\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Earl Dean BOND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-06\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.\nEarl Dean Bond appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence. Because we conclude that the district court erred in barring Bond’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.\nI. FACTS\nA jury convicted Bond of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE); conspiring to distribute cocaine and more than fifty kilograms of marijuana; and attempting to possess with the intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana. He appealed, and we affirmed. See United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir.1988). As a result of his conviction and sentence, Bond forfeited approximately $128,000 discovered in a brown suitcase that was seized by drug enforcement agents from a hotel room in Chesterfield, Missouri. That seizure and the admission of the money into evidence at his trial are the focal points of Bond’s section 2255 motion and this appeal. Bond contends that agents seized the suitcase pursuant to an invalid search warrant, which was subsequently quashed by a state court judge. Conceding that the warrant was invalid, the government maintained at Bond’s trial that the search and seizure were nonetheless justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313, 1315 (7th Cir.1993).\nBond’s section 2255 motion focuses primarily on the fact that his trial counsel did not move to suppress the allegedly improper evidence until the trial was well under way. The district court found the motion untimely and admitted the money into evidence. Bond also claims that his trial counsel should have made an offer of proof as to why suppression would have been appropriate.\nAt a hearing on the section 2255 motion, Robert Ciuffa, an attorney who represented Bond in Missouri state court, testified that he had convinced a state court judge to quash the warrant pursuant to which Bond’s bag had been seized and to order that the suitcase and money be returned to Bond. Ciuffa recalled that at the state hearing, an Assistant United States Attorney had not disputed Bond’s contention that the suitcase had been seized pursuant to the search warrant alone. After the state judge quashed the warrant, Ciuffa obtained the suitcase and money from the St. Louis County Police Department. But before long, federal drug enforcement agents seized the items from Ciuffa without a warrant and without arresting Bond. Bond had not yet been indicted on federal charges at that time.\nBond also testified at the section 2255 hearing. Bond said that two months prior to trial, he had told his trial attorney about the seizure of the suitcase from the hotel room, explaining that he “felt that the Government was going to use that as part of [its] evidence .... ” (Dec. 19, 1991 Tr. at 19.) He had informed his new counsel that Ciuffa had been successful in quashing the warrant and that Ciuffa “had all the records and that he should be contacted to help us on a suppression motion.” (Id.) According to Bond, he and his trial counsel had discussed the filing of a motion to suppress “on numerous occasions,” and his attorney had “said that he would contact Mr. Ciuffa and get all the records and make arrangements to file a motion to suppress.” (Id. at 19-20.) Finally, Bond testified that he had asked his counsel about the motion to suppress on the first day of his trial, and counsel had told him “that it had been filed but it had been denied.” (Id.)\nIn fact, Bond’s attorney had never filed a motion to suppress. Instead, he raised the issue for the first time during the third week of trial, when he told the district court that the money had been seized by drug enforcement agents and that it should be excluded from evidence because its admission would violate both the Missouri and United States Constitutions. The exchange that then took place between the district court, Bond’s trial attorney, and the government attorney seemingly contradicts Bond’s account inasmuch as it suggests that his trial counsel had been unaware until, at the earliest, the week before Bond’s trial that the search warrant had been quashed:\n[Bond’s Counsel]: That document [the order quashing the search warrant] wasn’t given to me. It was laying out here in the courtroom Monday when we started to pick the jury. Quite frankly, I didn’t catch it. I don’t see much problem with stopping the evidence now regarding it, but I do think that as long as it’s been declared, the search and seizure were declared unconstitutional by a recognized Court, that it shouldn’t proceed.\nMe. Meekel; ... [I]n regards to the material that [counsel] has, we talked the week before trial about that material, and I told him about the suppression of it over in St. Louis, and we met in my office, and he didn’t have enough time to stay, and I said I would get it to him as quickly as I could, the additional copies of documents that had not been provided, as far as I could tell, up to that time. We copied those and I laid them out here for everybody the morning that we picked the jury, Monday, and that’s correct, but there was discussion about it before that time. As to, and there is a search warrant involved in what happened with DEA that was never in fact executed as far as I can tell, but which was returned and the money listed as what was seized.... There was a state court judge that ordered that money returned. It was returned to Mr. Bond’s attorney at that time, and reseized immediately by DEA pursuant to the arrest that they effected, and that’s what they did, as my evidence would show, they arrested them on that date, went down, printed them, and everything else and then they were released, per our instructions, for future indictment. Our theory is that that was, that was seized pursuant to the arrest.\nThe Court: The second arrest.\nMr. Merkel: The arrest occurred at the time that they were armed with a certain warrant. They had a search warrant in them back pocket which they did not use, but they made a return on it....\nThe Court: They seized the money after they had given it back to them.\nMr. . Merkel: It has been suppressed. I don’t think that that’s binding on this Court. Number one, I think that’s a question that can still be answered here. Number two, this is in the form, I think, of a motion to suppress, and I think it’s awfully late in the game to be raising that question. I mean, that’s a pretrial motion, as I understand it, under Rule 12. [Bond’s Counsel]: It would be awful tough to have done that when you get the document in and of itself on the day that the trial begins. As far as the discussion the week before that, he may have mentioned it.... There was an awful lot of talking going on with a lot of people. But at the same time, but I think that once a court of competent jurisdiction has found that evidence to be suppressed and that was it was illegally seized—\nThe Court: Here is what I have a problem with, they seized it, and it was suppressed, then they seized it again. Well, the second seizure has never been suppressed.\n* * * * * *\nThe Court: I am going to leave it like it is. Let’s go.\n(Trial Tr. at 449-51, Bond App. at 11-13.)\nBond ultimately was convicted, and he retained new counsel on appeal. Bond testified at the section 2255 hearing that he discussed with appellate counsel the possibility of raising the suppression issue on appeal and that he never instructed counsel to abandon the issue. (Dec. 19, 1991 Tr. at 22.) Nonetheless, his appellate counsel did not raise the ineffectiveness of counsel claim Bond now pursues or the related claims that follow from it. Instead, Bond’s direct appeal challenged only the CCE conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, and the sufficiency of the CCE count in the indictment. We rejected these arguments and affirmed Bond’s conviction. See Bond, 847 F.2d at 1236-40.\nBond’s section 2255 motion advances essentially the same arguments he raised on direct appeal, but on different factual grounds that focus on the cocaine charges. The linchpin of his motion is the new claim that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel failed to keep from the jury evidence purportedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA defendant may challenge his conviction under section 2255 on a ground not raised on direct appeal only by showing: (1) both good cause for his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the newly-asserted errors (see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); or (2) that the district court’s refusal to consider the issue on procedural grounds would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667-68, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). The district court dismissed Bond’s motion, finding no cause for his failure to raise the issues on direct appeal.\nOne possible cause for a movant’s failure to raise the ineffectiveness issue on direct appeal may be that appellate counsel were themselves ineffective. See Velarde v. United States, 972 F.2d 826, 827 (7th Cir.1992). For instance, appellate counsel may be “constitutionally deficient in omitting a dead-bang winner even while zealously pressing other strong (but unsuccessful) claims.” Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1989). That “dead-bang winner” could be the argument that trial counsel made errors so serious that his representation fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Ineffectiveness compounded by ineffectiveness in this way would leave a section 2255 motion as the only viable means for a defendant to seek relief from the errors of his trial lawyer.\nTo be sure, omitting a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal might be foolhardy — and possibly itself ineffective — if the argument is a “dead-bang winner.” But raising the issue on direct appeal presents its own perils because the argument must rest solely on the trial court record, which often offers little insight into counsel’s decision-making process. See United States v. Penass, 997 F.2d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991). Thus, as we observed in United States v. Davenport, 986 F.2d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir.1993), “a defendant who presents an ineffective-assistance claim for the first time on direct appeal has little to gain and everything to lose.” Ineffective assistance claims almost always fail on direct appeal because we grant every indulgence “to the possibility that a seeming lapse or error by defense counsel was in fact a tactical move, flawed only in hindsight.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 417-18; see also Penass, 997 F.2d at 1229. In order to overcome this presumption of effective assistance, a criminal defendant often must supplement the record with extrinsic evidence that illuminates the attorney’s errors. Otherwise, “counsel’s apparent pratfalls [are] presumed to be failed stratagems rather than professional malpractice.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418. For that reason, a defendant who must supplement the trial record to support his ineffectiveness claim “will be well advised to wait till the postconviction stage and will be safe in doing so.” Id. at 419; see also Davenport, 986 F.2d at 1050. If the defendant has no extrinsic evidence that would support his claim, however, then Taglia requires that he raise the claim on direct appeal or lose it, for a defendant “must make his ineffective assistance claim at the earliest feasible opportunity.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418-19. Only if there is a need to embellish the picture of trial counsel’s performance with extrinsic evidence will we excuse the failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Id.; see also Davenport, 986 F.2d at 1050.\nHere, the district court found that Bond’s ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim was barred because it was not raised on direct appeal: “Because the petitioner’s attorney on his direct appeal was not his trial counsel, he is barred from raising his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for the first time on post-conviction review.” United States v. Bond, No. 91 C 637, slip op. at 5 (S.D.Ill. Aug. 27,1992). As support for its conclusion, the district court relied on Velarde, where we observed that “[b]ecause Velarde’s attorney on direct appeal was also his trial counsel, he is not barred from raising his ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim for the first time on post-conviction review.” 972 F.2d at 827; see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418. Yet it does not follow from Velarde and Taglia that if trial and appellate counsel were different, an ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim is necessarily barred if not raised on direct review. In that circumstance, we look instead to whether the claim is based on evidence outside the trial record or whether the ineffectiveness is apparent from the trial record or from evidence that is a matter of public record. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418.\nBond argues that he failed to advance his ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal because he needed to supplement the trial record. At the hearing, the district court heard evidence on two matters that are beyond the scope of the trial record: (1) that Bond’s trial attorney was being investigated for possible disciplinary violations at the time of Bond’s trial; and (2) that Bond had notified his counsel before trial of the search warrant issue (which was itself further developed at the section 2255 hearing) and that Bond’s counsel had lied to him about filing the motion to suppress. The district court apparently believed that this evidence was not relevant to Bond’s claims because it found that “[t]he trial record reveals all of the grounds currently alleged by the petitioner in his 2255 motion, including the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel.” Bond, No. 91 CV 637, slip op. at 5. We disagree and therefore find that Bond did not lose his ineffective assistance claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal.\nA. Disciplinary Proceedings\nBond contends that an investigation of his trial attorney by the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”) distracted his counsel so profoundly that he “prepared and tried [the] case beneath a Sword of Damocles.” (Bond’s Br. at 15.) Bond maintains that his counsel was scheduled for an ARDC interview on disciplinary charges at the same time that he was defending Bond at trial and that the coincidence of the preliminary disciplinary proceeding with Bond’s trial led to substandard representation. The fact of the disciplinary proceeding was not disclosed by the trial record and could be brought to the district court’s attention only through the submission of supplemental evidence. Because we find that investigation possibly relevant to the ineffectiveness claim, Bond was justified in waiting until the postconviction stage to raise the issue. Yet, because Bond presented no evidence at the section 2255 hearing to establish in what way the incipient disciplinary action affected his counsel so as to deprive Bond of effective representation under the Sixth Amendment, the extrinsic evidence relating to the ARDC investigation adds nothing to his claim.\nCourts consistently have declined to adopt a per se rule that ineffective assistance always results when a disciplinary action is pending against the defendant’s attorney. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a per se rule should be applied only when it “will achieve the correct result in almost all cases” and not “when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result most of the time.” Coleman v. Thompson, - U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2558, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). More to the point, the Court has held that the “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel” under Strickland. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 993, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). Of course, Nix involved an alleged breach of ethics in the course of counsel’s representation of the defendant himself, whereas the ARDC investigation of Bond’s trial counsel related to a separate matter. But we previously have rejected a per se rule in that context as well. In United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851-52 (7th Cir.1991), for example, we declined to adopt a per se rule of ineffectiveness when an attorney’s license was suspended after a defendant’s trial due to his neglect of other clients’ legal matters. We instead required the defendant to show “actual errors and omissions by counsel that prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 852. We similarly have found that representation by an attorney suspended from the state bar for nonpayment of dues at the time of a defendant’s trial did not necessarily violate the Sixth Amendment. Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668, 670 (7th Cir.1991).\nOther circuits similarly have refused to find per se ineffectiveness when an attorney has been suspended or disbarred, or when he has performed under other professional or personal duress. The sole exception that has been recognized is when a representative, unbeknownst to his client, has never been admitted to the practice of law in any state, either because he has never applied for admission or because he has been denied admission for a reason related to legal ability. See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.1983); see also Reese, 926 F.2d at 670; United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599-600 (9th Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Because Bond’s attorney was a member of the Illinois bar before and during Bond’s trial, this case is not akin to those in which courts have applied a per se rule of ineffective assistance, and we decline to do so here. Rather, to make out an ineffectiveness claim, Bond must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by an actual error or omission that fell below the range of reasonable, professional, and conscientious representation. See Williams, 934 F.2d at 852. The ARDC investigation is only relevant to that claim if Bond could link an error or omission of his trial counsel to the pending investigation. He made no attempt to do so here. Thus, although Bond established cause for failing to raise on direct appeal an ineffectiveness claim based in part on the disciplinary investigation, he established no actual prejudice from the ARDC investigation of his trial counsel. See Frady, 456 U.S.-at 168, 102 S.Ct. at 1594; see also supra, at 634-35. On remand, the district court need not provide Bond another opportunity to establish prejudice, and it therefore need not consider the ARDC matter further. That aspect of Bond’s ineffectiveness claim fails.\nB. Motion to Suppress\nThe extrinsic evidence pertaining to the suppression issue, however, provides a stronger basis for Bond’s ineffective assistance claim. Bond argues that appellate counsel could not have raised this issue in the earlier appeal because the record of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was not fully developed. Although the district court disagreed, we find that Bond was justified in bypassing the issue on direct appeal in order to supplement the record for post-conviction review. In other words, we think Bond’s extrinsic evidence was relevant to whether his Sixth Amendment rights were violated and that the district court should have considered the claim on its merits.\nConsidered in isolation, the colloquy about whether the money should be suppressed that occurred during the third week of trial (see supra, at 633-34) might suggest that Bond’s counsel was unprepared, disorganized, and ultimately ineffective in failing to either pursue the matter earlier or make an offer of proof as to why suppression was appropriate. Despite the government’s rather charitable characterization, trial counsel’s belated attempt to exclude the evidence hardly seems an intentional trial tactic enabling him to argue later that the suitcase did not belong to Bond. That aside, it is unlikely that we would have found that counsel’s performance was unreasonable from the trial transcript alone. The district court’s finding to the contrary notwithstanding, more was needed for Bond to attempt to establish ineffective assistance. For example, without Ciuffa’s testimony relating to the circumstances of the state court hearing and Bond’s representation that he had made trial counsel aware of those circumstances and that counsel himself recognized the need for a suppression motion, we might presume a tactical decision or failed strategy rather than professional malpractice. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 417-18. Bond’s extrinsic evidence is aimed at rebutting that presumption.\nWe do not decide today whether the supplemental evidence Bond offered establishes that his trial counsel was ineffective. We hold only that Bond did not default this claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The evidence adduced at the section 2255 hearing adds to Bond’s claim the possibility that his counsel had knowledge of but failed to investigate the warrant issue and that he may have lied to Bond about having filed a motion to suppress. Of course, this is only Bond’s take on events, and because the district court found a procedural default, it never assessed his credibility. Moreover, Bond’s trial counsel did not testify at the hearing and did not submit an affidavit to either confirm or deny Bond’s testimony. Yet that testimony can hardly be ignored as irrelevant to Bond’s claim. Bond established cause for his failure to raise the ineffectiveness issue on direct review — the record required the kind of elaboration that is possible only in a postconviction proceeding. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418-19. The district court therefore erred in barring Bond’s claim.\nFinally, we must decide whether we or the district court are best situated to consider Bond’s claim at this juncture. Our decisions make clear that ineffective assistance claims are best handled in the first instance by the district court, which has had the opportunity to observe and interact with counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 981 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir.1992). At the same time, we have been willing to resolve such claims “even without benefit of the district court’s views ‘if the issue is sufficiently clear-cut.’ ” United States v. Limehouse, 950 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 805 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1962, 118 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992). We think the district court is in the better position here, for Judge Beatty observed trial counsel’s representation in the course of Bond’s trial and heard Bond’s testimony in this supplemental proceeding. The district court should therefore consider Bond’s claims on remand in accordance with Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), to determine whether Bond’s counsel was ineffective and whether that ineffectiveness deprived Bond of a fair trial — that is, a trial whose result is reliable. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. A supplemental hearing may aid the resolution of Bond’s claims.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that Bond’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not barred by his failure to raise it on direct review. We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and Remakded.\n. At trial, however, the government asserted that the seizure occurred pursuant to an arrest. The government makes the same argument here.\n. By the same token, counsel's strategy decisions — including the decision not to pursue a plethora of issues on appeal — ordinarily do not violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Rogers-Bey v. Lane, 896 F.2d 279, 282 n. 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 831, 111 S.Ct. 93, 112 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Lawyers, after all, \"need not pursue every conceivable avenue; they are entitled to be selective.” United States v. Davenport, 986 F.2d 1047, 1049 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)). Indeed, selectivity is imperative because \"[d]efendants need dedicated, skillful appellate counsel, not routineers who present every non-frivolous claim.” Page, 884 F.2d at 302.\n. In addition to proving that counsel's performance was deficient (the “performance prong”), a defendant claiming ineffective assistance also must show that his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him (the \"prejudice prong”) by causing an unreliable result at trial, ,or a fundamentally unfair proceeding. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064).\n. We explained in Davenport that\n[t]he best the defendant can hope for is a remand, with instructions to explore explanations for conduct that appears questionable. We have not found any case in this circuit reversing a judgment without such a remand. If all the defendant can get is an opportunity to enlarge the record — something he could obtain with less fuss by a proceeding under § 2255— then raising ineffective assistance on appeal does the defendant no favors. For a defendant assuredly can lose such an argument. 986 F.2d at 1050 (emphasis in Davenport); see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418 (a defendant \"is unlikely to get to first base [on a section 2255 motion] if he already has presented a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the court of appeals unsuccessfully.”).\n. In a close case, we must err on the side of permitting the extrinsic evidence and entertain the claim so as to avoid punishing a defendant who waited to supplement the record with evidence that we later find irrelevant.\n. The Court explained:\nWhen examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state’s proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.\nId.\n. The order of suspension had been entered in the course of the defendant’s trial but did not take effect until the trial had been completed. Id. at 851.\n. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir.1992) (en banc) (\"[Tjhere is simply nothing inherent in an attorney's illness that necessarily will impede a spirited defense 'most of the time’ to justify finding the attorney’s representation per se ineffective”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1383, 122 L.Ed.2d 759 (1993); United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir.1992) (no per se ineffective assistance when counsel is disbarred at time of proceedings and no one, himself included, is aware of his status); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 382-83 (2d Cir.1988) (rejecting per se rule of ineffectiveness when licensed attorney is unknowingly disbarred immediately before or during trial); United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 698 (9th Cir.)' (\"Neither suspension nor disbarment invites a per se rule that continued representation in an ongoing trial is constitutionally ineffective”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985, 107 S.Ct. 574, 93 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986); United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599-601 (9th Cir.) (eschewing per se rule that attorney’s suspension by state bar automatically results in the denial of effective counsel in federal district court in another state), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Earl Dean BOND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.\\nEarl Dean Bond appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence. Because we conclude that the district court erred in barring Bond’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.\\nI. FACTS\\nA jury convicted Bond of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE); conspiring to distribute cocaine and more than fifty kilograms of marijuana; and attempting to possess with the intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana. He appealed, and we affirmed. See United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir.1988). As a result of his conviction and sentence, Bond forfeited approximately $128,000 discovered in a brown suitcase that was seized by drug enforcement agents from a hotel room in Chesterfield, Missouri. That seizure and the admission of the money into evidence at his trial are the focal points of Bond’s section 2255 motion and this appeal. Bond contends that agents seized the suitcase pursuant to an invalid search warrant, which was subsequently quashed by a state court judge. Conceding that the warrant was invalid, the government maintained at Bond’s trial that the search and seizure were nonetheless justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313, 1315 (7th Cir.1993).\\nBond’s section 2255 motion focuses primarily on the fact that his trial counsel did not move to suppress the allegedly improper evidence until the trial was well under way. The district court found the motion untimely and admitted the money into evidence. Bond also claims that his trial counsel should have made an offer of proof as to why suppression would have been appropriate.\\nAt a hearing on the section 2255 motion, Robert Ciuffa, an attorney who represented Bond in Missouri state court, testified that he had convinced a state court judge to quash the warrant pursuant to which Bond’s bag had been seized and to order that the suitcase and money be returned to Bond. Ciuffa recalled that at the state hearing, an Assistant United States Attorney had not disputed Bond’s contention that the suitcase had been seized pursuant to the search warrant alone. After the state judge quashed the warrant, Ciuffa obtained the suitcase and money from the St. Louis County Police Department. But before long, federal drug enforcement agents seized the items from Ciuffa without a warrant and without arresting Bond. Bond had not yet been indicted on federal charges at that time.\\nBond also testified at the section 2255 hearing. Bond said that two months prior to trial, he had told his trial attorney about the seizure of the suitcase from the hotel room, explaining that he “felt that the Government was going to use that as part of [its] evidence .... ” (Dec. 19, 1991 Tr. at 19.) He had informed his new counsel that Ciuffa had been successful in quashing the warrant and that Ciuffa “had all the records and that he should be contacted to help us on a suppression motion.” (Id.) According to Bond, he and his trial counsel had discussed the filing of a motion to suppress “on numerous occasions,” and his attorney had “said that he would contact Mr. Ciuffa and get all the records and make arrangements to file a motion to suppress.” (Id. at 19-20.) Finally, Bond testified that he had asked his counsel about the motion to suppress on the first day of his trial, and counsel had told him “that it had been filed but it had been denied.” (Id.)\\nIn fact, Bond’s attorney had never filed a motion to suppress. Instead, he raised the issue for the first time during the third week of trial, when he told the district court that the money had been seized by drug enforcement agents and that it should be excluded from evidence because its admission would violate both the Missouri and United States Constitutions. The exchange that then took place between the district court, Bond’s trial attorney, and the government attorney seemingly contradicts Bond’s account inasmuch as it suggests that his trial counsel had been unaware until, at the earliest, the week before Bond’s trial that the search warrant had been quashed:\\n[Bond’s Counsel]: That document [the order quashing the search warrant] wasn’t given to me. It was laying out here in the courtroom Monday when we started to pick the jury. Quite frankly, I didn’t catch it. I don’t see much problem with stopping the evidence now regarding it, but I do think that as long as it’s been declared, the search and seizure were declared unconstitutional by a recognized Court, that it shouldn’t proceed.\\nMe. Meekel; ... [I]n regards to the material that [counsel] has, we talked the week before trial about that material, and I told him about the suppression of it over in St. Louis, and we met in my office, and he didn’t have enough time to stay, and I said I would get it to him as quickly as I could, the additional copies of documents that had not been provided, as far as I could tell, up to that time. We copied those and I laid them out here for everybody the morning that we picked the jury, Monday, and that’s correct, but there was discussion about it before that time. As to, and there is a search warrant involved in what happened with DEA that was never in fact executed as far as I can tell, but which was returned and the money listed as what was seized.... There was a state court judge that ordered that money returned. It was returned to Mr. Bond’s attorney at that time, and reseized immediately by DEA pursuant to the arrest that they effected, and that’s what they did, as my evidence would show, they arrested them on that date, went down, printed them, and everything else and then they were released, per our instructions, for future indictment. Our theory is that that was, that was seized pursuant to the arrest.\\nThe Court: The second arrest.\\nMr. Merkel: The arrest occurred at the time that they were armed with a certain warrant. They had a search warrant in them back pocket which they did not use, but they made a return on it....\\nThe Court: They seized the money after they had given it back to them.\\nMr. . Merkel: It has been suppressed. I don’t think that that’s binding on this Court. Number one, I think that’s a question that can still be answered here. Number two, this is in the form, I think, of a motion to suppress, and I think it’s awfully late in the game to be raising that question. I mean, that’s a pretrial motion, as I understand it, under Rule 12. [Bond’s Counsel]: It would be awful tough to have done that when you get the document in and of itself on the day that the trial begins. As far as the discussion the week before that, he may have mentioned it.... There was an awful lot of talking going on with a lot of people. But at the same time, but I think that once a court of competent jurisdiction has found that evidence to be suppressed and that was it was illegally seized—\\nThe Court: Here is what I have a problem with, they seized it, and it was suppressed, then they seized it again. Well, the second seizure has never been suppressed.\\n* * * * * *\\nThe Court: I am going to leave it like it is. Let’s go.\\n(Trial Tr. at 449-51, Bond App. at 11-13.)\\nBond ultimately was convicted, and he retained new counsel on appeal. Bond testified at the section 2255 hearing that he discussed with appellate counsel the possibility of raising the suppression issue on appeal and that he never instructed counsel to abandon the issue. (Dec. 19, 1991 Tr. at 22.) Nonetheless, his appellate counsel did not raise the ineffectiveness of counsel claim Bond now pursues or the related claims that follow from it. Instead, Bond’s direct appeal challenged only the CCE conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, and the sufficiency of the CCE count in the indictment. We rejected these arguments and affirmed Bond’s conviction. See Bond, 847 F.2d at 1236-40.\\nBond’s section 2255 motion advances essentially the same arguments he raised on direct appeal, but on different factual grounds that focus on the cocaine charges. The linchpin of his motion is the new claim that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel failed to keep from the jury evidence purportedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.\\nII. ANALYSIS\\nA defendant may challenge his conviction under section 2255 on a ground not raised on direct appeal only by showing: (1) both good cause for his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the newly-asserted errors (see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); or (2) that the district court’s refusal to consider the issue on procedural grounds would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667-68, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). The district court dismissed Bond’s motion, finding no cause for his failure to raise the issues on direct appeal.\\nOne possible cause for a movant’s failure to raise the ineffectiveness issue on direct appeal may be that appellate counsel were themselves ineffective. See Velarde v. United States, 972 F.2d 826, 827 (7th Cir.1992). For instance, appellate counsel may be “constitutionally deficient in omitting a dead-bang winner even while zealously pressing other strong (but unsuccessful) claims.” Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1989). That “dead-bang winner” could be the argument that trial counsel made errors so serious that his representation fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Ineffectiveness compounded by ineffectiveness in this way would leave a section 2255 motion as the only viable means for a defendant to seek relief from the errors of his trial lawyer.\\nTo be sure, omitting a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal might be foolhardy — and possibly itself ineffective — if the argument is a “dead-bang winner.” But raising the issue on direct appeal presents its own perils because the argument must rest solely on the trial court record, which often offers little insight into counsel’s decision-making process. See United States v. Penass, 997 F.2d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991). Thus, as we observed in United States v. Davenport, 986 F.2d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir.1993), “a defendant who presents an ineffective-assistance claim for the first time on direct appeal has little to gain and everything to lose.” Ineffective assistance claims almost always fail on direct appeal because we grant every indulgence “to the possibility that a seeming lapse or error by defense counsel was in fact a tactical move, flawed only in hindsight.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 417-18; see also Penass, 997 F.2d at 1229. In order to overcome this presumption of effective assistance, a criminal defendant often must supplement the record with extrinsic evidence that illuminates the attorney’s errors. Otherwise, “counsel’s apparent pratfalls [are] presumed to be failed stratagems rather than professional malpractice.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418. For that reason, a defendant who must supplement the trial record to support his ineffectiveness claim “will be well advised to wait till the postconviction stage and will be safe in doing so.” Id. at 419; see also Davenport, 986 F.2d at 1050. If the defendant has no extrinsic evidence that would support his claim, however, then Taglia requires that he raise the claim on direct appeal or lose it, for a defendant “must make his ineffective assistance claim at the earliest feasible opportunity.” Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418-19. Only if there is a need to embellish the picture of trial counsel’s performance with extrinsic evidence will we excuse the failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Id.; see also Davenport, 986 F.2d at 1050.\\nHere, the district court found that Bond’s ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim was barred because it was not raised on direct appeal: “Because the petitioner’s attorney on his direct appeal was not his trial counsel, he is barred from raising his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for the first time on post-conviction review.” United States v. Bond, No. 91 C 637, slip op. at 5 (S.D.Ill. Aug. 27,1992). As support for its conclusion, the district court relied on Velarde, where we observed that “[b]ecause Velarde’s attorney on direct appeal was also his trial counsel, he is not barred from raising his ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim for the first time on post-conviction review.” 972 F.2d at 827; see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418. Yet it does not follow from Velarde and Taglia that if trial and appellate counsel were different, an ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim is necessarily barred if not raised on direct review. In that circumstance, we look instead to whether the claim is based on evidence outside the trial record or whether the ineffectiveness is apparent from the trial record or from evidence that is a matter of public record. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418.\\nBond argues that he failed to advance his ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal because he needed to supplement the trial record. At the hearing, the district court heard evidence on two matters that are beyond the scope of the trial record: (1) that Bond’s trial attorney was being investigated for possible disciplinary violations at the time of Bond’s trial; and (2) that Bond had notified his counsel before trial of the search warrant issue (which was itself further developed at the section 2255 hearing) and that Bond’s counsel had lied to him about filing the motion to suppress. The district court apparently believed that this evidence was not relevant to Bond’s claims because it found that “[t]he trial record reveals all of the grounds currently alleged by the petitioner in his 2255 motion, including the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel.” Bond, No. 91 CV 637, slip op. at 5. We disagree and therefore find that Bond did not lose his ineffective assistance claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal.\\nA. Disciplinary Proceedings\\nBond contends that an investigation of his trial attorney by the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”) distracted his counsel so profoundly that he “prepared and tried [the] case beneath a Sword of Damocles.” (Bond’s Br. at 15.) Bond maintains that his counsel was scheduled for an ARDC interview on disciplinary charges at the same time that he was defending Bond at trial and that the coincidence of the preliminary disciplinary proceeding with Bond’s trial led to substandard representation. The fact of the disciplinary proceeding was not disclosed by the trial record and could be brought to the district court’s attention only through the submission of supplemental evidence. Because we find that investigation possibly relevant to the ineffectiveness claim, Bond was justified in waiting until the postconviction stage to raise the issue. Yet, because Bond presented no evidence at the section 2255 hearing to establish in what way the incipient disciplinary action affected his counsel so as to deprive Bond of effective representation under the Sixth Amendment, the extrinsic evidence relating to the ARDC investigation adds nothing to his claim.\\nCourts consistently have declined to adopt a per se rule that ineffective assistance always results when a disciplinary action is pending against the defendant’s attorney. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a per se rule should be applied only when it “will achieve the correct result in almost all cases” and not “when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result most of the time.” Coleman v. Thompson, - U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2558, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). More to the point, the Court has held that the “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel” under Strickland. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 993, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). Of course, Nix involved an alleged breach of ethics in the course of counsel’s representation of the defendant himself, whereas the ARDC investigation of Bond’s trial counsel related to a separate matter. But we previously have rejected a per se rule in that context as well. In United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851-52 (7th Cir.1991), for example, we declined to adopt a per se rule of ineffectiveness when an attorney’s license was suspended after a defendant’s trial due to his neglect of other clients’ legal matters. We instead required the defendant to show “actual errors and omissions by counsel that prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 852. We similarly have found that representation by an attorney suspended from the state bar for nonpayment of dues at the time of a defendant’s trial did not necessarily violate the Sixth Amendment. Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668, 670 (7th Cir.1991).\\nOther circuits similarly have refused to find per se ineffectiveness when an attorney has been suspended or disbarred, or when he has performed under other professional or personal duress. The sole exception that has been recognized is when a representative, unbeknownst to his client, has never been admitted to the practice of law in any state, either because he has never applied for admission or because he has been denied admission for a reason related to legal ability. See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.1983); see also Reese, 926 F.2d at 670; United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599-600 (9th Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Because Bond’s attorney was a member of the Illinois bar before and during Bond’s trial, this case is not akin to those in which courts have applied a per se rule of ineffective assistance, and we decline to do so here. Rather, to make out an ineffectiveness claim, Bond must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by an actual error or omission that fell below the range of reasonable, professional, and conscientious representation. See Williams, 934 F.2d at 852. The ARDC investigation is only relevant to that claim if Bond could link an error or omission of his trial counsel to the pending investigation. He made no attempt to do so here. Thus, although Bond established cause for failing to raise on direct appeal an ineffectiveness claim based in part on the disciplinary investigation, he established no actual prejudice from the ARDC investigation of his trial counsel. See Frady, 456 U.S.-at 168, 102 S.Ct. at 1594; see also supra, at 634-35. On remand, the district court need not provide Bond another opportunity to establish prejudice, and it therefore need not consider the ARDC matter further. That aspect of Bond’s ineffectiveness claim fails.\\nB. Motion to Suppress\\nThe extrinsic evidence pertaining to the suppression issue, however, provides a stronger basis for Bond’s ineffective assistance claim. Bond argues that appellate counsel could not have raised this issue in the earlier appeal because the record of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was not fully developed. Although the district court disagreed, we find that Bond was justified in bypassing the issue on direct appeal in order to supplement the record for post-conviction review. In other words, we think Bond’s extrinsic evidence was relevant to whether his Sixth Amendment rights were violated and that the district court should have considered the claim on its merits.\\nConsidered in isolation, the colloquy about whether the money should be suppressed that occurred during the third week of trial (see supra, at 633-34) might suggest that Bond’s counsel was unprepared, disorganized, and ultimately ineffective in failing to either pursue the matter earlier or make an offer of proof as to why suppression was appropriate. Despite the government’s rather charitable characterization, trial counsel’s belated attempt to exclude the evidence hardly seems an intentional trial tactic enabling him to argue later that the suitcase did not belong to Bond. That aside, it is unlikely that we would have found that counsel’s performance was unreasonable from the trial transcript alone. The district court’s finding to the contrary notwithstanding, more was needed for Bond to attempt to establish ineffective assistance. For example, without Ciuffa’s testimony relating to the circumstances of the state court hearing and Bond’s representation that he had made trial counsel aware of those circumstances and that counsel himself recognized the need for a suppression motion, we might presume a tactical decision or failed strategy rather than professional malpractice. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 417-18. Bond’s extrinsic evidence is aimed at rebutting that presumption.\\nWe do not decide today whether the supplemental evidence Bond offered establishes that his trial counsel was ineffective. We hold only that Bond did not default this claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The evidence adduced at the section 2255 hearing adds to Bond’s claim the possibility that his counsel had knowledge of but failed to investigate the warrant issue and that he may have lied to Bond about having filed a motion to suppress. Of course, this is only Bond’s take on events, and because the district court found a procedural default, it never assessed his credibility. Moreover, Bond’s trial counsel did not testify at the hearing and did not submit an affidavit to either confirm or deny Bond’s testimony. Yet that testimony can hardly be ignored as irrelevant to Bond’s claim. Bond established cause for his failure to raise the ineffectiveness issue on direct review — the record required the kind of elaboration that is possible only in a postconviction proceeding. See Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418-19. The district court therefore erred in barring Bond’s claim.\\nFinally, we must decide whether we or the district court are best situated to consider Bond’s claim at this juncture. Our decisions make clear that ineffective assistance claims are best handled in the first instance by the district court, which has had the opportunity to observe and interact with counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 981 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir.1992). At the same time, we have been willing to resolve such claims “even without benefit of the district court’s views ‘if the issue is sufficiently clear-cut.’ ” United States v. Limehouse, 950 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 805 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1962, 118 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992). We think the district court is in the better position here, for Judge Beatty observed trial counsel’s representation in the course of Bond’s trial and heard Bond’s testimony in this supplemental proceeding. The district court should therefore consider Bond’s claims on remand in accordance with Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), to determine whether Bond’s counsel was ineffective and whether that ineffectiveness deprived Bond of a fair trial — that is, a trial whose result is reliable. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. A supplemental hearing may aid the resolution of Bond’s claims.\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that Bond’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not barred by his failure to raise it on direct review. We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nReversed and Remakded.\\n. At trial, however, the government asserted that the seizure occurred pursuant to an arrest. The government makes the same argument here.\\n. By the same token, counsel's strategy decisions — including the decision not to pursue a plethora of issues on appeal — ordinarily do not violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Rogers-Bey v. Lane, 896 F.2d 279, 282 n. 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 831, 111 S.Ct. 93, 112 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Lawyers, after all, \\\"need not pursue every conceivable avenue; they are entitled to be selective.” United States v. Davenport, 986 F.2d 1047, 1049 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)). Indeed, selectivity is imperative because \\\"[d]efendants need dedicated, skillful appellate counsel, not routineers who present every non-frivolous claim.” Page, 884 F.2d at 302.\\n. In addition to proving that counsel's performance was deficient (the “performance prong”), a defendant claiming ineffective assistance also must show that his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him (the \\\"prejudice prong”) by causing an unreliable result at trial, ,or a fundamentally unfair proceeding. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064).\\n. We explained in Davenport that\\n[t]he best the defendant can hope for is a remand, with instructions to explore explanations for conduct that appears questionable. We have not found any case in this circuit reversing a judgment without such a remand. If all the defendant can get is an opportunity to enlarge the record — something he could obtain with less fuss by a proceeding under § 2255— then raising ineffective assistance on appeal does the defendant no favors. For a defendant assuredly can lose such an argument. 986 F.2d at 1050 (emphasis in Davenport); see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418 (a defendant \\\"is unlikely to get to first base [on a section 2255 motion] if he already has presented a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the court of appeals unsuccessfully.”).\\n. In a close case, we must err on the side of permitting the extrinsic evidence and entertain the claim so as to avoid punishing a defendant who waited to supplement the record with evidence that we later find irrelevant.\\n. The Court explained:\\nWhen examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state’s proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.\\nId.\\n. The order of suspension had been entered in the course of the defendant’s trial but did not take effect until the trial had been completed. Id. at 851.\\n. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir.1992) (en banc) (\\\"[Tjhere is simply nothing inherent in an attorney's illness that necessarily will impede a spirited defense 'most of the time’ to justify finding the attorney’s representation per se ineffective”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1383, 122 L.Ed.2d 759 (1993); United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir.1992) (no per se ineffective assistance when counsel is disbarred at time of proceedings and no one, himself included, is aware of his status); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 382-83 (2d Cir.1988) (rejecting per se rule of ineffectiveness when licensed attorney is unknowingly disbarred immediately before or during trial); United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 698 (9th Cir.)' (\\\"Neither suspension nor disbarment invites a per se rule that continued representation in an ongoing trial is constitutionally ineffective”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985, 107 S.Ct. 574, 93 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986); United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599-601 (9th Cir.) (eschewing per se rule that attorney’s suspension by state bar automatically results in the denial of effective counsel in federal district court in another state), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1039, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":89,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513127,"string":"10,513,127"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3506"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\"], \"parties\": [\"SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\\nDial-A-Mattress International, Ltd. and Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. were joint venturers engaged in the business of telemarketing bedding products and accessories. The parties memorialized their relationship in an agreement signed March 8, 1991 (the Agreement). The Agreement provided that Sweet Dreams, in exchange for the right to use certain of Dial-A-Mattress’ trademarks, trade names and telephone numbers in the Chicago metropolitan area, would devise and implement a marketing campaign and operate a product delivery system for the parties’ mutual benefit. They were to divide the revenues generated by the venture, ninety percent to Sweet Dreams and ten percent to Dial-A-Mattress. The Agreement expired in four months, according to its own terms, but Sweet Dreams was given an option to purchase a Dial-A-Mattress franchise.\\nSweet Dreams continued to market products under the Dial-A-Mattress trademark even after the Agreement expired. Dial-A-Mattress apparently did not object to this, and, to induce Sweet Dreams to continue its marketing efforts, offered to expand Sweet Dreams’ territory to include, first, the City of Los Angeles and, later, the entire continental United States (except for the State of New York). Sweet Dreams promptly accepted in both instances. Following substantial urging by Sweet Dreams, Dial-A-Mattress prepared a franchise agreement. This agreement was never executed and Dial-A-Mattress has, according to Sweet Dreams, “unreasonably and vexatiously refused to perform” according to it. Complaint, count II, ¶ 23. Dial-A-Mattress severed entirely the parties business relationship in 1992. Moreover, Sweet Dreams charges, Dial-A-Mattress interfered with Sweet Dreams’ arrangements with its suppliers in an attempt to force Sweet Dreams out of business and to usurp the successful marketing and distribution network that it had established.\\nSweet Dreams filed a four-count complaint against Dial-A-Mattress in Illinois state court. Count I alleges that the Agreement violated Illinois law and that Sweet Dreams is, as a result, entitled to rescind it. In Count II, Sweet Dreams asserts that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced it to continue making expenditures in developing the Chicago market after the Agreement had expired. Count III alleges the same with regard to the Los Angeles and national markets. Finally, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress intentionally interfered with certain of Sweet Dreams’ business relationships. Dial-A-Mattress removed the case to the district court, jurisdiction being properly predicated upon a diversity of citizenship, and promptly moved the court to dismiss or stay the litigation pending arbitration of the parties’ disputes.\\nDial-A-Mattress argued that the Agreement relegated all of Sweet Dreams’ charges to arbitration and that, as a result, the litigation must be stayed pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The district court, in a careful opinion, concluded that the arbitration provision at issue did not encompass the parties’ disputes and, consistent with this conclusion, denied Dial-A-Mattress’ motion. Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd., 803 F.Supp. 1358 (N.D.Ill.1992). Dial-A-Mattress appeals from this decision. In resolving this puzzling matter, the district court placed great emphasis on certain decisions of other circuits, which denied arbitration based on assertedly relevant differences in wording of the respective arbitration clauses. Although these cases are instructive, we believe that they are subtly, but nonetheless materially, distinguishable from the present one. We also note that one of these opinions has been so limited by the court that issued it that it appears no longer to support the proposition for which the district court cited it. As a result, we are left to rely upon the clear thrust of our own arbitration cases and, of course, upon binding instruction from the Supreme Court. Because we find that these authorities compel arbitration of the parties’ disputes, we reverse.\\nIt is beyond peradventure that the Federal Arbitration Act embodies a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). But the duty to arbitrate remains one assumed by contract, and we will not compel parties to arbitrate disputes unless they have agreed to do so. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir.1977). Our analysis thus begins with the language of the Agreement’s arbitration provision itself: “Any disputes arising out of the agreement shall be settled and determined by the American Arbitration Association of the City of New York and their finding shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties hereto and judgment may be entered thereon in any court of record.” Agreement ¶4.\\nIn deciding whether any or all of the counts of Sweet Dreams’ complaint are subject to arbitration, we must bear in mind that, “[a]n order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Wanior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). Turning to Count I of the complaint, we observe that Sweet Dreams has requested rescission of the Agreement pursuant to the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 ILCS 705/1-705/42 (1993). This act prohibits offering for sale any franchise that has not been properly registered, 815 ILCS 705/5(1) (1993), and authorizes a franchisee that has purchased an unregistered franchise (which Sweet Dreams claims to be) to sue for rescission. 815 ILCS 705/26 (1993). A successful rescission action annuls the contract and returns the parties to the status quo ante. Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts ¶ 3.02[4] (1986). We are thus confronted with an interesting, if not somewhat metaphysical, question: Does a dispute, which has as its object the nullification of a contract, “arise out of’ that same contract?\\nThe Supreme Court has, we believe, answered this question in the affirmative, at least insofar as arbitration is concerned. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1805-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), the Court held, over a vigorous three-justice dissent, that a federal court may adjudicate issues going to the “ ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate” (in that case allegations of fraudulent inducement) but that the Federal Arbitration Act “does not permit [a] federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” The Prima Paint rule applies though only if the dispute falls within the scope of the particular arbitration clause in question. The Supreme Court had no trouble with this threshold issue, stating that the parties “contractual language is easily broad enough to encompass Prima Paint’s claim that both execution and acceleration of the ... agreement were procured by fraud.” Id. at 406, 87 S.Ct. at 1807. Seizing upon a difference in language in the Agreement’s arbitration provision and that involved in Prima Paint, the district court distinguished what it admitted would otherwise be binding authority compelling arbitration. We find the district court’s reasoning to be challenging, but do not believe that in the end it can stand.\\nThe arbitration clause in Prima Paint provided that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbi-tration_” 388 U.S. at 398, 87 S.Ct. at 1803 (emphasis supplied). The district court reasoned that, because the phrase “relating to” appears in Prima Paint but not in the Agreement, the arbitration provision in the Agreement is narrower than that at issue in Prima Paint. The Agreement’s clause is so much narrower, the district court found, that “it would be anomalous to hold that a challenge to the very existence” of the Agreement is arbitrable pursuant to it. 803 F.Supp. at 1361. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied principally upon Mediterranean Ent., Inc. v. Ssagyong, 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1983), which in turn relied upon In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.1961), both of which denied arbitration. The district court commented that the arbitration provisions in these cases were “essentially on all fours” with that in the Agreement. 803 F.Supp. at 1360. But we find the clauses to be different in one key respect.\\nThe arbitration provision in Mediterranean Ent. stated: “Any disputes arising hereunder ... shall be settled through binding arbitration_” 708 F.2d at 1461 (emphasis supplied). The analogous clause in Kinoshita required arbitration of “any dispute or difference [that] should arise under [the agreement].” 287 F.2d at 952. Both courts accepted the argument that such clauses encompass only those disputes that relate to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. 708 F.2d at 1464; 287 F.2d at 953. Here, of course, the arbitration provision reaches all disputes “arising out of” the Agreement. The district court did not comment on this difference, but we believe that it may be important. There is no need to disagree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that “arising under” may denote a dispute somehow limited to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. We find, however, that “arising out of” reaches all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract, whether or not they implicate interpretation or performance of the contract per se. We are not persuaded by Judge Medina’s dicta in Kinoshita that suggests an equation between “arising under” and “arising out of.” 287 F.2d at 953 (“The agreement to arbitrate is limited to [matters involving contract interpretation or performance] when it refers to controversies ‘under’ or ‘arising out of the contract_”) (emphasis supplied). We have indicated how our own analysis rejects such an equation. In addition, the authority of Kinoshita has been narrowed “to its precise facts.” S.A Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir.1984). As a matter of “precise fact,” Kinoshita deals with the effect of “arising under” language.\\nBearing in mind the Supreme Court’s instruction that “any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1985), we conclude that Count I is subject to arbitration. The cases cited by the district court to the contrary are either, as we have suggested, distinguishable or are of less than compelling authority. Unlike the district court, we do not believe that adding “relating to” to “arising out of’ substantially broadens the scope of the clause as applied to the present complaint.\\nAlthough Count I seeks to cancel the Agreement, it is nonetheless a result of the Agreement and has its origins in it. In that sense it “arises out of’ the Agreement and is subject to arbitration. In fact, any dispute between contracting parties that is in any way connected with their contract could be said to “arise out of’ their agreement and thus be subject to arbitration under a provision employing this language. At the very least, an “arising out of’ arbitration clause would “arguably eoverf ]” such disputes, and, under our cases, this is all that is needed to trigger arbitration. See Sehacht v. Beacon Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.1984).\\nWe note that contracting parties control their own fate when it comes to deciding which disputes to consign to arbitration. On the one hand, they may delineate precisely those claims that are subject to arbitration or, on the other, they may employ general— even vague — language in their arbitration provisions. They may also combine these techniques by using general language to authorize arbitration together with specific language to identify the types of disputes that are not subject to arbitration, thereby limiting the reach of phrases such as “arising out of,” “arising under” or “arising out of or relating to.” See S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri, 745 F.2d at 194. The parties here, however, have not taken any steps to narrow the reach of the Agreement’s arbitration clause, and, in the light of the heavy presumption in favor of arbitration, we are left to conclude that Count I is arbitrable.\\nCounts II, III and IV, for the most part, relate to events occurring after the Agreement expired. Although somewhat difficult to decipher, Counts II and III seem to allege some species of the torts of fraud or misrepresentation. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts §§ 7.1-7.15 (2d ed. 1986). Count IV more clearly alleges the tort of intentional interference with contractual advantage. See id. at §§ 6.5-6.9. Sweet Dreams contends that these counts are not arbitrable under the Agreement’s arbitration clause because they sound in tort. We have routinely held that a party may not avoid a contractual arbitration clause merely by “casting its complaint in tort.” See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the “Amoco Cadiz” etc., 659 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.1981) (quoting Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir.1967)). The touchstone of arbitrability in these circumstances is “the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.” Id.\\nCounts II, III and IV do not raise issues of contract interpretation or performance. Nor are they connected to the contract in the sense that they challenge the validity of the contract. But they clearly have their genesis in the Agreement. Counts II and III allege that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced Sweet Dreams to continue marketing efforts that were started pursuant to the Agreement. Complaint, Count II, ¶¶ 10-13 & Count III, ¶¶ 23-26. Similarly, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress interfered with business relations that developed “[f]rom March 8, 1991,” the date of the Agreement. Complaint, Count IV, ¶ 10. Keeping in mind the federal presumption in favor of arbitration, we conclude that these counts are related to the subject matter of the arbitration clause and subject to arbitration under it.\\nSweet Dreams raises one last point that need not detain us long. It argues that the arbitration provision is inapposite because the Agreement has expired. The Supreme Court, however, has stated that “the failure to exclude from .arbitrability contract disputes arising after termination, far from manifesting an intent to have arbitration obligations cease with the agreement, affords a basis for concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship.” Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 1074, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977). Although Nolde Bros, involved a collectively bargained labor agreement and thus is arguably not dispositive here, we find its reasoning persuasive in this context as well. If the parties had wished to limit the duty to arbitrate to the term of the Agreement itself they could have said so explicitly. Instead, they used language that evinces an intent to commit to arbitration any dispute connected with the contract irrespective of when it occurs. We would be presented with a different and more difficult question if the disputes had arisen a significant time after the expiration of the Agreement. See, e.g., Local 703, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kennicott, 771 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that dispute arising six months after expiration of collective bargaining agreement was not arbitrable). But following as they did on the heels of the Agreement, we readily find that they are subject to arbitration.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is Reversed and the case Remanded with instructions to enter an order staying litigation pending resolution of the arbitration proceedings.\\n. The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a district court to enforce written arbitration provisions and to stay litigation pending arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4.\\n. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (authorizing interlocutory appeals from orders refusing to stay litigation pending arbitration).\\n. Sweet Dreams suggests that ordering arbitration of Count I would “usurp Illinois’ right to interpret its own Franchise laws.” Appellee's Br. at 14-15. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it is nonsense. The arbitrator will be bound by the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act and any court decisions interpreting it. And it should go without saying that no Illinois court will be bound by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes any state provision that might attempt to insulate certain causes of action from arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-61, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).\\n. In other words, a court may consider a claim that a contracting party was fraudulently induced to include an arbitration provision in the agreement but not claims that the entire contract was the product of fraud.\\n. The Ninth Circuit interpreted \\\"arising hereunder” as synonymous with \\\"arising under the agreement.\\\" 708 F.2d at 1464. Thus, the arbitration provisions in Meditetranean Ent. and Ki-noshita are, for our purposes, identical.\\n. Count III also could be construed to allege that the Agreement was fraudulently induced. Complaint, Count III, ¶ 23. To this extent, it is subject to arbitration for the same reasons as Count I.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"Gerald A. Goldman, Arthur R. Ehrlich (argued), Ira Marcus, Goldman & Marcus, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.\", \"Jonathan G. Bunge, Angela Marsh, Mary B. Snyder, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Chicago, IL, Jeffrey J. Keyes (argued), James J. Long, Briggs & Morgan, Saint Paul, MN, for defendants-appellants.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants.\\nNo. 92-3506.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nArgued Feb. 22, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 6, 1993.\\nGerald A. Goldman, Arthur R. Ehrlich (argued), Ira Marcus, Goldman & Marcus, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.\\nJonathan G. Bunge, Angela Marsh, Mary B. Snyder, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Chicago, IL, Jeffrey J. Keyes (argued), James J. Long, Briggs & Morgan, Saint Paul, MN, for defendants-appellants.\\nBefore CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CUMMINGS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CUDAHY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 639"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-06\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\nDial-A-Mattress International, Ltd. and Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. were joint venturers engaged in the business of telemarketing bedding products and accessories. The parties memorialized their relationship in an agreement signed March 8, 1991 (the Agreement). The Agreement provided that Sweet Dreams, in exchange for the right to use certain of Dial-A-Mattress’ trademarks, trade names and telephone numbers in the Chicago metropolitan area, would devise and implement a marketing campaign and operate a product delivery system for the parties’ mutual benefit. They were to divide the revenues generated by the venture, ninety percent to Sweet Dreams and ten percent to Dial-A-Mattress. The Agreement expired in four months, according to its own terms, but Sweet Dreams was given an option to purchase a Dial-A-Mattress franchise.\nSweet Dreams continued to market products under the Dial-A-Mattress trademark even after the Agreement expired. Dial-A-Mattress apparently did not object to this, and, to induce Sweet Dreams to continue its marketing efforts, offered to expand Sweet Dreams’ territory to include, first, the City of Los Angeles and, later, the entire continental United States (except for the State of New York). Sweet Dreams promptly accepted in both instances. Following substantial urging by Sweet Dreams, Dial-A-Mattress prepared a franchise agreement. This agreement was never executed and Dial-A-Mattress has, according to Sweet Dreams, “unreasonably and vexatiously refused to perform” according to it. Complaint, count II, ¶ 23. Dial-A-Mattress severed entirely the parties business relationship in 1992. Moreover, Sweet Dreams charges, Dial-A-Mattress interfered with Sweet Dreams’ arrangements with its suppliers in an attempt to force Sweet Dreams out of business and to usurp the successful marketing and distribution network that it had established.\nSweet Dreams filed a four-count complaint against Dial-A-Mattress in Illinois state court. Count I alleges that the Agreement violated Illinois law and that Sweet Dreams is, as a result, entitled to rescind it. In Count II, Sweet Dreams asserts that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced it to continue making expenditures in developing the Chicago market after the Agreement had expired. Count III alleges the same with regard to the Los Angeles and national markets. Finally, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress intentionally interfered with certain of Sweet Dreams’ business relationships. Dial-A-Mattress removed the case to the district court, jurisdiction being properly predicated upon a diversity of citizenship, and promptly moved the court to dismiss or stay the litigation pending arbitration of the parties’ disputes.\nDial-A-Mattress argued that the Agreement relegated all of Sweet Dreams’ charges to arbitration and that, as a result, the litigation must be stayed pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The district court, in a careful opinion, concluded that the arbitration provision at issue did not encompass the parties’ disputes and, consistent with this conclusion, denied Dial-A-Mattress’ motion. Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd., 803 F.Supp. 1358 (N.D.Ill.1992). Dial-A-Mattress appeals from this decision. In resolving this puzzling matter, the district court placed great emphasis on certain decisions of other circuits, which denied arbitration based on assertedly relevant differences in wording of the respective arbitration clauses. Although these cases are instructive, we believe that they are subtly, but nonetheless materially, distinguishable from the present one. We also note that one of these opinions has been so limited by the court that issued it that it appears no longer to support the proposition for which the district court cited it. As a result, we are left to rely upon the clear thrust of our own arbitration cases and, of course, upon binding instruction from the Supreme Court. Because we find that these authorities compel arbitration of the parties’ disputes, we reverse.\nIt is beyond peradventure that the Federal Arbitration Act embodies a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). But the duty to arbitrate remains one assumed by contract, and we will not compel parties to arbitrate disputes unless they have agreed to do so. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir.1977). Our analysis thus begins with the language of the Agreement’s arbitration provision itself: “Any disputes arising out of the agreement shall be settled and determined by the American Arbitration Association of the City of New York and their finding shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties hereto and judgment may be entered thereon in any court of record.” Agreement ¶4.\nIn deciding whether any or all of the counts of Sweet Dreams’ complaint are subject to arbitration, we must bear in mind that, “[a]n order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Wanior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). Turning to Count I of the complaint, we observe that Sweet Dreams has requested rescission of the Agreement pursuant to the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 ILCS 705/1-705/42 (1993). This act prohibits offering for sale any franchise that has not been properly registered, 815 ILCS 705/5(1) (1993), and authorizes a franchisee that has purchased an unregistered franchise (which Sweet Dreams claims to be) to sue for rescission. 815 ILCS 705/26 (1993). A successful rescission action annuls the contract and returns the parties to the status quo ante. Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts ¶ 3.02[4] (1986). We are thus confronted with an interesting, if not somewhat metaphysical, question: Does a dispute, which has as its object the nullification of a contract, “arise out of’ that same contract?\nThe Supreme Court has, we believe, answered this question in the affirmative, at least insofar as arbitration is concerned. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1805-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), the Court held, over a vigorous three-justice dissent, that a federal court may adjudicate issues going to the “ ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate” (in that case allegations of fraudulent inducement) but that the Federal Arbitration Act “does not permit [a] federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” The Prima Paint rule applies though only if the dispute falls within the scope of the particular arbitration clause in question. The Supreme Court had no trouble with this threshold issue, stating that the parties “contractual language is easily broad enough to encompass Prima Paint’s claim that both execution and acceleration of the ... agreement were procured by fraud.” Id. at 406, 87 S.Ct. at 1807. Seizing upon a difference in language in the Agreement’s arbitration provision and that involved in Prima Paint, the district court distinguished what it admitted would otherwise be binding authority compelling arbitration. We find the district court’s reasoning to be challenging, but do not believe that in the end it can stand.\nThe arbitration clause in Prima Paint provided that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbi-tration_” 388 U.S. at 398, 87 S.Ct. at 1803 (emphasis supplied). The district court reasoned that, because the phrase “relating to” appears in Prima Paint but not in the Agreement, the arbitration provision in the Agreement is narrower than that at issue in Prima Paint. The Agreement’s clause is so much narrower, the district court found, that “it would be anomalous to hold that a challenge to the very existence” of the Agreement is arbitrable pursuant to it. 803 F.Supp. at 1361. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied principally upon Mediterranean Ent., Inc. v. Ssagyong, 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1983), which in turn relied upon In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.1961), both of which denied arbitration. The district court commented that the arbitration provisions in these cases were “essentially on all fours” with that in the Agreement. 803 F.Supp. at 1360. But we find the clauses to be different in one key respect.\nThe arbitration provision in Mediterranean Ent. stated: “Any disputes arising hereunder ... shall be settled through binding arbitration_” 708 F.2d at 1461 (emphasis supplied). The analogous clause in Kinoshita required arbitration of “any dispute or difference [that] should arise under [the agreement].” 287 F.2d at 952. Both courts accepted the argument that such clauses encompass only those disputes that relate to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. 708 F.2d at 1464; 287 F.2d at 953. Here, of course, the arbitration provision reaches all disputes “arising out of” the Agreement. The district court did not comment on this difference, but we believe that it may be important. There is no need to disagree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that “arising under” may denote a dispute somehow limited to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. We find, however, that “arising out of” reaches all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract, whether or not they implicate interpretation or performance of the contract per se. We are not persuaded by Judge Medina’s dicta in Kinoshita that suggests an equation between “arising under” and “arising out of.” 287 F.2d at 953 (“The agreement to arbitrate is limited to [matters involving contract interpretation or performance] when it refers to controversies ‘under’ or ‘arising out of the contract_”) (emphasis supplied). We have indicated how our own analysis rejects such an equation. In addition, the authority of Kinoshita has been narrowed “to its precise facts.” S.A Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir.1984). As a matter of “precise fact,” Kinoshita deals with the effect of “arising under” language.\nBearing in mind the Supreme Court’s instruction that “any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1985), we conclude that Count I is subject to arbitration. The cases cited by the district court to the contrary are either, as we have suggested, distinguishable or are of less than compelling authority. Unlike the district court, we do not believe that adding “relating to” to “arising out of’ substantially broadens the scope of the clause as applied to the present complaint.\nAlthough Count I seeks to cancel the Agreement, it is nonetheless a result of the Agreement and has its origins in it. In that sense it “arises out of’ the Agreement and is subject to arbitration. In fact, any dispute between contracting parties that is in any way connected with their contract could be said to “arise out of’ their agreement and thus be subject to arbitration under a provision employing this language. At the very least, an “arising out of’ arbitration clause would “arguably eoverf ]” such disputes, and, under our cases, this is all that is needed to trigger arbitration. See Sehacht v. Beacon Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.1984).\nWe note that contracting parties control their own fate when it comes to deciding which disputes to consign to arbitration. On the one hand, they may delineate precisely those claims that are subject to arbitration or, on the other, they may employ general— even vague — language in their arbitration provisions. They may also combine these techniques by using general language to authorize arbitration together with specific language to identify the types of disputes that are not subject to arbitration, thereby limiting the reach of phrases such as “arising out of,” “arising under” or “arising out of or relating to.” See S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri, 745 F.2d at 194. The parties here, however, have not taken any steps to narrow the reach of the Agreement’s arbitration clause, and, in the light of the heavy presumption in favor of arbitration, we are left to conclude that Count I is arbitrable.\nCounts II, III and IV, for the most part, relate to events occurring after the Agreement expired. Although somewhat difficult to decipher, Counts II and III seem to allege some species of the torts of fraud or misrepresentation. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts §§ 7.1-7.15 (2d ed. 1986). Count IV more clearly alleges the tort of intentional interference with contractual advantage. See id. at §§ 6.5-6.9. Sweet Dreams contends that these counts are not arbitrable under the Agreement’s arbitration clause because they sound in tort. We have routinely held that a party may not avoid a contractual arbitration clause merely by “casting its complaint in tort.” See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the “Amoco Cadiz” etc., 659 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.1981) (quoting Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir.1967)). The touchstone of arbitrability in these circumstances is “the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.” Id.\nCounts II, III and IV do not raise issues of contract interpretation or performance. Nor are they connected to the contract in the sense that they challenge the validity of the contract. But they clearly have their genesis in the Agreement. Counts II and III allege that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced Sweet Dreams to continue marketing efforts that were started pursuant to the Agreement. Complaint, Count II, ¶¶ 10-13 & Count III, ¶¶ 23-26. Similarly, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress interfered with business relations that developed “[f]rom March 8, 1991,” the date of the Agreement. Complaint, Count IV, ¶ 10. Keeping in mind the federal presumption in favor of arbitration, we conclude that these counts are related to the subject matter of the arbitration clause and subject to arbitration under it.\nSweet Dreams raises one last point that need not detain us long. It argues that the arbitration provision is inapposite because the Agreement has expired. The Supreme Court, however, has stated that “the failure to exclude from .arbitrability contract disputes arising after termination, far from manifesting an intent to have arbitration obligations cease with the agreement, affords a basis for concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship.” Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 1074, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977). Although Nolde Bros, involved a collectively bargained labor agreement and thus is arguably not dispositive here, we find its reasoning persuasive in this context as well. If the parties had wished to limit the duty to arbitrate to the term of the Agreement itself they could have said so explicitly. Instead, they used language that evinces an intent to commit to arbitration any dispute connected with the contract irrespective of when it occurs. We would be presented with a different and more difficult question if the disputes had arisen a significant time after the expiration of the Agreement. See, e.g., Local 703, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kennicott, 771 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that dispute arising six months after expiration of collective bargaining agreement was not arbitrable). But following as they did on the heels of the Agreement, we readily find that they are subject to arbitration.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is Reversed and the case Remanded with instructions to enter an order staying litigation pending resolution of the arbitration proceedings.\n. The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a district court to enforce written arbitration provisions and to stay litigation pending arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4.\n. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (authorizing interlocutory appeals from orders refusing to stay litigation pending arbitration).\n. Sweet Dreams suggests that ordering arbitration of Count I would “usurp Illinois’ right to interpret its own Franchise laws.” Appellee's Br. at 14-15. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it is nonsense. The arbitrator will be bound by the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act and any court decisions interpreting it. And it should go without saying that no Illinois court will be bound by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes any state provision that might attempt to insulate certain causes of action from arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-61, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).\n. In other words, a court may consider a claim that a contracting party was fraudulently induced to include an arbitration provision in the agreement but not claims that the entire contract was the product of fraud.\n. The Ninth Circuit interpreted \"arising hereunder” as synonymous with \"arising under the agreement.\" 708 F.2d at 1464. Thus, the arbitration provisions in Meditetranean Ent. and Ki-noshita are, for our purposes, identical.\n. Count III also could be construed to allege that the Agreement was fraudulently induced. Complaint, Count III, ¶ 23. To this extent, it is subject to arbitration for the same reasons as Count I.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\\nDial-A-Mattress International, Ltd. and Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. were joint venturers engaged in the business of telemarketing bedding products and accessories. The parties memorialized their relationship in an agreement signed March 8, 1991 (the Agreement). The Agreement provided that Sweet Dreams, in exchange for the right to use certain of Dial-A-Mattress’ trademarks, trade names and telephone numbers in the Chicago metropolitan area, would devise and implement a marketing campaign and operate a product delivery system for the parties’ mutual benefit. They were to divide the revenues generated by the venture, ninety percent to Sweet Dreams and ten percent to Dial-A-Mattress. The Agreement expired in four months, according to its own terms, but Sweet Dreams was given an option to purchase a Dial-A-Mattress franchise.\\nSweet Dreams continued to market products under the Dial-A-Mattress trademark even after the Agreement expired. Dial-A-Mattress apparently did not object to this, and, to induce Sweet Dreams to continue its marketing efforts, offered to expand Sweet Dreams’ territory to include, first, the City of Los Angeles and, later, the entire continental United States (except for the State of New York). Sweet Dreams promptly accepted in both instances. Following substantial urging by Sweet Dreams, Dial-A-Mattress prepared a franchise agreement. This agreement was never executed and Dial-A-Mattress has, according to Sweet Dreams, “unreasonably and vexatiously refused to perform” according to it. Complaint, count II, ¶ 23. Dial-A-Mattress severed entirely the parties business relationship in 1992. Moreover, Sweet Dreams charges, Dial-A-Mattress interfered with Sweet Dreams’ arrangements with its suppliers in an attempt to force Sweet Dreams out of business and to usurp the successful marketing and distribution network that it had established.\\nSweet Dreams filed a four-count complaint against Dial-A-Mattress in Illinois state court. Count I alleges that the Agreement violated Illinois law and that Sweet Dreams is, as a result, entitled to rescind it. In Count II, Sweet Dreams asserts that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced it to continue making expenditures in developing the Chicago market after the Agreement had expired. Count III alleges the same with regard to the Los Angeles and national markets. Finally, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress intentionally interfered with certain of Sweet Dreams’ business relationships. Dial-A-Mattress removed the case to the district court, jurisdiction being properly predicated upon a diversity of citizenship, and promptly moved the court to dismiss or stay the litigation pending arbitration of the parties’ disputes.\\nDial-A-Mattress argued that the Agreement relegated all of Sweet Dreams’ charges to arbitration and that, as a result, the litigation must be stayed pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The district court, in a careful opinion, concluded that the arbitration provision at issue did not encompass the parties’ disputes and, consistent with this conclusion, denied Dial-A-Mattress’ motion. Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd., 803 F.Supp. 1358 (N.D.Ill.1992). Dial-A-Mattress appeals from this decision. In resolving this puzzling matter, the district court placed great emphasis on certain decisions of other circuits, which denied arbitration based on assertedly relevant differences in wording of the respective arbitration clauses. Although these cases are instructive, we believe that they are subtly, but nonetheless materially, distinguishable from the present one. We also note that one of these opinions has been so limited by the court that issued it that it appears no longer to support the proposition for which the district court cited it. As a result, we are left to rely upon the clear thrust of our own arbitration cases and, of course, upon binding instruction from the Supreme Court. Because we find that these authorities compel arbitration of the parties’ disputes, we reverse.\\nIt is beyond peradventure that the Federal Arbitration Act embodies a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). But the duty to arbitrate remains one assumed by contract, and we will not compel parties to arbitrate disputes unless they have agreed to do so. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir.1977). Our analysis thus begins with the language of the Agreement’s arbitration provision itself: “Any disputes arising out of the agreement shall be settled and determined by the American Arbitration Association of the City of New York and their finding shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties hereto and judgment may be entered thereon in any court of record.” Agreement ¶4.\\nIn deciding whether any or all of the counts of Sweet Dreams’ complaint are subject to arbitration, we must bear in mind that, “[a]n order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Wanior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). Turning to Count I of the complaint, we observe that Sweet Dreams has requested rescission of the Agreement pursuant to the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, 815 ILCS 705/1-705/42 (1993). This act prohibits offering for sale any franchise that has not been properly registered, 815 ILCS 705/5(1) (1993), and authorizes a franchisee that has purchased an unregistered franchise (which Sweet Dreams claims to be) to sue for rescission. 815 ILCS 705/26 (1993). A successful rescission action annuls the contract and returns the parties to the status quo ante. Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts ¶ 3.02[4] (1986). We are thus confronted with an interesting, if not somewhat metaphysical, question: Does a dispute, which has as its object the nullification of a contract, “arise out of’ that same contract?\\nThe Supreme Court has, we believe, answered this question in the affirmative, at least insofar as arbitration is concerned. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1805-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), the Court held, over a vigorous three-justice dissent, that a federal court may adjudicate issues going to the “ ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate” (in that case allegations of fraudulent inducement) but that the Federal Arbitration Act “does not permit [a] federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” The Prima Paint rule applies though only if the dispute falls within the scope of the particular arbitration clause in question. The Supreme Court had no trouble with this threshold issue, stating that the parties “contractual language is easily broad enough to encompass Prima Paint’s claim that both execution and acceleration of the ... agreement were procured by fraud.” Id. at 406, 87 S.Ct. at 1807. Seizing upon a difference in language in the Agreement’s arbitration provision and that involved in Prima Paint, the district court distinguished what it admitted would otherwise be binding authority compelling arbitration. We find the district court’s reasoning to be challenging, but do not believe that in the end it can stand.\\nThe arbitration clause in Prima Paint provided that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbi-tration_” 388 U.S. at 398, 87 S.Ct. at 1803 (emphasis supplied). The district court reasoned that, because the phrase “relating to” appears in Prima Paint but not in the Agreement, the arbitration provision in the Agreement is narrower than that at issue in Prima Paint. The Agreement’s clause is so much narrower, the district court found, that “it would be anomalous to hold that a challenge to the very existence” of the Agreement is arbitrable pursuant to it. 803 F.Supp. at 1361. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied principally upon Mediterranean Ent., Inc. v. Ssagyong, 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1983), which in turn relied upon In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.1961), both of which denied arbitration. The district court commented that the arbitration provisions in these cases were “essentially on all fours” with that in the Agreement. 803 F.Supp. at 1360. But we find the clauses to be different in one key respect.\\nThe arbitration provision in Mediterranean Ent. stated: “Any disputes arising hereunder ... shall be settled through binding arbitration_” 708 F.2d at 1461 (emphasis supplied). The analogous clause in Kinoshita required arbitration of “any dispute or difference [that] should arise under [the agreement].” 287 F.2d at 952. Both courts accepted the argument that such clauses encompass only those disputes that relate to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. 708 F.2d at 1464; 287 F.2d at 953. Here, of course, the arbitration provision reaches all disputes “arising out of” the Agreement. The district court did not comment on this difference, but we believe that it may be important. There is no need to disagree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that “arising under” may denote a dispute somehow limited to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself. We find, however, that “arising out of” reaches all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract, whether or not they implicate interpretation or performance of the contract per se. We are not persuaded by Judge Medina’s dicta in Kinoshita that suggests an equation between “arising under” and “arising out of.” 287 F.2d at 953 (“The agreement to arbitrate is limited to [matters involving contract interpretation or performance] when it refers to controversies ‘under’ or ‘arising out of the contract_”) (emphasis supplied). We have indicated how our own analysis rejects such an equation. In addition, the authority of Kinoshita has been narrowed “to its precise facts.” S.A Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir.1984). As a matter of “precise fact,” Kinoshita deals with the effect of “arising under” language.\\nBearing in mind the Supreme Court’s instruction that “any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1985), we conclude that Count I is subject to arbitration. The cases cited by the district court to the contrary are either, as we have suggested, distinguishable or are of less than compelling authority. Unlike the district court, we do not believe that adding “relating to” to “arising out of’ substantially broadens the scope of the clause as applied to the present complaint.\\nAlthough Count I seeks to cancel the Agreement, it is nonetheless a result of the Agreement and has its origins in it. In that sense it “arises out of’ the Agreement and is subject to arbitration. In fact, any dispute between contracting parties that is in any way connected with their contract could be said to “arise out of’ their agreement and thus be subject to arbitration under a provision employing this language. At the very least, an “arising out of’ arbitration clause would “arguably eoverf ]” such disputes, and, under our cases, this is all that is needed to trigger arbitration. See Sehacht v. Beacon Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.1984).\\nWe note that contracting parties control their own fate when it comes to deciding which disputes to consign to arbitration. On the one hand, they may delineate precisely those claims that are subject to arbitration or, on the other, they may employ general— even vague — language in their arbitration provisions. They may also combine these techniques by using general language to authorize arbitration together with specific language to identify the types of disputes that are not subject to arbitration, thereby limiting the reach of phrases such as “arising out of,” “arising under” or “arising out of or relating to.” See S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri, 745 F.2d at 194. The parties here, however, have not taken any steps to narrow the reach of the Agreement’s arbitration clause, and, in the light of the heavy presumption in favor of arbitration, we are left to conclude that Count I is arbitrable.\\nCounts II, III and IV, for the most part, relate to events occurring after the Agreement expired. Although somewhat difficult to decipher, Counts II and III seem to allege some species of the torts of fraud or misrepresentation. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts §§ 7.1-7.15 (2d ed. 1986). Count IV more clearly alleges the tort of intentional interference with contractual advantage. See id. at §§ 6.5-6.9. Sweet Dreams contends that these counts are not arbitrable under the Agreement’s arbitration clause because they sound in tort. We have routinely held that a party may not avoid a contractual arbitration clause merely by “casting its complaint in tort.” See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the “Amoco Cadiz” etc., 659 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.1981) (quoting Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir.1967)). The touchstone of arbitrability in these circumstances is “the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.” Id.\\nCounts II, III and IV do not raise issues of contract interpretation or performance. Nor are they connected to the contract in the sense that they challenge the validity of the contract. But they clearly have their genesis in the Agreement. Counts II and III allege that Dial-A-Mattress fraudulently induced Sweet Dreams to continue marketing efforts that were started pursuant to the Agreement. Complaint, Count II, ¶¶ 10-13 & Count III, ¶¶ 23-26. Similarly, Count IV alleges that Dial-A-Mattress interfered with business relations that developed “[f]rom March 8, 1991,” the date of the Agreement. Complaint, Count IV, ¶ 10. Keeping in mind the federal presumption in favor of arbitration, we conclude that these counts are related to the subject matter of the arbitration clause and subject to arbitration under it.\\nSweet Dreams raises one last point that need not detain us long. It argues that the arbitration provision is inapposite because the Agreement has expired. The Supreme Court, however, has stated that “the failure to exclude from .arbitrability contract disputes arising after termination, far from manifesting an intent to have arbitration obligations cease with the agreement, affords a basis for concluding that they intended to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship.” Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 1074, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977). Although Nolde Bros, involved a collectively bargained labor agreement and thus is arguably not dispositive here, we find its reasoning persuasive in this context as well. If the parties had wished to limit the duty to arbitrate to the term of the Agreement itself they could have said so explicitly. Instead, they used language that evinces an intent to commit to arbitration any dispute connected with the contract irrespective of when it occurs. We would be presented with a different and more difficult question if the disputes had arisen a significant time after the expiration of the Agreement. See, e.g., Local 703, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kennicott, 771 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that dispute arising six months after expiration of collective bargaining agreement was not arbitrable). But following as they did on the heels of the Agreement, we readily find that they are subject to arbitration.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is Reversed and the case Remanded with instructions to enter an order staying litigation pending resolution of the arbitration proceedings.\\n. The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a district court to enforce written arbitration provisions and to stay litigation pending arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4.\\n. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (authorizing interlocutory appeals from orders refusing to stay litigation pending arbitration).\\n. Sweet Dreams suggests that ordering arbitration of Count I would “usurp Illinois’ right to interpret its own Franchise laws.” Appellee's Br. at 14-15. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it is nonsense. The arbitrator will be bound by the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act and any court decisions interpreting it. And it should go without saying that no Illinois court will be bound by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the statute. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes any state provision that might attempt to insulate certain causes of action from arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858-61, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).\\n. In other words, a court may consider a claim that a contracting party was fraudulently induced to include an arbitration provision in the agreement but not claims that the entire contract was the product of fraud.\\n. The Ninth Circuit interpreted \\\"arising hereunder” as synonymous with \\\"arising under the agreement.\\\" 708 F.2d at 1464. Thus, the arbitration provisions in Meditetranean Ent. and Ki-noshita are, for our purposes, identical.\\n. Count III also could be construed to allege that the Agreement was fraudulently induced. Complaint, Count III, ¶ 23. To this extent, it is subject to arbitration for the same reasons as Count I.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":90,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513177,"string":"10,513,177"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Duarte"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3417"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"COFFEY, Circuit Judge.\\nBienvenido Duarte was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A jury convicted him on both counts, and the U.S. district court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 180 months in prison pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, we affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing. United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (“Duarte I”). On remand, the district court conducted a new sentencing hearing and resentenced the defendant to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison.\\nDuarte appeals the resentencing. We affirm.\\nI. The Conspiracy\\nWe summarize the facts discussed in more detail in Duarte I (see 950 F.2d at 1257-58). On June 22, 1990, Milwaukee police received a tip from a reliable informant that the appellant and several eo-eonspirators had arrived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from New York City with a kilogram of cocaine. The informant advised that these individuals were staying in Room 234 of the Howard Johnson’s motel at 1716 W. Layton Avenue in Milwaukee. Upon investigation, officers from the Milwaukee police department were able to uncover facts corroborating the informant’s tip. They discovered that Room 234 had been rented five days earlier under the name of Maria Gonzales, who had given as her residence an address of a vacant, boarded-up home. Furthermore, a car parked immediately outside her motel room (234) bore New York license plates that were registered to another vehicle.\\nAfter placing Room 234 in the Howard Johnson’s motel under surveillance, Milwaukee detectives Thomas Górecki and Alan Wilke observed a man (later identified as Modesto Arroyo) leave the room and drive to a nearby Exel Inn at 1201 W. College Avenue, where he remained for about two hours before returning to the room in the Howard Johnson’s motel.\\nWhen the Milwaukee police arrested Arroyo, they found a key to Room 207 of the Exel Inn lying on the floor of his car. Uniformed officers entered this room to make sure no suspects were inside. Although detectives Górecki and Wilke waited in the hallway, they could see a large brick of cocaine inside the room. The detectives then stationed officers outside this Exel motel room until they could obtain a search warrant. A search of the room pursuant to the warrant later uncovered drug paraphernalia and 1.177 kilograms of cocaine.\\nMeanwhile, Detectives Górecki and Wilke returned to the Howard Johnson’s motel, knocked on the door of Room 234, and were admitted by a man who identified himself as Antonio De La Cruz. Duarte was also present in Room 234 and gave the police permission to search the room. This consent search uncovered a pager with a New York phone number and a wallet containing notes written in Spanish that appeared to the officers to reflect large drug transactions. Duarte claimed ownership of the wallet and pager, but was both untruthful and evasive when questioned about his presence in Milwaukee.\\nDuarte was arrested with Arroyo and charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine and with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram.\\nAt Duarte’s trial, the government introduced expert testimony by DEA Special Agent William C. Hehr that the notes found in the defendant’s wallet were drug ledgers that provided evidence of his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1258. The case was submitted to a jury on November 16, 1990, and guilty verdicts were returned the same day.\\nII. Issues\\nOn January 22, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Duarte to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. On remand for resentencing on August 13, 1992, the court reimposed this sentence after again finding Duarte responsible for more than 5 kilograms.\\nIn this appeal from resentencing, the defendant’s brief concedes that his drug notes record transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The remaining issue is whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the defendant trafficked in this cocaine as part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee drug conspiracy for which he was convicted.\\nIII. The First Sentencing Hearing\\nDuarte’s first sentencing hearing was conducted on January 22, 1991. The government’s expert witness testified that Duarte’s drug ledgers established his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine in June 1990, when the going price in New York for a kilo of cocaine was approximately $20,000. The government divided the value of the defendant’s cocaine ($117,000) by the kilo price he paid ($20,000) and determined that he was responsible for more than 5 kilograms during the time frame of the conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. The sentencing court disagreed with Duarte’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to hold him responsible for any drugs other than the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine seized at the Exel Inn, and it proceeded to sentence him on the basis of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nPursuant to Guidelines §§ lB1.3(a)(2) and 3D1.2(d), the sentencing courts are directed to “increase a defendant’s base offense level to account for ‘relevant conduct,’ which includes drugs from any acts that ‘were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’ as the convicted offense, regardless of whether the defendant was charged with or convicted of carrying out those acts.” Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 274,112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990)). This so-called “aggregation rule” exposed Duarte to significantly harsher penalties than would otherwise have been applicable. Because the government’s conspiracy evidence concerning Duarte convinced the court that he was involved in more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, the Sentencing Guidelines assigned him a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34 for a sentencing range of 151-188 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c).\\nIV. Duarte I\\nThis court remanded this case for resen-tencing on December 10, 1991, because it believed that the trial judge conceivably might have erred in calculating Duarte’s base offense level on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nThe Duarte I panel stated that it would reserve judgment on 1) whether Duarte was responsible for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, and 2) whether the transactions recorded in his drug notes were part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1266.\\nV. Resentencing\\nAt his resentencing hearing on August 13, 1992, the defendant argued that because the government failed to establish that his drug notes did not reflect hypothetical past drug deals in New York or other cities, it could not prove that his notes were connected to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\\nThe government once again called upon its expert witness, DEA Agent Hehr, to interpret Duarte’s drug notes. Testifying from the notes, Hehr initially described how the defendant had listed his income (from reselling cocaine in single-ounce and multi-ounce quantities) against his expenses (incurred in buying cocaine at wholesale prices). Hehr testified that these notations in the defendant’s drug ledgers demonstrated transactions involving 291 ounces of cocaine, or 6.5 kilograms.\\nThe government also had Agent Hehr give a more detailed explanation of the basis for his opinion that the drug sales recorded in Duarte’s notes were part of the same course of conduct as the crimes for which he had been convicted.\\nAgent Hehr testified that, based on his twenty years of experience in the infamous world of drugs, drug notes found in a dealer’s wallet usually reflect current and local drug deals rather than old or distant ones, and the drug notes in Duarte’s wallet at the time of his arrest thus relate to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy. According to Hehr, it would have been foolish for the defendant, an experienced drug dealer, to travel from city to city with old drug ledgers in his wallet due to the risk that his past dealings would be discovered if he were arrested. While drug traffickers in certain instances might keep ledgers of their current drug operations on their person in order to keep track of their drug debtors, an experienced dealer keeps records of past transactions in a secure hiding place, not on his person, and destroys them at the earliest possible moment.\\nAgent Hehr also testified and explained that, based on his research and knowledge of the going price of cocaine in Milwaukee and New York during the time frame of the Milwaukee conspiracy, it was clear that the drug prices listed in Duarte’s notes were consistent with the then-current Milwaukee price of cocaine, but inconsistent with the then-current New York price.\\nFor example, Agent Hehr interpreted an entry in Duarte’s notes, “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500,” as recording a single $59,500 sale of 70 ounces of cocaine priced at $850 per ounce. He then went on to testify that this $850 figure in the notes was consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices at the time of the charged conspiracy in June 1990 but inconsistent with the lower cocaine prices prevalent in New York. In the context of all the circumstances in this case, Hehr explained, these facts are convincing proof that the notes reflect cocaine sales made in the course of the defendant’s June 1990 Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\\nThe defendant’s only challenge and response to this evidence was merely to dispute the credibility of Hehr’s testimony.\\nDuarte argued, for example, that although the $850 figure in his notation “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” might be consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices, it was also consistent with New York single-ounce prices, and that in fact it would make better economic sense to construe this entry as referring to 70 unrelated New York single-ounce sales. The defendant, in his attempt to undermine Agent Hehr’s testimony, pointed to the trial testimony of Detective Górecki of the Milwaukee police, whose estimate of Milwaukee kilo prices was lower than the figure provided by Agent Hehr.\\nAfter listening to the testimony and arguments of counsel, the district court once again concluded that the defendant’s drug notes reflected transactions that 1) involved 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, and 2) were part of the same drug conspiracy for which the defendant had been convicted.\\nThe court initially found that Duarte’s drug notes, together with the expert testimony of Agent Hehr, demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte was responsible for 6.5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nThe sentencing judge next turned to the question of whether there was enough evidence to find that the transactions involving these 6.5 kilograms were part of the same course of conduct as the conspiracy for which Duarte was convicted. Here the court indicated that it was less impressed with Hehr’s testimony that drug dealers do not keep old drug notes on their person when traveling than it was with his testimony that the prices in Duarte’s notes reflected the cost of cocaine in Milwaukee during the same time period as the crimes for which the defendant was-convicted. The court explained:\\n“Well, I know that I don’t clear my wallet out every month, and I don’t think you can draw any time conclusions really from what a guy carries in his wallet ... [but] ... I think that the difference in the market or going price of cocaine in either ounce quantities or multi-ounce quantities between New York and Milwaukee gives us a very strong indication that the transactions occurred in Milwaukee or in this geographical area and hence were a part of the conspiracy of conviction here rather than a conspiracy in New York or Boston or anywhere else Mr. Duarte may have been carrying on his business.”\\nDuring his comments combined with his findings of fact, the district court stressed the credibility of the testimony offered by the government’s expert witness. It stated that:\\n“Let the record show that the Court having studied carefully the mandate of the 7th Circuit and their concerns with reference to the calculation of the amount of cocaine that Mr. Duarte is responsible for and having the benefit of further testimony this day plus a good deal of clarification from both counsel and the witness, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Duarte was, in fact, a heavy cocaine dealer.”\\nThe district court also stated that it believed Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the known practices of sophisticated drug dealers, and that it found the defendant to fit that profile. In the district court’s words:\\n“I was struck as I went over the notes and the history of the case again with the fact that this must have been a very sophisticated arrangement because Mr. Arroyo, who was the fellow that was actually in the actual presence of the cocaine, was totally separate from the man who brought it here — the different rooms and in different motels, and there was nothing that was particularly on its face incriminating except the notes in Mr. Duarte’s hotel room.\\n“He consented to a search all of which is consistent in the Court’s mind with a very — I hate to use the word professional in terms of cocaine distribution, but a sophisticated, experienced distributor of cocaine.\\n“I have no problem with the two-point enhancement that was assessed at the time of the original sentence for Mr. Duarte being a leader in the conspiracy.”\\nThus, based upon the totality of the evidence, the trial court again assigned Duarte a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34, and resentenced him to 180-month concurrent terms in prison.\\nVI. Discussion\\nWe will not upset a trial court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines so long as the court has correctly applied them to findings of fact that were not clearly erroneous. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. Moreover, the factual finding at issue in this case — that Duarte’s drug notes were part of the same conspiracy for which he was convicted — is resolved in the first instance by the district court’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable to all elements of the crime itself. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263.\\nHere the defendant offered no contrary evidence against which Agent Hehr’s testimony might have been weighed. Yet Duarte’s sole argument, at sentencing and on appeal, is that it would be clear error to give credence to Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the going prices of drugs in June 1990 and the factual inferences that may be made therefrom. According to the defendant, not only did Hehr have no reason to believe that the drug notes concerned the defendant’s Milwaukee drug conspiracy rather than similar but unrelated drug conspiracies he may have been operating in New York, there was no reason to limit the possibilities to just those two cities. For example, Duarte argued that because he maintains a home in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and has recently visited Chicago, his notes might well refer to his separate drug operations in one of those cities. Such self-serving speculation seems designed to raise doubts in the mind of the trier of fact. But we are a court of appeals, and not a trier of fact, and we have held that “[t]he district court, as the trier of fact, not only has the authority but is in the best position to determine the amount of narcotics attributable to the conspiracy or any member of it.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1502 (7th Cir.1993).\\nIn fact, we doubt that the appellant’s tactic of challenging the prosecution to rebut each and every one of his speculative and hypothetical theories would succeed even if we were to apply the reasonable doubt standard at sentencing hearings rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard.\\nWe have held that “[t]he view that the prosecution must answer all questions and remove all doubts ... of course is not the law because that would be impossible; the proof need only satisfy reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1511 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 599 (D.C.Cir.1967) (former Chief Justice Burger dissenting)).\\nSimilarly, “[i]f the government proves its case by circumstantial evidence, ‘it need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno^ cence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ... The trier of fact is free to choose among various reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1510 (quoting United States v. Radtke, 799 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.1986)).\\nNevertheless, in arguing that we must overturn the sentencing court’s fact-finding in the present case, Duarte has adopted a strategy remarkably similar to that rejected by the former Chief Justice in Borum:\\n“[T]he mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the case from the jury:\\n‘If the judge were to direct acquittal whenever in his opinion the evidence failed to exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, he would preempt the functions of the jury. Under such a rule, the judge would have to be convinced of guilt beyond peradventure of doubt before the jury would be permitted to consider the case. That is not the place of the jury in criminal procedure. They are the judges of facts and ... not merely a device for checking upon the conclusions of the judge.’ ”\\nBorum, 380 F.2d at 599 (former Chief Justice Burger, dissenting) (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947)).\\nOf course, in the sentencing aspect of the case before us, the government is not required to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard of proof; rather, it only must meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.\\nWe hold that the district court addressed the concerns the panel expressed in Duarte I. First, it is undisputed that Agent Hehr has 20 years of experience investigating, analyzing, and testifying concerning drug operations such as the one directed by Duarte. An educated professional, Hehr’s formal training with the DEA has been supplemented, if not exceeded, by his training and experience on the streets during the course of hundreds of undercover assignments and thousands of interviews of drug suspects. His record, as far as we can discern, is unblemished. He testified in this case solely in his capacity as an expert witness who had had no involvement whatsoever in the particular investigations that led to the defendant’s arrest.\\nSecond, Hehr’s testimony is entirely plausible. Certainly the district court was acting within the core of its fact-finding powers when it found this veteran agent’s testimony regarding Milwaukee and New York drug sales data to be more credible than the alternative, speculative and self-serving theories put forth by the defense, theories asserted without a thread of supporting testimony or evidence. A sentencing judge’s determinations of credibility are entitled to great deference on review. United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1992).\\nFinally, as we noted earlier, the defendant finds it highly significant that Detective Go-recki’s trial testimony regarding Milwaukee drug prices differed from Agent Hehr’s testimony. But we see nothing unusual in the trial court’s finding that Hehr’s expert testimony was entitled to more weight than Detective Gorecki’s good faith, but non-expert, estimate of Milwaukee drug prices. Agent Hehr’s testimony (that Milwaukee drug prices during the relevant time period were consistent with those in Duarte’s drug notes) was based not only upon his broad experience and knowledge, but also upon his detailed research. Detective Górecki, on the other hand, did not claim to have undertaken any such research. Moreover, while the conspiracy at issue in this case took place on the south side of a large metropolitan city, the detective’s expertise, according to Hehr’s un-contradicted testimony at resentencing, was limited to the drug prices charged in one small section of the City of Milwaukee — the north side:\\nQ: Now you know Detective Górecki, right?\\nHehr: Yes, I do.\\nQ: He’s pretty knowledgeable about the drug trade, isn’t he?\\nHehr: Detective Gorecki’s expertise lies on the north side of Milwaukee, yes, but he’s very, very knowledgeable.\\nThe trial judge, after hearing the testimony of both officers, obviously found Agent Hehr’s testimony to be more convincing and more credible and thus relied on it. We have stated before that the sentencing judge “has the best ‘opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements,’ as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d at 1497 (quoting Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992)).\\nIn applying the clearly erroneous standard, we will not reverse a sentencing judge’s factual determination unless it is “without foundation.” United States v. Bias, 947 F.2d 1320, 1328 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir.1989)). In the case before us, a rational fact-finder could well have been persuaded by Agent Hehr’s testimony that Duarte’s drug notes reflected June 1990 Milwaukee cocaine prices and therefore were part of the same course of conduct that led to his June 1990 Milwaukee arrest for trafficking in 1.177 kilograms.\\nIn summary, mindful that in reviewing the factual findings of a sentencing court we apply the clearly erroneous standard, we conclude that the district court has satisfactorily addressed the Duarte I panel’s concerns on remand. The sentencing judge determined (and the appellant’s brief concedes) that there was sufficient evidence before the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte’s drug notes reflected transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The court also found that the testimony of the government’s expert witness established by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions were part of the Milwaukee conspiracy for which the defendant was convicted. Neither factual finding was clearly erroneous.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, Duarte’s sentence is\\nAffirmed.\\n. Detectives Górecki and Wilke had Arroyo under surveillance during four such round-trips.\\n. Among other things, although Duarte claimed to be in Milwaukee to book singing acts, he knew of only one Milwaukee nightclub, was unable to name any Milwaukee singing acts, and gave .police a false home address.\\n.The defendant’s brief states that, \\\"for purposes of this appeal, Duarte does not challenge the [district court’s finding that the transactions reflected in his notes totalled over 5 kilograms]. Nor does he dispute ... that the drug notes reflect drug transactions.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 n. 3.\\n.Duarte has filed a pro se “Motion to Object to Brief of Appeal” in which he objects to his attorney's failure to make several attacks on the validity of his conviction in this sentencing appeal. We rendered a final judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction in United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and the defendant is therefore foreclosed by principles of res judicata from raising such issues now. See United States Secretary of Labor v. Cerro Copper Products Co., 795 F.2d 25, 26 (7th Cir.1986).\\nDuarte also objects to his attorney’s concession (found at 10 n. 3 of his brief) that his drug notes reflect more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. This concession was proper because Agent Hehr’s testimony at resentencing on the amount of drugs attributable to Duarte’s notes is uncontradicted.\\nFinally, Duarte's motion also asserts that the trial court failed to address his \\\"Motion in Opposition to Presentence Report” alerting the trial court to generalized \\\"misinformation” allegedly within the report. The record discloses that this allegation is without merit. The transcript from the defendant’s first sentencing hearing reflects that the sentencing court went over each of the defendant’s objections to the presentence report individually and concluded by stating \\\"I would adopt the factual statements contained in the presentence report as to which there are no objections. And to those which have been raised, the Court has resolved them [against the defendant].” In addition, a reading of the transcript makes clear that the trial court permitted the defendant to raise his objections again on resentencing. Thus, the record is clear that the defendant’s objections to the presentence report have been addressed, not once, but twice, and that in each instance the trial court found them to be without merit.\\n. In the Sentencing Commission's Commentary to the Guidelines, two or more offenses are said to constitute part of a common scheme or plan if they are \\\"substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.\\\" U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment, (n. 9(A)) Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are \\\"sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3, comment, (n. 9(B)) Factors relevant to whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other include \\\"the degree of similarity of the offenses and the time interval between the offenses.” Id.\\n. Had the sentencing judge held the appellant responsible for only the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine that the police seized at the time of his arrest and the count he was charged and convicted of, he would have been assigned a base offense level of 26. Increasing the offense level by two points to reflect Duarte's supervision of the underlying conspiracy would have produced a total offense level of 28 for a sentencing range of 78-97 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1(c).\\n. The district court found that Duarte had supervised the conspiracy and thus imposed a two-point upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c). Duarte does not challenge this upward adjustment.\\n. Because the Duarte I panel had some doubts about the government’s calculations at the first sentencing hearing, the government decided to use a different approach at resentencing. The results are similar, and, as we will discuss later in this opinion, the quantity of cocaine reflected in the drug notes is no longer at issue.\\n.Agent Hehr explained that a far greater supply of cocaine is available in New York because it is a \\\"source city” for cocaine smuggled from abroad.\\n. Hehr also testified that drug dealers typically offer customers a volume discount. Thus the per-ounce price of cocaine paid by a purchaser of a single ounce would be higher than the per-ounce price paid by a purchaser of 70 ounces, and, given the lower New York cocaine prices, a single, undiscounted ounce of cocaine in New York could be priced as low as the discount price offered to multi-ounce purchasers in Milwaukee.\\n. Duarte argued that 70 ounces is slightly less than 2 kilograms of cocaine, and that, according to Hehr’s own trial testimony, 2 kilos would sell in Milwaukee for between $48,000-$58,000. No one, Duarte argued, would purchase 70 ounces for $59,500 when they could purchase 2 kilos for $48,000-$58,000. Therefore, he concluded, in order to make economic sense, the entry \\\"70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” must refer to 70 New York single-ounce transactions unrelated to the Milwaukee conspiracy.\\nThis argument, raised for the first time at re-sentencing, proved to be unpersuasive not only to the sentencing judge, but also to us. For it is pure speculation to argue that no mid-level Milwaukee drug dealer would be willing to purchase cocaine from Duarte for $850 per ounce in order to resell it for $1,000 per ounce (the single-ounce price in Milwaukee during the time frame of the conspiracy according to Hehr’s uncontradicted testimony at resentencing).\\n.Whereas Agent Hehr testified at trial that his research showed kilos were selling for $24,000-$29,000 in Milwaukee in June 1990, Detective Górecki had estimated at trial that a kilo would have sold for $15,000-$20,000. As we discuss later, this apparent disagreement is understandable given the fact that Górecki was only familiar with drug prices in but one section of the city of Milwaukee.\\n. As already discussed, Agent Hehr also testified on resentencing that drug notes found on experienced drug dealers are virtually certain to reflect current and local sales rather than old or distant ones. Although not necessary to our decision to affirm in this case, we think this expert testimony, when combined with the other evidence in this case, provides further support for the district judge's finding that the drug transactions reflected in Duarte's notes were part of his ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Milwaukee area. Evidence that might be insufficient when considered in isolation may become quite relevant when considered in light of all the other evidence. As we cautioned last term, \\\"Although ... each piece of evidence alone may not support a finding, [we must] consider the aggregate effect of the evidence presented to the district court.\\\" United States v. Villarreal, 977 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir.1992) (emphasis added).\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"COFFEY, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"Stephen J. Liecione, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI (argued), for plaintiff-appellee.\", \"Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Jeffrey N. Costa-kos (argued), Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, for defendant-appellant.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant.\\nNo. 92-3417.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nArgued April 14, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 9, 1993.\\nStephen J. Liecione, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI (argued), for plaintiff-appellee.\\nThomas L. Shriner, Jr., Jeffrey N. Costa-kos (argued), Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, for defendant-appellant.\\nBefore COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.\\nHon. Paul H. Roney, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COFFEY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RONEY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 644"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-09\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCOFFEY, Circuit Judge.\nBienvenido Duarte was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A jury convicted him on both counts, and the U.S. district court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 180 months in prison pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, we affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing. United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (“Duarte I”). On remand, the district court conducted a new sentencing hearing and resentenced the defendant to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison.\nDuarte appeals the resentencing. We affirm.\nI. The Conspiracy\nWe summarize the facts discussed in more detail in Duarte I (see 950 F.2d at 1257-58). On June 22, 1990, Milwaukee police received a tip from a reliable informant that the appellant and several eo-eonspirators had arrived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from New York City with a kilogram of cocaine. The informant advised that these individuals were staying in Room 234 of the Howard Johnson’s motel at 1716 W. Layton Avenue in Milwaukee. Upon investigation, officers from the Milwaukee police department were able to uncover facts corroborating the informant’s tip. They discovered that Room 234 had been rented five days earlier under the name of Maria Gonzales, who had given as her residence an address of a vacant, boarded-up home. Furthermore, a car parked immediately outside her motel room (234) bore New York license plates that were registered to another vehicle.\nAfter placing Room 234 in the Howard Johnson’s motel under surveillance, Milwaukee detectives Thomas Górecki and Alan Wilke observed a man (later identified as Modesto Arroyo) leave the room and drive to a nearby Exel Inn at 1201 W. College Avenue, where he remained for about two hours before returning to the room in the Howard Johnson’s motel.\nWhen the Milwaukee police arrested Arroyo, they found a key to Room 207 of the Exel Inn lying on the floor of his car. Uniformed officers entered this room to make sure no suspects were inside. Although detectives Górecki and Wilke waited in the hallway, they could see a large brick of cocaine inside the room. The detectives then stationed officers outside this Exel motel room until they could obtain a search warrant. A search of the room pursuant to the warrant later uncovered drug paraphernalia and 1.177 kilograms of cocaine.\nMeanwhile, Detectives Górecki and Wilke returned to the Howard Johnson’s motel, knocked on the door of Room 234, and were admitted by a man who identified himself as Antonio De La Cruz. Duarte was also present in Room 234 and gave the police permission to search the room. This consent search uncovered a pager with a New York phone number and a wallet containing notes written in Spanish that appeared to the officers to reflect large drug transactions. Duarte claimed ownership of the wallet and pager, but was both untruthful and evasive when questioned about his presence in Milwaukee.\nDuarte was arrested with Arroyo and charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine and with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram.\nAt Duarte’s trial, the government introduced expert testimony by DEA Special Agent William C. Hehr that the notes found in the defendant’s wallet were drug ledgers that provided evidence of his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1258. The case was submitted to a jury on November 16, 1990, and guilty verdicts were returned the same day.\nII. Issues\nOn January 22, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Duarte to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. On remand for resentencing on August 13, 1992, the court reimposed this sentence after again finding Duarte responsible for more than 5 kilograms.\nIn this appeal from resentencing, the defendant’s brief concedes that his drug notes record transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The remaining issue is whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the defendant trafficked in this cocaine as part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee drug conspiracy for which he was convicted.\nIII. The First Sentencing Hearing\nDuarte’s first sentencing hearing was conducted on January 22, 1991. The government’s expert witness testified that Duarte’s drug ledgers established his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine in June 1990, when the going price in New York for a kilo of cocaine was approximately $20,000. The government divided the value of the defendant’s cocaine ($117,000) by the kilo price he paid ($20,000) and determined that he was responsible for more than 5 kilograms during the time frame of the conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. The sentencing court disagreed with Duarte’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to hold him responsible for any drugs other than the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine seized at the Exel Inn, and it proceeded to sentence him on the basis of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\nPursuant to Guidelines §§ lB1.3(a)(2) and 3D1.2(d), the sentencing courts are directed to “increase a defendant’s base offense level to account for ‘relevant conduct,’ which includes drugs from any acts that ‘were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’ as the convicted offense, regardless of whether the defendant was charged with or convicted of carrying out those acts.” Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 274,112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990)). This so-called “aggregation rule” exposed Duarte to significantly harsher penalties than would otherwise have been applicable. Because the government’s conspiracy evidence concerning Duarte convinced the court that he was involved in more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, the Sentencing Guidelines assigned him a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34 for a sentencing range of 151-188 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c).\nIV. Duarte I\nThis court remanded this case for resen-tencing on December 10, 1991, because it believed that the trial judge conceivably might have erred in calculating Duarte’s base offense level on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\nThe Duarte I panel stated that it would reserve judgment on 1) whether Duarte was responsible for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, and 2) whether the transactions recorded in his drug notes were part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1266.\nV. Resentencing\nAt his resentencing hearing on August 13, 1992, the defendant argued that because the government failed to establish that his drug notes did not reflect hypothetical past drug deals in New York or other cities, it could not prove that his notes were connected to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\nThe government once again called upon its expert witness, DEA Agent Hehr, to interpret Duarte’s drug notes. Testifying from the notes, Hehr initially described how the defendant had listed his income (from reselling cocaine in single-ounce and multi-ounce quantities) against his expenses (incurred in buying cocaine at wholesale prices). Hehr testified that these notations in the defendant’s drug ledgers demonstrated transactions involving 291 ounces of cocaine, or 6.5 kilograms.\nThe government also had Agent Hehr give a more detailed explanation of the basis for his opinion that the drug sales recorded in Duarte’s notes were part of the same course of conduct as the crimes for which he had been convicted.\nAgent Hehr testified that, based on his twenty years of experience in the infamous world of drugs, drug notes found in a dealer’s wallet usually reflect current and local drug deals rather than old or distant ones, and the drug notes in Duarte’s wallet at the time of his arrest thus relate to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy. According to Hehr, it would have been foolish for the defendant, an experienced drug dealer, to travel from city to city with old drug ledgers in his wallet due to the risk that his past dealings would be discovered if he were arrested. While drug traffickers in certain instances might keep ledgers of their current drug operations on their person in order to keep track of their drug debtors, an experienced dealer keeps records of past transactions in a secure hiding place, not on his person, and destroys them at the earliest possible moment.\nAgent Hehr also testified and explained that, based on his research and knowledge of the going price of cocaine in Milwaukee and New York during the time frame of the Milwaukee conspiracy, it was clear that the drug prices listed in Duarte’s notes were consistent with the then-current Milwaukee price of cocaine, but inconsistent with the then-current New York price.\nFor example, Agent Hehr interpreted an entry in Duarte’s notes, “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500,” as recording a single $59,500 sale of 70 ounces of cocaine priced at $850 per ounce. He then went on to testify that this $850 figure in the notes was consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices at the time of the charged conspiracy in June 1990 but inconsistent with the lower cocaine prices prevalent in New York. In the context of all the circumstances in this case, Hehr explained, these facts are convincing proof that the notes reflect cocaine sales made in the course of the defendant’s June 1990 Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\nThe defendant’s only challenge and response to this evidence was merely to dispute the credibility of Hehr’s testimony.\nDuarte argued, for example, that although the $850 figure in his notation “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” might be consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices, it was also consistent with New York single-ounce prices, and that in fact it would make better economic sense to construe this entry as referring to 70 unrelated New York single-ounce sales. The defendant, in his attempt to undermine Agent Hehr’s testimony, pointed to the trial testimony of Detective Górecki of the Milwaukee police, whose estimate of Milwaukee kilo prices was lower than the figure provided by Agent Hehr.\nAfter listening to the testimony and arguments of counsel, the district court once again concluded that the defendant’s drug notes reflected transactions that 1) involved 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, and 2) were part of the same drug conspiracy for which the defendant had been convicted.\nThe court initially found that Duarte’s drug notes, together with the expert testimony of Agent Hehr, demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte was responsible for 6.5 kilograms of cocaine.\nThe sentencing judge next turned to the question of whether there was enough evidence to find that the transactions involving these 6.5 kilograms were part of the same course of conduct as the conspiracy for which Duarte was convicted. Here the court indicated that it was less impressed with Hehr’s testimony that drug dealers do not keep old drug notes on their person when traveling than it was with his testimony that the prices in Duarte’s notes reflected the cost of cocaine in Milwaukee during the same time period as the crimes for which the defendant was-convicted. The court explained:\n“Well, I know that I don’t clear my wallet out every month, and I don’t think you can draw any time conclusions really from what a guy carries in his wallet ... [but] ... I think that the difference in the market or going price of cocaine in either ounce quantities or multi-ounce quantities between New York and Milwaukee gives us a very strong indication that the transactions occurred in Milwaukee or in this geographical area and hence were a part of the conspiracy of conviction here rather than a conspiracy in New York or Boston or anywhere else Mr. Duarte may have been carrying on his business.”\nDuring his comments combined with his findings of fact, the district court stressed the credibility of the testimony offered by the government’s expert witness. It stated that:\n“Let the record show that the Court having studied carefully the mandate of the 7th Circuit and their concerns with reference to the calculation of the amount of cocaine that Mr. Duarte is responsible for and having the benefit of further testimony this day plus a good deal of clarification from both counsel and the witness, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Duarte was, in fact, a heavy cocaine dealer.”\nThe district court also stated that it believed Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the known practices of sophisticated drug dealers, and that it found the defendant to fit that profile. In the district court’s words:\n“I was struck as I went over the notes and the history of the case again with the fact that this must have been a very sophisticated arrangement because Mr. Arroyo, who was the fellow that was actually in the actual presence of the cocaine, was totally separate from the man who brought it here — the different rooms and in different motels, and there was nothing that was particularly on its face incriminating except the notes in Mr. Duarte’s hotel room.\n“He consented to a search all of which is consistent in the Court’s mind with a very — I hate to use the word professional in terms of cocaine distribution, but a sophisticated, experienced distributor of cocaine.\n“I have no problem with the two-point enhancement that was assessed at the time of the original sentence for Mr. Duarte being a leader in the conspiracy.”\nThus, based upon the totality of the evidence, the trial court again assigned Duarte a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34, and resentenced him to 180-month concurrent terms in prison.\nVI. Discussion\nWe will not upset a trial court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines so long as the court has correctly applied them to findings of fact that were not clearly erroneous. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. Moreover, the factual finding at issue in this case — that Duarte’s drug notes were part of the same conspiracy for which he was convicted — is resolved in the first instance by the district court’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable to all elements of the crime itself. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263.\nHere the defendant offered no contrary evidence against which Agent Hehr’s testimony might have been weighed. Yet Duarte’s sole argument, at sentencing and on appeal, is that it would be clear error to give credence to Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the going prices of drugs in June 1990 and the factual inferences that may be made therefrom. According to the defendant, not only did Hehr have no reason to believe that the drug notes concerned the defendant’s Milwaukee drug conspiracy rather than similar but unrelated drug conspiracies he may have been operating in New York, there was no reason to limit the possibilities to just those two cities. For example, Duarte argued that because he maintains a home in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and has recently visited Chicago, his notes might well refer to his separate drug operations in one of those cities. Such self-serving speculation seems designed to raise doubts in the mind of the trier of fact. But we are a court of appeals, and not a trier of fact, and we have held that “[t]he district court, as the trier of fact, not only has the authority but is in the best position to determine the amount of narcotics attributable to the conspiracy or any member of it.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1502 (7th Cir.1993).\nIn fact, we doubt that the appellant’s tactic of challenging the prosecution to rebut each and every one of his speculative and hypothetical theories would succeed even if we were to apply the reasonable doubt standard at sentencing hearings rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard.\nWe have held that “[t]he view that the prosecution must answer all questions and remove all doubts ... of course is not the law because that would be impossible; the proof need only satisfy reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1511 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 599 (D.C.Cir.1967) (former Chief Justice Burger dissenting)).\nSimilarly, “[i]f the government proves its case by circumstantial evidence, ‘it need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno^ cence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ... The trier of fact is free to choose among various reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1510 (quoting United States v. Radtke, 799 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.1986)).\nNevertheless, in arguing that we must overturn the sentencing court’s fact-finding in the present case, Duarte has adopted a strategy remarkably similar to that rejected by the former Chief Justice in Borum:\n“[T]he mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the case from the jury:\n‘If the judge were to direct acquittal whenever in his opinion the evidence failed to exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, he would preempt the functions of the jury. Under such a rule, the judge would have to be convinced of guilt beyond peradventure of doubt before the jury would be permitted to consider the case. That is not the place of the jury in criminal procedure. They are the judges of facts and ... not merely a device for checking upon the conclusions of the judge.’ ”\nBorum, 380 F.2d at 599 (former Chief Justice Burger, dissenting) (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947)).\nOf course, in the sentencing aspect of the case before us, the government is not required to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard of proof; rather, it only must meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.\nWe hold that the district court addressed the concerns the panel expressed in Duarte I. First, it is undisputed that Agent Hehr has 20 years of experience investigating, analyzing, and testifying concerning drug operations such as the one directed by Duarte. An educated professional, Hehr’s formal training with the DEA has been supplemented, if not exceeded, by his training and experience on the streets during the course of hundreds of undercover assignments and thousands of interviews of drug suspects. His record, as far as we can discern, is unblemished. He testified in this case solely in his capacity as an expert witness who had had no involvement whatsoever in the particular investigations that led to the defendant’s arrest.\nSecond, Hehr’s testimony is entirely plausible. Certainly the district court was acting within the core of its fact-finding powers when it found this veteran agent’s testimony regarding Milwaukee and New York drug sales data to be more credible than the alternative, speculative and self-serving theories put forth by the defense, theories asserted without a thread of supporting testimony or evidence. A sentencing judge’s determinations of credibility are entitled to great deference on review. United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1992).\nFinally, as we noted earlier, the defendant finds it highly significant that Detective Go-recki’s trial testimony regarding Milwaukee drug prices differed from Agent Hehr’s testimony. But we see nothing unusual in the trial court’s finding that Hehr’s expert testimony was entitled to more weight than Detective Gorecki’s good faith, but non-expert, estimate of Milwaukee drug prices. Agent Hehr’s testimony (that Milwaukee drug prices during the relevant time period were consistent with those in Duarte’s drug notes) was based not only upon his broad experience and knowledge, but also upon his detailed research. Detective Górecki, on the other hand, did not claim to have undertaken any such research. Moreover, while the conspiracy at issue in this case took place on the south side of a large metropolitan city, the detective’s expertise, according to Hehr’s un-contradicted testimony at resentencing, was limited to the drug prices charged in one small section of the City of Milwaukee — the north side:\nQ: Now you know Detective Górecki, right?\nHehr: Yes, I do.\nQ: He’s pretty knowledgeable about the drug trade, isn’t he?\nHehr: Detective Gorecki’s expertise lies on the north side of Milwaukee, yes, but he’s very, very knowledgeable.\nThe trial judge, after hearing the testimony of both officers, obviously found Agent Hehr’s testimony to be more convincing and more credible and thus relied on it. We have stated before that the sentencing judge “has the best ‘opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements,’ as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d at 1497 (quoting Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992)).\nIn applying the clearly erroneous standard, we will not reverse a sentencing judge’s factual determination unless it is “without foundation.” United States v. Bias, 947 F.2d 1320, 1328 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir.1989)). In the case before us, a rational fact-finder could well have been persuaded by Agent Hehr’s testimony that Duarte’s drug notes reflected June 1990 Milwaukee cocaine prices and therefore were part of the same course of conduct that led to his June 1990 Milwaukee arrest for trafficking in 1.177 kilograms.\nIn summary, mindful that in reviewing the factual findings of a sentencing court we apply the clearly erroneous standard, we conclude that the district court has satisfactorily addressed the Duarte I panel’s concerns on remand. The sentencing judge determined (and the appellant’s brief concedes) that there was sufficient evidence before the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte’s drug notes reflected transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The court also found that the testimony of the government’s expert witness established by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions were part of the Milwaukee conspiracy for which the defendant was convicted. Neither factual finding was clearly erroneous.\nFor the foregoing reasons, Duarte’s sentence is\nAffirmed.\n. Detectives Górecki and Wilke had Arroyo under surveillance during four such round-trips.\n. Among other things, although Duarte claimed to be in Milwaukee to book singing acts, he knew of only one Milwaukee nightclub, was unable to name any Milwaukee singing acts, and gave .police a false home address.\n.The defendant’s brief states that, \"for purposes of this appeal, Duarte does not challenge the [district court’s finding that the transactions reflected in his notes totalled over 5 kilograms]. Nor does he dispute ... that the drug notes reflect drug transactions.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 n. 3.\n.Duarte has filed a pro se “Motion to Object to Brief of Appeal” in which he objects to his attorney's failure to make several attacks on the validity of his conviction in this sentencing appeal. We rendered a final judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction in United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and the defendant is therefore foreclosed by principles of res judicata from raising such issues now. See United States Secretary of Labor v. Cerro Copper Products Co., 795 F.2d 25, 26 (7th Cir.1986).\nDuarte also objects to his attorney’s concession (found at 10 n. 3 of his brief) that his drug notes reflect more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. This concession was proper because Agent Hehr’s testimony at resentencing on the amount of drugs attributable to Duarte’s notes is uncontradicted.\nFinally, Duarte's motion also asserts that the trial court failed to address his \"Motion in Opposition to Presentence Report” alerting the trial court to generalized \"misinformation” allegedly within the report. The record discloses that this allegation is without merit. The transcript from the defendant’s first sentencing hearing reflects that the sentencing court went over each of the defendant’s objections to the presentence report individually and concluded by stating \"I would adopt the factual statements contained in the presentence report as to which there are no objections. And to those which have been raised, the Court has resolved them [against the defendant].” In addition, a reading of the transcript makes clear that the trial court permitted the defendant to raise his objections again on resentencing. Thus, the record is clear that the defendant’s objections to the presentence report have been addressed, not once, but twice, and that in each instance the trial court found them to be without merit.\n. In the Sentencing Commission's Commentary to the Guidelines, two or more offenses are said to constitute part of a common scheme or plan if they are \"substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.\" U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment, (n. 9(A)) Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are \"sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3, comment, (n. 9(B)) Factors relevant to whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other include \"the degree of similarity of the offenses and the time interval between the offenses.” Id.\n. Had the sentencing judge held the appellant responsible for only the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine that the police seized at the time of his arrest and the count he was charged and convicted of, he would have been assigned a base offense level of 26. Increasing the offense level by two points to reflect Duarte's supervision of the underlying conspiracy would have produced a total offense level of 28 for a sentencing range of 78-97 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1(c).\n. The district court found that Duarte had supervised the conspiracy and thus imposed a two-point upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c). Duarte does not challenge this upward adjustment.\n. Because the Duarte I panel had some doubts about the government’s calculations at the first sentencing hearing, the government decided to use a different approach at resentencing. The results are similar, and, as we will discuss later in this opinion, the quantity of cocaine reflected in the drug notes is no longer at issue.\n.Agent Hehr explained that a far greater supply of cocaine is available in New York because it is a \"source city” for cocaine smuggled from abroad.\n. Hehr also testified that drug dealers typically offer customers a volume discount. Thus the per-ounce price of cocaine paid by a purchaser of a single ounce would be higher than the per-ounce price paid by a purchaser of 70 ounces, and, given the lower New York cocaine prices, a single, undiscounted ounce of cocaine in New York could be priced as low as the discount price offered to multi-ounce purchasers in Milwaukee.\n. Duarte argued that 70 ounces is slightly less than 2 kilograms of cocaine, and that, according to Hehr’s own trial testimony, 2 kilos would sell in Milwaukee for between $48,000-$58,000. No one, Duarte argued, would purchase 70 ounces for $59,500 when they could purchase 2 kilos for $48,000-$58,000. Therefore, he concluded, in order to make economic sense, the entry \"70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” must refer to 70 New York single-ounce transactions unrelated to the Milwaukee conspiracy.\nThis argument, raised for the first time at re-sentencing, proved to be unpersuasive not only to the sentencing judge, but also to us. For it is pure speculation to argue that no mid-level Milwaukee drug dealer would be willing to purchase cocaine from Duarte for $850 per ounce in order to resell it for $1,000 per ounce (the single-ounce price in Milwaukee during the time frame of the conspiracy according to Hehr’s uncontradicted testimony at resentencing).\n.Whereas Agent Hehr testified at trial that his research showed kilos were selling for $24,000-$29,000 in Milwaukee in June 1990, Detective Górecki had estimated at trial that a kilo would have sold for $15,000-$20,000. As we discuss later, this apparent disagreement is understandable given the fact that Górecki was only familiar with drug prices in but one section of the city of Milwaukee.\n. As already discussed, Agent Hehr also testified on resentencing that drug notes found on experienced drug dealers are virtually certain to reflect current and local sales rather than old or distant ones. Although not necessary to our decision to affirm in this case, we think this expert testimony, when combined with the other evidence in this case, provides further support for the district judge's finding that the drug transactions reflected in Duarte's notes were part of his ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Milwaukee area. Evidence that might be insufficient when considered in isolation may become quite relevant when considered in light of all the other evidence. As we cautioned last term, \"Although ... each piece of evidence alone may not support a finding, [we must] consider the aggregate effect of the evidence presented to the district court.\" United States v. Villarreal, 977 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir.1992) (emphasis added).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCOFFEY, Circuit Judge.\\nBienvenido Duarte was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A jury convicted him on both counts, and the U.S. district court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 180 months in prison pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, we affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing. United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (“Duarte I”). On remand, the district court conducted a new sentencing hearing and resentenced the defendant to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison.\\nDuarte appeals the resentencing. We affirm.\\nI. The Conspiracy\\nWe summarize the facts discussed in more detail in Duarte I (see 950 F.2d at 1257-58). On June 22, 1990, Milwaukee police received a tip from a reliable informant that the appellant and several eo-eonspirators had arrived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from New York City with a kilogram of cocaine. The informant advised that these individuals were staying in Room 234 of the Howard Johnson’s motel at 1716 W. Layton Avenue in Milwaukee. Upon investigation, officers from the Milwaukee police department were able to uncover facts corroborating the informant’s tip. They discovered that Room 234 had been rented five days earlier under the name of Maria Gonzales, who had given as her residence an address of a vacant, boarded-up home. Furthermore, a car parked immediately outside her motel room (234) bore New York license plates that were registered to another vehicle.\\nAfter placing Room 234 in the Howard Johnson’s motel under surveillance, Milwaukee detectives Thomas Górecki and Alan Wilke observed a man (later identified as Modesto Arroyo) leave the room and drive to a nearby Exel Inn at 1201 W. College Avenue, where he remained for about two hours before returning to the room in the Howard Johnson’s motel.\\nWhen the Milwaukee police arrested Arroyo, they found a key to Room 207 of the Exel Inn lying on the floor of his car. Uniformed officers entered this room to make sure no suspects were inside. Although detectives Górecki and Wilke waited in the hallway, they could see a large brick of cocaine inside the room. The detectives then stationed officers outside this Exel motel room until they could obtain a search warrant. A search of the room pursuant to the warrant later uncovered drug paraphernalia and 1.177 kilograms of cocaine.\\nMeanwhile, Detectives Górecki and Wilke returned to the Howard Johnson’s motel, knocked on the door of Room 234, and were admitted by a man who identified himself as Antonio De La Cruz. Duarte was also present in Room 234 and gave the police permission to search the room. This consent search uncovered a pager with a New York phone number and a wallet containing notes written in Spanish that appeared to the officers to reflect large drug transactions. Duarte claimed ownership of the wallet and pager, but was both untruthful and evasive when questioned about his presence in Milwaukee.\\nDuarte was arrested with Arroyo and charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilogram of cocaine and with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 1 kilogram.\\nAt Duarte’s trial, the government introduced expert testimony by DEA Special Agent William C. Hehr that the notes found in the defendant’s wallet were drug ledgers that provided evidence of his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1258. The case was submitted to a jury on November 16, 1990, and guilty verdicts were returned the same day.\\nII. Issues\\nOn January 22, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Duarte to two concurrent 180-month terms in prison on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. On remand for resentencing on August 13, 1992, the court reimposed this sentence after again finding Duarte responsible for more than 5 kilograms.\\nIn this appeal from resentencing, the defendant’s brief concedes that his drug notes record transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The remaining issue is whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the defendant trafficked in this cocaine as part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee drug conspiracy for which he was convicted.\\nIII. The First Sentencing Hearing\\nDuarte’s first sentencing hearing was conducted on January 22, 1991. The government’s expert witness testified that Duarte’s drug ledgers established his responsibility for $117,000 worth of cocaine in June 1990, when the going price in New York for a kilo of cocaine was approximately $20,000. The government divided the value of the defendant’s cocaine ($117,000) by the kilo price he paid ($20,000) and determined that he was responsible for more than 5 kilograms during the time frame of the conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. The sentencing court disagreed with Duarte’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to hold him responsible for any drugs other than the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine seized at the Exel Inn, and it proceeded to sentence him on the basis of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nPursuant to Guidelines §§ lB1.3(a)(2) and 3D1.2(d), the sentencing courts are directed to “increase a defendant’s base offense level to account for ‘relevant conduct,’ which includes drugs from any acts that ‘were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’ as the convicted offense, regardless of whether the defendant was charged with or convicted of carrying out those acts.” Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 274,112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990)). This so-called “aggregation rule” exposed Duarte to significantly harsher penalties than would otherwise have been applicable. Because the government’s conspiracy evidence concerning Duarte convinced the court that he was involved in more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, the Sentencing Guidelines assigned him a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34 for a sentencing range of 151-188 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c).\\nIV. Duarte I\\nThis court remanded this case for resen-tencing on December 10, 1991, because it believed that the trial judge conceivably might have erred in calculating Duarte’s base offense level on the basis of his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nThe Duarte I panel stated that it would reserve judgment on 1) whether Duarte was responsible for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, and 2) whether the transactions recorded in his drug notes were part of the same course of conduct as the Milwaukee conspiracy. See Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1266.\\nV. Resentencing\\nAt his resentencing hearing on August 13, 1992, the defendant argued that because the government failed to establish that his drug notes did not reflect hypothetical past drug deals in New York or other cities, it could not prove that his notes were connected to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\\nThe government once again called upon its expert witness, DEA Agent Hehr, to interpret Duarte’s drug notes. Testifying from the notes, Hehr initially described how the defendant had listed his income (from reselling cocaine in single-ounce and multi-ounce quantities) against his expenses (incurred in buying cocaine at wholesale prices). Hehr testified that these notations in the defendant’s drug ledgers demonstrated transactions involving 291 ounces of cocaine, or 6.5 kilograms.\\nThe government also had Agent Hehr give a more detailed explanation of the basis for his opinion that the drug sales recorded in Duarte’s notes were part of the same course of conduct as the crimes for which he had been convicted.\\nAgent Hehr testified that, based on his twenty years of experience in the infamous world of drugs, drug notes found in a dealer’s wallet usually reflect current and local drug deals rather than old or distant ones, and the drug notes in Duarte’s wallet at the time of his arrest thus relate to the Milwaukee drug conspiracy. According to Hehr, it would have been foolish for the defendant, an experienced drug dealer, to travel from city to city with old drug ledgers in his wallet due to the risk that his past dealings would be discovered if he were arrested. While drug traffickers in certain instances might keep ledgers of their current drug operations on their person in order to keep track of their drug debtors, an experienced dealer keeps records of past transactions in a secure hiding place, not on his person, and destroys them at the earliest possible moment.\\nAgent Hehr also testified and explained that, based on his research and knowledge of the going price of cocaine in Milwaukee and New York during the time frame of the Milwaukee conspiracy, it was clear that the drug prices listed in Duarte’s notes were consistent with the then-current Milwaukee price of cocaine, but inconsistent with the then-current New York price.\\nFor example, Agent Hehr interpreted an entry in Duarte’s notes, “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500,” as recording a single $59,500 sale of 70 ounces of cocaine priced at $850 per ounce. He then went on to testify that this $850 figure in the notes was consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices at the time of the charged conspiracy in June 1990 but inconsistent with the lower cocaine prices prevalent in New York. In the context of all the circumstances in this case, Hehr explained, these facts are convincing proof that the notes reflect cocaine sales made in the course of the defendant’s June 1990 Milwaukee drug conspiracy.\\nThe defendant’s only challenge and response to this evidence was merely to dispute the credibility of Hehr’s testimony.\\nDuarte argued, for example, that although the $850 figure in his notation “70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” might be consistent with Milwaukee multi-ounce prices, it was also consistent with New York single-ounce prices, and that in fact it would make better economic sense to construe this entry as referring to 70 unrelated New York single-ounce sales. The defendant, in his attempt to undermine Agent Hehr’s testimony, pointed to the trial testimony of Detective Górecki of the Milwaukee police, whose estimate of Milwaukee kilo prices was lower than the figure provided by Agent Hehr.\\nAfter listening to the testimony and arguments of counsel, the district court once again concluded that the defendant’s drug notes reflected transactions that 1) involved 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, and 2) were part of the same drug conspiracy for which the defendant had been convicted.\\nThe court initially found that Duarte’s drug notes, together with the expert testimony of Agent Hehr, demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte was responsible for 6.5 kilograms of cocaine.\\nThe sentencing judge next turned to the question of whether there was enough evidence to find that the transactions involving these 6.5 kilograms were part of the same course of conduct as the conspiracy for which Duarte was convicted. Here the court indicated that it was less impressed with Hehr’s testimony that drug dealers do not keep old drug notes on their person when traveling than it was with his testimony that the prices in Duarte’s notes reflected the cost of cocaine in Milwaukee during the same time period as the crimes for which the defendant was-convicted. The court explained:\\n“Well, I know that I don’t clear my wallet out every month, and I don’t think you can draw any time conclusions really from what a guy carries in his wallet ... [but] ... I think that the difference in the market or going price of cocaine in either ounce quantities or multi-ounce quantities between New York and Milwaukee gives us a very strong indication that the transactions occurred in Milwaukee or in this geographical area and hence were a part of the conspiracy of conviction here rather than a conspiracy in New York or Boston or anywhere else Mr. Duarte may have been carrying on his business.”\\nDuring his comments combined with his findings of fact, the district court stressed the credibility of the testimony offered by the government’s expert witness. It stated that:\\n“Let the record show that the Court having studied carefully the mandate of the 7th Circuit and their concerns with reference to the calculation of the amount of cocaine that Mr. Duarte is responsible for and having the benefit of further testimony this day plus a good deal of clarification from both counsel and the witness, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Duarte was, in fact, a heavy cocaine dealer.”\\nThe district court also stated that it believed Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the known practices of sophisticated drug dealers, and that it found the defendant to fit that profile. In the district court’s words:\\n“I was struck as I went over the notes and the history of the case again with the fact that this must have been a very sophisticated arrangement because Mr. Arroyo, who was the fellow that was actually in the actual presence of the cocaine, was totally separate from the man who brought it here — the different rooms and in different motels, and there was nothing that was particularly on its face incriminating except the notes in Mr. Duarte’s hotel room.\\n“He consented to a search all of which is consistent in the Court’s mind with a very — I hate to use the word professional in terms of cocaine distribution, but a sophisticated, experienced distributor of cocaine.\\n“I have no problem with the two-point enhancement that was assessed at the time of the original sentence for Mr. Duarte being a leader in the conspiracy.”\\nThus, based upon the totality of the evidence, the trial court again assigned Duarte a base offense level of 32 and a total offense level of 34, and resentenced him to 180-month concurrent terms in prison.\\nVI. Discussion\\nWe will not upset a trial court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines so long as the court has correctly applied them to findings of fact that were not clearly erroneous. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1262. Moreover, the factual finding at issue in this case — that Duarte’s drug notes were part of the same conspiracy for which he was convicted — is resolved in the first instance by the district court’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable to all elements of the crime itself. Duarte I, 950 F.2d at 1263.\\nHere the defendant offered no contrary evidence against which Agent Hehr’s testimony might have been weighed. Yet Duarte’s sole argument, at sentencing and on appeal, is that it would be clear error to give credence to Agent Hehr’s testimony regarding the going prices of drugs in June 1990 and the factual inferences that may be made therefrom. According to the defendant, not only did Hehr have no reason to believe that the drug notes concerned the defendant’s Milwaukee drug conspiracy rather than similar but unrelated drug conspiracies he may have been operating in New York, there was no reason to limit the possibilities to just those two cities. For example, Duarte argued that because he maintains a home in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and has recently visited Chicago, his notes might well refer to his separate drug operations in one of those cities. Such self-serving speculation seems designed to raise doubts in the mind of the trier of fact. But we are a court of appeals, and not a trier of fact, and we have held that “[t]he district court, as the trier of fact, not only has the authority but is in the best position to determine the amount of narcotics attributable to the conspiracy or any member of it.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1502 (7th Cir.1993).\\nIn fact, we doubt that the appellant’s tactic of challenging the prosecution to rebut each and every one of his speculative and hypothetical theories would succeed even if we were to apply the reasonable doubt standard at sentencing hearings rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard.\\nWe have held that “[t]he view that the prosecution must answer all questions and remove all doubts ... of course is not the law because that would be impossible; the proof need only satisfy reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1511 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 599 (D.C.Cir.1967) (former Chief Justice Burger dissenting)).\\nSimilarly, “[i]f the government proves its case by circumstantial evidence, ‘it need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno^ cence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ... The trier of fact is free to choose among various reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1510 (quoting United States v. Radtke, 799 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.1986)).\\nNevertheless, in arguing that we must overturn the sentencing court’s fact-finding in the present case, Duarte has adopted a strategy remarkably similar to that rejected by the former Chief Justice in Borum:\\n“[T]he mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the case from the jury:\\n‘If the judge were to direct acquittal whenever in his opinion the evidence failed to exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, he would preempt the functions of the jury. Under such a rule, the judge would have to be convinced of guilt beyond peradventure of doubt before the jury would be permitted to consider the case. That is not the place of the jury in criminal procedure. They are the judges of facts and ... not merely a device for checking upon the conclusions of the judge.’ ”\\nBorum, 380 F.2d at 599 (former Chief Justice Burger, dissenting) (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947)).\\nOf course, in the sentencing aspect of the case before us, the government is not required to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard of proof; rather, it only must meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.\\nWe hold that the district court addressed the concerns the panel expressed in Duarte I. First, it is undisputed that Agent Hehr has 20 years of experience investigating, analyzing, and testifying concerning drug operations such as the one directed by Duarte. An educated professional, Hehr’s formal training with the DEA has been supplemented, if not exceeded, by his training and experience on the streets during the course of hundreds of undercover assignments and thousands of interviews of drug suspects. His record, as far as we can discern, is unblemished. He testified in this case solely in his capacity as an expert witness who had had no involvement whatsoever in the particular investigations that led to the defendant’s arrest.\\nSecond, Hehr’s testimony is entirely plausible. Certainly the district court was acting within the core of its fact-finding powers when it found this veteran agent’s testimony regarding Milwaukee and New York drug sales data to be more credible than the alternative, speculative and self-serving theories put forth by the defense, theories asserted without a thread of supporting testimony or evidence. A sentencing judge’s determinations of credibility are entitled to great deference on review. United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1992).\\nFinally, as we noted earlier, the defendant finds it highly significant that Detective Go-recki’s trial testimony regarding Milwaukee drug prices differed from Agent Hehr’s testimony. But we see nothing unusual in the trial court’s finding that Hehr’s expert testimony was entitled to more weight than Detective Gorecki’s good faith, but non-expert, estimate of Milwaukee drug prices. Agent Hehr’s testimony (that Milwaukee drug prices during the relevant time period were consistent with those in Duarte’s drug notes) was based not only upon his broad experience and knowledge, but also upon his detailed research. Detective Górecki, on the other hand, did not claim to have undertaken any such research. Moreover, while the conspiracy at issue in this case took place on the south side of a large metropolitan city, the detective’s expertise, according to Hehr’s un-contradicted testimony at resentencing, was limited to the drug prices charged in one small section of the City of Milwaukee — the north side:\\nQ: Now you know Detective Górecki, right?\\nHehr: Yes, I do.\\nQ: He’s pretty knowledgeable about the drug trade, isn’t he?\\nHehr: Detective Gorecki’s expertise lies on the north side of Milwaukee, yes, but he’s very, very knowledgeable.\\nThe trial judge, after hearing the testimony of both officers, obviously found Agent Hehr’s testimony to be more convincing and more credible and thus relied on it. We have stated before that the sentencing judge “has the best ‘opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements,’ as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record.” United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d at 1497 (quoting Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992)).\\nIn applying the clearly erroneous standard, we will not reverse a sentencing judge’s factual determination unless it is “without foundation.” United States v. Bias, 947 F.2d 1320, 1328 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir.1989)). In the case before us, a rational fact-finder could well have been persuaded by Agent Hehr’s testimony that Duarte’s drug notes reflected June 1990 Milwaukee cocaine prices and therefore were part of the same course of conduct that led to his June 1990 Milwaukee arrest for trafficking in 1.177 kilograms.\\nIn summary, mindful that in reviewing the factual findings of a sentencing court we apply the clearly erroneous standard, we conclude that the district court has satisfactorily addressed the Duarte I panel’s concerns on remand. The sentencing judge determined (and the appellant’s brief concedes) that there was sufficient evidence before the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte’s drug notes reflected transactions involving more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. The court also found that the testimony of the government’s expert witness established by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions were part of the Milwaukee conspiracy for which the defendant was convicted. Neither factual finding was clearly erroneous.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, Duarte’s sentence is\\nAffirmed.\\n. Detectives Górecki and Wilke had Arroyo under surveillance during four such round-trips.\\n. Among other things, although Duarte claimed to be in Milwaukee to book singing acts, he knew of only one Milwaukee nightclub, was unable to name any Milwaukee singing acts, and gave .police a false home address.\\n.The defendant’s brief states that, \\\"for purposes of this appeal, Duarte does not challenge the [district court’s finding that the transactions reflected in his notes totalled over 5 kilograms]. Nor does he dispute ... that the drug notes reflect drug transactions.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 n. 3.\\n.Duarte has filed a pro se “Motion to Object to Brief of Appeal” in which he objects to his attorney's failure to make several attacks on the validity of his conviction in this sentencing appeal. We rendered a final judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction in United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and the defendant is therefore foreclosed by principles of res judicata from raising such issues now. See United States Secretary of Labor v. Cerro Copper Products Co., 795 F.2d 25, 26 (7th Cir.1986).\\nDuarte also objects to his attorney’s concession (found at 10 n. 3 of his brief) that his drug notes reflect more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. This concession was proper because Agent Hehr’s testimony at resentencing on the amount of drugs attributable to Duarte’s notes is uncontradicted.\\nFinally, Duarte's motion also asserts that the trial court failed to address his \\\"Motion in Opposition to Presentence Report” alerting the trial court to generalized \\\"misinformation” allegedly within the report. The record discloses that this allegation is without merit. The transcript from the defendant’s first sentencing hearing reflects that the sentencing court went over each of the defendant’s objections to the presentence report individually and concluded by stating \\\"I would adopt the factual statements contained in the presentence report as to which there are no objections. And to those which have been raised, the Court has resolved them [against the defendant].” In addition, a reading of the transcript makes clear that the trial court permitted the defendant to raise his objections again on resentencing. Thus, the record is clear that the defendant’s objections to the presentence report have been addressed, not once, but twice, and that in each instance the trial court found them to be without merit.\\n. In the Sentencing Commission's Commentary to the Guidelines, two or more offenses are said to constitute part of a common scheme or plan if they are \\\"substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.\\\" U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment, (n. 9(A)) Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are \\\"sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3, comment, (n. 9(B)) Factors relevant to whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other include \\\"the degree of similarity of the offenses and the time interval between the offenses.” Id.\\n. Had the sentencing judge held the appellant responsible for only the 1.177 kilograms of cocaine that the police seized at the time of his arrest and the count he was charged and convicted of, he would have been assigned a base offense level of 26. Increasing the offense level by two points to reflect Duarte's supervision of the underlying conspiracy would have produced a total offense level of 28 for a sentencing range of 78-97 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1(c).\\n. The district court found that Duarte had supervised the conspiracy and thus imposed a two-point upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c). Duarte does not challenge this upward adjustment.\\n. Because the Duarte I panel had some doubts about the government’s calculations at the first sentencing hearing, the government decided to use a different approach at resentencing. The results are similar, and, as we will discuss later in this opinion, the quantity of cocaine reflected in the drug notes is no longer at issue.\\n.Agent Hehr explained that a far greater supply of cocaine is available in New York because it is a \\\"source city” for cocaine smuggled from abroad.\\n. Hehr also testified that drug dealers typically offer customers a volume discount. Thus the per-ounce price of cocaine paid by a purchaser of a single ounce would be higher than the per-ounce price paid by a purchaser of 70 ounces, and, given the lower New York cocaine prices, a single, undiscounted ounce of cocaine in New York could be priced as low as the discount price offered to multi-ounce purchasers in Milwaukee.\\n. Duarte argued that 70 ounces is slightly less than 2 kilograms of cocaine, and that, according to Hehr’s own trial testimony, 2 kilos would sell in Milwaukee for between $48,000-$58,000. No one, Duarte argued, would purchase 70 ounces for $59,500 when they could purchase 2 kilos for $48,000-$58,000. Therefore, he concluded, in order to make economic sense, the entry \\\"70 sinta A 850 Hacen $59500” must refer to 70 New York single-ounce transactions unrelated to the Milwaukee conspiracy.\\nThis argument, raised for the first time at re-sentencing, proved to be unpersuasive not only to the sentencing judge, but also to us. For it is pure speculation to argue that no mid-level Milwaukee drug dealer would be willing to purchase cocaine from Duarte for $850 per ounce in order to resell it for $1,000 per ounce (the single-ounce price in Milwaukee during the time frame of the conspiracy according to Hehr’s uncontradicted testimony at resentencing).\\n.Whereas Agent Hehr testified at trial that his research showed kilos were selling for $24,000-$29,000 in Milwaukee in June 1990, Detective Górecki had estimated at trial that a kilo would have sold for $15,000-$20,000. As we discuss later, this apparent disagreement is understandable given the fact that Górecki was only familiar with drug prices in but one section of the city of Milwaukee.\\n. As already discussed, Agent Hehr also testified on resentencing that drug notes found on experienced drug dealers are virtually certain to reflect current and local sales rather than old or distant ones. Although not necessary to our decision to affirm in this case, we think this expert testimony, when combined with the other evidence in this case, provides further support for the district judge's finding that the drug transactions reflected in Duarte's notes were part of his ongoing conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Milwaukee area. Evidence that might be insufficient when considered in isolation may become quite relevant when considered in light of all the other evidence. As we cautioned last term, \\\"Although ... each piece of evidence alone may not support a finding, [we must] consider the aggregate effect of the evidence presented to the district court.\\\" United States v. Villarreal, 977 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir.1992) (emphasis added).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":91,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513220,"string":"10,513,220"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon \"Air\", an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Koppie v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3125"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.\"], \"parties\": [\"Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon “Air”, an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.\\nPlaintiff Chad M. Koppie sued Ligón “Air”, an Indiana partnership, and the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), over the ownership of a plane. Koppie claims that Ligón “Air” is in control of the aircraft, a Convair 880, which he rightly owns, and that the FAA took the wrong side in the dispute by issuing a Certificate of Registration to Ligón “Air” rather than to him. Plaintiff claims that these misdeeds by Ligón “Air” and the federal government cost him $667,-000, but the district judge was not convinced and neither are we. Koppie’s case against Ligón “Air” is based on diversity jurisdiction and his claim against the government is a federal question stemming from the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.\\nKoppie purchased, or thought he purchased, the Convair from Hudson General Corporation in 1987 for a mere $5,000, a strikingly good deal for an aircraft that originally cost $10 million. Hudson had obtained title through satisfaction of a garnishment lien against Ligón “Air”, which owed it money for storing and maintaining the plane. But unbeknownst to Koppie, the aircraft had made its way back into the hands of Ligón “Air” through a circuitous route. Koppie took ownership subject to the recorded interest of Cromwell State Bank, the original lienholder, and Cromwell assigned its interest to something called the “880 Partnership”, which then resold the plane to Ligón “Air”. Both the “880 Partnership” and Li-gón “Air” are owned by the same two people, Susan and Cliff Pettit. Koppie knew something was amiss when in June or July of 1987 he went to the airport to look after his plane and discovered Michael Potter, whom he thought was an agent for Ligón “Air”, working on the aircraft.\\nIn the meantime, Koppie had applied for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration from the FAA. On June 23,1987, he received a letter denying his request because of the conflicting claims over ownership. The letter said in part:\\nReview of the aircraft file indicates it was repossessed May 23, 1987, premised upon a security agreement, which was recorded by the FAA on July 9, 1982, and subsequently sold to Ligón Air, 105 West 2nd St., Ligonier, IN 46767. In view of the repossession and subsequent sale, we are unable to issue a certificate of aircraft registration in your name at this time. Having learned that his ownership of the plane was in serious dispute, Koppie signed two documents releasing whatever interests he might have had in the Convair in return for consideration of $36,000 from Michael Potter. Koppie eventually received and accepted the money, and the plane was flown to South Africa, where it remains.\\nThe district court granted Ligón “Air”’s motion for summary judgment in December 1991, but judgment was not officially rendered until August of 1992 (plaintiffs app. at 29). At that time the district judge also handed down an order and judgment granting the FAA’s motion for summary judgment. Koppie now claims that the release of his interests in the Convair was nullified by a subsequent document between him and Michael Potter and Western Continental Holdings, Ltd. But in that document Potter and Western Continental Holdings acknowledged that they have no interest of any kind in the plane. The document is thus meaningless. Clearly, it is impossible for a person who owns no interest in a piece of property to execute an agreement for consideration transferring ownership of the property to another. This is akin to the proverbial selling of the Brooklyn Bridge. Since the subsequent document has no validity, Koppie’s earlier decision to accept $36,000 for the relinquishment of all claims to the Convair prevents him from now complaining that he, not Ligón “Air”, owns the aircraft.\\nAs for the FAA, Koppie alleged in his first amended complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act that the agency wrongfully denied him a Certificate of Aircraft Registration and tortiously converted Koppie’s property. The major flaw in this argument is that merely registering an aircraft with the FAA does not determine ownership and has no legal effect. Under 49 U.S.C. § 1401(f), the purpose of registering a plane is to define its nationality for international travel, and the statute states explicitly: “Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of nationality for international purposes, but not in any proceeding under the laws of the United States. Registration shall not be evidence of ownership of aircraft in any proceeding [such as here] in which ownership by a particular person is, or may be an issue.” See Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1270 n. 13 (8th Cir.1982) (registration does not control questions of title). Since the registration does not even have effect in American courts, and the statute expressly forbids the kind of ownership claim made here based on certification, Kop-pie is clearly stretching credulity in arguing that the FAA harmed him with regard to ownership by failing to grant him, rather than Ligón “Air”, a certificate. In essence, such a certificate is worthless as far as proving ownership, and thus Koppie could not by definition have lost anything by its denial.\\nThe district court also held that Koppie’s claims against the FAA were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s exception for government officials performing discretionary functions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680, and by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because a summary judgment order had already been issued against Koppie in favor of Ligón “Air”. Having decided that the federal government is simply not liable in these circumstances for rendering an opinion about ownership, we need not reach these two issues. The judgments for both defendants are affirmed, but Ligón “Air” ’s motion for sanctions is denied because, although unsuccessful, plaintiffs appeal was not frivolous within the meaning of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.\\nThe United States was named as a defendant in the amended complaint while the original complaint incorrectly named the Federal Aviation Administration as a defendant. The government docs not challenge this error and indeed consented to the amendment (R. 11 reproduced in government's supplemental brief).\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"Dean E. Richards, Indianapolis, IN (argued), Vincent J. Backs, Beers, Mailers, Backs & Salin, Fort Wayne, IN, for Chad Koppie.\", \"Richard E. Steinbronn (argued), Deborah A. Lawrence, Barnes & Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, for Ligón “Air”.\", \"Robert A. Doehl, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Torts Branch, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for U.S. .\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon “Air”, an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees.\\nNo. 92-3125.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nArgued May 7, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 11, 1993.\\nDean E. Richards, Indianapolis, IN (argued), Vincent J. Backs, Beers, Mailers, Backs & Salin, Fort Wayne, IN, for Chad Koppie.\\nRichard E. Steinbronn (argued), Deborah A. Lawrence, Barnes & Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, for Ligón “Air”.\\nRobert A. Doehl, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Torts Branch, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for U.S. .\\nBefore BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CUMMINGS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 651"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon \"Air\", an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-11\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.\nPlaintiff Chad M. Koppie sued Ligón “Air”, an Indiana partnership, and the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), over the ownership of a plane. Koppie claims that Ligón “Air” is in control of the aircraft, a Convair 880, which he rightly owns, and that the FAA took the wrong side in the dispute by issuing a Certificate of Registration to Ligón “Air” rather than to him. Plaintiff claims that these misdeeds by Ligón “Air” and the federal government cost him $667,-000, but the district judge was not convinced and neither are we. Koppie’s case against Ligón “Air” is based on diversity jurisdiction and his claim against the government is a federal question stemming from the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.\nKoppie purchased, or thought he purchased, the Convair from Hudson General Corporation in 1987 for a mere $5,000, a strikingly good deal for an aircraft that originally cost $10 million. Hudson had obtained title through satisfaction of a garnishment lien against Ligón “Air”, which owed it money for storing and maintaining the plane. But unbeknownst to Koppie, the aircraft had made its way back into the hands of Ligón “Air” through a circuitous route. Koppie took ownership subject to the recorded interest of Cromwell State Bank, the original lienholder, and Cromwell assigned its interest to something called the “880 Partnership”, which then resold the plane to Ligón “Air”. Both the “880 Partnership” and Li-gón “Air” are owned by the same two people, Susan and Cliff Pettit. Koppie knew something was amiss when in June or July of 1987 he went to the airport to look after his plane and discovered Michael Potter, whom he thought was an agent for Ligón “Air”, working on the aircraft.\nIn the meantime, Koppie had applied for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration from the FAA. On June 23,1987, he received a letter denying his request because of the conflicting claims over ownership. The letter said in part:\nReview of the aircraft file indicates it was repossessed May 23, 1987, premised upon a security agreement, which was recorded by the FAA on July 9, 1982, and subsequently sold to Ligón Air, 105 West 2nd St., Ligonier, IN 46767. In view of the repossession and subsequent sale, we are unable to issue a certificate of aircraft registration in your name at this time. Having learned that his ownership of the plane was in serious dispute, Koppie signed two documents releasing whatever interests he might have had in the Convair in return for consideration of $36,000 from Michael Potter. Koppie eventually received and accepted the money, and the plane was flown to South Africa, where it remains.\nThe district court granted Ligón “Air”’s motion for summary judgment in December 1991, but judgment was not officially rendered until August of 1992 (plaintiffs app. at 29). At that time the district judge also handed down an order and judgment granting the FAA’s motion for summary judgment. Koppie now claims that the release of his interests in the Convair was nullified by a subsequent document between him and Michael Potter and Western Continental Holdings, Ltd. But in that document Potter and Western Continental Holdings acknowledged that they have no interest of any kind in the plane. The document is thus meaningless. Clearly, it is impossible for a person who owns no interest in a piece of property to execute an agreement for consideration transferring ownership of the property to another. This is akin to the proverbial selling of the Brooklyn Bridge. Since the subsequent document has no validity, Koppie’s earlier decision to accept $36,000 for the relinquishment of all claims to the Convair prevents him from now complaining that he, not Ligón “Air”, owns the aircraft.\nAs for the FAA, Koppie alleged in his first amended complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act that the agency wrongfully denied him a Certificate of Aircraft Registration and tortiously converted Koppie’s property. The major flaw in this argument is that merely registering an aircraft with the FAA does not determine ownership and has no legal effect. Under 49 U.S.C. § 1401(f), the purpose of registering a plane is to define its nationality for international travel, and the statute states explicitly: “Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of nationality for international purposes, but not in any proceeding under the laws of the United States. Registration shall not be evidence of ownership of aircraft in any proceeding [such as here] in which ownership by a particular person is, or may be an issue.” See Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1270 n. 13 (8th Cir.1982) (registration does not control questions of title). Since the registration does not even have effect in American courts, and the statute expressly forbids the kind of ownership claim made here based on certification, Kop-pie is clearly stretching credulity in arguing that the FAA harmed him with regard to ownership by failing to grant him, rather than Ligón “Air”, a certificate. In essence, such a certificate is worthless as far as proving ownership, and thus Koppie could not by definition have lost anything by its denial.\nThe district court also held that Koppie’s claims against the FAA were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s exception for government officials performing discretionary functions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680, and by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because a summary judgment order had already been issued against Koppie in favor of Ligón “Air”. Having decided that the federal government is simply not liable in these circumstances for rendering an opinion about ownership, we need not reach these two issues. The judgments for both defendants are affirmed, but Ligón “Air” ’s motion for sanctions is denied because, although unsuccessful, plaintiffs appeal was not frivolous within the meaning of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.\nThe United States was named as a defendant in the amended complaint while the original complaint incorrectly named the Federal Aviation Administration as a defendant. The government docs not challenge this error and indeed consented to the amendment (R. 11 reproduced in government's supplemental brief).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon \\\"Air\\\", an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.\\nPlaintiff Chad M. Koppie sued Ligón “Air”, an Indiana partnership, and the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), over the ownership of a plane. Koppie claims that Ligón “Air” is in control of the aircraft, a Convair 880, which he rightly owns, and that the FAA took the wrong side in the dispute by issuing a Certificate of Registration to Ligón “Air” rather than to him. Plaintiff claims that these misdeeds by Ligón “Air” and the federal government cost him $667,-000, but the district judge was not convinced and neither are we. Koppie’s case against Ligón “Air” is based on diversity jurisdiction and his claim against the government is a federal question stemming from the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.\\nKoppie purchased, or thought he purchased, the Convair from Hudson General Corporation in 1987 for a mere $5,000, a strikingly good deal for an aircraft that originally cost $10 million. Hudson had obtained title through satisfaction of a garnishment lien against Ligón “Air”, which owed it money for storing and maintaining the plane. But unbeknownst to Koppie, the aircraft had made its way back into the hands of Ligón “Air” through a circuitous route. Koppie took ownership subject to the recorded interest of Cromwell State Bank, the original lienholder, and Cromwell assigned its interest to something called the “880 Partnership”, which then resold the plane to Ligón “Air”. Both the “880 Partnership” and Li-gón “Air” are owned by the same two people, Susan and Cliff Pettit. Koppie knew something was amiss when in June or July of 1987 he went to the airport to look after his plane and discovered Michael Potter, whom he thought was an agent for Ligón “Air”, working on the aircraft.\\nIn the meantime, Koppie had applied for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration from the FAA. On June 23,1987, he received a letter denying his request because of the conflicting claims over ownership. The letter said in part:\\nReview of the aircraft file indicates it was repossessed May 23, 1987, premised upon a security agreement, which was recorded by the FAA on July 9, 1982, and subsequently sold to Ligón Air, 105 West 2nd St., Ligonier, IN 46767. In view of the repossession and subsequent sale, we are unable to issue a certificate of aircraft registration in your name at this time. Having learned that his ownership of the plane was in serious dispute, Koppie signed two documents releasing whatever interests he might have had in the Convair in return for consideration of $36,000 from Michael Potter. Koppie eventually received and accepted the money, and the plane was flown to South Africa, where it remains.\\nThe district court granted Ligón “Air”’s motion for summary judgment in December 1991, but judgment was not officially rendered until August of 1992 (plaintiffs app. at 29). At that time the district judge also handed down an order and judgment granting the FAA’s motion for summary judgment. Koppie now claims that the release of his interests in the Convair was nullified by a subsequent document between him and Michael Potter and Western Continental Holdings, Ltd. But in that document Potter and Western Continental Holdings acknowledged that they have no interest of any kind in the plane. The document is thus meaningless. Clearly, it is impossible for a person who owns no interest in a piece of property to execute an agreement for consideration transferring ownership of the property to another. This is akin to the proverbial selling of the Brooklyn Bridge. Since the subsequent document has no validity, Koppie’s earlier decision to accept $36,000 for the relinquishment of all claims to the Convair prevents him from now complaining that he, not Ligón “Air”, owns the aircraft.\\nAs for the FAA, Koppie alleged in his first amended complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act that the agency wrongfully denied him a Certificate of Aircraft Registration and tortiously converted Koppie’s property. The major flaw in this argument is that merely registering an aircraft with the FAA does not determine ownership and has no legal effect. Under 49 U.S.C. § 1401(f), the purpose of registering a plane is to define its nationality for international travel, and the statute states explicitly: “Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of nationality for international purposes, but not in any proceeding under the laws of the United States. Registration shall not be evidence of ownership of aircraft in any proceeding [such as here] in which ownership by a particular person is, or may be an issue.” See Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1270 n. 13 (8th Cir.1982) (registration does not control questions of title). Since the registration does not even have effect in American courts, and the statute expressly forbids the kind of ownership claim made here based on certification, Kop-pie is clearly stretching credulity in arguing that the FAA harmed him with regard to ownership by failing to grant him, rather than Ligón “Air”, a certificate. In essence, such a certificate is worthless as far as proving ownership, and thus Koppie could not by definition have lost anything by its denial.\\nThe district court also held that Koppie’s claims against the FAA were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s exception for government officials performing discretionary functions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680, and by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because a summary judgment order had already been issued against Koppie in favor of Ligón “Air”. Having decided that the federal government is simply not liable in these circumstances for rendering an opinion about ownership, we need not reach these two issues. The judgments for both defendants are affirmed, but Ligón “Air” ’s motion for sanctions is denied because, although unsuccessful, plaintiffs appeal was not frivolous within the meaning of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.\\nThe United States was named as a defendant in the amended complaint while the original complaint incorrectly named the Federal Aviation Administration as a defendant. The government docs not challenge this error and indeed consented to the amendment (R. 11 reproduced in government's supplemental brief).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":92,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513251,"string":"10,513,251"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Evans"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3147"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.\"], \"parties\": [\"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"PER CURIAM.\\nIn a state prosecution Ricky Evans was found guilty of participating in a criminal drug conspiracy, a Class X felony under Illinois law. He was sentenced to serve ten years in an Illinois prison. A year later Evans was indicted on federal drug conspiracy charges relating to the same conduct, to which he pleaded guilty. Under the Sentencing Guidelines Evans was eligible for a term of 121-151 months. Since he had already served twenty-three months in state prison for conduct taken into account when arriving at this range, the court subtracted twenty-three months from the bottom of the range and sentenced Evans to serve ninety-eight months, concurrent with his state sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). On appeal, Evans contends that he should have received good time credit against his federal sentence for the time he had already spent in state custody.\\nGuideline section 5G1.3(b) provides that when a defendant is serving “an undischarged term of imprisonment [that] resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.” The sentencing court applied section 5G1.3(b) correctly, following the example set forth in application note 2 to that section. That application note does not refer to good time at all, and there is no need for it to do so. The federal good time statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624, makes it clear that it is the Bureau of Prisons, not the court, that determines whether a federal prisoner should receive good time credit. Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211, 212 (11th Cir.1992) (“Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time credit.”); see 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(v). Cf. United States v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (Attorney General, not sentencing court, determines credit given for time spent in custody prior to commencement of the sentence); United States v. Dennis, 926 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir.1990) (same). Thus Evans must ask the Bureau of Prisons for the credit he seeks, and the district court did not err in refusing to award good time credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state custody.\\nAFFIRMED.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"PER CURIAM.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"K. Tate Chambers, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Peoria, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.\", \"Daniel G. O’Day, Cusack & Fleming, Peoria, IL, for defendant-appellant.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant.\\nNo. 92-3147.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nSubmitted July 7, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 11, 1993.\\nK. Tate Chambers, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Peoria, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.\\nDaniel G. O’Day, Cusack & Fleming, Peoria, IL, for defendant-appellant.\\nBefore CUMMINGS, COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.\\nAfter preliminary examination of the briefs, the court notified the parties that it had tentatively concluded that oral argument would not be helpful to the court in this case. The notice provided that any party might file a \\\"Statement as to Need of Oral Argument.” See Fed.R.App.P. 43(a); Circuit Rule 34(f). No such statement having been filed, the appeal has been submitted on the briefs and record.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CUMMINGS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COFFEY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 654"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-11\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPER CURIAM.\nIn a state prosecution Ricky Evans was found guilty of participating in a criminal drug conspiracy, a Class X felony under Illinois law. He was sentenced to serve ten years in an Illinois prison. A year later Evans was indicted on federal drug conspiracy charges relating to the same conduct, to which he pleaded guilty. Under the Sentencing Guidelines Evans was eligible for a term of 121-151 months. Since he had already served twenty-three months in state prison for conduct taken into account when arriving at this range, the court subtracted twenty-three months from the bottom of the range and sentenced Evans to serve ninety-eight months, concurrent with his state sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). On appeal, Evans contends that he should have received good time credit against his federal sentence for the time he had already spent in state custody.\nGuideline section 5G1.3(b) provides that when a defendant is serving “an undischarged term of imprisonment [that] resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.” The sentencing court applied section 5G1.3(b) correctly, following the example set forth in application note 2 to that section. That application note does not refer to good time at all, and there is no need for it to do so. The federal good time statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624, makes it clear that it is the Bureau of Prisons, not the court, that determines whether a federal prisoner should receive good time credit. Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211, 212 (11th Cir.1992) (“Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time credit.”); see 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(v). Cf. United States v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (Attorney General, not sentencing court, determines credit given for time spent in custody prior to commencement of the sentence); United States v. Dennis, 926 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir.1990) (same). Thus Evans must ask the Bureau of Prisons for the credit he seeks, and the district court did not err in refusing to award good time credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state custody.\nAFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPER CURIAM.\\nIn a state prosecution Ricky Evans was found guilty of participating in a criminal drug conspiracy, a Class X felony under Illinois law. He was sentenced to serve ten years in an Illinois prison. A year later Evans was indicted on federal drug conspiracy charges relating to the same conduct, to which he pleaded guilty. Under the Sentencing Guidelines Evans was eligible for a term of 121-151 months. Since he had already served twenty-three months in state prison for conduct taken into account when arriving at this range, the court subtracted twenty-three months from the bottom of the range and sentenced Evans to serve ninety-eight months, concurrent with his state sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). On appeal, Evans contends that he should have received good time credit against his federal sentence for the time he had already spent in state custody.\\nGuideline section 5G1.3(b) provides that when a defendant is serving “an undischarged term of imprisonment [that] resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.” The sentencing court applied section 5G1.3(b) correctly, following the example set forth in application note 2 to that section. That application note does not refer to good time at all, and there is no need for it to do so. The federal good time statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624, makes it clear that it is the Bureau of Prisons, not the court, that determines whether a federal prisoner should receive good time credit. Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211, 212 (11th Cir.1992) (“Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time credit.”); see 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(v). Cf. United States v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (Attorney General, not sentencing court, determines credit given for time spent in custody prior to commencement of the sentence); United States v. Dennis, 926 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir.1990) (same). Thus Evans must ask the Bureau of Prisons for the credit he seeks, and the district court did not err in refusing to award good time credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state custody.\\nAFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":93,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513299,"string":"10,513,299"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Schamel v. Textron-Lycoming"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-2336"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and HOLDERMAN, District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\\nThe plaintiff, the administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against a manufacturer of aircraft engines and parts, alleging that the company was liable for the plane crash resulting in her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the action sounded in product liability and was barred by the statute of repose in the Indiana Product Liability Act. We affirm.\\nI.\\nThe facts relevant to this appeal and taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are straightforward. On January 5, 1988, the plane which Jerry Brent Schamel was piloting crashed as a result of a fatigue failure in the number five connecting rod in the plane’s engine. Schamel died as a result of, the crash. The plane was a 1959 Piper Comanche, in which Schamel, his brother and a mechanic had installed a rebuilt, but previously damaged, 1959 Lycoming 540-A-1A5 engine. The connecting rods used in this engine were each designated Lycoming part # 71987.\\nOn December 11, 1989, Brenda Schamel, the wife of the deceased, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this action in Indiana circuit coui’t for wrongful death. Brenda alleged that Textron-Lycoming, a manufacturer of reciprocating (piston-driven) engines and the manufacturer of the connecting rod in question, was liable for her husband’s death because (1) Textron-Lycoming manufactured and sold defective and unreasonably dangerous connecting rods, (2) it was negligent in the manufacture and design of the rods and (3) Textron-Lycoming failed to exercise due care in discharging its obligations with respect to the proper procedures for overhauling the engine.\\nThe defendant removed this action to federal court on diversity grounds, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The uncontradicted evidence submitted by Textron-Lycoming showed that Ly-coming discontinued manufacturing connecting rods having part #71987 in February 1964; that Lycoming connecting rods were sold exclusively by Lycoming distributors; that connecting rod part # 71987 was last sold by Lycoming to its distributors in March, 1970; that part # 71987 was not included in Lycoming’s 1974 Parts List and thus was not available for purchase from Lycoming distributors after 1974; and that a substitute rod assembly design with a different part number was provided to users and consumers after 1973. Therefore, the latest that the part could have been sold was 1973- — sixteen years before the commencement of the present action. Consequently, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs wrongful death action was barred by Indiana’s statute of repose, which precludes product liability claims not brought within ten years of the time the product was initially delivered or sold.\\nThe district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appeals. She alleges that one count of her complaint was not a product liability claim, but rather a claim under § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and thus, not barred by the Indiana statute of repose. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that part # 71987 could not have been sold after 1973. The plaintiff suggests that a part could have stayed on one of the distributor’s shelves to be sold after 1979 — bringing the present action within the ten-year window provided by the Indiana statute of repose.\\nII.\\nThe Indiana Product Liability Act provides that\\nany product liability action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the cause of action accrues more than eight years but not more than ten years after the initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues.\\nInd.Code § 33-1-1.5-5. The “or” in the first clause of the passage quoted above has been interpreted in the conjunctive, barring all actions occurring more than ten years after initial delivery of a product. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1981).\\nThe plaintiff first contends that one of her claims was not a product liability claim but an action based on § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, thus, that the statute of repose did not apply to this claim. Section 324A provides, in sum, that, when a person either gratuitously or for consideration provides services to another, he must exercise reasonable care or risk liability. See Perry v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 433 N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind.App.1982). As evidence of her § 324A claim, the plaintiff points to the amended complaint, which alleges that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in providing adequate information to individuals overhauling its engines. This post-sale negligence — specifically, the failure to develop and to provide service or fatigue limits for its connecting rods in its overhaul and service manuals — she urges, is not within the scope of the Products Liability Act.\\nIt may be that a § 324A action is not a products liability suit for purposes of the Indiana Products Liability Act, since it may be that, under Indiana Law, the injury does not result from the manufacture, construction or design of a product, but rather from the voluntarily undertaken post-sale negligent acts. See Baker v. Midland-Ross Corp., 508 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.App.1987) (permitting suit against manufacturer for post-sale negligence pursuant to § 324A even though accident occurred sixteen years after sale). We need not address that issue, however, because the plaintiff has not alleged a § 324A action. The provision of service manuals and other sources of service information is not a separate and discrete, post-sale undertaking pursuant to § 324A; rather, such information is generally necessary to satisfy the manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (10th Cir.1991); Windle Turley, Aviation Litigation § 2.09, at 70 (1986) (“Aircraft manufacturers ordinarily satisfy their postsale duty to warn through the issuance of service bulletins or service letters.” (emphasis in original)).\\nIn her amended complaint and in her brief, the plaintiff acknowledges that the defendant had a duty to provide the service information and, thus, the provision of such information was not a voluntary undertaking distinct from the obligations inherent in the initial sale of the product. Accordingly, the plaintiff merely alleges that the defendant breached its continuing duty to warn by not establishing a safe fatigue life for the connecting rods. As Dague makes clear, however, “an action for damages resulting from the alleged failure of a manufacturer or seller to warn a user of its product’s latently defective nature is certainly a product liability action [and covered by the Product Liability Act and its statute of repose].” Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 212. Consequently, the district court was correct in holding this claim barred.\\nFinally, we reject the plaintiffs contention that the evidence does not support the award of summary judgment because the defendant did not establish that a part was not left on a distributor’s shelf even after Lycoming discontinued part #71987. A defendant need not rebut any and every possible factual scenario in order to obtain summary judgment. Rather, once the defendant had shown that it stopped distributing the part in 1973, it became incumbent upon the plaintiff to create an issue of fact by making an evidentiary showing to the contrary. She did not. Her belated, unsupported hypothesis of parts in the pipeline is, in short, too little, too late.\\nIII.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\nAffirmed.\\n. § 324A states:\\nOne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if\\n(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or\\n(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or\\n(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.\\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1977).\\n. For example, count III of the Amended Complaint alleged \\\"That the defendants are required to adequately inform mechanics in the field as to the procedures to be followed to safely overhaul its engines.” Moreover, paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Amended Contentions provided:\\n6. That the defendant has an obligation to provide adequate information in an accessible and usable form concerning the guidelines to be followed in overhauling and servicing its engines, and that obligation is continuing as to all engines the defendant has manufactured that continue in service.\\nFinally, in her brief, the plaintiff summarized, \\\"[i]n short, the defendant has not met its obligation to mechanics who service its engines to determine the safe service life of its connecting rods.”\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"David V. Scott (argued), New Albany, IN, for plaintiff-appellant.\", \"Ann E. Fulks, J. Bissell Roberts (argued), Stites & Harbison, Louisville, KY, Cecile A. Blau, Jeffersonville, IN, for defendant-appel-lee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. 92-2336.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nArgued Jan. 19, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 12, 1993.\\nDavid V. Scott (argued), New Albany, IN, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nAnn E. Fulks, J. Bissell Roberts (argued), Stites & Harbison, Louisville, KY, Cecile A. Blau, Jeffersonville, IN, for defendant-appel-lee.\\nBefore CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and HOLDERMAN, District Judge.\\nThe Honorable James F. Holderman, District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CUDAHY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HOLDERMAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 655"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-12\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\nThe plaintiff, the administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against a manufacturer of aircraft engines and parts, alleging that the company was liable for the plane crash resulting in her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the action sounded in product liability and was barred by the statute of repose in the Indiana Product Liability Act. We affirm.\nI.\nThe facts relevant to this appeal and taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are straightforward. On January 5, 1988, the plane which Jerry Brent Schamel was piloting crashed as a result of a fatigue failure in the number five connecting rod in the plane’s engine. Schamel died as a result of, the crash. The plane was a 1959 Piper Comanche, in which Schamel, his brother and a mechanic had installed a rebuilt, but previously damaged, 1959 Lycoming 540-A-1A5 engine. The connecting rods used in this engine were each designated Lycoming part # 71987.\nOn December 11, 1989, Brenda Schamel, the wife of the deceased, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this action in Indiana circuit coui’t for wrongful death. Brenda alleged that Textron-Lycoming, a manufacturer of reciprocating (piston-driven) engines and the manufacturer of the connecting rod in question, was liable for her husband’s death because (1) Textron-Lycoming manufactured and sold defective and unreasonably dangerous connecting rods, (2) it was negligent in the manufacture and design of the rods and (3) Textron-Lycoming failed to exercise due care in discharging its obligations with respect to the proper procedures for overhauling the engine.\nThe defendant removed this action to federal court on diversity grounds, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The uncontradicted evidence submitted by Textron-Lycoming showed that Ly-coming discontinued manufacturing connecting rods having part #71987 in February 1964; that Lycoming connecting rods were sold exclusively by Lycoming distributors; that connecting rod part # 71987 was last sold by Lycoming to its distributors in March, 1970; that part # 71987 was not included in Lycoming’s 1974 Parts List and thus was not available for purchase from Lycoming distributors after 1974; and that a substitute rod assembly design with a different part number was provided to users and consumers after 1973. Therefore, the latest that the part could have been sold was 1973- — sixteen years before the commencement of the present action. Consequently, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs wrongful death action was barred by Indiana’s statute of repose, which precludes product liability claims not brought within ten years of the time the product was initially delivered or sold.\nThe district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appeals. She alleges that one count of her complaint was not a product liability claim, but rather a claim under § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and thus, not barred by the Indiana statute of repose. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that part # 71987 could not have been sold after 1973. The plaintiff suggests that a part could have stayed on one of the distributor’s shelves to be sold after 1979 — bringing the present action within the ten-year window provided by the Indiana statute of repose.\nII.\nThe Indiana Product Liability Act provides that\nany product liability action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the cause of action accrues more than eight years but not more than ten years after the initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues.\nInd.Code § 33-1-1.5-5. The “or” in the first clause of the passage quoted above has been interpreted in the conjunctive, barring all actions occurring more than ten years after initial delivery of a product. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1981).\nThe plaintiff first contends that one of her claims was not a product liability claim but an action based on § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, thus, that the statute of repose did not apply to this claim. Section 324A provides, in sum, that, when a person either gratuitously or for consideration provides services to another, he must exercise reasonable care or risk liability. See Perry v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 433 N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind.App.1982). As evidence of her § 324A claim, the plaintiff points to the amended complaint, which alleges that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in providing adequate information to individuals overhauling its engines. This post-sale negligence — specifically, the failure to develop and to provide service or fatigue limits for its connecting rods in its overhaul and service manuals — she urges, is not within the scope of the Products Liability Act.\nIt may be that a § 324A action is not a products liability suit for purposes of the Indiana Products Liability Act, since it may be that, under Indiana Law, the injury does not result from the manufacture, construction or design of a product, but rather from the voluntarily undertaken post-sale negligent acts. See Baker v. Midland-Ross Corp., 508 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.App.1987) (permitting suit against manufacturer for post-sale negligence pursuant to § 324A even though accident occurred sixteen years after sale). We need not address that issue, however, because the plaintiff has not alleged a § 324A action. The provision of service manuals and other sources of service information is not a separate and discrete, post-sale undertaking pursuant to § 324A; rather, such information is generally necessary to satisfy the manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (10th Cir.1991); Windle Turley, Aviation Litigation § 2.09, at 70 (1986) (“Aircraft manufacturers ordinarily satisfy their postsale duty to warn through the issuance of service bulletins or service letters.” (emphasis in original)).\nIn her amended complaint and in her brief, the plaintiff acknowledges that the defendant had a duty to provide the service information and, thus, the provision of such information was not a voluntary undertaking distinct from the obligations inherent in the initial sale of the product. Accordingly, the plaintiff merely alleges that the defendant breached its continuing duty to warn by not establishing a safe fatigue life for the connecting rods. As Dague makes clear, however, “an action for damages resulting from the alleged failure of a manufacturer or seller to warn a user of its product’s latently defective nature is certainly a product liability action [and covered by the Product Liability Act and its statute of repose].” Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 212. Consequently, the district court was correct in holding this claim barred.\nFinally, we reject the plaintiffs contention that the evidence does not support the award of summary judgment because the defendant did not establish that a part was not left on a distributor’s shelf even after Lycoming discontinued part #71987. A defendant need not rebut any and every possible factual scenario in order to obtain summary judgment. Rather, once the defendant had shown that it stopped distributing the part in 1973, it became incumbent upon the plaintiff to create an issue of fact by making an evidentiary showing to the contrary. She did not. Her belated, unsupported hypothesis of parts in the pipeline is, in short, too little, too late.\nIII.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\nAffirmed.\n. § 324A states:\nOne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if\n(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or\n(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or\n(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1977).\n. For example, count III of the Amended Complaint alleged \"That the defendants are required to adequately inform mechanics in the field as to the procedures to be followed to safely overhaul its engines.” Moreover, paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Amended Contentions provided:\n6. That the defendant has an obligation to provide adequate information in an accessible and usable form concerning the guidelines to be followed in overhauling and servicing its engines, and that obligation is continuing as to all engines the defendant has manufactured that continue in service.\nFinally, in her brief, the plaintiff summarized, \"[i]n short, the defendant has not met its obligation to mechanics who service its engines to determine the safe service life of its connecting rods.”\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\\nThe plaintiff, the administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against a manufacturer of aircraft engines and parts, alleging that the company was liable for the plane crash resulting in her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the action sounded in product liability and was barred by the statute of repose in the Indiana Product Liability Act. We affirm.\\nI.\\nThe facts relevant to this appeal and taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are straightforward. On January 5, 1988, the plane which Jerry Brent Schamel was piloting crashed as a result of a fatigue failure in the number five connecting rod in the plane’s engine. Schamel died as a result of, the crash. The plane was a 1959 Piper Comanche, in which Schamel, his brother and a mechanic had installed a rebuilt, but previously damaged, 1959 Lycoming 540-A-1A5 engine. The connecting rods used in this engine were each designated Lycoming part # 71987.\\nOn December 11, 1989, Brenda Schamel, the wife of the deceased, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband’s estate, brought this action in Indiana circuit coui’t for wrongful death. Brenda alleged that Textron-Lycoming, a manufacturer of reciprocating (piston-driven) engines and the manufacturer of the connecting rod in question, was liable for her husband’s death because (1) Textron-Lycoming manufactured and sold defective and unreasonably dangerous connecting rods, (2) it was negligent in the manufacture and design of the rods and (3) Textron-Lycoming failed to exercise due care in discharging its obligations with respect to the proper procedures for overhauling the engine.\\nThe defendant removed this action to federal court on diversity grounds, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The uncontradicted evidence submitted by Textron-Lycoming showed that Ly-coming discontinued manufacturing connecting rods having part #71987 in February 1964; that Lycoming connecting rods were sold exclusively by Lycoming distributors; that connecting rod part # 71987 was last sold by Lycoming to its distributors in March, 1970; that part # 71987 was not included in Lycoming’s 1974 Parts List and thus was not available for purchase from Lycoming distributors after 1974; and that a substitute rod assembly design with a different part number was provided to users and consumers after 1973. Therefore, the latest that the part could have been sold was 1973- — sixteen years before the commencement of the present action. Consequently, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs wrongful death action was barred by Indiana’s statute of repose, which precludes product liability claims not brought within ten years of the time the product was initially delivered or sold.\\nThe district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appeals. She alleges that one count of her complaint was not a product liability claim, but rather a claim under § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and thus, not barred by the Indiana statute of repose. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that part # 71987 could not have been sold after 1973. The plaintiff suggests that a part could have stayed on one of the distributor’s shelves to be sold after 1979 — bringing the present action within the ten-year window provided by the Indiana statute of repose.\\nII.\\nThe Indiana Product Liability Act provides that\\nany product liability action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the cause of action accrues more than eight years but not more than ten years after the initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues.\\nInd.Code § 33-1-1.5-5. The “or” in the first clause of the passage quoted above has been interpreted in the conjunctive, barring all actions occurring more than ten years after initial delivery of a product. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1981).\\nThe plaintiff first contends that one of her claims was not a product liability claim but an action based on § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, thus, that the statute of repose did not apply to this claim. Section 324A provides, in sum, that, when a person either gratuitously or for consideration provides services to another, he must exercise reasonable care or risk liability. See Perry v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 433 N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind.App.1982). As evidence of her § 324A claim, the plaintiff points to the amended complaint, which alleges that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in providing adequate information to individuals overhauling its engines. This post-sale negligence — specifically, the failure to develop and to provide service or fatigue limits for its connecting rods in its overhaul and service manuals — she urges, is not within the scope of the Products Liability Act.\\nIt may be that a § 324A action is not a products liability suit for purposes of the Indiana Products Liability Act, since it may be that, under Indiana Law, the injury does not result from the manufacture, construction or design of a product, but rather from the voluntarily undertaken post-sale negligent acts. See Baker v. Midland-Ross Corp., 508 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.App.1987) (permitting suit against manufacturer for post-sale negligence pursuant to § 324A even though accident occurred sixteen years after sale). We need not address that issue, however, because the plaintiff has not alleged a § 324A action. The provision of service manuals and other sources of service information is not a separate and discrete, post-sale undertaking pursuant to § 324A; rather, such information is generally necessary to satisfy the manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (10th Cir.1991); Windle Turley, Aviation Litigation § 2.09, at 70 (1986) (“Aircraft manufacturers ordinarily satisfy their postsale duty to warn through the issuance of service bulletins or service letters.” (emphasis in original)).\\nIn her amended complaint and in her brief, the plaintiff acknowledges that the defendant had a duty to provide the service information and, thus, the provision of such information was not a voluntary undertaking distinct from the obligations inherent in the initial sale of the product. Accordingly, the plaintiff merely alleges that the defendant breached its continuing duty to warn by not establishing a safe fatigue life for the connecting rods. As Dague makes clear, however, “an action for damages resulting from the alleged failure of a manufacturer or seller to warn a user of its product’s latently defective nature is certainly a product liability action [and covered by the Product Liability Act and its statute of repose].” Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 212. Consequently, the district court was correct in holding this claim barred.\\nFinally, we reject the plaintiffs contention that the evidence does not support the award of summary judgment because the defendant did not establish that a part was not left on a distributor’s shelf even after Lycoming discontinued part #71987. A defendant need not rebut any and every possible factual scenario in order to obtain summary judgment. Rather, once the defendant had shown that it stopped distributing the part in 1973, it became incumbent upon the plaintiff to create an issue of fact by making an evidentiary showing to the contrary. She did not. Her belated, unsupported hypothesis of parts in the pipeline is, in short, too little, too late.\\nIII.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\nAffirmed.\\n. § 324A states:\\nOne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if\\n(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or\\n(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or\\n(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.\\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1977).\\n. For example, count III of the Amended Complaint alleged \\\"That the defendants are required to adequately inform mechanics in the field as to the procedures to be followed to safely overhaul its engines.” Moreover, paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Amended Contentions provided:\\n6. That the defendant has an obligation to provide adequate information in an accessible and usable form concerning the guidelines to be followed in overhauling and servicing its engines, and that obligation is continuing as to all engines the defendant has manufactured that continue in service.\\nFinally, in her brief, the plaintiff summarized, \\\"[i]n short, the defendant has not met its obligation to mechanics who service its engines to determine the safe service life of its connecting rods.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":94,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513346,"string":"10,513,346"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-2165"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"GRANT, Senior District Judge.\\nI. BACKGROUND\\nRalph Monaco was 38 years old in June 1985 when he began working for Fuddruck-ers, Inc., a national restaurant chain. As a “skilled butcher,” he was one of Fuddruck-ers’ top-paid hourly employees, with a starting wage of $6.00 an hour. That Monaco performed his job to the satisfaction of his employer throughout his tenure is evidenced by numerous performance evaluations, regular wage increases and increased supervisory responsibilities. By June 1986 Monaco was earning $8.00 an hour and his job responsibilities had expanded to include the training and scheduling of other butchers.\\nIn early 1987, Monaco became interested in becoming a shift supervisor. He asked an assistant manager, Marc Mackiewicz, and even a district manager about the job on “several occasions,” but never got around to filing an application or asking the one person who had the authority to promote him to shift supervisor, Thomas Hlady, the restaurant’s general manager. In February and March 1987, Hlady promoted two other employees to shift supervisor, Mary Dwyer and Kirby Dorsey. When Monaco asked Mack-iewicz why he had not been promoted over Dwyer, Mackiewicz allegedly told him he was getting too old. When he asked about the Dorsey promotion, Mackiewicz made no response.\\nThings went steadily downhill for Monaco from that point. In June 1987, Fuddruckers changed its vacation policy reducing the number of weeks its hourly employees could take from two to one. In December 1987, central corporate management decided that it was economically more feasible for its restaurants to use boxed beef in place of hanging forequarters' thus eliminating the need for skilled butchers. Fuddruckers’ Vice President and General Counsel, Charles Re-depenning, Jr., accordingly issued a directive to all district managers to reduce the wages and hours for their skilled butchers. As an hourly employee and skilled butcher, Monaco suffered the adverse consequences of Fud-druckers’ actions.\\nWhen Monaco was subsequently asked by Mackiewicz to train a younger hourly employee, Tom Bertram, he objected and questioned Mackiewicz’ reasons. Mackiewicz allegedly responded by telling Monaco he was getting too old and suggested that he quit.\\nThings came to a head on February 19, 1988, when Monaco demanded a second week of vacation. Mackiewicz, now general manager, told Monaco he was no longer entitled to a second week and allegedly said “you’re getting kind of old, why don’t you quit.” When Monaco returned to work three days later, he reiterated his demand for additional time off. Mackiewicz once again refused, and Monaco walked off the job.\\nOn June 21,1988, Monaco filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) alleging that he was constructively discharged as a result of the loss in wages, hours and vacation time in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623. What disposition IDHR may have made of his claim is unknown.\\nOn December 7, 1989, Monaco filed suit in federal district court alleging among other things that Fuddruckers had discriminated against him because of his age when it constructively forced him to resign his position and replaced him with a younger employee. Monaco amended his complaint to include more detailed factual allegations on January 24, 1990, and, on August 22, 1991, Fuddruck-ers moved for summary judgment. The district court, Judge Moran, granted the motion and this appeal followed.\\nII. DISCUSSION\\nOur review is, of course, de novo. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir.1993). Like the district court, we have reviewed the record in its entirety, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light which was most favorable to Monaco, the non-moving party, and have concluded that a rational trier of fact could not have found for Monaco on his claim of age discrimination.\\nTo establish an ADEA violation, Monaco must be able to demonstrate that he suffered a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of his employment because of his age. Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Spring v. Sheboygan Area School Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir.1989). He may do so under either the direct method set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1794-95, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), or the indirect burden-shifting method described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1708, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Monaco attempted both, and satisfied neither.\\nA. The Direct Method\\nThe only direct evidence of age discrimination offered by Monaco were the age-related remarks allegedly made by Marc Mackiewicz between February 1987 and February 1988. The district court found that Monaco failed to show a sufficient causal connection between those remarks and the actions taken by Fuddruckers. Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 944, 948-50 (N.D.Ill.1992). We agree. “Unless the remarks upon which plaintiff relies were related to the employment decision in question, they cannot be evidence of a discriminatory discharge.” McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Companies, 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir.1991). Monaco did not attempt to connect Mackiewicz’ remarks to the reductions in wages, hours and vacation time, nor could he. The record clearly shows that those decisions were made by Fuddruckers’ central corporate management and that they applied to all of its “skilled butchers” and/or hourly employees.\\nWhether Monaco could prove a discriminatory failure to promote based on Mackiewicz’ remarks is an issue we need not decide. The administrative charge which Monaco filed on June 21, 1988 made no reference to a failure to promote, and the allegations contained in the charge cannot reasonably be read to encompass such a claim. Under the circumstances, Monaco was barred from raising any claim premised on a failure to promote in his complaint. See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993); O’Rourke v. Continental Casualty Co., 983 F.2d 94, 97-98 (7th Cir.1993); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir.1985); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 949 n. 8.\\nB. The Indirect Method\\nMonaco fares no better under the indirect method. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the indirect method of proof, Monaco must show that: 1) he was more than forty years old; 2) he performed his job satisfactorily; 3) he was discharged (either actually or constructively); and 4) the discharge occurred under circumstances which gave rise to an inference of age discrimination. Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir.1993). See also Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992). That Monaco satisfies the first two steps is undisputed. He was 41 when he quit his job, and all performance evaluations through December 1986 showed that his work was consistently satisfactory. Although Fuddruekers disagrees, the district court also was willing to assume that Monaco had satisfied the third. Monaco’s stumbling block is at step four.\\nMonaco contends that he was forced to resign due to the “economic hardship” imposed upon him by the reduction in his wages, hours, and other benefits. He contends that it is reasonable to infer from the comments made by Mackiewicz and from the fact that he was replaced by a younger man that the changes in his working conditions were motivated by his age. While the district court found Mackiewicz’ statements insufficient evidence of discrimination, it was willing to assume for the sake of argument that Monaco had indeed been replaced by a younger individual and that he had therefore presented a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden therefore shifted to Fuddruckers to present legitimate non-diseriminatory reasons for its actions. Judge Moran found that it met that burden when it produced evidence showing that the wage, hour and vacation cuts were all made by upper level corporate management, not at the local level, and for business reasons unrelated to the age of its employees. Having successfully rebutted any presumption of discrimination, the burden shifted back to Monaco to show that Fuddruekers’ stated reasons were really a pretext for the employment action. Gustovich v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992). The district court found that Monaco “ha[d] clearly failed to meet this burden.” Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 952. We agree.\\nWhile there are numerous ways to prove pretext, see Gustovich, 972 F.2d at 848-49; La Montague v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1414-15 (7th Cir.1984), Monaco simply relied on the evidence he used to establish his prima facie case, i.e., the fact that Mackiewicz made ageist remarks and that he was replaced by a younger individual. This he may not do. La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1414.\\n[The mere fact that the employer may have hired a younger replacement is] too insubstantial to support an inference of age discrimination. It is not a violation of the Act to replace an employee in the protected class with a younger person, as long as the protected employee is not replaced because of his age. Because younger people often succeed to the jobs of older people for perfectly legitimate reasons, the mere fact that an older employee is replaced by a younger one does not permit an inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination.\\nId. at 1412-13. While there were as many as three butchers working at Fuddruekers’ Matteson, Illinois restaurant at one point, by January 1988 the number had diminished to one, Monaco. The record shows that Bertram was trained as a back-up for Monaco on his day off, and that he only worked in the butcher shop when Monaco was not there. The job Bertram performed therefore had no impact on the number of hours Monaco worked, the wage he was paid, his title or his job responsibilities.\\nThere is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Fuddruckers intended to fire Monaco if he had not quit, that Bertram was hired to, or did in fact, replace him when he quit, or that similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably than Monaco with respect to wages, hours, vacation or any other benefit Fuddruckers may have provided. To the extent Monaco relies on the remarks made by Mackiewicz to fill the gap, his reliance is misplaced. As previously discussed, those remarks standing-alone were insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference of age discrimination. See McCarthy, 924 F.2d at 686-87; Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1989); La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1412.\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we now Affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n. The decision was made on the basis of a Beef Study conducted by Fuddruckers' Purchasing Department in response to a decrease in the availability of forequarters of hanging beef in the meat processing industry. The Study was dated November 25, 1987.\\n. While Monaco made a general reference to a \\\"loss of benefits” in his administrative charge, the only benefit which he specifically identified, and allegedly lost, was vacation time. He alleged a failure to promote and miscellaneous and sundry other grievances for the first time in his amended complaint, all of which are time barred.\\n. To prove a constructive discharge, Monaco must show that Fuddruekers deliberately made his \\\"working conditions so onerous or demeaning that he [w]as effectively ... fired in place and compelled to leave.” Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092, 107 S.Ct. 1304, 94 L.Ed.2d 160 (1987); see also Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824, 826, 829 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964, 108 S.Ct. 454, 98 L.Ed.2d 394 (1987). The district court assumed for the sake of argument that Monaco met that burden.\\n. Although Monaco now contends that \\\"loss of benefits” included loss of vacation time, loss of medical insurance and loss of a promotion, the only \\\"benefit” mentioned in his administrative charge was the loss of vacation.\\n.The district court inferred from the mere fact that Bertram had been trained to work in the butcher shop and was doing so on Monaco’s days off that he was the one who replaced Monaco when he quit. The court thus concluded that Monaco had satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case by showing that Fuddruekers sought a younger replacement. The reasonableness of such an inference is subject to some speculation. While it was a seemingly easy matter to prove, there is nothing in the record which tells us whom Fuddruekers actually hired to replace Monaco, or what that person’s age was.\\n. Under the circumstances, we would be hard-pressed to find that Fuddruckers' decision was in any way \\\"materially adverse” to Monaco. See Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993) (materially adverse change may be indicated by termination of employment, demotion, less distinguished title, material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished material responsibilities).\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"GRANT, Senior District Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"James B. Koch (argued), Gardiner, Koch & Hines, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.\", \"Keith A. Dorman (argued), Ross & Har-dies, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. 92-2165.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.\\nArgued Dec. 11, 1992.\\nDecided Aug. 13, 1993.\\nJames B. Koch (argued), Gardiner, Koch & Hines, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nKeith A. Dorman (argued), Ross & Har-dies, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.\\nBefore BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge.\\n. The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, is sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CUMMINGS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 658"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-13\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nGRANT, Senior District Judge.\nI. BACKGROUND\nRalph Monaco was 38 years old in June 1985 when he began working for Fuddruck-ers, Inc., a national restaurant chain. As a “skilled butcher,” he was one of Fuddruck-ers’ top-paid hourly employees, with a starting wage of $6.00 an hour. That Monaco performed his job to the satisfaction of his employer throughout his tenure is evidenced by numerous performance evaluations, regular wage increases and increased supervisory responsibilities. By June 1986 Monaco was earning $8.00 an hour and his job responsibilities had expanded to include the training and scheduling of other butchers.\nIn early 1987, Monaco became interested in becoming a shift supervisor. He asked an assistant manager, Marc Mackiewicz, and even a district manager about the job on “several occasions,” but never got around to filing an application or asking the one person who had the authority to promote him to shift supervisor, Thomas Hlady, the restaurant’s general manager. In February and March 1987, Hlady promoted two other employees to shift supervisor, Mary Dwyer and Kirby Dorsey. When Monaco asked Mack-iewicz why he had not been promoted over Dwyer, Mackiewicz allegedly told him he was getting too old. When he asked about the Dorsey promotion, Mackiewicz made no response.\nThings went steadily downhill for Monaco from that point. In June 1987, Fuddruckers changed its vacation policy reducing the number of weeks its hourly employees could take from two to one. In December 1987, central corporate management decided that it was economically more feasible for its restaurants to use boxed beef in place of hanging forequarters' thus eliminating the need for skilled butchers. Fuddruckers’ Vice President and General Counsel, Charles Re-depenning, Jr., accordingly issued a directive to all district managers to reduce the wages and hours for their skilled butchers. As an hourly employee and skilled butcher, Monaco suffered the adverse consequences of Fud-druckers’ actions.\nWhen Monaco was subsequently asked by Mackiewicz to train a younger hourly employee, Tom Bertram, he objected and questioned Mackiewicz’ reasons. Mackiewicz allegedly responded by telling Monaco he was getting too old and suggested that he quit.\nThings came to a head on February 19, 1988, when Monaco demanded a second week of vacation. Mackiewicz, now general manager, told Monaco he was no longer entitled to a second week and allegedly said “you’re getting kind of old, why don’t you quit.” When Monaco returned to work three days later, he reiterated his demand for additional time off. Mackiewicz once again refused, and Monaco walked off the job.\nOn June 21,1988, Monaco filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) alleging that he was constructively discharged as a result of the loss in wages, hours and vacation time in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623. What disposition IDHR may have made of his claim is unknown.\nOn December 7, 1989, Monaco filed suit in federal district court alleging among other things that Fuddruckers had discriminated against him because of his age when it constructively forced him to resign his position and replaced him with a younger employee. Monaco amended his complaint to include more detailed factual allegations on January 24, 1990, and, on August 22, 1991, Fuddruck-ers moved for summary judgment. The district court, Judge Moran, granted the motion and this appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nOur review is, of course, de novo. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir.1993). Like the district court, we have reviewed the record in its entirety, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light which was most favorable to Monaco, the non-moving party, and have concluded that a rational trier of fact could not have found for Monaco on his claim of age discrimination.\nTo establish an ADEA violation, Monaco must be able to demonstrate that he suffered a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of his employment because of his age. Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Spring v. Sheboygan Area School Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir.1989). He may do so under either the direct method set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1794-95, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), or the indirect burden-shifting method described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1708, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Monaco attempted both, and satisfied neither.\nA. The Direct Method\nThe only direct evidence of age discrimination offered by Monaco were the age-related remarks allegedly made by Marc Mackiewicz between February 1987 and February 1988. The district court found that Monaco failed to show a sufficient causal connection between those remarks and the actions taken by Fuddruckers. Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 944, 948-50 (N.D.Ill.1992). We agree. “Unless the remarks upon which plaintiff relies were related to the employment decision in question, they cannot be evidence of a discriminatory discharge.” McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Companies, 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir.1991). Monaco did not attempt to connect Mackiewicz’ remarks to the reductions in wages, hours and vacation time, nor could he. The record clearly shows that those decisions were made by Fuddruckers’ central corporate management and that they applied to all of its “skilled butchers” and/or hourly employees.\nWhether Monaco could prove a discriminatory failure to promote based on Mackiewicz’ remarks is an issue we need not decide. The administrative charge which Monaco filed on June 21, 1988 made no reference to a failure to promote, and the allegations contained in the charge cannot reasonably be read to encompass such a claim. Under the circumstances, Monaco was barred from raising any claim premised on a failure to promote in his complaint. See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993); O’Rourke v. Continental Casualty Co., 983 F.2d 94, 97-98 (7th Cir.1993); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir.1985); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 949 n. 8.\nB. The Indirect Method\nMonaco fares no better under the indirect method. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the indirect method of proof, Monaco must show that: 1) he was more than forty years old; 2) he performed his job satisfactorily; 3) he was discharged (either actually or constructively); and 4) the discharge occurred under circumstances which gave rise to an inference of age discrimination. Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir.1993). See also Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992). That Monaco satisfies the first two steps is undisputed. He was 41 when he quit his job, and all performance evaluations through December 1986 showed that his work was consistently satisfactory. Although Fuddruekers disagrees, the district court also was willing to assume that Monaco had satisfied the third. Monaco’s stumbling block is at step four.\nMonaco contends that he was forced to resign due to the “economic hardship” imposed upon him by the reduction in his wages, hours, and other benefits. He contends that it is reasonable to infer from the comments made by Mackiewicz and from the fact that he was replaced by a younger man that the changes in his working conditions were motivated by his age. While the district court found Mackiewicz’ statements insufficient evidence of discrimination, it was willing to assume for the sake of argument that Monaco had indeed been replaced by a younger individual and that he had therefore presented a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden therefore shifted to Fuddruckers to present legitimate non-diseriminatory reasons for its actions. Judge Moran found that it met that burden when it produced evidence showing that the wage, hour and vacation cuts were all made by upper level corporate management, not at the local level, and for business reasons unrelated to the age of its employees. Having successfully rebutted any presumption of discrimination, the burden shifted back to Monaco to show that Fuddruekers’ stated reasons were really a pretext for the employment action. Gustovich v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992). The district court found that Monaco “ha[d] clearly failed to meet this burden.” Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 952. We agree.\nWhile there are numerous ways to prove pretext, see Gustovich, 972 F.2d at 848-49; La Montague v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1414-15 (7th Cir.1984), Monaco simply relied on the evidence he used to establish his prima facie case, i.e., the fact that Mackiewicz made ageist remarks and that he was replaced by a younger individual. This he may not do. La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1414.\n[The mere fact that the employer may have hired a younger replacement is] too insubstantial to support an inference of age discrimination. It is not a violation of the Act to replace an employee in the protected class with a younger person, as long as the protected employee is not replaced because of his age. Because younger people often succeed to the jobs of older people for perfectly legitimate reasons, the mere fact that an older employee is replaced by a younger one does not permit an inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination.\nId. at 1412-13. While there were as many as three butchers working at Fuddruekers’ Matteson, Illinois restaurant at one point, by January 1988 the number had diminished to one, Monaco. The record shows that Bertram was trained as a back-up for Monaco on his day off, and that he only worked in the butcher shop when Monaco was not there. The job Bertram performed therefore had no impact on the number of hours Monaco worked, the wage he was paid, his title or his job responsibilities.\nThere is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Fuddruckers intended to fire Monaco if he had not quit, that Bertram was hired to, or did in fact, replace him when he quit, or that similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably than Monaco with respect to wages, hours, vacation or any other benefit Fuddruckers may have provided. To the extent Monaco relies on the remarks made by Mackiewicz to fill the gap, his reliance is misplaced. As previously discussed, those remarks standing-alone were insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference of age discrimination. See McCarthy, 924 F.2d at 686-87; Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1989); La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1412.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we now Affirm the judgment of the district court.\n. The decision was made on the basis of a Beef Study conducted by Fuddruckers' Purchasing Department in response to a decrease in the availability of forequarters of hanging beef in the meat processing industry. The Study was dated November 25, 1987.\n. While Monaco made a general reference to a \"loss of benefits” in his administrative charge, the only benefit which he specifically identified, and allegedly lost, was vacation time. He alleged a failure to promote and miscellaneous and sundry other grievances for the first time in his amended complaint, all of which are time barred.\n. To prove a constructive discharge, Monaco must show that Fuddruekers deliberately made his \"working conditions so onerous or demeaning that he [w]as effectively ... fired in place and compelled to leave.” Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092, 107 S.Ct. 1304, 94 L.Ed.2d 160 (1987); see also Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824, 826, 829 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964, 108 S.Ct. 454, 98 L.Ed.2d 394 (1987). The district court assumed for the sake of argument that Monaco met that burden.\n. Although Monaco now contends that \"loss of benefits” included loss of vacation time, loss of medical insurance and loss of a promotion, the only \"benefit” mentioned in his administrative charge was the loss of vacation.\n.The district court inferred from the mere fact that Bertram had been trained to work in the butcher shop and was doing so on Monaco’s days off that he was the one who replaced Monaco when he quit. The court thus concluded that Monaco had satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case by showing that Fuddruekers sought a younger replacement. The reasonableness of such an inference is subject to some speculation. While it was a seemingly easy matter to prove, there is nothing in the record which tells us whom Fuddruekers actually hired to replace Monaco, or what that person’s age was.\n. Under the circumstances, we would be hard-pressed to find that Fuddruckers' decision was in any way \"materially adverse” to Monaco. See Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993) (materially adverse change may be indicated by termination of employment, demotion, less distinguished title, material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished material responsibilities).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nGRANT, Senior District Judge.\\nI. BACKGROUND\\nRalph Monaco was 38 years old in June 1985 when he began working for Fuddruck-ers, Inc., a national restaurant chain. As a “skilled butcher,” he was one of Fuddruck-ers’ top-paid hourly employees, with a starting wage of $6.00 an hour. That Monaco performed his job to the satisfaction of his employer throughout his tenure is evidenced by numerous performance evaluations, regular wage increases and increased supervisory responsibilities. By June 1986 Monaco was earning $8.00 an hour and his job responsibilities had expanded to include the training and scheduling of other butchers.\\nIn early 1987, Monaco became interested in becoming a shift supervisor. He asked an assistant manager, Marc Mackiewicz, and even a district manager about the job on “several occasions,” but never got around to filing an application or asking the one person who had the authority to promote him to shift supervisor, Thomas Hlady, the restaurant’s general manager. In February and March 1987, Hlady promoted two other employees to shift supervisor, Mary Dwyer and Kirby Dorsey. When Monaco asked Mack-iewicz why he had not been promoted over Dwyer, Mackiewicz allegedly told him he was getting too old. When he asked about the Dorsey promotion, Mackiewicz made no response.\\nThings went steadily downhill for Monaco from that point. In June 1987, Fuddruckers changed its vacation policy reducing the number of weeks its hourly employees could take from two to one. In December 1987, central corporate management decided that it was economically more feasible for its restaurants to use boxed beef in place of hanging forequarters' thus eliminating the need for skilled butchers. Fuddruckers’ Vice President and General Counsel, Charles Re-depenning, Jr., accordingly issued a directive to all district managers to reduce the wages and hours for their skilled butchers. As an hourly employee and skilled butcher, Monaco suffered the adverse consequences of Fud-druckers’ actions.\\nWhen Monaco was subsequently asked by Mackiewicz to train a younger hourly employee, Tom Bertram, he objected and questioned Mackiewicz’ reasons. Mackiewicz allegedly responded by telling Monaco he was getting too old and suggested that he quit.\\nThings came to a head on February 19, 1988, when Monaco demanded a second week of vacation. Mackiewicz, now general manager, told Monaco he was no longer entitled to a second week and allegedly said “you’re getting kind of old, why don’t you quit.” When Monaco returned to work three days later, he reiterated his demand for additional time off. Mackiewicz once again refused, and Monaco walked off the job.\\nOn June 21,1988, Monaco filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) alleging that he was constructively discharged as a result of the loss in wages, hours and vacation time in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623. What disposition IDHR may have made of his claim is unknown.\\nOn December 7, 1989, Monaco filed suit in federal district court alleging among other things that Fuddruckers had discriminated against him because of his age when it constructively forced him to resign his position and replaced him with a younger employee. Monaco amended his complaint to include more detailed factual allegations on January 24, 1990, and, on August 22, 1991, Fuddruck-ers moved for summary judgment. The district court, Judge Moran, granted the motion and this appeal followed.\\nII. DISCUSSION\\nOur review is, of course, de novo. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir.1993). Like the district court, we have reviewed the record in its entirety, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light which was most favorable to Monaco, the non-moving party, and have concluded that a rational trier of fact could not have found for Monaco on his claim of age discrimination.\\nTo establish an ADEA violation, Monaco must be able to demonstrate that he suffered a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of his employment because of his age. Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Spring v. Sheboygan Area School Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir.1989). He may do so under either the direct method set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1794-95, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), or the indirect burden-shifting method described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1708, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Monaco attempted both, and satisfied neither.\\nA. The Direct Method\\nThe only direct evidence of age discrimination offered by Monaco were the age-related remarks allegedly made by Marc Mackiewicz between February 1987 and February 1988. The district court found that Monaco failed to show a sufficient causal connection between those remarks and the actions taken by Fuddruckers. Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 944, 948-50 (N.D.Ill.1992). We agree. “Unless the remarks upon which plaintiff relies were related to the employment decision in question, they cannot be evidence of a discriminatory discharge.” McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Companies, 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir.1991). Monaco did not attempt to connect Mackiewicz’ remarks to the reductions in wages, hours and vacation time, nor could he. The record clearly shows that those decisions were made by Fuddruckers’ central corporate management and that they applied to all of its “skilled butchers” and/or hourly employees.\\nWhether Monaco could prove a discriminatory failure to promote based on Mackiewicz’ remarks is an issue we need not decide. The administrative charge which Monaco filed on June 21, 1988 made no reference to a failure to promote, and the allegations contained in the charge cannot reasonably be read to encompass such a claim. Under the circumstances, Monaco was barred from raising any claim premised on a failure to promote in his complaint. See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993); O’Rourke v. Continental Casualty Co., 983 F.2d 94, 97-98 (7th Cir.1993); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir.1985); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 949 n. 8.\\nB. The Indirect Method\\nMonaco fares no better under the indirect method. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the indirect method of proof, Monaco must show that: 1) he was more than forty years old; 2) he performed his job satisfactorily; 3) he was discharged (either actually or constructively); and 4) the discharge occurred under circumstances which gave rise to an inference of age discrimination. Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir.1993). See also Crady, 993 F.2d at 134; Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992). That Monaco satisfies the first two steps is undisputed. He was 41 when he quit his job, and all performance evaluations through December 1986 showed that his work was consistently satisfactory. Although Fuddruekers disagrees, the district court also was willing to assume that Monaco had satisfied the third. Monaco’s stumbling block is at step four.\\nMonaco contends that he was forced to resign due to the “economic hardship” imposed upon him by the reduction in his wages, hours, and other benefits. He contends that it is reasonable to infer from the comments made by Mackiewicz and from the fact that he was replaced by a younger man that the changes in his working conditions were motivated by his age. While the district court found Mackiewicz’ statements insufficient evidence of discrimination, it was willing to assume for the sake of argument that Monaco had indeed been replaced by a younger individual and that he had therefore presented a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden therefore shifted to Fuddruckers to present legitimate non-diseriminatory reasons for its actions. Judge Moran found that it met that burden when it produced evidence showing that the wage, hour and vacation cuts were all made by upper level corporate management, not at the local level, and for business reasons unrelated to the age of its employees. Having successfully rebutted any presumption of discrimination, the burden shifted back to Monaco to show that Fuddruekers’ stated reasons were really a pretext for the employment action. Gustovich v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992). The district court found that Monaco “ha[d] clearly failed to meet this burden.” Monaco, 789 F.Supp. at 952. We agree.\\nWhile there are numerous ways to prove pretext, see Gustovich, 972 F.2d at 848-49; La Montague v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1414-15 (7th Cir.1984), Monaco simply relied on the evidence he used to establish his prima facie case, i.e., the fact that Mackiewicz made ageist remarks and that he was replaced by a younger individual. This he may not do. La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1414.\\n[The mere fact that the employer may have hired a younger replacement is] too insubstantial to support an inference of age discrimination. It is not a violation of the Act to replace an employee in the protected class with a younger person, as long as the protected employee is not replaced because of his age. Because younger people often succeed to the jobs of older people for perfectly legitimate reasons, the mere fact that an older employee is replaced by a younger one does not permit an inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination.\\nId. at 1412-13. While there were as many as three butchers working at Fuddruekers’ Matteson, Illinois restaurant at one point, by January 1988 the number had diminished to one, Monaco. The record shows that Bertram was trained as a back-up for Monaco on his day off, and that he only worked in the butcher shop when Monaco was not there. The job Bertram performed therefore had no impact on the number of hours Monaco worked, the wage he was paid, his title or his job responsibilities.\\nThere is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Fuddruckers intended to fire Monaco if he had not quit, that Bertram was hired to, or did in fact, replace him when he quit, or that similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably than Monaco with respect to wages, hours, vacation or any other benefit Fuddruckers may have provided. To the extent Monaco relies on the remarks made by Mackiewicz to fill the gap, his reliance is misplaced. As previously discussed, those remarks standing-alone were insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference of age discrimination. See McCarthy, 924 F.2d at 686-87; Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.1989); La Montague, 750 F.2d at 1412.\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we now Affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n. The decision was made on the basis of a Beef Study conducted by Fuddruckers' Purchasing Department in response to a decrease in the availability of forequarters of hanging beef in the meat processing industry. The Study was dated November 25, 1987.\\n. While Monaco made a general reference to a \\\"loss of benefits” in his administrative charge, the only benefit which he specifically identified, and allegedly lost, was vacation time. He alleged a failure to promote and miscellaneous and sundry other grievances for the first time in his amended complaint, all of which are time barred.\\n. To prove a constructive discharge, Monaco must show that Fuddruekers deliberately made his \\\"working conditions so onerous or demeaning that he [w]as effectively ... fired in place and compelled to leave.” Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092, 107 S.Ct. 1304, 94 L.Ed.2d 160 (1987); see also Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824, 826, 829 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964, 108 S.Ct. 454, 98 L.Ed.2d 394 (1987). The district court assumed for the sake of argument that Monaco met that burden.\\n. Although Monaco now contends that \\\"loss of benefits” included loss of vacation time, loss of medical insurance and loss of a promotion, the only \\\"benefit” mentioned in his administrative charge was the loss of vacation.\\n.The district court inferred from the mere fact that Bertram had been trained to work in the butcher shop and was doing so on Monaco’s days off that he was the one who replaced Monaco when he quit. The court thus concluded that Monaco had satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case by showing that Fuddruekers sought a younger replacement. The reasonableness of such an inference is subject to some speculation. While it was a seemingly easy matter to prove, there is nothing in the record which tells us whom Fuddruekers actually hired to replace Monaco, or what that person’s age was.\\n. Under the circumstances, we would be hard-pressed to find that Fuddruckers' decision was in any way \\\"materially adverse” to Monaco. See Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993) (materially adverse change may be indicated by termination of employment, demotion, less distinguished title, material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished material responsibilities).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":95,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513403,"string":"10,513,403"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stanley PRUITT, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ-CALDERON, also known as Koki, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francisco SANTANA, Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Ortiz-Martinez"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 91-3856, 91-3858, 91-3866, 91-3872, 91-3873, 91-3875"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges.\"], \"parties\": [\"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stanley PRUITT, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ-CALDERON, also known as Koki, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francisco SANTANA, Appellant.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez, Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar, Carlos Fuentez, Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon, Stanley Pruitt, and Francisco Santana appeal from their convictions and sentences for drug-related offenses. We affirm.\\nI.\\nIn May 1989, following a series of events related to drug trafficking, the government began a multi-jurisdictional investigation of an extensive cocaine distribution network. The investigation involved cooperative efforts by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and various state and municipal police authorities throughout the United States.\\nThe cocaine distribution network began in January 1988 and lasted until February 1990. The network was headquartered in Passaic and Patterson, New Jersey, and was managed and staffed by a closely-knit group of individuals, most of whom had immigrated from the Dominican Republic or were of Hispanic origin.\\nThe government’s investigation led to the conclusion that the conspiracy’s “kingpin” was Francisco Santana. Santana, along with John Yazbek of Miami, was the primary organizer, manager and cocaine supplier of the network. Beginning in 1988, Santana began shipping cocaine from his base of operations in New Jersey to St. Louis, Missouri through a distribution network of couriers and middlemen, including appellants Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar and Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Ramirez, Rodriguez, and seven other middlemen in turn sold to twelve wholesale buyers in St. Louis, including Candido Ortiz-Martinez and Carlos Fuentez. The wholesale buyers in turn sold to a series of retail buyers, including Stanley Pruitt, who ultimately distributed the drugs to local purchasers and addicts in the St. Louis area. Santana’s organization was responsible for the distribution of more than 100 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.\\nOn February 9, 1990, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Missouri returned an indictment charging twenty-two individuals with various offenses related to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The conspiracy had included many other participants who had not been indicted at the time of trial, some of whom served as witnesses against their former colleagues. Of the twenty-two defendants, four remained fugitives at the time of the trial, one (Jose Hernandez) died awaiting trial, and eleven pled guilty before or during trial; the remaining six defendants, appellants herein, were tried and convicted of a variety of narcotics-related crimes.\\nThe government’s evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officials and numerous unindicted co-conspirators. In addition, the government provided the following physical evidence: the seizure of drug quantities; currency from drug proceeds; personal property obtained with drug proceeds; weapons; telephone toll records; bank records; and transcripts of undercover surveillance operations. The jury found each of the defendants guilty of conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990. In addition, the jury found each defendant guilty on all additional counts charged. The district court sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment ranging from 188 months to 900 months.\\nII.\\nWe first examine issues raised by the individual appellants, followed by the two issues that are raised by more than one appellant, and conclude with sentencing issues.\\nA. Francisco Santana\\nSantana was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) attempted interstate travel to distribute drug proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The district court sentenced Santana to a total term of 600 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nSantana argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance based upon the illness of one of his attorneys, Worsham Caldwell. Santana also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring Caldwell’s replacement, Richard Hughes, to complete the trial. We address these contentions in turn.\\nWe have noted that “[a] trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a trial continuance.” United States v. Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.1990). “ ‘To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the reviewing court will consider factors including counsel’s time for preparation, conduct of counsel at trial and presence of prejudice in the record.’ ” United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Nerison v. Solem, 715 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072, 104 S.Ct. 983, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984) and 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1283, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)).\\nSantana was represented by the law firm of Shaw, Howlett and Knappenberger from February 1990 until November 9, 1990, when the Shaw firm withdrew and Santana replaced it with the law firm of Caldwell, Hughes, McHugh and Singleton. The entry of appearance was signed by Richard G. Hughes, and the District Court Clerk’s Office directed all of its mailings to his attention during the case. Hughes also participated in lengthy and ultimately futile plea negotiations with the U.S. Attorney’s office on Santana’s behalf.\\nThe trial began on August 12, 1991, with Caldwell acting as Santana’s trial counsel. On Friday, August 23, Hughes informed the court that Caldwell had been forced to undergo surgery and requested a continuance of a week for him to prepare to substitute as Santana’s trial counsel. The district court denied Hughes’ motion and ruled that it would hold trial from August 26 through August 28, but agreed to continue the case from August 29, to resume five days later on September 3, 1991. On August 26, Madelyn Torres delivered testimony potentially damaging to Santana; however, the trial transcript demonstrates that Hughes skillfully cross-examined her. Moreover, Caldwell was in fact present and assisted Hughes on August 26. Caldwell was not present on August 28, but no testimony was offered on that date directly pertinent to Santana. When the trial resumed on September 3, both Hughes and Caldwell were present, as they were on every day thereafter. Indeed, with the exception of two days, Caldwell was present and available to assist Hughes in Santana’s defense.\\nBy requesting a continuance of one week, Hughes presumably believed that seven days would suffice to bring him up to speed on the case. Between August 23, when Hughes requested the continuance, and September 3, when he was rejoined by Caldwell, Hughes had, in fact, a total of seven days off. The only testimony during the intervening time period that directly incriminated Santana came from Marilyn Torres, and the record demonstrates that Hughes’s cross-examination was skilled and thorough.\\nSantana next argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring him to go forward with Hughes as counsel. To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel’s performance prejudices an individual’s defense if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Having reviewed the record, we find that Hughes’ performance was not deficient within the meaning of the Strickland test.\\nSantana’s arguments concerning his sentence are addressed below. We have considered Santana’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nB.Candido Ortiz-Martinez\\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez was convicted of four offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (3) using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime (conspiracy) on October 7, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (4) using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on February 13, 1990, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ortiz was sentenced to a total term of 592 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nOrtiz initially argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.\\nIn evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict against a defendant, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give the government the benefit of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir.1989).\\nDirect testimony by four witnesses, namely, Lisa Neeally, Larry Smith, Patricia Oliver, and Larry Birdsong implicated Ortiz in the sale and distribution of cocaine with co-defendants and other customers in the St. Louis area. One witness, Birdsong, even obtained tape-recorded conversations between himself and Ortiz, in which Ortiz candidly discussed the sale of a quarter kilogram of cocaine, eventually delivered by Jose Hernandez and Carlos Fuentez on Ortiz’s behalf. In addition, the St. Louis police detained Ortiz at the St. Louis airport, where they seized $26,974 in cash from him. Last, he supplied the cocaine for purchases by Larry Birdsong on more than one occasion. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence. See United States v. Bonadonna, 775 F.2d 949, 958 (8th Cir.1985).\\nOrtiz does not challenge any aspect of his sentence in this appeal. We have considered Ortiz’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nC. Gabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar\\nGabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) distribution of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Ramirez was sentenced to a total term of 188 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nStanley Pruitt, Jorge Rodriguez, Larry Smith, and Carlos Fuentez wired $5,000 from St. Louis to Gabriel Ramirez in New Jersey in June 1989. Shortly thereafter, Smith was informed of the imminent arrival of ten kilograms of cocaine from Miami. On July 11, 1989, Ramirez arrived in St. Louis and distributed nine kilograms to Larry Smith, John Yazbek, and others. That night, police seized Ramirez’s car and most of the cocaine and arrested both Yazbek and Ramirez in the motel room they were sharing.\\nRamirez’s sentencing claims are discussed below. We have considered Ramirez’s other arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nD. Carlos Fuentez\\nCarlos Fuentez was convicted of three offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine on November 6, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (3) using and carrying firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on May 18, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to a total term of 295 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nFuentez served as a courier for the drug distribution network, transporting drugs and cash between New Jersey and St. Louis. The government seized large amounts of currency from, Fuentez on two occasions at the St. Louis airport.\\nFuentez argues that district court abused its discretion when it refused (1) to permit him to conduct an in-court demonstration of a narcotics detection dog examining U.S. currency; (2) to present expert testimony by a toxicologist concerning the percentage of U.S. currency that is contaminated by the odor of illegal narcotics, and (3) to authorize government payment for the toxicologist’s services under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l).\\nWe have noted that the admissibility of experimental evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Patterson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 786 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir.1986); Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir.1982).\\nIn refusing to allow the in-court demonstration with the narcotics detection dog, the court noted that the testimony would be irrelevant because the government had based its seizure of the currency on numerous factors other than the positive canine reaction. These had included the following facts: (1) Fuentez had paid for his ticket in cash; (2) he had appeared nervous; (3) he had purchased a one-way ticket; (4) he had one carry-on duffel bag and (5) he had given a thoroughly implausible explanation for having such a large amount of cash on his person. Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the demonstration.\\nThese arguments apply with equal force to Fuentez’s request to present expert testimony concerning the level of drug contamination of currency. Fuentez’s expert was prepared to testify that a Substantial percentage of bills in the Miami area contain cocaine residue. Fuentez did not include in his offer of proof that the expert would testify (1) that a similar percentage of currency in St. Louis would be so contaminated; or (2) that the expert’s analysis applied to all denominations. As before, a number of other factors went into the currency seizures that would render such testimony, even if true, irrelevant.\\nLast, we address Fuentez’s argument that the district court committed reversible error by failing to authorize payment of his expert toxicologist under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l). Because the district court did not err in refusing to permit the toxicologist to testify, it clearly did not err in refusing to authorize payment for such a witness. Moreover, the two cases cited by appellant in support of his position on this issue are distinguishable and involved a far greater showing of need on the defendant’s part. See United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 908-909 (8th Cir.1970) (need for medical experts to determine if defendant was competent to stand trial); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-12 (8th Cir.1974) (need for independent psychiatrist to determine effects of LSD on defendant’s brain to present insanity defense). As we noted in Schultz, “a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere ‘fishing expedition’.” Id., 431 F.2d at 911.\\nWe address Fuentez’ sentencing challenge below. We have considered Fuentez’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nE. Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon\\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) engaging in financial transactions involving drag proceeds on June 8, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Rodriguez was sentenced to a total term of 262 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nAll of Rodriguez’ arguments pertain to sentencing and are discussed below.\\nF. Stanley Pruitt\\nStanley Pruitt was convicted of seven offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (4) possession with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (5) distribution of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (6) possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (7) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\nTitle 18, United States Code, § 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:\\nWhoever, during and in relation to ... any drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such ... drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.... In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years.... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, ... the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment^]\\nPruitt argues that he was improperly convicted of three separate violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that he was improperly sentenced consecutively for each violation.\\nBeginning in March 1989, Stanley Pruitt became the primary retail dealer/customer in the conspiracy, in addition to directing the activities of various other dealers, including Larry Smith. Pruitt conducted his transactions at numerous locations in St. Louis.\\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities searched Pruitt’s residence at 2201 Angelica. Pruitt and an associate, Frank Day, were present during the search. The authorities recovered automobile records, telephone numbers for members of the conspiracy, and $6,190 in U.S. currency from the residence. The authorities also seized numerous weapons from the first floor of the residence: (1) a .12 gauge shotgun; (2) a second .12 gauge shotgun with a sawed-off barrel; (3) an Arisaka bolt-action rifle; (4) a Marlin .35 caliber lever action rifle; (5) a .22 caliber revolver; and (6) a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.\\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities also searched the house at 5275 Beacon. The authorities recovered the following weapons from the front bedroom of the residence: (1) a .30 caliber semi-automatic machine pistol; and (2) a .22 caliber AR-7 rifle. The agents also seized various documents connecting Pruitt to the residence, including his driver’s license permit, a number of pieces of mail addressed to him; and cash receipts in Pruitt’s name.\\nThe section 924(c) “use and carry” charge for November 17, 1989, originated in a separate incident. The St. Louis police department arrested one Donnie Davis late in the evening of November 16, 1989, in possession of a small quantity of cocaine. After his arrest, Davis identified his source of cocaine as Stanley Pruitt and agreed to arrange an additional purchase of cocaine from Pruitt. The police recorded a conversation between Davis and Pruitt in which Pruitt agreed to sell four ounces of cocaine to Davis and scheduled the transfer to occur at one of Pruitt’s apartments at 9921B Sloane Square. After Davis had purchased five ounces of cocaine from Pruitt, the police arrested Pruitt as he exited the apartment building. During a search of 9921B Sloane Square, police recovered a total of more than 600 grams of cocaine, assorted drug paraphernalia, and a .22 caliber rifle. A subsequent search by officers of Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin uncovered a .22 caliber revolver hidden in a hidden safe in a closet, along with other documentary evidence linking Pruitt to the conspiracy.\\nThe principal witness to testify concerning Pruitt was Larry Smith, a lifetime acquaintance of Pruitt, who is currently in the Witness Protection Program. Smith testified that he was aware of weapons Pruitt kept at an apartment on Nor stead Walk, at a house at 5275 Beacon, and at the Angelica Street residence. Smith explained that Pruitt used the weapons for protection in his narcotics dealings. On one occasion, Smith was present when Pruitt showed Smith, Ortiz, and Fuentez a weapon at 5275 Beacon and stated that “if somebody ran in there and wasn’t supposed to be there, [Pruitt] was prepared for that.”\\nAs stated earlier, Pruitt was convicted of the following section 924(c) “use and carry” charges: (1) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (3) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989. Due to a number of previous offenses, Pruitt had a criminal history score of 11. The district court sentenced Pruitt to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment for the drug offenses. With respect to the section 924(c) charges, the district court sentenced Pruitt to 60 months on the first charge, and 240 months consecutively on each of the second and third charges, for a total of 540 months.\\nPruitt’s appeal presents the following questions: (1) may a defendant be convicted of more than one violation of section 924(e) based upon the same predicate offense and, if so; (2) can a second violation of section 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense be considered a “second or subsequent” offense, allowing the court to impose consecutive sentences for each offense and an enhanced twenty-year penalty for the second offense.\\nPruitt first argues that he cannot be convicted of more than one offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense (conspiracy) for the two stashes of weapons that were found, respectively, in the first floor of his residence at 2201 Angelica and in the front bedroom of 5275 Beacon. We resolved this issue in United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991), where we noted that “[w]e see no implication of the double jeopardy clause in multiple convictions for each separate possession of a firearm during and in relation to a single drug trafficking crime.” Id. Accord, United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the district court properly convicted Pruitt on two section 924(c) charges based upon the two stashes of weapons recovered from 2201 Angelica and 5275 Beacon.\\nHaving resolved that under Freisinger Pruitt may be convicted of three separate section 924(c) violations, we must now address a second question: once a defendant has properly been convicted of two section 924(c) violations based upon a single drug trafficking offense, is the second conviction a “second or subsequent” offense, permitting an enhanced and consecutively imposed twenty-year sentence?\\nIn United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, -, -, 112 S.Ct. 199, 349, 399, 609, 116 L.Ed.2d 159, 288, 348, 632 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1186, 117 L.Ed.2d 429 (1992), where the defendant had been convicted of the two section 924(c) charges based upon the same predicate offense, but entailing different uses, we found that “consecutive sentences on these counts do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” Id. at 1223. Although we reached a seemingly different result in Freis-inger, the facts of that case distinguish it from Pruitt’s situation. The defendant in Freisinger had been convicted of four separate section 924(c) violations based upon his carrying four weapons at the time police arrested him in possession of cocaine. 937 F.2d at 385. We upheld the defendant’s convictions on four separate section 924(c) violations based upon the same predicate offense. Id. at 390. In Freisinger, the district court had treated defendant’s second, third, and fourth section 924(c) violation as “second or subsequent offenses” for the purposes of the statute, and imposed consecutive sentences for each count. Id. at 385. We concluded that “when a defendant has been convicted of more than one violation of section 924(c) because he was carrying more than one firearm during a single drug trafficking offense, the convictions after the first one are not ‘second or subsequent’ convictions within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 391. Thus, in Freisinger we reasoned that the proper solution involved: (1) sentencing the defendant to a term corresponding to a first offense under section 924(e) for each violation based upon the same predicate offense; and (2) imposing those sentences to run concurrently.\\nThere is, however, a crucial difference between Freisinger and Lucas. In Lucas, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms based upon the two separate stashes of weapons. In Freisinger, by contrast, concur- ' rent sentences were appropriate because the defendant had been convicted separately for each of the four weapons found in a single stash.\\nMoreover, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Deal v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993), confirms that the district court may sentence a defendant to a consecutive twenty-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for “a second or subsequent conviction” where both the first and any subsequent convictions arise in the same proceeding.\\nAccordingly, the district court properly sentenced Pruitt to five years on the first section 924(e) conviction, and to consecutive twenty-year terms for his second and third section 924(c) convictions.\\nIII.\\nA number of the appellants argue the following two issues on appeal: (1) that the government improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike the only black juror from the jury panel in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) that the district court erroneously admitted the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\\nA. Batson Issue\\nAppellants Santana, Ortiz, Ramirez, Fuen-tez, and Pruitt argue that the government’s exercise of one of its peremptory strikes against juror # 1 was racially discriminatory and violated their equal protection rights under Batson.\\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection clause' forbids the government from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. See United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir.1990). Under Batson, once a defendant makes a prima facie case of the prosecution’s purposefully discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to the government to come forward with a neutral explanation, particular to the case, for striking jurors of the defendant’s race. Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142. We review a district court’s finding that the government has exercised its peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.\\nSix jurors (numbered respectively 1, 12, 17, 36, 39, and 49) were black and juror #47 was Hispanic. The eventual jury of twelve persons was chosen from the first thirty-one members, thus automatically eliminating jurors numbered 36, 39, 47, and 49. The district court struck jurors numbered 12 and 17 for cause, leaving juror # 1 as the only black or Hispanic juror available to sit on this case. The government used one of its peremptories to strike juror # 1. The defense made a proper Batson exception. In response to the district court’s request for a statement of reasons, the government stated that juror # 1 had testified as a witness in a case in which her sister had been a criminal defendant. Moreover, when asked whether that experience would affect her impartiality in the upcoming trial, juror # 1 replied equivocally, “No, I don’t think so.” Accordingly, the district court found that the government’s reason was a valid, race-neutral justification.\\nAppellants argue that the inclusion of juror # 14, who was white and who admitted during voir dire to having a friend who had recently been prosecuted for bribery in federal court, supports their Batson claim. Significant differences exist, however, between the experiences of juror # 1 and juror # 14. Juror # 14 had not been a witness at his friend’s trial, the trial did not involve a close family member, and juror # 14 admitted that he did not know the details of the bribery case. Moreover, when asked if that experience would affect his ability to impartially hear this trial, he replied unequivocally, “No.”\\nConsequently, we find no clear error here. The prosecution’s reasons for striking the black juror were unique to the facts of the case and were racially neutral, and thus constitutionally permissible. See Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142.\\nB. Co-Conspirator Hearsay Issue\\nSantana, Ramirez-Nazar, Fuentez, and Pruitt jointly argue that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\\nUnder the federal rules, a statement is not hearsay if made “by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), “ ‘the government must demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and declarant were part of the conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir.1986)).\\nUnder the approach used in this circuit, first set forth in United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.1978), a district court is required to admit conditionally the statements of alleged co-conspirators, subject to an on-the-record ruling that the statement is admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the rule against hearsay. United States v. Coco, 926 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 1991). Where the record indicates that the defendant failed to request a Bell ruling but made a motion for acquittal, we treat the district judge’s denial of the acquittal motion as substantial compliance with the Bell requirements, infer the requisite Bell findings, and employ a plain-error standard of review. See Id.\\nAppellants first challenge the admissibility of the testimony of Daniel Perkins concerning Perkins’s contact with Stanley Pruitt during November 1989, when Perkins installed several hidden safes in Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin Court. Contrary to the appellants’ contention, Perkins related no hearsay statements in the course of his testimony, but testified only as to his first-hand observations. Perkins testified that, while at that address, he personally observed Pruitt consummate several transactions that involved measuring white powder on a triple beam scale. Although Perkins testified that these visitors had spoken- to Pruitt, he did not relate the substance of any of these conversations. Consequently, Perkins provided no testimony that would offend Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).\\nNext, appellants challenge two portions of Madelyn Torres’s testimony concerning events that occurred in her apartment during the spring of 1989, when she was dating Frank Santana. Torres testified that on at least two occasions Santana had. received Ruben Santana, Francisco Herrera, Jose Hernandez, and Candido Polanco in her apartment. Torres testified that on both occasions the visitors delivered shoe boxes full of currency to Frank Santana and had stated that “... this is the money from the one eighth, or, you know, whatever material they had sold,” using terms associated with fractional amounts of cocaine.\\nWe find that Torres’ statements satisfy the requirements set forth in Kocher for admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Independent evidence demonstrated that Ruben Santana, Herrera, Hernandez and Polanco were all involved in the conspiracy. Moreover, as the visitors were primarily involved in handling the financial aspects of the venture, the statements concerning the shoebox-es described the source of the money, and thus were in furtherance of the conspiracy.\\nNext, the appellants challenge several aspects of Felix Gil’s testimony. Felix Gil was an illegal alien from the Dominican Republic who served as one of Santana’s money couriers and testified for the prosecution. Gil is currently in the Witness Security Program. First, the appellants challenge Gil’s testimony concerning conversations he had with Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Francisco Herrera concerning the operation of the conspiracy. The majority of this testimony concerned conversations between Gil and Herrera concerning Santana’s operation in St. Louis, its members, and its activities. Herrera, Frank Santana’s nephew, was a central player in the conspiracy. Gil’s conversations with Herrera satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) because Herrera was a member of the conspiracy and entered into the conversations in furtherance of the conspiracy to successfully recruit Gil to become one of Santana’s money couriers.\\nThe appellants also challenge Gil’s testimony regarding Santana’s source of income. In his direct examination, Gil testified that he had learned that Santana’s primary source of income was drugs from “the guys that used to sell” for Santana. The government admits on appeal that such testimony was probably inadmissible due to a lack of specificity concerning the identity of the speaker. Gil backed this statement up, however, by noting that his own observation had led him to the same conclusion, namely, that Santana’s principal source of income was drug-related. Because counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, we find that any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\\nAppellants also challenge Gil’s testimony concerning Santana’s alleged ownership of two New Jersey bars. Gil testified that various persons had told him that Santana owned two bars, but could not be more specific about the identity of these persons. Any error in admitting this testimony, however, was harmless, given its corroboration from independent sources. Moreover, Madelyn Torres testified that Santana personally told her that he owned two New Jersey bars, the “Copacabana” and “The Colombia House.” Indeed, a search of the Copacabana by authorities on September 9, 1988 recovered Santana’s personal identification documents, including his social security card, from a safe under the bar of the club. In addition, the ownership of these bars was a peripheral issue in the case.\\nLast, the appellants object to Sergeant Mario Recino’s testimony in which he related a conversation with a female identified as Brenda, who gave him Santana’s nickname and beeper number. Reciño used the beeper number to contact Santana, discussed with him the purchase of multiple kilograms of cocaine, and also learned directly from Santana that Santana was selling kilogram quantities of cocaine in both New Jersey and St. Louis. Brenda’s statements incriminate no one other than Santana, and the statements clearly had the purpose of furthering Santana’s drug distribution enterprise by putting him in contact with a potential customer. Moreover, other evidence established that the nickname and beeper number belonged to Santana. Last, because the record reveals that counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\\nIV.\\nLast, appellants make the following arguments with respect to the sentences imposed by the district court..\\nA. Attribution of Cocaine Amounts to Rodriguez, Ramirez & Fuentez under U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(1).\\nAppellants Fuentez, Ramirez-Nazar, and Rodriguez-Calderon argue that the district court erroneously attributed an excessive amount of cocaine to them in determining their base offense levels. The court computed the base offense level for these three defendants to be 36, based on a finding that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine.\\nWe set forth the standards for determining drug quantities attributable to individual defendants in a conspiracy in United States v. Olderbak, 961 F.2d 756 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 422, 121 L.Ed.2d 344 (1992). We noted that:\\nUnder subsection (a) of Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, each conspirator is responsible for all criminal acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. ‘[S]uch conduct is not included in establishing the defendant’s offense level,’ however, if it ‘was neither within the scope of the defendant’s agreement nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.’ ”\\nId. at 764 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A district court’s determination of the quantity attributable to an individual defendant for sentencing purposes “is a factual determination subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Id. at 763.\\nIn ascertaining the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy, the district court adopted the conclusion of the presentence investigation reports that “[i]n total, the drug distribution organization headed by Santana was responsible for the distribution of over 105 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.” The U.S. Probation Office obtained an amount of greater than 50 kilograms by two independent methods. First, the authorities arrived at the 105 kilogram figure by totalling amounts derived from the testimony of witnesses and corroborating evidence in the case. Second, U.S. law enforcement officers seized approximately 13.5 kilograms of cocaine. Additionally, officers seized $545,-552.00 in U.S. currency and checks. Last, the organization transferred approximately $400,000 by wire. The amount of drug proceeds totaled roughly $945,000, which, when divided by an average cost of $23,000 per kilogram, represents 41 kilograms of cocaine, which, when added in turn to the 13.5 kilograms actually seized, totals over 50 kilograms. We have previously endorsed the extrapolation of drug quantities from similar financial information. See United States v. Carper, 942 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, —— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 614, 116 L.Ed.2d 636 (1991). We do not find the calculation of drug quantities to be clearly erroneous here.\\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine distributed by the conspiracy in this case was reasonably foreseeable to Fuentez. We agree. Substantial evidence showed that he was personally involved in the conspiracy from beginning to end. Fuentez began working as a worker and money courier for co-defendant Taurino Gonzalez-Felix during the summer and fall of 1988, which included the attempted delivery of $40,000 to Frank Santana in August 1988. Fuentez was directly implicated in the conspiracy by the testimony of Lisa Neeally, Patricia Oliver, Lissette Jacquez, Larry Smith, and Larry Birdsong.\\nMoreover, Fuentez figured prominently in several of the law enforcement events involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, law enforcement officers seized a total of $22,680 in currency from Fuentez on two separate occasions at the St. Louis airport in the summer and fall of 1988. Fuentez was also present in an apartment on October 7, 1989, where police arrested Candido Ortiz and recovered a bag containing cocaine. Likewise, Fuentez was arrested after he, along with Ortiz and Jose Hernandez, sold an undercover officer and a police informant a quarter kilogram of cocaine for $7,000 on November 6, 1989. Last, when law enforcement officials stopped Fuentez at the St. Louis airport for a third time on December 21, 1989, papers confiscated from Fuentez contained the beeper number of Frank Santana.\\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine in the conspiracy was also attributable to Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar. As with Fuentez, the evidence demonstrated that Ramirez played an important role in the conspiracy. Ramirez worked as a courier/middleman for Santana, and worked closely with co-defendant Rodriguez. On June 8, 1989, Ramirez received $5000 from Larry Smith, wired to him at the direction of Rodriguez-Calderon. One month later, Ramirez delivered a vehicle containing nine kilograms of cocaine to Stanley Pruitt in St. Louis. Authorities arrested Ramirez shortly thereafter, at which time he was sharing a room with ringleader John Yazbek. Ramirez made a false exculpatory statement to police shortly after his arrest on July 11, 1989. At that time, police recovered from Ramirez a document indicating that he was the joint owner of an automobile with Yazbek. Additionally, testimony by both Felix Gil and Madelyn Torres linked Ramirez to Frank Santana, John Yazbek, and other members of the conspiracy. Last, at the time of Santana’s arrest, authorities recovered from him an address book containing the name and telephone number of Gabriel Ramirez under his nickname, “pela cuca.” The evidence showed that Ramirez and Rodriguez worked closely together.\\nAlthough Ramirez is not directly implicated in any law enforcement events other than those surrounding the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine, strong circumstantial evidence, both documentary and testimonial, indicate his willing participation in the full extent of the conspiracy. The conspiracy’s leaders plainly believed Ramirez worthy of sufficient trust to handle nine kilograms of cocaine, which, at a value of approximately $23,000 per kilogram, is worth $207,000, an amount that contradicts Ramirez’s assertion that he was a minor participant. Given the district’s opportunity to hear the testimony and ascertain the credibility of the numerous witnesses in this case, we cannot say that it clearly erred in attributing to Ramirez the total amount of the cocaine involved in the conspiracy.\\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon also argues that the district court erred in attributing to him the entire amount of cocaine distributed over the course of the conspiracy.\\nThe government presented substantial evidence establishing that Rodriguez played an important role in the conspiracy. Rodriguez directed Larry Smith to wire Ramirez $5,000 to pay off cocaine debts to the New Jersey operation, thereby opening the door to future shipments to the St. Louis area. The government introduced evidence that, as a result of this wire, Ramirez drove a car containing nine kilograms of cocaine. to St. Louis. When Rodriguez came to St. Louis in June 1989, he came in a supervisory capacity to, as one of the witnesses put it, “straighten everything up.” As the government later explained, “straightening everything up” consisted of collecting money to correct prior losses in the trans-continental drug enterprise. While in St. Louis, Rodriguez managed the dealing and distribution aspects of many members of the conspiracy, including Carlos Clausen and Jose Cintron. In addition, Madelyn Torres testified that Rodriguez had given instructions to both her and Delisa Cordero to deliver three kilograms of cocaine to St. Louis in mid-July 1989. In conversations with Larry Smith, Carlos Clausen referred to Rodriguez as the “big boss.” As with Ramirez, Rodriguez’s involvement in personally arranging the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine and acting in a managerial capacity with respect to the enterprise’s St. Louis contacts demonstrates his central role in the conspiracy. In the iight of this evidence, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in attributing to Rodriguez the amount of cocaine that it did. See Bonadonna, 775 F.2d at 958.\\nB. Santana and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the Enhancement of their Sentences under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.\\nSantana and Rodriguez also challenge the district court’s enhancement of their offense levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for their aggravating roles in the offense. The district court enhanced Santana’s offense level by foui’ levels because he was as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive. Similarly, the district court enhanced Rodriguez’ offense level by three levels for being a manager or supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive.\\nIn making a determination under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, the sentencing court should consider such factors as the nature of defendant’s role in the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n. 3); United States v. Roberts, 953 F.2d 351, 354 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3008, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992). A finding by the district court under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is a factual determination that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wiegers, 919 F.2d 76, 77 (8th Cir.1990).\\nWe have broadly defined the term “organizer” or “leader.” United States v. Manuel, 912 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir.1990). In addition, we have noted that an individual can occupy a leadership role without having directly controlled his co-conspirators. United States v. Grady, 972 F.2d 889, 889 (8th Cir.1992).\\nThe district court’s decision to increase Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous. Santana was the leader of this entire conspiracy. He was the conspiracy’s principal supplier, and he was involved in the conspiracy from August 1988 until his arrest in February 1990. For the duration of the conspiracy, a vast amount of money, estimated by law enforcement authorities to be nearly $1,000,000, was sent by other conspirators directly to Santana or via his relatives. Santana’s beeper served as the common link among all the conspirators. The evidence supported the inference that Santana directed the activities of Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Felix Gil. Gil testified that Santana had recruited him into the conspiracy and had directed him to transport $56,000 in cash to St. Louis in December 1989. Gil and Madelyn Torres both confirmed during their testimony that Santana was the ringleader of this conspiracy. Moreover, in July 1989, Santana represented himself to Sergeant Reciño as the leader of the conspiracy and boasted about the profit opportunities present in St. Louis. Given the facts recounted during testimony, the district court’s enhancement of Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous.\\nLikewise, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in enhancing the offense level of Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Rodriguez, as recounted earlier, played a significant role in the management of the conspiracy. He was referred to as the “big boss” and was dispatched to St. Louis to “straighten everything up” and await Ramirez’ nine kilogram cocaine shipment. Thus, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that Rodriguez was a manager or supervisor within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b).\\nC. Fuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the District Court’s Refusal to Reduce their Offense Levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).\\nFuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez claim that the district court erred in refusing to reduce their offense levels as minor or minimal participants under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A district court’s refusal to grant such a reduction is a finding of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States u Regan, 940 F.2d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.1991).\\nTo be a minimal participant, the particular defendant must have been “plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 1). The Application Notes to section 3B1.2 state that courts should use the “minimal participant” exception “infrequently,” possibly in cases where “an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 2). Given their extensive participation in the enterprise, any argument that Fuentez, Ramirez, or Rodriguez qualify for this exception is without merit.\\nTo be a minor participant, the particular defendant must have been “less culpable than most other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n. 3). Fuentez’s extensive participation in the conspiracy was discussed earlier and precludes serious consideration of his request. Likewise, Rodriguez’s role as a manager and one who directed the activities of other conspirators precludes his success in this argument. Finally, we cannot say the district court’s refusal to grant Ramirez a reduction under section 3B1.2 was clearly erroneous.\\nWe have examined appellants’ other arguments and we find them to be without merit.\\nAccordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the appellants.\\n. On June 27, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of • $13,490 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. Fuentez was travelling on a one-way ticket to Newark, New Jersey, under an assumed name. Fuentez told agents that a friend who owned a grocery store in New York had given him the cash to buy vegetables in St. Louis. A narcotics detection dog reacted positively to the currency.\\nOn October 22, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of $9,190 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. The cash was sewn into the lining of a leather jacket. Fuentez again claimed that the currency had been given to him by his mysterious friend in New York, this time to buy a car which he, Fuentez, had been unable to locate. No claim was ever made for the return of the currency.\\n. Section 3B1.1 provides, in pertinent part: Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:\\n(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.\\n(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"text\": \"BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,\\nconcurring separately.\\nI write separately to comment on the forty-five-year addition to Stanley Pruitt’s sentence, premised upon an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).\\nPruitt, a retail buyer of drugs in the conspiracy, received a sentence of seventy-five years (900 months), twenty-five years longer than the sentence of Frank Santana, the supplier of the drugs and leader of the conspiracy. Under the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provision for “second or subsequent” firearm offenses, the sentencing court added forty-five years to Pruitt’s sentence of thirty years; an additional five years for the first firearm offense, and an additional twenty years for each “second or subsequent” offense.\\nThe majority relies on United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, -, -, 112 S.Ct. 199, 349, 399, 609, 116 L.Ed.2d 159, 288, 348, 632 (1991) and - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1186, 117 L.Ed.2d 429 (1992), to support imposing consecutive sentences. Lucas holds that defendants may receive consecutive sentences under § 924(c) for the same predicate offense when the firearms are used for different purposes. Id. at 1223. The opinion states that the policy behind this interpretation is to “persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his gun at home.” Id. (citing United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Representative Poff at 114 Cong.Rec. 22231 (1968))). It fails to explain how draconian sentences for repeat offenders will deter a previously unconvicted, and perhaps uncharged, firearm offender.\\nI disagree with the rationale authorizing pyramiding of sentences for firearm violations without prior convictions underlying Lucas and the earlier case of United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838, 938, 111 S.Ct. 112, 342, 112 L.Ed.2d 81, 307 (1990), and believe those cases misinterpret § 924(c). I will not reiterate my position, which is elaborated in United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1519—21 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 346, 439, 121 L.Ed.2d 261, 358 (1992).\\nRecently, the majority of the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning expounded in Jones. Deal v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). I am bound to accept its ruling as binding legal precedent in sentencing Pruitt. Nevertheless, the Court’s interpretation of § 924(c) leads to draconian sentences perhaps unintended by the lawmakers. Congress should review and reconsider the language of the statute. It may conclude, as does the dissent in Deal, that the language of the statute relating to enhancement of sentences should be “applied to defendants who, having once been convicted under § 924(c), ‘failed to learn their lessons from the initial punishment’ and committed a repeat offense.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2003 (quoting United States v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601, 603 (9th Cir.1992) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)). I urge Congress to ponder the following comment from Jones, echoed by Justice Stevens in his dissent:\\n‘However, punishing first offenders with twenty-five-year sentences does not deter crime as much as it ruins lives. If, after arrest and conviction, a first offender is warned that he will face a mandatory twenty-year sentence' if he commits the same crime again, then the offender will know of the penalty. Having already served at least five years in prison, he will have a strong incentive to stay out of trouble. Discouraging recidivism by people who have already been in prison and been released serves a far more valuable purpose than deterring offenders who have yet to be arrested and have no knowledge of the law’s penalties.’\\nDeal, —— U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2003 n. 10 (quoting United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1521 (8th Cir.1992) (internal citation omitted)).\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"author\": \"BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant Henry Robertson, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Ramirez-Nazar.\", \"John F. Medler, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Fuentez.\", \"Jane C. Hogan, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Pruitt.\", \"Rodolfo Rivera, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Calderon.\", \"Gloria Reno, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Santana.\", \"Daniel P. Reardon, Jr., Clayton, MO, on brief, for appellants.\", \"Steven Holthousen, Asst. U.S. Atty.,’ St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stanley PRUITT, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ-CALDERON, also known as Koki, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francisco SANTANA, Appellant.\\nNos. 91-3856, 91-3858, 91-3866, 91-3872, 91-3873, 91-3875.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.\\nSubmitted Nov. 9, 1992.\\nDecided July 23, 1993.\\nRehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 7, 1993 in No. 91-3866.\\nRehearing Denied Sept. 8, 1993 in No. 91-3858.\\nRehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 8, 1993 in No. 91-3872.\\nCounsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant Henry Robertson, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Ramirez-Nazar.\\nJohn F. Medler, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Fuentez.\\nJane C. Hogan, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Pruitt.\\nRodolfo Rivera, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Calderon.\\nGloria Reno, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant Santana.\\nDaniel P. Reardon, Jr., Clayton, MO, on brief, for appellants.\\nSteven Holthousen, Asst. U.S. Atty.,’ St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.\\nBefore WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRIGHT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HENLEY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 662"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stanley PRUITT, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ-CALDERON, also known as Koki, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francisco SANTANA, Appellant\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez, Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar, Carlos Fuentez, Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon, Stanley Pruitt, and Francisco Santana appeal from their convictions and sentences for drug-related offenses. We affirm.\nI.\nIn May 1989, following a series of events related to drug trafficking, the government began a multi-jurisdictional investigation of an extensive cocaine distribution network. The investigation involved cooperative efforts by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and various state and municipal police authorities throughout the United States.\nThe cocaine distribution network began in January 1988 and lasted until February 1990. The network was headquartered in Passaic and Patterson, New Jersey, and was managed and staffed by a closely-knit group of individuals, most of whom had immigrated from the Dominican Republic or were of Hispanic origin.\nThe government’s investigation led to the conclusion that the conspiracy’s “kingpin” was Francisco Santana. Santana, along with John Yazbek of Miami, was the primary organizer, manager and cocaine supplier of the network. Beginning in 1988, Santana began shipping cocaine from his base of operations in New Jersey to St. Louis, Missouri through a distribution network of couriers and middlemen, including appellants Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar and Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Ramirez, Rodriguez, and seven other middlemen in turn sold to twelve wholesale buyers in St. Louis, including Candido Ortiz-Martinez and Carlos Fuentez. The wholesale buyers in turn sold to a series of retail buyers, including Stanley Pruitt, who ultimately distributed the drugs to local purchasers and addicts in the St. Louis area. Santana’s organization was responsible for the distribution of more than 100 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.\nOn February 9, 1990, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Missouri returned an indictment charging twenty-two individuals with various offenses related to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The conspiracy had included many other participants who had not been indicted at the time of trial, some of whom served as witnesses against their former colleagues. Of the twenty-two defendants, four remained fugitives at the time of the trial, one (Jose Hernandez) died awaiting trial, and eleven pled guilty before or during trial; the remaining six defendants, appellants herein, were tried and convicted of a variety of narcotics-related crimes.\nThe government’s evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officials and numerous unindicted co-conspirators. In addition, the government provided the following physical evidence: the seizure of drug quantities; currency from drug proceeds; personal property obtained with drug proceeds; weapons; telephone toll records; bank records; and transcripts of undercover surveillance operations. The jury found each of the defendants guilty of conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990. In addition, the jury found each defendant guilty on all additional counts charged. The district court sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment ranging from 188 months to 900 months.\nII.\nWe first examine issues raised by the individual appellants, followed by the two issues that are raised by more than one appellant, and conclude with sentencing issues.\nA. Francisco Santana\nSantana was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) attempted interstate travel to distribute drug proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The district court sentenced Santana to a total term of 600 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\nSantana argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance based upon the illness of one of his attorneys, Worsham Caldwell. Santana also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring Caldwell’s replacement, Richard Hughes, to complete the trial. We address these contentions in turn.\nWe have noted that “[a] trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a trial continuance.” United States v. Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.1990). “ ‘To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the reviewing court will consider factors including counsel’s time for preparation, conduct of counsel at trial and presence of prejudice in the record.’ ” United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Nerison v. Solem, 715 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072, 104 S.Ct. 983, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984) and 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1283, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)).\nSantana was represented by the law firm of Shaw, Howlett and Knappenberger from February 1990 until November 9, 1990, when the Shaw firm withdrew and Santana replaced it with the law firm of Caldwell, Hughes, McHugh and Singleton. The entry of appearance was signed by Richard G. Hughes, and the District Court Clerk’s Office directed all of its mailings to his attention during the case. Hughes also participated in lengthy and ultimately futile plea negotiations with the U.S. Attorney’s office on Santana’s behalf.\nThe trial began on August 12, 1991, with Caldwell acting as Santana’s trial counsel. On Friday, August 23, Hughes informed the court that Caldwell had been forced to undergo surgery and requested a continuance of a week for him to prepare to substitute as Santana’s trial counsel. The district court denied Hughes’ motion and ruled that it would hold trial from August 26 through August 28, but agreed to continue the case from August 29, to resume five days later on September 3, 1991. On August 26, Madelyn Torres delivered testimony potentially damaging to Santana; however, the trial transcript demonstrates that Hughes skillfully cross-examined her. Moreover, Caldwell was in fact present and assisted Hughes on August 26. Caldwell was not present on August 28, but no testimony was offered on that date directly pertinent to Santana. When the trial resumed on September 3, both Hughes and Caldwell were present, as they were on every day thereafter. Indeed, with the exception of two days, Caldwell was present and available to assist Hughes in Santana’s defense.\nBy requesting a continuance of one week, Hughes presumably believed that seven days would suffice to bring him up to speed on the case. Between August 23, when Hughes requested the continuance, and September 3, when he was rejoined by Caldwell, Hughes had, in fact, a total of seven days off. The only testimony during the intervening time period that directly incriminated Santana came from Marilyn Torres, and the record demonstrates that Hughes’s cross-examination was skilled and thorough.\nSantana next argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring him to go forward with Hughes as counsel. To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel’s performance prejudices an individual’s defense if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Having reviewed the record, we find that Hughes’ performance was not deficient within the meaning of the Strickland test.\nSantana’s arguments concerning his sentence are addressed below. We have considered Santana’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\nB.Candido Ortiz-Martinez\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez was convicted of four offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (3) using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime (conspiracy) on October 7, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (4) using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on February 13, 1990, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ortiz was sentenced to a total term of 592 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\nOrtiz initially argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.\nIn evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict against a defendant, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give the government the benefit of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir.1989).\nDirect testimony by four witnesses, namely, Lisa Neeally, Larry Smith, Patricia Oliver, and Larry Birdsong implicated Ortiz in the sale and distribution of cocaine with co-defendants and other customers in the St. Louis area. One witness, Birdsong, even obtained tape-recorded conversations between himself and Ortiz, in which Ortiz candidly discussed the sale of a quarter kilogram of cocaine, eventually delivered by Jose Hernandez and Carlos Fuentez on Ortiz’s behalf. In addition, the St. Louis police detained Ortiz at the St. Louis airport, where they seized $26,974 in cash from him. Last, he supplied the cocaine for purchases by Larry Birdsong on more than one occasion. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence. See United States v. Bonadonna, 775 F.2d 949, 958 (8th Cir.1985).\nOrtiz does not challenge any aspect of his sentence in this appeal. We have considered Ortiz’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\nC. Gabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar\nGabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) distribution of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Ramirez was sentenced to a total term of 188 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\nStanley Pruitt, Jorge Rodriguez, Larry Smith, and Carlos Fuentez wired $5,000 from St. Louis to Gabriel Ramirez in New Jersey in June 1989. Shortly thereafter, Smith was informed of the imminent arrival of ten kilograms of cocaine from Miami. On July 11, 1989, Ramirez arrived in St. Louis and distributed nine kilograms to Larry Smith, John Yazbek, and others. That night, police seized Ramirez’s car and most of the cocaine and arrested both Yazbek and Ramirez in the motel room they were sharing.\nRamirez’s sentencing claims are discussed below. We have considered Ramirez’s other arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\nD. Carlos Fuentez\nCarlos Fuentez was convicted of three offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine on November 6, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (3) using and carrying firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on May 18, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to a total term of 295 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\nFuentez served as a courier for the drug distribution network, transporting drugs and cash between New Jersey and St. Louis. The government seized large amounts of currency from, Fuentez on two occasions at the St. Louis airport.\nFuentez argues that district court abused its discretion when it refused (1) to permit him to conduct an in-court demonstration of a narcotics detection dog examining U.S. currency; (2) to present expert testimony by a toxicologist concerning the percentage of U.S. currency that is contaminated by the odor of illegal narcotics, and (3) to authorize government payment for the toxicologist’s services under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l).\nWe have noted that the admissibility of experimental evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Patterson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 786 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir.1986); Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir.1982).\nIn refusing to allow the in-court demonstration with the narcotics detection dog, the court noted that the testimony would be irrelevant because the government had based its seizure of the currency on numerous factors other than the positive canine reaction. These had included the following facts: (1) Fuentez had paid for his ticket in cash; (2) he had appeared nervous; (3) he had purchased a one-way ticket; (4) he had one carry-on duffel bag and (5) he had given a thoroughly implausible explanation for having such a large amount of cash on his person. Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the demonstration.\nThese arguments apply with equal force to Fuentez’s request to present expert testimony concerning the level of drug contamination of currency. Fuentez’s expert was prepared to testify that a Substantial percentage of bills in the Miami area contain cocaine residue. Fuentez did not include in his offer of proof that the expert would testify (1) that a similar percentage of currency in St. Louis would be so contaminated; or (2) that the expert’s analysis applied to all denominations. As before, a number of other factors went into the currency seizures that would render such testimony, even if true, irrelevant.\nLast, we address Fuentez’s argument that the district court committed reversible error by failing to authorize payment of his expert toxicologist under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l). Because the district court did not err in refusing to permit the toxicologist to testify, it clearly did not err in refusing to authorize payment for such a witness. Moreover, the two cases cited by appellant in support of his position on this issue are distinguishable and involved a far greater showing of need on the defendant’s part. See United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 908-909 (8th Cir.1970) (need for medical experts to determine if defendant was competent to stand trial); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-12 (8th Cir.1974) (need for independent psychiatrist to determine effects of LSD on defendant’s brain to present insanity defense). As we noted in Schultz, “a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere ‘fishing expedition’.” Id., 431 F.2d at 911.\nWe address Fuentez’ sentencing challenge below. We have considered Fuentez’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\nE. Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) engaging in financial transactions involving drag proceeds on June 8, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Rodriguez was sentenced to a total term of 262 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\nAll of Rodriguez’ arguments pertain to sentencing and are discussed below.\nF. Stanley Pruitt\nStanley Pruitt was convicted of seven offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (4) possession with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (5) distribution of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (6) possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (7) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\nTitle 18, United States Code, § 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:\nWhoever, during and in relation to ... any drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such ... drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.... In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years.... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, ... the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment^]\nPruitt argues that he was improperly convicted of three separate violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that he was improperly sentenced consecutively for each violation.\nBeginning in March 1989, Stanley Pruitt became the primary retail dealer/customer in the conspiracy, in addition to directing the activities of various other dealers, including Larry Smith. Pruitt conducted his transactions at numerous locations in St. Louis.\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities searched Pruitt’s residence at 2201 Angelica. Pruitt and an associate, Frank Day, were present during the search. The authorities recovered automobile records, telephone numbers for members of the conspiracy, and $6,190 in U.S. currency from the residence. The authorities also seized numerous weapons from the first floor of the residence: (1) a .12 gauge shotgun; (2) a second .12 gauge shotgun with a sawed-off barrel; (3) an Arisaka bolt-action rifle; (4) a Marlin .35 caliber lever action rifle; (5) a .22 caliber revolver; and (6) a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities also searched the house at 5275 Beacon. The authorities recovered the following weapons from the front bedroom of the residence: (1) a .30 caliber semi-automatic machine pistol; and (2) a .22 caliber AR-7 rifle. The agents also seized various documents connecting Pruitt to the residence, including his driver’s license permit, a number of pieces of mail addressed to him; and cash receipts in Pruitt’s name.\nThe section 924(c) “use and carry” charge for November 17, 1989, originated in a separate incident. The St. Louis police department arrested one Donnie Davis late in the evening of November 16, 1989, in possession of a small quantity of cocaine. After his arrest, Davis identified his source of cocaine as Stanley Pruitt and agreed to arrange an additional purchase of cocaine from Pruitt. The police recorded a conversation between Davis and Pruitt in which Pruitt agreed to sell four ounces of cocaine to Davis and scheduled the transfer to occur at one of Pruitt’s apartments at 9921B Sloane Square. After Davis had purchased five ounces of cocaine from Pruitt, the police arrested Pruitt as he exited the apartment building. During a search of 9921B Sloane Square, police recovered a total of more than 600 grams of cocaine, assorted drug paraphernalia, and a .22 caliber rifle. A subsequent search by officers of Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin uncovered a .22 caliber revolver hidden in a hidden safe in a closet, along with other documentary evidence linking Pruitt to the conspiracy.\nThe principal witness to testify concerning Pruitt was Larry Smith, a lifetime acquaintance of Pruitt, who is currently in the Witness Protection Program. Smith testified that he was aware of weapons Pruitt kept at an apartment on Nor stead Walk, at a house at 5275 Beacon, and at the Angelica Street residence. Smith explained that Pruitt used the weapons for protection in his narcotics dealings. On one occasion, Smith was present when Pruitt showed Smith, Ortiz, and Fuentez a weapon at 5275 Beacon and stated that “if somebody ran in there and wasn’t supposed to be there, [Pruitt] was prepared for that.”\nAs stated earlier, Pruitt was convicted of the following section 924(c) “use and carry” charges: (1) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (3) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989. Due to a number of previous offenses, Pruitt had a criminal history score of 11. The district court sentenced Pruitt to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment for the drug offenses. With respect to the section 924(c) charges, the district court sentenced Pruitt to 60 months on the first charge, and 240 months consecutively on each of the second and third charges, for a total of 540 months.\nPruitt’s appeal presents the following questions: (1) may a defendant be convicted of more than one violation of section 924(e) based upon the same predicate offense and, if so; (2) can a second violation of section 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense be considered a “second or subsequent” offense, allowing the court to impose consecutive sentences for each offense and an enhanced twenty-year penalty for the second offense.\nPruitt first argues that he cannot be convicted of more than one offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense (conspiracy) for the two stashes of weapons that were found, respectively, in the first floor of his residence at 2201 Angelica and in the front bedroom of 5275 Beacon. We resolved this issue in United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991), where we noted that “[w]e see no implication of the double jeopardy clause in multiple convictions for each separate possession of a firearm during and in relation to a single drug trafficking crime.” Id. Accord, United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the district court properly convicted Pruitt on two section 924(c) charges based upon the two stashes of weapons recovered from 2201 Angelica and 5275 Beacon.\nHaving resolved that under Freisinger Pruitt may be convicted of three separate section 924(c) violations, we must now address a second question: once a defendant has properly been convicted of two section 924(c) violations based upon a single drug trafficking offense, is the second conviction a “second or subsequent” offense, permitting an enhanced and consecutively imposed twenty-year sentence?\nIn United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, -, -, 112 S.Ct. 199, 349, 399, 609, 116 L.Ed.2d 159, 288, 348, 632 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1186, 117 L.Ed.2d 429 (1992), where the defendant had been convicted of the two section 924(c) charges based upon the same predicate offense, but entailing different uses, we found that “consecutive sentences on these counts do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” Id. at 1223. Although we reached a seemingly different result in Freis-inger, the facts of that case distinguish it from Pruitt’s situation. The defendant in Freisinger had been convicted of four separate section 924(c) violations based upon his carrying four weapons at the time police arrested him in possession of cocaine. 937 F.2d at 385. We upheld the defendant’s convictions on four separate section 924(c) violations based upon the same predicate offense. Id. at 390. In Freisinger, the district court had treated defendant’s second, third, and fourth section 924(c) violation as “second or subsequent offenses” for the purposes of the statute, and imposed consecutive sentences for each count. Id. at 385. We concluded that “when a defendant has been convicted of more than one violation of section 924(c) because he was carrying more than one firearm during a single drug trafficking offense, the convictions after the first one are not ‘second or subsequent’ convictions within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 391. Thus, in Freisinger we reasoned that the proper solution involved: (1) sentencing the defendant to a term corresponding to a first offense under section 924(e) for each violation based upon the same predicate offense; and (2) imposing those sentences to run concurrently.\nThere is, however, a crucial difference between Freisinger and Lucas. In Lucas, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms based upon the two separate stashes of weapons. In Freisinger, by contrast, concur- ' rent sentences were appropriate because the defendant had been convicted separately for each of the four weapons found in a single stash.\nMoreover, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Deal v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993), confirms that the district court may sentence a defendant to a consecutive twenty-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for “a second or subsequent conviction” where both the first and any subsequent convictions arise in the same proceeding.\nAccordingly, the district court properly sentenced Pruitt to five years on the first section 924(e) conviction, and to consecutive twenty-year terms for his second and third section 924(c) convictions.\nIII.\nA number of the appellants argue the following two issues on appeal: (1) that the government improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike the only black juror from the jury panel in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) that the district court erroneously admitted the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\nA. Batson Issue\nAppellants Santana, Ortiz, Ramirez, Fuen-tez, and Pruitt argue that the government’s exercise of one of its peremptory strikes against juror # 1 was racially discriminatory and violated their equal protection rights under Batson.\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection clause' forbids the government from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. See United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir.1990). Under Batson, once a defendant makes a prima facie case of the prosecution’s purposefully discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to the government to come forward with a neutral explanation, particular to the case, for striking jurors of the defendant’s race. Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142. We review a district court’s finding that the government has exercised its peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.\nSix jurors (numbered respectively 1, 12, 17, 36, 39, and 49) were black and juror #47 was Hispanic. The eventual jury of twelve persons was chosen from the first thirty-one members, thus automatically eliminating jurors numbered 36, 39, 47, and 49. The district court struck jurors numbered 12 and 17 for cause, leaving juror # 1 as the only black or Hispanic juror available to sit on this case. The government used one of its peremptories to strike juror # 1. The defense made a proper Batson exception. In response to the district court’s request for a statement of reasons, the government stated that juror # 1 had testified as a witness in a case in which her sister had been a criminal defendant. Moreover, when asked whether that experience would affect her impartiality in the upcoming trial, juror # 1 replied equivocally, “No, I don’t think so.” Accordingly, the district court found that the government’s reason was a valid, race-neutral justification.\nAppellants argue that the inclusion of juror # 14, who was white and who admitted during voir dire to having a friend who had recently been prosecuted for bribery in federal court, supports their Batson claim. Significant differences exist, however, between the experiences of juror # 1 and juror # 14. Juror # 14 had not been a witness at his friend’s trial, the trial did not involve a close family member, and juror # 14 admitted that he did not know the details of the bribery case. Moreover, when asked if that experience would affect his ability to impartially hear this trial, he replied unequivocally, “No.”\nConsequently, we find no clear error here. The prosecution’s reasons for striking the black juror were unique to the facts of the case and were racially neutral, and thus constitutionally permissible. See Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142.\nB. Co-Conspirator Hearsay Issue\nSantana, Ramirez-Nazar, Fuentez, and Pruitt jointly argue that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\nUnder the federal rules, a statement is not hearsay if made “by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), “ ‘the government must demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and declarant were part of the conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir.1986)).\nUnder the approach used in this circuit, first set forth in United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.1978), a district court is required to admit conditionally the statements of alleged co-conspirators, subject to an on-the-record ruling that the statement is admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the rule against hearsay. United States v. Coco, 926 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 1991). Where the record indicates that the defendant failed to request a Bell ruling but made a motion for acquittal, we treat the district judge’s denial of the acquittal motion as substantial compliance with the Bell requirements, infer the requisite Bell findings, and employ a plain-error standard of review. See Id.\nAppellants first challenge the admissibility of the testimony of Daniel Perkins concerning Perkins’s contact with Stanley Pruitt during November 1989, when Perkins installed several hidden safes in Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin Court. Contrary to the appellants’ contention, Perkins related no hearsay statements in the course of his testimony, but testified only as to his first-hand observations. Perkins testified that, while at that address, he personally observed Pruitt consummate several transactions that involved measuring white powder on a triple beam scale. Although Perkins testified that these visitors had spoken- to Pruitt, he did not relate the substance of any of these conversations. Consequently, Perkins provided no testimony that would offend Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).\nNext, appellants challenge two portions of Madelyn Torres’s testimony concerning events that occurred in her apartment during the spring of 1989, when she was dating Frank Santana. Torres testified that on at least two occasions Santana had. received Ruben Santana, Francisco Herrera, Jose Hernandez, and Candido Polanco in her apartment. Torres testified that on both occasions the visitors delivered shoe boxes full of currency to Frank Santana and had stated that “... this is the money from the one eighth, or, you know, whatever material they had sold,” using terms associated with fractional amounts of cocaine.\nWe find that Torres’ statements satisfy the requirements set forth in Kocher for admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Independent evidence demonstrated that Ruben Santana, Herrera, Hernandez and Polanco were all involved in the conspiracy. Moreover, as the visitors were primarily involved in handling the financial aspects of the venture, the statements concerning the shoebox-es described the source of the money, and thus were in furtherance of the conspiracy.\nNext, the appellants challenge several aspects of Felix Gil’s testimony. Felix Gil was an illegal alien from the Dominican Republic who served as one of Santana’s money couriers and testified for the prosecution. Gil is currently in the Witness Security Program. First, the appellants challenge Gil’s testimony concerning conversations he had with Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Francisco Herrera concerning the operation of the conspiracy. The majority of this testimony concerned conversations between Gil and Herrera concerning Santana’s operation in St. Louis, its members, and its activities. Herrera, Frank Santana’s nephew, was a central player in the conspiracy. Gil’s conversations with Herrera satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) because Herrera was a member of the conspiracy and entered into the conversations in furtherance of the conspiracy to successfully recruit Gil to become one of Santana’s money couriers.\nThe appellants also challenge Gil’s testimony regarding Santana’s source of income. In his direct examination, Gil testified that he had learned that Santana’s primary source of income was drugs from “the guys that used to sell” for Santana. The government admits on appeal that such testimony was probably inadmissible due to a lack of specificity concerning the identity of the speaker. Gil backed this statement up, however, by noting that his own observation had led him to the same conclusion, namely, that Santana’s principal source of income was drug-related. Because counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, we find that any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\nAppellants also challenge Gil’s testimony concerning Santana’s alleged ownership of two New Jersey bars. Gil testified that various persons had told him that Santana owned two bars, but could not be more specific about the identity of these persons. Any error in admitting this testimony, however, was harmless, given its corroboration from independent sources. Moreover, Madelyn Torres testified that Santana personally told her that he owned two New Jersey bars, the “Copacabana” and “The Colombia House.” Indeed, a search of the Copacabana by authorities on September 9, 1988 recovered Santana’s personal identification documents, including his social security card, from a safe under the bar of the club. In addition, the ownership of these bars was a peripheral issue in the case.\nLast, the appellants object to Sergeant Mario Recino’s testimony in which he related a conversation with a female identified as Brenda, who gave him Santana’s nickname and beeper number. Reciño used the beeper number to contact Santana, discussed with him the purchase of multiple kilograms of cocaine, and also learned directly from Santana that Santana was selling kilogram quantities of cocaine in both New Jersey and St. Louis. Brenda’s statements incriminate no one other than Santana, and the statements clearly had the purpose of furthering Santana’s drug distribution enterprise by putting him in contact with a potential customer. Moreover, other evidence established that the nickname and beeper number belonged to Santana. Last, because the record reveals that counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\nIV.\nLast, appellants make the following arguments with respect to the sentences imposed by the district court..\nA. Attribution of Cocaine Amounts to Rodriguez, Ramirez & Fuentez under U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(1).\nAppellants Fuentez, Ramirez-Nazar, and Rodriguez-Calderon argue that the district court erroneously attributed an excessive amount of cocaine to them in determining their base offense levels. The court computed the base offense level for these three defendants to be 36, based on a finding that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine.\nWe set forth the standards for determining drug quantities attributable to individual defendants in a conspiracy in United States v. Olderbak, 961 F.2d 756 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 422, 121 L.Ed.2d 344 (1992). We noted that:\nUnder subsection (a) of Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, each conspirator is responsible for all criminal acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. ‘[S]uch conduct is not included in establishing the defendant’s offense level,’ however, if it ‘was neither within the scope of the defendant’s agreement nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.’ ”\nId. at 764 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A district court’s determination of the quantity attributable to an individual defendant for sentencing purposes “is a factual determination subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Id. at 763.\nIn ascertaining the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy, the district court adopted the conclusion of the presentence investigation reports that “[i]n total, the drug distribution organization headed by Santana was responsible for the distribution of over 105 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.” The U.S. Probation Office obtained an amount of greater than 50 kilograms by two independent methods. First, the authorities arrived at the 105 kilogram figure by totalling amounts derived from the testimony of witnesses and corroborating evidence in the case. Second, U.S. law enforcement officers seized approximately 13.5 kilograms of cocaine. Additionally, officers seized $545,-552.00 in U.S. currency and checks. Last, the organization transferred approximately $400,000 by wire. The amount of drug proceeds totaled roughly $945,000, which, when divided by an average cost of $23,000 per kilogram, represents 41 kilograms of cocaine, which, when added in turn to the 13.5 kilograms actually seized, totals over 50 kilograms. We have previously endorsed the extrapolation of drug quantities from similar financial information. See United States v. Carper, 942 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, —— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 614, 116 L.Ed.2d 636 (1991). We do not find the calculation of drug quantities to be clearly erroneous here.\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine distributed by the conspiracy in this case was reasonably foreseeable to Fuentez. We agree. Substantial evidence showed that he was personally involved in the conspiracy from beginning to end. Fuentez began working as a worker and money courier for co-defendant Taurino Gonzalez-Felix during the summer and fall of 1988, which included the attempted delivery of $40,000 to Frank Santana in August 1988. Fuentez was directly implicated in the conspiracy by the testimony of Lisa Neeally, Patricia Oliver, Lissette Jacquez, Larry Smith, and Larry Birdsong.\nMoreover, Fuentez figured prominently in several of the law enforcement events involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, law enforcement officers seized a total of $22,680 in currency from Fuentez on two separate occasions at the St. Louis airport in the summer and fall of 1988. Fuentez was also present in an apartment on October 7, 1989, where police arrested Candido Ortiz and recovered a bag containing cocaine. Likewise, Fuentez was arrested after he, along with Ortiz and Jose Hernandez, sold an undercover officer and a police informant a quarter kilogram of cocaine for $7,000 on November 6, 1989. Last, when law enforcement officials stopped Fuentez at the St. Louis airport for a third time on December 21, 1989, papers confiscated from Fuentez contained the beeper number of Frank Santana.\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine in the conspiracy was also attributable to Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar. As with Fuentez, the evidence demonstrated that Ramirez played an important role in the conspiracy. Ramirez worked as a courier/middleman for Santana, and worked closely with co-defendant Rodriguez. On June 8, 1989, Ramirez received $5000 from Larry Smith, wired to him at the direction of Rodriguez-Calderon. One month later, Ramirez delivered a vehicle containing nine kilograms of cocaine to Stanley Pruitt in St. Louis. Authorities arrested Ramirez shortly thereafter, at which time he was sharing a room with ringleader John Yazbek. Ramirez made a false exculpatory statement to police shortly after his arrest on July 11, 1989. At that time, police recovered from Ramirez a document indicating that he was the joint owner of an automobile with Yazbek. Additionally, testimony by both Felix Gil and Madelyn Torres linked Ramirez to Frank Santana, John Yazbek, and other members of the conspiracy. Last, at the time of Santana’s arrest, authorities recovered from him an address book containing the name and telephone number of Gabriel Ramirez under his nickname, “pela cuca.” The evidence showed that Ramirez and Rodriguez worked closely together.\nAlthough Ramirez is not directly implicated in any law enforcement events other than those surrounding the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine, strong circumstantial evidence, both documentary and testimonial, indicate his willing participation in the full extent of the conspiracy. The conspiracy’s leaders plainly believed Ramirez worthy of sufficient trust to handle nine kilograms of cocaine, which, at a value of approximately $23,000 per kilogram, is worth $207,000, an amount that contradicts Ramirez’s assertion that he was a minor participant. Given the district’s opportunity to hear the testimony and ascertain the credibility of the numerous witnesses in this case, we cannot say that it clearly erred in attributing to Ramirez the total amount of the cocaine involved in the conspiracy.\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon also argues that the district court erred in attributing to him the entire amount of cocaine distributed over the course of the conspiracy.\nThe government presented substantial evidence establishing that Rodriguez played an important role in the conspiracy. Rodriguez directed Larry Smith to wire Ramirez $5,000 to pay off cocaine debts to the New Jersey operation, thereby opening the door to future shipments to the St. Louis area. The government introduced evidence that, as a result of this wire, Ramirez drove a car containing nine kilograms of cocaine. to St. Louis. When Rodriguez came to St. Louis in June 1989, he came in a supervisory capacity to, as one of the witnesses put it, “straighten everything up.” As the government later explained, “straightening everything up” consisted of collecting money to correct prior losses in the trans-continental drug enterprise. While in St. Louis, Rodriguez managed the dealing and distribution aspects of many members of the conspiracy, including Carlos Clausen and Jose Cintron. In addition, Madelyn Torres testified that Rodriguez had given instructions to both her and Delisa Cordero to deliver three kilograms of cocaine to St. Louis in mid-July 1989. In conversations with Larry Smith, Carlos Clausen referred to Rodriguez as the “big boss.” As with Ramirez, Rodriguez’s involvement in personally arranging the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine and acting in a managerial capacity with respect to the enterprise’s St. Louis contacts demonstrates his central role in the conspiracy. In the iight of this evidence, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in attributing to Rodriguez the amount of cocaine that it did. See Bonadonna, 775 F.2d at 958.\nB. Santana and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the Enhancement of their Sentences under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.\nSantana and Rodriguez also challenge the district court’s enhancement of their offense levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for their aggravating roles in the offense. The district court enhanced Santana’s offense level by foui’ levels because he was as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive. Similarly, the district court enhanced Rodriguez’ offense level by three levels for being a manager or supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive.\nIn making a determination under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, the sentencing court should consider such factors as the nature of defendant’s role in the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n. 3); United States v. Roberts, 953 F.2d 351, 354 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3008, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992). A finding by the district court under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is a factual determination that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wiegers, 919 F.2d 76, 77 (8th Cir.1990).\nWe have broadly defined the term “organizer” or “leader.” United States v. Manuel, 912 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir.1990). In addition, we have noted that an individual can occupy a leadership role without having directly controlled his co-conspirators. United States v. Grady, 972 F.2d 889, 889 (8th Cir.1992).\nThe district court’s decision to increase Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous. Santana was the leader of this entire conspiracy. He was the conspiracy’s principal supplier, and he was involved in the conspiracy from August 1988 until his arrest in February 1990. For the duration of the conspiracy, a vast amount of money, estimated by law enforcement authorities to be nearly $1,000,000, was sent by other conspirators directly to Santana or via his relatives. Santana’s beeper served as the common link among all the conspirators. The evidence supported the inference that Santana directed the activities of Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Felix Gil. Gil testified that Santana had recruited him into the conspiracy and had directed him to transport $56,000 in cash to St. Louis in December 1989. Gil and Madelyn Torres both confirmed during their testimony that Santana was the ringleader of this conspiracy. Moreover, in July 1989, Santana represented himself to Sergeant Reciño as the leader of the conspiracy and boasted about the profit opportunities present in St. Louis. Given the facts recounted during testimony, the district court’s enhancement of Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous.\nLikewise, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in enhancing the offense level of Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Rodriguez, as recounted earlier, played a significant role in the management of the conspiracy. He was referred to as the “big boss” and was dispatched to St. Louis to “straighten everything up” and await Ramirez’ nine kilogram cocaine shipment. Thus, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that Rodriguez was a manager or supervisor within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b).\nC. Fuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the District Court’s Refusal to Reduce their Offense Levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).\nFuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez claim that the district court erred in refusing to reduce their offense levels as minor or minimal participants under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A district court’s refusal to grant such a reduction is a finding of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States u Regan, 940 F.2d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.1991).\nTo be a minimal participant, the particular defendant must have been “plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 1). The Application Notes to section 3B1.2 state that courts should use the “minimal participant” exception “infrequently,” possibly in cases where “an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 2). Given their extensive participation in the enterprise, any argument that Fuentez, Ramirez, or Rodriguez qualify for this exception is without merit.\nTo be a minor participant, the particular defendant must have been “less culpable than most other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n. 3). Fuentez’s extensive participation in the conspiracy was discussed earlier and precludes serious consideration of his request. Likewise, Rodriguez’s role as a manager and one who directed the activities of other conspirators precludes his success in this argument. Finally, we cannot say the district court’s refusal to grant Ramirez a reduction under section 3B1.2 was clearly erroneous.\nWe have examined appellants’ other arguments and we find them to be without merit.\nAccordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the appellants.\n. On June 27, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of • $13,490 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. Fuentez was travelling on a one-way ticket to Newark, New Jersey, under an assumed name. Fuentez told agents that a friend who owned a grocery store in New York had given him the cash to buy vegetables in St. Louis. A narcotics detection dog reacted positively to the currency.\nOn October 22, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of $9,190 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. The cash was sewn into the lining of a leather jacket. Fuentez again claimed that the currency had been given to him by his mysterious friend in New York, this time to buy a car which he, Fuentez, had been unable to locate. No claim was ever made for the return of the currency.\n. Section 3B1.1 provides, in pertinent part: Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:\n(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.\n(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stanley PRUITT, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ-CALDERON, also known as Koki, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Francisco SANTANA, Appellant\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez, Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar, Carlos Fuentez, Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon, Stanley Pruitt, and Francisco Santana appeal from their convictions and sentences for drug-related offenses. We affirm.\\nI.\\nIn May 1989, following a series of events related to drug trafficking, the government began a multi-jurisdictional investigation of an extensive cocaine distribution network. The investigation involved cooperative efforts by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and various state and municipal police authorities throughout the United States.\\nThe cocaine distribution network began in January 1988 and lasted until February 1990. The network was headquartered in Passaic and Patterson, New Jersey, and was managed and staffed by a closely-knit group of individuals, most of whom had immigrated from the Dominican Republic or were of Hispanic origin.\\nThe government’s investigation led to the conclusion that the conspiracy’s “kingpin” was Francisco Santana. Santana, along with John Yazbek of Miami, was the primary organizer, manager and cocaine supplier of the network. Beginning in 1988, Santana began shipping cocaine from his base of operations in New Jersey to St. Louis, Missouri through a distribution network of couriers and middlemen, including appellants Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar and Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Ramirez, Rodriguez, and seven other middlemen in turn sold to twelve wholesale buyers in St. Louis, including Candido Ortiz-Martinez and Carlos Fuentez. The wholesale buyers in turn sold to a series of retail buyers, including Stanley Pruitt, who ultimately distributed the drugs to local purchasers and addicts in the St. Louis area. Santana’s organization was responsible for the distribution of more than 100 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.\\nOn February 9, 1990, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Missouri returned an indictment charging twenty-two individuals with various offenses related to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The conspiracy had included many other participants who had not been indicted at the time of trial, some of whom served as witnesses against their former colleagues. Of the twenty-two defendants, four remained fugitives at the time of the trial, one (Jose Hernandez) died awaiting trial, and eleven pled guilty before or during trial; the remaining six defendants, appellants herein, were tried and convicted of a variety of narcotics-related crimes.\\nThe government’s evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officials and numerous unindicted co-conspirators. In addition, the government provided the following physical evidence: the seizure of drug quantities; currency from drug proceeds; personal property obtained with drug proceeds; weapons; telephone toll records; bank records; and transcripts of undercover surveillance operations. The jury found each of the defendants guilty of conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990. In addition, the jury found each defendant guilty on all additional counts charged. The district court sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment ranging from 188 months to 900 months.\\nII.\\nWe first examine issues raised by the individual appellants, followed by the two issues that are raised by more than one appellant, and conclude with sentencing issues.\\nA. Francisco Santana\\nSantana was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) attempted interstate travel to distribute drug proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The district court sentenced Santana to a total term of 600 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nSantana argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance based upon the illness of one of his attorneys, Worsham Caldwell. Santana also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring Caldwell’s replacement, Richard Hughes, to complete the trial. We address these contentions in turn.\\nWe have noted that “[a] trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a trial continuance.” United States v. Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.1990). “ ‘To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the reviewing court will consider factors including counsel’s time for preparation, conduct of counsel at trial and presence of prejudice in the record.’ ” United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Nerison v. Solem, 715 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072, 104 S.Ct. 983, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984) and 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1283, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)).\\nSantana was represented by the law firm of Shaw, Howlett and Knappenberger from February 1990 until November 9, 1990, when the Shaw firm withdrew and Santana replaced it with the law firm of Caldwell, Hughes, McHugh and Singleton. The entry of appearance was signed by Richard G. Hughes, and the District Court Clerk’s Office directed all of its mailings to his attention during the case. Hughes also participated in lengthy and ultimately futile plea negotiations with the U.S. Attorney’s office on Santana’s behalf.\\nThe trial began on August 12, 1991, with Caldwell acting as Santana’s trial counsel. On Friday, August 23, Hughes informed the court that Caldwell had been forced to undergo surgery and requested a continuance of a week for him to prepare to substitute as Santana’s trial counsel. The district court denied Hughes’ motion and ruled that it would hold trial from August 26 through August 28, but agreed to continue the case from August 29, to resume five days later on September 3, 1991. On August 26, Madelyn Torres delivered testimony potentially damaging to Santana; however, the trial transcript demonstrates that Hughes skillfully cross-examined her. Moreover, Caldwell was in fact present and assisted Hughes on August 26. Caldwell was not present on August 28, but no testimony was offered on that date directly pertinent to Santana. When the trial resumed on September 3, both Hughes and Caldwell were present, as they were on every day thereafter. Indeed, with the exception of two days, Caldwell was present and available to assist Hughes in Santana’s defense.\\nBy requesting a continuance of one week, Hughes presumably believed that seven days would suffice to bring him up to speed on the case. Between August 23, when Hughes requested the continuance, and September 3, when he was rejoined by Caldwell, Hughes had, in fact, a total of seven days off. The only testimony during the intervening time period that directly incriminated Santana came from Marilyn Torres, and the record demonstrates that Hughes’s cross-examination was skilled and thorough.\\nSantana next argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring him to go forward with Hughes as counsel. To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel’s performance prejudices an individual’s defense if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Having reviewed the record, we find that Hughes’ performance was not deficient within the meaning of the Strickland test.\\nSantana’s arguments concerning his sentence are addressed below. We have considered Santana’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nB.Candido Ortiz-Martinez\\nCandido Ortiz-Martinez was convicted of four offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (3) using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime (conspiracy) on October 7, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (4) using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on February 13, 1990, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ortiz was sentenced to a total term of 592 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nOrtiz initially argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.\\nIn evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict against a defendant, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give the government the benefit of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir.1989).\\nDirect testimony by four witnesses, namely, Lisa Neeally, Larry Smith, Patricia Oliver, and Larry Birdsong implicated Ortiz in the sale and distribution of cocaine with co-defendants and other customers in the St. Louis area. One witness, Birdsong, even obtained tape-recorded conversations between himself and Ortiz, in which Ortiz candidly discussed the sale of a quarter kilogram of cocaine, eventually delivered by Jose Hernandez and Carlos Fuentez on Ortiz’s behalf. In addition, the St. Louis police detained Ortiz at the St. Louis airport, where they seized $26,974 in cash from him. Last, he supplied the cocaine for purchases by Larry Birdsong on more than one occasion. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence. See United States v. Bonadonna, 775 F.2d 949, 958 (8th Cir.1985).\\nOrtiz does not challenge any aspect of his sentence in this appeal. We have considered Ortiz’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nC. Gabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar\\nGabriel Jaime Ramirez-Nazar was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) distribution of more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Ramirez was sentenced to a total term of 188 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nStanley Pruitt, Jorge Rodriguez, Larry Smith, and Carlos Fuentez wired $5,000 from St. Louis to Gabriel Ramirez in New Jersey in June 1989. Shortly thereafter, Smith was informed of the imminent arrival of ten kilograms of cocaine from Miami. On July 11, 1989, Ramirez arrived in St. Louis and distributed nine kilograms to Larry Smith, John Yazbek, and others. That night, police seized Ramirez’s car and most of the cocaine and arrested both Yazbek and Ramirez in the motel room they were sharing.\\nRamirez’s sentencing claims are discussed below. We have considered Ramirez’s other arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nD. Carlos Fuentez\\nCarlos Fuentez was convicted of three offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) distributing cocaine on November 6, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (3) using and carrying firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on May 18, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to a total term of 295 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nFuentez served as a courier for the drug distribution network, transporting drugs and cash between New Jersey and St. Louis. The government seized large amounts of currency from, Fuentez on two occasions at the St. Louis airport.\\nFuentez argues that district court abused its discretion when it refused (1) to permit him to conduct an in-court demonstration of a narcotics detection dog examining U.S. currency; (2) to present expert testimony by a toxicologist concerning the percentage of U.S. currency that is contaminated by the odor of illegal narcotics, and (3) to authorize government payment for the toxicologist’s services under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l).\\nWe have noted that the admissibility of experimental evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Patterson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 786 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir.1986); Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir.1982).\\nIn refusing to allow the in-court demonstration with the narcotics detection dog, the court noted that the testimony would be irrelevant because the government had based its seizure of the currency on numerous factors other than the positive canine reaction. These had included the following facts: (1) Fuentez had paid for his ticket in cash; (2) he had appeared nervous; (3) he had purchased a one-way ticket; (4) he had one carry-on duffel bag and (5) he had given a thoroughly implausible explanation for having such a large amount of cash on his person. Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the demonstration.\\nThese arguments apply with equal force to Fuentez’s request to present expert testimony concerning the level of drug contamination of currency. Fuentez’s expert was prepared to testify that a Substantial percentage of bills in the Miami area contain cocaine residue. Fuentez did not include in his offer of proof that the expert would testify (1) that a similar percentage of currency in St. Louis would be so contaminated; or (2) that the expert’s analysis applied to all denominations. As before, a number of other factors went into the currency seizures that would render such testimony, even if true, irrelevant.\\nLast, we address Fuentez’s argument that the district court committed reversible error by failing to authorize payment of his expert toxicologist under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l). Because the district court did not err in refusing to permit the toxicologist to testify, it clearly did not err in refusing to authorize payment for such a witness. Moreover, the two cases cited by appellant in support of his position on this issue are distinguishable and involved a far greater showing of need on the defendant’s part. See United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 908-909 (8th Cir.1970) (need for medical experts to determine if defendant was competent to stand trial); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-12 (8th Cir.1974) (need for independent psychiatrist to determine effects of LSD on defendant’s brain to present insanity defense). As we noted in Schultz, “a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere ‘fishing expedition’.” Id., 431 F.2d at 911.\\nWe address Fuentez’ sentencing challenge below. We have considered Fuentez’s remaining arguments, and we find that they are without merit.\\nE. Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon\\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon was convicted of two offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; and (2) engaging in financial transactions involving drag proceeds on June 8, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Rodriguez was sentenced to a total term of 262 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release.\\nAll of Rodriguez’ arguments pertain to sentencing and are discussed below.\\nF. Stanley Pruitt\\nStanley Pruitt was convicted of seven offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine between January 1988 and February 1990; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (4) possession with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine on July 11, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (5) distribution of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (6) possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine on November 17, 1989, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (7) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).\\nTitle 18, United States Code, § 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:\\nWhoever, during and in relation to ... any drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such ... drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.... In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years.... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, ... the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment^]\\nPruitt argues that he was improperly convicted of three separate violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that he was improperly sentenced consecutively for each violation.\\nBeginning in March 1989, Stanley Pruitt became the primary retail dealer/customer in the conspiracy, in addition to directing the activities of various other dealers, including Larry Smith. Pruitt conducted his transactions at numerous locations in St. Louis.\\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities searched Pruitt’s residence at 2201 Angelica. Pruitt and an associate, Frank Day, were present during the search. The authorities recovered automobile records, telephone numbers for members of the conspiracy, and $6,190 in U.S. currency from the residence. The authorities also seized numerous weapons from the first floor of the residence: (1) a .12 gauge shotgun; (2) a second .12 gauge shotgun with a sawed-off barrel; (3) an Arisaka bolt-action rifle; (4) a Marlin .35 caliber lever action rifle; (5) a .22 caliber revolver; and (6) a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.\\nOn June 16,1989, law enforcement authorities also searched the house at 5275 Beacon. The authorities recovered the following weapons from the front bedroom of the residence: (1) a .30 caliber semi-automatic machine pistol; and (2) a .22 caliber AR-7 rifle. The agents also seized various documents connecting Pruitt to the residence, including his driver’s license permit, a number of pieces of mail addressed to him; and cash receipts in Pruitt’s name.\\nThe section 924(c) “use and carry” charge for November 17, 1989, originated in a separate incident. The St. Louis police department arrested one Donnie Davis late in the evening of November 16, 1989, in possession of a small quantity of cocaine. After his arrest, Davis identified his source of cocaine as Stanley Pruitt and agreed to arrange an additional purchase of cocaine from Pruitt. The police recorded a conversation between Davis and Pruitt in which Pruitt agreed to sell four ounces of cocaine to Davis and scheduled the transfer to occur at one of Pruitt’s apartments at 9921B Sloane Square. After Davis had purchased five ounces of cocaine from Pruitt, the police arrested Pruitt as he exited the apartment building. During a search of 9921B Sloane Square, police recovered a total of more than 600 grams of cocaine, assorted drug paraphernalia, and a .22 caliber rifle. A subsequent search by officers of Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin uncovered a .22 caliber revolver hidden in a hidden safe in a closet, along with other documentary evidence linking Pruitt to the conspiracy.\\nThe principal witness to testify concerning Pruitt was Larry Smith, a lifetime acquaintance of Pruitt, who is currently in the Witness Protection Program. Smith testified that he was aware of weapons Pruitt kept at an apartment on Nor stead Walk, at a house at 5275 Beacon, and at the Angelica Street residence. Smith explained that Pruitt used the weapons for protection in his narcotics dealings. On one occasion, Smith was present when Pruitt showed Smith, Ortiz, and Fuentez a weapon at 5275 Beacon and stated that “if somebody ran in there and wasn’t supposed to be there, [Pruitt] was prepared for that.”\\nAs stated earlier, Pruitt was convicted of the following section 924(c) “use and carry” charges: (1) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (2) carrying and using firearms during a drug trafficking crime (conspiracy) on June 16, 1989; (3) carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime (distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine) on November 17, 1989. Due to a number of previous offenses, Pruitt had a criminal history score of 11. The district court sentenced Pruitt to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment for the drug offenses. With respect to the section 924(c) charges, the district court sentenced Pruitt to 60 months on the first charge, and 240 months consecutively on each of the second and third charges, for a total of 540 months.\\nPruitt’s appeal presents the following questions: (1) may a defendant be convicted of more than one violation of section 924(e) based upon the same predicate offense and, if so; (2) can a second violation of section 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense be considered a “second or subsequent” offense, allowing the court to impose consecutive sentences for each offense and an enhanced twenty-year penalty for the second offense.\\nPruitt first argues that he cannot be convicted of more than one offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) based upon the same predicate offense (conspiracy) for the two stashes of weapons that were found, respectively, in the first floor of his residence at 2201 Angelica and in the front bedroom of 5275 Beacon. We resolved this issue in United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991), where we noted that “[w]e see no implication of the double jeopardy clause in multiple convictions for each separate possession of a firearm during and in relation to a single drug trafficking crime.” Id. Accord, United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the district court properly convicted Pruitt on two section 924(c) charges based upon the two stashes of weapons recovered from 2201 Angelica and 5275 Beacon.\\nHaving resolved that under Freisinger Pruitt may be convicted of three separate section 924(c) violations, we must now address a second question: once a defendant has properly been convicted of two section 924(c) violations based upon a single drug trafficking offense, is the second conviction a “second or subsequent” offense, permitting an enhanced and consecutively imposed twenty-year sentence?\\nIn United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, -, -, -, 112 S.Ct. 199, 349, 399, 609, 116 L.Ed.2d 159, 288, 348, 632 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1186, 117 L.Ed.2d 429 (1992), where the defendant had been convicted of the two section 924(c) charges based upon the same predicate offense, but entailing different uses, we found that “consecutive sentences on these counts do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” Id. at 1223. Although we reached a seemingly different result in Freis-inger, the facts of that case distinguish it from Pruitt’s situation. The defendant in Freisinger had been convicted of four separate section 924(c) violations based upon his carrying four weapons at the time police arrested him in possession of cocaine. 937 F.2d at 385. We upheld the defendant’s convictions on four separate section 924(c) violations based upon the same predicate offense. Id. at 390. In Freisinger, the district court had treated defendant’s second, third, and fourth section 924(c) violation as “second or subsequent offenses” for the purposes of the statute, and imposed consecutive sentences for each count. Id. at 385. We concluded that “when a defendant has been convicted of more than one violation of section 924(c) because he was carrying more than one firearm during a single drug trafficking offense, the convictions after the first one are not ‘second or subsequent’ convictions within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 391. Thus, in Freisinger we reasoned that the proper solution involved: (1) sentencing the defendant to a term corresponding to a first offense under section 924(e) for each violation based upon the same predicate offense; and (2) imposing those sentences to run concurrently.\\nThere is, however, a crucial difference between Freisinger and Lucas. In Lucas, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms based upon the two separate stashes of weapons. In Freisinger, by contrast, concur- ' rent sentences were appropriate because the defendant had been convicted separately for each of the four weapons found in a single stash.\\nMoreover, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Deal v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993), confirms that the district court may sentence a defendant to a consecutive twenty-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for “a second or subsequent conviction” where both the first and any subsequent convictions arise in the same proceeding.\\nAccordingly, the district court properly sentenced Pruitt to five years on the first section 924(e) conviction, and to consecutive twenty-year terms for his second and third section 924(c) convictions.\\nIII.\\nA number of the appellants argue the following two issues on appeal: (1) that the government improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike the only black juror from the jury panel in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) that the district court erroneously admitted the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\\nA. Batson Issue\\nAppellants Santana, Ortiz, Ramirez, Fuen-tez, and Pruitt argue that the government’s exercise of one of its peremptory strikes against juror # 1 was racially discriminatory and violated their equal protection rights under Batson.\\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection clause' forbids the government from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. See United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir.1990). Under Batson, once a defendant makes a prima facie case of the prosecution’s purposefully discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to the government to come forward with a neutral explanation, particular to the case, for striking jurors of the defendant’s race. Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142. We review a district court’s finding that the government has exercised its peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.\\nSix jurors (numbered respectively 1, 12, 17, 36, 39, and 49) were black and juror #47 was Hispanic. The eventual jury of twelve persons was chosen from the first thirty-one members, thus automatically eliminating jurors numbered 36, 39, 47, and 49. The district court struck jurors numbered 12 and 17 for cause, leaving juror # 1 as the only black or Hispanic juror available to sit on this case. The government used one of its peremptories to strike juror # 1. The defense made a proper Batson exception. In response to the district court’s request for a statement of reasons, the government stated that juror # 1 had testified as a witness in a case in which her sister had been a criminal defendant. Moreover, when asked whether that experience would affect her impartiality in the upcoming trial, juror # 1 replied equivocally, “No, I don’t think so.” Accordingly, the district court found that the government’s reason was a valid, race-neutral justification.\\nAppellants argue that the inclusion of juror # 14, who was white and who admitted during voir dire to having a friend who had recently been prosecuted for bribery in federal court, supports their Batson claim. Significant differences exist, however, between the experiences of juror # 1 and juror # 14. Juror # 14 had not been a witness at his friend’s trial, the trial did not involve a close family member, and juror # 14 admitted that he did not know the details of the bribery case. Moreover, when asked if that experience would affect his ability to impartially hear this trial, he replied unequivocally, “No.”\\nConsequently, we find no clear error here. The prosecution’s reasons for striking the black juror were unique to the facts of the case and were racially neutral, and thus constitutionally permissible. See Thomas, 914 F.2d at 142.\\nB. Co-Conspirator Hearsay Issue\\nSantana, Ramirez-Nazar, Fuentez, and Pruitt jointly argue that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of four witnesses as co-conspirator admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).\\nUnder the federal rules, a statement is not hearsay if made “by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), “ ‘the government must demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and declarant were part of the conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir.1986)).\\nUnder the approach used in this circuit, first set forth in United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.1978), a district court is required to admit conditionally the statements of alleged co-conspirators, subject to an on-the-record ruling that the statement is admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the rule against hearsay. United States v. Coco, 926 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 1991). Where the record indicates that the defendant failed to request a Bell ruling but made a motion for acquittal, we treat the district judge’s denial of the acquittal motion as substantial compliance with the Bell requirements, infer the requisite Bell findings, and employ a plain-error standard of review. See Id.\\nAppellants first challenge the admissibility of the testimony of Daniel Perkins concerning Perkins’s contact with Stanley Pruitt during November 1989, when Perkins installed several hidden safes in Pruitt’s residence at 4223 Marlin Court. Contrary to the appellants’ contention, Perkins related no hearsay statements in the course of his testimony, but testified only as to his first-hand observations. Perkins testified that, while at that address, he personally observed Pruitt consummate several transactions that involved measuring white powder on a triple beam scale. Although Perkins testified that these visitors had spoken- to Pruitt, he did not relate the substance of any of these conversations. Consequently, Perkins provided no testimony that would offend Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).\\nNext, appellants challenge two portions of Madelyn Torres’s testimony concerning events that occurred in her apartment during the spring of 1989, when she was dating Frank Santana. Torres testified that on at least two occasions Santana had. received Ruben Santana, Francisco Herrera, Jose Hernandez, and Candido Polanco in her apartment. Torres testified that on both occasions the visitors delivered shoe boxes full of currency to Frank Santana and had stated that “... this is the money from the one eighth, or, you know, whatever material they had sold,” using terms associated with fractional amounts of cocaine.\\nWe find that Torres’ statements satisfy the requirements set forth in Kocher for admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Independent evidence demonstrated that Ruben Santana, Herrera, Hernandez and Polanco were all involved in the conspiracy. Moreover, as the visitors were primarily involved in handling the financial aspects of the venture, the statements concerning the shoebox-es described the source of the money, and thus were in furtherance of the conspiracy.\\nNext, the appellants challenge several aspects of Felix Gil’s testimony. Felix Gil was an illegal alien from the Dominican Republic who served as one of Santana’s money couriers and testified for the prosecution. Gil is currently in the Witness Security Program. First, the appellants challenge Gil’s testimony concerning conversations he had with Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Francisco Herrera concerning the operation of the conspiracy. The majority of this testimony concerned conversations between Gil and Herrera concerning Santana’s operation in St. Louis, its members, and its activities. Herrera, Frank Santana’s nephew, was a central player in the conspiracy. Gil’s conversations with Herrera satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) because Herrera was a member of the conspiracy and entered into the conversations in furtherance of the conspiracy to successfully recruit Gil to become one of Santana’s money couriers.\\nThe appellants also challenge Gil’s testimony regarding Santana’s source of income. In his direct examination, Gil testified that he had learned that Santana’s primary source of income was drugs from “the guys that used to sell” for Santana. The government admits on appeal that such testimony was probably inadmissible due to a lack of specificity concerning the identity of the speaker. Gil backed this statement up, however, by noting that his own observation had led him to the same conclusion, namely, that Santana’s principal source of income was drug-related. Because counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, we find that any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\\nAppellants also challenge Gil’s testimony concerning Santana’s alleged ownership of two New Jersey bars. Gil testified that various persons had told him that Santana owned two bars, but could not be more specific about the identity of these persons. Any error in admitting this testimony, however, was harmless, given its corroboration from independent sources. Moreover, Madelyn Torres testified that Santana personally told her that he owned two New Jersey bars, the “Copacabana” and “The Colombia House.” Indeed, a search of the Copacabana by authorities on September 9, 1988 recovered Santana’s personal identification documents, including his social security card, from a safe under the bar of the club. In addition, the ownership of these bars was a peripheral issue in the case.\\nLast, the appellants object to Sergeant Mario Recino’s testimony in which he related a conversation with a female identified as Brenda, who gave him Santana’s nickname and beeper number. Reciño used the beeper number to contact Santana, discussed with him the purchase of multiple kilograms of cocaine, and also learned directly from Santana that Santana was selling kilogram quantities of cocaine in both New Jersey and St. Louis. Brenda’s statements incriminate no one other than Santana, and the statements clearly had the purpose of furthering Santana’s drug distribution enterprise by putting him in contact with a potential customer. Moreover, other evidence established that the nickname and beeper number belonged to Santana. Last, because the record reveals that counsel failed to request a Bell finding, we infer the Bell finding from the judge’s denial of Santana’s motion for acquittal on September 17, 1991, and review for plain error. Given this subsequent additional testimony, any error in admitting the earlier testimony was harmless.\\nIV.\\nLast, appellants make the following arguments with respect to the sentences imposed by the district court..\\nA. Attribution of Cocaine Amounts to Rodriguez, Ramirez & Fuentez under U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(1).\\nAppellants Fuentez, Ramirez-Nazar, and Rodriguez-Calderon argue that the district court erroneously attributed an excessive amount of cocaine to them in determining their base offense levels. The court computed the base offense level for these three defendants to be 36, based on a finding that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine.\\nWe set forth the standards for determining drug quantities attributable to individual defendants in a conspiracy in United States v. Olderbak, 961 F.2d 756 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 422, 121 L.Ed.2d 344 (1992). We noted that:\\nUnder subsection (a) of Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, each conspirator is responsible for all criminal acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. ‘[S]uch conduct is not included in establishing the defendant’s offense level,’ however, if it ‘was neither within the scope of the defendant’s agreement nor was reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.’ ”\\nId. at 764 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A district court’s determination of the quantity attributable to an individual defendant for sentencing purposes “is a factual determination subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Id. at 763.\\nIn ascertaining the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy, the district court adopted the conclusion of the presentence investigation reports that “[i]n total, the drug distribution organization headed by Santana was responsible for the distribution of over 105 kilograms of cocaine in the St. Louis area.” The U.S. Probation Office obtained an amount of greater than 50 kilograms by two independent methods. First, the authorities arrived at the 105 kilogram figure by totalling amounts derived from the testimony of witnesses and corroborating evidence in the case. Second, U.S. law enforcement officers seized approximately 13.5 kilograms of cocaine. Additionally, officers seized $545,-552.00 in U.S. currency and checks. Last, the organization transferred approximately $400,000 by wire. The amount of drug proceeds totaled roughly $945,000, which, when divided by an average cost of $23,000 per kilogram, represents 41 kilograms of cocaine, which, when added in turn to the 13.5 kilograms actually seized, totals over 50 kilograms. We have previously endorsed the extrapolation of drug quantities from similar financial information. See United States v. Carper, 942 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, —— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 614, 116 L.Ed.2d 636 (1991). We do not find the calculation of drug quantities to be clearly erroneous here.\\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine distributed by the conspiracy in this case was reasonably foreseeable to Fuentez. We agree. Substantial evidence showed that he was personally involved in the conspiracy from beginning to end. Fuentez began working as a worker and money courier for co-defendant Taurino Gonzalez-Felix during the summer and fall of 1988, which included the attempted delivery of $40,000 to Frank Santana in August 1988. Fuentez was directly implicated in the conspiracy by the testimony of Lisa Neeally, Patricia Oliver, Lissette Jacquez, Larry Smith, and Larry Birdsong.\\nMoreover, Fuentez figured prominently in several of the law enforcement events involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, law enforcement officers seized a total of $22,680 in currency from Fuentez on two separate occasions at the St. Louis airport in the summer and fall of 1988. Fuentez was also present in an apartment on October 7, 1989, where police arrested Candido Ortiz and recovered a bag containing cocaine. Likewise, Fuentez was arrested after he, along with Ortiz and Jose Hernandez, sold an undercover officer and a police informant a quarter kilogram of cocaine for $7,000 on November 6, 1989. Last, when law enforcement officials stopped Fuentez at the St. Louis airport for a third time on December 21, 1989, papers confiscated from Fuentez contained the beeper number of Frank Santana.\\nThe district court found that the entire amount of cocaine in the conspiracy was also attributable to Gabriel Ramirez-Nazar. As with Fuentez, the evidence demonstrated that Ramirez played an important role in the conspiracy. Ramirez worked as a courier/middleman for Santana, and worked closely with co-defendant Rodriguez. On June 8, 1989, Ramirez received $5000 from Larry Smith, wired to him at the direction of Rodriguez-Calderon. One month later, Ramirez delivered a vehicle containing nine kilograms of cocaine to Stanley Pruitt in St. Louis. Authorities arrested Ramirez shortly thereafter, at which time he was sharing a room with ringleader John Yazbek. Ramirez made a false exculpatory statement to police shortly after his arrest on July 11, 1989. At that time, police recovered from Ramirez a document indicating that he was the joint owner of an automobile with Yazbek. Additionally, testimony by both Felix Gil and Madelyn Torres linked Ramirez to Frank Santana, John Yazbek, and other members of the conspiracy. Last, at the time of Santana’s arrest, authorities recovered from him an address book containing the name and telephone number of Gabriel Ramirez under his nickname, “pela cuca.” The evidence showed that Ramirez and Rodriguez worked closely together.\\nAlthough Ramirez is not directly implicated in any law enforcement events other than those surrounding the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine, strong circumstantial evidence, both documentary and testimonial, indicate his willing participation in the full extent of the conspiracy. The conspiracy’s leaders plainly believed Ramirez worthy of sufficient trust to handle nine kilograms of cocaine, which, at a value of approximately $23,000 per kilogram, is worth $207,000, an amount that contradicts Ramirez’s assertion that he was a minor participant. Given the district’s opportunity to hear the testimony and ascertain the credibility of the numerous witnesses in this case, we cannot say that it clearly erred in attributing to Ramirez the total amount of the cocaine involved in the conspiracy.\\nJorge Rodriguez-Calderon also argues that the district court erred in attributing to him the entire amount of cocaine distributed over the course of the conspiracy.\\nThe government presented substantial evidence establishing that Rodriguez played an important role in the conspiracy. Rodriguez directed Larry Smith to wire Ramirez $5,000 to pay off cocaine debts to the New Jersey operation, thereby opening the door to future shipments to the St. Louis area. The government introduced evidence that, as a result of this wire, Ramirez drove a car containing nine kilograms of cocaine. to St. Louis. When Rodriguez came to St. Louis in June 1989, he came in a supervisory capacity to, as one of the witnesses put it, “straighten everything up.” As the government later explained, “straightening everything up” consisted of collecting money to correct prior losses in the trans-continental drug enterprise. While in St. Louis, Rodriguez managed the dealing and distribution aspects of many members of the conspiracy, including Carlos Clausen and Jose Cintron. In addition, Madelyn Torres testified that Rodriguez had given instructions to both her and Delisa Cordero to deliver three kilograms of cocaine to St. Louis in mid-July 1989. In conversations with Larry Smith, Carlos Clausen referred to Rodriguez as the “big boss.” As with Ramirez, Rodriguez’s involvement in personally arranging the delivery of nine kilograms of cocaine and acting in a managerial capacity with respect to the enterprise’s St. Louis contacts demonstrates his central role in the conspiracy. In the iight of this evidence, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in attributing to Rodriguez the amount of cocaine that it did. See Bonadonna, 775 F.2d at 958.\\nB. Santana and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the Enhancement of their Sentences under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.\\nSantana and Rodriguez also challenge the district court’s enhancement of their offense levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for their aggravating roles in the offense. The district court enhanced Santana’s offense level by foui’ levels because he was as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive. Similarly, the district court enhanced Rodriguez’ offense level by three levels for being a manager or supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive.\\nIn making a determination under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, the sentencing court should consider such factors as the nature of defendant’s role in the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n. 3); United States v. Roberts, 953 F.2d 351, 354 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3008, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992). A finding by the district court under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is a factual determination that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wiegers, 919 F.2d 76, 77 (8th Cir.1990).\\nWe have broadly defined the term “organizer” or “leader.” United States v. Manuel, 912 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir.1990). In addition, we have noted that an individual can occupy a leadership role without having directly controlled his co-conspirators. United States v. Grady, 972 F.2d 889, 889 (8th Cir.1992).\\nThe district court’s decision to increase Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous. Santana was the leader of this entire conspiracy. He was the conspiracy’s principal supplier, and he was involved in the conspiracy from August 1988 until his arrest in February 1990. For the duration of the conspiracy, a vast amount of money, estimated by law enforcement authorities to be nearly $1,000,000, was sent by other conspirators directly to Santana or via his relatives. Santana’s beeper served as the common link among all the conspirators. The evidence supported the inference that Santana directed the activities of Jose Hernandez, Candido Polanco, Eduardo Cedeno, and Felix Gil. Gil testified that Santana had recruited him into the conspiracy and had directed him to transport $56,000 in cash to St. Louis in December 1989. Gil and Madelyn Torres both confirmed during their testimony that Santana was the ringleader of this conspiracy. Moreover, in July 1989, Santana represented himself to Sergeant Reciño as the leader of the conspiracy and boasted about the profit opportunities present in St. Louis. Given the facts recounted during testimony, the district court’s enhancement of Santana’s offense level by four was not clearly erroneous.\\nLikewise, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in enhancing the offense level of Jorge Rodriguez-Calderon. Rodriguez, as recounted earlier, played a significant role in the management of the conspiracy. He was referred to as the “big boss” and was dispatched to St. Louis to “straighten everything up” and await Ramirez’ nine kilogram cocaine shipment. Thus, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that Rodriguez was a manager or supervisor within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b).\\nC. Fuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez’s Challenge to the District Court’s Refusal to Reduce their Offense Levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).\\nFuentez, Ramirez, and Rodriguez claim that the district court erred in refusing to reduce their offense levels as minor or minimal participants under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A district court’s refusal to grant such a reduction is a finding of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States u Regan, 940 F.2d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.1991).\\nTo be a minimal participant, the particular defendant must have been “plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 1). The Application Notes to section 3B1.2 state that courts should use the “minimal participant” exception “infrequently,” possibly in cases where “an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 2). Given their extensive participation in the enterprise, any argument that Fuentez, Ramirez, or Rodriguez qualify for this exception is without merit.\\nTo be a minor participant, the particular defendant must have been “less culpable than most other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n. 3). Fuentez’s extensive participation in the conspiracy was discussed earlier and precludes serious consideration of his request. Likewise, Rodriguez’s role as a manager and one who directed the activities of other conspirators precludes his success in this argument. Finally, we cannot say the district court’s refusal to grant Ramirez a reduction under section 3B1.2 was clearly erroneous.\\nWe have examined appellants’ other arguments and we find them to be without merit.\\nAccordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the appellants.\\n. On June 27, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of • $13,490 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. Fuentez was travelling on a one-way ticket to Newark, New Jersey, under an assumed name. Fuentez told agents that a friend who owned a grocery store in New York had given him the cash to buy vegetables in St. Louis. A narcotics detection dog reacted positively to the currency.\\nOn October 22, 1988, DEA Agents seized a total of $9,190 in U.S. currency from Fuentez at the St. Louis airport. The cash was sewn into the lining of a leather jacket. Fuentez again claimed that the currency had been given to him by his mysterious friend in New York, this time to buy a car which he, Fuentez, had been unable to locate. No claim was ever made for the return of the currency.\\n. Section 3B1.1 provides, in pertinent part: Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:\\n(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.\\n(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":96,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513440,"string":"10,513,440"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Suppenbach"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3698"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and STOHR, District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nRobert E. Suppenbach appeals from his conviction for conspiring to unlawfully modify and distribute electronic devices to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4). He argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court’s supplemental jury instructions denied him a fair trial. We affirm.\\nI.\\nIn 1986, major cable television programmers began scrambling their satellite transmissions in order to thwart unauthorized reception of their programming. Consequently, to receive scrambled programming, satellite dish owners must now purchase a transmission descrambler, or decoder, and then pay a subscription fee to have descrambled transmissions sent to their decoders. Since the introduction of program scrambling, pirates have begun to illegally modify decoders so that dish owners can receive scrambled programming without paying a subscription fee.\\nIn 1989, the FBI began investigating allegations that satellite dish vendors in the Kansas City, Missouri, area were selling illegally modified decoders. The investigation focused on John Weber, owner of Future Vision Satellite, and Larry Kueser, owner of Centek. The FBI learned that Bob Suppen-bach, also known as Decoder Bob, Computer Bob, and Chip Bob, was the individual illegally modifying decoders for Weber and Kueser.\\nSuppenbach was indicted pursuant to a three-count indictment. Count I charged that Suppenbach had conspired to unlawfully modify and distribute decoders to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count II charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count III charged that Suppenbach had modified a Channel Master Module, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).\\nAt trial, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had illegally modified decoders for John Weber and his company, Future Vision. More specifically, the government presented evidence that Suppen-bach had illegally modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, which Future Vision sold to James Saunders in November 1989, and that he had modified a Channel Master Module, which Future Vision sold to Jim Stubbs in March 1989. The modification of these two decoders constituted the basis for the substantive offenses charged in Counts II and III, respectively. Additionally, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had also modified decoders for Larry Kueser and his company, Centek.\\nThe jury found Suppenbach guilty on Count I, the conspiracy charge, and not guilty on Counts II and III, the substantive offense charges. The district court sentenced Suppenbach to four months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in restitution.\\nII.\\nSuppenbach first argues that his conspiracy conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. The district court instructed the jury that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had voluntarily agreed with a person or persons to commit a criminal offense (to illegally modify decoders) and that a person who had joined the agreement knowingly did one or more of the acts charged in the indictment. See Jury Instruction E. The only acts charged in the indictment were the acts alleged in Counts II and III. As stated above, these counts charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler and a Channel Master Module. Accordingly, Suppenbach argues, and the government agrees, that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy the jury had to find that he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. Sup-penbach argues that because the jury acquitted him on Counts II and III, it found that he had not modified either of the decoders and therefore could not have properly convicted him of conspiracy.\\nAlthough Suppenbach attempts to characterize his argument as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, his argument is actually an inconsistent verdict claim. It is understandable that Suppenbach would attempt to characterize his claim as other than an inconsistent verdict claim, because it is well settled that “[cjonsistency in the verdict is not necessary.” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). A defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58, 105 S.Ct. 471, 473, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (citing Dunn).\\nIndeed, in United States v. Toumsley, we rejected substantially the same argument that Suppenbach makes here. 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir.1988), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1406, 113 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). We refused to overturn a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice even though the defendant had been acquitted of obstruction of justice. Id. (citing United States v. Shigemura, 682 F.2d 699, 705 n. 11 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 741, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983)). See also United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 115, 116 (8th Cir.1991) (refusing to set aside inconsistent verdicts where the defendants were convicted of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine but acquitted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine).\\nAs the Supreme Court recognized in Powell, where a jury has reached inconsistent verdicts, “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S.Ct. at 476. It is possible that the jury found that Suppenbach had modified one or both of the decoders and thus properly convicted him of conspiracy, and then “through mistake, compromise, or lenity,” arrived at inconsistent conclusions on the substantive charges. Id. As Justice Holmes succinctly stated in Dunn:\\nThe most that can be said in [inconsistent verdict] cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.\\nThat the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.\\nDunn, 284 U.S. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91 (citation omitted).\\nAlthough we will not overturn Sup-penbach’s conspiracy conviction because it is inconsistent with his acquittals, he is entitled to an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 477. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on other counts was insufficient. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may logically be drawn from the evidence.” United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 315, 116 L.Ed.2d 257 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 890, 116 L.Ed.2d 793 (1992). We will reverse the jury’s verdict “ ‘only if the evidence so viewed is such that a reasonable-minded jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the government’s proof of one of the essential elements of the offense.’” Id. (quoting Yerks, 918 F.2d at 1374).\\nTo convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had agreed with a person or persons to illegally modify decoders, and that in furtherance of this agreement he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. The evidence clearly established that the decoders charged in Counts II and III had been modified for and sold by Weber through Future Vision. Thus, to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, it was necessary for the jury to find that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to modify decoders and that he had modified one of the decoders charged in the indictment. After reviewing the record, we find ample evidence supporting both propositions.\\nThe evidence established that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to illegally modify decoders. Weber testified that he sold illegally modified satellite decoders through Future Vision from 1988 to 1989. According to Weber, Suppenbach did all of the illegal modifications for Future Vision. Suppenbach modified thirty to fifty decoders, receiving between $125 to $250 per modification. Whenever Weber needed decoders modified, he would contact Suppenbach. Weber would then take the unmodified decoders to Sup-penbach’s home, or Suppenbach would pick them up at Weber’s office. After the decoders had been modified, Suppenbach either delivered them to Weber, or Weber would pick them up at Suppenbaeh’s home. Two Future Vision employees corroborated Weber’s testimony, stating that Suppenbach was the only person who had modified decoders for Future Vision.\\nThe evidence also established that Suppen-bach had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. As recounted above, Weber and two Future Vision employees testified that Suppenbach was the only person who modified decoders for Future Vision. The evidence established that Future Vision sold the illegally modified Channel Master Module to Jim Stubbs in March 1989 and the modified Panasonic 4500 De-scrambler to James Saunders in November 1989. Stubbs and Saunders confirmed that they had purchased decoders that allowed them to receive cable programming for which they had not paid. Additionally, Brant Candelore, an electrical engineer, testified that Stubbs’ and Saunders’ decoders had in fact been illegally modified.\\nAdditionally, Kueser’s testimony corroborated that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. According to Kueser, he sold illegally modified decoders through Centek in 1988 and 1989, and he too had hired Suppenbach to do illegal modifications. When he needed decoders modified, Kueser would contact Suppenbach; then, Centek would either deliver the decoders to Suppenbach, or Suppen-bach would pick them up.\\nHaving found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support Suppenbach’s conspiracy conviction, we turn to his argument that the district court’s supplemental instructions denied him a fair trial.\\nIn its closing argument, the government argued that to prove the conspiracy charge it had to show that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. The government stated that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppen-bach and Weber and did not involve Kueser. It argued that evidence that Suppenbach had conspired with Kueser merely added to the government’s case.\\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the district court. In the first note, the jury asked, among other things, “Is anything having to do with Syntex [sic] actually involved in the charges against Mr. Suppen-bach?” The court responded that “[t]he government does not contend that Syntex [sic] was involved in the charges in Counts 2 and 3.” The court stated further that “[t]he jury should deal with Count 1 in accordance with the evidence, the instructions, and the argument.” In the second note, the jury asked, “Is Count 1 the conspiracy between John Webber [sic] and Bob Suppenbach only or is Syntech [sic] involved also on Count 1?” The court answered that “[t]he conspiracy charge does not name co-conspirators and the instructions do not confine jury consideration to particular companies or individuals. It will be the jury’s responsibility to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, what companies or individuals were involved.”\\nSuppenbach argues that the court’s supplemental instructions were improper because they implied that Centek could have been involved in the conspiracy. He contends that this implication was improper in the light of the government’s argument that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppenbach and Weber and did not involve Kueser and his company Centek.\\n“ ‘The response to a jury request for supplemental instructions is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court.’ ” United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 551 (1988) (quoting United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir.1986)). “A trial judge must be painstakingly impartial any time he communicates with the jury during deliberations. He must insure that any supplemental instructions are accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial.” Id.\\nWe find that the court’s supplemental instructions were accurate and appropriate. The court properly told the jury that Centek was not involved in Counts II and III. As noted above, the government’s evidence clearly established that Counts II and III involved only decoders that Suppenbach had modified for Future Vision and which Future Vision had sold. Under no view of the evidence could Centek have been involved in Counts II or III.\\nLikewise, the court properly instructed the jury that it would have to be guided by the evidence, instructions, and arguments in determining whether Centek was involved in Count I. The court appropriately refused to tell the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, taken together, the indictment, the evidence, and the instructions required the government to prove that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber to modify decoders. Although the indictment and the instructions required the jury to find that Suppenbach and Weber had conspired, they did not foreclose a finding that Kueser and Centek were also involved in the conspiracy. As the court told the jury, the indictment did not name coconspirators and the instructions did not limit the jury’s consideration only to certain individuals or companies. The court properly told the jury that it would have to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, who was involved.\\nAs Suppenbach emphasizes, the government argued that Kueser and Centek were not involved in the conspiracy. The government’s closing argument, however, did not render the court’s supplemental instructions improper, for the argument merely reflected the government’s interpretation of the evidence. Certainly, a district court need not tell the jury to interpret the evidence in the manner urged by the government. Instead, the court’s instruction must be neutral, which it was in this case. Rather than telling the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy, the court impartially instructed the jury to determine for itself from the evidence what companies and individuals were involved.\\nThe conviction is affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"Robert G. Duncan, Kansas City, MO, argued, for appellant.\", \"Carla B. Oppenheimer, Kansas City, MO, argued (Jean Paul Bradshaw II and Carla B. Oppenheimer, on the brief), for appellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant.\\nNo. 92-3698.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.\\nSubmitted April 12, 1993.\\nDecided July 26, 1993.\\nRehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1993.\\nRobert G. Duncan, Kansas City, MO, argued, for appellant.\\nCarla B. Oppenheimer, Kansas City, MO, argued (Jean Paul Bradshaw II and Carla B. Oppenheimer, on the brief), for appellee.\\nBefore WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and STOHR, District Judge.\\nThe HONORABLE DONALD J. STOHR, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STOHR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 679"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nRobert E. Suppenbach appeals from his conviction for conspiring to unlawfully modify and distribute electronic devices to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4). He argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court’s supplemental jury instructions denied him a fair trial. We affirm.\nI.\nIn 1986, major cable television programmers began scrambling their satellite transmissions in order to thwart unauthorized reception of their programming. Consequently, to receive scrambled programming, satellite dish owners must now purchase a transmission descrambler, or decoder, and then pay a subscription fee to have descrambled transmissions sent to their decoders. Since the introduction of program scrambling, pirates have begun to illegally modify decoders so that dish owners can receive scrambled programming without paying a subscription fee.\nIn 1989, the FBI began investigating allegations that satellite dish vendors in the Kansas City, Missouri, area were selling illegally modified decoders. The investigation focused on John Weber, owner of Future Vision Satellite, and Larry Kueser, owner of Centek. The FBI learned that Bob Suppen-bach, also known as Decoder Bob, Computer Bob, and Chip Bob, was the individual illegally modifying decoders for Weber and Kueser.\nSuppenbach was indicted pursuant to a three-count indictment. Count I charged that Suppenbach had conspired to unlawfully modify and distribute decoders to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count II charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count III charged that Suppenbach had modified a Channel Master Module, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).\nAt trial, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had illegally modified decoders for John Weber and his company, Future Vision. More specifically, the government presented evidence that Suppen-bach had illegally modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, which Future Vision sold to James Saunders in November 1989, and that he had modified a Channel Master Module, which Future Vision sold to Jim Stubbs in March 1989. The modification of these two decoders constituted the basis for the substantive offenses charged in Counts II and III, respectively. Additionally, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had also modified decoders for Larry Kueser and his company, Centek.\nThe jury found Suppenbach guilty on Count I, the conspiracy charge, and not guilty on Counts II and III, the substantive offense charges. The district court sentenced Suppenbach to four months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in restitution.\nII.\nSuppenbach first argues that his conspiracy conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. The district court instructed the jury that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had voluntarily agreed with a person or persons to commit a criminal offense (to illegally modify decoders) and that a person who had joined the agreement knowingly did one or more of the acts charged in the indictment. See Jury Instruction E. The only acts charged in the indictment were the acts alleged in Counts II and III. As stated above, these counts charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler and a Channel Master Module. Accordingly, Suppenbach argues, and the government agrees, that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy the jury had to find that he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. Sup-penbach argues that because the jury acquitted him on Counts II and III, it found that he had not modified either of the decoders and therefore could not have properly convicted him of conspiracy.\nAlthough Suppenbach attempts to characterize his argument as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, his argument is actually an inconsistent verdict claim. It is understandable that Suppenbach would attempt to characterize his claim as other than an inconsistent verdict claim, because it is well settled that “[cjonsistency in the verdict is not necessary.” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). A defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58, 105 S.Ct. 471, 473, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (citing Dunn).\nIndeed, in United States v. Toumsley, we rejected substantially the same argument that Suppenbach makes here. 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir.1988), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1406, 113 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). We refused to overturn a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice even though the defendant had been acquitted of obstruction of justice. Id. (citing United States v. Shigemura, 682 F.2d 699, 705 n. 11 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 741, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983)). See also United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 115, 116 (8th Cir.1991) (refusing to set aside inconsistent verdicts where the defendants were convicted of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine but acquitted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine).\nAs the Supreme Court recognized in Powell, where a jury has reached inconsistent verdicts, “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S.Ct. at 476. It is possible that the jury found that Suppenbach had modified one or both of the decoders and thus properly convicted him of conspiracy, and then “through mistake, compromise, or lenity,” arrived at inconsistent conclusions on the substantive charges. Id. As Justice Holmes succinctly stated in Dunn:\nThe most that can be said in [inconsistent verdict] cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.\nThat the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.\nDunn, 284 U.S. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91 (citation omitted).\nAlthough we will not overturn Sup-penbach’s conspiracy conviction because it is inconsistent with his acquittals, he is entitled to an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 477. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on other counts was insufficient. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may logically be drawn from the evidence.” United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 315, 116 L.Ed.2d 257 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 890, 116 L.Ed.2d 793 (1992). We will reverse the jury’s verdict “ ‘only if the evidence so viewed is such that a reasonable-minded jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the government’s proof of one of the essential elements of the offense.’” Id. (quoting Yerks, 918 F.2d at 1374).\nTo convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had agreed with a person or persons to illegally modify decoders, and that in furtherance of this agreement he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. The evidence clearly established that the decoders charged in Counts II and III had been modified for and sold by Weber through Future Vision. Thus, to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, it was necessary for the jury to find that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to modify decoders and that he had modified one of the decoders charged in the indictment. After reviewing the record, we find ample evidence supporting both propositions.\nThe evidence established that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to illegally modify decoders. Weber testified that he sold illegally modified satellite decoders through Future Vision from 1988 to 1989. According to Weber, Suppenbach did all of the illegal modifications for Future Vision. Suppenbach modified thirty to fifty decoders, receiving between $125 to $250 per modification. Whenever Weber needed decoders modified, he would contact Suppenbach. Weber would then take the unmodified decoders to Sup-penbach’s home, or Suppenbach would pick them up at Weber’s office. After the decoders had been modified, Suppenbach either delivered them to Weber, or Weber would pick them up at Suppenbaeh’s home. Two Future Vision employees corroborated Weber’s testimony, stating that Suppenbach was the only person who had modified decoders for Future Vision.\nThe evidence also established that Suppen-bach had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. As recounted above, Weber and two Future Vision employees testified that Suppenbach was the only person who modified decoders for Future Vision. The evidence established that Future Vision sold the illegally modified Channel Master Module to Jim Stubbs in March 1989 and the modified Panasonic 4500 De-scrambler to James Saunders in November 1989. Stubbs and Saunders confirmed that they had purchased decoders that allowed them to receive cable programming for which they had not paid. Additionally, Brant Candelore, an electrical engineer, testified that Stubbs’ and Saunders’ decoders had in fact been illegally modified.\nAdditionally, Kueser’s testimony corroborated that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. According to Kueser, he sold illegally modified decoders through Centek in 1988 and 1989, and he too had hired Suppenbach to do illegal modifications. When he needed decoders modified, Kueser would contact Suppenbach; then, Centek would either deliver the decoders to Suppenbach, or Suppen-bach would pick them up.\nHaving found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support Suppenbach’s conspiracy conviction, we turn to his argument that the district court’s supplemental instructions denied him a fair trial.\nIn its closing argument, the government argued that to prove the conspiracy charge it had to show that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. The government stated that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppen-bach and Weber and did not involve Kueser. It argued that evidence that Suppenbach had conspired with Kueser merely added to the government’s case.\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the district court. In the first note, the jury asked, among other things, “Is anything having to do with Syntex [sic] actually involved in the charges against Mr. Suppen-bach?” The court responded that “[t]he government does not contend that Syntex [sic] was involved in the charges in Counts 2 and 3.” The court stated further that “[t]he jury should deal with Count 1 in accordance with the evidence, the instructions, and the argument.” In the second note, the jury asked, “Is Count 1 the conspiracy between John Webber [sic] and Bob Suppenbach only or is Syntech [sic] involved also on Count 1?” The court answered that “[t]he conspiracy charge does not name co-conspirators and the instructions do not confine jury consideration to particular companies or individuals. It will be the jury’s responsibility to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, what companies or individuals were involved.”\nSuppenbach argues that the court’s supplemental instructions were improper because they implied that Centek could have been involved in the conspiracy. He contends that this implication was improper in the light of the government’s argument that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppenbach and Weber and did not involve Kueser and his company Centek.\n“ ‘The response to a jury request for supplemental instructions is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court.’ ” United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 551 (1988) (quoting United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir.1986)). “A trial judge must be painstakingly impartial any time he communicates with the jury during deliberations. He must insure that any supplemental instructions are accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial.” Id.\nWe find that the court’s supplemental instructions were accurate and appropriate. The court properly told the jury that Centek was not involved in Counts II and III. As noted above, the government’s evidence clearly established that Counts II and III involved only decoders that Suppenbach had modified for Future Vision and which Future Vision had sold. Under no view of the evidence could Centek have been involved in Counts II or III.\nLikewise, the court properly instructed the jury that it would have to be guided by the evidence, instructions, and arguments in determining whether Centek was involved in Count I. The court appropriately refused to tell the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, taken together, the indictment, the evidence, and the instructions required the government to prove that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber to modify decoders. Although the indictment and the instructions required the jury to find that Suppenbach and Weber had conspired, they did not foreclose a finding that Kueser and Centek were also involved in the conspiracy. As the court told the jury, the indictment did not name coconspirators and the instructions did not limit the jury’s consideration only to certain individuals or companies. The court properly told the jury that it would have to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, who was involved.\nAs Suppenbach emphasizes, the government argued that Kueser and Centek were not involved in the conspiracy. The government’s closing argument, however, did not render the court’s supplemental instructions improper, for the argument merely reflected the government’s interpretation of the evidence. Certainly, a district court need not tell the jury to interpret the evidence in the manner urged by the government. Instead, the court’s instruction must be neutral, which it was in this case. Rather than telling the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy, the court impartially instructed the jury to determine for itself from the evidence what companies and individuals were involved.\nThe conviction is affirmed.\n. The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nRobert E. Suppenbach appeals from his conviction for conspiring to unlawfully modify and distribute electronic devices to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4). He argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court’s supplemental jury instructions denied him a fair trial. We affirm.\\nI.\\nIn 1986, major cable television programmers began scrambling their satellite transmissions in order to thwart unauthorized reception of their programming. Consequently, to receive scrambled programming, satellite dish owners must now purchase a transmission descrambler, or decoder, and then pay a subscription fee to have descrambled transmissions sent to their decoders. Since the introduction of program scrambling, pirates have begun to illegally modify decoders so that dish owners can receive scrambled programming without paying a subscription fee.\\nIn 1989, the FBI began investigating allegations that satellite dish vendors in the Kansas City, Missouri, area were selling illegally modified decoders. The investigation focused on John Weber, owner of Future Vision Satellite, and Larry Kueser, owner of Centek. The FBI learned that Bob Suppen-bach, also known as Decoder Bob, Computer Bob, and Chip Bob, was the individual illegally modifying decoders for Weber and Kueser.\\nSuppenbach was indicted pursuant to a three-count indictment. Count I charged that Suppenbach had conspired to unlawfully modify and distribute decoders to be used for the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable television programming, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count II charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Count III charged that Suppenbach had modified a Channel Master Module, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).\\nAt trial, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had illegally modified decoders for John Weber and his company, Future Vision. More specifically, the government presented evidence that Suppen-bach had illegally modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler, which Future Vision sold to James Saunders in November 1989, and that he had modified a Channel Master Module, which Future Vision sold to Jim Stubbs in March 1989. The modification of these two decoders constituted the basis for the substantive offenses charged in Counts II and III, respectively. Additionally, the government presented evidence that Suppenbach had also modified decoders for Larry Kueser and his company, Centek.\\nThe jury found Suppenbach guilty on Count I, the conspiracy charge, and not guilty on Counts II and III, the substantive offense charges. The district court sentenced Suppenbach to four months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in restitution.\\nII.\\nSuppenbach first argues that his conspiracy conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. The district court instructed the jury that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had voluntarily agreed with a person or persons to commit a criminal offense (to illegally modify decoders) and that a person who had joined the agreement knowingly did one or more of the acts charged in the indictment. See Jury Instruction E. The only acts charged in the indictment were the acts alleged in Counts II and III. As stated above, these counts charged that Suppenbach had modified a Panasonic 4500 Descrambler and a Channel Master Module. Accordingly, Suppenbach argues, and the government agrees, that to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy the jury had to find that he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. Sup-penbach argues that because the jury acquitted him on Counts II and III, it found that he had not modified either of the decoders and therefore could not have properly convicted him of conspiracy.\\nAlthough Suppenbach attempts to characterize his argument as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, his argument is actually an inconsistent verdict claim. It is understandable that Suppenbach would attempt to characterize his claim as other than an inconsistent verdict claim, because it is well settled that “[cjonsistency in the verdict is not necessary.” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). A defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58, 105 S.Ct. 471, 473, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (citing Dunn).\\nIndeed, in United States v. Toumsley, we rejected substantially the same argument that Suppenbach makes here. 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir.1988), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1406, 113 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). We refused to overturn a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice even though the defendant had been acquitted of obstruction of justice. Id. (citing United States v. Shigemura, 682 F.2d 699, 705 n. 11 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 741, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983)). See also United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 115, 116 (8th Cir.1991) (refusing to set aside inconsistent verdicts where the defendants were convicted of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine but acquitted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine).\\nAs the Supreme Court recognized in Powell, where a jury has reached inconsistent verdicts, “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S.Ct. at 476. It is possible that the jury found that Suppenbach had modified one or both of the decoders and thus properly convicted him of conspiracy, and then “through mistake, compromise, or lenity,” arrived at inconsistent conclusions on the substantive charges. Id. As Justice Holmes succinctly stated in Dunn:\\nThe most that can be said in [inconsistent verdict] cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.\\nThat the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.\\nDunn, 284 U.S. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91 (citation omitted).\\nAlthough we will not overturn Sup-penbach’s conspiracy conviction because it is inconsistent with his acquittals, he is entitled to an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 477. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on other counts was insufficient. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may logically be drawn from the evidence.” United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 315, 116 L.Ed.2d 257 (1991) and — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 890, 116 L.Ed.2d 793 (1992). We will reverse the jury’s verdict “ ‘only if the evidence so viewed is such that a reasonable-minded jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the government’s proof of one of the essential elements of the offense.’” Id. (quoting Yerks, 918 F.2d at 1374).\\nTo convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, the jury had to find that he had agreed with a person or persons to illegally modify decoders, and that in furtherance of this agreement he had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. The evidence clearly established that the decoders charged in Counts II and III had been modified for and sold by Weber through Future Vision. Thus, to convict Suppenbach of conspiracy, it was necessary for the jury to find that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to modify decoders and that he had modified one of the decoders charged in the indictment. After reviewing the record, we find ample evidence supporting both propositions.\\nThe evidence established that Suppenbach had agreed with Weber to illegally modify decoders. Weber testified that he sold illegally modified satellite decoders through Future Vision from 1988 to 1989. According to Weber, Suppenbach did all of the illegal modifications for Future Vision. Suppenbach modified thirty to fifty decoders, receiving between $125 to $250 per modification. Whenever Weber needed decoders modified, he would contact Suppenbach. Weber would then take the unmodified decoders to Sup-penbach’s home, or Suppenbach would pick them up at Weber’s office. After the decoders had been modified, Suppenbach either delivered them to Weber, or Weber would pick them up at Suppenbaeh’s home. Two Future Vision employees corroborated Weber’s testimony, stating that Suppenbach was the only person who had modified decoders for Future Vision.\\nThe evidence also established that Suppen-bach had modified one of the decoders charged in Counts II and III. As recounted above, Weber and two Future Vision employees testified that Suppenbach was the only person who modified decoders for Future Vision. The evidence established that Future Vision sold the illegally modified Channel Master Module to Jim Stubbs in March 1989 and the modified Panasonic 4500 De-scrambler to James Saunders in November 1989. Stubbs and Saunders confirmed that they had purchased decoders that allowed them to receive cable programming for which they had not paid. Additionally, Brant Candelore, an electrical engineer, testified that Stubbs’ and Saunders’ decoders had in fact been illegally modified.\\nAdditionally, Kueser’s testimony corroborated that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. According to Kueser, he sold illegally modified decoders through Centek in 1988 and 1989, and he too had hired Suppenbach to do illegal modifications. When he needed decoders modified, Kueser would contact Suppenbach; then, Centek would either deliver the decoders to Suppenbach, or Suppen-bach would pick them up.\\nHaving found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support Suppenbach’s conspiracy conviction, we turn to his argument that the district court’s supplemental instructions denied him a fair trial.\\nIn its closing argument, the government argued that to prove the conspiracy charge it had to show that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber. The government stated that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppen-bach and Weber and did not involve Kueser. It argued that evidence that Suppenbach had conspired with Kueser merely added to the government’s case.\\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the district court. In the first note, the jury asked, among other things, “Is anything having to do with Syntex [sic] actually involved in the charges against Mr. Suppen-bach?” The court responded that “[t]he government does not contend that Syntex [sic] was involved in the charges in Counts 2 and 3.” The court stated further that “[t]he jury should deal with Count 1 in accordance with the evidence, the instructions, and the argument.” In the second note, the jury asked, “Is Count 1 the conspiracy between John Webber [sic] and Bob Suppenbach only or is Syntech [sic] involved also on Count 1?” The court answered that “[t]he conspiracy charge does not name co-conspirators and the instructions do not confine jury consideration to particular companies or individuals. It will be the jury’s responsibility to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, what companies or individuals were involved.”\\nSuppenbach argues that the court’s supplemental instructions were improper because they implied that Centek could have been involved in the conspiracy. He contends that this implication was improper in the light of the government’s argument that the conspiracy at issue was between Suppenbach and Weber and did not involve Kueser and his company Centek.\\n“ ‘The response to a jury request for supplemental instructions is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court.’ ” United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547, 551 (1988) (quoting United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir.1986)). “A trial judge must be painstakingly impartial any time he communicates with the jury during deliberations. He must insure that any supplemental instructions are accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial.” Id.\\nWe find that the court’s supplemental instructions were accurate and appropriate. The court properly told the jury that Centek was not involved in Counts II and III. As noted above, the government’s evidence clearly established that Counts II and III involved only decoders that Suppenbach had modified for Future Vision and which Future Vision had sold. Under no view of the evidence could Centek have been involved in Counts II or III.\\nLikewise, the court properly instructed the jury that it would have to be guided by the evidence, instructions, and arguments in determining whether Centek was involved in Count I. The court appropriately refused to tell the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy. As discussed earlier, taken together, the indictment, the evidence, and the instructions required the government to prove that Suppenbach had conspired with Weber to modify decoders. Although the indictment and the instructions required the jury to find that Suppenbach and Weber had conspired, they did not foreclose a finding that Kueser and Centek were also involved in the conspiracy. As the court told the jury, the indictment did not name coconspirators and the instructions did not limit the jury’s consideration only to certain individuals or companies. The court properly told the jury that it would have to determine from the evidence if there was a conspiracy and, if so, who was involved.\\nAs Suppenbach emphasizes, the government argued that Kueser and Centek were not involved in the conspiracy. The government’s closing argument, however, did not render the court’s supplemental instructions improper, for the argument merely reflected the government’s interpretation of the evidence. Certainly, a district court need not tell the jury to interpret the evidence in the manner urged by the government. Instead, the court’s instruction must be neutral, which it was in this case. Rather than telling the jury that Centek was not involved in the conspiracy, the court impartially instructed the jury to determine for itself from the evidence what companies and individuals were involved.\\nThe conviction is affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":97,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513472,"string":"10,513,472"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Garland v. Peebles"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-07-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3899"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nMichal Kay Garland appeals from the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) of her medical malpractice suit against Samuel W. Peebles, M.D., for failure to prosecute. We affirm.\\nI.\\nGarland, represented by Charles Hicks and Charla Tindall, filed this diversity action on March 21, 1991, alleging that Dr. Peebles had negligently failed to diagnose and treat her breast cancer. Garland’s complaint stated that she visited Dr. Peebles in Nashville, Arkansas, for a routine gynecological and breast examination in October 1985. At that time, Dr. Peebles detected a lump in Garland’s left breast. In December 1985, Garland underwent a mammogram to determine the presence of cancerous tissue. Garland alleged that Dr. Peebles advised her that the mammogram indicated that she had fibrocystic disease of the breast, a non-cancerous condition. She fui’ther alleged that Dr. Pee-bles told her that the lump represented no real danger and could be reduced by her reducing her intake of caffeine. She stated that she continued to consult Dr. Peebles about the lump until April or May 1986 and that he continued to tell her not to be concerned.\\nUpon moving to Dallas, Texas, Garland consulted Dr. David Bookout in February 1987. Garland alleged that Dr. Bookout noticed the same lump that Dr. Peebles had detected. Dr. Bookout referred Garland to Linda Frame, R.N., director of the Griffiths Hale Breast Center at the Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, for a mammogram. The mammogram indicated that the lump was cancerous. In April 1987, Garland underwent surgery to remove the cancer. In December 1990, however, Garland learned that her breast cancer had reoccurred, and in January 1991 she underwent a mastectomy. Following her mastectomy, Garland’s physicians informed her that the cancer had spread and was incurable.\\nThis case was initially set for trial on March 23, 1992. On February 7, 1992, Garland moved for a continuance. The court granted the motion and reset the trial for June 22, 1992. Upon request by both parties, the court once again continued the case and rescheduled the trial for August 17,1992. Again upon the request of both parties, the court continued the case for a third time on August 14 and reset the trial for the week of November 2, 1992.\\nOn September 28, 1992, Garland’s attorney Hicks filed a motion to withdraw his firm from the case. On September 30, Hicks filed a supplemental motion to withdraw, which stated that his firm could not present Garland’s case consistent with her desires or understanding of the underlying facts. Additionally, the motion stated that this conflict had created a dilemma, making it impossible for Hicks’s firm to go forward without creating further conflicting circumstances.\\nOn September 30, the district court initiated a telephone conference call with Hicks and counsel for Dr. Peebles. Hicks informed the court that he had been aware of the facts constituting his asserted conflict since June 1992. He further stated that discovery was far from complete and that if he was to continue as counsel, he could not be ready for trial by November 2.\\nIn an order filed October 9,1992, the court first refused to grant a continuance. The court noted that the case had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and already had been set for trial several times. The court also denied Hicks’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record. . Based on Hicks’s comments, the court was unpersuaded that Hicks had an insurmountable conflict that would prevent him from proceeding with the trial on November 2. Nonetheless, the court stated that if and when Hicks or Garland secured new counsel who could assure the court that the case would be ready for trial within ninety days of the court’s order, the court would reconsider Hicks’s motion to withdraw and address a motion for continuance.\\nOn October 27, 1992, Garland moved to add William Wilson and Gary Corum as additional counsel of record. The motion stated that Wilson and Corum had accepted representation knowing that the trial had been scheduled for the week of November 2. The court took no formal action on this motion, and Hicks did not renew his motion to withdraw.\\nThe trial was ultimately scheduled to begin November 4, 1992. On the morning of November 4, Garland’s attorneys Corum, Wilson, Tindall, and Wayne Dowd requested a hearing to present a motion to withdraw as counsel for Garland. At the hearing, they stated that certain evidence, discovered only the previous night, made it impossible for them, as a matter of professional ethics, to proceed with the case as counsel for Garland. Based on the attorney-client privilege, all counsel declined to divulge the precise reason for their motion. They further stated that Garland had objected to their decision and had requested that they ask the court to allow her to speak privately with the court. Dr. Peebles responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.\\nThe court granted the attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the court also decided to honor Garland’s request for an ex parte conference with the court. Dr. Peebles renewed his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The court took the motion under advisement pending the interview with Garland.\\nBecause Hicks was still an attorney of record for Garland, the court notified Hicks that it intended to confer with Garland. Hicks then renewed his motion to withdraw. The court denied the motion because its preconditions for consideration of such a motion had not been fulfilled.\\nThe court met with Garland in the afternoon on November 4. The court began the conference by explaining certain ground rules. It informed Garland that she would be placed under oath, that the proceeding would be recorded by the court reporter, and that the court reserved the right to reveal the contents of the conference to Dr. Peebles, his attorneys, and all other attorneys involved in the case. Garland agreed to proceed under these rules.\\nDuring her conversation with the court, Garland disclosed the nature of the ethical conflict that had first developed with Hicks and then with her new attorneys. She explained that Hicks’s motion to withdraw was prompted by her refusal to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout, whose office notes reflected that Garland told him that the lump in her breast had been present for two months when she visited him in February 1987. In Hicks’ opinion, these notes either contradicted Garland’s allegations that the lump had been present since she saw Dr. Peebles eighteen months earlier or indicated that she lied to Dr. Bookout about how long the lump had been there. To present Garland’s case in an ethical manner and to have a chance of winning, Hicks had advised Garland that she would have to admit that she lied to Dr. Bookout because she was worried about her medical expenses being covered by insurance.\\nFurther, Garland told the court that two nights before trial was to begin her new attorneys had been presented with additional evidence regarding the same ethical conflict that had confronted Hicks. This evidence consisted of a report from Ms. Frame that indicated that the lump had been present for two months when Ms. Frame interviewed Garland in March 1987. Garland’s new attorneys informed her that the report either corroborated Dr. Peebles’s defense that Garland had told him the lump had disappeared or indicated that Garland had lied for insurance purposes.\\nIn an order filed November 18, 1992, the district court found that Garland had revealed no information in the ex parte conference that cast doubt upon the propriety of her attorneys’ request to withdraw. The court also found that Garland had not revealed anything to persuade the court to continue the case. Considering the case’s history, the court determined that a continuance would not ensure that Garland would be ready for trial in the foreseeable future. The court stated that any further delay would work an unduly prejudicial hardship on Dr. Peebles. Accordingly, the court granted Dr. Peebles’s motion to dismiss Garland’s complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute.\\nII.\\nOn appeal, Garland, still represented by the Hicks law firm, argues that the district court erred in dismissing her case for failure to prosecute. She contends that she did not engage in conduct that warranted such a dismissal. She argues that once the district court permitted her attorneys to withdraw, the court should have either called the case for trial, allowing her to proceed pro se, or continued the case.\\nA dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper when there has been “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1986). We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Du-Bose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1990). In reviewing a district court’s decision, we balance the court’s need to advance a crowded docket versus the consequences of denying a plaintiff his day in court. See, e.g., Brown, 806 F.2d at 804 (citing Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1193 (8th Cir.1976)). We consider the nature of the conduct that prompted the dismissal and the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration of justice in the district court. Id. We also consider the availability of other less severe options. See, e.g., Pardee v. Stock, 712 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.1983) (citing St. Louis Music Supply, 539 F.2d at 1193).\\nGiven the unusual circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Garland’s complaint. Garland engaged in conduct that prevented this case from going to trial. She created an ethical conflict that forced her attorneys to request to withdraw from her case. Against the advice of her attorneys, she refused to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. By insisting that her case be tried in a manner that five attorneys found unethical, Garland was directly responsible for her case not going to trial on its scheduled trial date.\\nThe court did not err by not allowing Garland to try her case pro se. Garland was extremely ill on the day trial was to begin (indeed, too ill to come to the courtroom that morning), so permitting her to proceed pro se was not a realistic option.\\nLikewise, the court did not err by not continuing the case. This action had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and had been continued several times. Even if the district court had granted another continuance, it is far from certain that the case would ever have gone to trial. During her conference with the court, Garland indicated that she was unwilling to change her mind concerning what she had told Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. A continuance would merely have given Garland more time to seek an attorney who would present her ease in the manner she desired. Because five attorneys had found that they could not ethically present the case as Garland wanted it presented, it is highly unlikely that Garland could have found an attorney to present her case as she wanted it tried. Even if Garland could have succeeded in this task, her new attorney would not have been ready for trial for at least several months. As the district court properly recognized, another continuance would have prolonged Dr. Peebles’s hardship after he and his attorneys had worked diligently to be ready for trial.\\nAccordingly, the dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"George R. Wise, Jr., Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant.\", \"Calvin J. Hall, Little Rock, AR, argued (Laura Hensley Smith, on the brief), for ap-pellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee.\\nNo. 92-3899.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.\\nSubmitted June 17, 1993.\\nDecided July 29, 1993.\\nRehearing Denied Sept. 1, 1993.\\nGeorge R. Wise, Jr., Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant.\\nCalvin J. Hall, Little Rock, AR, argued (Laura Hensley Smith, on the brief), for ap-pellee.\\nBefore WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge.\\nThe HONORABLE ELMO B. HUNTER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HUNTER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 683"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-07-29\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nMichal Kay Garland appeals from the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) of her medical malpractice suit against Samuel W. Peebles, M.D., for failure to prosecute. We affirm.\nI.\nGarland, represented by Charles Hicks and Charla Tindall, filed this diversity action on March 21, 1991, alleging that Dr. Peebles had negligently failed to diagnose and treat her breast cancer. Garland’s complaint stated that she visited Dr. Peebles in Nashville, Arkansas, for a routine gynecological and breast examination in October 1985. At that time, Dr. Peebles detected a lump in Garland’s left breast. In December 1985, Garland underwent a mammogram to determine the presence of cancerous tissue. Garland alleged that Dr. Peebles advised her that the mammogram indicated that she had fibrocystic disease of the breast, a non-cancerous condition. She fui’ther alleged that Dr. Pee-bles told her that the lump represented no real danger and could be reduced by her reducing her intake of caffeine. She stated that she continued to consult Dr. Peebles about the lump until April or May 1986 and that he continued to tell her not to be concerned.\nUpon moving to Dallas, Texas, Garland consulted Dr. David Bookout in February 1987. Garland alleged that Dr. Bookout noticed the same lump that Dr. Peebles had detected. Dr. Bookout referred Garland to Linda Frame, R.N., director of the Griffiths Hale Breast Center at the Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, for a mammogram. The mammogram indicated that the lump was cancerous. In April 1987, Garland underwent surgery to remove the cancer. In December 1990, however, Garland learned that her breast cancer had reoccurred, and in January 1991 she underwent a mastectomy. Following her mastectomy, Garland’s physicians informed her that the cancer had spread and was incurable.\nThis case was initially set for trial on March 23, 1992. On February 7, 1992, Garland moved for a continuance. The court granted the motion and reset the trial for June 22, 1992. Upon request by both parties, the court once again continued the case and rescheduled the trial for August 17,1992. Again upon the request of both parties, the court continued the case for a third time on August 14 and reset the trial for the week of November 2, 1992.\nOn September 28, 1992, Garland’s attorney Hicks filed a motion to withdraw his firm from the case. On September 30, Hicks filed a supplemental motion to withdraw, which stated that his firm could not present Garland’s case consistent with her desires or understanding of the underlying facts. Additionally, the motion stated that this conflict had created a dilemma, making it impossible for Hicks’s firm to go forward without creating further conflicting circumstances.\nOn September 30, the district court initiated a telephone conference call with Hicks and counsel for Dr. Peebles. Hicks informed the court that he had been aware of the facts constituting his asserted conflict since June 1992. He further stated that discovery was far from complete and that if he was to continue as counsel, he could not be ready for trial by November 2.\nIn an order filed October 9,1992, the court first refused to grant a continuance. The court noted that the case had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and already had been set for trial several times. The court also denied Hicks’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record. . Based on Hicks’s comments, the court was unpersuaded that Hicks had an insurmountable conflict that would prevent him from proceeding with the trial on November 2. Nonetheless, the court stated that if and when Hicks or Garland secured new counsel who could assure the court that the case would be ready for trial within ninety days of the court’s order, the court would reconsider Hicks’s motion to withdraw and address a motion for continuance.\nOn October 27, 1992, Garland moved to add William Wilson and Gary Corum as additional counsel of record. The motion stated that Wilson and Corum had accepted representation knowing that the trial had been scheduled for the week of November 2. The court took no formal action on this motion, and Hicks did not renew his motion to withdraw.\nThe trial was ultimately scheduled to begin November 4, 1992. On the morning of November 4, Garland’s attorneys Corum, Wilson, Tindall, and Wayne Dowd requested a hearing to present a motion to withdraw as counsel for Garland. At the hearing, they stated that certain evidence, discovered only the previous night, made it impossible for them, as a matter of professional ethics, to proceed with the case as counsel for Garland. Based on the attorney-client privilege, all counsel declined to divulge the precise reason for their motion. They further stated that Garland had objected to their decision and had requested that they ask the court to allow her to speak privately with the court. Dr. Peebles responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.\nThe court granted the attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the court also decided to honor Garland’s request for an ex parte conference with the court. Dr. Peebles renewed his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The court took the motion under advisement pending the interview with Garland.\nBecause Hicks was still an attorney of record for Garland, the court notified Hicks that it intended to confer with Garland. Hicks then renewed his motion to withdraw. The court denied the motion because its preconditions for consideration of such a motion had not been fulfilled.\nThe court met with Garland in the afternoon on November 4. The court began the conference by explaining certain ground rules. It informed Garland that she would be placed under oath, that the proceeding would be recorded by the court reporter, and that the court reserved the right to reveal the contents of the conference to Dr. Peebles, his attorneys, and all other attorneys involved in the case. Garland agreed to proceed under these rules.\nDuring her conversation with the court, Garland disclosed the nature of the ethical conflict that had first developed with Hicks and then with her new attorneys. She explained that Hicks’s motion to withdraw was prompted by her refusal to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout, whose office notes reflected that Garland told him that the lump in her breast had been present for two months when she visited him in February 1987. In Hicks’ opinion, these notes either contradicted Garland’s allegations that the lump had been present since she saw Dr. Peebles eighteen months earlier or indicated that she lied to Dr. Bookout about how long the lump had been there. To present Garland’s case in an ethical manner and to have a chance of winning, Hicks had advised Garland that she would have to admit that she lied to Dr. Bookout because she was worried about her medical expenses being covered by insurance.\nFurther, Garland told the court that two nights before trial was to begin her new attorneys had been presented with additional evidence regarding the same ethical conflict that had confronted Hicks. This evidence consisted of a report from Ms. Frame that indicated that the lump had been present for two months when Ms. Frame interviewed Garland in March 1987. Garland’s new attorneys informed her that the report either corroborated Dr. Peebles’s defense that Garland had told him the lump had disappeared or indicated that Garland had lied for insurance purposes.\nIn an order filed November 18, 1992, the district court found that Garland had revealed no information in the ex parte conference that cast doubt upon the propriety of her attorneys’ request to withdraw. The court also found that Garland had not revealed anything to persuade the court to continue the case. Considering the case’s history, the court determined that a continuance would not ensure that Garland would be ready for trial in the foreseeable future. The court stated that any further delay would work an unduly prejudicial hardship on Dr. Peebles. Accordingly, the court granted Dr. Peebles’s motion to dismiss Garland’s complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute.\nII.\nOn appeal, Garland, still represented by the Hicks law firm, argues that the district court erred in dismissing her case for failure to prosecute. She contends that she did not engage in conduct that warranted such a dismissal. She argues that once the district court permitted her attorneys to withdraw, the court should have either called the case for trial, allowing her to proceed pro se, or continued the case.\nA dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper when there has been “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1986). We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Du-Bose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1990). In reviewing a district court’s decision, we balance the court’s need to advance a crowded docket versus the consequences of denying a plaintiff his day in court. See, e.g., Brown, 806 F.2d at 804 (citing Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1193 (8th Cir.1976)). We consider the nature of the conduct that prompted the dismissal and the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration of justice in the district court. Id. We also consider the availability of other less severe options. See, e.g., Pardee v. Stock, 712 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.1983) (citing St. Louis Music Supply, 539 F.2d at 1193).\nGiven the unusual circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Garland’s complaint. Garland engaged in conduct that prevented this case from going to trial. She created an ethical conflict that forced her attorneys to request to withdraw from her case. Against the advice of her attorneys, she refused to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. By insisting that her case be tried in a manner that five attorneys found unethical, Garland was directly responsible for her case not going to trial on its scheduled trial date.\nThe court did not err by not allowing Garland to try her case pro se. Garland was extremely ill on the day trial was to begin (indeed, too ill to come to the courtroom that morning), so permitting her to proceed pro se was not a realistic option.\nLikewise, the court did not err by not continuing the case. This action had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and had been continued several times. Even if the district court had granted another continuance, it is far from certain that the case would ever have gone to trial. During her conference with the court, Garland indicated that she was unwilling to change her mind concerning what she had told Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. A continuance would merely have given Garland more time to seek an attorney who would present her ease in the manner she desired. Because five attorneys had found that they could not ethically present the case as Garland wanted it presented, it is highly unlikely that Garland could have found an attorney to present her case as she wanted it tried. Even if Garland could have succeeded in this task, her new attorney would not have been ready for trial for at least several months. As the district court properly recognized, another continuance would have prolonged Dr. Peebles’s hardship after he and his attorneys had worked diligently to be ready for trial.\nAccordingly, the dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is affirmed.\n. The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-07-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nMichal Kay Garland appeals from the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) of her medical malpractice suit against Samuel W. Peebles, M.D., for failure to prosecute. We affirm.\\nI.\\nGarland, represented by Charles Hicks and Charla Tindall, filed this diversity action on March 21, 1991, alleging that Dr. Peebles had negligently failed to diagnose and treat her breast cancer. Garland’s complaint stated that she visited Dr. Peebles in Nashville, Arkansas, for a routine gynecological and breast examination in October 1985. At that time, Dr. Peebles detected a lump in Garland’s left breast. In December 1985, Garland underwent a mammogram to determine the presence of cancerous tissue. Garland alleged that Dr. Peebles advised her that the mammogram indicated that she had fibrocystic disease of the breast, a non-cancerous condition. She fui’ther alleged that Dr. Pee-bles told her that the lump represented no real danger and could be reduced by her reducing her intake of caffeine. She stated that she continued to consult Dr. Peebles about the lump until April or May 1986 and that he continued to tell her not to be concerned.\\nUpon moving to Dallas, Texas, Garland consulted Dr. David Bookout in February 1987. Garland alleged that Dr. Bookout noticed the same lump that Dr. Peebles had detected. Dr. Bookout referred Garland to Linda Frame, R.N., director of the Griffiths Hale Breast Center at the Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, for a mammogram. The mammogram indicated that the lump was cancerous. In April 1987, Garland underwent surgery to remove the cancer. In December 1990, however, Garland learned that her breast cancer had reoccurred, and in January 1991 she underwent a mastectomy. Following her mastectomy, Garland’s physicians informed her that the cancer had spread and was incurable.\\nThis case was initially set for trial on March 23, 1992. On February 7, 1992, Garland moved for a continuance. The court granted the motion and reset the trial for June 22, 1992. Upon request by both parties, the court once again continued the case and rescheduled the trial for August 17,1992. Again upon the request of both parties, the court continued the case for a third time on August 14 and reset the trial for the week of November 2, 1992.\\nOn September 28, 1992, Garland’s attorney Hicks filed a motion to withdraw his firm from the case. On September 30, Hicks filed a supplemental motion to withdraw, which stated that his firm could not present Garland’s case consistent with her desires or understanding of the underlying facts. Additionally, the motion stated that this conflict had created a dilemma, making it impossible for Hicks’s firm to go forward without creating further conflicting circumstances.\\nOn September 30, the district court initiated a telephone conference call with Hicks and counsel for Dr. Peebles. Hicks informed the court that he had been aware of the facts constituting his asserted conflict since June 1992. He further stated that discovery was far from complete and that if he was to continue as counsel, he could not be ready for trial by November 2.\\nIn an order filed October 9,1992, the court first refused to grant a continuance. The court noted that the case had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and already had been set for trial several times. The court also denied Hicks’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record. . Based on Hicks’s comments, the court was unpersuaded that Hicks had an insurmountable conflict that would prevent him from proceeding with the trial on November 2. Nonetheless, the court stated that if and when Hicks or Garland secured new counsel who could assure the court that the case would be ready for trial within ninety days of the court’s order, the court would reconsider Hicks’s motion to withdraw and address a motion for continuance.\\nOn October 27, 1992, Garland moved to add William Wilson and Gary Corum as additional counsel of record. The motion stated that Wilson and Corum had accepted representation knowing that the trial had been scheduled for the week of November 2. The court took no formal action on this motion, and Hicks did not renew his motion to withdraw.\\nThe trial was ultimately scheduled to begin November 4, 1992. On the morning of November 4, Garland’s attorneys Corum, Wilson, Tindall, and Wayne Dowd requested a hearing to present a motion to withdraw as counsel for Garland. At the hearing, they stated that certain evidence, discovered only the previous night, made it impossible for them, as a matter of professional ethics, to proceed with the case as counsel for Garland. Based on the attorney-client privilege, all counsel declined to divulge the precise reason for their motion. They further stated that Garland had objected to their decision and had requested that they ask the court to allow her to speak privately with the court. Dr. Peebles responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.\\nThe court granted the attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the court also decided to honor Garland’s request for an ex parte conference with the court. Dr. Peebles renewed his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The court took the motion under advisement pending the interview with Garland.\\nBecause Hicks was still an attorney of record for Garland, the court notified Hicks that it intended to confer with Garland. Hicks then renewed his motion to withdraw. The court denied the motion because its preconditions for consideration of such a motion had not been fulfilled.\\nThe court met with Garland in the afternoon on November 4. The court began the conference by explaining certain ground rules. It informed Garland that she would be placed under oath, that the proceeding would be recorded by the court reporter, and that the court reserved the right to reveal the contents of the conference to Dr. Peebles, his attorneys, and all other attorneys involved in the case. Garland agreed to proceed under these rules.\\nDuring her conversation with the court, Garland disclosed the nature of the ethical conflict that had first developed with Hicks and then with her new attorneys. She explained that Hicks’s motion to withdraw was prompted by her refusal to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout, whose office notes reflected that Garland told him that the lump in her breast had been present for two months when she visited him in February 1987. In Hicks’ opinion, these notes either contradicted Garland’s allegations that the lump had been present since she saw Dr. Peebles eighteen months earlier or indicated that she lied to Dr. Bookout about how long the lump had been there. To present Garland’s case in an ethical manner and to have a chance of winning, Hicks had advised Garland that she would have to admit that she lied to Dr. Bookout because she was worried about her medical expenses being covered by insurance.\\nFurther, Garland told the court that two nights before trial was to begin her new attorneys had been presented with additional evidence regarding the same ethical conflict that had confronted Hicks. This evidence consisted of a report from Ms. Frame that indicated that the lump had been present for two months when Ms. Frame interviewed Garland in March 1987. Garland’s new attorneys informed her that the report either corroborated Dr. Peebles’s defense that Garland had told him the lump had disappeared or indicated that Garland had lied for insurance purposes.\\nIn an order filed November 18, 1992, the district court found that Garland had revealed no information in the ex parte conference that cast doubt upon the propriety of her attorneys’ request to withdraw. The court also found that Garland had not revealed anything to persuade the court to continue the case. Considering the case’s history, the court determined that a continuance would not ensure that Garland would be ready for trial in the foreseeable future. The court stated that any further delay would work an unduly prejudicial hardship on Dr. Peebles. Accordingly, the court granted Dr. Peebles’s motion to dismiss Garland’s complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute.\\nII.\\nOn appeal, Garland, still represented by the Hicks law firm, argues that the district court erred in dismissing her case for failure to prosecute. She contends that she did not engage in conduct that warranted such a dismissal. She argues that once the district court permitted her attorneys to withdraw, the court should have either called the case for trial, allowing her to proceed pro se, or continued the case.\\nA dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper when there has been “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1986). We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Du-Bose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1990). In reviewing a district court’s decision, we balance the court’s need to advance a crowded docket versus the consequences of denying a plaintiff his day in court. See, e.g., Brown, 806 F.2d at 804 (citing Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1193 (8th Cir.1976)). We consider the nature of the conduct that prompted the dismissal and the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration of justice in the district court. Id. We also consider the availability of other less severe options. See, e.g., Pardee v. Stock, 712 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.1983) (citing St. Louis Music Supply, 539 F.2d at 1193).\\nGiven the unusual circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Garland’s complaint. Garland engaged in conduct that prevented this case from going to trial. She created an ethical conflict that forced her attorneys to request to withdraw from her case. Against the advice of her attorneys, she refused to admit that she had lied to Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. By insisting that her case be tried in a manner that five attorneys found unethical, Garland was directly responsible for her case not going to trial on its scheduled trial date.\\nThe court did not err by not allowing Garland to try her case pro se. Garland was extremely ill on the day trial was to begin (indeed, too ill to come to the courtroom that morning), so permitting her to proceed pro se was not a realistic option.\\nLikewise, the court did not err by not continuing the case. This action had been filed more than eighteen months earlier and had been continued several times. Even if the district court had granted another continuance, it is far from certain that the case would ever have gone to trial. During her conference with the court, Garland indicated that she was unwilling to change her mind concerning what she had told Dr. Bookout and Ms. Frame. A continuance would merely have given Garland more time to seek an attorney who would present her ease in the manner she desired. Because five attorneys had found that they could not ethically present the case as Garland wanted it presented, it is highly unlikely that Garland could have found an attorney to present her case as she wanted it tried. Even if Garland could have succeeded in this task, her new attorney would not have been ready for trial for at least several months. As the district court properly recognized, another continuance would have prolonged Dr. Peebles’s hardship after he and his attorneys had worked diligently to be ready for trial.\\nAccordingly, the dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":98,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513515,"string":"10,513,515"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Newman"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 92-3443"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and SACHS, Senior District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.\\nThis is an appeal from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa affirming an order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa overruling appellant’s objection to the trustee’s distribution of funds. Security Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa (appellant), objected to the trustee’s decision to treat certain post-petition debts as Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, thereby giving those debts a higher priority than the debt owed to appellant. For reversal, appellant argues the post-petition debts are not entitled to administrative claim status and that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to subordinate the post-petition debts to that owed to appellant. We affirm the order of the district court.\\nI.\\nThe underlying facts are not disputed. Robert V. and Susan A. Brown (debtors), were farmers engaged in raising and selling hogs. On December 27, 1982, they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. At that time their debt owed to appellant was $323,-645.52; however, the collateral securing the debt, primarily their hog herd and various notes, was valued at only $151,745.60. Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan divided appellant’s claim into secured and unsecured portions and was confirmed in August 1983. The allowed secured portion of appellant’s claim, $168,-840.01, was originally to be paid over 5 years, but the period was later shortened to 3 years. The remaining unsecured portion of appellant’s claim, $154,805.51, was to be paid off at the same rate as other unsecured creditors — 44.5<f per dollar.\\nThe secured portion of appellant’s claim was fully paid off under the Chapter 13 plan and appellant was directed by the bankruptcy court to release its lien on debtors’ assets which primarily consisted of their hog herd. In re Brown, No. 82-1857-C, slip op. at 3 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa Oct. 7, 1986) (Brown). Appellant objected, but the bankruptcy court ordered the release of the lien in order to protect all the unsecured creditors in the event debtors converted their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 7. Id. at 6. The bankruptcy court provided that any new lien placed on the property formerly securing appellant’s claim was to be “subordinated to a claim in favor of the estate” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988) in the event the case was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Id.\\nDuring the pendency of their Chapter 13 proceedings, debtors were allowed to continue farming and as a result incurred more debts. When appellant’s lien was removed from the herd of hogs, debtors sold the hogs for fair market value and used the proceeds to pay some of their post-petition creditors. Debtors then converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The Chapter 7 trustee brought adversary proceedings against these post-petition creditors to recover the payments they received as preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The bankruptcy court employed § 547(c)(2), to allow a preference exception for payments made in the ordinary course of business within 45 days before the date of conversion to Chapter 7.\\nThe adversary proceedings were settled by allowing the post-petition creditors to retain any monies received in the ordinary course of business within the 45-day exception. As a result, the trustee holds some $43,000.00, which he proposed to distribute by paying first the Chapter 7 administrative fees and expenses and then the Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, including the payments to the post-petition creditors as costs of preserving the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Because of the limited assets, this meant appellant and other unsecured creditors would receive nothing because the administrative expense claims would be accorded a higher priority than appellant’s unsecured claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507. Appellant filed an objection to the trustee’s proposal.\\nThe bankruptcy cohrt decided that the claims were entitled to administrative claim status under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Brown, slip op. at 6. The bankruptcy court noted that appellant’s only argument was that the costs and expenses at issue were not necessary to preserve the estate because the estate ceased to exist upon confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Id. Appellant did not address whether the costs and expenses were necessary to the preservation of the estate should the bankruptcy court hold the estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. Id. at 7.\\nThe bankruptcy court decided that the Chapter 13 estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. The bankruptcy court thus allowed payment to the post-petition creditors as Chapter 13 administrative expense claims. Id. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. This appeal followed.\\nII.\\nThe only issue before this court is whether the Chapter 13 estate existed after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, which is when the debts were incurred. A survey of the cases addressing this issue reveals that there is a split in authority about whether a bankruptcy estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. We start by agreeing with In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987), that “[w]e must confess that we find neither § 1327(b) or § 1306 to be models of clarity.”\\nThere is a tension between these two sections. Section 1306 provides that property of the estate includes all property the debtor acquires after commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted. Section 1327(b) provides that upon confirmation of a plan under Chapter 13, all property of the estate is vested in the debtor. Courts differ based on their interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 1306 and 11 U.S.C. § 1327. One line of cases holds that the Chapter 13 estate exists after confirmation and includes the debtor’s property and earnings dedicated to the fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan. E.g.; In re Price, 130 B.R. 259, 269 (N.D.Ill.1991); In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1986). A second line of cases, however, holds that unless the Chapter 13 plan provides otherwise, confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests all property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor, ending the estate at that time. E.g., In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 16 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1990); In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr.D.Or.1984), aff'd, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D.Or.1985).\\nAppellant argues the better-reasoned position is that the Chapter 13 estate ceases to exist following confirmation of the plan. Appellant contends that, according to 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor making such property “property of the debtor” and terminating the estate, unless the order of confirmation provides otherwise. Appellant argues that any other interpretation would make 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) meaningless. Therefore, appellant argues that because no estate existed, the post-petition debts cannot be entitled to priority as Chapter 13 administrative expenses.\\nThe trustee argues the bankruptcy court recognized the existence of'a split of authorities and properly sided with the line of cases holding that the bankruptcy estate continues to exist following confirmation of the plan. The trustee contends that so long as the estate continued to exist, the claims in question were administrative expenses of preserving the estate, and are entitled to administrative priority. In addition, the trustee argues there would be no equity in failing to pay the post-petition creditors, who extended credit to debtors to further their attempts to keep their business going.\\nMost of the cases in this area have addressed either whether a debtor’s earnings can be reached by creditors after confirmation or whether the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 remains in effect post-confirmation. E.g., In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541-42 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). In an effort to balance the effect of § 1327(b) against the interests of the debtor, the court in In re Adams classified post-confirmation assets as “property of the estate” or “property of the debtor” depending on whether the assets were dedicated to fulfilling the Chapter 13 plan. 12 B.R. at 541. In re Adams presumed the Chapter 13 estate survived after confirmation, and the only issue was what the estate included and what was protected by the stay. That is not the issue in the present case — we must determine if an estate exists post-confirmation.\\nAlthough this issue was presented to this court in Laughlin v. United States IRS, 912 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991), the court resolved that case without addressing the issue. Judge Magill in dissent noted that the majority declined to “consider this issue, reasoning that the precise terms Congress used in § 362(a) are irrelevant because ... the IRS levy does not interfere with the general purpose of the stay.” Id. at 200. The dissent outlined the precedent addressing this issue and found the cases holding the estate continues to exist following confirmation to be “more persuasive.” Id. at 202. We agree.\\nWe join the line of cases holding the estate continues to exist after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Upon reviewing § 1327 regarding the effect of confirmation, even if property of the estate vests in the debtor at confirmation, that does not necessarily mean that the estate no longer exists. The estate can continue to exist as a legal entity after confirmation even if it holds no property. Several sections of the bankruptcy code support our view that the estate continues to exist after confirmation. Section 1322(a)(1) provides for “supervision and control” by the trustee over monies and property of the estate committed to the plan. In addition, the trustee is authorized to deposit or invest money of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 345, and 11 U.S.C. § 347(a) provides that the trustee shall stop payment on any unpaid cheeks 90 days after the final distribution and the remaining property of the estate is to be paid into the court. Section 704(9), made applicable to Chapter 13 by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1), requires the trustee to make a final report and file a final account of the “administration of the estate.” Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) states that ■ unless the court orders otherwise, dismissal of a Chapter 13 case “revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case.” These sections support the position that the estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\\nAs noted by the court in In re Root:\\n[i]f there is no existing estate upon confirmation, then what does the Chapter 13 Trustee administer? If there is no estate over which the Chapter 13 Trustee has control, then that Trustee is nothing more than an officious intermeddler. Even 11 U.S.C. § 704(9) ... provides that the Trustee shall “... make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate with the court.” There must be an “estate” upon and after confirmation, and that estate consists of the property and future earnings of the debtor dedicated to fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan.\\n61 B.R. at 985.\\nWe think that the opposing line of cases is “premised upon the mistaken belief that re-vesting under § 1327(b) transforms property of the estate into property of the debtor.” In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 428-29 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987). The Aneiro court further stated:\\nthe clear language of § 1306 demonstrates that confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is not relevant to determining whether property is or is not property of the estate. The relevant events in this determination are commencement of the ease and either dismissal, closing or conversion of the case. If Congress had intended for confirmation to so dramatically affect the expansive definition of property of the estate found in § 1306, it knew how to draft such a provision.\\nId. at 429. We agree.\\nFor example, Congress did intend for confirmation to so affect property of the estate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 vests all property of the estate in the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b). However, confirmation of a plan in Chapter 11 also acts as a discharge of the case, thus ending the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). That is not the effect of confirmation in a Chapter 13 case.\\nIII.\\nThe-post-petition debts in the present case were incurred for feed and veterinary services for debtors’ hog herd and should be considered administrative expenses necessary to preserve the estate pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A). These post-petition debts were not unauthorized borrowing by debtors; rather, these transactions were in the ordinary course of business and were necessary to preserve debtors’ principal asset, their hog herd. Therefore, we hold the bankruptcy court was correct in finding the Chapter 13 estate continued post-confirmation and in classifying the post-petition debts as administrative expenses entitled to priority under § 507(a)(1).\\nAccordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed.\\n.Honorable Harold D. Victor, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\\n. Honorable Russell J. Hill, Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\\n. All statutory references to 11 U.S.C. are from the 1988 edition.\\n. Neiman v. Brown, Adversary Proceeding No. 87-0109 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa, filed Nov. 7, 1988).\\n. This court addressed similar issues in In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (Lindberg), and Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1982) (Resendez). Lindberg dealt with a conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, but the sole issue in that case was whether the debtors could claim a different homestead exemption at the time of conversion than the one they originally designated at the commencement of their Chapter 13 proceedings. Resendez addressed whether a debtor could exempt undistributed funds turned over by the Chapter 13 trustee to the Chapter 7 trustee upon conversion.\\nThe court in Lindberg held the debtors could change their homestead because in Chapter 13 there are no true exemptions because the debtor remains in possession of his property. The “Chapter 13 statement” filed by the debtors listed their assets and liabilities and designated what exemptions they would claim if they had to liquidate their estate. The purpose of making such a statement is only to permit creditors to determine whether the Chapter 13 plan should be accepted, and for the court to determine in confirming the plan if the creditors are receiving more under the plan than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. 735 F.2d at 1089.\\nFollowing this discussion the court in Lindberg made the statement that \\\"when there is confirmation, ... of a chapter 13 plan, the confirmation of the plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan unless the plan provides otherwise.” Id. This statement was not made as part of the holding of the case; rather, its purpose was to explain that in Chapter 13 there are no exemptions, in contrast to Chapter 7 where the debtor may exempt from the property of the estate.\\nThe court in Lindberg was not attempting to address the larger issue with which we are faced, because the court did not refer to Resendez which supports our holding in the present case. The court in Resendez held that undistributed funds in the possession of a Chapter 13 trustee after confirmation of the plan are property of the Chapter 13 estate; therefore, the funds would become part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion and could not be exempted. Id. 691 F.2d at 399. The court found the funds were voluntarily paid to the Chapter 13 trustee; therefore, \\\"[tjhese funds no longer belonged to the debtor, but became part of their estate.” Id. This result is consistent with the holding of In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1985), and supports our present holding that an estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"James L. Goodman, Marshalltown, IA, argued, for appellant.\", \"David J. Lynch, Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee.\\nNo. 92-3443.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.\\nSubmitted April 15, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 2, 1993.\\nJames L. Goodman, Marshalltown, IA, argued, for appellant.\\nDavid J. Lynch, Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellee.\\nBefore McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and SACHS, Senior District Judge.\\nThe Honorable Howard F. Sachs, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"McMILLIAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SACHS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 687"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-02\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nMcMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa affirming an order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa overruling appellant’s objection to the trustee’s distribution of funds. Security Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa (appellant), objected to the trustee’s decision to treat certain post-petition debts as Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, thereby giving those debts a higher priority than the debt owed to appellant. For reversal, appellant argues the post-petition debts are not entitled to administrative claim status and that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to subordinate the post-petition debts to that owed to appellant. We affirm the order of the district court.\nI.\nThe underlying facts are not disputed. Robert V. and Susan A. Brown (debtors), were farmers engaged in raising and selling hogs. On December 27, 1982, they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. At that time their debt owed to appellant was $323,-645.52; however, the collateral securing the debt, primarily their hog herd and various notes, was valued at only $151,745.60. Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan divided appellant’s claim into secured and unsecured portions and was confirmed in August 1983. The allowed secured portion of appellant’s claim, $168,-840.01, was originally to be paid over 5 years, but the period was later shortened to 3 years. The remaining unsecured portion of appellant’s claim, $154,805.51, was to be paid off at the same rate as other unsecured creditors — 44.5<f per dollar.\nThe secured portion of appellant’s claim was fully paid off under the Chapter 13 plan and appellant was directed by the bankruptcy court to release its lien on debtors’ assets which primarily consisted of their hog herd. In re Brown, No. 82-1857-C, slip op. at 3 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa Oct. 7, 1986) (Brown). Appellant objected, but the bankruptcy court ordered the release of the lien in order to protect all the unsecured creditors in the event debtors converted their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 7. Id. at 6. The bankruptcy court provided that any new lien placed on the property formerly securing appellant’s claim was to be “subordinated to a claim in favor of the estate” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988) in the event the case was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Id.\nDuring the pendency of their Chapter 13 proceedings, debtors were allowed to continue farming and as a result incurred more debts. When appellant’s lien was removed from the herd of hogs, debtors sold the hogs for fair market value and used the proceeds to pay some of their post-petition creditors. Debtors then converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The Chapter 7 trustee brought adversary proceedings against these post-petition creditors to recover the payments they received as preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The bankruptcy court employed § 547(c)(2), to allow a preference exception for payments made in the ordinary course of business within 45 days before the date of conversion to Chapter 7.\nThe adversary proceedings were settled by allowing the post-petition creditors to retain any monies received in the ordinary course of business within the 45-day exception. As a result, the trustee holds some $43,000.00, which he proposed to distribute by paying first the Chapter 7 administrative fees and expenses and then the Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, including the payments to the post-petition creditors as costs of preserving the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Because of the limited assets, this meant appellant and other unsecured creditors would receive nothing because the administrative expense claims would be accorded a higher priority than appellant’s unsecured claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507. Appellant filed an objection to the trustee’s proposal.\nThe bankruptcy cohrt decided that the claims were entitled to administrative claim status under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Brown, slip op. at 6. The bankruptcy court noted that appellant’s only argument was that the costs and expenses at issue were not necessary to preserve the estate because the estate ceased to exist upon confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Id. Appellant did not address whether the costs and expenses were necessary to the preservation of the estate should the bankruptcy court hold the estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. Id. at 7.\nThe bankruptcy court decided that the Chapter 13 estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. The bankruptcy court thus allowed payment to the post-petition creditors as Chapter 13 administrative expense claims. Id. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. This appeal followed.\nII.\nThe only issue before this court is whether the Chapter 13 estate existed after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, which is when the debts were incurred. A survey of the cases addressing this issue reveals that there is a split in authority about whether a bankruptcy estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. We start by agreeing with In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987), that “[w]e must confess that we find neither § 1327(b) or § 1306 to be models of clarity.”\nThere is a tension between these two sections. Section 1306 provides that property of the estate includes all property the debtor acquires after commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted. Section 1327(b) provides that upon confirmation of a plan under Chapter 13, all property of the estate is vested in the debtor. Courts differ based on their interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 1306 and 11 U.S.C. § 1327. One line of cases holds that the Chapter 13 estate exists after confirmation and includes the debtor’s property and earnings dedicated to the fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan. E.g.; In re Price, 130 B.R. 259, 269 (N.D.Ill.1991); In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1986). A second line of cases, however, holds that unless the Chapter 13 plan provides otherwise, confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests all property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor, ending the estate at that time. E.g., In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 16 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1990); In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr.D.Or.1984), aff'd, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D.Or.1985).\nAppellant argues the better-reasoned position is that the Chapter 13 estate ceases to exist following confirmation of the plan. Appellant contends that, according to 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor making such property “property of the debtor” and terminating the estate, unless the order of confirmation provides otherwise. Appellant argues that any other interpretation would make 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) meaningless. Therefore, appellant argues that because no estate existed, the post-petition debts cannot be entitled to priority as Chapter 13 administrative expenses.\nThe trustee argues the bankruptcy court recognized the existence of'a split of authorities and properly sided with the line of cases holding that the bankruptcy estate continues to exist following confirmation of the plan. The trustee contends that so long as the estate continued to exist, the claims in question were administrative expenses of preserving the estate, and are entitled to administrative priority. In addition, the trustee argues there would be no equity in failing to pay the post-petition creditors, who extended credit to debtors to further their attempts to keep their business going.\nMost of the cases in this area have addressed either whether a debtor’s earnings can be reached by creditors after confirmation or whether the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 remains in effect post-confirmation. E.g., In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541-42 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). In an effort to balance the effect of § 1327(b) against the interests of the debtor, the court in In re Adams classified post-confirmation assets as “property of the estate” or “property of the debtor” depending on whether the assets were dedicated to fulfilling the Chapter 13 plan. 12 B.R. at 541. In re Adams presumed the Chapter 13 estate survived after confirmation, and the only issue was what the estate included and what was protected by the stay. That is not the issue in the present case — we must determine if an estate exists post-confirmation.\nAlthough this issue was presented to this court in Laughlin v. United States IRS, 912 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991), the court resolved that case without addressing the issue. Judge Magill in dissent noted that the majority declined to “consider this issue, reasoning that the precise terms Congress used in § 362(a) are irrelevant because ... the IRS levy does not interfere with the general purpose of the stay.” Id. at 200. The dissent outlined the precedent addressing this issue and found the cases holding the estate continues to exist following confirmation to be “more persuasive.” Id. at 202. We agree.\nWe join the line of cases holding the estate continues to exist after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Upon reviewing § 1327 regarding the effect of confirmation, even if property of the estate vests in the debtor at confirmation, that does not necessarily mean that the estate no longer exists. The estate can continue to exist as a legal entity after confirmation even if it holds no property. Several sections of the bankruptcy code support our view that the estate continues to exist after confirmation. Section 1322(a)(1) provides for “supervision and control” by the trustee over monies and property of the estate committed to the plan. In addition, the trustee is authorized to deposit or invest money of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 345, and 11 U.S.C. § 347(a) provides that the trustee shall stop payment on any unpaid cheeks 90 days after the final distribution and the remaining property of the estate is to be paid into the court. Section 704(9), made applicable to Chapter 13 by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1), requires the trustee to make a final report and file a final account of the “administration of the estate.” Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) states that ■ unless the court orders otherwise, dismissal of a Chapter 13 case “revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case.” These sections support the position that the estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\nAs noted by the court in In re Root:\n[i]f there is no existing estate upon confirmation, then what does the Chapter 13 Trustee administer? If there is no estate over which the Chapter 13 Trustee has control, then that Trustee is nothing more than an officious intermeddler. Even 11 U.S.C. § 704(9) ... provides that the Trustee shall “... make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate with the court.” There must be an “estate” upon and after confirmation, and that estate consists of the property and future earnings of the debtor dedicated to fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan.\n61 B.R. at 985.\nWe think that the opposing line of cases is “premised upon the mistaken belief that re-vesting under § 1327(b) transforms property of the estate into property of the debtor.” In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 428-29 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987). The Aneiro court further stated:\nthe clear language of § 1306 demonstrates that confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is not relevant to determining whether property is or is not property of the estate. The relevant events in this determination are commencement of the ease and either dismissal, closing or conversion of the case. If Congress had intended for confirmation to so dramatically affect the expansive definition of property of the estate found in § 1306, it knew how to draft such a provision.\nId. at 429. We agree.\nFor example, Congress did intend for confirmation to so affect property of the estate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 vests all property of the estate in the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b). However, confirmation of a plan in Chapter 11 also acts as a discharge of the case, thus ending the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). That is not the effect of confirmation in a Chapter 13 case.\nIII.\nThe-post-petition debts in the present case were incurred for feed and veterinary services for debtors’ hog herd and should be considered administrative expenses necessary to preserve the estate pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A). These post-petition debts were not unauthorized borrowing by debtors; rather, these transactions were in the ordinary course of business and were necessary to preserve debtors’ principal asset, their hog herd. Therefore, we hold the bankruptcy court was correct in finding the Chapter 13 estate continued post-confirmation and in classifying the post-petition debts as administrative expenses entitled to priority under § 507(a)(1).\nAccordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed.\n.Honorable Harold D. Victor, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\n. Honorable Russell J. Hill, Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\n. All statutory references to 11 U.S.C. are from the 1988 edition.\n. Neiman v. Brown, Adversary Proceeding No. 87-0109 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa, filed Nov. 7, 1988).\n. This court addressed similar issues in In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (Lindberg), and Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1982) (Resendez). Lindberg dealt with a conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, but the sole issue in that case was whether the debtors could claim a different homestead exemption at the time of conversion than the one they originally designated at the commencement of their Chapter 13 proceedings. Resendez addressed whether a debtor could exempt undistributed funds turned over by the Chapter 13 trustee to the Chapter 7 trustee upon conversion.\nThe court in Lindberg held the debtors could change their homestead because in Chapter 13 there are no true exemptions because the debtor remains in possession of his property. The “Chapter 13 statement” filed by the debtors listed their assets and liabilities and designated what exemptions they would claim if they had to liquidate their estate. The purpose of making such a statement is only to permit creditors to determine whether the Chapter 13 plan should be accepted, and for the court to determine in confirming the plan if the creditors are receiving more under the plan than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. 735 F.2d at 1089.\nFollowing this discussion the court in Lindberg made the statement that \"when there is confirmation, ... of a chapter 13 plan, the confirmation of the plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan unless the plan provides otherwise.” Id. This statement was not made as part of the holding of the case; rather, its purpose was to explain that in Chapter 13 there are no exemptions, in contrast to Chapter 7 where the debtor may exempt from the property of the estate.\nThe court in Lindberg was not attempting to address the larger issue with which we are faced, because the court did not refer to Resendez which supports our holding in the present case. The court in Resendez held that undistributed funds in the possession of a Chapter 13 trustee after confirmation of the plan are property of the Chapter 13 estate; therefore, the funds would become part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion and could not be exempted. Id. 691 F.2d at 399. The court found the funds were voluntarily paid to the Chapter 13 trustee; therefore, \"[tjhese funds no longer belonged to the debtor, but became part of their estate.” Id. This result is consistent with the holding of In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1985), and supports our present holding that an estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nMcMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.\\nThis is an appeal from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa affirming an order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa overruling appellant’s objection to the trustee’s distribution of funds. Security Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa (appellant), objected to the trustee’s decision to treat certain post-petition debts as Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, thereby giving those debts a higher priority than the debt owed to appellant. For reversal, appellant argues the post-petition debts are not entitled to administrative claim status and that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to subordinate the post-petition debts to that owed to appellant. We affirm the order of the district court.\\nI.\\nThe underlying facts are not disputed. Robert V. and Susan A. Brown (debtors), were farmers engaged in raising and selling hogs. On December 27, 1982, they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. At that time their debt owed to appellant was $323,-645.52; however, the collateral securing the debt, primarily their hog herd and various notes, was valued at only $151,745.60. Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan divided appellant’s claim into secured and unsecured portions and was confirmed in August 1983. The allowed secured portion of appellant’s claim, $168,-840.01, was originally to be paid over 5 years, but the period was later shortened to 3 years. The remaining unsecured portion of appellant’s claim, $154,805.51, was to be paid off at the same rate as other unsecured creditors — 44.5<f per dollar.\\nThe secured portion of appellant’s claim was fully paid off under the Chapter 13 plan and appellant was directed by the bankruptcy court to release its lien on debtors’ assets which primarily consisted of their hog herd. In re Brown, No. 82-1857-C, slip op. at 3 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa Oct. 7, 1986) (Brown). Appellant objected, but the bankruptcy court ordered the release of the lien in order to protect all the unsecured creditors in the event debtors converted their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 7. Id. at 6. The bankruptcy court provided that any new lien placed on the property formerly securing appellant’s claim was to be “subordinated to a claim in favor of the estate” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988) in the event the case was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Id.\\nDuring the pendency of their Chapter 13 proceedings, debtors were allowed to continue farming and as a result incurred more debts. When appellant’s lien was removed from the herd of hogs, debtors sold the hogs for fair market value and used the proceeds to pay some of their post-petition creditors. Debtors then converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The Chapter 7 trustee brought adversary proceedings against these post-petition creditors to recover the payments they received as preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The bankruptcy court employed § 547(c)(2), to allow a preference exception for payments made in the ordinary course of business within 45 days before the date of conversion to Chapter 7.\\nThe adversary proceedings were settled by allowing the post-petition creditors to retain any monies received in the ordinary course of business within the 45-day exception. As a result, the trustee holds some $43,000.00, which he proposed to distribute by paying first the Chapter 7 administrative fees and expenses and then the Chapter 13 administrative fees and expenses, including the payments to the post-petition creditors as costs of preserving the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Because of the limited assets, this meant appellant and other unsecured creditors would receive nothing because the administrative expense claims would be accorded a higher priority than appellant’s unsecured claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507. Appellant filed an objection to the trustee’s proposal.\\nThe bankruptcy cohrt decided that the claims were entitled to administrative claim status under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Brown, slip op. at 6. The bankruptcy court noted that appellant’s only argument was that the costs and expenses at issue were not necessary to preserve the estate because the estate ceased to exist upon confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Id. Appellant did not address whether the costs and expenses were necessary to the preservation of the estate should the bankruptcy court hold the estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. Id. at 7.\\nThe bankruptcy court decided that the Chapter 13 estate continued to exist after confirmation of the plan. The bankruptcy court thus allowed payment to the post-petition creditors as Chapter 13 administrative expense claims. Id. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. This appeal followed.\\nII.\\nThe only issue before this court is whether the Chapter 13 estate existed after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, which is when the debts were incurred. A survey of the cases addressing this issue reveals that there is a split in authority about whether a bankruptcy estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. We start by agreeing with In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987), that “[w]e must confess that we find neither § 1327(b) or § 1306 to be models of clarity.”\\nThere is a tension between these two sections. Section 1306 provides that property of the estate includes all property the debtor acquires after commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted. Section 1327(b) provides that upon confirmation of a plan under Chapter 13, all property of the estate is vested in the debtor. Courts differ based on their interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 1306 and 11 U.S.C. § 1327. One line of cases holds that the Chapter 13 estate exists after confirmation and includes the debtor’s property and earnings dedicated to the fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan. E.g.; In re Price, 130 B.R. 259, 269 (N.D.Ill.1991); In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1986). A second line of cases, however, holds that unless the Chapter 13 plan provides otherwise, confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests all property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor, ending the estate at that time. E.g., In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 16 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1990); In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr.D.Or.1984), aff'd, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D.Or.1985).\\nAppellant argues the better-reasoned position is that the Chapter 13 estate ceases to exist following confirmation of the plan. Appellant contends that, according to 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vests property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor making such property “property of the debtor” and terminating the estate, unless the order of confirmation provides otherwise. Appellant argues that any other interpretation would make 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) meaningless. Therefore, appellant argues that because no estate existed, the post-petition debts cannot be entitled to priority as Chapter 13 administrative expenses.\\nThe trustee argues the bankruptcy court recognized the existence of'a split of authorities and properly sided with the line of cases holding that the bankruptcy estate continues to exist following confirmation of the plan. The trustee contends that so long as the estate continued to exist, the claims in question were administrative expenses of preserving the estate, and are entitled to administrative priority. In addition, the trustee argues there would be no equity in failing to pay the post-petition creditors, who extended credit to debtors to further their attempts to keep their business going.\\nMost of the cases in this area have addressed either whether a debtor’s earnings can be reached by creditors after confirmation or whether the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 remains in effect post-confirmation. E.g., In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541-42 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). In an effort to balance the effect of § 1327(b) against the interests of the debtor, the court in In re Adams classified post-confirmation assets as “property of the estate” or “property of the debtor” depending on whether the assets were dedicated to fulfilling the Chapter 13 plan. 12 B.R. at 541. In re Adams presumed the Chapter 13 estate survived after confirmation, and the only issue was what the estate included and what was protected by the stay. That is not the issue in the present case — we must determine if an estate exists post-confirmation.\\nAlthough this issue was presented to this court in Laughlin v. United States IRS, 912 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991), the court resolved that case without addressing the issue. Judge Magill in dissent noted that the majority declined to “consider this issue, reasoning that the precise terms Congress used in § 362(a) are irrelevant because ... the IRS levy does not interfere with the general purpose of the stay.” Id. at 200. The dissent outlined the precedent addressing this issue and found the cases holding the estate continues to exist following confirmation to be “more persuasive.” Id. at 202. We agree.\\nWe join the line of cases holding the estate continues to exist after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. Upon reviewing § 1327 regarding the effect of confirmation, even if property of the estate vests in the debtor at confirmation, that does not necessarily mean that the estate no longer exists. The estate can continue to exist as a legal entity after confirmation even if it holds no property. Several sections of the bankruptcy code support our view that the estate continues to exist after confirmation. Section 1322(a)(1) provides for “supervision and control” by the trustee over monies and property of the estate committed to the plan. In addition, the trustee is authorized to deposit or invest money of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 345, and 11 U.S.C. § 347(a) provides that the trustee shall stop payment on any unpaid cheeks 90 days after the final distribution and the remaining property of the estate is to be paid into the court. Section 704(9), made applicable to Chapter 13 by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1), requires the trustee to make a final report and file a final account of the “administration of the estate.” Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) states that ■ unless the court orders otherwise, dismissal of a Chapter 13 case “revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case.” These sections support the position that the estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\\nAs noted by the court in In re Root:\\n[i]f there is no existing estate upon confirmation, then what does the Chapter 13 Trustee administer? If there is no estate over which the Chapter 13 Trustee has control, then that Trustee is nothing more than an officious intermeddler. Even 11 U.S.C. § 704(9) ... provides that the Trustee shall “... make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate with the court.” There must be an “estate” upon and after confirmation, and that estate consists of the property and future earnings of the debtor dedicated to fulfillment of the Chapter 13 plan.\\n61 B.R. at 985.\\nWe think that the opposing line of cases is “premised upon the mistaken belief that re-vesting under § 1327(b) transforms property of the estate into property of the debtor.” In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 428-29 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987). The Aneiro court further stated:\\nthe clear language of § 1306 demonstrates that confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is not relevant to determining whether property is or is not property of the estate. The relevant events in this determination are commencement of the ease and either dismissal, closing or conversion of the case. If Congress had intended for confirmation to so dramatically affect the expansive definition of property of the estate found in § 1306, it knew how to draft such a provision.\\nId. at 429. We agree.\\nFor example, Congress did intend for confirmation to so affect property of the estate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Confirmation of a plan under Chapter 11 vests all property of the estate in the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b). However, confirmation of a plan in Chapter 11 also acts as a discharge of the case, thus ending the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). That is not the effect of confirmation in a Chapter 13 case.\\nIII.\\nThe-post-petition debts in the present case were incurred for feed and veterinary services for debtors’ hog herd and should be considered administrative expenses necessary to preserve the estate pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A). These post-petition debts were not unauthorized borrowing by debtors; rather, these transactions were in the ordinary course of business and were necessary to preserve debtors’ principal asset, their hog herd. Therefore, we hold the bankruptcy court was correct in finding the Chapter 13 estate continued post-confirmation and in classifying the post-petition debts as administrative expenses entitled to priority under § 507(a)(1).\\nAccordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed.\\n.Honorable Harold D. Victor, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\\n. Honorable Russell J. Hill, Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa.\\n. All statutory references to 11 U.S.C. are from the 1988 edition.\\n. Neiman v. Brown, Adversary Proceeding No. 87-0109 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa, filed Nov. 7, 1988).\\n. This court addressed similar issues in In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (Lindberg), and Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1982) (Resendez). Lindberg dealt with a conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, but the sole issue in that case was whether the debtors could claim a different homestead exemption at the time of conversion than the one they originally designated at the commencement of their Chapter 13 proceedings. Resendez addressed whether a debtor could exempt undistributed funds turned over by the Chapter 13 trustee to the Chapter 7 trustee upon conversion.\\nThe court in Lindberg held the debtors could change their homestead because in Chapter 13 there are no true exemptions because the debtor remains in possession of his property. The “Chapter 13 statement” filed by the debtors listed their assets and liabilities and designated what exemptions they would claim if they had to liquidate their estate. The purpose of making such a statement is only to permit creditors to determine whether the Chapter 13 plan should be accepted, and for the court to determine in confirming the plan if the creditors are receiving more under the plan than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. 735 F.2d at 1089.\\nFollowing this discussion the court in Lindberg made the statement that \\\"when there is confirmation, ... of a chapter 13 plan, the confirmation of the plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan unless the plan provides otherwise.” Id. This statement was not made as part of the holding of the case; rather, its purpose was to explain that in Chapter 13 there are no exemptions, in contrast to Chapter 7 where the debtor may exempt from the property of the estate.\\nThe court in Lindberg was not attempting to address the larger issue with which we are faced, because the court did not refer to Resendez which supports our holding in the present case. The court in Resendez held that undistributed funds in the possession of a Chapter 13 trustee after confirmation of the plan are property of the Chapter 13 estate; therefore, the funds would become part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion and could not be exempted. Id. 691 F.2d at 399. The court found the funds were voluntarily paid to the Chapter 13 trustee; therefore, \\\"[tjhese funds no longer belonged to the debtor, but became part of their estate.” Id. This result is consistent with the holding of In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1985), and supports our present holding that an estate continues to exist after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":99,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10513602,"string":"10,513,602"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Hale"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"1993-08-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 93-1008, 93-1230"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": [\"Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge.\"], \"parties\": [\"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant.\"], \"opinions\": [{\"text\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nJesse L. Hale appeals from his conviction in district court for carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Adrian C. Waller appeals from his sentence for distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm.\\nI.\\nOn the evening of March 30, 1992, St. Louis County police were investigating complaints of drug dealing in the Meacham Park area of St. Louis County. Detective Tommy Marr was the designated undercover buyer that night. Marr was backed up by a surveillance officer, Detective Kirk Lloyd, and an arrest team, which included Sergeant James Vollmar, Detective Robert Bayes, and Detective Michael Hutcherson.\\nWhile driving an unmarked ear, Marr stopped alongside a curb and spoke with Waller about purchasing crack cocaine. After a brief conversation, Waller entered the car and directed Marr to a town house apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, Waller waved over Hale and Junius Rucker, II, who were standing in front of the apartment. When Hale and Rucker arrived at the car, Rucker asked Marr what he wanted. Marr responded that he wanted to purchase two “twenty pieces.” (A twenty piece is a piece of crack cocaine that sells for twenty dollars.) Rucker then nodded to Hale, who exchanged with Marr two pieces of crack cocaine for forty dollars. Marr and Waller then left.\\nDetective Lloyd observed the transaction from his surveillance position and listened to it through the body microphone worn by Marr. When the transaction had been completed, Lloyd directed Vollmar, Bayes, and Hutcherson to arrest Hale and Rucker. As the three officers moved in and identified themselves, Hale and Rucker began sprinting toward the apartment. Hale pulled a revolver from his waistband as he ran. The three officers followed Rucker and Hale into the apartment, which was occupied by several individuals. Upon entering the apartment, Hale threw the revolver onto a table, from which it fell to the floor. Officer Bayes tackled Hale and subdued him. After Hale had been controlled, Bayes picked up the gun, a loaded .38 caliber revolver. In the meantime, Vollmar followed Rucker to the upstairs area of the apartment and arrested him there.\\nCount I of the grand jury’s indictment charged Hale, Waller, and Rucker with having distributed cocaine base; Count II charged that Hale had carried a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Hale and Waller pled guilty to Count I. Hale and Rucker were then tried jointly before a jury, Rucker on Count I and Hale on Count II.\\nTestifying on behalf of Hale and Rucker, the individuals present in the apartment when the police arrived related a somewhat different version of the events. According to them, Hale and Rucker were inside the apartment when Waller came to the apartment looking for Hale. Hale left the apartment for several minutes and then returned, followed by a police officer giving chase. The defense witnesses testified that they had not seen the gun in the apartment before Hale re-entered the apartment.\\nThe jury acquitted Rucker and convicted Hale. The district court sentenced Hale to a twenty-four month prison term on the distribution charge and to a consecutive sixty month prison term on the firearms charge, to be followed by three years of supervised release.\\nII.\\nHale moved for a mistrial in response to the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that two of the defense witnesses had lied about not speaking with other witnesses concerning their testimony. Contending that the prosecutor improperly stated his personal belief concerning the witnesses’ credibility, Hale argues that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir.1985). To reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, we must find both that the prosecutor’s remarks were in fact improper and that they were so offensive as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 458, 460. In determining the effect of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we typically examine three factors: (1) the cumulative effect of the misconduct; (2) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; and (3) the curative actions taken by the trial court. Id. at 460.\\nApplying the foregoing factors, we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks did not have a significant effect on the fairness of Hale’s trial. The challenged remarks were brief and relatively innocuous and concerned a collateral matter rather than the witnesses’ substantive testimony. The government’s evidence against Hale was substantial, if indeed not overwhelming. The district court’s jury instructions helped alleviate any potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s remarks by informing the jury that the evidence consisted only of the witnesses’ testimony and documents received into evidence and that attorney comments during closing argument were not evidence. The court also informed the jurors that they were the sole judges of witness credibility.\\nHale also argues that the prosecutor improperly misstated the burden of proof during his closing argument. Because Hale did not object at trial to this portion of the prosecutor’s argument, we review only for plain error, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 229 (8th Cir.1990), and we find that the prosecutor’s argument did not rise to that level, if indeed it constituted error at all.\\nIII.\\nWe turn next to Waller’s appeal. On the basis of .33 grams of crack cocaine (the amount that Hale sold to Marr), Waller’s base offense level was 14. The district court granted Waller a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Based on a total offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of I, the court sentenced Waller to five months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five months in a community corrections center and three years of supervised release.\\nWaller argues that the court erred by not granting him a two-level downward adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the drug transaction. Waller contends that he was a minor participant because he acted merely as a “steerer,” an individual who directs a potential drug purchaser to a seller.\\nThe commentary to the guidelines provides that a minor participant is “any participant who is less culpable than most other participants” in the criminal activity. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.3). Under the stipulated facts, the district court found that Waller was not less culpable than most other participants in the crime, Hale being the most culpable, Waller the next most culpable, and Rucker the least culpable. The court noted that the crime would not have occurred had Waller not directed Marr to Hale, the ultimate seller.\\nWhether a defendant qualifies for a minor participant reduction is a question of fact, the determination of which we review for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir.1992). Steerers play an important and critical role in the street-level drug trade, directing prospective buyers to sellers who wish to remain hidden from public view. See United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.1989) (discussing the role that steerers play in the drug market). Indeed, absent Waller’s role as a steerer in this case, the transaction between Marr and Hale would not have occurred. Waller brought a purchaser with a specific demand to a furtive seller who could fulfill that demand. Additionally, we note that Waller did more than inform Marr where he could purchase drugs. He entered Marr’s car, accompanied him to the apartment, and signaled for Hale and Rucker. Cf. United States v. Sostre, 967 F.2d 728, 732 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that the district court did not err in denying a minor participant reduction under similar facts). Last, we note that Waller’s sentence was calculated on the basis of the relatively small quantity of drugs sold in the transaction that he facilitated. Thus, this case is not one in which the defendant played a small role in a transaction involving a large amount of drugs. Under these facts, we find that the district court did not err in denying Waller a minor participant reduction.\\nAccordingly, Hale’s conviction and Waller’s sentence are affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.\", \"type\": \"majority\", \"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}], \"attorneys\": [\"R. Thomas Day, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant Hale.\", \"Joseph Cordell, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant Waller.\", \"Richard Poehling, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.\"], \"corrections\": \"\", \"head_matter\": \"UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant.\\nNos. 93-1008, 93-1230.\\nUnited States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.\\nSubmitted June 16, 1993.\\nDecided Aug. 3, 1993.\\nR. Thomas Day, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant Hale.\\nJoseph Cordell, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant Waller.\\nRichard Poehling, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.\\nBefore WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge.\\nThe HONORABLE ELMO B. HUNTER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western De-trict of Missouri, sitting by designation.\"}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HUNTER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":"1 F.3d 691"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner\n- Respondent\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \n3 = reversed \n4 = reversed and remanded \n5 = vacated and remanded \n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \n8 = vacated \n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \n10 = certification to or from a lower court \n11 = no disposition \n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure \n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \n\n2 = Civil Rights \n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \n\n3 = First Amendment \n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \n\n4 = Due Process \n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \n\n5 = Privacy \n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \n\n6 = Attorneys \n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \n\n7 = Unions \n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \n\n8 = Economic Activity \n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \n\n9 = Judicial Power \n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \n\n10 = Federalism \n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \n\n11 = Interstate Relations \n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \n\n12 = Federal Taxation \n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \n\n13 = Miscellaneous \n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \n\n14 = Private Action \n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\n\n1 = Constitution \n2 = Constitutional Amendment \n3 = Federal Statute \n4 = Court Rules \n5 = Other \n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \n8 = State or local law or regulation \n9 = No Legal Provision \n\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\n\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\n\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\n or civil-liberties claim.\n\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\n\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\n\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\n review of agency or government action).\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\n\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\n\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\n\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\n\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative \n2 = liberal \n3 = unspecifiable \n\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 1993-08-03\nOpinion type: majority\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nJesse L. Hale appeals from his conviction in district court for carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Adrian C. Waller appeals from his sentence for distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm.\nI.\nOn the evening of March 30, 1992, St. Louis County police were investigating complaints of drug dealing in the Meacham Park area of St. Louis County. Detective Tommy Marr was the designated undercover buyer that night. Marr was backed up by a surveillance officer, Detective Kirk Lloyd, and an arrest team, which included Sergeant James Vollmar, Detective Robert Bayes, and Detective Michael Hutcherson.\nWhile driving an unmarked ear, Marr stopped alongside a curb and spoke with Waller about purchasing crack cocaine. After a brief conversation, Waller entered the car and directed Marr to a town house apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, Waller waved over Hale and Junius Rucker, II, who were standing in front of the apartment. When Hale and Rucker arrived at the car, Rucker asked Marr what he wanted. Marr responded that he wanted to purchase two “twenty pieces.” (A twenty piece is a piece of crack cocaine that sells for twenty dollars.) Rucker then nodded to Hale, who exchanged with Marr two pieces of crack cocaine for forty dollars. Marr and Waller then left.\nDetective Lloyd observed the transaction from his surveillance position and listened to it through the body microphone worn by Marr. When the transaction had been completed, Lloyd directed Vollmar, Bayes, and Hutcherson to arrest Hale and Rucker. As the three officers moved in and identified themselves, Hale and Rucker began sprinting toward the apartment. Hale pulled a revolver from his waistband as he ran. The three officers followed Rucker and Hale into the apartment, which was occupied by several individuals. Upon entering the apartment, Hale threw the revolver onto a table, from which it fell to the floor. Officer Bayes tackled Hale and subdued him. After Hale had been controlled, Bayes picked up the gun, a loaded .38 caliber revolver. In the meantime, Vollmar followed Rucker to the upstairs area of the apartment and arrested him there.\nCount I of the grand jury’s indictment charged Hale, Waller, and Rucker with having distributed cocaine base; Count II charged that Hale had carried a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Hale and Waller pled guilty to Count I. Hale and Rucker were then tried jointly before a jury, Rucker on Count I and Hale on Count II.\nTestifying on behalf of Hale and Rucker, the individuals present in the apartment when the police arrived related a somewhat different version of the events. According to them, Hale and Rucker were inside the apartment when Waller came to the apartment looking for Hale. Hale left the apartment for several minutes and then returned, followed by a police officer giving chase. The defense witnesses testified that they had not seen the gun in the apartment before Hale re-entered the apartment.\nThe jury acquitted Rucker and convicted Hale. The district court sentenced Hale to a twenty-four month prison term on the distribution charge and to a consecutive sixty month prison term on the firearms charge, to be followed by three years of supervised release.\nII.\nHale moved for a mistrial in response to the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that two of the defense witnesses had lied about not speaking with other witnesses concerning their testimony. Contending that the prosecutor improperly stated his personal belief concerning the witnesses’ credibility, Hale argues that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.\nWe review the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir.1985). To reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, we must find both that the prosecutor’s remarks were in fact improper and that they were so offensive as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 458, 460. In determining the effect of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we typically examine three factors: (1) the cumulative effect of the misconduct; (2) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; and (3) the curative actions taken by the trial court. Id. at 460.\nApplying the foregoing factors, we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks did not have a significant effect on the fairness of Hale’s trial. The challenged remarks were brief and relatively innocuous and concerned a collateral matter rather than the witnesses’ substantive testimony. The government’s evidence against Hale was substantial, if indeed not overwhelming. The district court’s jury instructions helped alleviate any potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s remarks by informing the jury that the evidence consisted only of the witnesses’ testimony and documents received into evidence and that attorney comments during closing argument were not evidence. The court also informed the jurors that they were the sole judges of witness credibility.\nHale also argues that the prosecutor improperly misstated the burden of proof during his closing argument. Because Hale did not object at trial to this portion of the prosecutor’s argument, we review only for plain error, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 229 (8th Cir.1990), and we find that the prosecutor’s argument did not rise to that level, if indeed it constituted error at all.\nIII.\nWe turn next to Waller’s appeal. On the basis of .33 grams of crack cocaine (the amount that Hale sold to Marr), Waller’s base offense level was 14. The district court granted Waller a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Based on a total offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of I, the court sentenced Waller to five months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five months in a community corrections center and three years of supervised release.\nWaller argues that the court erred by not granting him a two-level downward adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the drug transaction. Waller contends that he was a minor participant because he acted merely as a “steerer,” an individual who directs a potential drug purchaser to a seller.\nThe commentary to the guidelines provides that a minor participant is “any participant who is less culpable than most other participants” in the criminal activity. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.3). Under the stipulated facts, the district court found that Waller was not less culpable than most other participants in the crime, Hale being the most culpable, Waller the next most culpable, and Rucker the least culpable. The court noted that the crime would not have occurred had Waller not directed Marr to Hale, the ultimate seller.\nWhether a defendant qualifies for a minor participant reduction is a question of fact, the determination of which we review for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir.1992). Steerers play an important and critical role in the street-level drug trade, directing prospective buyers to sellers who wish to remain hidden from public view. See United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.1989) (discussing the role that steerers play in the drug market). Indeed, absent Waller’s role as a steerer in this case, the transaction between Marr and Hale would not have occurred. Waller brought a purchaser with a specific demand to a furtive seller who could fulfill that demand. Additionally, we note that Waller did more than inform Marr where he could purchase drugs. He entered Marr’s car, accompanied him to the apartment, and signaled for Hale and Rucker. Cf. United States v. Sostre, 967 F.2d 728, 732 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that the district court did not err in denying a minor participant reduction under similar facts). Last, we note that Waller’s sentence was calculated on the basis of the relatively small quantity of drugs sold in the transaction that he facilitated. Thus, this case is not one in which the defendant played a small role in a transaction involving a large amount of drugs. Under these facts, we find that the district court did not err in denying Waller a minor participant reduction.\nAccordingly, Hale’s conviction and Waller’s sentence are affirmed.\n. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner\\n- Respondent\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as “the Court”** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner \\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content \\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed, \\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The “name” should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The “description” should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = stay, petition, or motion granted \\n2 = affirmed (includes modified) \\n3 = reversed \\n4 = reversed and remanded \\n5 = vacated and remanded \\n6 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part \\n7 = affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded \\n8 = vacated \\n9 = petition denied or appeal dismissed \\n10 = certification to or from a lower court \\n11 = no disposition \\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 4, 5, or 7 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court \\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (1), denied (9), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (8) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 11 (“no disposition”).\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent \\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition \\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear \\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A “favorable disposition” is one that materially improves the petitioner’s position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner) \\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure \\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas) \\n\\n2 = Civil Rights \\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation) \\n\\n3 = First Amendment \\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims) \\n\\n4 = Due Process \\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process) \\n\\n5 = Privacy \\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy) \\n\\n6 = Attorneys \\n (e.g., attorney’s fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues) \\n\\n7 = Unions \\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security) \\n\\n8 = Economic Activity \\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation) \\n\\n9 = Judicial Power \\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure) \\n\\n10 = Federalism \\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power) \\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations \\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations) \\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation \\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues) \\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous \\n (cases that do not fit any other issue area) \\n\\n14 = Private Action \\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters) \\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning. Only use 13 (Miscellaneous)\\nwhen the case clearly does not fit any other category.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (varLawArea-style):\\n\\n1 = Constitution \\n2 = Constitutional Amendment \\n3 = Federal Statute \\n4 = Court Rules \\n5 = Other \\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes \\n8 = State or local law or regulation \\n9 = No Legal Provision \\n\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision, if possible (e.g., “Fourth Amendment, search and seizure”,\\n “42 U.S.C. § 1983”, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”, “state tort law”).\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court’s analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nInterpret “liberal” and “conservative” using the SCDB’s issue-specific rules, adapted to the appellate context. \\nYou MUST FIRST determine who won the case, THEN identify the issue_area, and LAST choose decision_direction \\nto match the rules below. Make sure to carefully apply ALL rules corresponding to the SPECIFIC issue area you identify.\\n\\nYou MUST follow the rules below for assigning decision_direction based on issue_area as closely as possible:\\n\\n- **Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment (issue_area.code = 1 OR 2 OR 3)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the person accused or convicted of crime, the civil rights or civil liberties claimant,\\n the person asserting First Amendment protections, or blocks government efforts to restrict these rights.\\n - Conservative (1): favors law enforcement or prosecution, the government defendant, or restricts the civil-rights\\n or civil-liberties claim.\\n\\n- **Due Process, Privacy (issue_area.code = 4 OR 5)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors individuals challenging government deprivation of liberty or property, or favors personal autonomy\\n and privacy interests (e.g., reproductive choice, family relations).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the government or regulation at the expense of those individual claims.\\n\\n- **Unions, Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 7 OR 8)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors unions, workers, consumers, injured parties, environmental interests, or small entities against\\n large business interests, and often favors regulation that protects those interests.\\n - Conservative (1): favors employers, business or property owners, management, large commercial entities, or deregulation.\\n For example, in an Economic Activity case (issue_area.code = 8) where an environmental or resource-protection regulation \\n is upheld against a challenge from business interests, the decision MUST be coded as liberal (2) because it favors \\n government regulation, especially protecting the environment.\\n\\n- **Judicial Power (issue_area.code = 9)**\\n - Liberal (2): expands the courts’ ability to hear and decide cases (broad standing, fewer justiciability limits, broader\\n review of agency or government action).\\n - Conservative (1): narrows access to the courts, restricts standing or justiciability, or limits judicial review.\\n\\n- **Federalism (issue_area.code = 10)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors federal authority over the states, or executive/legislative national power over state power.\\n - Conservative (1): favors state sovereignty or state authority against federal power.\\n\\n- **Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)**\\n - Liberal (2): favors the United States as the taxing authority (i.e., the government’s position in the tax dispute).\\n - Conservative (1): favors the taxpayer.\\nFor example, in a Federal Taxation case (issu_area.code = 12) where a taxpayer wins an appeal against the government,\\nthe decision MUST be coded as conservative (1) because it favors the taxpayer.\\n\\n- **Interstate Relations, many Private Action issues (issue_area.code = 11 OR 14)**\\n - Direction is often not ideologically meaningful in SCDB terms; use 3 (unspecifiable) unless the decision clearly aligns \\n with liberal or conservative patterns above.\\n\\nIf, after applying these rules, you cannot reasonably assign a direction, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following internal consistency check:\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side wins in the case (petitioner vs respondent).\\n3. Verify that decision_direction.code matches the rule for that issue_area and winner.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative \\n2 = liberal \\n3 = unspecifiable \\n\\nUse the same liberal/conservative rules as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court’s outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court’s direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt’s judgment and the appellate court’s disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 “affirmed” \\n or 9 “petition denied or appeal dismissed”), then the lower court’s direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 3 “reversed”, \\n 4 “reversed and remanded”, 5 “vacated and remanded”, or 8 “vacated”), then the lower court’s direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 6 or 7), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court’s direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 1, 10, 11), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate “unspecifiable” or “no disposition” code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is. \\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and \\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant\\nCourt: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 1993-08-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\nJesse L. Hale appeals from his conviction in district court for carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Adrian C. Waller appeals from his sentence for distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm.\\nI.\\nOn the evening of March 30, 1992, St. Louis County police were investigating complaints of drug dealing in the Meacham Park area of St. Louis County. Detective Tommy Marr was the designated undercover buyer that night. Marr was backed up by a surveillance officer, Detective Kirk Lloyd, and an arrest team, which included Sergeant James Vollmar, Detective Robert Bayes, and Detective Michael Hutcherson.\\nWhile driving an unmarked ear, Marr stopped alongside a curb and spoke with Waller about purchasing crack cocaine. After a brief conversation, Waller entered the car and directed Marr to a town house apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, Waller waved over Hale and Junius Rucker, II, who were standing in front of the apartment. When Hale and Rucker arrived at the car, Rucker asked Marr what he wanted. Marr responded that he wanted to purchase two “twenty pieces.” (A twenty piece is a piece of crack cocaine that sells for twenty dollars.) Rucker then nodded to Hale, who exchanged with Marr two pieces of crack cocaine for forty dollars. Marr and Waller then left.\\nDetective Lloyd observed the transaction from his surveillance position and listened to it through the body microphone worn by Marr. When the transaction had been completed, Lloyd directed Vollmar, Bayes, and Hutcherson to arrest Hale and Rucker. As the three officers moved in and identified themselves, Hale and Rucker began sprinting toward the apartment. Hale pulled a revolver from his waistband as he ran. The three officers followed Rucker and Hale into the apartment, which was occupied by several individuals. Upon entering the apartment, Hale threw the revolver onto a table, from which it fell to the floor. Officer Bayes tackled Hale and subdued him. After Hale had been controlled, Bayes picked up the gun, a loaded .38 caliber revolver. In the meantime, Vollmar followed Rucker to the upstairs area of the apartment and arrested him there.\\nCount I of the grand jury’s indictment charged Hale, Waller, and Rucker with having distributed cocaine base; Count II charged that Hale had carried a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Hale and Waller pled guilty to Count I. Hale and Rucker were then tried jointly before a jury, Rucker on Count I and Hale on Count II.\\nTestifying on behalf of Hale and Rucker, the individuals present in the apartment when the police arrived related a somewhat different version of the events. According to them, Hale and Rucker were inside the apartment when Waller came to the apartment looking for Hale. Hale left the apartment for several minutes and then returned, followed by a police officer giving chase. The defense witnesses testified that they had not seen the gun in the apartment before Hale re-entered the apartment.\\nThe jury acquitted Rucker and convicted Hale. The district court sentenced Hale to a twenty-four month prison term on the distribution charge and to a consecutive sixty month prison term on the firearms charge, to be followed by three years of supervised release.\\nII.\\nHale moved for a mistrial in response to the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that two of the defense witnesses had lied about not speaking with other witnesses concerning their testimony. Contending that the prosecutor improperly stated his personal belief concerning the witnesses’ credibility, Hale argues that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir.1985). To reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, we must find both that the prosecutor’s remarks were in fact improper and that they were so offensive as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 458, 460. In determining the effect of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we typically examine three factors: (1) the cumulative effect of the misconduct; (2) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; and (3) the curative actions taken by the trial court. Id. at 460.\\nApplying the foregoing factors, we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks did not have a significant effect on the fairness of Hale’s trial. The challenged remarks were brief and relatively innocuous and concerned a collateral matter rather than the witnesses’ substantive testimony. The government’s evidence against Hale was substantial, if indeed not overwhelming. The district court’s jury instructions helped alleviate any potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s remarks by informing the jury that the evidence consisted only of the witnesses’ testimony and documents received into evidence and that attorney comments during closing argument were not evidence. The court also informed the jurors that they were the sole judges of witness credibility.\\nHale also argues that the prosecutor improperly misstated the burden of proof during his closing argument. Because Hale did not object at trial to this portion of the prosecutor’s argument, we review only for plain error, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 229 (8th Cir.1990), and we find that the prosecutor’s argument did not rise to that level, if indeed it constituted error at all.\\nIII.\\nWe turn next to Waller’s appeal. On the basis of .33 grams of crack cocaine (the amount that Hale sold to Marr), Waller’s base offense level was 14. The district court granted Waller a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Based on a total offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of I, the court sentenced Waller to five months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five months in a community corrections center and three years of supervised release.\\nWaller argues that the court erred by not granting him a two-level downward adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.2(b) for being a minor participant in the drug transaction. Waller contends that he was a minor participant because he acted merely as a “steerer,” an individual who directs a potential drug purchaser to a seller.\\nThe commentary to the guidelines provides that a minor participant is “any participant who is less culpable than most other participants” in the criminal activity. § 3B1.2 comment. (n.3). Under the stipulated facts, the district court found that Waller was not less culpable than most other participants in the crime, Hale being the most culpable, Waller the next most culpable, and Rucker the least culpable. The court noted that the crime would not have occurred had Waller not directed Marr to Hale, the ultimate seller.\\nWhether a defendant qualifies for a minor participant reduction is a question of fact, the determination of which we review for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir.1992). Steerers play an important and critical role in the street-level drug trade, directing prospective buyers to sellers who wish to remain hidden from public view. See United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.1989) (discussing the role that steerers play in the drug market). Indeed, absent Waller’s role as a steerer in this case, the transaction between Marr and Hale would not have occurred. Waller brought a purchaser with a specific demand to a furtive seller who could fulfill that demand. Additionally, we note that Waller did more than inform Marr where he could purchase drugs. He entered Marr’s car, accompanied him to the apartment, and signaled for Hale and Rucker. Cf. United States v. Sostre, 967 F.2d 728, 732 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that the district court did not err in denying a minor participant reduction under similar facts). Last, we note that Waller’s sentence was calculated on the basis of the relatively small quantity of drugs sold in the transaction that he facilitated. Thus, this case is not one in which the defendant played a small role in a transaction involving a large amount of drugs. Under these facts, we find that the district court did not err in denying Waller a minor participant reduction.\\nAccordingly, Hale’s conviction and Waller’s sentence are affirmed.\\n. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":0,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":224,"offset":0,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3NjQwNzI4MCwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9hcHBlbGxhdGUtY29kaW5nLXNtYWxsIiwiZXhwIjoxNzc2NDEwODgwLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2h1Z2dpbmdmYWNlLmNvIn0.BwNIqi1LJ5J_y46eRNFcQE456g4H4hPVpWG9Sdal_BKcDSpfCzJ5J8-1AtRmfqM8A7Xjj9w_eb59yiUmMt44AQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":224,"numBytesParquet":6529802}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":0,"total":0},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10,507,259 | SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON, et al., Appellants, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Appellees | Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt | 1993-07-23 | No. 92-5255 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": ["Before MIKVA, Chief Judge; WILLIAMS and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON, et al., Appellants, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge MIKVA, except sect... | MIKVA | WILLIAMS | SENTELLE | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 F.3d 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,307 | UNITED STATES of America v. Blaine A'mmon WHITE, Appellant | United States v. White | 1993-07-27 | No. 92-3130 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America v. Blaine A’mmon WHITE, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.\nSILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:\nAppellant claims that his convictions for passport fr... | MIKVA | SILBERMAN | RANDOLPH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 13 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,368 | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C., United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Amarillo, Texas, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2250, Intervenor | United States Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority | 1993-08-06 | No. 91-1578 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RUTH BADER GINSBURG, WILLIAMS, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C., United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Amarillo, Texas, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, American Federation... | RUTH BADER GINSBURG | WILLIAMS | SENTELLE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 19 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,445 | UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, LOCAL NO. 150-A, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent Dubuque Packing Company, Inc., Intervenor | United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 150-A v. National Labor Relations Board | 1993-08-10 | Nos. 91-1290, 91-1325 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": ["Before EDWARDS, RUTH BADER GINSBURG, and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, LOCAL NO. 150-A, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent Dubuque Packing Company, Inc., Intervenor."], "opinions": [{"text": "Opinion for the ... | EDWARDS | RUTH BADER GINSBURG | BUCKLEY | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 24 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,517 | TMG II, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee | TMG II v. United States | 1993-08-13 | No. 91-5361 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, WALD and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["TMG II, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge MIKVA.\nMIKVA, Chief Judge:\nThis appeal concerns a dispute between the IRS and two partnersh... | MIKVA | WALD | BUCKLEY | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 36 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,571 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Omar Martin ZAPATA, a/k/a Omar Martin Zapata-Medina, a/k/a Omar Zapata Martin, Defendant, Appellant | United States v. Zapata | 1993-07-19 | No. 93-1116 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BREYER, Chief Judge, SELYA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Omar Martin ZAPATA, a/k/a Omar Martin Zapata-Medina, a/k/a Omar Zapata Martin, Defendant, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "SELYA, Circuit Judge.\nIn this criminal appeal, defendant-appel... | BREYER | SELYA | BOUDIN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 46 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,628 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph BREWSTER, a/k/a Patrick Brewster, Defendant, Appellant | United States v. Brewster | 1993-07-28 | No. 93-1046 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before SELYA, CYR and STAHL, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph BREWSTER, a/k/a Patrick Brewster, Defendant, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "SELYA, Circuit Judge.\nAfter selling drugs and a gun to an undercover federal agent, defendant-appellant Joseph Patric... | SELYA | CYR | STAHL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 51 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,706 | Joseph DOW, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Appellees | Dow v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America | 1993-07-28 | No. 93-1127 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Joseph DOW, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "SELYA, Circuit Judge.\nThis appeal pivots on the meaning and applicability of ... | TORRUELLA | SELYA | BOUDIN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 56 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,804 | Franco ACEVEDO-DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Jose E. APONTE, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Ada N. Perez, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants; Franco ACEVEDO-DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Jose E. APONTE, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Dorotea Collazo Rivera, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants | Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte | 1993-08-03 | Nos. 92-1846, 92-1848 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before SELYA, CYR and STAHL, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Franco ACEVEDO-DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Jose E. APONTE, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Ada N. Perez, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants. Franco ACEVEDO-DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Jose E. APONTE, et al., Defendants, Appelle... | SELYA | CYR | STAHL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 62 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,866 | Sandra ROLON-ALVARADO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, Defendant, Appellee | Rolon-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan | 1993-08-09 | No. 92-2298 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before SELYA, CYR and STAHL, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Sandra ROLON-ALVARADO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, Defendant, Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "SELYA, Circuit Judge.\nThis appeal necessitates that we consider the quantum and character of proof needed under Puerto Rico ... | SELYA | CYR | STAHL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 74 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,507,937 | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Roberto COLON-PAGAN, Defendant, Appellant | United States v. Colon-Pagan | 1993-08-20 | No. 92-2314 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BREYER, Chief Judge, SELYA and STAHL, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Roberto COLON-PAGAN, Defendant, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "BREYER, Chief Judge.\nRoberto Colon-Pagan appeals his conviction for possessing, with intent to distribute, about six kilograms of co... | BREYER | SELYA | STAHL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 80 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,018 | Leon E. COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALOMON BROTHERS INC., Defendant-Appellee | Cooper v. Salomon Bros. | 1993-07-20 | Nos. 1685, 1882, Dockets 92-9319, 93-7135 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: MESKILL and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge."], "parties": ["Leon E. COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALOMON BROTHERS INC., Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "MESKILL, Circuit Judge:\nLeon E. Cooper, an attorney, appeals pro se from three orders entered in the United States Di... | MESKILL | JACOBS | RESTANI | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 82 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,113 | In re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED OCTOBER 29, 1992. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. John DOE, Appellee | United States v. Doe | 1993-07-21 | No. 1497, Docket 93-1070 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: LUMBARD, CARDAMONE, and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["In re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED OCTOBER 29, 1992. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. John DOE, Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:\nThe government appeals from an order entered on January 7, 1... | LUMBARD | CARDAMONE | ALTIMARI | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 87 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,210 | Kam Shing CHAN, Kam Tai Chan, Jing Yi Chen, Shan Non Chiu, Bak Lok Chu, Kok Kun Chu, Israel Gonzalez, Sui Bin Huang, Jian Ning Jiang, Kam Fai Kwok, Moon Shuen Kwong, Wei Xiang Lee, Yang I Lee, Young Shi Lee, Bing Zhao Li, Hao Hui Li, Kei Man Li, Wai Tai Li, Chi Kwong Liu, Jack Ye Louie, Sheng Hua Lu, Tian Guang Mai, Ch... | Kam Shing Chan v. City of New York | 1993-07-26 | Nos. 1230, 1231, 2194, Dockets 92-9236, 92-9238 and 93-7038 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KEARSE and CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge ."], "parties": ["Kam Shing CHAN, Kam Tai Chan, Jing Yi Chen, Shan Non Chiu, Bak Lok Chu, Kok Kun Chu, Israel Gonzalez, Sui Bin Huang, Jian Ning Jiang, Kam Fai Kwok, Moon Shuen Kwong, Wei Xiang Lee, Yang I Lee, Young Shi Lee, Bing Zhao... | KEARSE | CARDAMONE | BURNS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 96 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,258 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 27.09 ACRES OF LAND, more or less, situated in The Town of Harrison and The Town of North Castle; The County of Westchester, and unknown others, Defendants, Purchase Environmental Protective Association, Inc., Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant, Town of Harrison, Defendant-I... | United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land | 1993-07-27 | No. 1539, Docket 93-6031 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: WINTER and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and MUKASEY, District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 27.09 ACRES OF LAND, more or less, situated in The Town of Harrison and The Town of North Castle; The County of Westchester, and unknown others, Defendants, Purchase Envi... | WINTER | JACOBS | MUKASEY | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 107 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,363 | WESTNAU LAND CORP., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, as an agency of the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee | Westnau Land Corp. v. U.S. Small Business Administration | 1993-07-28 | No. 459, Docket 92-6095 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: NEWMAN, CARDAMONE, and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["WESTNAU LAND CORP., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, as an agency of the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "MAHONEY, Circuit Judge:\nPlaintiff-appellant Westnau Land Corpo... | NEWMAN | CARDAMONE | MAHONEY | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 112 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,421 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bosko RADONJICH, Defendant, George Pape, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Radonjich | 1993-07-29 | No. 1720, Docket 93-1147 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, VAN GRAAFEILAND and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bosko RADONJICH, Defendant, George Pape, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge:\nGeorge Pape appeals from a judgment of the United States... | NEWMAN | VAN GRAAFEILAND | ALTIMARI | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 117 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,522 | The HERTZ CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, O. Peter Sherwood, in his official capacity as Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and Mark Green, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Consumer Affairs of the City of New York, Defendants-Appellees | Hertz Corp. v. City of New York | 1993-08-02 | No. 1592, Docket 92-7369 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: FEINBERG, PRATT and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["The HERTZ CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, O. Peter Sherwood, in his official capacity as Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and Mark Green, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Consumer Affai... | FEINBERG | PRATT | McLAUGHLIN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 121 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,583 | ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. A.A. McNAMARA & SONS, INC., and Arthur McNamara, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees | Allstate Insurance v. A.A. McNamara & Sons, Inc. | 1993-08-03 | Nos. 763, 1150, Dockets 92-7851, 92-9223 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: MESKILL and PRATT, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, District Judge."], "parties": ["ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. A.A. McNAMARA & SONS, INC., and Arthur McNamara, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "MESKILL, Circuit Judge:\nThis is an appe... | MESKILL | PRATT | POLLACK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 133 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,643 | MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY, doing business as Venture Stores, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LEASING CORP., INC., and Arnold Frumin, Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellees, Willing Group, Inc., and Louis Goldstein, Third-Party-Defendants | May Department Stores Co. v. International Leasing Corp. | 1993-08-03 | No. 1630, Docket No. 93-7106 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KEARSE, MINER and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY, doing business as Venture Stores, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LEASING CORP., INC., and Arnold Frumin, Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellees, Willing Group, Inc., and Louis Goldstein, Third-Par... | KEARSE | MINER | ALTIMARI | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 138 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,724 | Rayya ABDALLAH; David Abdallah, as next of kin of Baby Boy Abdallah, and on their own personal behalf, Appellants, v. Wilbur CALLENDER, M.D.; Government of the Virgin Islands | Abdallah v. Callender | 1993-06-07 | No. 92-7275 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: GREENBERG, SCIRICA, and GARTH, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Rayya ABDALLAH; David Abdallah, as next of kin of Baby Boy Abdallah, and on their own personal behalf, Appellants, v. Wilbur CALLENDER, M.D.; Government of the Virgin Islands."], "opinions": [{"text": "OPINION OF THE COURT\nGREENBERG, C... | GREENBERG | SCIRICA | GARTH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 141 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,852 | UNITED STATES of America v. Bryan THORNTON, a/k/a "Moochie", Appellant (D.C. Criminal No. 91-00570-03); UNITED STATES of America v. Aaron JONES, a/k/a "A", "J", Appellant (D.C. Criminal No. 91-00570-01); UNITED STATES of America v. Bernard FIELDS, a/k/a "Quadir", "Q", Appellant (D.C. Criminal No. 91-00570-05) | United States v. Thornton | 1993-07-19 | Nos. 92-1635, 92-1785 and 92-1878 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and WEIS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America v. Bryan THORNTON, a/k/a “Moochie”, Appellant (D.C. Criminal No. 91-00570-03). UNITED STATES of America v. Aaron JONES, a/k/a “A”, “J”, Appellant (D.C. Criminal No. 91-00570-01). UNITED STATES of Ameri... | SLOVITER | NYGAARD | WEIS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 149 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,508,982 | Frank G. McALEESE, Appellant at No. 92-1820, v. J.F. MAZURKIEWICZ, Warden; Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania; District Attorney for Philadelphia County, J.F. Mazurkiewicz, Appellant at No. 92-1718 | McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz | 1993-07-27 | Nos. 92-1718, 92-1820 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: BECKER, HUTCHINSON and WEIS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Frank G. McALEESE, Appellant at No. 92-1820, v. J.F. MAZURKIEWICZ, Warden; Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania; District Attorney for Philadelphia County, J.F. Mazurkiewicz, Appellant at No. 92-1718."], "opinions": [{"text": "OP... | BECKER | HUTCHINSON | WEIS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 159 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,069 | George KOST and Francis Ferri, Appellants, v. Charles KOZAKIEWICZ, Warden, James Gregg, Deputy Warden, (FNU) Balogh, Lieutenant, Allegheny County Jail, Unknown Executives and Officers, Allegheny County Solicitor's Office, Goldline Laboratories, Gatti Services | Kost v. Kozakiewicz | 1993-07-28 | No. 92-3386 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: COWEN, ROTH, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges"], "parties": ["George KOST and Francis Ferri, Appellants, v. Charles KOZAKIEWICZ, Warden, James Gregg, Deputy Warden, (FNU) Balogh, Lieutenant, Allegheny County Jail, Unknown Executives and Officers, Allegheny County Solicitor’s Office, Goldline Laboratories... | COWEN | ROTH | ROSENN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 176 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,147 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. DEANER et al. Tab Deaner, Appellant | United States v. Deaner | 1993-07-29 | No. 92-7626 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: BECKER, HUTCHINSON and ROTH, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. DEANER et al. Tab Deaner, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "OPINION OF THE COURT\nHUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.\nTab R. Deaner (“Deaner”) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the ... | BECKER | HUTCHINSON | ROTH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 192 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,293 | OLDE DISCOUNT CORPORATION v. W. Michael TUPMAN, and as Deputy Attorney General of the State of Delaware; Richard W. Hubbard, Securities Commissioner of the State of Delaware; Eugene H. Engelhardt and Carol D. Engelhardt, W. Michael Tupman, individually and as Deputy Attorney General of the State of Delaware; Richard W.... | Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman | 1993-07-30 | No. 92-7557 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: GREENBERG, NYGAARD and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.", "Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, and BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, and ROSEN.N, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["OLDE DISCOUNT CORPORATION v. W. Michael TUPMAN, and as Deputy Attorney G... | GREENBERG | NYGAARD | ROSENN | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 F.3d 202 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,327 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abel Parama BORROMEO, Defendant-Appellant. and Seven (7) Parcels of Real Property; Two (2) Automobiles; Undetermined Amount of United States Currency Contained In Several Bank Accounts, Stocks, Bonds, Securities and Other Negotiable Instruments and Various Items of Perso... | United States v. Borromeo | 1993-05-26 | No. 91-7070 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge, and KAUFMAN, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abel Parama BORROMEO, Defendant-Appellant. and Seven (7) Parcels of Real Pro... | HAMILTON | SPROUSE | KAUFMAN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 219 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,381 | Christopher WOLSKY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEDICAL COLLEGE OF HAMPTON ROADS, formerly known as Eastern VA Medical Authority, formerly known as Norfolk Area Medical Center Authority, Defendant-Appellant | Wolsky v. Medical College | 1993-07-28 | No. 92-2275 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Christopher WOLSKY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEDICAL COLLEGE OF HAMPTON ROADS, formerly known as Eastern VA Medical Authority, formerly known as Norfolk Area Medical Center Authority, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"t... | ERVIN | WIDENER | HAMILTON | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 222 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,500 | Jan J. ROSCISZEWSKI, Assignee of Physical Dynamics, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARETE ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED; David E. Mann; Richard A. Martini; Wilma R. Murphy; Frank Fernandez, Defendants-Appellees. (Two Cases) | Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc. | 1993-07-29 | Nos. 92-2122, 92-2390 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and KISER, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["Jan J. ROSCISZEWSKI, Assignee of Physical Dynamics, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARETE ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED; David E. Mann; Richard A... | WILKINS | LUTTIG | KISER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 225 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,586 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Michael MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Mitchell | 1993-08-03 | No. 92-5506 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RUSSELL and HALL, Circuit Judges, and PAYNE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Michael MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "OPINION\nDONALD RUSSELL, Circ... | RUSSELL | HALL | PAYNE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 235 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,651 | D.P. MUTH; J.P. Muth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee | Muth v. United States | 1993-08-06 | No. 92-2414 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RUSSELL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HILTON, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["D.P. MUTH; J.P. Muth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "OPINION\nHILTON, District... | RUSSELL | LUTTIG | HILTON | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 246 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,708 | Gladys CHARLES, the Surviving Divorced Spouse of Verdie Charles, on behalf of herself and on behalf of Verdie Charles, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent | Charles v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs | 1993-08-09 | No. 91-3028 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and G. Ross ANDERSON, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.", "parties": ["Gladys CHARLES, the Surviving Divorced Spouse of Verdie Charles, on behalf of herself and on behalf of Verdie Charles, Petitioner, v. ... | HALL | MURNAGHAN | ANDERSON | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 251 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,797 | Charles E. LITTLE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; Joseph V. Corless; John Doe; William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States, Defendants-Appellees | Little v. Federal Bureau of Investigation | 1993-08-10 | No. 92-2058 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before HALL, Circuit Judge, SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge, and MICHAEL, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["Charles E. LITTLE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; Joseph V. Corless; John Doe; William P. Barr, A... | HALL | SPROUSE | MICHAEL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 255 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,853 | Delbert O. TOPPING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant | Topping v. CSX Transportation, Inc. | 1993-08-11 | No. 92-2449 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge, and G. Ross ANDERSON, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["Delbert O. TOPPING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions"... | WILKINSON | SPROUSE | ANDERSON | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 260 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,924 | NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosalind D. GRAY, Administratrix of the Estate of Herman Wilson, Defendant-Appellant | National Credit Union Administration Board v. Gray | 1993-08-13 | No. 92-1226 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before HALL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and KISER, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation."], "parties": ["NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosalind D. GRAY, Administratrix of the Estate of Herman Wilson, Defendant-Appell... | HALL | WILKINS | KISER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 262 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,509,992 | Jess WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald O. GREGORY; Michael House, Defendants-Appellees | White v. Gregory | 1993-08-23 | No. 91-7641 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Jess WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald O. GREGORY; Michael House, Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "OPINION\nWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:\nJess White, a prisoner at Pruntytown Correctional Center, West Virginia, brought ... | WIDENER | MURNAGHAN | WILLIAMS | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 267 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,071 | Raymond Louis BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. BRUMLEY, et al., Defendants-Appellees | Bender v. Brumley | 1993-08-24 | No. 91-4884 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JERRE S. WILLIAMS, and JONES, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Raymond Louis BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. BRUMLEY, et al., Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "ON SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\nJERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:\nOn petition for rehearing f... | REYNALDO G. GARZA | JERRE S. WILLIAMS | JONES | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 271 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,141 | Mack Arthur KING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. S.W. PUCKETT, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, and Mike Moore, Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Respondents-Appellees | King v. Puckett | 1993-08-25 | No. 91-1940 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before JONES, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Mack Arthur KING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. S.W. PUCKETT, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, and Mike Moore, Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Respondents-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "WIENER, Circuit Judge.\nIn this p... | JONES | DUHÉ | WIENER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 280 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,172 | KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner-Appellee, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellant | Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner | 1993-08-25 | No. 91-4208 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before JOLLY, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner-Appellee, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "ORDER:\nOn January 17, 1992, we affirmed the tax court’s grant of summary judgment in f... | JOLLY | JONES | EMILIO M. GARZA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 287 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,247 | GULF STATES UTILITIES CO., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent | Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission | 1993-08-25 | No. 92-4599 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["GULF STATES UTILITIES CO., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent."], "opinions": [{"text": "BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:\nGulf States Utilities Company (GSU) challenges the Federal Energy Regulatory Commi... | REYNALDO G. GARZA | SMITH | BARKSDALE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 288 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,312 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anthony JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Johnson | 1993-08-26 | No. 92-8057 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHÉ, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anthony JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "WIENER, Circuit... | POLITZ | KING | GARWOOD | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 296 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,363 | Thomas Martin MALINA and Mrs. Thomas Martin Malina, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Judge Douglas GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant | Malina v. Gonzales | 1993-08-26 | No. 91-3757 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and RAINEY, District Judge:"], "parties": ["Thomas Martin MALINA and Mrs. Thomas Martin Malina, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Judge Douglas GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM:\nThe petition for rehearing is DENIED.\nIn their peti... | SMITH | EMILIO M. GARZA | RAINEY | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 304 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,430 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steve Wayne HOLLOWAY and Edwin L. Hines, Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Holloway | 1993-08-26 | No. 92-1652 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before JOHNSON, JOLLY, and JONES, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steve Wayne HOLLOWAY and Edwin L. Hines, Defendants-Appellants."], "opinions": [{"text": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\nSteve Wayne Holloway and Edwin L. Hines were convicted for committing ... | JOHNSON | JOLLY | JONES | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 307 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,493 | Juan Jaime MEDINA, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent | Medina v. Immigration & Naturalization Service | 1993-08-26 | No. 92-5305 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before KING, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Juan Jaime MEDINA, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent."], "opinions": [{"text": "BY THE COURT:\nIT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing filed on behalf of Respondent, the Immigration and Naturalization Serv... | KING | DAVIS | WIENER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 312 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,551 | Danny R. GRAVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Judge Jack HAMPTON, et al., Defendants-Appellees; Ronald Harlan EDMONDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael FITZPATRICK, Warden, FCI Big Spring, Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees; Chris LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Branch T. COE, M.D., Hale County Jail Physician, Defendant-Appe... | Graves v. Hampton | 1993-08-26 | Nos. 93-1292, 92-9114 and 93-1432 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Danny R. GRAVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Judge Jack HAMPTON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Ronald Harlan EDMONDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael FITZPATRICK, Warden, FCI Big Spring, Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Chris LO... | POLITZ | WIENER | DeMOSS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 315 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,637 | James C. THOMAS, Individually, and as Trustee of the SLT Trust # 1, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. N.A. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, Defendant-Appellee | Thomas v. N.A. Chase Manhattan Bank | 1993-08-27 | No. 92-2613 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["James C. THOMAS, Individually, and as Trustee of the SLT Trust # 1, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. N.A. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:\nIn issue is the summary judgmen... | POLITZ | REAVLEY | BARKSDALE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 320 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,671 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford SINCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Sinclair | 1993-08-27 | No. 92-1610 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE , District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford SINCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM:\nClifford Sinclair, a federal prisoner, has appealed from the district court’s denial o... | WIENER | EMILIO M. GARZA | LITTLE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 329 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,738 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Michael MASERATTI, Gabriel Ruiz, Miguel Rocha, Juan Manual Zamora, Johnny Davis, Jose Silva, David Pieratt, Bonifacio Filoteo, Deborah Ann Garza, Severo Garza, Jr., and Ramiro Gonzales Alvarado, Defendants-Appellants; UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, ... | United States v. Maseratti | 1993-08-27 | Nos. 90-2783, 91-2088 and 91-2332 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before REAVLEY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Michael MASERATTI, Gabriel Ruiz, Miguel Rocha, Juan Manual Zamora, Johnny Davis, Jose Silva, David Pieratt, Bonifacio Filoteo, Deborah Ann Garza, Severo Garza, Jr., and Ramiro Gonzal... | REAVLEY | DUHÉ | BARKSDALE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 330 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,795 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lynn Kirstin Waller ROGERS, a/k/a Lynn Waller Rogers, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Rogers | 1993-08-30 | No. 92-8478 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before KING and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lynn Kirstin Waller ROGERS, a/k/a Lynn Waller Rogers, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM:\nDefendant-appellant Lynn Kirstin Waller Rogers (Rogers) plead... | KING | JOLLY | PARKER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 341 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,898 | Clyde Ura CAIN, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, Defendant-Appellee | Cain v. Hearst Corp. | 1993-08-30 | No. 93-2459 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Clyde Ura CAIN, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM:\nCERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CI... | GARWOOD | SMITH | DeMOSS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 345 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,510,938 | Robert O. CUPIT and Donna Blair Cupit, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. McCLANAHAN CONTRACTORS, INC., formerly, AWI, Inc., Defendants, AWI Drilling and Workover, Inc., Defendant-Appellant | Cupit v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc. | 1993-09-10 | No. 92-3563 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before JOHNSON, JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Robert O. CUPIT and Donna Blair Cupit, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. McCLANAHAN CONTRACTORS, INC., formerly, AWI, Inc., Defendants, AWI Drilling and Workover, Inc., Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:\nMcC... | JOHNSON | JOLLY | JONES | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 346 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,004 | Laura Blueford SKIPPER, Individually and as Temporary Administratrix of the Estate of Royletta L. Blueford, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant | Skipper v. United States | 1993-09-10 | No. 92-8231 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before REAVLEY, KING, and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Laura Blueford SKIPPER, Individually and as Temporary Administratrix of the Estate of Royletta L. Blueford, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "KING, Circuit Judge:\nRoyl... | REAVLEY | KING | GARWOOD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 349 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,038 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marco Antonio BANDA, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Banda | 1993-09-10 | No. 92-7618 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before JOHNSON, JOLLY, and JONES, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marco Antonio BANDA, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:\nMarco Antonio Banda, an alien, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 497 bo... | JOHNSON | JOLLY | JONES | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 354 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,096 | Neva SPELLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee | Spellman v. Shalala | 1993-09-13 | No. 91-7390 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before GOLDBERG, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Neva SPELLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:\nNeva Spellman appeals the district court’s order... | GOLDBERG | SMITH | EMILIO M. GARZA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 357 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,166 | GULF CHEMICAL & METALLURGICAL CORPORATION and Cheminter Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. ASSOCIATED METALS & MINERALS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Associated Metals & Minerals Corporation, General Star Indemnity, Insurance Company of North America, a/k/a Cigna Property and Casualty Companies, ... | Gulf Chemical & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. | 1993-09-13 | No. 92-7499 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["GULF CHEMICAL & METALLURGICAL CORPORATION and Cheminter Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. ASSOCIATED METALS & MINERALS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Associated Metals & Minerals Corporation, General S... | POLITZ | REAVLEY | BARKSDALE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 365 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,232 | COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARKET PLANNERS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. and Jimmy Whited, Defendants-Appellants | Colonial Penn Insurance v. Market Planners Insurance Agency, Inc. | 1993-09-14 | No. 92-1890 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARKET PLANNERS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. and Jimmy Whited, Defendants-Appellants."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM:\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nIn 1985, the plaintiff, Col... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | DeMOSS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 374 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,290 | Audrey Eldon BAGLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Director of Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee | Bagley v. Collins | 1993-09-15 | No. 92-4236 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before GOLDBERG, HIGGINBOTHAM, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Audrey Eldon BAGLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Director of Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:\nAudre... | GOLDBERG | HIGGINBOTHAM | EMILIO M. GARZA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 378 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,349 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. CROUSORE, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Crousore | 1993-07-08 | Nos. 92-5449, 92-5450 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KEITH and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; and TAYLOR, District-Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. CROUSORE, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.\nIn this case we are' asked to review the sentence imposed by the district ... | KEITH | BATCHELDER | TAYLOR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 382 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,395 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason Brian VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Velez | 1993-07-23 | No. 92-3652 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: BOGGS and SILER, Circuit Judges; and JOINER, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason Brian VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "BOGGS, Circuit Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a guilty plea on charges of conspiracy to transport fa... | BOGGS | SILER | JOINER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 386 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,491 | Ann BRUNET and Denise Sachs, on behalf of themselves and the class they represent, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Guy E. Tucker; James T. Meyer; Stuart J. Tudor; and Joseph S. Hilleary, on behalf of themselves and the class they represent, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS; Ohio Columbus Civil Service Commi... | Brunet v. City of Columbus | 1993-07-28 | Nos. 92-3340, 92-3893 and 92-4102 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KENNEDY and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Ann BRUNET and Denise Sachs, on behalf of themselves and the class they represent, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Guy E. Tucker; James T. Meyer; Stuart J. Tudor; and Joseph S. Hilleary, on behalf of themselves and the ... | KENNEDY | MILBURN | WELLFORD | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 390 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,552 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie S. MILLS (92-5324) and Velinda S. Naftzger (92-5505), Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Mills | 1993-07-29 | Nos. 92-5324, 92-5505 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KENNEDY, NORRIS, and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie S. MILLS (92-5324) and Velinda S. Naftzger (92-5505), Defendants-Appellants."], "opinions": [{"text": "ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.\nDefendants, Ronnie Saunders Mills and Vel... | KENNEDY | NORRIS | SUHRHEINRICH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 414 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,628 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florencia Y. WALKER (92-3135) and Tanya M. Powell (92-3136), Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Walker | 1993-07-29 | Nos. 92-3135, 92-3136 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KEITH and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; and CHURCHILL, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florencia Y. WALKER (92-3135) and Tanya M. Powell (92-3136), Defendants-Appellants."], "opinions": [{"text": "CHURCHILL, Senior District Judge.\nOn December 5... | KEITH | BATCHELDER | CHURCHILL | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 423 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,662 | Everette CHANCELLOR, by his guardians Willie J. CHANCELLOR and Rosa V. Chancellor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, Dennis L. Dunlap; Sue Ann Jones, Third-Party Defendants | Chancellor ex rel. Chancellor v. United States | 1993-08-02 | No. 92-6567 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: GUY and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Everette CHANCELLOR, by his guardians Willie J. CHANCELLOR and Rosa V. Chancellor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, Dennis L. Dunlap; Sue Ann Jones, Third... | GUY | NELSON | WELLFORD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 438 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,700 | Joann AAMOT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert L. KASSEL, Defendant-Appellee | Aamot v. Kassel | 1993-08-06 | No. 91-6113 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: GUY and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; and MILES, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["Joann AAMOT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert L. KASSEL, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.\nI.\nDefendant Robert Kassel was ostensibly the legal counsel to a company ... | GUY | BATCHELDER | MILES | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 441 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,753 | Lawrence VAN METER; Catherine yan Meter, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant | Van Meter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. | 1993-08-09 | No. 92-2056 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: KEITH and JONES, Circuit Judges; and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Lawrence VAN METER; Catherine yan Meter, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.\nDefendant-Appellant State Farm ... | KEITH | JONES | PECK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 445 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,780 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard LOWENSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Lowenstein | 1993-08-20 | No. 92-2030 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before: MILBURN, RYAN, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard LOWENSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.\nDefendant, Leonard Lowenstein, appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following ... | MILBURN | RYAN | NORRIS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 452 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,826 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Janet K. HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Holland | 1993-04-29 | No. 92-2830 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RIPPLE, Circuit Judge (in chambers)."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Janet K. HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "This motion is before me on application of the appellant for recall of this court’s mandate and for stay of that mandate pending the ... | RIPPLE | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 454 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||
10,511,895 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony W. DAWSON, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Dawson | 1993-07-02 | No. 92-1934 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POSNER and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and CRABB, Chief District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony W. DAWSON, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.\nAnthony Dawson pleaded guilty to six counts of bank robbery in violation of 1... | POSNER | RIPPLE | CRABB | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 457 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,511,945 | John W. STRASBURG and Eldercare Asset Protection Plans, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, Gerald C. Sternberg, John A. Boltz, John E. Shannon, Edmund Manydeeds III, Jacqueline Bohman, Wilbur W. Warren III, Michael Wherry, Michael Fauerbach, Lisa Lotte Gameltoft, Patricia Grove, Robert J. Kay, Celi... | Strasburg v. State Bar | 1993-07-09 | No. 91-3860 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUDAHY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and MIHM, Chief District Judge."], "parties": ["John W. STRASBURG and Eldercare Asset Protection Plans, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, Gerald C. Sternberg, John A. Boltz, John E. Shannon, Edmund Manydeeds III, Jacqueline Bohman, Wilbur W. Wa... | CUDAHY | FLAUM | MIHM | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 468 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,018 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles EMENOGHA, Gibson Nwafor, and Vincent Nwafor, Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Emenogha | 1993-07-12 | Nos. 91-2577, 91-2832, 91-2833 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles EMENOGHA, Gibson Nwafor, and Vincent Nwafor, Defendants-Appellants."], "opinions": [{"text": "RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.\nOn March 26, 1991, the appellants were convicted of various drug o... | CUDAHY | RIPPLE | KANNE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 473 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,074 | UNION-TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, and San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local No. 95 of the Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, CLC, Intervening Respondent | Union-Tribune Publishing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board | 1993-07-20 | Nos. 92-1978, 92-2348 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUDAHY, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNION-TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, and San Diego Newspaper Guild, Local No. 95 of the Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, CLC, Intervening Respondent."], "opin... | CUDAHY | FLAUM | MANION | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 486 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,167 | Jack SCHMIDLING, Mike Regenfuss, Larry Clark, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation and Richard M. Daley, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees | Schmidling v. City of Chicago | 1993-07-22 | No. 92-1410 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and REYNOLDS, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["Jack SCHMIDLING, Mike Regenfuss, Larry Clark, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation and Richard M. Daley, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"tex... | MANION | ROVNER | REYNOLDS | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 494 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,208 | Lloyd E. WILLIAMS, Jr. and Mildred A. Williams, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee | Williams v. Commissioner | 1993-07-23 | No. 92-3691 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Lloyd E. WILLIAMS, Jr. and Mildred A. Williams, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "POSNER, Circuit Judge.\nSection 483 of the Internal Reven... | POSNER | COFFEY | ESCHBACH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 502 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,293 | Daniel L. KULAVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CHICAGO & ILLINOIS MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant | Kulavic v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co. | 1993-07-26 | Nos. 92-1707 & 92-1907 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["Daniel L. KULAVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CHICAGO & ILLINOIS MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.\nDaniel Kulavie was an em... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | KAUFMAN | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 507 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,367 | NORTHWEST TISSUE CENTER, Department of the Puget Sound Blood Center, a Washington Corporation, and Oregon Tissue Bank, a Department of the Em-manual Hospital and Health Center, a Legacy Health System Affiliate, an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of the United States Department ... | Northwest Tissue Center v. Shalala | 1993-07-27 | No. 93-1078 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BAUER, Chief Judge, MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["NORTHWEST TISSUE CENTER, Department of the Puget Sound Blood Center, a Washington Corporation, and Oregon Tissue Bank, a Department of the Em-manual Hospital and Health Center, a Legacy Health System Affiliate, an Oregon Corporat... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 522 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,414 | Todd KRUEGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ALGOMA, WISCONSIN, Police Department, City of Algoma, Marvin DeQuaine, individually and as the Chief of Police of the City of Algoma Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees | Krueger v. City of Algoma | 1993-07-28 | No. 92-2742 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Todd KRUEGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ALGOMA, WISCONSIN, Police Department, City of Algoma, Marvin DeQuaine, individually and as the Chief of Police of the City of Algoma Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees... | BAUER | FLAUM | MANION | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 537 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,446 | EVANSTON HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert V. HAUCK, Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Phillip Bradley, Director of Illinois Department of Public Aid, et al., Defendants-Appellees | Evanston Hospital v. Hauck | 1993-07-30 | No. 92-3551 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["EVANSTON HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert V. HAUCK, Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Phillip Bradley, Director of Illinois Department of Public Aid, et ... | BAUER | CUMMINGS | EASTERBROOK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 540 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,486 | John GOULD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTISOFT, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee | Gould v. Artisoft, Inc. | 1993-07-30 | No. 92-2419 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["John GOULD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTISOFT, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.\nIn this diversity action, John Gould alleges that Artisoft, Incorpora... | POSNER | ROVNER | ESCHBACH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 544 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,559 | NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SHELBY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, d.b.a. Shelby Memorial Home, Respondent | National Labor Relations Board v. Shelby Memorial Hospital Ass'n | 1993-08-02 | Nos. 92-1285, 92-2368 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and WILL, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SHELBY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, d.b.a. Shelby Memorial Home, Respondent."], "opinions": [{"text": "KANNE, Circuit Judge.\nThe National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or... | MANION | KANNE | WILL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 550 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,619 | Harold W. DOTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee | Dotson v. Shalala | 1993-08-02 | No. 92-3148 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Harold W. DOTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "ENGEL, Senior Circui... | RIPPLE | MANION | ENGEL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 571 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,660 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark A. CHEVALIER, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Chevalier | 1993-08-03 | No. 92-1598 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark A. CHEVALIER, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "MANION, Circuit Judge.\nOn June 11, 1991, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment ... | POSNER | MANION | WOOD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 581 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,704 | INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 103, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BABCOCK & WILCOX, Defendant-Appellee | International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 103 v. Babcock & Wilcox | 1993-08-04 | No. 91-3406 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 103, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BABCOCK & WILCOX, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Jud... | FLAUM | KANNE | FAIRCHILD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 589 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,741 | Roberta WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees | White v. General Motors Corp. | 1993-08-04 | No. 92-2505 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["Roberta WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "FLAUM, Circuit Judge.\nSeventy-one employees of General Motors Corporation (GM) broug... | FLAUM | KANNE | ENGEL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 593 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,786 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Grazino BAKER, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Baker | 1993-08-04 | No. 92-3429 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUMMINGS, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Grazino BAKER, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "FLAUM, Circuit Judge.\nIn early September, 1990, Keith Davis and Benjamin “Buster” Awousa flew from New York to St. Louis t... | CUMMINGS | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 596 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,850 | Ralph CONDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SYSCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee | Condo v. Sysco Corp. | 1993-08-04 | No. 92-3684 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Ralph CONDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SYSCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "COFFEY, Circuit Judge.\nRalph Condo sued his employer, Sysco Corporation, claiming that Sysco’s practice of paying him a fixed salary... | COFFEY | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 599 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,899 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel M. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Davis | 1993-08-05 | Nos. 92-2822, 92-3153 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUDAHY and POSNER, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel M. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.\nA grand jury returned an indictment against Daniel Davis charging him with o... | CUDAHY | POSNER | ESCHBACH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 606 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,512,961 | AHP SUBSIDIARY HOLDING COMPANY, Successor in Interest to Boyle-Midway Household Products, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. STUART HALE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant | AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co. | 1993-08-06 | Nos. 92-1437, 92-1472 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["AHP SUBSIDIARY HOLDING COMPANY, Successor in Interest to Boyle-Midway Household Products, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. STUART HALE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, De... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | ENGEL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 611 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,032 | BADGER PHARMACAL, INC., d/b/a Wisconsin Pharmacal Company, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY and SoftSoap Enterprises, Inc., Defendants-Appellees | Badger Pharmacal, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. | 1993-08-06 | No. 92-2810 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["BADGER PHARMACAL, INC., d/b/a Wisconsin Pharmacal Company, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY and SoftSoap Enterprises, Inc., Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "KANNE, Circuit Judg... | COFFEY | KANNE | ESCHBACH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 621 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,092 | Earl Dean BOND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee | Bond v. United States | 1993-08-06 | No. 92-3289 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Earl Dean BOND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.\nEarl Dean Bond appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, correct,... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 631 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,127 | SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and Joseph Vicens, Defendants-Appellants | Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd. | 1993-08-06 | No. 92-3506 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["SWEET DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIAL-A-MATTRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a Delaware Corporation, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corporation, a New York Corporation, Napoleon Barragan, Luis Barragan and ... | CUMMINGS | CUDAHY | ROVNER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 639 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,177 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Duarte | 1993-08-09 | No. 92-3417 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bienvenido DUARTE, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "COFFEY, Circuit Judge.\nBienvenido Duarte was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 1 kilog... | COFFEY | RIPPLE | RONEY | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 644 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,220 | Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon "Air", an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees | Koppie v. United States | 1993-08-11 | No. 92-3125 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["Chad M. KOPPIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Ligon “Air”, an Indiana partnership, Defendants-Appellees."], "opinions": [{"text": "CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.\nPlaintiff Chad M. Koppie sued Ligón “A... | BAUER | CUMMINGS | EASTERBROOK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 651 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,251 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Evans | 1993-08-11 | No. 92-3147 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky EVANS, Defendant-Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "PER CURIAM.\nIn a state prosecution Ricky Evans was found guilty of participating in a criminal drug conspiracy, a Class X felony ... | CUMMINGS | COFFEY | RIPPLE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 654 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,299 | Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee | Schamel v. Textron-Lycoming | 1993-08-12 | No. 92-2336 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and HOLDERMAN, District Judge."], "parties": ["Brenda K. SCHAMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry Brent Schamel, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON-LYCOMING, A DIVISION OF AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "CUDAHY, Circuit ... | CUDAHY | MANION | HOLDERMAN | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 655 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,346 | Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee | Monaco v. Fuddruckers, Inc. | 1993-08-13 | No. 92-2165 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": ["Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["Ralph MONACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FUDDRUCKERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "GRANT, Senior District Judge.\nI. BACKGROUND\nRalph Monaco was 38 years old in June 1985 when he began... | BAUER | CUMMINGS | GRANT | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 658 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,403 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known as Carlos Fuentes, also known as Pupo, also known as Pupoo, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appe... | United States v. Ortiz-Martinez | 1993-07-23 | Nos. 91-3856, 91-3858, 91-3866, 91-3872, 91-3873, 91-3875 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Candido ORTIZ-MARTINEZ, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gabriel Jaime RAMIREZ-NAZAR, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos FUENTEZ, also known... | WOLLMAN | BRIGHT | HENLEY | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 F.3d 662 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,440 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant | United States v. Suppenbach | 1993-07-26 | No. 92-3698 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and STOHR, District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert E. SUPPENBACH, also known as Decoder Bob, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nRobert E. Suppenbach appeals from his conviction for co... | WOLLMAN | MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD | STOHR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 679 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,472 | Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee | Garland v. Peebles | 1993-07-29 | No. 92-3899 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["Michal K. GARLAND, Appellant, v. Samuel W. PEEBLES, M.D., Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nMichal Kay Garland appeals from the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Proc... | WOLLMAN | LOKEN | HUNTER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 683 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,515 | The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee | Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Newman | 1993-08-02 | No. 92-3443 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and SACHS, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["The SECURITY BANK OF MARSHALLTOWN, IOWA, a Creditor of Robert V. Brown and Sue A. Brown, Debtors, Appellant, v. Donald F. NEIMAN, Appellee."], "opinions": [{"text": "McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.\nThis is an appeal fro... | McMILLIAN | BEAM | SACHS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 687 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
10,513,602 | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant | United States v. Hale | 1993-08-03 | Nos. 93-1008, 93-1230 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": ["Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, Senior District Judge."], "parties": ["UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse L. HALE, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Adrian Cedrick WALLER, Appellant."], "opinions": [{"text": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\nJesse L. Hale appeals fro... | WOLLMAN | LOKEN | HUNTER | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 F.3d 691 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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