e4d","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 clients MUST indicate the target domain name when negotiating TLS. Deployments of HTTP\/2 that negotiate TLS 1.3 or higher need only support and use the SNI extension; deployments of TLS 1.2 are subject to the requirements in the following sections. Implementations are <\/del> Requirements for deployments of HTTP\/2 that negotiate TLS13 are included in tls13features. Deployments of TLS 1.2 are subject to the requirements in tls12features and tls12ciphers. Implementations are <\/ins> encouraged to provide defaults that comply, but it is recognized that deployments are ultimately responsible for compliance."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ed2ac2908e6bc5accfcd63ffd846b985e24130c13bc92470e9cf0c773a7a96fc","title":"","text":"Implementations MUST support ephemeral key exchange sizes of at least 2048 bits for cipher suites that use ephemeral finite field Diffie- Hellman (DHE) TLS12 and 224 bits for cipher suites that use ephemeral <\/del> Hellman (DHE) TLS13 and 224 bits for cipher suites that use ephemeral <\/ins> elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) RFC4492. Clients MUST accept DHE sizes of up to 4096 bits. Endpoints MAY treat negotiation of key sizes smaller than the lower limits as a ConnectionErrorHandler of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-64df3a5c08f64a4c1792e2f14e414be6e3992e6f74b9aea5d47a1219d47b1e64","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 being negotiated with a prohibited cipher suite if the application protocol and cipher suite are independently selected. 9.2.3. TLS 1.3 includes a number of features not available in earlier versions. This section discusses the use of these features. HTTP\/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages. HTTP\/2 clients MUST treat a TLS post- handshake CertificateRequest message as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. The prohibition on post-handshake authentication applies even if the client offered the \"post_handshake_auth\" TLS extension. Post- handshake authentication support might be advertised independently of TLS-ALPN. Clients might offer the capability for use in other protocols, but inclusion of the extension cannot imply support within HTTP\/2. TLS13 defines other post-handshake messages, NewSessionTicket and KeyUpdate, which can be used as they have no direct interaction with HTTP\/2. Unless the use of a new type of TLS message depends on an interaction with the application-layer protocol, that TLS message can be sent after the handshake completes. TLS early data MAY be used to send requests, provided that the guidance in RFC8470 is observed. Clients send requests in early data assuming initial values for all server settings. <\/ins> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7507952bdd446446511112fd26b736856f992ebf14e6140cb71d674c15f605e4","title":"","text":"10.7. Padding within HTTP\/2 is not intended as a replacement for general purpose padding, such as might be provided by TLS12. Redundant <\/del> purpose padding, such as might be provided by TLS13. Redundant <\/ins> padding could even be counterproductive. Correct application can depend on having specific knowledge of the data that is being padded."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6c61e4e8906b7f70ccbbef3ed6fe92229a4de4e45d69ef49d146c3711894fdc3","title":"","text":"As far as these create observable differences in behavior, they could be used as a basis for fingerprinting a specific client, as defined in HTML5. <\/del> in PRIVACY. <\/ins> HTTP\/2's preference for using a single TCP connection allows correlation of a user's activity on a site. Reusing connections for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-607e610c5614fc7fdf46b3f11cd19c0021cef93e768d3a42b95846a60a5e61d6","title":"","text":"receives an unexpected stream identifier MUST respond with a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. The first use of a new stream identifier implicitly closes all streams in the \"idle\" state that might have been initiated by that peer with a lower-valued stream identifier. For example, if a client sends a HEADERS frame on stream 7 without ever sending a frame on stream 5, then stream 5 transitions to the \"closed\" state when the first frame for stream 7 is sent or received. <\/del> A HEADERS frame will transition the client-initiated stream identified by the stream identifier in the frame header from \"idle\" to \"open\". A PUSH_PROMISE frame will transition the server-initiated stream identified by the \"Promised Stream ID\" field in the frame payload from \"idle\" to \"reserved\". When a stream transitions out of the \"idle\" state, all streams that might have been initiated by that peer with a lower-valued stream identifier are implicitly transitioned to \"closed\". That is, an endpoint may skip a stream identifier, with the effect being that the skipped stream is immediately closed. <\/ins> Stream identifiers cannot be reused. Long-lived connections can result in an endpoint exhausting the available range of stream"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b7d421775532bf8d55ffb48a59f78431f72535a942f46852f12f2cc2f8554d6e","title":"","text":"A list of error codes is included in ErrorCodes. It is possible that an endpoint will encounter frames that would cause multiple errors. Implementations MAY discover multiple errors during processing, but they SHOULD report at most one stream and one connection error as a result. The first stream error reported for a given stream prevents any other errors on that stream from being reported. In comparison, the protocol permits multiple GOAWAY frames, though an endpoint SHOULD report just one type of connection error unless an error is encountered during graceful shutdown. If this occurs, an endpoint MAY send an additional GOAWAY frame with the new error code, in addition to any prior GOAWAY that contained NO_ERROR. If an endpoint detects multiple different errors, it MAY choose to report any one of those errors. If a frame causes a connection error, that error MUST be reported. <\/ins> 5.4.1. A connection error is any error that prevents further processing of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-03e1f1acf2891688a405fba320befd0943c6eb93e3a0bec4ad8dafd5faab2ef2","title":"","text":"supports HTTP\/2. The means by which support for HTTP\/2 is determined is different for \"http\" and \"https\" URIs. Discovery for \"http\" URIs is described in discover-http. Discovery for \"https\" URIs is described in discover- https. <\/del> \"http\" and \"https\" URIs. Discovery for \"https\" URIs is described in discover-https. HTTP\/2 support for \"http\" URIs can only be discovered by out-of-band means, and requires prior knowledge of the support as described in known-http. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-61d8f4ace9ed93bcd069d563c8455543001c03f2c832aa23c7222a4fd929b5f8","title":"","text":"3.2. A client that makes a request for an \"http\" URI without prior knowledge about support for HTTP\/2 on the next hop uses the HTTP Upgrade mechanism (HTTP). The client does so by making an HTTP\/1.1 request that includes an Upgrade header field with the \"h2c\" token. Such an HTTP\/1.1 request MUST include exactly one Http2SettingsHeader header field. For example: Requests that contain message content MUST be sent in their entirety before the client can send HTTP\/2 frames. This means that a large request can block the use of the connection until it is completely sent. If concurrency of an initial request with subsequent requests is important, an OPTIONS request can be used to perform the upgrade to HTTP\/2, at the cost of an additional round trip. A server that does not support HTTP\/2 can respond to the request as though the Upgrade header field were absent: A server MUST ignore an \"h2\" token in an Upgrade header field. Presence of a token with \"h2\" implies HTTP\/2 over TLS, which is instead negotiated as described in discover-https. A server that supports HTTP\/2 accepts the upgrade with a 101 (Switching Protocols) response. After the empty line that terminates the 101 response, the server can begin sending HTTP\/2 frames. These frames MUST include a response to the request that initiated the upgrade. For example: The first HTTP\/2 frame sent by the server MUST be a server connection preface (ConnectionHeader) consisting of a SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS). Upon receiving the 101 response, the client MUST send a ConnectionHeader, which includes a SETTINGS frame. The HTTP\/1.1 request that is sent prior to upgrade is assigned a stream identifier of 1 (see StreamIdentifiers). Stream 1 is implicitly \"half-closed\" from the client toward the server (see StreamStates), since the request is completed as an HTTP\/1.1 request. After commencing the HTTP\/2 connection, stream 1 is used for the response. 3.2.1. A request that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1 to HTTP\/2 MUST include exactly one header field. The header field is a connection-specific header field that includes settings that govern the HTTP\/2 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. A server MUST NOT upgrade the connection to HTTP\/2 if this header field is not present or if more than one is present. A server MUST NOT send this header field. The content of the header field is the frame payload of a SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS), encoded as a base64url string (that is, the URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding described in RFC4648, with any trailing '=' characters omitted). The RFC5234 production for is defined in HTTP. Since the upgrade is only intended to apply to the immediate connection, a client sending the header field MUST also send as a connection option in the header field to prevent it from being forwarded (see HTTP). A server decodes and interprets these values as it would any other SETTINGS frame. Explicit SettingsSync is not necessary, since a 101 response serves as implicit acknowledgement. Providing these values in the upgrade request gives a client an opportunity to provide settings prior to receiving any frames from the server. 3.3. <\/del> A client that makes a request to an \"https\" URI uses TLS13 with the TLS-ALPN."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7947b43396fe6122f39e5a5aa925bc0619fb45ea173c91ea4c6eb4cd087ce1c0","title":"","text":"Once TLS negotiation is complete, both the client and the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader. 3.4. <\/del> 3.3. <\/ins> A client can learn that a particular server supports HTTP\/2 by other means. For example, ALT-SVC describes a mechanism for advertising"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6a25fe5ec1b68111d4e39ef270b35f5b1ba2dba84bba27a5203aeb8b112bf904","title":"","text":"to change, for configurations to differ between instances in clustered servers, or for network conditions to change. 3.5. <\/del> 3.4. <\/ins> In HTTP\/2, each endpoint is required to send a connection preface as a final confirmation of the protocol in use and to establish the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-84caa189c21887aaa28ba081718a43c743e28b7f63f53d9055d980a9cde50fee","title":"","text":". This sequence MUST be followed by a SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS), which MAY be empty. The client sends the client connection preface immediately upon receipt of a 101 (Switching Protocols) response (indicating a successful upgrade) or as the first application data octets of a TLS connection. If starting an HTTP\/2 connection with prior knowledge of server support for the protocol, the client connection preface is sent upon connection establishment. <\/del> as the first application data octets of a connection. <\/ins> The server connection preface consists of a potentially empty SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS) that MUST be the first frame the server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f056b81b281ad00f8a2294e5246830ffb158aa61b3f1c9b31cc4a67e4bea1a38","title":"","text":"messages; the stream identifier of zero cannot be used to establish a new stream. HTTP\/1.1 requests that are upgraded to HTTP\/2 (see discover-http) are responded to with a stream identifier of one (0x1). After the upgrade completes, stream 0x1 is \"half-closed (local)\" to the client. Therefore, stream 0x1 cannot be selected as a new stream identifier by a client that upgrades from HTTP\/1.1. <\/del> The identifier of a newly established stream MUST be numerically greater than all streams that the initiating endpoint has opened or reserved. This governs streams that are opened using a HEADERS frame"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d9016b378cf8158beff080742281f7b97b01fa7747f0500228b79b303960471f","title":"","text":"The cleartext version of HTTP\/2 has minimal protection against cross- protocol attacks. The ConnectionHeader contains a string that is designed to confuse HTTP\/1.1 servers, but no special protection is offered for other protocols. A server that is willing to ignore parts of an HTTP\/1.1 request containing an Upgrade header field in addition to the client connection preface could be exposed to a cross-protocol attack. <\/del> offered for other protocols. <\/ins> 10.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e3b34335612716e2f282b15c9e2b20d1f61a5577fa6847797241c089b4911a9c","title":"","text":"11.5. This section registers the <\/del> This section marks the <\/ins> header field in the \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" registry BCP90. <\/del> header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. <\/ins> 11.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-15602623c30fc517ef4cd12d621b820e499c1eb228f641b09a9c001134444df2","title":"","text":"11.7. This document registers the \"h2c\" upgrade token in the \"HTTP Upgrade Tokens\" registry (HTTP). <\/del> Previous versions of this document (RFC7540) registered an upgrade token. This capability has been removed: see versioning. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d9ec042f00d5792d21bc1816ed2cd0e6befa07c0a1fd858e67dcc3e50d313c5b","title":"","text":"excessive number of server push streams can be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM. Processing capacity cannot be guarded as effectively as state capacity. The SETTINGS frame can be abused to cause a peer to expend additional processing time. This might be done by pointlessly changing SETTINGS parameters, setting multiple undefined parameters, or changing the same setting multiple times in the same frame. WINDOW_UPDATE or PRIORITY frames can be abused to cause an unnecessary waste of resources. Large numbers of small or empty frames can be abused to cause a peer to expend time processing frame headers. Note, however, that some uses are entirely legitimate, such as the sending of an empty DATA or CONTINUATION frame at the end of a stream. Field section compression also offers some opportunities to waste processing resources; see COMPRESSION for more details on potential abuses. Limits in SETTINGS parameters cannot be reduced instantaneously, which leaves an endpoint exposed to behavior from a peer that could exceed the new limits. In particular, immediately after establishing a connection, limits set by a server are not known to clients and could be exceeded without being an obvious protocol violation. All these features -- i.e., SETTINGS changes, small frames, field section compression -- have legitimate uses. These features become a burden only when they are used unnecessarily or to excess. An endpoint that doesn't monitor this behavior exposes itself to a risk of denial-of-service attack. Implementations SHOULD track the use of these features and set limits on their use. An endpoint MAY treat activity that is suspicious as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/del> A number of HTTP\/2 implementations were found to be vulnerable to denial of service NFLX-2019-002. The following lists known ways that implementations might be subject to denial of service attack: Most of the features that might be exploited for denial of service -- i.e., SETTINGS changes, small frames, field section compression -- have legitimate uses. These features become a burden only when they are used unnecessarily or to excess. An endpoint that doesn't monitor use of these features exposes itself to a risk of denial of service. Implementations SHOULD track the use of these features and set limits on their use. An endpoint MAY treat activity that is suspicious as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type <\/ins> ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM. 10.5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-14df6fbb5a1a8936312a132d8c1aca16fd9a5ae0faf0386700987c603e98dccc","title":"","text":"initiated the Upgrade. The first HTTP\/2.0 frame sent by the server is a SETTINGS. Upon receiving the 101 response, the client sents a SessionHeader, which <\/del> receiving the 101 response, the client sends a SessionHeader, which <\/ins> includes a SETTINGS frame. 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d5f548f20d3c8d53a9049fe58050c6a6c58486a4e2456c24bb2517bf60becfcf","title":"","text":"portion of the request-target (e.g. \"https\") All header field names MUST be lowercased, and the definitions of all header fields names defined by HTTP\/1.1 are updated to be all <\/del> all header field names defined by HTTP\/1.1 are updated to be all <\/ins> lowercase. The Connection, Host, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Connection, and Transfer-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-75177890394fc1c055adca6f3e590ed3a35098df213a6274688f4e03054e8bf3","title":"","text":"Although POSTs are inherently chunked, POST requests SHOULD also be accompanied by a Content-Length header field. First, it informs the server of how much data to expect, which the server can used to track <\/del> server of how much data to expect, which the server can use to track <\/ins> overall progress and provide appropriate user feedback. More importantly, some HTTP server implementations fail to correctly process requests that omit the Content-Length header field. Many existing clients send a Content-Length header field, which caused server implementations have come to depend upon its presence. <\/del> existing clients send a Content-Length header field, and some server implementations have come to depend upon its presence. <\/ins> The user-agent is free to prioritize requests as it sees fit. If the user-agent cannot make progress without receiving a resource, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2a419a93c6633ba1368a2c3bdc8092d4999df8aa9f3a773352dee2923c27df2a","title":"","text":"A client cannot push. Thus, servers MUST treat the receipt of a PUSH_PROMISE frame as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. Clients MUST reject any attempt to change the SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH setting to a value other than 0 by treating the message as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> PROTOCOL_ERROR. A server cannot set the SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH setting to a value other than 0 (see SettingValues). <\/ins> 8.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9859c1d55118c12dcc292839e756341d98e14f27f68fa8d051eaa4dbb319e1cc","title":"","text":"version 2 (HTTP\/2). HTTP\/2 enables a more efficient use of network resources and a reduced perception of latency by introducing header field compression and allowing multiple concurrent exchanges on the same connection. It also introduces unsolicited push of representations from servers to clients. <\/del> same connection. <\/ins> This specification is an alternative to, but does not obsolete, the HTTP\/1.1 message syntax. HTTP's existing semantics remain unchanged."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2333653647496627530014f84fba2645afd22e3ea97d8ba398f414b593cb91e0","title":"","text":"StreamPriority ensures that limited resources can be directed to the most important streams first. HTTP\/2 adds a new interaction mode whereby a server can PushResources. Server push allows a server to speculatively send data to a client that the server anticipates the client will need, trading off some network usage against a potential latency gain. The server does this by synthesizing a request, which it sends as a PUSH_PROMISE frame. The server is then able to send a response to the synthetic request on a separate stream. <\/del> Because HTTP header fields used in a connection can contain large amounts of redundant data, frames that contain them are FieldBlock. This has especially advantageous impact upon request sizes in the common case, allowing many requests to be compressed into one packet. Finally, HTTP\/2 adds a new, optional interaction mode whereby a server can PushResources. This is intended to allow a server to speculatively send data to a client that the server anticipates the client will need, trading off some network usage against a potential latency gain. The server does this by synthesizing a request, which it sends as a PUSH_PROMISE frame. The server is then able to send a response to the synthetic request on a separate stream. <\/ins> 2.1. The HTTP\/2 specification is split into four parts:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4fb6a0de280b9949408abe918f41ff81d45c6ecbac3e9a3cf39e626cb01d57ea","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 allows a server to pre-emptively send (or \"push\") responses (along with corresponding \"promised\" requests) to a client in association with a previous client-initiated request. This can be useful when the server knows the client will need to have those responses available in order to fully process the response to the original request. <\/del> association with a previous client-initiated request. Server push was designed to allow a server to improve client- perceived performance by predicting what requests will follow those that it receives, thereby removing a round trip for them. For example, a request for HTML is often followed by requests for stylesheets and scripts referenced by that page. When these requests are pushed, the client does not need to wait to receive the references to them in the HTML and issue separate requests. In practice, server push is difficult to use effectively, because it requires the server to correctly anticipate the additional requests the client will make, taking into account factors such as caching, content negotiation, and user behavior. Errors in prediction can lead to performance degradation, due to the opportunity cost that the additional data on the wire represents. In particular, pushing any significant amount of data can cause contention issues with more- important responses. <\/ins> A client can request that server push be disabled, though this is negotiated for each hop independently. The SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5c7b7c37a7c545ee66a8998ae5c65782314ff4761bb084b67ef49edcf962901c","title":"","text":"header field. The header field is a connection-specific header field that includes parameters that govern the HTTP\/2 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. <\/del> settings that govern the HTTP\/2 connection, provided in anticipation of the server accepting the request to upgrade. <\/ins> A server MUST NOT upgrade the connection to HTTP\/2 if this header field is not present or if more than one is present. A server MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0c7954500bc4fdc477bb8b3ca9dc69f68fc1f5be18da807a31b1032bac078810","title":"","text":"SETTINGS frame. Explicit SettingsSync is not necessary, since a 101 response serves as implicit acknowledgement. Providing these values in the upgrade request gives a client an opportunity to provide parameters prior to receiving any frames from the server. <\/del> settings prior to receiving any frames from the server. <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0fa1a8313401a2712bda44a8ae5c9ecd533f1064ff242546fb2f814f16fadf89","title":"","text":"additional frames to the server immediately after sending the client connection preface, without waiting to receive the server connection preface. It is important to note, however, that the server connection preface SETTINGS frame might include parameters that <\/del> connection preface SETTINGS frame might include settings that <\/ins> necessarily alter how a client is expected to communicate with the server. Upon receiving the SETTINGS frame, the client is expected to honor any parameters established. In some configurations, it is <\/del> honor any settings established. In some configurations, it is <\/ins> possible for the server to transmit SETTINGS before the client sends additional frames, providing an opportunity to avoid this issue."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e880683119292655f97173c2ebcaeec4a3e0609246501b42a12a0b01aaf161d8","title":"","text":"The SETTINGS frame (type=0x4) conveys configuration parameters that affect how endpoints communicate, such as preferences and constraints on peer behavior. The SETTINGS frame is also used to acknowledge the receipt of those parameters. Individually, a SETTINGS parameter can also be referred to as a \"setting\". <\/del> receipt of those settings. Individually, a configuration parameter from a SETTINGS frame is referred to as a \"setting\". <\/ins> SETTINGS parameters are not negotiated; they describe characteristics of the sending peer, which are used by the receiving peer. Different values for the same parameter can be advertised by each peer. For example, a client might set a high initial flow-control window, whereas a server might set a lower value to conserve resources. <\/del> Settings are not negotiated; they describe characteristics of the sending peer, which are used by the receiving peer. Different values for the same setting can be advertised by each peer. For example, a client might set a high initial flow-control window, whereas a server might set a lower value to conserve resources. <\/ins> A SETTINGS frame MUST be sent by both endpoints at the start of a connection and MAY be sent at any other time by either endpoint over the lifetime of the connection. Implementations MUST support all of the parameters defined by this specification. <\/del> the settings defined by this specification. <\/ins> Each parameter in a SETTINGS frame replaces any existing value for that parameter. Parameters are processed in the order in which they <\/del> that parameter. Settings are processed in the order in which they <\/ins> appear, and a receiver of a SETTINGS frame does not need to maintain any state other than the current value of its parameters. Therefore, <\/del> any state other than the current value of each setting. Therefore, <\/ins> the value of a SETTINGS parameter is the last value that is seen by a receiver. SETTINGS parameters are acknowledged by the receiving peer. To enable this, the SETTINGS frame defines the following flag: <\/del> SETTINGS frames are acknowledged by the receiving peer. To enable this, the SETTINGS frame defines the ACK flag: <\/ins> SETTINGS frames always apply to a connection, never a single stream. The stream identifier for a SETTINGS frame MUST be zero (0x0). If an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d85ff8c1e86c93b1d2d33472b68f05087155f46388969aa9f87b0d9d15f8395b","title":"","text":"6.5.1. The frame payload of a SETTINGS frame consists of zero or more parameters, each consisting of an unsigned 16-bit setting identifier <\/del> settings, each consisting of an unsigned 16-bit setting identifier <\/ins> and an unsigned 32-bit value. 6.5.2. The following parameters are defined: <\/del> The following settings are defined: <\/ins> An endpoint that receives a SETTINGS frame with any unknown or unsupported identifier MUST ignore that setting."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-47c24523f70375b4a2fd7ab7e3d80bb91f54a930466ac3640dad63825f73db91","title":"","text":"when the peer has received and applied the changed parameter values. In order to provide such synchronization timepoints, the recipient of a SETTINGS frame in which the ACK flag is not set MUST apply the updated parameters as soon as possible upon receipt. <\/del> updated settings as soon as possible upon receipt. <\/ins> The values in the SETTINGS frame MUST be processed in the order they appear, with no other frame processing between values. Unsupported parameters MUST be ignored. Once all values have been processed, the <\/del> settings MUST be ignored. Once all values have been processed, the <\/ins> recipient MUST immediately emit a SETTINGS frame with the ACK flag set. Upon receiving a SETTINGS frame with the ACK flag set, the sender of the altered parameters can rely on the setting having been <\/del> sender of the altered settings can rely on the value having been <\/ins> applied. If the sender of a SETTINGS frame does not receive an acknowledgement"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-7b8c7e2ad05fd96583f1293b1ed2cfdc2922d8952a31a2a53f7cda779e2a5498","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for frame types, settings, and error codes. These new registries appear in the new \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 (HTTP\/2) Parameters\" section. <\/del> Transfer Protocol version 2 (HTTP\/2)\" section. <\/ins> This document registers the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6ea3ae841e73dc19151ba04110fcdc4e450f82ba30b412873f73e24170c01881","title":"","text":"This specification is an alternative to, but does not obsolete, the HTTP\/1.1 message syntax. HTTP's existing semantics remain unchanged. This document obsoletes RFC 7540 and RFC 8740. <\/ins> Discussion Venues"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ff1236d34397d519adc18cab3b1011446eb0daa42167d95e68127b18a85a9719","title":"","text":"Finally, HTTP\/2 also enables more efficient processing of messages through use of binary message framing. This document obsoletes RFC7540 and RFC8740. <\/ins> 2. HTTP\/2 provides an optimized transport for HTTP semantics. HTTP\/2"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-6ce77ad6cf6cce5537c13cf40e7a0f9f1fada50f1804cd8fe04ebbeef8d4e4f0","title":"","text":"8.1.2.1. While HTTP\/1.x used the message start-line (see HTTP11) to convey control data, HTTP\/2 uses special pseudo-header fields beginning with ':' character (ASCII 0x3a) for this purpose. Pseudo-header fields are not HTTP header fields. Pseudo-header fields contain control data (see HTTP). Endpoints MUST NOT generate pseudo-header fields other than those defined in this document. Note that an extension could negotiate the use of additional pseudo-header fields; see extensibility. <\/del> HTTP\/2 uses special pseudo-header fields beginning with ':' character (ASCII 0x3a) to convey message control data (see HTTP). Pseudo-header fields are not HTTP header fields. Endpoints MUST NOT generate pseudo-header fields other than those defined in this document. Note that an extension could negotiate the use of additional pseudo-header fields; see extensibility. <\/ins> Pseudo-header fields are only valid in the context in which they are defined. Pseudo-header fields defined for requests MUST NOT appear"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e5a9ea7d96ccbca2d35ccb5ca888fb949e8f8d3a111dc3d90caf60271cf1b82e","title":"","text":"\"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" registry maintained at . Just as in HTTP\/1.x, field names are strings of ASCII characters that are compared in a case-insensitive fashion. Field names MUST be converted to lowercase prior to their encoding in HTTP\/2. A request or response containing uppercase header field names MUST be treated as malformed. <\/del> Field names are strings of ASCII characters that are compared in a case-insensitive fashion. Field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing a HTTP\/2 message. A request or response containing an uppercase character ('A' to 'Z', ASCII 0x41 to 0x5a) in a field name MUST be treated as malformed. HPACK is capable of carrying field names or values that are not valid in HTTP. Though HPACK can carry any octet, fields are not valid in the following cases: A request or response that contains a field that violates any of these conditions MUST be treated as malformed. In particular, an intermediary that does not process fields when forwarding messages MUST NOT forward fields that contain any of the values that are listed as prohibited above. Field values that are not valid according to the definition of the corresponding field do not cause a request to be malformed except as defined by the processing rules for the field. <\/ins> 8.1.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e699fede5a262f0664b40a0f2e63588a1b1674be064ba7033a03a7be7400ed23","title":"","text":"10.3. The HTTP\/2 field block encoding allows the expression of names that are not valid field names in HTTP. Requests or responses containing invalid field names MUST be treated as malformed. An intermediary therefore cannot translate an HTTP\/2 request or response containing an invalid field name into an HTTP\/1.1 message. Similarly, HTTP\/2 allows field values that are not valid. While most of the values that can be encoded will not alter header field parsing, carriage return (CR, ASCII 0xd), line feed (LF, ASCII 0xa), and the zero character (NUL, ASCII 0x0) might be exploited by an attacker if they are translated verbatim. Any request or response that contains a character not permitted in a field value MUST be treated as malformed. Valid characters are defined by the ABNF rule in HTTP. <\/del> HPACK permits encoding of field names and values that might be treated as delimiters in other HTTP versions. An intermediary that translates an HTTP\/2 request or response MUST validate fields according to the rules in HttpHeaders roles before translating a message to another HTTP version. Translating a field that includes invalid delimiters could be used to cause recipients to incorrectly interpret a message, which could be exploited by an attacker. An intermediary can reject fields that contain invalid field names or values for other reasons, in particular those that do not conform to the HTTP ABNF grammar from HTTP. Intermediaries that do not perform any validation of fields other than the minimum required by HttpHeaders could forward messages that contain invalid field names or values. <\/ins> 10.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c3d32292ee6c5a4dc870cf1a8da526511695778a2387963e051bf79828825188","title":"","text":"For malformed requests, a server MAY send an HTTP response prior to closing or resetting the stream. Clients MUST NOT accept a malformed response. Note that these requirements are intended to protect against several types of common attacks against HTTP; they are deliberately strict because being permissive can expose implementations to these vulnerabilities. <\/del> response. Endpoints that progressively process messages might have performed some processing before identifying a request or response as malformed. For instance, it might be possible to generate an informational or 404 status code without having received a complete request. Similarly, intermediaries might forward incomplete messages before detecting errors. A server MAY generate a final response before receiving an entire request when the response does not depend on the remainder of the request being correct. A server or intermediary MAY use RST_STREAM -- with a code other than REFUSED_STREAM -- to abort a stream if a malformed request or response is received. These requirements are intended to protect against several types of common attacks against HTTP; they are deliberately strict because being permissive can expose implementations to these vulnerabilities. <\/ins> 8.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-92b76d514981d7bbb2356e3e62bdbe5e73dd1978489c2e9f14c6d5b5908a3621","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 frame type codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry manages an 8-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry operates under either of the RFC5226 for values between 0x00 and 0xef, with values between 0xf0 and 0xff being reserved for Experimental Use. <\/del> Frame Type\" registry operates under either of the RFC8126 or RFC8126 policies. <\/ins> New entries in this registry require the following information:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-558e3e84022347dcda40614284ef5e8dd7cc26c33c185c8dfb8352e1f7fa054c","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 settings. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry manages a 16-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry operates under the RFC5226 for values in the range from 0x0000 to 0xefff, with values between and 0xf000 and 0xffff being reserved for Experimental Use. <\/del> Settings\" registry operates under the RFC8126. <\/ins> New registrations are advised to provide the following information:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bc6af0c7aca9114a594cfad8377b267ce8209f4891e5919e223e647d925fab17","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 error codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry manages a 32-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry operates under the RFC5226. <\/del> Error Code\" registry operates under the RFC8126. <\/ins> Registrations for error codes are required to include a description of the error code. An expert reviewer is advised to examine new"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-de4758c0217f84eaadbcf20d41e61efc7a0f6a694f17dbeea78e4204cb239424","title":"","text":"If an endpoint detects multiple different errors, it MAY choose to report any one of those errors. If a frame causes a connection error, that error MUST be reported. <\/del> error, that error MUST be reported. Additionally, an endpoint MAY use any applicable error code when it detects an error condition; a generic error code (such as PROTOCOL_ERROR or INTERNAL_ERROR) can always be used in place of more specific error codes. <\/ins> 5.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5a554c4acb18e82f219e4fd62339f1ab129cb73393cb5644220bf8eee7ee9fc3","title":"","text":"they can be used by an endpoint to measure latency to their peer. This might have privacy implications in certain scenarios. 10.9. Remote timing attacks extract secrets from servers by observing variations in the time that servers take when processing requests that use secrets. HTTP\/2 enables concurrent request creation and processing, which can give attackers better control over when request processing commences. Multiple HTTP\/2 requests can be included in the same IP packet or TLS record. HTTP\/2 can therefore make remote timing attacks more efficient by eliminating variability in request delivery, leaving only request order and the delivery of responses as sources of timing variability. Ensuring that processing time is not dependent on the value of secrets is the best defense against any form of timing attack. <\/ins> 11. A string for identifying HTTP\/2 is entered into the \"Application-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-742896501a64c8ac6c30bed97918ff25a9be5cd615cc642b93badf6d4515f0b5","title":"","text":"ABNF rule in HTTP. An intermediary that receives any field that requires removal before forwarding (see HTTP) MUST remove or replace those header fields when forwarding messages. Additionally, intermediaries should take care when forwarding messages containing Content-Length fields to ensure that the message is malformed. This ensures that if the message is translated into HTTP\/1.1 at any point the framing will be correct. <\/ins> 10.4. Pushed responses do not have an explicit request from the client; the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-37377d196b2f9253b280786cb2d67ee05b5a3706d75eab9f6120eef86a787207","title":"","text":"timely fashion. Failure to do so could lead to a deadlock when critical frames, such as WINDOW_UPDATE, are not read and acted upon. 5.2.3. If an endpoint cannot ensure that its peer always has available flow control window space that is greater than the peer's bandwidth-delay product on this connection, its receive throughput will be limited by HTTP\/2 flow control. This will result in degraded performance. Sending timely WINDOW_UPDATE frames can improve performance. Endpoints will want to balance the need to improve receive throughput with the need to manage resource exhaustion risks, and should take careful note of dos in defining their strategy to manage window sizes. <\/ins> 5.3. In a multiplexed protocol like HTTP\/2, prioritizing allocation of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ee992acf6f23482850ef26fe26737d201306ec93cdb976fe47055ff1eeeff925","title":"","text":"to distinguish them from decimal literals. This specification describes binary formats using the convention described in QUIC. <\/ins> The following terms are used: Finally, the terms \"gateway\", \"intermediary\", \"proxy\", and \"tunnel\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bef1da514f157fddbea75e38aa864660f146bcd36a3653fc2f8e125f173e4093","title":"","text":"frames to obscure the size of messages. Padding is a security feature; see padding. The DATA frame contains the following fields: <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The DATA frame contains the following additional fields: <\/ins> The DATA frame defines the following flags:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-02a069e3a281f46b1c9725af0625e9dd0c1deeeed8358e61785020948c4b8010","title":"","text":"HEADERS frames can be sent on a stream in the \"idle\", \"reserved (local)\", \"open\", or \"half-closed (remote)\" state. The HEADERS frame payload has the following fields: <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The HEADERS frame payload has the following additional fields: <\/ins> The HEADERS frame defines the following flags:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8aebc06cbfe4719d32d5f62a7bed1d175859a808c2ee4d2a0f74b3bac4fbbf29","title":"","text":"PRIORITY frame can be sent in any stream state, including idle or closed streams. The frame payload of a PRIORITY frame contains the following fields: <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The frame payload of a PRIORITY frame contains the following additional fields: <\/ins> The PRIORITY frame does not define any flags."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-00d42b0ef5d6144b3d13dadcecf71a1394dfe291e7026ca334d8caa35cf37d32","title":"","text":"stream. RST_STREAM is sent to request cancellation of a stream or to indicate that an error condition has occurred. The RST_STREAM frame contains a single unsigned, 32-bit integer identifying the ErrorCodes. The error code indicates why the stream is being terminated. <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. Additionally, the RST_STREAM frame contains a single unsigned, 32-bit integer identifying the ErrorCodes. The error code indicates why the stream is being terminated. <\/ins> The RST_STREAM frame does not define any flags."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b6070c3a2608ab47d400cbaa0ba0efb439ea35916b1ba6545a86f4eaa9d54de0","title":"","text":"provides additional context for the stream. PushResources contains a thorough description of the use of PUSH_PROMISE frames. The PUSH_PROMISE frame payload has the following fields: <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The PUSH_PROMISE frame payload has the following additional fields: <\/ins> The PUSH_PROMISE frame defines the following flags:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-aa413c4605b3dc56c3e3500af2eb1c6cb9fdd6a5afe7873a2b65ca5e91e56d37","title":"","text":"idle connection is still functional. PING frames can be sent from any endpoint. The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. <\/ins> In addition to the frame header, PING frames MUST contain 8 octets of opaque data in the frame payload. A sender can include any value it chooses and use those octets in any fashion."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-cc8e029eac6efe6e33ab8b49a22cb0f95a5d109fe9c055a16418068597276489","title":"","text":"connection SHOULD still send a GOAWAY frame before terminating the connection. The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. <\/ins> The GOAWAY frame does not define any flags. The GOAWAY frame applies to the connection, not a specific stream."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4a6fa558305acb090dd1d2352d67481310979a1bbfdb29e777cdf7f9d80eb094","title":"","text":"respond with a StreamErrorHandler or ConnectionErrorHandler of type FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR if it is unable to accept a frame. The frame payload of a WINDOW_UPDATE frame is one reserved bit plus an unsigned 31-bit integer indicating the number of octets that the sender can transmit in addition to the existing flow-control window. The legal range for the increment to the flow-control window is 1 to 2 <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The frame payload of a WINDOW_UPDATE frame is one reserved bit plus an unsigned 31-bit integer indicating the number of octets that the sender can transmit in addition to the existing flow-control window. The legal range for the increment to the flow-control window is 1 to 2 <\/ins> -1 (2,147,483,647) octets."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5985868ec73eeadb6565b6b2c9e2427fcaf7bf09cd18bfc6704900b6bdda9712","title":"","text":"as the preceding frame is on the same stream and is a HEADERS, PUSH_PROMISE, or CONTINUATION frame without the END_HEADERS flag set. The CONTINUATION frame payload contains a FieldBlock. <\/del> The Length, Type, Unused Flag(s), Reserved, and Stream Identifier fields are described in FramingLayer. The CONTINUATION frame payload contains a FieldBlock. <\/ins> The CONTINUATION frame defines the following flag:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f14dea971109ccdc3790127cd642bc6e7e070e7b83015a1d44f6d72f829a76dc","title":"","text":"Field names are strings of ASCII characters that are compared in a case-insensitive fashion. Field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing a HTTP\/2 message. A request or response containing an uppercase character ('A' to 'Z', ASCII 0x41 to 0x5a) in a field name MUST be treated as malformed. <\/del> when constructing a HTTP\/2 message. <\/ins> HPACK is capable of carrying field names or values that are not valid in HTTP. Though HPACK can carry any octet, fields are not valid in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-642ac46d9c40bb56ea926a05bf6ad9deaccbd8dfd3dae50cbb6fe876eb49b6a8","title":"","text":"MUST NOT forward fields that contain any of the values that are listed as prohibited above. Field values that are not valid according to the definition of the corresponding field do not cause a request to be malformed except as defined by the processing rules for the field. <\/del> A recipient MAY treat a message that contains a field name or value that includes other characters disallowed by HTTP and HTTP as malformed. When a request message violates one of the requirements above, it SHOULD be responded to using the 400 (Bad Request) status code HTTP before the stream is reset, unless a more suitable status code is defined, or the status code cannot be sent (e.g., because the error occurs in a trailer field). Note that field values that are not valid according to the definition of the corresponding field do not cause a request to be malformed; the requirements above only apply to the generic syntax for field values as defined in HTTP. <\/ins> 8.1.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-70adfea5da876a49aecf60c4606db8c61572e3e04bd9b268574469d4002fc6c4","title":"","text":"A malformed request or response is one that is an otherwise valid sequence of HTTP\/2 frames but is invalid due to the presence of extraneous frames, prohibited fields or pseudo-header fields, the absence of mandatory fields or pseudo-header fields, or the inclusion of uppercase field names. <\/del> absence of mandatory fields or pseudo-header fields, the inclusion of uppercase field names, or invalid field names and\/or values (in certain circumstances; see HttpHeaders). <\/ins> A request or response that includes message content can include a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-36bec3a67445c023a9935652eac10a522b95ac3f99c128098e885f480809bacd","title":"","text":"error codes. These new registries appear in the new \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 (HTTP\/2)\" section. This document registers the <\/del> This revision of the document marks the <\/ins> header field for use in HTTP. <\/del> header field registered in RFC7540 obsolete. <\/ins> This document registers the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d324c82dfea0122c5c1eda53fe2070bb2fd288dc05363bab0b2ca62335a3a5d7","title":"","text":"This section marks the header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. <\/del> header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/ins> 11.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-78296340fd7d5dcead0723884c255570505169e7064e48805a38ee31a075807a","title":"","text":"8. HTTP\/2 defines a framing of the HTTP message abstraction (HTTP). <\/del> 8.1. HTTP\/2 defines a framing of the HTTP message abstraction (HTTP). <\/ins> A client sends an HTTP request on a new stream, using a previously unused StreamIdentifiers. A server sends an HTTP response on the same stream as the request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-450e5e660692d4e45befe81beac6c9fa43d581fd4663f85a551d0e37bc3bae1b","title":"","text":"8.1.1. HTTP\/2 removes support for the 101 (Switching Protocols) informational status code (HTTP). <\/del> A malformed request or response is one that is an otherwise valid sequence of HTTP\/2 frames but is invalid due to the presence of extraneous frames, prohibited fields or pseudo-header fields, the absence of mandatory fields or pseudo-header fields, the inclusion of uppercase field names, or invalid field names and\/or values (in certain circumstances; see HttpHeaders). A request or response that includes message content can include a <\/ins> The semantics of 101 (Switching Protocols) aren't applicable to a multiplexed protocol. Alternative protocols are able to use the same mechanisms that HTTP\/2 uses to negotiate their use (see starting). <\/del> header field. A request or response is also malformed if the value of a header field does not equal the sum of the DATA frame payload lengths that form the content. A response that is defined to have no content, as described in HTTP, can have a non-zero header field, even though no content is included in DATA frames. Intermediaries that process HTTP requests or responses (i.e., any intermediary not acting as a tunnel) MUST NOT forward a malformed request or response. Malformed requests or responses that are detected MUST be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. For malformed requests, a server MAY send an HTTP response prior to closing or resetting the stream. Clients MUST NOT accept a malformed response. Endpoints that progressively process messages might have performed some processing before identifying a request or response as malformed. For instance, it might be possible to generate an informational or 404 status code without having received a complete request. Similarly, intermediaries might forward incomplete messages before detecting errors. A server MAY generate a final response before receiving an entire request when the response does not depend on the remainder of the request being correct. A server or intermediary MAY use RST_STREAM -- with a code other than REFUSED_STREAM -- to abort a stream if a malformed request or response is received. These requirements are intended to protect against several types of common attacks against HTTP; they are deliberately strict because being permissive can expose implementations to these vulnerabilities. <\/ins> 8.1.2. <\/del> 8.2. HTTP fields (HTTP) are conveyed by HTTP\/2 in the HEADERS, CONTINUATION, and PUSH_PROMISE frames, compressed with COMPRESSION. <\/ins> HTTP fields carry information as a series of field lines, which are key-value pairs. For a listing of registered HTTP fields, see the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" registry maintained at . <\/del> To improve efficiency and interoperability, field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing a HTTP\/2 message. <\/ins> Field names are strings of ASCII characters that are compared in a case-insensitive fashion. Field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing a HTTP\/2 message. <\/del> 8.2.1. <\/ins> HPACK is capable of carrying field names or values that are not valid in HTTP. Though HPACK can carry any octet, fields are not valid in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-19e31c01b177356d6b200181dfb53f9324d12bec8ecae1b0adf679fee2deeee1","title":"","text":"the requirements above only apply to the generic syntax for field values as defined in HTTP. 8.1.2.1. HTTP\/2 uses special pseudo-header fields beginning with ':' character (ASCII 0x3a) to convey message control data (see HTTP). Pseudo-header fields are not HTTP header fields. Endpoints MUST NOT generate pseudo-header fields other than those defined in this document. Note that an extension could negotiate the use of additional pseudo-header fields; see extensibility. Pseudo-header fields are only valid in the context in which they are defined. Pseudo-header fields defined for requests MUST NOT appear in responses; pseudo-header fields defined for responses MUST NOT appear in requests. Pseudo-header fields MUST NOT appear in a trailer section. Endpoints MUST treat a request or response that contains undefined or invalid pseudo-header fields as malformed. All pseudo-header fields MUST appear in a field block before all regular field lines. Any request or response that contains a pseudo- header field that appears in a field block after a regular field line MUST be treated as malformed. 8.1.2.2. <\/del> 8.2.2. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 does not use the header field to indicate connection-specific header fields; in this protocol, connection-specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate an HTTP\/2 message containing <\/del> header field (HTTP) to indicate connection-specific header fields; in this protocol, connection-specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate an HTTP\/2 message containing <\/ins> connection-specific header fields; any message containing connection- specific header fields MUST be treated as malformed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9973dba53cc278b1e5b555727cbf199a8234f605d77a89ca344db23113036911","title":"","text":"connection-specific header fields as discussed in HTTP, or their messages will be treated by other HTTP\/2 endpoints as malformed. 8.1.2.3. The following pseudo-header fields are defined for HTTP\/2 requests: All HTTP\/2 requests MUST include exactly one valid value for the , , and pseudo-header fields, unless it is a CONNECT. An HTTP request that omits mandatory pseudo-header fields is malformed. Individual HTTP\/2 requests do not carry an explicit indicator of protocol version. All HTTP\/2 messages implicitly have a protocol version of \"2.0\" (see HTTP). 8.1.2.4. For HTTP\/2 responses, a single pseudo-header field is defined that carries the HTTP status code field (see HTTP). This pseudo-header field MUST be included in all responses, including interim responses; otherwise, the response is malformed. HTTP\/2 responses implicitly have a protocol version of \"2.0\". 8.1.2.5. <\/del> 8.2.3. <\/ins> The COOKIE uses a semi-colon (\";\") to delimit cookie-pairs (or \"crumbs\"). This header field contains multiple values, but does not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5788c143299612cd6648711c8b238fadd5a88c731d8dc18be7e4cb2a71744fe6","title":"","text":"Therefore, the following two lists of Cookie header fields are semantically equivalent. 8.1.2.6. A malformed request or response is one that is an otherwise valid sequence of HTTP\/2 frames but is invalid due to the presence of extraneous frames, prohibited fields or pseudo-header fields, the absence of mandatory fields or pseudo-header fields, the inclusion of uppercase field names, or invalid field names and\/or values (in certain circumstances; see HttpHeaders). A request or response that includes message content can include a header field. A request or response is also malformed if the value of a header field does not equal the sum of the DATA frame payload lengths that form the content. A response that is defined to have no content, as described in HTTP, can have a non-zero header field, even though no content is included in DATA frames. Intermediaries that process HTTP requests or responses (i.e., any intermediary not acting as a tunnel) MUST NOT forward a malformed request or response. Malformed requests or responses that are detected MUST be treated as a StreamErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. For malformed requests, a server MAY send an HTTP response prior to closing or resetting the stream. Clients MUST NOT accept a malformed response. Endpoints that progressively process messages might have performed some processing before identifying a request or response as malformed. For instance, it might be possible to generate an informational or 404 status code without having received a complete request. Similarly, intermediaries might forward incomplete messages before detecting errors. A server MAY generate a final response before receiving an entire request when the response does not depend on the remainder of the request being correct. A server or intermediary MAY use RST_STREAM -- with a code other than REFUSED_STREAM -- to abort a stream if a malformed request or response is received. These requirements are intended to protect against several types of common attacks against HTTP; they are deliberately strict because being permissive can expose implementations to these vulnerabilities. 8.1.3. <\/del> 8.3. <\/ins> This section shows HTTP\/1.1 requests and responses, with illustrations of equivalent HTTP\/2 requests and responses. <\/del> HTTP\/2 uses special pseudo-header fields beginning with ':' character (ASCII 0x3a) to convey message control data (see HTTP). <\/ins> An HTTP GET request includes control data and a request header with no message content and is therefore transmitted as a single HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames containing the serialized block of request header fields. The HEADERS frame in the following has both the END_HEADERS and END_STREAM flags set; no CONTINUATION frames are sent. <\/del> Pseudo-header fields are not HTTP header fields. Endpoints MUST NOT generate pseudo-header fields other than those defined in this document. Note that an extension could negotiate the use of additional pseudo-header fields; see extensibility. <\/ins> Similarly, a response that includes only control data and a response header is transmitted as a HEADERS frame (again, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames) containing the serialized block of response header fields. <\/del> Pseudo-header fields are only valid in the context in which they are defined. Pseudo-header fields defined for requests MUST NOT appear in responses; pseudo-header fields defined for responses MUST NOT appear in requests. Pseudo-header fields MUST NOT appear in a trailer section. Endpoints MUST treat a request or response that contains undefined or invalid pseudo-header fields as malformed. <\/ins> An HTTP POST request that includes control data and a request header and message content is transmitted as one HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames containing the request header, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last CONTINUATION (or HEADERS) frame having the END_HEADERS flag set and the final DATA frame having the END_STREAM flag set: <\/del> All pseudo-header fields MUST appear in a field block before all regular field lines. Any request or response that contains a pseudo- header field that appears in a field block after a regular field line MUST be treated as malformed. <\/ins> Note that data contributing to any given field line could be spread between field block fragments. The allocation of field lines to frames in this example is illustrative only. <\/del> 8.3.1. <\/ins> A response that includes control data and a response header and message content is transmitted as a HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last DATA frame in the sequence having the END_STREAM flag set: <\/del> The following pseudo-header fields are defined for HTTP\/2 requests: <\/ins> An informational response using a 1xx status code other than 101 is transmitted as a HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames. <\/del> All HTTP\/2 requests MUST include exactly one valid value for the <\/ins> A trailer section is sent as a field block after both the request or response field block and all the DATA frames have been sent. The HEADERS frame starting the field block that comprises the trailer section has the END_STREAM flag set. <\/del> , <\/ins> The following example includes both a 100 (Continue) status code, which is sent in response to a request containing a \"100-continue\" token in the Expect header field, and a trailer section: <\/del> , and <\/ins> 8.1.4. <\/del> pseudo-header fields, unless it is a CONNECT. An HTTP request that omits mandatory pseudo-header fields is malformed. <\/ins> In general, an HTTP client is unable to retry a non-idempotent request when an error occurs because there is no means to determine the nature of the error. It is possible that some server processing occurred prior to the error, which could result in undesirable effects if the request were reattempted. <\/del> Individual HTTP\/2 requests do not carry an explicit indicator of protocol version. All HTTP\/2 messages implicitly have a protocol version of \"2.0\" (see HTTP). <\/ins> HTTP\/2 provides two mechanisms for providing a guarantee to a client that a request has not been processed: <\/del> 8.3.2. <\/ins> Requests that have not been processed have not failed; clients MAY automatically retry them, even those with non-idempotent methods. <\/del> For HTTP\/2 responses, a single <\/ins> A server MUST NOT indicate that a stream has not been processed unless it can guarantee that fact. If frames that are on a stream are passed to the application layer for any stream, then REFUSED_STREAM MUST NOT be used for that stream, and a GOAWAY frame MUST include a stream identifier that is greater than or equal to the given stream identifier. <\/del> pseudo-header field is defined that carries the HTTP status code field (see HTTP). This pseudo-header field MUST be included in all responses, including interim responses; otherwise, the response is malformed. <\/ins> In addition to these mechanisms, the PING frame provides a way for a client to easily test a connection. Connections that remain idle can become broken as some middleboxes (for instance, network address translators or load balancers) silently discard connection bindings. The PING frame allows a client to safely test whether a connection is still active without sending a request. <\/del> HTTP\/2 responses implicitly have a protocol version of \"2.0\". <\/ins> 8.2. <\/del> 8.4. <\/ins> HTTP\/2 allows a server to pre-emptively send (or \"push\") responses (along with corresponding \"promised\" requests) to a client in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4a3dbc59d1b8dc68a2ea597bb1fa03c2aecd05c34b9012800bf7ea2d281ccc05","title":"","text":"PROTOCOL_ERROR. A server cannot set the SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH setting to a value other than 0 (see SettingValues). 8.2.1. <\/del> 8.4.1. <\/ins> Server push is semantically equivalent to a server responding to a request; however, in this case, that request is also sent by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-78cd16927efc68da0fc0cd52a3830cab21bd46a9dc84d7f793bfd3cf8723a166","title":"","text":"into the \"reserved (local)\" state for the server and the \"reserved (remote)\" state for the client. 8.2.2. <\/del> 8.4.2. <\/ins> After sending the PUSH_PROMISE frame, the server can begin delivering the pushed response as a HttpResponse on a server-initiated stream"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8c08bb0114b1962af4ad50f8fc642edede9c7c30663fba84dd6d13a9bc051d36","title":"","text":"and ends with a frame bearing END_STREAM, which places the stream in the \"closed\" state. 8.3. <\/del> 8.5. <\/ins> In HTTP\/1.x, the pseudo-method CONNECT (HTTP) is used to convert an HTTP connection into a tunnel to a remote host. CONNECT is primarily used with HTTP proxies to establish a TLS session with an origin server for the purposes of interacting with <\/del> The CONNECT method (HTTP) is used to convert an HTTP connection into a tunnel to a remote host. CONNECT is primarily used with HTTP proxies to establish a TLS session with an origin server for the purposes of interacting with <\/ins> resources. In HTTP\/2, the CONNECT method is used to establish a tunnel over a single HTTP\/2 stream to a remote host for similar purposes. A CONNECT header section is constructed as defined in HttpRequest (\"HttpRequest\"), with a few differences. Specifically: <\/del> In HTTP\/2, the CONNECT method establishes a tunnel over a single HTTP\/2 stream to a remote host, rather than converting the entire connection to a tunnel. A CONNECT header section is constructed as defined in HttpRequest (\"HttpRequest\"), with a few differences. Specifically: <\/ins> A CONNECT request that does not conform to these restrictions is malformed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-078d57c89d7ac94df846a690b19a1713fc770c475b598d52f011d30a6068ade2","title":"","text":"the RST bit set if it detects an error with the stream or the HTTP\/2 connection. 8.6. HTTP\/2 does not support the 101 (Switching Protocols) informational status code (HTTP). The semantics of 101 (Switching Protocols) aren't applicable to a multiplexed protocol. Alternative protocols are able to use the same mechanisms that HTTP\/2 uses to negotiate their use (see starting). 8.7. In general, an HTTP client is unable to retry a non-idempotent request when an error occurs because there is no means to determine the nature of the error (see HTTP). It is possible that some server processing occurred prior to the error, which could result in undesirable effects if the request were reattempted. HTTP\/2 provides two mechanisms for providing a guarantee to a client that a request has not been processed: Requests that have not been processed have not failed; clients MAY automatically retry them, even those with non-idempotent methods. A server MUST NOT indicate that a stream has not been processed unless it can guarantee that fact. If frames that are on a stream are passed to the application layer for any stream, then REFUSED_STREAM MUST NOT be used for that stream, and a GOAWAY frame MUST include a stream identifier that is greater than or equal to the given stream identifier. In addition to these mechanisms, the PING frame provides a way for a client to easily test a connection. Connections that remain idle can become broken as some middleboxes (for instance, network address translators or load balancers) silently discard connection bindings. The PING frame allows a client to safely test whether a connection is still active without sending a request. 8.8. This section shows HTTP\/1.1 requests and responses, with illustrations of equivalent HTTP\/2 requests and responses. An HTTP GET request includes control data and a request header with no message content and is therefore transmitted as a single HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames containing the serialized block of request header fields. The HEADERS frame in the following has both the END_HEADERS and END_STREAM flags set; no CONTINUATION frames are sent. Similarly, a response that includes only control data and a response header is transmitted as a HEADERS frame (again, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames) containing the serialized block of response header fields. An HTTP POST request that includes control data and a request header and message content is transmitted as one HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames containing the request header, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last CONTINUATION (or HEADERS) frame having the END_HEADERS flag set and the final DATA frame having the END_STREAM flag set: Note that data contributing to any given field line could be spread between field block fragments. The allocation of field lines to frames in this example is illustrative only. A response that includes control data and a response header and message content is transmitted as a HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames, followed by one or more DATA frames, with the last DATA frame in the sequence having the END_STREAM flag set: An informational response using a 1xx status code other than 101 is transmitted as a HEADERS frame, followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames. A trailer section is sent as a field block after both the request or response field block and all the DATA frames have been sent. The HEADERS frame starting the field block that comprises the trailer section has the END_STREAM flag set. The following example includes both a 100 (Continue) status code, which is sent in response to a request containing a \"100-continue\" token in the Expect header field, and a trailer section: <\/ins> 9. This section outlines attributes of the HTTP protocol that improve"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4d38866b94668bd900c406ba3c23533a9fb54c90195d94059fb1b31f6596ab05","title":"","text":"Implementations MUST support ephemeral key exchange sizes of at least 2048 bits for cipher suites that use ephemeral finite field Diffie- Hellman (DHE) TLS13 and 224 bits for cipher suites that use ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) RFC4492. Clients MUST accept <\/del> elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) RFC8422. Clients MUST accept <\/ins> DHE sizes of up to 4096 bits. Endpoints MAY treat negotiation of key sizes smaller than the lower limits as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type INADEQUATE_SECURITY."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fb6e1a95e9489174fe62e28fc8be724e06f64c65ec5ff30c2284d14d7822a727","title":"","text":"to distinguish them from decimal literals. This specification describes binary formats using the convention described in QUIC. <\/del> described in QUIC. Note that this format uses network byte order and high-valued bits are listed before low-valued bits. <\/ins> The following terms are used:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-331dcd37c08add4296560f8c85c90a2817d8241fce4a2d7f4c3e5ca6e4278265","title":"","text":"largely independent of each other, so a blocked or stalled request or response does not prevent progress on other streams. Flow control and prioritization ensure that it is possible to efficiently use multiplexed streams. FlowControl helps to ensure that only data that can be used by a receiver is transmitted. StreamPriority ensures that limited resources can be directed to the most important streams first. <\/del> Effective use of multiplexing depends on flow control and prioritization. FlowControl ensures that it is possible to efficiently use multiplexed streams by restricting data that is transmitted to what the receiver is able to handle. StreamPriority ensures that limited resources are used most effectively. This revision of HTTP\/2 deprecates the priority signaling scheme from RFC7540. <\/ins> Because HTTP fields used in a connection can contain large amounts of redundant data, frames that contain them are FieldBlock. This has"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-0d31390ec62dc4114a7ec095cec5d7ffb4d771d4c644eb5a820cc5ac7689281b","title":"","text":"header field that appears in a field block after a regular field line MUST be treated as malformed. The same pseudo-header field name MUST NOT appear more than once in a field block. A field block for an HTTP request or response that contains a repeated pseudo-header field name MUST be treated as malformed. <\/ins> 8.3.1. The following pseudo-header fields are defined for HTTP\/2 requests:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f0c877e88995c9f1aed7f254fd5f6ae0a76d9301d694177bcc8ed0fd78a16395","title":"","text":"compression and allowing multiple concurrent exchanges on the same connection. This specification is an alternative to, but does not obsolete, the HTTP\/1.1 message syntax. HTTP's existing semantics remain unchanged. <\/del> This document obsoletes RFC 7540 and RFC 8740. Discussion Venues"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1a597cff1e2a1280881231c6490cc92da4a2a23309f64f43fc9bc62365bc28b1","title":"","text":"3.1. The protocol defined in this document has two identifiers. Negotiating \"h2\" or \"h2c\" implies the use of the transport, security, framing, and message semantics described in this document. <\/del> The protocol defined in this document has two identifiers. Creating a connection based on either implies the use of the transport, security, framing, and message semantics described in this document. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e0bc7ed6b83a1bc5510f5630504e29f5429cca670b38ff690e1b13cf59cc6417","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame changes the connection state as described in FieldBlock. The HEADERS frame can include padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the field block fragment MUST be treated as a PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> The total number of padding octets is determined by the value of the Pad Length field. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the field block fragment MUST be treated as a PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4614277e9c47525cc78f14ec38a3b4bc5066bdf75a7c409b78de434a3f002f2f","title":"","text":"Note that an illegal stream identifier is an identifier for a stream that is not currently in the \"idle\" state. The PUSH_PROMISE frame can include padding. Padding fields and flags are identical to those defined for DATA. <\/del> The total number of padding octets is determined by the value of the Pad Length field. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the field block fragment MUST be treated as a PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f9588315e413650ea1ea1fc8d4b5823297fc01dc4734e5fef72ddc64cbed1ac2","title":"","text":"1. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a wildly successful protocol. However, the way HTTP\/1.1 uses the underlying transport (HTTP11) has several characteristics that have a negative overall effect on application performance today. In particular, HTTP\/1.0 allowed only one request to be outstanding at a time on a given TCP connection. HTTP\/1.1 added request pipelining, but this only partially addressed request concurrency and still suffers from head-of-line blocking. Therefore, HTTP\/1.0 and HTTP\/1.1 clients that need to make many requests use multiple connections to a server in order to achieve concurrency and thereby reduce latency. <\/del> The performance of applications using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is linked to how each version of HTTP uses the underlying transport, and the conditions under which the transport operates. Making multiple concurrent requests can reduce latency and improve application performance. HTTP\/1.0 allowed only one request to be outstanding at a time on a given TCP connection. HTTP\/1.1 (HTTP11) added request pipelining, but this only partially addressed request concurrency and still suffers from application-layer head-of-line blocking. Therefore, HTTP\/1.0 and HTTP\/1.1 clients use multiple connections to a server to make concurrent requests. <\/ins> Furthermore, HTTP fields are often repetitive and verbose, causing unnecessary network traffic as well as causing the initial TCP TCP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c6b986db0a93fa8d5fcc795f69645b11536063f9308d409b2030d25764fe257f","title":"","text":"TCP connections can be used in comparison to HTTP\/1.x. This means less competition with other flows and longer-lived connections, which in turn lead to better utilization of available network capacity. Note, however, that TCP head-of-line blocking is not addressed by this protocol. <\/ins> Finally, HTTP\/2 also enables more efficient processing of messages through use of binary message framing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fd4eb77ac22f5b8014fd577e3d7e80d3b45a25a7428d1a7f8086192554f78e90","title":"","text":"11.7. Previous versions of this document (RFC7540) registered an upgrade token. This capability has been removed: see versioning. <\/del> RFC7540 registered an upgrade token. This capability has been removed: see versioning. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fed63aa4b7af7c82ad93ada32cb7de669e64b0bde5e963149ccd1cc26d888bad","title":"","text":"does not affect the existing options for extending HTTP, such as defining new methods, status codes, or fields (see HTTP). Extensions are permitted to use new FrameHeader, new SettingValues, or new ErrorCodes. Registries are established for managing these extension points: iana-frames, iana-settings, and iana-errors. <\/del> Extensions are permitted to use new FrameHeader, new SETTINGS, or new ErrorCodes. Registries are established for managing these extension points: iana-frames, iana-settings, and iana-errors. <\/ins> Implementations MUST ignore unknown or unsupported values in all extensible protocol elements. Implementations MUST discard frames"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-33e12a5b65f1e62b3c76abb0aad59e4191398657bd5f0f668ab0a2e5bdb8ac5a","title":"","text":"Streams have the following states: In the absence of more specific guidance elsewhere in this document, implementations SHOULD treat the receipt of a frame that is not expressly permitted in the description of a state as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. Note that PRIORITY can be sent and received in any stream state. Frames of unknown types are ignored. <\/del> In the absence of more specific rules, implementations SHOULD treat the receipt of a frame that is not expressly permitted in the description of a state as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. Note that PRIORITY can be sent and received in any stream state. The rules in this section only apply to frames defined in this document. Receipt of frames for which the semantics are unknown cannot be treated as an error as the conditions for sending and receiving those frames are also unknown; see extensibility. <\/ins> An example of the state transitions for an HTTP request\/response exchange can be found in HttpExamples. An example of the state"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-9d09c99054472e14075caa76ea89063626d02f32e3dbaa7321bb4976cee9ebff","title":"","text":"PROTOCOL_ERROR; errors on the connection flow-control window MUST be treated as a ConnectionErrorHandler. WINDOW_UPDATE can be sent by a peer that has sent a frame bearing the END_STREAM flag. This means that a receiver could receive a <\/del> WINDOW_UPDATE can be sent by a peer that has sent a frame with the END_STREAM flag set. This means that a receiver could receive a <\/ins> WINDOW_UPDATE frame on a \"half-closed (remote)\" or \"closed\" stream. A receiver MUST NOT treat this as an error (see StreamStates)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5ae040cf2be264d2b49caa507fe3cc24af25e9796c01313b8a78dd700f1f2b72","title":"","text":"interim response consists of a HEADERS frames (which might be followed by zero or more CONTINUATION frames) containing the control data and header section of an interim (1xx) HTTP response (see HTTP). A HEADERS frame with an END_STREAM flag that carries an informational status code is malformed. <\/del> A HEADERS frame with the END_STREAM flag set that carries an informational status code is malformed. <\/ins> The last frame in the sequence bears an END_STREAM flag, noting that a HEADERS frame bearing the END_STREAM flag can be followed by <\/del> a HEADERS frame with the END_STREAM flag set can be followed by <\/ins> CONTINUATION frames that carry any remaining fragments of the field block."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-335a8b8ffdabafecd8a65846899f8c05691a3754965071332fb7e6a2db3541fb","title":"","text":"An HTTP request\/response exchange fully consumes a single stream. A request starts with the HEADERS frame that puts the stream into an \"open\" state. The request ends with a frame bearing END_STREAM, which causes the stream to become \"half-closed (local)\" for the <\/del> \"open\" state. The request ends with a frame with the END_STREAM flag set, which causes the stream to become \"half-closed (local)\" for the <\/ins> client and \"half-closed (remote)\" for the server. A response stream starts with zero or more interim responses in HEADERS frames or a HEADERS frame containing a final status code."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-db41c5ff0b1b20566bb6e55711c63a6eb12282d9f0bd09fc040552ab2312cf74","title":"","text":"that has not been sent and received. When this is true, a server MAY request that the client abort transmission of a request without error by sending a RST_STREAM with an error code of NO_ERROR after sending a complete response (i.e., a frame with the END_STREAM flag). <\/del> a complete response (i.e., a frame with the END_STREAM flag set). <\/ins> Clients MUST NOT discard responses as a result of receiving such a RST_STREAM, though clients can always discard responses at their discretion for other reasons."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a8cddf81349d693b75f1784c1bbe364db24e4203bc469bc3c8034b518b36488a","title":"","text":"The response for a PUSH_PROMISE stream begins with a HEADERS frame, which immediately puts the stream into the \"half-closed (remote)\" state for the server and \"half-closed (local)\" state for the client, and ends with a frame bearing END_STREAM, which places the stream in the \"closed\" state. <\/del> and ends with a frame with the END_STREAM flag set, which places the stream in the \"closed\" state. <\/ins> 8.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-cd0890b7de183dd7cb7de87daed501cd0cdd32aa70f8a4d501e2c19da5ae0ed1","title":"","text":"The TCP connection can be closed by either peer. The END_STREAM flag on a DATA frame is treated as being equivalent to the TCP FIN bit. A client is expected to send a DATA frame with the END_STREAM flag set after receiving a frame bearing the END_STREAM flag. A proxy that <\/del> after receiving a frame with the END_STREAM flag set. A proxy that <\/ins> receives a DATA frame with the END_STREAM flag set sends the attached data with the FIN bit set on the last TCP segment. A proxy that receives a TCP segment with the FIN bit set sends a DATA frame with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-67b1fa748405b6700de04f751fe31d89a42cdf5d57e9303061d2329a6fcd789a","title":"","text":"FieldBlock. The total number of padding octets is determined by the value of the Pad Length field. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the field block fragment MUST be treated as a PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> Pad Length field. If the length of the padding is the length of the frame payload or greater, the recipient MUST treat this as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d6331707132dd68b71503ed23999b65d196fd370e5c11a9f5176cdaf92789816","title":"","text":"that is not currently in the \"idle\" state. The total number of padding octets is determined by the value of the Pad Length field. Padding that exceeds the size remaining for the field block fragment MUST be treated as a PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/del> Pad Length field. If the length of the padding is the length of the frame payload or greater, the recipient MUST treat this as a ConnectionErrorHandler of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-52aab5b93a3fe54f0f425a2117d2cb18715e968d348f3b526452c6636df3e7ee","title":"","text":"3.1. The protocol defined in this document has two identifiers. Negotiating \"h2\" or \"h2c\" implies the use of the transport, security, <\/del> The protocol defined in this document has two identifiers. Creating a connection based on either implies the use of the transport, <\/ins> framing, and message semantics described in this document. 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-c9957abe31dc47461b670e77074f03b853c919e15f41fa43d28c8574dc9338fa","title":"","text":"10. The use of TLS is necessary to provide many of the security properties of this protocol. Many of the claims in this section do not hold unless TLS is used as described in TLSUsage. <\/ins> 10.1. HTTP\/2 relies on the HTTP definition of authority for determining"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f359ce958c109c1f6e73ccf4b324b7c7af1586acfd6050462748d703adde74da","title":"","text":"3.3. A client can learn that a particular server supports HTTP\/2 by other means. For example, ALT-SVC describes a mechanism for advertising this capability. A client MUST send the ConnectionHeader and then MAY immediately send HTTP\/2 frames to such a server; servers can identify these connections by the presence of the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; implementations that support HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/del> means. For example, a client could be configured with knowledge that a server supports HTTP\/2. A client that knows that a server supports HTTP\/2 can establish a TCP connection and send the ConnectionHeader followed by HTTP\/2 frames. Servers can identify these connections by the presence of the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; implementations that support HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> Likewise, the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bbb41a2b08c8deac9b0d8ed017a857e7a8c9992403933806310c0afe75e41720","title":"","text":"8.2.1. HPACK is capable of carrying field names or values that are not valid in HTTP. Though HPACK can carry any octet, fields are not valid in the following cases: <\/del> The definitions of field names and values in HTTP prohibits some characters that HPACK might be able to convey. HTTP\/2 implementations SHOULD validate field names and values according to their definitions in Sections HTTP and HTTP respectively and treat messages that contain prohibited characters as malformed. Failure to validate fields can be exploited for request smuggling attacks. In particular, unvalidated fields might enable attacks when messages are forwarded using HTTP11, where characters such as CR and COLON are used as delimiters. Implementations that do not fully validate field names and values MUST perform the following minimal validation: <\/ins> A request or response that contains a field that violates any of these conditions MUST be treated as malformed. In particular, an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-babe46d6f12cffc4b51afe8bd83df8b233c403029b53bd956671f489384600bc","title":"","text":"MUST NOT forward fields that contain any of the values that are listed as prohibited above. A recipient MAY treat a message that contains a field name or value that includes other characters disallowed by HTTP and HTTP as malformed. When a request message violates one of the requirements above, it SHOULD be responded to using the 400 (Bad Request) status code (HTTP) before the stream is reset, unless a more suitable status code is defined, or the status code cannot be sent (e.g., because the error occurs in a trailer field). Note that field values that are not valid according to the definition of the corresponding field do not cause a request to be malformed; the requirements above only apply to the generic syntax for field values as defined in HTTP. <\/del> When a request message violates one of these requirements, an implementation SHOULD generate a HTTP, unless a more suitable status code is defined or the status code cannot be sent (e.g., because the error occurs in a trailer field). <\/ins> 8.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ce45c6a7a3fab7601acf5f1221bdf65f0ade1b8e4d4c53ea6bec164c8fed7169","title":"","text":"connection and send the ConnectionHeader followed by HTTP\/2 frames. Servers can identify these connections by the presence of the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; implementations that support HTTP\/2 over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/del> connections over cleartext TCP; HTTP\/2 connections over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> Likewise, the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5e3249099a20afa949e8be05129c01c91b0d7e2b87d9b78c832c4a64e04d4b90","title":"","text":"HTTP\/2 uses DATA frames to carry message content. The transfer encoding defined in HTTP11 cannot be used in HTTP\/2. <\/del> transfer encoding defined in HTTP11 cannot be used in HTTP\/2; see ConnectionSpecific. <\/ins> Trailer fields are carried in a field block that also terminates the stream. That is, trailer fields comprise a sequence starting with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-d499f6f788a4844085483b688aa6d84962894a4949b2239fb92b5e3b4077614e","title":"","text":"header field (HTTP) to indicate connection-specific header fields; in this protocol, connection-specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate an HTTP\/2 message containing connection-specific header fields; any message containing connection- specific header fields MUST be treated as malformed. <\/del> connection-specific header fields. This includes the header field and those listed as having connection-specific semantics in HTTP (that is, , , , and ). Any message containing connection-specific header fields MUST be treated as malformed. <\/ins> The only exception to this is the TE header field, which MAY be present in an HTTP\/2 request; when it is, it MUST NOT contain any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b4e9771fb058af7bd1ca044410a80f5799674c595caa3883e5947fda9152d316","title":"","text":"status code (HTTP). The semantics of 101 (Switching Protocols) aren't applicable to a multiplexed protocol. Alternative protocols are able to use the same <\/del> multiplexed protocol. Similar functionality might be enabled through the use of RFC8441 and other protocols are able to use the same <\/ins> mechanisms that HTTP\/2 uses to negotiate their use (see starting). 8.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-bbf6901f0fa084da618a1186493c773ff7593e482367efadafb06ce1e325bb07","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 frame type codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry manages an 8-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry operates under either of the RFC8126 or RFC8126 policies. <\/del> Frame Type\" registry operates under either of the \"IETF Review\" (RFC8126) or \"IESG Approval\" (RFC8126) policies. <\/ins> New entries in this registry require the following information:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-72f80e549744f58c0139b5aa4fd6c4e5b77ac004526f46d493abe1cbbc91a2c2","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 settings. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry manages a 16-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry operates under the RFC8126. <\/del> Settings\" registry operates under the \"Expert Review\" policy (RFC8126). <\/ins> New registrations are advised to provide the following information:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-ec485202fa9c1e82fc0bc19156b0f43c4d7d4e5fd3a60de7c2ebb95f81bd45a3","title":"","text":"This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 error codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry manages a 32-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry operates under the RFC8126. <\/del> Error Code\" registry operates under the \"Expert Review\" policy (RFC8126). <\/ins> Registrations for error codes are required to include a description of the error code. An expert reviewer is advised to examine new"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-45dd3e53cfe84635e21dfe57343913643418b465104be75e80bc7ef2eb1256d1","title":"","text":"PUSH_PROMISE frames. The body of a PUSH_PROMISE includes a \"Promised-Stream-ID\". This unsigned 31-bit integer indentifies the stream the endpoint intends to start sending frames for. The promised stream identifier MUST be a valid choice for the next stream sent by the sender (see <\/del> unsigned 31-bit integer identifies the stream the endpoint intends to start sending frames for. The promised stream identifier MUST be a valid choice for the next stream sent by the sender (see <\/ins> StreamCreation). PUSH_PROMISE frames MUST be associated with an existing stream. If"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a17adea96d59ec101708687b9cba49a9888c07d3c3af840aceab7738c9c6f666","title":"","text":"The HEADERS frame is associated with an existing stream. If a HEADERS frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the receipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/del> recipient MUST respond with a StreamErrorHandler of type <\/ins> PROTOCOL_ERROR. The HEADERS frame changes the connection state as defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-94587da9e0efe6504b1445a64001a2992a72d24bf847aee1a83ada233944b489","title":"","text":"HTTP fields (HTTP) are conveyed by HTTP\/2 in the HEADERS, CONTINUATION, and PUSH_PROMISE frames, compressed with COMPRESSION. To improve efficiency and interoperability, field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing an HTTP\/2 message. <\/del> Field names MUST be converted to lowercase when constructing an HTTP\/2 message. <\/ins> 8.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8f10e9f525d5da28facae222a626b10ee29e855b1e94402f3e727c5f865c65d2","title":"","text":"This section marks the header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/del> header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/ins> 11.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-a49bd640d5eb79671659de0fa4f5ed6398d5a2de4082b752439b3d822d7cf3b8","title":"","text":"11.7. RFC7540 registered an upgrade token. This capability has been removed: see versioning. <\/del> This section records the upgrade token registered in RFC7540 as obsolete. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated as follows: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-72188ca56283cd6448557d5af8867241e2b70c262e0c7986313af6f90079832f","title":"","text":"A malformed request or response is one that is an otherwise valid sequence of HTTP\/2 frames but is invalid due to the presence of extraneous frames, prohibited fields or pseudo-header fields, the absence of mandatory fields or pseudo-header fields, the inclusion of uppercase field names, or invalid field names and\/or values (in certain circumstances; see HttpHeaders). <\/del> absence of mandatory pseudo-header fields, the inclusion of uppercase field names, or invalid field names and\/or values (in certain circumstances; see HttpHeaders). <\/ins> A request or response that includes message content can include a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-44ab775cda3c9d18898f02630fcb5f07872127a5480644276448644ca6a03412","title":"","text":"not use TLS. Once TLS negotiation is complete, both the client and the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader. <\/del> send a preface. <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-50f845d2738a3d8fec18d9c62ef2a50a28dda4fa2b9397f75586b8e95ea5ebfc","title":"","text":"a server supports HTTP\/2. A client that knows that a server supports HTTP\/2 can establish a TCP connection and send the ConnectionHeader followed by HTTP\/2 frames. Servers can identify these connections by the presence of the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; HTTP\/2 connections over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/del> connection and send the preface followed by HTTP\/2 frames. Servers can identify these connections by the presence of the connection preface. This only affects the establishment of HTTP\/2 connections over cleartext TCP; HTTP\/2 connections over TLS MUST use TLS-ALPN. <\/ins> Likewise, the server MUST send a ConnectionHeader. <\/del> Likewise, the server MUST send a preface. <\/ins> Without additional information, prior support for HTTP\/2 is not a strong signal that a given server will support HTTP\/2 for future"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-40c760bb9c293a56f2f6c069d8dcdad650c0811e1fe42c065a8d38156ff9faa8","title":"","text":"defining new methods, status codes, or fields (see HTTP). Extensions are permitted to use new FrameHeader, new SETTINGS, or new ErrorCodes. Registries are established for managing these extension points: iana-frames, iana-settings, and iana-errors. <\/del> ErrorCodes. Registries for managing these extension points are defined in RFC7540. <\/ins> Implementations MUST ignore unknown or unsupported values in all extensible protocol elements. Implementations MUST discard frames"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-df6b333e811287b747f6b225d597ad68a7d5973eee04034f088e20ac6aceeeeb","title":"","text":"protocol. The cleartext version of HTTP\/2 has minimal protection against cross- protocol attacks. The ConnectionHeader contains a string that is designed to confuse HTTP\/1.1 servers, but no special protection is offered for other protocols. <\/del> protocol attacks. The preface contains a string that is designed to confuse HTTP\/1.1 servers, but no special protection is offered for other protocols. <\/ins> 10.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-b0bdf3877148b38d664a50c49b587a3aa2e3eac022fdb70201f991af0706bf43","title":"","text":"11. A string for identifying HTTP\/2 is entered into the \"Application- Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs\" registry established in TLS-ALPN. This document establishes a registry for frame types, settings, and error codes. These new registries appear in the new \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 (HTTP\/2)\" section. <\/del> This revision of the document marks the header field registered in RFC7540 obsolete. <\/del> header field and the <\/ins> This document registers the method for use in HTTP to avoid collisions with the ConnectionHeader. 11.1. This document creates two registrations for the identification of HTTP\/2 (see discover-https) in the \"Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs\" registry established in TLS-ALPN. The \"h2\" string identifies HTTP\/2 when used over TLS: The \"h2c\" string identifies HTTP\/2 when used over cleartext TCP: 11.2. <\/del> Upgrade token, both defined in RFC7540, as obsolete. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 frame type codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry manages an 8-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Frame Type\" registry operates under either of the \"IETF Review\" (RFC8126) or \"IESG Approval\" (RFC8126) policies. <\/del> RFC7540 registered the <\/ins> New entries in this registry require the following information: <\/del> and <\/ins> The entries in the following table are registered by this document. <\/del> ALPN identifiers along with the <\/ins> 11.3. <\/del> HTTP method. RFC 7540 also established a registry for frame types, settings, and error codes. These registrations and registries apply to HTTP\/2, but are not redefined in this document. <\/ins> This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 settings. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry manages a 16-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Settings\" registry operates under the \"Expert Review\" policy (RFC8126). <\/del> [RFC Editor: please remove this paragraph.] IANA is requested to update references in these registries to refer to this document. The registration of the <\/ins> New registrations are advised to provide the following information: <\/del> method needs to be updated to refer to preface; all other section numbers have not changed. <\/ins> The entries in the following table are registered by this document. 11.4. This document establishes a registry for HTTP\/2 error codes. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry manages a 32-bit space. The \"HTTP\/2 Error Code\" registry operates under the \"Expert Review\" policy (RFC8126). Registrations for error codes are required to include a description of the error code. An expert reviewer is advised to examine new registrations for possible duplication with existing error codes. Use of existing registrations is to be encouraged, but not mandated. New registrations are advised to provide the following information: The entries in the following table are registered by this document. 11.5. <\/del> 11.1. <\/ins> This section marks the header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: 11.6. <\/del> header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/ins> This section registers the method in the \"HTTP Method Registry\" (HTTP). <\/del> 11.2. <\/ins> 11.7. <\/del> This section records the <\/ins> RFC7540 registered an upgrade token. This capability has been removed: see versioning. <\/del> upgrade token registered in RFC7540 as obsolete. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated as follows: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-1ddd7ec057e22bb882228816d1e3cb568039582dd77ed03bb6068ee4e465f3bd","title":"","text":"to HTTP\/2, but are not redefined in this document. [RFC Editor: please remove this paragraph.] IANA is requested to update references in these registries to refer to this document. The registration of the <\/del> update references to RFC 7540 in the following registries to refer to this document: Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs, HTTP\/2 Frame Type, HTTP\/2 Settings, HTTP\/2 Error Code, and HTTP Method Registry. The registration of the <\/ins> method needs to be updated to refer to preface; all other section numbers have not changed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-32a7e5d54beab9119052b722ff09764259cef0bee762a072bb748d94c7781937","title":"","text":"This section marks the header field registered in RFC7540 as obsoleted. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/del> header field registered by RFC7540 in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry as obsolete. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated to include the details as required by HTTP: <\/ins> 11.2. This section records the upgrade token registered in RFC7540 as obsolete. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated as <\/del> upgrade token registered by RFC7540 in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry as obsolete. This capability has been removed: see versioning. The registration is updated as <\/ins> follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2092142eb52182ae758a443878ff1107ec684a1eb5cd09f53c8a0c619cacd32e","title":"","text":"All numeric values are in network byte order. Values are unsigned unless otherwise indicated. Literal values are provided in decimal or hexadecimal as appropriate. Hexadecimal literals are prefixed with <\/del> with \" <\/ins> to distinguish them from decimal literals. <\/del> \" to distinguish them from decimal literals. <\/ins> This specification describes binary formats using the convention described in QUIC. Note that this format uses network byte order and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f450248ecf4e780d1c73e7778be9ab5d22b41241722348e9bc04d0327681086a","title":"","text":"The client connection preface starts with a sequence of 24 octets, which in hex notation is: That is, the connection preface starts with the string <\/del> That is, the connection preface starts with the string \" <\/ins> . This sequence MUST be followed by a SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS), <\/del> \". This sequence MUST be followed by a SETTINGS frame (SETTINGS), <\/ins> which MAY be empty. The client sends the client connection preface as the first application data octets of a connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-5da42b70aec0ba786b9afd032532aa40dd38c7f242543203fbfd782e523f7db3","title":"","text":"While some of the frame and stream layer concepts are isolated from HTTP, this specification does not define a completely generic frame layer. The frame and stream layers are tailored to the needs of the HTTP protocol and server push. <\/del> HTTP protocol. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-497050b4027f30d64691830907e89126bfa68a412500c4ca41d55bf8df8567bd","title":"","text":"The HEADERS+PRIORITY frame is identical to the HEADERS, preceded by a single reserved bit and a 31-bit priority; see StreamPriority. No type-specific flags are defined. <\/del> HEADERS+PRIORITY uses exactly the same flags as the HEADERS frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/ins> HEADERS+PRIORITY frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a HEADERS+PRIORITY frame is received whose stream identifier field is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2e969a2d61da5cc6372af4d1e6aad6b0ec5a2b40b76ac67185e429d6ef7e4ed1","title":"","text":"PushResources contains a thorough description of the use of PUSH_PROMISE frames. The body of a PUSH_PROMISE includes a \"Promised-Stream-ID\". This <\/del> The payload of a PUSH_PROMISE includes a \"Promised-Stream-ID\". This <\/ins> unsigned 31-bit integer identifies the stream the endpoint intends to start sending frames for. The promised stream identifier MUST be a valid choice for the next stream sent by the sender (see"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-8a6b0881ec4e243febe1c6b7cca4aa17c5c2ab5404c4de3240f31812eb3430db","title":"","text":"originating stream state changes to fully closed, all associated promised streams fully close as well. There are no additional type-specific flags defined. <\/del> PUSH_PROMISE uses exactly the same flags as the HEADERS frame. See HEADERS for any flags. <\/ins> Promised streams are not required to be used in order promised. The PUSH_PROMISE only reserves stream identifiers for later use."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-fcf8c5c0c08e27dcbe66dc0a1b663d70a475a48ec7f6a9a886399035a3712112","title":"","text":"Any number of HEADERS frames can may be sent on an existing stream at any time. The HEADERS frame does not define any type-specific flags. <\/del> Additional type-specific flags for the HEADERS frame are: <\/ins> The body of a HEADERS frame contains a HeaderBlock. <\/del> Bit 2 being set indicates that this frame does not contain the entire payload necessary to interpret the HEADERS data. The payload in any series of headers frames is only interpretable when HDR_CONTINUES has NOT been set, and then only when concatenated with the payload from the unbroken series of HEADERS frames where HDR_CONTINUES was set. When this bit is set for a HEADERS frame on a particular stream (A), HEADERS frames MUST NOT be sent on other streams until a HEADERS frame has been sent on the same stream (A) where the HDR_CONTINUES bit is unset. The payload of a HEADERS frame contains a HeaderBlock. <\/ins> The HEADERS frame is associated with an existing stream. If a HEADERS frame is received with a stream identifier of 0x0, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e2817546fa44c97d1a16d8993e271e5f2a979cf2584ceb25bc18d8bb7c26da73","title":"","text":"bandwidth-delay product (see RFC7323). Even with full awareness of the current bandwidth-delay product, implementation of flow control can be difficult. When using flow control, the receiver MUST read from the TCP receive buffer in a timely fashion. Failure to do so could lead to a deadlock when <\/del> implementation of flow control can be difficult. Endpoints MUST read and process HTTP\/2 frames from the TCP receive buffer as soon as data is available. Failure to read promptly could lead to a deadlock when <\/ins> critical frames, such as WINDOW_UPDATE, are not read and acted upon. Reading frames promptly does not expose endpoints to resource exhaustion attacks as HTTP\/2 flow control limits resource commitments. <\/ins> 5.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-aec7caf98e2c42f90ca6986095bc675fa1a86b0f4d81420509884ef004ca1b3f","title":"","text":"An endpoint that encounters a connection error SHOULD first send a GOAWAY frame (GOAWAY) with the stream identifier of the last stream that it successfully received from its peer. The GOAWAY frame includes an error code that indicates why the connection is <\/del> includes an ErrorCodes that indicates why the connection is <\/ins> terminating. After sending the GOAWAY frame for an error condition, the endpoint MUST close the TCP connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-57f6a40599fa6249b59f628248691ace1a44263bee2e63748ea1c05a60065243","title":"","text":"request. Similarly, intermediaries might forward incomplete messages before detecting errors. A server MAY generate a final response before receiving an entire request when the response does not depend on the remainder of the request being correct. A server or intermediary MAY use RST_STREAM -- with a code other than REFUSED_STREAM -- to abort a stream if a malformed request or response is received. <\/del> on the remainder of the request being correct. <\/ins> These requirements are intended to protect against several types of common attacks against HTTP; they are deliberately strict because"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-13b9bd9920953cbbf73a67d781cd7ef435e5a9bc37d18bc9b8bb87712a684fe3","title":"","text":"to \"open\". A PUSH_PROMISE frame will transition the server-initiated stream identified by the \"Promised Stream ID\" field in the frame payload from \"idle\" to \"reserved\". When a stream transitions out of the \"idle\" state, all streams that might have been initiated by that peer with a lower-valued stream identifier are implicitly transitioned to \"closed\". That is, an endpoint may skip a stream identifier, with the effect being that the skipped stream is immediately closed. <\/del> the \"idle\" state, all \"idle\" streams that might have been opened by the peer with a lower-valued stream identifier immediately transition to \"closed\". That is, an endpoint may skip a stream identifier, with the effect being that the skipped stream is immediately closed. <\/ins> Stream identifiers cannot be reused. Long-lived connections can result in an endpoint exhausting the available range of stream"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-22d4ea03e1e63628a80af08727fd9a332435273ec44d46e1bb7499e1ce9faf16","title":"","text":"when the peer has received and applied the changed parameter values. In order to provide such synchronization timepoints, the recipient of a SETTINGS frame in which the ACK flag is not set MUST apply the updated settings as soon as possible upon receipt. <\/del> updated settings as soon as possible upon receipt. SETTINGS frames are acknowledged in the order in which they are received. <\/ins> The values in the SETTINGS frame MUST be processed in the order they appear, with no other frame processing between values. Unsupported"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-2661102ad3c304dba0f609e9b383ed10f87c79730dd2657742d041aed8f64a94","title":"","text":"If the sender of a SETTINGS frame does not receive an acknowledgement within a reasonable amount of time, it MAY issue a ConnectionErrorHandler of type SETTINGS_TIMEOUT. <\/del> ConnectionErrorHandler of type SETTINGS_TIMEOUT. In setting a timeout, some allowance need to be made for processing delays at the peer; a timeout that is solely based on the round trip time between endpoints might result in spurious errors. <\/ins> 6.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-f7767418382cf3b98a9eca5afe30c35f5d45059c1fa6ab5e5b61f17d3a9d459f","title":"","text":"The receiver of a frame sends a WINDOW_UPDATE frame as it consumes data and frees up space in flow-control windows. Separate WINDOW_UPDATE frames are sent for the stream- and connection-level flow-control windows. <\/del> flow-control windows. Receivers are advised to have mechanisms in place to avoid sending WINDOW_UPDATE frames with very small increments; see RFC1122. <\/ins> A sender that receives a WINDOW_UPDATE frame updates the corresponding window by the amount specified in the frame."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-4813309d7e830a84724e2a99dd26ff1153303adf6c9f584802a32a373424b8e4","title":"","text":"of a header field does not equal the sum of the DATA frame payload lengths that form the content. A response that is defined to have no content, as described in HTTP, can have a non-zero <\/del> that form the content, unless the message is defined as having no content. For example, 204 or 304 responses contain no content, as does the response to a HEAD request. A response that is defined to have no content, as described in HTTP, MAY have a non-zero <\/ins> header field, even though no content is included in DATA frames."} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-65fbcd366b0bd5edf6a34cad48ea4bef235847cc48dc259680a433f78c93e8dd","title":"","text":"A client can use the SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS setting to limit the number of responses that can be concurrently pushed by a server. Advertising a SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS value of zero disables server push by preventing the server from creating the necessary streams. This does not prohibit a server from sending PUSH_PROMISE frames; clients need to reset any promised streams that are not wanted. <\/del> Advertising a SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS value of zero prevents the server from opening the streams necessary to push responses. However, this does not prevent the server from reserving streams using PUSH_PROMISE frames, because \"reserved\" streams do not count toward the concurrent stream limit. Clients that do not wish to receive pushed resources need to reset any unwanted reserved streams or set SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH to 0. <\/ins> Clients receiving a pushed response MUST validate that either the server is authoritative (see authority) or the proxy that provided"} +{"_id":"doc-en-http2-spec-e5ac633f01ebef7be3c65d285b1c7e5c56a0ef5d12325fb4d7430a67eb8fd4d2","title":"","text":"-1 and a NO_ERROR code. This signals to the client that a shutdown is imminent and that initiating further requests is prohibited. After allowing time for any in-flight stream creation (at least one round-trip time), the server can send another GOAWAY frame with an <\/del> round-trip time), the server MAY send another GOAWAY frame with an <\/ins> updated last stream identifier. This ensures that a connection can be cleanly shut down without losing requests."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-04eded49d9dc75e3bf9ff5a1e7bb83934540e6b41b5bc8735820aa5ff497ebed","title":"","text":"_RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication_ Source code and issues for this draft can be found at https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/I-D\/tree\/main\/draft-gruessing-moq- requirements [1]. <\/del> https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements [1]. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-964c06fb2cb98ffc32c2c9a2a33b007933904d72a10ac13b80eaf3686af1973e","title":"","text":"3. For the sake of completeness this is a description of the known use- cases that have been described which would have applicability to the real-time serving of media over QUIC, and MoQ participants should consider which use case(s) should be part of any work, and which can be excluded. Previously I-D.draft-rtpfolks-quic-rtp-over-quic defined several key use cases, in addition to several others which may be summarised under the following: Peer-to-peer interactive applications, such as telephony or video conferencing. This may be in a 1-to-1 scenario, or in a multi- party arrangement. TODO: add more description here. <\/del> Previously I-D.draft-rtpfolks-quic-rtp-over-quic defined several key use cases, in addition to several others defined elsewhere. The two use cases that are most applicable today given the existing and known future capabilities of QUIC include: <\/ins> Unidirectional live stream contribution. Two immediate scenarios that best describe this is firstly users on a streaming platform in a remote scenario from their phone live streaming an event or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a4d862a51a3408a92ea406d238657e129c970036ae0ea86eca9221b61e3c2c7e","title":"","text":"4. TODO: Fill this in with detail <\/del> This section lists requirements for providing real time media streaming over a QUIC connection. 4.1. When initiating a media session, both the sender and receiver should be able to negotiate the codecs, bitrates and other media details based on capabilities and preferences. 4.2. Media should be able to flow in either direction from client to server or vice-versa, either individually or concurrently. 4.3. TODO: Unsure if this should be a requirement. If it is, we have to consider two things: WebTransport supports HTTP\/2, are we going to explicitly exclude it? Also, WebTransport I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans- overview has normative language around congestion control which may be at odds with our potential requirements. 4.4. The protocol SHOULD have capabilities asides from TLS mutual authentication to allow hosts to authenticate one another, this should be kept simple but robust in nature to prevent attacks like credential brute-forcing. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-76781d2ea047b1c7ea7991cb40fc65c93aacfe0b204536d7886014d3df85af18","title":"","text":"should work with the relevant working groups and present our use- cases. 5.2. Even if multicast and other network broadcasting capabilities are used in delivering media in our use cases, as QUIC doesn't yet support it and it's inclusion would require a lot more complexity in both the specification and client implimentation this should be left out for now. <\/ins> 6. This document makes no requests of IANA."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-fecc1dcd999b5fd64a35115561a5b0d4820357c5233c2b93227b2ba2b33028a5","title":"","text":"8.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/I-D\/tree\/main\/draft-gruessing- moq-requirements <\/del> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-53d9bec96d47be580dd2344e3325f38bcd2f52e38151575629ef7c37b16f2683","title":"","text":"Note to Readers Source code and issues for this draft can be found at https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements [1]. <\/del> https:\/\/github.com\/moq-wg\/moq-requirements [1]. <\/ins> Discussion of this draft should take place on the IETF Media Over QUIC (MoQ) mailing list, at https:\/\/www.ietf.org\/mailman\/listinfo\/moq"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-c811f2b9c83908d83c2f349a91a294cf7808796a4171d89083fae190503d8f63","title":"","text":"For instance, a speaker in a conferencing application might make a statement, and then ask, \"but what do you folks think?\" If one of the listeners is able to answer in a timeframe that seems natural, without without waiting for the current speaker to explicitly \"hand over\" control of the conversation, this would qualify as \"Interactive\". <\/del> without waiting for the current speaker to explicitly \"hand over\" control of the conversation, this would qualify as \"Interactive\". <\/ins> Live Streaming use cases allow consumers of media to \"watch together\", without having a sense that one consumer is experiencing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-bdcb5f4a9d6724f2a8b0793870685a1a6762a10dd903f96f21f02f07ca94750e","title":"","text":"3.1.3. Where media is both sent and received; This may include audio from both microphone(s) and\/or cameras, or may include \"screen sharing\" or inclusion of other content such as slide, document, or video presentation. This may be done as client\/server, or peer to peer with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. The target for latency may be as large as 200ms or more for some media types such as audio, but other media types in this use case have much more stringent latency targets. <\/del> In the Video Conferencing\/Telephony use case, media is both sent and received. This use case typically includes audio and video media, and may also include one or more additional media types, such as \"screen sharing\" and other content such as slides, documents, or video presentations. This may be done as client\/server, or peer to peer with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. The target for latency may be as large as 200ms or more for some media types such as audio, but other media types in this use case have much more stringent latency targets. <\/ins> 3.2. For the video conferencing\/telephony use case, there can be additional scenarios where the audience greatly outnumbers the concurrent active participants, but any member of the audience could participate. As this has a much larger total number of participants - as many as Live Media Streaming lmstream, but with the bi- directionality of conferencing, this should be considered a \"hybrid\". There can be additional functionality as well that overlap between the two, such as \"live rewind\", or recording abilities. Another consideration is the limits of \"human bandwidth\" - as the number of sources are included into a given session increase, the amount of media that can usefully understood by a single person diminishes. To put it more simply - too many people talking at once is much more difficult to understand than one person speaking at a time, and this varies on the audience and circumstance. Subsequently this will define some limitations in the number of potential concurrent or semi-concurrent, bidirectional communications that occur. 3.3. <\/del> The use cases in this section like those in interact do set some expectations to minimise high and\/or highly variable latency, however their key difference is that are seldom bi-directional as their basis"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-550de8e14d4402585de75a8ff546aba9d58c40b98e17092d2a70ae6eb26e9c82","title":"","text":"over loss, and may be more accepting of having slightly more latency to increase guarantee of delivery. 3.3.1. <\/del> 3.2.1. <\/ins> Where media is received from a source for onwards handling into a distribution platform. The media may comprise of multiple audio and\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-484f8a043d74e68f18b823e6179bac0d9ecf93b5bd66613046a1f82eb751e389","title":"","text":"data sent by the receiver, and the media may go through additional steps of transcoding or transformation before being distributed. 3.3.2. <\/del> 3.2.2. <\/ins> Where media is sent onwards to another platform for further distribution and not directly used for presentation to an audience,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-ae838db442bf5fbaaf74cab993a5f0e36c6e229f46df9d380f0171720eabac44","title":"","text":"larger than final distribution output. Streams may be redundant with failover mechanisms in place. 3.3.3. <\/del> 3.2.3. <\/ins> Where media is received from a live broadcast or stream either as a broadcast with fixed duration or as ongoing 24\/7 output. The number"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-2b47060da80a7efe9fbaf0f21c8780b4f7c49776e52fb68330a36c652c8e4fa5","title":"","text":"advertisement breaks). The use of \"live rewind\" where a window of media between the live edge and trailing edge can be made available for clients to playback, either because the local player falls behind edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. <\/del> the leading edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. 3.3. For the video conferencing\/telephony use case, there can be additional scenarios where the audience greatly outnumbers the concurrent active participants, but any member of the audience could participate. This use case can have an audience as large as Live Media Streaming as described in lmstream, but also relies on the interactivity and bi-directionality of conferencing as in Video Conferencing as described in vidconf. For this reason, this type of use case can be considered a \"hybrid\". There can be additional functionality as well that overlap between the two, such as \"live rewind\", or recording abilities. Another consideration is the limits of \"human bandwidth\" - as the number of sources are included into a given session increase, the amount of media that can usefully understood by a single person diminishes. To put it more simply - too many people talking at once is much more difficult to understand than one person speaking at a time, and this varies on the audience and circumstance. Subsequently this will define some limitations in the number of potential concurrent or semi-concurrent, bidirectional communications that occur. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-d91876f297f171ec1aca5421de693f24d2a45cb31961e2613789a68ef77de718","title":"","text":"Whilst QUIC and conversely TLS supports the ability for mutual authentication through client and server presenting certificates and performing validation, this is infeasible in many use cases where provisioning of client TLS certificates is unsupported or infeasible. Thus, support for a primitive method of authentication between MoQ entities SHOULD be included to authenticate entities between one another, noting that implementations and deployments should determine which authorisation model if any is applicable. <\/del> provisioning of client TLS certificates is unsupported or impractical. Thus, support for a primitive method of authentication between MoQ entities SHOULD be included to authenticate entities between one another, noting that implementations and deployments should determine which authorisation model if any is applicable. <\/ins> 4.9.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-e87e3d178c5b97dba43821318a1788119236f5cf8fc2662fbb1278fd73f03f78","title":"","text":"7.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements <\/del> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/moq-wg\/moq-requirements <\/ins> [2] https:\/\/www.ietf.org\/mailman\/listinfo\/moq"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-9428a033d3074bd1a828c02719019cd37ccd50ccf7050e67ee9fccbc78bd727b","title":"","text":"being carried in the other direction, this would not qualify as \"Interactive\". 2.2. The MOQ working group has used a wide variety of terms, with some, but not enough, effort to reconcile terms in use in various drafts. As these drafts are being adopted by the MOQ working group, it seems right to make every effort to align terminology for ease of reading and implementation. This draft does not yet, but will, align with the terminology defined in I-D.draft-ietf-moq-transport, as a starting point. We note that -00 of that draft observes that the working group hasn't converged on terminology and definitions, and if MOQ terminology changes, the terminology in this draft will change accordingly. <\/ins> 3. Our goal in this section is to understand the range of use cases that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-731ca8aa4dd14e51b131357004c666e0dc0de216edd85431b76a8d967b834145","title":"","text":"control of packetization and transmission, with addtional support for retransmission as an optional extension. To provide an overview of interactive use cases, we can consider a conferencing session comprised of: Multiple emitters, publishing on multiple tracks (audio, video tracks and at different qualities) A media switch, sourcing tracks that represent a subset of tracks from across all the emitters. Such subset may represent tracks representing top 5 speakers at higher qualities and lot of other tracks for rest of the emitters at lower qualities. Multiple receivers, with varied receiving capacity (bandwidth limited), subscribing to subset of the tracks This setup relies on the following functionalities: Media Switches source new tracks but retain the media payload from the original emitters. This implies publishing new Track IDs sourced from the SFU, with object payload unchanged from the original emitters. Media Switches propagate a subset of tracks as-is from the emitters to the subscribers. This implies Track IDs to be unchanged between the emitters and the receivers. Subscribers explictly request one or more media tracks in appropriate qualities and dynamically move between the qualtiies during the course of the session. Another topology for the conferencing use-case is to use multiple distribution networks for delivering the media, with media switching functionality running across distribution networks and these media functions as part of the core distribution network as shown below. Such a topology needs to meet all the properties listed in the homogenous topology setup, however having multiple distribution networks, and relying on the distribution networks to carry out the media delivery, brings in further requirements towards a data model that enables tracks to be uniquely identifiable across the distribution networks and not just within a single distribution network. <\/ins> 3.1.1. In this use case the computation for running a video game (single or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-c09e8c9631c53922e48801e78a048953e31aa83ab3540bf9aca497eaeb62389f","title":"","text":"3.2.1. In a typical live video ingest, the broadcast client - for example, an Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) client, publishes the video content to an ingest server under a provider domain. The Track IDs are scoped to the broadcast for the application under a provider domain. <\/ins> Where media is received from a source for onwards handling into a distribution platform. The media may comprise of multiple audio and\/ or video sources. Bitrates may either be static or set dynamically"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-81428619e74f7ed024980839dc7e5db01a47cceaa4f6bd1a6c43b875138a5b26","title":"","text":"3.2.3. Where media is received from a live broadcast or stream either as a broadcast with fixed duration or as ongoing 24\/7 output. The number of receivers may vary depending on the type of content; breaking news events may see sharp, sudden spikes, whereas sporting and entertainment events may see a more gradual ramp up with a higher sustained peak with some changes based on match breaks or interludes. <\/del> In a reference live streaming example shown below, the emitter streams one or more tracks as part of the application operated under a provider domain, which is then distributed to multiple clients using some form of distribution server operating under the same provider domain, over a content distribution network. In this setup, one can visualize the ingest and distribution as two separate systems operating within a given provider domain. One implication of this organization is that the Track Ids used by the emitter need not match the ones referred to by the subscribers. This can be the case because the distribution server sources the media as new tracks (for instance, if the media is transcoded after ingest) In Live Media Streaming, media might be received from a live broadcast or stream either as a broadcast with fixed duration or as ongoing 24\/7 output. The number of receivers may vary depending on the type of content; breaking news events may see sharp, sudden spikes, whereas sporting and entertainment events may see a more gradual ramp up with a higher sustained peak with some changes based on match breaks or interludes. <\/ins> Such broadcasts may comprise of multiple audio or video outputs with different codecs or bitrates, and may also include other types of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-96478bc0e315a1209eaf4b82caa0fda08eee9af07c79a59ad5824bddc2064c6e","title":"","text":"MOQ protocol specifications will provide details on the supported media encapsulation(s). 4.6.1. Some video codecs have a complex structure. Consider an application using both temporal layering and spatial layering. It would send for example: an object representing the 30 fps frame at 720p an object representing the spatial enhancement of that frame to 1080p an object representing the 60 fps frame at 720p an object representing the spatial enhancement of that 60 fps frame to 1080p The encoding of the 30 fps frame depends on the previous 30 fps frames, but not on any 60 fps frame. The encoding of the 60 fps depends on the previous 30 fps frames, and possibly also on the previous 60 fps frames (there are options). The encoding of the spatial enhancement depends on the corresponding 720p frames, and also on the previous 1080p enhancements. Add a couple of layers, and the expression of dependencies can be very complex. The AV1 documentation for example provides schematics of a video stream with 3 frame rate options at 15, 30 and 60 fps, and two definition options, with a complex graph of dependencies. Other video encodings have similar provisions. They may differ in details, but there are constants: if some object is dropped, then all objects that have a dependency on it are useless. Of course, we could encode these dependencies as properties of the object being sent, stating for example that \"object 17 can only be decoded if objects 16, 11 and 7 are available.\" However, this approach leads to a lot of complexity in relays. We believe that a linear approach is preferable, using attributes of objects like delivery order or priorities. 4.6.2. The conversion from dependency graph to linear ordering is not unique. The simple graph in our example could be ordered either \"frame rate first\" versus \"definition first\". If the application chooses frame rate first, the policy is expressed as \"in case of congestion, drop the spatial enhancement objects first, and if that is not enough drop the 60 fps frames\". If the application chooses \"definition first\", the policy becomes \"drop the 60 fps frames and their corresponding 1080p enhancement first, and if that is not enough also drop the 1080p enhancement of the 30 fps frames\". More complex graphs will allow for more complex policies, maybe for example \"15 fps at 720p as a minimum, but try to ensure at least 30fps, then try to ensure 1080p, and if there is bandwidth available forward 60 fps at 1080p\". Such linearization requires choices, and the choices should be made by the application, based on the user experience requirements of the application. The relays will not understand all the variation of what the media is but the applications will need a way to indicate to the relays the information they will need to correctly order which data is sent first. 4.6.3. We propose to express dependencies using a combination of object number and object priority. Let's consider our example of an encoding providing both spatial enhancement and frame rate enhancement options, and suppose that the application has expressed a preference for frame rate. We can express that policy as follow: the frames are ordered first by time and when the time is the same by resolution. This determines the \"object number\" property. the frame priority will be set to 1 for the 720p 30 fps frame, 2 for the 720p 60 fps frames, and 3 for all the enhancement frames. If the application did instead express a preference for definition, object numbers will be assigned in the same way, but the priorities will be different: the frame priority will be set to 1 for the 720p 30 fps I frames and 2 for the 720p 30 fps P and B frames, 3 and 4 for the 1080p enhancements of the 60 fps frames, and 5 and 6 for the 60 fps frames and their enhancements. Object numbers and priorities will be set by the publisher of the track, and will not be modified by the relays. <\/ins> 4.7. Receivers SHOULD be able to as part of negotiation of a session MOQ-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-661a1a83d8001c36825d76e2511fd1b5a23cf57e19bd78861bd2a455ae3fab29","title":"","text":"4.8.1. It is possible to use groups as units of congestion control. When the sending strategy is understoud, the objects in the group can be assigned sequence numbers and drop priorities that capture the encoding dependencies, such that: an object can only have dependencies with other objects in the same group, an object can only have dependencies with other objects with lower sequence numbers, an object can only have dependencies with other objects with lower or equal drop priorities. This simple rules enable real-time congestion control decisions at relays and other nodes. The main drawback is that if a packet with a given drop priority is actually dropped, all objects with higher sequence numbers and higher or equal drop priorities in the same group must be dropped. If the group duration is long, this means that the quality of experience may be lowered for a long time after a brief congestion. If the group duration is short, this can produce a jarring effect in which the quality of experience drops perdiodically at the tail of the group. 4.8.2. <\/ins> To enable use cases where receivers may wish to address a particular time of media in addition to having the most recently produced media available, both \"pull\" and \"push\" of media SHOULD be supported, with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-cd53a18edcf48593d5392878e8b3c9ee75cdaef7d2248d2800ddc64ee341e530","title":"","text":"Behaviours around cache durations for each MoQ entity should be defined. 4.8.3. In case of congestion, the relay will use the priorities to selectively drop the \"least important\" objects: if congestion is noticed, the relay will drop first the lesser priority layer. In our example, that would mean the objects marked at priority 6. The relay will drop all objects marked at that priority, from the first dropped object to the end of the group. if congestion persists despite dropping a first layer, the relay will start dropping the next layer, in our example the objects marked at priority 5. if congestion still persist after dropping all but the highest priority layer, the relay will have to close the group, and start relaying the next group. When dropping objects within the same priority: higher object numbers in the same group, which are later in the group, are \"less important\" and more likely to be dropped than objects in the same group with a lower object number. Objects in a previous group are \"less important\" than objects in the current group and MAY be dropped ahead of objects in the current group. The specification above assumes that the relay can detect the onset of congestion, and has a way to drop objects. There are several ways to achieve that result, such as sending all objects of a group in a single QUIC stream and making explicit action at the time of relaying, or mapping separate priority layers into different QUIC streams and marking these streams with different priorities. The exact solution will have to be defined in a draft that specifies transport priorities. 4.8.4. Web conferencing systems are used on networks with well over 20% packet loss and when this happens, it is often on connections with a relatively large round trip times. In these situtation, forward error correction or redundant transmitions are used to provide a reasonable user experience. Often video is turned off in. There are multiple machine learning based audio codecs in development that targeting a 2 to 3 Kbps rate. This can result in scenarios where very small audio objects are sent at a rate of several hundreds packets per second with a high network loss rate. 4.8.5. In the streaming scenarios, there is an important emphasis on resynchronization, characterized by a short distance between \"access points\". This can be used for features like fast-forward or rewinding, which are common in non-real-time streaming. For real- time streaming experiences such as watching a sport event, frequent access points allow \"channel surfers\" to quickly join the broadcast and enjoy the experience. The interval between these access points will often be just a few seconds. In video encoding, each access point is mapped to a fully encoded frame that can be used as reference for the \"group of blocks\". The encoding of these reference frames is typically much larger than the differential encoding of the following frames. This creates a peak of traffic at the beginning of the group. This peak is much easier to absorb in streaming applications that tolerate higher latencies than interactive video conferences. In practice, many real time conferences tend to use much longer groups, resulting in higher compression ratios and smoother bandwidth consumption along with a way to request the start of a new group when needed. Other real time conferences tend to use very short groups and just wait for the next group when needed. Of course, having longer blocks create other issues. Realtime conferences also need to accomodate the occasional occasional late comer, or the disconnected user who want to resynchronize after a network event. This drives a need for synchronization \"between access points\". For example, rather than waiting for 30 seconds before connecting, the user might quickly download the \"key\" frames of the past 30 seconds and replay them in order to \"synchronize\" the video decoder. <\/ins> 4.9. 4.9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b07c1242a32e8a9dac268bd8a55932723a818b01701d0ff7fe81c0d200e59702","title":"","text":"4.9.2. End-to-end security describes the use of encryption of the media stream(s) to provide confidentiality in the presence of unauthorized intermediates or observers and prevent or restrict ability to decrypt the media without authorization. Generally, there are three aspects of end-to-end media security: <\/del> Much of the early discussion about MOQ security was not entirely coherent. Some contributors pushed for \"end-to-end security\", and some contributors pushed for the ability of intermediate nodes to have sufficient visibility into media payloads to accomplish the responsibilities those intermediate nodes were given. Some contributors may have pushed for both, at various times. It is worthwhile to clarify what \"security\" means in a MOQ context. Generally, there are three aspects of media security: <\/ins> Digital Rights Management, which refers to the authorization of receivers to decode a media stream. Sender-to-Receiver Media Security, which refers to the ability of media senders and receivers to transfer media while protected from authorized intermediates and observers, and <\/del> unauthorized intermediates and observers, and <\/ins> Node-to-node Media Security, which refers to security when authorized intermediaries are needed to transform media into a form acceptable to authorized receivers. For example, this might refer to a video transcoder between the media sender and receiver. **Note: \"Node-to-node\" refers to a path segment connecting two MOQ nodes, that makes up part of the end-to-end path between the MOQ sender and ultimate MOQ receiver. <\/del> \"End-to-end security\" describes the use of encryption of one or more media stream(s) over an end-to-end path, to provide confidentiality in the presence of any intermediates or observers and prevent or restrict ability to decrypt that media. \"Node-to-node security\" refers to the use of encryption of one or more media stream(s) over a path segment connecting two MOQ nodes, that makes up part of the end-to-end path between the MOQ sender and ultimate MOQ receiver, to provide confidentiality in the presence of unauthorized intermediates or observers and prevent or restrict ability to decrypt that media. Many MOQ deployment models rely on intermediate nodes, and these intermediate nodes may have a variety of responsibilities, including, but not limited to, rate adaptation based on media metadata routing media based on the characteristics of the media caching media allowing \"watch in-progress broadcasts from the beginning\", \"instant replay\" and \"fast forward\" transcoding media Some of these responsibilities require authorization to see more media headers and even media payload than others. The protocol SHOULD allow MOQ intermediate nodes to perform a variety of responsibilities, without having access to media headers and\/or media payloads that they do not require to carry out their responsibilities. <\/ins> Support for encrypted media SHOULD be available in the protocol to support the above use cases, with key exchange and decryption"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-ec8bf1ce87803488ddfedeb6b4abbcaa218226a447ce203bd4c737c2394d13c5","title":"","text":"of the past 30 seconds and replay them in order to \"synchronize\" the video decoder. 4.8.6. In all of the applicable use cases defined in overallusecases it may be necessary for consumers to be aware of changes to the source of media being inserted, or be instructed to consume media from a different source. These may be done for the insertion of advertising or for operational movement of consumers, amongst other reasons. Within the media insertion scenario an existing stream being consumed may change as a result of a different source being spliced which necessitates the decoder being reset as parameters such as video frame rate, image resolution etc may have changed. For redirection, consumers may be signalled to consume media from a different source which may also require re-initialization of decoder. In both of these scenarios, triggering may occur either through an event provided in the media such as a SCTE-35 marker, or through an external trigger. Both should be supported. <\/ins> 4.9. 4.9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-affec81a14dc56b85b235ac8da308619d5498ab245285eb12af4a2397da07354","title":"","text":" Media over QUIC Requirements and Use Cases <\/del> Media over RTP over QUIC Requirements and Use Cases <\/ins> draft-gruessing-moq-requirements-latest Abstract This document describes the uses cases, requirements, and considerations that should be part of the design of a real-time media protocol over QUIC RFC9000. <\/del> considerations that should be form the design of the encapsulation of a real-time media transport protocol operating over QUIC RFC9000. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-adde0528f551bc3dd2ad1107740db9ab424c6474f35e77b95829aa823d63864c","title":"","text":"4.3. TODO: Confirm these requirements, consider looking at how RFC 8836 applies to this requirement. 4.4. <\/ins> TODO: confirm scope of this draft to describe lossless media transport, lossy media transport, or both lossless and lossy transport. 4.4. <\/del> 4.5. <\/ins> Media should be able to flow in either direction from client to server or vice-versa, either individually or concurrently. 4.5. <\/del> 4.6. <\/ins> TODO: Unsure if this should be a requirement. If it is, we have to consider two things: WebTransport supports HTTP\/2, are we going to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-e5021e386210ed43d1520fee7be00d28e46c7a1b65e5723b015ffb8f12b81943","title":"","text":"overview has normative language around congestion control which may be at odds with our potential requirements. 4.6. <\/del> 4.7. The protocol SHOULD have capabilities beyond what QUIC provides to allow hosts to authenticate one another, this should be kept simple but robust in nature to prevent attacks like credential brute- forcing. <\/ins> The protocol SHOULD have capabilities asides from TLS mutual authentication to allow hosts to authenticate one another, this should be kept simple but robust in nature to prevent attacks like credential brute-forcing. <\/del> TODO: More details are required here <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b3f4e2f6ec269464c323205fe3cf6763284e3d17b7a688cd7240fafcda1950a3","title":"","text":"This document describes the uses cases, requirements, and considerations that should guide the design of the encapsulation of a real-time media transport protocol as a payload in the the QUIC protocol RFC9000. <\/del> real-time media transport protocol as a payload in the QUIC protocol RFC9000. <\/ins> Protocol developers have been considering the implications of the QUIC protocol (RFC9000) on media transport for several years, but the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-825d48b9bab96de94ef33f178d0706e647ae3282f545b44ce80500ced026e88b","title":"","text":"and delivery of SRT on top of QUIC using datagram frame types. This specification sets some requirements regarding how the two interact and leaves considerations for congestion control and pacing to prevent conflict between the two protocols. <\/del> prevent conflict between the two protocols. Apart from that, SRT provides a native suport for stream multiplexing, thus contributing this missing functionality to QUIC datagrams. <\/ins> 3.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-fc886a175bee4ace9ffde05cf95abcc12198c60dd7ccb4c8cef12b1b6d17e621","title":"","text":"Interactive client-server applications. For example, a \"click here to speak to a representative\" button on a website that starts an interactive WebRTC call. Such applications avoid the NAT traversal issues that complicate peer-to-peer use of QUIC, and can benefit from stream demultiplexing and (if appropriate algorithms are provided) <\/del> interactive WebRTC call. Because a connection is being established to a known server, such applications avoid the NAT traversal issues that complicate peer-to-peer use of QUIC, and can benefit from stream demultiplexing and (if appropriate algorithms are provided) <\/ins> congestion control. They would benefit from unreliable delivery modes to reduce latency."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-9f5d034a733d2b86530db458ec4b2e26e54c7831bef2a0713a1afaac20e90b86","title":"","text":"4.2.2. While a media is being contributed in real time via an ingest point to a streaming platform, there may be a need to distribute the media between several servers and\/or perform a load balancing of the incoming traffic. The platform may peform transcoding at one or several points, or distribute (route) the media as is to one or many egress points. Such a distribution and load balancing may happen with or without the access to the encrypted payload. 4.2.3. <\/ins> Distribution from platform to audience. Whilst use of WebRTC or RTSP today for On-Demand media streaming is not typical with adaptive streaming like HLS and DASH being predominantly used as WebRTC is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-bb3820592e6b6643e668b28516394d1b869362197f619f506b16abadeb20d546","title":"","text":"When initiating a media session, both the sender and receiver should be able to negotiate the codecs, bitrates and other media details based on capabilities and preferences. <\/del> based on capabilities and preferences. It may be prefered to use existing ecosystem for such purposes, e.g. SDP RFC4566. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-2faef724d8b37342f246747cb4788738a98d091dc7ab6443efda9ae9e87bf307","title":"","text":"often used in delivering media in our use cases, QUIC doesn't yet support multicast, and would require a QUIC protocol extension to do so. In addition, the inclusion of multicast would introduce more complexity in both the specification and client implimentations. <\/del> complexity in both the specification and client implimentations. On the other hand, UDP multicast may be considered as the last mile delivery transport outside of QUIC transport, thus it would be beneficial for a protocol to provide such an opportunity (e.g. RTP\/ QUIC -> RTP\/UDP). <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-aed85031763a05747fff79fd907108edd053cc7bfdebfa092d0a2aafefc02989","title":"","text":"https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements [1]. Discussion of this draft should take place on the IETF Media Over QUIC (MOQ) mailing list, at https:\/\/www.ietf.org\/mailman\/listinfo\/ moq. <\/del> QUIC (MoQ) mailing list, at https:\/\/www.ietf.org\/mailman\/listinfo\/moq [2]. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-fb6c13bcba21393b85390a2dd35066326d4f2c6e82dfc5acacbce11dc8ff3f7e","title":"","text":"comprise of multiple audio or video outputs with different codecs or bitrates. This may also include other types of media essence such as subtitles or timing signalling information (e.g. markers to indicate change of behaviour in client such as advertisement breaks) <\/del> change of behaviour in client such as advertisement breaks). The use of \"live rewind\" where a window of media behind the live edge can be made available for clients to playback, either because the local player falls behind edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. <\/ins> 4.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a4f86f59b6c71fb0859ebca979b4408f78d4ac0724fab08afecd00808eaa99ef","title":"","text":"source. This may feature additional outputs, bitrates, codecs, and media types described in the live media streaming use case. 4.9. The use cases that are most applicable today given the existing and known future capabilities of QUIC are included in this section. *Editor Note:* this section is a work in progress, and is based on the opinions of the draft authors. We are happy to be guided by discussion about other use cases. 4.9.1. Unidirectional live stream contribution. Two immediate scenarios that best describe this is firstly users on a streaming platform in a remote scenario from their phone live streaming an event or going on to an audience in real time in relatively low bitrates (~1-5Mbit). The second scenario is larger bitrate contribution feeds in broadcast. This can be an OB feed \"back to base\" into playout gallery, or from playout facilities to online distribution platforms. 4.9.2. While a media is being contributed in real time via an ingest point to a streaming platform, there may be a need to distribute the media between several servers and\/or perform a load balancing of the incoming traffic. The platform may peform transcoding at one or several points, or distribute (route) the media as is to one or many egress points. Such a distribution and load balancing may happen with or without the access to the encrypted payload. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> 4.9.3. <\/del> This section is a work in progress, and is based on the opinions of the draft authors. We are happy to be guided by discussion about other use cases. Each of the above use cases fit into three classifications of solutions, with the first three covering gaming, screen sharing, and general video conferencing largely covered by WebRTC and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the WebRTC protocol and specifications. Such work could start in a QUIC specific forum, but would likely need to take place in rtcweb and the W3C. The second group of classifications covering Live Media Contribution, Syndication, and Streaming are likely the use cases likely to benefit most from this work. Existing protocols used such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH DASH are reaching limits towards how low they can reduce latency in live streaming and for scenarios where low-bitrate audio streams are used add a significant amount of overheads compared to the media bitstream. <\/ins> Distribution from platform to audience. Whilst use of WebRTC or RTSP today for On-Demand media streaming is not typical with adaptive streaming like HLS and DASH being predominantly used as WebRTC is more applicable in latency sensitive contexts such as live sporting events. Instead use cases where there is live streaming of TV linear output, or live streaming such as Twitch or Facebook, or non-UGC services like OTT offerings made by broadcasters. <\/del> On-Demand media streaming is unlikely to benefit from work in this space, without notable latency requirements and protocols such as HLS and DASH meeting the needs of this use case. However larger deployments may benefit from the use of HTTP\/3 I-D.draft-ietf-quic- http. <\/ins> 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> Even a cursory examination of the existing proposals listed in priorart shows that there are fundamental differences in the approaches being used - for instance, whether a proposal uses RTP as its Media Transport Protocol. In this section, we attempt to focus on high-level requirements for real time media streaming over a QUIC connection, recognizing that additional analysis will be required, and we are starting with requirements that are apparent for RTP-based proposals <\/del> approaches being used. <\/ins> 5.1. <\/del> 6.1. <\/ins> When initiating a media session, both the sender and receiver should be able to negotiate the codecs, bitrates and other media details based on capabilities and preferences. It may be prefered to use <\/del> be able to negotiate the codecs, bitrates, resolution, and other media details based on capabilities and preferences. This must be negotiable both before commencing playback but also during as a result of changes to device output or network conditions (such as reduction in available network bandwidth). It may be prefered to use <\/ins> existing ecosystem for such purposes, e.g. SDP RFC4566. 5.2. TODO: confirm requirements for latency <\/del> 6.2. <\/ins> I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons describes these latency requirements for streaming media. <\/del> requirements for streaming media: <\/ins> ultra low-latency (less than 1 second) low-latency live (less than 10 seconds) non-low-latency live (10 seconds to a few minutes) on-demand (hours or more) 5.3. <\/del> Support for a nominal latency in the low to ultra-low latency should be achieved, with consideration for minimum buffer a receiver playing content may need to handle congestion, packet loss, and other degradation in network quality. 6.3. Handling of migration of a session between hosts, either of sender or receiver should be supported. This may either happen because the sender is undergoing maintenence or a rebalancing of resource, because the either is experiencing a change in network connectivity (such as a device moving from WiFi to cellular connectivity) or other reasons. This may depend on QUIC capabilities such as I-D.draft-ietf-quic- multipath but is by no means a hard requirement. 6.4. <\/ins> TODO: Confirm these requirements, consider looking at how RFC 8836 applies to this requirement. 5.4. <\/del> 6.5. <\/ins> TODO: confirm scope of this draft to describe lossless media transport, lossy media transport, or both lossless and lossy transport. 5.5. <\/del> 6.6. <\/ins> Media should be able to flow in either direction from client to server or vice-versa, either individually or concurrently. <\/del> server or vice-versa, either individually or concurrently but should only be negotiated at the start of the session. <\/ins> 5.6. <\/del> 6.7. <\/ins> TODO: Unsure if this should be a requirement. If it is, we have to consider two things: WebTransport supports HTTP\/2, are we going to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-3d3fdf6d874621879fbe4912aab499c3688d31955d99c1fd2414e81c8664589d","title":"","text":"overview has normative language around congestion control which may be at odds with our potential requirements. 5.7. <\/del> 6.8. <\/ins> The encapsulation SHOULD have capabilities beyond what QUIC provides to allow hosts to authenticate one another, this should be kept"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-5a4993ec2ab735ebf726b7bb2f4f59e88bc3ca815643d29bc7a4fa18be047c51","title":"","text":"TODO: More details are required here 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> This section covers topics that are explicitly out of scope for the time being. 6.1. <\/del> 7.1. <\/ins> From Section 8.2 of RFC9000:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a054cfccdcdb77caac8a93d297abb0eb53a8cf32934cb063e48e79027034f587","title":"","text":"NAT traversal, a QUIC protocol extention would be required to support those use cases today. 6.2. <\/del> 7.2. <\/ins> The creation of new media transport protocols should be avoided, and instead we should make use of RTP RFC3550 and the existing ecosystem"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b5fc3426616687b949c81897b99b16cd096990f678f0a82d5ec63be924274c9d","title":"","text":"in which case we should work with the relevant working groups and present our use-cases. 6.3. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> Even if multicast and other network broadcasting capabilities are often used in delivering media in our use cases, QUIC doesn't yet"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-14b5559c4f00bebbc00ef4a7f8ff00be424aac5dabedb6469aff2614f77a3a5a","title":"","text":"beneficial for a protocol to provide such an opportunity (e.g. RTP\/ QUIC -> RTP\/UDP). 7. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> This document makes no requests of IANA. 8. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> As this document is intended to guide discussion and consensus, it introduces no security considerations of its own. 9. References <\/del> 10. References <\/ins> 9.1. URIs <\/del> 10.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements [2] https:\/\/www.ietf.org\/mailman\/listinfo\/moq <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-0c200fa864e787721b35eec5a3aecdabc3d5e574467da0c5a0f3a0cb385fe5d7","title":"","text":"for the ones that do, it seems useful to have a name for \"the protocol layer immediately beneath media\". Within this document, we extend the latency requirement categories for streaming media described in I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming- opcons: ultra low-latency (less than 1 second) low-latency live (less than 10 seconds) non-low-latency live (10 seconds to a few minutes) on-demand (hours or more) These latency bands were appropriate for streaming media, which was the target for I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons, but some realtime media may have requirements that are significantly less than \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are also using ull500 (less than 500 ms) ull100 (less than 100 ms) Obviously, these last two latency bands are the shortened form of \"ultra-low latency - 500 ms\" and \"ultra-low-latency - 100 ms\". Also obviously, bikeshedding on better names is welcomed. <\/ins> 3. Note - need to edit this section to reflect new draft scope and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-6652d651b1e70dda1b59d7379056ba2e78042987066d7b9447fddbc52a544ea6","title":"","text":"whether a session has bi-direction flows of media from senders and receivers, and the expected lowest latency requirements using the definitions specified in I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons. <\/del> specified in term. <\/ins> It is likely that we should add other characteristics, as we come to understand them."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b8475f9316b333eb9b0f1d1bfc39e2cf75c089f3e1b3040e3300c7c8ae520df0","title":"","text":"4.2. *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Significantly less than \"Ultra-Low\" <\/del> Ull100 <\/ins> Where media is received, and user inputs are sent by the client. This may also include the client receiving other types of signalling,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-075fefd4b6f759bc8be13ad7aee3f5c7ee1369882010c8c60a20ced0a2dc4fcf","title":"","text":"6.2. I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons describes these latency requirements for streaming media: ultra low-latency (less than 1 second) low-latency live (less than 10 seconds) non-low-latency live (10 seconds to a few minutes) on-demand (hours or more) Support for a nominal latency in the low to ultra-low latency should be achieved, with consideration for minimum buffer a receiver playing content may need to handle congestion, packet loss, and other degradation in network quality. <\/del> Support for a nominal latency appropriate for the use cases that are in scope should be achieved, with consideration for the minimum buffer that a receiver playing content may need to handle congestion, packet loss, and other degradation in network quality. <\/ins> 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-cec7caa23b68fac930108c062f27237707afd9d40b47f9a30fb03f612f0c487e","title":"","text":"7.2. The creation of new media transport protocols should be avoided, and instead we should make use of RTP RFC3550 and the existing ecosystem of payload formats and methods of signalling where possible. Work on QUIC encapsulation may reveal a need to extend these specificiations; in which case we should work with the relevant working groups and present our use-cases. 7.3. <\/del> Even if multicast and other network broadcasting capabilities are often used in delivering media in our use cases, QUIC doesn't yet support multicast, and would require a QUIC protocol extension to do"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-07bdf8351653de4940090e25bb04a7c203012040ddfb32a65e49973b19e75a10","title":"","text":"Both QRT and the Engelbart draft attempt to use existing payloads of RTP, RTCP, and SDP, unlike RUSH and SRT, as well as using existing Datagram frames RUSH introduces new frame types as its development pre-dates Datagram frames <\/del> All drafts take differing approaches to flow\/stream identification and management; some address congestion control and others just omit the subject and leave it to QUIC to handle"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-aa892759287c5a0f4ff2137ede65c584e5f3aaf82b99e8d84e33a8d4c26834e9","title":"","text":"3.3. RUSH uses its own frame types on top of QUIC as it pre-dates the datagram specification; in addition individual media frames are given their own stream identifiers to remove HoL blocking from processing out-of-order. <\/del> Whilst RUSH predates the datagram specification, it uses its own frame types on top of QUIC to take advantage of QUIC implementations reassembling messages greater than MTU. In addition individual media frames are given their own stream identifiers to remove HoL blocking from processing out-of-order. <\/ins> It defines its own registry for signalling codec information with room for future expansion but presently is limited to a subset of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-90b0aa9ed9521d0008cbf6e581df21aa4f2b579de4b05c1a2a9ed4ccb6efe18b","title":"","text":"4.5. Warp's specification attemps to map Group of Picture encoding of video on top of QUIC streams. It depends on ISOBMFF containers to encapsulate both media as well as messaging, and defines prioritisation with separate considerations for audio and video. It doesn't yet define bi-directionality of media flows, and can be run over protocols like WebTransport I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans-overview. 4.6. <\/ins> Both QRT and the Engelbart draft attempt to use existing payloads of RTP, RTCP, and SDP, unlike RUSH and SRT, as well as using existing Datagram frames All drafts take differing approaches to flow\/stream identification and management; some address congestion control and others just omit the subject and leave it to QUIC to handle Both QRT and RUSH specify ALPN identification; the Engelbart and SRT drafts do not. Note - need to add WARP and verify these characterizations. <\/del> Both QRT and RUSH specify ALPN identification; the Engelbart, Warp, and SRT drafts do not. <\/ins> 4.6. <\/del> 4.7. <\/ins> It's worth noting that work on \"RTP over QUIC\" is being considered in the AVTCORE working group at this time, although no proposals have"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-22e207ae7a7a961b65405de84e205c0191ca79134c177ef9830a32d9910e44cf","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes the uses cases, requirements, and considerations that should guide the design of the encapsulation of a real-time media transport protocol as a payload in the QUIC protocol, that will be used for live media contribution, syndication, and streaming. <\/del> This document describes the use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", and recommends use cases on live media contribution, syndication, and streaming as the basis for discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-ec3b26bf591338a4c981b7bc0a7e14e674a0963ff0e2af258b0f820516c35360","title":"","text":"1. This document describes the uses cases, requirements, and considerations that should guide the design of the encapsulation of a real-time media transport protocol as a payload in the QUIC protocol (RFC9000), that will be used for live media contribution, syndication, and streaming. Protocol developers have been considering the implications of the QUIC protocol (RFC9000) on media transport for several years, but the initial focus on QUIC in the IETF was to support web applications that used the HTTP\/3 protocol I-D.draft-ietf-quic-http. The completion of the initial versions of the QUIC specifications, and the adoption of I-D.draft-ietf-quic-datagram, have cleared the way for proposals to use QUIC as a media transport. This document considers a number of proposals for \"Media Over QUIC\", and analyzes them to understand requirements and considerations. <\/del> This document describes the use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", and recommends use cases on live media contribution, syndication, and streaming as the basis for requirements discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-19030282598ab12b79e167289567bed5e0c7484bb8de895d771a9aaccca8ac7e","title":"","text":"2. 2.1. Protocol developers have been considering the implications of the QUIC protocol (RFC9000) for media transport for several years, resulting in a large number of possible meanings of the term \"Media Over QUIC\", or \"MOQ\". As of this writing, \"Media Over QUIC\" has had at least these meanings: any kind of media carried directly over the QUIC protocol, as a QUIC payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an RTP payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an HTTP\/3 payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as a WebTransport payload the encapsulation of any Media Transport Protocol (mtp) in a QUIC payload an IETF mailing list (MOQ-ml) \"... for discussion of video ingest and distribution protocols that use QUIC as the underlying transport\" There may be IETF participants using other meanings as well. As of this writing, the second bullet (\"any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an RTP payload\"), seems to be in scope for the IETF AVTCORE working group, and was discussed at some length at the February 2022 AVTCORE working group meeting AVTCORE-2022-02. So, perhaps, that possible meaning is out of scope for \"Media over QUIC\". It will be SUPER HELPFUL if interested parties can come up with a term that unambiguously describes what we're trying to achieve. 2.2. <\/ins> Within this document, we use the term \"Media Transport Protocol\". This is easier to understand if the reader assumes that we are starting with a protocol stack that looks like this:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a91412305aa8be9c2d2411bc71641e499dfc0a52813ef1fe50aedda01256dfda","title":"","text":"On-Demand media streaming (odstream) is unlikely to benefit from work in this space. Without notable latency requirements, protocols such as HLS and DASH largely meet the needs of this use case. However larger deployments may benefit from the use of HTTP\/3 I-D.draft-ietf- quic-http. <\/del> as HLS and DASH largely meet the needs of this use case. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-c7726f8afb1a835251e67b80cc1b1180e53e35df0e3d8d9ad8e43aeda9d1be13","title":"","text":"This document describes the use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", and recommends use cases on live media contribution, syndication, and streaming as the basis for discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> use cases on live media ingest, syndication, and streaming as the basis for discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-d3d241d66ad57ec6187b714af601d1d09b57a3859588b7063d5eb3f8385d08e4","title":"","text":"This document describes the use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", and recommends use cases on live media contribution, syndication, and streaming as the basis for requirements discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> use cases on live media ingest, syndication, and streaming as the basis for requirements discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-801ec5779d2a0adadb8363a0bd9296169f4db27a102bfc5596a27bbc515989eb","title":"","text":"These latency bands were appropriate for streaming media, which was the target for I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons, but some realtime media may have requirements that are significantly less than \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are also using <\/del> interactive media may have requirements that are significantly less than \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are also using <\/ins> ull500 (less than 500 ms) ull100 (less than 100 ms) <\/del> Ull-50 (less than 50 ms) Ull-200 (less than 200 ms) <\/ins> Obviously, these last two latency bands are the shortened form of \"ultra-low latency - 500 ms\" and \"ultra-low-latency - 100 ms\". Also obviously, bikeshedding on better names is welcomed. <\/del> \"ultra-low latency - 50 ms\" and \"ultra-low-latency - 200 ms\". Perhaps less obviously, bikeshedding on better names and more useful values is welcomed. <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-3974a7874efd29254a96c1e6e32571a1034efadb67b49201eec5cd5a629bbe7d","title":"","text":"3.4. Secure Reliable Transport (SRT) (I-D.draft-sharabayko-srt) itself is a general purpose transport protocol primarily for contribution transport use cases and this specification covers the encapsulation and delivery of SRT on top of QUIC using datagram frame types. This <\/del> a general purpose transport protocol primarily for ingest transport use cases and this specification covers the encapsulation and delivery of SRT on top of QUIC using datagram frame types. This <\/ins> specification sets some requirements regarding how the two interact and leaves considerations for congestion control and pacing to prevent conflict between the two protocols. Apart from that, SRT"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-601033ea53cede5c466211c53207c0029565f63762430a34e0df63146d2eb4df","title":"","text":"3.6. Both QRT and the Engelbart draft attempt to use existing payloads of RTP, RTCP, and SDP, unlike RUSH and SRT, as well as using existing Datagram frames <\/del> Some drafts attempt to use existing payloads of RTP, RTCP, and SDP, while others do not. Some use QUIC Datagram frames, while others use QUIC streams. <\/ins> All drafts take differing approaches to flow\/stream identification and management; some address congestion control and others just omit the subject and leave it to QUIC to handle Both QRT and RUSH specify ALPN identification; the Engelbart, Warp, and SRT drafts do not. <\/del> and management. Some address congestion control and others just defer this to QUIC to handle. Some drafts specify ALPN identification, while others do not. <\/ins> 3.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-ebe7007ab203da880409a6117002799ab50dfdffe85a80eb490d12400262af09","title":"","text":"4.1. *Senders\/Receivers*: Many to Many *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Ultra-Low Where media is both sent and received; This may include audio from both microphone(s) or other inputs, or may include \"screen sharing\" or inclusion of other content such as slide, document, or video presentation. This may be done as client\/server, or peer to peer with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. 4.2. <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Ull100 <\/del> Ull-50 <\/ins> Where media is received, and user inputs are sent by the client. This may also include the client receiving other types of signalling,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b4efeb3f567e3fcf42ddb4e7f140fec27f9adf2061e4010ca631e88e694141e7","title":"","text":"the client such as microphone audio for in-game chat with other players. 4.3. <\/del> 4.1.2. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Ultra-Low <\/del> Ull-50 <\/ins> Where media is received, and user inputs are sent by the client. Latency requirements with this usecase are marginally different than the gaming use case. This may also include signalling and\/or transmitting of files or devices connected to the user's computer. 4.4. <\/del> 4.1.3. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to Many *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: Low to Non-Low <\/del> *Senders\/Receivers*: Many to Many *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Ull-200 <\/ins> Where media is received from a live broadcast or stream. This may comprise of multiple audio or video outputs with different codecs or bitrates. This may also include other types of media essence such as subtitles or timing signalling information (e.g. markers to indicate change of behaviour in client such as advertisement breaks). The use of \"live rewind\" where a window of media behind the live edge can be made available for clients to playback, either because the local player falls behind edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. <\/del> Where media is both sent and received; This may include audio from both microphone(s) or other inputs, or may include \"screen sharing\" or inclusion of other content such as slide, document, or video presentation. This may be done as client\/server, or peer to peer with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. 4.2. <\/ins> 4.5. <\/del> 4.2.1. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: Ultra-Low to Low <\/del> Ull-200 to Ultra-Low <\/ins> Where media is received from a source for onwards handling into a distribution platform. The media may comprise of multiple audio and\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-0249cff831329bae1c4524dc4ce45331dcb4a63c3d938af299164ddc8a7c93d5","title":"","text":"by signalling of connection inforation (bandwidth, latency) based on data sent by the receiver. 4.6. <\/del> 4.2.2. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: Ultra-Low to Low <\/del> Ull-200 to Ultra-Low <\/ins> Where media is sent onwards to another platform for further distribution. The media may be compressed down to a bitrate lower than source, but larger than final distribution output. Streams may be redundant with failover mechanisms in place. 4.7. <\/del> 4.2.3. *Senders\/Receivers*: One to Many *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: Ull-200 to Ultra-Low Where media is received from a live broadcast or stream. This may comprise of multiple audio or video outputs with different codecs or bitrates. This may also include other types of media essence such as subtitles or timing signalling information (e.g. markers to indicate change of behaviour in client such as advertisement breaks). The use of \"live rewind\" where a window of media behind the live edge can be made available for clients to playback, either because the local player falls behind edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. 4.3. 4.3.1. ** James, can you fill this section in?** 4.3.2. <\/ins> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to Many *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: On Demand"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-66e03fd0b5673efc84d431d4444f12d1c9e92e7ccfad042bcf3b826acb5262cd","title":"","text":"5. Our proposal is that \"Media Over QUIC\" discussions focus first on the use cases for Live Media Contribution (lmcont), Syndication (lmsynd), and Streaming (lmstream). Our reasoning is provided in usecaseanalysis. <\/del> use cases described in lm-media, which are Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Syndication (lmsynd), and Streaming (lmstream). Our reasoning is provided in usecaseanalysis. <\/ins> 5.1. Each of the above use cases in overallusecases fit into one of three classifications of solutions. The first group, covering gaming (gaming), screen sharing (remdesk), and general video conferencing (vidconf), are largely covered by WebRTC and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the WebRTC protocol and specifications. Such work could start in a QUIC specific forum, but would likely need to take place in rtcweb and the W3C. The second group of classifications, covering Live Media Contribution (lmcont), Syndication (lmsynd), and Streaming (lmstream) are likely the use cases likely to benefit most from this work. Existing protocols used such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH DASH are reaching limits towards how low they can reduce latency in live streaming and for scenarios where low-bitrate audio streams are used add a significant amount of overheads compared to the media bitstream. On-Demand media streaming (odstream) is unlikely to benefit from work in this space. Without notable latency requirements, protocols such as HLS and DASH largely meet the needs of this use case. <\/del> The first group, in interact, covering gaming (gaming), screen sharing (remdesk), and general video conferencing (vidconf), are largely covered by WebRTC and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the WebRTC protocol and specifications. Such work could start in a QUIC specific forum, but would likely need to take place in rtcweb and the W3C. The second group of classifications, in lm-media, covering Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Live Media Syndication (lmsynd), and Live Media Streaming (lmstream) are likely the use cases likely to benefit most from this work. Existing protocols used such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH DASH are reaching limits towards how low they can reduce latency in live streaming and for scenarios where low-bitrate audio streams are used add a significant amount of overheads compared to the media bitstream. The third group, od-media, covering On-Demand Media Ingest (od- ingest) and On-Demand Media streaming (od-stream) is unlikely to benefit from work in this space. Without notable latency requirements, protocols such as HLS and DASH largely meet the needs of this use case. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-d8e3bcf9cbb3b348ef7adf3f219354360681ae02b22ab0ea4520873c26b3d42d","title":"","text":"4.3.1. ** James, can you fill this section in?** <\/del> *Senders\/Receivers*: One to Many *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: On Demand Where media is ingested and processed for a system to later serve it to clients as on-demand media. This may be media captured from live output or provided as a pre-recorded source, and may optionally be transcoded upon ingest. <\/ins> 4.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-5d9f081df35dfbeb8c1303dadab5b0b59ff1177c066d94db39db8552520f03ad","title":"","text":"This document describes the use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", and recommends use cases on live media ingest, syndication, and streaming as the basis for requirements discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> basis for discussions that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-3e58025dca4d4fd3b14fa251b1bc0e34b60280f957eda70431e2107153dcebf8","title":"","text":"the key goals for QUIC were: Minimizing connection establishment and overall transport latency for applications, starting with HTTP\/2, <\/del> for applications, starting with HTTP, <\/ins> Providing multiplexing without head-of-line blocking, Requiring only changes to path endpoints to enable deployment, Enabling multipath and forward error correction extensions, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-2c6189e17533a38855ebcb9ccb9722da1c2e646fc5d9facb0dbfd4a9615f4d35","title":"","text":"indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an RTP payload\"), seems to be in scope for the IETF AVTCORE working group, and was discussed at some length at the February 2022 AVTCORE working group meeting AVTCORE-2022-02. So, perhaps, that possible meaning is out of scope for \"Media over QUIC\". It will be SUPER HELPFUL if interested parties can come up with a term that unambiguously describes what we're trying to achieve. <\/del> AVTCORE-2022-02, although no drafts in this space have been adopted by the AVTCORE working group. So, perhaps, that possible meaning is out of scope for \"Media over QUIC\". <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-55ce84b9edf3895d6a8eb2b36a40c0227fe259cd5dbff5eda71eb024cdcd89f3","title":"","text":"4.1. The use cases described in this section have one particular attribute in common - the target latency for these cases are on the order of one or two RTTs. In order to meet those targets, it is not possible to rely on protocol mechanisms that require multiple RTTs to function effectively. For example, When the target latency is on the order of one RTT, it makes sense to use FEC RFC6363 and codec-level packet loss concealment RFC6716, rather than selectively retransmitting only lost packets. These mechanisms use more bytes, but do not require multiple RTTs in order to recover from packet loss. When the target latency is on the order of one RTT, it is impossible to use congestion control schemes like BBR I-D.draft- cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control, since BBR has probing mechanisms that rely on temporarily inducing delay and amortizing the consequences of that over multiple RTTs. This may help to explain why these use cases often rely on protocols such as RTP RFC3550, which provide low-level control of packetization and transmission. <\/ins> 4.1.1. *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-e9d393011cff35b4ef105fcdb09aa7eda6009c6b98339c1eddcf691fef42c841","title":"","text":"4.1.3. *Senders\/Receivers*: Many to Many *Bi-directional*: Yes *Latency*: Ull-200 <\/del> Ull-50 to Ull-200 <\/ins> Where media is both sent and received; This may include audio from both microphone(s) or other inputs, or may include \"screen sharing\" or inclusion of other content such as slide, document, or video presentation. This may be done as client\/server, or peer to peer with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. <\/del> with a many to many relationship of both senders and receivers. The target for latency may be as large as Ull-200 for some media types such as audio, but other media types in this use case have much more stringent latency targets. <\/ins> 4.2. The use cases in this section, unlike the use cases described in interact, still have \"humans in the loop\", but these humans expect media to be \"responsive\", where the responsiveness is more on the order of 5 to 10 RTTs. This allows the use of protocol mechanisms that require more than one or two RTTs - as noted in interact, end- to-end recovery from packet loss and congestion avoidance are two such protocol mechanisms that can be used with Live Media. To illustrate the difference, the responsiveness expected with videoconferencing is much greater than watching a video, even if the video is being produced \"live\" and sent to a platform for syndication and distribution. <\/ins> 4.2.1. *Senders\/Receivers*: One to One *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-abe8067257ced8e8feb6ce75bdd03ba88a96d03ffa18803f8755c79b92a933bc","title":"","text":"4.3. Finally, the \"On-Demand\" use cases described in this section do not have a tight linkage between ingest and streaming, allowing significant transcoding, processing, insertion of video clips in a news article, etc. The latency constraints for the use cases in this section may be dominated by the time required for whatever actions are required before media are available for streaming. <\/ins> 4.3.1. *Senders\/Receivers*: One to Many *Bi-directional*: No *Latency*: On Demand Where media is ingested and processed for a system to later serve it to clients as on-demand media. This may be media captured from live output or provided as a pre-recorded source, and may optionally be transcoded upon ingest. <\/del> to clients as on-demand media. This media provided from a pre- recorded source, or captured from live output, but in either case, this media is not immediately passed to viewers, but is stored for \"on-demand\" retrieval, and may be transcoded upon ingest. <\/ins> 4.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-f1bca8d33578a64775e1d7c690eb7b410d914d6950e488f5d035840e6532b9fe","title":"","text":"Our proposal is that \"Media Over QUIC\" discussions focus first on the use cases described in lm-media, which are Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Syndication (lmsynd), and Streaming (lmstream). Our reasoning is provided in usecaseanalysis. 5.1. <\/del> reasoning for this suggestion follows. <\/ins> Each of the above use cases in overallusecases fit into one of three classifications of solutions. The first group, in interact, covering gaming (gaming), screen sharing (remdesk), and general video conferencing (vidconf), are largely covered by WebRTC and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the WebRTC protocol and specifications. Such work could start in a QUIC specific forum, but would likely need to take place in rtcweb and the W3C. <\/del> 5.1. The first group, Interactive Media, as described in interact, and covering gaming (gaming), screen sharing (remdesk), and general video conferencing (vidconf), are largely covered by RTP, often in conjunction with WebRTC WebRTC, and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the RTP protocols and specifications. 5.2. <\/ins> The second group of classifications, in lm-media, covering Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Live Media Syndication (lmsynd), and Live Media Streaming (lmstream) are likely the use cases likely to benefit most from this work. Existing protocols used such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH <\/del> Streaming (lmstream) are likely the use cases that will benefit most from this work. Existing ingest and streaming protocols such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH <\/ins> DASH are reaching limits towards how low they can reduce latency in live streaming and for scenarios where low-bitrate audio streams are used add a significant amount of overheads compared to the media bitstream. <\/del> used, these protocols add a significant amount of overhead compared to the media bitstream itself. For this reason, we suggest that work on \"Media Over QUIC\" protocols target these use cases at this time. 5.3. <\/ins> The third group, od-media, covering On-Demand Media Ingest (od- ingest) and On-Demand Media streaming (od-stream) is unlikely to benefit from work in this space. Without notable latency requirements, protocols such as HLS and DASH largely meet the needs of this use case. <\/del> benefit from work in this space. Without the same \"Live Media\" latency requirements that would motivate deployment of new protocols, existing protocols such as HLS and DASH are probably \"good enough\" to meet the needs of these use cases. This does not mean that existing protocols in this space are perfect. Segmented protocols such as HLS and DASH were developed to overcome the deficiencies of TCP, as used in HTTP\/1.1 RFC7230 and HTTP\/2 RFC7540, and do not make full use of the possible congestion window along the path from sender to receiver. Other protocols in this space have their own deficiencies. For example, RTSP RFC7826 does not have easy ways to add support for new media codecs. Our expectation is that these use cases will not drive work in the \"Media Over QUIC\" space, but as new protocols come into being, they may very well be taken up for these use cases as well. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-7094dbbf3bbb879aa959dd9a78048f2db423190ee02f50c78b840d9fe466ec93","title":"","text":"interactive media may have requirements that are significantly less than \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are also using Ull-50 (less than 50 ms) <\/del> near real-time (less than 50 ms) <\/ins> Ull-200 (less than 200 ms) Perhaps obviously, these last two latency bands are the shortened"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-2b8daf67201dc2a793d96990eb76011ca1c5022f04fd63a9133cc5d4436ecd50","title":"","text":" Media Over QUIC - Use Cases and Considerations for Media Transport <\/del> Media Over QUIC - Use Cases and Requirements for Media Transport <\/ins> Protocol Design draft-gruessing-moq-requirements-latest"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-ac04321bee876aac63c13dcd1c147350a7fa1168947984776ea3df1aa9be915d","title":"","text":"IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", provides analysis about those use cases, recommends a subset of use cases that cover live media ingest, syndication, and streaming for further exploration, and describes considerations that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> exploration, and describes requirements that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-7cc531563331c6cfbe6d05b4d313acd31b4995e7804aec5aa6d2037a6f91ad6f","title":"","text":"IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", provides analysis about those use cases, recommends a subset of use cases that cover live media ingest, syndication, and streaming for further exploration, and describes considerations that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> exploration, and describes requirements that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-8586979928ca63ed7ee6781c0c8fa62fc5084117086ddfdeb1cb48d8ed717221","title":"","text":"propscope, rather than on interactive media use cases or on-demand use cases. The reasoning behind this proposal can be found in analy-interact. The considerations for protocol work to satisfy the proposed use cases can be found in considerations. <\/del> The requirements for protocol work to satisfy the proposed use cases can be found in req-sec. <\/ins> Most of the rest of this document provides background for these sections."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-daaef5144cddec2061e72bf493707faf4bfde325c22aaf321da86f75fcff4357","title":"","text":"HTTP\/3 payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as a WebTransport payload the encapsulation of any Media Transport Protocol (mtp) in a QUIC <\/del> the encapsulation of any Media Transport Protocol in a QUIC <\/ins> payload an IETF mailing list (MOQ-ml), which was requested \"... for discussion of video ingest and distribution protocols that use"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-72f65060ad438a048bb86a7836d0f5feb81c304ae7c72ab4297c9a61f788a4d7","title":"","text":"2.2. This document describes considerations for work on extensions to existing \"Media Transport Protocols\" or creation of new \"Media Transport Protocols\". Within this document, we use the term \"Media Transport Protocol\" to describe the protocol of interest. This is easier to understand if the reader assumes that we are talking about a protocol stack that looks something like this: where \"Media Format\" would be something like RTP payload formats or ISOBMFF ISOBMFF, and \"Media Transport Protocol\" would be something like RTP or HTTP. Not all possible proposals for \"Media Over QUIC\" follow this model, but for the ones that do, it seems useful to have names for \"the protocol layers beteern Media and QUIC\". It is worth noting explicitly that the \"Media Transport Protocol\" layer might include more than one protocol. For example, a new Media Transport Protocol might be defined to run over HTTP, or even over WebTransport and HTTP. 2.3. Within this document, we extend the latency requirement categories for streaming media described in I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming- opcons: <\/del> }The \"Operational Considerations for Streaming Media\" document (I- D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons) described a range of latencies of interest to streaming media providers, as <\/ins> ultra low-latency (less than 1 second) low-latency live (less than 10 seconds) non-low-latency live (10 seconds to a few minutes) on-demand (hours or more) These latency bands were appropriate for streaming media, which was the target for I-D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons, but some interactive media may have requirements that are significantly less than \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are also using <\/del> Because the IETF Media Over QUIC community now expresses interest in interactive media interact and live media lm-media} use cases will have requirements that are significantly less than the \"streaming media\"-defined \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are using <\/ins> near real-time (less than 50 ms) Ull-200 (less than 200 ms) Perhaps obviously, these last two latency bands are the shortened form of \"ultra-low latency - 50 ms\" and \"ultra-low-latency - 200 ms\". Perhaps less obviously, bikeshedding on better names and more useful values is welcomed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b8d3acf97df1cf7bc48aed917f469d7530daf551c916d02e388dc013db51615b","title":"","text":"6. Even a cursory examination of the existing proposals listed in priorart shows that there are fundamental differences in the approaches being used. This sction is intended to \"up-level\" the conversation beyond specific protocols, so that we can more likely agree on what is important for protocol design work. Please note that the considerations in this section are focused especially on the use cases described in lm-media, although other use cases are mentioned for comparison and contrast. 6.1. The discussion in considerations is less mature than in most other sections of this document. The good news is that this section is fertile ground for people who would like to contribute to future revisions of this document. Comments are even more welcome for this section than for the rest of the document, for which they are welcome. The authors suggest that high-level comments are most appropriate at this time. 6.2. When initiating a media session, both the sender and receiver will need to agree on the codecs, bitrates, resolution, and other media details based on capabilities and preferences. This agreement needs to take place before commencing media transmission, but might also take place during media transmission, perhaps as a result of changes to device output or network conditions (such as reduction in available network bandwidth). It may be prefered to use existing ecosystem for such purposes, e.g. SDP RFC4566. 6.3. Support for a nominal latency appropriate for the use cases that are in scope should be achievable, with consideration for the minimum buffer that a receiver playing content may need to handle congestion, packet loss, and other degradation in network quality. 6.4. Handling of migration of a session between hosts, either of sender or receiver should be supported. This may either happen because the sender is undergoing maintenence or a rebalancing of resource, because the either is experiencing a change in network connectivity (such as a device moving from WiFi to cellular connectivity) or other reasons. This may depend on QUIC capabilities such as I-D.draft-ietf-quic- multipath but support for full QUIC operation over multiple paths between senders and receivers is by no means essential. 6.5. An appropriate congestion control mechanism will depend upon the use cases under consideration. It's worth remembering that we have more experience with QUIC carrying HTTP traffic than with any other type of application at this time, and consequently, we have more experience with congestion control mechanisms such as NewReno RFC9002, Cubic RFC8312, and BBR I- D.draft-cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control being used with QUIC than with any other congestion control mechanisms. These congestion control mechanisms may also be appropriate for the on-demand use cases described in od-media. Conversely, for the interactive use cases described in interact, these congestion control mechanisms are very likely inappropriate, especially when QUIC is being used with a Media Transport Protocol such as RTP, which provides its own congestion control mechanism, and which does not seem to interact well with a second, QUIC-level congestion control mechanism. Congestion control mechanisms such as SCReAM RFC8298 or NADA RFC8698 may be more appropriate for media. \"Congestion Control Requirements for Interactive Real-Time Media\" RFC8836 is a useful reference. Awkwardly, the live media use cases described in lm-media live somewhere in the middle, and work will be needed to understand the characteristics of an appropriate congestion control mechanism for these use cases. 6.6. TODO: confirm scope of this draft to describe lossless media transport, lossy media transport, or both lossless and lossy transport. 6.7. Media should be able to flow in either direction from client to server or vice-versa, either individually or concurrently but should only be negotiated at the start of the session. 6.8. TODO: Unsure of the importance of this consideration for live media use cases. If this is critical, we have to consider two things: WebTransport supports HTTP\/2, are we going to explicitly exclude it? Also, WebTransport I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans-overview has normative language around congestion control, which may be at odds with the considerations described in acc. 6.9. In order to allow hosts to authenticate one another, capabilities beyond what QUIC provides may be necessary. This should be kept simple but robust in nature to prevent attacks like credential brute- forcing. TODO: More details are required here 6.10. Most of the discussion of protocol work in this document has avoided mentioning capabilities that may be useful for some use cases, but seem to imply the need for extensions to the QUIC protocol, beyond what is already being considered in the IETF QUIC working group. These are included in this section, for completeness' sake. 6.10.1. From Section 8.2 of RFC9000: Path validation is not designed as a NAT traversal mechanism. Though the mechanism described here might be effective for the creation of NAT bindings that support NAT traversal, the expectation is that one endpoint is able to receive packets without first having sent a packet on that path. Effective NAT traversal needs additional synchronization mechanisms that are not provided here. Although there are use cases that would benefit from a mechanism for NAT traversal, a QUIC protocol extention would be needed to support those use cases. 6.10.2. Even if multicast and other network broadcasting capabilities are often used in delivering media in our use cases, QUIC doesn't yet support multicast, and a QUIC protocol extension would be needed to do so. In addition, the inclusion of multicast would introduce more complexity in both the specification and client implimentations. On the other hand, UDP multicast may be considered as the last mile delivery transport outside of QUIC transport, thus it would be beneficial for a protocol to provide such an opportunity (e.g. RTP\/ QUIC -> RTP\/UDP). <\/del> TODO: Quite a lot, really ... <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-f5f3ac7363ef755b89d2e8cbd96b8e0e7b7b03ee6b63d90054501007e9f88a33","title":"","text":"Abstract This document describes use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", provides analysis about those use cases, recommends a subset of use cases that cover live media ingest, syndication, and streaming for further exploration, and describes requirements that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> This document describes use cases and requirements that guide the specification of a simple, low-latency media delivery solution for ingest and distribution of media, using either the QUIC protocol or WebTransport. <\/ins> Note to Readers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-52c50c32ab6dbda56ab15b1796e637dc5ba34e4b7bef8e04b02919bf39b87f25","title":"","text":"1. This document describes use cases that have been discussed in the IETF community under the banner of \"Media Over QUIC\", provides analysis about those use cases, recommends a subset of use cases that cover live media ingest, syndication, and streaming for further exploration, and describes requirements that should guide the design of protocols to satisfy these use cases. <\/del> This document describes use cases and requirements that guide the specification of a simple, low-latency media delivery solution for ingest and distribution of media, using either the QUIC protocol RFC9000 or WebTransport WebTrans-charter. This document describes the chartered MOQ-charter use cases that guide development of a simple, low-latency media delivery solution for ingest and distribution of media, and the requirements for this solution that result from these use cases. <\/ins> 1.1. Our proposal is to focus on live media use cases, as described in propscope, rather than on interactive media use cases or on-demand use cases. The reasoning behind this proposal can be found in analy-interact. The requirements for protocol work to satisfy the proposed use cases can be found in req-sec. Most of the rest of this document provides background for these sections. 1.2. It is not the purpose of this document to argue against proposals for work on media applications that do not involve QUIC. Such proposals are simply out of scope for this document. When work on the QUIC protocol (RFC9000) was chartered (QUIC-goals), the key goals for QUIC were: Minimizing connection establishment and overall transport latency for applications, starting with HTTP, Providing multiplexing without head-of-line blocking, Requiring only changes to path endpoints to enable deployment, Enabling multipath and forward error correction extensions, and Providing always-secure transport, using TLS 1.3 by default. These goals were chosen with HTTP (I-D.draft-ietf-quic-http) in mind. While work on \"QUIC version 1\" (version codepoint 0x00000001) was underway, protocol designers considered potential advantages of the QUIC protocol for other applications. In addition to the key goals for HTTP applications, these advantages were immediately apparent for at least some media applications: QUIC endpoints can create bidirectional or unidirectional ordered byte streams. QUIC will automatically handle congestion control, packet loss, and reordering for stream data. QUIC streams allow multiple media streams to share congestion and flow control without otherwise blocking each other. QUIC streams also allow partial reliability, since either the sender or receiver can terminate the stream early without affecting the overall connection. With the DATAGRAM extension (I-D.draft-ietf-quic-datagram), further partially reliable models are possible, and applications can send congestion controlled datagrams below the MTU size. QUIC connections are established using an ALPN. QUIC endpoints can choose and change their connection ID. QUIC endpoints can migrate IP address without breaking the connection. Because QUIC is encapsulated in UDP, QUIC implementations can run in user space, rather than in kernel space, as TCP typically does. This allows more room for extensible APIs between application and transport, allowing more rapid implementation and deployment of new congestion control, retransmission, and prioritization mechanisms. QUIC is supported in browsers via HTTP\/3 or WebTransport. With WebTransport, it is possible to write libraries or applications in JavaScript. The specific advantages of interest may vary from use case to use case, but these advantages justify further investigation of \"Media Over QUIC\". <\/del> This version of the document is intended to provide the MOQ working group with a starting point for work on the \"Use Cases and Requirements document\" milestone. The update implements the work plan described in MOQ-ucr. The authors intend to request MOQ working group adoption after IETF 115, so we can begin work on these topics in earnest. <\/ins> 2. 2.1. Protocol developers have been considering the implications of the QUIC protocol (RFC9000) for media transport for several years, resulting in a large number of possible meanings of the term \"Media Over QUIC\", or \"MOQ\". As of this writing, \"Media Over QUIC\" has had at least these meanings: any kind of media carried directly over the QUIC protocol, as a QUIC payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an RTP payload (RFC3550) any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an HTTP\/3 payload any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as a WebTransport payload the encapsulation of any Media Transport Protocol in a QUIC payload an IETF mailing list (MOQ-ml), which was requested \"... for discussion of video ingest and distribution protocols that use QUIC as the underlying transport\", although discussion of other Media Over QUIC proposals have also been discussed there. There may be IETF participants using other meanings as well. As of this writing, the second bullet (\"any kind of media carried indirectly over the QUIC protocol, as an RTP payload\"), seems to be in scope for the IETF AVTCORE working group, and was discussed at some length at the February 2022 AVTCORE working group meeting AVTCORE-2022-02, although no drafts in this space have yet been adopted by the AVTCORE working group. 2.2. }The \"Operational Considerations for Streaming Media\" document (I- D.draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons) described a range of latencies of interest to streaming media providers, as ultra low-latency (less than 1 second) low-latency live (less than 10 seconds) non-low-latency live (10 seconds to a few minutes) on-demand (hours or more) Because the IETF Media Over QUIC community now expresses interest in interactive media interact and live media lm-media} use cases will have requirements that are significantly less than the \"streaming media\"-defined \"ultra-low latency\". Within this document, we are using near real-time (less than 50 ms) Ull-200 (less than 200 ms) Perhaps obviously, these last two latency bands are the shortened form of \"ultra-low latency - 50 ms\" and \"ultra-low-latency - 200 ms\". Perhaps less obviously, bikeshedding on better names and more useful values is welcomed. <\/del> (To Do) <\/ins> 3. Several draft specifications have been proposed which either encapsulate existing Media Transport Protocols in QUIC (I-D.draft- sharabayko-srt-over-quic), make use of RTP, RTCP, and SDP (I-D.draft- engelbart-rtp-over-quic) or define their own new Media Transport Protocol on top of QUIC. Some have already seen deployment into the wild (e.g. I-D.draft-kpugin-rush, I-D.draft-lcurley-warp) where as others are unconfirmed. Whilst most just focus on defining wire format, I-D.draft-jennings-moq-quicr-arch defines an architecture using a pub\/sub model for both producers and consumers. 3.1. Some use QUIC Datagram frames, while others use QUIC streams. All drafts take differing approaches to flow\/stream identification and management. Some address congestion control and others just defer this to QUIC to handle. Some drafts specify ALPN identification, while others do not. 4. <\/del> Our goal in this section is to understand the range of use cases that have been proposed for \"Media Over QUIC\". Although some of the use cases described in this section came out of \"RTP over QUIC\" proposals, they are worth considering in the broader \"Media Over QUIC\" context, and may be especially relevant to MOQ, depending on whether \"RTP over QUIC\" requires major changes to RTP and RTCP, in order to meet the requirements arising out of the corresponding use cases. <\/del> are in scope for \"Media Over QUIC\" MOQ-charter. <\/ins> An early draft in the \"media over QUIC\" space, I-D.draft-rtpfolks- quic-rtp-over-quic, defined several key use cases. Some of the following use cases have been inspired by that document, and others have come from discussions with the wider MOQ community (among other places, a side meeting at IETF 112). For each use case in this section, we also define <\/del> For each use case in this section, we also describe <\/ins> the number of senders or receiver in a given session transmitting distinct streams, whether a session has bi-direction flows of media from senders and receivers, and the expected lowest latency requirements using the definitions specified in term. <\/del> whether a session has bi-directional flows of media from senders and receivers, and the worst-case expected RTT requirements. <\/ins> It is likely that we should add other characteristics, as we come to understand them. 4.1. <\/del> 3.1. <\/ins> The use cases described in this section have one particular attribute in common - the target latency for these cases are on the order of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-075d50751265ab45e672a3861d9dad35553986a7ab42ff6c2e6184596b9f2210","title":"","text":"When the target latency is on the order of one RTT, it is impossible to use congestion control schemes like BBR I-D.draft- cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control, since BBR has probing mechanisms that rely on temporarily inducing delay and amortizing the consequences of that over multiple RTTs. <\/del> mechanisms that rely on temporarily inducing delay, but these mechanisms can then amortize the consequences of induced delay over multiple RTTs. <\/ins> This may help to explain why these use cases often rely on protocols such as RTP RFC3550, which provide low-level control of packetization and transmission. <\/del> This may help to explain why interactive use cases have typically relied on protocols such as RTP RFC3550, which provide low-level control of packetization and transmission, and make no provision for retransmission. <\/ins> 4.1.1. <\/del> 3.1.1. <\/ins> Where media is received, and user inputs are sent by the client. This may also include the client receiving other types of signalling, <\/del> This may also include the client receiving other types of signaling, <\/ins> such as triggers for haptic feedback. This may also carry media from the client such as microphone audio for in-game chat with other players. 4.1.2. <\/del> 3.1.2. <\/ins> Where media is received, and user inputs are sent by the client. Latency requirements with this usecase are marginally different than <\/del> Latency requirements with this use case are marginally different than <\/ins> the gaming use case. This may also include signalling and\/or transmitting of files or devices connected to the user's computer. 4.1.3. <\/del> 3.1.3. <\/ins> Where media is both sent and received; This may include audio from both microphone(s) or other inputs, or may include \"screen sharing\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-df2e14aecd71c921f00df5870f3aa8eb7fd48efe246a8eb3aabdb5645e219389","title":"","text":"such as audio, but other media types in this use case have much more stringent latency targets. 4.2. <\/del> 3.2. <\/ins> For the video conferencing\/telephony use case, there can be additional scenarios where the audience greatly outnumbers the concurrent active participants, but any member of the audience could participate. As this has a much larger total number of participants - as many as Live Media Streaming lmstream, but with the bi- directionality of confercing, this should be considered a \"hybrid\". <\/del> directionality of conferencing, this should be considered a \"hybrid\". <\/ins> 4.3. <\/del> 3.3. <\/ins> The use cases in this section, unlike the use cases described in interact, still have \"humans in the loop\", but these humans expect"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-05e5974e2861d3c4eeecc8e0a65f28785447c426a8b9208a8d8ec00f2bfd7bec","title":"","text":"video is being produced \"live\" and sent to a platform for syndication and distribution. 4.3.1. <\/del> 3.3.1. <\/ins> Where media is received from a source for onwards handling into a distribution platform. The media may comprise of multiple audio and\/ or video sources. Bitrates may either be static or set dynamically by signalling of connection inforation (bandwidth, latency) based on <\/del> by signaling of connection information (bandwidth, latency) based on <\/ins> data sent by the receiver. 4.3.2. <\/del> 3.3.2. <\/ins> Where media is sent onwards to another platform for further distribution. The media may be compressed down to a bitrate lower than source, but larger than final distribution output. Streams may be redundant with failover mechanisms in place. 4.3.3. <\/del> 3.3.3. <\/ins> Where media is received from a live broadcast or stream. This may comprise of multiple audio or video outputs with different codecs or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a0325af583d90e74bd6c316c3fd9fa680735a5a467e3c143f130e8eb2ee85da5","title":"","text":"player falls behind edge or because the viewer wishes to play back from a point in the past. 4.4. Finally, the \"On-Demand\" use cases described in this section do not have a tight linkage between ingest and streaming, allowing significant transcoding, processing, insertion of video clips in a news article, etc. The latency constraints for the use cases in this section may be dominated by the time required for whatever actions are required before media are available for streaming. 4.4.1. Where media is ingested and processed for a system to later serve it to clients as on-demand media. This media provided from a pre- recorded source, or captured from live output, but in either case, this media is not immediately passed to viewers, but is stored for \"on-demand\" retrieval, and may be transcoded upon ingest. 4.4.2. Where media is received from a non-live, typically pre-recorded source. This may feature additional outputs, bitrates, codecs, and media types described in the live media streaming use case. 5. Our proposal is that \"Media Over QUIC\" discussions focus first on the use cases described in lm-media, which are Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Syndication (lmsynd), and Streaming (lmstream). Our reasoning for this suggestion follows. Each of the above use cases in overallusecases fit into one of three classifications of solutions. 5.1. The first group, Interactive Media, as described in interact, and covering gaming (gaming), screen sharing (remdesk), and general video conferencing (vidconf), are largely covered by RTP, often in conjunction with WebRTC WebRTC, and related protocols today. Whilst there may be benefit in these use cases having a QUIC based protocol it may be more appropriate given the size of existing deployments to extend the RTP protocols and specifications. 5.2. The second group of classifications, in lm-media, covering Live Media Ingest (lmingest), Live Media Syndication (lmsynd), and Live Media Streaming (lmstream) are likely the use cases that will benefit most from this work. Existing ingest and streaming protocols such as HLS RFC8216 and DASH DASH are reaching limits towards how low they can reduce latency in live streaming and for scenarios where low-bitrate audio streams are used, these protocols add a significant amount of overhead compared to the media bitstream itself. <\/del> 4. <\/ins> For this reason, we suggest that work on \"Media Over QUIC\" protocols target these use cases at this time. <\/del> Our goal in this section is to understand the requirements that result from the use cases described in overallusecases. <\/ins> 5.3. <\/del> *Note: the initial high-level organization for this section is taken from Suhas Nandakumar's presentation, \"Progressing MOQ\" Prog-MOQ, at the October 2022 MOQ virtual interim meeting, which was in turn taken from the MOQ working group charter MOQ-charter. We think this is a reasonable starting point. We won't be surprised to see the high- level structure change a bit as things develop, but we didn't want to have this section COMPLETELY blank when we request working group adoption. <\/ins> The third group, od-media, covering On-Demand Media Ingest (od- ingest) and On-Demand Media streaming (od-stream) is unlikely to benefit from work in this space. Without the same \"Live Media\" latency requirements that would motivate deployment of new protocols, existing protocols such as HLS and DASH are probably \"good enough\" to meet the needs of these use cases. <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> This does not mean that existing protocols in this space are perfect. Segmented protocols such as HLS and DASH were developed to overcome the deficiencies of TCP, as used in HTTP\/1.1 RFC7230 and HTTP\/2 RFC7540, and do not make full use of the possible congestion window along the path from sender to receiver. Other protocols in this space have their own deficiencies. For example, RTSP RFC7826 does not have easy ways to add support for new media codecs. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> Our expectation is that these use cases will not drive work in the \"Media Over QUIC\" space, but as new protocols come into being, they may very well be taken up for these use cases as well. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> 6. <\/del> 4.4. <\/ins> TODO: Quite a lot, really ... <\/del> 4.5. <\/ins> 7. <\/del> 5. <\/ins> This document makes no requests of IANA. 8. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> As this document is intended to guide discussion and consensus, it introduces no security considerations of its own. 9. References <\/del> 7. References <\/ins> 9.1. URIs <\/del> 7.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/draft-gruessing-moq-requirements"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-d80485de51b9f63e219b772d44d85ce78f66f50802c45cd6834615c26240f143","title":"","text":"they consider implementation and deployment of systems that rely on the MOQ protocol. *Note: the initial high-level organization for this section is taken from Suhas Nandakumar's presentation, \"Progressing MOQ\" Prog-MOQ, at the October 2022 MOQ virtual interim meeting, which was in turn taken from the MOQ working group charter MOQ-charter. We think this is a reasonable starting point. We won't be surprised to see the high- level structure change a bit as things develop, but we didn't want to have this section COMPLETELY blank when we request working group adoption. TODO: Describe overall, high level requirements that we previously stated in earlier versions of this document. <\/del> 4.2. 4.2.1. 4.2.2. 4.2.3. 4.2.4. 4.2.5. 4.3. <\/ins> Many of the use cases have bi-directional flows of media, with clients both sending and receiving media concurrently, thus the protocol should have a unified approach in connection negotiation and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-eabc577aae04feb9acccd06af0a656bdf54b2f2530cda48f2066b09adb3fd1f3","title":"","text":"is unsupported (e.g. a live media server signalling it does not support receiving from a given client). 4.3. <\/del> In the initiation of a session both client and server must perform negotiation in order to agree upon a variety of details before media can move in any direction:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-946caf42f85db4920e669da71197f613577d305725402aa845bbd26da49d2a9d","title":"","text":"accepted? Re-negotiation in an existing protocol should be supported to allow changes in what is being sent of received. <\/del> changes in what is being sent or received. 4.3.1. 4.3.2. 4.3.3. 4.3.4. 4.3.5. 4.3.6. 4.3.7. <\/ins> 4.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-1a7c0ad3ec7afc6edfc677dff9441cf79d7aa11268f48ccd813dbb1049436ef9","title":"","text":"should be supported, but further extended metadata of the contents of the media or its ontology should not be supported. 4.4.1. 4.4.2. 4.4.3. 4.4.4. 4.4.5. <\/ins> 4.5. Packaging of media describes how encapsulation of media to carry the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-341f57688cadb6cfccce36a50ffd012095e3d96480f35ca8669cf4fbe5aba28a","title":"","text":"packaging of media, taking into consideration the various technical trade offs that each provide. 4.5.1. 4.5.2. 4.5.3. <\/ins> 4.6. 4.6.1. 4.6.2. 4.6.3. 4.7. 4.7.1. 4.7.2. 4.7.3. 4.7.4. 4.7.5. 4.8. <\/ins> End-to-end security describes the use of encryption of the media stream(s) to provide confidentiality in the presence of unauthorized intermediates or observers and prevent or restrict ability to decrypt"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-b584e6c1c65716c4f4fab46b45aeb14a46989d4985a367a24636911957d461c6","title":"","text":"security is \"sender-to-receiver\", but some \"ends\" may not be either senders or ultimate receivers, from a certain point of view. 4.8.1. <\/ins> 5. This document makes no requests of IANA."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-60e9e78bf0b2bf233a715e88e368e1d5ed27dd5e024393672af6acc051b8ca1b","title":"","text":"Our goal in this section is to understand the requirements that result from the use cases described in overallusecases. 4.1. Note: the intention for the requirements in this document is that they are useful for MOQ working group participants, to recognize constraints, and useful for readers outside the MOQ working group to understand the high-level functionality of the MOQ protocol, as they consider implementation and deployment of systems that rely on the MOQ protocol. <\/ins> *Note: the initial high-level organization for this section is taken from Suhas Nandakumar's presentation, \"Progressing MOQ\" Prog-MOQ, at the October 2022 MOQ virtual interim meeting, which was in turn taken"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-a57b3df0b33e5302f29db8555fbfac9ce6a3a2c6a8c19b4feeb668edf8b8a034","title":"","text":"TODO: Describe overall, high level requirements that we previously stated in earlier versions of this document. 4.1. <\/del> 4.2. <\/ins> Many of the use cases have bi-directional flows of media, with clients both sending and receiving media concurrently, thus the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-adf6988d17c3a89ef6eeba9c1d28ed9af0acd2fb42396566255db625d2fb7e88","title":"","text":"is unsupported (e.g. a live media server signalling it does not support receiving from a given client). 4.2. <\/del> 4.3. <\/ins> In the initiation of a session both client and server must perform negotiation in order to agree upon a variety of details before media"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-74bc00c0e9714c75bd80915b13b034d565d18e6640130371c9638ede9864a2d7","title":"","text":"Re-negotiation in an existing protocol should be supported to allow changes in what is being sent of received. 4.3. <\/del> 4.4. <\/ins> As multiple streams of media may be available for concurrent sending such as multiple camera views or audio tracks, a means of both"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-04127e3de766bc420cf909c7c68bedbcac752592aebd03de27053842cfc2ed63","title":"","text":"should be supported, but further extended metadata of the contents of the media or its ontology should not be supported. 4.4. <\/del> 4.5. <\/ins> Packaging of media describes how encapsulation of media to carry the raw media will work. There are at a high level two approaches to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-fd29a031ea8f783c12209ca711f77ea2d7de84765ab835d0151bc1cc7294c3d9","title":"","text":"packaging of media, taking into consideration the various technical trade offs that each provide. 4.5. <\/del> 4.6. <\/ins> End-to-end security describes the use of encryption of the media stream(s) to provide confidentiality in the presence of unauthorized"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-680e9b6469a31afbe989639048b735e74fb0cf7ea4c6f4914e83b25738ba88d7","title":"","text":"5. This document makes no requests of IANA. <\/del> This section covers topics that are explicitly out of scope for the time being. 5.1. The creation of new media transport protocols should be avoided, and instead we should make use of RTP RFC3550 and the existing ecosystem of payload formats and methods of signalling where possible. It may transpire a need to extend these specificiations; in which case we should work with the relevant working groups and present our use- cases. <\/ins> 6. This document makes no requests of IANA. 7. <\/ins> As this document is intended to create discussion and consensus and introduces no security considerations of its own. 7. References <\/del> 8. References <\/ins> 7.1. URIs <\/del> 8.1. URIs <\/ins> [1] https:\/\/github.com\/fiestajetsam\/I-D\/tree\/main\/draft-gruessing- moq-requirements"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-219fb305880b739780f4e147a59876309ca1b7cfd36def95696069a928ce0d13","title":"","text":"This document describes use cases and requirements that guide the specification of a simple, low-latency media delivery solution for ingest and distribution MOQ-charter, using either the QUIC protocol RFC9000 or WebTransport WebTrans-charter. <\/del> RFC9000 or WebTransport WebTrans-charter as transport protocols. <\/ins> 1.1. This version of the document is intended to provide the MOQ working group with a starting point for work on the \"Use Cases and Requirements document\" milestone. The update implements the work plan described in MOQ-ucr. The authors intend to request MOQ working group adoption after IETF 115, so the working group can begin to focus on these topics in earnest. <\/del> When adopted, this document is intended to capture use cases that are in scope for work on the MOQ protocol MOQ-charter, and requirements that arise from these use cases. As of this writing, the authors have not planned to request publication on this document, based on our understanding of the IESG's statement on \"Support Documents in IETF Working Groups\" IESG- sdwg, which says (among other things): It seems reasonable for the working group to improve this document, and then consider whether the result justifies publication as a part of the RFC archival document series. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-requirements-059e9fac43028e7edbe5045a24164bd3985e60f1a23d38a5969e3813bd5776ca","title":"","text":"4.6. Packaging of media describes how encapsulation of media to carry the raw media will work. There are at a high level two approaches to this: <\/del> Packaging of media describes how raw media will be encapsulated. There are at a high level two approaches to this: <\/ins> Within the protocol itself, where the protocol defines the carrying for each media encoding the ancillary data required for decoding the media. A common encapsulation format such as ISOBMFF which defines a generic method for all media and handles ancillary decode information. <\/del> ancillary data required to decode each media type the protocol supports. A common encapsulation format such as ISOBMFF ISOBMFF which defines a generic method for all media and handles ancillary decode information. <\/ins> The working group must agree on which approach should be taken to the packaging of media, taking into consideration the various technical trade offs that each provide. If the working group decides on a common encapsulation format, the mechanisms within the protocol SHOULD allow for new encapsulation formats to be used. <\/del> trade offs that each approach provides. If the working group decides to describe media encapsulation as part of the MOQ protocol, this will require a new version of the MOQ protocol in order to signal the receiver that a new media encapsulation format may be present. If the working group decides to use a common encapsulation format, the mechanisms within the protocol SHOULD allow for new encapsulation formats to be used. Without encapsulation agility, adding or changing the way media is encapsulated will also require a new version of the MOQ protocol, to signal the receiver that a new media encapsulation format may be present. MOQ protocol specifications will provide details on the supported media encapsulation(s). <\/ins> 4.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-25fc5a68c96357cc093b004c521e4e1d665005e4f357a615e6a0de1f29db7f6f","title":"","text":"This document defines the core behavior for Warp, a live media transport protocol over QUIC. Media is split into objects based on the underlying media encoding and transmitted independently over QUIC streams. QUIC streams are prioritized based on the delivery order, <\/del> streams. QUIC streams are prioritized based on the send order, <\/ins> allowing less important objects to be starved or dropped during congestion."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a7b2d58d3c10e0eab8cb4b89ca46fc668474685b14176c7b565e52a488b6b149","title":"","text":"The encoder determines how to fragment the encoded bitstream into objects (media). Objects are assigned an intended delivery order that should be obeyed during congestion (delivery-order) <\/del> Objects are assigned an intended send order that should be obeyed during congestion (send-order) <\/ins> The decoder receives each objects and skips any objects that do not arrive in time (decoder)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-45ff68cd0de507702673d19c2b0095b58c55293f15b24727e56049b5225d1c2c","title":"","text":"this ordering during congestion without increasing latency. The encoder determines how to behave during congestion by assigning each object a numeric delivery order. The delivery order SHOULD be followed when possible to ensure that the most important media is delivered when throughput is limited. Note that the contents within each object are still delivered in order; this delivery order only applies to the ordering between objects. <\/del> each object a numeric send order. The send order SHOULD be followed when possible to ensure that the most important media is delivered when throughput is limited. Note that the contents within each object are still delivered in order; this send order only applies to the ordering between objects. <\/ins> A sender MUST send each object over a dedicated QUIC stream. The QUIC library should support prioritization (prioritization) such that streams are transmitted in delivery order. <\/del> streams are transmitted in send order. <\/ins> A receiver MUST NOT assume that objects will be received in delivery <\/del> A receiver MUST NOT assume that objects will be received in send <\/ins> order for a number of reasons: Newly encoded objects MAY have a smaller delivery order than <\/del> Newly encoded objects MAY have a smaller send order than <\/ins> outstanding objects. Packet loss or flow control MAY delay the delivery of individual <\/del> Packet loss or flow control MAY delay the send of individual <\/ins> streams. The sender might not support QUIC stream prioritization."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-38523f7f93eb7d0e79b485837ba8c09dd4b72bfc85a96986e6aeee65bdc29e89","title":"","text":"The decoder will receive multiple objects in parallel and out of order. Objects arrive in delivery order, but media usually needs to be processed in decode order. The decoder SHOULD use a buffer to reassmble objects into decode order and it SHOULD skip objects after a configurable duration. The amount of time the decoder is willing to wait for an object (buffer duration) is what ultimately determines <\/del> Objects arrive in send order, but media usually needs to be processed in decode order. The decoder SHOULD use a buffer to reassmble objects into decode order and it SHOULD skip objects after a configurable duration. The amount of time the decoder is willing to wait for an object (buffer duration) is what ultimately determines <\/ins> the end-to-end latency. Objects MUST synchronize frames within and between tracks using"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c2d3a5de2f904cbecc5f282a736a031cfbc9d0b13433e57dcc79d0c1a97cbde8","title":"","text":"this to priority-congestion. The producer may assign a numeric delivery order to each object (delivery-order) <\/del> (send-order) <\/ins> This is a strict prioritization scheme, such that any available bandwidth is allocated to streams in ascending priority order. The sender SHOULD prioritize streams based on the delivery order. If two streams have the same delivery order, they SHOULD receive equal bandwidth (round-robin). <\/del> sender SHOULD prioritize streams based on the send order. If two streams have the same send order, they SHOULD receive equal bandwidth (round-robin). <\/ins> QUIC supports stream prioritization but does not standardize any mechanisms; see Section 2.3 in QUIC. In order to support"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4e89486a12b26bd3098439f30dc00256504dfafeaaf98bb5e27cf5d7b93c3d59","title":"","text":"priority order. The sender MUST respect flow control even if means delivering streams out of delivery order. It is OPTIONAL to prioritize retransmissions. <\/del> out of send order. It is OPTIONAL to prioritize retransmissions. <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a3bd9dfc9189ecdc0543837da7c0f7f8ce92505a849767a879e660a15719d7f3","title":"","text":"Warp encodes the delivery information for a stream via OBJECT headers (message-object). A relay SHOULD prioritize streams (prioritization) based on the delivery order. A relay MAY change the delivery order, in which case it SHOULD update the value on the wire for future hops. <\/del> A relay SHOULD prioritize streams (prioritization) based on the send order. A relay MAY change the send order, in which case it SHOULD update the value on the wire for future hops. <\/ins> A relay that reads from a stream and writes to stream in order will introduce head-of-line blocking. Packet loss will cause stream data"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-314038bb8260abbf47845b42e692fcc5ed94a5496b62c9762d14ead4c140c745","title":"","text":"Object Sequence: An integer always starts at 0 with in a Group and increases sequentially. Object Sequences are scoped to a Group. Object Delivery Order: An integer indicating the object delivery order (delivery-order). <\/del> Object Send Order: An integer indicating the object send order (send-order). <\/ins> Object Payload: The format depends on the track container (containers). This is a media bitstream intended for the decoder"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-39f610850539c18ff0ab9c9759ac1333204ba6a6a294deb2cc19af9d6c1590b5","title":"","text":"16.3. The delivery order (delivery-order depends on the desired user experience during congestion: <\/del> The send order (send-order depends on the desired user experience during congestion: <\/ins> if media should be skipped: delivery order = PTS <\/del> if media should be skipped: send order = PTS <\/ins> if media should not be skipped: delivery order = -PTS <\/del> if media should not be skipped: send order = -PTS <\/ins> if video should be skipped before audio: audio delivery order < video delivery order <\/del> if video should be skipped before audio: audio send order < video send order <\/ins> The delivery order may be changed if the content changes. For example, switching from a live stream (skippable) to an advertisement <\/del> The send order may be changed if the content changes. For example, switching from a live stream (skippable) to an advertisement <\/ins> (unskippable)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-968675b62a8bc42995500f99b91646e5ce3e14b65374eb84737013d196c7a814","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines the core behavior for MoQTransport, a live media transport protocol over QUIC. The application fragments a live stream into objects, including a header that describes the basic relationship between objects. Objects are starved\/dropped during congestion based on priorities in order to minimize latency. <\/del> This document defines the core behavior for MoQTransport, a media transport protocol over QUIC. MoQTransport allows a producer of media to publish data and have it consumed via subscription by a multiplicity of endpoints. It supports intermediate content distribution networks and is designed for high scale and low latency distribution. <\/ins> 1. MoQTransport is a live media transport protocol that utilizes the QUIC network protocol QUIC, either directly or via WebTransport WebTransport. It was originally developed for live media, but has been generalized for similar use-cases. <\/del> MoQTransport (MoQT) is a transport protocol that utilizes the QUIC network protocol QUIC, either directly or via WebTransport WebTransport, for the dissemination of media. MoQT utilizes a publish\/subscribe workflow in which producers of media publish data in response to subscription requests from a multiplicity of endpoints. MoQT supports wide range of use-cases with different resiliency and latency (live, interactive) needs without compromising the scalability and cost effectiveness associated with content delivery networks. MoQTransport is a generic protocol is designed to work in concert with multiple MoQ Streaming Formats. These MoQ Streaming Formats define how content is encoded, packaged, and mapped to MoQT objects, along with policies for discovery and subscription. <\/ins> motivation covers the background and rationale behind MoQ transport."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d3b555ec7fe7bb4d9084cb5ce8441aef1daccc8affcbd4a186a763f5b9613c8d","title":"","text":"1.1. The development of MoQT is driven by goals in a number of areas - specifically latency, the robustness of QUIC, workflow efficiency and relay support. <\/ins> 1.1.1. In a perfect world, we could deliver live content at the same rate it is produced. The end-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing. This queuing can occur anywhere in the path between the producer and consumer. For example: the application, the OS socket, a wifi router, within an ISP, or generally anywhere in transit. If nothing is done, new data will be appended to the end of a growing queue and will take longer to arrive than their predecessors, increasing latency. Our job is to minimize the growth of this queue, and if necessary, bypass the queue entirely by dropping content. The speed at which protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the latency. TCP-based protocols are simple, but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP- based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. A goal of this draft is to get the best of both worlds: a simple protocol that can still rapidly detect and respond to congestion using QUIC streams. <\/del> HTTP Adaptive Streaming (HAS) has been successful at achieving scale although often at the cost of latency. Latency is necessary to correct for variable network throughput. Ideally live content is consumed at the same bitrate it is produced. End-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing along the path from producer to consumer. The speed at which a protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the overall latency. TCP-based protocols are simple but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP-based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for the complexity of fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. One goal of MoQTransport is to achieve the best of both these worlds: leverage the features of QUIC to create a simple yet flexible low latency protocol that can rapidly detect and respond to congestion. <\/ins> 1.1.1.1. The live media protocol ecosystem is fragmented; each protocol has it's own niche. Specialization is often a good thing, but we believe there's enough overlap to warrant consolidation. For example, a service might simultaneously ingest via WebRTC, SRT, RTMP, etc. The same service might then simultaneously distribute via WebRTC, LL-HLS, HLS\/DASH, etc. Other similar live content would then be distributed other yet additional protocols: for example updates, chat, metadata, etc. This draft attempts to build a unified base transport protocol for media and similar use-cases. Any live content can be fragmented into objects and annotated to achieve the intended behavior. The goal is not to reinvent how content is encoded, just delivered. <\/del> The parallel nature of QUIC streams can provide improvements in the face of loss. A goal of MoQT is to design a streaming protocol to leverage the transmission benefits afforded by parallel QUIC streams as well exercising options for flexible loss recovery. Applying QUIC to HAS via HTTP\/3 has not yet yielded generalized improvements in throughput. One reason for this is that sending segments down a single QUIC stream still allows head-of-line blocking to occur. <\/ins> 1.1.1.2. The prevailing belief is that UDP-based protocols are more expensive and don't \"scale\". While it's true that UDP is more difficult to optimize than TCP, QUIC itself is proof that it is possible to reach performance parity. The ability to scale a live content transport actually depends on relay support: proxies, caches, CDNs, SFUs, etc. The success of HTTP-based protocols is due to the ability for a HTTP CDN to cache and deduplicate requests. It's difficult to build a CDN for live protocols that were not designed with relays in mind. This is the fatal flaw of many applications, as they relay on relays to perform bespoke parsing and decision making based on the contents. A goal of this draft is to treat relays as first class citizens. Any identification, reliability, ordering, prioritization, caching, etc is written to the wire in a header that is easy to parse. This ensures that relays can easily route content and respond to congestion in a specified, deterministic manner. <\/del> Internet delivered media today has protocols optimized for ingest and separate protocols optimized for distribution. This protocol switch in the distribution chain necessitates intermediary origins which re- package the media content. While specialization can have its benefits, there are gains in efficiency to be had in not having to re-package content. A goal of MoQT is to develop a single protocol which can be used for transmission from contribution to distribution. A related goal is the ability to support existing encoding and packaging schemas, both for backwards compatibility and for interoperability with the established content preparation ecosystem. <\/ins> 1.1.1.3. An integral feature of a protocol being successful is its ability to deliver media at scale. Greatest scale is achieved when third-party networks, independent of both the publisher and subscriber, can be leveraged to relay the content. These relays must cache content for distribution efficiency while simultaneously routing content and deterministically responding to congestion in a multi-tenant network. A goal of MoQT is to treat relays as first-class citizens of the protocol and ensure that objects are structured such that information necessary for distribution is available to relays while the media content itself remains opaque and private. 1.1.1.4. <\/ins> TODO: Add motivation text regarding bw management techniques in response to congestion. Also refer to priority-congestion for further details."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-82871146b3724ac7fc04f4b6f57c39878fd6ab8892a258a4959c98057f87988f","title":"","text":"1.1. The development of MoQT is driven by goals in a number of areas - specifically latency, the robustness of QUIC, workflow efficiency and relay support. <\/ins> 1.1.1. In a perfect world, we could deliver live content at the same rate it is produced. The end-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing. This queuing can occur anywhere in the path between the producer and consumer. For example: the application, the OS socket, a wifi router, within an ISP, or generally anywhere in transit. If nothing is done, new data will be appended to the end of a growing queue and will take longer to arrive than their predecessors, increasing latency. Our job is to minimize the growth of this queue, and if necessary, bypass the queue entirely by dropping content. The speed at which protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the latency. TCP-based protocols are simple, but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP- based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. A goal of this draft is to get the best of both worlds: a simple protocol that can still rapidly detect and respond to congestion using QUIC streams. <\/del> HTTP Adaptive Streaming (HAS) has been successful at achieving scale although often at the cost of latency. Latency is necessary to correct for variable network throughput. Ideally live content is consumed at the same bitrate it is produced. End-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing along the path from producer to consumer. The speed at which a protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the overall latency. TCP-based protocols are simple but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP-based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for the complexity of fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. One goal of MoQTransport is to achieve the best of both these worlds: leverage the features of QUIC to create a simple yet flexible low latency protocol that can rapidly detect and respond to congestion. <\/ins> 1.1.1.1. The live media protocol ecosystem is fragmented; each protocol has it's own niche. Specialization is often a good thing, but we believe there's enough overlap to warrant consolidation. For example, a service might simultaneously ingest via WebRTC, SRT, RTMP, etc. The same service might then simultaneously distribute via WebRTC, LL-HLS, HLS\/DASH, etc. Other similar live content would then be distributed other yet additional protocols: for example updates, chat, metadata, etc. This draft attempts to build a unified base transport protocol for media and similar use-cases. Any live content can be fragmented into objects and annotated to achieve the intended behavior. The goal is not to reinvent how content is encoded, just delivered. <\/del> The parallel nature of QUIC streams can provide improvements in the face of loss. A goal of MoQT is to design a streaming protocol to leverage the transmission benefits afforded by parallel QUIC streams as well exercising options for flexible loss recovery. Applying QUIC to HAS via HTTP\/3 has not yet yielded generalized improvements in throughput. One reason for this is that sending segments down a single QUIC stream still allows head-of-line blocking to occur. <\/ins> 1.1.1.2. The prevailing belief is that UDP-based protocols are more expensive and don't \"scale\". While it's true that UDP is more difficult to optimize than TCP, QUIC itself is proof that it is possible to reach performance parity. The ability to scale a live content transport actually depends on relay support: proxies, caches, CDNs, SFUs, etc. The success of HTTP-based protocols is due to the ability for a HTTP CDN to cache and deduplicate requests. <\/del> Internet delivered media today has protocols optimized for ingest and separate protocols optimized for distribution. This protocol switch in the distribution chain necessitates intermediary origins which re- package the media content. While specialization can have its benefits, there are gains in efficiency to be had in not having to re-package content. A goal of MoQT is to develop a single protocol which can be used for transmission from contribution to distribution. A related goal is the ability to support existing encoding and packaging schemas, both for backwards compatibility and for interoperability with the established content preparation ecosystem. <\/ins> It's difficult to build a CDN for live protocols that were not designed with relays in mind. This is the fatal flaw of many applications, as they relay on relays to perform bespoke parsing and decision making based on the contents. <\/del> 1.1.1.3. <\/ins> A goal of this draft is to treat relays as first class citizens. Any identification, reliability, ordering, prioritization, caching, etc is written to the wire in a header that is easy to parse. This ensures that relays can easily route content and respond to congestion in a specified, deterministic manner. <\/del> An integral feature of a protocol being successful is its ability to deliver media at scale. Greatest scale is achieved when third-party networks, independent of both the publisher and subscriber, can be leveraged to relay the content. These relays must cache content for distribution efficiency while simultaneously routing content and deterministically responding to congestion in a multi-tenant network. A goal of MoQT is to treat relays as first-class citizens of the protocol and ensure that objects are structured such that information necessary for distribution is available to relays while the media content itself remains opaque and private. <\/ins> 1.1.1.3. <\/del> 1.1.1.4. <\/ins> TODO: Add motivation text regarding bw management techniques in response to congestion. Also refer to priority-congestion for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1224a420b6fa8a374ffb73a22f7cd0c2c73cf994754b5430b69f3d655b75377e","title":"","text":"BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. TODO: The terms defined here doesn't capture the ongoing discussions within the Working Group (either as part of requirements or architecture documents). This section will be updated to reflect the discussions. <\/ins> Commonly used terms in this document are described below. 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8cdb336056d5bf41aff17010fb1589bd0075d3babe56b0dd7a1f683ae2b65539","title":"","text":"1.1. The development of MoQT is driven by goals in a number of areas - specifically latency, the robustness of QUIC, workflow efficiency and relay support. <\/ins> 1.1.1. In a perfect world, we could deliver live content at the same rate it is produced. The end-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing. This queuing can occur anywhere in the path between the producer and consumer. For example: the application, the OS socket, a wifi router, within an ISP, or generally anywhere in transit. If nothing is done, new data will be appended to the end of a growing queue and will take longer to arrive than their predecessors, increasing latency. Our job is to minimize the growth of this queue, and if necessary, bypass the queue entirely by dropping content. The speed at which protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the latency. TCP-based protocols are simple, but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP- based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. A goal of this draft is to get the best of both worlds: a simple protocol that can still rapidly detect and respond to congestion using QUIC streams. <\/del> HTTP Adaptive Streaming (HAS) has been successful at achieving scale although often at the cost of latency. Latency is necessary to correct for variable network throughput. Ideally live content is consumed at the same bitrate it is produced. End-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing along the path from producer to consumer. The speed at which a protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the overall latency. TCP-based protocols are simple but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. UDP-based protocols can avoid queuing, but the application is now responsible for the complexity of fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. One goal of MoQTransport is to achieve the best of both these worlds: leverage the features of QUIC to create a simple yet flexible low latency protocol that can rapidly detect and respond to congestion. <\/ins> 1.1.1.1. The live media protocol ecosystem is fragmented; each protocol has it's own niche. Specialization is often a good thing, but we believe there's enough overlap to warrant consolidation. For example, a service might simultaneously ingest via WebRTC, SRT, RTMP, etc. The same service might then simultaneously distribute via WebRTC, LL-HLS, HLS\/DASH, etc. Other similar live content would then be distributed other yet additional protocols: for example updates, chat, metadata, etc. This draft attempts to build a unified base transport protocol for media and similar use-cases. Any live content can be fragmented into objects and annotated to achieve the intended behavior. The goal is not to reinvent how content is encoded, just delivered. <\/del> The parallel nature of QUIC streams can provide improvements in the face of loss. A goal of MoQT is to design a streaming protocol to leverage the transmission benefits afforded by parallel QUIC streams as well exercising options for flexible loss recovery. Applying QUIC to HAS via HTTP\/3 has not yet yielded generalized improvements in throughput. One reason for this is that sending segments down a single QUIC stream still allows head-of-line blocking to occur. <\/ins> 1.1.1.2. The prevailing belief is that UDP-based protocols are more expensive and don't \"scale\". While it's true that UDP is more difficult to optimize than TCP, QUIC itself is proof that it is possible to reach performance parity. <\/del> Internet delivered media today has protocols optimized for ingest and separate protocols optimized for distribution. This protocol switch in the distribution chain necessitates intermediary origins which re- package the media content. While specialization can have its benefits, there are gains in efficiency to be had in not having to re-package content. A goal of MoQT is to develop a single protocol which can be used for transmission from contribution to distribution. A related goal is the ability to support existing encoding and packaging schemas, both for backwards compatibility and for interoperability with the established content preparation ecosystem. <\/ins> The ability to scale a live content transport actually depends on relay support: proxies, caches, CDNs, SFUs, etc. The success of HTTP-based protocols is due to the ability for a HTTP CDN to cache and deduplicate requests. It's difficult to build a CDN for live protocols that were not designed with relays in mind. This is the fatal flaw of many applications, as they relay on relays to perform bespoke parsing and decision making based on the contents. <\/del> 1.1.1.3. <\/ins> A goal of this draft is to treat relays as first class citizens. Any identification, reliability, ordering, prioritization, caching, etc is written to the wire in a header that is easy to parse. This ensures that relays can easily route content and respond to congestion in a specified, deterministic manner. <\/del> An integral feature of a protocol being successful is its ability to deliver media at scale. Greatest scale is achieved when third-party networks, independent of both the publisher and subscriber, can be leveraged to relay the content. These relays must cache content for distribution efficiency while simultaneously routing content and deterministically responding to congestion in a multi-tenant network. A goal of MoQT is to treat relays as first-class citizens of the protocol and ensure that objects are structured such that information necessary for distribution is available to relays while the media content itself remains opaque and private. <\/ins> 1.1.1.3. <\/del> 1.1.1.4. <\/ins> TODO: Add motivation text regarding bw management techniques in response to congestion. Also refer to priority-congestion for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5639d3c7ec44a17cb06238c91c84a9e57a19873e498156348720a3861977d1e6","title":"","text":"2. MoQT has a hierarchical object model for data, comprised of objects, groups and tracks. <\/ins> 2.1. The basic element of MoQTransport is an <\/del> The basic data element of MoQTransport is an <\/ins> . An object is an addressable unit whose payload is a sequence of bytes. All objects belong to a group, indicating ordering and potential dependencies. model-group Objects carry associated metadata such as priority, TTL, or other information usable by a relay, but relays MUST treat the object payload as opaque. The application is solely responsible for the contents of objects. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/del> potential dependencies. model-group Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the producer and consumer. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/ins> 2.2. A is collection of objects, part of a larger track (model-track). A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber may not want to receive the entire track, and will instead opt to receive only the latest group(s). The sender then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. The application is responsible for how objects are placed into groups. In general, objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. <\/del> is a collection of objects and is a sub-unit of a track (model- track). Objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber might not want to receive the entire track, and may instead opt to receive only the latest group(s). The sender then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. <\/ins> 2.3. A is a sequence of objects (model-object) organized into groups (model- group). A subscriber can request individual tracks at group boundaries, including any new objects while the track is active. <\/del> is a sequence of groups (model-group). It is the entity against which a consumer issues a subscription request. A subscriber can request to receive individual tracks starting at a group boundary, including any new objects pushed by the producer while the track is active. <\/ins> 2.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-683296f55e5b7cc475c79462094123557c530b6f66201edf5a7b9270f4dc3713","title":"","text":"specific to the underlying transport protocol usage transport- protocols. 2.4. A transport session is established for each track bundle. The client issues a CONNECT request with a URL which the server uses for identification and authentication. All control messages and prioritization occur within the context of a single transport session, which means a single track bundle. When WebTransport is used, multiple transport sessions may be pooled over a single QUIC connection for efficiency. <\/del> 3. MoQTransport works by transferring objects over QUIC streams. The application determines how live content is fragmented into tracks, groups, and objects. <\/del> 3.1. At the point of this writing, the working group has not reached"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c78b5c9947496f9f0394ecda3f4227f232ccf0cd61cf022ed11b1db6f220c7d3","title":"","text":"group. The two proposals are listed in send-order and ordering-by- priorities. We expect further work before a consensus is reached. 3.2. TODO: Add text describing iteration of group and intra object priorities within a group and their relation to congestion response. Add how it refers to <\/del> 4. This document defines a protocol that can be used interchangeably"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-27bb8789f129d5c032f8c4bb3b452ee1f96cfcf307dc5b88706654e899744edd","title":"","text":" Media over QUIC - Transport <\/del> Media over QUIC Transport <\/ins> draft-lcurley-moq-transport-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-862f3e9f2734f72591284cbaa0ed0e6e52c28054d97eb52a41bc023940d6f888","title":"","text":"how content is encoded, packaged, and mapped to MOQT objects, along with policies for discovery and subscription. model describes the object model employed by MOQT <\/del> model describes the object model employed by MOQT. <\/ins> session covers aspects of setting up a MOQT session."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-638003cf30d9b77e96cad84d3e995e3489c49011aaaa5063bf87fbad3cfad1cc","title":"","text":"The application MAY use any error message and SHOULD use a relevant code, as defined below: Session Terminated No error occurred; however the endpoint wishes <\/del> Session Terminated: No error occurred; however the endpoint wishes <\/ins> to terminate the session. Generic Error An unclassified error occurred. <\/del> Generic Error: An unclassified error occurred. <\/ins> Unauthorized: The endpoint breached an agreement, which MAY have been pre-negotiated by the application."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e3fd7442e9cf9ebdb7d47bb309ff2f925258ea09fd4f97493dc2dd2e74828d56","title":"","text":"2.1. The basic data element of MOQT is an . An object is an addressable unit whose payload is a sequence of bytes. All objects belong to a group, indicating ordering and potential dependencies. model-group Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the producer and consumer. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/del> The basic data element of MOQT is an object. An object is an addressable unit whose payload is a sequence of bytes. All objects belong to a group, indicating ordering and potential dependencies. model-group Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the producer and consumer. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/ins> 2.2. A is a collection of objects and is a sub-unit of a track (model- track). Objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber might not want to receive the entire track, and may <\/del> A group is a collection of objects and is a sub-unit of a track (model-track). Objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber might not want to receive the entire track, and may <\/ins> instead opt to receive only the latest group(s). The sender then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. 2.3. A is a sequence of groups (model-group). It is the entity against which a consumer issues a subscription request. A subscriber can request to receive individual tracks starting at a group boundary, including any new objects pushed by the producer while the track is active. <\/del> A track is a sequence of groups (model-group). It is the entity against which a consumer issues a subscription request. A subscriber can request to receive individual tracks starting at a group boundary, including any new objects pushed by the producer while the track is active. <\/ins> 2.3.1. In MOQT, every track has a and a <\/del> In MOQT, every track has a track name and a track namespace <\/ins> associated with it. A track name identifies an individual track within the namespace. A tuple of a track name and a track namespace together is known as <\/del> A tuple of a track name and a track namespace together is known as a full track name: <\/ins> : A is a set of servers (as identified by their connection URIs) for which full track names are guaranteed to be unique. This implies that within a single MOQT scope, subscribing to the same full track name would result in the subscriber receiving the data for the same track. It is up to the application using MOQT to define how broad or narrow the scope has to be. An application that deals with <\/del> A MOQT scope is a set of servers (as identified by their connection URIs) for which full track names are guaranteed to be unique. This implies that within a single MOQT scope, subscribing to the same full track name would result in the subscriber receiving the data for the same track. It is up to the application using MOQT to define how broad or narrow the scope has to be. An application that deals with <\/ins> connections between devices on a local network may limit the scope to a single connection; by contrast, an application that uses multiple CDNs to serve media may require the scope to include all of those"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6acc542b721b77f340f6fb218fc2b5dfd4f5dc681896fc6bebceac77020502de","title":"","text":"client and the server; it allows the peers to establish the mutually supported version and agree on the initial configuration before any objects are exchanged. It is a sequence of key-value pairs called ; the semantics and format of which can vary based on whether the client or server is sending. To ensure future extensibility of MOQT, the peers MUST ignore unknown setup parameters. TODO: describe GREASE for those. <\/del> SETUP parameters; the semantics and format of which can vary based on whether the client or server is sending. To ensure future extensibility of MOQT, the peers MUST ignore unknown setup parameters. TODO: describe GREASE for those. <\/ins> The wire format of the SETUP message is as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-11c047bd281ebc8a39541d0b10761176a90406fc6862fca8cbe830f38a25092a","title":"","text":"The wire format of the SETUP message is as follows: The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. <\/del> The available versions and SETUP parameters are detailed in the next sections. 6.1.1. MoQ Transport versions are a 32-bit unsigned integer, encoded as a varint. This version of the specification is identified by the number 0x00000001. Versions with the most significant 16 bits of the version number cleared are reserved for use in future IETF consensus documents. <\/ins> The client offers the list of the protocol versions it supports; the server MUST reply with one of the versions offered by the client. If"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a403784c7975ffffda9889afc0edeb946a37102f4e0daf041d23b6956e41bad7","title":"","text":"client, or the client receives a server version that it did not offer, the corresponding peer MUST close the connection. The SETUP parameters are described in the setup-parameters section. <\/del> [[RFC editor: please remove the remainder of this section before publication.]] <\/ins> 6.1.1. <\/del> The version number for the final version of this specification (0x00000001), is reserved for the version of the protocol that is published as an RFC. Version numbers used to identify IETF drafts are created by adding the draft number to 0xff000000. For example, draft-ietf-moq-transport-13 would be identified as 0xff00000D. 6.1.2. <\/ins> Every parameter MUST appear at most once within the SETUP message. The peers SHOULD verify that and close the connection if a parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1c1fc82b13bbb375087302ef1288208bbac703b6ef097dc6456b453765ed4610","title":"","text":"The ROLE parameter is mandatory for the client. All of the other parameters are optional. 6.1.1.1. <\/del> 6.1.2.1. <\/ins> The ROLE parameter (key 0x00) allows the client to specify what roles it expects the parties to have in the MOQT connection. It has three"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-da605ca51db3e89fd75b26e62f5a0b5238210b31e24361556c1b165f93b5d94e","title":"","text":"or it is different from what the server expects based on the application. 6.1.1.2. <\/del> 6.1.2.2. <\/ins> The PATH parameter (key 0x01) allows the client to specify the path of the MoQ URI when using native QUIC (QUIC). It MUST NOT be used by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ff63f8ef5404811f9a1f2008230a0bed3e1a8d535d876642bc1b15d1a4b9f4af","title":"","text":"6.6. A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" message to a publisher indicating it is no longer interested in receiving media for the specified track. The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" is as follows: Full Track Name: Identifies the track as defined in (track-name). 6.7. <\/ins> The publisher sends the ANNOUNCE control message to advertise where the receiver can route SUBSCRIBE REQUESTs for tracks within the announced Track Namespace. The receiver verifies the publisher is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e63f394cb49be38fa32dccbea98a024181454789ce1e6d2185ce5d190a559488","title":"","text":"Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in track-req- params. 6.6.1. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. 6.6.1.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.6.1.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.6.1.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST and ANNOUNCE messages. 6.7. <\/del> 6.8. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE OK\" control message to acknowledge the successful authorization and acceptance of an ANNOUNCE message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4e249da4306a7e4d4573850fd84bc66887c1ce74f6149e434119be68b3b924ba","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies the track namespace in the ANNOUNCE message for which this response is provided. 6.8. <\/del> 6.9. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE ERROR\" control message for tracks that failed authorization."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-507c23fdf9c13089dc53d6bced955a31aae5e46510f65e26616d9d89dc8ed3a7","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. 6.9. <\/del> 6.10. The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the provided Track Namespace. Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.11. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to force the client to reconnect. This is useful for server maintenance or reassignments without"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f89478f89d4655dd1889905a5b41693515cb3df0b6d319ea47830a6d606274d9","title":"","text":"SHOULD remain connected on both connections for a short period, processing objects from both in parallel. 6.12. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: 6.12.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.12.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.12.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST and ANNOUNCE messages. <\/ins> 7. TODO: Expand this section."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ca740443d9d00dd188a5a2661df6426eedd88a96f70d30ed4ecc2e90d5089bd2","title":"","text":"8. TODO: fill out currently missing registries: * MOQT version numbers * SETUP parameters * Track Request parameters * Subscribe Error codes * Announce Error codes * Track format numbers * Message types * Object headers <\/del> TODO: fill out currently missing registries: MOQT version numbers SETUP parameters Track Request parameters Subscribe Error codes Announce Error codes Track format numbers Message types Object headers <\/ins> TODO: register the URI scheme and the ALPN"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-682a1b56ac9bbaa0fa73f294c5b849132847257e6570dbb2fad3d749f58557c6","title":"","text":"Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in track-req- params. 6.6.1. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. 6.6.1.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.6.1.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.6.1.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST and ANNOUNCE messages. <\/del> 6.7. The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE OK\" control message to acknowledge"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c8a6896d9ad2703941852bc2ad265be49c986198e4f96377c66415b7ce8c7712","title":"","text":"SHOULD remain connected on both connections for a short period, processing objects from both in parallel. 6.10. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: 6.10.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.10.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.10.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST and ANNOUNCE messages. <\/ins> 7. TODO: Expand this section."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b275781add3c9f9e30d817342677e86697ad75c914e14a09aa962726c30479ab","title":"","text":"6.6. A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE REQUEST\" message to a publisher indicating it is no longer interested in receiving media for the specified track. <\/del> A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" message to a publisher indicating it is no longer interested in receiving media for the specified track. <\/ins> The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE REQUEST\" is as follows: <\/del> The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" is as follows: <\/ins> Full Track Name: Identifies the track as defined in (track-name). Track Request Parameters: As defined in track-req-params. <\/del> 6.7. A \"UNSUBSCRIBE OK\" control message is sent in response to a successful \"UNSUBSCRIBE REQUEST\" message. Full Track Name: Identifies the track for which this response is provided. On successfully validating the \"UNSUBSCRIBE REQUEST\" message, the publisher SHOULD cease delivering objects for the track to the subscriber. 6.8. A publisher sends a \"UNSUBSCRIBE ERROR\" control message in response to a failed \"UNSUBSCRIBE REQUEST\" message Full Track Name: Identifies the track in the request message for which this response is provided. Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for the failure. Reason Phrase Length: The length in bytes of the reason phrase. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for unsubscription error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. 6.9. <\/del> The publisher sends the ANNOUNCE control message to advertise where the receiver can route SUBSCRIBE REQUESTs for tracks within the announced Track Namespace. The receiver verifies the publisher is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-82c8850f4e8981369c19f70c0263c5f85e64e36d1e10941021201f26813748f0","title":"","text":"Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in track-req- params. 6.9.1. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. 6.9.1.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.9.1.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.9.1.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST, UNSUBSCRIBE and ANNOUNCE messages. 6.10. <\/del> 6.8. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE OK\" control message to acknowledge the successful authorization and acceptance of an ANNOUNCE message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-80ed360e903c72e0c78a4bb1e066a8f12d169445fd1a8332bc245675099b9f84","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies the track namespace in the ANNOUNCE message for which this response is provided. 6.11. <\/del> 6.9. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE ERROR\" control message for tracks that failed authorization."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f2f17b096f799a4985d58a7180c7635c29f52a79eedc92d2755d03b6ae2360b8","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. 6.12. <\/del> 6.10. The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the provided Track Namespace. Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.11. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to force the client to reconnect. This is useful for server maintenance or reassignments without"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-97e0033317e1f36990a6b4b0667814230c6415db34f62401a1dbe4852384e306","title":"","text":"Announce Error codes Unsubscribe Error codes <\/del> Track format numbers Message types"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-082657a40ff7ab8221dc5d30b946228bec3a0eebc0f71486fc49b01cd27407ec","title":"","text":"6.9. The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the provided Track Namespace. Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.10. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to force the client to reconnect. This is useful for server maintenance or reassignments without severing the QUIC connection. The server can be a producer or a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ba33dd03c4c906db1c8812d6c1532e0791cb88b9f01311412493029965f2f2d8","title":"","text":"SHOULD remain connected on both connections for a short period, processing objects from both in parallel. 6.11. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: 6.11.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.11.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.11.3. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST and ANNOUNCE messages. <\/ins> 7. TODO: Expand this section."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4eae8a3fd8a263f0ec6796caf2ddca5ece39c672f636a5e00c88b24e1bec782f","title":"","text":"Both unidirectional and bidirectional QUIC streams contain sequences of length-delimited messages. The Message Length field contains the length of the Message Payload field in bytes. A length of 0 indicates the message is unbounded and continues until the end of the stream. <\/del> An endpoint that receives an unknown message type MUST close the connection. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7fcea0b0e19bc36156e3baa165992d67bdef41f973e3cb2505ad06dc53806d3c","title":"","text":"Object Send Order: An integer indicating the object send order send-order or priority ordering-by-priorities value. Object Payload Length: The length of the following Object Payload. The sender MAY encode a zero in this field, which means that the message continues to the end of the stream. <\/ins> Object Payload: An opaque payload intended for the consumer and SHOULD NOT be processed by a relay."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-908af752fac4586dde5d42e4cda29bd1269c525708c215ee6c5b57fa7cc7b616","title":"","text":"Media over QUIC Transport draft-ietf-moq-transport-00 <\/del> draft-ietf-moq-transport-latest <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-73e055bdf093a8ebe5b1fafa1726dbcd61cf4e3a9f7f269c69a5a41cd2725f29","title":"","text":"A OBJECT message contains a range of contiguous bytes from from the specified track, as well as associated metadata required to deliver, cache, and forward it. <\/del> cache, and forward it. There are two subtypes of this message. When the message type is 0x00, the optional Object Payload Length field is present. When the message type ix 0x02, the field is not present. <\/ins> The format of the OBJECT message is as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-9bde99885661ad112cd9c09526fe8a0a6ea516daa742d05eac3a72993d1b4a09","title":"","text":"send-order or priority ordering-by-priorities value. Object Payload Length: The length of the following Object Payload. The sender MAY encode a zero in this field, which means that the message continues to the end of the stream. <\/del> If this field is absent, the object payload continues to the end of the stream. <\/ins> Object Payload: An opaque payload intended for the consumer and SHOULD NOT be processed by a relay."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a8509bab1bbf90f45ca643b7e2caa2e30882aabc2035466fd03bf3d492fa5aa9","title":"","text":"The subscriber making the subscribe request is notified of the result of the subscription, via \"SUBSCRIBE OK\" (message-subscribe-ok) or the \"SUBSCRIBE ERROR\" message-subscribe-error control message. <\/del> \"SUBSCRIBE ERROR\" message-subscribe-error control message. The entity receiving the SUBSCRIBE MUST send only a single response to a given SUBSCRIBE of either an OK or ERROR. <\/ins> For successful subscriptions, the publisher maintains a list of subscribers for each full track name. Each new OBJECT belonging to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7185efb32c439a651438abc7ef46ed4eb2051beb10be590fa86481b02d6fd36b","title":"","text":"specific (typically based on prior business agreement). Relays respond with \"ANNOUNCE OK\" and\/or \"ANNOUNCE ERROR\" control messages providing the results of announcement. <\/del> messages providing the results of announcement. The entity receiving the ANNOUNCE MUST send only a single response to a given ANNOUNCE of either an OK or ERROR. <\/ins> OBJECT message header carry short hop-by-hop Track Id that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use the Track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-cf2d32d6c05685f9f0a1a4701e715e3dbf0431f08c231f3afccb64691274abd3","title":"","text":"The format of SUBSCRIBE REQUEST is as follows: Full Track Name: Identifies the track as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/ins> Track Request Parameters: As defined in track-req-params."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d71a99d850a97390e6b55886c4cc4936716b9016ce24a59b9c2c044474b94741","title":"","text":"A \"SUBSCRIBE OK\" control message is sent for successful subscriptions. Full Track Name: Identifies the track for which this response is provided. <\/del> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/ins> Track ID: Session specific identifier that is used as an alias for the Full Track Name in the Track ID field of the OBJECT (message-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-dee27eb6f1ccc3abab5cf8397c25c8aea8e5ffe995b2adfde02183151d05ad34","title":"","text":"A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE ERROR control message in response to a failed SUBSCRIBE REQUEST. Full Track Name: Identifies the track in the request message for which this response is provided. <\/del> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/ins> Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1b77c835cf75695f594d3d12d2dbdec589f6860e32471b418f2886afa2c7e249","title":"","text":"The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" is as follows: Full Track Name: Identifies the track as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5507a68763bb81f8023b2999e92409e6298a40f50831eb61ee62ef28f5d1fe22","title":"","text":"prioritize streams (priority-congestion) based on the send order\/ priority. A sender SHOULD begin sending incomplete objects when available to avoid incurring additional latency. <\/ins> A relay that reads from a stream and writes to stream in order will introduce head-of-line blocking. Packet loss will cause stream data to be buffered in the QUIC library, awaiting in order delivery, which"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d296b78f24886cece3046f53e5a35f5dfdbc23c598ba23214cf672d22e98df86","title":"","text":"3.3. A QUIC stream MAY be canceled at any point with an error code. The producer does this via a \"RESET_STREAM\" frame while the consumer requests cancellation with a \"STOP_SENDING\" frame. When using \"order\", lower priority streams will be starved during congestion, perhaps indefinitely. These streams will consume resources and flow control until they are canceled. When nearing resource limits, an endpoint SHOULD cancel the lowest priority stream with error code 0. The sender MAY cancel streams in response to congestion. This can be useful when the sender does not support stream prioritization. TODO: this section actually describes stream cancellation, not session cancellation. Is this section required, or can it be deleted, or added to a new \"workflow\" section. <\/del> QUIC streams aside from the control stream MAY be canceled due to congestion or other reasons by either the sender or receiver. Early termination of a QUIC stream does not affect the MoQ application state, and therefore has no effect on outstanding subscriptions. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a8ae221639d635186504ba554ff57c4be14ae81890e595c6ec1ae05a198d8d36","title":"","text":"3.2. The first stream opened is a client-initiated bidirectional stream where the peers exchange SETUP messages (message-setup). The subsequent streams MAY be either unidirectional or bidirectional. For exchanging content, an application would typically send a unidirectional stream containing a single OBJECT message (message- object), as putting more than one object into one stream may create head-of-line blocking delays. However, if one object has a hard dependency on another object, putting them on the same stream could be a valid choice. <\/del> The first stream opened is a client-initiated bidirectional control stream where the peers exchange SETUP messages (message-setup). All messages defined in this draft are sent on the control stream after the SETUP message. Control messages MUST NOT be sent on any other stream, and a peer receiving a control message on a different stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Objects MUST NOT be sent on the control stream, and a peer receiving an Object on the control stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. This draft only specifies a single use of bidirectional streams. Objects are sent on unidirectional streams. Because there are no other uses of bidirectional streams, a peer MAY currently close the connection if it receives a second bidirectional stream. The control stream MUST NOT be abruptly closed at the QUIC layer. Doing so results in the session being closed as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ac382302010302ceeacc6ff2400b5aa0e7885f00f38e700784f2f31a5bbee9da","title":"","text":"subscribers for each full track name. Each new OBJECT belonging to the track is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track stops producing objects or there is a subscription error (see message-subscribe-error). <\/del> until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). <\/ins> Relays MAY aggregate authorized subscriptions for a given track when multiple subscribers request the same track. Subscription"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-bea667f0177098df714c83fb0f58739b7ef2c0b37ae80c83673e3a3de797974f","title":"","text":"6.7. A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_FIN\" message to all subscribers indicating it is done publishing objects on the subscribed track. The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_FIN\" is as follows: Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). Final Group: The largest Group Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track. Final Object: The largest Object Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in the \"Final Group\" for this track. 6.8. A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_RST\" message to all subscribers indicating there wan an error publishing to the given track and subscription is terminated. The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_RST\" is as follows: Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure. Reason Phrase Length: The length in bytes of the reason phrase. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. Final Group: The largest Group Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track. Final Object: The largest Object Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in the \"Final Group\" for this track. 6.9. <\/ins> The publisher sends the ANNOUNCE control message to advertise where the receiver can route SUBSCRIBE REQUESTs for tracks within the announced Track Namespace. The receiver verifies the publisher is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d7133f27323c6a00dfcaef5fcde168c6e36cadd8755e1ff9922f50644f633037","title":"","text":"Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in track-req- params. 6.8. <\/del> 6.10. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE OK\" control message to acknowledge the successful authorization and acceptance of an ANNOUNCE message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7e7bd8ddc8ddf05b9b0f2818c799b8ce1bb8ddea7537f3c600db7e4f5663d9c9","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies the track namespace in the ANNOUNCE message for which this response is provided. 6.9. <\/del> 6.11. <\/ins> The receiver sends an \"ANNOUNCE ERROR\" control message for tracks that failed authorization."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8e05ac5c406beb73d4e2325e3dcd8f06346ce914a1554b35cbcab34e214d52e3","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. 6.10. <\/del> 6.12. <\/ins> The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-bde4b90fe9defd443bdeca1d5904cd54d338ae57b3084a80b21d6b53577a9376","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.11. <\/del> 6.13. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to force the client to reconnect. This is useful for server maintenance or reassignments without"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a716946ef9110fac4a3f76901e8e42cdc6c6b24bf699552b88dc0114ddf2f737","title":"","text":"SHOULD remain connected on both connections for a short period, processing objects from both in parallel. 6.12. <\/del> 6.14. <\/ins> The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6e8cdd476250e78443b83f42004e7cfc38f8a1f0de47465abec145847ae7e7d3","title":"","text":"The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: 6.12.1. <\/del> 6.14.1. <\/ins> The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6f07fa81ceb6756bbb1859b460aa38c8b24cb6f334dacbcf1e30001fdbb469f1","title":"","text":"parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.12.2. <\/del> 6.14.2. <\/ins> The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-231aec480279baf6237da594c5d85c3619b7b6f249fdede153c099f7579da2fb","title":"","text":"the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. 6.12.3. <\/del> 6.14.3. <\/ins> AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f859b8e1fd58106068d9008c628d7e76a46b896a8fc829a8c4cb772892c1b83c","title":"","text":"WebTransport. Both provide streams and datagrams with similar semantics (see I-D.ietf-webtrans-overview); thus, the main difference lies in how the servers are identified and how the connection is established. <\/del> established. There is no definition of the protocol over other transports, such as TCP, and applicaitons using MoQ might need to fallback to another protocol when QUIC or WebTransport aren't available. <\/ins> 3.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-248f7128263c57dfe0b0ee262d16bf48b4d1728dcb0461c3452cf610ae0767e1","title":"","text":"Abstract This document defines the core behavior for Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT), a media transport protocol over QUIC. MOQT allows a producer of media to publish data and have it consumed via subscription by a multiplicity of endpoints. It supports intermediate content distribution networks and is designed for high scale and low latency distribution. <\/del> (MOQT), a media transport protocol designed to operate over QUIC and WebTransport, which have similar functionality. MOQT allows a producer of media to publish data and have it consumed via subscription by a multiplicity of endpoints. It supports intermediate content distribution networks and is designed for high scale and low latency distribution. <\/ins> 1. Media Over QUIC Transport (MOQT) is a transport protocol that utilizes the QUIC network protocol QUIC, either directly or via WebTransport WebTransport, for the dissemination of media. MOQT utilizes a publish\/subscribe workflow in which producers of media publish data in response to subscription requests from a multiplicity of endpoints. MOQT supports wide range of use-cases with different <\/del> Media Over QUIC Transport (MOQT) is a protocol that is optimized for the QUIC protocol QUIC, either directly or via WebTransport WebTransport, for the dissemination of media. MOQT utilizes a publish\/subscribe workflow in which producers of media publish data in response to subscription requests from a multiplicity of endpoints. MOQT supports wide range of use-cases with different <\/ins> resiliency and latency (live, interactive) needs without compromising the scalability and cost effectiveness associated with content delivery networks."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6128e1e763d8b8a286c51882d7fc5161af3a37b1e0777f0e4acabf52224e2200","title":"","text":"other uses of bidirectional streams, a peer MAY currently close the connection if it receives a second bidirectional stream. The control stream MUST NOT be abruptly closed at the QUIC layer. Doing so results in the session being closed as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/del> The control stream MUST NOT be abruptly closed at the underlying transport layer. Doing so results in the session being closed as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> 3.3. QUIC streams aside from the control stream MAY be canceled due to <\/del> Streams aside from the control stream MAY be canceled due to <\/ins> congestion or other reasons by either the sender or receiver. Early termination of a QUIC stream does not affect the MoQ application state, and therefore has no effect on outstanding subscriptions. <\/del> termination of a stream does not affect the MoQ application state, and therefore has no effect on outstanding subscriptions. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b078f4740b583d9dcac795e2a6a95b764097ea4043a1301181bacdd1fe647a00","title":"","text":"object are still delivered in order; this send order only applies to the ordering between objects. A sender MUST send each object over a dedicated QUIC stream. The QUIC library should support prioritization (priority-congestion) such that streams are transmitted in send order. <\/del> A sender MUST send each object over a dedicated stream. The library should support prioritization (priority-congestion) such that streams are transmitted in send order. <\/ins> A receiver MUST NOT assume that objects will be received in send order, for the following reasons:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a84be76f6cca439b91fc3fe5ed817cd216c3b8daaa5a407e4bc72be75dadebf2","title":"","text":"Packet loss or flow control can delay the send of individual streams. The sender might not support QUIC stream prioritization. <\/del> The sender might not support stream prioritization. <\/ins> TODO: Refer to Congestion Response and Prioritization Section for further details on various proposals."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-058ca5d8a19323cb67882f263701cb492db77ab9d132170f1455d26866e343b8","title":"","text":"A relay that reads from a stream and writes to stream in order will introduce head-of-line blocking. Packet loss will cause stream data to be buffered in the QUIC library, awaiting in order delivery, which will increase latency over additional hops. To mitigate this, a relay SHOULD read and write QUIC stream data out of order subject to flow control limits. See section 2.2 in QUIC. <\/del> to be buffered in the library, awaiting in order delivery, which will increase latency over additional hops. To mitigate this, a relay SHOULD read and write stream data out of order subject to flow control limits. See section 2.2 in QUIC. <\/ins> 6. Both unidirectional and bidirectional QUIC streams contain sequences of length-delimited messages. <\/del> Both unidirectional and bidirectional streams contain sequences of length-delimited messages. <\/ins> An endpoint that receives an unknown message type MUST close the connection."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5786b2af6aaeca238075f7d55ad78005fb7c3e16be0fa2c59bfce9e5739a8991","title":"","text":"Live content requires significant bandwidth and resources. Failure to set limits will quickly cause resource exhaustion. MOQT uses QUIC flow control to impose resource limits at the network layer. Endpoints SHOULD set flow control limits based on the anticipated bitrate. <\/del> MOQT uses stream limits and flow control to impose resource limits at the network layer. Endpoints SHOULD set flow control limits based on the anticipated bitrate. <\/ins> Endpoints MAY impose a MAX STREAM count limit which would restrict the number of concurrent streams which a MOQT Streaming Format could"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c0c2a615ee622f168af1d4691a737722d02ca26063bec40eb5237bd3fdb2ff6a","title":"","text":"Track Request Parameters: As defined in track-req-params. Subscription Hints: As defined in sub-hints. <\/ins> On successful subscription, the publisher SHOULD start delivering objects from the group sequence and object sequence as defined in the \"Track Request Parameters\". OPEN QUESTION: Should we disallow multiple hints ? <\/ins> 6.4. A \"SUBSCRIBE OK\" control message is sent for successful"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-45e344fb39403bb8197803a64d39d119b933d1031420199c8594fbdab22f01c0","title":"","text":"6.12. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. <\/del> Subscription hints provide a way for a subscriber to indicate, to the publisher, its preferences for receiving objects from a given track. <\/ins> The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: <\/del> Subscription Hints have the following structure: The \"HintType\" parameter identifies one of the following values: \"HintValue\" contains \"HintValueLength\" bytes, which encode attributes as specified by the HintType. If the HintType does not need extra hint attributes, the HintValueLength is 0, and the HintValue is empty. Future versions of the specification may define more hint types as needed. In the sections below, a publisher's current state of the track is defined by the most recent group and object sequence received (or active in the cache), if available, at the time of request. <\/ins> 6.12.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. <\/del> \"Current\" subscription hint specifies the start point for object delivery from the beginning of the current group. Current hint type defines no further hint attributes. <\/ins> 6.12.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. This parameter is applicable in SUBSCRIBE REQUEST message. <\/del> \"Now\" subscription hint specifies the start point for object delivery from the most recent object of the current group. Now hint type defines no further hint attributes. <\/ins> 6.12.3. \"RelativeStartPrevious\" subscription hint specifies the start point for object delivery from an earlier group relative to the current group. The \"GroupCount\" hint attribute specifies the number of groups to go back from the current group to determine the start point. 6.12.4. \"RelativeStartNext\" subscription hint specifies the start point for object delivery to a future group relative to the current group. The \"GroupCount\" hint attribute specifies the number of groups to wait on before delivering the objects. 6.12.5. The \"AbsoluteStart\" subscription hint allows subscribers to specify an absolute point in the track to start delivering objects, as indicated by the \"TrackOffset\" hint attribute. The structure for AbsoluteStart hint value is as follows: TrackOffset: Identifies the group and the object sequence value within the track as the start point for the delivery. TrackOffset is defined as below. \"ObjectSequence\" set to 0x0 implies until the end of the group identified in \"GroupSequence\". 6.12.6. The \"AbsoluteInterval\" subscription hint allows subscribers to request for range of objects by specifying values pertaining to start and end group\/object sequences. The AbsoluteInterval hint value has the following structure: The end track offset of the range is exclusive. 6.13. The Track Request Parameters identify properties of the track requested in either the ANNOUNCE or SUSBCRIBE REQUEST control messages. The peers MUST close the connection if there are duplicates. The Parameter Value Length field indicates the length of the Parameter Value. The format of \"Track Request Parameter\" is as follows: 6.13.1. <\/ins> AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies track's authorization information. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. This"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-91127b34ab744a15d3e7af9bb6baa1d21105900902eff3187bfbb7620e63bd63","title":"","text":"given URI by setting up a QUIC connection to the host and port identified by the \"authority\" section of the URI. The \"path-abempty\" and \"query\" portions of the URI are communicated to the server using the PATH parameter (path) which is sent in the SETUP message at the start of the session. The ALPN value RFC7301 used by the protocol is \"moq-00\". <\/del> the PATH parameter (path) which is sent in the CLIENT_SETUP message at the start of the session. The ALPN value RFC7301 used by the protocol is \"moq-00\". <\/ins> 3.2. Endpoints use the exchange of SETUP messages to negotiate the MOQT version and any extensions to use. The client indicates the MOQT versions it supports in its SETUP message (see message-setup). It also includes the union of all Setup Parameters setup-params required for a handshake by any of those versions. <\/del> The client indicates the MOQT versions it supports in the CLIENT_SETUP message (see message-setup). It also includes the union of all Setup Parameters setup-params required for a handshake by any of those versions. <\/ins> Within any MOQT version, clients request the use of extensions by adding SETUP parameters corresponding to that extension. No extensions are defined in this document. The server replies with a SETUP message that indicates the chosen version, includes all parameters required for a handshake in that version, and parameters for every extension requested by the client that it supports. <\/del> The server replies with a SERVER_SETUP message that indicates the chosen version, includes all parameters required for a handshake in that version, and parameters for every extension requested by the client that it supports. <\/ins> New versions of MOQT MUST specify which existing extensions can be used with that version. New extensions MUST specify the existing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5385b06379770d7a4ae1a9e92bf82715cddd4cd21c7d30815a6c2810d140460a","title":"","text":"6.2. The \"SETUP\" message is the first message that is exchanged by the client and the server; it allows the peers to establish the mutually supported version and agree on the initial configuration before any objects are exchanged. It is a sequence of key-value pairs called SETUP parameters; the semantics and format of which can vary based on whether the client or server is sending. To ensure future extensibility of MOQT, the peers MUST ignore unknown setup parameters. TODO: describe GREASE for those. <\/del> The \"CLIENT_SETUP\" and \"SERVER_SETUP\" messages are the first messages exchanged by the client and the server; they allows the peers to establish the mutually supported version and agree on the initial configuration before any objects are exchanged. It is a sequence of key-value pairs called SETUP parameters; the semantics and format of which can vary based on whether the client or server is sending. To ensure future extensibility of MOQT, the peers MUST ignore unknown setup parameters. TODO: describe GREASE for those. <\/ins> The wire format of the SETUP message is as follows: <\/del> The wire format of the SETUP messages is as follows: <\/ins> The available versions and SETUP parameters are detailed in the next sections."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fc48e1e853e5fa98364b2ecd1a208f2705aeb12e6588b76ef2ca0d0a4371707e","title":"","text":"6.1.1.1. The GROUP SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x00) identifies the group within the track to start delivering objects in a SUBSCRIBE message. The publisher MUST start delivering the objects from the most recent group, when this parameter is omitted. The value is of type varint. 6.1.1.2. The OBJECT SEQUENCE parameter (key 0x01) identifies the object with the track to start delivering objects in a SUBSCRIBE message. The \"GROUP SEQUENCE\" parameter MUST be set to identify the group under which to start delivery. The publisher MUST start delivering from the beginning of the selected group when this parameter is omitted. The value is of type varint. 6.1.1.3. <\/del> AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies a track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE or ANNOUNCE message. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1f6284b7b77fffd2e7653168bec53d651014e9b3483d758b0759e5f64fa91c4c","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase Length: The length in bytes of the reason phrase. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. <\/del> Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error. <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a0093ddb165f9adb602d958ccc45b51be037f8ac67d1c68275294bfa6dc31287","title":"","text":"Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure. Reason Phrase Length: The length in bytes of the reason phrase. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. <\/del> Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error. <\/ins> Final Group: The largest Group Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-98cfbd90cc6cc371d9cecf8970df7a7675eeb5370e4f604003ecf431c700ef8d","title":"","text":"Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for announcement failure. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error and \"Reason Phrase Length\" field carries its length. <\/del> Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error. <\/ins> 6.13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-bf27f335bf9018a9e102388bdecff1737fb6cff95746b8b8ce53b4b1637ba10a","title":"","text":"ANNOUNCE MUST send only a single response to a given ANNOUNCE of either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. OBJECT message header carry short hop-by-hop Track Id that maps to <\/del> OBJECT message header carry short hop-by-hop Track ID that maps to <\/ins> the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use the Track ID of an incoming OBJECT message to identify its track and find the active subscribers for that track. Relays MUST NOT depend on OBJECT"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6a8ae7f91d1ebea0fc6d17a8b4c20316d3743005178eaa0d525e93dd8184e489","title":"","text":"specified track, as well as associated metadata required to deliver, cache, and forward it. There are two subtypes of this message. When the message type is 0x00, the optional Object Payload Length field is present. When the message type ix 0x02, the field is not present. <\/del> present. When the message type is 0x02, the field is not present. <\/ins> The format of the OBJECT message is as follows: Track ID: The track identifier obtained as part of subscription and\/or publish control message exchanges. <\/del> Track ID : The compressed full track name obtained as part of subscription and\/or publish control message exchanges. <\/ins> Group Sequence : The object is a member of the indicated group model-group within the track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1a7d8eb4b160b87173d4ffee5b5a4f05f05b97548c0dca6da3d7018ce059def9","title":"","text":"6.4.2. The format of SUBSCRIBE REQUEST is as follows: <\/del> The format of SUBSCRIBE is as follows: <\/ins> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). Subscribe ID: Session unique identifier for the subscription. \"Subscribe ID\" is monotonically increasing variable length integer and it MUST uniquely identify a subscription within a session. \"Subscribe ID\" is used by subscribers and the publishers to identify a given subscription. Subscribers specify the \"Subscribe ID\" and it is included in the corresponding SUBSCRIBE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ERROR. <\/ins> StartGroup: The Location of the requested group. StartGroup's Mode MUST NOT be None."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-9494fe7b8c218c588cc76115168736649d07eed5ff042db61837c4c95919eeab","title":"","text":"publisher MUST NOT send objects from outside the requested start and end. TODO: Define the flow where subscribe request matches an existing subscribe id (subscription updates.) <\/ins> 6.4.3. 6.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4badd9149972a5649ae19b58fbe87f983816d0f528ad95c2fa01410d1cb859a7","title":"","text":"the Full Track Name in the Track ID field of the OBJECT (message- object) message headers of the requested track. Track IDs are generally shorter than Full Track Names and thus reduce the overhead in OBJECT messages. <\/del> overhead in OBJECT messages Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer from the incoming subscription request for which this message is the response. <\/ins> Expires: Time in milliseconds after which the subscription is no longer valid. A value of 0 indicates that the subscription stays"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0b9704ac97b3f6662894e125a7f3980600a31c971e4800a3bbf135e3156824f4","title":"","text":"A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR control message in response to a failed SUBSCRIBE. Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer as defined in message- subscribe-req. <\/ins> Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6e111e1e7fea300d02f82c9ea187924c8dea893d64db7ce5dcf25ecb046b7ca6","title":"","text":"The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" is as follows: Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer as defined in message- subscribe-req. <\/ins> 6.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d01ac9cac95b56a60cda0c77d4b9a6c85d2b943e00e48799af5a8b1f9bc5b4a3","title":"","text":"The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_FIN\" is as follows: Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Subscribe ID: Subscription identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. <\/ins> Final Group: The largest Group Sequence sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3e93e919aa797388da21fad4d2646195ef6c0cd597f40e842388cd181cbd74a7","title":"","text":"The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_RST\" is as follows: Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. <\/ins> Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ece825678f845bd95e07ed643b04b8bb9f210ff9037cf06f3ca4d3d0957b9485","title":"","text":"This draft only specifies a single use of bidirectional streams. Objects are sent on unidirectional streams. Because there are no other uses of bidirectional streams, a peer MAY currently close the connection if it receives a second bidirectional stream. <\/del> session as a 'Protocol Violation' if it receives a second bidirectional stream. <\/ins> The control stream MUST NOT be abruptly closed at the underlying transport layer. Doing so results in the session being closed as a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-594b4d5cad7013c83c3afc43cedc29c7b65124297fab60607df0bcf3cd95ef92","title":"","text":"length-delimited messages. An endpoint that receives an unknown message type MUST close the connection. <\/del> session. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7aa3a4a3b2c327666bbf878b83b140a9119e107e412afd17bdc38eb87d5c66e2","title":"","text":"Senders MUST NOT repeat the same parameter type in a message. Receivers SHOULD check that there are no duplicate parameters and close the connection if found. <\/del> close the session as a 'Protocol Violation' if found. <\/ins> Receivers ignore unrecognized parameters."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-72c019633104a350718bcf04a633eb197d77a94fcd09e513888ccbe5c3cc61a6","title":"","text":"server MUST reply with one of the versions offered by the client. If the server does not support any of the versions offered by the client, or the client receives a server version that it did not offer, the corresponding peer MUST close the connection. <\/del> offer, the corresponding peer MUST close the session. <\/ins> [[RFC editor: please remove the remainder of this section before publication.]]"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0e36282c8c8933ba15d69cb00812a0ff377c7d8b9a91af392d47715a3351bb9f","title":"","text":"possible values, which are of type varint: The client MUST send a ROLE parameter with one of the three values specified above. The server MUST close the connection if the ROLE <\/del> specified above. The server MUST close the session if the ROLE <\/ins> parameter is missing, is not one of the three above-specified values, or it is different from what the server expects based on the application."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-58b975bf6882cdbea1741d767c1d7f13bdddad7bc440c59bfb11c042c49d01e4","title":"","text":"5.3. TODO: This section shall cover aspects of relay failover and protocol interactions. 5.4. TODO: This section shall cover reconnect considerations for clients when moving between the Relays. 5.5. <\/del> TODO: Refer to priority-congestion. Add details to describe relay behavior when merging or splitting streams and interactions with congestion response. 5.6. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> MOQT encodes the delivery information for a stream via OBJECT headers (message-object)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2dd2ef6105dab3a38cb823584457b53fa36f9665dbe474811964382a312edfcd","title":"","text":"The first stream opened is a client-initiated bidirectional control stream where the peers exchange SETUP messages (message-setup). All messages defined in this draft are sent on the control stream after the SETUP message. Control messages MUST NOT be sent on any other stream, and a peer receiving a control message on a different stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Objects MUST NOT be sent on the control stream, and a peer receiving an Object on the control stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/del> messages defined in this draft except OBJECT and OBJECT_WITH_LENGTH are sent on the control stream after the SETUP message. Control messages MUST NOT be sent on any other stream, and a peer receiving a control message on a different stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Objects MUST NOT be sent on the control stream, and a peer receiving an Object on the control stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> This draft only specifies a single use of bidirectional streams. Objects are sent on unidirectional streams. Because there are no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f01a6b4576d65585fbfd27d4751688d37551fc05d9b724af6dd0f8826294edb9","title":"","text":"in time, two tracks within the same scope contain different data, they have to have different full track names. In this specification, both the Track Namespace and the Track Name are not constrained to a specific encoding. They carry a sequence of bytes and comparison between two Track Namespaces or Track Names is done by exact comparison of the bytes. Specifications that use MoQ Transport may constrain the information in these fields, for example by restricting them to UTF-8. Any specification that does needs to specify the canonicalization into the bytes in the Track Namespace or Track Name such that exact comparison works. <\/ins> 2.3.2. Each track MAY have one or more associated connection URLs specifying"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-136323cbc82a6c2a12d926803bd6ea4aa299f4c967ca2334b39b0ef7fe2fad06","title":"","text":"associated with it. A track name identifies an individual track within the namespace. A tuple of a track name and a track namespace together is known as a full track name: <\/del> A MOQT scope is a set of servers (as identified by their connection URIs) for which full track names are guaranteed to be unique. This implies that within a single MOQT scope, subscribing to the same full track name would result in the subscriber receiving the data for the same track. It is up to the application using MOQT to define how broad or narrow the scope has to be. An application that deals with connections between devices on a local network may limit the scope to a single connection; by contrast, an application that uses multiple CDNs to serve media may require the scope to include all of those CDNs. The full track name is the only piece of information that is used to identify the track within a given MOQT scope and is used as cache key. MOQT does not provide any in-band content negotiation methods similar to the ones defined by HTTP (RFC9110); if, at a given moment in time, two tracks within the same scope contain different data, they have to have different full track names. <\/del> URIs) for which the tuple of Track Name and Track Namespace are guaranteed to be unique and identify a specific track. It is up to the application using MOQT to define how broad or narrow the scope is. An application that deals with connections between devices on a local network may limit the scope to a single connection; by contrast, an application that uses multiple CDNs to serve media may require the scope to include all of those CDNs. Because the tuple of Track Namespace and Track Name are unique within an MOQT scope, they can be used as a cache key. MOQT does not provide any in-band content negotiation methods similar to the ones defined by HTTP (RFC9110); if, at a given moment in time, two tracks within the same scope contain different data, they have to have different names and\/or namespaces. <\/ins> In this specification, both the Track Namespace and the Track Name are not constrained to a specific encoding. They carry a sequence of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d9358443797b0a56d1c97f0a571db51b5cff38aa074fc25e3a756bd7a1e3ea61","title":"","text":"Subscribers interact with the Relays by sending a SUBSCRIBE (message- subscribe-req) control message for the tracks of interest. Relays MUST ensure subscribers are authorized to access the content associated with the Full Track Name. The authorization information can be part of subscription request itself or part of the encompassing session. The specifics of how a relay authorizes a user are outside the scope of this specification. <\/del> associated with the track. The authorization information can be part of subscription request itself or part of the encompassing session. The specifics of how a relay authorizes a user are outside the scope of this specification. <\/ins> The subscriber making the subscribe request is notified of the result of the subscription, via SUBSCRIBE_OK (message-subscribe-ok) or the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d5087ca100b78be920ec3792cad9d33f16c0a583a9fdd29225f51f058e37af7e","title":"","text":"SUBSCRIBE of either SUBSCRIBE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ERROR. For successful subscriptions, the publisher maintains a list of subscribers for each full track name. Each new OBJECT belonging to the track is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). <\/del> subscribers for each track. Each new OBJECT belonging to the track within the subscription range is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). <\/ins> Relays MAY aggregate authorized subscriptions for a given track when multiple subscribers request the same track. Subscription"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8c3551df3ec5cf5b186250ee07f6b154038275f8ffc5a3e1428f54057b139da8","title":"","text":"track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). A relay MUST not reorder or drop objects received on a multi-object stream when forwarding to subscribers, unless it has application specific information. <\/ins> Relays MAY aggregate authorized subscriptions for a given track when multiple subscribers request the same track. Subscription aggregation allows relays to make only a single forward subscription"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f3dc7642e8e399fe58b6e1bdaced3a8b4f608f220119e2839ab44b797f6db195","title":"","text":"subscription request is cached and shared among the pending subscribers. The application SHOULD use a relevant error code in SUBSCRIBE_ERROR, as defined below: <\/ins> 5.2. Publishing through the relay starts with publisher sending ANNOUNCE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7aa19cb3549275cfb8556d8052d0d90076d6419285197f1b37db4773c44c9be0","title":"","text":"6.3. A OBJECT message contains a range of contiguous bytes from from the <\/del> An OBJECT message contains a range of contiguous bytes from from the <\/ins> specified track, as well as associated metadata required to deliver, cache, and forward it. There are two subtypes of this message. When the message type is 0x00, the optional Object Payload Length field is present. When the message type is 0x02, the field is not present. <\/del> cache, and forward it. <\/ins> The format of the OBJECT message is as follows: <\/del> 6.3.1. <\/ins> Track Alias :The track identifier as specified in the SUBSCRIBE message message-subscribe-req. <\/del> A canonical MoQ Object has the following information: <\/ins> Group ID : The object is a member of the indicated group ID model- <\/del> Track Namespace and Track Name: The track this object belongs to. Group ID: The object is a member of the indicated group ID model- <\/ins> group within the track. Object ID: The order of the object within the group. The IDs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8bb7c56d9e474db92b3c98c2d35199abf3fcf8249f426888d9102aac150cc442","title":"","text":"Object Send Order: An integer indicating the object send order send-order or priority ordering-by-priorities value. Object Payload Length: The length of the following Object Payload. If this field is absent, the object payload continues to the end of the stream. <\/del> Object Forwarding Preference: An enumeration indicating how a sender sends an object. The preferences are Track, Group, and Object. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object Forwarding Preference\", described below. <\/ins> Object Payload: An opaque payload intended for the consumer and SHOULD NOT be processed by a relay. 6.3.2. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message carries a single object on a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the end of the stream. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message MUST be the first and only message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Object\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Object\", open a stream, serialize object fields below, and terminate the stream. Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer as defined in message- subscribe-req. Track Alias: Identifies the Track Namespace and Track Name as defined in message-subscribe-req. The Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias is different from the one specified in the subscription identified by Subscribe ID, the receiver MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. 6.3.3. When multiple objects are sent on a stream, the stream begins with a stream header message and is followed by one or more sets of serialized object fields. If a stream ends gracefully in the middle of a serialized Object, terminate the session with a Protocol Violation. A sender SHOULD NOT open more than one multi-object stream at a time with the same stream header message type and fields. TODO: figure out how a relay closes these streams When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\". All objects on the stream have the \"Object Send Order\" specified in the stream header. All Objects received on a stream opened with STREAM_HEADER_TRACK have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Track\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Track\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription, or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\" if needed, then serialize the the following object fields. When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the group indicated by \"Group ID\". All objects on the stream have the \"Object Send Order\" specified in the stream header. All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription, \"Group ID\" and \"Object Send Order\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. 6.3.4. Sending a track on one stream: Sending a group on one stream, with a unordered object in the group appearing on its own stream. <\/ins> 6.4. A receiver issues a SUBSCRIBE to a publisher to request a track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-52590731f253038dfdc06f3ad59958769405ddd748b5f76bb1b0fc9f29f93b2f","title":"","text":"objects from the group ID and object ID described above. If a publisher cannot satisfy the requested start or end for the subscription it MAY send a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code TBD. A publisher MUST NOT send objects from outside the requested start and end. <\/del> subscription it MAY send a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'. A publisher MUST NOT send objects from outside the requested start and end. <\/ins> TODO: Define the flow where subscribe request matches an existing subscribe id (subscription updates.)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c88644d09f36c7fb30b49b62f03dea640442d9d22ec67a6f7422c92846480c3f","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error. Track Alias: When Error Code is TBD, the subscriber SHOULD re- issue the SUBSCRIBE with this Track Alias instead. If this Track Alias is already in use, the receiver MUST close the connection with a Duplicate Track Alias error (session-termination). TODO: Add a registry for subscribe error codes and make this field conditional. <\/del> Track Alias: When Error Code is 'Retry Track Alias', the subscriber SHOULD re-issue the SUBSCRIBE with this Track Alias instead. If this Track Alias is already in use, the receiver MUST close the connection with a Duplicate Track Alias error (session- termination). <\/ins> 6.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c07fc6b7519f7f64cd8b772a5f1b0ed70004c702a24fd34f27374f0b1835d143","title":"","text":"of the Parameter Value field in bytes. Each parameter description will indicate the data type in the Parameter Value field. If the parameter value is a varint, but the self-encoded length of that varint does not match the Parameter Length field, the receiver MUST ignore the parameter using the value in the Parameter Length field. <\/del> Parameter Value field. If a receiver understands a parameter type, and the parameter length implied by that type does not match the Parameter Length field, the receiver MUST terminate the session with error code 'Parameter Length Mismatch'. <\/ins> 6.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-89886e0c3a4b31594b593052dda0b95b8dbef40b83ae74b09f89f7da64c74aba","title":"","text":"SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). A relay MUST not reorder or drop objects received on a multi-object stream when forwarding to subscribers. <\/del> stream when forwarding to subscribers, unless it has application specific information. <\/ins> Relays MAY aggregate authorized subscriptions for a given track when multiple subscribers request the same track. Subscription"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f69f90a645472d0a3c71884939b56e4b9b66fa5994d2be3f7818edf0fdc6fdc8","title":"","text":"5.4. MOQT encodes the delivery information for a stream via OBJECT headers (message-object). <\/del> (message-object). A relay MUST NOT modify Object properties when forwarding. <\/ins> A relay MUST treat the object payload as opaque. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. A relay SHOULD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f90caacc581fecc8ebc5521d082b8001df8cb511aa74413b5711f7934ea51155","title":"","text":"send-order or priority ordering-by-priorities value. Object Forwarding Preference: An enumeration indicating how a sender sends an object. The preferences are Track, Group, and Object. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object <\/del> sender sends an object. The preferences are Track, Group, Object and Datagram. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object <\/ins> Forwarding Preference\", described below. Object Payload: An opaque payload intended for the consumer and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-081b3564fe25ac8df3384e6240a9bd15509a64e60620608b0c2af697679576c7","title":"","text":"Track Alias: Identifies the Track Namespace and Track Name as defined in message-subscribe-req. The Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias is different from the one specified in the subscription identified by <\/del> If the Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias are different from those specified in the subscription identified by <\/ins> Subscribe ID, the receiver MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. An \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram or a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram or stream. If this message appears on a stream, it MUST be the first message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\", determine the length of the fields and payload, and compare the length with the maximum datagram size of the session. If the object size is less than or equal maximum datagram size, send the serialized data as a datagram. Otherwise, open a stream, send the serialized data and terminate the stream. An implementation SHOULD NOT send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\" on a stream if it is possible to send it as a datagram. <\/ins> 6.3.3. When multiple objects are sent on a stream, the stream begins with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-174a96b71709feada3d0e5ad98dcc51be6af573c835e9df030ddcc3ea17cdf1f","title":"","text":"When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\". All objects on the stream have the same \"Object Send Order\". <\/del> \"Object Send Order\" specified in the stream header. <\/ins> All Objects received on a stream opened with STREAM_HEADER_TRACK have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Track\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fb9c25ecf2edbc6014b754c0b58579baef8061d15c676e631523c33fc42255a2","title":"","text":"new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\" if needed, then serialize the the following object fields. A sender MUST NOT send an Object on a stream if its Group ID is less than a previously sent Group ID on that stream, or if its Object ID is less than or equal to a previously sent Object ID within a given group on that stream. <\/ins> When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the group indicated by \"Group ID\". All objects on the stream have the same \"Object Send Order\". <\/del> All objects on the stream have the \"Object Send Order\" specified in the stream header. <\/ins> All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-35275101d09087673ac559b52074bcb5a61d48b33fd3d037d5463503bf64deb1","title":"","text":"and \"Object Send Order\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. A sender MUST NOT send an Object on a stream if its Object ID is less than a previously sent Object ID within a given group in that stream. <\/ins> 6.3.4. Sending a track on one stream:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-776f1f379671fdf4e775a5a20b4648a18b8239f6ae18c6f0e96ff0dd34a3f9fb","title":"","text":"The basic data element of MOQT is an object. An object is an addressable unit whose payload is a sequence of bytes. All objects belong to a group, indicating ordering and potential dependencies. model-group Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the producer and consumer. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/del> model-group An object is uniquely identified by its track namespace, track name, group ID, and object ID, and must be an identical sequence of bytes regardless of how or where it is retrieved. An Object can become unavailable, but it's contents MUST NOT change over time. Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the producer and consumer. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7293ecd23bdc4e1f3330b8df7b9547af474d6ada3a23074a3f52f4bc0c1e8e13","title":"","text":"6.3.2. Every Track has a single 'Object Forwarding Preference' and publishers MUST NOT mix different forwarding preferences within a single track. If a subscriber receives different forwarding preferences for a track, it SHOULD close the session with an error of 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message carries a single object on a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the end of the stream. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message MUST be the first and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-50296f2a474832e17001effe3149140fa6733d39dab0e193b27185db39a6fc72","title":"","text":"Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. An \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram or a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram or stream. If this message appears on a stream, it MUST be the only message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\", determine the length of the fields and payload, and compare the length with the maximum datagram size of the session. If the object size is less than or equal maximum datagram size, send the serialized data as a datagram. Otherwise, open a stream, send the serialized data and terminate the stream. An implementation SHOULD NOT send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\" on a stream if it is possible to send it as a datagram. <\/ins> 6.3.3. When multiple objects are sent on a stream, the stream begins with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c1335bb482c7c747e60e560b750d49bf0847597afe0202cc0e0f47008b5119d7","title":"","text":"Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer as defined in message- subscribe-req. Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Expires: Time in milliseconds after which the subscription is no longer valid. A value of 0 indicates that the subscription stays active until it is explicitly unsubscribed. ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published on this track, 0 if not. If 0, then the Largest Group ID and Largest Object ID fields will not be present. Largest Group ID: the largest Group ID available for this track. This Group ID corresponds to the Group that would be returned with a subscribe-locations RelativePrevious value of 0. This field is only present if ContentExists has a value of 1. Largest Object ID: the largest Object ID available within the largest Group ID for this track. This Object ID corresponds to the Object that would be returned with a subscribe-locations RelativePrevious value of 0. This field is only present if ContentExists has a value of 1. <\/ins> 6.6. A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR control message in response to a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fa1171ff206c0c27b281d53973d5cd30cb89bd1e3077ac89abc5c05af34e63b8","title":"","text":"Track Alias: Identifies the Track Namespace and Track Name as defined in message-subscribe-req. The Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias is different from the one specified in the subscription identified by <\/del> If the Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias are different from those specified in the subscription identified by <\/ins> Subscribe ID, the receiver MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. An \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram or a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram or stream. If this message appears on a stream, it MUST be the only message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\", determine the length of the fields and payload, and compare the length with the maximum datagram size of the session. If the object size is less than or equal maximum datagram size, send the serialized data as a datagram. Otherwise, open a stream, send the serialized data and terminate the stream. An implementation SHOULD NOT send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\" on a stream if it is possible to send it as a datagram. <\/ins> 6.3.3. When multiple objects are sent on a stream, the stream begins with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f649d1d95fa61016804fa47618cdb80f10a31febca7abffe682c8033e2537611","title":"","text":"This document uses the conventions detailed in (RFC9000) when describing the binary encoding. This document also defines an additional field type for binary data: <\/del> As a quick reference, the following list provides a non normative summary of the parts of RFC9000 field syntax that are used in this specification. This document extends the RFC9000 syntax and with the additional field types: To reduce unnecessary use of bandwidth, variable length integers SHOULD be encoded using the least number of bytes possible to represent the required value. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2acd1715c3d2bbc4e5b567a433aec98f1cddc59ce4e5f4ce38098710cf29d9f6","title":"","text":"Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifer as defined in message- subscribe-req. Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name). Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). <\/del> Expires: Time in milliseconds after which the subscription is no longer valid. A value of 0 indicates that the subscription stays active until it is explicitly unsubscribed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ce7a44fbe0000119741993c78ae5075e7e3090fbb2e03c19a837a689fda4af70","title":"","text":"dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). <\/del> SUBSCRIBE_RESET (see message-subscribe-reset). <\/ins> A relay MUST not reorder or drop objects received on a multi-object stream when forwarding to subscribers, unless it has application"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3ce22510effd58547b19165f60f5187200c3e4527bb643cc1c3bba4a61fec873","title":"","text":"6.9. A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_RST\" message to all subscribers <\/del> A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_RESET\" message to all subscribers <\/ins> indicating there was an error publishing to the given track and subscription is terminated. The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_RST\" is as follows: <\/del> The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_RESET\" is as follows: <\/ins> Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8573f9f91f689fc484a02a0bf5a0115830b047b4bb190b84eea144d19cfe2351","title":"","text":"track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RESET (see message-subscribe-reset). Objects MUST NOT be sent for unsuccessful subscriptions, and if a subscriber receives a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR after receiving objects, it MUST close the session with a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> A relay MUST not reorder or drop objects received on a multi-object stream when forwarding to subscribers, unless it has application specific information."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5c154cbe0ada01b21b046bb301594ccb6f3779df474b25d82bc1f073f75ab885","title":"","text":"Subscribe ID: Subscription identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published for this subscription, 0 if not. If 0, then the Final Group and Final Object fields will not be present. <\/ins> Final Group: The largest Group ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-89441a5f5f656c0075c05ef55f927cf63c4aa9ec6bbac5e56a439bd23e7b4d5c","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error. ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published for this subscription, 0 if not. If 0, then the Final Group and Final Object fields will not be present. <\/ins> Final Group: The largest Group ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5e26b581a13870512e1111d6387b63e57c8b65eba1c9d3ed893901706128c730","title":"","text":"WebTransport. Both provide streams and datagrams with similar semantics (see I-D.ietf-webtrans-overview); thus, the main difference lies in how the servers are identified and how the connection is established. There is no definition of the protocol over other transports, such as TCP, and applications using MoQ might need to fallback to another protocol when QUIC or WebTransport aren't available. <\/del> established. When using QUIC, datagrams MUST be supported via the [QUIC-DATAGRAM] extension, which is already a requirement for WebTransport over HTTP\/3. There is no definition of the protocol over other transports, such as TCP, and applications using MoQ might need to fallback to another protocol when QUIC or WebTransport aren't available. <\/ins> 3.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fd2ed0fb5c161d83afa34f4f7af7d1e48282b324badfd4e191f4f9e6628d9f74","title":"","text":"No Error: The session is being terminated without an error. Generic Error: An unclassified error occurred. <\/del> Internal Error: An implementation specific error occurred. <\/ins> Unauthorized: The endpoint breached an agreement, which MAY have been pre-negotiated by the application."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8aa0628bff079966359ba81df477564b8f01ff79a29c8a3861cd6cd9c36586fd","title":"","text":"dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RST (see message-subscribe-rst). <\/del> SUBSCRIBE_RESET (see message-subscribe-reset). Objects MUST NOT be sent for unsuccessful subscriptions, and if a subscriber receives a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR after receiving objects, it MUST close the session with a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> A relay MUST not reorder or drop objects received on a multi-object stream when forwarding to subscribers, unless it has application"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a5eb6ba99f7b9b3d2ac43cff63f98f9f82706d59029680d6f0610c9384892e80","title":"","text":"Relays respond with an ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR control message providing the result of announcement. The entity receiving the ANNOUNCE MUST send only a single response to a given ANNOUNCE of either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. <\/del> either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. When a publisher wants to stop new subscriptions for an announced namespace it sends an UNANNOUNCE. A subscriber indicates it will no longer route subscriptions for a namespace it previously responded ANNOUNCE_OK to by sending an ANNOUNCE_CANCEL. <\/ins> OBJECT message headers carry a short hop-by-hop \"Track Alias\" that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-78ba545c31588c2d5c7a2c2297d774f3f4b1621fe76591f0c926db6620a1ab01","title":"","text":"Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. An \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram or a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram or stream. If this message appears on a stream, it MUST be the only message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_PREFER_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". <\/del> An \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram. <\/ins> To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\", determine the length of the fields and payload, and compare the length with the maximum datagram size of the session. If the object size is less than or equal maximum datagram size, send the serialized data as a datagram. Otherwise, open a stream, send the serialized data and terminate the stream. An implementation SHOULD NOT send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\" on a stream if it is possible to send it as a datagram. <\/del> An Object received in an \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\", determine the length of the fields and payload and send the Object as datagram. In certain scenarios where the object size can be larger than maximum datagram size for the session, the Object will be dropped. <\/ins> 6.3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2faf937f0cb89ef09ca30960ba3fb6f4b3f2e678513545d5cf38be3e3b91a268","title":"","text":"6.14. The subscriber sends an \"ANNOUNCE_CANCEL\" control message to indicate it will stop sending new subscriptions for tracks within the provided Track Namespace. If a publisher recieves new subscriptions for that namespace after receiving an ANNOUNCE_CANCEL, it SHOULD close the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.15. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to initiate session migration (session-migration) with an optional URI."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3a78d0909be87dd1e5ea32f6b5008cde74ba73c4f632e2abe7d441f13e18a76d","title":"","text":"ANNOUNCE MUST send only a single response to a given ANNOUNCE of either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. A relay manages sessions from multiple publishers and subscribers, connecting them based on the track namespace. This MUST use an exact match on track namespace unless otherwise negotiated by the application. For example, a SUBSCRIBE namespace=foobar message will be forwarded to the session that sent ANNOUNCE namespace=foobar. <\/ins> OBJECT message headers carry a short hop-by-hop \"Track Alias\" that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use the \"Track Alias\" of an incoming OBJECT message to identify its track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4a07e7615f0e28c514317458c9577d5c3cc3f6eb0b7837e0a493be4fc21ceac3","title":"","text":"6.2.2.1. The ROLE parameter (key 0x00) allows the client to specify what roles it expects the parties to have in the MOQT connection. It has three possible values, which are of type varint: <\/del> The ROLE parameter (key 0x00) allows each endpoint to independently specify what funnctionality they support for the session. It has three possible values, which are of type varint: <\/ins> The client MUST send a ROLE parameter with one of the three values specified above. The server MUST close the session if the ROLE parameter is missing, is not one of the three above-specified values, or it is different from what the server expects based on the application. <\/del> Both endpoints MUST send a ROLE parameter with one of the three values specified above. Both endpoints MUST close the session if the ROLE parameter is missing or is not one of the three above-specified values. <\/ins> 6.2.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-56624b93be1006d448dd86e9e7301943a320b1d0edcd4226c3b055749f0e1836","title":"","text":"within the subscription range is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_FIN (see message-subscribe-fin) or a SUBSCRIBE_RESET (see message-subscribe-reset). <\/del> track with a SUBSCRIBE_DONE (see message-subscribe-done). <\/ins> Objects MUST NOT be sent for unsuccessful subscriptions, and if a subscriber receives a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR after receiving objects, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ee9752846125ea453c59a8330fc11ecd30489cde71b03cc214d948d290237a55","title":"","text":"The application SHOULD use a relevant error code in SUBSCRIBE_ERROR, as defined below: The applicaiton SHOULD use a relevant status code in SUBSCRIBE_DONE, as defined below: <\/ins> 5.2. Publishing through the relay starts with publisher sending ANNOUNCE"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3048c7443c33ff98fbbcac57b6fd7c220279f224931a97edeb6f5600576e8fd6","title":"","text":"6.7. A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" message to a publisher indicating it is no longer interested in receiving media for the specified track. <\/del> it is no longer interested in receiving media for the specified track and Objects should stop being sent as soon as possible. The publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_DONE to acknowledge the unsubscribe was successful and indicate the final Object. <\/ins> The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE\" is as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ddc858651288aa9d0241e1e5e01e182120f704f12796e714fda0f06545cbc5d1","title":"","text":"6.8. A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_FIN\" message to all subscribers indicating it is done publishing objects on the subscribed track. <\/del> A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_DONE\" message to indicate it is done publishing Objects for that subscription. The Status Code indicates why the subscription ended, and whether it was an error. <\/ins> The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_FIN\" is as follows: <\/del> The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_DONE\" is as follows: <\/ins> Subscribe ID: Subscription identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published for this subscription, 0 if not. If 0, then the Final Group and Final Object fields will not be present. Final Group: The largest Group ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track. Final Object: The largest Object ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in the \"Final Group\" for this track. 6.9. A publisher issues a \"SUBSCRIBE_RESET\" message to all subscribers indicating there was an error publishing to the given track and subscription is terminated. The format of \"SUBSCRIBE_RESET\" is as follows: Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for subscription failure. <\/del> Status Code: An integer status code indicating why the subscription ended. <\/ins> Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for subscription error."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-348620e8cf5879a83042a659a4eae215325092cf29f88e4fbf2b45f2056001d1","title":"","text":"Final Object: The largest Object ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in the \"Final Group\" for this track. 6.10. <\/del> 6.9. <\/ins> The publisher sends the ANNOUNCE control message to advertise where the receiver can route SUBSCRIBEs for tracks within the announced"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1a19c0acf553254975fb5bf88117453d9fb534e453fd59f68a86e55fc22fc8f4","title":"","text":"Parameters: The parameters are defined in version-specific-params. 6.11. <\/del> 6.10. <\/ins> The receiver sends an ANNOUNCE_OK control message to acknowledge the successful authorization and acceptance of an ANNOUNCE message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-114fc3cfadd474bcbfd130682fb4890d192d54b5ce633a3e17f6cefafe3ced28","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies the track namespace in the ANNOUNCE message for which this response is provided. 6.12. <\/del> 6.11. <\/ins> The receiver sends an ANNOUNCE_ERROR control message for tracks that failed authorization."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-cff621c6e568a841c69a7f9597d710c8b863f0f325dcefa689db27015839e01a","title":"","text":"Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement error. 6.13. <\/del> 6.12. <\/ins> The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-01b1d279aa6771dcca063fcd9852c940e4f1c19bd4ab9b983cf232e24fe720f4","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.14. <\/del> 6.13. <\/ins> The subscriber sends an \"ANNOUNCE_CANCEL\" control message to indicate it will stop sending new subscriptions for tracks within the provided"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-9cb22f33740652039304b28a40f01b20731b11903f7115e1ca6219c9dbe81c7a","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.15. <\/del> 6.14. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to initiate session migration (session-migration) with an optional URI."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fc442230bb9747b782e6b0c6ea6fef2f90711f9a331ac67b4a726f5f31fe2558","title":"","text":"subscribers for each track. Each new OBJECT belonging to the track within the subscription range is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until it expires, until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_DONE (see message-subscribe-done). <\/del> until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_DONE (see message-subscribe-done). <\/ins> Objects MUST NOT be sent for unsuccessful subscriptions, and if a subscriber receives a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR after receiving objects, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d08d72803dbbe105eb8dfa9bd645e1d32a6bbedade039a8fafacb7fbf182ca59","title":"","text":"subscribe-req. Expires: Time in milliseconds after which the subscription is no longer valid. A value of 0 indicates that the subscription stays active until it is explicitly unsubscribed. <\/del> longer valid. A value of 0 indicates that the subscription does not expire or expires at an unknown time. Expires is advisory and a subscription can end prior to the expiry time or last longer. <\/ins> ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published on this track, 0 if not. If 0, then the Largest Group ID and Largest Object ID"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-85a1dd0ae17eb50bb76cfad2f91810537339d9198153d9277f7ffd5269b495f2","title":"","text":"6.14. A potential subscriber sends a 'TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST' message on the control stream to obtain information about the current status of a given track. A TRACK_STATUS message MUST be sent in response to each TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST. 6.15. An endpoint sends a 'TRACK_STATUS' message on the control stream in response to a TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST message. The 'Status Code' field provides additional information about the status of the track. It MUST hold one of the following values. Any other value is a malformed message. 0x00: The track is in progress, and subsequent fields contain the highest group and object ID for that track. 0x01: The track does not exist. Subsequent fields MUST be zero, and any other value is a malformed message. 0x02: The track has not yet begun. Subsequent fields MUST be zero. Any other value is a malformed message. 0x03: The track has finished, so there is no \"live edge.\" Subsequent fields contain the highest Group and object ID known. 0x04: The sender is a relay that cannot obtain the current track status from upstream. Subsequent fields contain the largest group and object ID known. Any other value in the Status Code field is a malformed message. When a relay is subscribed to a track, it can simply return the highest group and object ID it has observed, whether or not that object was cached or completely delivered. If not subscribed, a relay SHOULD send a TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST upstream to obtain updated information. Alternatively, the relay MAY subscribe to the track to obtain the same information. If a relay cannot or will not do either, it should return its best available information with status code 0x04. The receiver of multiple TRACK_STATUS messages for a track uses the information from the latest arriving message, as they are delivered in order on a single stream. 6.16. <\/ins> The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to initiate session migration (session-migration) with an optional URI."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6d8e0a20cd64fae1fb295fa9b45cecfb824df48885374102d42c2ff324f60bca","title":"","text":"and Datagram. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object Forwarding Preference\", described below. Object Status: As enumeration used for missing or dropped objects that indicates why data is missing. <\/ins> Object Payload: An opaque payload intended for the consumer and SHOULD NOT be processed by a relay. There is also a status field which help subscribers understand what objects it will not receive due to then being dropped, lost, or never be produced including the case where they will not be produced because they are beyond the end of a group or track. Every object has an associated \"Status\" that can have following values: 0x0 := Normal object. The payload is array of bytes and can by empty. 0x1 := Indicates Object does not exist. Indicates that this object does not exist at any publisher and it will not be published in the future. This SHOULD be cached. 0x2 := Indicates Group does not exist. Indicates that objects with this GroupID do not exist at any publisher and they will not be published in the future. This SHOULD be cached. 0x3 := Indicates end of Group. ObjectId is one greater that the largest object produced in the group identified by the GroupID. This is sent right after the last object in the group. This SHOULD be cached. 0x4 := Indicates end of Track and Group. GroupID is one greater than the largest group produced in this track and the ObjectId is one greater than the largest object produced in that group. This is sent right after the last object in the track. This SHOULD be cached. 0x5 := Indicates Object was dropped at a relay. Sent by a relay indicating the object identified by the ObjectId was dropped. This SHOULD NOT be cached. 0x6 := Indicates Group was dropped at a relay. Sent by a relay indicating some of the objects in the group identified by the GroupId were dropped. The Object ID is one greater than last object sent and MAY be zero. This SHOULD NOT be cached. Open Issue: We could make end of track and end of group just be a status set on the last object sent on the group or track. This would mean the status could no longer optional and only occur when the payload length was zero as it would be needed in non zero length packets. It would also have the issue that when a P frame is produced, the software getting data from the decoder often does not know if it is the last P frame until the next frame is encoded and the software gets an I frame. We do not want a solution where we add a whole frame of latency on the encoder waiting for next frame so it can set the end of group field on the last last object in the group. Any other value SHOULD be treated as a protocol error and terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session-termination). There are times where some of the status information is redundant with information learned at the lower layer. For example, when using stream per object, the end of Group is redundant. In most cases messages with a non zero status code are sent on the same stream that an object with that GroupID would have been sent on. The exception to this is when that stream has been reset; in that case they are sent on a new stream. This is to avoid the status message being lost in cases such as a relay dropping a group and reseting the stream the group is being sent on. <\/ins> 6.3.2. Every Track has a single 'Object Forwarding Preference' and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d5590949ec13658a5701a75832d3edc782e771718550c1177c741bd1f0a21392","title":"","text":"To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Track\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription, or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\" if needed, then serialize the following object fields. <\/del> the following object fields. The Object Status field is only sent if the Object Payload Length is zero. <\/ins> A sender MUST NOT send an Object on a stream if its Group ID is less than a previously sent Group ID on that stream, or if its Object ID"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5d418ab176da9a5fa753866bf7b95395b9eb9b4439f5ee69b51442fae0c5afd9","title":"","text":"the open stream that is associated with the subscription, \"Group ID\" and \"Object Send Order\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. The Object Status field is only sent if the Object Payload Length is zero. <\/ins> A sender MUST NOT send an Object on a stream if its Object ID is less than a previously sent Object ID within a given group in that stream."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4012ab9dbc9e125f755fb72b9a3bc101df6e3cf1ca56a1fdcd5edc54429cab26","title":"","text":"A receiver issues a SUBSCRIBE to a publisher to request a track. 6.4.1. The receiver specifies a start and optional end \"Location\" for the subscription. A location value may be an absolute group or object sequence, or it may be a delta relative to the largest group or the largest object in a group. There are 4 modes: None (0x0): The Location is unspecified, Value is not present Absolute (0x1): Value is an absolute sequence RelativePrevious (0x2): Value is a delta from the largest sequence. 0 is the largest sequence, 1 is the largest sequence - 1, and so on. RelativeNext (0x3): Value is a delta from the largest sequence. 0 is the largest sequence + 1, 1 is the largest sequence + 2, and so on. The following table shows an example of how the RelativePrevious and RelativeNext values are used to determine the absolute sequence. 6.4.2. <\/del> The format of SUBSCRIBE is as follows: Subscribe ID: The subscription identifier that is unique within"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-389281f2e2645daf4f3a52bdeec97e1202bdfd4288f5a08146d7a0022d509671","title":"","text":"Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). StartGroup: The Location of the requested group. StartGroup's Mode MUST NOT be None. <\/del> StartGroup: The start Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the latest group. <\/ins> StartObject: The Location of the requested object. StartObject's Mode MUST NOT be None. <\/del> StartObject: The start Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the latest object. This field is not present when Start Group is 0. <\/ins> EndGroup: The last Group requested in the subscription, inclusive. EndGroup's Mode is None for an open-ended subscription. <\/del> EndGroup: The end Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the subscription is open-ended and continues to the end of the track. <\/ins> EndObject: The last Object requested in the subscription, exclusive. EndObject's Mode MUST be None if EndGroup's Mode is None. EndObject's Mode MUST NOT be None if EndGroup's Mode is not None. <\/del> EndObject: The end Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. This field is not present when End Group is 0. <\/ins> Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in On successful subscription, the publisher SHOULD start delivering objects from the group ID and object ID described above. <\/del> On successful subscription, the publisher MUST reply with a SUBSCRIBE_OK, allowing the subscriber to determine the start group\/ object when not explicitly specified and the publisher SHOULD start delivering objects. <\/ins> If a publisher cannot satisfy the requested start or end for the subscription it MAY send a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-cae40d4d86319deb9b9d4a82ea337663f57f10cd2e7689740db3591d582cbe54","title":"","text":"TODO: Define the flow where subscribe request matches an existing subscribe id (subscription updates.) 6.4.3. <\/del> 6.5. A SUBSCRIBE_OK control message is sent for successful subscriptions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-119f565480afaef52e9a30f4580a0d238d02aae1249cad08a57f53ffd2809543","title":"","text":"6.4. 6.4.1. The subscriber specifies a filter on the subscription to allow the publisher to identify which objects need to be delivered. There are 4 types of filters: Lastest Group (0x1) : Specifies an open-ended subscription with objects from the beginning of the current group. Latest Object (0x2): Specifies an open-ended subscription beginning from the current object of the current group. AbsoluteStart (0x3): Specifies an open-ended subscription with objects beginning from the object identified in the StartGroup and StartObject fields. AbsoluteRange (0x4): Specifies a closed subscription starting at StartObject in StartGroup and ending at EndObject in EndGroup. The start and end of the range are inclusive. A filter type other than the above MUST be treated as error. 6.4.2. <\/ins> A receiver issues a SUBSCRIBE to a publisher to request a track. The format of SUBSCRIBE is as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2ba8c983a91e7df2463af2228a06edb4aab61a3064748b4c8febd2f9c3bda321","title":"","text":"Track Name: Identifies the track name as defined in (track-name). StartGroup: The start Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the latest group. <\/del> Filter Type: Identifies the type of filter, which also indicates whether the StartGroup\/StartObject and EndGroup\/EndObject fields will be present. See (sub-filter). StartGroup: The start Group ID. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. <\/ins> StartObject: The start Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the latest object. This field is not present when Start Group is 0. <\/del> StartObject: The start Object ID within the StartGroup. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. <\/ins> EndGroup: The end Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the subscription is open-ended and continues to the end of the track. <\/del> EndGroup: The end Group ID. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type. <\/ins> EndObject: The end Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. This field is not present when End Group is 0. <\/del> entire group is requested. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type. <\/ins> Track Request Parameters: The parameters are defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3afcba2e5c2bfd18cf07bfc60dea0117e58683f9077150a5cdf6baa4eddb63da","title":"","text":"AbsoluteRange (0x4): Specifies a closed subscription starting at StartObject in StartGroup and ending at EndObject in EndGroup. The start and end of the range are inclusive. <\/del> start and end of the range are inclusive. EndGroup and EndObject MUST specify the same or a later object than StartGroup and StartObject. <\/ins> A filter type other than the above MUST be treated as error."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-cead11d2199761ffe919cccb49b8e8b2c3ce2adaff42ad0603f057016ea196d5","title":"","text":"already sent Objects after the new end Object. Unlike a new subscription, SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE can not cause an Object to be delivered multiple times. <\/del> to be delivered multiple times. Like SUBSCRIBE, EndGroup and EndObject MUST specify the same or a later object than StartGroup and StartObject. <\/ins> The format of SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE is as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8edb0648274de61336d3932e410f048f05eb3bc87f48410916e17a68fd2ad48d","title":"","text":"StartGroup: The start Group ID. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. StartObject: The start Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. <\/del> StartObject: The start Object ID. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. <\/ins> EndGroup: The end Group ID. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b6c179f175f0774e7aef75b3fabfa254ebbe65e15a3ad331e97dd42e0164189e","title":"","text":"StartGroup: The start Group ID. StartObject: The start Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. <\/del> StartObject: The start Object ID. <\/ins> EndGroup: The end Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the subscription is open-ended."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-76599c3a3124d7259277e4e8ce6b19844e66359096c6523cac9f2184f0ddcbab","title":"","text":"(appendix.encoding). A segment MAY depend on any number of other segments. The encoder MUST indicate these dependecies on the wire via the \"HEADERS\" message (headers). <\/del> MUST indicate these dependecies on the wire via the SEGMENT header (segment). <\/ins> The sender SHOULD NOT use this list of dependencies to determine which segment to transmit next. The sender SHOULD use the delivery"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a9fe37792c8e7de090e8cae590f32d1eebb260efb12b58630d51674ee169bf9d","title":"","text":"QUIC and HTTP\/3 frames, but called messages to avoid the media terminology. Each stream MUST start with a \"HEADERS\" message (headers) to indicates how the stream should be transmitted. <\/del> Messages SHOULD be sent over the same stream if ordering is desired. For example, \"PAUSE\" and \"PLAY\" messages SHOULD be sent on the same stream to avoid a race."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6f839ba500a3f69896c812c3fa8a73ff3263aebcb10ed8c74c3d7580e75978c4","title":"","text":"4.5. Warp encodes the delivery information for each stream via a \"HEADERS\" frame (headers). This MUST be at the start of each stream so it is easy for a relay to parse. <\/del> Warp encodes the delivery information for a stream via SEGMENT headers (segment). <\/ins> A relay SHOULD prioritize streams (prioritization) based on the delivery order. A relay MAY change the delivery order, in which case"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7a073cbef31f15d1bd5da07bfd08826088dcc8a6a646e277098fae884dfa2b54","title":"","text":"5.1. The \"HEADERS\" message contains information required to deliver, cache, and forward a stream. This message SHOULD be parsed and obeyed by any Warp relays. <\/del> A SEGMENT message contains a single segment associated with a specified track, as well as associated metadata required to deliver, cache, and forward it. The header of the SEGMENT message is as follows: <\/ins> \"id\". An unique identifier for the stream. This field is optional and MUST be unique if set."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a3e1f32e49afd8fb008662c28bb19b2056d46962d9c217007f1be24a6b0364ea","title":"","text":"(dependencies). This field is optional and the default value is an empty array. 5.2. A \"SEGMENT\" message consists of a segment in a fragmented MP4 container. <\/del> The payload of the SEGMENT message is a fragmented MP4 container. <\/ins> Each segment MUST start with an initialization fragment, or MUST depend on a segment with an initialization fragment. An"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a3fc41fdfddd6388b20b9339cec5225532557c072d2aafb481f40c103fedb35f","title":"","text":"between overhead and latency. It is RECOMMENDED that a media fragment consists of a single frame to minimize latency. 5.3. The \"APP\" message contains arbitrary contents. This is useful for metadata that would otherwise have to be shoved into the media bitstream. Relays MUST NOT differentiate between streams containing \"SEGMENT\" and \"APP\" frames. The same forwarding and caching behavior applies to both as specified in the\"HEADERS\" frame. 5.4. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> The \"GOAWAY\" message is sent by the server to force the client to reconnect. This is useful for server maintenance or reassignments"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d99ba2bde6ebf35efc078cc5659363bf36286a3cc7465212ca07064f1ee9d00b","title":"","text":"guarantee that a publisher will not have already sent Objects before the new start Object. The end Object MUST NOT increase and when it decreases, there is no guarantee that a publisher will not have already sent Objects after the new end Object. <\/del> already sent Objects after the new end Object. A publisher SHOULD close the Session as a 'Protocol Violation' if the SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE violates either rule or if the subscriber specifies a Subscribe ID that does not exist within the Session. <\/ins> Unlike a new subscription, SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE can not cause an Object to be delivered multiple times. Like SUBSCRIBE, EndGroup and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e3ea9c2b7cf1d36a6024e26b8f47d4098a24a8930adfa1dd08ecc746f7856779","title":"","text":"Track Alias: A session specific identifier for the track. Messages that reference a track, such as OBJECT (message-object), reference this Track Alias instead of the Track Name and Track Namespace to reduce overhead. If the Track Alias is already in use, the publisher MUST close the session with a Duplicate Track Alias error (session-termination). <\/del> Namespace to reduce overhead. If the Track Alias is already being used for a different track, the publisher MUST close the session with a Duplicate Track Alias error (session-termination). <\/ins> Track Namespace: Identifies the namespace of the track as defined in (track-name)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b948f9f3cc643d625531e78c5ddcd9359e0f1dd4b7c2982b7802efcd59cbc02d","title":"","text":"of the subscription, via SUBSCRIBE_OK (message-subscribe-ok) or the SUBSCRIBE_ERROR message-subscribe-error control message. The entity receiving the SUBSCRIBE MUST send only a single response to a given SUBSCRIBE of either SUBSCRIBE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ERROR. <\/del> SUBSCRIBE of either SUBSCRIBE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ERROR. If a relay does not already have a subscription for the track, or if the subscription does not cover all the requested Objects, it will need to make an upstream subscription. The relay SHOULD NOT return a SUBCRIBE_OK until at least one SUBSCRIBE_OK has been received for the track, to ensure the Group Order is correct. <\/ins> For successful subscriptions, the publisher maintains a list of subscribers for each track. Each new OBJECT belonging to the track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-16b506a28048c3482e470ddc04e39f4951f9394041892f2c395843110b01b852","title":"","text":"Relays MAY aggregate authorized subscriptions for a given track when multiple subscribers request the same track. Subscription aggregation allows relays to make only a single forward subscription for the track. The published content received from the forward <\/del> aggregation allows relays to make only a single upstream subscription for the track. The published content received from the upstream <\/ins> subscription request is cached and shared among the pending subscribers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a7a639d307f3c718845d512a88e73443d62a102fa05a5a06be59513810e75648","title":"","text":"parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. The value is an ASCII string. 6.1.1.2. The DELIVERY TIMEOUT parameter (key 0x03) MAY appear in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_OK, or a SUBSCRIBE_UDPATE message. It is the duration in milliseconds the relay SHOULD continue to attempt forwarding Objects after they have been received. The start time for the timeout is based on when the beginning of the Object is received, and does not depend upon the forwarding preference. If both the subscriber and publisher specify the parameter, they use the min of the two values for the subscription. The publisher SHOULD always specify the value received from an upstream subscription when there is one, and nothing otherwise. If an earlier Object arrives later than subsequent Objects, relays can consider the receipt time as that of the next later Object, with the assumption that the Object's data was reordered. If neither the subscriber or publisher specify DELIVERY TIMEOUT, Objects are delivered as indicated by their Group Order and Priority. When sent by a subscriber, this parameter is intended to be specific to a subscription, so it SHOULD NOT be forwarded upstream by a relay that intends to serve multiple subscriptions for the same track. Publishers SHOULD consider whether the entire Object is likely to be delivered before sending any data for that Object, taking into account priorities, congestion control, and any other relevant information. <\/ins> 6.2. The \"CLIENT_SETUP\" and \"SERVER_SETUP\" messages are the first messages"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7f39aff34c53e6fd0fe7a764a5012e22f03c95364003fa4d93dc33fffac419f6","title":"","text":"largest Group ID for this track. This field is only present if ContentExists has a value of 1. Subscribe Parameters: The parameters are defined in version- specific-params. <\/ins> 6.13. A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR control message in response to a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-deb935753315a64b85f06d7cf3f40c8093db5731fd6ed3a26b01721f7eb8691f","title":"","text":"preferences for a track, it SHOULD close the session with an error of 'Protocol Violation'. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message carries a single object on a stream. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the end of the stream. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message MUST be the first and only message on a unidirectional stream. <\/del> An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message carries a single object on a stream. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message MUST be the first and only message on a unidirectional stream. <\/ins> An Object received in an \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Object\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5fb89b8c8de481758a3607ae97a92671697d4a04de3722d85a9f067ba5cb94e2","title":"","text":"Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. An \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram. There is no explicit length of the payload; it is determined by the length of the datagram. <\/del> An Object received in an \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Datagram\". To send an Object with \"Object"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-56b1f8f114cbf898cd8c08c4fb628b435f598c32aed3a4e3d5df1e633450e099","title":"","text":"There are 4 types of filters: Latest Group (0x1) : Specifies an open-ended subscription with objects from the beginning of the current group. <\/del> objects from the beginning of the current group. If no content has been delivered yet, the subscription starts with the first published or received group. <\/ins> Latest Object (0x2): Specifies an open-ended subscription beginning from the current object of the current group. <\/del> from the current object of the current group. If no content has been delivered yet, the subscription starts with the first published or received group. <\/ins> AbsoluteStart (0x3): Specifies an open-ended subscription beginning from the object identified in the StartGroup and StartObject fields."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d3caf2d67a1cc4447aad3aed0cd70ef05f3105ead0b9085a51c5bf83f3335a02","title":"","text":"Duplicate Track Alias: The endpoint attempted to use a Track Alias that was already in use. Too Many Subscribes: The session was closed because the subscriber used a Subscribe ID equal or larger than the current Maximum Subscribe ID. <\/ins> GOAWAY Timeout: The session was closed because the client took too long to close the session in response to a GOAWAY (message-goaway) message. See session migration (session-migration)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ef01230d148692ee87454bf4d0d013470852d3151eed50892ac2f314674da666","title":"","text":"the URI; if \"query\" is present, the client MUST concatenate \"?\", followed by the \"query\" portion of the URI to the parameter. 6.2.2.3. The MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID parameter (key 0x02) communicates an initial value for the Maximum Subscribe ID the peer can use when making subscriptions. The default value is 0, so if not specified, the peer MUST NOT create subscriptions. <\/ins> 6.3. The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to initiate session migration"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-24a59083919869e4ce18eb1a9388f22b63aa765b6f6cee938aaa822865fb1ce3","title":"","text":"The format of SUBSCRIBE is as follows: Subscribe ID: The subscription identifier that is unique within the session. \"Subscribe ID\" is a monotonically increasing variable length integer which MUST not be reused within a session. \"Subscribe ID\" is used by subscribers and the publishers to identify a given subscription. Subscribers specify the \"Subscribe ID\" and it is included in the corresponding SUBSCRIBE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ERROR messages. <\/del> Subscribe ID: The subscriber specified identifier used to manage a subscription. \"Subscribe ID\" is a variable length integer that MUST be unique and monotonically increasing within a session and MUST be less than the session's Maximum Subscribe ID. <\/ins> Track Alias: A session specific identifier for the track. Messages that reference a track, such as OBJECT (message-object),"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ab44f0faeb90edc98cc708d77cc9cad3bc2e3220388ab9d6b4ab81fe0c6e0952","title":"","text":"6.15. A publisher sends a MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID message to increase the number of subscriptions a subscriber can create within a session. The Maximum Subscribe Id MUST only increase within a session, and receipt of a MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID message with an equal or smaller Subscribe ID value is a 'Protocol Violation'. Subscribe ID: The new Maximum Subscribe ID for the session. If a Subscribe ID equal or larger than this is received in any message, including SUBSCRIBE, the publisher MUST close the session with an error of 'Too Many Subscribes'. More on Subscribe ID in message- subscribe-req. 6.16. <\/ins> The publisher sends the ANNOUNCE control message to advertise where the receiver can route SUBSCRIBEs for tracks within the announced Track Namespace. The receiver verifies the publisher is authorized"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-be7309b07b6a0108f05cff78f058cc444871f0ac9332869d7fb9fcdf7c27b637","title":"","text":"Parameters: The parameters are defined in version-specific-params. 6.16. <\/del> 6.17. <\/ins> The publisher sends the \"UNANNOUNCE\" control message to indicate its intent to stop serving new subscriptions for tracks within the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6ced287f2e756403c0fb1559faf3921d4dc2570b0c63c767735de9774feb9551","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). 6.17. <\/del> 6.18. <\/ins> A publisher sends a 'TRACK_STATUS' message on the control stream in response to a TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST message."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-014196fa5cd9da246094a03af2b4ca3db5e4a308a0537ff5a2d7660239bc66e6","title":"","text":"When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\". All objects on the stream have the \"Object Send Order\" specified in the stream header. <\/del> \"Publisher Priority\" specified in the stream header. <\/ins> All Objects received on a stream opened with STREAM_HEADER_TRACK have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Track\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0676ff5348ed901e7acf5dc1359eaec5c030315af9b43db96381187c8539588e","title":"","text":"When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the group indicated by \"Group ID\". All objects on the stream have the \"Object Send Order\" specified in <\/del> All objects on the stream have the \"Publisher Priority\" specified in <\/ins> the stream header. All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription, \"Group ID\" and \"Object Send Order\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. <\/del> the open stream that is associated with the subscription and \"Group ID\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. <\/ins> The Object Status field is only sent if the Object Payload Length is zero."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-38b97080d6e49743a4535e6aa9d8ef0b38bd9064ac0a2a272b107a6dd4028d2f","title":"","text":"2.2. A group is a collection of objects and is a sub-unit of a track (model-track). Objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber might not want to receive the entire track, and may instead opt to receive only the latest group(s). The publisher then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. <\/del> A peep is a collection of one or more objects and is a sub-unit of a group (model-group). A peep consists of a set of objects within a Group that have a dependency and priority relationship consistent with sharing a QUIC stream. In some cases, a Group will be most effectively delivered using more than one stream. When a Track's forwarding preference (see object-fields) is \"Track\" or \"Datagram\", Groups do not contain Peeps, no Peep IDs are assigned, and the description in the remainder of this section does not apply. QUIC streams offer in-order reliable delivery and the ability to cancel sending and retransmission of data. Furthermore, many implementations offer the ability to control the relative priority of streams, which allows control over the scheduling of sending data on active streams. Every object within a Group belongs to exactly one Peep. Original publishers assign each Peep a Peep ID, and do so as they see fit. The scope of a Peep ID is a Group, so Peeps from different Groups MAY share a Peep ID without implying any relationship between them. However, the following strategy is RECOMMENDED: Higher object IDs are dependent on lower object IDs in the same peep. If two objects are dependent on the same lower object ID, but are not dependent on each other, one ought to assigned the same peep as the lower ID, but the other ought to be in a different peep. The second peep would ideally have a lower priority than the one with two objects. There often multiple assignment schemes that meet these conditions. Original publishers ought to choose an assignment that minimizes the number of peeps (and therefore QUIC streams) in the group. For example, imagine that Object 3 and Object 2 are both dependent on Object 1, but are have no depedency relationship with each other. It would therefore be appropriate for Objects 1 and 3 to be in one peep and Object 2 in another, with lower priority. The separate stream prevents delivery of Object 3 from being blocked by the loss of Object 2. Alternatively, objects 1 and 2 could be in one peep and 3 in another. The optimal choice would depend on the dependencies of later objects. An original publisher might not follow these guidelines. Reasons would include implementation complexity, lack of foreknowledge of the dependencies of further objects, the knowledge that the transport is WebTransport over HTTP\/2 (thus introducing head-of-line blocking across streams), or knowledge of low session stream limits that require aggregation of independent objects into the same stream. For the purposes of peep assignment, the dependencies of objects with non- normal status are described in object-status. <\/ins> 2.3. A group is a collection of one or more peeps and is a sub-unit of a track (model-track). Objects within a group SHOULD NOT depend on objects in other groups. A group behaves as a join point for subscriptions. A new subscriber might not want to receive the entire track, and may instead opt to receive only the latest group(s). The publisher then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. 2.4. <\/ins> A track is a sequence of groups (model-group). It is the entity against which a subscriber issues a subscription request. A subscriber can request to receive individual tracks starting at a group boundary, including any new objects pushed by the publisher while the track is active. 2.3.1. <\/del> 2.4.1. <\/ins> In MOQT, every track has a track name and a track namespace associated with it. A track name identifies an individual track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-90e28513d37140ac43d5086569fbac87b4c37cc93c636ab3f88f0da9b07dc446","title":"","text":"specify the canonicalization into the bytes in the Track Namespace or Track Name such that exact comparison works. 2.3.2. <\/del> 2.4.2. <\/ins> Each track MAY have one or more associated connection URLs specifying network hosts through which a track may be accessed. The syntax of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6484c9cb4c60061bcc1601b64e3a4078a1423ac79c08e7274b3c7914d2975cff","title":"","text":"priority in every stream or datagram header. As such, the subscriber's priority is a property of the subscription and the original publisher's priority is a property of the Track and the Objects it contains. In both cases, a lower value indicates a higher <\/del> Peeps it contains. In both cases, a lower value indicates a higher <\/ins> priority, with 0 being the highest priority. The Subscriber Priority is considered first when selecting a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7c1c905f1e8a526116d0c1eeb3505df57c574e500fe48fbd23fae557906ea3b0","title":"","text":"Within the same Group, and the same priority level, Objects with a lower Object Id are always sent before objects with a higher Object Id, regardless of the specified Group Order. If the priority varies within a Group, higher priority Objects are sent before lower priority Objects. <\/del> Id, regardless of the specified Group Order. If the group contains more than one Peep and the priority varies between these Peeps, higher priority Peeps are sent before lower priority Peeps, and Objects in peeps are sent in increasing Object Id order. <\/ins> The Group Order cannot be changed via a SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE message, and instead an UNSUBSCRIBE and SUBSCRIBE can be used."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-48118b06e329f909eeb95a2407dfca3be4cd41bcdb207eca157d02c5f2a60c45","title":"","text":"priority for the Object priorities. Object Forwarding Preference: An enumeration indicating how a publisher sends an object. The preferences are Track, Group, Object and Datagram. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object Forwarding Preference\", described below. <\/del> publisher sends an object. The preferences are Track, Peep, and Datagram. An Object MUST be sent according to its \"Object Forwarding Preference\", described below. Peep ID: The object is a member of the indicated peep ID (model- peep) within the group. This field is omitted if the Object Forwarding Preference is Track or Datagram. <\/ins> Object Status: As enumeration used to indicate missing objects or mark the end of a group or track. See object-status below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-100f415a741bedc5511bc965ad88bd9cc6cf9a0e741c19caa57fce1c56590cc1","title":"","text":"7.2. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message carries a single object on a stream. An \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message MUST be the first and only message on a unidirectional stream. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_STREAM\" message has an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Object\". To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Object\", open a stream, serialize object fields below, and terminate the stream. Subscribe ID: Subscription Identifier as defined in message- subscribe-req. Track Alias: Identifies the Track Namespace and Track Name as defined in message-subscribe-req. If the Track Namespace and Track Name identified by the Track Alias are different from those specified in the subscription identified by Subscribe ID, the subscriber MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. Other fields: As described in canonical-object-fields. 7.3. <\/del> An \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message carries a single object in a datagram. An Object received in an \"OBJECT_DATAGRAM\" message has an \"Object"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d58cc612b6db588507d3d9b035bfdff976c3db3fcbc59f796b7bcb47ef8980a8","title":"","text":"scenarios where the object size can be larger than maximum datagram size for the session, the Object will be dropped. 7.4. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> When multiple objects are sent on a stream, the stream begins with a stream header message and is followed by one or more sets of serialized object fields. If a stream ends gracefully in the middle of a serialized Object, terminate the session with a Protocol Violation. <\/del> When objects are sent on streams, the stream begins with a stream header message and is followed by one or more sets of serialized object fields. If a stream ends gracefully in the middle of a serialized Object, terminate the session with a Protocol Violation. <\/ins> A publisher SHOULD NOT open more than one multi-object stream at a time with the same stream header message type and fields. <\/del> A publisher SHOULD NOT open more than one stream at a time with the same stream header message type and fields. <\/ins> TODO: figure out how a relay closes these streams 7.4.1. <\/del> 7.3.1. <\/ins> When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_TRACK\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7abc77ee76727324c5a98dbf8e22c39fd8c467a6417f960362aedb84a3bf256e","title":"","text":"A publisher MUST NOT send an Object on a stream if its Group ID is less than a previously sent Group ID on that stream, or if its Object ID is less than or equal to a previously sent Object ID within a given group on that stream. <\/del> ID is less than or equal to a previously sent Object ID with the same Group ID. <\/ins> 7.4.2. <\/del> 7.3.2. <\/ins> When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\", all objects on the <\/del> When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_PEEP\", all objects on the <\/ins> stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the group indicated by \"Group ID\". All objects on the stream have the \"Publisher Priority\" specified in the stream header. <\/del> identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the peep indicated by 'Group ID' and \"Peep ID\". <\/ins> All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\". <\/del> All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_PEEP\" have an \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Peep\". <\/ins> To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Group\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription and \"Group ID\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_GROUP\" if needed, then serialize the following fields. <\/del> To send an Object with \"Object Forwarding Preference\" = \"Peep\", find the open stream that is associated with the subscription, \"Group ID\" and \"Peep ID\", or open a new one and send the \"STREAM_HEADER_PEEP\". Then serialize the following fields. <\/ins> The Object Status field is only sent if the Object Payload Length is zero."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e7e8d407b34467d089524e8b87bb2a074080edfd8b9afadab0bb2eeba7dc4a8c","title":"","text":"less than a previously sent Object ID within a given group in that stream. 7.5. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> Sending a track on one stream: Sending a group on one stream, with a unordered object in the group appearing on its own stream. <\/del> Sending a peep on one stream: <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-bff49b623f12c6d557687afe1b173d94e78370ea776809e29953375e0e201401","title":"","text":"OBJECT message headers carry a short hop-by-hop \"Track Alias\" that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use the \"Track Alias\" of an incoming OBJECT message to identify its track and find the active subscribers for that track. Relays MUST NOT depend on OBJECT payload content for making forwarding decisions and MUST only depend on the fields, such as priority order and other metadata properties in the OBJECT message header. Unless determined by congestion response, Relays MUST forward the OBJECT message to the matching subscribers. <\/del> and find the active subscribers for that track. Relays MUST forward OBJECT messages to matching subscribers in accordance to each subscription's priority, group order, and delivery timeout. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-07622e0197c4156e0ee4123f57091521a867a72cad631ebde39de1beeb4f57f3","title":"","text":"Message types TODO: register the URI scheme and the ALPN TODO: the MOQT spec should establish the IANA registration table for MoQ Streaming Formats. Each MoQ streaming format can then register its type in that table. The MoQ Streaming Format type MUST be carried as the leading varint in catalog track objects. <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f3f9fdc7247a03ba29914211d0da07af77b5658b0d4de7d4f9131f89783a3e52","title":"","text":"object does not exist at any publisher and it will not be published in the future. This SHOULD be cached. 0x2 := Indicates Group does not exist. Indicates that objects with this GroupID do not exist at any publisher and they will not be published in the future. This SHOULD be cached. <\/del> 0x3 := Indicates end of Group. ObjectId is one greater that the largest object produced in the group identified by the GroupID. This is sent right after the last object in the group. This SHOULD be cached. <\/del> This is sent right after the last object in the group. If the ObjectID is 0, it indicates there are no Objects in this Group. This SHOULD be cached. <\/ins> 0x4 := Indicates end of Track and Group. GroupID is one greater than the largest group produced in this track and the ObjectId is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-9537dd92699bba7e9bc2cd23c25dbce4f4380ce910c7cd89288d23e7d6565ee3","title":"","text":"Track Namespace: Identifies a track's namespace as defined in (track-name). Error Code: Identifies an integer error code for canceling the announcement. Reason Phrase: Provides the reason for announcement cancelation. <\/ins> 6.10. A potential subscriber sends a 'TRACK_STATUS_REQUEST' message on the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2b54c784bd3ebc5a56f11381057c01b4bb3b64eff8e2f806009448aae8fde574","title":"","text":"Announce Error codes Announce Cancel Reason codes <\/ins> Message types TODO: register the URI scheme and the ALPN"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b66c9ed8d7c1b51d9d067b20acf7611f393688efaf2db14e1e990d885551e797","title":"","text":"model-group An object is uniquely identified by its track namespace, track name, group ID, and object ID, and must be an identical sequence of bytes regardless of how or where it is retrieved. An Object can become unavailable, but it's contents MUST NOT change over <\/del> Object can become unavailable, but its contents MUST NOT change over <\/ins> time. Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-41362ef5ecd283d4e1c411aeebc15e4c090f3328583c237c56ca87b6ac1bec8c","title":"","text":"more than one Peep and the priority varies between these Peeps, higher priority Peeps are sent before lower priority Peeps. If the specified priority of two Peeps in a Group are equal, the lower Peep ID has priority. Within a Peep, Objects MUST bs sent in increasing <\/del> ID has priority. Within a Peep, Objects MUST be sent in increasing <\/ins> Object ID order. The Group Order cannot be changed via a SUBSCRIBE_UPDATE message, and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ff1902eb44bf8d2905259c560c2fb2c0aa968db0dc33371de044bc095053d5ed","title":"","text":"within the subscription range is forwarded to each active subscriber, dependent on the congestion response. A subscription remains active until the publisher of the track terminates the track with a SUBSCRIBE_DONE (see message-subscribe-done). <\/del> SUBSCRIBE_DONE (see message-subscribe-done). A caching relay saves objects to its cache identified by the object's fulltrackname, group ID and object ID. Relays MUST be ready to process objects for the same fulltrackname from multiple publishers and the objects received are forwarded to active matching subscribers. If multiple objects are received with the same fulltrackname, group ID and object ID - a caching Relays MUST drop the received objects as duplicate if there exists already an object with the matching fulltrackame, group ID and object ID, in its cache. <\/ins> Objects MUST NOT be sent for unsuccessful subscriptions, and if a subscriber receives a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR after receiving objects, it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d6cdb539219b91d08a0766c62373796266c121d1b82a30e2d8939000e1f6893e","title":"","text":"The application SHOULD use a relevant status code in SUBSCRIBE_DONE, as defined below: 5.1.1. This section describes behavior a subscriber MAY implement to allow for a better user experience when a relay sends a GOAWAY. When a subscriber receives the GOAWAY message, it starts of the process of connecting to a new relay and sending the SUBSCRIBE requests for all it's active subscriptions to the new relay. The new relay will send a response to the subscribes and once this has happened, the subscription to the old relay can be stopped with an UNSUBSCRIBE. <\/ins> 5.2. Publishing through the relay starts with publisher sending ANNOUNCE control message with a \"Track Namespace\" (model-track). <\/del> control message with a \"Track Namespace\" (model-track). The annouce allows the relays to know which publisher to forward a SUBSCRIBE to. <\/ins> Relays MUST ensure that publishers are authorized by: Verifying that the publisher is authorized to publish the content associated with the set of tracks whose Track Namespace matches the announced namespace. Specifics of where the authorization happens, either at the relays or forwarded for further processing, depends on the way the relay is managed and is application specific (typically based on prior business agreement). <\/del> the announced namespace. Specifics of where the authorization and identification of the publisher happens either at the relays or forwarded for further processing, depends on the way the relay is managed and is application specific (typically based on prior business agreement). <\/ins> Relays respond with an ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR control message providing the result of announcement. The entity receiving the ANNOUNCE MUST send only a single response to a given ANNOUNCE of either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. When a publisher wants to stop new subscriptions for an announced namespace it sends an UNANNOUNCE. A subscriber indicates it will no longer route subscriptions for a namespace it previously responded ANNOUNCE_OK to by sending an ANNOUNCE_CANCEL. <\/del> either ANNOUNCE_OK or ANNOUNCE_ERROR. A Relay can receive announcements from multiple publishers for the same tracknamespace and it MUST respond with appropriate response to each of the publishers, in the same way as it would responds when processing ANNOUNCE from a single publisher for a given tracknamespace. When a publisher wants to stop new subscriptions for an announced namespace it sends an UNANNOUNCE. A subscriber indicates it will no longer route subscriptions for a namespace it previously responded ANNOUNCE_OK to by sending an ANNOUNCE_CANCEL. <\/ins> A relay manages sessions from multiple publishers and subscribers, connecting them based on the track namespace. This MUST use an exact"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e00e9e37520a7d5627cfa77cc55c4800df53ffe4abbdc891dac0c384a5b41705","title":"","text":"application. For example, a SUBSCRIBE namespace=foobar message will be forwarded to the session that sent ANNOUNCE namespace=foobar. When a relay receives an incoming SUBSCRIBE for a given namespace, for each publisher that has announced that namespace, the relay MUST send a SUBSCRIBE to that publisher unless it already has an active subscription to that publisher for the full track name in the incoming SUBSCRIBE. When a relay receives an incoming ANNOUCE for a given namespace, for each active subscription that matches that namespace, it MUST send a SUBSCRIBE to that publisher that send the ANNOUCE. <\/ins> OBJECT message headers carry a short hop-by-hop \"Track Alias\" that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use the \"Track Alias\" of an incoming OBJECT message to identify its track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-268a78daa2c9046acb6d6fa610b9d239f2a05c1aa239910ee484b5fe2eaa3e5d","title":"","text":"OBJECT messages to matching subscribers in accordance to each subscription's priority, group order, and delivery timeout. 5.2.1. This section describes non normative behavior that a publisher MAY choose to implement to allow for a better users experience when switching from WiFi to Cellular networks or visa versa. If the original publisher detects it is likely to need to switch networks, for example because the WiFi signal is getting weaker, and it does not have QUIC connection migration available, it establishes a new session over the new interface and sends an ANNOUCE. The relay will forward matching subscribes and the publisher publishes objects on both sessions. Once the subscriptions have migrated over to session on the new network, the publisher can stop publishing objects on the old network. The relay will drop duplicate objects received on both subscriptions. Ideally, the subscriptions downstream from the relay do no observe this change, and keep receiving the objects on the same subscription. 5.2.2. This section describes non normative behavior that a publisher MAY choose to implement to allow for a better users experience when a relay sends them a GOAWAY. When a publisher receives a GOAWAY, it starts the process of connecting to a new relay and sends announces, but it does not immediately stop publishing objects to the old relay. The new relay will send subscribes and the publisher can start sending new objects to the new relay instead of the old relay. Once objects are going to the new relay, the announcement and subscription to the old relay can be stopped. <\/ins> 5.3. MOQT encodes the delivery information for a stream via OBJECT headers"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-182f7fd3e1a21de793d882df36908c0e0d2ae5caafcb38721e3043f1ca1be946","title":"","text":"6. MOQT uses a single bidirectional stream to exchange control messages, as defined in session-init. Every signle message on the control <\/del> as defined in session-init. Every single message on the control <\/ins> stream is formatted as follows: An endpoint that receives an unknown message type MUST close the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8f092f31d1ba2168f98ce84db75629bca60d27cb0d5523f770b232e2b47cac3a","title":"","text":"SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE is not required for a publisher to send ANNOUNCE and UNANNOUNCE messages to a subscriber. It is useful in applications or relays where subscribers are only interested in or authorized to access a subset of available annoucements. <\/del> authorized to access a subset of available announcements. <\/ins> 6.12."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f2ed4ec888018a509f5799fffdd4318f7cb091fd57fff369f18fc2f27a5f87ae","title":"","text":"session as a 'Protocol Violation' if it receives a second bidirectional stream. The control stream MUST NOT be abruptly closed at the underlying transport layer. Doing so results in the session being closed as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/del> The control stream MUST NOT be closed at the underlying transport layer while the session is active. Doing so results in the session being closed as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6ca08db042e5c9800f2c57af93c431af698e7a65df8feafb3cf4cb2490620c74","title":"","text":"time. Objects are comprised of two parts: metadata and a payload. The metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays. The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the Original Publisher and End Subscribers. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/del> metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays (see relays-moq). The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the Original Publisher and End Subscribers. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/ins> 2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7d0aba9b51677c7546585a01064507370ce9407c27afe2c711030f7e6f98db32","title":"","text":"3.5. The transport session can be terminated at any point. When native <\/del> The Transport Session can be terminated at any point. When native <\/ins> QUIC is used, the session is closed using the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (QUIC). When WebTransport is used, the session is closed using the CLOSE_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSION capsule (WebTransport)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-1c36b8e8fdc460ea05bf9553891c003b7c3f60c09585d224716d515767f36dcb","title":"","text":"(CDNs). Additionally, relays serve as policy enforcement points by validating subscribe and publish requests at the edge of a network. Relays are endpoints, which means they terminate Transport Sessions in order to have visibility of MoQ Object metadata. <\/ins> Relays can cache Objects, but are not required to. 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-4210392f699f05d4dd05f43c537cbe1e3d0bf25bcabd49ac61bdaa01cfd2e729","title":"","text":"ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published on this track, 0 if not. If 0, then the Largest Group ID and Largest Object ID fields will not be present. <\/del> fields will not be present. Any other value is a protocol error and MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session- termination). <\/ins> Largest Group ID: The largest Group ID available for this track. This field is only present if ContentExists has a value of 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d947f898569b810616baeeefbae905304839a87407536ca455b6dd7c4d04ff71","title":"","text":"ContentExists: 1 if an object has been published for this subscription, 0 if not. If 0, then the Final Group and Final Object fields will not be present. <\/del> Object fields will not be present. Any other value is a protocol error and MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session-termination). <\/ins> Final Group: The largest Group ID sent by the publisher in an OBJECT message in this track."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8ce951dd59049ad257e49999694530779566870b50ab3f0f616acdace4a405f3","title":"","text":"6.1.1.1. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies a track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE or <\/del> authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES or <\/ins> ANNOUNCE message. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. The value is an ASCII string."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e480a82b9a24920450b5b8193300d9e8684bc8229cdbbdd26c3392eb6da55164","title":"","text":"6.11. The subscriber sends the SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE control message to a <\/del> The subscriber sends the SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES control message to a <\/ins> publisher to request the current set of matching announcements, as well as future updates to the set."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-abb676fbd6a8a37b86eb8541bdf06f6641403d05e16e693c52a35557923336ea","title":"","text":"example, if the publisher is a relay that has received ANNOUNCE messages for namespaces (\"example.com\", \"meeting=123\", \"participant=100\") and (\"example.com\", \"meeting=123\", \"participant=200\"), a SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE for (\"example.com\", <\/del> \"participant=200\"), a SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES for (\"example.com\", <\/ins> \"meeting=123\") would match both. Parameters: The parameters are defined in version-specific-params. The publisher will respond with SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_OK or SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_ERROR. If the SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE is successful, <\/del> The publisher will respond with SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_OK or SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_ERROR. If the SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES is successful, <\/ins> the publisher will forward any matching ANNOUNCE messages to the subscriber that it has not yet sent. If the set of matching ANNOUNCE messages changes, the publisher sends the corresponding ANNOUNCE or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b667ad47e279d511f3a6609a00af6cdf8363b72c3689e274ccc346b1babe5aba","title":"","text":"A subscriber cannot make overlapping namespace subscriptions on a single session. Within a session, if a publisher receives a SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE with a Track Namespace Prefix that is a prefix of an earlier SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE or vice versa, it MUST respond with SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_ERROR, with error code SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_OVERLAP. <\/del> SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES with a Track Namespace Prefix that is a prefix of an earlier SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES or vice versa, it MUST respond with SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_ERROR, with error code SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_OVERLAP. <\/ins> The publisher MUST ensure the subscriber is authorized to perform this namespace subscription. SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE is not required for a publisher to send ANNOUNCE <\/del> SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES is not required for a publisher to send ANNOUNCE <\/ins> and UNANNOUNCE messages to a subscriber. It is useful in applications or relays where subscribers are only interested in or authorized to access a subset of available announcements. 6.12. A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE\" message to a publisher <\/del> A subscriber issues a \"UNSUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES\" message to a publisher <\/ins> indicating it is no longer interested in ANNOUNCE and UNANNOUNCE messages for the specified track namespace prefix. The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE\" is as follows: <\/del> The format of \"UNSUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES\" is as follows: <\/ins> Track Namespace Prefix: As defined in message-subscribe-ns."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a7b1f6a522147eb078fc44239729991dbda8b5139df613e1f5f04ee2df5dd5e0","title":"","text":"6.20. A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_OK control message for <\/del> A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_OK control message for <\/ins> successful namespace subscriptions. Track Namespace Prefix: As defined in message-subscribe-ns. 6.21. A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE_ERROR control message in response to a failed SUBSCRIBE_NAMESPACE. <\/del> A publisher sends a SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES_ERROR control message in response to a failed SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES. <\/ins> Track Namespace Prefix: As defined in message-subscribe-ns."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-60acbe30602b54b4c540823f4eb8b1a0bf2c1efc8c80bb6208b0255392a76518","title":"","text":"A subscription causes the publisher to send newly published objects for a track. A subscriber MUST NOT make multiple active subscriptions for a track within a single session and publishers SHOULD treat this as a protocol violation. <\/del> SHOULD treat this as a protocol violation. The only objects prior to the current object that can be requested are those in the current group. <\/ins> The subscriber specifies a filter on the subscription to allow the publisher to identify which objects need to be delivered."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d27cc23f748ffc43b7d70acb98eb65e9706e320cc75e6f5ff71e29409be6082e","title":"","text":"AbsoluteStart (0x3): Specifies an open-ended subscription beginning from the object identified in the StartGroup and StartObject fields. If the StartGroup is prior to the current group, the publisher MUST reply with a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'. <\/ins> AbsoluteRange (0x4): Specifies a closed subscription starting at StartObject in StartGroup and ending at EndObject in EndGroup. The start and end of the range are inclusive. EndGroup and EndObject MUST specify the same or a later object than StartGroup and StartObject. <\/del> StartObject. If the StartGroup is prior to the current group, the publisher MUST reply with a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'. <\/ins> A filter type other than the above MUST be treated as error. If a subscriber wants to subscribe to Objects both before and after the Latest Object, it can send a SUBSCRIBE for the Latest Object followed by a FETCH. Depending upon the application, one might want to send both messages at the same time or wait for the first to return before sending the second. <\/ins> The format of SUBSCRIBE is as follows: Subscribe ID: The subscriber specified identifier used to manage a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-15cafc2a166bf106652a3689798887d017fa53ae201532738d82ec0650b09889","title":"","text":"AbsoluteRange (0x4): Specifies a closed subscription starting at StartObject in StartGroup and ending at EndObject in EndGroup. The start and end of the range are inclusive. EndGroup and EndObject MUST specify the same or a later object than StartGroup and StartObject. If the StartGroup is prior to the current group, the publisher MUST reply with a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'. <\/del> start and end of the range are inclusive. EndGroup MUST specify the same or a later group than StartGroup. If the StartGroup is prior to the current group, the publisher MUST reply with a SUBSCRIBE_ERROR with code 'Invalid Range'. <\/ins> A filter type other than the above MUST be treated as error."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-9cba8870809fd8b8d21936bcf9ea4f78ca294f193802054600e816a703414871","title":"","text":"StartObject: The start Object ID. Only present for \"AbsoluteStart\" and \"AbsoluteRange\" filter types. EndGroup: The end Group ID. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type. EndObject: The end Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type. <\/del> EndGroup: The end Group ID, inclusive. Only present for the \"AbsoluteRange\" filter type. <\/ins> Subscribe Parameters: The parameters are defined in version- specific-params."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-98823fefb3dd76db2d202b737565181973b25f3d30f8176cfd8f47ab1dc220eb","title":"","text":"EndGroup: The end Group ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the subscription is open-ended. EndObject: The end Object ID, plus 1. A value of 0 means the entire group is requested. <\/del> Subscriber Priority: Specifies the priority of a subscription relative to other subscriptions in the same session. Lower numbers get higher priority. See priorities."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e583252c105c5ac4c16479acaad5db1189b6e93aacde030b44b72531cb52a07a","title":"","text":"is sent right after the last object in the track. This SHOULD be cached. 0x5 := Indicates end of Subgroup. Object ID is one greater than the largest normal object ID in the Subgroup. <\/del> Any other value SHOULD be treated as a protocol error and terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session-termination). Any object with a status code other than zero MUST have an empty payload."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-94d63b158d507e8abdcb4691280bb080ab3a2623025edd4d7a1fa90ab2438f32","title":"","text":"received all objects in a subgroup from the start of the subscription. If a relay, it can forward stream FINs to its own subscribers once those objects have been sent. A relay MAY treat receipt of EndOfGroup, EndOfSubgroup, GroupDoesNotExist, or EndOfTrack objects as a signal to close corresponding streams even if the FIN has not arrived, as further objects on the stream would be a protocol violation. <\/del> receipt of EndOfGroup, GroupDoesNotExist, or EndOfTrack objects as a signal to close corresponding streams even if the FIN has not arrived, as further objects on the stream would be a protocol violation. <\/ins> Similarly, an EndOfGroup message indicates the maximum Object ID in the Group, so if all Objects in the Group have been received, a FIN"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-7792a6c5688a29bf94d83959401ffaf51b7ed1f179a72dd7a3c3d21306c140dc","title":"","text":"6.2.2.1. The ROLE parameter (key 0x00) allows each endpoint to independently specify what functionality they support for the session. It has three possible values, which are of type varint: Both endpoints MUST send a ROLE parameter with one of the three values specified above. Both endpoints MUST close the session if the ROLE parameter is missing or is not one of the three above-specified values. 6.2.2.2. <\/del> The PATH parameter (key 0x01) allows the client to specify the path of the MoQ URI when using native QUIC (QUIC). It MUST NOT be used by the server, or when WebTransport is used. If the peer receives a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-032170a5af1097ebb7b90bad20025beeccb46656b142da9d47c3e24fd79d7043","title":"","text":"the URI; if \"query\" is present, the client MUST concatenate \"?\", followed by the \"query\" portion of the URI to the parameter. 6.2.2.3. <\/del> 6.2.2.2. <\/ins> The MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID parameter (key 0x02) communicates an initial value for the Maximum Subscribe ID to the receiving subscriber. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f30607e2caa131afeed8fd3532e28df81d462475c63ab1e622c0c945beb417aa","title":"","text":"When a relay receives an incoming ANNOUCE for a given namespace, for each active upstream subscription that matches that namespace, it SHOULD send a SUBSCRIBE to that publisher that send the ANNOUNCE. <\/del> SHOULD send a SUBSCRIBE to the publisher that sent the ANNOUNCE. <\/ins> OBJECT message headers carry a short hop-by-hop \"Track Alias\" that maps to the Full Track Name (see message-subscribe-ok). Relays use"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-e99fc83bf62c0048ad6e0af0e7ba6b574556788d17f4c50f1c3c9f59f63579fe","title":"","text":"When a stream begins with \"STREAM_HEADER_SUBGROUP\", all objects on the stream belong to the track requested in the Subscribe message identified by \"Subscribe ID\" and the subgroup indicated by 'Group ID' <\/del> identified by \"Track Alias\" and the subgroup indicated by 'Group ID' <\/ins> and \"Subgroup ID\". All Objects received on a stream opened with \"STREAM_HEADER_SUBGROUP\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6a143b20f1c2839d41a4b82d228a960d3d64ba448c201ea9e793cd60bce9210b","title":"","text":"Subscribe ID value is a 'Protocol Violation'. Subscribe ID: The new Maximum Subscribe ID for the session. If a Subscribe ID equal or larger than this is received in any message, including SUBSCRIBE, the publisher MUST close the session with an error of 'Too Many Subscribes'. More on Subscribe ID in message- subscribe-req. <\/del> Subscribe ID message-subscribe-req equal or larger than this is received by the publisher that sent the MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID, the publisher MUST close the session with an error of 'Too Many Subscribes'. <\/ins> 6.21."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-66162a3280f548bdc14880adcbb885a820c9f462d43f76308bedae54fa3986db","title":"","text":". A schedulable object in MoQT is either: An object that belongs to a peep where that object would be the next object to be sent in that peep. <\/del> An object that belongs to a subgroup where that object would be the next object to be sent in that subgroup. <\/ins> An object that belongs to a track with delivery preference Datagram. Since a single peep or datagram has a single publisher priority, it can be useful to conceptualize this process as scheduling peeps or datagrams instead of individual objects on them. <\/del> Since a single subgroup or datagram has a single publisher priority, it can be useful to conceptualize this process as scheduling subgroups or datagrams instead of individual objects on them. <\/ins> A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a57a50a555e736e5b0f3e5f3f81ed7deb498b083ee45cbe041e5d9f9b148371b","title":"","text":"what happens to objects that have already been received and possibly scheduled. is a priority number associated with an indiviaul schedulable object. It is specified in the header of the respective peep or datagram, and is the same for all objects in a single peep. <\/del> is a priority number associated with an individual schedulable object. It is specified in the header of the respective subgroup or datagram, and is the same for all objects in a single subgroup. <\/ins> is a property of an invidual subscription. It can be either 'Ascending' (groups with lower group ID are sent first), or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-8d8ebb021a9d46a882b65ef13191867c843a4a9e1e585267af454444b900f8ca","title":"","text":"If two objects belong to the same group of the same track received through the same subscription, the one with (for tracks with delivery preference Peep), or <\/del> (for tracks with delivery preference Subgroup), or <\/ins> (for tracks with delivery preference Datagram) is sent first."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2c0768aa271a999d08480a06bf178808818cc8bc454d549da632730da0d4b9eb","title":"","text":"provides a join point for subscriptions, so a subscriber that does not want to receive the entire track can opt to receive only the latest group(s). The publisher then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. <\/del> based on their group membership. Groups can contain any number of objects. <\/ins> Groups are ordered numerically by their Group ID."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-a9d67ed309018ae4fe41d371e112aa71557355950aadb7202dbf049992522cda","title":"","text":"6.1.1.1. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (key 0x02) identifies a track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES or ANNOUNCE message. This parameter is populated for cases where the <\/del> AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (Parameter Type 0x02) identifies a track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES or ANNOUNCE message. This parameter is populated for cases where the <\/ins> authorization is required at the track level. The value is an ASCII string. 6.1.1.2. The DELIVERY TIMEOUT parameter (key 0x03) MAY appear in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_OK, or a SUBSCRIBE_UDPATE message. It is the duration in milliseconds the relay SHOULD continue to attempt forwarding Objects after they have been received. The start time for the timeout is based on when the beginning of the Object is received, and does not depend upon the forwarding preference. There is no explicit signal that an Object was not sent because the delivery timeout was exceeded. <\/del> The DELIVERY TIMEOUT parameter (Parameter Type 0x03) MAY appear in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_OK, or a SUBSCRIBE_UDPATE message. It is the duration in milliseconds the relay SHOULD continue to attempt forwarding Objects after they have been received. The start time for the timeout is based on when the beginning of the Object is received, and does not depend upon the forwarding preference. There is no explicit signal that an Object was not sent because the delivery timeout was exceeded. <\/ins> If both the subscriber and publisher specify the parameter, they use the min of the two values for the subscription. The publisher SHOULD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-d38ccfb9226ae1e8e0fc9e3c6b75ec5a7675e7061fdb0d09fa4fccd683bc65e0","title":"","text":"6.1.1.3. MAX_CACHE_DURATION (key 0x04): An integer expressing a number of milliseconds. If present, the relay MUST NOT start forwarding any individual Object received through this subscription after the specified number of milliseconds has elapsed since the beginning of the Object was received. This means Objects earlier in a multi- object stream will expire earlier than Objects later in the stream. Once Objects have expired, their state becomes unknown, and a relay that handles a subscription that includes those Objects re-requests them. <\/del> MAX_CACHE_DURATION (Parameter Type 0x04): An integer expressing a number of milliseconds. If present, the relay MUST NOT start forwarding any individual Object received through this subscription after the specified number of milliseconds has elapsed since the beginning of the Object was received. This means Objects earlier in a multi-object stream will expire earlier than Objects later in the stream. Once Objects have expired, their state becomes unknown, and a relay that handles a subscription that includes those Objects re- requests them. <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0ebda11b8de21a3b8500fee97342540be4f300581f6c10bf24f2ceef64c7626e","title":"","text":"6.2.2.1. The PATH parameter (key 0x01) allows the client to specify the path of the MoQ URI when using native QUIC (QUIC). It MUST NOT be used by the server, or when WebTransport is used. If the peer receives a PATH parameter from the server, or when WebTransport is used, it MUST close the connection. It follows the URI formatting rules RFC3986. <\/del> The PATH parameter (Parameter Type 0x01) allows the client to specify the path of the MoQ URI when using native QUIC (QUIC). It MUST NOT be used by the server, or when WebTransport is used. If the peer receives a PATH parameter from the server, or when WebTransport is used, it MUST close the connection. It follows the URI formatting rules RFC3986. <\/ins> When connecting to a server using a URI with the \"moqt\" scheme, the client MUST set the PATH parameter to the \"path-abempty\" portion of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0f4e10389cddac9dbbe8cb253ff4161b6a9380075e67f2ab0c69333a26879f68","title":"","text":"6.2.2.2. The MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID parameter (key 0x02) communicates an initial value for the Maximum Subscribe ID to the receiving subscriber. The default value is 0, so if not specified, the peer MUST NOT create subscriptions. <\/del> The MAX_SUBSCRIBE_ID parameter (Parameter Type 0x02) communicates an initial value for the Maximum Subscribe ID to the receiving subscriber. The default value is 0, so if not specified, the peer MUST NOT create subscriptions. <\/ins> 6.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-382fc1aebc89729279a028d7148797a15e33c518210028d4125fe67f41022946","title":"","text":"Objects are assigned an intended delivery order that should be obeyed during congestion (delivery-order) Objects can be dependent on other objects, in which case reordering is required (dependencies). <\/del> The decoder receives each objects and skips any objects that do not arrive in time (decoder)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-109c5d1b0a0e493650cc5dffb370c10764dd7d8315b3cf5fc7fd50eb75197a9d","title":"","text":"MAY overlap with other objects. This means timestamps may be interleaved between objects. MAY reference frames in other objects, but only if listed as a dependency. <\/del> Media objects are encoded using a specified container (containers). 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ab33b16fbc225fa84661b3846adc216f88c5a376b056cc21e3b216b542bd4dd1","title":"","text":"each object are still delivered in order; this delivery order only applies to the ordering between objects. An object MUST NOT have a smaller delivery order than an object it depends on. Delivering objects out of dependency order will increase latency and can cause artifacting when memory limits are tight. This is especially problematic and can cause a deadlock if the receiver does not release flow control until dependencies are received. <\/del> A sender MUST send each object over a dedicated QUIC stream. The QUIC library should support prioritization (prioritization) such that streams are transmitted in delivery order."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-b0f05a6b52e705e4dbb1a193a082d4795a8ada98907c9160b47dc48d37352097","title":"","text":"4.3. Media encoding uses references to improve the compression. This creates hard and soft dependencies that need to be respected by the transport. See the appendex for an overview of media encoding (appendix.encoding). An object MAY depend on any number of other objects. The encoder MUST indicate these dependecies on the wire via the OBJECT header (object). The sender SHOULD NOT use this list of dependencies to determine which object to transmit next. The sender SHOULD use the delivery order instead, which MUST respect dependencies. The decoder SHOULD process object according to their dependencies. This means buffering a object until the relevent timestamps have been processed in all dependencies. A decoder MAY drop dependencies at the risk of producing decoding errors and artifacts. 4.4. <\/del> The decoder will receive multiple objects in parallel and out of order."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-cfdc19800fcce0a5073d6fd75e108cc92af58c695f933d64c27d9986f046197e","title":"","text":"\"order\". An integer indicating the delivery order (delivery- order). This field is optional and the default value is 0. \"depends\". An list of dependencies by stream identifier (dependencies). This field is optional and the default value is an empty array. <\/del> The payload of the OBJECT message consists of a fragmented MP4 container (fmp4)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5533013fc068eed83dff3fd3a27af470d1259cea1a7c13347306cfaf49ff2d34","title":"","text":"Track Box in the initialization fragment. A Common Media Application Format Segment CMAF meets all these requirements. Each OBJECT message (object) MUST start with an initialization segment, or MUST depend on a OBJECT that does. The rest of the OBJECT message MAY be a media segment. <\/del> Media fragments can be packaged at any frequency, causing a trade-off between overhead and latency. It is RECOMMENDED that a media fragment consists of a single frame to minimize latency."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-0592e45a5b7880dcfe3aa0781a3aad981068fdb09cfad12c50d432089563c9a9","title":"","text":"We can further reduce the number of objects by combining frames that don't depend on each other. The only restriction is that frames can only reference frames earlier in the object, or within a dependency object. For example, non-reference frames can have their own object so they can be prioritized or dropped separate from reference frames. <\/del> only reference frames earlier in the object. For example, non- reference frames can have their own object so they can be prioritized or dropped separate from reference frames. <\/ins> The same GoP structure can also be represented using six objects, although we've removed the ability to drop individual B-frames:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3b52a8669a11dbda1c9e19323f1ef5c5a2cc90146b8cd6241d7a5ed4e71128b4","title":"","text":"as that of the next later Object, with the assumption that the Object's data was reordered. If neither the subscriber or publisher specify DELIVERY TIMEOUT, Objects are delivered as indicated by their Group Order and Priority. <\/del> If neither the subscriber or publisher specify DELIVERY TIMEOUT, all Objects in the track matching the subscription filter are delivered as indicated by their Group Order and Priority. If a subscriber exceeds the publisher's resource limits by failing to consume objects at a sufficient rate, the publisher MAY terminate the subscription with error 'Too Far Behind'. If an object in a subgroup exceeds the delivery timeout, the publisher MUST reset the underlying transport stream (see closing- subgroup-streams). <\/ins> When sent by a subscriber, this parameter is intended to be specific to a subscription, so it SHOULD NOT be forwarded upstream by a relay"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-622cc00c772441401d8e2e8e3b88930c4a3f364fc11ef1b0c209a484e5f00239","title":"","text":"end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. Objects within a group are ordered numerically by their Object ID. <\/ins> 2.2. A subgroup is a sequence of one or more objects from the same group"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-aceea28276b5fdd1636a67738a06687c0e0c13937c1141f34c821645e9390ee3","title":"","text":"latest group(s). The publisher then selectively transmits objects based on their group membership. Groups are ordered numerically by their Group ID. <\/ins> 2.4. A track is a sequence of groups (model-group). It is the entity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fd7cf503c437ae4bfacab508228436d3a7d04caf2bb39f96257196408c89c2aa","title":"","text":"sessions, either within a single connection or on multiple connections can be used. Implementations that have a default priority SHOULD set it to a value in the middle of the range (eg: 128) to allow non-default priorities to be set either higher or lower. <\/ins> 5. Relays are leveraged to enable distribution scale in the MoQ"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-78ff2f2b4598b781ac836dd484b382bc54a6f84ec83872533175f2f952d6b5d7","title":"","text":"The Object Status field is only sent if the Object Payload Length is zero. The Subgroup ID field of an object with a Forwarding Preference of \"Datagram\" (see object-fields) is set to the Object ID. <\/ins> 7.4. Sending a track on one stream:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-51fffb5de51e93d5329ce628557a48dc905e176aba7d6b64cda9338e0394909b","title":"","text":"the scalability and cost effectiveness associated with content delivery networks. MOQT is a generic protocol is designed to work in concert with multiple MoQ Streaming Formats. These MoQ Streaming Formats define how content is encoded, packaged, and mapped to MOQT objects, along with policies for discovery and subscription. <\/del> MOQT is a generic protocol designed to work in concert with multiple MoQ Streaming Formats. These MoQ Streaming Formats define how content is encoded, packaged, and mapped to MOQT objects, along with policies for discovery and subscription. <\/ins> model describes the object model employed by MOQT."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-fc12e910cdb5480c5aa5874ed437c929ebc86831b360108bd79b047cfd973412","title":"","text":"1.1. The development of MOQT is driven by goals in a number of areas - specifically latency, the robustness of QUIC, workflow efficiency and relay support. <\/del> specifically latency, the robust feature set of QUIC and relay support. <\/ins> 1.1.1. HTTP Adaptive Streaming (HAS) has been successful at achieving scale although often at the cost of latency. Latency is necessary to correct for variable network throughput. Ideally live content is consumed at the same bitrate it is produced. End-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing along the path from producer to consumer. The speed at which a protocol can detect and respond to queuing determines the overall latency. TCP-based protocols are simple but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. Protocols utilizing UDP directly can avoid queuing, but the application is then responsible for the complexity of fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. One goal of MOQT is to achieve the best of both these worlds: leverage the features of QUIC to create a simple yet flexible low latency protocol that can rapidly detect and respond to congestion. <\/del> Latency is necessary to correct for variable network throughput. Ideally live content is consumed at the same bitrate it is produced. End-to-end latency would be fixed and only subject to encoding and transmission delays. Unfortunately, networks have variable throughput, primarily due to congestion. Attempting to deliver content encoded at a higher bitrate than the network can support causes queuing along the path from producer to consumer. The speed at which a protocol can detect and respond to congestion determines the overall latency. TCP-based protocols are simple but are slow to detect congestion and suffer from head-of-line blocking. Protocols utilizing UDP directly can avoid queuing, but the application is then responsible for the complexity of fragmentation, congestion control, retransmissions, receiver feedback, reassembly, and more. One goal of MOQT is to achieve the best of both these worlds: leverage the features of QUIC to create a simple yet flexible low latency protocol that can rapidly detect and respond to congestion. <\/ins> 1.1.2. The parallel nature of QUIC streams can provide improvements in the face of loss. A goal of MOQT is to design a streaming protocol to leverage the transmission benefits afforded by parallel QUIC streams as well exercising options for flexible loss recovery. Applying QUIC to HAS via HTTP\/3 has not yet yielded generalized improvements in throughput. One reason for this is that sending segments down a single QUIC stream still allows head-of-line blocking to occur. <\/del> as well exercising options for flexible loss recovery. <\/ins> 1.1.3. Internet delivered media today has protocols optimized for ingest and separate protocols optimized for distribution. This protocol switch in the distribution chain necessitates intermediary origins which re- <\/del> Some live media architectures today have separate protocols for ingest and distribution, for example RTMP and HTTP based HLS or DASH. Switching protocols necessitates intermediary origins which re- <\/ins> package the media content. While specialization can have its benefits, there are gains in efficiency to be had in not having to re-package content. A goal of MOQT is to develop a single protocol <\/del> benefits, there are efficiency gains to be had in not having to re- package content. A goal of MOQT is to develop a single protocol <\/ins> which can be used for transmission from contribution to distribution. A related goal is the ability to support existing encoding and packaging schemas, both for backwards compatibility and for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-3f85ff645bcdec35f6144b9b8693ef892ec2163e9923e96720656a450dd45980","title":"","text":"metadata is never encrypted and is always visible to relays (see relays-moq). The payload portion may be encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the Original Publisher and End Subscribers. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/del> Original Publisher is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. This includes the underlying encoding, compression, any end-to-end encryption, or authentication. A relay MUST NOT combine, split, or otherwise modify object payloads. <\/ins> Objects within a group are ordered numerically by their Object ID."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c8a4f4d0c3cde476583cbc7084a20c59cfe55dddf0064820313d037af48307fa","title":"","text":"a URI with a \"moqt\" scheme. The \"moqt\" URI scheme is defined as follows, using definitions from RFC3986: The \"authority\" portion MUST NOT contain a non-empty \"host\" portion. <\/del> The \"authority\" portion MUST NOT contain an empty \"host\" portion. <\/ins> The \"moqt\" URI scheme supports the \"\/.well-known\/\" path prefix defined in RFC8615."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-f7ecce542eab48bfdc00280a1ab58c3a9d0759a2746262ca6f1bf09a525dc85a","title":"","text":"3.3. The first stream opened is a client-initiated bidirectional control stream where the peers exchange Setup messages (message-setup). All messages defined in this draft except OBJECT and OBJECT_WITH_LENGTH are sent on the control stream after the Setup message. Control messages MUST NOT be sent on any other stream, and a peer receiving a control message on a different stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Objects MUST NOT be sent on the control stream, and a peer receiving an Object on the control stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/del> stream where the endpoints exchange Setup messages (message-setup). All messages defined in this draft except OBJECT and OBJECT_WITH_LENGTH are sent on the control stream after the Setup message. Control messages MUST NOT be sent on any other stream, and a peer receiving a control message on a different stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. Objects MUST NOT be sent on the control stream, and a peer receiving an Object on the control stream closes the session as a 'Protocol Violation'. <\/ins> This draft only specifies a single use of bidirectional streams. Objects are sent on unidirectional streams. Because there are no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-c27e268990fd10356ad1b3dc70133809accbeae360d413ff8cfb869ce5e86958","title":"","text":"A publisher SHOULD begin sending incomplete objects when available to avoid incurring additional latency. A relay that reads from a stream and writes to stream in order will <\/del> A relay that reads from one stream and writes to another in order can <\/ins> introduce head-of-line blocking. Packet loss will cause stream data to be buffered in the library, awaiting in order delivery, which will increase latency over additional hops. To mitigate this, a relay SHOULD read and write stream data out of order subject to flow <\/del> to be buffered in the library, awaiting in-order delivery, which could increase latency over additional hops. To mitigate this, a relay MAY read and write stream data out of order subject to flow <\/ins> control limits. See section 2.2 in QUIC. 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-2da36d2f9313abe5b8973d483e07467b2393d5766d589d28a129a700741df99b","title":"","text":"6.2. The \"CLIENT_SETUP\" and \"SERVER_SETUP\" messages are the first messages exchanged by the client and the server; they allows the peers to <\/del> exchanged by the client and the server; they allow the endpoints to <\/ins> establish the mutually supported version and agree on the initial configuration before any objects are exchanged. It is a sequence of key-value pairs called Setup parameters; the semantics and format of which can vary based on whether the client or server is sending. To ensure future extensibility of MOQT, the peers MUST ignore unknown <\/del> ensure future extensibility of MOQT, endpoints MUST ignore unknown <\/ins> setup parameters. TODO: describe GREASE for those. The wire format of the Setup messages are as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-6d5b84d41ec451125d5492b66754c2a42146c2fb151e4a293f7df1b4bf4f98e9","title":"","text":"Track namespace is an ordered N-tuple of bytes where N can be between 1 and 32. The structured nature of Track Namespace allows relays and applications to manipulate prefixes of a namespace. Track name is a sequence of bytes. <\/del> sequence of bytes. If an endpoint receives a Track Namespace tuple with an N of 0 or more than 32, it MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. <\/ins> In this specification, both the Track Namespace tuple fields and the Track Name are not constrained to a specific encoding. They carry a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-13ca0b51909eec3bfce6e047a8d74b45d4965814a7da30de604d4a1d19a39c17","title":"","text":"messages for namespaces (\"example.com\", \"meeting=123\", \"participant=100\") and (\"example.com\", \"meeting=123\", \"participant=200\"), a SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES for (\"example.com\", \"meeting=123\") would match both. <\/del> \"meeting=123\") would match both. If an endpoint receives a Track Namespace Prefix tuple with an N of 0 or more than 32, it MUST close the session with a Protocol Violation. <\/ins> Parameters: The parameters are defined in version-specific-params."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-5e25d2da93671e3b7685f01e623e7614db56fd931e162455e8fc0f4a62c036e5","title":"","text":"used a Subscribe ID equal or larger than the current Maximum Subscribe ID. GOAWAY Timeout: The session was closed because the client took too <\/del> GOAWAY Timeout: The session was closed because the peer took too <\/ins> long to close the session in response to a GOAWAY (message-goaway) message. See session migration (session-migration). 3.6. MoqTransport requires a long-lived and stateful session. However, a service provider needs the ability to shutdown\/restart a server without waiting for all sessions to drain naturally, as that can take days for long-form media. MoqTransport avoids this via the GOAWAY message (message-goaway). <\/del> MOQT requires a long-lived and stateful session. However, a service provider needs the ability to shutdown\/restart a server without waiting for all sessions to drain naturally, as that can take days for long-form media. MOQT enables proactively draining sessions via the GOAWAY message (message-goaway). <\/ins> The server sends a GOAWAY message, signaling that the client should establish a new session and migrate any active subscriptions. The GOAWAY message may contain a new URI for the new session, otherwise <\/del> The server sends a GOAWAY message, signaling the client to establish a new session and migrate any active subscriptions. The GOAWAY message optionally contains a new URI for the new session, otherwise <\/ins> the current URI is reused. The server SHOULD terminate the session with 'GOAWAY Timeout' after a sufficient timeout if there are still open subscriptions on a connection. <\/del> open subscriptions or fetches on a connection. <\/ins> The GOAWAY message does not immediately impact subscription state. A subscriber SHOULD individually UNSUBSCRIBE for each existing subscription, while a publisher MAY reject new SUBSCRIBEs while in the draining state. When the server is a subscriber, it SHOULD send a GOAWAY message to downstream subscribers prior to any UNSUBSCRIBE messages to upstream publishers. <\/del> When the server is a subscriber, it SHOULD send a GOAWAY message to downstream subscribers prior to any UNSUBSCRIBE messages to upstream publishers. <\/ins> After the client receives a GOAWAY, it's RECOMMENDED that the client waits until there are no more active subscriptions before closing the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-aa4d013bc7cb33268e9b0fe4d003bbce2e95af837cee14b3144ae6f2296d2b9d","title":"","text":"6.3. The server sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to initiate session migration (session-migration) with an optional URI. <\/del> An endpoint sends a \"GOAWAY\" message to inform the peer it intends to close the session soon. Servers can use GOAWAY to initiate session migration (session-migration) with an optional URI. <\/ins> The server MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session-termination) if it receives a GOAWAY message. The client MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session- termination) if it receives multiple GOAWAY messages. <\/del> The GOAWAY message does not impact subscription state. A subscriber SHOULD individually UNSUBSCRIBE for each existing subscription, while a publisher MAY reject new requests while in the draining state. <\/ins> New Session URI: The client MUST use this URI for the new session if provided. If the URI is zero bytes long, the current URI is reused instead. The new session URI SHOULD use the same scheme as the current URL to ensure compatibility. <\/del> Upon receiving a GOAWAY, an endpoint SHOULD NOT initiate new requests to the peer including SUBSCRIBE, FETCH, ANNOUNCE and SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCE. The endpoint MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation (session-termination) if it receives multiple GOAWAY messages. New Session URI: When received by a client, indicates where the client can connect to continue this session. The client MUST use this URI for the new session if provided. If the URI is zero bytes long, the client can reuse the current URI is reused instead. The new session URI SHOULD use the same scheme as the current URL to ensure compatibility. If a server receives a GOAWAY with a non-zero New Session URI Length it MUST terminate the session with a Protocol Violation. <\/ins> 6.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-43120093be852139daa2a7d4e11eb813c8f342d6fb78ddc00c2c52e366fc1c96","title":"","text":"6.1.1.1. AUTHORIZATION INFO parameter (Parameter Type 0x02) identifies a track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES or ANNOUNCE message. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. The value is an ASCII string. <\/del> track's authorization information in a SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBE_ANNOUNCES, ANNOUNCE or FETCH message. This parameter is populated for cases where the authorization is required at the track level. The value is an ASCII string. <\/ins> 6.1.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-moq-transport-ff6c65ed08bf54b5b6ebbc81ecfbb1dd0779a7318cd8c79406085a68b8563a3f","title":"","text":"Track ID: The track identifier as declared in CATALOG (message- catalog). Object ID: A unique identifier for each object within the track. <\/del> Group Sequence : An integer always starts at 0 and increases sequentially at the original media publisher. Group sequences are scoped under a Track. Object Sequence: An integer always starts at 0 with in a Group and increases sequentially. Object Sequences are scoped to a Group. <\/ins> Object Delivery Order: An integer indicating the object delivery order (delivery-order)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-299627cefbb12cf288ae89c7829f2329272e8dc9285b96f8bbc449f6a2674e90","title":"","text":"6. There are three primary architectural patterns available when building browser-based applications. <\/del> Here are the main architectural patterns available when building browser-based applications. single-domain, not using OAuth a JavaScript application accessing resource servers <\/ins> a JavaScript application that has methods of sharing data with resource servers, such as using common-domain cookies <\/del> either directly <\/ins> a JavaScript application with a backend component <\/del> or through a service worker <\/ins> a JavaScript application with no backend, accessing resource servers directly <\/del> a JavaScript application with a stateful backend component for storing tokens and handling all authentication flows (BFF proxy) <\/ins> These three architectures have different use cases and considerations. <\/del> These architectures have different use cases and considerations. <\/ins> 6.1. For simple system architectures, such as when the JavaScript application is served from a domain that can share cookies with the domain of the API (resource server), OAuth adds additional attack vectors that could be avoided with a different solution. <\/del> domain of the API (resource server) and the authorization server, OAuth adds additional attack vectors that could be avoided with a different solution. <\/ins> In particular, using any redirect-based mechanism of obtaining an access token enables the redirect-based attacks described in oauth-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-342baeba907ee4c560069e507167e41494e6fa72124dc2b4e47864d61bda3caf","title":"","text":"use a redirect mechanism to communicate between them. An additional concern with handling access tokens in a browser is that as of the date of this publication, there is no secure storage mechanism where JavaScript code can keep the access token to be later used in an API request. Using an OAuth flow results in the JavaScript code getting an access token, needing to store it somewhere, and then retrieve it to make an API request. Instead, a more secure design is to use an HTTP-only cookie between the JavaScript application and API so that the JavaScript code can't <\/del> that in case of successful XSS attack, tokens could be read and further used or transmitted by the injected code if no secure storage mechanism is in place. It could as such be considered to use an HTTP-only cookie between the JavaScript application and API so that the JavaScript code can't <\/ins> access the cookie value itself. The \"Secure\" cookie attribute should be used to ensure the cookie is not included in unencrypted HTTP requests. Additionally, the \"SameSite\" cookie attribute can be used to counter CSRF attacks, but should not be considered the extent of the CSRF protection, as described in <\/del> to counter some CSRF attacks, but should not be considered the extent of the CSRF protection, as described in <\/ins> OAuth was originally created for third-party or federated access to APIs, so it may not be the best solution in a common-domain"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-4795c94f956777187e5841fe8191c643ea6ded436f0f94201ce35a83b5660485","title":"","text":"and recovery at the OAuth server, rather than making it part of the application logic. Splitting of responsibilities between authenticating a user and serving resources <\/ins> Using OAuth for browser-based apps in a first-party same-domain scenario provides these advantages, and can be accomplished by either of the two architectural patterns described below. <\/del> scenario provides these advantages, and can be accomplished by any of the architectural patterns described below. <\/ins> 6.2. In this architecture, commonly referred to as \"backend for frontend\" or \"BFF\", the JavaScript code is loaded from a dynamic Application Server (A) that also has the ability to execute code itself. This enables the ability to keep all of the steps involved in obtaining an access token outside of the JavaScript application. Note that this application backend is not the Resource Server, it is still considered part of the OAuth client and would be accessing data at a separate resource server. In this case, the Application Server initiates the OAuth flow itself, by redirecting the browser to the authorization endpoint (B). When the user is redirected back, the browser delivers the authorization code to the application server (C), where it can then exchange it for an access token at the token endpoint (D) using its client secret. The application server then keeps the access token and refresh token stored internally, and creates a separate session with the browser- based app via a traditional browser cookie (E). <\/del> Server (A) that has the ability to execute code and handle the full authentication flow itself. This enables the ability to keep the call to actually get an access token outside the JavaScript application. Note that this BFF is not the Resource Server, it is the OAuth client and would be accessing data at a separate resource server. In this case, the BFF initiates the OAuth flow itself, by redirecting the browser to the authorization endpoint (B). When the user is redirected back, the browser delivers the authorization code to the application server (C), where it can then exchange it for an access token at the token endpoint (D) using its client secret and PKCE code verifier. The application server then keeps the access token and refresh token stored internally, and creates a separate session with the browser-based app via a traditional browser cookie (E). <\/ins> When the JavaScript application in the browser wants to make a request to the Resource Server, it instead makes the request to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-a9abcb87cf622f9637d9e95a00e2c94d3b33e939aae924384654fa4b1d2ca8c8","title":"","text":"In this scenario, the connection between the browser and Application Server SHOULD be a session cookie provided by the Application Server. 6.2.1. <\/ins> Security of the connection between code running in the browser and this Application Server is assumed to utilize browser-level protection mechanisms. Details are out of scope of this document,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-c3ef1c22001e222a8fbd4547a98e66ecd37a97b297aaf8b794d1bf35d0e46ee3","title":"","text":"and \"Secure\" cookie to authenticate the session between the browser and Application Server. Additionally, cookies MUST be protected from leakage by other means, such as logs. This architecture protects against tokens leakage from the browser, but creates a CSRF attack vector: once the user is authenticated, the BFF proxy will automatically add tokens to calls to the resource server. <\/ins> 6.3. In this architecture, the JavaScript code is first loaded from a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-982a117fdaf98842be8cc0d223226a2d6f6eaa3ae21eba6f6bb218a8bbdce27d","title":"","text":"In this architecture, the JavaScript code is first loaded from a static web host into the browser (A), and the application then runs in the browser. This application is considered a public client, since there is no way to issue it a client secret and there is no other secure client authentication mechanism available in the browser. <\/del> since there is no way to issue it a client secret and authentication is handled by the application, not by the browser. <\/ins> The code in the browser initiates the Authorization Code flow with the PKCE extension (described in authorization_code_flow) (B) above, and obtains an access token via a POST request (C). The JavaScript application is then responsible for storing the access token (and <\/del> and obtains an access token via a POST request (C). The application is then responsible for storing the access token (and <\/ins> optional refresh token) as securely as possible using appropriate browser APIs. As of the date of this publication there is no browser API that allows to store tokens in a completely secure way. <\/del> browser APIs. <\/ins> When the JavaScript application in the browser wants to make a request to the Resource Server, it can interact with the Resource"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-b52bfe369d49f405be9c4033901dae8d0f217d5dc302574ccadd31358ee74392","title":"","text":"In this scenario, the Authorization Server and Resource Server MUST support the necessary CORS headers to enable the JavaScript code to make this POST request from the domain on which the script is <\/del> make these POST requests from the domain on which the script is <\/ins> executing. (See cors for additional details.) 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-1d47ea99e3ceabaed601aad4b59f67a02d53509eceec0c3f54167fb77b7e5159","title":"","text":"refresh token to obtain new access tokens potentially without being detectable by the authorization server. Browser-based applications provide an attacker with several opportunities by which a refresh token can be leaked, just as with access tokens. As such, these applications are considered a higher risk for handling refresh tokens. <\/del> Javascript-accessible storage mechanisms like _Local Storage_ provide an attacker with several opportunities by which a refresh token can be leaked, just as with access tokens. As such, these mechanisms are considered a higher risk for handling refresh tokens. <\/ins> Authorization servers may choose whether or not to issue refresh tokens to browser-based applications. oauth-security-topics describes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-d479acbf1d3428bf64ae9c2ea96b22fbb75dae91fa93ecf374f2156d8243d28b","title":"","text":"having refresh tokens at all to avoid the risk of giving prolonged access to the attacker. 6.3.2. In this scenario, a Service Worker [1] is responsible for obtaining tokens from the authorization server and passing them to the resource API. Service workers are inherently safe from XSS, because the browser APIs allowing to register one take an origin-constrained URL. They can thus be used as a safe store for tokens. In this architecture, a service worker intercepts calls from the frontend to the resource server. As such, it completely isolates calls to the authorization server from XSS attack surface, as all tokens and PKCE secrets are safely kept there without any access from other JavaScript contexts. The service worker is then solely responsible for adding authentication headers to calls to the resource server. 6.3.2.1. The service worker MUST initiate the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code grant with PKCE itself. The service worker MUST intercept the authorization code when the _authorization server_ redirects to the application. This makes this architecture completely safe from token or session leaks in case of XSS. The service worker implementation MUST then initiate the token request itself. The service worker MUST not transmit tokens, authorization codes or PKCE secrets (e.g. code verifier) to the frontend application. The service worker MUST block \/token or \/authorize calls initiating from the frontend application in order to avoid any front-end side-channel for getting credentials: the only way of starting the authorization flow is through the service worker. This protects against re-authorization from XSS-injected code. <\/ins> 7. Browser-based applications that are public clients and use the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-6e73b418905f5dabb6cff814a4a4e2456f8aa2d9a457dca94cc997a67f41897b","title":"","text":"10. This document does not require any IANA actions. 11. References 11.1. URIs [1] https:\/\/developer.mozilla.org\/en-US\/docs\/Web\/API\/ Service_Worker_API <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-95caf324c038d61a265260af3aa212e762862e02e50341552f16c3422cd5ba3e","title":"","text":"6.1. For all known architectures, all precautions MUST be taken to prevent XSS attacks. In general, cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks are a huge risk, and can lead to full compromise of the application. 6.2. <\/ins> For simple system architectures, such as when the JavaScript application is served from a domain that can share cookies with the domain of the API (resource server) and the authorization server,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-dac7cf4b1262153ea298f2e8d2cb8f2b861e84545064668c5a0feeef8dfc1ba4","title":"","text":"scenario provides these advantages, and can be accomplished by any of the architectural patterns described below. 6.2. <\/del> 6.3. <\/ins> In this architecture, commonly referred to as \"backend for frontend\" or \"BFF\", the JavaScript code is loaded from a dynamic Application"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-53ebf6492b026d3e0110d8a96b937bc984b5e5710c8355bb987e63f3ada5fd0f","title":"","text":"In this scenario, the connection between the browser and Application Server SHOULD be a session cookie provided by the Application Server. 6.2.1. <\/del> 6.3.1. <\/ins> Security of the connection between code running in the browser and this Application Server is assumed to utilize browser-level"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-427d087c1e6b267eb0916636d519339c78e00e04e43cd3dc5fca51ed5575165f","title":"","text":"BFF proxy will automatically add tokens to calls to the resource server. 6.3. <\/del> 6.4. <\/ins> In this architecture, the JavaScript code is first loaded from a static web host into the browser (A), and the application then runs"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-e742060079b617148e9fe0ea8d0ff9326c81ccc2851f26675f23059338ec028a","title":"","text":"make these POST requests from the domain on which the script is executing. (See cors for additional details.) All precautions MUST be taken to prevent XSS attacks. <\/del> Besides the general risks of XSS, if tokens are stored or handled by the browser, XSS poses an additional risk of token exfiltration. In this architecture, the JavaScript application is storing the access token so that it can make requests directly to the resource server. There are two primary methods by which the application can store the token, with different security considerations of each. <\/ins> In general, cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks are a huge risk, and can lead to full compromise of the application. If tokens are ever stored or handled by the browser, XSS poses an additional risk of token exfiltration. In this architecture, the JavaScript application is storing the access token so that it can make requests directly to the resource server. There are two primary methods by which the application can store the token, with slightly different security considerations of each. 6.3.1. <\/del> 6.4.1. <\/ins> If the JavaScript in the DOM will be making requests directly to the resource server, it will need to store the tokens somewhere accessible to the DOM. In the case of a successful XSS attack, the injected code will have full access to the stored tokens and can exfiltrate them to the attacker. <\/del> resource server, the simplest mechanism is to store the tokens somewhere accessible to the DOM. In the case of a successful XSS attack, the injected code will have full access to the stored tokens and can exfiltrate them to the attacker. <\/ins> 6.3.2. <\/del> 6.4.2. <\/ins> In this scenario, a Service Worker [1] is responsible for obtaining tokens from the authorization server and making requests to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-161241cc163b96d739ce1faba533caddbb5d50ccf4b93175dbe36128291755e3","title":"","text":"solely responsible for adding the token in the authorization header to calls to the resource server. 6.3.2.1. <\/del> 6.4.2.1. <\/ins> The service worker MUST initiate the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code grant with PKCE itself."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-196b846dcfd8778793cb8b0b17b4a8720e1aff832d59f12bec50f6beaf500de8","title":"","text":"worker. This protects against re-authorization from XSS-injected code. 6.3.2.2. <\/del> 6.4.2.2. <\/ins> A successful XSS attack on an application using this Service Worker pattern would be unable to exfiltrate existing tokens stored by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-af350c1afbf51ea82240b96bca7ff7844cc19b291e856d4fbe4e78d57f5c5a25","title":"","text":"However, an XSS attack would still result in the attacker being able to initiate a new OAuth flow, and\/or unregister the Service Worker. 6.3.3. <\/del> 6.4.3. <\/ins> To limit the risk of token exfiltration:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-9177b51b2f47fda45524858a79024cb54b840aa5d7d10efb86c9ccafc549df18","title":"","text":"Section 4.4 of oauth-security-topics provides additional details about mix-up attacks and the countermeasures mentioned above. 9.4. In browser-based apps, it is common to execute the OAuth flow in a secondary window, such as a popup or iframe, instead of redirecting the primary window. In these flows, the browser-based app holds control of the primary window, for instance, to avoid page refreshes or run silent frame-based flows. If the browser-based app and the authorization server are invoked in different frames, they have to use in-browser communication techniques like the postMessage API (a.k.a. WebMessaging) instead of top-level redirections. To guarantee confidentiality and authenticity of messages, both the initiator origin and receiver origin of a postMessage MUST be verified using the mechanisms inherently provided by the postMessage API (Section 9.3.2 in WebMessaging). Section 4.18. of oauth-security-topics provides additional details about the security of in-browser communication flows and the countermeasures that browser-based apps and authorization servers MUST apply to defend against these attacks. <\/ins> 10. This document does not require any IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-929a386b2da40e6fb154d4b990188d9428bfef3e7d8352ee5a6681c520f5897d","title":"","text":"the frontend and the BFF do not require any preflights, so there's no additional overhead. 6.1.3.3.3. Some technology stacks and frameworks have built-in CRSF protection using anti-forgery cookies. This mechanism relies on a session- specific secret that is stored in a cookie, which can only be read by the legitimate frontend running in the domain associated with the cookie. The frontend is expected to read the cookie and insert its value into the request, typically by adding a custom request header. The backend verifies the value in the cookie to the value provided by the frontend to identify legitimate requests. When implemented correctly for all state changing requests, this mechanism effectively mitigates CSRF. Note that this mechanism is not necessarily recommended over the CORS approach. However, if a framework offers built-in support for this mechanism, it can serve as a low-effort alternative to protect against CSRF. <\/ins> 6.1.3.4. In the BFF pattern, all OAuth responsibilities have been moved to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-6259375b872f3a7b9b725ee664cfdb57d27a24ef737c024ab45964b274bd7c86","title":"","text":"6.3.2.4.2. In browser-based apps, it is common to execute the OAuth flow in a secondary window, such as a popup or iframe, instead of redirecting the primary window. In these flows, the browser-based app holds control of the primary window, for instance, to avoid page refreshes or run silent frame-based flows. If the browser-based app and the authorization server are invoked in different frames, they have to use in-browser communication techniques like the postMessage API (a.k.a. WebMessaging) instead of top-level redirections. To guarantee confidentiality and authenticity of messages, both the initiator origin and receiver origin of a postMessage MUST be verified using the mechanisms inherently provided by the postMessage API (Section 9.3.2 in WebMessaging). Section 4.18. of oauth-security-topics provides additional details about the security of in-browser communication flows and the countermeasures that browser-based apps and authorization servers MUST apply to defend against these attacks. 6.3.2.4.3. <\/ins> Browser-based applications MUST prevent CSRF attacks against their redirect URI. This can be accomplished by any of the below:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-10966f748e2425c75ee4aa441da8572ad4f803278804925e6f64542b698ce4f9","title":"","text":"Section 4.4 of oauth-security-topics provides additional details about mix-up attacks and the countermeasures mentioned above. 9.4. In browser-based apps, it is common to execute the OAuth flow in a secondary window, such as a popup or iframe, instead of redirecting the primary window. In these flows, the browser-based app holds control of the primary window, for instance, to avoid page refreshes or run hidden iframe-based flows. If the browser-based app and the authorization server are invoked in different frames, they have to use in-browser communication techniques like the postMessage API (a.k.a. WebMessaging) instead of top-level redirections. To guarantee confidentiality and authenticity of messages, both the initiator origin and receiver origin of a postMessage MUST be verified using the mechanisms inherently provided by the postMessage API (Section 9.3.2 in WebMessaging). Section 4.18. of oauth-security-topics provides additional details about the security of in-browser communication flows and the countermeasures that browser-based apps and authorization servers MUST apply to defend against these attacks. <\/del> 10. This document does not require any IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-f98c62f86eca205ad29cd29877b7f046ae1cc62857dc9281134c2af4b8df2e0a","title":"","text":"The token-mediating backend pattern is more lightweight than the BFF pattern (See pattern-bff), since it does not require the proxying of all requests to a resource server, which improves latency and significantly simplifies deployment. From a security perspective, the token-mediating backend is less secure than a BFF, but still offers significant advantages over an OAuth client application running directly in the browser. <\/del> all requests and responses between the JavaScript application and the resource server. From a security perspective, the token-mediating backend is less secure than a BFF, but still offers significant advantages over an OAuth client application running directly in the browser. <\/ins> If an attacker is able to execute malicious code within the JavaScript application, the application architecture is able to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-browser-based-apps-ef212ab54d1f9f7cf56828a4eede1fc7aa1288e48ec1a55c070d371004fb775f","title":"","text":"The code in the browser initiates the authorization code flow with the PKCE extension (described in authorization_code_flow) (B) above, and obtains an access token via a POST request (C). The JavaScript app is then responsible for storing the access token (and optional refresh token) securely using appropriate browser APIs. <\/del> application is then responsible for storing the access token (and optional refresh token) as securely as possible using appropriate browser APIs. As of the date of this publication there is no browser API that allows to store tokens in a completely secure way. <\/ins> When the JavaScript application in the browser wants to make a request to the Resource Server, it can include the access token in the request (D) and make the request directly. <\/del> request to the Resource Server, it can interact with the Resource Server directly. It includes the access token in the request (D) and receives the Resource Server's response (E). <\/ins> In this scenario, the Authorization Server and Resource Server MUST support the necessary CORS headers to enable the JavaScript code to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-b97292166cc80887c6fce5f259fa019ef108454905f9c4a00f8b802dda94d2c2","title":"","text":"described in this document. By restricting the protocol to only be executed on devices trusted by the authorization server, it prevents attackers from using arbitrary devices, or by mimicking devices to initiate the protocol. Trusted devices include devices that are pre- registered with the authorization server or are subject to device management policies. Device management policies may enforce <\/del> initiate the protocol. Authorization Servers MAY use different mechanisms to establish which devices it trusts. This includes limiting cross-device flows to specific device types such as intractive whiteboards or smart TVs, pre-registering devices with the authorization server or only allow cross-device flows on devices managed through device management systems. Device management systems may enforce policies that govern <\/ins> patching, version updates, on-device anti-malware deployment, revocation status and device location amongst others. Trusted devices may have their identities rooted in hardware (e.g., a TPM or equivalent technology). By only allowing trusted devices to initiate cross-device flows, it requires the attacker to have access to such a device and maintain access in a way that does not result in the device's trust status from being revoked. <\/del> devices MAY have their identities rooted in hardware (e.g., a TPM or equivalent technology). By only allowing trusted devices to initiate cross-device flows, it requires the attacker to have access to such a device and maintain access in a way that does not result in the device's trust status from being revoked. <\/ins> An attacker may still be able to obtain access to a trusted device and use it to initiate authorization requests, making it necessary to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-daab925a77bc7a5bf1054dd6393c04f3a1ee79f2d642301431af7c084a0e1e98","title":"","text":"credential. In preserving the context, it should be clear to the user who invoked the flow, why it was invoked and what the consequence of completing the authorization, authentication or credential presentation is. The user experience should reinforce the <\/del> credential presentation is. The user experience SHOULD reinforce the <\/ins> message that unless the user initiated the authorization request, or was expecting it, they should decline the request. This information MAY be communicated graphically or in a simple message (e.g., \"It looks like you are trying to access your files on a digital whiteboard in your city center office. Click here to grant access to your files. If you are not trying to access your files, you should decline this request and notify the security department\"). It SHOULD be clear to the user how to decline the request. To avoid accidental authorization grants, the \"decline\" option SHOULD be the default option or given similar prominence in the user experience as the \"grant\" option. <\/ins> If the user uses an application on a mobile device to scan a QR code, the application MAY display information advising the user under which conditions they should expect to be asked to scan a QR code and under"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-e1b696c169165bc2e9b75fcef12eada279be1616fcdaac79a188d5a55e1307f1","title":"","text":"trusted locations or on trusted websites hosted on a specific domain, and never in e-mail or other media and locations). It SHOULD be clear to the user how to decline the request. To avoid accidental authorization grants, the \"decline\" option SHOULD be the default option or given similar prominence in the user experience as the \"grant\" option. <\/del> The user experience MAY include information to further educate the user on cross-device consent phishing attacks and reinforce the conditions under which authorization grants may be requested. This information may be communicated graphically or in a simple message (e.g., \"It looks like you are trying to access your files on a digital whiteboard in your city center office. Click here to grant access to your files. If you are not trying to access your files, you should decline this request and notify the security department\"). <\/del> Improvements to user experience on their own is unlikely to be sufficient and SHOULD be used in conjunction with other controls described in this document."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-836e9ce5cf4cc6688de95c8a50a269d7c7dd61e289f6ac604f17f6cee3c6d276","title":"","text":"it in the CAD application, after which the CAD application displays the user's most recent designs. 2.4.9. A network administrator wants to access an adminstration portal used to configure network assets and deploy new applications. When attempting to access the service, the network administrator receives a notification in an app on their mobile device, requesting them to confirm access to the portal. The network administrator approves the request on their mobile phone and is granted access to the portal. <\/ins> 3. Attackers exploit cross-device flows by initiating an authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-a5143731894c64230199e3f1bcb9f18df19d1f465ec6f27eaf95757c31e85625","title":"","text":"3.4.10. An attacker attempts to access an adminstration portal repeatedly, generating a stream of authorization requests to the network administrator. The attempts are timed to occur while the administrator is asleep. The administrator is woken by the incoming requests on their phone, and, in an attempt to stop the notifications, they accidentally approve access and the attacker gains access to the portal. 3.4.11. <\/ins> In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is misled or exploited. For other attacks, where the user is willingly colluding with the attacker, the threat model, security implications and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-a6fe0aabe233a770dff52cbdc294f95297242c81a5a0fa66bf30b02875cbaa49","title":"","text":"3.4.5. An attacker obtains the contact information for a user and contacts them, pretending to be a representative of the user's financial institution. The attacker informs the user that there were a number of fraudulent transactions against their account and asks them to review these transactions by approving or rejecting them. The attacker then triggers a sequence of transactions. The user receives an authorization request for each transaction and declines them as they do not recognize them. The attacker then informs the user that they need to close the users account and transfer all the funds to a new account to prevent further fraudulent transactions. The user receives another authorization request which they approve, or provide additional authorization information to the attacker which enables the attacker to complete their attack and defraud the user. 3.4.6. <\/ins> An attacker creates a message to all employees of a company, claiming to be from a trusted technology provider investigating a suspected security breach. They ask employees to send them the QR code"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-9ab60a5e2f4cf48341a380c49f2fc70d4fe5c0f77744f592109feeeaad96db45","title":"","text":"access as an entry point and perform lateral moves to obtain additional privileges and access to restricted resources. 3.4.6. <\/del> 3.4.7. <\/ins> An attacker initiates an employee onboarding flow and obtains a QR code from the onboarding portal to invoke a digital wallet and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-e07e4e0d63f272e0ac644509657a28e24325c77732fc928019fcff31e7c10495","title":"","text":"to obtain the QR code displays a message to the attacker with instructions on how to access their account. 3.4.7. <\/del> 3.4.8. <\/ins> An attacker creates a message to all employees of a company, claiming to be from the company's IT service provider. They claim that they"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-8abdfd983d85cee607a15419039ff0b2078002e7368eb49cb77860a681e93eef","title":"","text":"send the QR code to the attacker. The attacker scans the QR code with their mobile phone and access the users data and resources. 3.4.8. <\/del> 3.4.9. <\/ins> An attacker wants to use some website which requires presentation of a verifiable credential for authentication. The attacker creates a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-130b0de1056591d3311bad37fd9aa208c6818506a61dc1a2d07b0bd05097b679","title":"","text":"the credentials are presented, the original session from the attackers device is authorized with the user's credentials. 3.4.9. <\/del> 3.4.10. <\/ins> In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is misled or exploited. For other attacks, where the user is willingly colluding"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-e4712adae6056a366bc8ac9bb994b18afe39458ee644300b0e5e903e77a6af07","title":"","text":"phishing resistant authentication mechanism, which may in itself negate the need for a cross-device flow. Starting with an authenticated flow does not prevent the attacks described in Example B5: Illicit Network Join [6] and Example B7: Illicit Session Transfer [7] and it is RECOMMENDED that additional mitigations described in this document is used if the cross-device flows are used in scenarios such as Example A5: Add a device to a network [8] and Example A7: Transfer a session [9]. <\/del> Authenticating on the Consumption Device before starting a cross- device flow does not prevent the attacks described in Example B5: Illicit Network Join [6] and Example B7: Illicit Session Transfer [7] and it is RECOMMENDED that additional mitigations described in this document is used if the cross-device flows are used in scenarios such as Example A5: Add a device to a network [8] and Example A7: Transfer a session [9]. <\/ins> 5.1.16."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-a859dd2e593dc72fd38d720a1ae5ec11c0b91bbe3ae8af0ce25158430385fb1f","title":"","text":"The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628) is an example of a cross- device flow that relies on the user copying information from the Consumption Device to the Authorization Device. The figure below shows a typical example of this flow: <\/del> Consumption Device to the Authorization Device by either entering data manually or scanning a QR code. The figure below shows a typical example of this flow: <\/ins> 2.1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-de76ea1517d100e123ce395fa327ec105f5ca438eeb6f609f914ee955eb63a37","title":"","text":"a verifiable credential for authentication. The attacker creates a phishing website which will in real time capture log-in QR Codes from the original website and present these to the user. The attacker tries to get the user to use the phishing website using an e-mail campaign etc. The user scans the QR code on the phishing website, invokes their digital wallet and presents their credentials. Once the credentials are presented, the original session from the attackers device is authorized with the user's credentials. <\/del> tries to get the user to use the phishing website by sending messages by e-mail or other messaging technologies. The user scans the QR code on the phishing website, invokes their digital wallet and presents their credentials. Once the credentials are presented, the original session from the attackers device is authorized with the user's credentials. <\/ins> 4.3.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-b9ebe3d3a47d6f183bdc06abcd241dc479e905e960c9183ef27c51c98ed810f4","title":"","text":"3.3.1. An end-user sets up a new smart TV and wants to connect it to their favorite streaming service. The TV displays a QR code that the user scans with their mobile phone. The user is redirected to the streaming service provider's web page and asked to enter their credentials to authorize the smart TV to access the streaming service. The user enters their credentials and grants authorization, after which the streaming service is available on the smart TV. <\/del> favorite streaming service. The streaming service displays a QR code on the TV that the user scans with their mobile phone. The user is redirected to the streaming service provider's web page and asked to enter their credentials to authorize the smart TV to access the streaming service. The user enters their credentials and grants authorization, after which the streaming service is available on the smart TV. <\/ins> 3.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3a32a5095d1afe35194e299ed09a132b8ffbaad02f583aa5237ada4149ad5fe7","title":"","text":"4.3.1. An attacker obtains a smart TV and attempts to access an online streaming service. The smart TV obtains a QR code from the authorization server and displays it on screen. The attacker copies the QR code and embeds it in an e-mail that is sent to a large number of recipients. The e-mail contains a message stating that the <\/del> streaming service. The smart TV obtains a QR code from the streaming service authorization server and displays it on screen. The attacker copies the QR code and embeds it in an e-mail that is sent to a large number of recipients. The e-mail contains a message stating that the <\/ins> streaming service wants to thank them for their loyal support and by scanning the QR code, they will be able to add a bonus device to their account for no charge. One of the recipients open the e-mail"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-78ebd0bc4885f3494742318d1bdcfe360845fb7425944d67876a0e9a7671242a","title":"","text":"Examples of the user-transferred authorization data pattern include flows in which the Consumption Device requests the Authorization Server to send authorization data (e.g., a 6 digit authorization code in a text message or e-mail) to the Authorization Device. Once the Authorization Device receives the authorization data, the user enters it on the Consumption Device. The Consumption Device sends the authorization data back to the Authorization Server for validation before gaining access to the user's resources. The figure below shows an example of this flow. <\/del> in a text message, e-mail or mobile application) to the Authorization Device. Once the Authorization Device receives the authorization data, the user enters it on the Consumption Device. The Consumption Device sends the authorization data back to the Authorization Server for validation before gaining access to the user's resources. The figure below shows an example of this flow. <\/ins> The Authorization Server may choose to authenticate the user before sending the authorization data. The authorization data may be delivered as a text message or through a mobile application. <\/del> sending the authorization data. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-9a3a25d7285f7d784793797cbba97543a4c581aec41d47a6dd06a376bcc309d1","title":"","text":"6.2.3.5. FIDO2\/WebAuthn SHOULD be used for cross-device authentication scenarios whenever the devices are capable of doing so. It MAY be used as an authentication method with the Authorization Code Grant <\/del> scenarios whenever the devices are capable of doing so and a suitable FIDO credential is not available on the consumption device. It MAY be used as an authentication method with the Authorization Code Grant <\/ins> RFC6749 and PKCE RFC7663, to grant authorization to an Consumption Device (e.g., Smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a mobile phone as the authenticating device. This combination of FIDO2\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-263bd6ceac5cd1a07d0addc8242fc08e2ce2c395603c5916fdcc929395c3c159","title":"","text":"Protocol flows that span multiple end-user devices are in widespread use today. These flows are often referred to as cross-device flows. A common example is a user that uses their mobile phone to scan a QR code from their SmartTV, giving an app on the TV access to their <\/del> code from their smart TV, giving an app on the TV access to their <\/ins> video streaming service. Besides QR codes, other mechanisms are often used such as PIN codes that the user has to enter on one of the devices, or push notifications to a mobile app that the user has to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-17f272e9836461487a4d5797f650ce323150487259b0e12fba93e715a5a3fd68","title":"","text":"3. Cross-device flows allow a user to start a flow on one device (e.g., a SmartTV) and then transfer the session to continue it on a second <\/del> a smart TV) and then transfer the session to continue it on a second <\/ins> device (e.g., a mobile phone). The second device may be used to access the service that was running on the first device, or to perform an action such as authenticating or granting authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-18bdd892bd93a40a958ea38c1613da709a6a82b130f0da4fab9938589cae7f06","title":"","text":"4.1.1. A common action in cross-device flows is to present the user with a QR code or a user code on the Consumption Device (e.g., Smart TV) <\/del> QR code or a user code on the Consumption Device (e.g., smart TV) <\/ins> which is then scanned or entered on the Authorization Device (the mobile phone). When the user scans the code or copies the user code, they do so without any proof that the QR code or user code is being"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-dae26213f98209510d36799b5e0de3b00c5686f11c2a752e245abe05fa83c2a5","title":"","text":"Client Initiated Back-Channel Authentication (CIBA) CIBA: A standard developed in the OpenID Foundation that allows a device or service (e.g., a personal computer, Smart TV, Kiosk) to request the OpenID <\/del> (e.g., a personal computer, smart TV, Kiosk) to request the OpenID <\/ins> Provider to initiate an authentication flow if it knows a valid identifier for the user. The user completes the authentication flow using a second device (e.g., a mobile phone). In this flow the user"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-ad6cd43237c600a9bd57cebcf10f7c5d51bc4a885670ee0f58d6da99b950a5b4","title":"","text":"FIDO credential is not available on the consumption device. It MAY be used as an authentication method with the Authorization Code Grant RFC6749 and PKCE RFC7663, to grant authorization to an Consumption Device (e.g., Smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a mobile <\/del> Device (e.g., smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a mobile <\/ins> phone as the authenticating device. This combination of FIDO2\/ WebAuthn and Authorization Code Flow with PKCE enables cross device authorization flows, without the risks posed by the Device"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-6f8da7b47f5aa1df2a0c574e985c573c03299091410884eb948dec46e0058d7a","title":"","text":"user authentication using asymmetric cryptography that can be invoked from a web browser or native client. Version 2.2 of the FIDO Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) supports a new cross-device authentication protocol, called \"hybrid\", which enables an external device, such as a phone or tablet, to be used as a roaming <\/del> authentication protocol, called \"hybrid transports\", which enables an external device, such as a phone or tablet, to be used as a roaming <\/ins> authenticator for signing into the primary device, such as a personal computer. This is commonly called FIDO Cross-Device Authentication (CDA). <\/del> (CDA). CTAP 2.2 hybrid transports is implemented by the client and authenticator platforms. <\/ins> When a user wants to authenticate using their mobile device (authenticator) for the first time, they need to link their authenticator to their main device. This is done using a scan of a QR code. When the authenticator scans the QR code, the device sends an encrypted BLE advertisement containing keying material and a tunnel ID. The main device and authenticator both establish connections to the web service, and the normal CTAP protocol exchange occurs. <\/del> tunnel ID. The main device (CTAP client) and authenticator both establish connections to the web service, and the normal CTAP protocol exchange occurs. <\/ins> If the user chooses to keep their authenticator linked with the main device, the QR code link step is not necessary for subsequent use."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-da249637ead29d87a1d35163f301b5bc800e283b0f35aa2c0ee0d8696100eee4","title":"","text":"6.2.3.3. Both the Consumption Device and the authenticator require BLE support. The Consumption Device must support both FIDO2\/WebAuthn, specifically CTAP 2.2 with hybrid transport CTAP22Draft. The mobile phone must support CTAP 2.2 or greater to be used as a cross-device authenticator. <\/del> Both the Consumption Device and the authenticator require BLE support and access to the internet. The Consumption Device must support both FIDO2\/WebAuthn, specifically CTAP 2.2 with hybrid transports CTAP22Draft. The device serving as the FIDO authenticator must support CTAP 2.2 or later to be used as a cross-device authenticator. <\/ins> 6.2.3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-6d8eadd339886dec5640f344b9b8dc68ea853ff4d54ffd9feff51a14bc3a0620","title":"","text":"FIDO2\/WebAuthn SHOULD be used for cross-device authentication scenarios whenever the devices are capable of doing so and a suitable FIDO credential is not available on the consumption device. It MAY <\/del> FIDO credential is not available on the Consumption Device. It MAY <\/ins> be used as an authentication method with the Authorization Code Grant RFC6749 and PKCE RFC7663, to grant authorization to an Consumption Device (e.g., smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a mobile phone as the authenticating device. This combination of FIDO2\/ WebAuthn and Authorization Code Flow with PKCE enables cross device authorization flows, without the risks posed by the Device Authorization Grant RFC8628. <\/del> RFC6749 and PKCE RFC7663, to grant authorization to a Consumption Device (e.g., smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a device serving as the FIDO authenticator (e.g. a mobile phone) for authentication. This combination of FIDO2\/WebAuthn and Authorization Code Flow with PKCE enables cross device authorization flows, without the risks posed by the Device Authorization Grant RFC8628. <\/ins> 6.2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-bd94fd08d861b4eb2b62f029eba33af309e5c03d8d8ad36169ebc2f25f02a9ec","title":"","text":"Authorization Code Grant as defined in RFC6749 are more appropriate. If a protocol supports both same-device and cross-device modes (e.g., OpenID.SIOPV2), the cross-device mode SHOULD not be used for same- device scenarios. If an implementor decides to use a cross-device protocol or a protocol with a cross-device mode in a same-device scenario, the mitigations recommended in this document SHOULD be implemented to reduce the risks that the unauthenticated channel is exploited. <\/del> device scenarios. An authorization server MAY choose to block cross- device protocols used in same-device scenarios if it detects that the same device is used. An authorization Server may use techniques such as device fingerprinting, network address or other techniques to detect if a cross-device protocol is being used on the same device. If an implementor decides to use a cross-device protocol or a protocol with a cross-device mode in a same-device scenario, the mitigations recommended in this document SHOULD be implemented to reduce the risks that the unauthenticated channel is exploited. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-af4f221ea0afb677c4320bcedd678352c90ba0e5ae7730c6aa85b34c2bee92e1","title":"","text":"These flows typically involve using a mobile phone to scan a QR code or enter a user code displayed on the first device (e.g., Smart TV, Kiosk, Personal Computer etc.). <\/del> Kiosk, Personal Computer or other electronic devices.). <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3a2fe9f490e8714279ac0a380733fb0a36397d6a09a37830fbfcbf979bbae2e5","title":"","text":"Attackers exploit the unauthenticated channel by changing the context of the user code or QR code and then sending a message to a user (e-mail, text, instant messaging etc). By deploying content filtering (e.g., anti-spam filter), these messages can be blocked and prevented from reaching the end-users. It may be possible to fine- tune content filtering solutions to detect artefacts like QR codes or user codes that are included in a message that is sent to multiple recipients in the expectation that at least one of the recipients will be convinced by the message and grant authorization to access restricted resources. <\/del> (e-mail, text messaging, instant messaging or other communication mechanisms). By deploying content filtering (e.g., anti-spam filter), these messages can be blocked and prevented from reaching the end-users. It may be possible to fine-tune content filtering solutions to detect artefacts like QR codes or user codes that are included in a message that is sent to multiple recipients in the expectation that at least one of the recipients will be convinced by the message and grant authorization to access restricted resources. <\/ins> Some scenarios may require legitimate re-transmission of user, QR and authorization data (e.g., retries). To prevent the disruption of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-81ca307fdb5ac1ad1acb9ec56eeb1f433950f9ef284073620c7890c7eaa7aff3","title":"","text":"limited number of messages with the same QR or user codes to be transmitted before interrupting the delivery of those messages. Content filtering may also be fragmented across multiple communications systems and channels (e-mail, messaging, text etc), <\/del> communications systems and communication channels (e-mail, text messaging, instant messaging or other communication mechanisms), <\/ins> making it harder to detect or interrupt attacks that are executed over multiple channels, unless here is a high degree of integration between content filtering systems."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3c030c25e938ed333bc37dbe4233ebf90829557f37c1b795b9a282e03b5e3a05","title":"","text":"6.1.16. The user MAY be asked to verify if they initiated an authentication <\/del> The user MAY be asked to confirm if they initiated an authentication <\/ins> or authorization request by sending a one-time password (OTP) or PIN to the user's Authorization Device and asking them to enter it on the Consumption Device to confirm the request. If the request was"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-100dd0f52bbbdfb841d75eb991d3e272eaf43dde7d538488a9de0c96ed3abdb4","title":"","text":"process of being standardized that share these characteristics include: Cross-device protocols should not be used for same-device scenarios. If the initiating device and authorization device is the same device protocols like OpenID Connect Core OpenID.Core and OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant as defined in RFC6749 are more appropriate. <\/ins> 5. The unauthenticated channel between the initiating device and the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-336aaf2dd57c926051e3374554edd72bcbfe1485a9bf0cfc4892e74151c3cd3d","title":"","text":"due to device or system constraints. Avoid using if the protected resources are sensitive, high value or business critical. Always deploy additional mitigations like proximity or only allow with pre- registered devices. <\/del> registered devices. Do not use for same-device scenarios (e.g. if the initiating device and authorization device is the same device). <\/ins> 5.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-935d7c58b4087269b9029bcc3db3eacf8138240c50b39a1bb98976c93e91045c","title":"","text":"the initiating device to obtain a user identifier on the initiating device (e.g., through an input or selection mechanism) and if the Authorization Server can trigger an authorization on the authorization device. <\/del> authorization device. Do not use for same-device scenarios (e.g. if the initiating device and authorization device is the same device). <\/ins> 5.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-8a0ce6408ea0643a143ce0c2a40679e074e187025796972704127ebb14d86e10","title":"","text":"5.2.2.1. A standard under development as part of the Financial-grade API (FAPI) family of standards that allows a device or service (e.g., a personal computer, Smart TV, Kiosk) to request the OpenID Provider to initiate an authentication flow if it knows a valid identifier for the user. The user completes the authentication flow using a second device (e.g., a mobile phone). In this flow the user does not scan a QR code or obtain a user code from the initiating device. <\/del> Client Initiated Back-Channel Authentication (CIBA) CIBA: A standard developed in the OpenID Foundation that allows a device or service (e.g., a personal computer, Smart TV, Kiosk) to request the OpenID Provider to initiate an authentication flow if it knows a valid identifier for the user. The user completes the authentication flow using a second device (e.g., a mobile phone). In this flow the user does not scan a QR code or obtain a user code from the initiating device, but is instead contacted by the OpenID Provider to complete the authentication using a push notification, e-mail, text message or any other suitable mechanism. <\/ins> 5.2.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c48fe8275234cba5f3d1878e0393f0b6d799e002fb54281d2fc1c59881fb5a7e","title":"","text":"3.7. 3.8. <\/ins> In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is tricked or exploited. For other attacks, where the user is willingly colluding with the attacker, the security implications and potential"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-8b355839690b1a4a4778f66bc3e10c0452ec1eaa0dd86d93f7b6b04c170755cf","title":"","text":"5.1.13. Use cross device authentication after a successful phishing resistant authentication. The unauthenticated channel between the initiating and authenticating device allows attackers to obtain a QR code. When the QR Code is presented after a successful phishing resistant authentication, this prevents the attack from being initiated. Scenario A user would like to verify an identity on a web application using an identity stored on a separate mobile device in a phishing resistant way. Using verifiable credentials from a secure and trusted wallet and presenting this to a trusted verifier service would be an example of this. The flow is initialized using a QR Code created inside a secure session on the target service after a phishing resistant authentication. The verifier could validate the identity from the authenticated session where the QR Code is presented, and the identity sent in the verifiable credential. 5.1.14. <\/ins> The practical mitigations described in this section can prevent the attacks from being initiated, disrupt attacks once they start or reduce the impact or remediate an attack if it succeeds. When"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-95a810067a58fc0e4941dbba2e45629087b6f58e6372f1d6da0f70e38f514af5","title":"","text":"of the credentials and after completing the onboarding process, their account is activated. 2.7. An employee is signed into an application on their personal computer and wants to bootstrap the mobile application on their mobile phone. The employee initiates the cross-device flow and is shown a QR code in their application. The employee launches the mobile application on their phone and scans the QR code which results in the user being signed into the application on the mobile phone. <\/ins> 3. The benefits of cross-device flows is compelling and is seeing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-7f8c30af822d26cdecad40f9903cdb2c1495d0a063e2537d41991e004dc3e99b","title":"","text":"3.7. An attacker creates a message to all employees of a company, claiming to be from a trusted technology provider investigating a suspected security breach. They ask employees to send them the QR code typically used to transfer a session. The employee, eager to assist, initiates the process to transfer a session. They authenticate and obtain a QR code and then send the QR code to the attacker. The attacker scans the QR code with their mobile phone and access the users data and resources. <\/ins> 3.8. In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is tricked or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c2258d374499945a1a729ef1469d8048206049672503cfc3f6ce74387570f793","title":"","text":"5.1.14. Use cross device authentication after a successful phishing resistant authentication. The unauthenticated channel between the initiating and authenticating device allows attackers to obtain a QR code. When the QR Code is presented after a successful phishing resistant authentication, this prevents the attack from being initiated. Scenario A user would like to verify an identity on a web application using an identity stored on a separate mobile device in a phishing resistant way. Using verifiable credentials from a secure and trusted wallet and presenting this to a trusted verifier service would be an example of this. The flow is initialized using a QR Code created inside a secure session on the target service after a phishing resistant authentication. The verifier could validate the identity from the authenticated session where the QR Code is presented, and the identity sent in the verifiable credential. <\/del> By requiring a user to authenticate on the initiating device with a phishing resistant authentication method before initiating a cross- device flow, the server can prevent an attacker from initiating a cross-device flow and obtaining QR codes or user codes. This prevents the attacker from obtaining a QR code or user code that they can use to mislead an unsuspecting user. This requires that the initiating device has sufficient input capabilities to support a phishing resistant authentication mechanism. Note that this does not prevent the attacks described in Example B5: Illicit Network Join [4] and Example B7: Illicit Session Transfer [5] and it is recommended that additional mitigations described in this document is used if the cross-device flows are used in scenarios such as Example A5: Add a device to a network [6] and Example A7: Transfer a session [7]. <\/ins> 5.1.15."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-1248ccf495298b398ccac21b47a37cb5635ecf39a53ce83886b1476946fb230b","title":"","text":"[2] #Unique Codes [3] #Content Filtering [4] #Example B5: Illicit Network Join [5] #Example B7: Illicit Session Transfer [6] ##Example A5: Add a device to a network [7] #Example A7: Transfer a session <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-cf70e943517ade6a1b97ca4b04aeb9a6a567a684db0704790fa990ddcdc4853a","title":"","text":"displays a message to the attacker with instructions on how to access their account. 3.7. In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is tricked or exploited. For other attacks, where the user is willingly colluding with the attacker, the security implications and potential mitigations are very different. For example, a cooperating user can bypass software mitigations on his device, share access to hardware tokens with the attacker, and install additional devices to forward radio signals to trick proximity checks. This document therefore only considers scenarios where a user does not collude with an attacker. <\/ins> 4. Cross-device flows that are subject to the attacks described earlier,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-dfbdb49bd2b9db12f78dc5a8443fa08a165b2694987398ed17b3d701064f4e45","title":"","text":"2.1. An example of a cross-device flow that relies on the user copying information from the Initiating Device to the Authorization Device is shown below: The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628) follows this pattern. <\/del> The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628)is an example of a cross- device flow that relies on the user copying information from the Initiating Device to the Authorization Device. The figure below shows a typical example of this flow: <\/ins> 2.2. The figure below shows an example of the client requesting the authorization server to initiate an authorization on the user's authorization device via the backchannel. <\/del> The Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA transfers the session on the backchannel with the Authroization Server to request authorization on the Authroization Device. The figure below shows an example of this flow. <\/ins> The Authorization Server may use a variety of mechanisms to request user authorization, including a push notification to a dedicated app on a mobile phone, or sending a text message with a link to an endpoint where the user can authenticate and authorize an action. The Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA follows this pattern. 2.3. The figure below shows an example of the client requesting the authorization server to initiate an authorization request via the backchannel. <\/del> Examples of the user-transferred authorization data pattern includes flows in which the Initiating Device requests the Authorization Server to send a one time access code (e.g. as a text message or e-mail) to the Authorization Device. Once the Authroization Device receives the code, the user enters it on the Initiating Device. The Initiatng Device presents it back to the Authroization Server for validation before gaining access to the user's resources. The figure below shows an example of this flow. <\/ins> The Authorization Server may choose to authenticate the user before sending the access code. The access code may be delivered as a text"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-0ca1c9d1fa59509ef91d005213a016ee81ee132e71504dbc458bc9d5571f8269","title":"","text":"3.1. A common action in cross-device flows is to present the user with a QR code or a user code on the initiating device (e.g., Smart TV) which is then scanned or entered on the authorization device (the <\/del> QR code or a user code on the Initiating Device (e.g., Smart TV) which is then scanned or entered on the Authorization Device (the <\/ins> mobile phone). When the user scans the code or copies the user code, they do so without any proof that the QR code or user code is being displayed in the place or context intended by the service provider. It is up to the user's judgment to decide on whether they can trust the QR code or user code. In effect the user is asked to compensate for the absence of an authenticated channel between the initiating device (smart TV) and the device on which the authentication\/ authorization will take place (the mobile phone). <\/del> It is up to the user to decide whether they should trust the QR code or user code. In effect the user is asked to compensate for the absence of an authenticated channel between the Initiating Device (e.g., smart TV) and the Authorizing Device (e.g., the mobile phone). <\/ins> Attackers exploit this absence of an authenticated channel between the two devices by obtaining QR codes or user codes (e.g., by initiating the authorization flows). They then use social engineering techniques to change the context in which authorization is requested to trick end-users to scan the QR code or enter it on their mobile devices. Once the end-user performs the authorization on the mobile device, the attacker who initiated the authentication or authorization request obtains access to the users resources. The figure below shows an example of such an attack. <\/del> their Authorization Device (e.g., mobile phone). Once the end-user performs the authorization on the mobile device, the attacker who initiated the authentication or authorization request obtains access to the users resources. The figure below shows an example of such an attack. <\/ins> 3.2. In the client transferred pattern, the client instructs the authorization server to authenticate the user and obtain <\/del> In the backchannel transferred session pattern, the client requests the authorization server to authenticate the user and obtain <\/ins> authorization for an action. This may happen as a result of user interaction with the initiating device, but may also be triggered without the users direct interaction with the initiating device, <\/del> interaction with the Initiating Device, but may also be triggered without the users direct interaction with the Initiating Device, <\/ins> resulting in an authorization request presented to the user without context of why or who triggered the request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-69e7fd007ff44c5fed561cb5110ab813460193afcb5cacbdb1d2f24350b27c11","title":"","text":"techniques to prime the user for an authorization request and thereby trick them into granting authorization. The social engineering techniques range in sophistication from messages misrepresenting the reason for receiving an authorization request to triggering a large <\/del> reason for receiving an authorization request, to triggering a large <\/ins> volume of requests at an inconvenient time for the user, in the hope that the user will grant authorization to make the requests stop. The figure below shows an example of such an attack. 3.3. In cross-device flows that follow the Hybrid Pattern, the client initiates the authorization request, but the user still has to transfer the authorization code to the initiating device. The authorization request may happen as a result of user interaction with the initiating device, but may also be triggered without the user's direct interaction with the initiating device. Attackers exploit the hybrid pattern by combining the social engineering techniques used to set context for users and tricking users into providing them with access codes sent to their phones. These attacks are very similar to phishing attacks, except that the attacker also has the ability to trigger the authorization request to be sent to the user directly by the Authorization server. <\/del> In cross-device flows that follow the user-transferred authorization data pattern, the client on the Initiating Device initiates the authorization request, but the user still has to transfer the authorization code to the Initiating Device. The authorization request may happen as a result of user interaction with the Initiating Device, but may also be triggered without the user's direct interaction with the Initiating Device. Attackers exploit the user-transferred authorization data pattern by combining the social engineering techniques used to set context for users and tricking users into providing them with access codes sent to their phones. These attacks are very similar to phishing attacks, except that the attacker also has the ability to trigger the authorization request to be sent to the user directly by the Authorization Server. <\/ins> The unauthenticated channel may also be exploited in variations of the above scenario where the user initiates the flow and is then tricked into sending the QR code or user code to the attacker. In these flows, the user is already authenticated and they request a QR code or user code to transfer a session or obtain some other privilege such as joining a device to a network. The attacker then proceeds to exploit the unauthenticated channel by using social engineering techniques to trick the user into initiating a flow and send the QR code or user code to the attacker, which they can then use to obtain the privileges that would have been assigned to the user. <\/del> the above scenario where the user (as opposed tot he attacker) initiates the flow and is then tricked into sending the authorization data (e.g. access code) to the attacker. In these flows, the user is already authenticated and they request authroization data to transfer a session or obtain some other privilege such as joining a device to a network. The authorization data may be represented as a QR code o text message. The attacker then proceeds to exploit the unauthenticated channel by using social engineering techniques to trick the user into initiating a flow and send the QR code or user code to the attacker, which the attacker use to obtain the privileges that would have been assigned to the user. <\/ins> 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-734960fde46fa666b67832fadb26cf44c6495047377c6c0fbedc65200adb0fde","title":"","text":"[3] #Content Filtering [4] #Example B1: Illicit access to a video streaming service (User Transferred Pattern) <\/del> [4] #Example B1: Illicit access to a video streaming service (User- Transferred Session Data Pattern) <\/ins> [5] #Example B4: Illicit Transaction Authorization (Client Transferred Pattern) [6] #Example B5: Illicit Network Join (Hybrid Pattern) <\/del> [6] #Example B5: Illicit Network Join (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern) <\/ins> [7] #Example B7: Illicit session transfer (Hybrid Pattern) <\/del> [7] #Example B7: Illicit session transfer (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern) <\/ins> [8] #Example A5: Add a device to a network (Hybrid) <\/del> [8] #Example A5: Add a device to a network (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern) <\/ins> [9] #Example A7: Transfer a session (Hybrid) <\/del> [9] #Example A7: Transfer a session (User-Transferred Authorization Data Pattern) <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-885b2439375ff89869561118825152aec7fbba31899b67a7554100664e639ceb","title":"","text":"2.2. The figure below shows an example of the client requesting the authorization server to initiate an authorization on the user's authorization device via the backchannel. <\/del> The Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA transfers the session on the backchannel with the Authroization Server to request authorization on the Authroization Device. The figure below shows an example of this flow. <\/ins> The Authorization Server may use a variety of mechanisms to request user authorization, including a push notification to a dedicated app on a mobile phone, or sending a text message with a link to an endpoint where the user can authenticate and authorize an action. The Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA follows this pattern."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3dff09eb2fca0e5d4cd872103faa816880e18c0c09d187e36273911be0fac904","title":"","text":"3.2. In the client transferred pattern, the client instructs the authorization server to authenticate the user and obtain <\/del> In the backchannel transferred session pattern, the client requests the authorization server to authenticate the user and obtain <\/ins> authorization for an action. This may happen as a result of user interaction with the initiating device, but may also be triggered without the users direct interaction with the initiating device, <\/del> interaction with the Initiating Device, but may also be triggered without the users direct interaction with the Initiating Device, <\/ins> resulting in an authorization request presented to the user without context of why or who triggered the request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c46576107196f93803c86218c04f51214aeb55dc602ed1bd7bb47f6914997526","title":"","text":"techniques to prime the user for an authorization request and thereby trick them into granting authorization. The social engineering techniques range in sophistication from messages misrepresenting the reason for receiving an authorization request to triggering a large <\/del> reason for receiving an authorization request, to triggering a large <\/ins> volume of requests at an inconvenient time for the user, in the hope that the user will grant authorization to make the requests stop. The figure below shows an example of such an attack."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-87af2b19b20044c33adae8491d55a74e3284a62cf60a1df16bd7c9f93c054bd9","title":"","text":"[4] #Example B1: Illicit access to a video streaming service (User Transferred Pattern) [5] #Example B4: Illicit Transaction Authorization (Client Transferred Pattern) <\/del> [5] #Example B4: Illicit Transaction Authorization (Backchannel Transferred Session Pattern) <\/ins> [6] #Example B5: Illicit Network Join (User Transferred Authorization Data Pattern)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-5c3a6d62b836b4093fa8e08517c5649c64eba2fa94cdab53e9c0cf2b67c9f90c","title":"","text":"that this is the third time that they have been notified and their last opportunity to prevent deletion of their work files. One or more employees respond by following the URL, entering the code and performing multi-factor authentication. Once these employees authorized access, the attacker obtains access and refresh tokens from the authorization server and uses it to access the users files, perform lateral attacks to obtain access to other information and continuously refresh the session by requesting new access tokens. These tokens may be exfiltrated and sold to third parties. <\/del> performing multi-factor authentication. Throughout the authentication experience, the user is interacting with a trusted user experience, re-enforcing the legitimacy of the request. Once these employees authorized access, the attacker obtains access and refresh tokens from the authorization server and uses it to access the users files, perform lateral attacks to obtain access to other information and continuously refresh the session by requesting new access tokens. These tokens may be exfiltrated and sold to third parties. <\/ins> 3.4.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-cdbf225764a98381820a62bedd63e3c2143afd2bbe723b37557ee0329c55d7d0","title":"","text":"protocols for standards -based authorization and authentication flows. If FIDO2\/WebAuthn support is not available, Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) provides an alternative, provided that there is a channel through which the authorizations server can <\/del> that there is a channel through which the authorization server can <\/ins> contact the end user. Examples of such a channel include device push notifications, e-mail or text messages which the user can access from their device. If CIBA is used, additional mitigations to enforce"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-d644cb295e702e9e20ef8f1c82438236de082f775d82530ed253c186904eb73c","title":"","text":"These flows are increasingly popular and typically involve using a mobile phone to scan a QR code or enter a user code displayed on an initiating device (e.g., Smart TV, Kiosk, Personal Computer etc). <\/del> Initiating Device (e.g., Smart TV, Kiosk, Personal Computer etc). <\/ins> The channel between the Initiating Device and the Authorization Device is unauthenticated and relies on the user's judgment to decide whether to trust a QR code, user code, or the authorization request pushed to their authorization device. Several publications have emerged in the public domain (Exploit1, Exploit2, Exploit3, Exploit4, Exploit5, Exploit6), describing how the unauthenticated channel can be exploited using social engineering techniques borrowed from phishing. Unlike traditional phishing attacks, these attacks don't harvest credentials. Instead, they skip the step of collecting credentials by persuading users to grant authorization using their Authorization Devices. <\/del> Cross-Device Consent Phishing (CDCP) attacks exploit the unauthenticated channel between the Initiating Device and Authorization Device using social engineering techniques to to gain unauthorized access to the victims data. Several publications have emerged in the public domain (Exploit1, Exploit2, Exploit3, Exploit4, Exploit5, Exploit6), describing how the unauthenticated channel can be exploited using social engineering techniques borrowed from phishing. Unlike traditional phishing attacks, these attacks don't harvest credentials. Instead, they skip the step of collecting credentials by persuading users to grant authorization using their Authorization Devices. <\/ins> Once the user grants authorization, the attacker has access to the user's resources and in some cases is able to collect access and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-951ec8e1dff77e03f91e5d141ba1c7804d42cf735504d2588733c79b32c7d222","title":"","text":"Attackers exploit cross-device flows by initiating an authorization flow on the Initiating Device and then use social engineering techniques to change the context in which the request is presented to the user in order to trick them into granting authorization on the <\/del> the user in order to convince them to grant authorization on the <\/ins> Authorization Device. The attacker is able to change the context of the authorization request because the channel between the Initiating Device and the Authorizing Device is unauthenticated. These attacks are also known as illicit consent grant attacks. <\/del> are also known as Cross-Device Consent Phishing (CDCP) attacks. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-aa4c6cef0cfced555107070fa526b83b131f9eea246db8c9e75547efa63f5b59","title":"","text":"In all of the attack scenarios listed above, a user is tricked or exploited. For other attacks, where the user is willingly colluding with the attacker, the security implications and potential mitigations are very different. For example, a cooperating user can bypass software mitigations on their device, share access to hardware tokens with the attacker, and install additional devices to forward radio signals to trick proximity checks. <\/del> with the attacker, the threat model, security implications and potential mitigations are very different. For example, a cooperating user can bypass software mitigations on their device, share access to hardware tokens with the attacker, and install additional devices to forward radio signals to circumvent proximity checks. <\/ins> This document only considers scenarios where a user does not collude with an attacker."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-d174011da544299b0f6ad708792df72a4e7347760362965fb3e772ac76f13e8b","title":"","text":"equipped to authenticate the channel between the two devices. Mitigations should focus on: To achieve the above outcomes, mitigating the exploits of cross- device flows require a three-pronged approach: <\/del> To achieve the above outcomes, mitigating against Cross-Device Consent Phishing attacks require a three-pronged approach: <\/ins> 5.1. A number of protocols that enable cross-device flows that are susceptible to illicit consent grant attacks are already deployed. The security profile of these protocols can be improved through practical mitigations that provide defense in depth that either: <\/del> susceptible to Cross-Device Consent Phishing attacks are already deployed. The security profile of these protocols can be improved through practical mitigations that provide defense in depth that either: <\/ins> It is recommended that one or more of the mitigations are applied whenever implementing a cross-device flow. Every mitigation provides an additional layer of security that makes it harder to initiate the attack, disrupts attacks when in process or reduces the impact of a <\/del> attack, disrupts attacks in progress or reduces the impact of a <\/ins> successful attack. 5.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-e14a389d867996cb898027275718515f3556dc2f360c3bf7d39656c2e21bcd30","title":"","text":"5.2.1.2. There are several reports in the public domain outlining how the unauthenticated channel may be exploited to execute an illicit consent grant attack. <\/del> unauthenticated channel may be exploited to execute a Cross-Device Consent Phishing attack (Exploit1, Exploit2, Exploit3, Exploit4, Exploit5, Exploit6). <\/ins> 5.2.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c75fa7517ce1e83e6424ca76537fde97bca12b82e45bb0611496ffd05696cc57","title":"","text":"(e.g., a smartphone) to authorize access to a resource (e.g., access to a streaming service). Cross device flows have several benefits, including: <\/del> Cross-device flows have several benefits, including: <\/ins> There are three cross-device flow patterns for transferring the authorization request between the Initiating Device to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-2c9e6a800b865c0ec5a904337480a26ae8e154cf8c4ed596f4f1b0d6fecfdd70","title":"","text":"5.1.8. An attacker can be prevented from initiating a cross device flow <\/del> An attacker can be prevented from initiating a cross-device flow <\/ins> protocol by only allowing the protocol to be initiated on a trusted network or within a security perimeter (e.g., a corporate network). A trusted network may be defined as a set of IP addresses and joining"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-9af8bd80ea9d02bc8268f3053270772dad26a503a2d24e74bcb85f9939f9c788","title":"","text":"RFC6749 and PKCE RFC7663, to grant authorization to an Initiating Device (e.g., Smart TV or interactive whiteboard) using a mobile phone as the authenticating device. This combination of FIDO2\/ WebAuthn and Authorization Code Flow with PKCE enables cross device <\/del> WebAuthn and Authorization Code Flow with PKCE enables cross-device <\/ins> authorization flows, without the risks posed by the Device Authorization Grant RFC8628. 5.2.4. The FIDO Cross-Device Authentication (CDA) flow provides the best protection against attacks on the unauthenticated channel for cross <\/del> protection against attacks on the unauthenticated channel for cross- <\/ins> device flows. It can be combined with OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols for standards -based authorization and authentication flows. If FIDO2\/WebAuthn support is not available, Client Initiated"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c39195630c497312d353593686d3148ccf26089702199bdc1bd2127b5b25f6b3","title":"","text":"Cross-device flows enable a user to initiate an authorization flow on one device (the Initiating Device) and then use a second, personally trusted, device (Authorization Device) to authorize access to a resource (e.g., access to a service). <\/del> trusted, device (Authorization Device) to authorize the Initiating Device to access a resource (e.g., access to a service). The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628) and Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA are two examples of popular cross-device flows. <\/ins> These flows are increasingly popular and typically involve using a mobile phone to scan a QR code or enter a user code displayed on an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-c55e1aa2f82da69b2c10395b316fa72666bb10f65cb8bcc7a5b5c47b9c0245e5","title":"","text":"In a cross-device flow, a user starts a scenario on the Initiating Device (e.g., a smart TV) and then uses an Authorization Device (e.g., a smartphone) to authorize access to a resource (e.g., access to a streaming service). <\/del> to a streaming service) on the Initiating Device. <\/ins> Cross-device flows have several benefits, including:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-7c7c5cdab1c3c512ddee5f6552835503b60960998a44910ceb4cfdb6d3724363","title":"","text":"2.1. The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628)is an example of a cross- <\/del> The Device Authorization Grant (RFC8628) is an example of a cross- <\/ins> device flow that relies on the user copying information from the Initiating Device to the Authorization Device. The figure below shows a typical example of this flow:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-cfba94342f096e798bb82446d347a3c1bded9b1b8997e02d436406bf0cff5786","title":"","text":"user authorization, including a push notification to a dedicated app on a mobile phone, or sending a text message with a link to an endpoint where the user can authenticate and authorize an action. The Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication CIBA follows this pattern. <\/del> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-f500db580beca8f92b53fc8bcacf0345a5b817c6b80368f35f186aa854990a57","title":"","text":"In cross-device flows that follow the user-transferred authorization data pattern, the client on the Initiating Device initiates the authorization request, but the user still has to transfer the authorization code to the Initiating Device. The authorization request may happen as a result of user interaction with the Initiating Device, but may also be triggered without the user's direct interaction with the Initiating Device. <\/del> authorization data to the Initiating Device. The authorization data may take different forms, including a numerical value such as a 6 digit authorization code. The authorization request may happen as a result of user interaction with the Initiating Device, but may also be triggered without the user's direct interaction with the Initiating Device. <\/ins> Attackers exploit the user-transferred authorization data pattern by combining the social engineering techniques used to set context for users and tricking users into providing them with access codes sent to their phones. These attacks are very similar to phishing attacks, except that the attacker also has the ability to trigger the <\/del> users and tricking users into providing them with authorization data sent to their phones. These attacks are very similar to phishing attacks, except that the attacker also has the ability to trigger the <\/ins> authorization request to be sent to the user directly by the Authorization Server. The unauthenticated channel may also be exploited in variations of the above scenario where the user (as opposed tot he attacker) initiates the flow and is then tricked into sending the authorization data (e.g. access code) to the attacker. In these flows, the user is already authenticated and they request authroization data to transfer <\/del> the above scenario where the user (as opposed to the attacker) initiates the flow and is then convinced using social engineering techniques into sending the authorization data (e.g. a 6 digit authorization code) to the attacker. In these flows, the user is already authenticated and they request authorization data to transfer <\/ins> a session or obtain some other privilege such as joining a device to a network. The authorization data may be represented as a QR code o text message. The attacker then proceeds to exploit the <\/del> a network. The authorization data may be represented as a QR code or authorization code. The attacker then proceeds to exploit the <\/ins> unauthenticated channel by using social engineering techniques to trick the user into initiating a flow and send the QR code or user code to the attacker, which the attacker use to obtain the privileges <\/del> convince the user to send the QR code or user code to the attacker. The attacker then use the authroization data to obtain the privileges <\/ins> that would have been assigned to the user. 3.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-a8a0418f439833d72e70f3790a244e87a1d190794e20baa3380ad6dbfd927500","title":"","text":"degrade spray attacks, but do not prevent more targeted attacks that are executed with lower volumes and velocity. Therefore, it should be used along with other techniques to provide a defence-in-depth against cross-device attacks. <\/del> defence against cross-device attacks. <\/ins> 5.1.12."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3ec3a50268403426968ce6e76e50fe8789fa0f23f832baf20a183cc999e9d3b4","title":"","text":"5.2.4. The FIDO Cross-Device Authentication (CDA) flow provides the best protection against attacks on the unauthenticated channel for cross- <\/del> protection against attacks on the unauthenticated channel for cross <\/ins> device flows. It can be combined with OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols for standards -based authorization and authentication flows. If FIDO2\/WebAuthn support is not available, Client Initiated <\/del> protocols for standards-based authorization and authentication flows. If FIDO2\/WebAuthn support is not available, Client Initiated <\/ins> Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) provides an alternative, provided that there is a channel through which the authorization server can contact the end user. Examples of such a channel include device push"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-45ca59771ee844335ee5d16ce1d0b0fdae86ce57e8820ac00c11e0840943a996","title":"","text":"filtering (e.g., anti-spam filter), these messages can be blocked and prevented from reaching the end-users. It may be possible to fine- tune content filtering solutions to detect artefacts like QR codes or user codes that are being reused in multiple messages to disrupt spray attacks. Content filtering may be better suited to interrupt large scale spray attacks since some scenarios may require re-transmission of user, QR and access codes. Content filtering may also be fragmented across multiple communications systems and channels (e-mail, messaging, text etc), making it harder to detect or interrupt attacks that are executed over multiple channels, unless here is a high degree of integration between content filtering systems. <\/del> user codes that are included in a message that is sent to multiple recipients in the expectation that at least one of the recipients will be convinced by the message and grant authroization to access restricted resources. Some scenarios may require legitimate re-transmission of user, QR and authorization data (e.g. retries). To prevent the disruption of legitimate scenarios, content filters may use a threshold and allow a limited number of messages with the same QR or user codes to be transmitted before interrupting the delivery of those messages. Content filtering may also be fragmented across multiple communications systems and channels (e-mail, messaging, text etc), making it harder to detect or interrupt attacks that are executed over multiple channels, unless here is a high degree of integration between content filtering systems. <\/ins> 5.1.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-4bdc8d6748c6f8281289d4a41748f85ab3c7bfd0df7eefa7d19e102270c4d84d","title":"","text":"attacker gathers a large number of access and refresh tokens on a single device and then sells them for profit more difficult, since the attacker would also have to export the cryptographic keys used to sender constrain the tokens or be able to access them and generate <\/del> sender-constrain the tokens or be able to access them and generate <\/ins> signatures for future use. If the attack is being executed on a trusted device to a device with anti-malware, any attempts to exfiltrate tokens or keys may be detected and the device's trust status may be changed. Using hardware keys for sender constraining <\/del> status may be changed. Using hardware keys for sender-constraining <\/ins> tokens will further reduce the ability of the attacker to move tokens to another device. Sender-constrained tokens, especially sender-constrained tokens that require proof-of-posession, raise the bar for executing the attack and and profiting from exfiltrating tokens. The quality of key protection has an impact on the effectiveness of the attack. Although a software proof-of-posession key is better than no proof- of-posession key, an attacker may still exfiltrate the software key. Hardware keys will be harder to exfiltrate, but come with additional implementation complexity. An attacker that controls the Initiating Device may still be able to excercise they key, even if it is in hardware, thus the main protection derived from sender constrianed tokens is preventing them from being moved from the Initiating Device to another device that can be used to profit from the attack. <\/del> and profiting from exfiltrating tokens. Although a software proof- of-posession key is better than no proof-of-posession key, an attacker may still exfiltrate the software key. Hardware keys are harder to exfiltrate, but come with additional implementation complexity. An attacker that controls the Initiating Device may still be able to excercise the key, even if it is in hardware. Consequently the main protection derived from sender-constrained tokens is preventing tokens from being moved from the Initiating Device to another device, thereby making it harder sell stolen tokens and profit from the attack. <\/ins> 5.1.13."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-408d2b889ad61b4e014f5fc51e05f821d36c9973f770b4918fb2f04133713b91","title":"","text":"The unauthenticated channel between the Initiating Device and Authorization Device allows attackers to obtain a QR code or user code in one location and display in another location. Establishing proximity between the location of the Initiating Device and the Authorization Device limits an attacker's ability to launch attacks by sending the user or QR codes to large numbers of users across the globe. There are a couple of ways to establish proximity: <\/del> code in one location and display it in another location. Consequently, proximity-enforced cross-device flows are more resistant to Cross-Device Consent Phishing attacks than proximity- less cross-device flows. Establishing proximity between the location of the Initiating Device and the Authorization Device limits an attacker's ability to launch attacks by sending the user or QR codes to large numbers of users that are geographically distributed. There are a couple of ways to establish proximity: <\/ins> Depending on the risk profile and the threat model in which a system is operating, it may be necessary to use more than one mechanism to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-673e59b97873549471252660fb276558a7b7d408a8b49416b81977358b5859f5","title":"","text":"the user in order to convince them to grant authorization on the Authorization Device. The attacker is able to change the context of the authorization request because the channel between the Initiating Device and the Authorizing Device is unauthenticated. These attacks are also known as Cross-Device Consent Phishing (CDCP) attacks. <\/del> Device and the Authorization Device is unauthenticated. These attacks are also known as Cross-Device Consent Phishing (CDCP) attacks. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-f579f980f57edf9e4d524761b0d61c97385f4b70f45061a54540104635a7b76b","title":"","text":"It is up to the user to decide whether they should trust the QR code or user code. In effect the user is asked to compensate for the absence of an authenticated channel between the Initiating Device (e.g., smart TV) and the Authorizing Device (e.g., the mobile phone). <\/del> (e.g., smart TV) and the Authorization Device (e.g., the mobile phone). <\/ins> Attackers exploit this absence of an authenticated channel between the two devices by obtaining QR codes or user codes (e.g., by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-e6800c24df0dfb1519dcd72767f3ed6de5428ed87f6295b0a2aa604a3f946c68","title":"","text":"5.2.2.3. There is no requirement on the Initiating Device to support specific hardware. The authorizing device must be registered\/associated with the user and it must be possible for the Authorization Server to <\/del> hardware. The Authorization Device must be registered\/associated with the user and it must be possible for the Authorization Server to <\/ins> trigger an authorization on this device. 5.2.2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-80c96259f287fb6f98ef60bcd4aade13bd31a3798d7fe9e6a86182c580c8bab4","title":"","text":"The popularity of cross-device flows attracted the attention of attackers that exploit the unauthenticated channel between the Initiating Device and Authorizing Device using techniques commonly <\/del> Initiating Device and Authorization Device using techniques commonly <\/ins> used in phishing attacks. These Cross-Device Consent Phishing (CDCP) attacks allow attackers to obtain access and refresh tokens, rather than authentication credentials, resulting in access to resources"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-d2bb63c3b9f3bf117e6218d27e83969474fb47b77bbe85a83eb53b60488f4e64","title":"","text":"5.1.13. Research shows that user education is effective in reducing the risk of phishing attacks Baki2023. The service provider MAY educate users on the risks of cross-device consent phishing and provide out-of-band reinforcement to the user on the context and conditions under which an authorization grant may be requested. For example, if the service provider does not send e-mails with QR codes requesting users to grant authorization, this may be reinforced in marketing messages and anti-fraud awareness campaigns. The service provider MAY also choose to reinforce these user education messages through in-app experiences. Although user education helps to raise awareness and reduce the overall risk to users, it is insufficient on its own to mitigate cross-device consent phishing attacks. In particular, carefully designed phishing attacks can be practically indistinguishable from benign authorization flows even for well-trained users. User education SHOULD therefore be used in conjunction with other controls described in this document. 5.1.14. <\/ins> The user experience SHOULD preserve the context within which the protocols were initiated and communicate this clearly to the user when they are asked to authorize, authenticate or present a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-4a8495d6ef418f3a0bc93c0124ea56bf1f43428faa0d36f0a9a0384886a13081","title":"","text":"default option or given similar prominence in the user experience as the \"grant\" option. The user experience MAY include information to further educate the user on cross-device consent phishing attacks and reinforce the conditions under which authorization grants may be requested. <\/ins> This information may be communicated graphically or in a simple message (e.g., \"It looks like you are trying to access your files on a digital whiteboard in your city center office. Click here to grant access to your files. If you are not trying to access your files, you should decline this request and notify the security department\"). The service may provide out-of-band reinforcement to the user on the context and conditions under which an authorization grant may be requested. For example if the service provider does not send e-mails with QR codes requesting users to grant authorization, this may be reinforced in marketing messages, in-app experiences and through anti-fraud awareness campaigns. <\/del> Improvements to user experience on their own is unlikely to be sufficient and SHOULD be used in conjunction with other controls described in this document. 5.1.14. <\/del> 5.1.15. <\/ins> By requiring a user to authenticate on the Initiating Device with a phishing resistant authentication method before initiating a cross-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-3e402c4a60b750ee9f5ebb96c634e4ba074f72c4472abc8442588a625678f7cf","title":"","text":"flows are used in scenarios such as Example A5: Add a device to a network [8] and Example A7: Transfer a session [9]. 5.1.15. <\/del> 5.1.16. <\/ins> The practical mitigations described in this section can prevent the attacks from being initiated, disrupt attacks once they start or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-8601515dbf0e0400d158612666b7317d2fa72a3ec39cdedacd471f54dcf8abe3","title":"","text":"message that unless the user initiated the authorization request, or was expecting it, they should decline the request. If the user uses an application on a mobile device to scan a QR code, the application MAY display information advising the user under which conditions they should expect to be asked to scan a QR code and under which circumstances they should never scan a QR code (e.g. display a message that the QR code will only be displayed on kiosks within trusted locations or on trusted websites hosted on a specific domain, and never in e-mail or other media and locations). <\/ins> It SHOULD be clear to the user how to decline the request. To avoid accidental authorization grants, the \"decline\" option SHOULD be the default option or given similar prominence in the user experience as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-cross-device-security-46579fe74e15620ad74046b4832d3be4b4d516e5a55019b3c9edbf7fcbc2ea64","title":"","text":"5.1.16. The user MAY be asked to verify if they initiated an authentication or authorization request by sending a one-time password (OTP) or PIN to the user's Authorization Device and asking them to enter it on the Initiating Device to confirm the request. If the request was initiated without the users' consent, they would receive an OTP or PIN out of context which may raise suspicion for the user. In addition, they would not have information on where to enter the OTP or PIN. The user experience on the Authorization Device MAY reinforce the risk of receiving an out-of-context OTP or PIN and provide information to the user on how to report an unauthorized authentication or authorization request. The additional verification step may reduce the overall usability of the system as it is one more thing users need to do right. Attackers may combine traditional phishing attacks and target users who respond to those messages with an interactive attack that sets the expectation with the user that they will have to provide the OTP or PIN, in addition to granting authorization for the request. 5.1.17. <\/ins> The practical mitigations described in this section can prevent the attacks from being initiated, disrupt attacks once they start or reduce the impact or remediate an attack if it succeeds. When"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-63e77cc5527e263352e5c43e665d8005fa5ecdfbd06e9427f0ae0b13a4b2eddc","title":"","text":"Abstract This document extends the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework RFC6749 with new grant types to support first-party native applications that want to control the user experience of the process of obtaining authorization from the user. <\/del> with a new endpoint \"authorization_challenge_endpoint\" to support first-party native applications that want to control the process of obtaining authorization from the user using a native experience. <\/ins> In many cases, this can provide an entirely browserless experience suited for native applications, only delegating to the browser in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-2de7b56435cd026e38ae2de734c37dba368b3e4871b8a0ee22ac6264c2580d91","title":"","text":"1.2. TODO If the service provides multiple applications, then it creates an additional burden to build and maintain native login flows within each application. Instead, the redirect-based authorization code flow removes the burden of implementing login flows from each application by centralizing all aspects of logging in at the authorization server. See phishing section below. <\/del> It's important to remember that the scope of this specification is limited to 1st party native applications. Please review the entirety of security-considerations and when more than one 1st party native application is supported, multiple-applications. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c1c6f8433ed8d8d698d91f9f7c65de965f2ccd55712bd53dd0c967e6678023d3","title":"","text":"this specification which the native application uses to obtain an authorization code. Authorization servers supporting this specification SHOULD include the URL of their authorization challenge endpoint in their authorization server metadata document RFC8414 using the \"authorization_challenge_request_endpoint\" parameter as defined in authorization-server-metadata. The endpoint accepts the authorization request parameters defined in RFC6749 for the authorization endpoint as well as all applicable extensions defined for the authorization endpoint. Some examples of such extensions include Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) RFC7636, Resource Indicators RFC8707, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) [OIDC]. It is important to note that some extension parameters have meaning in a web context but don't have meaning in a native mechanism (e.g. response_mode=query). It is out of scope as to what the AS does in the case that an extension defines a parameter that is has no meaning in this use case. <\/ins> The client initiates the authorization flow with or without information collected from the user (e.g. a password or MFA code)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-d9a2d94c3cc3af1e7fa99356190395a0c7379bb109e487c96bb81f2521903478","title":"","text":"parameters with the response: The parameters are included in the content of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by [RFC7159]. The <\/del> the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The <\/ins> parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-2620a3f887b4d0479a944f7a58e195cb7583655046a158dbb4698a018c4478f7","title":"","text":"8. 8.1. <\/del> The following authorization server metadata parameters RFC8414 are introduced to signal the server's capability and policy with respect to 1st Party Native Applications. 9. 9.1. <\/ins> Because this specification enables a client application to interact directly with the end user, and the application handles sending any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-e67a41d6111fbc19231bf8eb6ff183c862d5bf5c8793297b331a132d9c834d5e","title":"","text":"belonging to the same brand as the authorization server. For example, a bank publishing their own mobile application. 8.2. <\/del> 9.2. <\/ins> There are two ways using this specification increases the risk of phishing."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-5cc8b3ab6e1916bf7818e1f3765691238f61ca892e1a04ff8f3c1b1ad2ca36bf","title":"","text":"require that the user go through a redirect-based flow at any stage of the process based on its own risk assessment. 8.3. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> Typically, mobile and desktop applications are considered \"public clients\" in OAuth, since they cannot be shipped with a statically"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-5d934edb6f2b89e48af807b9767f47d73d0a30175073c519d531a329921c9ecc","title":"","text":"client impersonation, such as using attestation APIs available from the operating system. 8.4. <\/del> 9.4. <\/ins> TODO: Describe how to add proof of possession into the various parts of this flow. Describe why, because things like device session could"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-a92a23a5b68231135463094b6dc0229601d0a55753b85cbf93984d5b1eb723bd","title":"","text":"PoP binding of device session parameter 8.4.1. <\/del> 9.4.1. <\/ins> The client SHOULD use DPoP for every request, the AS SHOULD bind any artifacts returned to the DPoP key 8.4.2. <\/del> 9.4.2. <\/ins> Possible, but of scope of this document. 8.5. <\/del> 9.5. <\/ins> Increased phishing risk <\/del> When there there is more than one 1st-party native applications supported by the AS, then it is important to consider a number of additional risks. These risks fall into two main categories: Experience Risk and Technical Risk which are described below. <\/ins> User confusion <\/del> 9.5.1. <\/ins> Increased attack surface <\/del> Any time a user is asked to provide the authentication credentials in user experiences that differ, it has the effect of increasing the likelihood that the user will fall prey to a phishing attack because they are used to entering credentials in different looking experiences. When multiple native applications are support, the implementation MUST ensure the native experience is identical across all the 1st party native applications. <\/ins> Higher chance of incorrect implementations <\/del> Another experience risk is user confusion caused by different looking experiences and behaviors. This can increase the likelihood the user will not complete the authentication experience for the 1st party native application. <\/ins> 9. <\/del> 9.5.2. In addition to the experience risks, multiple implementations in 1st party native applications increases the risk of an incorrect implementation as well as increasing the attack surface as each implementation may expose it's own weaknesses. 9.5.3. To address these risk, when multiple 1st party native applications must be supported, and other methods such as [Native SSO] are not applicable, it is RECOMMENDED that a client-side SDK be used to ensure the implementation is consistent across the different native apps and to ensure the user experience is identical for all 1st party apps. 10. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-cb615c3f689d8cebcc2c9e176405c81df5e96f948ae1c7c5801a038463234242","title":"","text":"The error may contain additional information to guide the Client on what information to collect next. This pattern of collecting information, submitting it to the Authorization Challenge Endpoint and then receing an error or authroization code may repeat several <\/del> and then receing an error or authorization code may repeat several <\/ins> times. (D) The client gathers additional information (e.g. passkey, or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c0dcc79345bb35f244ab50c144a7964b2b246c7a5b8be1f3bcc13d1b385d7dd1","title":"","text":"DPoP is an application-level mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth RFC6749 access and refresh tokens I-D.ietf-oauth-dpop. If DPoP is used to sender constrain tokens, the native client SHOULD use DPoP for every token request to the Authroization Server and interaction <\/del> for every token request to the authorization Server and interaction <\/ins> with the Resource Server. DPoP includes an optional capability to bind the authorization code"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c9cfdcb1c181442436b8be7c60fcea0b659fa3ef263b8e40eb4ce183a120bce8","title":"","text":"9.3. The authorization challenge endpoint is capable of directly receiving user credentials and returning authorization codes. This exposes a new vector to perform credential stuffing attacks, if additional measures are not taken to ensure the authenticity of the application. An authorization server may already have a combination of built-in or 3rd party security tools in place to monitor and reduce this risk in browser-based authentication flows. Implementors SHOULD consider similar security measures to reduce this risk in the authorization challenge endpoint. Additionally, the attestation APIs SHOULD be used when possible to assert a level of confidence to the authorization server that the request is originating from an application owned by the same party. 9.4. <\/ins> Typically, mobile and desktop applications are considered \"public clients\" in OAuth, since they cannot be shipped with a statically configured set of client credentials RFC8252. Because of this,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-bbb8dec6a99ee7473afd63aefba7dbc5663f71608c11dc2c3852b93be1220e9e","title":"","text":"client impersonation, such as using attestation APIs available from the operating system. 9.4. <\/del> 9.5. <\/ins> Tokens issued to native apps SHOULD be sender constrained to mitigate the risk of token theft and replay."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-283bf55bac58a2bfabc6ff147a6cd821efc4d3837e3fa47afeffb437feb5fec7","title":"","text":"possession sender constrained token is presented without valid proof of possession of the cryptographic key, it MUST be rejected. 9.4.1. <\/del> 9.5.1. <\/ins> DPoP is an application-level mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth RFC6749 access and refresh tokens I-D.ietf-oauth-dpop. If DPoP is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-bf85176f50b77018e74e03ed7ea31b0b084667ed742676b59d70f321b8d44031","title":"","text":"Server MUST reject the request (do we need to define a specific error code for that?). 9.4.2. <\/del> 9.5.2. <\/ins> It may be possible to use other proof of possession mechanisms to sender constrain access and refresh tokens. Defining these mechanisms are out of scope for this specification. 9.4.3. <\/del> 9.5.3. <\/ins> PoP binding of device session parameter 9.5. <\/del> 9.6. <\/ins> When there is more than one 1st-party native applications supported by the AS, then it is important to consider a number of additional risks. These risks fall into two main categories: Experience Risk and Technical Risk which are described below. 9.5.1. <\/del> 9.6.1. <\/ins> Any time a user is asked to provide the authentication credentials in user experiences that differ, it has the effect of increasing the likelihood that the user will fall prey to a phishing attack because they are used to entering credentials in different looking experiences. When multiple native applications are support, the <\/del> experiences. When multiple native applications are supported, the <\/ins> implementation MUST ensure the native experience is identical across all the 1st party native applications."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-1c5360c9396769b2e3aa7f0cf74420bb840964d4fd95ef664166ae95a262f1df","title":"","text":"will not complete the authentication experience for the 1st party native application. 9.5.2. <\/del> 9.6.2. <\/ins> In addition to the experience risks, multiple implementations in 1st party native applications increases the risk of an incorrect implementation as well as increasing the attack surface as each implementation may expose it's own weaknesses. 9.5.3. <\/del> 9.6.3. <\/ins> To address these risk, when multiple 1st party native applications must be supported, and other methods such as OpenID.Native-SSO are"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-0fd9c0812992eaff75ccf6d07e96bf4ef6ce7c6323598ab1ad05abe5ec49e04f","title":"","text":"5.2.2. In the case where the authorization server wishes to interact with the user directly, it can return the \"redirect\" response. The authorization server may choose to interact directly with the user based on a risk assesment, the introduction of a new authentication method not supported in the application, or to handle an exception flow like account recovery. In this case the client is expected to initiate a traditional OAuth Authorization Code flow with PKCE according to RFC6749 and RFC7636. 5.2.3. <\/ins> If the request contains invalid parameters or incorrect data, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code (unless specified otherwise) and includes the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c0f8b6485f9244998bf88d58282c74c967d16e37c77cf7ac7d9234bf311df8a6","title":"","text":"whether that is to do an MFA flow, or perform an OAuth redirect-based flow. In order to preserve the security of this specification, the Authorization Server MUST verify the \"first-partyness\" of the client before continuing with the authentication flow. Please see first- party-applications for additional considerations. <\/ins> 5.1. The client makes a request to the authorization challenge endpoint by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-a039aaa144e492d5715eb79acea2f2c4d93cf596eba5522e0ca912ebb480f4c2","title":"","text":"5.2. The authorization server determines whether the information provided up to this point is sufficient to issue an authorization code, and responds with an authorization code or an error message. <\/del> up to this point is sufficient to issue an authorization code, and if so responds with an authorization code. If the information is not sufficient for issuing an authorization code, then the authorization server MUST respond with an error response. <\/ins> 5.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-df78e520478e6e1c9d7b583415c362eb5e6179e32b96b5df169ea36f56ed1922","title":"","text":"code (unless specified otherwise) and includes the following parameters with the response: This specification requires the authorization server to define new error codes that relate to the actions the client must take in order to properly authenticate the user. These new error codes are specific to the authorization server's implementation of this specification and are intentionally left out of scope. <\/ins> The parameters are included in the content of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c4bfaddfd2b4fabf217de68312f2d9386ee858c6ae42ff6e3a14c49592f15f8e","title":"","text":"vary. The authorization server MAY define additional parameters in the response depending on the implmentation. <\/del> response depending on the implmentation. The authorization server MAY also define more specific content types for the error responses as long as the response is JSON and conforms to \"application\/+json\". <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-e41dbc44e81c0439fb71c421e15dc7981b5e5e0b04d7c2df985fdbb9d17737d5","title":"","text":"9.1. First-party applications are applications that the user recognizes as belonging to the same brand as the authorization server. For example, a bank publishing their own mobile application. <\/ins> Because this specification enables a client application to interact directly with the end user, and the application handles sending any information collected from the user to the authorization server, it is expected to be used only for first-party applications when the authorization server also has a high degree of trust of the client. First-party applications are applications that the user recognizes as belonging to the same brand as the authorization server. For example, a bank publishing their own mobile application. <\/del> This specification is not prescriptive on how the Authorization Server establishes it's trust in the first-partyness of the application. For mobile platforms, most support some mechanism for application attestation that can be used to identify the entity that created\/signed\/uploaded the app to the app store. App attestation can be combined with other mechanisms like Dynamic Client Registration RFC7591 to enable strong client authentication in addition to client verification (first-partyness). The exact steps required are out of scope for this specification. Note that applications running inside a browser (e.g. Single Page Apps) context it is much more difficult to verify the first-partyness of the client. Please see single-page-apps for additional details. <\/ins> 9.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-0b0cf6d8b5c98fc2237a2d8a408c8be07bcf9716863a08a5d854193d1febb3e5","title":"","text":"applications and to ensure the user experience is identical for all first-party apps. 9.7. Single Page Applications (SPA) run inside the context of a browser instance. Due to the inability to securely attest to the first- partyness of a browser based application, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use this specification in a browser-based application. <\/ins> 10. IANA has (TBD) registered the following values in the IANA \"OAuth"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-257e5866c40ec5676e9a916ee958df89dff9861a4b0d59fd559ed196da5e65f6","title":"","text":"server. The \"auth_session\" value is completely opaque to the client, and as such the AS MUST adequately protect the value from inspection by the client, for example by using a random string or using a JWE if the AS is not maintaining state on the backend. <\/del> such the authorization server MUST adequately protect the value from inspection by the client, for example by using a random string or using a JWE if the authorization server is not maintaining state on the backend. <\/ins> If the client has an \"auth_session\", the client MUST include it in future requests to the authorization challenge endpoint. The client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-64bf26f8d378bbc1808e544b4278b079dcffde56a000a8584da979d413acc272","title":"","text":"values are static, and MUST be prepared to update the stored \"auth_session\" value if one is received in a response. To mitigate the risk of session hijacking, the 'auth_session' MUST be bound to the device, and the authorization server MUST reject an 'auth_session' if it is presented from a different device than the one it was bound to. <\/ins> See auth-session-security for additional security considerations. 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-fbb65e837c63e3a9ed7650db8f23667fe0e64a9633c944133de907f5e06a15d4","title":"","text":"9.6.1. If the client and authorization server are using DPoP binding of access tokens and\/or authorization codes, then they SHOULD also require DPoP binding of the \"auth_session\" value as well. <\/del> access tokens and\/or authorization codes, then the \"auth_session\" value SHOULD be protected by the DPoP binding as well. The authorization server SHOULD bind the \"auth_session\" value to the DPoP public key. If the authorization server is binding the \"auth_session\" value to the DPoP public key, it MUST check that the same DPoP public key is being used and MUST verify the DPoP proof to ensure the client controls the corresponding private key whenever the client includes the \"auth_session\" in an Authorization Challenge Request as described in challenge-request. <\/ins> DPoP binding of the \"auth_session\" value ensures that the context referenced by the \"auth_session\" cannot be stolen and reused by another device. This specification defines an additional claim in the DPoP Proof JWT Syntax defined in Section 4.2 of RFC9449: <\/del> 9.6.2. This specification makes no requirements or assumptions on the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-c0ebff5b5e3d54f853a311ce9e7b2797154ae2f03056af747c1e37b095b07552","title":"","text":"IANA has (TBD) registered the following Claims in the \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry IANA.JWT established by RFC7519. : \"ash\" : The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the ASCII encoding of the \"auth_session\" value : IETF : Section 9.6.1 of this specification <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-e627ed99677383c31c85cb4c82f5a1acf0e39ff43da459cbbfd34a51ea19cc3f","title":"","text":"end protection that DPoP provides, so DPoP Authorization Code binding SHOULD be used. To bind the authorization code using the Authorization Challenge Endpoint, the JWK Thumbprint of the DPoP key MUST be communicated to the Authorization Server by including the \"dpop_jkt\" parameter defined in section 10 of RFC9449 alongside other authorization request parameters in the POST body of the first Authorization Challenge Request. If it is included in subsequent Authorization Challenge Requests, the value of this parameter must be the same as in the initial request. If the JWK Thumbprint in the \"dpop_jkt\" differ at any point, the Authorization Server MUST reject the request. If the \"dpop_jkt\" parameter is not included in the first request, but added in subsequent requests, the Authorization Server MUST reject the request (do we need to define a specific error code for that?). <\/del> The mechanism for Authorization Code binding with DPoP is similar as that defined for Pushed Authorization Requests (PARs) in Section 10.1 of RFC9449. In order to bind the Authorization Code with DPoP, the client MUST add the DPoP header to the Authorization Challenge Request. The authorization server MUST check the DPoP proof JWT that was included in the DPoP header as defined in Section 4.3 of RFC9449. The authorization server MUST ensure that the same key is used in all subsequent Authorization Challenge Requests, or in the eventual token request. The authorization server MUST reject subsequent Authorization Challenge Requests, or the eventual token request, unless a DPoP proof for the same key presented in the original Authorization Challenge Request is provided. The above mechanism simplifies the implementation of the client, as it can attach the DPoP header to all requests to the authorization server regardless of the type of request. This mechanism provides a stronger binding than using the \"dpop_jkt\" parameter, as the DPoP header contains a proof of possession of the private key. <\/ins> 9.5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-617c012b88d9b4e3cc0efd1f3f5bcc024571c82c41d3a1bb24bd1d79cee1a2a3","title":"","text":"deployed in a tightly coupled environment since it is only applicable to first-party applications. 1.3. It is important to consider the user experience implications of different authentication challenges as well as the device with which the user is attempting to authorize. For example, requesting a user to enter a password on a limited input device (e.g. TV) creates a lot of user friction while also exposing the user's password to anyone else in the room. On the other hand, using a challenge method that involves say a fingerprint reader on the TV remote allowing for a FIDO2 passkey authentication would be a good experience. The Authorization Server should consider the user's device when presenting authentication challenges and developers should consider whether the device implementing this specification can provide a good experience for the user. If the combination of user device and authentiation challenge methods creates a lot of friction or security risk, consider using a specification like OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant RFC8628. If selecting OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant RFC8628 which uses a cross-device authorization mechanism, please incorporate the security best practices identified in Cross-Device Flows: Security Best Current Practice I-D.ietf-oauth- cross-device-security. <\/ins> 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-facfa03cf4fc51478f914c86a9dc3bb38227749cc787069b389fc7e4815055c7","title":"","text":"There are two ways using this specification increases the risk of phishing. With this specification, the client interacts directly with the end user, collecting information provided by the user and sending it to the authorization server. If an attacker impersonates the client and successfully tricks a user into using it, they may not realize they are giving their credentials to the malicious application. In a traditional OAuth deployment using the redirect-based authorization code flow, the user will only ever enter their credentials at the authorization server, and it is straightforward to explain to avoid entering credentials in other \"fake\" websites. By introducing a new place the user is expected to enter their credentials using this specification, it is more complicated to teach users how to recognize other fake login prompts that might be attempting to steal their credentials. <\/del> Malicious application: With this specification, the client interacts directly with the end user, collecting information provided by the user and sending it to the authorization server. If an attacker impersonates the client and successfully tricks a user into using it, they may not realize they are giving their credentials to the malicious application. User education: In a traditional OAuth deployment using the redirect-based authorization code flow, the user will only ever enter their credentials at the authorization server, and it is straightforward to explain to avoid entering credentials in other \"fake\" websites. By introducing a new place the user is expected to enter their credentials using this specification, it is more complicated to teach users how to recognize other fake login prompts that might be attempting to steal their credentials. <\/ins> Because of these risks, the authorization server MAY decide to require that the user go through a redirect-based flow at any stage"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-f369396d7133f0a5b2782ba50892953280fa16d07d2463a12db625e9a7ea9a9b","title":"","text":"defined in Section 5.1 with the additional parameter \"auth_session\", defined in auth-session. The response MAY include an \"auth_session\" parameter which the client is expected to include on a subsequent request to the authorization challenge endpoint. The \"auth_session\" parameter MAY also be included even if the authorization code was obtained through a traditional OAuth authorization code flow rather than the flow defined by this specification. <\/del> An example successful token response is below: The response MAY include an \"auth_session\" parameter which the client is expected to include on any subsequent requests to the authorization challenge endpoint, as described in auth-session. The \"auth_session\" parameter MAY also be included even if the authorization code was obtained through a traditional OAuth authorization code flow rather than the flow defined by this specification. Including the \"auth_session\" parameter in the token response enables flows such as step-up authentication RFC9470, so that the authorization server can restore the context of a previous session and prompt only for the needed step-up factors. See step-up-sms- example for an example application. <\/ins> 6.2. Upon any request to the token endpoint, including a request with a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-first-party-apps-862745998716747deb27cbb04207e2f276cef3d702d72b6e2c2c03a295686be6","title":"","text":"If the client and authorization server are using DPoP binding of access tokens and\/or authorization codes, then the \"auth_session\" value SHOULD be protected by the DPoP binding as well. The authorization server SHOULD bind the \"auth_session\" value to the DPoP public key. If the authorization server is binding the \"auth_session\" value to the DPoP public key, it MUST check that the same DPoP public key is being used and MUST verify the DPoP proof to ensure the client controls the corresponding private key whenever the client includes the \"auth_session\" in an Authorization Challenge Request as described in challenge-request. <\/del> value SHOULD be protected as well. The authorization server SHOULD associate the \"auth_session\" value with the DPoP public key. This removes the need for the authorization server to include additional claims in the DPoP proof, while still benefitting from the assurance that the client presenting the proof has control over the DPoP key. To associate the \"auth_session\" value with the DPoP public key, the authorization server: MUST check that the same DPoP public key is being used when the client presents the DPoP proof. MUST verify the DPoP proof to ensure the client controls the corresponding private key whenever the client includes the \"auth_session\" in an Authorization Challenge Request as described in challenge-request. <\/ins> DPoP binding of the \"auth_session\" value ensures that the context referenced by the \"auth_session\" cannot be stolen and reused by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-6882076ce1bc0e8be04fe85d248c659e845d00a17199b0691e55b5f3a49f9d06","title":"","text":"2.1. 2.1.1. A US state official in State A needs to access the database of State B to retrieve information about a customer who is a citizen of State B. The official first gains access to the State A gateway by logging in and authenticating to their local front-end system. The gateway then passes the official's request and identity to a central information sharing system that all states use to share data. Finally, the central system obtains credentials to access the State B gateway and routes the request from the official, along with the officials identity, to the State B gateway to access the customer's information in the State B database. 2.1.2. A home devices company provides a \"Camera API\" to enable access to home cameras. Partner companies use this Camera API to integrate the camera feeds into their security dashboards. Using 2-legged OAuth between the partner and the Camera API, a partner can request the feed from a home camera to be displayed in their dashboard. The user has an account with the camera provider. The user may be logged in to view the partner provided dashboard, or they may authorize emergency access to the camera. The home devices company must be able to independently verify that the request originated and was authorized by a user who is authorized to view the feed of the requested home camera. 2.1.3. A user attempts to access a service that is implemented as a number of on-prem and cloud-based microservices. Both the on-premise and cloud-based services are segmented by multiple trust boundaries that span one or more on-premise or cloud service environments. Every microservice can apply an authorization policy that takes the context of the original user, as well as intermediary microservices into account, irrespective of where the microservices are running and even when a microservice in one trust domain calls another service in another trust domain. 2.1.4. A client requests a report from a \"local\" resource that incorporates data from one or more associated sources. Each source is in a separate trust domain. Trust domains have a federated identity framework (e.g. PKI) and authorization framework, but may have varied and asymmetric specific trust relationships (e.g. transitive trust is not guaranteed). Trust relationships are established between authorization servers in each trust domain, and exercised through messages passed between the authorization servers that assert identity and authorization claims. The identity of requesters is chained throughout, but authorization claims are limited to what is necessary to each request. 2.2. <\/ins> The Identity Chaining flow outlined below describes how these specification are used and work together. Two examples in the suffix give more concrete examples. One where a resource server acts as the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-3d213825397ad9cf144dae35eb3211580f44a74854d90aa0a5fd2ba968588517","title":"","text":"(F) The client now possesses an access token to access the protected resource in Domain B. 2.2. <\/del> 2.3. <\/ins> This specification does not define authorization server discovery. A client MAY contact the resource and leverage the WWW-Authentication response (see section 3 of RFC6750), maintain a static mapping or use other means to identify the authorization server. 2.3. <\/del> 2.4. <\/ins> Once the authorization server is identified the client performs token exchange as defined in RFC8693 with its own authorization server in order to obtain an authorization grant as specified in section 1.3 of RFC6749. 2.3.1. <\/del> 2.4.1. <\/ins> The parameters described in section 2.1 of RFC8693 apply here with the following restrictions: 2.3.2. <\/del> 2.4.2. <\/ins> An authorization server SHOULD deny the request on an unknown resource or audience. In cases where federation to any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-e08bad2966cfaac26adf56f919933da0bce6daabde30cd50e266fa41d5d5c1dd","title":"","text":"The authorization server MAY add, remove or change claims. See transcribing-claims. 2.3.3. <\/del> 2.4.3. <\/ins> The authorization grant format and content is part of a contract between the authorization servers. To achieve a maintainable and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-4ce2617de08b5d1217cd4b148c3e52662b83996a762da6b2dc61c807f3e2d02b","title":"","text":"\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer\" to indicate SAML. Other grant types MAY be used to indicate other formats. 2.3.4. <\/del> 2.4.4. <\/ins> Authorization servers MAY choose to:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-0623acbbd6bc778059f6810191a386ae08166b0b231f293b444ec3f14d97c051","title":"","text":"verify that requested scopes are not higher priveleged than the scopes of presented subject_token. 2.3.5. <\/del> 2.4.5. <\/ins> All of section 2.2 of RFC8693 applies. In addition, the following applies to specification that conform to this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-c79d0ec2d4c32e9675541dc3678ab00b8f8f1f8e828c821d92b1fc098f5c7a8b","title":"","text":"only one audience is used to prevent Authorization Server B to abuse and present the token to Authorization Server C. 2.3.6. <\/del> 2.4.6. <\/ins> The example belows shows the message invoked by the client in trust domain A to perform token exchange with the authorization server in domain A (https:\/\/a.org\/auth) to receive an authorization grant for the authorization server in trust domain B (https:\/\/b.org\/auth). 2.4. <\/del> 2.5. <\/ins> The client uses the received authorization grant from steps B and C as an asseration towards authorization server of domain B. 2.4.1. <\/del> 2.5.1. <\/ins> If the authorization grant is in the form of a JWT bearer token, the client SHOULD use the \"JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-4ef6e24b96591d3532de52f586e8524907fd6c038290d2ad27375059d3a69df3","title":"","text":"The client MAY indicate the audience it is trying to access through the \"scope\" parameter or the \"resource\" parameter defined in RFC8707. 2.4.2. <\/del> 2.5.2. <\/ins> All of RFC7521 (Section 5.2 in specific) applies. In context of this specification the following rules apply in addition:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-afd45a3e61cca09a45d71225ed9eb2e4c84b0fed7ce64f17ac5d7f08a17b8322","title":"","text":"Due to policy the request MAY be denied (for instance if the federation from domain A is not allowed) 2.4.3. <\/del> 2.5.3. <\/ins> The authorization server MAY leverage claims from the present authorization grant for claim population of the access token. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-8f06a05d0cbdc83225c0d9c7a21e3ed540a786e2e5e955c1ba5b9df5a9bc3476","title":"","text":"The specifics (such as the format) of returned access token is not part of this specification. 2.4.4. <\/del> 2.5.4. <\/ins> The authorization server responds with an access token as described in section 5.1 of RFC6749. 2.4.5. <\/del> 2.5.5. <\/ins> The example belows shows how the client in trust domain A presents an authorization grant to the authorization server in trust domain B"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-199df5cf11f0919df994a6b1924c67d8f56e464546c325d9d252de94affef0b2","title":"","text":"2.3.2. Either one of resource or audience is required to indicate for what authorization server the authorization grant should be audienced. The authorization server MUST deny the request if neither is set. An authorization server SHOULD deny the request on an unknown resource\/ audience. In cases where federation to any authorization server is deliberate unknown resource or scope identifiers MAY be allowed. 2.3.3. <\/del> An authorization server SHOULD deny the request on an unknown resource or audience. In cases where federation to any authorization server is deliberate unknown resource or audience identifiers MAY be allowed. <\/ins> The authorization server MAY deny the request due to policy. For instance if federation to the requested domain\/authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-caa39a51020dea3954bd11ec2644078f747bb2690eeb75df0ade75256f3962fc","title":"","text":"The authorization server MAY add, remove or change claims. See transcribing-claims. 2.3.4. <\/del> 2.3.3. <\/ins> The authorization grant format and content is part of a contract between the authorization servers. To achieve a maintainable and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-e0288c77497c35cf47fd250dcdd56ff8e7d5262568571b55c678e49ef5d10447","title":"","text":"\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer\" to indicate SAML. Other grant types MAY be used to indicate other formats. 2.3.5. <\/del> 2.3.4. <\/ins> Authorization servers MAY choose to:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-aa21c7573d936643f97b09b3e9f172be2333fa0ee852d33e348abf4cc1e42ecd","title":"","text":"verify that requested scopes are not higher priveleged than the scopes of presented subject_token. 2.3.6. <\/del> 2.3.5. <\/ins> All of section 2.2 of RFC8693 applies. In context of this specification the following applies in addtion:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-92367503dd9bb31ea0e09de27f5feaaaaafa04f5216107763cdbfd41044650cb","title":"","text":"only one audience is used to prevent Authorization Server B to abuse and present the token to Authorization Server C. 2.3.7. <\/del> 2.3.6. <\/ins> The example belows shows a command the client invokes to perform token exchange at authorization server of domain A (https:\/\/a.org\/"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-2793db8852dcd3fbebbce94e50faa5cb2949ddd97dc3d56978a327b4d2212ad0","title":"","text":"4. To be added. <\/del> 4.1. Authorization Servers SHOULD follow the OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice OAUTH2-BCP for client authentication. <\/ins> 5. References"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-ec186532d7a6890f43c2e612bdb66b7077e3aa00b970e15f4b0de4e0244465c8","title":"","text":"2.1. This section describes the primary use case addressed in this specification. <\/del> This section describes two use cases addressed in this specification. <\/ins> 2.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-0ac1008fda3a076b8087e3b07f78392f78aedcc739eb64372107d4285d1f1a0c","title":"","text":"2.2. The Identity Chaining flow outlined below describes how these specifications are used to address the use cases identified. The appendix include two additional examples that describe how this flow is used when the resource server acts as the client an another that describes what happens when the authorization server acts as the client. <\/del> The Identity Chaining flow outlined below describes how a combination of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 and Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7521 are used to address the use cases identified. The appendix include two additional examples that describe how this flow is used. In one example, the resource server acts as the client and in the other, the authorization server acts as the client. <\/ins> The flow illustrated in Figure 1 shows the steps the client in trust domain A needs to perform to access a protected resource in trust <\/del> Domain A needs to perform to access a protected resource in trust <\/ins> domain B. In this flow, the client has a way to discover the authroization server in Domain B and a trust relationship exists between Domain A and Domain B (e.g. through federation). It includes the following: <\/del> authorization server in Domain B and a trust relationship exists between Domain A and Domain B (e.g., through federation). It includes the following: <\/ins> (A) The client of Domain A needs to discover the authorization server of Domain B. See authorization-server-discovery. (B) The client exchanges its token at the authorization server of its own domain (Domain A) for an authorization grant that can be used with the authorization server in Domain B. See token- exchange. <\/del> used at the authorization server in Domain B. See token-exchange. <\/ins> (C) The authorization server of Domain A processes the request and returns an authorization grant that the client can use with Domain B. This requires a trust relationship between Domain A and Domain B (e.g. through federation). <\/del> returns an authorization grant that the client can use with the authorization server of Domain B. This requires a trust relationship between Domain A and Domain B (e.g., through federation). <\/ins> (D) The client presents the authorization grant to the authorization server of Domain B. See present-authorization- grant. <\/del> authorization server of Domain B. See authorization-grant. <\/ins> (E) Authorization server of Domain B validates the authorization grant and returns an access token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-755b8600ade38cab8afdae71c26980df5372f8f80cc3217928af8bc61971e1ae","title":"","text":"2.3. This specification does not define authorization server discovery. A client MAY contact the resource and leverage the WWW-Authentication response (see section 3 of RFC6750), maintain a static mapping or use other means to identify the authorization server. <\/del> client MAY contact the resource server and leverage the WWW- Authentication response (see section 3 of RFC6750), maintain a static mapping or use other means to identify the authorization server. <\/ins> 2.4. The client performs token exchange as defined in RFC8693 with the authorization server for its own domain (e.g. Domain A), in order to <\/del> authorization server for its own domain (e.g., Domain A) in order to <\/ins> obtain an authorization grant that can be used with the authorization server of a different domain (e.g. Domain B) as specified in section <\/del> server of a different domain (e.g., Domain B) as specified in section <\/ins> 1.3 of RFC6749. 2.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-79ad040d3958dc68dc3c86abc6b4bb877b46e569ce6abdf904f1f214ef2f3449","title":"","text":"between the authorization servers. To achieve a maintainable and flexible systems clients SHOULD NOT request a specific \"requested_token_type\" during the token exchange and SHOULD NOT require a certain format or parse the authorization grant (for instance in caes of JWT). The \"issued_token_type\" parameter in the response indicates the type and SHOULD be passed into the assertion request. This allows flexibility for authorization servers to change format and content. <\/del> require a certain format or parse the authorization grant (e.g., if the token is encoded as a JWT). The \"issued_token_type\" parameter in the response indicates the type and SHOULD be passed into the assertion request. This allows flexibility for authorization servers to change format and content. <\/ins> Authorization servers MAY use an existing grant type such us \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer\" to indicate a JWT or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-956ed58d1527a9bebbefd09970974a851870ca4cff2ab31512b38ee14251e5ec","title":"","text":"2.4.4. All of section 2.2 of RFC8693 applies. In addition, the following applies to specification that conform to this specification. <\/del> applies to implementations that conform to this specification. <\/ins> Returned authorization grant MUST be audienced to the requested <\/del> Returned authorization grants MUST be audienced to the requested <\/ins> authorization server. This corresponds with RFC 7523 Section 3, Point 3 [1] and is there to reduce missuse and to prevent clients from presenting their access tokens as an authorization grant to an authorization server in a different domain. <\/del> from presenting access tokens as an authorization grant to an authorization server in a different domain. <\/ins> The returned authorization grant MAY be audienced to multiple authorization servers, provided that trust relationships exist with them (e.g. through federation). It is RECOMMENDED that only one audience is used to prevent an authorization server in one domain from presenting the client's authorization grant to another authorization in another trust domain. For example, this will prevent the authorization server in Domain B from presenting the authorization grant it received from the client in Domain A to the authorization server for Domain C. <\/del> domain from presenting the client's authorization grant to an authorization server in a different trust domain. For example, this will prevent the authorization server in Domain B from presenting the authorization grant it received from the client in Domain A to the authorization server for Domain C. <\/ins> 2.4.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-109e009e0c2133b1ecadfd471c264c4b0696453f9222ef9e2f01710948cda457","title":"","text":"authorization server in its own domain and presents it to the authorization server in the domain of the resources server it wants to access as defined in the \"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Auhorization Grants\" RFC7521. <\/del> Authentication and Authorization Grants\" RFC7521. <\/ins> 2.5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-ba6bd99c0fa6e6cc02516b87246920015fe1e504892515f0361f4755187650ed","title":"","text":"All of RFC7521 (Section 5.2 in specific) applies, along with the following processing rules: The request MUST be denied presented authorization grant is not audienced to the authorization server that processes the request <\/del> The request MUST be denied if the presented authorization grant is not audienced to the authorization server that processes the request <\/ins> The authorization server SHOULD deny the request if it is not able to identify the subject"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-38d1eca6d5117a33612feb1af059fe6830cdab4648c6d47b4b61e8838c258063","title":"","text":"2.6. Authorization servers MAY transcribe claims when either producing authorization grant at the token exchange flow or access tokens at <\/del> authorization grants in the token exchange flow or access tokens in <\/ins> the assertion flow. : Subject identifier can differ between the parties involved. For instance: A user is known at domain A by \"johndoe@a.org\" but in domain B by \"doe.john\". The mapping from one identifier to the other MAY either happen in the token exchange step and updated identifer is reflected in returned authorization grant or in the assertion step where the updated identifier would be reflected in the access token. To support this both authorization servers MAY add, change or remove claims as described above. <\/del> domain B by \"doe.john@b.org\". The mapping from one identifier to the other MAY either happen in the token exchange step and the updated identifer is reflected in returned authorization grant or in the assertion step where the updated identifier would be reflected in the access token. To support this both authorization servers MAY add, change or remove claims as described above. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-562632f7788aa0164692fe2f01ed7200b04b71652c564260454bd709707df77e","title":"","text":": The authorization server performing the assertion flow MAY leverage claims from the presented authorization grant and include it in the access token. The populated claims SHOULD be namespaced or validated to prevent the injection of invalid claims. <\/del> them in the returned access token. The populated claims SHOULD be namespaced or validated to prevent the injection of invalid claims. <\/ins> The representation of transcribed claims and their format is not defined in this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-1ceb5c5cb0c37a00fac14832110e4c2fbe5de25a62e2aa49e3679ef1da2e33e8","title":"","text":"authorization server in domain B in order to obtain an access token for the protected resource in domain B. The client in domain A may be a resource server, or it may be the authorization server itself. A client in trust domain A that needs to access a resource server in trust domain B requests an authorization grant from the authorization server for trust domain A via a token exchange. The client in trust domain A presents the received grant as an assertion to the authorization server in domain B in order to obtain an access token for the protected resource in domain B. The client in domain A may be a resource server, or it may be the authorization server itself. <\/del> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-0882ffe76e560cd9b7efafe082237084efe8817ac0b9cabb5b9e62276cb11e7d","title":"","text":"The example belows shows the message invoked by the client in trust domain A to perform token exchange with the authorization server in domain A (https:\/\/a.org\/auth) to receive an authorization grant for the authorization server in trust domain B (https:\/\/b.org\/auth). <\/del> domain A (https:\/\/as.a.org\/auth) to receive an authorization grant for the authorization server in trust domain B (https:\/\/as.b.org\/ auth). <\/ins> 2.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-d7d7a1f97747f61c44e684ddbd84372979a814a311d611edd5342e131842951a","title":"","text":"The example belows shows how the client in trust domain A presents an authorization grant to the authorization server in trust domain B (https:\/\/b.org\/auth) to receive an access token for a protected <\/del> (https:\/\/as.b.org\/auth) to receive an access token for a protected <\/ins> resource in trust domain B. 2.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-2e3ea5aa24195d79de96f9305776718ca481a899f6190b9ec5469924a03df3a9","title":"","text":"If the authorization grant is in the form of a JWT bearer token, the client SHOULD use the \"JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants\" as defined in RFC7521. Otherwise, the client SHOULD request an access token using <\/del> RFC7523. Otherwise, the client SHOULD request an access token using <\/ins> the \"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants\" as defined in RFC7521 (Section 4.1). For the purpose of this specification the following descriptions apply:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-2a8d2b2738b436b034c0d54fcb065c7f6b3a403f918d128b4a29a8c07dece7e5","title":"","text":"2.5.2. All of RFC7521 (Section 5.2 in specific) applies, along with the following processing rules: <\/del> All of Section 5.2 RFC7521 applies, in addition to the following processing rules: <\/ins> The request MUST be denied if the presented authorization grant does not include an \"aud\" claim identifying the authorization server that processes the request. <\/del> The \"aud\" claim MUST identify the Authorization Server as a valid intended audience of the assertion using either the token endpoint as described Section 3 RFC7523 or the issuer identifier as defined in Section 2 of RFC8414. <\/ins> The authorization server SHOULD deny the request if it is not able to identify the subject."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-5b5e0ccd2e236fbd8efe870dcf9b545f8c85fb3a5c6baeb1dfeb1fcb5e4e330f","title":"","text":"Preserving this information is referred to as identity chaining. This document defines a mechanism for preserving identity chaining information across trust domains using a combination of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 and Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7521. <\/del> Token Exchange RFC8693 and JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7523. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-071342bb7403601d80dad97fba55260fa98ad7dd99e6dbcb559a377cca13bfa0","title":"","text":"2. This specification describes a combination of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 and Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7521 to achieve identity chaining across trust domains. <\/del> Exchange RFC8693 and JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7523 to achieve identity chaining across trust domains. <\/ins> A client in trust domain A that needs to access a resource server in trust domain B requests an authorization grant from the authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-efe162474705f887901bcf208f62c321549dd44414de73494634cbb62ab34abd","title":"","text":"2.2. The Identity Chaining flow outlined below describes how a combination of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 and Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7521 are used to address the use cases identified. The appendix include two <\/del> of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 and JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7523 are used to address the use cases identified. The appendix include two <\/ins> additional examples that describe how this flow is used. In one example, the resource server acts as the client and in the other, the authorization server acts as the client."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-a2062eefb17d3de638c6836b54f8d930dd578180241f2d732d287d07281021bc","title":"","text":"2.4.3. The authorization grant format and content is part of a contract between the authorization servers. To achieve a maintainable and flexible systems clients SHOULD NOT request a specific \"requested_token_type\" during the token exchange and SHOULD NOT require a certain format or parse the authorization grant (e.g., if the token is encoded as a JWT). The \"issued_token_type\" parameter in the response indicates the type and SHOULD be passed into the assertion request. This allows flexibility for authorization servers to change format and content. Authorization servers MAY use an existing grant type such us \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer\" to indicate a JWT or \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer\" to indicate SAML. Other grant types MAY be used to indicate other formats. 2.4.4. <\/del> All of section 2.2 of RFC8693 applies. In addition, the following applies to implementations that conform to this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-60e08653754c21783df3256d8a7e380bb7f867729132e68e068c2592e3b46463","title":"","text":"presenting the authorization grant it received from the client in Domain A to the authorization server for Domain C. 2.4.5. <\/del> 2.4.4. <\/ins> The example belows shows the message invoked by the client in trust domain A to perform token exchange with the authorization server in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-350fbf42cb512d9aaf50fc7653d6e1bbe86d9e414ea8cc8169f0ae80c50877f3","title":"","text":"2.5. The client presents the authorization grant it received from the authorization server in its own domain and presents it to the authorization server in the domain of the resources server it wants to access as defined in the \"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants\" RFC7521. <\/del> The client presents the token it received from the authorization server in its own domain as an authorization grant to the authorization server in the domain of the resource server it wants to access as defined in RFC7523. <\/ins> 2.5.1. If the authorization grant is in the form of a JWT bearer token, the client SHOULD use the \"JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants\" as defined in RFC7523. Otherwise, the client SHOULD request an access token using the \"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants\" as defined in RFC7521 (Section 4.1). For the <\/del> The authorization grant is a JWT bearer token, which the client uses to request an access token as described in the JWT Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants RFC7523. For the <\/ins> purpose of this specification the following descriptions apply: The client MAY indicate the audience it is trying to access through"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-ac5c255033d74dcbad9aca3311d465f5dded58b11806665bc983714ad9276f4c","title":"","text":"2.5.2. All of Section 5.2 RFC7521 applies, in addition to the following processing rules: <\/del> The authorization server MUST validate the JWT authorization grant as specified in Sections 3 and 3.1 of RFC7523. The following processing rules also apply: <\/ins> The \"aud\" claim MUST identify the Authorization Server as a valid intended audience of the assertion using either the token endpoint"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-7b52622b2cba2e16f66813326cd09481b16fda88f2e3aa5be649b4c13d50e76e","title":"","text":"instance: A user is known at domain A by \"johndoe@a.org\" but in domain B by \"doe.john@b.org\". The mapping from one identifier to the other MAY either happen in the token exchange step and the updated identifer is reflected in returned authorization grant or <\/del> updated identifier is reflected in returned authorization grant or <\/ins> in the assertion step where the updated identifier would be reflected in the access token. To support this both authorization servers MAY add, change or remove claims as described above."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-fde53576e9b182d59501b27640e974b366667c0841682b0be22018adc96fb3f7","title":"","text":"trust domains. A client in trust domain A that needs to access a resource server in trust domain B requests an authorization grant from the authorization server for trust domain A via a token exchange. The client in trust domain A presents the received grant as an assertion to the authorization server in domain B in order to obtain an access token for the protected resource in domain B. The client in domain A may be a resource server, or it may be the authorization server itself. <\/del> trust domain B requests a JWT authorization grant from the authorization server for trust domain A via a token exchange. The client in trust domain A presents the received grant as an assertion to the authorization server in domain B in order to obtain an access token for the protected resource in domain B. The client in domain A may be a resource server, or it may be the authorization server itself. <\/ins> 2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-f69dc3b2d9ae62d03060e7fd08b210c5b10af43a4cecb6b3f65bbe4c4a112c75","title":"","text":"server of Domain B. See authorization-server-discovery. (B) The client exchanges its token at the authorization server of its own domain (Domain A) for an authorization grant that can be used at the authorization server in Domain B. See token-exchange. <\/del> its own domain (Domain A) for a JWT authorization grant that can be used at the authorization server in Domain B. See token- exchange. <\/ins> (C) The authorization server of Domain A processes the request and returns an authorization grant that the client can use with the <\/del> returns a JWT authorization grant that the client can use with the <\/ins> authorization server of Domain B. This requires a trust relationship between Domain A and Domain B (e.g., through federation)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-a1b4d78abf5c2746e12b6a577f204aaf1a7a6b5233055a980be7a934f9d5e5ce","title":"","text":"(D) The client presents the authorization grant to the authorization server of Domain B. See access-token-request. (E) Authorization server of Domain B validates the authorization grant and returns an access token. <\/del> (E) Authorization server of Domain B validates the JWT authorization grant and returns an access token. <\/ins> (F) The client now possesses an access token to access the protected resource in Domain B."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-bfa05d0d2858c7515797fe1f644099841d13dbb58537a18f3917408c765387d1","title":"","text":"The client performs token exchange as defined in RFC8693 with the authorization server for its own domain (e.g., Domain A) in order to obtain an authorization grant that can be used with the authorization server of a different domain (e.g., Domain B) as specified in section 1.3 of RFC6749. <\/del> obtain a JWT authorization grant that can be used with the authorization server of a different domain (e.g., Domain B) as specified in section 1.3 of RFC6749. <\/ins> 2.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-000a93c57277f53aaea9a0610025913de9b20a64556d9e2902dc563964603199","title":"","text":"All of section 2.2 of RFC8693 applies. In addition, the following applies to implementations that conform to this specification. The \"aud\" claim in the returned authorization grant MUST identify the requested authorization server. This corresponds with RFC 7523 Section 3, Point 3 [1] and is there to reduce missuse and to prevent clients from presenting access tokens as an authorization grant to an authorization server in a different domain. <\/del> The \"aud\" claim in the returned JWT authorization grant MUST identify the requested authorization server. This corresponds with RFC 7523 Section 3, Point 3 [1] and is there to reduce missuse and to prevent clients from presenting access tokens as an authorization grant to an authorization server in a different domain. <\/ins> The \"aud\" claim included in the returned authorization grant MAY identify multiple authorization servers, provided that trust <\/del> The \"aud\" claim included in the returned JWT authorization grant MAY identify multiple authorization servers, provided that trust <\/ins> relationships exist with them (e.g. through federation). It is RECOMMENDED that the \"aud\" claim is restricted to a single authorization server to prevent an authorization server in one"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-d0d97550ffdb24ab80415a09fbd6ee8510832ab713c3111ce53786ae45d53852","title":"","text":"The example belows shows the message invoked by the client in trust domain A to perform token exchange with the authorization server in domain A (https:\/\/as.a.org\/auth) to receive an authorization grant <\/del> domain A (https:\/\/as.a.org\/auth) to receive a JWT authorization grant <\/ins> for the authorization server in trust domain B (https:\/\/as.b.org\/ auth). 2.5. The client presents the token it received from the authorization server in its own domain as an authorization grant to the authorization server in the domain of the resource server it wants to access as defined in RFC7523. <\/del> The client presents the JWT authorization grant it received from the authorization server in its own domain as an authorization grant to the authorization server in the domain of the resource server it wants to access as defined in RFC7523. <\/ins> 2.5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-3d99894d928bc393c7efeca472ed74c870cc9eba53fe0fd759a306f5daf81d28","title":"","text":"2.6. Authorization servers MAY transcribe claims when either producing <\/del> Authorization servers MAY transcribe claims when either producing JWT <\/ins> authorization grants in the token exchange flow or access tokens in the assertion flow."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-0c77b18795912f8ff5625663b5147cce18ef213c99574bcbc4ca4dc8ad999191","title":"","text":"instance: A user is known at domain A by \"johndoe@a.org\" but in domain B by \"doe.john@b.org\". The mapping from one identifier to the other MAY either happen in the token exchange step and the updated identifier is reflected in returned authorization grant or in the assertion step where the updated identifier would be reflected in the access token. To support this both authorization servers MAY add, change or remove claims as described above. <\/del> updated identifier is reflected in returned JWT authorization grant or in the assertion step where the updated identifier would be reflected in the access token. To support this both authorization servers MAY add, change or remove claims as described above. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-identity-chaining-8cb9567b4ece1a124ddcdb2775a83a0825b14cb40b6ea002170b6f10caf7ed2d","title":"","text":": The authorization server performing the assertion flow MAY leverage claims from the presented authorization grant and include them in the returned access token. The populated claims SHOULD be namespaced or validated to prevent the injection of invalid claims. <\/del> leverage claims from the presented JWT authorization grant and include them in the returned access token. The populated claims SHOULD be namespaced or validated to prevent the injection of invalid claims. <\/ins> The representation of transcribed claims and their format is not defined in this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ea974f377ff2271078695ec17139439c69a3d8aca93ddfd6b3f68e1a4e250af9","title":"","text":"JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/del> and private claims. This specification aims to express metadata of the properties of the Verifiable Credentials utilizing registered JWT claims, while allowing Issuers to use other registered, public, or private claims to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-9f278043988828d4edd4d0be7c43984f2beff9ec0b20ac607cc262b2bc563825","title":"","text":"referenced in the credential. This process is further described in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, an optional fourth party can be involved, a Status Provider, who delivers revocation information to Verifiers. (The Verifier can also serve as the Status Provider.) <\/del> To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, revocation information can optionally be retrieved from a Status Provider. The role of a Status Provider can be fulfilled by either a fourth party or by the Issuer. <\/ins> This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format with a JWT Claim Set."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-974bcf8f748d18727e38b4f8d4d6e8f16ab364f7a111906fd1220d9a06e025fd","title":"","text":"SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads (SD-JWT VC) draft-terbu-sd-jwt-vc-latest <\/del> draft-terbu-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-latest <\/ins> Abstract This specification describes data formats as well as validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload based on the SD-JWT format I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads based on the Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt format. It can be used when there are no selective disclosable claims, too. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-fa89518a7ab27a77b7b0691b6db6b8e7637c4f4c42427d6c962ea13fc12d323d","title":"","text":"referenced in the credential. This process is further described in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, an optional fourth party can be involved, a Status Provider, who delivers revocation information to Verifiers. (The Verifier can also serve as the Status Provider.) <\/del> To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, revocation information can optionally be retrieved from a Status Provider. The role of a Status Provider can be fulfilled by either a fourth party or by the Issuer. <\/ins> This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format with a JWT Claim Set. <\/del> format with a JWT Claim Set. It can be used when there are no selective disclosable claims, too. <\/ins> 1.2. JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 can in principle be used to express Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. While JWT- based credentials enable selective disclosure, i.e., the ability for a Holder to disclose only a subset of the contained claims, in an Identity Provider ecosystem by issuing new JWTs to the Verifier for every presentation, this approach does not work in the three-party- model. <\/del> process as it builds upon established web primitives. <\/ins> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials. SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how Verifiable Credentials can be expressed using SD-JWT. JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/del> the Issuer). SD-JWT is a superset of JWT as it can also be used when there are no selectively disclosable claims and also supports JWS JSON serialization, which is useful for long term archiving and multi signatures. However, SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload. Those Verifiable Credentials are called SD-JWT VCs. SD-JWTs VC can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-db761f9b44266ffb4b297adc5e4f670ed091844bc1b169aa1cbb74db4a780d4f","title":"","text":"Issuance as defined in Section 5.3. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. SD-JWT VCs MUST contain all Disclosures corresponding to their SD-JWT component except for Decoy Digests as per Section 5.1.1.3. of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> When there are selectively disclosable claims, SD-JWT VCs MUST contain all Disclosures corresponding to their SD-JWT component except for Decoy Digests as per Section 5.1.1.3. of I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-08aed870e5b645adc82ffbe7f81d5c02b454b27b275bb14f7f78e20c80149ec6","title":"","text":"Additional public claims MAY be used in SD-JWT VCs depending on the application. 4.2.2.4. An SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims. In that case, the SD-JWT VC MUST NOT contain the claim in the JWT body. It also MUST NOT have any Disclosures. <\/ins> 4.3. The following is a non-normative example of an unsecured payload of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ebf92749aa71f845a1418ddb6328f4a52d9b00bc1c0beca9d8f98c4512142230","title":"","text":"described in Section 5.4.1. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure- jwt. When there are no selectively disclosable claims, a presentation of SD-JWT VC does not contain any Disclosures. <\/ins> 6.1.1. If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Holder Binding JWT,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a6fc5e16275cad12a136186d8229637515f2b7b3abbed222e28217a1f9672f98","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes data formats as well as validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload based on the SD-JWT format I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads based on the Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt format. It can be used when there are no selective disclosable claims, too. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-dc280782cb6707fc10e2fcf7142aa73fb54877f09f826aa70eb4b7dfad6ce97f","title":"","text":"Provider.) This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format with a JWT Claim Set. <\/del> format with a JWT Claim Set. It can be used when there are no selective disclosable claims, too. <\/ins> 1.2. JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 can in principle be used to express Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. While JWT- based credentials enable selective disclosure, i.e., the ability for a Holder to disclose only a subset of the contained claims, in an Identity Provider ecosystem by issuing new JWTs to the Verifier for every presentation, this approach does not work in the three-party- model. <\/del> process as it builds upon established web primitives. <\/ins> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials. SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how Verifiable Credentials can be expressed using SD-JWT. JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/del> the Issuer). SD-JWT is a superset of JWT as it can also be used when there are no selectively disclosable claims and also supports JWS JSON serialization, which is useful for long term archiving and multi signatures. However, SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload. Those Verifiable Credentials are called SD-JWT VCs. SD-JWTs VC can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e0e50fa3ce73c87671f0f8d4d6c69cd5696e4272be049155aa3756749bee0a58","title":"","text":"1.1. In the so-called Three-Party-Model, Issuers issue Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Credentials are <\/del> In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Credentials are <\/ins> cryptographically signed statements about a Subject, typically the Holder."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-d4c6522006f43e38c642dbd9d052702b10f36178ef1595208fd10c039128b2c5","title":"","text":"3. TBD: explain use cases of the three-party-model. <\/del> TBD: explain use cases of the Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model. <\/ins> TBD: conventional crypt, hardware security, hsm, mobile secure area, compliance with FIPS"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-d66bcc7a8ec89757c17e3bf1ee92dbdf329ad21bf066db8b51625ab8c235bc28","title":"","text":" SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads (SD-JWT VC) <\/del> SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC) <\/ins> draft-terbu-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4b9ee8f3c8d38865e8b057fa1ed77501931bda344ec978a1029eaa6c6889b2e3","title":"","text":". The claim is used to express the type of the JSON object that is secured by the JWT. The <\/del> value MUST be a case-sensitive value. <\/del> value serving as an identifier for the type of the SD-JWT VC. A type defines which claims may or must appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This specification does not define any values; instead it is expected that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values including the semantics of the respective claims and associated rules (e.g., policies for issuing and validating credentials beyond what is defined in this specification). <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of how is used to express a type: For example, a type can be defined such that at least the registered JWT claims , , , and must appear in the Unsecured Payload. Additionally, the registered JWT claims and , and the private claims , , and may be used. The type might also indicate that , , , can be selectively disclosable. <\/ins> 4.2.2.2. SD-JWT VCs MAY use any claim registered in the \"JSON Web Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ef9e356fce911b2889f1f109b907284def3fbe3776c9872c45d3c644e876d417","title":"","text":"This specification describes data formats as well as validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads based on the Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt format. It can be used when there are no <\/del> selective-disclosure-jwt format. It can be used without any <\/ins> selective disclosable claims, too. 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-dee661c27e3bf387b76141e1ca77a8bd1eb04763d14e390505b98b7a5cea5816","title":"","text":"1.4. This specification uses the terms \"Holder\", \"Issuer\", \"Verifier\", defined by I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> \"Key Binding JWT\" defined by I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a27a001ddf3ca554fe4466521f53a5bab8495b6bf7a0e4b90e519072bed05cae","title":"","text":"4.2. SD-JWT VCs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Issuance as defined in Section 5.3. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. <\/del> SD-JWT VCs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT format defined in Section 5 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MAY contain a Key Binding JWT. <\/ins> When there are selectively disclosable claims, SD-JWT VCs MUST contain all Disclosures corresponding to their SD-JWT component except for Decoy Digests as per Section 5.1.1.3. of I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims, and therefore the encoded SD-JWT will not contain any Disclosures. <\/ins> 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ed5c9dbc4ff467c0d7ccbb1b77cd1cd0d709950f75778b43bac869ae590d59f2","title":"","text":"6.1. A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Presentation as defined in Section 5.4. of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MAY contain a Key Binding JWT as described in Section 5.4.1. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure- jwt. When there are no selectively disclosable claims, a presentation of SD-JWT VC does not contain any Disclosures. 6.1.1. <\/del> If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the following claims are used within the Key Binding JWT:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-982d08a9cf97c383f356097146bc8356b6258061a730eedffa196f7baabf10d9","title":"","text":"4.4. The recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST process and verify an SD-JWT VC as follows: <\/del> The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and verify an SD-JWT VC as described in Section 6 of I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt. If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in Section 9.6 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt), the Verifier MUST verify the Key Binding JWT according to Section 6 of I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To verify the Key Binding JWT, the claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used. For the verification, the claim in the SD-JWT MAY be used to retrieve the public key from the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration (as defined in jwt-issuer-metadata) of the SD-JWT VC issuer. Alternative methods MAY be used to obtain the public key to verify the signature of the SD-JWT. If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the claim nor any Disclosures. If is present in the verified payload of the SD-JWT, the status SHOULD be checked. It depends on the Verifier policy to reject or accept a presentation of a SD-JWT VC based on the status of the Verifiable Credential. <\/ins> Any claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4c335ff37b2d2bf52ac8ab9c88bc8d6291ac03cb2e6919a7d3bf276d26311212","title":"","text":"The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT: 6.3. The Verifier MUST process and verify a presentation of SD-JWT VC as follows: <\/del> 7. TBD: Verifier provided"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-299159a69cb362a490617eec6b6ff32483b4d18381bc1ff0b66a98b80c59be9a","title":"","text":"3.2.2.1. 3.2.2.1.1. <\/ins> This specification defines the JWT claim . The value MUST be a case-sensitive value serving as an identifier for the type of the SD-JWT VC. A type defines which claims may or must appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This specification does not define any <\/del> (see RFC7519) value serving as an identifier for the type of the SD- JWT VC. A type defines which claims may or must appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This specification does not define any <\/ins> values; instead it is expected that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values including the semantics of the respective claims"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-50fa4974716cd62f097ffe49973092480e7987b2a1a3ab8b73db0c65e0f9f771","title":"","text":"6. TBD: Verifier provided . <\/del> The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt apply to this specification. Additionally, the following security considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs: 6.1. The JWT Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT Issuer by the Holder or Verifier. Similar to other metadata endpoints, the URL for the retrieval MUST be considered an untrusted value and could be a vector for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. Before making a request to the JWT Issuer Metadata endpoint, the Holder or Verifier MUST validate the URL to ensure that it is a valid HTTPS URL and that it does not point to internal resources. This requires, in particular, ensuring that the host part of the URL does not address an internal service (by IP address or an internal host name) and that, if an external DNS name is used, the resolved DNS name does not point to an internal IPv4 or IPv6 address. When retrieving the metadata, the Holder or Verifier MUST ensure that the request is made in a time-bound and size-bound manner to prevent denial of service attacks. The Holder or Verifier MUST also ensure that the response is a valid JWT Issuer Metadata configuration document before processing it. Additional considerations can be found in OWASP_SSRF. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-27dafaeac2931bc85697462d9de7da8d50b8358b8e11dfaf1d6f788e02ac1324","title":"","text":"7. TBD: Holder provided nonce via <\/del> The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt apply to this specification. Additionally, the following privacy considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs. <\/ins> . <\/del> 7.1. The Privacy Considerations in Section 10.5 of I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt apply especially to the claim. 7.2. Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the claim is not selectively disclosable. In certain situations this could lead to unwanted leakage of additional context information. In general, Issuers are advised to choose values following data minimization principles. For example, government Issuers issuing an SD-JWT VC to their citizens to enable them to prove their age, have to avoid putting information into the value that allows third-parties to infer additional personal information about the Holder, e.g., country of residency, citizenship etc. A better approach is to have more generalized types, for example an age-proof SD-JWT VC type. Additionally, Holders have to be informed that besides the actual requested claims what information is shared with the Verifier. 7.3. A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer identifier is Holder-specific and if the resolution of the key material to verify the Issuer-signed JWT requires the Verifier to phone home to the Issuer. For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., and host the JWT Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would create a HTTPS GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when the SD-JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to keep track where and how oftehn the SD-JWT VC was used. Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pining specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behaviour such as frequently rotating Issuer identifiers. If such behaviour was detected, Verifiers are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs issued by such Issuers. Holders are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs if they contain easiliy correlateable information in the Issuer identifier. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-751f097f246f65750b84166336ffd6dbc18497fb73bc04a28d4e74cc18388743","title":"","text":"Abstract This document specifies Verifiable Credentials based on Selective Disclosure JSON Web Tokens (SD-JWT) with JSON payloads. <\/del> This specification describes data formats, validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format (TBD: see oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt) using JSON payloads. <\/ins> 1. TBD: why? - simplicity - JWTs are well-known, popular but doesn't work best with three-party-model - Also no selective disclosure, which impacts costs and security. This specification describes data formats, validation and processing rules for SD-JWT expresing Verifiable Credentials. <\/del> Todo: Discuss VCs, introduce terminology. Signed JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 can in principle be used to express Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWTs do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability to disclose only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT. This is a common problem in the so-called three-party model: An Issuer creates a Verifiable Credential for some End-User (Holder), who then presents this credential to multiple Verifiers. A credential might contain a large number of claims, but the Holder typically only wants to disclose a subset of these claims to a Verifier. In this case, the Holder would have to receive a new signed JWT from the Issuer, containing only the claims that should be disclosed, for each interaction with a new Verifier. This is inefficient, costly, and the necessary interaction with the Issuer introduces additional privacy risks. SD-JWT is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suitable for Verifiable Credentials. SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload of the token or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how Verifiable Credentials can be expressed using SD-JWT. Todo: Explain the 'plain JSON' part <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-294514ad439f25d65d622793ea7e7d91baab59f1c9412620f2691a637ac3618f","title":"","text":"5.2. SD-JWT-VCs as defined in this specification can use any claim registered in the \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC 7519. <\/del> registered in the \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519. <\/ins> Some of the claims in a VC MUST NOT be selectively disclosed as they are always required for processing on the verifier side. All other"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-de399b0dafffe53d411681cb0b8045e92147a654a7281a189f45a7a993a8698d","title":"","text":"A verifier MUST validate an SD-JWT-VC as follows: Additional validation rules MAY apply but their use is out-of-scope of this specification. <\/del> Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the scope of this specification. <\/ins> 6.1. Verifiers processing SD-JWT-VCs MUST verify the signature of the SD- JWT with the public key of the SD-JWT-VC issuer. This makes sure that the SD-JWT-VC was issued by the SD-JWT-VC issuer and that it has not been tampered with since issuance. The claim in the SD-JWT-VC MAY be used to retrieve the public key from the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration (as defined in {#jwt-issuer- metadata}) of the SD-JWT-VC issuer. A verifier MAY use alternative methods to obtain the public key to verify the signature of the SD- JWT. 6.2. <\/del> This specification defines the JWT Issuer Metadata to retrieve the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration of the JWT Issuer of the JWT. The JWT Issuer is identified by the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-065afc7278d956aa3f2330232b5b5e419574618ab574ffb9cb6e02fef55b573b","title":"","text":"The JWT Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be a JSON document compliant with this specification and MUST be returned using the application\/json content type. <\/del> content type. <\/ins> This specification defines the following JWT Issuer Metadata parameters: JWT Issuer Metadata MUST include either or in their JWT Issuer Metadata, but not both. <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED that the JWT contains a JWT header parameter that can be used to lookup the public key in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-cbb2f2eabfd0c159ef74e69bc0b755f53aff33420bca83a8892d6dd828b60eb9","title":"","text":"value MUST be a case-sensitive (see RFC7519) value serving as an identifier for the type of the SD- JWT VC. A type defines which claims may or must appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This specification does not define any <\/del> JWT VC. The value MUST be a Collision-Resistant Name as defined in Section 2 of RFC7515. A type is associated with rules defining which claims may or must appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This specification does not define any <\/ins> values; instead it is expected that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values including the semantics of the respective claims"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-14e0ad1e413e98765d3ee9caf03497b1d41c579f38a414eb8aaf517249856664","title":"","text":"For example, a type can be defined such that at least the registered JWT claims <\/del> can be associated with rules that define that at least the registered JWT claims <\/ins> ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a4b3f15f13ee273125b4bdf8a027da71591ee01fe35b5c875f5e11ee28d0e369","title":"","text":", and may be used. The type might also indicate that , , , can be selectively disclosable. <\/del> may be used. The type might also indicate that any of the aforementioned claims can be selectively disclosable. <\/ins> 3.2.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-41b65b2999f9225a6371205a50c9345e1b9a0f15fdfcdb36d127b24cb0a9adf3","title":"","text":"This specification defines the JWT claim . The <\/del> (for verifiable credential type). The <\/ins> value MUST be a case-sensitive"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-31120b92c0d29694a17be9e317ad76a32f7e53158cfbeaa0209084f82e638732","title":"","text":"is used to express a type: For example, a type <\/del> For example, a value of <\/ins> can be associated with rules that define that at least the registered JWT claims"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-355c8e7fd1e37f790019041e009ec7e9de15f955100aacbb9413801b5599398d","title":"","text":"5.1. If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the following claims are used within the Key Binding JWT: <\/del> Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.10 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> The Key Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which when not understood MUST be ignored. <\/del> The Key Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which, when not understood, MUST be ignored by the Verifier. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-d891b3b432d93a147ba277a731eca4ca4fdf80656a4a7ec532740277c544b17a","title":"","text":"claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used. For the verification, the claim in the SD-JWT MAY be used to retrieve the public key from the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration (as defined in jwt-issuer-metadata) of the SD-JWT VC issuer. Alternative methods MAY be used to obtain the public key to verify the signature of the SD-JWT. <\/del> Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST verify that the public key used for verification of the Issuer-signed JWT belongs to the Issuer of the Issuer-signed JWT, as defined in public-key-for- issuer-signed-jwts-verification. <\/ins> If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-799c5969b6dbe8ed1f4abb850aa9259ba34f1113fa9d4e3d79d19e7ab7bc4cd1","title":"","text":"Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the scope of this specification. 3.5. A recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST apply the following rules to verify the Issuer-signed JWT corresponds to the Issuer: - JWT Issuer Metadata: If the value contains a HTTPS URI, the recipient MUST obtain the public key using JWT Issuer Metadata as defined in jwt-issuer-metadata. - DID Document Resolution: If the value contains a DID, the recipient MUST retrieve the public key from the DID Document resolved from the DID in the value. If the JWT header parameter is present, the MUST be a relative or absolute DID URL of the DID in the value, identifying the public key. - X.509 Certificates: The recipient MUST obtain the public key from the leaf X.509 certificate defined by the , , or JWT header parameters of the Issuer-signed JWT and validate the X.509 certificate chain in the following cases: - If the value contains a DNS name encoded as a URI using the DNS URI scheme RFC4501. The DNS name MUST matche a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) RFC5280 entry of the leaf certificate. - If the value contains a URN using the URN URI scheme RFC2141. The URN MUST match a SAN entry of the leaf certificate. Additional rules for verifying the public key belongs to the Issuer MAY be used but are out of scope of this specification. <\/ins> 4. This specification defines the JWT Issuer Metadata to retrieve the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-605bb96772b8ba526ec1590691f698ea71351867e4aed67656944d5c3aa79538","title":"","text":"Additional considerations can be found in OWASP_SSRF. 6.2. When defining ecosystem-specific rules for the verification of the public key, as outlined in verifying-public-key-for-issuer-signed- jwts, it is critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship between the value within the Issuer-signed JWT and the public keys of the Issuer. In situations where an attacker tampers with an SD-JWT VC, it is paramount to ensure that they cannot exert influence over the verification process while employing the same value. <\/ins> 7. The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-348c5124153891ab1709dad0c7c419a4335bb75fa9ba73249c6f3e3e408dd72e","title":"","text":"claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used. Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST obtain the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in public-key- discovery-for-issuer-signed-jwts. <\/del> Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST validate that the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in issuer-signed-jwt-verification-key-validation. <\/ins> If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e8f62461fe6fd0bd36a0d9ed239411871dbbdcd7bb90ef7a2a4591b56c71d3ec","title":"","text":"6.2. When defining ecosystem-specific rules for the verification of the public key, as outlined in public-key-discovery-for-issuer-signed- jwts, it is critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship between the <\/del> public key, as outlined in issuer-signed-jwt-verification-key- validation, it is critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship between the <\/ins> value within the Issuer-signed JWT and the public keys of the Issuer."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-2710d230a85d6eb6242202af3090188560707a50c7c655877f69ef7a97231ee7","title":"","text":"4. This specification defines the JWT Issuer Metadata to retrieve the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration of the JWT Issuer of the JWT. The JWT Issuer is identified by the <\/del> This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for presentations of SD-JWT VCs. 4.1. If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.3 of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL. <\/del> The Key Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which, when not understood, MUST be ignored by the Verifier. 4.2. The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD- JWT shown above including a Key Binding JWT: <\/ins> JWT Issuers publishing JWT Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT Issuer <\/del> In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the claim . Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT: 5. This specification defines the JWT VC Issuer Metadata to retrieve the JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration of the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC. The Issuer is identified by the claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL. Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer <\/ins> Metadata configuration available at the path formed by concatenating the string"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-96f6e48f89f4cb11b1d4fba5850333fb786eb9ae944762e4bc2379ea1dff7ebb","title":"","text":"scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path components, but no query or fragment components. 4.1. <\/del> 5.1. <\/ins> A JWT Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP <\/del> A JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP <\/ins> request at the path defined in jwt-issuer-metadata. <\/del> request at the path defined in jwt-vc-issuer-metadata. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/del> JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/ins> is set to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-135ca5013efc4246d5c4d8931628eefe501fb8477173a5432b73cb83d33cb05d","title":"","text":"component. The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/del> JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/ins> is set to : 4.2. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> A successful response MUST use the and return the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration using the <\/del> and return the JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration using the <\/ins> content type. An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value. This specification defines the following JWT Issuer Metadata <\/del> This specification defines the following JWT VC Issuer Metadata <\/ins> configuration parameters: JWT Issuer Metadata MUST include either <\/del> JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST include either <\/ins> or in their JWT Issuer Metadata, but not both. <\/del> in their JWT VC Issuer Metadata, but not both. <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED that the JWT contains a JWT header parameter that can be used to lookup the public key in the JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT Issuer Metadata. <\/del> JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer Metadata. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a JWT Issuer Metadata <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata <\/ins> configuration including : The following is a non-normative example of a JWT Issuer Metadata <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata <\/ins> configuration including : Additional JWT Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also be used. <\/del> Additional JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also be used. <\/ins> 4.3. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-df78115772559739954361dbeeac4226593e49b716660b28706d450f9c294297","title":"","text":"value of the JWT. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. 5. This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for presentations of SD-JWT VCs. 5.1. If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.3 of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The Key Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which, when not understood, MUST be ignored by the Verifier. 5.2. The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD- JWT shown above including a Key Binding JWT: In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the claim . Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT: <\/del> 6. The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-607615d0d8142c9608231dbc849946a477d23138e91a18a346fc444655e39ad1","title":"","text":"6.1. The JWT Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT <\/del> The JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT VC <\/ins> Issuer by the Holder or Verifier. Similar to other metadata endpoints, the URL for the retrieval MUST be considered an untrusted value and could be a vector for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. Before making a request to the JWT Issuer Metadata endpoint, the <\/del> Before making a request to the JWT VC Issuer Metadata endpoint, the <\/ins> Holder or Verifier MUST validate the URL to ensure that it is a valid HTTPS URL and that it does not point to internal resources. This requires, in particular, ensuring that the host part of the URL does"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-1405740423ac06e3dc751b6e623d21444df3080fe2bfc0e85ea89459e54a8c09","title":"","text":"When retrieving the metadata, the Holder or Verifier MUST ensure that the request is made in a time-bound and size-bound manner to prevent denial of service attacks. The Holder or Verifier MUST also ensure that the response is a valid JWT Issuer Metadata configuration <\/del> that the response is a valid JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration <\/ins> document before processing it. Additional considerations can be found in OWASP_SSRF."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-84cc378d0d34ed5adcb367643ea938d73bfb241dad7ccadfcc72e3880132883d","title":"","text":"For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., and host the JWT Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would create a HTTPS GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when the SD-JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used. <\/del> and host the JWT VC Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would create a HTTPS GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when the SD- JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used. <\/ins> Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pinning specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behaviour"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-b565c2c441dfee46a2c448aaf20b2a64eac4caece0850da98ea779eb1500316f","title":"","text":"3.5. A recipient of an SD-JWT VC MUST apply the following rules to obtain the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT: <\/del> A recipient of an SD-JWT VC MUST apply the following rules to validate that the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT corresponds to the value: <\/ins> Separate specifications or ecosystem regulations MAY define rules complementing the rules defined above, but such rules are out of scope of this specification. See ecosystem-verification-rules for security considerations. If a recipient cannot validate that the public verification key corresponds to the value of the Issuer-signed JWT, the SD-JWT VC MUST be rejected. <\/ins> 4. This specification defines the JWT Issuer Metadata to retrieve the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-cb55cbcd9d3872f0e48253b4334544ce9933b22e6738a80c2d89e8783279ced2","title":"","text":"1.4. This specification uses the terms \"Holder\", \"Issuer\", \"Verifier\", \"Key Binding JWT\" defined by I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> \"Key Binding\", and \"Key Binding JWT\" defined by I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c134b7549178a8e80e3d29aa817e0625608f82cc92cfb8a3c38dfc57d9ccc6f4","title":"","text":"Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.3 of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The Key Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which, when not <\/del> The Key Binding JWT MAY include additional claims which, when not <\/ins> understood, MUST be ignored by the Verifier. 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a5901eb8926aa7d40b4209d07fa27d3ac5815c6a3c54a856cc5383f5ae5a2376","title":"","text":"It is RECOMMENDED that the JWT contains a JWT header parameter that can be used to lookup the public key in the JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer <\/del> JWT header parameter that can be used to look up the public key in the JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer <\/ins> Metadata. The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-23e8c9217dd0a5499eefd38a4accaf248577fe74bd5cd71a29b9213fd21cc987","title":"","text":"claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL. Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration available at the path formed by concatenating the string <\/del> Metadata configuration available at the location formed by inserting the well-known string <\/ins> to the <\/del> between the host component and the path component (if any) of the <\/ins> claim value in the JWT. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-3ab197d03dfed102660699307a7ac3d0f1e14901a177d67f0c6be09c12fc49a0","title":"","text":"request at the path defined in jwt-vc-issuer-metadata. The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the <\/ins> JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when is set to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a554b688d3521297ee78d438d5faa3416cf2319c4a90749d80e17f060a905cdf","title":"","text":"1.2. TBD 1.3. TBD <\/del> 2. TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-dc686ee209debfaa96c9c567897746319ec5eccaf2852a9b5fc8a467ba58f758","title":"","text":"5. TBD <\/del> This specification defines the media type which describes a VC-SD-JWT with the following components: 1. An SD- JWT to protect the integrity of the claims, to enable selective disclosure and to ensure authorship of the VC-SD-JWT. The SD-JWT header parameters and the payload is further defined by this specification. 1. The full set of SD-JWT Disclosures that contain the claims in plain text. This specification defines the media type which describes the VP-SD-JWT with the following components: 1. The SD-JWT from the VC-SD-JWT. 1. A subset of the SD-JWT Disclosures that are selectively disclosed by the Holder. 1. An optional holder binding JWT that proves the Holder is the intended Holder of the Verifiable Credential. Note, it is the responsibility for the Issuer to include a confirmation method in the Verifiable Credential. This process is referred to as holder binding. This enables the Holder to prove they are the intended Holder of the Verifiable Credential. Further note, it is up to the Verifier to require or to not require the Holder to prove posessions of the confirmation method. <\/ins> 5.1. The header parameter of the SD-JWT-VC MUST be present. The <\/del> header parameter of the SD-JWT MUST be present. The <\/ins> value MUST use the media type <\/del> value MUST use <\/ins> that is registered by this specification. This indicates that the payload of the SD-JWT-VC contains plain JSON and follows the rules as defined in this specification. <\/del> . This indicates that the payload of the SD-JWT contains plain JSON and follows the rules as defined in this specification. It further indicates that the SD-JWT is a SD-JWT component of a VC-SD-JWT. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT-VC header:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-9cbca502cbb99cde1e6f6460e383c00b5cc5c3bcd1ea64a481c0fe8ca9270194","title":"","text":"8. TBD <\/del> This specification defines validation and processing rules for verifiable credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-JWT I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. Other specifications exist that define their own verifiable credential formats, which can be used independently of each other. For example, W3C Verifiable Credential Data Model (VCDM) 2.0 W3C.VCDM defines a data model for verifiable credentials encoded as JSON-LD, and ISO\/IEC 18013-5:2021 ISO.18013-5 defines a representation of verifiable credentials in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded as CBOR and secured using COSE. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-8585d0de9bd9af98bfc4be8fbcb7ab8ba4650a8d3edc273488e65def44d80470","title":"","text":"8. TBD <\/del> This specification defines validation and processing rules for verifiable credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-JWT I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. Other specifications exist that define their own verifiable credential formats; for example, W3C Verifiable Credential Data Model (VCDM) 2.0 W3C.VCDM defines a data model for verifiable credentials encoded as JSON-LD, and ISO\/IEC 18013-5:2021 ISO.18013-5 defines a representation of verifiable credentials in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded as CBOR and secured using COSE. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-6617db8c8388ac4d825bbcc651a2968eca31fe99e7586858dd2b6e0bb2b902f7","title":"","text":"4.2. The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD- JWT shown above including a Key Binding JWT: <\/del> JWT shown in vc-sd-jwt-example including a Key Binding JWT. In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the <\/ins> In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the claim . Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. <\/del> claim. Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. <\/ins> The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ebb7327ac912b3d993a454adceaf901e17e04c4dcd906ad3849c7517f42b251b","title":"","text":"6. A type is associated with metadata defining, for example, information about the type, a schema defining which claims MAY or MUST appear in the SD-JWT VC, and how they can be displayed. This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type of a SD-JWT VC as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used, among other things, for the following purposes: Applications using Type Metadata defined in this specification are called \"Consumers\" in the following. This typically includes Issuers, Verifiers, and Wallets. 6.1. All examples in this section are non-normative. Type Metadata about the value of a claim value can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. Here, the type is . The Type Metadata is retrieved from the URL . The following is an example for a Type Metadata document: 6.2. The Type Metadata document MUST be a JSON object. The following properties are defined: 6.3. A type can extend another type. The extended type is identified by the URI in the property. Consumers MUST retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before processing the Type Metadata for the extending type. The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations described in circular-extends apply in order to avoid problems with circular dependencies. 6.4. 6.4.1. A URI in the claim can be used to express a type. If the type is a URL using the HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata can be retrieved from the URL , i.e., by inserting after the authority part of the URL. The Type Metadata is retrieved using the HTTP GET method. The response MUST be a JSON object as defined in type-metadata-format. If the claim is present in the SD-JWT VC, its value MUST be an \"integrity metadata\" string as defined in Section document-integrity. 6.4.2. A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a type, e.g., if the type is not a HTTPS URL or if the Consumer does not have access to the URL. The registry MUST be a trusted registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type. The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as described in type-metadata-format. 6.4.3. Ecosystems MAY define additional methods for retrieving Type Metadata. For example, a standardization body or a community MAY define a service which has to be used to retrieve Type Metadata based on a URN in the claim. 6.4.4. A Consumer MAY cache Type metadata for a type. If a hash for integrity protection is present in the Type Metadata as defined in document-integrity, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is static and can be cached indefinitely. Otherwise, the Consumer MUST use the header of the HTTP response to determine how long the metadata can be cached. 6.4.5. Credentials MAY encode Type Metadata directly, providing it as \"glue information\" to the consumer. For JSON-serialized JWS-based credentials, such Type Metadata documents MAY be included in the unprotected header of the JWS. In this case, the key MUST be used in the unprotected header and its value MUST be an array of base64url-encoded Type Metadata documents as defined in this specification. Multiple documents MAY be included for providing a whole chain of types to the Consumer (see extending-type-metadata). A Consumer of a credential MAY use the documents in the array instead of retrieving the respective Type Metadata elsewhere as follows: 7. Both the claim in the SD-JWT VC and various URIs in the metadata document MAY be accompanied by a respective claim suffixed with , in particular: The value MUST be an \"integrity metadata\" string as defined in Section 3 of W3C.SRI. A Consumer of the respective documents MUST verify the integrity of the retrieved document as defined in Section 3.3.5 of W3C.SRI. 8. <\/ins> The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt apply to this specification. Additionally, the following security considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs: 6.1. <\/del> 8.1. <\/ins> The JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT VC Issuer by the Holder or Verifier. Similar to other metadata"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e0afd16849563744fc9f8ff2e238533369eb520d2302c3fc0a02c4c1682453ab","title":"","text":"Additional considerations can be found in OWASP_SSRF. 6.2. <\/del> 8.2. <\/ins> When defining ecosystem-specific rules for the verification of the public key, as outlined in issuer-signed-jwt-verification-key-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-b5aa1e1e0d22989772c6c5bb54d84045abbeacf66cad281a71cb1a3b759be0d9","title":"","text":"attacker to potentially manipulate the verification result to their advantage. 7. <\/del> 8.3. A type MUST NOT extend another type that extends (either directly or with steps in-between) the first type. This would result in a circular dependency that could lead to infinite recursion when retrieving and processing the metadata. Consumers MUST detect such circular dependencies and reject the credential. 8.4. In retrieving-type-metadata, various methods for distributing and retrieving metadata are described. Methods relying on a network connection may fail due to network issues or unavailability of a network connection due to offline usage of credentials, temporary server outages, or denial of service attacks on the metadata server. Consumers SHOULD therefore implement a local cache as described in retrieval-from-local-cache if possible. Such a cache MAY be populated with metadata before the credential is used. Issuers MAY provide glue documents as described in glue-documents to provide metadata directly with the credential and avoid the need for network requests. These measures allow the Consumders to continue to function even if the metadata server is temporarily unavailable and avoid privacy issues as described in privacy-preserving-retrieval-of-type-metadata. 9. <\/ins> The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt apply to this specification. Additionally, the following privacy considerations need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs. 7.1. <\/del> 9.1. <\/ins> The Privacy Considerations in Section 12.5 of I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt apply especially to the claim. 7.2. <\/del> 9.2. <\/ins> Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-94232c7c1bfbcc0affc554ab3afb13412acde73426050e2469b90df920457d9e","title":"","text":"information is shared with the Verifier. 7.3. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-811e0e45c6b8030d93a047c53049a58b74269dc5f17314dd1831eafb1c09d49e","title":"","text":"Holders are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs if they contain easily correlatable information in the Issuer identifier. 8. <\/del> 10. <\/ins> This specification defines validation and processing rules for verifiable credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-JWT I-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4c0f447ceed7e54ef1ea778472a0eded7e8103aa6f1c04e2638efdf00290ac15","title":"","text":"18013-5:2021 ISO.18013-5 defines a representation of verifiable credentials in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded as CBOR and secured using COSE. 10.1. In retrieving-type-metadata, various methods for distributing and retrieving Type Metadata are described. For methods which rely on a network connection to a URL (e.g., provided by an Issuer), third parties (like the Issuer) may be able to track the usage of a credential by observing requests to the Type Metadata URL. Consumers SHOULD prefer methods for retrieving Type Metadata that do not leak information about the usage of a credential to third parties. The recommendations in robust-retrieval apply. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-914dd9296c07debf51cfd51d2a262e236ef42622eeefffb8120fe6695e28588c","title":"","text":"In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue so- called Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Credentials are cryptographically signed statements about a Subject, typically the <\/del> cryptographically secured statements about a Subject, typically the <\/ins> Holder. Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in the Verifiable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-0e1464f900ac536857cf808fb7859e9d8efc08b79ce009d1ab6b776556dcd7a5","title":"","text":"claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used. Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST validate that the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in issuer-signed-jwt-verification-key-validation. <\/del> Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST validate the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in issuer- signed-jwt-verification-key-validation. <\/ins> If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-78befec9513f8414d8265809e0fd692a75ad1d9d1890f1c03328d5e06aa312fb","title":"","text":"verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in issuer- signed-jwt-verification-key-validation. If Schema Type Metadata is provided, a recipient MUST validate the JSON Schema as defined in schema-type-metadata. <\/ins> If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c3d9a5ae69e82435392c04db66b9f618919784bb17d140fa9eea1fd1c3f2bd51","title":"","text":"6. A type is associated with metadata defining, for example, information about the type, a schema defining which claims MAY or MUST appear in the SD-JWT VC, and how they can be displayed. <\/del> A SD-JWT VC type, i.e., the value, is associated with Type Metadata defining, for example, information about the type or a Schema defining (see schema- definition) which claims MAY or MUST appear in the SD-JWT VC. <\/ins> This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type of a SD-JWT VC as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/del> of a SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/ins> and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used, among other things, for the following purposes: Applications using Type Metadata defined in this specification are called \"Consumers\" in the following. This typically includes Issuers, Verifiers, and Wallets. <\/del> Type Metadata can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. <\/ins> 6.1. All examples in this section are non-normative. Type Metadata about the value of a claim value can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. <\/del> Here, the type is . The Type Metadata is retrieved from the URL"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e8ab25f494c0cbe3abd7942cb186062969bbf0c7b7b6b3e1fcd825f88c92ff0f","title":"","text":"6.3. A type can extend another type. The extended type is identified by the URI in the property. Consumers MUST retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before processing the Type Metadata for the extending type. The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations described in circular-extends apply in order to avoid problems with circular dependencies. 6.4. 6.4.1. <\/del> 6.3.1. <\/ins> A URI in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-27a06cb9f3bf7bffcdbb23699fe10653378acc99cd79d2ca0ae12d147d98dcb4","title":"","text":"MUST be an \"integrity metadata\" string as defined in Section document-integrity. 6.4.2. <\/del> 6.3.2. <\/ins> A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a type, e.g., if the type is not a HTTPS URL or if the Consumer does not have access to the URL. The registry MUST be a trusted registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type. <\/del> A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a SD-JWT VC type, e.g., if the type is not a HTTPS URL or if the Consumer does not have access to the URL. The registry MUST be a trusted registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type. <\/ins> The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as described in type-metadata-format. 6.4.3. <\/del> 6.3.3. <\/ins> Ecosystems MAY define additional methods for retrieving Type Metadata. For example, a standardization body or a community MAY"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-3de01af6dda3f146af3d9b49cc33e467bd20e27c767b3c24f59ba9606053faa3","title":"","text":"claim. 6.4.4. <\/del> 6.3.4. <\/ins> A Consumer MAY cache Type metadata for a type. If a hash for integrity protection is present in the Type Metadata as defined in document-integrity, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is static and can be cached indefinitely. Otherwise, the Consumer MUST use the <\/del> A Consumer MAY cache Type Metadata for a SD-JWT VC type. If a hash for integrity protection is present in the Type Metadata as defined in document-integrity, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is static and can be cached indefinitely. Otherwise, the Consumer MUST use the <\/ins> header of the HTTP response to determine how long the metadata can be cached. 6.4.5. <\/del> 6.3.5. <\/ins> Credentials MAY encode Type Metadata directly, providing it as \"glue information\" to the consumer. <\/del> information\" to the Consumer. <\/ins> For JSON-serialized JWS-based credentials, such Type Metadata documents MAY be included in the unprotected header of the JWS. In"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-1ae16772a5f7edd450a2b9ebb21475ac35353a6f2ed381f0bd3b23c1479cde6a","title":"","text":"array instead of retrieving the respective Type Metadata elsewhere as follows: 6.4. An SD-JWT VC type can extend another type. The extended type is identified by the URI in the property. Consumers MUST retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before processing the Type Metadata for the extending type. The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations described in circular-extends apply in order to avoid problems with circular dependencies. 6.5. 6.5.1. Schemas for Verifiable Credentials are contained in the or retrieved via the Type Metadata parameters (as defined in type-metadata-format). A Schema MUST be represented by a JSON Schema document according to draft version 2020-12 JSON.SCHEMA.2020-12, or above. The Schema of a Verifiable Credential MUST include all properties that are required by this specification and MUST NOT override their cardinality, JSON data type, or semantic intent. The following is a non-normative example of a JSON Schema document for the example in vc-sd-jwt-example requiring the presence of the claim in an SD-JWT VC presentation: Note, that and are always required by this specification. 6.5.2. If a or property is present, a Consumer MUST validate the JSON document resulting from the SD-JWT verification algorithm (as outlined in Section 8 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt) against the JSON Schema document provided by the or property. If an property is present, the Schema Type Metadata of the extended type MUST also be validated in the same manner. This process includes validating all subsequent extended types recursively until a type is encountered that does not contain an property in its Type Metadata. Each Schema Type Metadata in this chain MUST be evaluated for a specific Verifiable Credential. If the Schema Type Metadata validation fails for any of the types in the chain, the Consumer MUST reject the Verifiable Credential. The following is a non-normative example of a result JSON document after executing the SD-JWT verification algorithm that is validated against the JSON Schema document in the example provided in schema- definition: Note, the example above does not contain any , , or claims. <\/ins> 7. Both the claim in the SD-JWT VC and various URIs in the metadata document MAY <\/del> claim in the SD-JWT VC and the various URIs in the Type Metadata MAY <\/ins> be accompanied by a respective claim suffixed with , in particular:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-06f6c3b0dde35481ccda31353f51dd32f8a1308764f8787014f07ad206f849c8","title":"","text":"All examples in this section are non-normative. Type Metadata about the value of a <\/del> The following is an example of an SD-JWT VC payload, containing a <\/ins> claim value can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. <\/del> claim with the value <\/ins> Here, the type is <\/del> : <\/ins> . The Type Metadata is retrieved from the URL <\/del> Type Metadata for the type <\/ins> . <\/del> can be retrieved using various mechanisms as described in retrieving- type-metadata. For this example, the well-known URL as defined in retrieval-from-vct-claim is used and the following Type Metadata Document is retrieved from the URL : <\/ins> The following is an example for a Type Metadata document: <\/del> Note: The hash of the Type Metadata document shown in the second example must be equal to the one in the claim in the SD-JWT VC payload, . <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-6e5fb3adebe41694ed61b53345c003b05b3584ef6dd2f7dc264ec5ad63a10434","title":"","text":"verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in issuer- signed-jwt-verification-key-validation. If a schema is provided in the Type Metadata, a recipient MUST validate the schema as defined in schema-type-metadata. <\/ins> If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to process the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a82632dd78ce509503546dd303bc3837f20ab281291c8c4330ae80815bc33522","title":"","text":"6. A type is associated with metadata defining, for example, information about the type, a schema defining which claims MAY or MUST appear in the SD-JWT VC, and how they can be displayed. <\/del> A SD-JWT VC type, i.e., the value, is associated with Type Metadata defining, for example, information about the type or a schema defining (see schema- definition) which claims MAY or MUST appear in the SD-JWT VC. <\/ins> This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type of a SD-JWT VC as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/del> of a SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/ins> and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used, among other things, for the following purposes: Applications using Type Metadata defined in this specification are called \"Consumers\" in the following. This typically includes Issuers, Verifiers, and Wallets. <\/del> Type Metadata can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. <\/ins> 6.1. All examples in this section are non-normative. Type Metadata about the value of a <\/del> The following is an example of an SD-JWT VC payload, containing a <\/ins> claim value can be retrieved as described in retrieving-type- metadata. <\/del> claim with the value <\/ins> Here, the type is <\/del> : <\/ins> . The Type Metadata is retrieved from the URL <\/del> Type Metadata for the type <\/ins> . <\/del> can be retrieved using various mechanisms as described in retrieving- type-metadata. For this example, the well-known URL as defined in retrieval-from-vct-claim is used and the following Type Metadata Document is retrieved from the URL : Note: The hash of the Type Metadata document shown in the second example must be equal to the one in the <\/ins> The following is an example for a Type Metadata document: <\/del> claim in the SD-JWT VC payload, . <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-9268919e59cb9a10a93fc8ca30d28c2686f76f33a45417d342cea683d53bb923","title":"","text":"array instead of retrieving the respective Type Metadata elsewhere as follows: 6.4. An SD-JWT VC type can extend another type. The extended type is identified by the URI in the property. Consumers MUST retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before processing the Type Metadata for the extending type. The extended type MAY itself extend another type. This can be used to create a chain or hierarchy of types. The security considerations described in circular-extends apply in order to avoid problems with circular dependencies. 6.5. 6.5.1. Schemas for Verifiable Credentials are contained in the or retrieved via the Type Metadata parameters (as defined in type-metadata-format). A schema MUST be represented by a JSON Schema document according to draft version 2020-12 JSON.SCHEMA.2020-12 or above. The schema of a Verifiable Credential MUST include all properties that are required by this specification and MUST NOT override their cardinality, JSON data type, or semantic intent. The following is a non-normative example of a JSON Schema document for the example in vc-sd-jwt-example requiring the presence of the claim in an SD-JWT VC presentation: Note that and are always required by this specification. 6.5.2. If a or property is present, a Consumer MUST validate the JSON document resulting from the SD-JWT verification algorithm (as defined in Section 8 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt) against the JSON Schema document provided by the or property. If an property is present, the schema of the extended type MUST also be validated in the same manner. This process includes validating all subsequent extended types recursively until a type is encountered that does not contain an property in its Type Metadata. Each schema in this chain MUST be evaluated for a specific Verifiable Credential. If the schema validation fails for any of the types in the chain, the Consumer MUST reject the Verifiable Credential. The following is a non-normative example of a result JSON document after executing the SD-JWT verification algorithm that is validated against the JSON Schema document in the example provided in schema- definition: Note, the example above does not contain any , , or claims. <\/ins> 7. Both the claim in the SD-JWT VC and various URIs in the metadata document MAY <\/del> claim in the SD-JWT VC and the various URIs in the Type Metadata MAY <\/ins> be accompanied by a respective claim suffixed with , in particular:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-6cb035d02ac11096376581ebc3d9f94c2fb59461284eb9b41a2c4d41cc61ffad","title":"","text":"3.3. The following is a non-normative example of an unsecured payload of an SD-JWT VC. <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of the user data of an unsecured payload of an SD-JWT VC. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of how the unsecured payload of the SD-JWT VC above can be used in a SD-JWT where the resulting <\/del> of the SD-JWT VC above can be used in an SD-JWT where the resulting <\/ins> SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the Subject that are selectively disclosable:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-fc31184911908e79ef0c5ecfbf7b5e6f0dd47d0bb977f4dab8e96d7680bcab63","title":"","text":"The SD-JWT and the Disclosures would then be serialized by the Issuer into the following format for issuance to the Holder: Examples of what presentations of SD-JWT VCs might look like are provided in presentation-examples. <\/ins> 3.4. The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-91b2a421b1a1bd4669e28874de352719a27a16cc67b36acf449e802ca44d30a2","title":"","text":"The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD- JWT shown in vc-sd-jwt-example including a Key Binding JWT. In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the <\/del> presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosures for the and claims. Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. After validation, the Verifier will have the following processed SD- JWT payload available for further handling: <\/ins> claim. Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier. <\/del> The following example shows a presentation of a (similar but different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT: <\/ins> The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT without a Key Binding JWT: <\/del> The Verifier will have the following processed SD-JWT payload after validation: <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4a616036ef77a3d071d7cf0cd56fddd5d1a9f047e4883a6475a64e4d2303498f","title":"","text":"SD-JWT VCs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type as defined in application-vc-sd-jwt. <\/del> as defined in media-type. The base subtype name is meant to stand for \"digital credential\", which is a term that is emerging as a conceptual synonym for \"verifiable credential\". <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-415b3e3ada1278529f9e8d9e21684b32311017195065b582e46dc75cd86f2a27","title":"","text":"The following is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT header: Note that this draft used as the value of the header from its inception in July 2023 until November 2024 when it was changed to to avoid conflict with the media type name registered by the W3C's Verifiable Credentials Data Model draft. In order to facilitate a minimally disruptive transition, it is RECOMMENDED that Verifiers and Holders accept both and as the value of the header for a reasonable transitional period. <\/ins> 3.2.2. This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c230e9566fd92cc23b39ffa4eb6490b01bdecf35ac42a39379a5c43cb0162c17","title":"","text":"3.2. SD-JWT VCs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT format defined in Section 5 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. A presentation <\/del> Section 4 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. A presentation <\/ins> of an SD-JWT VC MAY contain a Key Binding JWT. Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-eeaceec9cb73d9d31be18dd4aefa68ef4b14461622e2fcb5ad47f2a12ec0a392","title":"","text":"selective-disclosure-jwt. If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in Section 11.6 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt), the Verifier MUST verify the Key Binding JWT according to Section 8 of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To verify the Key Binding JWT, the <\/del> Section 9.5 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt), the Verifier MUST verify the Key Binding JWT according to Section 7 of I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To verify the Key Binding JWT, the <\/ins> claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-17f5677b9352d82ec3c77805997219ae37f103757183cadd8ba7512dbc845b04","title":"","text":"4.1. If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.3 of I- <\/del> Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 4.3 of I- <\/ins> D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The Key Binding JWT MAY include additional claims which, when not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e4776d071993b44a9ada14f827211ebe7ba05e2a8741d371d859e3d26051c0c3","title":"","text":"credentials are displayed. This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type of a SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/del> of an SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata <\/ins> and processing rules. This Type Metadata is intended to be used, among other things, for the following purposes:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-e2bc5bdda576686cc0aa84243e31510255a038e0c917aebb99d8617625dac7ec","title":"","text":"Type Metadata for the type can be retrieved using various mechanisms as described in retrieving- type-metadata. For this example, the well-known URL as defined in retrieval-from-vct-claim is used and the following Type Metadata Document is retrieved from the URL <\/del> type-metadata. For this example, the <\/ins> : <\/del> value is a URL as defined in retrieval-from-vct-claim and the following Type Metadata Document is retrieved from it: <\/ins> This example is shortened for presentation, a full Type Metadata example can be found in ExampleTypeMetadata."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-18e889b57a18fc491aad6c664346a8f5b7a923f5f67fe45efa9ea1c28b7f2bc3","title":"","text":"A URI in the claim can be used to express a type. If the type is a URL using the HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata can be retrieved from the URL , i.e., by inserting after the authority part of the URL. <\/del> HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata MAY be retrieved from it. <\/ins> The Type Metadata is retrieved using the HTTP GET method. The response MUST be a JSON object as defined in type-metadata-format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-0ad32d4d79bbbc621a1ffed644e5df7c08706c945d05f9665c7fd4c4e81d5521","title":"","text":"6.3.2. A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a SD-JWT VC type, e.g., if the type is not a HTTPS URL or if the Consumer does not have access to the URL. The registry MUST be a trusted registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type. <\/del> VC type, e.g., if the type is not an HTTPS URL or if the Consumer does not have access to the URL. The registry MUST be a trusted registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide correct Type Metadata for the type. <\/ins> The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as described in type-metadata-format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c5e4688149319e2836a5b8e9090f16c7432e6896fceaf45c0746504365158434","title":"","text":"property is present, a Consumer MUST validate the JSON document resulting from the SD-JWT verification algorithm (as defined in Section 8 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt) against the <\/del> Section 7 of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt) against the <\/ins> JSON Schema document provided by the or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-325a7a9a4077480dea7e13d90b4a546bd3c41b81833ecb8a03a681ea3e3469e8","title":"","text":"11.1. The Privacy Considerations in Section 12.5 of I-D.ietf-oauth- <\/del> The Privacy Considerations in Section 10.1 of I-D.ietf-oauth- <\/ins> selective-disclosure-jwt apply especially to the claim."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-776ee9ac928cc21b6bce82ae9cb47449d5572cb1e936ed011d9efa05d0dc8522","title":"","text":". The claim is used to express the type or types of the JSON object that is contained in the JWT payload. In the general case, the <\/del> claim is used to express the type of the JSON object that is contained in the JWT payload. The <\/ins> value is an array of case-sensitive strings, each containing a value. In the special case when the SD-JWT has one credential type, the value MAY be a single case-sensitive string containing a <\/del> value MUST be a case-sensitive <\/ins> value. The following is a non-normative example of how is used to express a single type: The following is a non-normative example of how is used to express multiple types: <\/del> is used to express a type: <\/ins> 5.1.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c814c8fb4b74792dbc83ca1432491f07591e6f78c13a87b4053c6ef40e33f8f9","title":"","text":"9.1. The W3C VCDM 2.0 (see TBD) defines a JSON-LD vocabulary for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. To interop with the W3C VCDM 2.0 data model defined in [TBD], this specification defines mapping algorithm for VC-SD-JWT and VP-SD-JWT to the vocabulary and data model defined W3C VCDM 2.0 which is based on JSON-LD. <\/del> The W3C VCDM 2.0 VC-DATA defines a JSON-LD vocabulary for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. To interop with the W3C VCDM 2.0 data model defined in VC-DATA, this specification defines a mapping algorithm for VC-SD-JWT and VP-SD-JWT to the vocabulary and data model defined W3C VCDM 2.0 which is based on JSON-LD. <\/ins> 9.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-600edcd398970c1679b7a94e9e077ad16a385a604bfbd2c3065b16a1680326ae","title":"","text":"1. 1.1. <\/ins> A Verifiable Credential is an tamper-evident statement made by an Issuer about a Subject of the Verifiable Credential. Verifiable Credentials are issued to Holders which can present Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers typically in form of Verifiable Presentations. <\/del> Presentations which are secure envelops that contain Verifiable Credentials addressed to a specific audience. <\/ins> These relationships are described by the three-party-model which involves the following parties: Verifiers have to trust Issuers to make trustworthy statements about the Subject and they can additionally require that the Holder provides a proof that they are the intended Holder of the Verifiable Credential which can important for security reasons. This is only possible if an Issuer binds the Verifiable Credential to a specific Holder at the time of issuance. <\/del> In the three-party-model, Verifiers have to trust Issuers to make trustworthy statements about the Subject and they can additionally require that the Holder provides a proof that they are the intended Holder of the Verifiable Credential which can important for security reasons. This is only possible if an Issuer binds the Verifiable Credential to a specific Holder at the time of issuance. This process is referred to as Holder Binding and is further described in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations, are further described in [VCDM2.0]. However, this specification focuses on a specific version of the three-party-model which can have different features but will provide a representation of the model described in [VCDM2.0]. 1.2. <\/ins> JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 can in principle be used to express Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWTs do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability to disclose only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT, in the three-party- model as described above. This is a common problem in the so-called three-party model: An Issuer creates a Verifiable Credential for some End-User (Holder), who then presents this credential to multiple Verifiers. A credential might contain a large number of claims, but the Holder typically only wants to disclose a subset of these claims to a Verifier. In this case, the Holder would have to receive a new JWT from the Issuer, containing only the claims that should be disclosed, for each interaction with a new Verifier. This is inefficient, costly, and the necessary interaction with the Issuer <\/del> model as described above. This is a common problem in the three- party model: An Issuer creates a Verifiable Credential for some End- User (Holder), who then can presents this credential to multiple Verifiers. A Verifiable Credential might contain a large number of claims, but the Holder typically only wants to disclose a subset of these claims to a Verifier. In this case, the Holder would have to receive a new JWT from the Issuer, containing only the claims that should be disclosed, for each interaction with a new Verifier. This is inefficient, costly, and the necessary interaction with the Issuer <\/ins> introduces additional privacy risks. SD-JWT is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suitable for Verifiable Credentials. <\/del> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [SD-JWT] is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suitable for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. <\/ins> SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-f3de262711d298898c8eb397a56c1b1adda2c082341931d49a3c63dbe22f7698","title":"","text":"claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. 1.1. <\/del> 1.3. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 RFC2119. 1.2. <\/del> 1.4. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c82e15d053bc6b616926a5d4c625315961e8546d9621a4a14d5a597f9610c58e","title":"","text":"4. This specification defines the media type which describes a VC-SD-JWT with the following components: <\/del> This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for VC-SD-JWTs. <\/ins> 4.1. 4.1.1. <\/del> VC-SD-JWTs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type as defined in {#application-vc-sd-jwt}. 4.2. VC-SD-JWTs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Issuance as defined in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. VC-SD-JWTs MUST contain all Disclosures corresponding to their SD-JWT component except for Decoy Digests as per [@!I-D.ietf-oauth- selective-disclosure-jwt, section 5.1.1.3.]. 4.2.1. This section defines JWT header parameters for the SD-JWT component of the VC-SD-JWT. <\/ins> The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-66f04c5aade431efef892da0c494264c497f4e6437c0b10be54c68fa0981ac6c","title":"","text":"The following is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT header: 4.1.2. VC-SD-JWTs and VP-SD-JWTs can use any claim registered in the \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519. Some of the claims in a VC MUST NOT be selectively disclosed as they are always required for processing on the verifier side. All other claims can be made selectively disclosable by the issuer when issuing the respective VC-SD-JWT. <\/del> 4.2.2. <\/ins> VC-SD-JWTs and VP-SD-JWTs MAY contain additional registered or public claims depending on the application. <\/del> This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload of SD-JWTs and Diclosures belonging to VC-SD-JWTs. <\/ins> 4.1.2.1. <\/del> 4.2.2.1. <\/ins> This specification defines the JWT claim"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-cafd42777c449d36b8b0555c5f887c1745812335dd4b7f470fa51f7512e516ba","title":"","text":"is used to express a type: 4.1.2.2. <\/del> 4.2.2.2. <\/ins> The following are non-selectively disclosable registered JWT claims that SD-JWTs of VC-SD-JWTs contain for specific purposes: <\/del> VC-SD-JWTs MAY use any claim registered in the \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519. <\/ins> The following are selectively disclosable registered JWT claims that SD-JWTs of VC-SD-JWTs contain for specific purposes: <\/del> If present, the following registered JWT claims MUST be included in the SD-JWT and MUST NOT be included in the Disclosures, i.e. cannot be selectively disclosed: <\/ins> 4.2. <\/del> The following registered JWT claims MAY be contained in the SD-JWT or in the Disclosures and MAY be selectively disclosed: 4.2.2.3. Additional public claims MAY be used in the SD-JWT or in the Disclosures depending on the application. 4.3. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a Credential acting as the input for the VC-SD-JWT:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-5e3dfe6fca09340b8ace1c1d4ebeedd6055b768a3a1641c609db6bbd1738f3ee","title":"","text":"TBD: add other disclosures. 4.3. <\/del> 4.4. The recipient of the VC-SD-JWT MUST process and verify an VC-SD-JWT as follows: <\/ins> A Verifier MUST validate an VC-SD-JWT as follows: <\/del> Any claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored. <\/ins> Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the scope of this specification."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-f1d22027c5d27643eae27dfd1030d78832311bafe28bd698db7971d83196be98","title":"","text":"6. This specification defines the media type which describes the VP-SD-JWT with the following components: <\/del> This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for VP-SD-JWTs. <\/ins> 6.1. The following is a non-normative example of a VP-SD-JWT without holder binding: <\/del> VP-SD-JWTs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a VP-SD-JWT with holder binding: <\/del> as defined in {#application-vp-sd-jwt}. <\/ins> 6.2. TBD: same as VC-SD-JWT (-> refer to SD-JWT) + Holder Binding <\/del> VP-SD-JWTs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Presentation as defined in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. VP-SD-JWTs MAY contain a Holder Binding JWT as described in I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. 6.2.1. If the VP-SD-JWT includes a Holder Binding JWT, the following claims are used within the Holder Binding JWT: The Holder Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which when not understood MUST be ignored. 6.3. The following is a non-normative example of a VP-SD-JWT without Holder Binding: The following is a non-normative example of a VP-SD-JWT with Holder Binding: 6.4. The Verifier MUST process and verify an VP-SD-JWT as follows: <\/ins> 7. TBD <\/del> TBD: Verifier provided . <\/ins> 8. TBD <\/del> TBD: Holder provided nonce via . <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a80ec666a12caf2a018836a58a88efae12e413a43125bbf7d6c13ac5cd586c30","title":"","text":"Issuer about a Subject of the Verifiable Credential. Verifiable Credentials are issued to Holders which can present Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers typically in form of Verifiable Presentations which are secure Verifiable Credentials addressed to a <\/del> Presentations which secure Verifiable Credentials addressed to a <\/ins> specific audience. These relationships are described by the three-party-model which"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4a77ed60886b72052dc3ea7ede9cb9ee9364a4164b2b952b2801ac811dbfce24","title":"","text":"I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations, are further described in [VCDM2.0]. However, this specification focuses on a specific version of the three-party-model which can have different features but will provide a representation of the model described in [VCDM2.0]. <\/del> Verifiable Presentations, are further described in VC-DATA. However, this specification focuses on a specific version of the three-party- model which can have different features but will provide a representation of the model described in VC-DATA. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c8a5eebfbf300faf5dad4ccfe44c8661a59f131892dbd4652f80512acc5f144f","title":"","text":"This specification registers the media type in the W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC) Directory. <\/del> in the W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC) Directory VC-DIR. <\/ins> 9.1.2. The following is a uni-directional transformation algorithm that takes in a VC-SD-JWT conformant to this specification and maps it to the corresponding properties in the W3C VCDM 2.0 [VCDM2.0] which is <\/del> the corresponding properties in the W3C VCDM 2.0 VC-DATA which is <\/ins> based on a JSON-LD vocabulary. It includes specific handling for JWT claims used in this specification. The function returns a Verifiable Credential object in the W3C VCDM 2.0 format. The following is a uni-directional transformation algorithm from a VP-SD-JWT onto W3C Verifiable Presentations in pseudo-code: <\/del> Procedure: 1. Let <\/ins> #### <\/del> be the unsecured payload of the VC-SD-JWT reconstructed from the SD- JWT and Disclosures. 1. Let be an empty JSON object that represents the transformed Verifiable Credential: - Set the property of to . 1. If the payload contains the property: - Convert the value of from epoch time to an ISO datetime format. - Assign the converted value to the property of . - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. If the payload contains the property: - Convert the value of from epoch time to an ISO datetime format. - Assign the converted value to the property of . - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. If the payload contains the property: - Assign the value of to the property of . - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. Set the property of to the value of the property in the payload. - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. Set the property of to a String array and set the first array element to . Add the value of the property in the payload as the second array element. - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. If the payload contains the property: - Assign the value of as the property of the object in . - Remove the claim from the payload. 1. Else if the payload does not have a property, create an empty object. 1. Add all remaining claims in the payload to the object of and ignore claims that do not have a corresponding representation. 1. Output which contains the resulting Verifiable Credential. The following is a non-normative example of a pseudocode algorithm: <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-10405715d2f3c059d4fa2b934a1d42230d9db5bf9f59f3739147e4332adec1a3","title":"","text":"claims used in this specification. The function returns a Verifiable Credential object in the W3C VCDM 2.0 format. Procedure: 1. Let be the unsecured payload of the SD-JWT VC reconstructed from the SD- JWT and Disclosures. 1. Let be an empty JSON object that represents the transformed Verifiable Credential: - Set the property of to . 1. If contains the property: - Convert the value of from epoch time to an ISO datetime format. - Assign the converted value to the property of . - Remove the claim from . 1. If contains the property: - Convert the value of from epoch time to an ISO datetime format. - Assign the converted value to the property of . - Remove the claim from . 1. If contains the property: - Assign the value of to the property of . - Remove the claim from . 1. Set the property of to the value of the property in . - Remove the claim from . 1. Set the property of to a String array and set the first array element to . Add the value of the property in as the second array element. - Remove the claim from . 1. If contains the property: - Assign the value of as the property of the object in . - Remove the claim from . 1. Else if does not have a property, create an empty object. 1. Add all remaining claims in to the object of and ignore claims that do not have a corresponding representation. 1. Output which contains the resulting Verifiable Credential. <\/del> Procedure: <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of a pseudocode algorithm:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-4054543f57ea3c5193ad889b7caa15b3a3b39d01ea424e4bb4860e6585f8cdfb","title":"","text":"I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations, are further described in VC-DATA. However, this specification focuses on a specific version of the three-party- model which can have different features but will provide a representation of the model described in VC-DATA. <\/del> Verifiable Presentations, is also described in VC-DATA. However, this specification provides a specific format of Verifiable Credentials which deviates from the format described in VC-DATA to create Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT and JSON payloads but a translation algorithm is provided in this specification. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-5ceb556b08f03bb77b1f420776e58a7d15e0f0c173655f7ceff72230dede9a0f","title":"","text":"Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWTs do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability to disclose only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT, in the three-party- model as described above. This is a common problem in the three- party model: An Issuer creates a Verifiable Credential for some End- User (Holder), who then can presents this credential to multiple Verifiers. A Verifiable Credential might contain a large number of claims, but the Holder typically only wants to disclose a subset of these claims to a Verifier. In this case, the Holder would have to receive a new JWT from the Issuer, containing only the claims that should be disclosed, for each interaction with a new Verifier. This is inefficient, costly, and the necessary interaction with the Issuer introduces additional privacy risks. <\/del> only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT, which is a requirement to implement the three-party-model efficiently. <\/ins> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [SD-JWT] is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-a75786ddbc9c593be17fabb33f8e832845ab715ef40d618839d9bbe28a479694","title":"","text":"scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path components, but no query or fragment components. The following is a non-normative example of the URL of the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/del> 5.1. A JWT Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP request at the path defined in jwt-issuer-metadata. The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/ins> is set to : The following is a non-normative example of the URL of the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/del> If the value contains a path component, any terminating MUST be removed before inserting and the well-known URI suffix between the host component and the path component. The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration when <\/ins> is set to : The JWT Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be a JSON document compliant with this specification and MUST be returned using the <\/del> 5.2. A successful response MUST use the and return the JWT Issuer Metadata configuration using the <\/ins> content type. An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value. <\/ins> This specification defines the following JWT Issuer Metadata parameters: <\/del> configuration parameters: <\/ins> JWT Issuer Metadata MUST include either"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-817aec863763a8d19f195950e8f5587cfcb3866ac280b1b35d4c91dd1592e87c","title":"","text":"JWK Set included by value or referenced in the JWT Issuer Metadata. The following is a non-normative example of a JWT Issuer Metadata including <\/del> configuration including <\/ins> : The following is a non-normative example of a JWT Issuer Metadata including <\/del> configuration including <\/ins> : Additional JWT Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also be used. 5.3. The value returned MUST be identical to the value of the JWT. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. <\/ins> 6. This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-45939fbff0143723f22bb76e35d5021a5d3bfb5470cc4fc9066df8672a61b6dd","title":"","text":"4.3. The following is a non-normative example of an unsecured input payload of an SD-JWT VC. <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of an unsecured payload of an SD-JWT VC. <\/ins> The following is a non-normative example of how the Credential above can be used in a SD-JWT where the resulting SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the Subject that are selectively disclosable: <\/del> The following is a non-normative example of how the unsecured payload of the SD-JWT VC above can be used in a SD-JWT where the resulting SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the Subject that are selectively disclosable: <\/ins> Note that a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-ff2553f0dcc4bf7ad9a14add6fbfd41f8f0430eb0f6a64a8ad97be11f326b2ee","title":"","text":"Abstract This specification describes data formats, validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload based on the securing mechanisms of SD-JWT I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. <\/del> This specification describes data formats as well as validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payload based on the SD-JWT format I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> 1. 1.1. A Verifiable Credential is an tamper-evident statement made by an Issuer about a Subject of the Verifiable Credential. Verifiable Credentials are issued to Holders which can present Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers typically in form of Verifiable Presentations which secure Verifiable Credentials addressed to a specific audience. These relationships are described by the three-party-model which involves the following parties: In the three-party-model, Verifiers have to trust Issuers to make trustworthy statements about the Subject and they can additionally require that the Holder provides a proof that they are the intended Holder of the Verifiable Credential which can important for security reasons. This is only possible if an Issuer binds the Verifiable Credential to a specific Holder at the time of issuance. This process is referred to as Holder Binding and is further described in <\/del> In the so-called Three-Party-Model, Issuers issue Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Credentials are tamper-evident (usually cryptographically signed) statements about a Subject, typically the Holder. Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in the Verifiable Credentials and optionally enforce Holder Binding, i.e., ask the Holder to prove that they are the intended holder of the Verifiable Credential, for example, by proving possession of a cryptographic key referenced in the credential. This process is further described in <\/ins> I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To support revocation of credentials, an optional fourth party can be involved, a Status Provider, who delivers revocation information to Verifiers. (The Verifier can also serve as the Status Provider.) <\/ins> The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations, is also described in VC-DATA. However, this specification provides a specific format of Verifiable Credentials which deviates from the format described in VC-DATA to create Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT and JSON payloads but a translation algorithm is provided in this specification. <\/del> Verifiable Presentations, is also described in VC-DATA. This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format and JSON payloads. A translation algorithm between the two approaches is provided in this specification. <\/ins> 1.2. JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) RFC7519 can in principle be used to express Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWTs do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability to disclose only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT, which is a requirement to implement the three-party-model efficiently. <\/del> process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWT- based credentials do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability for a holder to disclose only a subset of the claims contained in the JWT, which is a requirement to implement the three- party-model efficiently. <\/ins> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [SD-JWT] is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suitable for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable <\/del> perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable <\/ins> Presentations. SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how Verifiable Credentials can be expressed using SD-JWT. JWTs are used to protect the integrity of JSON payloads, which can contain claims that are registered in the IANA JWT Claim Registry, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JSON payloads, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/del> JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in the IANA JWT Claim Registry, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-6ffcf86604f7416fcee20b5e04563e25bcab67ddc14dcc75e1ca9e65e6fb1903","title":"","text":"contained in the JWT, which is a requirement to implement the three- party-model efficiently. Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) [SD-JWT] is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. <\/del> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt is a specification that introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. <\/ins> SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-f147ea154f9db42b29c3f7c8408fb43561636190be10764691016b8fbda74231","title":"","text":"4.2. SD-JWT VCs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Issuance as defined in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> Issuance as defined in Section 5.3. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> SD-JWT VCs MUST contain all Disclosures corresponding to their SD-JWT component except for Decoy Digests as per section 5.1.1.3. of I- <\/del> component except for Decoy Digests as per Section 5.1.1.3. of I- <\/ins> D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-683244c614a3964040e024fcb2dc15c63ad1a1a0f8c1b3e0f999abf0c135d540","title":"","text":"6.1. SD-JWT VPs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Presentation as defined in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> Presentation as defined in Section 5.4. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> SD-JWT VPs MAY contain a Holder Binding JWT as described in I-D.ietf- oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> SD-JWT VPs MAY contain a Holder Binding JWT as described in Section 5.4.1. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> 6.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-b52fadf79c2e6775e31f71a27c5e2c243238c453692db0a67790cc33d1d25bb4","title":"","text":"referenced in the credential. This process is further described in I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. To support revocation of credentials, an optional fourth party can be involved, a Status Provider, who delivers revocation information to Verifiers. (The Verifier can also serve as the Status Provider.) <\/del> To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, an optional fourth party can be involved, a Status Provider, who delivers revocation information to Verifiers. (The Verifier can also serve as the Status Provider.) <\/ins> The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations, is also described in VC-DATA. This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format and JSON payloads. A translation algorithm between the two approaches is provided in this specification. <\/del> The three-party-model, i.e., actors, Verifiable Credentials, is also described in VC-DATA. This specification defines Verifiable Credentials based on the SD-JWT format and JWT Claim Sets with JSON payloads. A translation algorithm between the two approaches is provided in this specification. <\/ins> 1.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-cec9f97717026cbc66366d3e92fa30ea134625d4b1d8cd9bf1d96217492eb55e","title":"","text":"Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and process as it builds upon established web primitives. However, JWT- based credentials do not support selective disclosure, i.e., the ability for a holder to disclose only a subset of the claims <\/del> ability for a Holder to disclose only a subset of the claims <\/ins> contained in the JWT, which is a requirement to implement the three- party-model efficiently."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-c3c5d2e4625b4d361d02c54f3bc8527efc0e2ca22bfd50cac9e0c5f0f307ad82","title":"","text":"support selective disclosure for JWTs: For an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release (within bounds defined by the Issuer). This format is therefore perfectly suited for Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations. <\/del> Verifiable Credentials. <\/ins> SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that must be used within the payload or their semantics. This specification therefore defines how Verifiable Credentials can be expressed using SD-JWT. JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in the IANA JWT Claim Registry, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/del> JWTs (and SD-JWTs) can contain claims that are registered in \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry as defined in RFC7519, as well as public and private claims. Private claims are not relevant for this specification due to the openness of the three-party-model. Since SD-JWTs are based on JWTs, this specification aims to express the basic Verifiable Credential data model purely through JWT Claim Sets, using registered claims while allowing Issuers to use additional registered claims, as well as new or existing public claims, to make statements about the Subject of the Verifiable Credential. <\/ins> 1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-0a32447189164c676de9c91a1a927aa580903998e44f53540b43d7ae5a2b223e","title":"","text":"This specification uses the terms \"Holder\", \"Issuer\", \"Verifier\", defined by I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt, Verifiable Credential and Verifiable Presentation defined by VC-DATA. <\/del> Credential defined by VC-DATA. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-816ca39b66c785c8f278d5100abd3d879c002f72295b8e2d7772e7057e187175","title":"","text":"6. This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for SD-JWT VPs. <\/del> presentations of SD-JWT VCs. <\/ins> 6.1. SD-JWT VPs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Presentation as defined in Section 5.4. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective- disclosure-jwt. <\/del> A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT Combined Format for Presentation as defined in Section 5.4. of I- D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/ins> SD-JWT VPs MAY contain a Holder Binding JWT as described in Section 5.4.1. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt. <\/del> A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MAY contain a Holder Binding JWT as described in Section 5.4.1. of I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure- jwt. <\/ins> 6.1.1. If the SD-JWT VP includes a Holder Binding JWT, the following claims are used within the Holder Binding JWT: <\/del> If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Holder Binding JWT, the following claims are used within the Holder Binding JWT: <\/ins> The Holder Binding JWT MAY include addtional claims which when not understood MUST be ignored."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-2cbbda1f78ce6125270d369bfe9347d3fabc2934f1e4f58bee39923c4bf7740b","title":"","text":" Selective Disclosure JWS (SD-JWS) <\/del> Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) <\/ins> draft-fett-selective-disclosure-jwt-00 Abstract This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Signature (JWS) documents that support selective disclosure of claim values. <\/del> This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Token (JWT) documents that support selective disclosure of JWT claim values. <\/ins> 1. The JSON-based content of JSON Web Signatures (JWS) as defined in RFC7515 is secured against modification using digital signatures. A consumer of a JWS document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving a JWS document can read all contents of the document. For example, a common use case is that the signed document represents a user's identity credential, created by an issuer. The issuer includes the user's public key or a reference thereto. To proof their identity to a verifier, the user can then send the issuer- signed credential plus a signature over some transaction-specific values, the so-called proof. It is signed using the user's private key. This demonstrates possession of the private key, and by extension, the identity of the user. The problem is, that using this approach, the user has to release the full issuer-signed credential to the verifier. The credential is often created once and can then be used for many transactions. Thus, it is in the user's interest that the credential creates many user attributes which can be disclosed selectively to verifiers. This document describes a format for JWS documents that support selective disclosure (SD-JWS) including a format for proofs. It is important to note that while user identity credentials of natural persons are common use cases, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for any other use case as well. <\/del> The JSON-based claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 document are secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. This document describes a format for JWT that supports selective disclosure (SD-JWT) which would enable sharing only subset of the claims included in the original JWT instead of releasing all the claims to every Verifeir. This document also defines an optional format for signatures called releases (SD-JWT-R). One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity created by an issuer. In such use case, there has been no privacy-related concerns with existing JOSE signature schemes, because when a signed JWT is one-time use, it contains only JWT claims that the user has consented in real time to release to the Verifier. However, when a signed JWT is intended to be multi-use, the ability to selectively disclose a subset of the claims depending on the verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent Verifier from obtaining claims irrelevant for the use case at hand. One example of such multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, or a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable authorship that contains claims about a subject. SD-JWT defined in this document enables such selective disclosure of claims. In a common use case, such JWT includes claims describing natural persons, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for any other use cases as well. It is also important to note that this format enables selective disclosure of claims, but in itself it does not achieve unlinkability of the subject of a JWS document. Note: so far agreed to define holder binding (user's public key contained inside an SD-JWS) as an option. It is not mandatory since holder binding is use case specific and orthogonal to the general mechanism of selective disclosure we are trying to define here. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4ba88aa19623bf3fc3d1f15202d35c4367a513de39ba6d021b75c2940a024779","title":"","text":"14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This specification uses the terms \"access token\", \"refresh token\", \"authorization server\", \"resource server\", \"authorization endpoint\", \"authorization request\", \"authorization response\", \"token endpoint\", \"grant type\", \"access token request\", \"access token response\", and \"client\" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework RFC6749. <\/del> denotes the URL-safe base64 encoding without padding defined in Section 2 of RFC7515. <\/ins> 2. Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the actor. Note: noneed to define anymore? <\/ins> 3. In the following, the concept of SD-JWSs and matching proofs is described on a conceptual level. <\/del> In the following section, the concepts of SD-JWTs and releases are described at a conceptual level. <\/ins> 3.1. An SD-JWS, at its core, is a signed document containing some metadata, the holder's public key, and hashed and salted claims. It is signed using the issuer's private key. <\/del> An SD-JWS, at its core, is a digitally signed document containing hashes over the claim values with unique salts, optionally the holder's public key and other metadata. It is digitally signed using the issuer's private key. <\/ins> is usually a simple object with claim names mapped to salted and hashed claim values: <\/del> is usually a simple object with claim names mapped to hashes over the claim values with unique salts: <\/ins> can also be nested deeper to capture more complex objects, as will be shown later. The SD-JWT is sent from the issuer to the holder, together with the mapping of the plain-text claim values, the salt values, and potentially some other information. <\/ins> 3.2. For a proof, a holder releases a document such as the following to the verifier: <\/del> To release to a verifier a subset of SD-JWT claim values, a holder creates a JWS such as the following: Note that the signature over is optional and required if, and only if, holder binding is desired. <\/ins> is usually a simple object with claim names mapped to values and salts:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a2d1ca73e7ca2fccfeba0cf47e70e8901c2866c88cafee45b4ceb802ce086e88","title":"","text":"can be more complex as well. The Release is sent together with the SD-JWT from the holder to the verifier. <\/ins> 3.3. A verifier first checks that the <\/del> A verifier checks that <\/ins> was indeed signed by the private key belonging to the public key contained in <\/del> The detailed algorithm is described below. <\/ins> . The verifier can then check that for each claim in <\/del> 4. <\/ins> , the hash <\/del> This section defines data formats of SD-JWT that contains hashes of the salted claim values and SD-JWT Salt\/Value Container that contains the mapping of the plain-text claim values and the salt values. <\/ins> matches the hash under the given claim name in the SD-JWS. <\/del> 4.1. <\/ins> 4. <\/del> An SD-JWT is a JWT that is optionally signed using the issuer's private key and contains following claims as payload. <\/ins> A SD-JWS is a JWT signed using the issuer's private key. The following shows an example for a SD-JWS document: <\/del> 4.1.1. <\/ins> In <\/del> Payload of SD-JWT can consist of the following claims. <\/ins> , the hashes are built by hashing over a JSON array containing the salt and the claim value, in the JSON notation: <\/del> 4.1.1.1. <\/ins> . The salt values and the hashes are Base64url encoded, trailing <\/del> SD-JWT MUST include hashes of the salted claim values that are included by the issuer under the property <\/ins> removed. Note that the precise JSON encoding can vary, and therefore, the JSON encodings are sent to the holder along with the SD-JWS, as described below. <\/del> . <\/ins> TODO: Consider using Base85 instead. <\/del> Issuer MUST choose a unique salt value for each claim value. Each salt value MUST contain at least 128 bits of pseudorandom data, making it hard for an attacker to guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to BASE64URL encode at least 16 pseudorandom bytes. <\/ins> The SD-JWS is then signed by the issuer, to create a document like the following (shortened for presentation): <\/del> Issuer MUST build the hashes by hashing over a string that is formed by JSON-encoding an ordered array containing the salt and the claim value, e.g.: <\/ins> 5. <\/del> . The hash value is then BASE64URL-encoded. Note that the precise JSON encoding can vary, and therefore, the JSON encodings MUST be sent to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below. <\/ins> Besides the SD-JWS itself, the holder needs to learn the raw claim values that are contained in the SD-JWS, along with the precise input to the hash calculation, and the salts. <\/del> object can be a 'flat' object, directly containing all claim names and hashed claim values without any deeper structure. <\/ins> The issuer therefore creates a Salt\/Value Container (SVC) as follows: <\/del> object can also be a 'structured' object, where some claims and their respective hashes are contained in places deeper in the structure. It is up to the issuer to decide how to structure the representation such that it is suitable for the use case. Examples 1 and 2 below show this using the OIDC <\/ins> For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWS from the issuer to the holder, the SVC is base64url encoded (as the parts of any JWS, todo reference) and appended to the SD-JWS using <\/del> claim, a structured claim. Appendix 1 shows a more complex example using claims from eKYC (todo: reference). <\/ins> as the separator: <\/del> Note that it is up to the issuer's discretion whether to turn the same payload of SD-JWT into 'flat' or 'structured' <\/ins> (Shortened for presentation.) <\/del> SD-JWT object. <\/ins> 6. <\/del> 4.1.1.2. If the issuer wants to enable holder binding, it includes a public key associated with the holder, or a reference thereto. It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the holder key pair is established. For example, the holder MAY provide a key pair to the issuer, the issuer MAY create the key pair for the holder, or holder and issuer MAY use pre-established key material. Note: need to define how holder public key is included, right now examples are using I think. 4.1.1.3. The SD-JWT payload typically contains other JWT claims, such as , , etc. 4.1.2. This example shows a simple SD-JWT containing user claims. The issuer here decided to use a completely flat structure, i.e., the claim can only be disclosed in full. In this example, these claims are the payload of the SD-JWT: The following shows the resulting SD-JWT payload: The SD-JWT is then signed by the issuer to create a document like the following: (Line breaks for presentation only.) 4.1.3. In this example, the issuer decided to create a structured object for the hashes. This allows for the release of individual members of the address claim separately. The user claims are as in Example 1 above. The resulting SD-JWT payload is as follows: 4.2. Besides the SD-JWT itself, the holder needs to learn the raw claim values that are contained in the SD-JWT, along with the precise input to the hash calculation, and the salts. There MAY be other information the issuer needs to communicate to the holder, such as a private key key if the issuer selected the holder key pair. 4.2.1. A SD-JWT Salt\/Value Container (SVC) is a JSON object containing at least the top-level property . Its structure mirrors the one of in the SD-JWT, but the values are the inputs to the hash calculations the issuer used, as strings. The SVC MAY contain further properties, for example, to transport the holder private key. <\/ins> The following shows the contents of a proof document: <\/del> 4.2.2. The SVC for Example 1 is as follows: 4.2.3. The SVC for Example 2 is as follows: 4.3. For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWT from the issuer to the holder, the SVC is base64ur-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT using as the separator. For Example 1, the combined format looks as follows: (Line breaks for presentation only.) 4.4. The following shows the contents of a release document for Example 1: <\/ins> For each claim, an array of the salt and the claim value is contained in the object. The SD-JWS Proof is then signed by the holder, to create a document like the following: <\/del> Again, the release document follows the same structure as the <\/ins> 7. <\/del> in the SD-JWT. For Example 2, a release document limiting to and only could look as follows: The SD-JWT Release MAY contain further claims, for example, to ensure a binding to a concrete transaction (in the example the and claims). If holder binding is desired, the SD-JWT Release is signed by the holder. If no holder binding is to be used, the algorithm is used, i.e., the document is not signed. <\/ins> The SD-JWS and the SD-JWS Proof can be combined into one document <\/del> In any case, the result is encoded as described in RFC7519 (here for Example 1): (Line breaks for presentation only.) 4.5. The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT Release can be combined into one document <\/ins> using as a separator: <\/del> as a separator (here for Example 1): <\/ins> 8. <\/del> (Line breaks for presentation only.) 5. Verifiers MUST follow RFC8725 for checking the SD-JWT and, if signed, the SD-JWT Release. Verifiers MUST go through (at least) the following steps before trusting\/using any of the contents of an SD-JWT: If any step fails, the input is not valid and processing MUST be aborted. 6. <\/ins> For the security of this scheme, the following properties are required of the hash function: 9. <\/del> Add: The Salts must be random\/long enough so that the attacker cannot brute force them. Note: No need for the wallet-generated hashes? to prevent issuer- verifier collusion 6.1. 7. <\/ins> TBD 10. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> We would like to thank ... 11. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e23fa840d335a1dc4959d61f08f16dbe429a20811ac5d0ed382a49d9573b67aa","title":"","text":"7.1. ToDo: add text explaining mechanisms that should be adopted to ensure that verifiers validate the claim values received in SD-JWT-R by calculating the hashes of those values and comparing them with the hashes in the SD-JWT: - create a test suite that forces hash computation by the Verifiers, and includes negative test cases in test vectors - use only implementations\/libraries that are compliant to the test suite - etc. 7.2. <\/ins> The SD-JWT MUST be signed by the issuer to protect integrity of the issued claims. An attacker can modify or add claims if an SD-JWT is not signed (e.g., change the \"email\" attribute to take over the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8780455d570e6013ba817eb54efe201b84f8f1cb853c2f3f8633b7826b74aa88","title":"","text":"signature on the SD-JWT cannot be verified, the SD-JWT MUST be rejected. 7.2. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> The security model relies on the fact that the salt is not learned or guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to adhere to this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9298caf3b8cc774fa532efdcac0c61efacc4c29ee0d6a92ef1a7931ecc1ae034","title":"","text":"it is not practical for the attacker to guess. Each salt value MUST be unique. 7.3. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> The length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt MUST be at least 128 bits. 7.4. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> For the security of this scheme, the hash function is required to be preimage and collision resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to calculate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-807c057d5bc2265a4f849dd077974a1e325eb59c84c732c75fd9abb74ef1e79a","title":"","text":"Furthermore the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. 7.5. <\/del> 7.6. <\/ins> TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-48f8ef2e7e5c1746c6134918f4e8ef621787a44e1bcfd32c79c4a99aed267f17","title":"","text":"9. We would like to thank ... <\/del> We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Brian Campbell, Christian Paquin, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Pieter Kasselman, and Torsten Lodderstedt for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway. <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-93c278cf3ee68ab6186d2c4a3e7ec1924cd1168a813f902e6deca12dec80e13c","title":"","text":"must contain information about key material controlled by the holder: Note: How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference. Examples in this document use Claim to include raw public key by value in SD-JWT. <\/del> this document. It can be passed by value or by reference. <\/ins> With holder binding, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a6a37c64a7aab515e0050dadfae225dd2d43e3f54301a615a751bc63b8a05a3b","title":"","text":"pair to the issuer, the issuer MAY create the key pair for the holder, or holder and issuer MAY use pre-established key material. Note: need to define how holder public key is included, right now examples are using <\/del> Note: Examples in this document use <\/ins> I think. <\/del> Claim defined in RFC7800 to include raw public key by value in SD- JWT. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-13450ef3ec4317d249f71371a328d8bf7145c47f08c427f7264322c77e9888f0","title":"","text":"Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) draft-fett-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-01 <\/del> draft-fett-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-02 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b780627395e1695dfc4930dda9f75756b598aef96159428449c7858e2daad63f","title":"","text":"can be a simple object with claim names mapped to hash digests over the claim values with unique random salts: The claim name ( ) is an optional <\/ins> can also be nested deeper to capture more complex objects, as will be shown later."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-dd7db0293ee242e97822775db5269d585956a61d931a055b3d895d08311a152f","title":"","text":"4.4. If claim name blinding is used, is created as follows: is a placeholder used instead of the original claim name, chosen such that it does not leak information about the claim name (e.g., randomly). The contents of are modified as follows: Note that blinded and unblinded claim names can be mixed in and accordingly in . 4.5. <\/ins> A verifier checks that The detailed algorithm is described below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-40906bc856fb3a72a08dbd468f2f3322b63bf5e5131d55219d3d29c5dad83623","title":"","text":"guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode the salt value. The issuer MUST build the digests by hashing over a string that is formed by JSON-encoding an ordered array containing the salt and the claim value, e.g.: <\/del> The issuer MUST build the digests by hashing over a JSON literal according to RFC8259 that is formed by JSON-encoding an object with the following contents: The following is an example for a JSON literal without claim name blinding: <\/ins> . The digest value is then base64url-encoded. Note that the precise JSON encoding can vary, and therefore, the JSON encodings MUST be sent to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below. <\/del> The following is an example for a JSON literal with claim name blinding: IMPORTANT: JSON encoding according to RFC8259 allows for white space characters and other variations in the encoded representation. To ensure that issuer and verifier produce the same hash digest, the issuer therefore sends the JSON literal to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below. The claim contains an object where claim names are mapped to the respective digests. If a claim name is to be blinded, the digests MUST contain the key as described above and the claim name in MUST be replaced by a placeholder value that does not leak information about the claim's original name. The same placeholder value is to be used in the SVC and SD-JWT-R described below. <\/ins> 5.1.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-ab5aa1a9ae2bff5043538867b36a1c4fa4ca5115940cd422411bec8d1bf248d3","title":"","text":"The SVC for Example 1 is as follows: Important: As described above, hash digests are calculated over the string formed by serializing a JSON array containing the salt and the claim value. This ensures that issuer and verifier use the same input to their hash functions and avoids issues with canonicalization of JSON values that would lead to different hash digests. The SVC therefore maps claim names to JSON-encoded arrays. <\/del> JSON literal formed by serializing an object containing the salt, the claim value, and optionally the claim name. This ensures that issuer and verifier use the same input to their hash functions and avoids issues with canonicalization of JSON values that would lead to different hash digests. The SVC therefore maps claim names to JSON- encoded arrays. <\/ins> 5.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-991c789124a00473124d5cd9c0937f6f9b84f8f5956661800e7e1b60af238b6c","title":"","text":"The following is a non-normative example of the contents of an SD- JWT-R for Example 1: For each claim, an array of the salt and the claim value is contained in the <\/del> For each claim, a JSON literal that decodes to an object with the and the claim value (plus optionally the claim name) is contained in the <\/ins> object."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c67fad1115bcda0a5e6a9e2c493f291ba6af18e4004657a19ce9afc500e81b8a","title":"","text":"TBD 7.7. Issuers that chose to blind claim names MUST ensure not to inadvertently leak information about the blinded claim names to verifiers. In particular, issuers MUST choose placeholder claim names accordingly. It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically random values with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names. The order of elements in JSON-encoded objects is not relevant to applications, but the order may reveal information about the blinded claim name to the verifier. It is therefore RECOMMENDED to ensure that the order is shuffled or otherwise hidden (e.g., alphabetically ordered using the blinded claim names). <\/ins> 8. 8.1. Claim names are not hashed in the SD-JWT and are used as keys in a key-value pair, where the value is the hash. This is because SD-JWT already reveals information about the issuer and the schema, and revealing the claim names does not provide any additional information. <\/del> By default, claim names are not blinded in an SD-JWT. In this case, even when the claim's value is not known to a verifier, the claim name can disclose some information to the verifier. For example, if the SD-JWT contains a claim named , the verifier might assume that the end-user is a member of the Super Secret Club. Blinding claim names can help to avoid this potential privacy issue. In many cases, however, verifiers can already deduce this or similar information just from the identification of the issuer and the schema used for the SD-JWT. Blinding claim names might not provide additional privacy if this is the case. <\/ins> 8.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-96acdcdafbd301511359b47c416352f0403f174d914c8266fb02e8993299bf65","title":"","text":" Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) <\/del> Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) <\/ins> draft-fett-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-02 Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-444391ff9253a79eb991049b146fb6af9c38c8f4f8223dc84edde95785fcf1d7","title":"","text":"1. The JSON-based claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 document are secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. <\/del> The JSON-based representation of claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 is secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the contents of the token have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. <\/ins> This document describes a format for signed JWTs that supports selective disclosure (SD-JWT), enabling sharing only a subset of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b95e6b6ad568f36c934f363feb5acabf0ca95c9565b3ebeb4eaa9bb14e16f3f8","title":"","text":"4.1. An SD-JWT, at its core, is a digitally signed document containing hash digests over the claim values with unique random salts and other <\/del> hash digests over the claim values with random salts and other <\/ins> metadata. It MUST be digitally signed using the issuer's private key. can be a simple object with claim names mapped to hash digests over the claim values with unique random salts: <\/del> is an object with claim names mapped to the digests over the claim values with random salts calculated using digest derivation function such as hash function, HMAC, or other: <\/ins> The claim name ("} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4bf982e46da89b1bb6b5c8a55301d71ebb7e6785b689bc8a0c48a388cf86dfce","title":"","text":". The issuer MUST choose a unique and cryptographically random salt value for each claim value. Each salt value SHOULD contain at least 128 bits of pseudorandom data, making it hard for an attacker to guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is <\/del> The issuer MUST choose a cryptographically random salt value for each claim value. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is <\/ins> RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode the salt value. The issuer MUST build the digests by hashing over a JSON literal"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4d2ff22b975c7103fb0cdbc772cac1781e7ca7e7315d67d73bef3603874323d6","title":"","text":"The claim indicates the hash algorithm used by the Issuer to generate the hashes of the salted claim values. The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry [IANA.Hash.Algorithms]. SD-JWTs with hash algorithm identifiers not found in this registry are not considered valid and MUST NOT be accepted by verifiers. <\/del> indicates the hash algorithm function used by the Issuer to generate the hashes over the random values and the claim values. The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry [IANA.Hash.Algorithms] or HMAC algorithms in \"Algorithmn Name\" column in the IANA \"JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms\" registry [IANA.JWS.Algorithms]. <\/ins> To promote interoperability, implementations MUST support the SHA-256 hash algorithm. <\/del> hash algorithm. Other specifications and\/or profiles of this specification may register additional algorithm identifiers. See security_considerations for requirements regarding entropy of the salt, minimum length of the salt, and choice of a hash function. <\/ins> 5.1.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-025fcb6d20f181ed8616b159493c977262e3e7f9bacd245d54feb657d66726f3","title":"","text":"guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to adhere to this principle. As such, the salt MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, long enough and has high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess. Each salt value MUST be unique. <\/del> it is not practical for the attacker to guess. A new random value MUST be chosen for each claim. <\/ins> 7.4. The length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt MUST be at least 128 bits. <\/del> The RECOMMENDED length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is at least 128 bits. <\/ins> 7.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8a0f323820c6e002459e5f77f70800af04cb423eb208d9a9ccc348ca06d4696f","title":"","text":"Issuers that chose to blind claim names MUST ensure not to inadvertently leak information about the blinded claim names to verifiers. In particular, issuers MUST choose placeholder claim names accordingly. It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically random values with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names. <\/del> names accordingly. It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically random values with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names. <\/ins> The order of elements in JSON-encoded objects is not relevant to applications, but the order may reveal information about the blinded"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b69b90c84d204b9fef37ea21bffa94afa2ba75f6ed23ce9bf1bfcfad412f7088","title":"","text":"1. The JSON-based content of signed JSON Web Token (JWT) as defined in RFC7515 is secured against modification using digital signatures. A consumer of a JWT that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the content has not been modified. However, anyone receiving a JWT can read the actual content of the document if not encrypted. <\/del> The JSON-based claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 document are secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. <\/ins> This document describes a format for JWT that supports selective disclosure (SD-JWT) which would enable sharing only subset of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-23880f71644acc233d6f02d45b4d53c8540835b266a50ac967192c6ff9df00be","title":"","text":"14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. BASE64URL denotes the URL-safe Base64 encoding without padding as defined in RFC7515, Section 2. <\/del> denotes the URL-safe base64 encoding without padding defined in Section 2 of RFC7515. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-0d241298e41211e36192fe1f726e8461d04a35fb1d14161c151d9dfc0d7b33cb","title":"","text":"by JSON-encoding an ordered array containing the salt and the claim value, e.g.: . The hash value is then BASE64URL encoded. Note that the precise <\/del> . The hash value is then BASE64URL-encoded. Note that the precise <\/ins> JSON encoding can vary, and therefore, the JSON encodings MUST be sent to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-972bae3cc5b9d1f7f76abe520a08d66e46977f7fe72c66bdd00c89547952d766","title":"","text":"4.3. For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWT from the issuer to the holder, the SVC is BASE64URL encoded and appended to the SD-JWT <\/del> the holder, the SVC is base64ur-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT <\/ins> using as the separator. For Example 1, the combined format looks as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-edf4fbc3ff6c39c2ec3d58f6ae2f913bf0acd531822db9fafb464da1a9ca93f1","title":"","text":"algorithm is used, i.e., the document is not signed. In any case, the result is encoded as described in RFC7515 (here for <\/del> In any case, the result is encoded as described in RFC7519 (here for <\/ins> Example 1): (Line breaks for presentation only.)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-28fb7aabbd169fce8db6d15ec2dfa541946da69d55fcfb3c7915f5f72d2de3f0","title":"","text":"7. TBD <\/del> 7.1. Claim names are not hashed in the SD-JWT and are used as keys in a key-value pair, where the value is the hash. This is because SD-JWT already reveals information about the issuer and the schema, and revealing the claim names does not provide any additional information. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5c6c81ed7ce04d9883e682a8c4a99bac162c67bcdcca9db967ed72fe32d50db4","title":"","text":"MUST be used by the issuer to include digests of the salted claim values for any claim that is intended to be selectively disclosable. The issuer MUST choose a cryptographically random salt value for each claim value. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode the salt value. <\/del> The issuer MUST choose a random salt value for each claim. It is RECOMMENDED to do so by base64url-encoding a cryptographically secure nonce. See salt-minlength for further requirements. <\/ins> The issuer MUST generate the digests over a JSON literal according to RFC8259 that is formed by JSON-encoding an object with the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8a5ec53152ad63902439550964c6b5c19ff8bbb97aa4398382e534198fa8e776","title":"","text":"key as described above and the claim name in MUST be replaced by a placeholder value that does not leak information about the claim's original name. The same placeholder value is to be used in the II-Disclosures and HS-Disclosures described below. <\/del> MUST be replaced by a placeholder name that does not leak information about the claim's original name. The same placeholder name will be used in the II-Disclosures ( ) and HS-Disclosures ( ) described below. To this end, the issuer MUST choose a random placeholder name for each claim that is to be blinded. It is RECOMMENDED to do so by base64url-encoding a cryptographically secure nonce. See blinding- claim-names for further requirements. <\/ins> 5.2.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-dcb59eb38da5040992779a3d946c2cf9a8c54654d0b83e2a3ace4ed5116bf478","title":"","text":"7.4. The RECOMMENDED length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is at least 128 bits. <\/del> The RECOMMENDED minimum length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is 128 bits. <\/ins> Note that minimum 128 bits would be necessary when SHA-256, HMAC- SHA256, or a function of similar strength is used, but a smaller salt size might achieve similar level of security if a stronger iterative derivation function is used. The issuer MUST ensure that a new salt value is chosen for each claim, including when the same claim name occurs at different places in the structure of the SD-JWT. This can be seen in Example 3 in the Appendix, where multiple claims with the name appear, but each of them has a different salt. <\/ins> 7.5. For the security of this scheme, the digest derivation algorithm is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5365aadf458fb2032caf6b209d1ae948497426856022d3e6d413346a4202dbc3","title":"","text":"7.7. Issuers that chose to blind claim names MUST ensure not to inadvertently leak information about the blinded claim names to verifiers. In particular, issuers MUST choose placeholder claim names accordingly. <\/del> It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically random numbers with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names. With the approach chosen in this specification, claim names of objects that are not themselves selectively disclosable are not blinded. This can be seen in Example 6 in the Appendix, where even in the blinded SD-JWT, <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED to use cryptographically salts with at least 128 bits of entropy as placeholder claim names. <\/del> and are visible. This limitation needs to be taken into account by issuers when creating the structure of the SD-JWT. The issuer MUST ensure that a new random placeholder name is chosen for each claim, including when the same claim name occurs at different places in the structure of the SD-JWT. This can be seen in Example 6 in the Appendix, where multiple claims with same name appear below and , but each of them has a different blinded claim name. For each credential issued, new random placeholder names MUST be chosen by the issuer. <\/ins> The order of elements in JSON-encoded objects is not relevant to applications, but the order may reveal information about the blinded"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f2c13d87670a619329116246e1c5de36eee8f57f2179695fa0284f8ffc9d8d1a","title":"","text":"2. 2.1. A JWT RFC7515 created by the issuer, which can be signed as a JWS RFC7515, that supports selective disclosure as defined in this document. 2.2. A JSON object created by the issuer that contains mapping between raw claim values that contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value. 2.3. A JWT created by the holder that contains a subset of the claim values of an SD-JWT in a verifiable way. 2.4. Ability of the holder to prove legitimate possession of SD-JWT by proving control over the same private key during the issuance and presentation. SD-JWT signed by the issuer contains a public key or a reference to a public key that matches to the private key controlled by the holder. 2.5. An entity that creates SD-JWTs (2.1). 2.6. An entity that received SD-JWTs (2.1) from the issuer and has control over them. 2.7. An entity that entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SSD-JWT-R (2.2) <\/ins> Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the actor. Note: noneed to define <\/del> Note: no need to define <\/ins> anymore?"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-cff1f37f8b81d69238c00d7121bf8b23da15e88aa41479081a3a4505c0910397","title":"","text":"3.2. To release to a verifier a subset of SD-JWT claim values, a holder <\/del> To SD-JWT-R to a verifier a subset of SD-JWT claim values, a holder <\/ins> creates a JWS such as the following: Note that the signature over"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b7d592b9e42a5ea6ad830528bf3a8a9bf428d44aaf7ba6b0461baa9a485d64e3","title":"","text":"can be more complex as well. The Release is sent together with the SD-JWT from the holder to the <\/del> The SD-JWT-R is sent together with the SD-JWT from the holder to the <\/ins> verifier. 3.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-57818d4873836434b80e84f3c38d8cd09d9accfcc5e5b3e144f60347e374eba9","title":"","text":"4.4. The following shows the contents of a release document for Example 1: <\/del> The following shows the contents of an SD-JWT-R for Example 1: <\/ins> For each claim, an array of the salt and the claim value is contained in the object. Again, the release document follows the same structure as the <\/del> Again, the SD-JWT-R follows the same structure as the <\/ins> in the SD-JWT. For Example 2, a release document limiting <\/del> in the SD-JWT. For Example 2, a SD-JWT-R limiting <\/ins> to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-923e22f4ed0c8882a8c3753fb6bd157bf23f998774c33c667442dac16a6fc005","title":"","text":"only could look as follows: The SD-JWT Release MAY contain further claims, for example, to ensure a binding to a concrete transaction (in the example the <\/del> The SD-JWT-R MAY contain further claims, for example, to ensure a binding to a concrete transaction (in the example the <\/ins> and claims). If holder binding is desired, the SD-JWT Release is signed by the holder. If no holder binding is to be used, the <\/del> If holder binding is desired, the SD-JWT-R is signed by the holder. If no holder binding is to be used, the <\/ins> algorithm is used, i.e., the document is not signed."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5345bf18fc755b2d7907b3a3ebd5b8be0f5f5a4b6efac62aafc204b254f19ef9","title":"","text":"4.5. The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT Release can be combined into one document using <\/del> The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT-R can be combined into one document using <\/ins> as a separator (here for Example 1):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-d9e73f23e697b9dd8c8fde08036dbee20a8f35d3482611737286b742a04bbb7f","title":"","text":"1.1. 1.2. <\/ins> The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-00860798c1312c795b91d97f7186014e3d4e79fac859eacd13156b56aae5bbf9","title":"","text":"Colluding Issuer\/Verifier or Verifier\/Verifier pairs could link issuance\/presentation or two presentation sessions to the same user on the basis of unique values encoded in the SD-JWT (Issuer signature, salts, digests, etc.). More advanced cryptographic schemes, outside the scope of this specification, can be used to prevent this type of linkability. <\/del> signature, salts, digests, etc.). To prevent these types of linkability, various methods, including but not limited to the following ones can be used: <\/ins> 9. We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Brian Campbell, Christian Paquin, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Pieter Kasselman, Shawn Butterfield, and Torsten Lodderstedt for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Brian Campbell, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, and Torsten Lodderstedt for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-bca9406dfec9315ddb151d43db844f605a42680f44a667eeabb614f2212c9b1d","title":"","text":"disclosure (SD-JWT) which would enable sharing only subset of the claims included in the original JWT instead of releasing all the claims to every Verifeir. This document also defines an optional format for signatures called releases (SD-JWT-R). <\/del> format for signatures called SD-JWT Releases (SD-JWT-R). <\/ins> One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity created by an issuer. In such use case, there has been no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8dbecb12a7af9e0487a09f32ff8203d01d6abaceabf372c8383bece12ee82856","title":"","text":"3. In the following section, the concepts of SD-JWTs and releases are described at a conceptual level. <\/del> In the following section, the concepts of SD-JWTs and SD-JWT Releases are described at a conceptual level. <\/ins> 3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-91dcf825e03787dfd6b88931c86c3e6654c8502d8b42356aae689a09ffe4ce52","title":"","text":"verifier. However, when a signed JWT is intended to be multi-use, the ability to selectively disclose a subset of the claims depending on the verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent verifier from obtaining claims irrelevant for the use case at hand. <\/del> prevent verifier from obtaining claims irrelevant for the transaction at hand. <\/ins> One example of such a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, or a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-59b6111aeb14b523ad2be37500c06edab91cd0a0c1cfef990f952b8714dded38","title":"","text":"Note: so far agreed to define holder binding (user's public key contained inside an SD-JWT) as an option. It is not mandatory since holder binding is use case specific and orthogonal to the general mechanism of selective disclosure we are trying to define here. <\/del> mechanism of selective disclosure defined here. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-bc971dc11fb9ff3a75a25cd74c528ad472b77f478c12e0f66516ed0031b20cf7","title":"","text":"2.7. An entity that entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SSD-JWT-R (2.2) <\/del> from SD-JWT-R (2.2) <\/ins> Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4cb0fcc5d4b0b1a1c87ddadea7a1ff765c37f67e0ef518fa2955d4cc335e5fe2","title":"","text":"The issuer MUST choose a unique salt value for each claim value. Each salt value MUST contain at least 128 bits of pseudorandom data, making it hard for an attacker to guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url encode at least <\/del> encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url-encode at least <\/ins> 16 pseudorandom bytes. The issuer MUST build the hashes by hashing over a string that is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-6cedcb4f9928ca4026d990230cdf10ecea0bd921affeeb85aa8473a3885be44e","title":"","text":"values that are contained in the SD-JWT, along with the precise input to the hash calculation, and the salts. There MAY be other information the issuer needs to communicate to the holder, such as a private key key if the issuer selected the holder key pair. <\/del> private key if the issuer selected the holder key pair. <\/ins> 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e3eb40ee423e159012b5d7cfa8b42888a1073cdb9932717e28ea0b996cf2bdb5","title":"","text":"4.3. For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWT from the issuer to the holder, the SVC is base64ur-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT using <\/del> the holder, the SVC is base64url-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT using a period character <\/ins> as the separator. For Example 1, the combined format looks as follows:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b7905ffe018c1af9195d57a4065330b881f2d7173dbbd16dec87f830db5e0da3","title":"","text":"4.5. The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT-R can be combined into one document using period character <\/ins> as a separator (here for Example 1):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b2e125078436afee1bfc7ab58ee4597fa2c749780c222faee6fb0d9793182224","title":"","text":"10. We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, and Torsten Lodderstedt Vittorio Bertocci for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, and Vittorio Bertocci for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-ef21afe265594333726a2ee871d706057865c8c611a2896189d14ac2ad84b090","title":"","text":"8.7. Holder binding aims to ensure that the presenter of a credential is actually the legitimate Holder of the credential. There are, in general, two approaches to Holder Binding: Claims-based Holder Binding and Crpytographic Holder Binding. Claims-based Holder Binding means that the Issuer includes claims in the SD-JWT that a Verifier can correlate with the Holder, potentially with the help of other credentials presented at the same time. For example, in a vaccination certificate, the Issuer can include a claim that contains the Holder's name and birthdate, and a Verifier can correlate this data with the Holder's passport that has to be presented together with the vaccination certificate - either as a digital credential or a physical document. Cryptographic Holder Binding means that the Issuer includes some cryptographic data, usually a public key, belonging to the Holder. The Holder can then sign over some data defined by the Verifier to prove that the Holder is in possession of the private key. Without Holder Binding, a Verifier only gets the proof that the credential was issued by a particular Issuer, but the credential itself can be replayed by anyone who gets access to it. This means that, for example, after a credential was leaked to an attacker, the attacker can present the credential to any verifier that does not require Holder Binding. But also a malicious Verifier to which the Holder presented the credential can present the credential to another Verifier if that other Verifier does not require Holder Binding. <\/ins> Verifiers MUST decide whether Holder Binding is required for a particular use case or not before verifying a credential. This decision can be informed by various factors including, but not"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e3117ed1e05c8b945ee2483c015a06a5eacb49014bcd7b6c1fcdb348d88619b4","title":"","text":"is the actual Holder of the license. The Verifier (e.g., the software used by the police officer) will ensure that a Holder Binding JWT is present and signed with the Holder's private key. Claims-based Holder Binding may be used as well, e.g., by including a first name, last name and a date of birth that matches that of an insurance policy paper. <\/ins> A rental car agency may want to ensure, for insurance purposes, that all drivers named on the rental contract own a government-issued"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-0f4b27f85f86b4344fe3c13937538a57230d33e6fb4d7fcf2ea856b42bf4820e","title":"","text":"If a Verifier has decided that Holder Binding is required for a particular use case and the Holder Binding is not present, does not fulfill the requirements (e.g., on the signing algorithm), or no recognized key reference is present in the SD-JWT, the Verifier will reject the presentation, as described in verifier_verification. <\/del> recognized Holder Binding data is present in the SD-JWT, the Verifier will reject the presentation, as described in verifier_verification. <\/ins> 8.8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3b2e8468db9a20e95018b216cb423d3fef38f3408b417681f3fa9dd88022c6b7","title":"","text":"claims. This limitation needs to be taken into account by Issuers when creating the structure of the SD-JWT. 8.9. This specification does not define how signature verification keys of Issuers are distributed to Verifiers. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Issuers publish their keys in a way that allows for efficient and secure key rotation and revocation, for example, by publishing keys at a predefined location using the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) format RFC7517. Verifiers need to ensure that they are not using expired or revoked keys for signature verification using reasonable and appropriate means for the given key-distribution method. <\/ins> 9. 9.1. Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national identity service. For example, in OpenID Connect, signed ID Tokens can be stored by Relying Parties. In the case of SD-JWT, Holders have to store signed SD-JWTs and associated Disclosures, and Issuers and Verifiers may decide to do so as well. Not surprisingly, a leak of such data risks revealing private data of End-Users to third parties. Signed End-User data, the authenticity of which can be easily verified by third parties, further exacerbates the risk. As discussed in holder_binding_security, leaked SD-JWTs may also allow attackers to impersonate Holders unless Holder Binding is enforced and the attacker does not have access to the Holder's cryptographic keys. Altogether, leaked SD-JWT credentials may have a high monetary value on black markets. Due to these risks, systems implementing SD-JWT SHOULD be designed to minimize the amount of data that is stored. All involved parties SHOULD store SD-JWTs only for as long as needed, including in log files. Issuers SHOULD NOT store SD-JWTs after issuance. Holders SHOULD store SD-JWTs and associated Disclosures only in encrypted form, and, wherever possible, use hardware-backed encryption in particular for the private Holder Binding key. Decentralized storage of data, e.g., on End-User devices, SHOULD be preferred for End-User credentials over centralized storage. Expired SD-JWTs SHOULD be deleted as soon as possible. Verifiers SHOULD NOT store SD-JWTs after verification. It may be sufficient to store the result of the verification and any End-User data that is needed for the application. If reliable and secure key rotation and revocation is ensured according to issuer_signature_key_distribution, Issuers may MAY opt to publish expired or revoked private signing keys (after a grace period that ensures that the keys are not cached any longer at any Verifier). This reduces the value of any leaked credentials as the signatures on them can no longer be trusted to originate from the Issuer. 9.2. <\/ins> If the SD-JWT and associated Disclosures are transmitted over an insecure channel during issuance or presentation, an adversary may be able to intercept and read the End-User's personal data or correlate"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1129cef0f067341c4e104fe7ec0bd3411eda0340add56f9c7a3c9ea5dd9c2493","title":"","text":"Format as the plaintext payload of a JWE) to encrypt the SD-JWT and associated Disclosures when transmitted over an insecure channel. 9.2. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> The use of decoy digests is RECOMMENDED when the number of claims (or the existence of particular claims) can be a side-channel disclosing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9bb85282878e7f1cbe26eceb6251cdf7e4fa2a90399fe40ea465934602ee3933","title":"","text":"digests (or whether to use them at all) is a trade-off between the size of the SD-JWT and the privacy of the End-User's data. 9.3. <\/del> 9.4. <\/ins> Colluding Issuer\/Verifier or Verifier\/Verifier pairs could link issuance\/presentation or two presentation sessions to the same user"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-39b178718e7a4ce99bdf0c0b8328d57ff1b0f68c8e038a66bdd3c48cc84bf874","title":"","text":"Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the contents of the token have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, <\/del> receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all the claims and likewise, <\/ins> anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. <\/del> read all the claims. <\/ins> One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity. As long as the signed JWT is one-time use, it typically"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8964ea3cc15bc258887748a673008dd8e88d848a65bd5b7972ee7b7b51c845b6","title":"","text":"The ability to selectively disclose a subset of these claims depending on the Verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent Verifiers from obtaining claims irrelevant for the transaction at hand. One example of such a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable authorship that contains claims about a subject. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of claims. <\/del> the transaction at hand. One example of such a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable authorship that contains claims about a subject. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of JWT claims. Similar to the JWT specification on which it builds, this document is a product of the Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) working group. However, while both JWT and SD-JWT have potential OAuth 2.0 applications, their utility and application is certainly not constrained to OAuth 2.0. JWT was developed as a general-purpose token format and has seen widespread usage in a variety of applications. SD-JWT is a selective disclosure mechanism for JWT and is similarly intended to be general-purpose specification. <\/ins> In an SD-JWT, claims can be hidden, but cryptographically protected against undetected modification. When issuing the SD-JWT to the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1ffa40cae0e10ccfecae9958d1c9ff823d9af0cec849db33a350f065a537c867","title":"","text":"5.2.1.4. An SD-JWT is a JWT that MUST be signed using the Issuer's private key. <\/del> key. It MUST use a JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithm and MUST NOT use or an identifier for a symmetric algorithm (MAC). <\/ins> An SD-JWT MAY contain both selectively disclosable claims and non- selectively disclosable claims, i.e., claims that are always"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-2d85fa5d11383a6883bcafb3bababdefb3261ff8036d80d29a4fa94c605fead9","title":"","text":"The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a hash algorithm value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms. <\/del> Algorithm\" registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms or a value defined in another specification and\/or profile of this specification. <\/ins> To promote interoperability, implementations MUST support the SHA-256 hash algorithm."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b1ec987c8c7f7dff71bcd32a3fe91b1ee5cc6de5a5917bbcecdc40f95b399dbf","title":"","text":"8.6. For the security of this scheme, the hash algorithm is required to be preimage and collision resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to calculate the salt and claim value that result in a particular digest, and it is infeasible to find a different salt and claim value pair that result in a matching digest, respectively. <\/del> preimage resistant and second-preimage resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to calculate the salt and claim value that result in a particular digest, and, for any salt and claim value pair, it is infeasible to find a different salt and claim value pair that result in the same digest, respectively. Hash algorithms that do not meet the aforementioned requirements MUST NOT be used. Inclusion in the \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms alone does not indicate a hash algorithm's suitability for use in SD-JWT (it contains several heavily truncated digests, such as <\/ins> Furthermore the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 <\/del> and , which are unfit for security applications). Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 <\/ins> revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. 8.7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-6329aaaf95913cdef18407264cf2154287900a4180c74cf23557dff2b5d3c189","title":"","text":"This document describes a format for JWTs that support selective disclosure (SD-JWT), enabling sharing only a subset of the claims included in the original JWT instead of releasing all the claims to every verifier. This document also defines a format for so-called SD-JWT Releases (SD-JWT-R). <\/del> every verifier. During issuance, an SD-JWT is sent from the issuer to the holder alongside an SD-JWT Salt\/Value Container (SVC), a JSON object that contains the mapping between raw claim values contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value. This document also defines a format for SD-JWT Releases (SD-JWT-R), which conveys a subset of the claim values of an SD-JWT that the holder is selectively releasing to the verifier. During presentation, SD-JWT-R and SD-JWT are both sent to the verifier from the holder. To verify claim values received in SD-JWT-R, verifier uses salts in SD-JWT-R to compute the hashes of the claim values and compare them to the hashes in SD-JWT. <\/ins> One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity created by an issuer. In such a use case, there has been no"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-05c682afd0cbfad9c5f13d03b0a11d99226f9b9a272c0db0a6d6128693688f11","title":"","text":"2.2. A JSON object created by the issuer that contains mapping between raw claim values that contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value. <\/del> claim values contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value. <\/ins> 2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f5c310c2943e644472d6003ea8cea6cc3b4e4812c21310d3d12ae4c062b9e5c1","title":"","text":"2.7. An entity that entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SD-JWT-R (2.2) <\/del> An entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SSD- JWT-R (2.2) <\/ins> Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b538b29ac78fe40b20a118907b3e2c05b63d0121942f35598c6563ddeb018759","title":"","text":"8. Security considerations in this section help achieve the following properties: <\/ins> 8.1. ToDo: add text explaining mechanisms that should be adopted to ensure"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b4e450c6caed66520900f10f63db1fbe952957e5949fa550e47bfbfcb507c5dc","title":"","text":"9. The privacy principles of ISO.29100 should be adhered to. <\/ins> 9.1. Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c1873cf4bb0f0998ad4a3bfca6c9d7abe0fe4801b981e400db5d1cc232625be3","title":"","text":"any encryption mechanism. Implementers MUST ensure that the transport protocol provides confidentiality, if the privacy of End-User data or correlation attacks are a concern. Implementers MAY define an envelope format (such as described in enveloping or nesting the SD-JWT Combined Format as the plaintext payload of a JWE) to encrypt the SD-JWT and associated Disclosures when transmitted over an insecure channel. <\/del> confidentiality if the privacy of End-User data or correlation attacks by passive observers are a concern. Implementers MAY define an envelope format (such as described in enveloping or nesting the SD-JWT Combined Format as the plaintext payload of a JWE) to encrypt the SD-JWT and associated Disclosures when transmitted over an insecure channel. <\/ins> 9.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e63b118dd4f15261e963ea80586dbe63c28252b51c9d44cb461744dbd857c1c8","title":"","text":"To prevent these types of linkability, various methods, including but not limited to the following ones can be used: 9.5. An Issuer issuing only one type of SD-JWT might have privacy implications, because if the Holder has an SD-JWT issued by that Issuer, its type and claim names can be determined. For example, if the National Cancer Institute only issued SD-JWTs with cancer registry information, it is possible to deduce that the Holder owning its SD-JWT is a cancer patient. Moreover, the issuer identifier alone may reveal information about the user. For example, when a military organization or a drug rehabilitation center issues a vaccine credential, verifiers can deduce that the holder is a military member or may have a substance use disorder. To mitigate this issue, a group of issuers may elect to use a common Issuer identifier. A group signature scheme outside the scope of this specification may also be used, instead of an individual signature. <\/ins> 10. We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Paquin,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f3e53f7ca4138abca930098844648b0443dafa9a2f3c9dc4d6855586ef57a539","title":"","text":"belongs to. Other ways of proving Holder Binding MAY be used when supported by the Verifier, e.g., when the Combined Format for Presentation is itself embedded in a signed JWT. See enveloping for details. <\/del> the Verifier, e.g., when the Combined Format for Presentation without a Holder Binding JWT is itself embedded in a signed JWT. See enveloping for details. <\/ins> If no Holder Binding JWT is included, the Combined Format for Presentation ends with the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f85cdc0a8aecfef097b7112da4f79ec4afd68e43a18ef0ae9d044993570954d0","title":"","text":"not contain a Holder Binding JWT as the outer container can be signed instead. Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting the Combined Format for Presentation that envelopes multiple such objects into one object, and provides Holder Binding using means other than Holder Binding JWT. <\/ins> 8. Security considerations in this section help achieve the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-76404c754aa18b55e499ba89e00a5bfdcbf76103a456079f37c9985748b74988","title":"","text":"10. We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Matthew Miller, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, and Vittorio Bertocci for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, and Vittorio Bertocci for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f332c00a779095edcf49e52b73c7d31f7dc6c989978e3f2e2ba4c09be6815b16","title":"","text":"Security considerations in this section help achieve the following properties: An adversary in the role of the Verifier cannot obtain information from an SD-JWT about any claim name or claim value that was not explicitly disclosed by the Holder unless that information can be derived from other disclosed claims or sources other than the presented SD-JWT. A malicious Holder cannot modify names or values of selectively disclosable claims without detection by the Verifier. Additionally, as described in holder_binding_security, the application of Holder Binding can ensure that the presenter of an SD- JWT credential is the legitimate Holder of the credential. <\/ins> 8.1. The SD-JWT MUST be signed by the Issuer to protect integrity of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1a5ec9eef350c923004f817d3f9d67c8ab77388d91406bf98c4ec82e03ccf0a8","title":"","text":"expired or revoked keys for signature verification using reasonable and appropriate means for the given key-distribution method. 8.9. When Holder Binding is not enforced, any entity in possession of a Combined Format for Presentation can forward the contents to third parties. When doing so, that entity may remove Disclosures such that the receiver learns only a subset of the claims contained in the original Combined Format for Presentation. For example, a device manufacturer might produce an SD-JWT containing information about upstream and downstream supply chain contributors. Each supply chain party can verify only the claims that were selectively disclosed to them by an upstream party, and they can choose to further reduce the disclosed claims when presenting to a downstream party. In some scenarios this behavior could be desirable, but if it is not, Issuers need to support and Verifiers need to enforce Holder Binding. <\/ins> 9. The privacy principles of ISO.29100 should be adhered to."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3ca2419a1181c306a3e0d626395690ef744d2ecaadf7e97cc2d8b45d93900646","title":"","text":"TBD @VC_JWT <\/del> 11.1. This section requests registration of the \"application\/sd-jwt\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.MediaTypes in the manner described in RFC6838, which can be used to indicate that the content is an SD-JWT. 11.2. This section requests registration of the \"+sd-jwt\" structured syntax suffix in the \"Structured Syntax Suffix\" registry IANA.StructuredSuffix in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the media type is encoded as an SD-JWT. <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-73989346f89a08b2135c719f6a7333a2ff2af995f92b4842f0adba8b197dff5e","title":"","text":"not, however, learn any claim values not disclosed in the Disclosures. This document also describes an optional mechanism for Holder <\/del> This document also specifies an optional mechanism for Holder <\/ins> Binding, or the concept of binding an SD-JWT to key material controlled by the Holder. The strength of the Holder Binding is conditional upon the trust in the protection of the private key of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e138f3a38fe5ac391d4b5e11d39b41f809b2d0dad98ea1aafb59371b80a10e20","title":"","text":"4.3. Holder Binding is an optional feature. For example, when Cryptographic Holder Binding is required by the use-case, the SD-JWT must contain information about the key material controlled by the Holder. <\/del> Holder Binding is an optional feature. When Cryptographic Holder Binding is required by the use-case, the SD-JWT MUST contain information about the key material controlled by the Holder. <\/ins> Note: How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference. The Holder can then create a signed document, the Holder Binding JWT, using its private key. This document contains some data provided by the Verifier (out of scope of this document) to ensure the freshness of the signature, for example, a nonce and an indicator of the intended audience for the document. <\/del> The Holder can then create a signed document, the Holder Binding JWT as defined in hb-jwt, using its private key. This document contains some data provided by the Verifier such as a nonce to ensure the freshness of the signature, and audience to indicate the intended audience for the document. <\/ins> The Holder Binding JWT can be included in the Combined Format for Presentation and sent to the Verifier along with the SD-JWT and the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-aa125864aaf0c7b52811f7f9d9e5c61df9071c68fb9c6403b5e0b805663e1f1f","title":"","text":"5.4.1. The Holder MAY add an optional JWT to prove Holder Binding to the Verifier. The precise contents of the JWT are out of scope of this specification. Usually, a <\/del> Verifier. 5.4.1.1. This section defines the contents of the Holder Binding JWT. The JWT MUST contain the following elements: * in the JOSE header, * : REQUIRED. MUST be , which explicitly types the Holder Binding JWT as recommended in Section 3.11 of RFC8725. * : REQUIRED. A digital signature algorithm identifier such as per IANA \"JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms\" registry. MUST NOT be or an identifier for a symmetric algorithm (MAC). * in the JWT body, * : REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Holder Binding JWT was issued using the syntax defined in RFC7519. * : REQUIRED. The intended receiver of the Holder Binding JWT. How the value is represented is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification. * : REQUIRED. Ensures the freshness of the signature. The value type of this claim MUST be a string. How this value is obtained is up to the protocol used and out of scope of this specification. To validate the signature on the Holder Binding JWT, the Verifier MUST use the key material in the SD-JWT. If it is not clear from the SD-JWT, HB-JWT MUST specify which key material the Verifier needs to use to validate HB-JWT using JOSE header parameters such as <\/ins> and claim are included to show that the proof is intended for the Verifier and to prevent replay attacks. How the <\/del> . <\/ins> or other claims are obtained by the Holder is out of scope of this specification. <\/del> Below is a non-normative example of a Holder Binding JWT header: <\/ins> Example Holder Binding JWT payload: <\/del> Below is a non-normative example of a Holder Binding JWT payload: <\/ins> Which is then signed by the Holder to create a JWT like the following: <\/del> Below is a non-normative example of a Holder Binding JWT produced by signing a payload in the example above: <\/ins> Whether to require Holder Binding is up to the Verifier's policy, based on the set of trust requirements such as trust frameworks it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a0fecfb376c06d146aab1dcede626424ac284d1c65651acec8c045599e9bceef","title":"","text":"8.2. Holders can manipulate the Disclosures by changing the values of the claims before sending them to the Issuer. The Issuer MUST check the Disclosures to ensure that the values of the claims are correct, <\/del> claims before sending them to the Verifier. The Verifier MUST check the Disclosures to ensure that the values of the claims are correct, <\/ins> i.e., the digests of the Disclosures are actually present in the signed SD-JWT."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06dace842dfab975e34e93f90bcdd7d677745cce0caa85bf16f6784e523555f4","title":"","text":"Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, and Vittorio Bertocci for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-79a475bb1ccd7ef614e6686e2078af8c589933246c846cf364707ee6e2f408ff","title":"","text":", etc. as defined or required by the application using SD-JWTs. Applications of SD-JWT SHOULD be explicitly typed using the header parameter. See explicit_typing for more details. <\/ins> 5.1.1. For each claim that is to be selectively disclosed, the Issuer"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-abb3f2f95609e3da565f075a0e001c0eb773c7997ae6b8c7593ee07beb7b2df4","title":"","text":"In some scenarios this behavior could be desirable, but if it is not, Issuers need to support and Verifiers need to enforce Holder Binding. 8.10. Section 3.11 of RFC8725 describes the use of explicit typing to prevent confusion attacks in which one kind of JWT is mistaken for another. SD-JWTs are also potentially vulnerable to such confusion attacks, so it is RECOMMENDED to specify an explicit type by including the header parameter when the SD-JWT is issued, and for Verifiers to check this value. When explicit typing is employed for an SD-JWT, it is RECOMMENDED that a media type name of the format \"application\/example+sd-jwt\" be used, where \"example\" is replaced by the identifier for the specific kind of SD-JWT. The definition of in Section 4.1.9 of RFC7515 recommends that the \"application\/\" prefix be omitted, so \"example+sd-jwt\" would be the value of the header parameter. <\/ins> 9. The privacy principles of ISO.29100 should be adhered to."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-434e64971e8ae11b0730b4379b9901eb2f16d878a1e08aaa070f20c8023ba299","title":"","text":" Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) <\/del> SD-JWT: Selective Disclosure for JWT and JWS with JSON payloads <\/ins> draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-latest Abstract This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Token (JWT) documents that support selective disclosure of JWT claims. <\/del> This specification defines a mechanism for selective disclosure of individual elements of a JSON object used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure. It encompasses various applications, including but not limited to the selective disclosure of JSON Web Tokens (JWT) claims. <\/ins> 1. The JSON-based RFC8259 representation of claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 is secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the <\/del> This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 structures with JSON RFC8259 objects as the payload while supporting selective disclosure of individual elements of that JSON. Because JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 is a very prevalent application of JWS with a JSON payload, the selective disclosure of JWT claims receives primary treatment herein. However, that does not preclude the mechanism's applicability to other or more general applications of JWS with JSON payloads. The JSON-based representation of claims in a signed JWT is secured against modification using JWS digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT that has checked the signature can safely assume that the <\/ins> contents of the token have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all the claims. Likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving encrypted JWT can also read"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b165f97dcd666827b73c0f174e1e7608f564bfe75736151d28e26d627dbd3646","title":"","text":", which are unfit for security applications). Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. <\/del> Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. <\/ins> 8.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-857b57820eafb0b37aaa0b58fbc0a53012a78bef0ae880217f2f1a60fa17ce3a","title":"","text":"The claim indicates the hash algorithm used by the Issuer to generate the digests over the salts and the claim values. If the <\/del> digests. When used, this claim MUST appear at the top level of the SD-JWT payload. It MUST NOT be used in any object nested within the payload. If the <\/ins> claim is not present, a default value of <\/del> claim is not present at the top level, a default value of <\/ins> is used. <\/del> MUST be used. <\/ins> The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a hash algorithm value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e023fc4be021ef4855f64019f0598fe5ab690372bf98babdaa366dcab0db9acc","title":"","text":" SD-JWT: Selective Disclosure for JWT and JWS with JSON payloads <\/del> SD-JWT: Selective Disclosure for JWT and JWS with JSON Payloads <\/ins> draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8fe79cb033f25d087d8f5ba71be9de39d70b4699a9f75918bf66631e4051ea88","title":"","text":"the transaction at hand. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of JWT claims. One example of a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, an issuer- <\/del> One example of a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, an Issuer- <\/ins> signed credential that contains the claims about a subject, and whose authenticity can be cryptographically verified."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f489f4f194846db3522c2a4ce077492282ce643defc9ef17dca9df4b7cde1bac","title":"","text":"6.1. The Holder MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps when receiving a Combined Format for Issuance: <\/del> Upon receiving an SD-JWT, a Holder or a Verifier MUST ensure that The Holder or the Verifier MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps when receiving an SD-JWT: If any step fails, the SD-JWT is not valid and processing MUST be aborted. <\/ins> It is up to the Holder how to maintain the mapping between the Disclosures and the plaintext claim values to be able to display them to the End-User when needed. 6.2. If a Key Binding JWT is received by a Holder, the SD-JWT SHOULD be rejected. <\/ins> For presentation to a Verifier, the Holder MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps: 6.2. <\/del> 6.3. <\/ins> Upon receiving a Presentation, Verifiers MUST ensure that <\/del> Upon receiving a Presentation, in addition to the checks outlined in sd_jwt_verification, Verifiers MUST ensure that <\/ins> To this end, Verifiers MUST follow the following steps (or equivalent):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a2e0d0af4bc5cbe23314e78355f99be226c09ac439b7524af756203bf18ddf96","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Tobias Looker, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-dbb49dac94f743a893663dc39f713a0f7c7ce43ab104cff27a7123467de43c96","title":"","text":" SD-JWT: Selective Disclosure for JWT and JWS with JSON Payloads <\/del> Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) <\/ins> draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-latest Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5831744400c7747af15dc4313e6947e376ad2aecae3238266944d4c56c979400","title":"","text":"The resulting Disclosure would be: Note that the JSON encoding of the object is not canonicalized, so variations in white space, encoding of Unicode characters, and ordering of object properties are allowed. For example, the following strings are all valid and encode the same claim value \"Moebius\": <\/del> Note that variations in whitespace, encoding of Unicode characters, ordering of object properties, etc., are allowed in the JSON representation and no canonicalization needs be performed before base64url-encoding. For example, the following strings are all valid and encode the same claim value \"Moebius\": <\/ins> See disclosure_format_considerations for some further considerations on the Disclosure format approach."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e4b7b908ade57f2dea13391db94b29eb23c54360014e9db5565fb843b9d1c52d","title":"","text":"string. Key Binding MAY be achieved by signing the envelope JWT instead of including a separate Key Binding JWT in the SD-JWT. The claim SHOULD be used when transporting an SD-JWT unless the application or protocol defines a different claim name. <\/del> The following non-normative example shows an SD-JWT Presentation enveloped in a JWT payload: Here, the SD-JWT is shown where <\/del> Here, the SD-JWT is shown as the value of an claim where <\/ins> represents the Issuer-signed JWT and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c488f9d23ede6325b7dcca8aa5dccf6913d565d5d041bf0b4f2fef3ca85cd4f9","title":"","text":"5.5. This example uses the following object as the set of claims that the Issuer is issuing: <\/del> In this example, a simple SD-JWT is demonstrated. <\/ins> The following non-normative example shows a payload of an SD-JWT for this End-User data: <\/del> The Issuer is using the following input claim set: <\/ins> The Issuer in this case made the following decisions: The Issuer creates the following Disclosures: <\/del> The following payload is used for the SD-JWT: The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer: <\/ins> The payload is then signed by the Issuer to create a JWT like the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-40cd592129edab9cb3d01806407333a11eb5ed36ad73b4ab90218fd3bdea632d","title":"","text":"Note: Examples in this document use the Claim defined in RFC7800 to include the raw public key by value in <\/del> claim defined in RFC7800 to include the raw public key by value in <\/ins> SD-JWT. 5.10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-100f804c1db28d49eeba21de406dddd66183c04c6dcd3807b2b96b22e5158921","title":"","text":"recognized Key Binding data is present in the SD-JWT, the Verifier will reject the presentation, as described in verifier_verification. 9.6.1. Issuer provided integrity protection of the SD-JWT payload and Disclosures is achieved by the signature on the Issuer-signed JWT that covers the SD-JWT payload including the digest values of the Disclosures as described in sec-is-jwt and sec-disclosures, respectively. The Key Binding JWT, defined in kb-jwt, serves exclusively as a mechanism for the Holder to demonstrate possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the SD-JWT payload. As such, the signature on the Key Binding JWT does not cover other parts of the SD-JWT. In cases where it's desirable for the Holder's signature to convey more than a proof-of-possession, such as signing over the selected Disclosures to prove those were the Disclosures selected, the SD-JWT to be presented can be embedded in another JWT (as described in Enveloping SD-JWTs [3]) or otherwise signed by the Holder via the application protocol delivering it. <\/ins> 9.7. SD-JWT ensures that names of claims that are selectively disclosable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3e3dc8cbc06f0e18dfb2f6416e6b9d4ab64bcaf12cd5a6cdb07274a070d6a284","title":"","text":"Implementers MUST ensure that the transport protocol provides confidentiality if the privacy of End-User data or correlation attacks by passive observers are a concern. Implementers MAY define an envelope format (such as described in enveloping or nesting the SD-JWT as the plaintext payload of a JWE) to encrypt the SD-JWT when transmitted over an insecure channel. <\/del> attacks by passive observers are a concern. To encrypt the SD-JWT when transmitted over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) RFC7516 by nesting the SD-JWT as the plaintext payload of a JWE. Especially, when an SD-JWT is transmitted via a URL and information may be stored\/cached in the browser or end up in web server logs, the SD-JWT SHOULD be encrypted using JWE. <\/ins> 10.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-bdcecdc031b842ea19a2babf5d76d4a2fa858a22d719a1f49fe8021ee4102f21","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-27c1b5215c2c81f6f04728cfc07a47ac43af3c006d52dce42b31d6f452285842","title":"","text":"[1] #example-1 [2] #example-1 [3] #enveloping <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-6c89ae7f1b74c34e19edf32b18649486fd5cfa167abf188a9bf6a5085267d2db","title":"","text":"Each digest value ensures the integrity of, and maps to, the respective Disclosure. Digest values are calculated using a hash function over the Disclosures, each of which contains a random salt, the claim name (only when the claim is an object property), and the claim value. The Disclosures are sent to the Holder as part of the SD-JWT in the format defined in sd-jwt-structure. <\/del> function over the Disclosures, each of which contains a cryptographically secure random salt, the claim name (only when the claim is an object property), and the claim value. The Disclosures are sent to the Holder as part of the SD-JWT in the format defined in sd-jwt-structure. <\/ins> An SD-JWT MAY also contain clear-text claims that are always disclosed to the Verifier."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-0b18f375931f6bf4027983ba0cc4720d176ea1278eaffad7b781c7a7d6baf6bb","title":"","text":"associated with the Holder, or a reference thereto. It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the Holder key pair is established. For example, the Holder MAY provide a key pair to the Issuer, the Issuer MAY create the key pair for the Holder, or Holder and Issuer MAY use pre-established key material. <\/del> key pair is established. For example, the Holder MAY create a key pair and provide a public key to the Issuer, the Issuer MAY create the key pair for the Holder, or Holder and Issuer MAY use pre- established key material. <\/ins> Note: The examples in this document use the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9d81b3bf4caaf0fab9cab2ba5486f7255a4c5bdad2c98fc866074c53a98ebddf","title":"","text":"instead of including a separate Key Binding JWT in the SD-JWT. The following non-normative example shows an SD-JWT Presentation enveloped in a JWT payload: <\/del> enveloped in a JWT: <\/ins> Here, the SD-JWT is shown as the value of an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4dfb6ed98f4c8c841f76a8c4e48861ed48ae0fc9d69b583a27f11f2fb165bb37","title":"","text":"Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting an SD-JWT that envelope multiple such objects into one object, and provides Key Binding using means <\/del> such objects into one object, and provide Key Binding using means <\/ins> other than the Key Binding JWT. 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-04ef9f11eed0c74eb3c06d5491f4f0c3858db1380f79ac2affd545a95e3b6a91","title":"","text":"verified. The security of the Issuer-signed JWT depends on the security of the signature algorithm. Any of the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registered in IANA.JWS.Algorithms can be used, including <\/del> signature algorithm. Any of the JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithms registered in IANA.JWS.Algorithms can be used, including <\/ins> post-quantum algorithms, when they are ready. 9.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-27a32eb9b31051d7d3c284f92f50f28dd27105f8b34fe656303e320cf8436574","title":"","text":"Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9b7e81ab2e8c7399932569b2d5d2b800beb8dbbb167a6ebc0a4a8af6ccb9bc42","title":"","text":"disclosable claims MAY even appear within other Disclosures. The following examples illustrate some of the options an Issuer has. It is up to the Issuer to decide which option to use, depending on, for example, the expected use cases for the SD-JWT, requirements for privacy, size considerations, or ecosystem requirements. For more examples with nested structures, see example-simple_structured and example-complex-structured-sd-jwt. <\/del> It is up to the Issuer to decide which structure to use, depending on, for example, the expected use cases for the SD-JWT, requirements for privacy, size considerations, or ecosystem requirements. For more examples with nested structures, see example-simple_structured and example-complex-structured-sd-jwt. <\/ins> The following input claim set is used as an example throughout this section: Important: Throughout the examples in this document, line breaks had to be added to JSON strings and base64-encoded strings (as shown in the next example) to adhere to the 72 character limit for lines in RFCs and for readability. JSON does not allow line breaks in strings. <\/del> Important: The following examples of the structures are non-normative and are not intended to represent all possible options. They are also not meant to define or restrict how can be represented in an SD-JWT. Note: Throughout the examples in this document, line breaks had to be added to JSON strings and base64-encoded strings (as shown in the next example) to adhere to the 72 character limit for lines in RFCs and for readability. JSON does not allow line breaks in strings. <\/ins> 5.7.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8048b339588293ea6ee97e57e857aa5e1093988831d2dee954236f7219cb534f","title":"","text":"7. In some applications or transport protocols, it is desirable to put an SD-JWT into an outer JWT container. For example, an implementation may envelope multiple credentials and presentations, independent of their format, in a JWT to enable application-layer encryption during transport. For such use cases, the SD-JWT SHOULD be transported as a single string. Key Binding MAY be achieved by signing the envelope JWT instead of including a separate Key Binding JWT in the SD-JWT. The following non-normative example shows an SD-JWT Presentation enveloped in a JWT: Here, the SD-JWT is shown as the value of an claim where represents the Issuer-signed JWT and represents a Disclosure. The SD-JWT does not contain a Key Binding JWT as the outer container can be signed instead. Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting an SD-JWT that envelope multiple such objects into one object and provide Key Binding using means other than the Key Binding JWT. 8. <\/del> This section describes an optional alternate format for SD-JWT using the JWS JSON Serialization from RFC7515. For both the General and Flattened JSON Serialization, the SD-JWT is represented as a JSON object according to Section 7.2 of RFC7515. The disclosures (both for issuance and presentation) are included in the serialized JWS using the key <\/del> The disclosures (both for issuance and presentation) SHOULD be included in the serialized JWS using the member name <\/ins> at the top-level of the JSON object (the same level as the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a61c3bc22eca43ad0e3e472f2b91cf2a638641905180b5b822189a10c02134e3","title":"","text":"Disclosure as described in creating_disclosures. The Issuer includes a Disclosure for each selectively disclosable claim of the SD-JWT payload, whereas the Holder includes only the Disclosures selected for the given presentation. Additionally, for presentation with a Key Binding, the Holder adds the key <\/del> for the given presentation. Alternative methods for conveying the disclosures MAY be used (such as including them in a <\/ins> at the top-level of the serialized JWS with a string value containing the Key Binding JWT as described in kb-jwt. <\/del> member of an outer JSON structure also containing the JSON Serialized SD-JWT) as dictated by a specific application or transport protocol. However, the details of such approaches fall outside the scope of this specification. <\/ins> Verification of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT follows the same rules defined in verification, except that the SD-JWT does not need to be split into component parts, but disclosures and (if applicable) a Key Binding JWT can be found in the respective members of the JSON object. <\/del> split into component parts, the disclosures can be found in the respective member of the JSON object (or elsewhere), and Key Binding (if applicable) will be provided by means not specifically defined in this specification. <\/ins> Using a payload similar to that from Example 1 [2], the following is a non-normative example of a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT from an Issuer with all the respective Disclosures. Below is a non-normative example of a presentation of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT, where the Holder includes a Key Binding JWT and has selected to disclose <\/del> serialized SD-JWT, where the Holder has selected to disclose <\/ins> ,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-ffcaf515ebb52506b30c46681596acb4b39988a8b06fc65b79df669e38f7d137","title":"","text":". 8. In some applications or transport protocols, it is desirable to encapsulate an SD-JWT into an outer JWT container. For example, an implementation may enclose multiple credentials and presentations, independent of their format, in a JWT to enable application-layer encryption during transport. For such use cases, a compact serialized SD-JWT SHOULD be included as a single string value and a JSON serialized SD-JWT SHOULD be included as a JSON object value. Key Binding MAY be achieved by signing the envelope JWT instead of including a separate Key Binding JWT. The following non-normative example payload shows a compact serialized SD-JWT Presentation enveloped in a JWT. The SD-JWT is shown as the value of an claim where is the Issuer-signed JWT and is a Disclosure. The SD-JWT does not contain a Key Binding JWT as the outer container can be signed instead. This next non-normative example payload shows a JSON serialized SD- JWT enveloped in a JWT. The JSON serialized SD-JWT appears as the value of an claim and the disclosures are included separately as a top-level claim. Key Binding is achieved by the signature on the enclosing JWT. Other specifications or profiles of this specification may define alternative formats for transporting an SD-JWT that envelope multiple such SD-JWTs into one object and provide Key Binding using means other than the Key Binding JWT. <\/ins> 9. Security considerations in this section help achieve the following"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-afe2d8126d74ba0c71f6a03cb11dee04de6f94f8f83c01d242c36c9c49a0789c","title":"","text":"12. TBD <\/del> 12.1. This specification requests registration of the following Claims in the IANA \"JSON Web Token Claims\" registry IANA.JWT established by RFC7519. 12.2. <\/ins> This section requests registration of the \"application\/sd-jwt\" media type RFC2046 in the \"Media Types\" registry IANA.MediaTypes in the manner described in RFC6838."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3e6de7a09906e1d69ba1c9375f3b2d8caa9e7403ef1a95aec931ba2aa7720157","title":"","text":"To indicate that the content is a Key Binding JWT: 12.2. <\/del> 12.3. <\/ins> This section requests registration of the \"+sd-jwt\" structured syntax suffix in the \"Structured Syntax Suffix\" registry"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-74229d97340fec03e04f02ee43e291fa08409257460b8f6475ca66a8559d414c","title":"","text":"non-selectively disclosable and hide only the other sub-claims: There would be no Disclosure for <\/del> In this case there would be no Disclosure for <\/ins> in this case. <\/del> since it is provided in the clear. <\/ins> 5.7.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f599869496891da1a45b3813cff11f471bdfb756b676d34652fba5781fa85248","title":"","text":"11. We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3459ddc6cd28b77d4bc73791a1bce4cabe7a8d8ac0b361c1761c6070dd1583b2","title":"","text":"In an SD-JWT, claims can be hidden, but cryptographically protected against undetected modification. \"Claims\" here refers to both object properties (key-value pairs) as well as array elements. When issuing the SD-JWT to the Holder, the Issuer includes the cleartext <\/del> properties (name-value pairs) as well as array elements. When issuing the SD-JWT to the Holder, the Issuer includes the cleartext <\/ins> counterparts of all hidden claims, the so-called Disclosures, outside the signed part of the SD-JWT."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-831468439c0d045975a26e866898eef5e19216744f2fae80f7c98d950adc64a0","title":"","text":"Disclosures outside the document. Disclosures can be omitted without breaking the signature, and modifying them can be detected. Selectively disclosable claims can be individual object properties (key-value pairs) or array elements. <\/del> (name-value pairs) or array elements. <\/ins> Each digest value ensures the integrity of, and maps to, the respective Disclosure. Digest values are calculated using a hash"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5a5ab42df544e274d21caf2a50501677f88bdb86358d23d1557cb0dbb8e9c71a","title":"","text":"5.2. Disclosures are created differently depending on whether a claim is an object property (key-value pair) or an array element. <\/del> an object property (name-value pair) or an array element. <\/ins> 5.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-d6ccf50d4a6ecaa3177cb3f770439dd1353a254efbecae8335cd4b509d0bae8c","title":"","text":"For selectively disclosable claims, the digests of the Disclosures are embedded into the Issuer-signed JWT instead of the claims themselves. The precise way of embedding depends on whether a claim is an object property (key-value pair) or an array element. <\/del> is an object property (name-value pair) or an array element. <\/ins> 5.2.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-47028cb31689cf5d92444cf763ef756eda40146f7ccca089a0928953938da03e","title":"","text":"7. Being JSON, an object in an SD-JWT payload MAY contain key-value <\/del> Being JSON, an object in an SD-JWT payload MAY contain name-value <\/ins> pairs where the value is another object or objects MAY be elements in arrays. In SD-JWT, the Issuer decides for each claim individually, on each level of the JSON, whether the claim should be selectively"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-62a1d5a106cd2d4096df32c0889bafc9189b65d72a821b379a59c3e2138c5280","title":"","text":"11.5. For the security of this scheme, the hash algorithm is required to be preimage resistant and second-preimage resistant, i.e., it is infeasible to calculate the salt and claim value that result in a particular digest, and, for any salt and claim value pair, it is infeasible to find a different salt and claim value pair that result in the same digest, respectively. Hash algorithms that do not meet the aforementioned requirements MUST NOT be used. Inclusion in the \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" <\/del> To ensure privacy of claims that are selectively disclosable, but are not being disclosed in a given presentation, the hash function MUST ensure that it is infeasible to calculate any portion of the three elements (salt, claim name, claim value) from a particular digest. This implies the hash function MUST be preimage resistant, but should also not allow an observer to infer any partial information about the undisclosed content. In the terminology of cryptographic commitment schemes, the hash function MUST be computationally hiding. To ensure the integrity of selectively disclosable claims, the hash function MUST be second-preimage resistant. That is, for any combination of salt, claim name and claim value, it is infeasible to find a different combination of salt, claim name and claim value that result in the same digest. The hash function SHOULD also be collision resistant. Although not essential to the anticipated uses of SD-JWT, without collision resistance an Issuer may be able to find multiple disclosures that have the same hash value. In which case, the signature over the SD- JWT would not then commit the Issuer to the contents of the JWT. The collision resistance of the hash function used to generate digests SHOULD match the collision resistance of the hash function used by the signature scheme. For example, use of the ES512 signature algorithm would require a disclosure hash function with at least 256-bit collision resistance, such as SHA-512. Note that inclusion in the \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" <\/ins> registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms alone does not indicate a hash algorithm's suitability for use in SD-JWT (it contains several heavily truncated digests, such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c5e8ef67d617f272b2ed4d2818033fe22d0908eabb385e991a2bbcd3475c3f6e","title":"","text":", which are unfit for security applications). Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. <\/del> fundamental weaknesses and MUST NOT be used. <\/ins> 11.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-593589db7c202bec457902d8a7824720ba732a5d18d05cd994864940682cee57","title":"","text":"Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a03a4acd8fd47b9abd946edea46e793034152e1611185083c7d665baa9b8b8e6","title":"","text":"MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, long enough, and has high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess. A new salt MUST be chosen for each claim independently from other salts. <\/del> independently from other salts. See Randomness Requirements for Security RFC4086 for considerations on generating random values. <\/ins> 11.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9aada47c26b40c78074c53c9c83a31b84c292ece423b90e7baa9bee46f8ec49a","title":"","text":"An SD-JWT is composed of the following: The individual parts will be explained in the following subsections. <\/del> The Issuer-signed JWT, Disclosures, and Key Binding JWT are explained in iss-signed-jwt, creating_disclosures, and kb-jwt respectively. <\/ins> The serialized format for the SD-JWT is the concatenation of each part delineated with a single tilde ('~') character as follows: The order of the tilde separated values MUST be the Issuer-signed JWT, followed by any number of Disclosures, and lastly the optional Key Binding JWT. In the case that there is no Key Binding JWT, the last element MUST be an empty string and the last separating tilde character MUST NOT be omitted. <\/del> The order of the concatenated parts MUST be the Issuer-signed JWT, a tilde character, zero or more Disclosures each followed by a tilde character, and lastly the optional Key Binding JWT. In the case that there is no Key Binding JWT, the last element MUST be an empty string and the last separating tilde character MUST NOT be omitted. <\/ins> The Disclosures are linked to the Issuer-signed JWT through the digest values included therein."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a1d5171d3958e8eb587334ddf2047d9b4f697bd8be8847536cf919f69a15bd36","title":"","text":"The Holder MAY send any subset of the Disclosures to the Verifier, i.e., none, some, or all Disclosures. For data that the Holder does not want to reveal to the Verifier, the Holder MUST NOT send Disclosures or reveal the salt values in any other way. <\/del> Disclosures or reveal the salt values in any other way. A Holder MUST NOT send a Disclosure that was not included in the issued SD-JWT or send a Disclosure more than once. <\/ins> A Holder MUST NOT send a Disclosure that was not included in the SD- JWT or send a Disclosure more than once. <\/del> To further illustrate the SD-JWT format, the following example shows a few different SD-JWT permutations, both with and without various constituent parts. <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1aa7020779c1eae6d8da621fc9d8aa6434457f52a2eca9069c27db114cf649ee","title":"","text":"Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e7ff31564a8710c308fea0b6fa5c7fc8386cea1c006b6b5b9096dd7cebc8f575","title":"","text":"Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-0794e81b69b05e8511e113242ec0b1a9554eef760203f65c97ae4461841fc54f","title":"","text":"Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-093aa6349767614c29ebea79a0c6a73eab2b3a195946578a47691c265787b7c4","title":"","text":"4.1.1.2. 4.1.1.3. <\/ins> If the issuer wants to enable holder binding, it includes a public key associated with the holder, or a reference thereto."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e94768f3c57c81efadc3e7b302d26b92003c0dc8ca43b878251a12635d311ae1","title":"","text":"I think. 4.1.1.3. <\/del> 4.1.1.4. <\/ins> The SD-JWT payload MAY contain other claims and will typically contain other JWT claims, such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-528451081d28d3341566469388508f21ef9559a0537ebf4e77d8e89ec65c0893","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-781696f4e9c915639ab2d16934857583181c671d9e692e0f062315107084f631","title":"","text":"8.1. Upon receiving an SD-JWT, a Holder or a Verifier MUST ensure that <\/del> Upon receiving an SD-JWT, a Holder or a Verifier needs to ensure that <\/ins> The Holder or the Verifier MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps when receiving an SD-JWT:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-997b7b92dddfda593ba64845b314a99791d4f8e24a94f7feef035a6966c9897a","title":"","text":"8.3. Upon receiving a Presentation, in addition to the checks outlined in sd_jwt_verification, Verifiers MUST ensure that <\/del> sd_jwt_verification, Verifiers need to ensure that <\/ins> To this end, Verifiers MUST follow the following steps (or equivalent):"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4ff9b80a26c770b37d78e1a6330deddf262ae2b26581a8f8b411397be6812945","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, Jeffrey Yasskin, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-edf64dcbc27e3698dc90b90c6e90d896b999d8d515b67f550752ec679ca25353","title":"","text":"5.1. An SD-JWT has a JWT component that MUST be signed using the Issuer's private key. It MUST use a JWS asymmetric digital signature algorithm. It MUST NOT use <\/del> private key. It MUST NOT use the <\/ins> or an identifier for a symmetric algorithm (MAC). <\/del> algorithm. <\/ins> The payload of an SD-JWT is a JSON object according to the following rules:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-eb63bd951c2f12bb7ca21492c0c041014952250295efdc285c791e5d8a658336","title":"","text":"cryptographically secure random salt, the claim name (only when the claim is an object property), and the claim value. The Disclosures are sent to the Holder as part of the SD-JWT in the format defined in data_formats. <\/del> data_formats. When presenting an SD-JWT to a Verifier, the Holder only includes the Disclosures for the claims that it wants to reveal to that Verifier. <\/ins> An SD-JWT MAY also contain clear-text claims that are always disclosed to the Verifier."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-102d5d8eb43dc5b9b85dfbfe33e24751a8cc4b6d65387bb8a843dfd447e8a421","title":"","text":"5.2.3. For embedding the Disclosures in the SD-JWT, the Disclosures are hashed using the hash algorithm specified in the <\/del> For embedding references to the Disclosures in the SD-JWT, each Disclosure is hashed using the hash algorithm specified in the <\/ins> claim described in hash_function_claim. The resulting digest is then included in the SD-JWT payload instead of the original claim value, as described next. The digest MUST be taken over the US-ASCII bytes of the base64url- encoded Disclosure. This follows the convention in JWS RFC7515 and JWE RFC7516. The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded. <\/del> encoded value that is the Disclosure. This follows the convention in JWS RFC7515 and JWE RFC7516. The bytes of the digest MUST then be base64url-encoded. <\/ins> It is important to note that:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-50a82c1629c1ad1997b28d14618657ae8587b1b9b561f7aa75d0555965834f4b","title":"","text":"For both the General and Flattened JSON Serialization, the SD-JWT is represented as a JSON object according to Section 7.2 of RFC7515. The disclosures (both for issuance and presentation) SHOULD be <\/del> The Disclosures (both for issuance and presentation) SHOULD be <\/ins> included in the serialized JWS using the member name at the top-level of the JSON object (the same level as the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-54ca7b078a859dd591a14d88b8a7f214b06deabebfea19ada844312496c80a07","title":"","text":"payload, whereas the Holder includes only the Disclosures selected for the given presentation. Alternative methods for conveying the disclosures MAY be used (such <\/del> Alternative methods for conveying the Disclosures MAY be used (such <\/ins> as including them in a member of an outer JSON structure also containing the JSON Serialized"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-f03591e1209c6aeee52773a53a996ba4d160611a686072ec97bd80e4bb449384","title":"","text":"Verification of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT follows the same rules defined in verification, except that the SD-JWT does not need to be split into component parts and the disclosures can be found in the <\/del> split into component parts and the Disclosures can be found in the <\/ins> respective member of the JSON object (or elsewhere). Using a payload similar to that from Example 1 [1], the following is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4a2d85fbb36c14ad0423c7b6e5ab74d3ba772a859f67b2c03d42cec278302e0c","title":"","text":"Yasskin, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard Barnes, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8fbf613b0595f4024cd9795360355095b7cd209ecc7d84c355468d0202809034","title":"","text":"10.3. The security model that conceals the plaintext claims relies on the fact that salts not revealed to an attacker cannot be learned or guessed by the attacker, even if other salts have been revealed. It is vitally important to adhere to this principle. As such, each salt MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, long enough, and has high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess. A new salt MUST be chosen for each claim independently from other salts. See Randomness Requirements for <\/del> high entropy random data of the salt as additional input to the hash function. The randomness ensures that the same plaintext claim value does not produce the same digest value. It also makes it infeasible to guess the preimage of the digest (thereby learning the plaintext claim value) by enumerating the potential value space for a claim into the hash function to search for a matching digest value. It is therefore vitally important that unrevealed salts cannot be learned or guessed, even if other salts have been revealed. As such, each salt MUST be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random, sufficiently long, and has high enough entropy that it is infeasible to guess. A new salt MUST be chosen for each claim independently of other salts. See Randomness Requirements for <\/ins> Security RFC4086 for considerations on generating random values. 10.4. <\/del> The RECOMMENDED minimum length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt is 128 bits."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-559d3d1bba42f2e4014d79602bdc0461ac92bbe7f13cf9fb908aefb1e5b51ec5","title":"","text":"appear, but each of them has a different salt. 10.5. <\/del> 10.4. <\/ins> To ensure privacy of claims that are selectively disclosable, but are not being disclosed in a given presentation, the hash function MUST"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-2cb84173a8086f2c9ef52dba6271744ad23111c687ce784e75d671ad351dfa90","title":"","text":"Furthermore, the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and MUST NOT be used. 10.6. <\/del> 10.5. <\/ins> Key Binding aims to ensure that the presenter of an SD-JWT credential is actually the legitimate Holder of the credential. An SD-JWT with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-539a0aa1db7e878342ac3a5731c137210dad46272dd48ec3247225c6e38c9617","title":"","text":"recognized Key Binding data is present in the SD-JWT, the Verifier will reject the presentation, as described in verifier_verification. 10.7. <\/del> 10.6. <\/ins> SD-JWT ensures that names of claims that are selectively disclosable are always blinded. This prevents an attacker from learning the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1f573c422859246fd51a6998d20023d201e88b0fb9c4b24b757daddcb5dae933","title":"","text":"claims. This limitation needs to be taken into account by Issuers when creating the structure of the SD-JWT. 10.8. <\/del> 10.7. <\/ins> An Issuer MUST NOT allow any content to be selectively disclosable that is critical for evaluating the SD-JWT's authenticity or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b21f555086b0f747ae0b095a7ee1edb72d59a62f2a860f539899ef9b093c514a","title":"","text":"by ecosystem rules, application-specific profile, or the credential format and MAY include claims other than those listed herein. 10.9. <\/del> 10.8. <\/ins> This specification does not define how signature verification keys of Issuers are distributed to Verifiers. However, it is RECOMMENDED"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06b7cf94f0bc43bb28b45bde837249840ec9acd8429da7168f5d5a7d1e0f3814","title":"","text":"expired or revoked keys for signature verification using reasonable and appropriate means for the given key-distribution method. 10.10. <\/del> 10.9. <\/ins> When Key Binding is not enforced, any entity in possession of an SD- JWT Presentation can forward the contents to third parties. When"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-680f767186b63d697eb232619efc88809dfc0c464442c73d77935150b4406cda","title":"","text":"In some scenarios this behavior could be desirable, but if it is not, Issuers need to support and Verifiers need to enforce Key Binding. 10.11. <\/del> 10.10. <\/ins> In a Presentation, the Issuer-signed JWT is integrity-protected by the Issuer's signature, and the Disclosures are integrity-protected"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1ea465b687beed476cd3f2fa4ca6f77a2d8fe33a61d022278be388a413993003","title":"","text":"JWT, besides proving Key Binding, protects the integrity of the set of Disclosures the Holder disclosed. 10.12. <\/del> 10.11. <\/ins> Section 3.11 of RFC8725 describes the use of explicit typing to prevent confusion attacks in which one kind of JWT is mistaken for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-138de330bcdd479436d02c36fac28b29e1d75727afa8a6105197f0d60b946aff","title":"","text":"split into issuance and presentation. Note: Throughout the examples in this document, line breaks had to be added to JSON strings and base64-encoded strings to adhere to the 72 character limit for lines in RFCs and for readability. JSON does not allow line breaks within strings. <\/del> added to JSON strings and base64-encoded strings to adhere to the 72-character limit for lines in RFCs and for readability. JSON does not allow line breaks within strings. <\/ins> 6.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-ef6300004b7e6fc796babe62a639087b2230d9c4ccfed9f2290699ac95c3ebc1","title":"","text":"split into component parts and the Disclosures can be found in the respective member of the JSON object (or elsewhere). Using a payload similar to that from Example 1 [1], the following is a non-normative example of a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT from an Issuer with all the respective Disclosures. <\/del> Using a payload similar to that from the example in main-example, the following is a non-normative example of a JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT from an Issuer with all the respective Disclosures. <\/ins> Below is a non-normative example of a presentation of the JWS JSON serialized SD-JWT, where the Holder has selected to disclose"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-869a7ff95adb9ca3a56ef29d03cdcccf61578c8d9bf7ea4cfa691b3e1f457dae","title":"","text":"The Issuer MUST ensure that a new salt value is chosen for each claim, including when the same claim name occurs at different places in the structure of the SD-JWT. This can be seen in Example 3 in the Appendix, where multiple claims with the name <\/del> in the structure of the SD-JWT. This can be seen in the example in example-complex-structured-sd-jwt, where multiple claims with the name <\/ins> appear, but each of them has a different salt."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-3ea057cb9b4ff9a1b67fcfbe5fe78078748e798beb5464a97aeeb0c6de1656c4","title":"","text":"suffix in the \"Structured Syntax Suffix\" registry IANA.StructuredSuffix in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the media type is encoded as an SD-JWT. 14. References 14.1. URIs [1] #example-1 <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-25fbe6e054350e7cee50d250fbd6d14f54f2f49d8ef0c95a018b77c4cc540dcc","title":"","text":"a few different SD-JWT permutations, both with and without various constituent parts. As an alternative illustration of the SD-JWT format, for those who celebrate, ABNF RFC5234 for the SD-JWT, SD-JWT+KB, and various constituent parts is provided here: <\/ins> 5.1. An SD-JWT has a JWT component that MUST be signed using the Issuer's"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-35d827e2e9b68e166288b333069022cce1a407e6767932b1d9f103dd72a68180","title":"","text":"This document also defines a format for SD-JWTs with Key Binding (SD- JWT+KB). By optionally sending an SD-JWT+KB to a Verifier, the Holder can prove to the Verifier that they hold the private key associated to the SD-JWT (e.g., using the <\/del> associated to the SD-JWT (i.e., using the <\/ins> claim RFC7800). The strength of the binding is conditional upon the trust in the protection of the private key of the key pair an SD-JWT"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-0a6c36c2331062f475ec3db46a1a82745bfd173debf9d34b6f52a51e3db1f73e","title":"","text":"5.1.2. If the Issuer wants to enable Key Binding, it includes a public key associated with the Holder, or a reference thereto. The <\/del> associated with the Holder, or a reference thereto, using the <\/ins> member of the <\/del> claim as defined in RFC7800. The <\/ins> claim as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7800 is suggested for doing so, however, other means can be used. <\/del> confirmation method, as defined in Section 3.2 of RFC7800, is suggested for doing so, however, other confirmation methods can be used. Note that, as was stated in RFC7800, if an application needs to represent multiple proof-of-possession keys in the same SD-JWT, one way to achieve this is to use other claim names, in addition to , to hold the additional proof-of-possession key information. <\/ins> It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the Holder key pair is established. For example, the Holder MAY create a key"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c2082d6e5354c30fde5beba30364726348311ed082ac22e253c3e65f9e53190d","title":"","text":"Note: The examples throughout this document use the claim to include the raw public key by value in SD-JWT. <\/del> claim with the member to include the raw public key by value in SD-JWT. <\/ins> 5.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-34d2d386dc50036285347baa57e5b0932a1dd96956b702b69735619c563165a2","title":"","text":"presented at the same time, etc. It is important that a Verifier does not make its security policy decisions based on data that can be influenced by an attacker or that can be misinterpreted. For this reason, when deciding whether Key Binding is required or not, Verifiers MUST NOT take into account: <\/del> decisions based on data that can be influenced by an attacker. For this reason, when deciding whether Key Binding is required or not, Verifiers MUST NOT take into account whether the Holder has provided an SD-JWT+KB or a bare SD-JWT, since otherwise an attacker could strip the KB-JWT from an SD-JWT+KB and present the resulting SD-JWT. Furthermore, Verifiers should be aware that Key Binding information may have been added to an SD-JWT in a format that they do not recognize and therefore may not be able to tell whether the SD-JWT supports Key Binding or not. <\/ins> If a Verifier determines that Key Binding is required for a particular use case and the Holder presents either a bare SD-JWT or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-cee9cb7595c2d6c41d5a8bc9fda14ca9e086e0ff698c244cfff2b6d62196d9ea","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, Jeffrey Yasskin, John Mattsson, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Michael Fraser, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard \"fnord\" Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Yasskin, John Mattsson, Joseph Heenan, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Michael Fraser, Mike Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard \"fnord\" Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-eda61829703b5c325eff65b1ee38d10571bee2fc9d0aca2fb061fde96d503744","title":"","text":"a few different SD-JWT permutations, both with and without various constituent parts. An SD-JWT without Disclosures and without a KB-JWT: <\/del> An SD-JWT without Disclosures: <\/ins> An SD-JWT with Disclosures and without a KB-JWT: <\/del> An SD-JWT with Disclosures: <\/ins> An SD-JWT+KB without Disclosures:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-be598b54b5e5ca1dcafd89db6354cb1c185b2932e427a4ce261f7958659ac21c","title":"","text":"credential to the Issuer. It is important to note that the timing of such requests could potentially serve as a side-channel. Verifier\/Verifier unlinkablility and presentation unlinkablility can be achieved using batch issuance: A batch of credentials based on the <\/del> Verifier\/Verifier unlinkability and presentation unlinkability can be achieved using batch issuance: A batch of credentials based on the <\/ins> same claims is issued to the Holder instead of just a single credential. The Holder can then use a different credential for each Verifier or even for each session with a Verifier. New key binding"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-fdf58eeec6abd99ee29df474922b447380928f89fe737635e2418580b635f3db","title":"","text":"and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. Special appreciation is extended to Martin Thomson, who wielded his considerable intellect and influence to change a single occurrence of the word \"to\" to \"with\" in the midst of a significant proposal that would be integrated into this document six months later. <\/ins> The work on this draft was started at OAuth Security Workshop 2022 in Trondheim, Norway."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-bffafb7613a80846afdbf2abe6d5e2dc41a91db5dadd46b6a739a9e21f4bc745","title":"","text":"(three dots). The value MUST be the digest of the Disclosure created as described in hashing_disclosures. There MUST NOT be any other keys in the object. <\/del> keys in the object. Note that the string was chosen because the ellipsis character, typically entered as three period characters, is commonly used in places where content is omitted from the present context. <\/ins> For example, using the digest of the array element Disclosure created above, the Issuer could create the following SD-JWT payload to make"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-833b769d40b820eb61fb3997e7154fe55db90dd3337e3426279348708e3ad310","title":"","text":"Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national identity service. For example, in OpenID Connect, signed ID Tokens can be stored by Relying Parties. In the case of SD-JWT, Holders have to store SD-JWTs, and Issuers and Verifiers may decide to do so as well. <\/del> identity service. For example, in OpenID Connect OpenID.Core, signed ID Tokens can be stored by Relying Parties. In the case of SD-JWT, Holders have to store SD-JWTs, and Issuers and Verifiers may decide to do so as well. <\/ins> Not surprisingly, a leak of such data risks revealing private data of End-Users to third parties. Signed End-User data, the authenticity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-4101df36fd5a429514a8033056f308cc97b59b961563bc1474605d90af17e0ca","title":"","text":"6.1. The Issuer is using the following input JWT Claims Set: <\/del> The following data about the user comprises the input JWT Claims Set used by the Issuer: <\/ins> The Issuer in this case made the following decisions: <\/del> In this example, the following decisions were made by the Issuer in constructing the SD-JWT: <\/ins> The following payload is used for the SD-JWT: The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer: <\/del> The respective Disclosures are created by the Issuer: <\/ins> The payload is then signed by the Issuer to create the following JWT: <\/del> The payload is then signed by the Issuer to create the following Issuer-signed JWT: <\/ins> The following is the issued SD-JWT: <\/del> Adding the Disclosures produces the SD-JWT: <\/ins> 6.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5050b438d8aec085ed4b959c4b9b6cc14c5f0d185db090752569aba8db1974cc","title":"","text":"have presented the SD-JWT with selected Disclosures directly, instead of encapsulating it in an SD-JWT+KB. After validation, the Verifier will have the following processed SD- JWT payload available for further handling: <\/ins> 7. Being JSON, an object in an SD-JWT payload MAY contain name\/value"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-2270bef86dc3ac77f7fb893121a0e2fffe8ac889d5c03f04a7be516b429b6d6d","title":"","text":"claim is treated as an object in the Disclosure. The Issuer would create the following Disclosure: <\/del> The Issuer would create the following Disclosure referenced by the one hash in the SD-JWT: <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-fd8c4aa2ee4e227e434f356d57b9759f5b1aa76656b14ef786b1ce78a54e628e","title":"","text":"The Holder or the Verifier MUST perform the following (or equivalent) steps when receiving an SD-JWT: If any step fails, the SD-JWT is not valid and processing MUST be aborted. <\/del> If any step fails, the SD-JWT is not valid, and processing MUST be aborted. Otherwise, the JSON document resulting from the preceding processing and verification steps, herein referred to as the processed SD-JWT payload, can be made available to the application to be used for its intended purpose. <\/ins> It is up to the Holder how to maintain the mapping between the Disclosures and the plaintext claim values to be able to display them"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5c8c3183b4f158a78df3f38984f1769ecdee5b2996913d67be1b3f238d7cc616","title":"","text":"11.1. Unlinkability is a property whereby adversaries are prevented from correlating credential presentations of the same user beyond the user's consent. Without unlinkability, an adversary might be able to learn more about the user than the user intended to disclose, for example: The following types of unlinkability are considered here: In all cases, unlinkability is limited to cases where the disclosed claims do not contain information that directly or indirectly identifies the user. For example, when a taxpayer identification number is contained in the disclosed claims, the Issuer and Verifier can easily link the user's transactions. However, when the user only discloses a birthdate to one Verifier and a postal code to another Verifier, the two Verifiers should not be able to determine that they were interacting with the same user. Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability with a colluding or compromised Verifier cannot be achieved in salted-hash based selective disclosure approaches, such as SD-JWT, as the issued credential with the Issuer's signature is directly presented to the Verifier, who can forward it to the Issuer. In considering Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability, it is important to note the potential for an asymmetric power dynamic between Issuers and Verifiers. This dynamic can compel an otherwise honest Verifier into collusion. For example, a governmental Issuer might have the authority to mandate that a Verifier report back information about the credentials presented to it. Legal requirements could further enforce this, explicitly undermining Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability. Similarly, a large service provider issuing credentials might implicitly pressure Verifiers into collusion by incentivizing participation in their larger ecosystem. Deployers of SD-JWT must be aware of these potential power dynamics, mitigate them as much as possible, and\/or make the risks transparent to the End-User. Contrary to that, Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability with an honest Verifier can generally be achieved. However, a callback from the Verifier to the Issuer, such as a revocation check, could potentially disclose information about the credential's usage to the Issuer. Where such callbacks are necessary, they MUST be executed in a manner that preserves privacy and does not disclose details about the credential to the Issuer. It is important to note that the timing of such requests could potentially serve as a side-channel. Verifier\/Verifier unlinkability and presentation unlinkability can be achieved using batch issuance: A batch of credentials based on the same claims is issued to the Holder instead of just a single credential. The Holder can then use a different credential for each Verifier or even for each session with a Verifier. New key binding keys and salts MUST be used for each credential in the batch to ensure that the Verifiers cannot link the credentials using these values. Likewise, claims carrying time information, like , , and , MUST either be randomized within a time period considered appropriate (e.g., randomize within the last 24 hours and calculate accordingly) or rounded (e.g., rounded down to the beginning of the day). 11.2. <\/ins> Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-8159ff4bb1fa7e8dd3e0f19d998b0e4916f7b6457902fbbb3e7954ebc1f796ed","title":"","text":"signatures on them can no longer be trusted to originate from the Issuer. 11.2. <\/del> 11.3. <\/ins> If the SD-JWT is transmitted over an insecure channel during issuance or presentation, an adversary may be able to intercept and read the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b7d22ef6086a616c123289b555b7bb2e4f9b2538bc69483ef3db4f17f433a160","title":"","text":"browser or end up in web server logs, the SD-JWT SHOULD be encrypted using JWE. 11.3. <\/del> 11.4. <\/ins> The use of decoy digests is RECOMMENDED when the number of claims (or the existence of particular claims) can be a side-channel disclosing"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e1b767b0b8f67bbe8ac425b4969562be14598683494eefd7a2e0e59d8eb8f61d","title":"","text":"digests (or whether to use them at all) is a trade-off between the size of the SD-JWT and the privacy of the End-User's data. 11.4. Unlinkability is a property whereby adversaries are prevented from correlating credential presentations of the same user beyond the user's consent. Without unlinkability, an adversary might be able to learn more about the user than the user intended to disclose, for example: The following types of unlinkability are considered here: In all cases, unlinkability is limited to cases where the disclosed claims do not contain information that directly or indirectly identifies the user. For example, when a taxpayer identification number is contained in the disclosed claims, the Issuer and Verifier can easily link the user's transactions. However, when the user only discloses a birthdate to one Verifier and a postal code to another Verifier, the two Verifiers should not be able to determine that they were interacting with the same user. Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability with a colluding or compromised Verifier cannot be achieved in salted-hash based selective disclosure approaches, such as SD-JWT, as the issued credential with the Issuer's signature is directly presented to the Verifier, who can forward it to the Issuer. In considering Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability, it is important to note the potential for an asymmetric power dynamic between Issuers and Verifiers. This dynamic can compel an otherwise honest Verifier into collusion. For example, a governmental Issuer might have the authority to mandate that a Verifier report back information about the credentials presented to it. Legal requirements could further enforce this, explicitly undermining Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability. Similarly, a large service provider issuing credentials might implicitly pressure Verifiers into collusion by incentivizing participation in their larger ecosystem. Deployers of SD-JWT must be aware of these potential power dynamics, mitigate them as much as possible, and\/or make the risks transparent to the End-User. Contrary to that, Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability with an honest Verifier can generally be achieved. However, a callback from the Verifier to the Issuer, such as a revocation check, could potentially disclose information about the credential's usage to the Issuer. Where such callbacks are necessary, they MUST be executed in a manner that preserves privacy and does not disclose details about the credential to the Issuer. It is important to note that the timing of such requests could potentially serve as a side-channel. Verifier\/Verifier unlinkability and presentation unlinkability can be achieved using batch issuance: A batch of credentials based on the same claims is issued to the Holder instead of just a single credential. The Holder can then use a different credential for each Verifier or even for each session with a Verifier. New key binding keys and salts MUST be used for each credential in the batch to ensure that the Verifiers cannot link the credentials using these values. Likewise, claims carrying time information, like , , and , MUST either be randomized within a time period considered appropriate (e.g., randomize within the last 24 hours and calculate accordingly) or rounded (e.g., rounded down to the beginning of the day). <\/del> 11.5. An Issuer issuing only one type of SD-JWT might have privacy"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-abd5b4013e3c33d50a224c9cb8e0f8db5ba8fbf2357ffe5aa2afd934d77e0912","title":"","text":"It may be sufficient to store the result of the verification and any End-User data that is needed for the application. If reliable and secure key rotation and revocation is ensured according to issuer_signature_key_distribution, Issuers may opt to publish expired or revoked private signing keys (after a grace period that ensures that the keys are not cached any longer at any Verifier). This reduces the value of any leaked credentials as the signatures on them can no longer be trusted to originate from the Issuer. <\/del> 11.3. If the SD-JWT is transmitted over an insecure channel during issuance"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-9bd177875bdb9f094a1355a9c7f6fe7b86ac0c9ec9fcf043f33eaa1d51f6d29d","title":"","text":"The following payload is used for the SD-JWT: The respective Disclosures are created by the Issuer: <\/del> The respective Disclosures, created by the Issuer, are listed below. In the text below and in other locations in this specification, the label \"SHA-256 Hash:\" is used as a shorthand for the label \"Base64url-Encoded SHA-256 Hash:\". <\/ins> The payload is then signed by the Issuer to create the following Issuer-signed JWT:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-cf996b4c1022afe96f1ef2e46f6579904a1756c85c2efb54851415858aeca8f9","title":"","text":"For example, the base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the Disclosure would be <\/del> for the <\/ins> . The base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the Disclosure would be <\/del> claim from disclosures_for_object_properties above is <\/ins> ."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a3d98ccd0ee3b8e709780790e1816a86938dbd56f854f623e1c2ef95e5f07a80","title":"","text":"method does not matter as long as it does not depend on the original order of elements. For example, using the digest of the object property Disclosure created above, the Issuer could create the following SD-JWT payload to make <\/del> For example, using the digest of the Disclosure from hashing_disclosures, the Issuer could create the following SD-JWT payload to make <\/ins> selectively disclosable:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-44bcbb61228c55881c3b69fa331fc6ab0c7290d4f608cc6ca32e30634e23ee58","title":"","text":"The same digest value MUST NOT appear more than once in the SD-JWT. Applications of SD-JWT SHOULD be explicitly typed using the header parameter. See explicit_typing for more details. <\/del> Application and profiles of SD-JWT SHOULD be explicitly typed. See explicit_typing for more details. <\/ins> It is the Issuer who decides which claims are selectively disclosable and which are not. End-User claims MAY be included as plaintext as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-a3dd1c9b2d03dfaf4b1bfd1d6a37dc5a953ac41d369d75e5bfeb29dcd48cddb0","title":"","text":"10.11. Section 3.11 of RFC8725 describes the use of explicit typing to prevent confusion attacks in which one kind of JWT is mistaken for another. SD-JWTs are also potentially vulnerable to such confusion attacks, so it is RECOMMENDED to specify an explicit type by including the <\/del> RFC8725 describes the use of explicit typing as one mechanism to prevent confusion attacks (described in RFC8725) in which one kind of JWT is mistaken for another. SD-JWTs are also potentially subject to such confusion attacks, so in the absence of other techniques, it is RECOMMENDED that application profiles of SD-JWT specify an explicit type by including the <\/ins> header parameter when the SD-JWT is issued, and for Verifiers to check this value. When explicit typing is employed for an SD-JWT, it is RECOMMENDED that a media type name of the format \"application\/example+sd-jwt\" be used, where \"example\" is replaced by the identifier for the specific kind of SD-JWT. The definition of <\/del> When explicit typing using the header is employed for an SD-JWT, it is RECOMMENDED that a media type name of the format \"application\/example+sd-jwt\" be used, where \"example\" is replaced by the identifier for the specific kind of SD- JWT. The definition of <\/ins> in Section 4.1.9 of RFC7515 recommends that the \"application\/\" prefix be omitted, so \"example+sd-jwt\" would be the value of the header parameter. Use of the content type header parameter to indicate the content type of the SD- JWT payload can also be used to distinguish different types of JSON objects, or different kinds of JWT Claim Sets. <\/ins> 11. The privacy principles of ISO.29100 should be adhered to."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-5add152f618c8bdca1ed651f9718f119db8230264190450e20960e2ab72d030c","title":"","text":"We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Anders Rundgren, Arjan Geluk, Christian Bormann, Christian Paquin, Dale Bowie, David Bakker, David Waite, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, Jeffrey Yasskin, John Mattsson, Joseph Heenan, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Michael Fraser, Michael B. Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard \"fnord\" Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/del> Waite, Dick Hardt, Fabian Hauck, Filip Skokan, Giuseppe De Marco, Jacob Ward, Jeffrey Yasskin, John Mattsson, Joseph Heenan, Justin Richer, Kushal Das, Matthew Miller, Michael Fraser, Michael B. Jones, Mike Prorock, Nat Sakimura, Neil Madden, Oliver Terbu, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian, Peter Altmann, Pieter Kasselman, Richard \"fnord\" Barnes, Rohan Mahy, Ryosuke Abe, Sami Rosendahl, Shawn Butterfield, Simon Schulz, Tobias Looker, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt, Vittorio Bertocci, and Yaron Sheffer for their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the initial set of implementations. <\/ins> Special appreciation is extended to Martin Thomson, who wielded his considerable intellect and influence to change a single occurrence of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-70c1026d031328d5dd11415c2221ef787c54ec2eb9a2ed148ffe68b3bbabc13c","title":"","text":"explicit_typing for more details. It is the Issuer who decides which claims are selectively disclosable and which are not. End-User claims MAY be included as plaintext as well, e.g., if hiding the particular claims from the Verifier is not required in the intended use case. See sd-validity-claims for <\/del> by the Holder and which are not. Claims MAY be included as plaintext as well, e.g., if hiding the particular claims from the Verifier is not required in the intended use case. See sd-validity-claims for <\/ins> considerations on making validity-controlling claims such as selectively disclosable."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-d391a8def38ff2b41d2e1517324f386ef6f31e5ce1bedbd959f6e3d7d89af9fb","title":"","text":"MUST be used. The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a hash algorithm value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms or a value defined in another specification and\/or profile of this specification. <\/del> This claim value is a case-sensitive string with the hash algorithm identifier. The hash algorithm identifier MUST be a hash algorithm value from the \"Hash Name String\" column in the IANA \"Named Information Hash Algorithm\" registry IANA.Hash.Algorithms or a value defined in another specification and\/or profile of this specification. <\/ins> To promote interoperability, implementations MUST support the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-40c4b94fb8d463c985d5a6f87be203c007978dfd3c5831c43f09219bac7b021f","title":"","text":"4.3.2. The Verifier MUST ensure that the key with which it validates the signature on the Key Binding JWT is the key specified in the SD-JWT as the Holder's public key. For example, if the SD-JWT contains a <\/del> Whether to require Key Binding is up to the Verifier's policy, based on the set of trust requirements such as trust frameworks it belongs to. See key_binding_security for security considerations. If the Verifier requires Key Binding, the Verifier MUST ensure that the key with which it validates the signature on the Key Binding JWT is the key specified in the SD-JWT as the Holder's public key. For example, if the SD-JWT contains a <\/ins> value with a member, the Verifier would parse the provided JWK and use it to verify the Key Binding JWT. Whether to require Key Binding is up to the Verifier's policy, based on the set of trust requirements such as trust frameworks it belongs to. See key_binding_security for security considerations. <\/del> Details of the Validation process are defined in verifier_verification. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-c7fbeef281ee8876fd654549b6a67b7dbd598548fde23988b98bcfd2023691bd","title":"","text":"Holder about having received a complete set of Disclosures. That is, for some digest values in the Issuer-signed JWT (which are not decoy digests) there may be no corresponding Disclosures, for example, if the message from the Issuer was truncated. It is up to the Holder how to maintain the mapping between the Disclosures and the plaintext claim values to be able to display them to the End-User when needed. <\/del> the message from the Issuer was truncated. It is up to the Holder how to maintain the mapping between the Disclosures and the plaintext claim values to be able to display them to the user when needed. <\/ins> 7.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-296e368195b0fba9e8ca1e49c0f9b68821b3407f9e94f396d4b1c1bcfd5bc876","title":"","text":"implicitly pressure Verifiers into collusion by incentivizing participation in their larger ecosystem. Deployers of SD-JWT must be aware of these potential power dynamics, mitigate them as much as possible, and\/or make the risks transparent to the End-User. <\/del> possible, and\/or make the risks transparent to the user. <\/ins> Contrary to that, Issuer\/Verifier unlinkability with an honest Verifier can generally be achieved. However, a callback from the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-b09af6b3c561a4bf1fb88bf3becad00a08a8415383bcbb4f11b46c98695ec635","title":"","text":"10.2. Wherever End-User data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national <\/del> Wherever user data is stored, it represents a potential target for an attacker. This target can be of particularly high value when the data is signed by a trusted authority like an official national <\/ins> identity service. For example, in OpenID Connect OpenID.Core, signed ID Tokens can be stored by Relying Parties. In the case of SD-JWT, Holders have to store SD-JWTs, and Issuers and Verifiers may decide to do so as well. Not surprisingly, a leak of such data risks revealing private data of End-Users to third parties. Signed End-User data, the authenticity of which can be easily verified by third parties, further exacerbates the risk. As discussed in key_binding_security, leaked SD-JWTs may also allow attackers to impersonate Holders unless Key Binding is enforced and the attacker does not have access to the Holder's cryptographic keys. Altogether, leaked SD-JWT credentials may have a high monetary value on black markets. <\/del> users to third parties. Signed user data, the authenticity of which can be easily verified by third parties, further exacerbates the risk. As discussed in key_binding_security, leaked SD-JWTs may also allow attackers to impersonate Holders unless Key Binding is enforced and the attacker does not have access to the Holder's cryptographic keys. <\/ins> Due to these risks, systems implementing SD-JWT SHOULD be designed to minimize the amount of data that is stored. All involved parties"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-69c1fb916ff29f91e52605f015f42dca6a0e7c112b1be61ab1ac174ed4229b07","title":"","text":"Holders SHOULD store SD-JWTs only in encrypted form, and, wherever possible, use hardware-backed encryption in particular for the private Key Binding key. Decentralized storage of data, e.g., on End-User devices, SHOULD be preferred for End-User credentials over <\/del> user devices, SHOULD be preferred for user credentials over <\/ins> centralized storage. Expired SD-JWTs SHOULD be deleted as soon as possible. After Verification, Verifiers SHOULD NOT store the Issuer-signed JWT or the respective Disclosures if they contain privacy-sensitive data. It may be sufficient to store the result of the verification and any End-User data that is needed for the application. <\/del> user data that is needed for the application. <\/ins> 10.3. If the SD-JWT is transmitted over an insecure channel during issuance or presentation, an adversary may be able to intercept and read the End-User's personal data or correlate the information with previous uses of the same SD-JWT. <\/del> user's personal data or correlate the information with previous uses of the same SD-JWT. <\/ins> Usually, transport protocols for issuance and presentation of credentials are designed to protect the confidentiality of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-cdd0f415e55b42fc79d2185d97f71dc1de9544f76e1e61077a8408f319cd7c70","title":"","text":"any encryption mechanism. Implementers MUST ensure that the transport protocol provides confidentiality if the privacy of End-User data or correlation attacks by passive observers are a concern. <\/del> confidentiality if the privacy of user data or correlation attacks by passive observers are a concern. <\/ins> To encrypt the SD-JWT when transmitted over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) RFC7516 by nesting the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-573a308047e132ca546524a86d72dabed812707c0f3a7c101fc8fc34c5783f08","title":"","text":"the existence of particular claims) can be a side-channel disclosing information about otherwise undisclosed claims. In particular, if a claim in an SD-JWT is present only if a certain condition is met (e.g., a membership number is only contained if the End-User is a member of a group), the Issuer SHOULD add decoy digests when the condition is not met. <\/del> (e.g., a membership number is only contained if the user is a member of a group), the Issuer SHOULD add decoy digests when the condition is not met. <\/ins> Decoy digests increase the size of the SD-JWT. The number of decoy digests (or whether to use them at all) is a trade-off between the size of the SD-JWT and the privacy of the End-User's data. <\/del> size of the SD-JWT and the privacy of the user's data. <\/ins> 10.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1704ae4e8a1f2dbe896139d901d4661db2f523727fd1a39e5510accca9ff73c2","title":"","text":"case, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for many other use cases as well. Note: so far agreed to define holder binding (user's public key contained inside an SD-JWT) as an option. It is not mandatory since holder binding is use case specific and orthogonal to the general mechanism of selective disclosure defined here. <\/del> This document also describes holder binding, or the concept of binding SD-JWT to a key material controlled by the subject of SD-JWT, which is optional to implement. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-1f0b22a33a08ea300e68d7f26966efeb00569471a65100d98f5f273c2adcd1ed","title":"","text":"4.3. Some use-cases MAY require holder binding. Information about the key material controlled by the holder MUST be communicated in SD-JWT. How the public key is included in SD-JWT is out of scope of this document. It can be passed by value or by reference. Examples in this document use Claim to include raw public key by value in SD-JWT. Holder MUST sign SD-JWT-R using the private key associated with the public key included in SD-JWT. Verifier MUST verify that the signature on SD-JWT-R using the public key information in SD-JWT. 4.4. <\/ins> A verifier checks that The detailed algorithm is described below."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-e73fcda7e8cde1f4849b68c126920e2dec71e14656e9ddb20e1d5080b6f95a87","title":"","text":"1. The JSON-based content of signed JSON Web Token documents as defined in RFC7515 is secured against modification using digital signatures. A consumer of a JWT document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving a JWT can read all contents of the document. <\/del> The JSON-based claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) RFC7519 document are secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) RFC7515 digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims. <\/ins> A common use case is that the signed document represents a user's identity credential, created by an issuer. The issuer includes the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-511b8efad0b661434f6e609a22eca6fd58f550fea142209283e953efeba4244e","title":"","text":"7.3. The length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt MUST be at least 128 bits. 7.4. <\/ins> For the security of this scheme, the hash function is required to have the following property. Given a claim value, a salt, and the resulting hash, it is hard to find a second salt value so that equals the hash. 7.4. <\/del> Furthermore the hash algorithms MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, and SHA-1 revealed fundamental weaknesses and they MUST NOT be used. 7.5. <\/ins> TBD"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-26dea3b1833f18444bc4104acb7dd766d0df1e3dd3826f644f3de49eb0442037","title":"","text":"parameters for the response header defined by RFC6750, which the resource server can use to explicitly communicate to the client the required authentication strength or recentness. <\/del> authentication scheme challenge defined by RFC6750, which the resource server can use to explicitly communicate to the client the required authentication strength or recentness. <\/ins> The client can use that information to reach back to the authorization server with an authorization request specifying the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-2e92f05d9e7203876c78b0bdb8286b47d7e715951735f5824369f260af6a9bd1","title":"","text":"or parameter as defined in OIDC. <\/del> authorization request parameters as defined in OIDC. <\/ins> Those extensions will make it possible to implement interoperable step up authentication with minimal work from resource servers,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-bce6161639b88d15d6340be987c4b84281810c118b34168329c89f68c22dd806","title":"","text":"14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This specification uses the terms \"access token\", \"authorization server\", \"authorization endpoint\", \"authorization request\", \"client\", \"protected resource\", and \"resource server\" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework RFC6749. <\/ins> 2. The following is an end-to-end sequence of a typical step-up"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-470f49116c767b76b2291c693ac59f249402225229470416f0bc04b1913a8aab","title":"","text":"This specification introduces a new error code value for the parameter of RFC6750 or authentication schemes, such as I-D.ietf- oauth-dpop, which use the <\/del> parameter of the challenge of the authentication scheme from RFC6750 and other OAuth authentication schemes, such as I-D.ietf-oauth-dpop, which use the same <\/ins> parameter:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-0a8d6e30a697a2368a45fe97a394d5a8660b37e39fe15705ef46b80c3ecb9aec","title":"","text":"deploying and publishing such requirements) is out of scope for this document. Furthermore, this specification defines additional <\/del> Furthermore, this specification defines the following <\/ins> auth-param values to convey the authentication requirements back to the client. <\/del> auth-param values for those OAuth authentication schemes to convey the authentication requirements back to the client. <\/ins> acr-challenge below is an example of a authentication scheme challenge with the <\/ins> header using the error code value to inform the client that the access token presented"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-639bca7b085c185049f90f5b5248f0af4a999b27d0f2ebee96656339fb8d25a0","title":"","text":"4. A client receiving an authorization error from the resource server carrying the error code <\/del> A client receiving a challenge from the resource server carrying the error code <\/ins> SHOULD parse the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-45c3b00a90d4fe2f437d413f69539f7e00bb75b1118382234bc90dace110aba1","title":"","text":"and and use them, if present, in constructing an authorization request, which is then conveyed to the authorization server via the user agent in order to obtain a new access token complying with the corresponding requirements. Both <\/del> which is then conveyed to the authorization server's authorization endpoint via the user agent in order to obtain a new access token complying with the corresponding requirements. Both <\/ins> and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-bb63d4258c82ac13d3e3b4fad743082e3a68f8a6b9d5fa189a06d95f6a892377","title":"","text":"to frequent prompts, hence a suboptimal user experience, if reused for routine operations. In those scenarios, the client would be better served by keeping both the old tokens, associated with a lower authentication level, and the new one- selecting the appropriate <\/del> authentication level, and the new one - selecting the appropriate <\/ins> token for each API call. This is not a new requirement for clients, as incremental consent and least privilege principles will require similar heuristics for managing access tokens associated to different"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-dd221fb47657025fff41076c42a6699910c66ce4e631c19822985ed89098e63c","title":"","text":". Subsequent to the challenge in age-challenge, a client might direct the user agent to the following example authorization request URI where the <\/del> After the challenge in age-challenge, a client might direct the user agent to the following example authorization request URI where the <\/ins> parameter indicates to the authorization server that the user authentication event needs to have occurred no more than five seconds"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-96ae34a36b513971802bc925dfcef03c8bca68cfb93351629b023e3167941cb3","title":"","text":"6. To evaluate whether an access token meets the protected resource's requirements, the resource servers needs a way of accessing <\/del> requirements, the resource server needs a way of accessing <\/ins> information about the authentication event by which that access token was obtained. This specification provides guidance on how to convey that information in conjunction with two common access token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-13689cd7115e884f44c5fb82ab883a00f8fae00cc1525545f3101192b7b0438e","title":"","text":"impose requirements that are impossible for users to comply with, or leading to an undesirable user experience outcome. The authentication prompts presented by the authorization server as a result of the requirements propagation method described here might require the user to perform some specific actions such as using multiple devices, having access to devices complying with specific security requirements, and so on. Those extra requirements, concerning more about how to comply with a particular requirement rather than indicating the identifier of the requirement itself, are out of scope for this specification. <\/del> result of the method of propagating authentication requirements described here might require the user to perform some specific actions such as using multiple devices, having access to devices complying with specific security requirements, and so on. Those extra requirements, concerning more about how to comply with a particular requirement rather than indicating the identifier of the requirement itself, are out of scope for this specification. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-2f2a47ed390f96518c95170bf1a419c26c5661f4183c998429f5ad106e9a512e","title":"","text":"attacks. Implementers should use care in determining what to disclose in the challenge and in what circumstances. The logic examining the incoming access token to determine whether a challenge should be returned can execute either before or after the traditional token validation logic, be it based on JWT token validation, introspection, or any other method. The resource server MAY return a challenge without verifying the client presented a valid token. However, this approach will leak the required properties of an authorization token to an actor who has not proven they can obtain a token for this resource server. <\/del> should be returned can execute either before or after the conventional token validation logic, be it based on JWT token validation, introspection, or any other method. The resource server MAY return a challenge without verifying the client presented a valid token. However, this approach will leak the required properties of an authorization token to an actor who has not proven they can obtain a token for this resource server. <\/ins> As this specification provides a mechanism for the resource server to trigger user interaction, it's important for the authorization server"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-a3e0b50c13b7ed76ca209bfd8004be24d10ced8cb908802b8260cd02a3ac1b8a","title":"","text":"To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request as described in txn-token-request but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter. <\/del> to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter. The \"scope\" value in the replacement request, if different from that in the original Txn-Token, MUST NOT increase the authorization surface beyond that of the original Txn-Token. <\/ins> 7.5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-ca6ab599bd30aff842a1ade64668589cd6a622ed3f667c3291f712d5d66df570","title":"","text":"specification RFC8693 are also not used in Txn-Token responses. The \"expires_in\" is not required since the issued token has an \"exp\" field, which indicates the token lifetime. The \"scope\" field is omitted from the request and therefore omitted in the response. <\/del> omitted from the response in favor of the \"purp\" claim in the Txn- Token. <\/ins> 9.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-dba468b140fbd63d9fcb9fe48d89e43fd062d0f96c5068a85c5111bae34e8e34","title":"","text":"request. The \"actor_token\" MUST authenticate the identity of the requesting workload. 9.4. Validation of a replacement Txn-Token, as well as any Txn-Token, is critical to the security of the entire transaction invocation sequence. Only Txn-Tokens issued by a trusted Transaction Token Service may be trusted, so verification of the Txn-Token signature is required. For replacement transaction tokens, not only must the JWT signature be verified but also the workload identity of the workload requesting the replacement Txn-Token. 9.5. The authorization model within a trust domain boundary is most often quite different from the authorization model (e.g. OAuth scopes) used with client external to the trust domain. This makes managing unintentional scope increase a critical aspect of the Transaction Token Service. The TTS MUST ensure that the requested purpose (\"scope\") of the Txn-Token is equal or less than the scope(s) identified in the \"subject_token\". This is also true of requesting a replacement Txn-Token. The TTS MUST ensure there is not unintentional increase in authorization scope. <\/ins> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-60f5dea7ddad743420627a5a6f44dd036d82c0f0b405618a826a5c216fa2e01b","title":"","text":"REQUIRED A unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC8417. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain. <\/del> entire call chain. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to provide an identifier unique within the trust domain. If providing such an identifier is not possible, then a fixed value of \"N_A\" MAY be supplied. <\/ins> REQUIRED A unique identifier for the subject within the context of the \"aud\" trust domain. Unlike OpenID Connect, the \"sub\" claim is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f7962eae26e55da17a3d7c0e4a631ccd3db62b6f8062a8f5c12e4c76a96eb2c1","title":"","text":"5.2.1. The \"purp\" claim captures the exact purpose of this particular transaction. This is often much narrower than a scope value issued to an external client. This is due to the fact that in most cases, the authorization model within the trust domain is quite different than the authorization model used with clients external to the trust domain. To that end, it is intentional to separate the concept of scope (often fairly coarse-grained) used with external clients from the purpose of the transaction used within the trust domain. How a given deployment represents the authorization model within the trust domain is out of scope for this specification. 5.2.2. <\/ins> The Txn-Token SHOULD contain an \"rctx\" claim. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn-"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-d4dae0d3a5e51ccb14d8c001c25c2fa9b8039900653e59c15ac6d0ebd3f387c9","title":"","text":"that have requested Txn-Tokens as part of the transaction processing. 5.2.1.1. <\/del> 5.2.2.1. <\/ins> It is useful to be able to track the set of workloads that have requested a Txn-Token. The \"req_wl\" claim allows for tracking this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-631a97aa7551ec05bbb5b0f2e635691eb6be0339afd8d6de2e6d5dd0d42d0c33","title":"","text":"single value, then \"req_wl\" will be prepresented by an array of StringOrURIs. 5.2.2. <\/del> 5.2.3. <\/ins> The figure below figleaftxtokenbody shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Txn-Token:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-b99630ef3986fe41d376a75456f2122e0e28aa4eaf4358031080cd4195430613","title":"","text":"relating to the transaction being performed. Most of these elements are provided by the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification and the rest are defined as new parameters. Additionally, this profile defines a new token type URN \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn- token\" which is used by the requesting workload to identify that it is requesting the Txn-Token Response to contain a Txn-Token. <\/del> defines a new token type URN \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token- type:txn_token\" which is used by the requesting workload to identify that it is requesting the Txn-Token Response to contain a Txn-Token. <\/ins> To request a Txn-Token the workload invokes the OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 token endpoint with the following parameters:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-61223abd29c5e3372ddba8ea9760c068e216bfce389401fbb4dde415d6e6d241","title":"","text":"intent of the transaction. \"requested_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token\" <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\" <\/ins> \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST represent the subject of the transaction. This could be an inbound token received by an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-71918ef2c39369ce5014ee2dc58fba504fb5d964c137e7e89c72c0b571183f21","title":"","text":"The \"access_token\" value MUST be the Txn-Token JWT The \"issued_token_type\" value MUST bet set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token\" <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\" <\/ins> The response MUST NOT include the values \"expires_in\", \"refresh_token\" and \"scope\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-bd0c95ff650e188136486aefbb639c5b2dc02136a61ccb0235f9129f18214398","title":"","text":"11.1. URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token <\/del> URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token <\/ins> Common Name: Transaction Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-e20458913d32bf8a11727e0e7c13ba5dc7a3e906f2b0d11ea1497e35035dc157","title":"","text":"\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\" \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST represent the subject of the transaction. This could be an inbound token received by an API Gateway, or a self-signed JWT constructed by a workload initiating a transaction, the type of which is identified by <\/del> the transaction. This MAY be: An inbound token received by an API Gateway A self-signed JWT constructed by a workload initiating a transaction An unsigned JSON object constructed by a workload initiating a transaction Any other format that is understood by the Txn-Token Service The type of the \"subject_token\" field is identified by <\/ins> \"subject_token_type\". \"subject_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-c243fd1a47fe6c2d10c91d40e370e72ec6b60ad512d554960f0bc7a40176ff2f","title":"","text":"7.2. The \"subject_token_type\" parameter value MUST be a URI RFC3986. It MAY be any one of the subject token types described in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 except the Refresh Token type (i.e., \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token\"), or it MAY be a self-signed JWT, as described below, or it MAY be a custom URI agreed to between requesters and the Txn-Token Service. <\/del> MAY be: <\/ins> The Txn-Token Service MAY support other token formats, which MAY be specified in the \"subject_token_type\" parameter. Any value used in this parameter MUST be a URI as specified in RFC 8693 RFC8693. <\/del> Any one of the subject token types described in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 except the Refresh Token type (i.e., \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token\"). A URN type name when the subject token is a self-signed JWT, as described below. A URN type name when the subject token is an unsigned JSON object, as described below. A custom URN agreed to between requesters and the Txn-Token Service. The Txn-Token Service MAY support other token formats, which MAY be specified in the \"subject_token_type\" parameter. <\/ins> 7.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-8d314519d7eff0d303e9c9ba270bf23c0cea02fe40451f3374c2ff980331e6c8","title":"","text":"The self-signed JWT MAY contain other claims. 7.2.2. A requester MAY use an unsigned JSON object as a \"subject_token\" value. In that case, the requester MUST set the \"subject_token_type\" value to: \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:unsigned_json\". The value of the \"subject_token\" field MUST be the BASE64URL encoded value of the JSON object as described in Section 5 of RFC6848. The JSON object in the subject token MUST contain the following fields: \"sub\": The subject for whom the Txn-Token is being requested. The Txn-Token Service SHALL use this value in determining the \"sub\" value in the Txn-Token issued in the response to this request. \"exp\": The expiration time of the unsigned JSON object, which the TTS MAY use as input to determining the lifetime of the Txn-token. The unsigned JSON object MAY contain other fields, and the Txn-Token Service MAY consider them when generating the Txn-Token. <\/ins> 7.3. When the Transaction Token Service receives a Txn-Token Request it"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f3f4c0ef1b47b2b96dce2ddeb3b5f33a366b961c77f7a708016ddd4893e27fc6","title":"","text":"within the trust domain defined by the \"aud\" claim. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"iat\" claim to the time of issuance of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"aud\" claim to an identifier representing the Trust Domain of the Transaction Token Service. If the Transaction Token Service supports multiple trust domains, then it MUST determine the correct \"aud\" value for this request. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"exp\" claim to the expiry time of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"txn\" claim to a unique ID specific to this transaction. <\/del> issuance of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"aud\" claim to an identifier representing the Trust Domain of the Transaction Token Service. If the Transaction Token Service supports multiple trust domains, then it MUST determine the correct \"aud\" value for this request. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"exp\" claim to the expiry time of the Txn-Token. The Txn-Token Service MAY consider any \"exp\" value present in the \"subject_token\" parameter of the Txn-Token Request in determining the \"exp\" value of the resulting Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"txn\" claim to a unique ID specific to this transaction. <\/ins> The Transaction Token Service MAY set the \"iss\" claim of the Txn- Token to a value defining the entity that signed the Txn-Token. This claim MUST be ommitted if not set. <\/del> claim MUST be omitted if not set. <\/ins> The Transaction Token Service MUST evaluate the value specified in the \"scope\" parameter of the request to determine the \"purp\" claim of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-c01042a69e6ff46c47f30ee5b3d5ac1be5f44ef658c42e62202f2bf7c6151e7f","title":"","text":"9.3. A service requesting a Txn-Token SHOULD provide an incoming token if it has one that it used itself to authorize a caller, and if it directly correlates with the downstream call chain it needs the Txn- Token for. In the absence of an appropriate incoming token, the requesting service MAY use a self-signed JWT, an unsigned JSON object or any other format to represent the details of the requester to the Txn-Token service. 9.4. <\/ins> How requesting clients authenticate to the Transaction Token Service is out of scope for this specification. However, if using the \"actor_token\" and \"actor_token_type\" parameters of the OAuth 2.0"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6b2afe4727a4c5502b2746855cca912a8babf97614119048101cab44e0168fda","title":"","text":"request. The \"actor_token\" MUST authenticate the identity of the requesting workload. 9.4. <\/del> 9.5. <\/ins> Validation of a replacement Txn-Token, as well as any Txn-Token, is critical to the security of the entire transaction invocation"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-8eb24fde15f55ba08feaffb17248d351996c9a5c10e982b9f9a206a1e559200d","title":"","text":"signature be verified but also the workload identity of the workload requesting the replacement Txn-Token. 9.5. <\/del> 9.6. <\/ins> The authorization model within a trust domain boundary is most often quite different from the authorization model (e.g. OAuth scopes)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-a98b62f7146c10c15a015c6de67f5ad1448bb56b7ce7e0e6d20135ab30ef1c8a","title":"","text":"URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token Common Name: Transaction Token <\/del> Common Name: Transaction Token <\/ins> Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IESG <\/ins> Specification Document Section txn-token-request of this specification <\/del> Specification Document Section txn-token-request of this specification <\/ins> URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:self_signed Common Name: Token type for Self-signed JWT <\/del> Common Name: Token type for Self-signed JWT Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section self-signed-subject-token-type of this specification URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:unsigned_json <\/ins> Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Common Name: Token type for Unsigned JSON Object Change Controller: IESG <\/ins> Specification Document: Section subject-token-types of this specification <\/del> Specification Document: Section unsigned-json-subject-token- type of this specification <\/ins> 11.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-b4c5208a4cd7cff2b77b20f102efa8b4c1660864ec340aa66360b753a6d8c770","title":"","text":"REQUIRED Expiry time of the Txn-Token as defined in REQUIRED A unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC8417. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to provide an identifier unique within the trust domain. If providing such an identifier is not possible, then a fixed value of \"N_A\" MAY be supplied. <\/del> of RFC8417. <\/ins> REQUIRED A unique identifier for the subject within the context of the \"aud\" trust domain. Unlike OpenID Connect, the \"sub\" claim is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-fc5e9f4b60300952c168d6248c5801d175c45ba19f8e2d096f311143adb960ac","title":"","text":"replacement Txn-Token. The TTS MUST ensure there is not unintentional increase in authorization scope. 9.7. A Txn-token typically represents the call-chain of workloads necessary to complete a logical function initiated by an external or internal workload. The \"txn\" claim in the Txn-token provides a unique identifier that when logged by the TTS and each subsequent workload can provide both discovery and auditability of successful and failed transactions. It is therefore strongly RECOMMENDED to use an identifier, unique within the trust domain, for the \"txn\" value. <\/ins> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6c5261e1438796656593e7b6b321eef1289e3f3b63ac9b39dfde75bf1e2768ff","title":"","text":"10.2. Txn-Tokens SHOULD NOT be logged if they contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII). What constitutes PII depends upon the use case, but in some cases even an email address (which could be a \"sub\" value) can be protected PII, which should not be logged. <\/del> Complete Txn-Tokens must not be logged verbatim. This is in order to prevent replay of tokens or leakage of PII or other sensitive information via log files. A hash of the Txn-Token may be logged to allow for correlation with the log files of the Txn-Token Service that records issued tokens. Alternatively the JWS payload of a Txn- Token may be logged after the signature has been removed. If the Txn-Token contains PII, then care should be taken in logging the content of the Txn-Token so that the PII does not get logged. <\/ins> 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-3b1865b2363f344114f313b15710754ab7c7514855b821a23b0ec5480424fa88","title":"","text":"microservices, monolithic services and infrastructure services such as managed databases. A virtually or physically separated network, which contains two or more workloads. The workloads within a Trust Domain may be invoked only through published interfaces. <\/del> A collection of systems, applications, or workloads that share a common security policy. In practice this may include a virtually or physically separated network, which contains two or more workloads. The workloads within a Trust Domain may be invoked only through published interfaces. <\/ins> A published interface to a Trust Domain that results in the invocation of a workload within the Trust Domain."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-8f91b73c5a92b57f124969c83634707594ee9082336bb5c06c55af1b1ca97e47","title":"","text":"A successful response to a Txn-Token Request by a Transaction Token Service is called a Txn-Token Response. If the Transaction Token Service responds with an error, the error response is as described in Section 5.2 of RFC6749. The following describes required values of a Txn-Token Response: <\/del> Section 5.2 of RFC6749. The following values defined in RFC8693 MUST be included in the Txn-Token Response: <\/ins> The \"token_type\" value MUST be set to \"N_A\" per guidance in OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-4e91ec8f7e44fcd323a21da678fee07f710148a06b2b445ae6c06f2a33e9a019","title":"","text":"The \"issued_token_type\" value MUST bet set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\" The response MUST NOT include the values \"expires_in\", \"refresh_token\" and \"scope\" <\/del> The Txn-Token Response MUST NOT include the values \"expires_in\", \"refresh_token\" and \"scope\" <\/ins> figtxtokenresponse shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Response."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-d2681f7b16eddb645e82ec49b3ab4586ed3d713c6d0acdac222a11707d60233c","title":"","text":"an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 to obtain a Txn-Token. To do this, it invokes a special Token Service (the Txn-Token Service) and provides context that is sufficient for it to generate a Txn-Token. This context MAY include: <\/del> The context information provided to the Txn-Token Service MAY include: <\/ins> The external authorization token (e.g., the OAuth access token)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-fafc35352a25ba224068bc9225c1df5f4dceb867c6628055a64d582b5cfaf692","title":"","text":"REQUIRED This claim, defined in RFC7519, identifies the trust domain in which the Txn-Token is valid. This identifier MUST uniquely identify the trust domain. <\/del> uniquely identify the trust domain to prevent the Txn-Token from being accepted outside it's current trust domain. <\/ins> REQUIRED Expiry time of the Txn-Token as defined in"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-0ad6944201128f38be6f301b15ea31c6154a38d1719b05da08ddbe1ba2e04931","title":"","text":"token endpoint with the following parameters: \"grant_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange\" <\/del> \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange\". <\/ins> \"audience\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to the Trust Domain name <\/del> \"audience\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to the trust domain name. <\/ins> \"scope\" REQUIRED. A space-delimited list of case-sensitive strings where the value(s) MUST represent the specific purpose or"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-451a4859a4b2f45cb30bec8c71e88a596423ce78bd822fc5f2819c2c32358c48","title":"","text":"7.6. A workload and Transaction Token Service MUST perform mutual authentication. <\/ins> A Txn-Token Service MUST ensure that it authenticates any workloads requesting Txn-Tokens. In order to do so: It MUST name a limited, pre-configured set of workloads that MAY request Txn-Tokens <\/del> It MUST maintain a limited, pre-configured set of authorized workloads that MAY request Txn-Tokens. It MUST authenticate the requesting workload and confirm that it is included in the list of workloads authorized to request a transaction token. <\/ins> It MUST individually authenticate the requester as being one of the named requesters <\/del> It SHOULD accept workload credentials such as JWTs or X.509 certificates which MAY be provisiond using mechanisms such as SPIFFE or other provisioning protocols. <\/ins> It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as SPIFFE used in conjunction with MTLS RFC8446, or some other means of performing MTLS, to securely authenticate the requester <\/del> It SHOULD use X.509 credentials in conjunction with MTLS RFC8446, or a JWT protected by TLS at the transport layer, to securely authenticate the requesting workload. <\/ins> It SHOULD NOT rely on insecure mechanisms, such as long-lived shared secrets to authenticate the requesters <\/del> shared secrets to authenticate the requesting workloads. The requesting workload MUST ensure that it authenticates the Transaction Token Service. In order to do so: It MUST have a pre-configured location for the Transaction Token Service. <\/ins> The requesting workload MUST have a pre-configured location for the Transaction Token Service. It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as SPIFFE, to securely authenticate the Transaction Token Service before making a Txn-Token Request. <\/del> It SHOULD accept Transaction Token Service credentials such as JWTs or X.509 certificates which MAY be provisiond using mechanisms such as SPIFFE or other provisioning protocols. It SHOULD use X.509 credentials in conjunction with MTLS RFC8446, or a JWT protected by TLS at the transport layer, to securely authenticate the Transaction Token Service. It SHOULD NOT rely on insecure mechanisms, such as long-lived shared secrets to authenticate the Transaction Token Service. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-637d080893a437d34ee0285ba7ea7be7ca69bf9fd8138649a25b1c0a02cbfb6c","title":"","text":"9.4. How requesting clients authenticate to the Transaction Token Service is out of scope for this specification. However, if using the \"actor_token\" and \"actor_token_type\" parameters of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification, both parameters MUST be present in the request. The \"actor_token\" MUST authenticate the identity of the requesting workload. <\/del> If using the \"actor_token\" and \"actor_token_type\" parameters of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification, both parameters MUST be present in the request. The \"actor_token\" MUST authenticate the identity of the requesting workload. <\/ins> 9.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-df00b74b2360bcaf80c8208c3dbf8d6c2925c155184a513a52693bc506718aca","title":"","text":"and failed transactions. It is therefore strongly RECOMMENDED to use an identifier, unique within the trust domain, for the \"txn\" value. 9.8. A workload may be configured to access more than one instance of a Transaction Token Service to ensure redundency or reduce latency for transaction token requests. The workload configuration should be protected against unauthorized addition or removal of Transaction Token Service instances. An attacker may perform a denial of service attack or degrade the performance of a system by removing an instance of a Transaction Token Service from the workload configuration. 9.9. A workload may accidently send a transaction token request to a service that is not a Transaction Token Service, or an attacker may attempt to impersonate a Transaction Token Service in order to gain access to transaction token requests which includes senstive information like access tokens. To minimise the risk of leaking sensitive information like access tokens that are included in the transacation token request, the workload must ensure that it authenticates the Transaction Token Service and only contact instances of the Transaction Token Service that is authorized to issue transaction tokens. <\/ins> 10. 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-9adf92a8410430242816f3c95e7d57b505d5551eb735dc848774e6ed14b43196","title":"","text":"To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request as described in txn-token-request but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter. The \"scope\" value in the replacement request, if different from that in the original Txn-Token, MUST NOT increase the authorization surface beyond that of the original Txn-Token. <\/del> to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter and sets the \"subject_token_type\" parameter to the value \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\". The \"scope\" value in the replacement request, if different from that in the original Txn- Token, MUST NOT increase the authorization surface beyond that of the original Txn-Token. <\/ins> 7.5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-238aa938f18ef334416a3dec1226e7d276614e2429a91a510a154685ae7211c0","title":"","text":"Common Name: Transaction Token Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document Section txn-token-request of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-b4de159eb6427d7ac3470db1edf01aea2fec41e6810bd8e9aded21571421bfc2","title":"","text":"Common Name: Token type for Self-signed JWT Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document: Section self-signed-subject-token-type of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-b6e0a120901c513e3d230a6e5b6e80dc7fb37485246feab020859fbc43c9bc0f","title":"","text":"Common Name: Token type for Unsigned JSON Object Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document: Section unsigned-json-subject-token- type of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-abd7000f9c8b869ebf3790296d0fe257a8c04784995686ca1e68f92161afcf4d","title":"","text":"Claim Description: The authorization context details Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f54ea99174733eafe6d053dedf4a004fcaf907bce4fa116a99b5cee1d82278d2","title":"","text":"Claim Description: The requester context Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document: Section requester-context of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6341dd6b114c6e516f71000cd3dd832767ec900032d6e7ca13a400bb23e6a7a3","title":"","text":"Claim Description: The purpose of the transaction Change Controller: IESG <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-93f0315aaf778f565ed33fad353b206832baed27919a939adeb86e763b793729","title":"","text":"The following entry will be proposed using the IANA Media Type registration IANA.MediaTypes form. Applicant Name: Atul Tulshibagwale <\/del> Type Name: application <\/ins> Applicant Email: atul@sgnl.ai <\/del> Subtype Name: txntoken+jwt <\/ins> Type Name: \"application (RFC 2046)\" <\/del> Change Controller: IETF <\/ins> Subtype Name: \"txntoken+jwt\" <\/del> Required Parameters: N\/A. <\/ins> Required Parameters: \"N\/A.\" Optional Parameters: \"N\/A.\" <\/del> Optional Parameters: N\/A. <\/ins> Encoding Considerations: 7-bit text"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-60e56e3743110be47bd160e2f4b6cd5bcd6d2c4310c7352799648f5218739819","title":"","text":"7.5. A workload within a call chain may request the Transaction Token Server to replace a Txn-Token. <\/del> Service to replace a Txn-Token. <\/ins> Workloads MAY request replacement Txn-Tokens in order to change (add to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f3919351709f490917883c32726c70bccc8dbb1995c9f388a13bf736df0c22a3","title":"","text":"identifiers from the \"req_wl\" field in the \"rctx\" claim of the Txn-Token MUST NOT issue replacement Txn-token with lifetime exceeding the lifetime of the originally presented token <\/ins> 7.5.2. To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-c7e6844002181aff470552dc9c76e64d994d0bf3def1156265df492420e1922d","title":"","text":"2.5. fig-arch shows how Txn-Tokens are used in an a multi-workload environment. (A) The user accesses a resource server and present an Access Token obtained from an Authorization Server using an OAuth 2.0 or an OpenID Connect flow. (B) The resource server is implemented as a workload (Workload 1) and requests a Leaf Txn-Token from the Transaction Token Server using the Token Exchange protocol RFC8693. (C) The Transaction Token Service returns a Leaf Txn-Token containing the requested claims that establish the identity of the original caller as well as additional claims that can be used to make authorization decisions and establish the call chain. (D) The Resource Server (Workload 1) calls Workload 2 and passes the Leaf Txn-Token for Workload 1. Workload 2 validates the Txn- Token and makes an authorization decision by combining contextual information at its disposal with information in the Txn-Token to make an authorization decision to accept or reject the call. (E) Workload 2 is not required to add aditional information to the Txn-Token and passes the unmodified Txn-Token for Workload 1 to Workload 3. Workload 3 validates the Txn-Token and makes an authorization decision by combining contextual information at its disposal with information in the Txn-Token to make an authorization decision to accept or reject the call. (F) Workload 3 generates a Nested Txn-Token that includes additional call chain information. (G) Workload 3 sends the Nested Txn-Token to Workload 4. Workload 4 validates the Nested Txn-Token and makes an authorization decision by combining contextual information at its disposal with information in the Nested Txn-Token to make an authorization decision to accept or reject the call. (H) Workload 4 needs a Txn-Token containing information from the Authroization Server and requests a new Leaf Transaction Token (Leaf Txn-Token) from the Transaction Token Server using the Token Exchange protocol RFC8693. (I) The Transaction Token Service returns a Leaf Transaction Token (Leaf Txn-Token) containing the requested claims that include the call chain information included in the Txn-Token as well as additional claims needed. (J) Workload 4 sends the Txn-Token to the Workload 5, who verifies it and extracts claims and combine it with contextual information for use in authroization decisions. Other workloads continue to pass Txn-Tokens, generate Nested Txn-Tokens or request new Txn- Tokens. <\/del> 2.5.1. fig-arch-basic shows the basic flow of how Txn-Tokens are used in an a multi-workload environment. External endpoint is invoked using conventional authorization scheme such as access token External endpoint provides context and incoming authorization (e.g. access token) to the Txn-Token Service Txn-Token Service mints a Txn-Token that provides immutable context for the transaction and returns it to the requester The external endpoint initiates a call to an internal microservice and provides the Txn-Token as authorization Subsequent calls to other internal microservices use the same Txn- Token to authorize calls Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. External client is provided a response to the external invocation 2.5.2. fig-arch-nested shows an internal microservice generating a Nested Txn-Token in the flow In the diagram above, steps 1-5 are the same as in basic-flow. An internal microservice determines it needs to generate a Nested Txn-Token. It uses its own private key to generate a Nested Txn- Token. The internal microservice uses the Nested Txn-Token to authorize calls to downstream services Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. External client is provided a response to the external invocation 2.5.3. An intermediate service may decide to obtain a replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token service. That flow is described below in In the diagram above, steps 1-5 are the same as in An intermediate service determines that it needs to obtain a Replacement Txn-Token. It requests a Replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token Service. It passes the incoming Txn-Token in the request, along with any additional context it needs to send the Txn-Token Service. The Txn-Token Service responds with a replacement Txn-Token The service that requested the Replacement Txn-Token uses that Txn-Token for downstream call authorization Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. <\/ins> (K) Workload n is the final workload in the call chain. It verifies the received Txn-Token, extracts claims and combine it with contextual information for use in authroization decisions. <\/del> External client is provided a response to the external invocation <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-a4e9889c513f7d8cb2c77c81c23d6b4f9a9bb9091df4e0411d3b1cfef9981dfc","title":"","text":"The following additional parameter MUST be present in a Txn-Token Request: A parameter named \"azc\" , whose value is a JSON object. This object contains any information the Transaction Token Service needs to understand the context of the incoming request. <\/del> A parameter named \"rctx\" , whose value is a JSON object. This object contains the request context, i.e. any information the Transaction Token Service needs to understand the context of the incoming request. <\/ins> figtxtokenrequest shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-da2d08928c0bf52d6a39b32cea36c49780b89ba3552c4c6800e5684df9853ea2","title":"","text":"The following claims MUST be present in the JWT body of a Leaf Txn- Token: A \"tid\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of entire call <\/del> A \"txn\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of entire call <\/ins> chain. A \"sub_id\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of the user"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f649a92a3ecba7c13ed2888adf5f4d81c15d19345582c8bcff72da36787ddff0","title":"","text":"9. This memo includes no request to IANA. <\/del> This specification registers the following claims defined in Section txn-token-header to the OAuth Access Token Types Registry defined in RFC6749, and the following claims defined in Section txn-token-claims in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in 9.1. Name: \"txn_token\" Description: JWT of type Transaction Token Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: none HTTP Authentication Schemes: TLS Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section txn-token-header of this specificaiton 9.2. Claim Name: \"azc\" Claim Description: The authorization context Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification <\/ins> 10."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-54674d03841f784585d11a9a8dc9621055c79808313bb0ac4a66fba3d884ff5c","title":"","text":"An \"exp\" claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token expires. A \"txn\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of entire call chain. <\/del> A \"txn\" claim, whose value is the unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC8417. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain. <\/ins> A \"sub_id\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of the user or workload on whose behalf the call chain is being executed. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-90dcc4ad2146d1216e628050f83128330e527bcd198af5433a9fdd1afda898e4","title":"","text":"Txn-Tokens are expected to be short-lived (order of minutes, e.g., 5 minutes), and as a result MAY be used only for the expected duration of an external invocation. If a long-running process such as an batch or offline task is involved, it can use a separate mechanism to perform the external invocation, but the resulting Txn-Token is still short-lived. <\/del> of an external invocation. If the token or other credential presented to the Txn-Token service when requesting a Txn-Token has an expiration time, then the Txn-Token MUST NOT exceed the lifetime of the originally presented token or credential. If a long-running process such as an batch or offline task is involved, it can use a separate mechanism to perform the external invocation, but the resulting Txn-Token is still short-lived. <\/ins> 2.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-b14dea3c6fc3dbfbc7560f5779ab9714a57b974d914de2d61a04fb589110b016","title":"","text":"Because Txn-Tokens are short-lived, the Txn-Token response from the Txn-Token service does not contain the \"refresh_token\" field. A Txn- Token is also cannot be issued by presenting a \"refresh_token\". <\/del> Token cannot be issued by presenting a \"refresh_token\". <\/ins> The \"expires_in\" and \"scope\" fields of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification RFC8693 are also not used in Txn-Token responses. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-2957cd0bc76d9824869be9511ed297c80b0bf419f16fb7162078a4f3e043cc82","title":"","text":"An \"iat\" claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token was created. An \"aud\" claim, whose value is a URN RFC8141 that uniquely identifies the audience of the Txn-Token. This MUST identify the trust domain in which the Txn-Token is used. <\/ins> An \"exp\" claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token expires."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-659930214a2e44385203b95681cd0b5896512d9482217b35d05800fedb4f7dfb","title":"","text":"format of this claim MAY be a Subject Identifier as specified in SubjectIdentifiers. An \"azc\" claim, whose value is a JSON object that contains values <\/del> An \"azd\" claim, whose value is a JSON object that contains values <\/ins> that remain constant in the call chain. figleaftxtokenbody shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Txn-Token: <\/del> 5.2.2. The JWT body MAY have the following claims: 5.2.2.1. The Txn-Token MAY contain an \"req_ctx\" claim, whose value is a JSON object the describes the requester context of the transaction. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. The JSON value of the \"req_ctx\" claim MAY include any values the Txn- Token Service determines are interesting to downstream services that rely on the Txn-Token. The following claims are defined so that if they are included, they have the following meaning: * \"req_ip\" The IP address of the requester. This MAY be the end-user or a robotic process that requested the Transaction * \"authn\" The authentication method used to idenitfy the requester. Its value is a URN that uniquely identifies the method used. * \"req_wl\" The requesting workload. A URN that uniquely identifies the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. This entity MUST be within the Trust Domain of the Txn-Token. 5.2.2.2. The Txn-Token MAY contain a \"purp\" claim, whose value specifies the purpose of the transaction. The format of this claim is a JSON string. 5.2.3. The figure below figleaftxtokenbody shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Txn-Token: <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6b5dcaa9b8684de692edfd350ee42f02b1545e2cd73d2e0c4e2281384a480b7b","title":"","text":"Workloads MAY request replacement Txn-Tokens in order to change (add to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token. The value of the \"aud\" claim MUST remain unchanged in a replacement Txn-Token. If the claim \"req_ctx\" is present in the original Txn- Token, then it MUST be present unchanged in the replacement Txn- Token. <\/ins> 7.3.1. A Txn-Token Service replacing a Txn-Token must consider that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-be0db559ca138b91620e7fd50e16aca8eb3c5a4235d5ec5fb4b610b9961eb9d2","title":"","text":"8.2. Claim Name: \"azc\" <\/del> Claim Name: \"azd\" <\/ins> Claim Description: The authorization context <\/del> Claim Description: The authorization context details <\/ins> Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification Claim Name: \"req_ctx\" Claim Description: The requester context Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section requester-context of this specification Claim Name: \"purp\" Claim Description: The purpose of the transaction Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section purpose of this specification <\/ins> 9. 9.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-61384def4bf1bd79d823d5b390ccc07c8335d0c4d09d36578d45bdf1d6d87824","title":"","text":"8. 8.1. A Txn-Token is not resistant to replay attacks. A long-lived Txn- Token therefore represents a risk if it is stored in a file, discovered by an attacker, and then replayed. For this reason, a Txn-Token lifetime must be kept short, not exceeding the lifetime of a call-chain. Even for long-running \"batch\" jobs, a longer lived access token should be used to initiate the request to the batch endpoint. It then obtains short-lived Txn-Tokens that may be used to authorize the call to downstream services in the call-chain. Because Txn-Tokens are short-lived, the Txn-Token response from the Txn-Token service does not contain the \"refresh_token\" field. A Txn- Token cannot be issued by presenting a \"refresh_token\". The \"expires_in\" and \"scope\" fields of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification RFC8693 are also not used in Txn-Token responses. The \"expires_in\" is not required since the issued token has an \"exp\" field, which indicates the token lifetime. The \"scope\" field is omitted from the request and therefore omitted in the response. 8.2. Although Txn-Tokens are short-lived, they MAY be sender constrained as an additional layer of defence to prevent them from being re-used by a compromised or malicious workload under the control of a hostile actor. 8.3. When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the external endpoint. If an Access Token is included in a Txn-Token, an attacker may extract the Access Token from the Txn-Token, and replay it to any Resource Server that can accept that Access Token. Txn-Token expiry does not protect against this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired. 9. 9.1. Some \"req_ctx\" claims may be considered personal information in some jurisdictions and if so their values need to be obsfucated. For example, originating IP address (\"req_ip\") is often considerd personal information and in that case must be protected through some obsfucation method (e.g. SHA256). 10. <\/ins> This specification registers the following claims defined in Section txn-token-header to the OAuth Access Token Types Registry defined in RFC6749, and the following claims defined in Section txn-token-claims in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in 8.1. <\/del> 10.1. <\/ins> Name: \"txn_token\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6ac0b0b0755ac7ea7f2522c76b8f7b7c749119ce25dd687adcfff4475808620f","title":"","text":"Specification Document: Section txn-token-header of this specificaiton 8.2. <\/del> 10.2. <\/ins> Claim Name: \"azd\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-5946ba406401404b1f3181ca6543b978d8ec40fcbb5685326fa514088e761e9f","title":"","text":"Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section purpose of this specification 9. 9.1. A Txn-Token is not resistant to replay attacks. A long-lived Txn- Token therefore represents a risk if it is stored in a file, discovered by an attacker, and then replayed. For this reason, a Txn-Token lifetime must be kept short, not exceeding the lifetime of a call-chain. Even for long-running \"batch\" jobs, a longer lived access token should be used to initiate the request to the batch endpoint. It then obtains short-lived Txn-Tokens that may be used to authorize the call to downstream services in the call-chain. Because Txn-Tokens are short-lived, the Txn-Token response from the Txn-Token service does not contain the \"refresh_token\" field. A Txn- Token cannot be issued by presenting a \"refresh_token\". The \"expires_in\" and \"scope\" fields of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification RFC8693 are also not used in Txn-Token responses. The \"expires_in\" is not required since the issued token has an \"exp\" field, which indicates the token lifetime. The \"scope\" field is omitted from the request and therefore omitted in the response. 9.2. Although Txn-Tokens are short-lived, they MAY be sender constrained as an additional layer of defence to prevent them from being re-used by a compromised or malicious workload under the control of a hostile actor. 9.3. When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the external endpoint. If an Access Token is included in a Txn-Token, an attacker may extract the Access Token from the Txn-Token, and replay it to any Resource Server that can accept that Access Token. Txn-Token expiry does not protect against this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired. <\/del>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-16c6dd025db5867f0063a76081373df53e56ba46cbc46061c4e2ca9cbf1614fb","title":"","text":"5.2. 5.2.1. The JWT body MUST have the following claims: <\/del> The transaction token body follows the JWT format and includes existing JWT claims as well as defines new claims. These claims are described below: <\/ins> An \"iss\" claim, whose value is a URN RFC8141 that uniquely identifies the workload or the Txn-Token Service that created the Txn-Token. <\/del> OPTIONAL The \"iss\" claim as defined in RFC7519 is not required as Txn-Tokens are bound to a single trust domain as defined by the \"aud\" claim and often the signing keys are known. The \"iss\" claim MUST be used in cases where the signing keys are not predetermined or it is desired that the Txn-Token Service signs with unique keys. <\/ins> An \"iat\" claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token was created. <\/del> REQUIRED The issued at time of the Txn-Token as defined in <\/ins> An \"aud\" claim, whose value is a URN RFC8141 that uniquely identifies the audience of the Txn-Token. This MUST identify the trust domain in which the Txn-Token is used. <\/del> REQUIRED This claim, defined in RFC7519, contains the trust domain in which the Txn-Token is valid <\/ins> An \"exp\" claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token expires. <\/del> REQUIRED Expiry time of the Txn-Token as defined in <\/ins> A \"txn\" claim, whose value is the unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC8417. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain. <\/del> REQUIRED A unique transaction identifier as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC8417. When used in the transaction token, it identifies the entire call chain. <\/ins> A \"sub_id\" claim, whose value is the unique identifier of the user or workload on whose behalf the call chain is being executed. The format of this claim MAY be a Subject Identifier as specified in SubjectIdentifiers. <\/del> REQUIRED A unique identifier for the subject as defined by the \"aud\" trust domain. Unlike OpenID Connect, the \"sub\" claim is NOT associated with the \"iss\" claim. <\/ins> An \"azd\" claim, whose value is a JSON object that contains values that remain constant in the call chain. <\/del> REQUIRED A string defining the purpose or intent of this transaction. <\/ins> 5.2.2. <\/del> OPTIONAL A JSON object that conatains values that remain immutable throughout the call chain. <\/ins> The JWT body MAY have the following claims: <\/del> OPTIONAL A JSON object that describes the environmental context of the requested transaction. <\/ins> 5.2.2.1. <\/del> 5.2.1. <\/ins> The Txn-Token MAY contain an \"req_ctx\" claim, whose value is a JSON object the describes the requester context of the transaction. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. <\/del> The Txn-Token SHOULD contain an \"rctx\" claim. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn- Token. <\/ins> The JSON value of the \"req_ctx\" claim MAY include any values the Txn- <\/del> The JSON value of the \"rctx\" claim MAY include any values the Txn- <\/ins> Token Service determines are interesting to downstream services that rely on the Txn-Token. The following claims are defined so that if they are included, they have the following meaning:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-381d7cb84b4be1ea355b5166a1ec688801282c62936fc4b4f9f1847a3f8ed89e","title":"","text":"the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. This entity MUST be within the Trust Domain of the Txn-Token. 5.2.2.2. The Txn-Token MAY contain a \"purp\" claim, whose value specifies the purpose of the transaction. The format of this claim is a JSON string. 5.2.3. <\/del> 5.2.2. <\/ins> The figure below figleaftxtokenbody shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Txn-Token: 6. A Txn-Token Service provides a OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 endpoint that can respond to Txn-Token issuance requests. The token exchange requests it supports require extra parameters than those defined in the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 specification. The unique properties of the Txn-Token requests and responses are described below. The Txn-Token Service MAY optionally support other OAuth 2.0 endpoints and features, but that is not a requirement for it to be a Txn-Token Service. <\/del> A Txn-Token Service defines a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 endpoint that can respond to Txn-Token issuance requests. This profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 specification MUST be used to obtain Txn-Tokens. The unique properties of the Txn- Token requests and responses are described below. The Txn-Token Service MAY optionally support other OAuth 2.0 endpoints and features, but that is not a requirement for it to be a Txn-Token Service. <\/ins> Each Trust Domain MUST have exactly one Txn-Token Service. <\/del> Each Trust Domain MUST have exactly one logical Txn-Token Service. <\/ins> 7. A workload requests a Txn-Token from a Transaction Token Service using OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693. The request to obtain a Txn- <\/del> using a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693. Txn-Tokens may be requested for both externally originating or internally originating requests. The profile describes how required and optional context can be provided to the Transaction Token Service in order for the Txn-Token to be issued. The request to obtain a Txn- <\/ins> Token using this method is called a Txn-Token Request, and a successful response is called a Txn-Token Response. A Txn-Token Request is a Token Exchange Request, as described in Section 2.1 of RFC8693 with additional parameters. A Txn-Token Response is a OAuth 2.0 token endpoint response, as described in Section 5 of RFC6749, where the \"token_type\" in the response has the value \"txn_token\". <\/del> successful response is called a Txn-Token Response. The Txn-Token profile of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 is described below. <\/ins> 7.1. A Txn-Token Request is an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange Request, as described in Section 2.1 of RFC8693, with an additional parameter in the request. The following parameters are required in the Txn-Token Request by the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification RFC8693: The \"audience\" value MUST be set to the Trust Domain name The \"requested_token_type\" value MUST be \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token\" The \"subject_token\" value MUST be the external token received by the workload that authorized the call <\/del> A workload requesting a Txn-Token must provide the Transaction Token Service with proof of its identity (client authentication), the purpose of the Txn-Token and optionally any additional context relating to the transaction being performed. Most of these elements are provided by the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification and the rest are defined as new parameters. Additionally, this profile defines a new token type URN \"urn:ieft:params:oauth:token-type:txn- token\" which is used by the requesting workload to identify that it is requesting the Txn-Token Response to contain a Txn-Token. To request a Txn-Token the workload invokes the OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 token endpoint with the following parameters: * \"grant_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant- type:token-exchange\" * \"audience\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be set to the Trust Domain name * \"scope\" REQUIRED. A space-delimited list of case-sensitive strings where the value(s) MUST represent the specific purpose or intent of the transaction. * \"requested_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn- token\" * \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be a token representing the subject of the transaction. This could be an OAuth access_token received by an API Gateway or a JWT assertion constructed by a workload initiating a transaction or another form of token as identified by \"subject_token_type\". * \"subject_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type of the token present in the \"subject_token\" parameter The following additional parameters MAY be present in a Txn-Token Request: <\/ins> The \"subject_token_type\" value MUST be present and indicate the type of the authorization token present in the \"subject_token\" parameter <\/del> \"request_context\" OPTIONAL. This parameter contains a base64url encoded JSON object which represents the context of this transaction. The parameter SHOULD be present and how the Transaction Token Service uses this parameter is out of scope for this specification. <\/ins> The following additional parameter MUST be present in a Txn-Token Request: <\/del> \"request_details\" OPTIONAL. This parameter contains a base64url encoded JSON object which represents additional details of the transaction that MUST remain immutable throughout the processing of the transaction by multiple workloads. <\/ins> A parameter named \"rctx\" , whose value is a JSON object. This object contains the request context, i.e. any information the Transaction Token Service needs to understand the context of the incoming request <\/del> The requesting workload MUST authenticate its identity to the Transaction Token Service. The exact client authentication mechanism used is outside the scope of this specification. <\/ins> figtxtokenrequest shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request. 7.2. When the Transaction Token Service receives a Txn-Token Request it MUST validate the requesting workload client authentication and determine if that workload is authorized to obtain the Txn-Tokens with the requested values. The authorization policy for determining such issuance is out of scope for this specification. Next, the Transaction Token Service MUST validate the \"subject_token\" and determine the value to specify as the \"sub\" of the issued Txn- Token. The Txn-Token Service MUST ensure the \"sub\" value is unique within the trust domain defined by the \"aud\" claim. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"iat\" claim to the time of issuance of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"aud\" claim to a Trust Domain of the Transaction Token Service. If the Transaction Token Service supports multiple trust domains, then it MUST determine the correct \"aud\" value for this request. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"exp\" claim to the expiry time of the Txn-Token. The Transaction Token Service MUST set the \"txn\" claim to a unique ID specific to this transaction. The Transaction Token Service MAY set the \"iss\" claim of the Txn- Token to a value defining the entity that signed the Txn-Token. This claim MUST be ommitted if not set. The Transaction Token Service MUST evaluate the value specified in the \"scope\" parameter of the request to determine the \"purp\" claim of the issued Txn-Token. If a \"request_context\" parameter is present in the Txn-Token Request, the data SHOULD be added to the \"rctx\" object of the Txn-Token. In addition, the Transaction Token Service SHOULD add the authenticated requesting workload identifier in the \"rctx\" object as the \"req_wl\" claim. If a \"request_details\" parameter is present in the Txn-Token Request, then the Transaction Token Service SHOULD propagate the data from the \"request_details\" object into the claims in the \"azd\" object as authorized by the Transaction Token Service authorization policy for the requesting client. The Transaction Token Service MAY provide additional processing and verification that is outside the scope of this specification. 7.3. <\/ins> A successful response to a Txn-Token Request by a Transaction Token Service is called a Txn-Token Response. If the Transaction Token Service responds with an error, the error response is as described in Section 5.2 of RFC6749. The following describes required values of a Txn-Token Response: The \"token_type\" value MUST be set to \"txn_token\" <\/del> The \"token_type\" value MUST be set to \"N_A\" per guidance in OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange <\/ins> The \"access_token\" value MUST be the Txn-Token <\/del> The \"access_token\" value MUST be the Txn-Token JWT The \"issued_token_type\" value MUST bet set to \"urn:ieft:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token\" <\/ins> The response MUST NOT include the values \"expires_in\", \"refresh_token\" and \"scope\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-d8ec297251b90f294eb082fa09ab2f41b6230cbdb9fb2c75b872e2f9417c350a","title":"","text":"figtxtokenresponse shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Response. 7.3. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> A workload within a call chain may request the Transaction Token Server to replace a Txn-Token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-5e9ea295e6b019f67765ba6435ebe82e4c23e37898b104f7c89c529dc4d0712e","title":"","text":"to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token. The value of the \"aud\" claim MUST remain unchanged in a replacement Txn-Token. If the claim \"req_ctx\" is present in the original Txn- Token, then it MUST be present unchanged in the replacement Txn- Token. <\/del> Txn-Token. If the claim \"rctx\" is present in the original Txn-Token, then it MUST be present unchanged in the replacement Txn-Token. <\/ins> 7.3.1. <\/del> 7.4.1. <\/ins> A Txn-Token Service replacing a Txn-Token must consider that modifying previously asserted values from existing Txn-Tokens can"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-639b6fe1e8053c2d736a5c7339efd85761bd09b3b384e810560caf7c99867e02","title":"","text":"SHOULD NOT enable modification to asserted values that expand the scope of permitted actions 7.3.2. <\/del> 7.4.2. <\/ins> To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request as described in txn-token-request but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter. 7.3.3. <\/del> 7.4.3. <\/ins> A successful response by the Transaction Token Server to a Replacement Txn-Token Request is a Txn-Token Response as described in 7.4. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> A Txn-Token Service MUST ensure that it authenticates any workloads requesting Txn-Tokens. In order to do so:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-44151c8adb15aadd1725f5fab68692855452167163b9d57d1ef7be6a8193da21","title":"","text":"this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired. 8.4. How requesting clients authenticate to the Transaction Token Service is out of scope for this specification. However, if using the \"actor_token\" and \"actor_token_type\" parameters of the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange specification, both parameters MUST be present in the request. The \"actor_token\" MUST autenticate the identity of the requesting workload. <\/ins> 9. 9.1. Some \"req_ctx\" claims may be considered personal information in some <\/del> Some \"rctx\" claims may be considered personal information in some <\/ins> jurisdictions and if so their values need to be obsfucated. For example, originating IP address (\"req_ip\") is often considerd personal information and in that case must be protected through some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-3f477c092d603dbf760efee89422fb8cab3e883dfdc97d8902a78e6f90f4fbf4","title":"","text":"Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification Claim Name: \"req_ctx\" <\/del> Claim Name: \"rctx\" <\/ins> Claim Description: The requester context"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-33800fe0ecb365278b4b5e068f3472bbc015025af210083545c93efa593a0103","title":"","text":"Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section purpose of this specification <\/del> Specification Document: Section txn-token-claims of this specification <\/ins>"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-eae255f0d48150a781ebfec7209487b0206d2e62d0599460361518940fc14c29","title":"","text":"8. Txn-Tokens need to be communicated between workloads that depend upon them to authorize the request. Such workloads will often present HTTP RFC2616 interfaces for being invoked by other workloads. This section specifies the HTTP header the invoking workload MUST use to communicate the Txn-Token to the invoked workload, when the invoked workload presents an HTTP interface. Note that the standard HTTP \"Authorization\" header MUST NOT be used because that may be used by the workloads to communicate channel authorization. <\/ins> 8.1. A workload that invokes another workload using HTTP and needs to present a Txn-Token to the invoked workload MUST use the HTTP Header \"Txn-Token\" to communicate the Txn-Token. The value of this header MUST be the JWT that represents the Txn-Token. 9. 9.1. <\/ins> A Txn-Token is not resistant to replay attacks. A long-lived Txn- Token therefore represents a risk if it is stored in a file, discovered by an attacker, and then replayed. For this reason, a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-ffde0b4847398a33d4020b9c8fab8d186222dc4bf8b54a9e0ea8ff33f0329b96","title":"","text":"field, which indicates the token lifetime. The \"scope\" field is omitted from the request and therefore omitted in the response. 8.2. <\/del> 9.2. <\/ins> Although Txn-Tokens are short-lived, they MAY be sender constrained as an additional layer of defence to prevent them from being re-used by a compromised or malicious workload under the control of a hostile actor. 8.3. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the external endpoint. If an Access Token is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6eb74a885f7c77197738d24556bd2124f22762a8c120f38c7a448b9543617bc8","title":"","text":"this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired. 9. <\/del> 10. <\/ins> 9.1. <\/del> 10.1. <\/ins> Some \"req_ctx\" claims may be considered personal information in some jurisdictions and if so their values need to be obsfucated. For"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-9f751a6be253c56d1d7e32932981b4e76abc24dcb3d84a0468e682c4b0013df5","title":"","text":"personal information and in that case must be protected through some obsfucation method (e.g. SHA256). 10. <\/del> 11. <\/ins> This specification registers the following claims defined in Section txn-token-header to the OAuth Access Token Types Registry defined in RFC6749, and the following claims defined in Section txn-token-claims in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in 10.1. <\/del> 11.1. <\/ins> Name: \"txn_token\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-66b24332673fd10b62108a1a2eab4bfaedd17b32b1d3d5961e8e62931a059dd4","title":"","text":"Specification Document: Section txn-token-header of this specificaiton 10.2. <\/del> 11.2. <\/ins> Claim Name: \"azd\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-1fdcc0944a6320530a5a144e84d9f5df6e490a740a311a71008e0ebed629d61a","title":"","text":"9.2. Although Txn-Tokens are short-lived, they MAY be sender constrained as an additional layer of defence to prevent them from being re-used by a compromised or malicious workload under the control of a hostile actor. 9.3. <\/del> When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the external endpoint. If an Access Token is included in a Txn-Token, an attacker may extract the Access Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-60a02a6808490d6f9da70d4d7b8587710a18ed1c797bd6f6ad720c9183fbe9fb","title":"","text":"this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired. 9.4. <\/del> 9.3. <\/ins> How requesting clients authenticate to the Transaction Token Service is out of scope for this specification. However, if using the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-fdaf0f8f4e74a9979adb688816b157a0197f5f827bff33f1b21a0f7b1273cc08","title":"","text":"more workloads. The workloads within an Trust Domain may be invoked only through published interfaces. A Trust Domain must have an identifier that is used as the \"aud\" (audience) value in Txn-Tokens. The format of this identifier is a universal resource identifier. Each Trust Domain has exactly one Txn-Token Service. <\/del> Txn-Tokens. The format of this identifier is as defined in the JWT specification RFC7519. <\/ins> A published interface to an Trust Domain that results in the invocation of a workload within the Trust Domain."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-86414f681d5f06efc4f6b3728c38367085043606f98ae389aa84744325bd5a30","title":"","text":"\"aud\" trust domain. Unlike OpenID Connect, the \"sub\" claim is NOT associated with the \"iss\" claim. REQUIRED A string defining the purpose or intent of this <\/del> REQUIRED A String defining the purpose or intent of this <\/ins> transaction. OPTIONAL A JSON object that conatains values that remain immutable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-38d695d939d45499f83249c397da00616836f197c578ef7742dda50173e11fd5","title":"","text":"The Txn-Token SHOULD contain an \"rctx\" claim. This MAY include the IP address information of the originating user, as well as information about the computational entity that requested the Txn- Token. <\/del> Token and contextual attributes of the originating request itself. <\/ins> The JSON value of the \"rctx\" claim MAY include any values the Txn- Token Service determines are interesting to downstream services that"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-96b600e1b250d5815ae36b2797f62569a036d470d66b8a77cbc97ba5ba82e0d3","title":"","text":"user or a robotic process that requested the Transaction \"authn\" The authentication method used to idenitfy the requester. Its value is a URN that uniquely identifies the method used. \"req_wl\" The requesting workload. A URN that uniquely identifies the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. This entity MUST be within the Trust Domain of the Txn-Token. <\/del> Its value is a StringOrURI that uniquely identifies the method used. \"req_wl\" The requesting workload. A StringOrURI that uniquely identifies the computational entity that requested the Txn-Token. This entity MUST be within the Trust Domain of the Txn-Token. If a replacement Txn-Token has been requested, then this claim will be an array of StringOrURIs representing the different workloads that have requested Txn-Tokens as part of the transaction processing. 5.2.1.1. It is useful to be able to track the set of workloads that have requested a Txn-Token. The \"req_wl\" claim allows for tracking this information even through requests for a replacement Txn-Token. By default the \"req_wl\" is a StringOrURI representing the original workload entity that requested the Txn-Token. However, if a workload within the path of servicing the transaction requests a replacement Txn-Token, then the Transaction Token Service will append the new requesting workload as a subsequent array element in the \"req_wl\" claim. This provides a \"pathing\" mechanism to track which services have requested replacement Txn-Tokens. If there is only a single value the \"req_wl\" will be a StringOrURI. If there is more than a single value, then \"req_wl\" will be prepresented by an array of StringOrURIs. <\/ins> 5.2.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6b21dff4e76725087e7ebceb5c3238b0ff92bcc00a0c107bf06a7db76616d7b3","title":"","text":"case-sensitive strings where the value(s) MUST represent the specific purpose or intent of the transaction. * \"requested_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn- token\" * \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST be a token representing the subject of the transaction. This could be an OAuth access_token received by an API Gateway or a JWT assertion constructed by a workload initiating a transaction or another form of token as identified by \"subject_token_type\". * \"subject_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type of the token present in the \"subject_token\" parameter <\/del> token\" * \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST represent the subject of the transaction. This could be an OAuth access_token received by an API Gateway, a JWT assertion constructed by a workload initiating a transaction or a simple string value all identified by \"subject_token_type\". * \"subject_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type of the token or value present in the \"subject_token\" parameter <\/ins> The following additional parameters MAY be present in a Txn-Token Request:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-8109c16a3bad9652eb082f2ad77440ce521554ffcdbbca2eba2435b18433f8e2","title":"","text":"Workloads MAY request replacement Txn-Tokens in order to change (add to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token. The value of the \"aud\" claim MUST remain unchanged in a replacement Txn-Token. If the claim \"rctx\" is present in the original Txn-Token, then it MUST be present unchanged in the replacement Txn-Token. <\/del> The values of the \"sub\" and \"aud\" claims MUST remain unchanged in a replacement Txn-Token. If the claim \"rctx\" is present in the original Txn-Token, then it MUST be present and unchanged in the replacement Txn-Token except for the \"req_wl\" claim which MUST be updated to include the requesting workload identifier. <\/ins> 7.4.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-07bf8203f35c4098418cc5c3ba7208f41a6e85739db1fe90e2c5381003b3fbc9","title":"","text":"immutable context of a call chain. A special service within the Trust Domain, which issues Txn-Tokens to requesting workloads. Each Trust Domain has exactly one Txn- Token Service. <\/del> to requesting workloads. Each Trust Domain that uses Txn-Tokens MUST have exactly one logical Txn-Token Service. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-ab16550afb5764c1d222249cde0e5a1a7877daca89a70ffcb811527b16b72368","title":"","text":"features, but that is not a requirement for it to be a Txn-Token Service. Each Trust Domain MUST have exactly one logical Txn-Token Service. <\/del> Each Trust Domain that uses Txn-Tokens MUST have exactly one logical Txn-Token Service. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f093560c0757f3539103aba55a1f3ecaa618a001650dbd1673fa7f8f6c790f39","title":"","text":"jurisdictions and if so their values need to be obsfucated. For example, originating IP address (\"req_ip\") is often considerd personal information and in that case must be protected through some obsfucation method (e.g. SHA256). <\/del> obsfucation method (e.g. salted SHA256). 10.2. Txn-Tokens SHOULD NOT be logged if they contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII). What constitutes PII depends upon the use case, but in some cases even an email address (which could be a \"sub\" value) can be protected PII, which should not be logged. <\/ins> 11."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-0ab0185506a24dbd537116a3774fd204b26ccb1660ac1c8dee8dd884881a5cd6","title":"","text":"7.5.1. A Txn-Token Service replacing a Txn-Token must consider that modifying previously asserted values from existing Txn-Tokens can completely negate the benefits of Txn-Tokens. When issuing replacement Txn-Tokens, a Transaction Token Server therefore: <\/del> When issuing replacement Txn-Tokens, a Txn-Token Service: <\/ins> MAY enable modifications to asserted values that reduce the scope of permitted actions"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-a89691d7fe3d10aa767d2cea34206c43a50719d481e18d311a605e9084437018","title":"","text":"SHOULD NOT enable modification to asserted values that expand the scope of permitted actions MUST NOT modify \"sub\" and \"aud\" values of the Txn-Token in the request MUST NOT remove any of the existing requesting workload identifiers from the \"req_wl\" field in the \"rctx\" claim of the Txn-Token <\/ins> 7.5.2. To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-bd56ebde60988d78e4b8a4426d7c5fc2de3d151a1f28a2d01988be1411b8cf1b","title":"","text":"7.5.3. A successful response by the Transaction Token Server to a Replacement Txn-Token Request is a Txn-Token Response as described in <\/del> A successful response by the Txn-Token Service to a Replacement Txn- Token Request is a Txn-Token Response as described in <\/ins> 7.6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-c75f4d71356b6dc138cd5422916a0743a3085b33fc3c840ebb115d974d3f10ab","title":"","text":"to authorize its calls to subsequent workloads. Subsequent workloads may obtain Txn-Tokens of their own. If the requesting service does not have an inbound token that it can use in its request to the Txn-Token Service, it generates a self- signed JWT and passes that in the request in place of the external authorization token. <\/ins> 2.2.2. A service within a call chain may choose to replace the Txn-Token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-4df38088952d7f47ee89a1196c8e9da8f4a3b2076b4eea457ba7e78368d68980","title":"","text":"\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn-token\" \"subject_token\" REQUIRED. The value MUST represent the subject of the transaction. This could be an OAuth access_token received by an API Gateway, a JWT assertion constructed by a workload initiating a transaction or a simple string value all identified by \"subject_token_type\". <\/del> the transaction. This could be an inbound token received by an API Gateway, or a self-signed JWT constructed by a workload initiating a transaction, the type of which is identified by \"subject_token_type\". <\/ins> \"subject_token_type\" REQUIRED. The value MUST indicate the type of the token or value present in the \"subject_token\" parameter"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-6bd9a4b61862fec5c6d0b533f772f6dfc93bf2c9c22071d3c1edfc2b34c9d145","title":"","text":"Transaction Token Service. The exact client authentication mechanism used is outside the scope of this specification. figtxtokenrequest shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request. <\/del> The figure below figtxtokenrequest shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request. <\/ins> 7.2. The \"subject_token_type\" parameter value MUST be a URI RFC3986. It MAY be any one of the subject token types described in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange RFC8693 except the Refresh Token type (i.e., \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token\"), or it MAY be a self-signed JWT, as described below. The Txn-Token Service MAY support other token formats, which MAY be specified in the \"subject_token_type\" parameter. Any value used in this parameter MUST be a URI as specified in RFC 8693 RFC8693. 7.2.1. A requester MAY use a self-signed JWT as a \"subject_token\" value. In that case, the requester MUST set the \"subject_token_type\" value to: \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:self_signed\". This self-signed JWT MUST contain the following claims: \"iss\": The unique identifier of the requesting workload. The Txn- Token Service SHALL use this value in determiining the \"req_wl\" value in the Txn-Token issued in response to this request. \"sub\": The subject for whom the Txn-Token is being requested. The Txn-Token Service SHALL use this value in determining the \"sub\" value in the Txn-Token issued in the response to this request. \"iat\": The time at which the self-signed JWT was created. Note that the Txn-Token Service may reject self-signed tokens with an \"iat\" value that is unreasonably far in the past. The self-signed JWT MAY contain other claims. 7.3. <\/ins> When the Transaction Token Service receives a Txn-Token Request it MUST validate the requesting workload client authentication and determine if that workload is authorized to obtain the Txn-Tokens"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-e8ccea8bc8aa4d870c8ca207756938072bd6cde00349ff414dc3c676bd76156e","title":"","text":"The Transaction Token Service MAY provide additional processing and verification that is outside the scope of this specification. 7.3. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> A successful response to a Txn-Token Request by a Transaction Token Service is called a Txn-Token Response. If the Transaction Token"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-88b01f6bc61011326b4ce6708ffb43d14d599d731688af0bc4e0c9a17ed64c6e","title":"","text":"figtxtokenresponse shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Response. 7.4. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> A workload within a call chain may request the Transaction Token Server to replace a Txn-Token."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-11377c1a5c3f128d6fb264a325ae0d4bef812e7dd46ccd78c73b35adf7322f16","title":"","text":"replacement Txn-Token except for the \"req_wl\" claim which MUST be updated to include the requesting workload identifier. 7.4.1. <\/del> 7.5.1. <\/ins> A Txn-Token Service replacing a Txn-Token must consider that modifying previously asserted values from existing Txn-Tokens can"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-f8996b438bf8da4a5441d7fe8d5a9b22b119800f32fac1a3f0f0df7d9d5b210e","title":"","text":"SHOULD NOT enable modification to asserted values that expand the scope of permitted actions 7.4.2. <\/del> 7.5.2. <\/ins> To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request as described in txn-token-request but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the \"subject_token\" parameter. 7.4.3. <\/del> 7.5.3. <\/ins> A successful response by the Transaction Token Server to a Replacement Txn-Token Request is a Txn-Token Response as described in 7.5. <\/del> 7.6. <\/ins> A Txn-Token Service MUST ensure that it authenticates any workloads requesting Txn-Tokens. In order to do so:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-ae3efe2dd5b138a53f4203110791d0653de26a3ea669f22de8a81583807a0113","title":"","text":"This specification registers the following claims defined in Section txn-token-header to the OAuth Access Token Types Registry defined in RFC6749, and the following claims defined in Section txn-token-claims in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in <\/del> RFC6749, the following claim in Section subject-token-types to the \"OAuth URI\" subregistry of the \"OAuth Parameters\" IANA.OAuth.Parameters registry, and the following claims defined in Section txn-token-claims in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims Registry defined in <\/ins> 11.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-1cab584344ac9678edf35a3485f5514186c9707de8db569595210dcd730223ba","title":"","text":"11.2. URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:self_signed Common Name: Token type for Self-signed JWT Change Controller: IESG Specification Document: Section subject-token-types of this specification 11.3. <\/ins> Claim Name: \"azd\" Claim Description: The authorization context details"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-transaction-tokens-7492aff1e206586e4b17ee6a2c1847bc84f29e3fe7b789f9bbf195e205664aca","title":"","text":"that have requested Txn-Tokens as part of the transaction processing. 5.2.1.1. <\/del> 5.2.2. The Txn-Token SHOULD contain an \"azd\" claim. The value of this claim is a JSON object that contains name\/value pairs (wherein the value could itself be an object), which together assert the details that remain immutable through the call-chain where this Txn-Token is used. Txn-Tokens are primarily used to assure identity and context for a transaction, and the content of this field is a critical part of that context. Whereas the \"rctx\" field contains environmental values related to the request, the \"azd\" field contains the actual authorizaiton details that are determined by the TTS. These values are used by services using the Txn-Token to reliably obtain specific parameters needed to perform their work. The content of the \"azd\" field is determined by the Txn-Token Service and they may be computed internally or from parameters it receives from the service that requests the Txn-Token. The following is a non-normative example of an \"azd\" claim: 5.2.2.1. <\/ins> It is useful to be able to track the set of workloads that have requested a Txn-Token. The \"req_wl\" claim allows for tracking this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-52c996f2d90349717a49b7f30b443f5fab995fb940ef39d31545401b82e4d6ea","title":"","text":"string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of Refresh tokens for public clients must either be sender- constrained or one-time use as per Section 4.12.2 of <\/del> constrained or one-time use as per Section 4.13.2 of <\/ins> 10.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-fcaf7b860cf76b1ea655b11b375b5cc0dfb9c8c1d135590f93ba101bd384bcfd","title":"","text":"1.3.3. The client credentials or other forms of client authentication (e.g. a \"client_secret\" or a private key used to sign a JWT) can be used as an authorization grant when the authorization scope is limited to the protected resources under the control of the client, or to protected resources previously arranged with the authorization server. Client credentials are used as an authorization grant typically when the client is acting on its own behalf (the client is also the resource owner) or is requesting access to protected resources based on an authorization previously arranged with the authorization server. <\/del> a private key used to sign a JWT, as described in RFC7523) can be used as an authorization grant when the authorization scope is limited to the protected resources under the control of the client, or to protected resources previously arranged with the authorization server. Client credentials are used as an authorization grant typically when the client is acting on its own behalf (the client is also the resource owner) or is requesting access to protected resources based on an authorization previously arranged with the authorization server. <\/ins> 1.4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-bd557f4fadcd7a41de04eb21b0ffb0bfc04d46eeef1c5670eb797ab34909f8fc","title":"","text":"2.1. OAuth 2.1 defines three client types based on their ability to authenticate securely with the authorization server as well as the authorization server's assurance of the client's identity. Clients that have credentials and have a prior relationship with the AS are designated as \"confidential clients\" <\/del> OAuth 2.1 defines two client types based on their ability to authenticate securely with the authorization server. <\/ins> Clients that have credentials but no prior relationship with the AS are designated as \"credentialed clients\" <\/del> Clients that have credentials with the AS are designated as \"confidential clients\" <\/ins> Clients without credentials are called \"public clients\" Any clients with credentials MUST take precautions to prevent leakage and abuse of their credentials. Client authentication allows an Authorization Server to ensure it interacts with a certain client (identified by its \"client_id\") in an OAuth flow. This might by the pre-requisite to use client policy and metadata in the course of processing this flow. For example, the Authorization Server may show the trustworthy client name in user consent or allow access to certain functions as defined in the respective's client policy. Whether and how an Authorization server validates the identity of a client or the party providing\/operating this client is out of scope of this specification. <\/ins> Authorization servers SHOULD consider the level of confidence in a client's identity when deciding whether they allow such a client access to more critical functions, such as the Client Credentials grant type. <\/del> client's identity when deciding whether they allow a client access to certain resource servers or critical functions, such as the Client Credentials grant type. <\/ins> A single \"client_id\" MUST NOT be treated as more than one type of client. For example, a client that has been registered at the authorization server by a registered application developer, where the client is expected to be run as server-side code, would be considered a confidential client. A client that runs on an end-user's device, and uses Dynamic Client Registration (RFC7591) to establish credentials the first time the app runs, would be considered a credentialed client. An application deployed as a single-page app on a static web host would be considered a public client. <\/del> This specification has been designed around the following client profiles: A web application is a confidential client running on a web server. Resource owners access the client via an HTML user interface rendered in a user agent on the device used by the resource owner. The client credentials as well as any access tokens issued to the client are stored on the web server and are not exposed to or accessible by the resource owner. A browser-based application is a public client in which the client code is downloaded from a web server and executes within a user agent (e.g., web browser) on the device used by the resource owner. Protocol data and credentials are easily accessible (and often visible) to the resource owner. Since such applications reside within the user agent, they can make seamless use of the user agent capabilities when requesting authorization. A native application is a public client installed and executed on the device used by the resource owner. Protocol data and credentials are accessible to the resource owner. It is assumed that any client authentication credentials included in the application can be extracted. On the other hand, dynamically issued credentials such as access tokens or refresh tokens can receive an acceptable level of protection. At a minimum, these credentials are protected from hostile servers with which the application may interact. On some platforms, these credentials might be protected from other applications residing on the same device. <\/del> A web application is a client running on a web server. Resource owners access the client via an HTML user interface rendered in a user agent on the device used by the resource owner. The client credentials as well as any access tokens issued to the client are stored on the web server and are not exposed to or accessible by the resource owner. A browser-based application is a client in which the client code is downloaded from a web server and executes within a user agent (e.g., web browser) on the device used by the resource owner. Protocol data and credentials are easily accessible (and often visible) to the resource owner. If such applications shall use client credentials, it is recommended to utilize the backend for frontend pattern. Since such applications reside within the user agent, they can make seamless use of the user agent capabilities when requesting authorization. A native application is a client installed and executed on the device used by the resource owner. Protocol data and credentials are accessible to the resource owner. It is assumed that any client authentication credentials included in the application can be extracted. If such applications shall use client credentials, it is recommended to utilize the backend for frontend pattern. Dynamically issued credentials such as access tokens or refresh tokens can receive an acceptable level of protection. At a minimum, these credentials are protected from hostile servers with which the application may interact. On some platforms, these credentials might be protected from other applications residing on the same device. <\/ins> 2.2. The authorization server issues the registered client a client identifier - a unique string representing the registration information provided by the client. The client identifier is not a secret; it is exposed to the resource owner and MUST NOT be used alone for client authentication. The client identifier is unique to the authorization server. <\/del> Every client is identified in the context of an authorization server by a client identifier - a unique string representing the registration information provided by the client. The Authorization Server may itself issue the client identifier, it may also serve clients whose client identifier was issued by a trusted third party. The client identifier is not a secret; it is exposed to the resource owner and MUST NOT be used alone for client authentication. The client identifier is unique in the context of an authorization server. <\/ins> The client identifier string size is left undefined by this specification. The client should avoid making assumptions about the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-81bd656bc3de2616ec03f6b3d3c32202c8fc1c5a0327f9672b4d21c97545279c","title":"","text":"the process of issuance\/registration and distribution of the underlying credentials ensures their confidentiality. If the client is confidential or credentialed, the authorization server MAY accept any form of client authentication meeting its security requirements (e.g., password, public\/private key pair). <\/del> If the client is confidential, the authorization server MAY accept any form of client authentication meeting its security requirements (e.g., password, public\/private key pair). <\/ins> It is RECOMMENDED to use asymmetric (public-key based) methods for client authentication such as mTLS RFC8705 or \"private_key_jwt\""} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-043c6feff5357c5934d7db8f2afe405be946c7271674cdab12b6899fd4198d8b","title":"","text":"credentials to a counterfeit client after obtaining resource owner authorization. The authorization server MAY establish a client authentication method with public clients, which converts them to credentialed clients. However, the authorization server MUST NOT rely on credentialed client authentication for the purpose of identifying the client. <\/del> The client MUST NOT use more than one authentication method in each request to prevent a conflict of which authentication mechanism is authoritative for the request."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-686f2f5a39a051884e97c8dc7e7b7851fd78c4b6a58519fe87bb9ad83fe0d468","title":"","text":"3.2.1. Confidential or credentialed clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in client-authentication when making requests to the token endpoint. <\/del> Confidential clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in client-authentication when making requests to the token endpoint. <\/ins> Client authentication is used for:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-a53203064509008ce0f32e74fd579236ba2cd2922b2408d75106a4bc0dd766b3","title":"","text":"supported by the token request. The details of those grant types are defined below. Confidential or credentialed clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in token-endpoint-client- authentication. <\/del> Confidential clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in token-endpoint-client-authentication. <\/ins> For example, the client makes the following HTTP request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): The authorization server MUST: require client authentication for confidential and credentialed clients (or clients with other authentication requirements), <\/del> require client authentication for confidential clients (or clients with other authentication requirements), <\/ins> authenticate the client if client authentication is included"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-973b8b3dac4a4589673080d0d53952766c5822c15492ad1f49fc0b7623d740b0","title":"","text":"authorization server MUST: ensure that the authorization code was issued to the authenticated confidential or credentialed client, or if the client is public, ensure that the code was issued to \"client_id\" in the request, <\/del> confidential client, or if the client is public, ensure that the code was issued to \"client_id\" in the request, <\/ins> verify that the authorization code is valid,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-f5bb8f7097066ea1136f3d7952c26212867ba9b431dce9ca04b50ad15f87d5ae","title":"","text":"the scope of this specification). The client credentials grant type MUST only be used by confidential or credentialed clients. <\/del> clients. <\/ins> The use of the client credentials grant illustrated in fig-client- credentials-grant includes the following steps:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-e41e7f791d21227ab976458a9b62dab45a7664574ce534b9bb23f5c62d9b9177","title":"","text":"Because refresh tokens are typically long-lasting credentials used to request additional access tokens, the refresh token is bound to the client to which it was issued. Confidential or credentialed clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in token-endpoint-client-authentication. <\/del> client to which it was issued. Confidential clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in token- endpoint-client-authentication. <\/ins> For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using transport-layer security (with extra line breaks for display purposes"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-49c5d05a152193bcea5584859ee18521f79183a261aba45285e38a125603ae88","title":"","text":"2.3.1. Authorization servers MUST require clients to register their complete redirect URI (including the path component) and reject authorization requests that specify a redirect URI that doesn't exactly match one that was registered; the exception is loopback redirects, where an exact match is required except for the port URI component. <\/del> redirect URI (including the path component). Authorization servers MUST reject authorization requests that specify a redirect URI that doesn't exactly match one that was registered, with an exception for loopback redirects, where an exact match is required except for the port URI component. <\/ins> The authorization server MAY allow the client to register multiple redirect URIs. Registration may happen out of band, such as a manual step of configuring the client information at the authorization server, or may happen at runtime, such as in the initial POST in Pushed Authorization Requests RFC9126. <\/ins> For private-use URI scheme-based redirect URIs, authorization servers SHOULD enforce the requirement in private-use-uri-scheme that clients use schemes that are reverse domain name based. At a minimum, any"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-0c41909bf92ec9134ecca859b3e307532d953df274ca2cb8f516dc053cb7270e","title":"","text":"token and client identity whenever the client identity can be authenticated. When client authentication is not possible, the authorization server SHOULD issue sender-constrained refresh tokens or use refresh token rotation as described in (#refresh-token- endpoint-extension). <\/del> or use refresh token rotation as described in refresh-token-endpoint- extension. <\/ins> The authorization server MUST ensure that refresh tokens cannot be generated, modified, or guessed to produce valid refresh tokens by"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-e2161c1230e5e0318beef478904768f2dc1ba0a2a8ba941ac5bde04fde454839","title":"","text":"2.3.4. In order to prevent mix-up attacks, clients MUST only process redirect responses of the authorization server they sent the respective request to and from the same user agent this authorization request was initiated with. Clients MUST store the authorization server they sent an authorization request to and bind this information to the user agent and check that the authorization response was received from the correct authorization server. Clients MUST ensure that the subsequent access token request, if applicable, is sent to the same authorization server. Clients SHOULD use distinct redirect URIs for each authorization server as a means to identify the authorization server a particular response came from. <\/del> When an OAuth client can only interact with one authorization server, a mix-up defense is not required. In scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with two or more authorization servers, however, clients MUST prevent mix-up attacks. In order to prevent mix-up attacks, clients MUST only process redirect responses of the issuer they sent the respective request to and from the same user agent this authorization request was initiated with. See mixupcountermeasures for a detailed description of two different defenses against mix-up attacks. <\/ins> 2.3.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-8db8bab2962a016e9f0e5f7d4cc4ac7e31597cd5fce645d295b21a5d9678bde9","title":"","text":"authorization request. The exact value received from the client. OPTIONAL. The identifier of the authorization server which the client can use to prevent mixup attacks, if the client interacts with more than one authorization server. See RFC9207 for additional details on when this parameter is necessary, and how the client can use it to prevent mixup attacks. <\/del> client can use to prevent mix-up attacks, if the client interacts with more than one authorization server. See mix-up and RFC9207 for additional details on when this parameter is necessary, and how the client can use it to prevent mix-up attacks. <\/ins> For example, the authorization server redirects the user agent by sending the following HTTP response:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-a5e23fac16d92b81b54ec9c587e21b5769567204d2128cca70008fa0cd64deb5","title":"","text":"7.14. (TODO: merge this with the regular mix-up section when it is brought in) To protect against a compromised or malicious authorization server attacking another authorization server used by the same app, it is REQUIRED that a unique redirect URI is used for each authorization server used by the app (for example, by varying the path component), and that authorization responses are rejected if the redirect URI they were received on doesn't match the redirect URI in an outgoing authorization request. The native app MUST store the redirect URI used in the authorization request with the authorization session data (i.e., along with \"state\" and other related data) and MUST verify that the URI on which the authorization response was received exactly matches it. <\/del> Mix-up is an attack on scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with two or more authorization servers and at least one authorization server is under the control of the attacker. This can be the case, for example, if the attacker uses dynamic registration to register the client at his own authorization server or if an authorization server becomes compromised. When an OAuth client can only interact with one authorization server, a mix-up defense is not required. In scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with two or more authorization servers, however, clients MUST prevent mix-up attacks. Two different methods are discussed in the following. For both defenses, clients MUST store, for each authorization request, the issuer they sent the authorization request to, bind this information to the user agent, and check that the authorization response was received from the correct issuer. Clients MUST ensure that the subsequent access token request, if applicable, is sent to the same issuer. The issuer serves, via the associated metadata, as an abstract identifier for the combination of the authorization endpoint and token endpoint that are to be used in the flow. If an issuer identifier is not available, for example, if neither OAuth metadata RFC8414 nor OpenID Connect Discovery OpenID.Discovery are used, a different unique identifier for this tuple or the tuple itself can be used instead. For brevity of presentation, such a deployment-specific identifier will be subsumed under the issuer (or issuer identifier) in the following. Note: Just storing the authorization server URL is not sufficient to identify mix-up attacks. An attacker might declare an uncompromised AS's authorization endpoint URL as \"their\" AS URL, but declare a token endpoint under their own control. 7.14.1. This defense requires that the authorization server sends his issuer identifier in the authorization response to the client. When receiving the authorization response, the client MUST compare the received issuer identifier to the stored issuer identifier. If there is a mismatch, the client MUST abort the interaction. There are different ways this issuer identifier can be transported to the client: The issuer information can be transported, for example, via an optional response parameter \"iss\" (see authorization-response). When OpenID Connect is used and an ID Token is returned in the authorization response, the client can evaluate the \"iss\" claim in the ID Token. In both cases, the \"iss\" value MUST be evaluated according to RFC9207. While this defense may require using an additional parameter to transport the issuer information, it is a robust and relatively simple defense against mix-up. 7.14.2. For this defense, clients MUST use a distinct redirect URI for each issuer they interact with. Clients MUST check that the authorization response was received from the correct issuer by comparing the distinct redirect URI for the issuer to the URI where the authorization response was received on. If there is a mismatch, the client MUST abort the flow. While this defense builds upon existing OAuth functionality, it cannot be used in scenarios where clients only register once for the use of many different issuers (as in some open banking schemes) and due to the tight integration with the client registration, it is harder to deploy automatically. Furthermore, an attacker might be able to circumvent the protection offered by this defense by registering a new client with the \"honest\" AS using the redirect URI that the client assigned to the attacker's AS. The attacker could then run the attack as described above, replacing the client ID with the client ID of his newly created client. <\/ins> The requirement of native-app-registration, specifically that authorization servers reject requests with URIs that don't match what was registered, is also required to prevent such attacks. <\/del> This defense SHOULD therefore only be used if other options are not available. <\/ins> 8."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-0859a9b85553b9e874e499821be0c86d846fb6f8db8f670602215b3d40e4804d","title":"","text":"REQUIRED. The type of the access token issued as described in access-tokens. Value is case insensitive. RECOMMENDED. The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default value. <\/del> RECOMMENDED. A JSON number that represents the lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default value. <\/ins> RECOMMENDED, if identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as described"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-48e1f9ac5be1fc894fc0b1a78ed95e7f82ba0ea6b6be2b843256a0c20d7e41dc","title":"","text":"1.3.3. The client credentials or other forms of client authentication (e.g. <\/del> The client credentials or other forms of client authentication (e.g., <\/ins> a private key used to sign a JWT, as described in RFC7523) can be used as an authorization grant when the authorization scope is limited to the protected resources under the control of the client,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-7c00287350db0e94bf239be87cf9727fcedc2f148e4cd7f18e7a71cd20b12498","title":"","text":"authentication, integrity and confidentiality such as Transport-Layer Security RFC8446, to protect the exchange of clear-text credentials and tokens either in the content or in header fields from eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery (eg. see client-secret, authorization_codes, token-endpoint, and bearer-tokens). <\/del> eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery (e.g., see client- secret, authorization_codes, token-endpoint, and bearer-tokens). <\/ins> OAuth URLs MUST use the \"https\" scheme except for loopback interface redirect URIs, which MAY use the \"http\" scheme. When using \"https\","} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-a69724df897e8c70191801f1177d9dbd4149a1e0ce717474ae7269de50e27608","title":"","text":"an HTML document response, processed by the user agent. If the HTML response is served directly as the result of the redirection request, any script included in the HTML document will execute with full access to the redirect URI and the artifacts (e.g. authorization <\/del> access to the redirect URI and the artifacts (e.g., authorization <\/ins> code) it contains. Additionally, the request URL containing the authorization code may be sent in the HTTP Referer header to any embedded images, stylesheets and other elements loaded in the page."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-32a98c6141777feba09e821c5909a071b23874704a5b4a9100ac250942bab943","title":"","text":"_Sender-constrained refresh tokens:_ the authorization server cryptographically binds the refresh token to a certain client instance, e.g. by utilizing DPoP RFC9449 or mTLS RFC8705. <\/del> instance, e.g., by utilizing DPoP RFC9449 or mTLS RFC8705. <\/ins> _Refresh token rotation:_ the authorization server issues a new refresh token with every access token refresh response. The"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-4084ca83be6c3d709e64b0017fc0cba1f9cc0556f945ec8d5f705ac5078b94f2","title":"","text":"9. Browser-based apps are are clients that run in a web browser, typically written in JavaScript, also known as \"single-page apps\". These types of apps have particular security considerations similar to native apps. <\/del> Browser-based apps are clients that run in a web browser, typically written in JavaScript, also known as \"single-page apps\". These types of apps have particular security considerations similar to native apps. <\/ins> TODO: Bring in the normative text of the browser-based apps BCP when it is finalized."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-b4d993a3875218d12f6b292081ecb863e2abe43f3885c14647227cdd0baf5657","title":"","text":"authorization server during the client registration process. The redirect URI MUST be an absolute URI as defined by RFC3986 Section 4.3. The redirect URI MAY include an \"application\/x-www- form-urlencoded\" formatted query component (WHATWG.URL), which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The redirect URI MUST NOT include a fragment component. <\/del> Section 4.3. The redirect URI MAY include an query string component (query-string-serialization), which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The redirect URI MUST NOT include a fragment component. <\/ins> 2.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-fdd787bb4626d3053f4275acb94620d07a101fc094394c86279775dfc94305e5","title":"","text":"the authorization server's metadata document (RFC8414). The authorization endpoint URL MUST NOT include a fragment component, and MAY include an \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" formatted query component WHATWG.URL, which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. <\/del> and MAY include a query string component query-string-serialization, which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. <\/ins> The authorization server MUST support the use of the HTTP \"GET\" method Section 9.3.1 of RFC9110 for the authorization endpoint and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-d4ca906989a3c1cd5d3732d7da8ee36443dafd423c0800469641540e16a39389","title":"","text":"metadata document (RFC8414) and fetched programmatically at runtime. The token endpoint URL MUST NOT include a fragment component, and MAY include an \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" formatted query component (WHATWG.URL). <\/del> include a query string component query-string-serialization. <\/ins> The client MUST use the HTTP \"POST\" method when making requests to the token endpoint."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-3fb430c28d2abb98c7d36df7180a6a55b5e0683fb555326cf6b836debf48c57d","title":"","text":"3.2.2. The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the following parameters using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format per application-x-www-form-urlencoded with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request content: <\/del> following parameters using the form-encoded serialization format per form-serialization with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request content: <\/ins> REQUIRED. Identifier of the grant type the client uses with the particular token request. This specification defines the values"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-484ba38d58a71b9535ef64fb99745c57520fd38dd57f5a5c1532c68922642f53","title":"","text":"%x5D-7E. The parameters are included in the content of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included as JSON numbers. The order of parameters does not matter and can vary. <\/del> the \"application\/json\" media type as defined in json-serialization. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-51e620d2131469f8721574d5f1b3dd05adf24e911ffc0dfe09cf233a1300eec8","title":"","text":"The client constructs the request URI by adding the following parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format, per application-x-www-form-urlencoded: <\/del> as described by query-string-serialization: <\/ins> REQUIRED. The authorization endpoint supports different sets of request and response parameters. The client determines the type"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-850fd98c8ea84b2f3f88920aea99eda2b074e746f87f7def9acdd1c69f8fd5a2","title":"","text":"If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization server issues an authorization code and delivers it to the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirect URI using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format, per application-x-www-form-urlencoded: <\/del> redirect URI using the query string serialization described by query- string-serialization, unless specified otherwise by an extension: <\/ins> REQUIRED. The authorization code is generated by the authorization server and opaque to the client. The authorization"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-ace8df5ec10e0ab3a634fc01bf072970a4f5ca4153ccc42b5a91b8f7ae71020d","title":"","text":"If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirect URI, the authorization server informs the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirect URI using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format, per application-x-www- form-urlencoded: <\/del> parameters to the query component of the redirect URI as described by query-string-serialization: <\/ins> REQUIRED. A single ASCII USASCII error code from the following:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-d42377b4605a3fc65ba2b1499eda7e5ca92473e443061a2bacdfca59905ad5a5","title":"","text":"The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework oauth-2.1 <\/del> draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1 <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-846eb440f5cac57103032aec271403a8453ee96cdac86b7f4380a363d45acf3c","title":"","text":"behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. <\/del> specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework described in RFC 6749. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-48a82cf15e844f79a13342dab53801eea21f9314f6030b00a9218555f0984e8d","title":"","text":"This specification is designed for use with HTTP (RFC2616). The use of OAuth over any protocol other than HTTP is out of scope. The OAuth 1.0 protocol (RFC5849), published as an informational document, was the result of a small ad hoc community effort. This Standards Track specification builds on the OAuth 1.0 deployment experience, as well as additional use cases and extensibility requirements gathered from the wider IETF community. The OAuth 2.0 protocol is not backward compatible with OAuth 1.0. The two versions may co-exist on the network, and implementations may choose to support both. However, it is the intention of this specification that new implementations support OAuth 2.0 as specified in this document and that OAuth 1.0 is used only to support existing deployments. The OAuth 2.0 protocol shares very few implementation details with the OAuth 1.0 protocol. Implementers familiar with OAuth 1.0 should approach this document without any assumptions as to its structure and details. <\/del> Since the publication of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (RFC6749) in October 2012, it has been updated by OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252) and OAuth Security Best Current Practice (I- D.ietf-oauth-security-topics). The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage (RFC6750) has also been updated with (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics). This Standards Track specification consolidates the information in all of these documents and removes features that have been found to be insecure in I-D.ietf-oauth- security-topics. <\/ins> 1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-a161b56a61612b5d8d76918f208347b186307e555c7c0fccff617f4fcf10249d","title":"","text":"1.2. The abstract OAuth 2.0 flow illustrated in fig-protocol-flow <\/del> The abstract OAuth 2.1 flow illustrated in fig-protocol-flow <\/ins> describes the interaction between the four roles and includes the following steps:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-6855d3989075a6325b64de53ad6331941526ebb231b49f302db92fafaf2140f1","title":"","text":"1.8. OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined <\/del> OAuth 2.1 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined <\/ins> security properties. However, as a rich and highly extensible framework with many optional components, on its own, this specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-interoperable"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-7394608b02ae26dc58ba81bf500be7c6b27f74ed02c60cc547917bba2a8269bd","title":"","text":"\"confidentiality\", \"credential\", \"encryption\", \"identity\", \"sign\", \"signature\", \"trust\", \"validate\", and \"verify\". The term \"payload\" is to be interpreted as described in Section 3.3 of RFC7231. <\/ins> Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-cd0b1d77db847db182e2e84da110d038463a61b6df8abdb6c0c0eb3be4c47a67","title":"","text":"The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the following parameters using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body: <\/del> request payload: <\/ins> REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to \"authorization_code\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-d9b9cf4c8aa471cf771399673015f188770a513cb7bdff45e0c70e1751890a98","title":"","text":"The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the following parameters using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body: <\/del> request payload: <\/ins> REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to \"client_credentials\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-dcaf0c7825fd00fdbbde9d12088026f5df21186e426b417ff3ba452eda99662e","title":"","text":"The authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh token, and constructs the response by adding the following parameters to the entity-body of the HTTP response with a 200 (OK) status code: <\/del> to the payload of the HTTP response with a 200 (OK) status code: <\/ins> REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-e711ee66247651b463cec5a9a306b1fcf303ce02bbb785763b8d60f1ed4b5b5a","title":"","text":"otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as described by access-token-scope. The parameters are included in the entity-body of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The <\/del> The parameters are included in the payload of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The <\/ins> parameters are serialized into a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-9ba6022bee6f8681db008752796b022f42cd06a7b0c1ed2ed9f17139c97d197e","title":"","text":"thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 \/ %x23-5B \/ %x5D-7E. The parameters are included in the entity-body of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The <\/del> The parameters are included in the payload of the HTTP response using the \"application\/json\" media type as defined by RFC7159. The <\/ins> parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-f2d6179caaa15f9bfab05f1f422941afa0e28b284baaedbcdeb0f5d17a227afa","title":"","text":"client makes a refresh request to the token endpoint by adding the following parameters using the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body: <\/del> request payload: <\/ins> REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to \"refresh_token\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-e245b6518f9786397a1129d357d110c42e7a36a5f6b70baabff3e15d4c7316ef","title":"","text":"7.2.1.2. When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the client adds the access token to the request-body using the \"access_token\" parameter. The client MUST NOT use this method unless all of the following conditions are met: <\/del> When sending the access token in the HTTP request payload, the client adds the access token to the request-body using the \"access_token\" parameter. The client MUST NOT use this method unless all of the following conditions are met: <\/ins> The HTTP request entity-header includes the \"Content-Type\" header field set to \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\". The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the \"application\/x-www-form-urlencoded\" content-type as defined by HTML 4.01 W3C.REC-html401-19991224. <\/del> The payload follows the encoding requirements of the \"application\/ x-www-form-urlencoded\" content-type as defined by HTML 4.01 W3C.REC-html401-19991224. <\/ins> The HTTP request entity-body is single-part. <\/del> The HTTP request payload is single-part. <\/ins> The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely of ASCII USASCII characters. <\/del> The content to be encoded in the payload MUST consist entirely of ASCII USASCII characters. <\/ins> The HTTP request method is one for which the request-body has defined semantics. In particular, this means that the \"GET\" method MUST NOT be used. The entity-body MAY include other request-specific parameters, in which case the \"access_token\" parameter MUST be properly separated from the request-specific parameters using \"&\" character(s) (ASCII code 38). <\/del> The payload MAY include other request-specific parameters, in which case the \"access_token\" parameter MUST be properly separated from the request-specific parameters using \"&\" character(s) (ASCII code 38). <\/ins> For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using transport-layer security:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-625babdf398c20084228a3908006200b739d615ab273070db650480aa1e0a377","title":"","text":"The authorization server MUST include the HTTP \"Cache-Control\" response header field RFC7234 with a value of \"no-store\" in any response containing tokens, credentials, or other sensitive information, as well as the \"Pragma\" response header field RFC7234 with a value of \"no-cache\". <\/del> information. <\/ins> For example:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-ac85f6cdbf2031212cf6daacacd15a86b0a26e89c9c3edbc49ea794497d9b189","title":"","text":"(authorization server), which issues the printing service delegation- specific credentials (access token). This specification is designed for use with HTTP (RFC7230). The use of OAuth over any protocol other than HTTP is out of scope. <\/del> This specification is designed for use with HTTP (HTTP=RFC7231). The use of OAuth over any protocol other than HTTP is out of scope. <\/ins> Since the publication of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (RFC6749) in October 2012, it has been updated by OAuth 2.0 for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-cadf83cde380793bc54397df88fc4b3c8c72cbc3441aecc4474c019c9818e26c","title":"","text":"An authorization grant is a credential representing the resource owner's authorization (to access its protected resources) used by the client to obtain an access token. This specification defines three grant types -- authorization code, refresh token, and client credentials -- as well as an extensibility mechanism for defining <\/del> grant types - authorization code, refresh token, and client credentials - as well as an extensibility mechanism for defining <\/ins> additional types. 1.3.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-8be88c691318ed5860b5d44eb10d44b0b9f704e0194c105731624431c426806c","title":"","text":"The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. <\/del> \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. <\/ins> This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of RFC5234. Additionally, the rule URI-reference is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-00f542e181c3c7d72185402fed9d79d0fd7c73515af53e60daeb997e1d8ccd21","title":"","text":"2.2. The authorization server issues the registered client a client identifier -- a unique string representing the registration <\/del> identifier - a unique string representing the registration <\/ins> information provided by the client. The client identifier is not a secret; it is exposed to the resource owner and MUST NOT be used alone for client authentication. The client identifier is unique to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-b76bd6596ff93a04e224b9dd7272053ccc84242216e2534ad0f7df15c0b1076c","title":"","text":"underlying credentials ensures their confidentiality. When client authentication is not possible, the authorization server SHOULD employ other means to validate the client's identity -- for <\/del> SHOULD employ other means to validate the client's identity - for <\/ins> example, by requiring the registration of the client redirect URI or enlisting the resource owner to confirm identity. A valid redirect URI is not sufficient to verify the client's identity when asking for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-18eda2f5d6826fd2318ceee2443567c61f0ce3e7abbd3d5104c6b406e8aaca0d","title":"","text":"authorization requests automatically without user consent or interaction, except when the identity of the client can be assured. This includes the case where the user has previously approved an authorization request for a given client ID -- unless the identity of <\/del> authorization request for a given client ID - unless the identity of <\/ins> the client can be proven, the request SHOULD be processed as if no previous request had been approved."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-04ee3fa8abd1d6ad2cb950c601890872fed8216b093b21fb4782022cbb074df4","title":"","text":"service, or introduce a wide range of malicious side-effects. The authorization server and client MUST sanitize (and validate when possible) any value received -- in particular, the value of the <\/del> possible) any value received - in particular, the value of the <\/ins> \"state\" and \"redirect_uri\" parameters. 7.18."} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-12209330447482ed9bd57199c2d7e061a624b1b415027c17f99c3834a871a840","title":"","text":"2.4. Confidential and credentialed clients establish a client authentication method with the authorization server suitable for the security requirements of the authorization server. The authorization <\/del> If the client is confidential or credentialed, the authorization <\/ins> server MAY accept any form of client authentication meeting its security requirements. Confidential and credentialed clients are typically issued (or establish) a set of client credentials used for authenticating with the authorization server (e.g., password, public\/private key pair). <\/del> security requirements (e.g., password, public\/private key pair). <\/ins> The authorization server MUST authenticate the client whenever possible. If the authorization server cannot authenticate the client"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-2dcc1c3235011e808a87382a4bbc0d5be2db68c2a1727226dc4b5a679347c595","title":"","text":"3.2.1. Confidential clients or other clients issued client credentials MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in client- authentication when making requests to the token endpoint. Client authentication is used for: <\/del> Confidential or credentialed clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in client-authentication when making requests to the token endpoint. Client authentication is used for: <\/ins> Enforcing the binding of refresh tokens and authorization codes to the client they were issued to. Client authentication is critical"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-2cc0568d32751970e73224abc4f5d5d50dab87de5afa0d51aa888955080eec26","title":"","text":"HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client MAY request a new access token and retry the protected resource request. The request requires higher privileges than provided by the access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the \"scope\" attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected resource. <\/del> The request requires higher privileges (scopes) than provided by the scopes granted to the client and represented by the access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the \"scope\" attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected resource. <\/ins> If the request lacks any authentication information (e.g., the client was unaware that authentication is necessary or attempted using an"} +{"_id":"doc-en-oauth-v2-1-4219dfcbacc475301898d6d12cf67213dd1fd069963f45ed9f73e059b044f968","title":"","text":"Refresh tokens should either be sender-constrained or one-time use as per Section 4.12.2 of 10.1. The OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant is omitted from OAuth 2.1 as it was deprecated in I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics. The intent of removing the Implicit grant is to no longer issue access tokens in the authorization response, as such tokens are vulnerable to leakage and injection, and are unable to be sender- constrained to a client. This behavior was indicated by clients using the \"response_type=token\" parameter. This value for the \"response_type\" parameter is no longer defined in OAuth 2.1. Removal of \"response_type=token\" does not have an effect on other extension response types returning other artifacts from the authorization endpoint, for example, \"response_type=id_token\" defined by OpenID. <\/ins> 11. This document does not require any IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a5ddeff7962b62ed6ef6274f0bf412382b2c9bfb9def309e1a4bb70ec9771f4b","title":"","text":"writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. 5.9. Data centers are characterized by very low latencies (< 2 ms). Many workloads involve bursty traffic where many nodes complete a task at the same time. As a controlled environment, data centers often deploy fabrics that employ rich signalling from switches to endpoints. Furthermore, the operator can often limit the number of operating congestion controls. For these reasons, data center congestion controls are often distinct from those running elsewhere on the Interenet. A proposed congestion control need not coexist well with all other algorithms if it is intended for data centers, but the proposal SHOULD indicate which are expected to safely coexist with it. <\/ins> 6. This document does not represent a change to any aspect of the TCP\/IP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9072adc48aa0f02ac4a89f2039a12b114c1b70b09154000718a660f9841fa00e","title":"","text":"even if the criteria indicate an unsatisfactory result for these scenarios. In general, measurements from Internet-scale deployments will not expose the properties of operation in these scenarios, as they are statistically small. <\/del> In general, measurements from Internet-scale deployments might not expose the properties of operation in each of these scenarios, because they are not as ubiquitous as the General Use scenarios. <\/ins> 5.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-d407765294e44a6ee14f8f72b802efee94984bc3442fdd820d168eb83494da0e","title":"","text":"algorithm would perform in the presence of transient events such as sudden onset of congestion, a routing change, or a mobility event. Routing changes, link disconnections, intermittent link connectivity, and mobility are discussed in more detail in Section 17 of Tools. <\/del> and mobility are discussed in more detail in Section 16 of Tools. <\/ins> As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a511c23f16763b9525513f641a4c9ff1fcd77f035e7e4fa1352708df1f35b480","title":"","text":"3.1.3. A congestion control algorithm should try to avoid causing excessively high rates of packet loss. To accomplish this, it should avoid excessive increases in sending rate, and reduce its sending rate if experiencing high packet loss. The first version of the BBR algorithm BBRv1-draft failed this requirement. Experimental evaluation BBRv1-Evaluation showed that it caused a sustained rate of packet loss when multiple BBRv1 flows shared a bottleneck and the buffer size was less than roughly one and a half BDP. This kind of behavior needed to be fixed, and indeed further versions of BBR BBR-draft fixed this issue. This requirement does not imply that the algorithm should react to packet losses in exactly the same way as current standards-track congestion control algorithms (e.g., RFC5681). 3.1.4. <\/ins> When multiple competing flows all use the same proposed congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. Capacity fairness can be important"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-8d9b3b0f4011ffa0d63c463824db8915aca4ebe8ca9e85007682d4fa751acdd6","title":"","text":"that seek to send at different rates or when some of the flows do not last sufficiently long to approach asymptotic behavior. 3.1.4. <\/del> 3.1.5. <\/ins> A great deal of congestion control analysis concerns the steady-state behavior of long flows. However, many Internet flows are relatively"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-fee9b5729a203bc9a6f744769d387ab2f1507d6cb51304cf9304fe29b61524f2","title":"","text":"In contexts where differing congestion control algorithms are used, it is important to understand whether the proposed congestion control algorithm could result in more harm than previously defined algorithms to flows sharing a common bottleneck. The measure of harm is not restricted to the equality of capacity, but ought also to consider metrics such as the introduced latency, or an increase in packet loss. An evaluation must assess the potential to cause starvation, including assurance that a loss of all feedback (e.g., detected by expiry of a retransmission time out) results in backoff. <\/del> algorithm could result in more harm than previous standards-track algorithms (e.g. RFC5681, RFC9002, RFC9438) to flows sharing a common bottleneck. The measure of harm is not restricted to the equality of capacity, but ought also to consider metrics such as the introduced latency, or an increase in packet loss. An evaluation must assess the potential to cause starvation, including assurance that a loss of all feedback (e.g., detected by expiry of a retransmission time out) results in backoff. <\/ins> 4.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-6009ee416d39b5481592937b26a89659f77df0286393116c522ed307504fc7cc","title":"","text":"simulate their interaction with those algorithms. To the extent they are not, experiments can be conducted where possible. Note that in many deployments, real-time flows are directed into distinct queues via Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) or other mechanisms, which substantially reduces the interplay with other traffic. However, a proposal targeting general Internet use <\/del> Real-time flows can be directed into distinct queues via Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) or other mechanisms, which can substantially reduce the interplay with other traffic. However, a proposal targeting general Internet use can not assume this is always the case. <\/ins> 4.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-b5a1392c4caef50157ddaf24d395545c25885679ca1f55b0b8cf1d90c17c1965","title":"","text":"introduce bursty traffic where many nodes complete a task at the same time). In evaluating a new proposal for use in a controlled environment, the IETF needs to understand the usage, e.g., how the usage is scoped to the controlled environment, whether the algorithm will share resources with Internet traffic and consider what could happen if used in a protocol that is bridged across an Internet path. Algorithms that are designed for special environments and are forbidden from use in the general Internet, might instead seek real- world data for those environments. In such cases, the evaluation criteria in the remainder of this document might not apply. <\/del> In evaluating a new proposal for use in a controlled environment RFC8799, the IETF needs to understand the usage, e.g., how the usage is scoped to the controlled environment, whether the algorithm will share resources with Internet traffic and consider what could happen if used in a protocol that is bridged across an Internet path. Algorithms that are designed to be confined to a controlled environment and are not intended for use in the general Internet, might instead seek real-world data for those environments. In such cases, the evaluation criteria in the remainder of this document might not apply. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-b0eb1317d0a5c6e3d0cf0b7eb73845933411e8711c2f3f20c20a93c1e2f15db3","title":"","text":"Informational RFC in 2017 RFC8312 and then as a Proposed Standard in 2023 RFC9438. BBR is developed as an internal research project by Google, with the first implementation contributed to Linux kernel 4.19 in 2016. It was described in an IRTF draft in 2018, and that draft is regularly updated to document the evolving versions of the algorithm BBR-draft. BBR is widely used for Google services using either TCP or QUIC, and is also widely deployed outside of Google. <\/del> At the time of writing, BBR is being developed as an internal research project by Google, with the first implementation contributed to Linux kernel 4.19 in 2016. It was described in an IRTF draft in 2018, and that draft has been regularly updated to document the evolving versions of the algorithm BBR-draft. BBR is currently widely used for Google services using either TCP or QUIC, and is also widely deployed outside of Google. <\/ins> We cannot say now whether the original authors of RFC5033 expected that developers would be somehow waiting for IETF review before widely deploying a new congestion control algorithm over the Internet, but the examples of Cubic and BBR teach us that deployment of new algorithms is not in fact gated by publication of the <\/del> of new algorithms is not in fact gated by the publication of the <\/ins> algorithm as an RFC. Nevertheless, specifying congestion control algorithms has a number"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-36e4491e23e1707cfc4624c78bbe462acf881132ff4e97927f5b3b30d523bff7","title":"","text":"specification can help multiple contributors align on a consensus change to the algorithm. A specification that is accessible to anyone circumvents the issue that some implementors may be unable to read open source reference implementations due to the constraints of some open source licenses. <\/del> A specification that is accessible to anyone can circumvent the issue that some implementors may be unable to read open source reference implementations due to the constraints of some open source licenses. <\/ins> Beyond helping develop specific algorithm proposals, guidelines can also serve as a reminder to potential inventors and developers of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-0621efee0a243634ea5746cebe7731a79e4c1e834f32789da7f30e8a9d5a834d","title":"","text":"proposals in this space. This document is meant to reduce the barriers to entry for new congestion control work to the IETF. As such, proponents ought not to interpret these criteria as a checklist of requirements before approaching the IETF. Instead, proponents are encouraged to think about these issues beforehand, and have the willingness to do the work implied by the remainder of this document. <\/del> congestion control work to the IETF. As such, proponents of new congestion control algorithms ought not to interpret these criteria as a checklist of requirements before approaching the IETF. Instead, proponents are encouraged to think about these issues beforehand, and have the willingness to do the work implied by the remainder of this document. <\/ins> 2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-915d8b34e93479e6b16149d82c7bb50a2f9b5b7d39c5aeae01228f392b1e3e64","title":"","text":"The criteria in this section evaluate the congestion control algorithm when one or more flows using that algorithm share a bottleneck link (i.e. with no flows using a differing congestion <\/del> bottleneck link (i.e., with no flows using a differing congestion <\/ins> control algorithm). 4.1.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-f8430786d3d7c68df51f5501e2be63b8ba05cc2becd657fc166fec54cfd4e8ed","title":"","text":"4.2. These criteria evaluate the interaction of the proposed congestion control algorithm with commonly deployed congestion control algorithms. <\/del> Mixed algorithm behavior criteria evaluate the interaction of the proposed congestion control algorithm with commonly deployed congestion control algorithms. <\/ins> In contexts where differing congestion control algorithms are used, it is important to understand whether the proposed congestion control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-d9a98d52bdd5c74f6ed3461fb15675bf1a4f35692806b60d235464252344991e","title":"","text":"a proposal targeting general Internet use can not assume this is always the case. circuit-breakers describes the impact of network transport circuit breaker algorithms. RFC8083 also defines a minimal set of RTP circuit breakers that operate across a path. This identifies conditions under which a sender needs to stop transmitting media data to protect the network from excessive congestion. It is expected that, in the absence of long-lived excessive congestion, RTP applications running on best-effort IP networks will be able to operate without triggering these circuit breakers. <\/ins> 4.2.3. The effect on short-lived and long-lived flows using other common"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-fb57dbd0fe61940d8df21e154240700a476941dce5a9b3e872d192da4e3a5385","title":"","text":"4.3.1. Proposed congestion control algorithms SHOULD include a clear <\/del> A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD include a clear <\/ins> explanation of any deviations from RFC2914 and RFC7141. 4.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-f5d2f4992a2147a4ff4078583005fcb88680358e31338af02607ae68666a9779","title":"","text":"on a specific proposed congestion control algorithm - is out of scope of this document. RFC7567 describes design considerations for AQMs. 6.1.1. Some equipment in the network use an automatic mechanism to continuously monitor the use of resources by a flow or aggregate set of flows RFC8084. Such a network transport circuit breaker can automatically detect excessive congestion, and when detected, it can terminate (or significantly reduce the rate of) the flow(s). A well- designed congestion control algorithm ought to react before the flow uses excessive resources and therefore will operate within the envelope set by network transport circuit breaker algorithms. <\/ins> 6.2. An Internet Path can include simple links, where the minimum delay is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-49f750f27b1dc7ce3c2e39c2d945f24b8f3ef9cacd85afbc7008216d24c83502","title":"","text":"might then have to buffer data until an assigned transmission opportunity or when the physical path changes (e.g., when the length of a wireless path changes, or the physical layer changes its mode of operation). Variation also arises when a higher priority diffserv traffic classic prompts the transmission by a lower class. In these cases, the delay varies as a function of external factors and attempting to infer congestion from an increase in the delay results in reduced throughput. The jitter from variation over short timescales might not be distinguishable similar from other effects. <\/del> operation). Variation also arises when traffic with a higher priority diffserv class pre-empts transmission of traffic with a lower class. In these cases, the delay varies as a function of external factors and attempting to infer congestion from an increase in the delay results in reduced throughput. The jitter from variation over short timescales might not be distinguishable similar from other effects. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD be evaluated to ensure their operation is robust when there is a significant change in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-64a198cddf8a658118054426e067dba35344680851843cc4414e189dbfa6fef8","title":"","text":"operating congestion controls. For these reasons, data center congestion controls are often distinct from those running elsewhere on the Interenet. A proposed congestion control need not coexist well with all other algorithms if it is intended for data centers, but the proposal SHOULD indicate which are expected to safely coexist with it. <\/del> from those running elsewhere on the Interenet (see controlled- environments). A proposed congestion control need not coexist well with all other algorithms if it is intended for data centers, but the proposal SHOULD indicate which are expected to safely coexist with it. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-2d9ab1f53e326987397bb58ccfa75e8209e8da700b97084624be913fc19c3112","title":"","text":"Another example use is concurrent multipath, where the transport protocol simultaneously schedules flows to aggregate the capacity across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: A proposed congestion control algorithm MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the potential for harm to other flows. Synchronisation of congestion control mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/del> across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: A proposed congestion control algorithm MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the potential for harm to other flows. Synchronisation of congestion control mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are currently no Standards Track RFCs, but there is an Experimental RFC RFC6356 that specifies a concurrent multipath congestion control algorithm for TCP (MP-TCP). <\/ins> 6.9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-0c15c08eb96458924332c46947f66090616447bdb6cabae15a08c50010518ce5","title":"","text":"proceed with caution when evaluating proposals for alternate congestion control. The goal of this document is to provide guidance for considering standardization of a proposed congestion control algorithm at the IETF. It replaces RFC5033 to reflect changes in the congestion control landscape. <\/del> algorithm at the IETF. It obsoletes RFC5033 to reflect changes in the congestion control landscape. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-d1df4c473490b2eb29812d2befeec0338fc634305e026f9cdd8c94015670cb97","title":"","text":"proposal is appropriate for publication in the RFC series and for deployment in the Internet. This document obsoletes the similarly titled RFC5033 that was published in 2007 as a Best Current Practice to evaluate proposed congestion control algorithms as Experimental or Proposed Standard RFCs. <\/del> This document obsoletes RFC5033, which was published in 2007 as a Best Current Practice to evaluate proposed congestion control algorithms as Experimental or Proposed Standard RFCs. <\/ins> The IETF's standard congestion control algorithms have been shown to have performance challenges in various environments (e.g., high-speed networks, cellular and WiFi wireless technologies, long distance satellite links) and also flows carrrying specific workloads (VoIP, gaming, and videoconferencing). In 2007, TCP was the dominant consumer of this work, and proposals were typically discussed in the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG). The Datagram Congestrion Copntrol Protocol (DCCP) was developed as a method for developing new congestion control algorithms for datagram traffic. Since RFC 5033 was published, many conditions have changed. The set of protocols using these algorithms has spread beyond TCP, SCTP RFC9260, and DCCP RFC4340, to include QUIC RFC9000, RTP Media Congestion Avoidance Techniques (RMCAT) and beyond. <\/del> networks, cellular and WiFi wireless technologies, and long distance satellite links) and also flows carrying specific workloads (Voice over IP (VoIP), gaming, and videoconferencing). In 2007, TCP RFC9293 was the dominant consumer of this work, and proposals were typically discussed in the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG). The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) RFC4340 was developed as a method for defining new congestion control algorithms for datagram traffic. Since RFC5033 was published, many conditions have changed. The set of protocols using these algorithms has spread beyond TCP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) RFC9260, and DCCP, to include QUIC RFC9000, RTP Media Congestion Avoidance Techniques (RMCAT) (e.g., RFC8836) and beyond. <\/ins> Some proponents of alternative congestion control algorithms now have the opportunity to test and deploy at scale without IETF review. There is more interest in specialized use cases, such as data centers, and in support for a variety of upper layer protocols\/ applications, e.g., real-time protocols. Finally, the community has gained much more experience with indications of congestion beyond packet loss. <\/del> There is more interest in specialized use cases, such as data centers (e.g., RFC8257), and in support for a variety of upper layer protocols\/applications, e.g., real-time protocols. Finally, the community has gained much more experience with indications of congestion beyond packet loss. <\/ins> Multicast congestion control is a considerably less mature field of study and are not in scope for this document. However, Section 4 of the UDP Usage Guidelines RFC8085 provides additional guidelines for multicast and broadcast usage of UDP. <\/del> RFC8085 provides additional guidelines for multicast and broadcast usage of UDP. <\/ins> Congestion control algorithms have been developed outside of the IETF, including at least two that saw large scale deployment: Cubic"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-82feeb3add6408b0ca39c67b42e70d2d2d82dc03dc3c8e96063109bae7749dd8","title":"","text":"then adopted as the default congestion control algorithm for the TCP implementation in Linux. It was already used in a significant fraction of TCP connections over the Internet before being documented in an Informational Internet Draft in 2015, published as an <\/del> in an Informational Internet-Draft in 2015, published as an <\/ins> Informational RFC in 2017 RFC8312 and then as a Proposed Standard in 2023 RFC9438. BBR is developed as an internal research project by Google, with the first implementation contributed to Linux kernel 4.19 in 2016. It was described in an IRTF draft in 2018, and that draft is regularly updated to document the evolving versions of the algorithm BBR-draft. BBR is widely used for Google services using either TCP or QUIC, and is also widely deployed outside of Google. <\/del> was described in an IRTF Internet-Draft in 2018, and that Internet- Draft is regularly updated to document the evolving versions of the algorithm BBR-draft. BBR is widely used for Google services using either TCP or QUIC, and is also widely deployed outside of Google. <\/ins> We cannot say now whether the original authors of RFC5033 expected that developers would be somehow waiting for IETF review before"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-849024bf7f6ca4e00464cf1b611501ac3c297caa167542867fe78be2a2e4121e","title":"","text":"A specification can help potential contributors understand the algorithm, which can make it easier for them to suggest improvements and\/or identify limitations. Further, the <\/del> improvements and\/or identify limitations. Furthermore, the <\/ins> specification can help multiple contributors align on a consensus change to the algorithm."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-df21f329b9ed7d34f0fa0c8d92bfcb18811fe35dc393172ba9cf574b1011c302","title":"","text":"the developers of alternative algorithms and by the IETF in the context of each proposal. The high-order criterion for advancing any proposal is a serious scientific study of the pros and cons that occur when the proposal is considered for publication by the IETF or before it is deployed at large scale. <\/del> The high-order criterion for advancing any proposal within the IETF is a serious scientific study of the pros and cons that occur when the proposal is considered for publication by the IETF or before it is deployed at large scale. <\/ins> After initial studies, we encourage authors to write a specification of their proposal for publication in the RFC series. This allows others to concretely understand and investigate the wealth of <\/del> After initial studies, authors are encouraged to write a specification of their proposal for publication in the RFC series. This allows others to understand and investigate the wealth of <\/ins> proposals in this space. This document is meant to reduce the barriers to entry for new"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-efd1f044ca50d729ef4518ac21ed34772413f755cdb6cfec6bc4d55ad6a5105a","title":"","text":"consider other non-standard congestion control algorithms that are known to be widely deployed. We note that this guideline is not a requirement for strict Reno- or <\/del> Note that this guideline is not a requirement for strict Reno- or <\/ins> Cubic- friendliness as a prerequisite for a proposed congestion control mechanism to advance to Experimental or Standards Track status. As an example, HighSpeed TCP is a congestion control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-7c13f9d50707da2020d1ba1ba8edef9b2e883d614c30d6f014ab74c62a0d9bb2","title":"","text":"A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD consider coexistence with widely deployed real-time congestion control algorithms. Regrettably, at the time of writing, many algorithms with detailed public specifications are not widely deployed, while many widely deployed real-time congestion control algorithms have incomplete public specifications. It is hoped this situation will change. <\/del> Regrettably, at the time of writing (2024), many algorithms with detailed public specifications are not widely deployed, while many widely deployed real-time congestion control algorithms have incomplete public specifications. It is hoped this situation will change. <\/ins> To the extent that behavior of widely deployed algorithms is understood, a proposed congestion control algorithm can analyze and"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-390f2a23073f3edc230d20a0df4f227d52554d119651a58dfc08b23e27a631b5","title":"","text":"contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are currently no Standards Track RFCs, but there is an Experimental RFC RFC6356 that specifies a concurrent multipath congestion control algorithm for TCP (MP-TCP). <\/del> At the time of writing (2024), there are currently no Standards Track RFCs, but there is an Experimental RFC RFC6356 that specifies a concurrent multipath congestion control algorithm for TCP (MPTCP RFC8684). <\/ins> 6.9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9db30b274b292f59a0068b40095b20a41d798b69d2797aa423ed18570ea4dfce","title":"","text":"2. This document applies to proposed congestion control algorithms that seek Experimental or Standards Track status. Evaluation of both cases involves the same questions, but with different expectations for both the answers and the degree of certainty of the answers. Congestion control algorithms without experience of Internet-scale deployment SHOULD seek Experimental status until real-world data is able to answer the questions in general-use. Congestion control <\/del> This document applies to proposed congestion control algorithms proposals that seek Experimental or Standards Track status. Evaluation of both cases involves the same questions, but with different expectations for both the answers and the degree of certainty of the answers. Congestion control algorithms without empirical evidence of Internet- scale deployment SHOULD seek Experimental status. Congestion control <\/ins> algorithms with a record of measured Internet-scale deployment MAY directly seek the Standards Track if the community believes it is safe, and the design is stable, guided by the considerations in general-use. The existence of this data does not waive the other considerations in this document. <\/del> directly seek the Standards Track if there is solid data that reflects that it is safe, and the design is stable, guided by the considerations in general-use. However, the existence of this data does not waive the other considerations in this document. <\/ins> Experimental specifications SHOULD NOT be deployed as a default. They SHOULD only be deployed in situations where they are being actively measured, and where it is possible to deactivate if there are signs of pathological behavior. <\/del> actively measured, and where it is possible to deactivate them if there are signs of pathological behavior. <\/ins> Each published congestion control algorithm is REQUIRED to include a statement in the abstract indicating whether or not there is IETF"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-53a840c8a49a090ecee2c8eea9c37149a40c07a51279ab6e61f6c28d372035f4","title":"","text":"also required to include a statement in the abstract describing environments where the protocol is not recommended for deployment. There can be environments where the congestion control algorith is deemed _safe_ for use, but it is still is not _recommended_ for use because it does not perform well for the user. <\/del> deemed _safe_ for use, but it is still is _not recommended_ for use because it does not perform well for the user RFC8890. <\/ins> As examples of such statements, RFC3649 specifying HighSpeed TCP includes a statement in the abstract stating that the proposed congestion control algorithm is Experimental, but may be deployed in the current Internet. In contrast, the Quick-Start document RFC4782 includes a paragraph in the abstract stating the mechanism is only being proposed for use in controlled environments. The abstract specifies environments where the Quick-Start request could give false positives (and therefore would be unsafe for incremental deployment where some routers forward, but do not process the option). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment would not be recommended because it could lead to unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick-Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. Alhough out of the scope of this document, a proponent of a new <\/del> the Internet. In contrast, the Quick-Start document RFC4782 includes a paragraph in the abstract stating that the mechanism is only being proposed for use in controlled environments. The abstract specifies environments where the Quick-Start request could give false positives (and therefore would be unsafe for incremental deployment where some routers forward, but do not process the option). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment would not be recommended because it could lead to unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick-Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. Alhough out of the scope of this document, proponents of a new <\/ins> algorithm could alternatively seek publication as an Informational or Experimental RFC via the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). In general, these algorithms are expected to be less mature than ones"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-ffb207b6523e9189e5b81f9babb4edaec5d241d54c8c3f5f30a9048d2951c2c4","title":"","text":"2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. <\/ins> This document applies to proposals for congestion control algorithms that seek Experimental or Standards Track status. Evaluation of both cases involves the same questions, but with different expectations"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-68967dd0c2e7fb5b01dc13b94f5c7e50d17afeeaec2d54440c7243d32cd93829","title":"","text":"or IRTF review are invited to publish as an Informational RFC via the Independent Stream Editor (ISE). 3. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. <\/del> 4. Algorithms can be designed for general Internet deployment or for use"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a13d8e8446684f6cbe3b7995583da7ba4808beacaf2dc7ef1b7e455f8d6a6c05","title":"","text":"5.2.2. General-purpose protocols need to coexist in the Internet with real- <\/del> General-purpose algorithms need to coexist in the Internet with real- <\/ins> time congestion control algorithms, which, in general, have finite throughput requirements (i.e., do not seek to utilize all available capacity) and more strict latency bounds. See RFC8836 for a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-8df10be95c61ed52489bbca99d5c13135ec2b415f21d7655adfafe075a54ce96","title":"","text":"General-purpose protocols need to coexist in the Internet with real- time congestion control algorithms, which, in general, have finite throughput requirements (i.e., do not seek to utilize all available capacity) and more strict latency bounds. <\/del> capacity) and more strict latency bounds. See RFC8836 for a description of the characteristics of this use case and the resulting requirements. <\/ins> RFC8868 provides suggestions for real-time congestion control design and RFC8867 suggests test cases. RFC9392 describes some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-158b3173db7c40d3c5cff2b3ae8b338398e5a767a784facdaca0ad82cee39456","title":"","text":"3. 3.1. This document does not specify specific evaluation methods, short of internet-scale deployment and measurement, to test the criteria described below. There are multiple possible approaches to evaluation. Each has a role, and the most appropriate approach depends on the criteria being evaluated and the maturity of the specification. For many algorithms, an initial evaluation will consider individual protocol mechanisms in a simulator to analyse their stability and safety across a wide range of conditions, including overload. For example, RFC8869 describes evaluation test cases for interactive real-time media over wireless networks. Such results could also be published or discussed in IRTF research groups, such as ICCRG and MAPRG. Before a proposed congestion control algorithm is published as an Experimental or Standards Track RFC, the community SHOULD gain practical experience with implementation and experience using the algorithm. Where there is implementation by independent teams, this can help provide assurance that a specification has avoided assumptions or ambiguity. An independent evaluation by multiple teams helps provide assurance that the design meets the evaluation criteria, and can assess typical interactions with other traffic. This evaluation could use an emulated laboratory environment or a controlled experiment (within a limited domain or at Internet-scale). Evidence of results is normally considered by the working group in deciding if a specification is ready for publication and ought to be documented in any request for the working group to publish the specification. 3.2. <\/ins> This document applies to proposals for congestion control algorithms that seek Experimental or Standards Track status. Evaluation of both cases involves the same questions, but with different expectations"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-99a922c9624fbc4bbbe89357be5664284fbc830ea88e15856e9453d0b1c3d1e6","title":"","text":"delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick- Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. Strictly speaking, Informational RFCs in the IETF stream need not meet all of the criteria in this document, as they do not carry a formal recommendation from the community. Instead, the community judges the publication of Informational RFCs based on the value of their addition to the RFC series. <\/ins> Although out of the scope of this document, proponents of a new algorithm could alternatively seek publication as an Informational or Experimental RFC via the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). In"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-2f7676dc3d38259d1d872a6f199d0a8bdadb58629c1768278b46bf025bd0c9e3","title":"","text":"requirement. Experimental evaluation BBRv1-Evaluation showed that it caused a sustained rate of packet loss when multiple BBRv1 flows shared a bottleneck and the buffer size was less than roughly one and a half BDP. This was unsatisfactory, and indeed further versions have fixed this aspect of BBR BBR-draft. <\/del> a half times the Bandwidth Delay Product (BDP). This was unsatisfactory, and indeed further versions have fixed this aspect of BBR BBR-draft. <\/ins> This requirement does not imply that the algorithm should react to packet losses in exactly the same way as current standards-track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a8f4ffa657b3d7118e2fb7d9ea963d304ac86650a8912b577b28c2dc606b6745","title":"","text":"5.3.2. The proposed congestion control algorithm ought to discuss whether it <\/del> A congestion control algorithm proposal MUST discuss whether it <\/ins> allows for incremental deployment in the targeted environment. For a mechanism targeted for deployment in the current Internet, it would be helpful for the proposal to discuss what is known (if anything) about the correct operation of the mechanisms with some of the equipment in the current Internet, e.g., routers, transparent proxies, WAN optimizers, intrusion detection systems, home routers, and the like. <\/del> mechanism targeted for deployment in the current Internet, the proposal SHOULD discuss what is known (if anything) about the correct operation of the mechanisms with some of the equipment in the current Internet, e.g., routers, transparent proxies, WAN optimizers, intrusion detection systems, home routers, and the like. <\/ins> Similarly, if the proposed congestion control algorithm is intended only for specific environments (and not the global Internet), the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-cbae0c7d7cda86d947deca8408fb6647f6275ac8b38f06dc74a460d99c1e4c61","title":"","text":"The criteria in evaluation-criteria will be evaluated in the following scenarios. Unless a proposed congestion control specification explicitly forbids use on the public Internet, the community MUST find that it meets the criteria in these scenarios for the proposed congestion control algorithm to progress. <\/del> community MUST reach consensus that it meets the criteria in these scenarios for the proposed congestion control algorithm to progress. <\/ins> The evaluation in each scenario SHOULD occur over a representative range of bandwidths, delays, and queue depths. Of course, the set of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c0bbf2559d8cd020c2e8bbc1b3e25f05b6e7d5b6702fbad31e30d87a15fff6c8","title":"","text":"For these reasons, data center congestion controls are often distinct from those running elsewhere on the Internet (see controlled- environments. A proposed congestion control need not coexist well <\/del> environments). A proposed congestion control need not coexist well <\/ins> with all other algorithms if it is intended for data centers, but the proposal SHOULD indicate which are expected to safely coexist with it."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-5de7e0cfec5ca734f2486e1ca7087e5590a18f1a6d2b0d48e5de485704075ff0","title":"","text":"on a specific proposed congestion control algorithm - is out of scope of this document. RFC7567 describes design considerations for AQMs. 7.1.1. <\/del> 7.2. <\/ins> Some equipment in the network uses an automatic mechanism to continuously monitor the use of resources by a flow or aggregate set"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-07393cb6940b0d73ac07ddbcceb2216ddb4b603fe4dfd7cac4a1115ee6eea6ec","title":"","text":"uses excessive resources, and therefore will operate within the envelope set by network transport circuit breaker algorithms. 7.2. <\/del> 7.3. <\/ins> An Internet Path can include simple links, where the minimum delay is the propagation delay, and any additional delay can be attributed to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-26c8f9e4fd7828f5340dc85e6a518af3049ba5a35a363af495acf33bedd87b13","title":"","text":"its operation is robust when there is a significant change in the minimum delay. 7.3. <\/del> 7.4. <\/ins> The \"Internet of Things\" (IoT) is a broad concept, but when evaluating a proposed congestion control algorithm, it is often"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-dd6c8f53a6475fe6a70642bc1ac014f54cf15a2ff53b45f2458d6ba7bc340588","title":"","text":"relate to a user experience. Congestion control algorithm can still need to share the path with other flows with different constraints. 7.4. <\/del> 7.5. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm ought not to presume that all general Internet paths have a low delay. Some paths include links"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-564ef27b5b57a5e2e5c346a5265df23ac852bfc9f18a1bf9eab15f7a4fa54b2f","title":"","text":"Paths can also present a variable delay as described in delay. 7.5. <\/del> 7.6. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD explore how the algorithm performs with non-compliant senders, receivers, or routers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-50f05e62c9429598734f44fb52f262cca24066b2f1745d28bbe85cc1ba50f831","title":"","text":"middleboxes; and the potential use of Quick- Start to attack routers or to tie up available Quick-Start bandwidth. 7.6. <\/del> 7.7. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm ought not to presume that all general Internet paths reliably deliver packets in order. RFC4653 discusses the effect of extreme packet reordering. 7.7. <\/del> 7.8. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD consider how the proposed congestion control algorithm would perform in the presence"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-71a4713c58f503a47e3313fc18de2201b669ee63fd63911bcf46ad1d6e2b3ff1","title":"","text":"As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782. 7.7.1. <\/del> 7.9. <\/ins> An IETF transport is not tied to a specific Internet path or type of path. The set of routers that form a path can and do change with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-172a0b9c1093f7013d068b5d1497193b5157281aa640763485a2e71c53f03be8","title":"","text":"in path characteristics on the interval of common Internet re-routing intervals. 7.8. <\/del> 7.10. <\/ins> Multipath transport protocols permit more than one path to be differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-d73b11cc98b95efde0b8e4fe78b96fc60f647a820e657d5946ae6460ce68f25c","title":"","text":"RFC6356 that specifies a concurrent multipath congestion control algorithm for MPTCP RFC8684. 7.9. <\/del> 7.11. <\/ins> Data centers are characterized by very low latencies (< 2 ms). Many workloads involve bursty traffic where many nodes complete a task at"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-61e36632ded8a7e16255a5343c650fc820c0a42e02280bcc50123539f193eecb","title":"","text":"caused a sustained rate of packet loss when multiple BBRv1 flows shared a bottleneck and the buffer size was less than roughly one and a half times the Bandwidth Delay Product (BDP). This was unsatisfactory, and indeed further versions have fixed this aspect of BBR BBR-draft. <\/del> unsatisfactory, and indeed further versions provided a fix for this aspect of BBR BBR-draft. <\/ins> This requirement does not imply that the algorithm should react to packet losses in exactly the same way as current standards-track"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-f4c7364d0a91b76796ff51cf2a50d1a91975cefdb6cd1cd7c7825fd82afe51fe","title":"","text":"6.4. While the early Internet was dominated by wired links, the properties of wireless links have become extremely important to Internet performance. In particular, a proposed congestion control algorithm should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. <\/del> of wireless links have become important to Internet performance. In particular, a proposed congestion control algorithm should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-bf8c5b37e98ee297defd76088d86376bfa2aca48893b77286e9537230ac2d8d3","title":"","text":"include complex subnetworks where the minimum delay changes over various time scales, resulting in a non- stationary minimum delay. This occurs when a subnet changes the forwarding path to optimise capacity, resilience, etc. It could also arise when a subnet uses a capacity management method where the available resource is periodically distributed among the active nodes. A node might then have to buffer data until an assigned transmission opportunity or until the physical path changes (e.g., when the length of a wireless path changes, or the physical layer changes its mode of operation). Variation also arises when traffic with a higher priority DSCP pre- empts transmission of traffic with a lower class. In these cases, the delay varies as a function of external factors, and attempting to infer congestion from an increase in the delay results in reduced throughput. This variation in the delay over short timescales (jitter) might not be distinguishable from jitter that results from other effects. <\/del> Varying delay occurs when a subnet changes the forwarding path to optimise capacity, resilience, etc. It could also arise when a subnet uses a capacity management method where the available resource is periodically distributed among the active nodes. A node might then have to buffer data until an assigned transmission opportunity or until the physical path changes (e.g., when the length of a wireless path changes, or the physical layer changes its mode of operation). Variation also arises when traffic with a higher priority DSCP pre-empts transmission of traffic with a lower class. In these cases, the delay varies as a function of external factors, and attempting to infer congestion from an increase in the delay results in reduced throughput. This variation in the delay over short timescales (jitter) might not be distinguishable from jitter that results from other effects. <\/ins> A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD be evaluated to ensure its operation is robust when there is a significant change in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c887949fe5b1d1160ff9dd1495f1940ec4aa9f04b63b7a7a8b2e1fa3095b1bec","title":"","text":"The IETF specifies standard Internet congestion control algorithms in the RFC-series. These congestion control algorithms can suffer performance challenges when used in various environments (e.g., high- speed networks, cellular and WiFi wireless technologies, and long distance satellite links), and also when flows carry specific <\/del> performance challenges when used in differing environments (e.g., high-speed networks, cellular and WiFi wireless technologies, and long distance satellite links), and also when flows carry specific <\/ins> workloads (Voice over IP (VoIP), gaming, and videoconferencing). When RFC5033 was published in 2007, TCP RFC9293 was the dominant"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-8c7dc65bfd7f187fb5d306326b2c3b2cdae22e29f9d9691d087cccce42a63552","title":"","text":"documented in any request for the working group to publish the specification. Publication might occur without multiple implementations if a single implementation is widely used, open source, and shown to have positive impact on the Internet, particularly if the target status is Experimental. <\/ins> 3.2. This document applies to proposals for congestion control algorithms"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-096176668ff9b0ec205d83b09092434eaf9719a9898963dfd99523b5ed6cbfcd","title":"","text":"for both the answers and the degree of certainty of those answers. Congestion control algorithms without empirical evidence of Internet- scale deployment SHOULD seek Experimental status. <\/del> scale deployment MUST seek Experimental status, unless they are not targeted at general use. Specifications published as Experimental ought to explain the reason for the status and what further information would be required to progress to standards track. For example, section 12 of RFC6928 provides \"Usage and Deployment Recommendations\" that describe the experiments expected by the TCPM working group. Section 4 of RFC4614 provides other examples of extensions that were considered experimental when the specification was published. Experimental specifications SHOULD NOT be deployed as a default. They SHOULD only be deployed in situations where they are being actively measured, and where it is possible to deactivate them if there are signs of pathological behavior. <\/ins> Congestion control algorithms with a record of measured Internet- scale deployment MAY directly seek the Standards Track if there is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a0e79bdeda3b0fce7778e4a772817bd725d173b76d3755d00cd890f2940e5b95","title":"","text":"of this data does not waive the other considerations in this document. Experimental specifications SHOULD NOT be deployed as a default. They SHOULD only be deployed in situations where they are being actively measured, and where it is possible to deactivate them if there are signs of pathological behavior. <\/del> Each published congestion control algorithm is REQUIRED to include a statement in the abstract indicating whether or not there is IETF consensus that the proposed congestion control algorithm is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-0dc079d2d68ec4ba3926796131f3a8cf5791f56ed64692ac1e13314d7a48d230","title":"","text":"the Internet. In contrast, the Quick-Start document RFC4782 includes a paragraph in the abstract stating that the mechanism is only being proposed for use in controlled environments. The abstract specifies environments where the Quick- Start request could give false positives (and therefore would be unsafe for incremental deployment where some routers forward, but do not process the option). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment is not recommended because it could lead to unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick- Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. <\/del> environments where the Quick-Start request could give false positives (and therefore would be unsafe for incremental deployment where some routers forward, but do not process the option). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment is not recommended because it could lead to unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick-Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. <\/ins> Strictly speaking, Informational RFCs in the IETF stream need not meet all of the criteria in this document, as they do not carry a"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-cdba0b174aec5cf02d67ded86cb8e739488c184dfb071c1324abeb1a8cacf665","title":"","text":"5. As noted above, authors are expected to do a well-rounded evaluation of the pros and cons of congestion control algorithms that are brought to the IETF. The following guidelines are designed to help authors and the IETF community. Concerns that fall outside the scope of these guidelines are certainly possible; these guidelines should not be considered an all-encompassing check-list. <\/del> Authors are expected to evaluate the congestion control algorithms that they bring to the IETF. The working group is expecteed to complete a well-rounded evaluation of the pros and cons of an algorithm before it submits the specification for publication by the IETF. The following guidelines are designed to help authors and the IETF community. Concerns that fall outside the scope of these guidelines are certainly possible; these guidelines should not be considered an all-encompassing check-list. <\/ins> When considering a proposed congestion control algorithm, the community MUST consider the following criteria. These criteria will"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c5dbf38414bdb281fced5f5ee9a17fbedf6696b81d70f4445850a6d39264d136","title":"","text":"most Internet flows. Furthermore, many IoT applications do not a have a human in the loop, and therefore can have weaker latency constraints because they do not relate to a user experience. Congestion control algorithm can still need to share the path with other flows with different constraints. <\/del> and therefore might have weaker latency constraints because they do not relate to a user experience. Congestion control algorithm can still need to share the path with other flows with different constraints. <\/ins> 7.5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-5cd6f489b8c7a43d43947f47bf5b53e37eed7cca08eec4b90ac0650c85ab3a3d","title":"","text":"state of each path, and demonstrate independent congestion control for each path being used. Authors of a proposed multipath congestion control algorithm that implements path fail-over MUST evaluate the harm resulting from a change in the path, and show that this does not result in flow starvation. Synchronisation of failover (e.g., where multiple flows change their path on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness. These effects also ought to be evaluated. <\/del> harm to performance resulting from a change in the path, and show that this does not result in flow starvation. Synchronisation of failover (e.g., where multiple flows change their path on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness. These effects also ought to be evaluated. <\/ins> Another example use is concurrent multipath, where the transport protocol simultaneously schedules a flow to aggregate the capacity"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-b46ba4941b1ae87aa57df7252ca9282d62b2d9c74b8838cd585a485ed4fef055","title":"","text":"general, these algorithms are expected to be less mature than ones that follow the procedures in this document. Authors documenting deployed congestion control algorithms that cannot be changed by IETF or IRTF review are invited to publish as an Informational RFC via the Independent Stream Editor (ISE). <\/del> or IRTF review are invited to seek publication as an Informational RFC via the Independent Stream Editor (ISE). <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c371c046b045fbd29c704e25455540f49fce21438b944039ee6328579b5a0b72","title":"","text":"Algorithms that rely on specific functions or configurations in the network need to provide a reference or specification for these functions (an RFC or another stable specification). The IETF will need to assess whether the relevant working group is able to review the proposed new algorithm and whether there is sufficient experience to understand any dependent functions. <\/del> functions (an RFC or another stable specification). For publication to proceed, the IETF will need to assess whether a working group exists that can properly assess the network-layer aspects and their interaction with the congestion control. <\/ins> In evaluating a new proposal for use in a controlled environment, the IETF needs to understand the usage, e.g., how the usage is scoped to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-5bc672705ba6ee27c0b9221b36bacab41ba3ce765e2e830228369f9a582783d6","title":"","text":"community MUST consider the following criteria. These criteria will be evaluated in various domains (see general-use and special-cases). Some of the sections below will list criteria that SHOULD be met. It could happen that these criteria are not in fact met by the proposal. In such cases, the community MUST document whether not meeting the criteria is acceptable, for example because there are practical limitations on carrying out an evaluation of the criteria. The requirement that the community consider a criterion does not imply that the result needs to be described in a resulting RFC. There is no formal requirement to document the results, although normal IETF policies for archiving proceedings will provide a record. This document, except where otherwise noted, does not provide normative guidance on the acceptable thresholds for any of these criteria. Instead, the community will use these evaluations as an input when considering whether to progress the proposed algorithm. <\/ins> 5.1. The criteria in this section evaluate the congestion control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-56cec4115e1311f25fd8253e3b7faaac1adec1aa251125e2590bf7be68b84b9a","title":"","text":"5.2.1. A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD be evaluated when competing using standard IETF congestion controls, e.g. RFC5681, <\/del> A proposed congestion control algorithm MUST be evaluated when competing against standard IETF congestion controls, e.g. RFC5681, <\/ins> RFC9002, RFC9438. A proposed congestion control algorithm that has a significantly negative impact on flows using standard congestion control might be suspect, and this aspect should be part of the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-0eac55da1b065f43f09108477842e2a7fda5bf81d9c6e665b3037eb44b62500e","title":"","text":"5.3.1. A proposed congestion control algorithm SHOULD include a clear explanation of any deviations from RFC2914 and RFC7141. <\/del> A proposed congestion control algorithm MUST clearly explain any deviations from RFC2914 and RFC7141. <\/ins> 5.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-8b06cfabbd3ffe02b1170bb0d0a3b3b4acb2477ca4ebda37e764c01338380725","title":"","text":"The criteria in evaluation-criteria will be evaluated in the following scenarios. Unless a proposed congestion control specification explicitly forbids use on the public Internet, the community MUST reach consensus that it meets the criteria in these scenarios for the proposed congestion control algorithm to progress. <\/del> specification explicitly forbids use on the public Internet, there MUST be IETF consensus that it meets the criteria in these scenarios for the proposed congestion control algorithm to progress. <\/ins> The evaluation in each scenario SHOULD occur over a representative range of bandwidths, delays, and queue depths. Of course, the set of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a004cbd1b02a6889906af9b16b1d8a1812d73bfc346ae35aaeb6927dd97efc72","title":"","text":"current congestion control algorithms do have security implications (e.g., as outlined in RFC5681). The IETF process that results in publication needs to ensure that these security implications are considered. Proposed congestion control algorithms therefore ought to be mindful of pitfalls, and SHOULD examine any potential security issues that may arise. <\/del> Proposed congestion control algorithms MUST examine any potential security or privacy issues that may arise from their design. <\/ins> 9."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-24edb4c4563f09c37178cc0959d921a7ba1fdb0fa1bfca3b9e52702600eec401","title":"","text":"statement in the abstract indicating whether or not there is IETF consensus that the proposed congestion control algorithm is considered safe for use on the Internet. Each published algorithm is also required to include a statement in the abstract describing <\/del> also REQUIRED to include a statement in the abstract describing <\/ins> environments where the protocol is not recommended for deployment. There can be environments where the congestion control algorithm is deemed safe for use, but it is still is not recommended for use"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c6563f6d58e0d9314917e960159e58510baca2d6710bf23fe766b6c35366007b","title":"","text":"environments is discussed in Section 12 of RFC3649 (HighSpeed TCP) and Section 9.7 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). Protection Against Congestion Collaps <\/del> Protection Against Congestion Collapse <\/ins> The alternate congestion control mechanism should either stop sending when the packet drop rate exceeds some threshold RFC3714,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-d4c9f6b2350ce2aceb76ded1b4c718dca110c6d63b6f9f1817aeb33a64358895","title":"","text":"mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable bandwidth during backoff. Protection Against Bufferbloat The alternate congestion control mechanism should reduce its sending rate if the round trip time (RTT) significantly increases. Exactly how the algorithm reduces its sending rate is algorithm specific. Bufferbloat Bufferbloat refers to the building of long queues in the network. Many network routers are configured with very large buffers. If congestion starts happening, classic TCP congestion control algorithms RFC5681 will continue sending at a high rate until the buffer fills up completely and packet losses occur. Every connection going through that bottleneck will experience high latency. This is particularly bad for highly interactive applications like games, but it also affects routine web browsing and video playing. This problem became apparent in the last decade and was not discussed in the Congestion Control Principles published in September 2002 RFC2914. The classic congestion control algorithm RFC5681 and the widely deployed Cubic algorithm RFC9438 do not address it, but newly designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. <\/ins> Fairness within the Alternate Congestion Control Algorithm. In environments with multiple competing flows all using the same"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-6bf0116bd4d1565d2128f20d2449296638c5db7d3d2fe889023200b6082b82b2","title":"","text":"deployment in the Internet. This document updates the similarly titled RFC5033 that was published in 2007. Since then, multiple congestion control algorithms were developed outside of the IETF, including at least two that saw large scale deployment: Cubic HRX08 and BBR BBR-draft. <\/del> in 2007 as a Best Current Practice to evaluate new congestion control algorithms as Experimental or Proposed Standard RFCs. In 2007, TCP was the dominant consumer of this work, and proposals were typically discussed in research groups, for example the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG). Since RFC 5033 was published, many conditions have changed. The set of protocols using these algorithms has spread beyond TCP and SCTP to include DCCP, QUIC, and beyond. Some congestion control algorithm proponents now have the opportunity to test and deploy at scale without IETF review. There is more interest in specialized use cases such as data centers and real-time protocols. Finally, the community has gained much more experience with indications of congestion beyond packet loss. Multiple congestion control algorithms have been developed outside of the IETF, including at least two that saw large scale deployment: Cubic HRX08 and BBR BBR-draft. <\/ins> Cubic was documented in a research publication in 2007 HRX08, and then adopted as the default congestion control algorithm for the TCP"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-4e9d3c87aba5d02499959439ce1bba9c47d85f027e9e02479d527ce1d75d148f","title":"","text":"Proposed congestion control mechanisms should include a clear explanation of the deviations from RFC2914. Impact on Standard TCP, SCTP RFC2960, and DCCP RFC4340. <\/del> Impact on existing deployments of TCP RFC9293, SCTP RFC9260, DCCP RFC4340, and QUIC RFC9000. <\/ins> Proposed congestion control mechanisms should be evaluated when competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC2581, RFC2960, RFC4340. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. We note that this bullet is not a requirement for strict TCP- friendliness as a prerequisite for an alternate congestion control mechanism to advance to Experimental. As an example, HighSpeed TCP is a congestion control mechanism that is Experimental, but that is not TCP-friendly in all environments. We also note that this guideline does not constrain the fairness offered for non- best-effort traffic. <\/del> competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC5681, RFC9260, RFC4340, RFC9002, RFC9438. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. The community should also consider other non-standard congestion controls known to be widely deployed, We note that this bullet is not a requirement for strict Reno- or Cubic- friendliness as a prerequisite for an alternate congestion control mechanism to advance to Experimental. As an example, HighSpeed TCP is a congestion control mechanism that is Experimental, but that is not TCP-friendly in all environments. When a new algorithm is deployed, the existing major deployments need to be considered to avoid severe performance degradation. We also note that this guideline does not constrain the interaction with non-best-effort traffic. <\/ins> As an example from an Experimental RFC, fairness with standard TCP is discussed in Sections 4 and 6 of RFC3649 (HighSpeed TCP) and using spare capacity is discussed in Sections 6, 11.1, and 12 of RFC3649. Wireless links While the early Internet was dominated by wired links, the properties of wireless links have become extremely important to Internet performance. In particular, congestion controllers should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. <\/ins> Difficult Environments. The proposed algorithms should be assessed in difficult environments such as paths containing wireless links. Characteristics of wireless environments are discussed in RFC3819 and in Section 16 of Tools. Other difficult environments can include those with multipath routing within a connection. We note that there is still much to be desired in terms of the performance of TCP in some of these difficult environments. For congestion control mechanisms with explicit feedback from routers, difficult environments can include paths with non-IP queues at layer-two, IP tunnels, and the like. A minimum goal for experimental mechanisms proposed for widespread deployment in the Internet should be that they do not perform significantly worse than TCP in these environments. <\/del> environments. We note that there is still much to be desired in terms of the performance of TCP in some of these difficult environments. For congestion control mechanisms with explicit feedback from routers, difficult environments can include paths with non-IP queues at layer-two, IP tunnels, and the like. A minimum goal for experimental mechanisms proposed for widespread deployment in the Internet should be that they do not perform significantly worse than TCP in these environments. <\/ins> While it is impossible to enumerate all the possible \"difficult environments\", we note that the IETF has previously grappled with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-964de6b3ca521be6c6c066e3998216294b5142f70b593344936a00670a00b415","title":"","text":"Similar to the last criteria, proposed alternate congestion controllers should be assessed in a range of environments. For instance, proposals should be investigated across a range of bandwidths, round-trip times, levels of traffic on the reverse <\/del> capacities, round-trip times, levels of traffic on the reverse <\/ins> path, and levels of statistical multiplexing at the congested link. Similarly, proposals should be investigated for robust performance with different queueing mechanisms in the routers,"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-1927755f44dc9e131a35aabc26ec43a1fb7941c23cb70de40ddaf5b72f928a3d","title":"","text":"full backoff mechanism must be identical to that of TCP RFC2988. As an example, this bullet does not preclude full backoff mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable bandwidth during backoff. <\/del> comparable caapcity during backoff. <\/ins> Protection Against Bufferbloat"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-060d60db70f0d13c19d4aeb82beff9e50ae6a6cb6685f42a7329e10ccd10edfb","title":"","text":"In environments with multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how bandwidth is shared among the competing flows. <\/del> explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. <\/ins> Performance with Misbehaving Nodes and Outside Attackers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-56df334670ad33236b8ff7d64cfec5a9c4bb08bc87cf7627d9a333d018b8652a","title":"","text":"The minimum requirements for approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet include the following guidelines on: (1) assessing the impact on standard congestion control, (3) investigation of the proposed mechanism in a range of environments, (4) protection against congestion collapse, and (8) discussing whether the mechanism allows for incremental deployment. For other guidelines, i.e., (2), (5), (6), and (7), the author must perform the suggested evaluations and provide recommended analysis. Evidence that the proposed mechanism has significantly more problems than those of TCP should be a cause for concern in approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet. <\/del> assessing the impact on standard congestion control, (2) performance in wireless environments, (4) investigation of the proposed mechanism in a range of environments, (5) protection against congestion collapse, and (10) discussing whether the mechanism allows for incremental deployment. For other guidelines, the author must perform the suggested evaluations and provide recommended analysis. Evidence that the proposed mechanism has significantly more problems than those of TCP should be a cause for concern in approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet. <\/ins> 5."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-534ddcff3613578708a55444658f9200d26d931b42a5633e9e36080666c968fd","title":"","text":"protocol suite and therefore does not directly impact Internet security. The implementation of various facets of the Internet's current congestion control algorithms do have security implications (e.g., as outlined in RFC2581). Alternate congestion control schemes <\/del> (e.g., as outlined in RFC5681). Alternate congestion control schemes <\/ins> should be mindful of such pitfalls, as well, and should examine any potential security issues that may arise."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-f71875b18c2d2a2754bcf1da7ebdfadc7bd77d7c41d94a7d48474fd1f9560c1d","title":"","text":"Impact on Standard TCP, SCTP RFC2960, and DCCP RFC4340. Proposed congestion control mechanisms should be evaluated when competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC2581, RFC2960, RFC4340. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. <\/del> Evaluation of proposed congestion control mechanisms should include test cases competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC2581, RFC2960, RFC4340. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. <\/ins> We note that this bullet is not a requirement for strict TCP- friendliness as a prerequisite for an alternate congestion control"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-32d305b566a3323a30cdff43b9ab44f210099011d48025dc073ad43d10312a1e","title":"","text":"using spare capacity is discussed in Sections 6, 11.1, and 12 of RFC3649. Wireless links While the early Internet was dominated by wired links, the properties of wireless links have become extremely important to Internet performance. In particular, congestion controllers should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. <\/ins> Difficult Environments. The proposed algorithms should be assessed in difficult environments such as paths containing wireless links. Characteristics of wireless environments are discussed in RFC3819 and in Section 16 of Tools. Other difficult environments can include those with multipath routing within a connection. We note that there is still much to be desired in terms of the performance of TCP in some of these difficult environments. For congestion control mechanisms with explicit feedback from routers, difficult environments can include paths with non-IP queues at layer-two, IP tunnels, and the like. A minimum goal for experimental mechanisms proposed for widespread deployment in the Internet should be that they do not perform significantly worse than TCP in these environments. <\/del> environments. We note that there is still much to be desired in terms of the performance of TCP in some of these difficult environments. For congestion control mechanisms with explicit feedback from routers, difficult environments can include paths with non-IP queues at layer-two, IP tunnels, and the like. A minimum goal for experimental mechanisms proposed for widespread deployment in the Internet should be that they do not perform significantly worse than TCP in these environments. <\/ins> While it is impossible to enumerate all the possible \"difficult environments\", we note that the IETF has previously grappled with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-5bbf3994164d5ba7e1df87e3e43d2228c5a8ecad90205cee98f437d2e6fb9db4","title":"","text":"the abstract stating the mechanism is only being proposed for controlled environments. The abstract specifies environments where the Quick-Start request could give false positives (and therefore would be unsafe to deploy). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment would still not be recommended because it could cause unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. <\/del> would be unsafe for incremental deployment where some routers forward, but do not process the option). The abstract also specifies environments where packets containing the Quick-Start request could be dropped in the network; in such an environment, Quick-Start would not be unsafe to deploy, but deployment would not be recommended because it could lead to unnecessary delays for the connections attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick-Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. <\/ins> For authors of alternate congestion control schemes who are not ready to bring their congestion control mechanisms to the IETF for"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-757399e0ed508e830b22ff2f409aa5b9ec43f10a03cb6a336c88f5a643002f71","title":"","text":"possibility would be to submit an internet-draft that documents the alternate congestion control mechanism for the benefit of the IETF and IRTF communities. This is particularly encouraged in order to get algorithm specifications widely disseminated to facilitate further research. Such an internet-draft could be submitted to be considered as an Informational RFC, as a first step in the process towards standardization. Such a document would also be expected to carry an explicit warning against using the scheme in the global Internet. <\/del> ensure algorithm specifications are widely disseminated to facilitate further research. Such an internet-draft could also be considered as an Informational RFC, as a first step in the process towards standardization. Such a document would be expected to carry an explicit warning against using the scheme in the global Internet. <\/ins> Note: we are not changing the RFC publication process for non-IETF produced documents (e.g., those from the IRTF or Independent"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-4bebd9b02adec50e46eebe574b78af986278d5b3a6b7575f283064fb506903a8","title":"","text":"these guidelines should not be considered as an all-encompassing check-list. Differences with Congestion Control Principles Proposed congestion control mechanisms should include a clear explanation of the deviations from RFC2914. Impact on existing deployments of TCP RFC9293, SCTP RFC9260, DCCP RFC4340, and QUIC RFC9000. Proposed congestion control mechanisms should be evaluated when competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC5681, RFC9260, RFC4340, RFC9002, RFC9438. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. The community should also consider other non-standard congestion controls known to be widely deployed, We note that this bullet is not a requirement for strict Reno- or Cubic- friendliness as a prerequisite for an alternate congestion control mechanism to advance to Experimental. As an example, HighSpeed TCP is a congestion control mechanism that is Experimental, but that is not TCP-friendly in all environments. When a new algorithm is deployed, the existing major deployments need to be considered to avoid severe performance degradation. We also note that this guideline does not constrain the interaction with non-best-effort traffic. As an example from an Experimental RFC, fairness with standard TCP is discussed in Sections 4 and 6 of RFC3649 (HighSpeed TCP) and using spare capacity is discussed in Sections 6, 11.1, and 12 of RFC3649. Wireless links While the early Internet was dominated by wired links, the properties of wireless links have become extremely important to Internet performance. In particular, congestion controllers should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. Difficult Environments. The proposed algorithms should be assessed in difficult environments. We note that there is still much to be desired in terms of the performance of TCP in some of these difficult environments. For congestion control mechanisms with explicit feedback from routers, difficult environments can include paths with non-IP queues at layer-two, IP tunnels, and the like. A minimum goal for experimental mechanisms proposed for widespread deployment in the Internet should be that they do not perform significantly worse than TCP in these environments. While it is impossible to enumerate all the possible \"difficult environments\", we note that the IETF has previously grappled with paths with long delays RFC2488, high delay bandwidth products RFC3649, high packet corruption rates RFC3155, packet reordering RFC4653, and significantly slow links RFC3150. Aspects of alternate congestion control that impact networks with these characteristics should be detailed. As an example from an Experimental RFC, performance in difficult environments is discussed in Sections 6, 9.2, and 10.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). Investigating a Range of Environments. Similar to the last criteria, proposed alternate congestion controllers should be assessed in a range of environments. For instance, proposals should be investigated across a range of capacities, round-trip times, levels of traffic on the reverse path, and levels of statistical multiplexing at the congested link. Similarly, proposals should be investigated for robust performance with different queueing mechanisms in the routers, especially Random Early Detection (RED) FJ03 and Drop-Tail. This evaluation is often not included in the internet-draft itself, but in related papers cited in the draft. A particularly important aspect of evaluating a proposal for standardization is in understanding where the algorithm breaks down. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to characterizing the areas where the proposed mechanism does not perform well. As an example from an Experimental RFC, performance in a range of environments is discussed in Section 12 of RFC3649 (HighSpeed TCP) and Section 9.7 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). Protection Against Congestion Collapse The alternate congestion control mechanism should either stop sending when the packet drop rate exceeds some threshold RFC3714, or should include some notion of \"full backoff\". For \"full backoff\", at some point the algorithm would reduce the sending rate to one packet per round-trip time and then exponentially backoff the time between single packet transmissions if congestion persists. Exactly when either \"full backoff\" or a pause in sending comes into play will be algorithm-specific. However, as discussed in RFC2914, this requirement is crucial to protect the network in times of extreme congestion. If \"full backoff\" is used, this bullet does not require that the full backoff mechanism must be identical to that of TCP RFC2988. As an example, this bullet does not preclude full backoff mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable caapcity during backoff. Protection Against Bufferbloat The alternate congestion control mechanism should reduce its sending rate if the round trip time (RTT) significantly increases. Exactly how the algorithm reduces its sending rate is algorithm specific. Bufferbloat Bufferbloat refers to the building of long queues in the network. Many network routers are configured with very large buffers. If congestion starts happening, classic TCP congestion control algorithms RFC5681 will continue sending at a high rate until the buffer fills up completely and packet losses occur. Every connection going through that bottleneck will experience high latency. This is particularly bad for highly interactive applications like games, but it also affects routine web browsing and video playing. This problem became apparent in the last decade and was not discussed in the Congestion Control Principles published in September 2002 RFC2914. The classic congestion control algorithm RFC5681 and the widely deployed Cubic algorithm RFC9438 do not address it, but newly designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. Fairness within the Alternate Congestion Control Algorithm. In environments with multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. Test for the effect of path changes An IETF transport is not tied to a specific Internet path. The set of routers forming a path can and do change with time, this will also cause the properties of the path to change with respect to time. New CCs MUST evaluate the impact of changes in the path, and be robust to changes in path characteristics on the interval of common Internet re-routing intervals. Utilising More than one Path. Multipath transport protocols permit more than one path to be differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A multipath sender can schedule which packets travel on which of its active paths. This enables a tradeoff in timeliness and reliability. <\/del> When considering a new congestion control proposal, the community MUST consider the following criteria. These criteria will be evaluated in various domains (see general-use and special-cases). 3.1. The following criteria evaluate the proposed algorithm when one or more flows using that algorithm share a bottleneck link, with no other algorithms operating. 3.1.1. The alternate congestion control mechanism should either stop sending when the packet drop rate exceeds some threshold RFC3714, or should include some notion of \"full backoff\". For \"full backoff\", at some point the algorithm would reduce the sending rate to one packet per round-trip time and then exponentially backoff the time between single packet transmissions if congestion persists. Exactly when either \"full backoff\" or a pause in sending comes into play will be algorithm-specific. However, as discussed in RFC2914, this requirement is crucial to protect the network in times of extreme congestion. If the result of full backoff is used, this test does not require that the full backoff mechanism must be identical to that of TCP RFC2988. As an example, this bullet does not preclude full backoff mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable capacity during backoff. 3.1.2. The alternate congestion control mechanism should reduce its sending rate if the round trip time (RTT) significantly increases. Exactly how the algorithm reduces its sending rate is algorithm specific, but see RFC8961 and RFC8085 for requirements. Bufferbloat Bufferbloat refers to the building of long queues in the network. Many network routers are configured with very large buffers. If congestion starts happening, classic TCP congestion control algorithms RFC5681 will continue sending at a high rate until the buffer fills up completely and packet losses occur. Every connection going through that bottleneck will experience high latency. This adds unwanted latency that impacts highly interactive applications like games, but it also affects routine web browsing and video playing. This problem became apparent in the last decade and was not discussed in the Congestion Control Principles published in September 2002 RFC2914. The classic congestion control algorithm RFC5681 and the widely deployed Cubic algorithm RFC9438 do not address it, but newly designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. 3.1.3. When multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. 3.1.4. (TODO: Discuss short and long flows) 3.2. These criteria evaluate the interaction of the proposal with commonly deployed congestion controls. 3.2.1. Evaluate the impact on TCP RFC9293, SCTP RFC9260, DCCP RFC4340, and QUIC RFC9000. Proposed congestion control mechanisms should be evaluated when competing with standard IETF congestion control RFC5681, RFC9260, RFC4340, RFC9002, RFC9438. Alternate congestion controllers that have a significantly negative impact on traffic using standard congestion control may be suspect and this aspect should be part of the community's decision making with regards to the suitability of the alternate congestion control mechanism. The community should also consider other non-standard congestion controls known to be widely deployed, We note that this bullet is not a requirement for strict Reno- or Cubic- friendliness as a prerequisite for an alternate congestion control mechanism to advance to Experimental. As an example, HighSpeed TCP is a congestion control mechanism that is Experimental, but that is not TCP-friendly in all environments. When a new algorithm is deployed, the existing major deployments need to be considered to avoid severe performance degradation. We also note that this guideline does not constrain the interaction with non-best- effort traffic. As an example from an Experimental RFC, fairness with standard TCP is discussed in Sections 4 and 6 of RFC3649 (HighSpeed TCP) and using spare capacity is discussed in Sections 6, 11.1, and 12 of RFC3649. 3.2.2. (TODO: Clarify that real time congestion controls are included, with allowances for the poor documentation \/ open source availability of these) 3.2.3. (TODO: Discuss short and long flows) 3.3. 3.3.1. Proposed congestion control mechanisms SHOULD include a clear explanation of the deviations from RFC2914. 3.3.2. The proposal should discuss whether the alternate congestion control mechanism allows for incremental deployment in the targeted environment. For a mechanism targeted for deployment in the current Internet, it would be helpful for the proposal to discuss what is known (if anything) about the correct operation of the mechanism with some of the equipment installed in the current Internet, e.g., routers, transparent proxies, WAN optimizers, intrusion detection systems, home routers, and the like. As a similar concern, if the alternate congestion control mechanism is intended only for specific environments (and not the global Internet), the proposal should consider how this intention is to be carried out. The community will have to address the question of whether the scope can be enforced by simply stating the restrictions or whether additional protocol mechanisms are required to enforce the scoping. The answer will necessarily depend on the change being proposed. As an example from an Experimental RFC, deployment issues are discussed in Sections 10.3 and 10.4 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). 4. The criteria in evaluation-criteria will be evaluated in the following scenarios. Unless a proposal is explicitly forbidden on the public internet, the community MUST find that it meets the criteria in these scenarios for the proposal to progress. The evaluation in each scenario should occur over a representative range of bandwidths, delays, and queue depths. Of course, the set of parameters representative of the public internet will change over time. These criteria are meant to capture a statistically dominant set of internet conditions. In the case that the algorithm has been tested at internet scale, the results from that deployment are often useful for answering these questions. 4.1. (TODO: Describe properties of wired networks.) Proposals should be investigated for robust performance with different queueing mechanisms in the routers, especially Random Early Detection (RED) FJ03 and Drop-Tail. This evaluation is often not included in the internet-draft itself, but in related papers cited in the draft. 4.2. While the early Internet was dominated by wired links, the properties of wireless links have become extremely important to Internet performance. In particular, congestion controllers should be evaluated in situations where some packet losses are due to radio effects, rather than router queue drops; the link capacity varies over time due to changing link conditions; and media access delays and link-layer retransmission lead to increased jitter in round-trip times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. 5. The criteria in evaluation-criteria will be evaluated in the following scenarios, unless the proposal specifically presents its use in a scenario. The community MAY allow a proposal to progress even if the criteria indicate an unsatisfactory result for these scenarios. In general, measurements from internet-scale deployments will not expose the properties of operation in these scenarios, as they are statistically small. 5.1. (TODO: Write this section) <\/ins> A concurrent multipath transport protocol simultaneously schedules flows to aggregate the capacity across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: New CCs MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the fairness with other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/del> 5.2. <\/ins> Performance with Misbehaving Nodes and Outside Attackers. <\/del> Satellite links often have delays longer than typical for wired paths RFC2488 and high delay bandwidth productsRFC3649. <\/ins> The proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with misbehaving senders, receivers, or routers. In addition, the proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with outside attackers. This can be particularly important for congestion control mechanisms that involve explicit feedback from routers along the path. <\/del> 5.3. <\/ins> As an example from an Experimental RFC, performance with misbehaving nodes and outside attackers is discussed in Sections 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). This includes discussion of misbehaving senders and receivers; collusion between misbehaving routers; misbehaving middleboxes; and the potential use of Quick-Start to attack routers or to tie up available Quick- Start bandwidth. <\/del> The proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with non-compliant senders, receivers, or routers. In addition, the proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with outside attackers. This can be particularly important for congestion control mechanisms that involve explicit feedback from routers along the path. <\/ins> Responses to Sudden or Transient Events. <\/del> As an example from an Experimental RFC, performance with misbehaving nodes and outside attackers is discussed in Sections 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). This includes discussion of misbehaving senders and receivers; collusion between misbehaving routers; misbehaving middleboxes; and the potential use of Quick- Start to attack routers or to tie up available Quick-Start bandwidth. <\/ins> The proposal should consider how the alternate congestion control mechanism would perform in the presence of transient events such as sudden congestion, a routing change, or a mobility event. Routing changes, link disconnections, intermittent link connectivity, and mobility are discussed in more detail in Section 17 of Tools. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). <\/del> When the proposal relies on explicit signals from the path, the effect of traffic passing through the tunnel - where routers may not be aware of the underlying flow - MUST be considered. <\/ins> Incremental Deployment. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> The proposal should discuss whether the alternate congestion control mechanism allows for incremental deployment in the targeted environment. For a mechanism targeted for deployment in the current Internet, it would be helpful for the proposal to discuss what is known (if anything) about the correct operation of the mechanism with some of the equipment installed in the current Internet, e.g., routers, transparent proxies, WAN optimizers, intrusion detection systems, home routers, and the like. <\/del> RFC4653 discusses the effect of extreme packet reordering. <\/ins> As a similar concern, if the alternate congestion control mechanism is intended only for specific environments (and not the global Internet), the proposal should consider how this intention is to be carried out. The community will have to address the question of whether the scope can be enforced by simply stating the restrictions or whether additional protocol mechanisms are required to enforce the scoping. The answer will necessarily depend on the change being proposed. <\/del> 5.6. <\/ins> As an example from an Experimental RFC, deployment issues are discussed in Sections 10.3 and 10.4 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). <\/del> The proposal should consider how the alternate congestion control mechanism would perform in the presence of transient events such as sudden congestion, a routing change, or a mobility event. Routing changes, link disconnections, intermittent link connectivity, and mobility are discussed in more detail in Section 17 of Tools. <\/ins> 4. <\/del> As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). <\/ins> This section suggests minimum requirements for a document to be approved as Experimental with approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet. <\/del> 5.6.1. <\/ins> The minimum requirements for approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet include the following guidelines on: (1) assessing the impact on standard congestion control, (2) performance in wireless environments, (4) investigation of the proposed mechanism in a range of environments, (5) protection against congestion collapse, and (12) discussing whether the mechanism allows for incremental deployment. <\/del> An IETF transport is not tied to a specific Internet path. The set of routers forming a path can and do change with time, this will also cause the properties of the path to change with respect to time. New CCs MUST evaluate the impact of changes in the path, and be robust to changes in path characteristics on the interval of common Internet re-routing intervals. <\/ins> For other guidelines, the author must perform the suggested evaluations and provide recommended analysis. Evidence that the proposed mechanism has significantly more problems than those of TCP should be a cause for concern in approval for widespread deployment in the global Internet. <\/del> Event when the routers constituting a path does not change, the properties of that path can vary, with similar impacts on congestion control 5.7. Multipath transport protocols permit more than one path to be differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A multipath sender can schedule which packets travel on which of its active paths. This enables a tradeoff in timeliness and reliability. One use is to provide fail-over from one path to another when the original path is no longer viable or to switch the traffic from one path to another when this is expected to improve performance (latency, throughput, reliability, cost). Designs need to independently track the congestion state of each path, and need to demonstrate independent congestion control for each path being used. New multipath CCs that implement path fail-over MUST evaluate the harm resulting from a change in the path, and show that this does not result in flow starvation. Synchronisation of failover (e.g., where multiple flows change their path on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. A concurrent multipath transport protocol simultaneously schedules flows to aggregate the capacity across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: New CCs MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the fairness with other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/ins> 5. <\/del> 6. <\/ins> This document does not represent a change to any aspect of the TCP\/IP protocol suite and therefore does not directly impact Internet"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-4516f161e780bf409ecad6b8a99efb34b62f1f06d973c59932fc97e7a6fdc289","title":"","text":"should be mindful of such pitfalls, as well, and should examine any potential security issues that may arise. 6. <\/del> 7. <\/ins> This document has no IANA actions."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-b139a4b6dcbf17a447b9264aaa3bafb52a8ee048d27852ea2eb19c26d5f06d5f","title":"","text":"3.1.1. The alternate congestion control mechanism should not cause increased overhead under adverse network conditions. This criteria can be evaluated by counting the total bytes (data and headers) arriving at the receiver when delivering a fixed workload over varying network conditions. The total delivered bytes should remain constant, independent of network conditions over the entire operating range for the protocol. For general transport protocols such as TCP this means over any path in the Internet. There are known exceptions to this guideline, for example spurious Retransmission Timeouts RFC7765 and TCP loss Probe RFC8985. These algorithms can substantially improve application performance in certain environments at the cost of additional network overhead due to spurious retransmissions. Alternate congestion control mechanisms should be carefully evaluated for exceptions. That evaluation should appropriately reflect on any the inherent trade-offs. This criteria can also be applied protocol layers above transport. 3.1.2. <\/ins> The alternate congestion control mechanism should either stop sending when the packet drop rate exceeds some threshold RFC3714, or should include some notion of \"full backoff\". For \"full backoff\", at some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-93b064e7b688f599cbdfb726c04fdfc064421a4bcd1f1c4396c4e47999e9a796","title":"","text":"mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable capacity during backoff. 3.1.2. <\/del> 3.1.3. <\/ins> The alternate congestion control mechanism should reduce its sending rate if the round trip time (RTT) significantly increases. Exactly"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-936c6e8df1ec2af45f61b3295e1ddc772af6e4667697a0ef7ffd98dbcff24903","title":"","text":"designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. 3.1.3. <\/del> 3.1.4. <\/ins> When multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. 3.1.4. <\/del> 3.1.5. <\/ins> (TODO: Discuss short and long flows)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-3f0a75a939255fca1221ec15b49c0dfbab7d211694b9aeac6e6064dc12ee6806","title":"","text":"differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A multipath sender can schedule which packets travel on which of its active paths. This enables a tradeoff in timeliness and reliability. There are various ways that multipath techniques can be used, <\/ins> One use is to provide fail-over from one path to another when the original path is no longer viable or to switch the traffic from one path to another when this is expected to improve performance <\/del> One example use is to provide fail-over from one path to another when the original path is no longer viable or to switch the traffic from one path to another when this is expected to improve performance <\/ins> (latency, throughput, reliability, cost). Designs need to independently track the congestion state of each path, and need to demonstrate independent congestion control for each path being used."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-e0a73f03f9a616e64406cd6561a80338ea311488d1d8a06f438e307c443e5b3c","title":"","text":"contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. A concurrent multipath transport protocol simultaneously schedules flows to aggregate the capacity across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: New CCs MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the fairness with other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/del> Another example use is concurrent multipath, where the transport protocol simultaneously schedules flows to aggregate the capacity across multiple paths. The Internet provides no guarantee that different paths (e.g., using different endpoint addresses) are disjoint. This has additional implications: New CCs MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the fairness with other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9672482c2e780170e21f04a3e31c8001d15a459942e1368b1053ddda88ba278c","title":"","text":"3.1.4. When multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion <\/del> When multiple competing flows all use the same alternate congestion <\/ins> control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. <\/del> shared among the competing flows. Capacity fairness can be important when a small number of similar flows compete to fill a bottleneck. It can however also not be useful: for example when comparing flows seek to send at different rates or when some of the flows do not last sufficiently long to approach asymptotic behavior. <\/ins> 3.1.5. In contexts where differing congestion control algorithms are used, it is important to understand whether an alternate congestion control algorithm can induce more harm to sharing flows than existing defined methods. The measure of harm is not restricted to the equality of capacity, but ought also to consider metrics such as the latency introduced, or an increase in packet loss. This evaluation must assess the potential to cause starvation, including assurance that a loss of all feedback (e.g., detected by expiry of a retransmission time out) results in backoff. 3.1.6. <\/ins> (TODO: Discuss short and long flows) 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-cac826259bfba5e315c5c4c42d0740b8056bf376968666e0592684283a0a1871","title":"","text":"New CCs MUST evaluate the potential harm to other flows when the multiple paths share a common congested bottleneck (or share resources that are coupled between different paths, such as an overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the fairness with other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/del> overall capacity limit), and SHOULD consider the potential for harm to other flows. Synchronisation of CC mechanisms (e.g., where multiple flows change their behaviour on similar timeframes) can also contribute to harm and\/or reduce fairness, these effects also ought to be evaluated. At the time of writing, there are no IETF standards for concurrent multipath congestion control in the general Internet. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-2952a6e7ba96bc5ad8f78165479021a0248c6b0307a3efd8729e313cf0d30c79","title":"","text":"3.1.1. The alternate congestion control mechanism should not cause increased overhead under adverse network conditions. This criteria can be evaluated by counting the total bytes (data and headers) arriving at the receiver when delivering a fixed workload over varying network conditions. The total delivered bytes should remain constant, independent of network conditions over the entire operating range for the protocol. For general transport protocols such as TCP this means over any path in the Internet. There are known exceptions to this guideline, for example spurious Retransmission Timeouts RFC7765 and TCP loss Probe RFC8985. These algorithms can substantially improve application performance in certain environments at the cost of additional network overhead due to spurious retransmissions. Alternate congestion control mechanisms should be carefully evaluated for exceptions. That evaluation should appropriately reflect on any the inherent trade-offs. This criteria can also be applied protocol layers above transport. 3.1.2. <\/del> The alternate congestion control mechanism should either stop sending when the packet drop rate exceeds some threshold RFC3714, or should include some notion of \"full backoff\". For \"full backoff\", at some"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-5c65fef43d5a99f1bdd5e92c85b28458dc27065f14c4c20dd473f3c80c17c44d","title":"","text":"mechanisms that would give flows with different round- trip times comparable capacity during backoff. 3.1.3. <\/del> 3.1.2. <\/ins> The alternate congestion control mechanism should reduce its sending rate if the round trip time (RTT) significantly increases. Exactly"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-7eeff9431593e91125092911e61fbfd8f00aef0a6b35c37cf2d19cf79fbcac69","title":"","text":"designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. 3.1.4. <\/del> 3.1.3. <\/ins> When multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. 3.1.5. <\/del> 3.1.4. <\/ins> (TODO: Discuss short and long flows)"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9cff3cdec326c221a49eaaadbb4be8f0fc56d36f0e84aead65a53033254cc841","title":"","text":"3.3.1. Proposed congestion control mechanisms SHOULD include a clear explanation of the deviations from RFC2914. <\/del> explanation of the deviations from RFC2914 and RFC7141. <\/ins> 3.3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-1fecfdb84afef872e0cfcbc602de887db079a71e1725b3fc7d0ffe863f396ce6","title":"","text":"times. See RFC3819 and Section 16 of Tools for further discussion of wireless properties. 4.3. Congestion control performance is affected by the queue discipline applied at the bottleneck link. The default queue discipline that MUST be evaluated is drop-tail, First In First Out (FIFO). See aqm for evaluation of other queue disciplines. <\/ins> 5. The criteria in evaluation-criteria will be evaluated in the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-0003287f90015685e54dd4e81ba809f6a28d7ed29b3bd075522f55d8a22cc051","title":"","text":"5.1. (TODO: Write this section) <\/del> Proposals SHOULD be evaluated under a variety of bottleneck queue disciplines. At a minimum, a proposal should reason about an algorithm's response to various AQMs. Simulation or empirical results are, of course, valuable. Note that evaluation of AQM techniques - as opposed to their impact on specific congestion control proposals - is out of scope of this document. RFC7567 describes design considerations for AQMs. Among the AQM techniques that might have an impact on a congestion control algorithm are FQ-CoDel RFC8290; Proportional Integral Controller Enhanced (PIE) RFC8033; and Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput (L4S) RFC9332. <\/ins> 5.2. (TODO: Write this section) 5.3. <\/ins> Satellite links often have delays longer than typical for wired paths RFC2488 and high delay bandwidth products RFC3649. 5.3. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> The proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with non-compliant senders, receivers, or routers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-3f10412c3e44916773ddd69b0933aa860d3415099eda6d343e32156d5b0c9dfd","title":"","text":"routers; misbehaving middleboxes; and the potential use of Quick- Start to attack routers or to tie up available Quick-Start bandwidth. 5.4. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> When the proposal relies on explicit signals from the path, the effect of traffic passing through the tunnel - where routers may not be aware of the underlying flow - MUST be considered. 5.5. <\/del> 5.6. <\/ins> RFC4653 discusses the effect of extreme packet reordering. 5.6. <\/del> 5.7. <\/ins> The proposal should consider how the alternate congestion control mechanism would perform in the presence of transient events such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-3877a2f42d935a23c5c3df0c04a892c6516a1579d91886e60bf716655bd1c298","title":"","text":"As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). 5.6.1. <\/del> 5.7.1. <\/ins> An IETF transport is not tied to a specific Internet path. The set of routers forming a path can and do change with time, this will also"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-947ed7e317028f52ae32b85220b07cc23d7fe1181fe07d19818057440da5b403","title":"","text":"properties of that path can vary, with similar impacts on congestion control 5.7. <\/del> 5.8. <\/ins> Multipath transport protocols permit more than one path to be differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9f465f0e785aa6ef7e2f1ad1960b9a4ea8dd72e23376a8b4a949959163d13185","title":"","text":"to concretely understand and investigate the wealth of proposals in this space. This document is meant to reduce the barriers to entry for new congestion control work. As such, proponents should not interpret these criteria as a checklist of requirements before approaching the IETF. Instead, proponents are encouraged to think about these issues beforehand, and have the willingness to do the work implied by the rest of this document. <\/ins> 2. Following the lead of HighSpeed TCP RFC3649, alternate congestion"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-165245be5adca8b3792e4c600b2ad2f53139edf93a66b771f31756c97f0b149c","title":"","text":"designed congestion control algorithms have the opportunity to improve the state of the art. 3.1.4. <\/del> 3.1.3. <\/ins> When multiple competing flows all using the same alternate congestion control algorithm, the proposal should explore how the capacity is shared among the competing flows. 3.1.5. <\/del> 3.1.4. A great deal of congestion control analysis concerns the steady-state behavior of long flows. However, many internet flows are relatively short-lived. If they never experience a packet loss, they remain in the \"slow start\" mode of operation RFC5681 that features exponential congestion window growth. <\/ins> (TODO: Discuss short and long flows) <\/del> Proposals will consider how new and short-lived flows affect long- lived flows, and vice versa. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-eb8a4e4cc2c6f88ed573153a403dcde95cd66a448a912e1a2ab503d96c5fda98","title":"","text":"5.1. (TODO: Write this section) <\/del> Proposals SHOULD be evaluated under a variety of bottleneck queue disciplines. At a minimum, a proposal should reason about an algorithm's response to various AQMs. Simulation or empirical results are, of course, valuable. Note that evaluation of AQM techniques - as opposed to their impact on specific congestion control proposals - is out of scope of this document. RFC7567 describes design considerations for AQMs. Among the AQM techniques that might have an impact on a congestion control algorithm are FQ-CoDel RFC8290; Proportional Integral Controller Enhanced (PIE) RFC8033; and Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput (L4S) RFC9332. <\/ins> 5.2. The \"Internet of Things\" (IoT) is a broad concept, but for congestion control purposes it is often associated with unique characteristics. IoT nodes might be more constrained in power, CPU, or other parameters than conventional Internet hosts. This might place limits on the complexity of any given algorithm. These power and radio constraints might make the volume of control packets in a given algorithm a key evaluation metric. Furthermore, many IoT applications do not a have a human in the loop, and therefore have weaker latency constraints because they do not relate to a user experience. Extremely low-power links can lead to very low throughput and a low bandwidth- delay product, well below the standard operating range of most Internet flows. 5.3. <\/ins> Satellite links often have delays longer than typical for wired paths RFC2488 and high delay bandwidth products RFC3649. 5.3. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> The proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with non-compliant senders, receivers, or routers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-c50da68b8078dcc48e396ef659973da4a4b3f949325530e2aa361e03de0c2601","title":"","text":"3.2.2. (TODO: Clarify that real time congestion controls are included, with allowances for the poor documentation \/ open source availability of these) <\/del> General-purpose protocols coexist in the Internet with real-time congestion control protocols, which in general have finite throughput requirements (i.e. they do not seek to utilize all available capacity) and more strict latency bounds. RFC8868 provides suggestions for real-time congestion control design and RFC8867 suggests test cases. RFC9392 describes some considerations for the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). This document does not change the informational status of those RFCs. New proposals SHOULD consider coexistence with widely deployed real- time congestion controls. Regrettably, at the time of writing, many algorithms with detailed public specifications are not widely deployed, while many widely deployed real-time congestion controls have incomplete public specifications. To the extent that behavior of widely deployed algorithms is understood, proposals can analyze and simulate the their interaction with those algorithms. To the extent they are not, experiments can be conducted where possible. Note that in many deployments, real-time traffic is directed into distinct queues via Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) or other mechanisms, which substantially reduces the interplay with other traffic. However, proposals cannot assume that this is always the case. <\/ins> 3.2.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-06a8303d9d6a99236308c1a148e6829f40fd157692a8042c9b4340e2a2285975","title":"","text":"5.2. (TODO: Write this section) <\/del> The \"Internet of Things\" (IoT) is a broad concept, but for congestion control purposes it is often associated with unique characteristics. IoT nodes might be more constrained in power, CPU, or other parameters than conventional Internet hosts. This might place limits on the complexity of any given algorithm. These power and radio constraints might make the volume of control packets in a given algorithm a key evaluation metric. Furthermore, many IoT applications do not a have a human in the loop, and therefore have weaker latency constraints because they do not relate to a user experience. Extremely low-power links can lead to very low throughput and a low bandwidth- delay product, well below the standard operating range of most Internet flows. <\/ins> 5.3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-3bddf891bbd5ac3bba6fd92fb1ce7e1e08492e7e2c12fab193373eae36858021","title":"","text":"Controller Enhanced (PIE) RFC8033; and Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput (L4S) RFC9332. Congestion control algorithms that set one of the two Explicit Congestion Transport (ECT) codepoints in the IP header can gain the benefits of receiving Explicit Congestion Notifictaion (ECN) Congestion Experienced (CE) signals from an on-path AQM RFC8087. Use of ECN ?RFC3168,RFC9332 results in requirements for the congestion control algorithm to react when it receives a packet with an ECN-CE marking. This reaction needs to be evaluated to confirm that the algorithm conforms with the requirements of the ECT codepoint that was used. <\/ins> 5.2. The \"Internet of Things\" (IoT) is a broad concept, but for congestion"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-160288f523e904d0c538f18d5ed1696d73d3a5ddc420a802505c9b4695b754bb","title":"","text":"community has gained much more experience with indications of congestion beyond packet loss. Multicast congestion controls are a considerably less mature field of study and are not in scope for this document. However, Section 4 of the UDP Usage Guidelines RFC8085 provide additional guidelines for multicast and broadcast usage of UDP. <\/ins> Multiple congestion control algorithms have been developed outside of the IETF, including at least two that saw large scale deployment: Cubic HRX08 and BBR BBR-draft."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-9bfabb8356170677826b8f1b6bc7b63205a0359d375abd30face5ab60e0910d1","title":"","text":"5.2. An Internet Path can include simple links, where the minimum delay is the propagation delay, and any additional delay can be attributed to link buffering. This cannot be assumed. An internet Path can also include complex subnetworks where the minimum delay changes over various time scales, resulting in a non-stationary minimum delay. This occurs when a subnet changes the forwarding path to optimise capacity, resilience, etc. It could also arise when a subnet uses a capacity management method where the available resource is periodically distributed among the active nodes and where a node might then have to buffer data until an assigned transmission opportunity or when the physical path changes (e.g., when the length of a wireless path changes, or the physical layer changes its mode of operation). Variation also arises when a higher priority diffserv traffic classic prompts the transmission by a lower class. In these cases, the delay varies as a function of external factors and attempting to infer congestion from an increase in the delay results in reduced throughput. The Jitter from variation over short timescales might not be distinguishable similar from other effects. Proposals SHOULD be evaluated to ensure their operation is robust when there is a significant change in the minimum delay. 5.3. <\/ins> The \"Internet of Things\" (IoT) is a broad concept, but for congestion control purposes it is often associated with unique characteristics."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-bfc786b5efd9220949d0f9e95fce81e577063be960c6714b8016ebdebc39916e","title":"","text":"bandwidth- delay product, well below the standard operating range of most Internet flows. 5.3. <\/del> 5.4. <\/ins> Satellite links often have delays longer than typical for wired paths RFC2488 and high delay bandwidth products RFC3649. 5.4. <\/del> 5.5. <\/ins> The proposal should explore how the alternate congestion control mechanism performs with non-compliant senders, receivers, or routers."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-b0b8d02021e2493ae3aabfbaea012aeaf19ea63fc3b286cd5258aadaa2fe5eb0","title":"","text":"routers; misbehaving middleboxes; and the potential use of Quick- Start to attack routers or to tie up available Quick-Start bandwidth. 5.5. <\/del> 5.6. <\/ins> When the proposal relies on explicit signals from the path, the effect of traffic passing through the tunnel - where routers may not be aware of the underlying flow - MUST be considered. 5.6. <\/del> 5.7. <\/ins> RFC4653 discusses the effect of extreme packet reordering. 5.7. <\/del> 5.8. <\/ins> The proposal should consider how the alternate congestion control mechanism would perform in the presence of transient events such as"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-09d983c7e8625da03efcdba81c2ae7d6d672cc00c0f6f5731f3dea16b7ef1b49","title":"","text":"As an example from an Experimental RFC, response to transient events is discussed in Section 9.2 of RFC4782 (Quick-Start). 5.7.1. <\/del> 5.8.1. <\/ins> An IETF transport is not tied to a specific Internet path or type of path. The set of routers that form a path can and do change with"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-55cb884c8b74dbf7cb3bfdf4e491efb573a404a9d6ea4bc0c9cbc7aa165283fa","title":"","text":"traffic sharing a bottleneck), with similar impacts on congestion control. 5.8. <\/del> 5.9. <\/ins> Multipath transport protocols permit more than one path to be differentiated and used by a single connection at the sender. A"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-545f2e5eb97043e4e85323d52ae035fc5f15ae72e1baaa44fad471a34ae974d4","title":"","text":"Abstract The IETF's standard congestion control schemes have been widely shown to be inadequate for various environments (e.g., high-speed networks, wireless technologies such as 3GPP and WiFi, long distance satellite links) and also in conflict with the needed, more isochronous, behaviors of VoIP, gaming, and videoconferencing traffic. Recent research has yielded many alternate congestion control schemes that significantly differ from the IETF's congestion control principles. Using these new congestion control schemes in the global Internet has possible ramifications to both the traffic using the new congestion control and to traffic using the currently standardized congestion control. Therefore, the IETF must proceed with caution when dealing with alternate congestion control proposals. The goal of this document is to provide guidance for considering alternate congestion control algorithms within the IETF. <\/del> There have been proposals to extend or update the standard IETF congestion control schemes. Recent research has yielded many alternate congestion control schemes that significantly differ from the IETF's congestion control principles. Using these new congestion control schemes in the global Internet has possible ramifications to both the traffic using the new congestion control and to traffic using the currently standardized congestion control. Therefore, the IETF must proceed with caution when dealing with alternate congestion control proposals. The goal of this document is to provide guidance for considering alternate congestion control algorithms within the IETF. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a84c5108b8aaec05bf578e79bca80ba3c5f21fd9d210b5334a3cc0d4e8a46d1d","title":"","text":"in 2007 as a Best Current Practice to evaluate new congestion control algorithms as Experimental or Proposed Standard RFCs. The IETF's standard congestion control schemes have been shown to have performance challenges in various environments (e.g., high-speed networks, cellular and WiFi wireless technologies, long distance satellite links) and also for specific traffic workloads (VoIP, gaming, and videoconferencing). <\/ins> In 2007, TCP was the dominant consumer of this work, and proposals were typically discussed in research groups, for example the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG)."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-f285e5aaff4fd588a17a9a72b5d010b384bde4b62f2b456eb8343f4c21198a36","title":"","text":"5.1. Proposals SHOULD be evaluated under a variety of bottleneck queue disciplines. At a minimum, a proposal should reason about an algorithm's response to various AQMs. Simulation or empirical results are, of course, valuable. <\/del> disciplines. The effect of an AQM discipline can be hard to detect by Internet evaluation. At a minimum, a proposal should reason about an algorithm's response to various AQM disciplines. Simulation or empirical results are, of course, valuable. <\/ins> Note that evaluation of AQM techniques - as opposed to their impact on specific congestion control proposals - is out of scope of this"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-a08b8202e95ba36c184901f2284a10483760d10fd2487f0685f9a768a97190ee","title":"","text":"Abstract There have been proposals to extend or update the standard IETF congestion control schemes. Recent research has yielded many alternate congestion control schemes that significantly differ from the IETF's congestion control principles. Using these new congestion control schemes in the global Internet has possible ramifications to both the traffic using the new congestion control and to traffic using the currently standardized congestion control. Therefore, the IETF must proceed with caution when dealing with alternate congestion control proposals. The goal of this document is to provide guidance for considering alternate congestion control algorithms within the IETF. <\/del> Introducing new or modified congestion controllers in the global Internet have possible ramifications to both the traffic using the new congestion controller and to traffic using a standardized congestion controller. Therefore, the IETF must proceed with caution when evaluating alternate congestion control proposals. The goal of this document is to provide guidance for considering standardization of alternate congestion controllers at the IETF. It replaces RFC5033 to reflect changes in the congestion control landscape. <\/ins> 1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-e7b3564efeb44271e1155c796d23978ce77f0c307fcde8e04b96f9a2f3ed65df","title":"","text":"2. Following the lead of HighSpeed TCP RFC3649, alternate congestion control algorithms are expected to be published as \"Experimental\" RFCs, until such time that the community better understands the solution space. Traditionally, the meaning of \"Experimental\" status has varied in its use and interpretation. As part of this document we define two classes of congestion control proposals that can be published with the \"Experimental\" status. The first class includes algorithms that are judged to be safe to deploy for best-effort traffic in the global Internet and further investigated in that environment. The second class includes algorithms that, while promising, are not yet deemed safe enough for widespread deployment as best-effort traffic on the Internet, but are being specified to facilitate investigations in simulation, testbeds, or controlled environments. The second class can also include algorithms where the IETF does not yet have sufficient understanding to decide whether the algorithm is or is not safe for deployment on the Internet. Each alternate congestion control algorithm published is required to include a statement in the abstract indicating whether or not the proposal is considered safe for use on the Internet. Each alternate congestion control algorithm published is also required to include a statement in the abstract describing environments where the protocol is not recommended for deployment. There can be environments where the protocol is deemed _safe_ for use, but it is still is not _recommended_ for use because it does not perform well for the user. <\/del> This document applies to congestion controllers that seek Experimental or Standards Track status. Evaluation of both cases involves the same questions, but with different expectations for both the answers and the degree of certainty it the answers. Congestion controllers without experience of internet-scale deployment SHOULD seek Experimental status until real-world data is able to answer the questions in general-use. Congestion controllers with a record of measured internet- scale deployment MAY directly seek the standards track if the community believes it is safe, and the design is stable, guided by the considerations in general-use. The existence of this data does not waive the other considerations in this document. Algorithms that are designed for special environments (e.g., data centers) and forbidden from use in the general internet would, of course, seek real-world data for those environments instead. Experimental specifications SHOULD NOT be deployed as a default. They SHOULD only be deployed in situations where they are being actively measured, and where it is possible to deactivate if there are signs of pathological behavior. Each alternate congestion controller published is required to include a statement in the abstract indicating whether or not there is IETF consensus that the proposal is considered safe for use on the Internet. Each alternate congestion controller published is also required to include a statement in the abstract describing environments where the protocol is not recommended for deployment. There can be environments where the controller is deemed _safe_ for use, but it is still is not _recommended_ for use because it does not perform well for the user. <\/ins> As examples of such statements, RFC3649 specifying HighSpeed TCP includes a statement in the abstract stating that the proposal is"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-6ee71225b0edaf15f37ef93acb5a8ab7acde6b5299a51c46abddf9ac0d610b73","title":"","text":"attempting to use Quick-Start. The Quick-Start method is discussed as an example in RFC9049. For authors of alternate congestion control schemes who are not ready to bring their congestion control mechanisms to the IETF for standardization (either as Experimental or as Proposed Standard), one possibility would be to submit an internet-draft that documents the alternate congestion control mechanism for the benefit of the IETF and IRTF communities. This is particularly encouraged in order to ensure algorithm specifications are widely disseminated to facilitate further research. Such an internet-draft could also be considered for publication as an Informational RFC, as a first step in the process towards standardization. Such a document would be expected to carry an explicit warning against using the scheme in the global Internet. Note: we are not changing the RFC publication process for non-IETF produced documents (e.g., those from the IRTF or Independent Submissions via the RFC-Editor). However, we would hope the guidelines in this document inform the IESG as they consider whether to add a note to such documents. <\/del> Though out of scope of this document, congestion controller proponents may also seek publication of an Informational or Experimental RFC via the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). In general, these proposals are expected to be less mature than ones that follow the procedures in this document. Documentation of deployed congestion controllers that cannot be changed by IETF or IRTF review are invited to publish as an Informational RFC via the Independent Stream Editor (ISE). <\/ins> 3."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-053c3d8797aa9683484d5156e71e4d0be5f7387f320090c47a64067189744e6b","title":"","text":"4.1. (TODO: Describe properties of wired networks.) Proposals should be investigated for robust performance with different queueing mechanisms in the routers, especially Random Early Detection (RED) FJ03 and Drop-Tail. This evaluation is often not included in the internet-draft itself, but in related papers cited in the draft. <\/del> Wired networks are characterized by extremely low rates of packet loss except for those due to queue drops. They tend to have stable aggregate bandwidth, usually higher than other types of links, and low non-queueing delay. Because the properties are relatively simple, wired links are typically used as a \"baseline\" case even if they are not always the bottleneck link in the modern Internet. <\/ins> 4.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-94aef7a11df34fdfe7a0b5a43567fd8a22865e26c90c4d650f61b2aabab1b680","title":"","text":"widely deploying a congestion control algorithm over the Internet, but the examples of Cubic and BBR teach us that deployment of new algorithms is not in fact gated by publication of the algorithm as an RFC. Nevertheless, guidelines are important, if only to remind potential inventors and developers of the multiple facets of the congestion control problem. <\/del> RFC. Nevertheless, specifying congestion control algorithms has a number of advantages: A specification can help implementers, operators, and other interested parties to develop a shared understanding of how the algorithm works and how it is expected to behave in various different scenarios or configurations. A specification can help potential contributors understand the algorithm, which can make it easier for them to suggest improvements and\/or identify limitations. Further, the specification can help multiple contributors align on a consensus change to the algorithm. A specification that is accessible to anyone circumvents the issue that some implementors may be unable to read open source reference implementations due to the constraints of some open source licenses. Beyond helping develop specific algorithm proposals, guidelines can also serve as a reminder to potential inventors and developers of the multiple facets of the congestion control problem. <\/ins> The evaluation guidelines in this document are intended to be consistent with the congestion control principles from RFC2914 of"} +{"_id":"doc-en-rfc5033bis-e4d75ea9e5d7405a1f7d2d8947273fd2ff12bd9ce00102abce0e345921fcd3e5","title":"","text":"deployed congestion control algorithms. In contexts where differing congestion control algorithms are used, it is important to understand whether a proposal can induce more harm to flows sharing a bottleneck than for the existing defined methods. The measure of harm is not restricted to the equality of capacity, but ought also to consider metrics such as the latency introduced, or an increase in packet loss. An evaluation must assess the potential to cause starvation, including assurance that a loss of all feedback (e.g., detected by expiry of a retransmission time out) results in backoff. <\/del> it is important to understand whether a proposal could result in more harm than previously defined algorithms to flows sharing a common bottleneck. The measure of harm is not restricted to the equality of capacity, but ought also to consider metrics such as the latency introduced, or an increase in packet loss. An evaluation must assess the potential to cause starvation, including assurance that a loss of all feedback (e.g., detected by expiry of a retransmission time out) results in backoff. <\/ins> 3.2.1."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-41ce5924bb9c14d2b5dc7d1239943cbd049e51a8960b098f6381e066c5f4f5c5","title":"","text":"3.1. The catalog object MUST have a track ID of 0. <\/del> Per MoQTransport sect X.X, the catalog object MUST have a track name of \"catalog\". <\/ins> Each catalog object MUST be independent of other catalog objects and MUST carry a unqiue group sequence number (see MoQTransport, Sect X.X). The first catalog published MUST have a group sequence number of 0. Every catalog object MUST have an object sequence number of 0 and there MUST be only one object per catalog group. A catalog track object SHOULD be published only when the availability of tracks changes. <\/del> A catalog object MAY be independent of other catalog objects or it MAY represent a delta update of a prior catalog object. The first catalog object published within a new group MUST be independent. A catalog object SHOULD only be published only when the availability of tracks changes. <\/ins> The format of the CATALOG object payload, as defined by MoQTransport Sect X.X, is as follows: <\/del> The format of the CATALOG object payload is as follows: <\/ins> Media format type: this MUST hold the value 0x001 (see IANA). This value MUST NOT be encrypted. <\/ins> Version: this MUST be the version of WMF to which the media packaging and catalog serialization conforms. Track count: The number of tracks described by the catalog. A catalog describing 0 tracks is a signal to the WMF client that the publishing session is complete. Each track is described by a track descriptor with the format: Track ID: Within WMF, track IDs are numeric integers. Track IDs SHOULD start at 0 and SHOULD increment by 1 for each additional track. Track IDs MUST never be reused. If a track is published and then unpublished, it must be allocated a new track ID before it is re-published. Init payload: The init payload in a track descriptor MUST consist of a File Type Box (ftyp) followed by a Movie Box (moov). This Movie Box (moov) consists of Movie Header Boxes (mvhd), Track Header Boxes (tkhd), Track Boxes (trak), followed by a final Movie Extends Box (mvex). These boxes MUST NOT contain any samples and MUST have a duration of zero. A Common Media Application Format Header CMAF meets all these requirements. <\/del> Parent object ID: 0 if this object represents an independent catalog or the parent object ID if this represents a delta update. Track change count: The number of track changes described by the catalog. A catalog update describing 0 tracks, or deleting all existing tracks, SHALL be interpreted by the WMF client to mean that the publishing session is complete. A WMF client SHOULD process all changes before making a subscription selection. Each track change is described by a track change descriptor with the format: Track name length: the length of track name field Track name: the UTF-8 encoded track name. Within MoQTransport track names are strings. Track names MUST never be reused. If a track is published and then unpublished, it must be allocated a new track name before it is re-published. A catalog MUST NOT reference itself i.e the the track name must not be \"catalog\". Operation: a binary flag. 1 if the track is being added and 0 if it is being deleted. A publisher MUST NOT signal deletion of a track that has not been previously added. Change payload: depends upon the value of the operation flag. If the operation is a 1 (add), then it SHALL hold an Initialization Header. If the operation is 0 (delete), then it SHALL hold a Deletion Header. Init length: the length of the init payload Init payload: The init payload MUST consist of a File Type Box (ftyp) followed by a Movie Box (moov). This Movie Box (moov) consists of Movie Header Boxes (mvhd), Track Header Boxes (tkhd), Track Boxes (trak), followed by a final Movie Extends Box (mvex). These boxes MUST NOT contain any samples and MUST have a duration of zero. A Common Media Application Format Header CMAF meets all these requirements. Last group: holds the last MoQTransport Group sequence number published under that track name. Last object: holds the last MoQTransport Object sequence number published under that track name. <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-a0d3edb95a26a86bd81531eb2140aaa9c0fde7c5cdafebbfc535b17462f64bab","title":"","text":"WARP Streaming Format draft-law-moq-warpmedia-latest <\/del> draft-law-moq-warpstreamingformat-latest <\/ins> Abstract"} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-ea59ee3c5e33dec6084b5bfdc7ad3a48603f5179923c25e63d5a570631ae898d","title":"","text":"3. Each codec bitstream MUST be packaged in to a sequence of Objects within a separate track. <\/del> WARP delivers CMAF-packaged media bitstreams. This specification references CMAFpackaging to define how CMAF packaged bitstreams are mapped to MoQTransport groups and objects. <\/ins> Media tracks SHOULD be media-time aligned. CMAF CMAF Aligned Switching Sets meet this requirement. A receiver SHOULD be able to cleanly switch between media tracks at group boundaries. <\/del> Both CMAF Object mappings CMAFpackaging Section 4 are supported and a content producer may use either. To identify to consumers which object mapping mode is being used for a given Track, a new track field is defined as per table 1. <\/ins> Each group MUST be independently decodeable. Assigning a new group ID to each CMAF Fragment (see CMAF Sect 6.6.1) meets this requirement. <\/del> 3.1. The packaging mode value is defined by Table 2. 3.2. WARP Tracks MAY be time-aligned. Those that are, are subject to the following requirements: Time-aligned tracks MUST be advertised in the catalog as belonging to a common render group. The presentation time of the first media sample contained within the first MOQT Object of each equally numbered MOQT Group MUST be identical. A consequence of this restriction is that a WARP receiver SHOULD be able to cleanly switch between time-aligned media tracks at group boundaries. 3.3. The catalog and media object payloads MAY be encrypted. Common Encryption CENC with 'cbcs' mode (AES CBC with pattern encryption) is the RECOMMENDED encryption method. ToDo - details of how keys are exchanged and license servers signaled. May be best to extend catalog spec to allow the specification of content protection schema, along with any pssh or protection initialization data. <\/ins> 4."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-1604c07a6fa623cc0d98a2e2ce661ca6adf0a60259b75f58dcb7c1e47b21d163","title":"","text":"Each catalog update MUST be mapped to a discreet moq-transport object. 4.1. Object Delivery Order MUST match the Object sequence number. The media object payload: MUST consist of a Segment Type Box (styp) followed by any number of media fragments. Each media fragment consists of a Movie Fragment Box (moof) followed by a Media Data Box (mdat). The Media Fragment Box (moof) MUST contain a Movie Fragment Header Box (mfhd) and Track Box (trak) with a Track ID (\"track_ID\") matching a Track Box in the initialization fragment. MUST contain a single ISOBMFF track. MUST contain media content encoded in decode order. This implies an increasing decoding time stamp (DTS). MAY contain any number of frames\/samples. MAY have gaps between frames\/samples. MAY overlap with other objects. This means timestamps may be interleaved between objects. Two options are RECOMMENDED for packaging CMAF content into WARP media objects: the first is to package a complete CMAF Fragment (see CMAF sect 6.6.1) into a single object within each group. This results in there being a single GOP (Group of Pictures) in the media object and a single media object per group. The second is to package a CMAF chunk (see CMAF sect 6.6.5), in which the mdat holds a single frame of video, or sample of audio, into each object and to assign a unique group ID to each fragment. This approach is RECOMMENDED to minimize latency. <\/del> 5. A WARP publisher MUST publish a catalog track object before publishing any media track objects. At the completion of a session, a publisher should publish a catalog object with track count of 0. This SHOULD be interpreted by receivers that the publish session is complete. <\/del> The MOQT Groups and MOQT Objects need to be mapped to moq-transport Streams. Irrespective of the packagingmode in place, each MOQT Object MUST be mapped to a new moq-transport Stream. <\/ins> 6. The catalog and media object payloads MAY be encrypted. Common Encryption CENC with 'cbcs' mode (AES CBC with pattern encryption) is the RECOMMENDED encryption method. <\/del> A WARP publisher MUST publish a catalog track object before publishing any media track objects. <\/ins> ToDo - details of how keys are exchanged and license servers signalled. <\/del> At the completion of a session, a publisher MUST publish a catalog update that removes all currently active tracks. This action SHOULD be interpreted by receivers to mean that the publish session is complete. <\/ins> 7."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-e4538a1134d8ade18ff26627e18030531a238cf384ccd16301d77832075be621","title":"","text":"6. The timeline track provides data about the previously published groups and their relationship to wallclock time, media time and associated timed-metadata. Timeline tracks allow players to seek to precise points behind the live head in a live broadcast, or for random access in a VOD asset. A timeline track may also be used to insert events at media times which do not correlate with Object boundaries. Timeline tracks are optional. Multiple timeline tracks MAY exist inside a catalog. 6.1. The payload of a timeline track is a UTF-8 encoded CSV text file. This payload is formatted according to RFC4180 \"Common Format and MIME Type for Comma-Separated Values (CSV)\" Files RFC4180. The separator is a comma and each line is separated by a carriage return. The mime-type of a timeline track MUST be specified as \"text\/csv\" in the catalog. Each timeline track begins with a header row of MEDIA_PTS,GROUP_ID,OBJECT_ID,WALLCLOCK,METADATA. This row defines the 5 columns of data within each record. MEDIA_PTS: a media timestamp rounded to the nearest millisecond. This entry MUST not be empty. If the Object ID entry is present, then this value MUST match the media presentation timestamp of the first media sample in the referenced Object. GROUP_ID: the MOQT Group ID. This entry MAY be empty. OBJECT_ID: the MOQT Object ID. This entry MAY be empty. WALLCLOCK: the wallclock time at which the media was encoded, expressed as the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since January 1, 1970 (midnight UTC\/GMT). For VOD assets, or if the wallclock time is not known, the value SHOULD be 0. METADATA: a flexible field holding arbitrary string metadata. This field may be empty. If not empty, it MUST be enclosed in double quotes. A double-quote appearing inside this field MUST be escaped by preceding it with another double quote. 6.2. A timeline track MUST carry a 'type' identifier in the Catalog with a value of \"timeline\". A timeline track MUST carry a 'dependencies' attribute which contains an array of all track names to which the timeline track applies. 6.3. The publisher MUST publish a complete timeline in the first MOQT Object of each MOQT Group. The publisher MAY publish incremental updates in the second and subsequent Objects within each GROUP. Incremental updates only contain timeline events since the last timeline Object. Group duration SHOULD not exceed 30 seconds. 7. <\/ins> A WARP publisher MUST publish a catalog track object before publishing any media track objects."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-59ac9a28c284c17cd5cfb26de109360969dbfa13dcf4957d7ac877414ab522d7","title":"","text":"be interpreted by receivers to mean that the publish session is complete. 7. <\/del> 8. <\/ins> ToDo 8. <\/del> 9. <\/ins> This document creates a new entry in the \"MoQ Streaming Format\" Registry (see MoQTransport Sect 8). The type value is 0x001, the"} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-4d2ae5292fe2ca66f1d4b88c7c55a159c97f9486097f81798206ced6a78a2b60","title":"","text":"1. WARP Streaming Format (WARP) is a media format designed to deliver CMAF CMAF compliant media content over Media Over QUIC Transport (MOQT) MoQTransport. WARP works by fragmenting the bitstream into objects that can be independently transmitted. WARP leverages a simple prioritization strategy of assigning newer content a higher delivery order, allowing intermediaries to drop older data, and video over audio, in the face of congestion. Either complete Groups of Pictures (GOPS) ISOBMFF or individual frames are mapped to MoQTransport Objects. WARP is targeted at interactive levels of live latency. <\/del> CMAF CMAF and LOC LOC compliant media content over Media Over QUIC Transport (MOQT) MoQTransport. WARP works by fragmenting the bitstream into objects that can be independently transmitted. WARP leverages the Common Catalog Format COMMON-CATALOG-FORMAT to describe the output of the original publisher. WARP specifies how content should be packaged and signaled, defines how the catalog communicates the content, specifies prioritization strategies for real-time and workflows for beginning and terminating broadcasts. WARP also details how end-subscribers may perform adaptive bitrate switching. WARP is targeted at real-time and interactive levels of live latency. <\/ins> This document describes version 1 of the streaming format."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-76e03831cbfd6656efc000c58b53736c929141b740f1958f4531e8c8a408d8e9","title":"","text":"3. WARP delivers CMAF-packaged media bitstreams. This specification references CMAFpackaging to define how CMAF packaged bitstreams are mapped to MoQTransport groups and objects. Both CMAF Object mappings CMAFpackaging Section 4 are supported and a content producer may use either. To identify to consumers which object mapping mode is being used for a given Track, a new track field is defined as per table 1. <\/del> WARP delivers CMAF CMAF and LOC LOC packaged media bitstreams. Either format may be used in a broadcast, or they may be intermixed between tracks. The packaging format of a track, once declared, MUST remain constant. <\/ins> 3.1. The packaging mode value is defined by Table 2. <\/del> This specification references CMAFpackaging to define how CMAF packaged bitstreams are mapped to MoQTransport groups and objects. Both CMAF Object mappings CMAFpackaging Section 4 are supported and a content producer may use either. To identify to clients which object mapping mode is being used for a given Track, the catalog \"packaging\" field MUST use one of the values defined in Table 1. The values are case-sensitive. Table 1 provides values for the catalog \"packaging\" field with CMAF packaging. <\/ins> 3.2. This specification references Low Overhead Container (LOC) LOC to define how audio and video content is packaged. With this packaging mode, each EncodedAudioChunk or EncodedVideoChunk sample is placed in a separate MOQT Object. Samples that belong to the same Group of Pictures (GOP) MUST be placed within the same MOQT Group. Table 2 provides values for the catalog \"packaging\" field with LOC packaging. 3.3. <\/ins> WARP Tracks MAY be time-aligned. Those that are, are subject to the following requirements:"} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-9673cf9d50af52012af2aacff45019780e59609887702b305f45caa16a3b4b2a","title":"","text":"able to cleanly switch between time-aligned media tracks at group boundaries. 3.3. <\/del> 3.4. <\/ins> The catalog and media object payloads MAY be encrypted. Common Encryption CENC with 'cbcs' mode (AES CBC with pattern encryption) is the RECOMMENDED encryption method. <\/del> the RECOMMENDED encryption method for CMAF packaged content. <\/ins> ToDo - details of how keys are exchanged and license servers signaled. May be best to extend catalog spec to allow the specification of content protection schema, along with any pssh or protection initialization data. ToDo - content protection for LOC-packaged content. <\/ins> 4. WARP uses the Common Catalog Format {[COMMON-CATALOG-FORMAT}} to"} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-cc32c461151ce973fa4d8159ba1a94320897077fbca1f8ce45840636aedc18b7","title":"","text":"catalog object SHOULD only be published only when the availability of tracks changes. Each catalog update MUST be mapped to a discreet moq-transport object. <\/del> Each catalog update MUST be mapped to a discreet MOQT Object. <\/ins> 5. The MOQT Groups and MOQT Objects need to be mapped to moq-transport Streams. Irrespective of the packagingmode in place, each MOQT Object MUST be mapped to a new moq-transport Stream. <\/del> The MOQT Groups and MOQT Objects need to be mapped to MOQT Streams. Irrespective of the mediapackaging in place, each MOQT Object MUST be mapped to a new MOQT Stream. <\/ins> 6."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-d9c6c86203ec781e49805e659109c8f622f1461e2394e671fb88c192294a67a6","title":"","text":"a separate MOQT Object. Samples that belong to the same Group of Pictures (GOP) MUST be placed within the same MOQT Group. Table 2 provides values for the catalog \"packaging\" field with LOC packaging. <\/del> When LOC packaging is used for a track, the catalog packaging attribute (packaging) MUST be present and it MUST be populated with a value of \"loc\". <\/ins> 3.2."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-32f58424d10419954e5f28ad60269becb7d70cd104f9a2adb8b6b796b1b79a40","title":"","text":"publishers for advertising their output and for subscribers in consuming that output. The payload of the Catalog object is opaque to Relays and can be end-to-end encrypted. The Catalog provides the names and namespaces of the tracks being produced, along with the relationship between tracks, properties of the tracks that consumers may use for selection and any relevant initialization data. <\/del> names and namespaces of the tracks being produced, along with therelationship between tracks, properties of the tracks that consumers may use for selection and any relevant initialization data. <\/ins> The catalog track MUST have a case-sensitive Track Name of \"catalog\"."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-73a101543ec60de6293476a54424e3f86303682679d9da6edf8546a1cce5f8c3","title":"","text":"Location: R Required: Optional JSON Type: Boolean A boolean that if true indicates that the publisher MAY issue <\/del> A Boolean that if true indicates that the publisher MAY issue <\/ins> incremental (delta) updates - see patch. If false or absent, then the publisher gaurantees that they will NOT issue any incremental <\/del> the publisher guarantees that they will NOT issue any incremental <\/ins> updates and that any future updates to the catalog will be independent. The default value is false. This field MUST be present if its value is true, but may be omitted if the value is false."} +{"_id":"doc-en-warp-streaming-format-f5272b0d82a90b52876498b3f33a25ca38cee842919a2261ec6c5c220a54ac12","title":"","text":"the catalog. Each timeline track begins with a header row of MEDIA_PTS,GROUP_ID,OBJECT_ID,WALLCLOCK,METADATA. This row defines <\/del> MEDIA_PTS,GROUP_ID,OBJECT_ID, WALLCLOCK,METADATA. This row defines <\/ins> the 5 columns of data within each record. MEDIA_PTS: a media timestamp rounded to the nearest millisecond."}