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+  {
+    "page_title": "Hermann_Göring",
+    "name": "Hermann Göring",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Hermann Wilhelm Göring was a German Nazi politician, aviator, military leader, and convicted war criminal. He was one of the most powerful figures in the Nazi Party, which controlled Germany from 1933 to 1945. He also served as Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, a position he held until the final days of the regime.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician and military leader (1893–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Hermann Göring\nGerman Nazi politician and military leader (1893–1946)\n\"Göring\" and \"Goering\" redirect here. For other uses, see\nGöring (disambiguation)\n.\nHermann Wilhelm Göring\n(or\nGoering\n;\nGerman:\n[\nˈhɛʁman\nˈvɪlhɛlm\nˈɡøːʁɪŋ\n]\n; 12 January 1893\n– 15 October 1946) was a German\nNazi\npolitician, aviator, military leader, and convicted war criminal. He was one of the most powerful figures in the\nNazi Party\n, which controlled Germany from 1933 to 1945. He also served as\nOberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe\n(Supreme Commander of the Air Force), a position he held until the final days of the regime.\nHe was born in\nRosenheim\n,\nBavaria\n. A veteran\nWorld War I\nfighter pilot\nace\n, Göring was a recipient of the\nPour le Mérite\n. He served as the last commander of\nJagdgeschwader\n1\n(JG I), the fighter wing once led by\nManfred von Richthofen\n. An early member of the Nazi Party, Göring was among those wounded in\nAdolf Hitler\n's failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin 1923. While receiving treatment for his injuries, he developed an addiction to\nmorphine\nthat persisted until the last year of his life. After Hitler became\nChancellor of Germany\nin 1933, Göring was named as\nminister without portfolio\nin the new government. One of his first acts as a cabinet minister was to oversee the creation of the\nGestapo\n, which he ceded to\nHeinrich Himmler\nin 1934.\nFollowing the establishment of the Nazi state, Göring amassed power and political capital to become the second most powerful man in Germany. Upon being named\nPlenipotentiary\nof the\nFour Year Plan\nin 1936, Göring was entrusted with the task of mobilising all sectors of the economy for war, an assignment which brought numerous government agencies under his control. In September 1939, Hitler gave a speech to the\nReichstag\ndesignating him as his successor. After the\nFall of France\nin 1940, he was bestowed the specially created rank of\nReichsmarschall\n, which gave him seniority over all officers in\nGermany's armed forces\n.\nBy 1941, Göring was at the peak of his power and influence. As the\nSecond World War\nprogressed, Göring's standing with Hitler and the German public declined after the Luftwaffe proved incapable of\npreventing the Allied bombing of Germany's cities\nand\nresupplying surrounded Axis forces in Stalingrad\n. Around that time, Göring increasingly withdrew from military and political affairs to devote his attention to collecting property and artwork, much of which was stolen from Jewish victims of\nthe Holocaust\n. Informed on 22 April 1945 that Hitler intended to commit suicide, Göring sent\na telegram to Hitler\nrequesting his permission to assume leadership of the Reich. Considering his request an act of treason, Hitler removed Göring from all his positions, expelled him from the party and ordered his arrest.\nAfter the war, Göring was convicted of\nconspiracy\n,\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nin 1946. He requested at trial an execution by firing squad, but was denied; instead he was sentenced to death by hanging. He committed suicide by\ningesting cyanide\nthe night before his scheduled execution.\nEarly life\nGöring in 1907, at age 14\nHermann Wilhelm Göring was born on 12 January 1893\nat the Marienbad Sanatorium in\nRosenheim\n,\nBavaria\n. His father,\nHeinrich Ernst Göring\n(31 October 1839\n– 7 December 1913), a former cavalry officer, had been the first\ngovernor-general of German South West Africa\n(modern-day\nNamibia\n).\nHeinrich had three children from a previous marriage. Göring was the fourth of five children by Heinrich's second wife, Franziska Tiefenbrunn (1859–15 July 1943), a Bavarian peasant. Göring's elder siblings were Karl, Olga, and Paula; his younger brother was\nAlbert\n. At the time that Göring was born, his father was serving as consul general in\nHaiti\n,\nand his mother had returned home briefly to give birth. She left the six-week-old baby with a friend in Bavaria and did not see the child again for three years, when she and Heinrich returned to Germany.\nGöring's godfather was\nHermann Epenstein\n, a wealthy Jewish physician and businessman his father had met in Africa. Epenstein provided the Göring family, who were surviving on Heinrich's pension, first with a family home in Berlin-Friedenau,\nand then a small castle called\nBurg Veldenstein\n(\nde\n)\n, near\nNuremberg\n. Göring's mother became Epenstein's mistress around this time and remained so for some fifteen years. Epenstein acquired the minor title of\nRitter\n(knight) von Epenstein through service and donations to the Crown.\nInterested in a career as a soldier from a very early age, Göring enjoyed playing with toy soldiers and dressing up in a\nBoer\nuniform his father had given him. He was sent to boarding school at age eleven, where the food was poor and discipline harsh. He sold a violin to pay for his train ticket home and then took to his bed, feigning illness, until he was told he would not have to return.\nHe continued to enjoy war games, pretending to lay siege to the castle Veldenstein and studying Teutonic legends and sagas. He became a mountain climber, scaling peaks in Germany, at the\nMont Blanc massif\nand in the\nAustrian Alps\n. At age 16, he was sent to a military academy in\nBerlin-Lichterfelde\n, from which he graduated with distinction.\nGöring joined the Prince Wilhelm Regiment (112th Infantry, Garrison:\nMülhausen\n) of the\nPrussian Army\nin 1912. The next year his mother had a falling-out with Epenstein. The family was forced to leave Veldenstein and moved to\nMunich\n; Göring's father died shortly afterwards. It was in Bavaria where Göring developed his \"romantic sense of Germanness\" that further evolved under Nazism.\nWhen World War I began in August 1914, Göring was stationed at\nMülhausen\nwith his regiment.\nWorld War I\nFilm clip of Göring in a\nFokker D.VII\nduring World War I (1918)\nDuring the first year of World War I, Göring served with his infantry regiment in the area of\nMülhausen\n, a garrison town less than 2\nkm from the French frontier. He was hospitalised with\nrheumatism\n, a result of the damp of\ntrench warfare\n. While he was recovering, his friend\nBruno Loerzer\nconvinced him to transfer to what would become, by October 1916, the\nLuftstreitkräfte\n(\ntransl.\nair combat forces\n) of the German army, but his request was turned down. Later that year, Göring flew as Loerzer's observer in\nFeldflieger Abteilung\n25 (FFA 25); Göring had informally transferred himself. He was discovered and sentenced to three weeks' confinement to barracks, but the sentence was never carried out. By the time it was supposed to be imposed, Göring's association with Loerzer had been made official. They were assigned as a team to FFA 25 in the\nCrown Prince\n's Fifth Army. They flew reconnaissance and bombing missions, for which the crown prince invested both Göring and Loerzer with the\nIron Cross\n, first class.\nGöring with the\nPour le Mérite\nand several awards\nAfter completing the pilot's training course, Göring was assigned to\nJagdstaffel\n5\n. Seriously wounded in the hip in aerial combat, he took nearly a year to recover. He then was transferred to\nJagdstaffel\n26\n, commanded by Loerzer, in February 1917. He steadily scored\nair victories\nuntil May, when he was assigned to command\nJagdstaffel\n27\n. Serving with\nJastas\n5, 26 and 27, he continued to win victories. In addition to his Iron Crosses (1st and 2nd Class), he received the\nZähringer Lion\nwith swords, the\nFriedrich Order\n, the\nHouse Order of Hohenzollern\nwith swords third class and, finally, in May 1918, the coveted\nPour le Mérite\n.\nAccording to\nHermann Dahlmann\n, who knew both men, Göring had Loerzer lobby for the award.\nHe finished the war with\n22 victories\n.\nA thorough post-war examination of\nAllied\nloss records showed that only two of his awarded victories were doubtful. Three were possible and 17 were certain, or highly likely.\nGöring in 1918 as commander of\nJagdgeschwader\n1\nbeside his\nFokker D VII\n(F) 5125/18. He holds a walking stick\nGeschwader Stock\nthat had been owned by\nManfred von Richthofen\n.\nOn 7 July 1918, following the death of\nWilhelm Reinhard\n, successor to\nManfred von Richthofen\n, Göring was made commander of the \"Flying Circus\",\nJagdgeschwader\n1\n.\nHis arrogance made him unpopular with the men of his squadron.\nIn the last days of the war, Göring was repeatedly ordered to withdraw his squadron, first to\nTellancourt\nairdrome, then to\nDarmstadt\n. At one point, he was ordered to surrender the aircraft to the Allies; he refused. Many of his pilots intentionally crash-landed their planes to keep them from falling into enemy hands.\nLike many other German veterans, Göring was a proponent of the\nstab-in-the-back myth\n, the belief which held that the German Army had not really lost the war, but instead was betrayed by the civilian leadership: Marxists, Jews and especially the\nrepublicans\n, who had overthrown the German monarchy.\nAtop the frustration of military defeat, Göring also experienced the personal disappointment of being snubbed by his fiancée's upper-class family, who broke off the engagement when he returned penniless from the front.\nAfter World War I\nGöring remained in aviation after the war. He tried\nbarnstorming\nand briefly worked at\nFokker\n. After spending most of 1919 living in\nDenmark\n, he moved to Sweden and joined\nSvensk Lufttrafik\n, a Swedish airline. Göring was often hired for private flights. During the winter of 1920–1921, he was hired by\nCount Eric von Rosen\nto fly him to his castle from Stockholm. Invited to spend the night, Göring may at this time have first seen the\nswastika\nemblem, which Rosen had set in the chimney piece as a family badge.\nThis was also the first time that Göring saw his future wife; the count introduced his sister-in-law, Baroness\nCarin von Kantzow\n(\nnée\nFreiin von Fock). Estranged from her husband of 10 years, she had an eight-year-old son. Göring was immediately infatuated and asked her to meet him in Stockholm. They arranged a visit at the home of her parents and spent much time together through 1921, when Göring left to study political science at the\nUniversity of Munich\n. Carin obtained a divorce, followed Göring to Munich and married him on 3 February 1922.\nTheir first home together was a hunting lodge at Hochkreuth in the\nBavarian Alps\n, near\nBayrischzell\n, some\n80 kilometres (50\nmi)\nfrom Munich.\nLater in 1922, they moved to\nObermenzing\n(\nde\n)\n, a suburb of Munich.\nEarly Nazi career\nGöring (left) stands in front of\nHitler\nat a\nNazi Party rally\nin\nNuremberg\n(1929).\nGöring joined the\nNazi Party\nin 1922 after hearing a speech by\nAdolf Hitler\n.\nHe was given command of the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) as the\nOberster SA-Führer\non 1 March 1923,\nsucceeding\nHans Ulrich Klintzsch\n, and headed the organisation until it was banned in November 1923.\nThrough the early years, Carin—who liked Hitler—often played hostess to meetings of leading Nazis, including her husband as well as Hitler,\nRudolf Hess\n,\nAlfred Rosenberg\nand\nErnst Röhm\n.\nHitler later recalled his early association with Göring:\nI liked him. I made him the head of my SA. He is the only one of its heads that ran the SA properly. I gave him a dishevelled rabble. In a very short time he had organised a division of 11,000 men.\nHitler and the Nazi Party held mass meetings and rallies in Munich and elsewhere during the early 1920s, attempting to gain supporters in a bid for political power.\nInspired by\nBenito Mussolini\n's\nMarch on Rome\n, the Nazis attempted to seize power on 8–9 November 1923 in a failed coup known as the\nBeer Hall Putsch\n. Göring, who was with Hitler leading the march to the War Ministry, was shot in the groin.\nFourteen Nazis and four policemen were killed; many top Nazis, including Hitler, were arrested.\nWith Carin's help, Göring was smuggled to\nInnsbruck\n, where he received surgery and was given morphine for the pain. He remained in hospital until 24 December.\nThis was the beginning of his morphine addiction, which lasted until his imprisonment at Nuremberg.\nMeanwhile, the authorities in Munich declared Göring a wanted man. The Görings—acutely short of funds and reliant on the good will of Nazi sympathisers abroad—moved from Austria to\nVenice\n. In May 1924 they visited Rome, via\nFlorence\nand\nSiena\n. Sometime in 1924, Göring met Mussolini through his contacts with members of Italy's Fascist Party;\nMussolini had also expressed an interest in meeting Hitler, who was by then in prison.\nHitler penned\nMein Kampf\nwhile incarcerated, before being released in December 1924.\nMeanwhile, personal problems continued to multiply for Göring. By 1925, Carin's mother was ill. The Görings—with difficulty—raised the money in the spring of 1925 for a journey to Sweden via Austria,\nCzechoslovakia\n, Poland and\nDanzig\n(now Gdańsk). Göring had become a violent morphine addict; Carin's family were shocked by his deterioration. Carin, who was ill with\nepilepsy\nand a weak heart, had to allow the doctors to take charge of Göring; her son was taken by his father. Göring was certified a dangerous drug addict and was placed in\nLångbro Asylum\non 1 September 1925 after he had violently attacked a nurse who had refused his request for morphine.\nHe was violent to the point where he had to be confined in a\nstraitjacket\n, but his psychiatrist felt he was sane; the condition was caused solely by the morphine.\nWeaned off the drug, he left the facility briefly, but had to return for further treatment. He returned to Germany when an amnesty was declared in 1927 and resumed working in the aircraft industry.\nCarin Göring, ill with epilepsy and\ntuberculosis\n,\ndied of heart failure on 17 October 1931.\nCamp service of the\nNSDAP\ndelegation; in the first row SS Chief\nHeinrich Himmler\n, SA Chief\nErnst Röhm\nand Göring, 1931\nMeanwhile, the Nazi Party was in a period of rebuilding and waiting. The economy had recovered, which meant fewer opportunities for the Nazis to agitate. The SA was reorganised, but with\nFranz Pfeffer von Salomon\nas its head rather than Göring, and the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) was founded in 1925, initially as a bodyguard for Hitler. Membership in the party increased from 27,000 in 1925 to 108,000 in 1928 and 178,000 in 1929. In\nthe May 1928 elections\nthe Nazi Party only obtained 12 seats out of an available 491 in the\nReichstag\n.\nGöring was elected as a representative from Bavaria.\nHaving secured a seat in the\nReichstag\n, Göring gained a more prominent place in the Nazi movement, since Hitler saw him as a public relations officer for Nazism in this capacity.\nGöring continued to be elected to the Reichstag in all subsequent elections during the Weimar and Nazi regimes.\nElectoral success also afforded Göring with access to powerful sympathisers to the Nazi cause, such as\nPrince August Wilhelm of Prussia\nand the conservative-minded businessmen,\nFritz Thyssen\nand\nHjalmar Schacht\n.\nThe\nGreat Depression\nled to a disastrous downturn in the German economy, and\nin the 1930 election\n, the Nazi Party won 6,409,600 votes and 107 seats.\nIn May 1931, Hitler sent Göring on a mission to the\nVatican\n, where he met the future\nPope Pius XII\n.\nHe was appointed an\nSA-\nGruppenführer\non 18 December 1931. On 1 January 1933, he was among the first to be promoted to the recently created rank of\nSA-\nObergruppenführer\nand he held this rank on the SA rolls until 1945.\nIn the\nJuly 1932 election\n, the Nazis won 230 seats to become far and away the largest party in the\nReichstag\n. By longstanding tradition, the Nazis were thus entitled to select the President of the\nReichstag\n, and elected Göring to the post.\nHe would retain this position until 23 April 1945.\nReichstag fire\nThe\nReichstag fire\noccurred on the night of 27 February 1933. Göring was one of the first to arrive on the scene.\nMarinus van der Lubbe\n, a\nCommunist\nradical, was arrested and claimed sole responsibility for the fire. Göring immediately called for a crackdown on Communists.\nThe Nazis took advantage of the fire to advance their own political aims. The\nReichstag Fire Decree\n, passed the next day on Hitler's urging, suspended basic rights and allowed detention without trial. Activities of the\nGerman Communist Party\nwere suppressed and some 4,000 Party members arrested.\nGöring demanded that the prisoners should be shot, but\nRudolf Diels\n, head of the Prussian political police, ignored the order.\nAlthough the consensus amongst historians is that van der Lubbe set the fire,\na few accuse the Nazis of staging a\nfalse flag attack\n.\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\n, General\nFranz Halder\ntestified that Göring admitted responsibility for starting the fire at a luncheon held on Hitler's birthday in 1942.\nIn his own Nuremberg testimony, Göring denied this story.\nSecond marriage\nDuring the early 1930s, Göring was often in the company of\nEmmy Sonnemann\n, an actress from\nHamburg\n.\nThey were married on 10 April 1935, in Berlin. The wedding was celebrated on a huge scale. A large reception was held the night before at the\nBerlin Opera House\n. Fighter aircraft flew overhead on the night of the reception and the day of the ceremony,\nat which Hitler was best man.\nGöring's daughter,\nEdda\n, was born on 2 June 1938.\nNazi potentate\nWhen Hitler was named\nchancellor of Germany\non 30 January 1933, Göring was appointed as\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio\nand\nReichskommissar\nof Aviation.\nThis was followed on 11 April 1933 by his appointment as\nMinister-President\nof Prussia, Prussian\ninterior minister\nand chief of the Prussian police.\nOn 25 April 1933, Hitler also delegated his powers as\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich Governor) of Prussia to Göring.\nOn 18 May 1933, Göring secured passage of an\nenabling act\nthrough the\nLandtag of Prussia\nthat conferred all legislative powers on the cabinet.\nHitler,\nMartin Bormann\n, Göring and\nBaldur von Schirach\nin\nObersalzberg\nin\nBavaria\n, in 1936\nUsing this authority, on 8 July 1933 Göring enacted a law abolishing the\nPrussian State Council\n, the second chamber of the Prussian legislature that represented the interests of the Prussian provinces. In its place, he created a revised non-legislative\nPrussian State Council\nto serve merely as a body of advisors to him. Göring would serve as President of the council. It would consist,\nex officio\n, of the Prussian cabinet ministers and state secretaries, as well as hand-picked Nazi Party officials and other industry and society leaders selected solely by Göring.\nIn October 1933, Göring was made a member of\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\nat its inaugural meeting.\nIn July 1934, he was appointed\nReichforstmeister\n, with the rank of a\nReichsminister\n, as the head of the newly created\nReich Forestry Office\n.\nWilhelm Frick\n, the Reich interior minister, and the head of the SS,\nHeinrich Himmler\n, hoped to create a unified police force for all of Germany, but Göring on 26 April 1933 established a special Prussian police force, with\nRudolf Diels\nat its head. The force was called the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n(\ntransl.\nSecret State Police\n), or\nGestapo\n. Göring, thinking that Diels was not ruthless enough to use the Gestapo effectively to counteract the power of the SA, handed over control of the Gestapo to Himmler on 20 April 1934.\nBy this time, the SA numbered over two million men.\nHitler was deeply concerned that\nErnst Röhm\n, the chief of the SA, was planning a coup. Himmler and\nReinhard Heydrich\nplotted with Göring to use the Gestapo and SS to crush the SA.\nMembers of the SA got wind of the proposed action and thousands of them took to the streets in violent demonstrations on the night of 29 June 1934. Enraged, Hitler ordered the arrest of the SA leadership. Röhm was shot dead in his cell when he refused to commit suicide; Göring personally went over the lists of prisoners—numbering in the thousands—and determined who else should be shot. At least 85 people were killed in the period of 30 June to 2 July, which is now known as the\nNight of the Long Knives\n.\nHitler admitted in the Reichstag on 13 July that the killings had been entirely illegal but claimed a plot had been under way to overthrow the Reich. A retroactive law was passed making the action legal. Any criticism was met with arrests.\nGöring attending the\nGreen Week\nin Berlin, 1937\nOne of the terms of the\nTreaty of Versailles\n, which had been in place since the end of World War I, stated that Germany was not allowed to maintain an air force. After the 1928 signing of the\nKellogg–Briand Pact\n, police aircraft were permitted. Göring was appointed Air Traffic Minister in May 1933. Germany began to accumulate aircraft in violation of the Treaty, and in 1935 the existence of the\nLuftwaffe\nwas formally acknowledged,\nwith Göring as Reich Aviation Minister.\nDuring a cabinet meeting in September 1936, Göring and Hitler announced that the\nGerman rearmament\nprogramme must be sped up. On 18 October, Hitler named Göring as\nPlenipotentiary\nof the Four Year Plan to undertake this task. Göring created a new organisation to administer the Plan and drew the ministries of labour and agriculture under its umbrella. He bypassed the Economics Ministry in his policy-making decisions, to the chagrin of\nHjalmar Schacht\n, the minister in charge. Huge expenditures were made on rearmament, in spite of growing deficits.\nSchacht resigned on 26 November 1937, and Göring took over the Economics Ministry on an interim basis until January 1938.\nHe then managed to install\nWalther Funk\nin the position, who also took control of the\nReichsbank\nwhen Schacht was forced out of that post as well in January 1939. In this way, both of these institutions effectively were brought under Göring's control under the auspices of the Four Year Plan.\nIn July 1937, the\nReichswerke Hermann Göring\nwas established under state ownership – though led by Göring – with the aim of boosting steel production beyond the level which private enterprise could economically provide.\nGöring with British War Secretary\nLord Halifax\nat Schorfheide, 20 November 1937\nHitler with Göring on balcony of the Chancellery, Berlin, 16 March 1938\nIn 1938, Göring was involved in the\nBlomberg–Fritsch Affair\n, which led to the resignations of the War Minister,\nGeneralfeldmarschall\nWerner von Blomberg\n, and the army commander, General\nWerner von Fritsch\n. Göring had acted as witness at Blomberg's wedding to Margarethe Gruhn, a 26-year-old typist, on 12 January 1938. Information received from the police showed that the young bride was a prostitute.\nGöring felt obligated to tell Hitler, but also saw this event as an opportunity to dispose of Blomberg. Blomberg was forced to resign. Göring did not want Fritsch to be appointed to that position and thus be his superior. Several days later, Heydrich revealed a file on Fritsch that contained allegations of homosexual activity and blackmail. The charges were later proven to be false, but Fritsch had lost Hitler's trust and was forced to resign.\nHitler used the dismissals as an opportunity to reshuffle the leadership of the military. Göring asked for the post of War Minister but was turned down; he was appointed to the rank of\nGeneralfeldmarschall\n. Hitler took over as\nsupreme commander of the armed forces\nand created subordinate posts to head the three main branches of service.\nMain article:\nAnschluss\nAs minister in charge of the Four-Year Plan, Göring became concerned with the lack of natural resources in Germany and began pushing for Austria to be incorporated into the Reich. The province of\nStyria\nhad rich iron ore deposits, and the country as a whole was home to many skilled labourers who would also be useful. Hitler had always been in favour of a takeover of Austria, his native country. He met the Austrian Chancellor\nKurt Schuschnigg\non 12 February 1938, threatening invasion if peaceful unification was not forthcoming. The Nazi Party was made legal in Austria to gain a power base, and a referendum on reunification was scheduled for March. When Hitler did not approve of the wording of the plebiscite, Göring telephoned Schuschnigg and Austrian head of state\nWilhelm Miklas\nto demand Schuschnigg's resignation, threatening invasion by German troops and civil unrest by the Austrian Nazi Party members. Schuschnigg resigned on 11 March and the plebiscite was cancelled. By 5:30 the next morning, German troops that had been massing on the border marched into Austria, meeting no resistance.\nMain article:\nGerman occupation of Czechoslovakia\nAlthough\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nhad been named Foreign Minister in February 1938, Göring continued to involve himself in foreign affairs.\nThat July, he contacted the British government with the idea that he should make an official visit to discuss Germany's intentions for Czechoslovakia.\nNeville Chamberlain\nwas in favour of a meeting and there was talk of a pact being signed between Britain and Germany. In February 1938, Göring visited Warsaw to quell rumours about the upcoming\ninvasion of Poland\n. He had conversations with the Hungarian government that summer as well, discussing their potential role in an invasion of Czechoslovakia. At the\nNuremberg Rally\nthat September, Göring and other speakers denounced the Czechs as an inferior race that must be conquered.\nChamberlain and Hitler had a series of meetings that led to the signing of the\nMunich Agreement\n(29 September 1938), which turned over control of the\nSudetenland\nto Germany.\nIn March 1939, Göring threatened Czechoslovak president\nEmil Hácha\nwith the bombing of\nPrague\n. Hácha then agreed to sign a communique accepting\nthe German occupation\nof the remainder of\nBohemia\nand\nMoravia\n.\nAlthough many in the party disliked him,\nbefore the war Göring enjoyed widespread personal popularity among the German public because of his perceived sociability, colour and humour.\nAs the Nazi leader most responsible for economic matters, he presented himself as a champion of national interests over allegedly corrupt big business and the old German elite. The Nazi press was on Göring's side. Other leaders, such as Hess and Ribbentrop, were envious of his popularity.\nIn Britain and the United States, some viewed Göring as more acceptable than the other Nazis and as a possible mediator between the western democracies and Hitler.\nWorld War II\nGöring as\nReichsmarschall\nSuccess on all fronts\nGöring and other senior officers were concerned that Germany was not yet ready for war, but Hitler insisted on pushing ahead as soon as possible.\nOn 30 August 1939, immediately prior to the outbreak of the\nSecond World War\n, Hitler appointed Göring as the chairman of a new six-person\nCouncil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich\nwhich was set up to operate as a war cabinet.\nThe invasion of Poland, the opening action of World War II, began at dawn on 1 September 1939.\nLater in the day, speaking to the\nReichstag\n, Hitler designated Göring as his successor as Führer of all Germany, \"If anything should befall me\",\nwith Hess as the second alternate.\nMajor German victories followed one after the other in quick succession. With the help of the Luftwaffe, the\nPolish Air Force\nwas defeated within a week.\nThe\nFallschirmjäger\nseized vital airfields in\nNorway\n(\nOperation Weserübung\n) and captured\nFort Eben-Emael\nin Belgium on 10 May 1940, the first day of the\nBattle of France\n. Göring's Luftwaffe played critical roles in the\nBattles of the Netherlands\n,\nof Belgium\nand of France in May 1940.\nAfter the\nFall of France\n, Hitler awarded Göring the\nGrand Cross of the Iron Cross\nfor his successful leadership.\nDuring the\n1940 Field Marshal Ceremony\n, Hitler promoted Göring to the rank of\nReichsmarschall\ndes Grossdeutschen Reiches\n(\ntransl.\nReich Marshal of the Greater German Reich\n), a specially created rank which made him senior to all field marshals in the military. As a result of this promotion, he was the highest-ranking soldier in Germany until the end of the war. Göring had already received the\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross\non 30 September 1939 as Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.\nThe UK had declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the third day of the invasion of Poland.\nIn July 1940, Hitler began preparations for an invasion of Britain. As part of the plan, the\nRoyal Air Force\n(RAF) had to be neutralised. Bombing raids commenced on British air installations and on cities and centres of industry.\nGöring had by then already announced in a radio speech, \"If as much as a single enemy aircraft flies over German soil, my name is Meier!\",\nsomething that would return to haunt him, when the RAF began bombing German cities on 11 May 1940.\nThough he was confident the Luftwaffe could defeat the RAF within days, Göring, like Admiral\nErich Raeder\n,\ncommander-in-chief of the\nKriegsmarine\n(navy),\nwas pessimistic about the chance of success of the planned invasion (codenamed\nOperation Sea Lion\n).\nGöring hoped that a victory in the air would be enough to force peace without an invasion. The campaign failed and Sealion was postponed indefinitely on 17 September 1940.\nAfter their defeat in the\nBattle of Britain\n, the Luftwaffe attempted to defeat Britain via\nstrategic bombing\n. On 12 October 1940 Hitler cancelled Sea Lion due to the onset of winter.\nBy the end of the year, it was clear that British morale was not being shaken by\nthe Blitz\n, though the bombings continued through May 1941.\nDefeat on all fronts\nGöring with General der Flieger and Luftwaffe Chief of Staff\nHans Jeschonnek\n, General der Flieger\nOtto Hoffmann von Waldau\nand General der Flieger\nGustav Kastner-Kirdorf\nissuing an order for German troops on the\nEastern Front\n, 1941\nIn spite of the\nMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact\n, signed in 1939, Nazi Germany began\nOperation Barbarossa\n—the invasion of the Soviet Union—on 22 June 1941. Initially, the Luftwaffe was at an advantage, destroying thousands of Soviet aircraft in the first month of fighting.\nHitler and his top staff were sure that the campaign would be over by Christmas, and no provisions were made for reserves of men or equipment.\nBut, by July, the Germans had only 1,000 planes remaining in operation and their troop losses were over 213,000 men. The choice was made to concentrate the attack on only one part of the vast front; efforts would be directed at capturing Moscow.\nAfter the long, but successful,\nBattle of Smolensk\n, Hitler ordered\nArmy Group Centre\nto halt its advance to Moscow and temporarily diverted its Panzer groups north and south to aid in the encirclement of\nLeningrad\nand\nKiev\n.\nThe pause provided the\nRed Army\nwith an opportunity to mobilise fresh reserves; historian\nRussel Stolfi\nconsiders it to be one of the major factors that caused the failure of the Moscow offensive, which was resumed in October 1941 with the\nBattle of Moscow\n.\nPoor weather conditions, fuel shortages, a delay in building aircraft bases in Eastern Europe and overstretched supply lines were also factors. Hitler did not give permission for even a partial retreat until mid-January 1942; by this time the losses were comparable to those of the\nFrench invasion of Russia\nin 1812.\nHitler, Dr\nRobert Ley\n, automotive engineer\nFerdinand Porsche\nand Göring at the\nWolf's Lair\nin 1942\nIn late October or early November 1941, Hitler and Göring decided on the mass deportation of\nSoviet prisoners of war\n—and a larger number of Soviet civilians—to Germany for\nforced labor\n, but epidemics soon caused the halting of prisoner-of-war transports.\nThose who were deported to Germany faced conditions not necessarily any better than existed in the\noccupied Soviet Union\n.\nBy the end of the war, at least 1.3\nmillion Soviet prisoners of war had been deported to Germany or its annexed territories.\nOf these, 400,000 did not survive and most of these\ndeaths\noccurred in the winter of 1941/1942.\nAfter the\nattack on Pearl Harbor\n, Göring, along with Field Marshal\nWilhelm Keitel\nand Admiral\nErich Raeder\n, urged Hitler to immediately declare war on the United States.\nHitler decided that the summer 1942 campaign would be concentrated in the south; efforts would be made to capture the oilfields in the\nCaucasus\n.\nThe\nBattle of Stalingrad\n, a major turning point of the war,\nbegan on 23 August 1942 with a bombing campaign by the Luftwaffe.\nThe German\nSixth Army\nentered the city, but because of its location on the front line, it was still possible for the Soviets to encircle and trap it there without reinforcements or supplies. When the Sixth Army was surrounded by the end of November in\nOperation Uranus\n, Göring promised that the Luftwaffe would be able to deliver a minimum of 300 tons of supplies to the trapped men every day. On the basis of these assurances, Hitler demanded that there be no retreat; they were to fight to the last man. Though some airlifts were able to get through, supplies delivered never exceeded 120 tons per day.\nThe remnants of the Sixth Army—some 91,000 men out of an army of 285,000—surrendered in early February 1943; only 5,000 of these captives survived the\nSoviet prisoner of war camps\nto see Germany again.\nWar over Germany\nGöring with Hitler and\nAlbert Speer\n, 10 August 1943\nMeanwhile, the strength of the US and British bomber fleets had increased. Based in Britain, they began\noperations against German targets\n. The first thousand-bomber raid was staged\non Cologne\non 30 May 1942.\nAir raids continued on targets farther from England after auxiliary fuel tanks were installed on US\nfighter aircraft\n. Göring refused to believe reports that American fighters had been shot down as far east as\nAachen\nin winter 1942–1943. His reputation began to decline.\nThe American\nP-51 Mustang\n, with a\ncombat radius\nof over\n1,800 miles (2,900\nkm)\nwhen using underwing\ndrop tanks\n, began to escort the bombers in large formations to and from the target area in early 1944. From that point onwards, the Luftwaffe began to suffer casualties in aircrews it could not sufficiently replace. By targeting oil refineries and rail communications,\nAllied\nbombers crippled the German war effort by late 1944.\nGerman civilians blamed Göring for his failure to protect the homeland.\nHitler began excluding him from conferences but retained him in his positions at the head of the Luftwaffe and as plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan.\nAs he lost Hitler's trust, Göring began to spend more time at his various residences.\nOn\nD-Day\n(6 June 1944), the Luftwaffe only had some 300 fighters and a small number of bombers in the area of the landings; the Allies had a total strength of 11,000 aircraft.\nEnd of the war\nSee also:\nGöring telegram\nGöring in captivity 9 May 1945\nAs the\nSoviets approached Berlin\n, Hitler's efforts to organise the defence of the city became ever more meaningless and futile.\nHis last birthday, celebrated at the\nFührerbunker\nin Berlin on 20 April 1945, was the occasion for leave-taking by many top Nazis, Göring included. By this time, Göring's hunting lodge\nCarinhall\nhad been evacuated, the building destroyed,\nand its art treasures moved to\nBerchtesgaden\nand elsewhere.\nGöring arrived at his estate at Obersalzberg on 22 April, the same day that Hitler, in a lengthy diatribe against his generals, first publicly admitted that the war was lost and that he intended to remain in Berlin to the end and then commit suicide.\nHe also stated that Göring was in a better position to negotiate a peace settlement.\nOKW\noperations chief\nAlfred Jodl\nwas present for Hitler's rant and notified Göring's chief of staff,\nKarl Koller\n, at a meeting a few hours later. Sensing its implications, Koller immediately flew to Berchtesgaden to notify Göring of this development. A week after the start of the Soviet invasion, Hitler had issued a decree naming Göring his successor in the event of his death, thus codifying the declaration he had made soon after the beginning of the war. The decree also gave Göring full authority to act as Hitler's deputy if Hitler ever lost his freedom of action.\nGöring feared being branded a traitor if he tried to take power, but also feared being accused of dereliction of duty if he did nothing. After some hesitation, Göring reviewed his copy of the 1941 decree naming him Hitler's successor. After conferring with Koller and\nHans Lammers\n(the state secretary of the Reich Chancellery), Göring concluded that by remaining in Berlin to face certain death, Hitler had incapacitated himself from governing. All agreed that under the terms of the decree, it was incumbent upon Göring to take power in Hitler's stead.\nHe was also motivated by fears that his rival,\nMartin Bormann\n, would seize power upon Hitler's death and would have him killed as a traitor. With this in mind, Göring sent a carefully worded telegram asking Hitler for permission to take over as the leader of Germany, stressing that he would be acting as Hitler's deputy. He added that, if Hitler did not reply by 22:00 that night (23 April), he would assume that Hitler had indeed lost his freedom of action and would assume leadership of the Reich.\nGöring after his capture (15 May 1945)\nThe telegram was intercepted by Bormann, who convinced Hitler that Göring was attempting a coup. Bormann argued that Göring's telegram was not a request for permission to act as Hitler's deputy, but a demand to resign or be overthrown.\nBormann also intercepted another telegram in which Göring directed Ribbentrop to report to him if there was no further communication from Hitler or Göring before midnight.\nHitler sent a reply to Göring\n—\nprepared with Bormann's help\n—\nrescinding the 1941 decree and threatening him with execution for high treason unless he immediately resigned from all of his offices. Realising his situation was untenable, Göring duly resigned. Afterwards, Hitler (or Bormann, depending on the source) ordered the SS to place Göring, his staff and Lammers under house arrest at Obersalzberg.\nBormann made an announcement over the radio that Göring had resigned for health reasons.\nBy 26 April, the complex at Obersalzberg\nwas under attack\nby the Allies, so Göring was moved to\nhis castle at Mauterndorf\n. In his\nlast will and testament\n, Hitler expelled Göring from the party, formally rescinded the decree making him his successor and upbraided Göring for \"illegally attempting to seize control of the state\".\nHe then appointed\nKarl Dönitz\n, the Navy's commander-in-chief, as president of the Reich and supreme commander of the\narmed forces\n. Hitler and his wife,\nEva Braun\n,\ncommitted suicide\non 30 April 1945, a few hours after a hastily arranged wedding. Göring was freed on 5 May by a passing Luftwaffe unit and made his way to the U.S. lines in hopes of surrendering to them rather than to the Soviets. He was taken into custody near\nRadstadt\non 9 May by elements of the\n36th Infantry Division\nof the\nUS Army\n.\nThis move likely saved Göring's life; Bormann had ordered him executed if Berlin had fallen.\nOn 10 May, US Air Forces commander\nCarl Spaatz\n, along with Lieutenant General\nHoyt Vandenberg\nand Spaatz's\nspecial consultant\nBruce Campbell Hopper\n, conducted an interrogation of Göring at the Ritter School in\nAugsburg\n, Germany.\nTrial and death\nMain article:\nNuremberg trials\nGöring (first row, far left) at the Nuremberg trial\nGöring was flown to\nCamp Ashcan\n, a temporary prisoner-of-war camp housed in the Palace Hotel at\nMondorf-les-Bains\n, Luxembourg. Here he was weaned off\ndihydrocodeine\n(a mild morphine derivative)—he had been taking the equivalent of three or four grains (260 to 320\nmg) of morphine a day—and was put on a strict diet; he lost\n60 pounds (27\nkg)\n. His\nIQ\nwas tested while in custody and found to be 138.\nTop Nazi officials were transferred in September to Nuremberg, which was to be the location of a series of military tribunals beginning in November.\nAt Nuremberg, Göring was examined by Chief Medical Officer Lt. Col.\nRene Juchli\n, who reported that Göring was \"still suffering from heart disease and excess fat, both due to glandular disturbance.\"\nGöring was the second highest-ranking official tried at Nuremberg, behind Reich President (former Admiral) Karl Dönitz. The prosecution levelled an indictment of four charges, including a charge of conspiracy; waging a war of aggression; war crimes, including the\nplundering and removal to Germany of works of art and other property\n; and crimes against humanity, including the disappearance of political and other opponents under the\nNacht und Nebel\n(\ntransl.\nNight and Fog\n) decree; the torture and ill treatment of prisoners of war; and the murder and enslavement of civilians, including what was at the time estimated to be 5,700,000 Jews. When asked for his plea, Göring attempted to read a lengthy statement to the court, but was rebuked by presiding judge\nSir Geoffrey Lawrence\nand instructed to simply plead either \"guilty\" or \"not guilty\";\nGöring then declared himself to be \"in the sense of the indictment, not guilty\".\nThe trial lasted 218 days. The prosecution presented its case from November to March, and Göring's defence\n—\nthe first to be presented\n—\nlasted from 8 to 22 March. The sentences were read on 30 September 1946.\nGöring, forced to remain silent while seated in the dock, communicated his opinions about the proceedings using gestures, shaking his head, or laughing. He constantly took notes, whispered with the other defendants and tried to control the erratic behaviour of Hess, who was seated beside him.\nDuring breaks in the proceedings, Göring tried to dominate the other defendants, and he was eventually placed in solitary confinement when he attempted to influence their testimony.\nGöring told American psychiatrist\nLeon Goldensohn\nthat the court was \"stupid\" to try \"little fellows\" like Funk and\nKaltenbrunner\ninstead of letting Göring take all the blame on himself.\nHe also claimed that he had never heard of most of the other defendants before the trial.\nGöring at the Nuremberg trials\nOn several occasions over the course of the trial, the prosecution showed films of the\nconcentration camps\nand other atrocities. Everyone present, including Göring, found the contents of the films shocking; he said that the films must have been faked. Witnesses, including\nPaul Körner\nand\nErhard Milch\n, tried to portray Göring as a peaceful moderate. Milch stated that it had been impossible to oppose Hitler or disobey his orders; to do so would likely have meant death for oneself and one's family.\nWhen testifying on his own behalf, Göring emphasised his loyalty to Hitler and claimed to know nothing about what had happened in the concentration camps, which were under Himmler's control. He provided evasive, convoluted answers to direct questions and had plausible excuses for all of his actions during the war. He used the witness stand as a venue to expound at great length on his own role in the Reich, attempting to present himself as a peacemaker and diplomat before the outbreak of the war.\nDuring cross-examination, chief prosecutor\nRobert H. Jackson\nread the minutes of a meeting that had been held shortly after\nKristallnacht\n, a major\npogrom\nin November 1938. At the meeting, Göring had plotted to confiscate Jewish property in the wake of the pogrom.\nLater,\nDavid Maxwell-Fyfe\npresented evidence that Göring must have known about\nthe\nkilling of 50 airmen\nwho had been recaptured after escaping from\nStalag Luft III\nin time to have saved them.\nHe also presented evidence that Göring knew about the extermination of the\nHungarian Jews\n.\nGöring was found guilty on all four counts and was sentenced to death by hanging. The judgment stated:\nThere is nothing to be said in mitigation. For Göring was often, indeed almost always, the moving force, second only to his leader. He was the leading war aggressor, both as political and as military leader; he was the director of the slave labour programme and the creator of the oppressive programme against the Jews and other races, at home and abroad. All of these crimes he has frankly admitted. On some specific cases there may be conflict of testimony, but in terms of the broad outline, his own admissions are more than sufficiently wide to be conclusive of his guilt. His guilt is unique in its enormity. The record discloses no excuses for this man.\nGöring's corpse\nGöring made an appeal asking to be shot as a soldier instead of hanged as a common criminal, but the court refused.\nThe night before he was to be hanged, however, Göring committed suicide with a\npotassium cyanide\ncapsule.\nSince he was guarded around the clock, it was not clear how Göring obtained the poison. At the time, speculation centered on whether he had access to a jar of his hair cream where another cyanide capsule was later found. Decades later, another theory focused on a U.S. Army lieutenant, Jack G. Wheelis, who had been stationed at the trials but who had since died. Göring had given Wheelis his gold watch, pen and cigarette case,\nand so it was theorised that Wheelis had retrieved the capsules from their hiding place among Göring's confiscated personal effects and then passed them along.\nIn 2005, former U.S. Army private Herbert Lee Stivers, who served in the\n1st Infantry Division\n's\n26th Infantry Regiment\n—\nthe honour guard for the Nuremberg Trials\n—\nclaimed he gave Göring \"medicine\" hidden inside a fountain pen that a young German woman, Mona, had asked him to smuggle into the prison. In explaining his decision to speak out 60 years later, Stivers said that he was convinced to come forward by his daughter. He wanted to set the record straight: He thought that he was just offering medicine; he said that he did not know what was in the pill until after Göring's suicide.\nGöring's body, as with those of the men who\nwere executed\n, was displayed at the execution ground for witnesses. The bodies were cremated at\nOstfriedhof\n, Munich, and the ashes scattered in the\nIsar\nRiver.\nPersonal properties\nSee also:\nNazi plunder\nand\nReichswerke Hermann Göring\nGöring's\nReichsmarschall\nbaton and\nSmith & Wesson Model 10\nrevolver. To the left is the silver-bound guest book from\nCarinhall\n(\nWest Point Museum\n).\nGöring's name is closely associated with the Nazi plunder of Jewish property. His name appears 135 times on the\nOSS Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU) Red Flag Names List\ncompiled by US Army intelligence in 1945–46 and declassified in 1997.\nThe confiscation of Jewish property gave Göring the opportunity to amass a personal fortune. Some properties he seized himself or acquired for a nominal price. In other cases, he collected bribes for allowing others to steal Jewish property. He took\nkickbacks\nfrom industrialists for favourable decisions as Four-Year Plan director and money for supplying arms to the Spanish Republicans in the\nSpanish Civil War\nvia\nPyrkal\nin Greece (although Germany was supporting Franco and the Nationalists).\nGöring was appointed Reich Master of the Hunt in 1933 and Master of the German Forests in 1934. He instituted reforms to the forestry laws and acted to protect endangered species. Around this time, he became interested in\nSchorfheide Forest\n, where he set aside\n100,000 acres (400\nkm\n)\nas a state park, which is still extant. There he built an elaborate hunting lodge, Carinhall, in memory of his first wife, Carin. By 1934, her body had been transported to the site and placed in a vault on the estate.\nThrough most of the 1930s, Göring kept pet lion cubs, borrowed from the\nBerlin Zoo\n, both at Carinhall and at his house at\nObersalzberg\n.\nThe main lodge at Carinhall had a large art gallery where Göring displayed works that had been plundered from private collections and museums around Europe from 1939 onward.\nGöring worked closely with the\nEinsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg\n(\ntransl.\nReichsleiter Rosenberg Taskforce\n), an organisation tasked with the looting of artwork and cultural material from Jewish collections, libraries and museums throughout Europe.\nHeaded by Alfred Rosenberg, the task force set up a collection centre and headquarters in Paris. Some 26,000 railroad cars full of art treasures, furniture and other looted items were sent to Germany from France alone. Göring repeatedly visited the Paris headquarters to review the incoming stolen goods and to select items to be sent on a special train to Carinhall and his other homes.\nThe estimated value of his collection, which numbered some 1,500 pieces, was $200\nmillion.\nStandard, on display at the\nMusée de la Guerre\nin\nLes Invalides\n, Paris\nGöring was known for his extravagant tastes and garish clothing. He had various special uniforms made for the many posts he held;\nhis\nReichsmarschall\nuniform included a jewel-encrusted baton.\nHans-Ulrich Rudel\n, the top\nStuka\npilot of the war, recalled twice meeting Göring dressed in outlandish costumes: first, a medieval hunting costume, practicing archery with his doctor; and second, dressed in a red\ntoga\nfastened with a golden clasp, smoking an unusually large pipe.\nItalian Foreign Minister\nGaleazzo Ciano\nonce noted Göring wearing a fur coat that looked like what \"a high-grade prostitute wears to the opera\".\nHe threw lavish housewarming parties each time a round of construction was completed at Carinhall and changed costumes several times throughout the evenings.\nGöring was noted for his patronage of music, especially opera. He entertained frequently and sumptuously and hosted elaborate birthday parties for himself.\nArmaments minister\nAlbert Speer\nrecalled that guests brought expensive gifts, such as gold bars, Dutch cigars and valuable artwork. For his birthday in 1944, Speer gave Göring an oversized marble bust of Hitler.\nAs a member of the Prussian Council of State, Speer was required to donate a considerable portion of his salary towards the council's birthday gift to Göring without even being asked.\nGeneralfeldmarschall\nMilch told Speer that similar donations were required out of the Air Ministry's general fund.\nFor his birthday in 1940, Ciano decorated Göring with the coveted\nCollar of Annunziata\n. The award reduced him to tears.\nThe design of the\nReichsmarschall\nstandard, on a light blue field, featured a gold\nGerman eagle\ngrasping a wreath surmounted by two batons overlaid with a swastika. The reverse side of the flag had the\nGroßkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes\n(\ntransl.\nGrand Cross of the Iron Cross\n) surrounded by a wreath between four Luftwaffe eagles. The flag was carried by a personal standard-bearer at all public occasions.\nThough he liked to be called \"\nder Eiserne\n\" (\ntransl.\nthe Iron Man\n), the former fighter pilot had become corpulent. He was one of the few Nazi leaders who did not take offence at hearing jokes about himself, \"no matter how rude\", taking them as a sign of his popularity among the masses. One such German joke poked fun at Göring by stating that he would wear an admiral's uniform with rubber medals to take a bath. His obesity was also a target, it being joked that \"he sits down on his stomach\".\nAnother joke claimed that he had sent a wire to Hitler after his visit to the Vatican: \"Mission accomplished. Pope unfrocked. Tiara and pontifical vestments are a perfect fit.\"\nRole in the Holocaust\nSee also:\nLuftwaffe §\nWar crimes\nGöring's July 1941 letter to\nReinhard Heydrich\nJoseph Goebbels\nand Himmler were far more antisemitic than Göring, who mainly adopted that attitude because party politics required him to do so.\nHis deputy\nErhard Milch\nhad a Jewish parent. However, Göring supported the\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935 and later initiated economic measures unfavourable to Jews.\nHe required the registration of all Jewish property as part of the Four-Year Plan, and at a meeting held after\nKristallnacht\nwas livid that the financial burden for the Jewish losses would have to be made good by German-owned insurance companies. He proposed that the Jews be fined one billion\nmarks\n.\nAt the same meeting, options for the disposition of the Jews and their property were discussed. Jews would be segregated into ghettos or encouraged to emigrate, and their property would be seized in a programme of\nAryanisation\n. Compensation for seized property would be low, if any was given at all.\nDetailed minutes of this meeting and other documents were read out at the Nuremberg trial, proving his knowledge of and complicity with the persecution of the Jews.\nOn 24 January 1939, Göring established in Berlin the head office of the\nCentral Office for Jewish Emigration\n,\nmodelled on the similar organisation established in Vienna in August 1938.\nUnder the direction of Heydrich, it was tasked with using any means necessary to prompt Jews to leave the Reich, and with creating a Jewish organisation that would co-ordinate emigration from the Jewish side.\nIn July 1941, Göring issued a memo to Heydrich ordering him to organise the practical details of the\nFinal Solution\nto the \"Jewish Question\". By the time that this letter was written, many Jews and others had already been killed in Poland,\nRussia\nand elsewhere. At the\nWannsee Conference\n, held six months later, Heydrich formally announced that genocide of the Jews was now official Reich policy. Göring did not attend the conference, but he was present at other meetings where the number of people killed was discussed.\nGöring directed\nanti-partisan\noperations by Luftwaffe security battalions in the\nBiałowieża Forest\nbetween 1942 and 1944 that resulted in the murder of thousands of Jews and Polish civilians.\nAt the Nuremberg trial, Göring told\nfirst lieutenant\nand U.S. Army psychologist\nGustave Gilbert\nthat he would never have supported the anti-Jewish measures if he had known what was going to happen. \"I only thought we would eliminate Jews from positions in big business and government\", he claimed.\nDecorations and awards\nGöring wearing his\nPour le Mérite\nmedal (1932)\nGerman\nKingdom of Prussia\n:\nIron Cross\n2nd Class (15 September 1914)\nIron Cross 1st Class (22 March 1915)\nRoyal\nHouse Order of Hohenzollern\n, Knights Cross with Swords\nOrder\nPour le Mérite\n(2 June 1918)\nGrand Duchy of Baden\n:\nMilitary Karl-Friedrich Merit Order\n, Knights Cross\nOrder of the Zähringer Lion\n, Knights Cross 2nd Class with Swords\nNazi Germany\n:\n1939\nClasp to the Iron Cross\n2nd Class (30 September 1939)\n1939 Clasp to the Iron Cross 1st Class (30 September 1939)\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross\n(30 September 1939)\nGrand Cross of the Iron Cross for \"the victories of the Luftwaffe in 1940 during the French campaign\" (the only award of this decoration during World War II – 19 August 1940)\nGolden Party Badge\nBlood Order\n(Commemorative Medal of 9 November 1923)\nDanzig Cross\n, 1st and 2nd class\nForeign\nKingdom of Bulgaria\n:\nOrder of Saints Cyril and Methodius\n, Knight\nKingdom of Denmark\n:\nOrder of the Dannebrog\n, Grand Cross with Breast Star in Diamonds (25 July 1938)\nFinland\n:\nOrder of the White Rose of Finland\nGrand Cross (6 March 1935)\nGrand Cross with Collar (21 April 1941)\nOrder of the Cross of Liberty\n, Grand Cross with Swords (25 March 1942)\nKingdom of Hungary\n:\nOrder of St Stephen\n, Grand Cross\nKingdom of Italy\n:\nSupreme Order of the Most Holy Annunciation\n, Knight (12 January 1940)\nKingdom of Sweden\n:\nOrder of the Sword\nCommander Grand Cross with Collar (1939)\nEmpire of Japan\n:\nOrder of the Rising Sun\n, Grand Cordon with\nPaulownia Flowers\n(4 October 1943)\nSee also\nBiography portal\nGermany portal\nPolitics portal\nAviation portal\nAerial victory standards of World War I\nAir warfare of World War II\nFallschirm-Panzer Division 1 Hermann Göring\n– German elite Luftwaffe armoured division\nPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets\nGlossary of German military terms\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nGöring's Green Folder\n– Nazi policy directive for conquered Soviet Union, presented as evidence at Nuremberg Trials\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nNotes\n↑\nGöring\nis the German spelling, but the name is\ncommonly transliterated\nGoering\nin English and other languages, using\n⟨\noe\n⟩\n, an alternative German spelling for ö (o with an\numlaut\n) in general.\n↑\nThe swastika was a badge that the count and some friends had adopted at school, and he adopted it as a family emblem. See\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n403–404.\n↑\nBy 1930, the Nazi party claimed upwards of 293,000 members.\n↑\nConfident that the Luftwaffe was without peer and practically invincible in the wake of these victories, Göring commented to the German press that should the enemy ever penetrate German airspace, they could call him \"Meyer\".\n↑\nUpon being captured by American soldiers, Göring immediately asked to be taken before Eisenhower. He hoped to be treated as a \"spokesman for Germany\".\nCitations\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n284.\n↑\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression 1946\n, pp.\n100–101.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n358.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nBlock\n&\nTrow 1971\n, pp.\n327–330.\n1\n2\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n21–22.\n↑\nFreitag 2015\n, pp.\n25–45.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n22–24.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n24–25.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n24–28.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n28–29.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n31–32.\n↑\nFranks 1993\n, pp.\n95, 117, 156.\n↑\nFranks 1993\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nKilduff 2013\n, pp.\n165–166.\n↑\nFranks\n&\nVan Wyngarden 2003\n, pp.\n15, 17, 92.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n31–33.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n403.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n34–36.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, pp.\n5–6.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n39–41.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n41, 43.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n45, 47.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n426.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n112.\n1\n2\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, pp.\n29, 41.\n1\n2\nLepage 2016\n, p.\n140.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nHitler 1988\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n49–51.\n↑\nHolland 2011\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n57–58.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n644.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n59–60.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n160.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n404.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n62, 64.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nEvans 2024\n, p.\n122.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n118–121.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nReichstag databank\n.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n136, 138.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n297.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n315–318.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n329–330.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n331.\n↑\nHett 2014\n, pp.\n255–259.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n192.\n↑\nBullock 1999\n, p.\n262.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nNuremberg Trial Proceedings, 18 March 1946\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n139–140.\n↑\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n63.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, pp.\n50–51.\n↑\nNew York Times, 19 May 1933\n.\n↑\nLilla 2005\n, pp.\n292–295.\n↑\nFrank 1933–1934\n, p.\n253.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nGoldhagen 1996\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n31–35, 39.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n38.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n116–117.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n364.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n357–360.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n60.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n361.\n↑\nOvery 2002\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, pp.\n116, 117.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n642–644.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n646–652.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n194–197.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n674.\n↑\nNoakes\n&\nPridham 2001\n, p.\n119.\n1\n2\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n19.\n1\n2\nOvery 2002\n, p.\n73.\n1\n2\nOvery 2002\n, p.\n236.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n197, 211.\n↑\nBroszat 1981\n, pp.\n308–309.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n597.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n599.\n↑\nHooton 1999\n, pp.\n177–189.\n↑\nMoorhouse 2012\n, p.\n350.\n↑\nPerry 2013\n, p.\n45fn.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n721, 723, 725.\n1\n2\nFellgiebel 2000\n, p.\n198.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n615.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n113, 136, 143.\n↑\nOestermann 2001\n, p.\n157.\n↑\nSelwood 2015\n.\n↑\nRaeder 2001\n, pp.\n324–325.\n↑\nBungay 2000\n, p.\n337.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nTaylor 1965\n, p.\n500.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n178–179.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n201.\n1\n2\nStolfi 1982\n.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n207–213.\n↑\nKeller 2021\n, p.\n204.\n↑\nGerlach 2016\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nPohl 2012\n, p.\n214.\n1\n2\nPohl 2012\n, p.\n215.\n↑\nFleming 1987\n.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n404–405.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n421.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n409.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n412–413.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n329.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n932.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n438, 441.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n378.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n461.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n447.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n296, 297, 299.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n510.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n295, 302.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n725.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n310.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n722.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n723.\n1\n2\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n1115–1116.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n1116.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n315.\n1\n2\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n1118.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n608–609.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n724.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n1126.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n320–325.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n728.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n1128.\n↑\nUSAF 1945\n.\n↑\nGilbert 1995\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n329–331.\n↑\nVallejo Times-Herald\n&\nOctober 1945\n.\n↑\nPathé 1945\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n336–337.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n337.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n339.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n341–342.\n1\n2\nGoldensohn 2004\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n343–347.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n359–367.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n369.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n371.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n374–375.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1946\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n392–393.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n964.\n↑\nBotting 2006\n, p.\n280.\n↑\nTaylor 1992\n, p.\n623.\n↑\nBBC News 2005\n.\n↑\nDarnstädt 2005\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nOSS Reports\n.\n↑\nNARA Records\n.\n↑\nBeevor 2006\n, pp.\n366–368, 538.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n120–123.\n↑\nKellerhoff 2018\n.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n244–245.\n↑\nRothfeld 2002\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n283–285.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n283–285, 291.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n281.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n115–116.\n↑\nFussell 2002\n, pp.\n24–25.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n122.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n417.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n416–417.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n417–418.\n↑\nMosley 1974\n, p.\n280.\n↑\nBlock\n&\nTrow 1971\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n409.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n136–137.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n189–191.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n160.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n62.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n259–260.\n↑\nBlood 2001\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nBlood 2010\n, pp.\n261–262, 266.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n378.\n↑\nGilbert 1995\n, p.\n208.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n442.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nPetrov 2005\n, p.\n56.\n↑\nGade 2011\n.\n↑\nBille-Hansen\n&\nHolck 1943\n, p.\n20.\n↑\nMatikkala 2017\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nMatikkala 2017\n, p.\n515.\n↑\nMatikkala 2017\n, p.\n511.\n↑\nLajos 2011\n, p.\n41.\n↑\nOvery 2012\n, p.\n233.\n↑\nStatskalender 1940\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nGazeta Lwowska 1943\n, p.\n1.\nSources\n\"Art Provenance and Claims Records and Research\"\n. National Archives and Records Administration. 15 August 2016\n. Retrieved\n16 July\n2017\n.\nBeevor, Antony\n(2006).\nThe Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939\n. London: Phoenix.\nISBN\n978-0-7538-2165-7\n.\nBille-Hansen, A. C.; Holck, Harald, eds. (1943).\nStatshaandbog for Kongeriget Danmark for Aaret 1943\n[\nState Manual of the Kingdom of Denmark for the Year 1943\n]\n(PDF)\n. Kongelig Dansk Hof- og Statskalender (in Danish). Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz A.-S. Universitetsbogtrykkeri\n. Retrieved\n20 January\n2021\n–\nvia\nda:DIS Danmark\n.\nBlock, Maxine; Trow, E. Mary (1971).\nCurrent Biography: Who's News and Why 1941\n. New York: H.W. Wilson.\nOCLC\n16655369\n.\nBlood, Philip W. (2001). Holmes, E. R. (ed.).\nBandenbekämpfung: Nazi occupation security in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia 1942–45\n(PhD thesis).\nCranfield University\n.\nBlood, Philip W. (3 August 2010). \"Securing Hitler's Lebensraum: The Luftwaffe and Bialowieza Forest, 1942–1944\".\nHolocaust and Genocide Studies\n.\n24\n(2):\n247–\n272.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/hgs/dcq024\n.\nISSN\n1476-7937\n.\nBotting, Douglas\n(2006).\nIn the Ruins of The Reich: Germany 1945–1949\n. London: Methuen Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-413-77511-5\n.\nBroszat, Martin (1981).\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich\n. New York: Longman Inc.\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n.\nBullock, Alan\n(1999) .\nHitler: A Study in Tyranny\n. New York: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n978-1-56852-036-0\n.\nBungay, Stephen\n(2000).\nThe Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain\n. London: Aurum Press.\nISBN\n978-1-85410-721-3\n.\nCesarani, David\n(2005) .\nEichmann: His Life and Crimes\n. London: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-09-944844-0\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nDarnstädt, Thomas (4 April 2005).\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n. Retrieved\n13 September\n2016\n.\n\"Datenbank der deutschen Parlamentsabgeordneten. Basis: Parlamentsalmanache/Reichstagshandbücher 1867–1938\"\n.\nwww.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de\n. Retrieved\n18 September\n2020\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2024).\nHitler's People: The Faces of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-59329-643-1\n.\nFellgiebel, Walther-Peer (2000) .\nDie Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes, 1939–1945\n(in German). Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas.\nISBN\n978-3-7909-0284-6\n.\nFleming, Thomas (December 1987).\n\"The Big Leak\"\n.\nAmerican Heritage\n.\n38\n(8). Archived from\nthe original\non 14 February 2008\n. Retrieved\n28 June\n2022\n.\n\"Forgetfulness Of Hess Held Intentional\".\nVallejo Times-Herald\n. Luther Gibson. 18 October 1945. p.\n7.\nFrank, Hans\n, ed. (1933–1934).\nJahrbuch der Akademie für Deutsches Recht\n[\nYearbook of the Academy for German Law\n]\n. München/Berlin/Leipzig: Schweitzer Verlag.\nFranks, Norman (1993).\nAbove the Lines: The Aces and Fighter Units of the German Air Service, Naval Air Service and Flanders Marine Corps, 1914–1918\n. Oxford: Grub Street.\nISBN\n978-0-948817-19-9\n.\nFranks, Norman; Van Wyngarden, Greg (2003).\nFokker D VII Aces of World War 1: Part 1\n. Oxford: Osprey.\nISBN\n1-84176-533-3\n.\nFreitag, Christian H. (2015).\nRitter, Reichsmarschall & Revoluzzer. Aus der Geschichte eines Berliner Landhauses\n(in German). Berlin: Friedenauer Brücke.\nISBN\n978-3-9816130-2-5\n.\nFussell, Paul (2002).\nUniforms: Why We Are What We Wear\n. New York: Houghton Mifflin.\nISBN\n978-0-618-38188-3\n.\nGade, Ida K. Richter (21 February 2011).\n\"Herman Göring\"\n.\nberlingske.dk\n(in Danish). Berlingske Media A/S\n. Retrieved\n23 April\n2020\n.\n\"Odznaczenie japońskie dla marsz. Goeringa\"\n(PDF)\n.\nGazeta Lwowska\n(in Polish). No.\n233. 5 October 1943. p.\n1\n. Retrieved\n20 January\n2021\n.\nGerlach, Christian\n(2016).\nThe Extermination of the European Jews\n.\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-521-70689-6\n.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nGilbert, Gustave\n(1995).\nNuremberg Diary\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80661-2\n.\nGoldensohn, Leon N.\n(2004).\nThe Nuremberg Interviews: Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses\n. New York:\nAlfred A. Knopf\n.\nISBN\n978-0-375-41469-5\n.\nGoldhagen, Daniel\n(1996).\nHitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust\n. New York: Knopf.\nISBN\n978-0-679-44695-8\n.\n\"Guard 'gave Goering suicide pill'\n\"\n.\nBBC News\n. 8 February 2005\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2012\n.\nGunther, John\n(1940).\nInside Europe\n. New York: Harper & Brothers.\nOCLC\n836676034\n.\nHett, Benjamin Carter (2014).\nBurning the Reichstag: An Investigation into the Third Reich's Enduring Mystery\n. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n9780199322329\n.\nHilberg, Raul (1985).\nThe Destruction of the European Jews\n. New York: Holmes & Meier.\nISBN\n0-8419-0910-5\n.\nHitler, Adolf\n(1988).\nHitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-285180-2\n.\nHolland, James\n(2011).\nThe Battle of Britain: Five Months That Changed History; May-October 1940\n. New York: St. Martin's Press.\nISBN\n978-0-31-267500-4\n.\nHooton, Edward (1999).\nPhoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe\n. Garden City, NJ: Arms & Armour.\nISBN\n1-85409-181-6\n.\n\"Judgment of International Military Tribunal on Hermann Goering\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library. 30 September 1946\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2012\n.\nKeller, Rolf\n[in German]\n(2021). \"\n\"...A necessary evil\": use of Soviet prisoners of war as labourers in the German Reich, 1941–1945\".\nDimensionen eines Verbrechens: Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im Zweiten Weltkrieg | Dimensions of a Crime. Soviet Prisoners of War in World War II\n(in German and English). Metropol Verlag. pp.\n194–\n205.\nISBN\n978-3-86331-582-5\n.\nKellerhoff, Sven Felix (23 March 2018).\n\"Raubkunst: Für Löwen hatte Hermann Göring eine Schwäche\"\n.\nDie Welt\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n22 January\n2020\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKilduff, Peter (2013).\nHerman Göring, Fighter Ace: The World War I Career of Germany's Most Infamous Airman\n. London: Grub Street.\nISBN\n978-1-906502-66-9\n.\n\"Kungl. Svenska Riddarordnarna\".\nBihang till Sveriges Statskalender 1940\n(in Swedish). Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri. 1940.\nLajos, Pallos (2011). \"A Magyar Királyi Szent István Rend jelvényei a Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum Éremtárában\". In Tibor, Kovács (ed.).\n2010–2011 A Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum történeti évkönyve\n. Folia Historica: Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum Évkönyve (in Hungarian). Budapest: Hungarian National Museum. pp.\n39–\n65.\nISSN\n0133-6622\n.\nLepage, Jean-Denis (2016).\nHitler's Stormtroopers: The SA, The Nazi's Brownshirts, 1922–1945\n. Frontline Books.\nISBN\n978-1-399-07721-7\n.\nLilla, Joachim (2005).\nDer Preußische Staatsrat 1921–1933: Ein biographisches Handbuch\n. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-770-05271-4\n.\nManvell, Roger\n;\nFraenkel, Heinrich\n(2011) .\nGoering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader\n. London: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMatikkala, Antti (2017).\nKunnian ruletti: Korkeimmat ulkomaalaisille 1941–1944 annetut suomalaiset kunniamerkit\n(in Finnish). Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.\nISBN\n978-952-222-847-5\n.\nMiller, Michael D. (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2015).\nLeaders of the Storm Troops, Vol. 1\n. Solihull, West Midlands: Helion & Company.\nISBN\n978-1-909982-87-1\n.\nMoorhouse, Roger (2012).\nBerlin at War\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-46502-855-9\n.\nMosley, Leonard\n(1974).\nThe Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering\n. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.\nISBN\n0-385-04961-7\n.\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XV, Part 3: The Reich Cabinet\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n20 August\n2017\n.\nNoakes, Jeremy; Pridham, Geoffrey, eds. (2001) .\nNazism 1919–1945: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination\n. Exeter Studies in History. Vol.\n3. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.\n\"Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume 9: Eighty-fourth day, Monday, 18 March 1946, morning session\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library\n. Retrieved\n28 March\n2012\n.\nThe Nuremberg Trials\n(Newsreel)\n. British Pathé. 1945.  Event occurs at 1:22\n. Retrieved\n16 December\n2024\n.\nOestermann, Günter (2001).\nJunger Wolf im Nebel. Ein Junge in Deutschland 1930–1945\n(in German). Hamburg: [Norderstedt] Books on Demand.\nISBN\n978-3-8311-2487-9\n.\n\"OSS (USS Office of Strategic Services) Art Looting Intelligence Unit (ALIU) Reports 1945–1946 and ALIU Red Flag Names List and Index\"\n. Central Registry of Information on Looted Cultural Property 1933–1945\n. Retrieved\n16 July\n2017\n.\nOvery, Richard (2012) .\nGoering: Hitler's Iron Knight\n. London and New York: I.B. Taurus.\nISBN\n978-1-84885-932-6\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nInterrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945\n. New York: Viking.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03008-8\n.\nOvery, Richard J. (2002) .\nWar and Economy in the Third Reich\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-164737-6\n.\nPerry, Marvin (2013).\nWorld War II in Europe: A Concise History\n. Boston: Wadsworth.\nISBN\n978-1-11183-652-8\n.\nPetrov, Todor (2005).\nBulgarian Orders and Medals 1878–2005\n. Sofia: Military Publishing House Ltd.\nISBN\n954-509-317-X\n.\nPohl, Dieter\n(2012).\nDie Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944\n(in German). Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag.\nISBN\n978-3-486-70739-7\n.\n\"Prussian Diet Out For 4-Year Period: Adopts Act Transferring All Its Powers to the Cabinet Headed by Goering\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 19 May 1933. p.\n8.\nRaeder, Erich (2001).\nErich Rader, Grand Admiral: The Personal Memoir of the Commander in Chief of the German Navy From 1935 Until His Final Break With Hitler in 1943\n. London: New York: Da Capo Press. United States Naval Institute.\nISBN\n0-306-80962-1\n.\nRothfeld, Anne (2002).\n\"Nazi Looted Art: The Holocaust Records Preservation Project, Part 1\"\n.\nPrologue Magazine\n.\n34\n(3). U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.\nSelwood, Dominic\n(13 February 2015).\n\"Dresden was a civilian town with no military significance. Why did we burn its people?\"\n.\nThe Telegraph\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 13 February 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 February\n2015\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSpeer, Albert\n(1971) .\nInside the Third Reich\n. New York: Avon.\nISBN\n978-0-380-00071-5\n.\nStolfi, Russel (March 1982).\n\"Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June–December 1941)\"\n(PDF)\n.\nJournal of Modern History\n.\n54\n(1):\n27–\n46.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/244076\n.\nhdl\n:\n10945/44218\n.\nS2CID\n143690841\n.\nTaylor, A. J. P.\n(1965).\nEnglish History 1914–1945\n. Reading, Berkshire: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n0-19-280140-6\n.\nTaylor, Telford (1992).\nThe Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials\n. New York: Knopf.\nISBN\n978-0-394-58355-6\n.\nUnited States Army Air Forces.\n\"Interrogation of Reich Marshal Hermann Goering\"\n.\nCombined Arms Research Library\n. United States Army Air Forces\n. Retrieved\n17 October\n2023\n.\nFurther reading\nBrandenburg, Erich (1995).\nDie Nachkommen Karls Des Grossen\n. Neustadt/Aisch: Degener.\nISBN\n3-7686-5102-9\n.\nBurke, William Hastings (2009).\nThirty Four\n. London: Wolfgeist.\nISBN\n978-0-9563712-0-1\n.\nButler, Ewan (1951).\nMarshal Without Glory\n. London: Hodder & Stoughton.\nOCLC\n1246848\n.\nFest, Joachim\n(2004).\nInside Hitler's Bunker\n. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.\nISBN\n0-374-13577-0\n.\nFrischauer, Willi (2013) .\nGoering\n. Unmaterial Books.\nISBN\n978-1-78301-221-3\n.\nGöring, Hermann (1934).\nGermany Reborn\n. London: E. Mathews & Marrot.\nOCLC\n570220\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nLeffland, Ella (1990).\nThe Knight, Death and the Devil\n. New York: Morrow.\nISBN\n0-688-05836-1\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nMaser, Werner (2000).\nHitlers janusköpfiger Paladin: die politische Biographie\n(in German). Soesterberg: Aspekt.\nISBN\n3-86124-509-4\n.\nMaser, Werner (2004).\nFälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin\n(in German). Munich: Olzog.\nISBN\n3-7892-8134-4\n.\nMolitor, Andreas (2025).\nHermann Göring. Macht und Exzess. Eine Biografie\n[\nHermann Göring. Power and Excess. A Biography.\n]\n(in German). Munich:\nC. H. Beck\n.\nISBN\n978-3-406-83640-4\n.\nPaul, Wolfgang (1983).\nWer War Hermann Göring: Biographie\n(in German). Esslingen: Bechtle.\nISBN\n3-7628-0427-3\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nHermann Göring\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nHermann Göring\n.\nNuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 9\nTranscript of Goering's testimony at the trial\n\"Lost Prison Interview with Hermann Goring: The Reichsmarschall's Revelations\"\npublished by\nWorld War II Magazine\nGöring at Långbro asylum\nThe Goering Collection: online database (in German as Die Kunstsammlung Hermann Göring) of 4263 artworks in Hermann Göring's collection\nNewspaper clippings about Hermann Göring\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Paul von Hindenburg(1932–1934)",
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "chancellor": "Franz von Papen(1932)Kurt von Schleicher(1932–1933)Adolf Hitler (1933–1945)",
+      "preceded_by": "Franz von Papen(Reichskommissar)",
+      "succeeded_by": "Office abolished",
+      "deputy": "Erhard Milch",
+      "additional_positions": "Additional positions1939–1945Chairman of theCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich[2]1937–1938Reichsministerof Economics1936–1945Reich Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan[3]1934–1945Reichsministerof Forestry1933–1945Reichsministerof Aviation1933–1945President of thePrussian State Council1933–1945Member of theGreater German Reichstag1928–1933Member of theReichstag1923Oberster SA-Führer",
+      "1939–1945": "Chairman of theCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich[2]",
+      "1937–1938": "Reichsministerof Economics",
+      "1936–1945": "Reich Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan[3]",
+      "1934–1945": "Reichsministerof Forestry",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "1928–1933": "Member of theReichstag",
+      "1923": "Oberster SA-Führer",
+      "born": "Hermann Wilhelm Göring(1893-01-12)12 January 1893Rosenheim, Germany",
+      "died": "15 October 1946(1946-10-15)(aged53)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Suicidebycyanide poisoning",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1922–1945)",
+      "spouses": "Carin von Kantzow​​(m.1923;died1931)​Emmy Sonnemann​(m.1935)​",
+      "children": "Edda Göring",
+      "parent": "Heinrich Ernst Göring(father)",
+      "relatives": "Albert Göring(brother)",
+      "residence": "Carinhall",
+      "alma_mater": "University of Munich",
+      "occupation": "Aviatorpolitician",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler cabinet",
+      "allegiance": "German EmpireNazi Germany",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German ArmyLuftstreitkräfteSturmabteilungLuftwaffe",
+      "yearsof_service": "1912–19181933–1945",
+      "rank": "ReichsmarschallSA-ObergruppenführerReichsforst-undReichsjägermeister",
+      "commands": "Jagdgeschwader1",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWorld War II",
+      "awards": "Pour le MériteGrand Cross of the Iron Cross",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 76197
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Rudolf_Hess",
+    "name": "Rudolf Hess",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Rudolf Walter Richard Hess was a German politician, convicted war criminal and a leading member of the Nazi Party in Germany. Appointed Deputy Führer to Adolf Hitler in 1933, Hess held that position until 1941, when he flew solo to Scotland in an attempt to negotiate the United Kingdom's exit from the Second World War. He was taken prisoner and eventually convicted of crimes against peace. He was still serving his life sentence at the time of his suicide in 1987.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician (1894–1987)",
+    "full_text": "Rudolf Hess\nGerman Nazi politician (1894–1987)\nThis article is about the Deputy Führer to Adolf Hitler. For the commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, see\nRudolf Höss\n. For the Californian artist, see\nRudolf Hess (artist)\n.\nRudolf Walter Richard Hess\n(\nHeß\nin German; 26 April 1894\n– 17 August 1987) was a German politician,\nconvicted war criminal\nand a leading member of the\nNazi Party\nin\nGermany\n. Appointed Deputy\nFührer\n(\nStellvertreter des Führers\n) to\nAdolf Hitler\nin 1933, Hess held that position until 1941, when he flew solo to Scotland in an attempt to negotiate the United Kingdom's exit from the\nSecond World War\n. He was taken prisoner and eventually convicted of crimes against peace. He was still serving his life sentence at the time of his suicide in 1987.\nHess enlisted as an infantryman in the\nImperial German Army\nat the outbreak of\nWorld War I\n. He was wounded several times during the war and was awarded the\nIron Cross\n, 2nd Class, in 1915. Shortly before the war ended, he enrolled to train as an aviator, but he saw no action in that role. He left the armed forces in December 1918 with the rank of\nLeutnant der Reserve\n. In 1919, he enrolled in the\nUniversity of Munich\n, where he studied\ngeopolitics\nunder\nKarl Haushofer\n, a proponent of the concept of\nLebensraum\n('living space'), which became one of the pillars of Nazi ideology. He joined the Nazi Party on 1 July 1920 and was at Hitler's side on 8 November 1923 for the\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, a failed Nazi attempt to seize control of the government of Bavaria. While serving a prison sentence for this attempted coup, he assisted Hitler with\nMein Kampf\n, which became a foundation of the political platform of the Nazi Party.\nAfter\nHitler became Chancellor\nin January 1933, Hess was appointed Deputy\nFührer\nof the Nazi Party in April. He was elected to the\nReichstag\nin the March elections, was made a\nReichsleiter\nof the Nazi Party in June, and in December 1933, he became\nMinister without Portfolio\nin Hitler's cabinet.\nHe was also appointed in 1938 to the Cabinet Council and to the Council of Ministers for Defence of the Reich in August 1939. Hitler decreed on the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939 that\nHermann Göring\nwas his official successor, and named Hess as next in line.\nIn addition to appearing on Hitler's behalf at speaking engagements and rallies, Hess signed into law much of the government's legislation, including the\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935, which stripped the Jews of Germany of their rights in the lead-up to\nthe Holocaust\n.\nBy the start of the war, Hess was sidelined from most important decisions, and many in Hitler's inner circle thought him to be mad. On 10 May 1941, Hess made a solo flight to\nScotland\n, where he hoped to arrange peace talks with the\nDuke of Hamilton\n, whom he believed to be a prominent opponent of the British government's war policy. The British authorities arrested Hess immediately on his arrival and held him in custody until the end of the war, when he was returned to Germany to stand trial at the 1946\nNuremberg trials\nof major war criminals. During much of his trial, he claimed to be suffering from amnesia, but he later admitted to the tribunal that this had been a ruse. The tribunal convicted him of crimes against peace and of conspiracy with other German leaders to commit crimes. He served a life sentence in\nSpandau Prison\n; the\nSoviet Union\nblocked repeated attempts by family members and prominent politicians to procure his early release. While still in custody as the only prisoner in Spandau, he hanged himself in 1987 at the age of 93.\nAfter his death, the prison was demolished to prevent it from becoming a\nneo-Nazi\nshrine. His grave, bearing the inscription\nIch hab's gewagt\n(\"I dared it\"), became a site of regular pilgrimage and demonstrations by neo-Nazis. In 2011, authorities refused to renew the lease on the gravesite, and his remains were exhumed and cremated and the gravestone was destroyed.\nEarly life and family\nHess, the eldest of three children, was born on 26 April 1894 in\nal-Ibrahimiyya\n, a suburb of\nAlexandria\n,\nEgypt\n(then under British occupation, though formally a part of the\nOttoman Empire\n), into a wealthy German family. Originally from\nBohemia\n, the family settled in\nWunsiedel\n,\nUpper Franconia\n, in the 1760s. His grandfather, Johann Christian Hess, married Margaretha Bühler, the daughter of a Swiss consul, in 1861 in\nTrieste\n. After the birth of his father, Johann Fritz Hess, the family moved to Alexandria, where Johann Christian Hess founded the import company Hess & Co. which his son, Johann Fritz Hess, took over in 1888. Hess's mother, Klara, was the daughter of Rudolf Münch, a textile industrialist and councillor of commerce from\nHof\n, Upper Franconia.\nHis brother, Alfred, was born in 1897 and his sister, Margarete, was born in 1908.\nThe family lived in a villa on the Egyptian coast near Alexandria, and visited Germany often from 1900, staying at their summer home in Reicholdsgrün (now part of\nKirchenlamitz\n) in the\nFichtel Mountains\n.\nHess' youth in Egypt left him with a strong admiration for the British Empire.\nHis youth growing up under the \"\nVeiled Protectorate\n\" of\nSir Evelyn Baring\nmade him unique among the Nazi leaders in that he grew up under British rule, which he saw in very positive terms.\nHess attended a German-language Protestant school in Alexandria from 1900 to 1908, when he was sent back to Germany to study at a boarding school in\nBad Godesberg\n. He demonstrated aptitudes for science and mathematics, but his father wished him to join the family business, Hess & Co., so he sent Hess in 1911 to study at the\nÉcole supérieure de commerce\nin\nNeuchâtel\n, Switzerland. After a year there, he took an\napprenticeship\nat a trading company in\nHamburg\n.\nWorld War I\nWithin weeks of the outbreak of\nWorld War I\n, Hess enlisted in the 7th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment, part of the\n1st Royal Bavarian Division\n. His initial posting was against the British on the\nSomme\n.\nHe was present at the\nFirst Battle of Ypres\n. On 9 November 1914, he transferred to the 1st Infantry Regiment, stationed near\nArras\n. He was awarded the\nIron Cross\n, second class, and promoted to\nGefreiter\n(corporal) in April 1915. After additional training at the\nMunster Training Area\n, he was promoted to\nVizefeldwebel\n(senior non-commissioned officer) and received the Bavarian\nMilitary Merit Cross\n. Returning to the front lines in November, Hess fought in\nArtois\n, participating in the battle for the town of\nNeuville-Saint-Vaast\n. After two months out of action with a throat infection, he served in the\nBattle of Verdun\nin May, and was hit by\nshrapnel\nin the left hand and arm on 12 June 1916 while fighting near the village of Thiaumont. After a month off to recover, he was sent back to the Verdun area, where he remained until December.\nHess was promoted to platoon leader of the 10th Company of the 18th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, which was serving in\nRomania\n. He was wounded on 23 July and again on 8 August 1917; the first injury was a shell splinter to the left arm, which was dressed in the field, but the second was a bullet wound that entered the upper chest near the armpit and exited near his spinal column, leaving a pea-sized entry wound and a cherry stone-sized exit wound on his back.\nBy 20 August, Hess was well enough to travel; he was thus sent to a hospital in\nHungary\nand eventually back to Germany, where he recovered in hospital in\nMeissen\n. In October, he was promoted to\nLeutnant der Reserve\nand was recommended for, but did not receive, the Iron Cross, first class. At his father's request, Hess was transferred to a hospital closer to home, arriving at\nAlexandersbad\non 25 October.\nWhile still convalescing, Hess had requested that he be allowed to enrol to train as a pilot, so after Christmas leave with his family, he reported to\nMunich\n. He received basic flight training at\nOberschleissheim\nand\nLechfeld Air Base\nfrom March to June 1918, and advanced training at\nValenciennes\nin France in October. On 14 October, he was assigned to\nJagdstaffel 35b\n, a Bavarian fighter squadron equipped with\nFokker D.VII\nbiplanes. He saw no action with Jagdstaffel 35b, as the war ended on 11 November 1918, before he had the opportunity.\nHess (right) with his geopolitics professor,\nKarl Haushofer\n,\nc.\n1920\nHess was discharged from the armed forces in December 1918. The family fortunes had taken a serious downturn, as their business interests in Egypt had been expropriated by the British.\nHe joined the\nThule Society\n, an\nantisemitic\nright-wing\nVölkisch\ngroup, and the\nFreikorps\nof Colonel Ritter von Epp,\none of many such volunteer paramilitary organisations active in Germany at the time.\nBavaria witnessed frequent and often bloody conflicts between right-wing groups, the\nFreikorps\n, and left-wing forces as they fought for control of the state during this period.\nHess was a participant in street battles in early 1919 and led a group that distributed thousands of antisemitic pamphlets in Munich.\nHe later said that Egypt made him a nationalist, the war made him a socialist, and Munich made him an antisemite.\nIn 1919, Hess enrolled in the\nUniversity of Munich\n, where he studied history and economics. His\ngeopolitics\nprofessor was\nKarl Haushofer\n, a former general in the German Army who was a proponent of the concept of\nLebensraum\n(\"living space\"), which Haushofer cited to justify the proposal that Germany should forcefully conquer additional territory in Eastern Europe.\nHe later introduced this concept to\nAdolf Hitler\n, and it became one of the pillars of\nNazi Party\nideology.\nHess became friends with Haushofer and his son\nAlbrecht\n, a social theorist and lecturer.\nIlse Pröhl\n, a fellow student at the university, met Hess in April 1920 when they by chance rented rooms in the same boarding house. They married on 20 December 1927 and their only child,\nWolf Rüdiger Hess\n, was born 10 years later, on 18 November 1937.\nHis name was, at least in part, to honour Hitler, who often used \"Wolf\" as a code name.\nHess nicknamed the boy \"Buz\".\nRelationship with Hitler\nHitler,\nEmil Maurice\n,\nHermann Kriebel\n, Hess, and\nFriedrich Weber\nat\nLandsberg Prison\nin 1924\nHess (2nd from left, behind\nHeinrich Himmler\n) was an early supporter of the Nazi Party.\nAfter hearing the Nazi Party leader Hitler speak for the first time in 1920 at a Munich rally, Hess became completely devoted to him. They held a shared belief in the\nstab-in-the-back myth\n, the notion that Germany's loss in World War I was caused by a conspiracy of Jews and\nBolsheviks\nrather than a military defeat.\nHe joined the Nazi Party on 1 July as member number 16.\nAs the party continued to grow, holding rallies and meetings in ever larger\nbeer halls\nin Munich, he focused his attention on fundraising and organisational activities. On 4 November 1921, he was injured while protecting Hitler when a bomb planted by a Marxist group exploded at the\nHofbräuhaus\nduring a party event. Hess joined the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) by 1922 and helped organise and recruit its early membership.\nMeanwhile, problems continued with the economy;\nhyperinflation\nrendered many personal fortunes worthless. When the German government failed to meet its reparations payments and French troops marched in to occupy the industrial areas along the\nRuhr\nin January 1923, widespread civil unrest was the result.\nHitler decided the time was ripe to attempt to seize control of the government with a\ncoup d'état\nmodelled on\nBenito Mussolini\n's 1922\nMarch on Rome\n.\nHess was with Hitler on the night of 8 November 1923 when he and the SA stormed a public meeting organised by Bavaria's de facto ruler,\nStaatskommissar\n(state commissioner)\nGustav von Kahr\n, in the\nBürgerbräukeller\n, a large beer hall in Munich. Brandishing a pistol, Hitler interrupted Kahr's speech and announced that the national revolution had begun, declaring the formation of a new government with World War I General\nErich Ludendorff\n.\nThe next day, Hitler and several thousand supporters attempted to march to the Ministry of War in the city centre. Gunfire broke out between the Nazis and the police; sixteen marchers and four police officers were killed. Hitler was arrested on 11 November.\nHess and some SA men had taken a few of the dignitaries hostage on the night of the 8th, driving them to a house about\n50 kilometres (31\nmi)\nfrom Munich. When Hess left briefly to make a phone call the next day, the hostages convinced the driver to help them escape. Hess, stranded, called Ilse Pröhl, who brought him a bicycle so he could return to Munich. He went to stay with the Haushofers and then fled to Austria, but they convinced him to return. He was arrested and sentenced to 18 months of\nFestungshaft\n(fortress confinement) for his role in the attempted coup, which later became known as the\nBeer Hall Putsch\n. Hitler was sentenced to five years of fortress confinement, and the Nazi Party and SA were both outlawed.\nHitler speaking at a party rally in\nMunich\nin 1925\nBoth men were incarcerated in\nLandsberg Prison\n, where Hitler soon began work on his memoir,\nMein Kampf\n(\"My Struggle\"), which he dictated to fellow prisoners Hess and\nEmil Maurice\n. Edited by publisher\nMax Amann\n, Hess and others, the work was published in two parts in 1925 and 1926. It was later released in a single volume, which became a best-seller after 1930.\nThis book, with its message of violent antisemitism, became the foundation of the political platform of the Nazi Party.\nHitler was released on parole on 20 December 1924 and Hess was released ten days later.\nThe ban on the Nazi Party and SA was lifted in February 1925, and the party grew to 100,000 members in 1928 and 150,000 in 1929.\nThey received only 2.6 per cent of the vote in the 1928 election, but support increased steadily up until the\nseizure of power\nin 1933.\nHitler named Hess his private secretary in April 1925 at a salary of 500\nReichsmarks\nper month, and named him as personal adjutant on 20 July 1929.\nHess accompanied Hitler to speaking engagements around the country and became his friend and confidante.\nHess was one of the few people who could meet with Hitler at any time without an appointment.\nHis influence in the Party continued to grow. On 15 December 1932, Hess was named head of the Party Liaison Staff and Chairman of the Party Central Political Commission.\nRetaining his interest in flying after the end of his active military career, Hess obtained his private pilot's licence on 4 April 1929. His instructor was World War I flying ace\nTheodor Croneiss\n. In 1930, Hess became the owner of a\nBFW M.23b\nmonoplane sponsored by the party newspaper, the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n. He acquired two more\nMesserschmitt\naircraft in the early 1930s, logging many flying hours and becoming proficient in the operation of light single-engine aircraft.\nDeputy Führer\nVehicle standard for Hess while serving as Deputy Führer\nOn 30 January 1933, Hitler was appointed\nReich Chancellor\n, his first step in gaining dictatorial control of Germany.\nHess was named Deputy Führer (\nStellvertreter des Führers\n) of the Nazi Party on 21 April. On 2 June 1933, he was made one of 16\nReichsleiters\nin the Party hierarchy. On 1 July, Hess was raised to the rank of\nObergruppenführer\nin the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS). However, by 20 September, Hitler decreed that he stop using the titles of\nReichsleiter\nand\nObergruppenführer\n, and use only the title of \"Deputy Führer\". This was an acknowledgement of his\nprimus inter pares\nstatus in the Party.\nHess was appointed to the cabinet as a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio on 1 December.\nWith offices in the\nBrown House\nin Munich and another in\nBerlin\n, Hess was responsible for several departments, including foreign affairs, finance, health, education and law.\nHess also was named as a member of\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nAll legislation passed through his office for approval, except that concerning the army, the police and foreign policy, and he wrote and co-signed many of Hitler's decrees.\nAn organiser of the annual\nNuremberg Rallies\n, Hess usually gave the opening speech and introduced Hitler. Hess also spoke over the radio and at rallies around the country, so frequently that the speeches were collected into book form in 1938.\nHess acted as Hitler's delegate in negotiations with industrialists and members of the wealthier classes.\nAs Hess had been born abroad, Hitler had him oversee the Nazi Party groups such as the\nNSDAP/AO\nthat were in charge of party members living in other countries.\nHitler instructed Hess to review all court decisions that related to persons deemed enemies of the Party. He was authorised to increase the sentences of anyone he felt got off too lightly in these cases, and was also empowered to take \"merciless action\" if he saw fit to do so. This often entailed sending the person to a concentration camp or simply ordering the person killed.\nIn 1933, Hess founded the\nVolksdeutscher Rat\n(Council of Ethnic Germans) to handle the Nazi Party's relations with ethnic German minorities around the world, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe. The purpose of the council was to protect the Nazi Party from criticism that it was attempting to extend the process of\nGleichschaltung\nto international ethnic German communities. Despite Hess's claims to the contrary, the council members were primarily loyal to Germany rather than their current nations. The eight council members, only one of whom was a member of the Nazi Party, were responsible only to Hess. All had long been known to either Hess or Haushofer, who was also involved with the council. Members publicly claimed to be uninvolved in the council, which Hess used as proof that the Nazi Party was not trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations.\nAs the council had considerable funds and appeared to be sufficiently independent of the German government to satisfy foreign governments, its activities had some impact on international German communities in the 1930s.\nIts most notable impact was in the\nSudetenland\n, where in 1933 it promoted\nKonrad Henlein\nas the politician with the best hope of building a Nazi-friendly party that would win mass support without being banned by the Czechoslovak government.\nThe Nazi regime began to persecute Jews soon after the seizure of power. Hess's office was partly responsible for drafting Hitler's\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935. These laws had far-reaching implications for the Jews of Germany, banning marriage between non-Jewish and Jewish Germans and depriving non-\nAryans\nof their German citizenship. Hess's friend Karl Haushofer and his family were subject to these laws, as Haushofer had married a half-Jewish woman, so Hess issued documents exempting them from this legislation.\nHess,\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nPhillip Bouhler\n,\nFritz Todt\n,\nReinhard Heydrich\n, and others listening to\nKonrad Meyer\nat a\nGeneralplan Ost\nexhibition, 20 March 1941\nHess did not build a power base or develop a coterie of followers.\nHe was motivated by his loyalty to Hitler and a desire to be useful to him; he did not seek power or prestige\nor take advantage of his position to accumulate personal wealth. He lived in a modest house in Munich.\nHess was devoted to the\nvölkisch\nideology and viewed many issues in terms of an alleged Jewish conspiracy against Germany. For example, he said in a speech that \"Today's League of Nations is really only a farce which functions primarily as the basis for the Jews to reach their own aims. You need only to note how many Jews sit in the League.\"\nIn a speech in 1937, Hess blamed the\nSpanish Civil War\non \"international Jewry\", called the Soviet Foreign Commissar\nMaxim Litvinov\na \"dirty Jew\", and claimed that without Hitler or Mussolini, \"Jewish Asiatic Bolshevism would dominate European culture\".\nOn 30 August 1939, immediately prior to the outbreak of the\nSecond World War\n, Hess was appointed by Hitler to the six-person\nCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich\nwhich was set up to operate as a war cabinet.\nAfter the\ninvasion of Poland\nand the start of the war on 1 September, Hitler made Hess second in line to succeed him, after\nHermann Göring\n.\nAround the same time, Hitler appointed Hess's chief of staff,\nMartin Bormann\n, as his personal secretary, a post formerly held by Hess.\nOn 8 October, Hess co-signed the law that annexed the\nFree City of Danzig\n, the\nPolish Corridor\n, and the\npart of Upper Silesia lost in 1921\nto Germany. That same day, Hess and\nHeinrich Himmler\nordered that a racial registry be established in these areas and stated that Poles and Jews living in these areas were not to be treated as equals of Germans. A separate legal code for Poles and Jews in the annexed areas was created, imposing draconian punishments. Hess argued that a separate legal code was necessary because \"the Pole is less susceptible to the infliction of ordinary punishment\".\nIn another decree, Hess ordered that none of the buildings destroyed in Warsaw during the siege were to be rebuilt as a reminder to the Poles of their \"war guilt\".\nHess's antisemitism markedly increased after the war started, as he was convinced that the war had been caused by Jews. This became a major theme of his wartime speeches. In a speech given on 20 April 1940 to mark Hitler's 51st birthday, Hess accused \"Jews and their fellow travellers\" of Germany's capitulation in November 1918, which he called the most calamitous event in world history. In that same speech, Hess, referring to the\nBlack Horror on the Rhine\nstory, stated the defeat of 1918 was followed by an occupation of the Rhineland by \"Negroes and Indians\", which he again blamed on the Jews. Hess concluded his speech by saying that with Hitler in charge, there was no possibility of the current war ending similarly. \"How the Jewish hounds will howl when Adolf Hitler stands before them,\" he concluded.\nHess was obsessed with his health to the point of\nhypochondria\n, consulting many doctors and other practitioners for what he described to his captors in Britain as a long list of ailments involving the kidneys, colon, gall bladder, bowels and heart. At that time Hess was a vegetarian, and he did not smoke or drink. He brought his own food to the\nBerghof\n, claiming it was\nbiologically dynamic\n, but Hitler did not approve of this practice, so he discontinued taking meals with the Führer.\nHess was interested in music, enjoyed reading and loved to spend time hiking and climbing in the mountains with his wife, Ilse. He and his friend Albrecht Haushofer shared an interest in\nastrology\n, and Hess also was keen on clairvoyance and the occult.\nHess continued to be interested in aviation. He won an air race in 1934, flying a\nBFW M.35\nin a circuit around\nZugspitze\nMountain and returning to the airfield at Munich with a time of 29 minutes. Hess placed sixth of 29 participants in a similar race held the following year.\nWith the outbreak of World War II, Hess asked Hitler to be allowed to join the\nLuftwaffe\nas a pilot, but Hitler forbade it, and ordered him to stop flying for the duration of the war. Hess convinced him to reduce the ban to one year.\nAttempted peace mission\nAs the war progressed, Hitler's attention became focused on foreign affairs and the conduct of the war.\nHess, whose duties did not require him to be directly engaged in the war, became increasingly sidelined from the affairs of the nation and from Hitler's attention. He was excluded from most important decisions, and many in Hitler's inner circle thought him to be mad due to his eccentricities.\nBormann had successfully supplanted Hess in many of his duties and had taken Hess' position at Hitler's side.\nHess was concerned that Germany would face a war on two fronts as plans progressed for\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the invasion of the\nSoviet Union\nscheduled to take place in 1941. Hess decided to attempt to bring Britain to the negotiating table by travelling there himself to seek meetings with the British government.\nOn 31 August 1940, Hess met with Karl Haushofer, who told Hess that he believed that\nKing George VI\nwas opposed to Churchill and would dismiss him and send him to Canada at the first opportunity. Haushofer spoke of his belief that it was possible to make contact with the king via either General\nIan Hamilton\nor\nthe Duke of Hamilton\n.\nHess decided they should contact his fellow aviator the Duke of Hamilton, whom he had never met. Hess chose Hamilton in the mistaken belief that he was one of the leaders of a party opposed to war with Germany, and because Hamilton was a friend of Haushofer. On Hess's instructions, Haushofer wrote to Hamilton in September 1940, but the letter was intercepted by\nMI5\nand Hamilton did not see it until March 1941.\nA letter Hess wrote to his wife dated 4 November 1940 shows that in spite of not receiving a reply from Hamilton, he intended to proceed with his plan. Hess began training on the\nMesserschmitt Bf 110\n, a two-seater twin-engine aircraft, in October 1940 under instructor\nWilhelm Stör\n, the chief test pilot at Messerschmitt. He continued to practice, as well as log his many cross-country flights, and found a specific aircraft which handled well—a Bf 110E-1/N—which was from then on held in reserve for his personal use. He asked for a radio compass, modifications to the oxygen delivery system, and large long-range fuel tanks to be installed on this plane, and these requests were granted by March 1941.\nFlight to Scotland\nAfter a final check of the weather reports for Germany and the\nNorth Sea\n, Hess took off at 17:45 on 10\nMay 1941 from the airfield at\nAugsburg-Haunstetten\nin his specially prepared aircraft.\nIt was the last of several attempts to depart on his mission; previous efforts had to be called off due to mechanical problems or poor weather.\nWearing a leather flying suit bearing the rank of captain, he brought along a supply of money and toiletries, a\ntorch\n, a camera, maps and charts, and a collection of 28 different medicines, as well as\ndextrose\ntablets to help ward off fatigue and an assortment of homoeopathic remedies.\nSetting a course towards\nBonn\n, Hess used landmarks on the ground to orient himself and make minor course corrections. When he reached the coast near the\nFrisian Islands\n, Hess turned and flew in an easterly direction for twenty minutes to stay out of range of British radar. He then took a heading of 335\ndegrees for the trip across the North Sea, initially at low altitude but travelling for most of the journey at\n5,000 feet (1,500\nm)\n. At 20:58, he changed his heading to 245\ndegrees, intending to approach the coast of\nNorth East England\nnear the village of\nBamburgh\n, Northumberland. As it was not yet sunset when he first approached the coast, Hess backtracked, zigzagging back and forth for 40\nminutes until it grew dark. Around this time, his auxiliary fuel tanks were exhausted so he released them into the sea. Also around this time, at 22:08, the British\nChain Home\nstation at Ottercops Moss near\nNewcastle upon Tyne\ndetected Hess' presence and informed the\nFilter Room\nat\nBentley Priory\n. He was quickly detected by several other stations, and the aircraft was designated as \"Raid 42\".\nWreckage of Hess's\nMesserschmitt Bf 110\nat the site of the crash\nTwo\nSpitfires\nof\nNo. 72 Squadron RAF\n,\nNo. 13 Group RAF\nthat were already in the air were sent to attempt an interception, but failed to find the intruder. A third Spitfire sent from\nAcklington\nat 22:20 also failed to spot the aircraft; by then, it was dark and Hess had dropped to an extremely low altitude, so low that the volunteer on duty at the\nRoyal Observer Corps\n(ROC) station at\nChatton\nwas able to correctly identify it as a Bf 110, and reported its altitude as\n50 feet (15\nm)\n. Tracked by additional ROC posts, Hess continued his flight into Scotland at high speed and low altitude, but was unable to spot his destination,\nDungavel House\n, so he headed for the west coast to orient himself and then turned back inland. At 22:35, a\nBoulton Paul Defiant\nsent from\nNo. 141 Squadron RAF\nbased at\nAyr\nbegan pursuit. Hess was nearly out of fuel, so he climbed to\n6,000 feet (1,800\nm)\nand parachuted out of the plane at 23:06. He injured his foot, either while exiting the aircraft or when he hit the ground. The aircraft crashed at 23:09, about\n12 miles (19\nkm)\nwest of Dungavel House, the Duke of Hamilton's home.\nHess would have been closer to his destination had he not had trouble exiting the aircraft.\nHess's biographers Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel considered the flight to have been \"the proudest technical achievement of Hess's life.\"\nBefore his departure from Germany, Hess had given his adjutant,\nKarlheinz Pintsch\n, a letter addressed to Hitler that detailed his plans to initiate peace negotiations with the UK.\nHess intended to approach the Duke of Hamilton at his home in Scotland, hoping that the duke might then be willing to advocate for and assist him in negotiating peace with Germany on terms that would be acceptable to Hitler.\nPintsch delivered the letter to Hitler at the Berghof around noon on 11 May.\nAfter reading the letter, Hitler let loose a cry heard throughout the entire Berghof and sent for a number of his inner circle, concerned that a\nputsch\nmight be underway.\nHitler worried that his allies, Italy and Japan, would perceive Hess' act as an attempt by Hitler to secretly open peace negotiations with the British. Hitler contacted Mussolini specifically to reassure him otherwise.\nFor this reason, Hitler ordered that the German press should characterise Hess as a madman who made the decision to fly to Scotland entirely on his own, without Hitler's knowledge or authority. Subsequent German newspaper reports described Hess as \"deluded, deranged,\" indicating that his mental health had been affected by injuries sustained during World War I. Some members of the government, including Göring and Propaganda Minister\nJoseph Goebbels\n, believed this only made matters worse, because if Hess truly were mentally ill, he should not have held an important government position.\nHitler stripped Hess of all of his party and state offices, and secretly ordered him shot on sight if he ever returned to Germany. Hitler abolished the post of Deputy Führer, assigning Hess' former duties to Bormann, with the title of Head of the\nParty Chancellery\n.\nBormann used the opportunity afforded by Hess's departure to secure significant power for himself.\nMeanwhile, Hitler initiated\nAktion Hess\n, a flurry of hundreds of arrests of astrologers, faith healers and occultists that took place around 9 June. The campaign was part of a propaganda effort by Goebbels and others to denigrate Hess and to make scapegoats of occult practitioners.\nUS journalist\nHubert Renfro Knickerbocker\n, who had met both Hitler and Hess, speculated that Hitler had sent Hess to deliver a message informing\nWinston Churchill\nof the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union, and offering a negotiated peace or even an anti-Bolshevik partnership.\nSoviet leader\nJoseph Stalin\nbelieved that Hess's flight had been engineered by the British. Stalin persisted in this belief as late as 1944, when he mentioned the matter to Churchill, who insisted that they had no advance knowledge of the flight.\nWhile some sources reported that Hess had been on an official mission, Churchill later stated in his book\nThe Grand Alliance\nthat in his view, the mission had not been authorised. \"He came to us of his own free will, and, though without authority, had something of the quality of an envoy\", said Churchill, and referred to Hess's plan as one of \"lunatic benevolence\".\nAfter the war,\nAlbert Speer\ndiscussed the rationale for the flight with Hess, who told him that \"the idea had been inspired in him in a dream by supernatural forces. We will guarantee England her empire; in return she will give us a free hand in Europe.\"\nWhile in Spandau prison, Hess told journalist\nDesmond Zwar\nthat Germany could not win a war on two fronts. \"I knew that there was only one way out – and that was certainly not to fight against England. Even though I did not get permission from the Führer to fly, I knew that what I had to say would have had his approval. Hitler had great respect for the English people\n...\"\nHess wrote that his flight to Scotland was intended to initiate \"the fastest way to win the war.\"\nCapture\nShortly before midnight on 10 May 1941, Hess landed at Floors Farm, by\nWaterfoot\n, south of Glasgow, where he was discovered still struggling with his parachute by local ploughman David McLean. Identifying himself as \"\nHauptmann\nAlfred Horn\", Hess said he had an important message for the Duke of Hamilton. McLean helped Hess to his nearby cottage and contacted the local\nHome Guard\nunit, who escorted the captive to their headquarters in\nBusby, East Renfrewshire\n. Hess was next taken to the police station at\nGiffnock\n, arriving after midnight. He was searched and his possessions confiscated. Hess repeatedly requested to meet with the Duke of Hamilton during questioning undertaken with the aid of an interpreter by Major Graham Donald, the area commandant of the Royal Observer Corps. After the interview, he was taken under guard to\nMaryhill Barracks\nin Glasgow, where his injuries were treated. By this time, some of his captors suspected his true identity, though Hess continued to insist his name was Horn.\nPart of the\nfuselage\nof Hess' Bf 110.\nImperial War Museum\n(2008)\nHamilton had been on duty as\nwing commander\nat\nRAF Turnhouse\nnear Edinburgh when Hess had arrived, and his station had been one of those that had tracked the progress of the flight. He arrived at Maryhill Barracks the next morning, and after examining Hess' effects, he met alone with the prisoner. Hess immediately admitted his true identity and outlined the reason for his flight. Hamilton told Hess that he hoped to continue the conversation with the aid of an interpreter; Hess could speak English well, but was having trouble understanding Hamilton.\nHe told Hamilton that he was on a \"mission of humanity\" and that Hitler \"wished to stop the fighting\" with England.\nAfter the meeting, Hamilton examined the remains of the Messerschmitt in the company of an intelligence officer, then returned to Turnhouse, where he made arrangements through the\nForeign Office\nto meet Churchill, who was at\nDitchley Park\nin Oxfordshire for the weekend. They had some preliminary talks that night, and Hamilton accompanied Churchill back to London the next day, where they both met with members of the\nWar Cabinet\n. Churchill sent Hamilton with foreign affairs expert\nIvone Kirkpatrick\n, who had met Hess previously, to positively identify the prisoner, who had been moved to\nBuchanan Castle\novernight.\nHess, who had prepared extensive notes to use during this meeting, spoke to them at length about Hitler's expansionary plans and the need for Britain to let the Nazis have free rein in Europe, in exchange for Britain being allowed to keep its overseas possessions. Kirkpatrick held two more meetings with Hess over the course of the next few days, while Hamilton returned to his duties. In addition to being disappointed at the apparent failure of his mission, Hess began claiming that his medical treatment was inadequate and that there was a plot afoot to poison him.\nHess' flight, but not his destination or fate, was first announced by\nMunich Radio\nin Germany on the evening of 12 May. The following day, Hitler sent Foreign Minister\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nto give the news in person to Mussolini, and the British press was permitted to release full information about events that same day. On 14 May, Ilse Hess finally learned that her husband had survived the trip when news of his fate was broadcast on German radio.\nTwo sections of the fuselage of the aircraft were initially hidden by David McLean and later retrieved. One part was sold to the former assistant secretary of the Battle of Britain Association, who gave it to a war museum in the US; this\n17.5 by 23 inches (44 by 58\ncm)\npart was later sold by\nBonhams\nat auction.\nPart of the fuel tank and a strut were offered for sale via Bonhams in 2014.\nOther wreckage was salvaged by 63 Maintenance Unit between 11 and 16 May 1941 and then taken to\nOxford\nto be stored. The aeroplane had been armed with four machine guns in the nose, but carried no ammunition.\nOne of the engines is on display at the\nRAF Museum\nwhile the\nImperial War Museum\ndisplays another engine and part of the fuselage.\nTrial and imprisonment\nPrisoner of war\nFrom Buchanan Castle, Hess was transferred briefly to the\nTower of London\nand then to\nMytchett Place\nin\nSurrey\n, a fortified mansion, designated \"Camp Z\", where he stayed for the next 13 months.\nChurchill issued orders that Hess was to be treated well, though he was not allowed to read newspapers or listen to the radio. Three intelligence officers were stationed onsite and 150 soldiers were placed on guard. By early June, Hess was allowed to write to his family. He also prepared a letter to the Duke of Hamilton, but it was never delivered, and his repeated requests for further meetings were turned down.\nMajor\nFrank Foley\n, the leading German expert in MI6 and former British Passport Control Officer in Berlin, took charge of a year-long abortive debriefing of Hess, according to Foreign Office files released to the National Archives.\nHenry V. Dicks and\nJohn Rawlings Rees\n, psychiatrists who treated Hess during this period, noted that while he was not insane, he was mentally unstable, with tendencies toward hypochondria and paranoia.\nHess repeated his peace proposal to\nJohn Simon, 1st Viscount Simon\n, then serving as\nLord Chancellor\n, in an interview on 9 June 1942. Lord Simon noted that the prisoner's mental state was not good; Hess claimed he was being poisoned and was being prevented from sleeping.\nHe would insist on swapping his dinner with that of one of his guards, and attempted to get them to send samples of the food out for analysis.\nAt this time he resumed eating meat,\nand continued to include it in his diet during his incarceration at Spandau.\nWhile in Scotland, Hess claimed to have discovered a \"secret force\" controlling the minds of Churchill and other British leaders, filling them with an irrational hatred of Germany. Hess claimed that the force acted on Hitler's mind as well, causing him to make poor military decisions. He said that the Jews had psychic powers that allowed them to control the minds of others, including Himmler, and that the Holocaust was part of a Jewish plot to defame Germany.\nIn the early morning hours of 16 June 1942, Hess rushed his guards and attempted suicide by jumping over the railing of the staircase at Mytchett Place. He fell onto the stone floor below, fracturing the\nfemur\nof his left leg. The injury required that the leg be kept in\ntraction\nfor 12 weeks, with a further six weeks bed rest before he was permitted to walk with crutches. Captain Munro Johnson of the\nRoyal Army Medical Corps\n, who assessed Hess, noted that another suicide attempt was likely to occur in the near future. Hess began around this time to complain of amnesia. This symptom and some of his increasingly erratic behaviour may have in part been a ruse, because if he were declared mentally ill, he could be repatriated under the terms of the\nGeneva Conventions\n.\nHess was moved to\nMaindiff Court Hospital\non 26 June 1942, where he remained for the next three years. The facility was chosen for its added security and the need for fewer guards. Hess was allowed walks on the grounds and car trips into the surrounding countryside. He had access to newspapers and other reading materials; he wrote letters and journals. His mental health remained under the care of Dr. Rees. Hess continued to complain on and off of memory loss and made a second suicide attempt on 4 February 1945, when he stabbed himself with a bread knife. The wound was not serious, requiring two stitches. Despondent that Germany was losing the war, he took no food for the next week, only resuming eating when he was threatened with being force-fed.\nGermany surrendered unconditionally on 8 May 1945. Hess, facing charges as a war criminal, was ordered to appear before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nand was transported to\nNuremberg\non 10 October 1945.\nNuremberg trials\nFurther information:\nNuremberg trials\nHess in his cell at Nuremberg in November 1945\nThe\nAllies of World War II\nheld a series of military tribunals and trials, beginning with a trial of the major war criminals from November 1945 to October 1946. Hess was tried with this first group of 23 defendants, all of whom were charged with several counts from conspiracy to commit crimes, crimes against peace,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n, in violation of international laws governing warfare.\nOn his arrival in Nuremberg, Hess was reluctant to give up some of his possessions, including samples of food he said had been poisoned by the British; he proposed to use these for his defence during the trial. The commandant of the facility, Colonel\nBurton C. Andrus\nof the United States Army, advised him that he would be allowed no special treatment; the samples were sealed and confiscated.\nHess's diaries indicate that he did not acknowledge the validity of the court and felt the outcome was a foregone conclusion. He was thin when he arrived, weighing\n65 kilograms (143\nlb)\n, and had a poor appetite, but was deemed to be in good health. As one defendant,\nRobert Ley\n, had managed to hang himself in his cell on 24 October, the remaining prisoners were monitored around the clock.\nBecause of his previous suicide attempts, Hess was handcuffed to a guard whenever he was out of his cell.\nAlmost immediately after his arrival, Hess began exhibiting\namnesia\n, which may have been feigned in the hope of avoiding the death sentence. The chief psychiatrist at Nuremberg,\nDouglas Kelley\nof the US Military, gave the opinion that the defendant suffered from \"a true psychoneurosis, primarily of the hysterical type, engrafted on a basic paranoid and schizoid personality, with amnesia, partly genuine and partly feigned\", but found him fit to stand trial.\nEfforts were made to trigger his memory, including bringing in his former secretaries and showing old newsreels, but he persisted in showing no response to these stimuli.\nThe tribunal's Chief medical officer, Lieutenant Colonel\nRene Juchli\n, declared that Hess was suffering from intentional amnesia.\nWhen he was allowed to make a statement to the tribunal on 30 November, Hess admitted that he had faked memory loss as a tactic.\nThe prosecution's case against Hess was presented by\nMervyn Griffith-Jones\nbeginning on 7 February 1946. By quoting from Hess' speeches, he attempted to demonstrate that Hess had been aware of and agreed with Hitler's plans to conduct a war of aggression in violation of international law. He declared that as Hess had signed important governmental decrees, including the decree requiring mandatory military service, the Nuremberg racial laws, and a decree incorporating the conquered Polish territories into the Reich, he must share responsibility for the acts of the regime. Griffith-Jones pointed out that the timing of Hess's trip to Scotland, only six weeks before the German\ninvasion of the Soviet Union\n, could only be viewed as an attempt by Hess to prevent the British from interfering. Hess resumed showing symptoms of amnesia at the end of February, partway through the prosecution's case.\nHess (left) and\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nin the defendants' box at the\nNuremberg Trials\nAt the opening of the trial in November 1945, Hess responded \"\nnein\n\" (no) when asked to enter a plea. The court recorded this as a \"not guilty\" plea.\nThe case for Hess' defence was presented from 22 to 26 March 1946 by his lawyer, Dr Alfred Seidl. He noted that while Hess accepted responsibility for the many decrees he had signed, he said these matters were part of the internal workings of a sovereign state and thus outside the purview of a war crimes trial. He called to the stand\nErnst Wilhelm Bohle\n, the man who had been head of the\nNSDAP/AO\n, to testify on Hess' behalf. When Griffith-Jones presented questions about the organisation's spying in several countries, Bohle testified that any warlike activities such as espionage had been done without his permission or knowledge. Seidl called two other witnesses, former mayor of\nStuttgart\nKarl Strölin\nand Hess' brother Alfred, both of whom repudiated the allegations that the NSDAP/AO had been spying and fomenting war. Seidl presented a summation of the defence's case on 25 July, in which he attempted to refute the charge of conspiracy by pointing out that Hitler alone had made all the important decisions. He noted that Hess could not be held responsible for any events that took place after he left Germany in May 1941. Meanwhile, Hess mentally detached himself from what was happening, declining visits from his family and refusing to read the newspapers.\nHess spoke to the tribunal again on 31 August 1946 during the last day of closing statements, where he made a lengthy statement.\nThe court deliberated for nearly two months before passing judgement on 30 September, with the defendants being individually sentenced the following day. Hess was found guilty on two counts: crimes against peace (planning and preparing a war of aggression), and conspiracy with other German leaders to commit crimes. He was found not guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hess was given a life sentence, one of seven Nazis to receive prison sentences at the trial. These seven were transported by aircraft to the Allied military prison at\nSpandau\nin Berlin on 18 July 1947.\nThe Soviet member of the tribunal, Major-General\nIona Nikitchenko\n, filed a document recording his dissent of Hess's sentence; he felt the death sentence was warranted.\nSpandau Prison\nSpandau was placed under the control of the\nAllied Control Council\n, the governing body in charge of the military occupation of Germany, which consisted of representatives from the UK, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Each country supplied prison guards for a month at a time on a rotating basis. After the inmates were given medical examinations—Hess refused his body search, and had to be held down\n—they were provided with prison garb and assigned the numbers by which they were addressed throughout their stay. Hess was Number 7. The prison had a small library and inmates were allowed to file special requests for additional reading material. Writing materials were limited; each inmate was allowed four pieces of paper per month for letters. They were not allowed to speak to one another without permission and were expected to work in the facility, helping with cleaning and gardening chores.\nThe inmates were taken for outdoor walks around the prison grounds for an hour each day, separated by about\n10 yards (9\nm)\n. Some of the rules became more relaxed as time went on.\nChanging of the guard at\nSpandau Prison\n, mid-1980s\nVisitors were allowed to come for half an hour per month, but Hess forbade his family to visit until December 1969, when he was a patient at the British Military Hospital in\nWest Berlin\nfor a perforated ulcer. By this time, Wolf Rüdiger Hess was 32 years old and Ilse 69; they had not seen Hess since his departure from Germany in 1941. After this illness, he allowed his family to visit regularly. His daughter-in-law, Andrea, who often brought photos and films of his grandchildren, became a particularly welcome visitor.\nHess' health problems, both mental and physical, were ongoing during his captivity. He cried out in the night, claiming he had stomach pains. He continued to suspect that his food was being poisoned and complained of amnesia.\nA psychiatrist who examined him in 1957 deemed that Hess was not ill enough to be transferred to a mental hospital.\nHess attempted suicide again in 1977.\nOther than his stays in hospital, Hess spent the rest of his life in Spandau Prison.\nHis fellow inmates\nKonstantin von Neurath\n,\nWalther Funk\n, and\nErich Raeder\nwere released because of poor health in the 1950s;\nKarl Dönitz\n,\nBaldur von Schirach\n, and\nAlbert Speer\nserved their time and were released; Dönitz left in 1956, Schirach and Speer in 1966.\nThe 600-cell prison continued to be maintained for its lone prisoner from 1966 until Hess's death in 1987, at an estimated annual cost of\nDM\n800,000.\nConditions were far more pleasant in the 1980s than in the early years; Hess was allowed to move more freely around the cell block, setting his own routine and choosing his own activities, which included television, films, reading, and gardening. A lift was installed so he could easily reach the garden, and he was provided with a medical orderly from 1982 onward.\nHess' lawyer Alfred Seidl launched numerous appeals for his release, beginning as early as 1947. These were denied, mainly because the Soviets repeatedly vetoed the proposal. Spandau was located in West Berlin, and its existence gave the Soviets a foothold in that sector of the city. Additionally, Soviet officials believed Hess must have known in 1941 that an attack on their country was imminent.\nIn 1967, Wolf Rüdiger Hess began a campaign to win his father's release, garnering support from politicians such as\nGeoffrey Lawrence\nin the UK and\nWilly Brandt\nin West Germany, but to no avail, in spite of the prisoner's advanced age and deteriorating health.\nIn 1967, Wolf Hess founded a society that by September had collected 700 signatures on a petition calling for Hess's release. By 1974, 350,000 people had signed the petition.\nThe American historian\nNorman Goda\nwrote that those who campaigned to free Hess routinely exaggerated the harshness of his imprisonment.\nGoda states that Wolf Hess's efforts to free his father ultimately backfired as he conflated the question of whether his father deserved release on humanitarian grounds with the question of whether his father was guilty.\nWolf argued that his father was unjustly imprisoned to hide the UK's \"war guilt\", arguing that millions of lives could have been saved if only Churchill had accepted Hess's peace offer in May 1941.\nIn 1973, the Israeli foreign minister\nAbba Eban\ncharged that Hess was not being treated as badly as his champions claimed and that he should serve his full sentence.\nGraffiti on a hoarding outside\nKaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church\nin\nWest Berlin\nin 1981. The comments read \"Freedom for Rudolf Hess\" and \"\nDo you also want total war\n?\"\nIn September 1979, medical tests showed that Hess was suffering from potentially fatal prostate cancer.\nIn a letter dated 8 September 1979, Hess announced that he would refuse treatment unless released, saying he deserved freedom as an \"unjustly convicted man\" and that if he were to die, his death would be on the consciences of the leaders of the UK, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States.\nCyrus Vance\nwrote: \"Far from representing the beginning of irrationality, Hess's well considered attempt is to use his medical condition to 'force' his release\".\nThe British Foreign Secretary,\nLord Carrington\n, appealed for Hess's release, but Soviet Foreign Minister\nAndrei Gromyko\nrefused on the grounds that Hess had never \"shown even a shadow of repentance\" and was still claiming innocence.\nGromyko also said that many people would take Hess's release as confirmation of a wrongful conviction. Hess's appeal to neo-Nazi groups in West Germany further increased the Soviet unwillingness to consider his release.\nHess continued to be an unapologetic Nazi and antisemite; this was usually ignored by those championing his release, who portrayed him as a harmless old man.\nHess further hindered efforts to get himself released by promising to make no statements to the media if he were released, while repeatedly writing drafts of statements that he planned to make. On 25 June 1986, a Soviet guard caught Charles Gabel, the chaplain at Spandau, attempting to smuggle out a statement by Hess, causing Gabel to be fired. Hess had originally written the document as his opening address at the Nuremberg trial in 1946, which he had been unable to deliver in full after the judges cut him short. Hess tried to mail a copy of the statement to Sir\nOswald Mosley\nin October 1946, but the letter was intercepted by his US guards.\nHess's statement (both the 1946 version and the 1986 version) claimed that Germany's attack on the Soviet Union was preemptive; he claimed there had been overwhelming evidence that\nthe Soviet Union had planned to attack Germany\n. He said in the statement that he had decided to make his flight to Scotland without informing Hitler, with the aim of informing the UK of the Soviet danger to \"European civilization\" and the entire world. He believed his warning would cause the UK to end its war with Germany and join in the fight against the Soviet Union.\nDeath and aftermath\nHess was found dead on 17 August 1987, aged 93, in a summer house that had been set up in the prison garden as a reading room; he had hanged\nhimself using an extension cable strung over a window latch. A short note to his family was found in his pocket, thanking them for all that they had done.\nThe Four-Powers Authority\nreleased a statement on 17 September ruling the death a suicide. Hess was initially buried at a secret location to avoid media attention or demonstrations by Nazi sympathisers, but his body was re-interred in a family plot at\nWunsiedel\non 17 March 1988; his wife was subsequently buried beside him in 1995.\nHess' lawyer Alfred Seidl felt that he was too old and frail to have managed to kill himself. Wolf Rüdiger Hess repeatedly claimed that his father had been murdered by the British\nSecret Intelligence Service\nto prevent him from revealing information about British misconduct during the war. According to an investigation by the British government in 1989, the available evidence did not back up the claim that Hess was murdered, and Solicitor General\nSir Nicholas Lyell\nsaw no grounds for further investigation.\nThe autopsy results supported the conclusion that Hess had killed himself.\nA report declassified and published in 2012 led to questions again being asked as to whether Hess had been murdered. Historian\nPeter Padfield\nwrote that the suicide note found on the body appeared to have been written when Hess was hospitalised in 1969.\nHess' grave in Wunsiedel became a destination for\nneo-Nazi\npilgrimage and for demonstrations each August on the anniversary of his death. To prevent further pilgrimages, the parish council did not extend the grave's lease when it expired in 2011.\nWith the eventual consent of his family, Hess's grave was re-opened on 20 July 2011. The remains were cremated and the ashes scattered at sea by family members. The gravestone, which bore the epitaph\n\"Ich hab's gewagt\"\n(\"I have dared\"), was destroyed.\nSpandau Prison was demolished in 1987 to prevent it from becoming a neo-Nazi shrine.\nA myth that the Spandau prisoner was not actually Hess was disproved in 2019.\nA study of DNA testing undertaken by Sherman McCall, formerly of the\nWalter Reed Army Medical Center\n, and Jan Cemper-Kiesslich of the\nUniversity of Salzburg\ndemonstrated a 99.99 per cent match between the prisoner's\nY chromosome\nDNA markers and those of a living male Hess relative.\nSee also\nBiography portal\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nList of SS-\nObergruppenführer\nNeue Deutsche Heilkunde\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nLawrence had been the president of the judicial group at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.\nCitations\n1\n2\nOrlow 2010\n, p.\n261.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n69.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n19.\n↑\nCollier\n&\nPedley 2000\n, p.\n68.\n1\n2\nBroszat 1981\n, pp.\n308–309.\n1\n2\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression 1946\n, p.\n466.\n↑\nWilliams 2015\n, pp.\n497–498.\n1\n2\nWilliams 2015\n, p.\n497.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n2.\n↑\nSchmidt 1997\n, pp.\n37–38.\n1\n2\nHess 1987\n, pp.\n26–27.\n1\n2\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n2–3.\n1\n2\nRubinstein 2007\n, p.\n140.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n4–6.\n↑\nHess 1987\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n8–9.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n9–12.\n↑\nHess 1987\n, pp.\n27–28.\n↑\nPadfield 2001\n, p.\n13.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n13–14.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n156–159.\n1\n2\n3\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n14.\n1\n2\n3\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n345.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n15, 20.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nPick 2012\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n15.\n1\n2\nHess 1987\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n186–187.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n186.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n193–194.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n73–74.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n18–19.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n70, 73.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n196.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n201, 211.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n209, 282.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n6.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n20–21.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n307.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n226–227.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n79.\n1\n2\nHess 1987\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n21–22.\n↑\nWilliams 2015\n, p.\n498.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n47–48.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n37, 60, 62.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nJacobsen 1999\n, pp.\n68.\n↑\nJacobsen 1999\n, pp.\n69.\n↑\nJacobsen 1999\n, pp.\n70.\n1\n2\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, pp.\n543–544.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nHess 1987\n, p.\n36.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n226.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n599.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n47.\n1\n2\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n63–67.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n24.\n1\n2\n3\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nWright 2024\n.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n837.\n↑\nSereny 1996\n, p.\n321.\n↑\nHerwig 2016\n, p.\n176.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n29–30.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n836.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n32–37.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n92.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n46–51.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n52–58.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n97.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nHandwerk 2016\n.\n1\n2\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n478.\n1\n2\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n838.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n169.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, pp.\n478–479.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n126–127, 131–132.\n↑\nKnickerbocker 1941\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n107–108.\n↑\nChurchill 1950\n, p.\n55.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n241.\n↑\nBoyes 2010\n.\n↑\nZwar 2010\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n101–105.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n58–61.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n105–107.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n61–63.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n835.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n61–68.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n116–117, 124.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n119–120.\n↑\nBonhams 2014\n.\n↑\nBonhams 2015\n.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n72–73.\n↑\nThe Scotsman\n2014\n.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n128.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n82, 88, 95.\n↑\nSmith 2004\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n139–140.\n↑\nLeasor 2001\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, pp.\n152, 196, 257.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n262–263.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n92–95.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n139–140, 149.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n95–97.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n142–145.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n741.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n151–152.\n↑\nSereny 1996\n, p.\n573.\n1\n2\nBird 1974\n, pp.\n37–38.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n153.\n1\n2\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n154–155.\n↑\nChesler 2014\n.\n↑\nWashington Daily News\n&\nOctober 17, 1945\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n159.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n162–163.\n↑\nPathé 1945\n.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n165–171.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nPick 2012\n, p.\n282.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n173.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n175.\n1\n2\nSereny 1996\n, p.\n604.\n↑\nBird 1974\n, pp.\n68–71.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n186, 195.\n1\n2\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n100–101.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n186–187, 195.\n↑\nSpeer 1976\n, pp.\n193, 197, 234, 305.\n↑\nSpeer 1976\n, p.\n314.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n195, 200.\n↑\nSpeer 1976\n, pp.\n258, 278, 310.\n↑\nSpeer 1976\n, pp.\n300, 446.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n189, 197.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n189–192.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, p.\n195.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 1971\n, pp.\n192–195.\n↑\nHess 1987\n, pp.\n325–327.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n237, 243.\n1\n2\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n222.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n248–249.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n249.\n1\n2\n3\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n250.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n252.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n253–254.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n260–261.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, p.\n263.\n↑\nGoda 2007\n, pp.\n261–262.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, pp.\n101–103.\n↑\nMilmo 2013\n.\n1\n2\nGreenwald\n&\nFreeman 1987\n.\n↑\nNesbit\n&\nvan Acker 2011\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nBild\n2009\n.\n↑\nRojas\n&\nWardrop 2012\n.\n↑\nDowling 2011\n.\n↑\nBBC News 2011\n.\n↑\nMcCall et al. 2019\n.\n↑\nKnapton 2019\n.\nBibliography\n\"Bezirk feuert Krankenpfleger von Heß\"\n[\nDistrict nurse fired over Hess\n]\n.\nBild\n(in German). Axel Springer AG. 24 July 2008. Archived from\nthe original\non 23 January 2009\n. Retrieved\n27 February\n2013\n.\nBird, Eugene\n(1974).\nThe Loneliest Man in the World\n. London: Martin Secker & Warburg.\nOCLC\n1094312\n.\nBoyes, Roger\n(7 June 2010).\n\"How I got Hess talking: Australian journalist Desmond Zwar explains\"\n.\nThe Australian\n. News Corp Australia.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 21 October 2021\n. Retrieved\n26 November\n2024\n.\nBroszat, Martin (1981).\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich\n. New York: Longman Inc.\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n.\nChesler, Caren (1 October 2014).\n\"Rudolf Hess' Tale of Poison, Paranoia and Tragedy\"\n.\nSmithsonian Magazine\n.\nSmithsonian Institution\n. Retrieved\n4 September\n2018\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nChurchill, Winston\n(1950).\nThe Grand Alliance: The Second World War\n. Boston; Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin.\nCollier, Martin; Pedley, Philip (2000).\nGermany 1919–1945\n. Heinemann Educational Publishers.\nISBN\n0-435-32721-6\n.\n\"Deputy Fuhrer Rudolf Walter Richard Hess: Sections of his Crashed Plane, Recovered From Floors Farm, Eagleston, Scotland, 11 May 1941\"\n.\nBonhams\n. 21 October 2015\n. Retrieved\n4 September\n2019\n.\nDowling, Siobhan (21 July 2011).\n\"Rudolf Hess's body removed from cemetery to deter Nazi pilgrims\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n. Retrieved\n26 February\n2013\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nGoda, Norman\n(2007).\nTales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-86720-7\n.\nGunther, John\n(1940).\nInside Europe\n. New York: Harper & Brothers.\nOCLC\n836676034\n.\nHandwerk, Brian (10 May 2016).\n\"Will We Ever Know Why Nazi Leader Rudolf Hess Flew to Scotland in the Middle of World War II?\"\n.\nSmithsonian Magazine\n. Smithsonian Institution\n. Retrieved\n28 August\n2017\n.\n\"Hess Faking Amnesia, Says U.S. Army Doctor\".\nWashington Daily News\n. No.\n30. E. W. Scripps. 17 October 1945.\nHess, Wolf Rüdiger\n(1987) .\nMy Father Rudolf Hess\n. London: W.H. Allen.\nISBN\n0-352-32214-4\n.\nHerwig, Holger (2016).\nThe Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer \"Educated\" Hitler and Hess\n. Latham: Rowman & Littlefield.\nISBN\n978-1-4422-6114-3\n.\nGreenwald, John; Freeman, Clive (31 August 1987).\n\"Germany: The Inmate of Spandau's Last Wish\"\n.\nTime\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 6 December 2008\n. Retrieved\n27 February\n2013\n.\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf (1999). \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1945\". In Leitz, Christian (ed.).\nThe Third Reich: The Essential Readings\n. London: Blackwell.\nISBN\n0-631-20700-7\n.\nKnapton, Sarah (22 January 2019).\n\"Conspiracy theory that Rudolf Hess was switched for doppelganger in Spandau prison, debunked by DNA\"\n.\nThe Telegraph\n. Retrieved\n28 January\n2019\n.\nKnickerbocker, H. R.\n(1941).\nIs Tomorrow Hitler's? 200 Questions on the Battle of Mankind\n. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.\nLang, Jochen von (1979).\nThe Secretary. Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler\n. New York: Random House.\nISBN\n978-0-394-50321-9\n.\nLeasor, James (2001) .\nRudolf Hess: The Uninvited Envoy\n. London: House of Stratus.\nISBN\n978-0-7551-0041-5\n.\nOCLC\n155720683\n.\nManvell, Roger\n;\nFraenkel, Heinrich\n(1971).\nHess: A Biography\n. London: Granada.\nISBN\n0-261-63246-9\n.\nMcCall, Sherman; Kreindl, Gabriele; Kastinger, Tamara; Müller, Eva; Zahrer, Waltraud; Grießner, Ines; Dunkelmann, Bettina; Tutsch-Bauer, Edith; Neuhuber, Franz; Pittman, Phillip R.; Wahl, Rick; Lowry, Mark; Cemper-Kiesslich, Jan (May 2019). \"Rudolf Hess – The Doppelgänger conspiracy theory disproved\".\nForensic Science International. Genetics\n.\n40\n:\n18–\n22.\ndoi\n:\n10.1016/j.fsigen.2019.01.004\n.\nISSN\n1878-0326\n.\nPMID\n30685710\n.\nS2CID\n59306479\n.\nMilmo, Cahal (10 September 2013).\n\"Adolf Hitler's Nazi deputy Rudolf Hess 'murdered by British agents' to stop him spilling wartime secrets\"\n.\nThe Independent\n. Retrieved\n10 September\n2013\n.\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XV, Part 3: The Reich Cabinet\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n20 August\n2017\n.\nNesbit, Roy Conyers; van Acker, Georges (2011) .\nThe Flight of Rudolf Hess: Myths and Reality\n. Stroud: History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7509-4757-2\n.\nThe Nuremberg Trials\n(Newsreel)\n. British Pathé. 1945.  Event occurs at 2:20\n. Retrieved\n14 December\n2024\n.\nOrlow, Dietrich (2010).\nThe Nazi Party 1919–1945: A Complete History\n. Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-1-929631-57-5\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n(2001).\nHess: The Fuhrer's Disciple\n. London: Cassell & Co.\nISBN\n0-304-35843-6\n.\nPick, Daniel\n(2012).\nThe Pursuit of the Nazi Mind: Hitler, Hess, and the Analysts\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-954168-3\n.\nRojas, John-Paul Ford; Wardrop, Murray (17 March 2012).\n\"Report into Rudolf Hess death fails to answer unexplained questions about Nazi prisoner's 'suicide'\n\"\n.\nThe Telegraph\n. Retrieved\n21 June\n2013\n.\nRubinstein, William (2007).\nUnsolved Historical Mysteries: Answers to Outstanding Historical Puzzles\n. Brighton: Edward Everett Root.\nISBN\n978-1-911454-45-8\n.\n\"Rudolf Walter Richard Hess: a fuselage section from the Messerschmitt that Hess piloted to Scotland, 10 May 1941\"\n.\nBonhams\n. 5 June 2014\n. Retrieved\n4 September\n2019\n.\nSereny, Gitta\n(1996) .\nAlbert Speer: His Battle With Truth\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-679-76812-8\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSchmidt, Rainer F. (1997).\nRudolf Heß: Botengang eines Toren?: Der Flug nach Großbritannien vom 10. Mai 1941\n(in German). Econ.\nISBN\n978-3-430-18016-0\n.\n\"Scottish field wreckage of Hess plane to be sold\"\n.\nThe Scotsman\n. Edinburgh. 31 May 2014\n. Retrieved\n4 September\n2019\n.\nSmith, Michael (27 December 2004).\n\"Mrs Foley's diary solves the mystery of Hess\"\n.\nThe Telegraph\n. Telegraph Media Group Limited.\nSpeer, Albert\n(1971) .\nInside the Third Reich\n. New York: Avon.\nISBN\n978-0-380-00071-5\n.\nSpeer, Albert (1976).\nSpandau: The Secret Diaries\n. New York: Macmillan.\nISBN\n0-02-612810-1\n.\n\"Top Nazi Rudolf Hess exhumed from 'pilgrimage' grave\"\n.\nBBC News\n. 21 July 2011\n. Retrieved\n4 September\n2019\n.\nWilliams, Max (2015).\nSS Elite: The Senior Leaders of Hitler's Praetorian Guard, Vol. 1 (A-J)\n. Fonthill Media LLC.\nISBN\n978-1-78155-433-3\n.\nWright, Ashley (5 June 2024).\n\"Hitler's Inner Circle: The 7 Most Powerful Figures in the Third Reich\"\n.\nTheCollector\n. Retrieved\n21 June\n2024\n.\nZwar, Desmond\n(16 June 2010).\nTalking to Rudolf Hess\n. Stroud: History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-5522-8\n.\nFurther reading\nAllen, Martin\n(2004).\nThe Hitler/Hess Deception\n: British Intelligence's Best-Kept Secret of the Second World War\n. London: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n978-0-00-714119-7\n.\nAllen, Peter (1983).\nThe Crown and the Swastika: Hitler, Hess, and the Duke of Windsor\n. London: R. Hale.\nISBN\n978-0-7090-1294-8\n.\nCostello, John\n(1991).\nTen Days that Saved the West\n. London: Bantam.\nISBN\n978-0-593-01919-1\n.\nDouglas-Hamilton, James\n(1979).\nMotive for a Mission: The Story Behind Rudolf Hess's Flight to Britain\n. Edinburgh: Mainstream.\nISBN\n978-0-906391-05-1\n.\nHaiger, Ernst (2006). \"Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The 'Revelations' of Peter and Martin Allen about the History of the Second World War\".\nJournal of Intelligence History\n.\n6\n(1):\n105–\n117.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/16161262.2006.10555127\n.\nS2CID\n161410964\n.\nHess, Rudolf; Hess, Ilse (1954).\nPrisoner of Peace\n. London: Britons.\nOCLC\n1302579\n.\nHutton, Joseph Bernard (1971).\nHess: The Man and His Mission\n. New York: Macmillan.\nOCLC\n126879\n.\nLe Tissier, Tony (1994).\nFarewell to Spandau\n. Leatherhead: Ashford, Buchan & Enright.\nISBN\n978-1-85253-314-4\n.\nPadfield, Peter (1991).\nHess: Flight for the Führer\n. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n978-0-297-81181-7\n.\nRees, John R\n;\nDicks, Henry Victor\n(1948).\nThe Case of Rudolf Hess: A Problem in Diagnosis and Forensic Psychiatry\n. New York: Norton.\nOCLC\n1038757\n.\nThomas, W. Hugh (1979).\nThe Murder of Rudolf Hess\n. New York: Harper & Row.\nISBN\n978-0-06-014251-3\n.\nSchwarzwäller, Wulf (1988).\nRudolf Hess: the Last Nazi\n. Bethesda, Md: National Press.\nISBN\n978-0-915765-52-2\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nRudolf Hess\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nRudolf Hess\n.\nRudolf Hess autopsy results\n(Italian and English)\n\"Reported statement by Hess\"\n.\nThe Scotsman\n.\nJohnston Press\n. 14 February 2005.\n'The Facts about Rudolf Hess'\n, a transcript of a British Foreign Office report on Rudolf Hess's capture and subsequent interrogations. National Archives file # FO 371/34484.\nFox, Jo (2011).\n\"Propaganda and the Flight of Rudolf Hess, 1941–45\"\n(PDF)\n.\nThe Journal of Modern History\n.\n83\n(1):\n78–\n110.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/658050\n.\nJSTOR\n658050\n.\nS2CID\n154294679\n.\n(subscription required)\nNewspaper clippings about Rudolf Hess\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nPortals\n:\nBiography\nGermany\nPolitics\nEgypt",
+    "infobox": {
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Office established",
+      "succeeded_by": "Martin Bormann",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1939–1941": "Member of theCouncil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich[5]",
+      "june–september_1933": "Reichsleiterof theNazi Party",
+      "1933–1941": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag[6]",
+      "1932–1941": "Chairman of the Nazi Party's Central Political Committee[6]",
+      "born": "Rudolf Walter Richard Hess(1894-04-26)26 April 1894Alexandria, Egypt",
+      "died": "17 August 1987(1987-08-17)(aged93)Spandau Prison,West Berlin,West Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Suicide by hanging",
+      "resting_place": "Friedhof Wunsiedel,Wunsiedel, Bavaria, Germany",
+      "nationality": "German",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1920–1941)",
+      "spouse": "Ilse Pröhl​(m.1927)​",
+      "children": "Wolf Rüdiger Hess",
+      "alma_mater": "University of Munich",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1918",
+      "rank": "Leutnant der Reserve",
+      "unit": "7th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment1st Infantry Regiment",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IFirst Battle of YpresBattle of VerdunRomanian Front",
+      "awards": "Iron Cross, 2nd Class",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggression",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Life imprisonment"
+    },
+    "char_count": 70713
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Joachim_von_Ribbentrop",
+    "name": "Joachim von Ribbentrop",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Ulrich Friedrich-Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop was a German Nazi politician, diplomat and convicted war criminal who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany from 1938 to 1945.",
+    "description": "German politician and diplomat (1893–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Joachim von Ribbentrop\nGerman politician and diplomat (1893–1946)\n\"Ribbentrop\" redirects here. For other people with the surname, see\nRibbentrop (surname)\n.\nUlrich Friedrich-Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop\n(\nGerman:\n[\njoˈʔaxɪm\nfɔn\nˈʁɪbəntʁɔp\n]\n; 30 April 1893 – 16 October 1946) was a German Nazi politician, diplomat and\nconvicted war criminal\nwho served as\nMinister of Foreign Affairs\nof\nNazi Germany\nfrom 1938 to 1945.\nRibbentrop first came to\nAdolf Hitler\n's notice as a well-travelled businessman with more knowledge of the outside world than most senior Nazis and as a perceived authority on foreign affairs.  He offered his house\nSchloss Fuschl\nfor the secret meetings in January 1933 that resulted in Hitler's appointment as\nChancellor of Germany\n.  He became a close confidant of Hitler, to the dismay of some party members, who thought him unintelligent, superficial and lacking in talent. He was appointed ambassador to the\nCourt of St James's\n, the royal court of the\nUnited Kingdom\n, in 1936 and then Foreign Minister of Germany in February 1938.\nBefore\nWorld War II\n, he played a key role in brokering the\nPact of Steel\n(an alliance with\nFascist Italy\n) and the\nMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact\n(the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact). He favoured retaining good relations with the Soviets, opposing the\ninvasion of the Soviet Union\n. In late 1941, due to\nAmerican aid to Britain\nand the\nincreasingly frequent \"incidents\"\nin the North Atlantic between U-boats and American warships guarding convoys to Britain, Ribbentrop worked for the failure of the Japanese-American talks in Washington and for\nJapan\nto attack the\nUnited States\n.\nHe did his utmost to support a\ndeclaration of war\non the United States after the\nattack on Pearl Harbor\n.\nFrom 1941 onwards, Ribbentrop's influence declined.\nArrested in June 1945, Ribbentrop was convicted and\nsentenced to death\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nfor his role in starting World War II in Europe and enabling\nthe Holocaust\n. On 16 October 1946, he became the first of the Nuremberg defendants to be\nexecuted\nby\nhanging\n.\nEarly life\nJoachim von Ribbentrop was born in\nWesel\n,\nRhine Province\nof the\nKingdom of Prussia\n, to Richard Ulrich Friedrich Joachim Ribbentrop, a career army officer, and his wife, Johanne Sophie Hertwig.\nHe was not born with the\nnobiliary particle\nvon\n.\nFrom 1904 to 1908, Ribbentrop took\nFrench\ncourses at\nLycée Fabert\nin\nMetz\n,\nthe\nGerman Empire\n's most powerful fortress, and would become fluent in both French and\nEnglish\n.\nA former teacher recalled Ribbentrop \"was the most stupid in his class, full of vanity and very pushy\".\nHis father was\ncashiered\nfrom the\nPrussian Army\nin 1908 for repeatedly disparaging Kaiser\nWilhelm II\nfor his dismissal of\nOtto von Bismarck\nand the Kaiser's\nalleged homosexuality\n. As a result, the Ribbentrop family was often short of money.\nFor the next 18 months, the family moved to\nArosa\n, Switzerland, where the children continued to be taught by French and English private tutors, and Ribbentrop spent his free time skiing and mountaineering.\nFollowing the stay in Arosa, Ribbentrop was sent to Britain for a year to improve his knowledge of English. \nFluent in both French and English, young Ribbentrop lived at various times in\nGrenoble\n, France and\nLondon\n, before travelling to\nCanada\nin 1910.\nHe worked for the\nMolsons Bank\non\nStanley Street\nin\nMontreal\n, and then for the engineering firm M. P. and J. T. Davis on the\nQuebec Bridge\nreconstruction. He was also employed by the\nNational Transcontinental Railway\n, which constructed a line from\nMoncton\nto\nWinnipeg\n. He worked as a journalist in New York City and\nBoston\nbut returned to Germany to recover from\ntuberculosis\n.\nHe returned to\nCanada\nand set up a small business in\nOttawa\nimporting German wine and champagne.\nIn 1914, he competed for Ottawa's\nMinto\nice-skating team and participated in the Ellis Memorial Trophy tournament in Boston in February.\nWhen the\nFirst World War\nbegan later in 1914, Ribbentrop left Canada, which, as part of the\nBritish Empire\n, was at war with Germany, and found temporary sanctuary in the neutral\nUnited States\n.\nOn 15 August 1914, he sailed from\nHoboken, New Jersey\non the\nHolland-America\nship\nPotsdam\n, bound for\nRotterdam\n,\nand on his return to Germany enlisted in the Prussian 12th\nHussar\nRegiment.\nRibbentrop served first on the\nEastern Front\n, and was then transferred to the\nWestern Front\n.\nHe earned a commission and was awarded the\nIron Cross\n, having been wounded during his service. In 1918, 1st Lieutenant Ribbentrop was stationed in\nIstanbul\nas a staff officer. During his time in\nTurkey\n, he became a friend of another staff officer,\nFranz von Papen\n.\nIn 1919, Ribbentrop met Anna Elisabeth Henkell,\nthe daughter of a wealthy Wiesbaden wine producer. They were married on 5 July 1920, and Ribbentrop began to travel throughout Europe as a wine salesman. They had five children.\nIn 1925, his \"aunt\"\nGertrud von Ribbentrop, adopted him, which allowed him to add the nobiliary particle\nvon\nto his name.\nEarly career\nIn 1928, Ribbentrop was introduced to\nAdolf Hitler\nas a businessman with foreign connections who \"gets the same price for German champagne as others get for French champagne\".\nWolf-Heinrich Graf von Helldorff\n, with whom Ribbentrop had served in the 12th Torgau Hussars in the First World War, arranged the introduction.\nRibbentrop and his wife joined the\nNazi Party\non 1 May 1932.\nRibbentrop began his political career by offering to be a secret emissary between Chancellor of Germany\nFranz von Papen\n, his old wartime friend, and Hitler. His offer was initially refused. Six months later, however, Hitler and Papen accepted his help.\nTheir change of heart occurred after General\nKurt von Schleicher\nousted Papen in December 1932. This led to a complex set of intrigues in which Papen and various friends of president\nPaul von Hindenburg\nnegotiated with Hitler to oust Schleicher. On 22 January 1933, State Secretary\nOtto Meissner\nand Hindenburg's son\nOskar\nmet Hitler,\nHermann Göring\n, and\nWilhelm Frick\nat Ribbentrop's home in Berlin's exclusive\nDahlem\ndistrict.\nOver dinner, Papen made the fateful concession that if Schleicher's government were to fall, he would abandon his demand for the Chancellorship and instead use his influence with President Hindenburg to ensure Hitler got the Chancellorship.\nRibbentrop was not popular with the Nazi Party's\nAlte Kämpfer\n(Old Fighters); they nearly all disliked him.\nBritish historian\nLaurence Rees\ndescribed Ribbentrop as \"the Nazi almost all the other leading Nazis hated\".\nJoseph Goebbels\nexpressed a common view when he\nconfided to his diary\nthat \"Von Ribbentrop bought his name, he married his money and he swindled his way into office\".\nDuring most of the\nWeimar Republic\nera, Ribbentrop was apolitical and displayed no\nantisemitic\nprejudices.\nA visitor to a party Ribbentrop threw in 1928 recorded that Ribbentrop had no political views beyond a vague admiration for\nGustav Stresemann\n, fear of Communism, and a wish to restore the monarchy.\nSeveral Berlin Jewish businessmen who did business with Ribbentrop in the 1920s and knew him well later expressed astonishment at the vicious antisemitism he later displayed in the\nNazi era\n, saying that they did not see any indications he had held such views.\nTen months after the\nNazi seizure of power\n, Ribbentrop secured a seat as a deputy to the\nReichstag\nfrom electoral constituency 4 (\nPotsdam I\n) at the\nNovember 1933 parliamentary election\n. He was reelected in 1936 and 1938, holding this seat until the fall of the Nazi regime.\nEarly diplomatic career\nBackground\nRibbentrop became Hitler's favourite foreign-policy adviser, partly by dint of his familiarity with the world outside Germany but also by flattery and sycophancy.\nOne German diplomat later recalled, \"Ribbentrop didn't understand anything about foreign policy. His sole wish was to please Hitler\".\nIn particular, Ribbentrop acquired the habit of listening carefully to what Hitler was saying, memorizing his pet ideas and then later presenting Hitler's ideas as his own, a practice that much impressed Hitler as proving Ribbentrop was an ideal Nazi diplomat.\nRibbentrop quickly learned that Hitler always favoured the most radical solution to any problem and accordingly tendered his advice in that direction as a Ribbentrop aide recalled:\nWhen Hitler said \"Grey\", Ribbentrop said \"Black, black, black\". He always said it three times more, and he was always more radical. I listened to what Hitler said one day when Ribbentrop wasn't present: \"With Ribbentrop it is so easy, he is always so radical. Meanwhile, all the other people I have, they come here, they have problems, they are afraid, they think we should take care and then I have to blow them up, to get strong. And Ribbentrop was blowing up the whole day and I had to do nothing. I had to break – much better!\"\nAnother reason for Ribbentrop's rise was Hitler's distrust of and disdain for Germany's professional diplomats. He suspected that they did not entirely support his revolution.\nHowever, the Foreign Office diplomats loyally served the government and rarely gave Hitler grounds for criticism,\nwhile the\nForeign Office\ndiplomats were ultranationalist, authoritarian and antisemitic.\nAs a result, there was enough overlap in values between both groups to allow most of them to work comfortably for the Nazis.\nNonetheless, Hitler never quite trusted the Foreign Office and was on the lookout for someone to carry out his foreign policy goals.\nUndermining Versailles\nThe Nazis and Germany's professional diplomats shared a goal in destroying the\nTreaty of Versailles\nand restoring Germany as a great power.\nIn October 1933, German Foreign Minister Baron\nKonstantin von Neurath\npresented a note at the\nWorld Disarmament Conference\nannouncing that it was unfair that Germany should remain disarmed by Part V of the Versailles Treaty and demanded for the other powers to disarm to Germany's level or to rescind Part V and allow Germany\nGleichberechtigung\n(\"equality of armaments\"). When France rejected Neurath's note, Germany stormed out of the\nLeague of Nations\nand the World Disarmament Conference. It all but announced its intention of unilaterally violating Part V. Consequently, there were several calls in France for a\npreventive war\nto put an end to the Nazi regime while Germany was still more-or-less disarmed.\nHowever, in November, Ribbentrop arranged a meeting between Hitler and the French journalist\nFernand de Brinon\n, who wrote for the newspaper\nLe Matin\n. During the meeting, Hitler stressed what he claimed to be his love of peace and his friendship towards France.\nHitler's meeting with Brinon had a huge effect on French public opinion and helped to put an end to the calls for a preventive war. It convinced many in France that Hitler was a man of peace, who wanted to do away only with Part V of the Versailles Treaty.\nSpecial Commissioner for Disarmament\nIn 1934, Hitler named Ribbentrop Special Commissioner for\nDisarmament\n.\nIn his early years, Hitler's goal in foreign affairs was to persuade the world that he wished to reduce the\ndefence budget\nby making idealistic but very vague disarmament offers (in the 1930s, disarmament described\narms limitation\nagreements).\nAt the same time, the Germans always resisted making concrete arms-limitations proposals, and they went ahead with increased military spending on grounds that other powers would not take up German arms-limitation offers.\nRibbentrop was tasked with ensuring that the world remained convinced that Germany sincerely wanted an arms-limitation treaty, but he ensured that no such treaty was ever developed.\nOn 17 April 1934, French Foreign Minister\nLouis Barthou\nissued the so-called \"Barthou note\", which led to concerns on the part of Hitler that the French would ask for sanctions against Germany for violating Part V of the Versailles Treaty.\nRibbentrop volunteered to stop the rumoured sanctions and visited London and Rome.\nDuring his visits, Ribbentrop met with British Foreign Secretary, Sir\nJohn Simon\n, and Italian dictator\nBenito Mussolini\nand asked them to postpone the next meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament in exchange for which Ribbentrop offered nothing in return other than promising better relations with Berlin.\nThe meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament went ahead as scheduled, but because no sanctions were sought against Germany, Ribbentrop could claim a success.\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\nIn August 1934, Ribbentrop founded an organization linked to the Nazi Party called the\nBüro Ribbentrop\n(later renamed the\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\n). It functioned as an alternative foreign ministry.\nThe\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\n, which had its offices directly across from the Foreign Office's building on the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, had in its membership a collection of\nHitlerjugend\nalumni, dissatisfied businessmen, former reporters, and ambitious\nNazi Party\nmembers, all of whom tried to conduct a foreign policy independent of and often contrary to the official Foreign Office.\nThe Dienststelle served as an informal tool for the implementation of the foreign policy of Hitler, consciously bypassing the traditional foreign policy institutions and diplomatic channels of the German Foreign Office. However, the Dienststelle also competed with other Nazi party units active in the area of foreign policy, such as the foreign organization of the Nazis (\nNSDAP/AO\n) led by\nErnst Bohle\nand\nNazi Party office of foreign affairs\n(APA) led by\nAlfred Rosenberg\n.\nWith the appointment of Ribbentrop to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 1938, the Dienststelle itself lost its importance, and about a third of the staff of the office followed Ribbentrop to the Foreign Office.\nRibbentrop engaged in diplomacy on his own, such as when he visited France and met Foreign Minister Louis Barthou.\nDuring their meeting, Ribbentrop suggested for Barthou to meet Hitler at once to sign a Franco-German non-aggression pact.\nRibbentrop wanted to buy time to complete German rearmament by removing preventive war as a French policy option. The Barthou-Ribbentrop meeting infuriated\nKonstantin von Neurath\n, since the Foreign Office had not been informed.\nAlthough the\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\nwas concerned with German relations in every part of the world, it emphasised\nAnglo-German relations\n, as Ribbentrop knew that Hitler favoured an alliance with Britain.\nAs such, Ribbentrop greatly worked during his early diplomatic career to realize Hitler's dream of an anti-Soviet Anglo-German alliance. Ribbentrop made frequent trips to Britain, and upon his return he always reported to Hitler that most British people longed for an alliance with Germany.\nIn November 1934, Ribbentrop met\nGeorge Bernard Shaw\n, Sir\nAusten Chamberlain\n,\nLord Cecil\nand\nLord Lothian\n.\nOn the basis of Lord Lothian's praise for the natural friendship between Germany and Britain, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that all elements of British society wished for closer ties with Germany. His report delighted Hitler, causing him to remark that Ribbentrop was the only person who told him \"the truth about the world abroad\".\nBecause the Foreign Office's diplomats were not so sunny in their appraisal of the prospects for an alliance, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler increased.\nRibbentrop's personality, with his disdain for diplomatic niceties, meshed with what Hitler felt should be the relentless dynamism of a revolutionary regime.\nAmbassador-Plenipotentiary at Large\nHitler rewarded Ribbentrop by appointing him\nReich\nMinister Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large. In that capacity, Ribbentrop negotiated the\nAnglo-German Naval Agreement\n(AGNA) in 1935 and the\nAnti-Comintern Pact\nin 1936.\nAnglo-German Naval Agreement\nNeurath did not think it possible to achieve the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. To discredit his rival, he appointed Ribbentrop head of the delegation sent to London to negotiate it.\nOnce the talks began, Ribbentrop issued an ultimatum to\nSir John Simon\n,\ninforming him that if Germany's terms were not accepted in their entirety, the German delegation would go home.\nSimon was angry with that demand, and walked out of the talks.\nHowever, to everyone's surprise, the next day the British accepted Ribbentrop's demands, and the AGNA was signed in London on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop and Sir\nSamuel Hoare\n, the new British Foreign Secretary.\nThe diplomatic success did much to increase Ribbentrop's prestige with Hitler, who called the day the AGNA was signed \"the happiest day in my life\". He believed it marked the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance, and ordered celebrations throughout Germany to mark the event.\nImmediately after the AGNA was signed, Ribbentrop followed up with the next step that was intended to create the Anglo-German alliance, the\nGleichschaltung\n(co-ordination) of all societies demanding the restoration of\nGermany's former colonies in Africa\n. On 3 July 1935, it was announced that Ribbentrop would head the efforts to recover Germany's former African colonies.\nHitler and Ribbentrop believed that demanding colonial restoration would pressure the British into making an alliance with the\nReich\non German terms.\nHowever, there was a difference between Ribbentrop and Hitler: Ribbentrop sincerely wished to recover the former German colonies, but for Hitler, colonial demands were just a negotiating tactic. Germany would renounce its demands in exchange for a British alliance.\nAnti-Comintern Pact\nMain article:\nAnti-Comintern Pact\nRibbentrop and the Japanese ambassador to Germany,\nKintomo Mushakoji\n, sign the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936.\nThe Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936 marked an important change in German foreign policy.\nThe Foreign Office had traditionally favoured a policy of friendship with the\nRepublic of China\n, and an\ninformal Sino-German alliance\nhad emerged by the late 1920s.\nNeurath very much believed in maintaining Germany's good relations with China and mistrusted the\nEmpire of Japan\n.\nRibbentrop was opposed to the Foreign Office's pro-China orientation and instead favoured an alliance with Japan.\nTo that end, Ribbentrop often worked closely with General\nHiroshi Ōshima\n, who served first as the Japanese military attaché and then as ambassador in Berlin, to strengthen German-Japanese ties, despite furious opposition from the\nWehrmacht\nand the Foreign Office, which preferred closer Sino-German ties.\nThe origins of the Anti-Comintern Pact went back to mid-1935, when in an effort to square the circle between seeking a\nrapprochement\nwith Japan and Germany's traditional alliance with China, Ribbentrop and Ōshima devised the idea of an anticommunist alliance as a way to bind China, Japan and Germany together.\nHowever, when the Chinese made it clear that they had no interest in such an alliance (especially given that the Japanese regarded Chinese adhesion to the proposed pact as a way of subordinating China to Japan), both Neurath and War Minister\nField Marshal\nWerner von Blomberg\npersuaded Hitler to shelve the proposed treaty to avoid damaging Germany's good relations with China.\nRibbentrop, who valued Japanese friendship far more than that of the Chinese, argued that Germany and Japan should sign the pact without Chinese participation.\nBy November 1936, a revival of interest in a German-Japanese pact in both Tokyo and Berlin led to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin.\nWhen the Pact was signed, invitations were sent to Italy, China, Britain and Poland to join. However, of the invited powers, only the Italians would ultimately sign.\nThe Anti-Comintern Pact marked the beginning of the shift on Germany's part from China's ally to Japan's ally.\nVeterans' exchanges\nIn 1935, Ribbentrop arranged for a series of much-publicised visits of First World War veterans to Britain, France and Germany.\nRibbentrop persuaded the\nRoyal British Legion\nand many French veterans' groups to send delegations to Germany to meet German veterans as the best way to promote peace.\nAt the same time, Ribbentrop arranged for members of the\nFrontkämpferbund\n, the official German World War I veterans' group, to visit Britain and France to meet veterans there.\nThe veterans' visits and attendant promises of \"never again\" did much to improve the \"New Germany's\" image in Britain and France. In July 1935, Brigadier Sir Francis Featherstone-Godley led the British Legion's delegation to Germany.\nThe\nPrince of Wales\n, the Legion's patron, made a much-publicized speech at the Legion's annual conference in June 1935 that stated that he could think of no better group of men than those of the Legion to visit and carry the message of peace to Germany and that he hoped that Britain and Germany would never fight again.\nAs for the contradiction between German rearmament and his message of peace, Ribbentrop argued to whoever would listen that the German people had been \"humiliated\" by the Versailles Treaty, Germany wanted peace above all and German violations of Versailles were part of an effort to restore Germany's \"self-respect\". By the 1930s, much of British opinion had been convinced that the treaty was monstrously unfair and unjust to Germany, so as a result, many in Britain, such as\nThomas Jones\n, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, were very open to Ribbentrop's message that European peace would be restored if only the Treaty of Versailles could be done away with.\nAmbassador to the United Kingdom\nIn August 1936, Hitler appointed Ribbentrop\nambassador\nto the United Kingdom with orders to negotiate an Anglo-German alliance.\nRibbentrop arrived to take up his position in October 1936, formally presenting his credentials to King\nEdward VIII\non 30 October.\nRibbentrop's time in London was marked by an endless series of social gaffes and blunders that worsened his already-poor relations with the British\nForeign Office\n.\nInvited to stay as a house guest of the\n7th Marquess of Londonderry\nat\nWynyard Hall\nin\nCounty Durham\n, in November 1936, he was taken to a service in\nDurham Cathedral\n, and the hymn\nGlorious Things of Thee Are Spoken\nwas announced. As the organ played the opening bars, identical to the\nGerman national anthem\n, Ribbentrop gave the\nNazi salute\nand had to be restrained by his host.\nAt his wife's suggestion, Ribbentrop hired the Berlin interior decorator\nMartin Luther\nto assist with his move to London and help realise the design of the new German embassy that Ribbentrop had built there (he felt that the existing embassy was insufficiently grand). Luther proved to be a master intriguer and became Ribbentrop's favourite hatchet man.\nRibbentrop did not understand the limited role in government exercised by 20th-century British monarchs. He thought that Edward VIII could dictate British foreign policy if he wanted.\nHe convinced Hitler that he had Edward's support, but that was as much a delusion as his belief that he had impressed British society. In fact, Ribbentrop often displayed a fundamental misunderstanding of British politics and society. During the\nabdication crisis in December 1936\n, Ribbentrop reported to Berlin that it had been precipitated by an anti-German Jewish-Masonic-reactionary conspiracy to depose Edward, whom Ribbentrop represented as a staunch friend of Germany, and that civil war would soon break out in Britain between supporters of Edward and those of Prime Minister\nStanley Baldwin\n. Ribbentrop's civil war predictions were greeted with incredulity by the British people who heard them.\nDuke Carl Alexander of Württemberg\nhad told the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nthat\nWallis Simpson\n, Edward's lover and a suspected Nazi sympathizer, had slept with Ribbentrop in London in 1936; had remained in constant contact with him; and had continued to leak secrets.\nRibbentrop had a habit of summoning tailors from the best British firms, making them wait for hours and then sending them away without seeing him but with instructions to return the next day, only to repeat the process. That did immense damage to his reputation in British high society, as London's tailors retaliated by telling all their well-off clients that Ribbentrop was impossible to deal with.\nIn an interview, his secretary Reinhard Spitzy stated, \"He [Ribbentrop] behaved very stupidly and very pompously and the British don't like pompous people\".\nIn the same interview, Spitzy called Ribbentrop \"pompous, conceited and not too intelligent\" and stated he was an utterly insufferable man to work for.\nIn addition, Ribbentrop chose to spend as little time as possible in London to stay close to Hitler, which irritated the British Foreign Office immensely, as Ribbentrop's frequent absences prevented the handling of many routine diplomatic matters.\n(\nPunch\nreferred to him as the\n\"Wandering Aryan\"\nfor his frequent trips home.)\nAs Ribbentrop alienated more and more people in Britain,\nReichsmarschall\nHermann Göring\nwarned Hitler that Ribbentrop was a \"stupid ass\".\nHitler dismissed Göring's concerns: \"But after all, he knows quite a lot of important people in England.\" That remark led Göring to reply \"\nMein Führer\n, that may be right, but the bad thing is, they know\nhim\n\".\nIn February 1937, Ribbentrop committed a notable social gaffe by unexpectedly greeting\nGeorge VI\nwith the \"German greeting\", a stiff-armed Nazi salute:\nthe gesture nearly knocked over the King, who was walking forward to shake Ribbentrop's hand at the time.\nRibbentrop further compounded the damage to his image and caused a minor crisis in Anglo-German relations by insisting that henceforward all German diplomats were to greet heads of state by giving and receiving the stiff-arm fascist salute.\nThe crisis was resolved when Neurath pointed out to Hitler that under Ribbentrop's rule, if the Soviet ambassador were to give the Communist clenched-fist salute, Hitler would be obliged to return it.\nOn Neurath's advice, Hitler disavowed Ribbentrop's demand that King George receive and give the \"German greeting\".\nMost of Ribbentrop's time was spent demanding that Britain either sign the Anti-Comintern Pact or return the former German colonies in Africa.\nHowever, he also devoted considerable time to courting what he called the \"men of influence\" as the best way to achieve an Anglo-German alliance.\nIn order to achieve this he became a member of the\nLansdowne Club\n, a\nprivate members' club\nin\nMayfair\n.\nHe believed that the British aristocracy comprised some sort of secret society that ruled from behind the scenes, and that if he could befriend enough members of Britain's \"secret government\" he could bring about the alliance.\nAlmost all of the initially favourable reports Ribbentrop provided to Berlin about the alliance's prospects were based on friendly remarks about the \"New Germany\" that came from British aristocrats such as\nLord Londonderry\nand\nLord Lothian\n. The rather cool reception that Ribbentrop received from British Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats did not make much of an impression on him at first.\nThis British governmental view, summarised by\nRobert, Viscount Cranborne\n, Parliamentary\nUnder-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs\n, was that Ribbentrop always was a second-rate man.\nIn 1935, Sir\nEric Phipps\n, the\nBritish Ambassador to Germany\n, complained to London about Ribbentrop's British associates in the\nAnglo-German Fellowship\n. He felt that they created \"false German hopes as in regards to British friendship and caused a reaction against it in England, where public opinion is very naturally hostile to the Nazi regime and its methods\".\nIn September 1937, the British Consul in\nMunich\n, writing about the group that Ribbentrop had brought to the Nuremberg Rally, reported that there were some \"serious persons of standing among them\" but that an equal number of Ribbentrop's British contingent were \"eccentrics and few, if any, could be called representatives of serious English thought, either political or social, while they most certainly lacked any political or social influence in England\".\nIn June 1937, when\nLord Mount Temple\n, the Chairman of the Anglo-German Fellowship, asked to see Prime Minister\nNeville Chamberlain\nafter meeting Hitler in a visit arranged by Ribbentrop,\nRobert Vansittart\n, the British Foreign Office's\nPermanent Under-Secretary of State\n, wrote a memo stating that:\nThe P.M. [Prime Minister] should certainly not see Lord Mount Temple – nor should the S[ecretary] of S[tate]. We really must put a stop to this eternal butting in of amateurs – and Lord Mount Temple is a particularly silly one. These activities – which are practically confined to Germany – render impossible the task of diplomacy.\nAfter Vansittart's memo, members of the Anglo-German Fellowship ceased to see Cabinet ministers after they went on Ribbentrop-arranged trips to Germany.\nIn February 1937, before a meeting with the\nLord Privy Seal\n,\nLord Halifax\n, Ribbentrop suggested to Hitler that Germany, Italy and Japan begin a worldwide propaganda campaign with the aim of forcing Britain to return the former German colonies in Africa.\nHitler turned down the idea, but nonetheless during his meeting with Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop spent much of the meeting demanding that Britain sign an alliance with Germany and return the former German colonies.\nThe German historian\nKlaus Hildebrand\nnoted that as early as the Ribbentrop–Halifax meeting the differing foreign policy views of Hitler and Ribbentrop were starting to emerge, with Ribbentrop more interested in restoring the pre-1914 German\nImperium\nin Africa than the conquest of Eastern Europe.\nFollowing the lead of\nAndreas Hillgruber\n, who argued that Hitler had a\nStufenplan\n(stage by stage plan) for world conquest, Hildebrand argued that Ribbentrop may not have fully understood what Hitler's\nStufenplan\nwas or that in pressing so hard for colonial restoration, he was trying to score a personal success that might improve his standing with Hitler.\nIn March 1937, Ribbentrop attracted much adverse comment in the British press when he gave a speech at the\nLeipzig Trade Fair\nin Leipzig in which he declared that German economic prosperity would be satisfied \"through the restoration of the former German colonial possessions, or by means of the German people's own strength.\"\nThe implied threat that if colonial restoration did not occur, the Germans would take back their former colonies by force attracted a great deal of hostile commentary on the inappropriateness of an ambassador threatening his host country in such a manner.\nRibbentrop's negotiating style, a mix of bullying bluster and icy coldness coupled with lengthy monologues praising Hitler, alienated many.\nThe American historian\nGordon A. Craig\nonce observed that of all the voluminous memoir literature of the diplomatic scene of 1930s Europe, there are only two positive references to Ribbentrop.\nOf the two references, General\nLeo Geyr von Schweppenburg\n, the German military attaché in London, commented that Ribbentrop had been a brave soldier in World War I, and the wife of the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Elisabetta Cerruti, called Ribbentrop \"one of the most diverting of the Nazis\".\nIn both cases, the praise was limited, with Cerruti going on to write that only in Nazi Germany was it possible for someone as superficial as Ribbentrop to rise to be a minister of foreign affairs, and Geyr von Schweppenburg called Ribbentrop an absolute disaster as ambassador in London.\nThe British historian/television producer\nLaurence Rees\nnoted for his 1997 series\nThe Nazis: A Warning from History\nthat every single person interviewed for the series who had known Ribbentrop expressed a passionate hatred for him. One German diplomat, Herbert Richter, called Ribbentrop \"lazy and worthless\", while another, Manfred von Schröder, was quoted as saying Ribbentrop was \"vain and ambitious\". Rees concluded, \"No other Nazi was so hated by his colleagues\".\nIn November 1937, Ribbentrop was placed in a highly-embarrassing situation since his forceful advocacy of the return of the former German colonies led British Foreign Secretary\nAnthony Eden\nand French Foreign Minister\nYvon Delbos\nto offer to open talks on returning the former German colonies in return for which the Germans would make binding commitments to respect their borders in Central and Eastern Europe.\nSince Hitler was not interested in obtaining the former colonies, especially if the price was a brake on expansion into Eastern Europe, Ribbentrop was forced to turn down the Anglo-French offer that he had largely brought about.\nImmediately after turning down the Anglo-French offer on colonial restoration, Ribbentrop, for reasons of pure malice, ordered the\nReichskolonialbund\nto increase the agitation for the former German colonies, a move that exasperated both the Foreign Office and the\nFrench Ministry of Foreign Affairs\n.\nAs the Italian Foreign Minister, Count\nGaleazzo Ciano\n, noted in his diary in late 1937, Ribbentrop had come to hate Britain with all the \"fury of a woman scorned\".\nRibbentrop—and Hitler, for that matter—never understood that British foreign policy aimed at the\nappeasement\nof Germany, not an alliance with it.\nWhen Ribbentrop traveled to Rome in November 1937 to oversee Italy's adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact, he made clear to his hosts that the pact was really directed against Britain. As Ciano noted in his diary, the Anti-Comintern Pact was \"anti-Communist in theory, but in fact unmistakably anti-British\".\nBelieving himself to be in a state of disgrace with Hitler over his failure to achieve the British alliance, Ribbentrop spent December 1937 in a state of depression and, together with his wife, wrote two lengthy documents for Hitler that denounced Britain.\nIn the first report to Hitler, which was presented on 2 January 1938, Ribbentrop stated that \"England is our most dangerous enemy\".\nIn the same report, Ribbentrop advised Hitler to abandon the idea of a British alliance and instead embrace the idea of an alliance of Germany, Japan and Italy to destroy the\nBritish Empire\n.\nRibbentrop wrote in his \"Memorandum for the\nFührer\n\" that \"a change in the status quo in the East to Germany's advantage can only be accomplished by force\" and that the best way to achieve it was to build a global anti-British alliance system.\nBesides converting the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British military alliance, Ribbentrop argued that German foreign policy should work to \"winning over all states whose interests conform directly or indirectly to ours.\"\nBy the last statement, Ribbentrop clearly implied that the Soviet Union should be included in the anti-British alliance system he had proposed.\nForeign Minister of the\nReich\nRibbentrop as\nSS-Gruppenführer\n, 1938\nIn early 1938, Hitler asserted his control of the military-foreign policy apparatus, in part by sacking Neurath.\nOn 4 February 1938, Ribbentrop succeeded Neurath as Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop's appointment has generally been seen as an indication that German foreign policy was moving in a more radical direction. In contrast to Neurath's cautious and less bellicose nature, Ribbentrop unequivocally supported war in 1938 and 1939.\nRibbentrop's time as Foreign Minister can be divided into three periods. In the first, from 1938 to 1939, he tried to persuade other states to align themselves with Germany for the coming war. In the second, from 1939 to 1943, Ribbentrop attempted to persuade other states to enter the war on Germany's side or at least to maintain pro-German neutrality. He was also involved in\nOperation Willi\n, an attempt to convince the former\nKing Edward VIII\nto lobby his brother, now the king, on behalf of Germany. Many historians have suggested that Hitler was prepared to reinstate the Duke of Windsor as king in the hope of establishing a fascist Britain.\nIf Edward would agree to work openly with Nazi Germany, he would be given financial assistance and would hopefully come to be a \"compliant\" king. Reportedly, 50 million Swiss francs were set aside for that purpose.\nThe plan was never realised.\nIn the final phase, from 1943 to 1945, he had the task of trying to keep Germany's allies from leaving her side. During the course of all three periods, Ribbentrop frequently met leaders and diplomats from\nItaly\n,\nJapan\n,\nRomania\n,\nSpain\n,\nBulgaria\n, and\nHungary\n. During all of that time, Ribbentrop feuded with various other Nazi leaders.\nAs time went by, Ribbentrop started to oust the Foreign Office's old diplomats from their senior positions and replace them with men from the\nDienststelle\n. As early as 1938, 32 per cent of the offices in the Foreign Ministry were held by men who previously served in the\nDienststelle\n.\nOne of Ribbentrop's first acts as Foreign Minister was to achieve a total volte-face in Germany's Far Eastern policies. Ribbentrop was instrumental in February 1938 in persuading Hitler to recognize the Japanese\npuppet state\nof\nManchukuo\nand to renounce German claims upon its former colonies in the Pacific, which were now held by Japan.\nBy April 1938, Ribbentrop had ended all\nGerman arms shipments to China\nand had all of the\nGerman Army\nofficers serving with the\nKuomintang\ngovernment\nof\nChiang Kai-shek\nrecalled, with the threat that the families of the officers in China would be sent to concentration camps if the officers did not return to Germany immediately.\nIn return, the Germans received little thanks from the Japanese, who refused to allow any new German businesses to be set up in the part of China they had occupied and continued with their policy of attempting to exclude all existing German and all other Western businesses from Japanese-occupied China.\nAt the same time, the end of the informal Sino-German alliance led Chiang to terminate all concessions and contracts held by German companies in Kuomintang China.\nMunich Agreement and Czechoslovakia's destruction\nThe French Premier\nÉdouard Daladier\n(centre) with Ribbentrop at the\nMunich Summit\n, 1938\nErnst von Weizsäcker\n, the State Secretary from 1938 to 1943, opposed the general trend in German foreign policy towards attacking the\nFirst Czechoslovak Republic\nand feared that it might cause a general war that Germany would lose. Weizsäcker had no moral objections to the idea of destroying Czechoslovakia but opposed only the timing of the attack. He favoured the idea of a \"chemical\" destruction of Czechoslovakia in which Germany, Hungary and Poland would close their frontiers to destabilise Czechoslovakia economically. He strongly disliked Ribbentrop's idea of a \"mechanical\" destruction of Czechoslovakia by war, which he saw as too risky. However, despite all of their reservations and fears about Ribbentrop, whom they saw as recklessly seeking to plunge Germany into a general war before the\nReich\nwas ready, neither Weizsäcker nor any of the other professional diplomats were prepared to confront their chief.\nNeville Chamberlain\nwith Ribbentrop at the Munich Summit, 1938\nBefore the Anglo-German summit at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938, the British Ambassador, Sir\nNevile Henderson\n, and Weizsäcker worked out a private arrangement for Hitler and Chamberlain to meet with no advisers present as a way of excluding the ultrahawkish Ribbentrop from attending the talks.\nHitler's interpreter,\nPaul Schmidt\n, later recalled that it was \"felt that our Foreign Minister would prove a disturbing element\" at the Berchtesgaden summit.\nIn a moment of pique at his exclusion from the Chamberlain-Hitler meeting, Ribbentrop refused to hand over Schmidt's notes of the summit to Chamberlain, a move that caused much annoyance on the British side.\nRibbentrop spent the last weeks of September 1938 looking forward very much to the German-Czechoslovak war that he expected to break out on 1 October 1938.\nRibbentrop regarded the\nMunich Agreement\nas a diplomatic defeat for Germany, as it deprived Germany of the opportunity to wage the war to destroy Czechoslovakia that Ribbentrop wanted to see. The\nSudetenland\nissue, which was the ostensible subject of the German-Czechoslovak dispute, had been a pretext for German aggression.\nDuring the Munich Conference, Ribbentrop spent much of his time brooding unhappily in the corners.\nRibbentrop told the head of Hitler's Press Office, Fritz Hesse, that the Munich Agreement was \"first-class stupidity.... All it means is that we have to fight the English in a year, when they will be better armed.... It would have been much better if war had come now\".\nLike Hitler, Ribbentrop was determined that in the next crisis, Germany would not have its professed demands met in another Munich-type summit and that the next crisis to be caused by Germany would result in the war that Chamberlain had \"cheated\" the Germans out of at Munich.\nErnst von Weizsäcker\n, the Secretary of State at the\nGerman Foreign Office\n, 1938–1943\nIn the aftermath of Munich, Hitler was in a violently anti-British mood caused in part by his rage over being \"cheated\" out of the war to \"annihilate\" Czechoslovakia that he very much wanted to have in 1938 and in part by his realisation that Britain would neither ally itself nor stand aside in regard to Germany's ambition to dominate Europe.\nAs a consequence, Britain was considered after Munich to be the main enemy of the\nReich\n, and as a result, the influence of ardently Anglophobic Ribbentrop correspondingly rose with Hitler.\nPartly for economic reasons, and partly out of fury over being \"cheated\" out of war in 1938, Hitler decided to destroy the rump state of\nCzecho-Slovakia\n, as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938, early in 1939.\nRibbentrop played an important role in setting in motion the crisis that was to result in the end of Czecho-Slovakia by ordering German diplomats in\nBratislava\nto contact Father\nJozef Tiso\n, the premier of the Slovak regional government, and pressure him to declare independence from\nPrague\n. When Tiso proved reluctant to do so on the grounds that the autonomy that had existed since October 1938 was sufficient for him and that to completely sever links with the Czechs would leave Slovakia open to being annexed by Hungary, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in\nBudapest\ncontact the regent, Admiral\nMiklós Horthy\n. Horthy was advised that the Germans might be open to having more of Hungary restored to its former borders and that the Hungarians should best start concentrating troops on their northern border at once if they were serious about changing their frontiers. Upon hearing of the Hungarian mobilization, Tiso was presented with the choice of either declaring independence, with the understanding that the new state would be in the German sphere of influence, or seeing all of Slovakia absorbed into Hungary. As a result, Tiso had the Slovak regional government issue a declaration of independence on 14 March 1939; the ensuing crisis in Czech-Slovak relations was used as a pretext to summon Czecho-Slovak President\nEmil Hácha\nto Berlin over his \"failure\" to keep order in his country. On the night of 14–15 March 1939, Ribbentrop played a key role in the German occupation of the Czech part of Czecho-Slovakia by bullying Hácha into transforming his country into a German\nprotectorate\nat a meeting in the\nReich Chancellery\nin Berlin. On 15 March 1939, German troops occupied the Czech areas of Czecho-Slovakia, which then became the\nReich\nProtectorate of Bohemia and Moravia\n.\nOn 20 March 1939, Ribbentrop summoned Lithuanian Foreign Minister\nJuozas Urbšys\nto Berlin and informed him that if a Lithuanian plenipotentiary did not arrive at once to negotiate to turn over the\nMemelland\nto Germany the Luftwaffe would raze\nKaunas\nto the ground.\nAs a result of Ribbentrop's\nultimatum\non 23 March, the Lithuanians agreed to return Memel (modern Klaipėda, Lithuania) to Germany.\nIn March 1939, Ribbentrop assigned the largely ethnically Ukrainian\nSub-Carpathian Ruthenia\nregion of Czecho-Slovakia, which had just proclaimed its independence as the Republic of\nCarpatho-Ukraine\n, to Hungary, which then proceeded to annex it after a short war.\nThis was significant as there had been many fears in the Soviet Union in the 1930s that the Germans would use\nUkrainian nationalism\nas a tool to break up the Soviet Union.\nThe establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian region in Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938 had prompted a major Soviet media campaign against its existence on the grounds that this was part of a Western plot to support separatism in\nSoviet Ukraine\n.\nBy allowing the Hungarians to destroy Europe's only Ukrainian state, Ribbentrop had signified that Germany was not interested, at least for now, in sponsoring Ukrainian nationalism.\nThat, in turn, helped to improve German-Soviet relations by demonstrating that German foreign policy was now primarily anti-Western rather than anti-Soviet.\nFrench-German non-aggression pact, December 1938\nIn December 1938, during Ribbentrop's visit to Paris to sign the French-German\nnon-aggression pact\n, he had conversations with French Foreign Minister\nGeorges Bonnet\n, which Ribbentrop later claimed included a promise that France would recognize all of Eastern Europe as Germany's exclusive\nsphere of influence\n. The talks with Bonnet were also conducted on the German side by\nErnst von Weizsäcker\n, a high-ranking German diplomat who worked under Ribbentrop.\nGerman threat to Poland and British guarantee\nInitially, Germany hoped to transform Poland into a satellite state, with Ribbentrop and Japanese military attache\nHiroshi Ōshima\ntrying to convince Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.\nBy March 1939, German demands had been rejected by the Poles three times, which led Hitler to decide, with enthusiastic support from Ribbentrop, upon the destruction of Poland as the main German foreign policy goal of 1939.\nOn 21 March 1939, Hitler first went public with his demand that Danzig rejoin the\nReich\nand for \"\nextra-territorial\n\" roads across the\nPolish Corridor\n. That marked a significant escalation of the German pressure on Poland, which until then had been confined to private meetings between German and Polish diplomats. The same day, on 21 March 1939, Ribbentrop presented a set of demands to the Polish Ambassador\nJózef Lipski\nabout Poland allowing the\nFree City of Danzig\nto return to Germany in such violent and extreme language that it led the Poles to fear their country was on the verge of an immediate German attack. Ribbentrop had used such extreme language, particularly his remark that if Germany had a different policy towards the Soviet Union then Poland would cease to exist, that it led to the Poles ordering partial\nmobilisation\nand placing their armed forces on the highest state of alert on 23 March 1939.\nIn a protest note at Ribbentrop's behaviour, Poland's Foreign Minister\nJózef Beck\nreminded him that Poland was an independent country and not some sort of German protectorate that Ribbentrop could bully at will.\nRibbentrop, in turn, sent out instructions to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Count\nHans-Adolf von Moltke\n, that if Poland agreed to the German demands, Germany would ensure that Poland could partition Slovakia with Hungary and be ensured of German support for annexing Ukraine. If the Poles rejected his offer, Poland would be considered an enemy of the\nReich\n.\nOn 26 March, in a stormy meeting with the Polish Ambassador,\nJózef Lipski\n, Ribbentrop accused the Poles of attempting to bully Germany by their partial mobilisation and violently attacked them for offering consideration only of the German demand about the \"extra-territorial\" roads.\nThe meeting ended with Ribbentrop screaming that if Poland invaded the Free City of Danzig, Germany would go to war to destroy Poland.\nWhen the news of Ribbentrop's remarks was leaked to the Polish press, despite Beck's order to the censors on 27 March, it caused anti-German riots in Poland with the local Nazi Party headquarters in the mixed town of\nLininco\ndestroyed by a mob. On 28 March, Beck told Moltke that any attempt to change the status of Danzig unilaterally would be regarded by Poland as a\ncasus belli\n. Although the Germans were not planning an attack on Poland in March 1939, Ribbentrop's bullying behaviour towards the Poles destroyed any faint chance of Poland allowing Danzig to return to Germany.\nThe German occupation of the Czech areas of Czecho-Slovakia on 15 March, in total contravention of the Munich Agreement, which had been signed less than six months before, infuriated British and French public opinion and lost Germany any sympathy.\nSuch was the state of public fury that it appeared possible for several days afterwards that the Chamberlain government might fall because of a\nbackbench\nrebellion.\nEven Ribbentrop's standard line that Germany was only reacting to an unjust Versailles Treaty and wanted peace with everyone, which had worked so well in the past, failed to carry weight. Reflecting the changed mood, Conservative MP\nDuff Cooper\nwrote in a letter to\nThe Times\n:\nSome of us are getting rather tired of the sanctimonious attitude which seeks to take upon our shoulders the blame for every crime committed in Europe. If Germany had been left stronger in 1919 she would sooner have been in a position to do what she is doing today.\nMoreover, the British government had genuinely believed in the German claim that it was only the Sudetenland that concerned it and that Germany was not seeking to dominate Europe. By occupying the Czech parts of Czecho-Slovakia, Germany lost all credibility for its claim to be only righting the alleged wrongs of Versailles.\nShortly afterwards, false reports spread in mid-March 1939 by the Romanian minister in London,\nVirgil Tilea\n, that his country was on the verge of an immediate German attack, led to a dramatic U-turn in the British policy of resisting commitments in Eastern Europe.\nRibbentrop truthfully denied that Germany was going to invade\nRomania\n. But his denials were expressed in almost identical language to the denials that he had issued in early March, when he had denied that anything was being planned against the Czechs; thus they actually increased the \"Romanian war scare\" of March 1939.\nFrom the British point of view, it was regarded as highly desirable to keep Romania and its oil out of German hands. Since Germany itself had hardly any sources of oil, the ability of the Royal Navy to impose a blockade represented a British trump card to deter and, if necessary, win a war.\nIf Germany were to occupy oil-rich Romania, that would undercut all of the British strategic assumptions on Germany's need to import oil from the Americas. Since Poland was regarded as the East European state with the most powerful army, Poland had to be tied to Britain as the best way of ensuring Polish support for Romania; it was the obvious\nquid pro quo\nthat Britain would have to do something for Polish security if the Poles were to be induced to do something for Romanian security.\nOn 31 March 1939, Chamberlain announced before the House of Commons the British \"guarantee\" of Poland, which committed Britain to go to war to defend Polish independence, though pointedly the \"guarantee\" excluded Polish frontiers.\nAs a result of the \"guarantee\" of Poland, Hitler began to speak with increasing frequency of a British \"encirclement\" policy, which he used as the excuse for denouncing, in a speech before the\nReichstag\non 28 April 1939, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland.\nTurkey\nIn late March, Ribbentrop had the German\nchargé d'affaires\nin\nTurkey\n,\nHans Kroll\n, start pressuring Turkey into an alliance with Germany.\nThe Turks assured Kroll that they had no objection to Germany making the Balkans its economic sphere of influence but would regard any move to make the Balkans into a sphere of German political influence as most unwelcome.\nIn April 1939, when Ribbentrop announced at a secret meeting of the senior staff of the Foreign Office that Germany was ending talks with Poland and was instead going to destroy it in an operation late that year, the news was greeted joyfully by those present.\nAnti-Polish\nfeelings had long been rampant in the agency and so, in marked contrast to their cool attitude about attacking Czechoslovakia in 1938, diplomats such as Weizsäcker were highly enthusiastic about the prospect of war with Poland in 1939.\nProfessional diplomats such as Weizsäcker who had never accepted the legitimacy of Poland, which they saw as an \"abomination\" created by the Versailles Treaty, were wholehearted in their support of a war to wipe Poland off the map.\nThe degree of unity within the German government with both the diplomats and the military united in their support of Hitler's anti-Polish policy, which stood in contrast to their views the previous year about destroying Czechoslovakia, very much encouraged Hitler and Ribbentrop with their chosen course of action.\nIn April 1939, Ribbentrop received intelligence that Britain and Turkey were negotiating an alliance intended to keep Germany out of the Balkans.\nOn 23 April 1939, Turkish Foreign Minister\nŞükrü Saracoğlu\ntold the British ambassador of Turkish fears of Italian claims of the Mediterranean as\nMare Nostrum\nand German control of the Balkans, and he suggested an Anglo-Soviet-Turkish alliance as the best way of countering the\nAxis\n.\nAs the Germans had broken the Turkish diplomatic codes, Ribbentrop was well aware as he warned in a circular to German embassies that Anglo-Turkish talks had gone much further \"than what the Turks would care to tell us\".\nRibbentrop appointed\nFranz von Papen\nGermany's ambassador in Turkey with instructions to win it to an alliance with Germany.\nRibbentrop had been attempting to appoint Papen as an ambassador to Turkey since April 1938.\nHis first attempt ended in failure when Turkish President\nMustafa Kemal Atatürk\n, who remembered Papen well with considerable distaste from World War I, refused to accept him as ambassador and complained in private the nomination of Papen must have been meant as some sort of sick German joke.\nThe German embassy in Ankara had been vacant ever since the retirement of the previous ambassador\nFriedrich von Keller\nin November 1938, and Ribbentrop was  able to get the Turks to accept Papen as ambassador only when Saracoğlu complained to Kroll in April 1939 about when the Germans were ever going to send a new ambassador.\nPapen's attempt to address Turkish fears of Italian expansionism by getting Ribbentrop to have Count\nGaleazzo Ciano\npromise the Turks that they had nothing to fear from Italy backfired when the Turks found the Italo-German effort to have been patronising and insulting.\nInstead of focusing on talking to the Turks, Ribbentrop and Papen became entangled in a feud over Papen's demand to bypass Ribbentrop and to send his dispatches straight to Hitler.\nAs a former chancellor, Papen had been granted the privilege of bypassing the Foreign Minister while he was ambassador to Austria. Ribbentrop's friendship with Papen, which went back to 1918, ended over that issue.\nAt the same time, Ribbentrop took to shouting at the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, Mehemet Hamdi Arpag, as part of the effort to win Turkey over as a German ally. Ribbentrop believed that Turks were so stupid that one had to shout at them to make them understand.\nOne of the consequences of Ribbentrop's heavyhanded behaviour was the signing of the Anglo-Turkish alliance on 12 May 1939.\nFrom early 1939 onwards, Ribbentrop had become the leading advocate within the German government of reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union as the best way of pursuing both the short-term anti-Polish and long-term anti-British foreign policy goals.\nRibbentrop first seems to have considered the idea of a pact with the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful visit to\nWarsaw\nin January 1939, when the Poles again refused Ribbentrop's demands about Danzig, the \"extra-territorial\" roads across the Polish Corridor and the Anti-Comintern Pact.\nDuring the\nMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations\n, Ribbentrop was overjoyed by a report from his ambassador in Moscow, Count\nFriedrich Werner von der Schulenburg\n, of a speech by Soviet leader\nJoseph Stalin\nbefore the 18th Party Congress in March 1939 that was strongly anti-Western, which Schulenburg reported meant that the Soviet Union might be seeking an accord with Germany.\nRibbentrop followed up Schulenburg's report by sending Dr. Karl Schnurre of the Foreign Office's trade department to negotiate a German-Soviet economic agreement.\nAt the same time, Ribbentrop's efforts to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British alliance met with considerable hostility from the Japanese in late 1938 and early 1939, but with the Italians, Ribbentrop enjoyed some apparent success. Because of Japanese opposition to participation in an anti-British alliance, Ribbentrop decided to settle for a bilateral German-Italian anti-British treaty. Ribbentrop's efforts were crowned with success with the signing of the\nPact of Steel\nin May 1939, but it was accomplished only by falsely assuring Mussolini that there would be no war for the next three years.\nPact with Soviet Union and outbreak of World War II\nStalin and Ribbentrop at the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, 23 August 1939\nRibbentrop played a key role in the conclusion of a Soviet-German\nnon-aggression pact\n, the\nMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact\n, in 1939 and in the diplomatic action surrounding the attack on Poland. In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the\nReich\nor to grant Polish permission for the \"extra-territorial\" highways, but since the matters were intended after March 1939 to be only a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused privately to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about those matters.\nRibbentrop feared that if German–Polish talks took place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands, as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, depriving the Germans of their excuse for aggression.\nTo block German–Polish diplomatic talks further, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, recalled, and he refused to see the Polish ambassador,\nJózef Lipski\n.\nOn 25 May 1939, Ribbentrop sent a secret message to Moscow to tell the Soviet Foreign Commissar,\nVyacheslav Molotov\n, that if Germany attacked Poland \"Russia's special interests would be taken into consideration\".\nThroughout 1939, Hitler always privately referred to Britain as his main opponent but portrayed the coming destruction of Poland as a necessary prelude to any war with Britain.\nRibbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honour their commitments.\nAlong the same lines, Ribbentrop told Ciano on 5 May 1939, \"It is certain that within a few months not one Frenchman nor a single Englishman will go to war for Poland\".\nRibbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by showing Hitler only the diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain nor France would honour their commitments to Poland. In that, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London,\nHerbert von Dirksen\n, who reported that Chamberlain knew \"the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the\nBritish Empire\n, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war\" and so would back down over Poland.\nFurthermore, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers such as the\nDaily Mail\nand the\nDaily Express\nfor Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland than it actually was.\nThe British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers used by Ribbentrop to provide his press summaries for Hitler were out of touch not only with British public opinion but also with British government policy in regard to Poland.\nThe press summaries Ribbentrop provided were particularly important, as Ribbentrop had managed to convince Hitler that the British government secretly controlled the British press, and just as in Germany, nothing appeared in the British press that the British government did not want to appear. Furthermore, the Germans had broken the British diplomatic codes and were reading the messages between the Foreign Office in London to and from the Embassy in Warsaw.\nThe decrypts showed that there was much tension in Anglo-Polish relations, with the British pressuring the Poles to allow Danzig to rejoin the\nReich\nand the Poles staunchly resisting all efforts to pressure them into concessions to Germany.\nOn the basis of such decrypts, Hitler and Ribbentrop believed that the British were bluffing with their warnings that they would go to war to defend Polish independence.\nIn mid-1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian\nGerhard Weinberg\nto comment that \"perhaps Chamberlain's haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop's beaming smile\", as the countdown to a war that would kill tens of millions inexorably gathered pace.\nNeville Chamberlain's European Policy\nin 1939 was based upon creating a \"peace front\" of alliances linking Western and Eastern European states to serve as a \"tripwire\" meant to deter any act of German aggression.\nThe new \"containment\" strategy adopted in March 1939 was to give firm warnings to Berlin, increase the pace of\nBritish re-armament\nand attempt to form an interlocking network of alliances that would block German aggression anywhere in Europe by creating such a formidable deterrence to aggression that Hitler could not rationally choose that option.\nUnderlying the basis of the \"containment\" of Germany were the so-called \"X documents\", provided by\nCarl Friedrich Goerdeler\n, in 1938–39. They suggested that the\nGerman economy\n, under the strain of massive military spending, was on the verge of collapse and led British policy-makers to the conclusion that if Hitler could be deterred from war and that if his regime was \"contained\" long enough, the German economy would collapse, and, with it, presumably the Nazi regime.\nAt the same time, British policymakers were afraid that if Hitler were \"contained\" and faced with a collapsing economy, he would commit a desperate \"mad dog act\" of aggression as a way of lashing out.\nHence, emphasis was put on pressuring the Poles to allow the return of Danzig to Germany as a way of resolving the crisis peacefully by allowing Hitler to back down without him losing face.\nAs part of a dual strategy to avoid war via deterrence and appeasement of Germany, British leaders warned that they would go to war if Germany attacked Poland, but at the same time, they tried to avoid war by holding unofficial talks with would-be peacemakers such as the British newspaper proprietor\nLord Kemsley\n, the Swedish businessman\nAxel Wenner-Gren\nand another Swedish businessman\nBirger Dahlerus\n, who attempted to work out the basis for a peaceful return of Danzig.\nIn May 1939, as part of his efforts to bully Turkey into joining the Axis, Ribbentrop had arranged for the cancellation of the delivery of 60 heavy howitzers from the\nŠkoda Works\n, which the Turks had paid for in advance.\nThe German refusal either to deliver the artillery pieces or refund the 125 million\nReichsmarks\nthat the Turks had paid for them was to be a major strain on German-Turkish relations in 1939 and had the effect of causing Turkey's politically powerful army to resist Ribbentrop's entreaties to join the Axis.\nAs part of the fierce diplomatic competition in\nAnkara\nin the first half of 1939 between von Papen and French Ambassador\nRené Massigli\nwith British Ambassador, Sir\nHughe Knatchbull-Hugessen\nto win the allegiance of Turkey to either the Axis or the\nAllies\n, Ribbentrop suffered a major reversal in July 1939 when Massigli was able to arrange for major French arms shipments to Turkey on credit to replace the weapons that the Germans had refused to deliver to the Turks.\nIn June 1939,\nFranco-German relations\nwere strained when the head of the French section of the\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\n,\nOtto Abetz\n, was expelled from France following allegations that he had bribed two French newspaper editors to print pro-German articles.\nRibbentrop was enraged by Abetz's expulsion and attacked Count Johannes von Welczeck, the German Ambassador in Paris, over his failure to have the French readmit him.\nIn July 1939, Ribbentrop's claims about an alleged statement of December 1938 made by French Foreign Minister\nGeorges Bonnet\nwere to lead to a lengthy war of words via a series of letters to the French newspapers between Ribbentrop and Bonnet over precisely what Bonnet had said to Ribbentrop.\nOn 11 August 1939, Ribbentrop met the Italian Foreign Minister, Count\nGaleazzo Ciano\n, and the Italian Ambassador to Germany,\nCount Bernardo Attolico\n, in\nSalzburg\n. During that meeting, both Ciano and Attolico were horrified to learn from Ribbentrop that Germany planned to attack Poland and that the Danzig issue was just a pretext for aggression.\nWhen Ciano asked if there was anything Italy could do to broker a Polish-German settlement that would avert a war, he was told by Ribbentrop, \"We want war!\"\nRibbentrop expressed his firmly held belief that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland, but if that occurred, he fully expected the Italians to honour the terms of the\nPact of Steel\n, which was both an offensive and defensive treaty, and to declare war not only on Poland but on the Western powers if necessary.\nRibbentrop told his Italian guests that \"the localisation of the conflict is certain\" and \"the probability of victory is infinite\".\nRibbentrop brushed away Ciano's fears of a general war. He claimed, \"France and England cannot intervene because they are insufficiently prepared militarily and because they have no means of injuring Germany\".\nCiano complained furiously that Ribbentrop had violated his promise given earlier that year, when Italy signed the Pact of Steel, that there would be no war for the next three years. Ciano said that it was absurd to believe that the\nReich\ncould attack Poland without triggering a wider war and that now the Italians were left with the choice of going to war when they needed three more years to rearm or being forced into the humiliation of having to violate the terms of the Pact of Steel by declaring neutrality, which would make the Italians appear cowardly.\nCiano complained in his diary that his arguments \"had no effect\" on Ribbentrop, who simply refused to believe any information that did not fit in with his preconceived notions.\nDespite Ciano's efforts to persuade Ribbentrop to put off the attack on Poland until 1942 to allow the Italians time to get ready for war, Ribbentrop was adamant that Germany had no interest in a diplomatic solution of the Danzig question but wanted a war to wipe Poland off the map.\nThe Salzburg meeting marked the moment when Ciano's dislike of Ribbentrop was transformed into outright hatred and of the beginning of his disillusionment with the pro-German foreign policy that he had championed.\nOn 21 August 1939, Hitler received a message from Stalin: \"The Soviet Government has instructed me to say they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August\".\nThe same day, Hitler ordered German mobilisation.\nThe extent that Hitler was influenced by Ribbentrop's advice can be seen in Hitler's orders for a limited mobilisation against Poland alone.\nWeizsäcker recorded in his diary throughout the first half of 1939 repeated statements from Hitler that any German–Polish war would be a localized conflict and that there was no danger of a general war if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to stay neutral.\nHitler believed that British policy was based upon securing Soviet support for Poland, which led him to perform a diplomatic U-turn and support Ribbentrop's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the best way of ensuring a local war.\nThat was especially the case as decrypts showed the British military attaché to Poland arguing that Britain could not save Poland in the event of a German attack and that only Soviet support offered the prospect of Poland holding out.\nRibbentrop during the signing of the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship in Moscow, 1939\nThe signing of the Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on 23 August 1939 was the crowning achievement of Ribbentrop's career. He flew to Moscow, where, over the course of a 13-hour visit, Ribbentrop signed both the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocols, which partitioned much of Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Germans.\nRibbentrop had expected to see only the Soviet Foreign Commissar\nVyacheslav Molotov\nand was most surprised to be holding talks with\nJoseph Stalin\nhimself.\nDuring his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceeded very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of\nLatvia\n, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.\nRibbentrop had been instructed to claim the\nDaugava\nas the future boundary between the\nGreater Germanic Reich\nand the Soviet Union, but had also been ordered to grant extensive concessions to Stalin.\nWhen Stalin claimed Latvia for the Soviet Union, Ribbentrop was forced to telephone Berlin for permission from Hitler to concede Latvia to the Soviets.\nAfter finishing his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, at a dinner with the Soviet leaders, launched into a lengthy diatribe against the British Empire, with frequent interjections of approval from Stalin, and exchanged toasts with Stalin in honour of German-Soviet friendship.\nFor a brief moment in August 1939, Ribbentrop convinced Hitler that the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union would cause the fall of the Chamberlain government and lead to a new British government that would abandon the Poles to their fate.\nRibbentrop argued that with Soviet economic support, especially in the form of oil, Germany was now immune to the effects of a British naval blockade and so the British would never take on Germany. On 23 August 1939, at a secret meeting of the\nReich'\ns top military leadership at the\nBerghof\n, Hitler argued that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland without the Soviet Union, and fixed \"X-Day\", the date for the invasion of Poland, for 26 August.\nHitler added, \"My only fear is that at the last moment some\nSchweinehund\nwill make a proposal for mediation\".\nUnlike Hitler, who saw the Non-Aggression Pact as merely a pragmatic device forced on him by circumstances, the refusal of Britain or Poland to play the roles that Hitler had allocated to them, Ribbentrop regarded the Non-Aggression Pact as integral to his anti-British policy.\nThe signing of the\nMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact\non 23 August 1939 not only won Germany an informal alliance with the Soviet Union but also neutralized Anglo-French attempts to win Turkey to the \"peace front\". The Turks always believed that it was essential to have the Soviet Union as an ally to counter Germany, and the signing of the pact undercut completely the assumptions behind Turkish security policy.\nThe Anglo-French effort to include the Balkans into the \"peace front\" had always rested on the assumption that the cornerstone of the \"peace front\" in the Balkans was to be Turkey, the regional superpower.\nBecause the Balkans were rich in raw materials such as iron, zinc and Romanian oil, which could help Germany survive a British blockade, it was viewed as highly important by the Allies to keep German influence in the Balkans to a minimum. That was the principal motivation behind efforts to link British promises to support Turkey in the event of an Italian attack, in exchange for Turkish promises to help defend Romania from a German attack.\nBritish and French leaders believed that the deterrent value of the \"peace front\" could be increased if Turkey were a member, and the\nTurkish Straits\nwere open to Allied ships. That would allow the Allies to send troops and supplies to Romania over the\nBlack Sea\nand through Romania to Poland.\nOn 25 August 1939, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler wavered for a moment when the news reached Berlin of the ratification of the\nAnglo-Polish military alliance\nand a personal message from Mussolini that told Hitler that Italy would dishonour the Pact of Steel if Germany attacked Poland.\nThis was especially damaging to Ribbentrop, as he always assured Hitler, \"Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis\".\nAs a result of the message from Rome and the ratification of the Anglo-Polish treaty, Hitler cancelled the invasion of Poland planned for 26 August but ordered it held back until 1 September to give Germany some time to break up the unfavourable international alignment.\nThough Ribbentrop continued to argue that Britain and France were bluffing, both he and Hitler were prepared, as a last resort, to risk a general war by invading Poland.\nBecause of Ribbentrop's firmly held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much-desired war with Britain came.\nThe Greek historian Aristotle Kaillis wrote that it was Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler and his insistence that the Western powers would fail to go to war for Poland that was the most important reason that Hitler did not cancel\nFall Weiß\n, the German invasion of Poland, altogether, instead of only postponing \"X-day\" for six days.\nRibbentrop told Hitler that his sources showed that Britain would not be militarily prepared to take on Germany at the earliest until 1940 or more probably 1941, so that meant that the British were bluffing.\nEven if the British were serious in their warnings of war, Ribbentrop took the view that since a war with Britain was inevitable, the risk of a war with Britain was acceptable and so he argued that Germany should not shy away from such challenges.\nOn 27 August 1939, Chamberlain sent a letter to Hitler that was intended to counteract reports Chamberlain had heard from intelligence sources in Berlin that Ribbentrop had convinced Hitler that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact would ensure that Britain would abandon Poland. In his letter, Chamberlain wrote:\nWhatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfil.\nIt has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.\nIf the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured\nRibbentrop told Hitler that Chamberlain's letter was just a bluff and urged his master to call it.\nThe British Ambassador to Germany,\nSir Nevile Henderson\n, in 1937. Though Henderson was a leading supporter of appeasement, his relations with Ribbentrop were extremely poor throughout his ambassadorship. On the night of 30–31 August 1939, he and Ribbentrop almost came to blows.\nOn the night of 30–31 August 1939, Ribbentrop had an extremely heated exchange with the British Ambassador to Germany,\nSir Nevile Henderson\n, who objected to Ribbentrop's demand, given at about midnight, that if a Polish plenipotentiary did not arrive in Berlin that night to discuss the German \"final offer\", the responsibility for the outbreak of war would not rest on the\nReich\n.\nAmbassador Henderson stated that the terms of the German \"final offer\" were very reasonable but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the \"final offer\" was most unreasonable, and he also demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the \"final offer\" to Ambassador\nJózef Lipski\nor provide a written copy of the \"final offer\".\nThe Henderson–Ribbentrop meeting became so tense that the two men almost came to blows.\nThe American historian\nGerhard Weinberg\ndescribed the Henderson–Ribbentrop meeting:\nWhen Joachim von Ribbentrop refused to give a copy of the German demands to the British Ambassador [Henderson] at midnight of 30–31 August 1939, the two almost came to blows. Ambassador Henderson, who had long advocated concessions to Germany, recognized that here was a deliberately conceived alibi the German government had prepared for a war it was determined to start. No wonder Henderson was angry; von Ribbentrop on the other hand could see war ahead and went home beaming.\nAs intended by Ribbentrop, the narrow time limit for acceptance of the \"final offer\" made it impossible for the British government to contact the Polish government in time about the German offer, let alone for the Poles to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary envoy to arrive in Berlin that night, thereby allowing Ribbentrop to claim that the Poles had rejected the German \"final offer\".\nAs it was, a special meeting of the British cabinet called to consider the \"final offer\" and declined to pass on the message to Warsaw under the grounds that it was not a serious proposal on the part of Berlin.\nThe \"rejection\" of the German proposal was one of the pretexts used for the German aggression against Poland on 1 September 1939. The British historian D.C. Watt wrote, \"Two hours later, Berlin Radio broadcast the sixteen points, adding that Poland had rejected them. Thanks to Ribbentrop, they had never even seen them\".\nOn 31 August, Ribbentrop met with Ambassador Attolico to tell him that Poland's \"rejection\" of the \"generous\" German 16-point peace plan meant that Germany had no interest in Mussolini's offer to call a conference about the status of Danzig.\nBesides the Polish \"rejection\" of the German \"final offer\", the aggression against Poland was justified with the\nGleiwitz incident\nand other SS-staged incidents on the German–Polish border.\nAs soon as the news broke in the morning of 1 September 1939 that Germany had invaded Poland, Mussolini launched another desperate peace mediation plan intended to stop the German–Polish war from becoming a world war. Mussolini's motives were in no way altruistic. Instead, he was motivated entirely by a wish to escape the self-imposed trap of the Pact of Steel, which obliged Italy to go to war while the country was entirely unprepared. If he suffered the humiliation of having to declare neutrality, it would make him appear cowardly. French Foreign Minister\nGeorges Bonnet\n, acting on his own initiative, told the Italian Ambassador to France, Baron\nRaffaele Guariglia\n, that France had accepted Mussolini's peace plan.\nBonnet had\nHavas\nissue a statement at midnight on 1 September: \"The French government has today, as have several other Governments, received an Italian proposal looking to the resolution of Europe's difficulties. After due consideration, the French government has given a 'positive response'\".\nThough the French and the Italians were serious about Mussolini's peace plan, which called for an immediate ceasefire and a four-power conference in the manner of the Munich conference of 1938 to consider Poland's borders, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax stated that unless the Germans withdrew from Poland immediately, Britain would not attend the proposed conference.\nRibbentrop finally scuttled Mussolini's peace plan by stating that Germany had no interest in a ceasefire, a withdrawal from Poland or attending the proposed peace conference.\nOn the morning of 3 September 1939, when Chamberlain followed through with his threat of a\nBritish declaration of war\nif Germany attacked Poland, a visibly shocked Hitler asked Ribbentrop \"Now what?\", a question to which Ribbentrop had no answer except to state that there would be a \"similar message\" forthcoming from French Ambassador\nRobert Coulondre\n, who arrived later that afternoon to present the\nFrench declaration of war\n.\nWeizsäcker later recalled, \"On 3 Sept., when the British and French declared war, Hitler was surprised, after all, and was to begin with, at a loss\".\nThe British historian\nRichard Overy\nwrote that what Hitler thought he was starting in September 1939 was only a local war between Germany and Poland and that his decision to do so was largely based on a vast underestimate of the risks of a general war.\nIn effect, Ribbentrop's influence made Hitler go to war in 1939 with the country he wanted as his ally, the United Kingdom, and ally with the country he wanted as his enemy, the Soviet Union.\nAfter the outbreak of World War II, Ribbentrop spent most of the\nPolish campaign\ntravelling with Hitler.\nOn 27 September 1939, Ribbentrop made a second visit to Moscow. There, at meetings with the Soviet Foreign Commissar\nVyacheslav Molotov\nand\nJoseph Stalin\n, he was forced to agree to revising the Secret Protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact in the Soviet Union's favour, most notably agreeing to Stalin's demand for\nLithuania\nto go to the Soviet Union.\nThe imposition of the\nBritish blockade\nhad made the\nReich\nhighly dependent upon Soviet economic support, which placed Stalin in a strong negotiating position with Ribbentrop. On 1 March 1940, Ribbentrop received\nSumner Welles\n, the American Under-Secretary of State, who was on a peace mission for US President\nFranklin Roosevelt\n, and did his best to abuse his American guest.\nWelles asked Ribbentrop under what terms Germany might be willing to negotiate a compromise peace, before the\nPhoney War\nbecame a real war. Ribbentrop told Welles that only a total German victory \"could give us the peace we want\". Welles reported to Roosevelt that Ribbentrop had a \"completely closed and very stupid mind\".\nOn 10 March 1940, Ribbentrop visited Rome to meet with Mussolini, who promised him that Italy would soon enter the war.\nFor his one-day Italian trip, Ribbentrop was accompanied by a staff of 35, including a gymnastics coach, a masseur, a doctor, two hairdressers and various legal and economic experts from the Foreign Office.\nAfter the Italo-German summit at the\nBrenner Pass\non 18 March 1940, which was attended by Hitler and Mussolini, Count Ciano wrote in his diary: \"Everyone in Rome dislikes Ribbentrop\".\nOn 7 May 1940, Ribbentrop founded a new section of the Foreign Office, the\nAbteilung Deutschland\n(Department of Internal German Affairs), under\nMartin Luther\n, to which was assigned the responsibility for all antisemitic affairs.\nOn 10 May 1940, Ribbentrop summoned the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg ambassadors to present them with notes justifying the German invasion of their countries several hours after the Germans had invaded those nations.\nMuch to Ribbentrop's fury, someone leaked the plans for the German invasion to the Dutch embassy in Berlin, which led Ribbentrop to devote the next several months to an investigation aimed at identifying the leaker. The investigation tore apart the agency, as colleagues were encouraged to denounce each other, and was ultimately unsuccessful.\nIn early June 1940, when Mussolini informed Hitler that he would finally enter the war on 10 June 1940, Hitler was most dismissive, in private calling Mussolini a cowardly opportunist who broke the terms of the Pact of Steel in September 1939 when the going looked rough, and was entering the war in June 1940 only after it was clear that France was beaten and it appeared that Britain would soon make peace.\nRibbentrop shared Hitler's assessment of the Italians but welcomed Italy coming into war. In part, that seemed to affirm the importance of the Pact of Steel, which Ribbentrop had negotiated, and in addition, with Italy now an ally, the Foreign Office had more to do.\nRibbentrop championed the so-called\nMadagascar Plan\nin June 1940 to deport all of\nEurope's Jews\nto\nMadagascar\nafter the presumed imminent defeat of Britain.\nRelations with wartime allies\nRibbentrop, a\nFrancophile\n, argued that Germany should allow\nVichy France\na limited degree of independence within a binding Franco-German partnership.\nTo that end, Ribbentrop appointed a colleague from the\nDienststelle\n,\nOtto Abetz\n, as Ambassador to France with instructions to promote the political career of\nPierre Laval\n, whom Ribbentrop had decided to be the French politician most favourable to Germany.\nThe Foreign Office's influence in France varied, as there were many other agencies competing for power there. But in general, from late 1943 to mid-1944, the Foreign Office was second only to the SS in terms of power in France.\nFrom the latter half of 1937, Ribbentrop had championed the idea of an alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan that would partition the\nBritish Empire\namong them.\nAfter signing the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, Ribbentrop expanded on this idea for an Axis alliance to include the Soviet Union to form a Eurasian bloc that would destroy maritime states such as Britain.\nThe German historian\nKlaus Hildebrand\nargued that besides Hitler's foreign policy programme, there were three other factions within the Nazi Party who had alternative foreign policy programmes, whom Hildebrand designated the\nagrarians\n, the\nrevolutionary socialists\n, and the Wilhelmine Imperialists.\nAnother German diplomatic historian, Wolfgang Michalka argued that there was a fourth alternative to the Nazi foreign policy programme, and that was Ribbentrop's concept of a\nEurasian\nbloc comprising the four totalitarian states of Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan. Unlike the other factions, Ribbentrop's foreign policy programme was the only one that Hitler allowed to be executed during the years 1939–41, though it was more due to the temporary bankruptcy of Hitler's own foreign policy programme that he had laid down in\nMein Kampf\nand\nZweites Buch\nfollowing the failure to achieve an alliance with Britain, than to a genuine change of mind.\nRibbentrop's foreign policy conceptions differed from Hitler's in that Ribbentrop's concept of international relations owed more to the traditional Wilhelmine\nMachtpolitik\nthan to Hitler's racist and Social Darwinist vision of different \"races\" locked in a merciless and endless struggle over\nLebensraum\n.\nThe different foreign-policy conceptions held by Hitler and Ribbentrop were illustrated in their reaction to the\nFall of Singapore\nin 1942: Ribbentrop wanted this great British defeat to be a day of celebration in Germany, whereas Hitler forbade any celebrations on the grounds that Singapore represented a sad day for the principles of\nwhite supremacy\n. Another area of difference was Ribbentrop's obsessive hatred for Britain—which he saw as the main enemy—and view of the Soviet Union as an important ally in the anti-British struggle. Hitler saw the alliance with the Soviet Union as only tactical, and was nowhere as anti-British as his Foreign Minister.\nIn August 1940, Ribbentrop oversaw the\nSecond Vienna Award\n, which saw about 40 per cent of the\nTransylvania\nregion of Romania returned to Hungary.\nThe decision to award so much of Romania to the Hungarians was Hitler's, as Ribbentrop himself spent most of the Vienna conference loudly attacking the Hungarian delegation for their coolness towards attacking Czechoslovakia in 1938 and then demanding more than their fair share of the spoils.\nWhen Ribbentrop finally got around to announcing his decision, the Hungarian delegation, which had expected Ribbentrop to rule in favour of Romania, broke out in cheers, while the Romanian foreign minister\nMihail Manoilescu\nfainted.\nIn late 1940, Ribbentrop made a sustained but unsuccessful effort to have\nFrancoist Spain\nenter the war on the Axis side. During his talks with the Spanish foreign minister,\nRamón Serrano Suñer\n, Ribbentrop affronted Suñer with his tactless behaviour, especially his suggestion that Spain cede the\nCanary Islands\nto Germany.\nAn angry Suñer replied that he would rather see the Canaries sink into the Atlantic than cede an inch of Spanish territory. An area in which Ribbentrop enjoyed more success arose in September 1940, when he had the Far Eastern agent of the\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\n,\nHeinrich Georg Stahmer\n, start negotiations with the Japanese foreign minister,\nYōsuke Matsuoka\n, for an\nanti-American\nalliance. The result of these talks was the signing in Berlin on 27 September 1940 of the\nTripartite Pact\nby Ribbentrop, Count Ciano, and Japanese Ambassador\nSaburō Kurusu\n.\nIn October 1940,\nGauleiters\nJosef Bürckel\nand\nRobert Heinrich Wagner\noversaw the near total expulsion of the Jews into the unoccupied\nzone libre\nof\nVichy France\n; they deported them not only from the parts of Alsace-Lorraine that had been annexed to the\nReich\n, but also from their\nGaue\nas well.\nRibbentrop treated in a \"most dilatory fashion\" the ensuing complaints by the Vichy French government over the expulsions.\nIn November 1940, during the visit of the Soviet Foreign Commissar\nVyacheslav Molotov\nto Berlin, Ribbentrop tried hard to get the Soviet Union to sign the\nTripartite Pact\n.\nRibbentrop argued that the Soviets and Germans shared a common enemy in the form of the British Empire, and as such, it was in the best interests of the Kremlin to enter the war on the Axis side.\nHe proposed that, after the defeat of Britain, they could carve up the territory in the following way: the Soviet Union would have India and the Middle East, Italy the Mediterranean area, Japan the\nBritish possessions\nin the Far East (presuming of course that Japan would enter the war), and Germany would take central Africa and Britain.\nMolotov was open to the idea of the Soviet Union entering the war on the Axis side, but demanded as the price of entry into the war that Germany recognise Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Hungary and Yugoslavia as within the exclusive Soviet sphere of influence.\nRibbentrop's efforts to persuade Molotov to abandon his demands about Europe as the price of a Soviet alliance with Germany were entirely unsuccessful. After Molotov left Berlin, the Soviet Union indicated that it wished to sign the Tripartite Pact and enter the war on the Axis side. Though Ribbentrop was all for taking Stalin's offer, Hitler by this point had decided that he wanted to attack the Soviet Union. The\nGerman–Soviet Axis talks\nled nowhere.\nClockwise from top left:\nFunk\n,\nKrosigk\n,\nGoebbels\n, Ribbentrop and\nNeurath\nduring a Reichstag session, 1941\nAs World War II continued, Ribbentrop's once-friendly relations with the\nSS\nbecame increasingly strained. In January 1941, the nadir of the relations between the SS and the Foreign Office was reached when the\nIron Guard\nattempted a\ncoup in Romania\n. Ribbentrop supported Marshal\nIon Antonescu\n's government and\nHeinrich Himmler\nsupported the Iron Guard.\nIn the aftermath of the failed coup in\nBucharest\n, the Foreign Office assembled evidence that the\nSD\nhad backed the coup, which led Ribbentrop to restrict sharply the powers of the SD police attachés. Since October 1939 they had operated largely independently of the German embassies at which they had been stationed.\nIn early 1941, Ribbentrop appointed an assemblage of\nSA\nmen to German embassies in eastern Europe, with\nManfred Freiherr von Killinger\ndispatched to\nRomania\n,\nSiegfried Kasche\nto\nCroatia\n,\nAdolf-Heinz Beckerle\nto\nBulgaria\n,\nDietrich von Jagow\nto\nHungary\n, and\nHanns Ludin\nto\nSlovakia\n.\nThe major qualifications of all these men, none of whom had previously held a diplomatic position before, were that they were close friends of Luther and helped to enable a split in the\nSS\n(the traditional rivalry between the SS and SA was still running strong).\nIn March 1941, Japan's Foreign Minister\nYōsuke Matsuoka\n, a Germanophile, visited Berlin. On 29 March 1941, during a conversation with Matsuoka, Ribbentrop, as instructed by Hitler, told the Japanese nothing about the upcoming\nOperation Barbarossa\n, as Hitler believed that he could defeat the Soviet Union on his own and preferred that the Japanese attack Britain instead.\nHitler did not wish for any information that might lead the Japanese into attacking the Soviet Union to reach their ears. Ribbentrop tried to convince Matsuoka to urge the government in Tokyo to attack the great British naval base at Singapore, claiming the\nRoyal Navy\nwas too weak to retaliate due to its involvement in the\nBattle of the Atlantic\n. Matsuoka responded that preparations to occupy Singapore were under way.\nPoglavnik\nAnte Pavelić\n(left) of the\nIndependent State of Croatia\nand Ribbentrop in Salzburg, 6 June 1941\nIn late 1940 and early 1941, Ribbentrop strongly pressured the\nKingdom of Yugoslavia\nto sign the Tripartite Pact, despite advice from the German Legation in\nBelgrade\nthat such an action would probably lead to the overthrow of\nPrince Paul\n, the Yugoslav Regent.\nRibbentrop's intention was to gain transit rights through the country that would allow the Germans to invade Greece. On 25 March 1941,\nYugoslavia reluctantly signed the Tripartite Pact\n; the next day the\nYugoslav military\noverthrew Prince Paul in a\nbloodless coup\n.\nWhen Hitler ordered the\ninvasion of Yugoslavia\n, Ribbentrop was opposed, because he thought the Foreign Office was likely to be excluded from ruling occupied Yugoslavia.\nAs Hitler was displeased with Ribbentrop over his opposition to the invasion, the minister took to his bed for the next couple of days.\nWhen Ribbentrop recovered, he sought a chance to increase his agency's influence by giving\nCroatia\nindependence.\nRibbentrop chose the\nUstaše\nto rule Croatia. He had\nEdmund Veesenmayer\nsuccessfully conclude talks in April 1941 with General\nSlavko Kvaternik\nof the Ustaše on having his party rule Croatia after the German invasion.\nReflecting his displeasure with the German Legation in Belgrade, which had advised against pushing Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact, Ribbentrop refused to have the German Legation withdrawn in advance before Germany\nbombed Belgrade\non 6 April 1941. The staff was left to survive the fire-bombing as best it could.\nRibbentrop liked and admired\nJoseph Stalin\nand was opposed to the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.\nHe passed a word to a Soviet diplomat: \"Please tell Stalin I was against this war, and that I know it will bring great misfortune to Germany.\" When it came to time for Ribbentrop to present the German declaration of war on 22 June 1941 to the Soviet Ambassador, General\nVladimir Dekanozov\n, the interpreter\nPaul Schmidt\ndescribed the scene:\nIt is just before four on the morning of Sunday, 22 June 1941 in the office of the Foreign Minister. He is expecting the Soviet Ambassador, Dekanozov, who had been phoning the Minister since early Saturday. Dekanozov had an urgent message from Moscow. He had called every two hours, but was told the Minister was away from the city. At two on Sunday morning, von Ribbentrop finally responded to the calls. Dekanozov was told that von Ribbentrop wished to meet with him at once. An appointment was made for 4\nam\nVon Ribbentrop is nervous, walking up and down from one end of his large office to the other, like a caged animal, while saying over and over, \"The\nFührer\nis absolutely right. We must attack Russia, or they will surely attack us!\" Is he reassuring himself? Is he justifying the ruination of his crowning diplomatic achievement? Now he has to destroy it \"because that is the\nFührer'\ns wish\".\nWhen Dekanozov finally appeared, Ribbentrop read out a short statement saying that the Reich had been forced into \"military countermeasures\" because of an alleged Soviet plan to attack Germany in July 1941.\nRibbentrop did not present a declaration of war to General Dekanozov, confining himself to reading the statement about Germany being forced to take \"military countermeasures\".\nRibbentrop (left) with Marshal\nIon Antonescu\n, in 1943\nDespite his opposition to\nOperation Barbarossa\nand a preference to concentrate against Britain, Ribbentrop began a sustained effort on 28 June 1941, without consulting Hitler, to have Japan attack the Soviet Union.\nBut Ribbentrop's motives in seeking to have Japan enter the war were more anti-British than anti-Soviet.\nOn 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop ordered General\nEugen Ott\n, the German Ambassador to Japan to:\nGo on with your efforts to bring about the earliest possible participation of Japan in the war against Russia…The natural goal must be, as before, to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the\nTrans-Siberian Railway\nbefore winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia, the position of the Tripartite Powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation of the British Isles, will only be a question of time. An America completely isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with the seizure of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire important to the Tripartite Powers.\nAs part of his efforts to bring Japan into Barbarossa, on 1 July 1941, Ribbentrop had Germany break off diplomatic relations with\nChiang Kai-shek\nand recognized the\nJapanese-puppet government\nof\nWang Jingwei\nas China's legitimate rulers.\nRibbentrop hoped that recognizing Wang would be seen as a coup that might add to the prestige of the pro-German Japanese Foreign Minister\nYōsuke Matsuoka\n, who was opposed to opening American-Japanese talks. Despite Ribbentrop's best efforts, Matsuoka was sacked as foreign minister later in July 1941, and the Japanese-American talks began.\nAfter the war, Ribbentrop was found to have had culpability in\nthe Holocaust\nbased on his efforts to persuade the leaders of\nNazi puppet states\nand other\nAxis powers\nto deport Jews to the Nazi\nextermination camps\n.\nIn August 1941, when the question of whether to deport foreign Jews living in Germany arose, Ribbentrop argued against deportation as a way of maximizing the Foreign Office's influence.\nTo deport foreign Jews living in the Reich, Ribbentrop had Luther negotiate agreements with the governments of\nRomania\n,\nSlovakia\nand\nCroatia\nto allow Jews holding citizenship of those states to be deported.\nIn September 1941, the Reich Plenipotentiary for\nNazi-occupied Serbia\n, Felix Benzler, reported to Ribbentrop that the SS had arrested 8,000\nSerbian Jews\n, whom they were planning to execute en masse. He asked for permission to try to stop the massacre. Ribbentrop assigned the question to Luther, who ordered Benzler to co-operate fully in the massacre.\nIn late 1941, Ribbentrop worked for the failure of the Japanese-American talks in Washington and for Japan to attack the United States.\nIn October 1941 Ribbentrop ordered\nEugen Ott\n, the German ambassador to Japan, to start applying pressure on the Japanese to attack the Americans as soon as possible.\nRibbentrop argued to Hitler that a war between the United States and Germany was inevitable given the extent of American aid to Britain and the increasingly frequent \"incidents\" in the North Atlantic between U-boats and American warships guarding convoys to Britain. He said that having such a war start with a Japanese attack on the United States was the best way to begin it.\nRibbentrop told Hitler that because of his four years in Canada and the United States before 1914, he was an expert on all things American; he thought that the United States was not a serious military power.\nOn 4 December 1941, the Japanese Ambassador General\nHiroshi Ōshima\ntold Ribbentrop that Japan was on the verge of war with the United States. In turn, Ribbentrop promised that Germany would join the war against the Americans.\nOn 7 December 1941, Ribbentrop was jubilant at the news of the Japanese\nattack on Pearl Harbor\nand did his utmost to support a declaration of war on the United States. He delivered the\nofficial declaration\nto the American\nChargé d'Affaires\nLeland B. Morris\non 11 December 1941.\nIn early 1942, following American entry into war, the United States successfully pressured all of the\nLatin American\nstates, except for Argentina and Chile, to declare war on Germany.\nRibbentrop considered the acceptance of declarations of war from small states such as Costa Rica and Ecuador to be deeply humiliating, and he refused to see any of the Latin American ambassadors. He had Weizsäcker accept their declarations of war instead.\nIn April 1942, as part of a diplomatic counterpart to\nCase Blue\n, a military operation in\nsouthern Russia\n, Ribbentrop assembled a collection of\nanti-Soviet émigrés\nfrom the\nCaucasus\nin the\nHotel Adlon\nin Berlin with the intention to have them declared leaders of governments-in-exile.\nFrom Ribbentrop's point of view, this had the dual benefit of ensuring popular support for the German Army as it advanced into the Caucasus and of ensuring that it was the Foreign Office that ruled the Caucasus once the Germans occupied the area.\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, the German Minister of the East, saw this as an intrusion into his area of authority, and told Hitler that the émigrés at the Hotel Adlon were \"a nest of Allied agents\".\nTo Ribbentrop's disappointment, Hitler sided with Rosenberg.\nDespite the often fierce rivalry with the SS, the Foreign Office played a key role in arranging the deportations of Jews to the death camps from\nFrance (1942–44)\n,\nHungary (1944–45)\n,\nSlovakia\n,\nItaly (after 1943)\n, and the\nBalkans\n. Ribbentrop assigned all of the\nHolocaust\n-related work to\nMartin Luther\n, an old crony from the\nDienststelle\nwho represented the Foreign Ministry at the\nWannsee Conference\n.\nIn 1942, Ambassador\nOtto Abetz\nsecured the deportation of 25,000 French Jews, and Ambassador\nHanns Ludin\nsecured the deportation of 50,000 Slovak Jews to the death camps.\nOnly once, in August 1942, did Ribbentrop try to restrict the deportations, but only because of jurisdictional disputes with the SS.\nRibbentrop halted deportations from\nRomania\nand\nCroatia\n; in the case of the former, he was insulted because the SS were negotiating with the Romanians directly, and in the case of the latter, he learned that the SS and Luther had pressured the Italians in their zone of occupation to deport their Jews without first informing Ribbentrop. He had required being kept updated on all developments in Italo-German relations.\nIn September 1942, after a meeting with Hitler, who was unhappy with his foreign minister's actions, Ribbentrop changed course and ordered the deportations to be resumed immediately.\nIn November 1942, following\nOperation Torch\n(the British-American invasion of North Africa), Ribbentrop met French Chief of the Government\nPierre Laval\nin Munich. He presented Laval with an ultimatum for Germany's occupation of the French unoccupied zone and Tunisia.\nRibbentrop tried unsuccessfully to arrange for the Vichy French\nArmistice Army\nin North Africa to be formally placed under German command.\nIn December 1942, he met the Italian Foreign Minister Count\nGaleazzo Ciano\n, who carried Mussolini's request urging the Germans to go on the defensive in the Soviet Union in order to focus on attacking North Africa. Ribbentrop joined Hitler in belittling Italy's war effort.\nDuring the same meeting in East Prussia with Count Ciano,\nPierre Laval\narrived. He quickly agreed to Hitler's and Ribbentrop's demands that he place French police under the command of more radical antisemites and transport hundreds of thousands of French workers as labourers in Germany's war industry.\nAnother low point in Ribbentrop's relations with the SS occurred in February 1943, when the SD backed a Luther-led internal\nputsch\nto oust Ribbentrop as foreign minister.\nLuther had become estranged from Ribbentrop because the latter's wife treated the former as a household servant. She pushed her husband into ordering an investigation into allegations of corruption on Luther's part.\nLuther's\nputsch\nfailed largely because Himmler decided that a foreign ministry headed by Luther would be a more dangerous opponent than the current one under Ribbentrop. At the last minute, he withdrew his support from Luther. In the aftermath of the\nputsch\n, Luther was sent to\nSachsenhausen concentration camp\n.\nIn April 1943, during a summit meeting with Hungary's Regent\nMiklós Horthy\n, Ribbentrop strongly pressed the Hungarians to deport their Jewish population to the death camps, but was unsuccessful. During their meeting, Ribbentrop declared \"the Jews must either be exterminated or taken to the concentration camps. There is no other possibility\".\nDeclining influence\nRibbentrop's detention report and\nmugshots\nAs the war went on, Ribbentrop's influence waned. Because most of the world was at war with Germany, the Foreign Ministry's importance diminished as the value of diplomacy became limited. By January 1944, Germany had diplomatic relations only with Argentina, Ireland, Vichy France, the\nItalian Social Republic\nin Italy,\nOccupied Denmark\n, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, the Holy See, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Thailand, Japan, and the\nJapanese puppet states\nof\nManchukuo\nand the\nWang Jingwei regime\nin China. Later that year, Argentina and Turkey severed ties with Germany; Romania and Bulgaria joined the Allies and Finland made a separate peace with the Soviet Union and declared war on Germany.\nHitler found Ribbentrop increasingly tiresome and started to avoid him.\nThe Foreign Minister's pleas for permission to seek peace with at least some of Germany's enemies—the Soviet Union in particular—played a role in their estrangement.\nAs his influence declined, Ribbentrop spent his time feuding with other Nazi leaders over control of antisemitic policies to curry Hitler's favour.\nRibbentrop suffered a major blow when many old Foreign Office diplomats participated in the\n20 July 1944\nputsch\nand assassination attempt on Hitler.\nRibbentrop had not known of the plot, but the participation of so many current and former Foreign Ministry members reflected badly on him.\nHitler felt that Ribbentrop's \"bloated administration\" prevented him from keeping proper tabs on his diplomats' activities.\nRibbentrop worked closely with the\nSS\n, with which he had reconciled, to purge the Foreign Office of those involved in the\nputsch\n.\nIn the hours immediately following the assassination attempt on Hitler, Ribbentrop, Göring, Dönitz, and Mussolini were having tea with Hitler in Rastenberg when Dönitz began to rail against the failures of the Luftwaffe. Göring immediately turned the direction of the conversation to Ribbentrop, and the bankruptcy of Germany's foreign policy. \"You dirty little champagne salesman! Shut your mouth!\" Göring shouted, threatening to smack Ribbentrop with his marshal's baton. But Ribbentrop refused to remain silent at this disrespect. \"I am still the Foreign Minister,\" he shouted, \"and my name is\nvon\nRibbentrop!\"\nOn 20 April 1945, Ribbentrop attended Hitler's 56th, and last, birthday party in Berlin.\nThree days later, Ribbentrop attempted to meet Hitler, but was rejected with the explanation the Führer had more important things to do.\nArrest\nAfter Hitler's suicide, Ribbentrop attempted to find a role under the new president,\nGroßadmiral\nKarl Dönitz\n, but was rebuffed.  He went into hiding under an assumed name (Herr Reiser) in the port city of\nHamburg\n.  On 14 June, after Germany's surrender, Ribbentrop was arrested by Sergeant Jacques Goffinet,\na French citizen who had joined the\n5th Special Air Service\n, the Belgian SAS, and was working with the\nBritish Army\nnear Hamburg.\nHe was found with a rambling letter written in English\naddressed to the British Prime Minister \"\nWincent Churchill\n\"\nand Foreign Minister\nAnthony Eden\ncriticizing British foreign policy for\nanti-German sentiments\n, and blaming Britain's failure to ally with Germany before the war for the\nSoviet occupation of eastern Germany\nand the advancement of\nBolshevism\ninto central Europe.\nIn it Ribbentrop said it was Hitler's \"last political will\" and a friendship appeal and claimed to have met with Hitler shortly before his death who \"having suddenly turned around to me and said: 'You will see, my spirit will arise from my grave and one will see that I have been right.\n'\n\"\nRibbentrop in his cell at Nuremberg after the trials had concluded\nTrial and execution\nRibbentrop was a defendant at the\nNuremberg trials\n. The Allies'\nInternational Military Tribunal\nconvicted him on four counts: crimes against peace, deliberately planning a war of aggression, committing war crimes, and\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nAccording to the judgment, Ribbentrop was actively involved in planning the\nAnschluss\n, as well as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. He was also deeply involved in the \"\nfinal solution\n\"; as early as 1942 he had ordered German diplomats in Axis countries to hasten the process of sending Jews to\ndeath camps\nin the east. He supported the lynching of Allied airmen shot down over Germany, and helped to cover up the 1945 murder of Major-General\nGustave Mesny\n, a French officer being held as a prisoner-of-war. He was held directly responsible for atrocities which took place in Denmark and\nVichy France\n, since the top officials in those two occupied countries reported to him. Ribbentrop claimed that Hitler made all the important decisions himself, and that he had been deceived by Hitler's repeated claims of only wanting peace. The Tribunal rejected this argument, saying that given how closely involved Ribbentrop was with the execution of the war, \"he could not have remained unaware of the aggressive nature of Hitler's actions.\"\nEven in prison, Ribbentrop remained loyal to Hitler: \"Even with all I know, if in this cell Hitler should come to me and say 'do this!', I would still do it.\"\n17 October 1946 newsreel of\nNuremberg trials\nsentencing\nRibbentrop's body after his execution\nGustave Gilbert\n, an American Army psychologist, was allowed to examine the Nazi leaders who stood trial. Among other tests, he administered a German version of the\nWechsler–Bellevue IQ test\n. Ribbentrop scored 129, the 10th highest among the Nazi leaders tested.\nRibbentrop was also examined by Chief Medical Officer Lt. Col.\nRene Juchli\nwho reported that Ribbentrop was \"highly neurotic\".\nAt one point during the trial, a US Army interpreter asked\nErnst\nFreiherr\nvon Weizsäcker\nhow Hitler could have promoted Ribbentrop to high office. Von Weizsäcker responded, \"Hitler never noticed Ribbentrop's babbling because Hitler always did all the talking.\"\nOn 16 October 1946, Ribbentrop became the first of those sentenced to death at Nuremberg to be\nhanged\n, after Göring committed suicide just before his scheduled execution.\nThe hangman was U.S. Master Sergeant\nJohn C. Woods\n. Ribbentrop was escorted up the 13 steps of the gallows and asked if he had any final words. He said: \"God protect Germany. God have mercy on my soul. My final wish is that Germany should recover her unity and that, for the sake of peace, there should be understanding between East and West. I wish peace to the world.\"\nNuremberg Prison Commandant\nBurton C. Andrus\nlater recalled that Ribbentrop turned to the prison's\nLutheran\nchaplain,\nHenry F. Gerecke\n, immediately before the hood was placed over his head and then he whispered, \"I'll see you again.\"\nThe execution was\nbotched\nand it took 14 minutes for Ribbentrop to die.\nHis remains, like those of the other nine executed men and of the suicide Hermann Göring, were cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand his ashes scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nIn popular culture\nIn\nFamous Last Words\n(1981), a novel by\nTimothy Findley\n, Ribbentrop conspires with the\nDuke of Windsor\nto kill Hitler and then take over the Nazi Party and Europe.\nIn\nKazuo Ishiguro\n's novel\nThe Remains of the Day\n(1989), Ribbentrop is a frequent visitor to the fictitious Darlington Hall.\nThe\nRobert Harris\nnovel\nFatherland\n(1992) explores an alternate history in which the Nazis have won the war and Ribbentrop is still the foreign minister in 1964.\nIn\nHarry Turtledove\n's\nWorldwar: Striking the Balance\n(1996) imagining an\nalien invasion\nof Earth during\nWorld War II\n, Ribbentrop represents Nazi Germany in negotiation of an armistice between the Allied and Axis powers.\nIn\nGuy Walters\n'\nThe Leader\n(2003),\nOswald Mosley\nbecomes\nPrime Minister\nin 1937, allying the United Kingdom with the\nAxis powers\n. Ribbentrop is seen talking to\nDiana Mitford\nin London after the creation of the new alliance.\nIn\nPhilip Roth\n's alternative history\nThe Plot Against America\n(2004),\nCharles Lindbergh\nwins\nthe presidential election of 1940\nand allies the United States with Nazi Germany; Ribbentrop visits the\nWhite House\nas part of the two countries' new friendship.\nFilm portrayals\nRibbentrop has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theatre productions:\nHenry Daniell\nin the 1943 United States propaganda film\nMission to Moscow\nGraham Chapman\nin the 1970 television sketch comedy series\nMonty Python's Flying Circus\nHenryk Borowski\nin the 1971 Polish film\nEpilogue at Nürnberg\nGeoffrey Toone\nin the 1973 British television production\nThe Death of Adolf Hitler\nRobert Hardy\nin the 1974 television production\nThe Gathering Storm\nKosti Klemelä\nin the 1978 Finnish television production\nSodan ja rauhan miehet\nDemeter Bitenc\nin the 1979 Yugoslavian television production\nSlom\nFrederick Jaeger\nin the 1981 British television production\nWinston Churchill: The Wilderness Years\nAnton Diffring\nin the 1983 United States television production\nThe Winds of War\nHans-Dieter Asner in the 1985 television production\nMussolini and I\nRichard Kane in the 1985 US/Yugoslavian television production\nMussolini: The Untold Story\nJohn Woodvine\nin the 1989 British television production\nCountdown to War\nWolf Kahler\nin the 1993\nMerchant-Ivory\nfilm\nThe Remains of the Day\nBenoît Girard in the 2000 Canadian/US TV production\nNuremberg\nBernd-Uwe Reppenhagen in the 2004 Indian production\nNetaji Subhas Chandra Bose: The Forgotten Hero\nIvaylo Geraskov in the 2006 British television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\nEdward Baker-Duly\nin the 2010 BBC Wales/Masterpiece TV production\nUpstairs, Downstairs\nHolger Handtke\nin the 2011 film\nHotel Lux\nOrest Ludwig in the 2020 mini-series\nThe Plot Against America\nEmanuel Fellmer in the 2024 German film\nFührer und Verführer (Goebbels and the Führer)\nHonours\nRibbentrop received many orders, decorations and medals. His role as chief diplomat of the Reich meant he was a natural recipient for diplomatic honours given out by various nations. It is theorised that many of the honours bestowed on Ribbentrop were actually intended for Hitler, who only ever wore at most his WWI\nIron Cross\n1st Class, his\nwound badge\nand his\nNSDAP Party badge\n. Hitler refused to accept any foreign decorations and so it is thought that many of the decorations conferred on Ribbentrop were intended for Hitler.\nRibbentrop's full collection of honours were recovered and sold off after the war. He had taken great care to make sure his decorations and other valuable items were kept safe and easily accessible for a potential escape after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Shortly before the end of the war, he hid his decorations and other valuables on the second floor of the Hotel Krone in\nUmhausen\n,\nTyrol\n, Austria. He intended to recover them and other valuables before his eventual escape into\nSwitzerland\n. On 5 May 1945, the\n44th Infantry Division\nentered Umhausen. Shortly after, a captain in the Division, Howard Goldsmith, entered the Hotel Krone intending to stay the night, something he and his men were greatly looking forward to after months of sleeping rough in the winter of the Alpine region. The proprietor of the hotel refused them entry, but they forced their way in, and on reaching the second floor they uncovered trunks filled with clothing and personal items, confidential government documents and\nlooted art\nfrom across\noccupied Europe\n. Also in the room was a chest which Captain Goldsmith discovered was filled with Ribbentrop's personal orders and decorations.\nAccording to army rules, official and sensitive documents were to be passed on to the relevant authorities, while looted art was to be handed over to the\nMonuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program\nfor restitution. However, personal items were considered legitimate war souvenirs and after asking for permission, Goldsmith was allowed to keep the items. He had Ribbentrop's decorations shipped back to his home in\nCollege Station, Texas\n. Upon arriving back home he had the items appraised and found that the value at that time was around $40,000 (1945 US Dollars). For years afterwards they were exhibited across the United States, and a few years later the collection was broken up and sold.\nSee also\nGermany portal\nBiography portal\nPolitics portal\nOtto Abetz\n: German Ambassador to Vichy France (1940–1944)\nRudolf Buttmann\n: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1920–1943)\nHans-Heinrich Dieckhoff\n: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1937–1938) and Spain (1943–1945)\nHerbert von Dirksen\n: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1928–1933), Japan (1933–1938), and the United Kingdom (1938–1939)\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nFritz Grobba\n: German Ambassador to Iraq (1932–1939, 1941) and Saudi Arabia (1938–1939)\nUlrich von Hassell\n: German Ambassador to Italy (1932–1938)\nEduard Hempel\n: German Ambassador to Ireland (1937–1945)\nWalther Hewel\n: German diplomat\nLeopold von Hoesch\n: German Ambassador to France (1923–1932) and the United Kingdom (1932–1936)\nManfred Freiherr von Killinger\n: German Ambassador to the Slovak Republic (1940) and Romania (1940–1944)\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nHans Luther\n: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1933–1937)\nEugen Ott\n: German Ambassador to Japan (1938–1942)\nList SS-Obergruppenführer\nHeinrich Georg Stahmer\n: German Ambassador to Japan (1942–1945)\nHans Thomsen\n: German diplomat\nDiego von Bergen\n: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1915–1918, 1920–1943)\nFranz von Papen\n: German Ambassador to Austria (1934–1938) and Turkey (1939–1944)\nCecil von Renthe-Fink\n: German Ambassador to Denmark (1940–1942)\nFriedrich Werner von der Schulenburg\n: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1934–1941)\nErnst von Weizsäcker\n: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1943–1945)\nReferences\nNotes\n↑\n\"Gertrud von Ribbentrop, although a distant relative, had been a close family friend and had lived with them for long periods during Ribbentrop's youth in\nMetz\n.\"\nSources\n↑\n\"Ribbentrop, von, Ulrich Friedrich-Wilhelm Joachim - TracesOfWar.com\"\n.\nwww.tracesofwar.com\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 14 November 2022\n. Retrieved\n14 November\n2022\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n345\n.\n1\n2\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n346–347\n.\n1\n2\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n1–2\n.\n↑\nLes années liberté, 1944–1945,\nLe Républicain Lorrain, Metz, 1994, (p. 32). (fr).\n↑\nL'Express, n° 2937, «\nMetz en 1900\n», 18–24 October 2007. (fr).\n↑\nWeitz, p. 6.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n5\n.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n3–4\n.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n6\n.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 13.\n1\n2\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n7\n.\n↑\nLawson, Robert (2007). \"Ribbentrop in Canada 1910 to 1914: A Note\".\nInternational History Review\n.\n29\n(4):\n821–\n832.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/07075332.2007.9641142\n.\nJSTOR\n40110928\n.\nS2CID\n159731198\n.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n8\n.\n↑\nCurrent Biography 1941\n, pp. 707–709.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n8-9\n.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n12\n.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n12–13\n.\n↑\nPaul Seabury\n(August 2022).\nThe Wilhelmstrasse: A study of German diplomats under the Nazi regime\n.\nUniversity of California Press\n. p.\n179.\nISBN\n9780520345478\n. Retrieved\n23 May\n2025\n.\n1\n2\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n1056.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 38.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n26\n.\n1\n2\nTurner, p. 70.\n↑\nTurner, p. 116.\n↑\nWatt, p. 329.\n↑\nRees, p. 243.\n↑\nSnyder, p. 295.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n16, 20–21\n.\n↑\nJoaquim von Ribbentrop entry\nin the\nReichstag\nMembers Database\n↑\nCraig, pp. 420–421.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nRees, p. 93.\n↑\nCraig, p. 420.\n↑\nRees, p. 95.\n↑\nJacobsen, pp. 59–60, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n1\n2\nJacobsen, p. 59, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n1\n2\nTrevor-Roper, Hugh \"Hitler's War Aims\" from\nAspects of the Third Reich\n, H. W. Koch (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 241–242.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n40–41\n.\n↑\nDemetz, Peter (2009).\nPrague in Danger: The Years of German Occupation, 1939–45: Memories and History, Terror and Resistance, Theater and Jazz, Film and Poetry, Politics and War\n. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p.\n56.\nISBN\n9780374531560\n.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 56.\n↑\nCraig, p. 421.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nCraig, p. 422.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 59–61.\n↑\nTammo Luther:\nVolkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938: die Auslandsdeutschen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten\n. Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004,\nISBN\n3-515-08535-1\n. Diagramm \"Versuche zur Zentralisierung der Volkstumspolitik (Volksdeutscher Rat) / Stufe\nII (15. Oktober 1934)\", Organigramm Stab Rudolf Heß/Bormann↔Hitler↔Auswärtiges Amt, p.\n113.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 52.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 52–53.\n↑\nCraig, p. 423.\n1\n2\n3\nCraig, p. 425.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 68–69.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 71–72.\n↑\nBloch, p. 72.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 72–73.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 73–74.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian.\nHitler Hubris\nNew York: Norton, 1999, p. 558.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 94.\n↑\nHildebrand, p. 40.\n↑\nHildebrand, pp. 40–41.\n↑\nBloch, p. 106.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nBloch, p. 81.\n1\n2\nCraig, p. 432.\n1\n2\n3\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n342\n1\n2\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n343\n↑\nBloch, pp. 120–121.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 65.\n↑\nBloch, p. 79.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 92–93.\n↑\nJeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham (editors)\nNazism 1919–1945. Volume 3. Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. A Documentary Reader.\nUniversity of Exeter Press, Exeter, Devon, United Kingdom, 1997, p. 673.\n↑\nBloch, p. 110.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 112–113.\n↑\nBloch, Michael (2011),\nRibbentrop\n, Hachette UK,\nISBN\n978-1405513609\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 107.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 121–123.\n↑\nEvans, Rob; Hencke, David (29 June 2002),\n\"Wallis Simpson, the Nazi minister, the telltale monk and an FBI plot\"\n,\nThe Guardian\n, London,\narchived\nfrom the original on 26 August 2013\n, retrieved\n2 May\n2010\n↑\nBloch, p. 120.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, pp. 125–127.\n↑\nBiagi, Enzo (1983).\nLa seconda guerra mondiale, una storia di uomini\n[\nThe Second World War, a history of men\n]\n(in Italian). Milan: Gruppo editoriale Fabbri. p.\n591.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 126–127.\n↑\nBloch, p. 127.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 113–114, 120, 125–127.\n↑\nBloch, p. 114.\n↑\nPerry, Maria (11 January 2003).\nThe House in Berkeley Square: A History of the Lansdowne Club\n(1st\ned.). London: The Lansdowne Club.\nISBN\n0954607503\n.\n↑\nWatt, p. 37.\n1\n2\nWaddington, p. 58.\n↑\nLetter of 30 August 1939 to Harold Macmillan, cited in\nMacmillan, Harold (1966),\nWinds of Change 1914–1939\n, London: Macmillan, p.\n604\n↑\nWaddington, p. 64.\n↑\nWaddington, pp. 59–60.\n1\n2\n3\nHildebrand, p. 48.\n↑\nHildebrand, p. 49.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 128.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 116–117.\n1\n2\nCraig, p. 419.\n↑\nCraig, pp. 419–420.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 145–146.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 146.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 131–134, 146–147.\n↑\nMaiolo, Joseph.\nThe Royal Navy and Nazi Germany\n, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 36–37, 190–191.\n↑\nBloch, p. 142.\n↑\nBloch, p. 148.\n1\n2\nMichalka 1985, pp. 271–273.\n1\n2\n3\nHillgruber, pp. 64–65.\n↑\nOvery, Richard. \"Misjudging Hitler\" pp. 93–115, from\nThe Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered\nGordon Martel (ed.)\nRoutledge\n: London, United Kingdom, 1999. pp. 101–103.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 195.\n↑\nYenne, Bill (2015).\nOperation Long Jump: Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Greatest Assassination Plot in History\n.\nRegnery Publishing\n. p.\n60.\nISBN\n978-1-62157-440-8\n.\n1\n2\nCadbury, Deborah (2015).\nPrinces at War: The Bitter Battle Inside Britain's Royal Family in the Darkest Days of WWII\n. PublicAffairs. pp.\n157–.\nISBN\n978-1-61039-404-8\n.\n↑\nDundas, Deborah (5 March 2015).\n\"Andrew Morton on the Duke and Duchess of Windsor and the Nazis\"\n.\nThe Star\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 16 November 2018\n. Retrieved\n25 January\n2019\n.\n↑\nTravis, Alan (20 July 2017).\n\"Churchill tried to suppress Nazi plot to restore Edward VIII to British throne\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 3 June 2023\n. Retrieved\n25 January\n2019\n.\n↑\nBloch, p. 230.\n↑\nJacobsen, p. 81, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 178–179.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 179.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n182\n↑\nKaillis, p. 91.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 193.\n↑\nBloch, p. 194.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 196–197.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 196.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970, pp. 462–463.\n1\n2\nHillgruber, Andreas (1974). \"England's Place in Hitler's Plans for World Dominion\".\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n9\n(1): 5–22 (15).\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/002200947400900101\n.\nJSTOR\n260265\n.\nS2CID\n159878696\n.\n1\n2\nWeinberg 1980, pp. 506–507.\n↑\nMesserschmidt, pp. 671, 682–683.\n↑\nRothwell, pp. 90–91.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 142–143.\n↑\nMurray, Williamson.\nThe Change in the European Balance of Power\n.\nPrinceton University Press\n: Princeton, NJ, US, 1984, p. 268.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 156–157.\n↑\nWatt, p. 157.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nRothwell, pp. 118–119.\n↑\nRothwell, p. 119.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980, pp. 537–539, 557–560.\n↑\nWatt, p. 158.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 158–159.\n↑\nWatt, p. 159.\n1\n2\nWatt, pp. 159–160.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 159–161.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 155–157, 166–167.\n↑\nWatt, p. 167.\n↑\nGilbert, Martin\nBritain and Germany Between The Wars\nLongmans: Bungay, 1966, p. 17.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 168–176.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n541\n.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n547\n↑\nMurray, Williamson.\nThe Change in the European Balance of Power\n. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1984, p. 286.\n↑\nStrang, Bruce (1996).\n\"Once more onto the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland, March 1939\"\n.\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n31\n(4): 721–752 (736–737).\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/002200949603100406\n.\nJSTOR\n261045\n.\nS2CID\n159558319\n.\n↑\nCienciala, Anna. \"Poland in British and French Policy in 1939\", from Finney, Patrick (ed.),\nThe Origins of The Second World War\n. Edward Arnold: London, 1997, p. 418.\n↑\nMesserschmidt, p. 702.\n1\n2\nWatt, p. 275.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nKaillis, p. 164.\n↑\nBloch, p. 222.\n↑\nWatt, p. 278.\n↑\nWatt, p. 279.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nBloch, p. 223.\n1\n2\n3\nWatt, p. 280.\n↑\nWatt, p. 281.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 233–235.\n↑\nWeitz, pp. 195–196.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 207.\n↑\nBloch, p. 236.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 224–226.\n1\n2\n3\nWeinberg 1980, pp. 561–562, 583–584.\n1\n2\nWeitz, p. 208.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980, pp. 579–581.\n↑\nCraig, p. 436.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nOvery, p. 125, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n↑\nOvery, Richard & Wheatcroft, Andrew\nThe Road To War\n, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 56.\n↑\nWatt, p. 385.\n1\n2\nRothwell, p. 106.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n650\n↑\nMesserschmidt, p. 695.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n544\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett, pp. 436–437.\n↑\nOvery, p. 103, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n↑\nGreenwood, Sean \"The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939\" pp. 225–246 from\nThe Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered\nGordon Martel (ed.) Routledge: London, United Kingdom, 1999 p. 238.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 394–407.\n1\n2\nWatt, p. 304.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 308–309.\n↑\nAdamthwaite, Anthony (1977)\nFrance and the Coming of the Second World War\n, London: Frank Cass. p. 332.\nISBN\n978-0714630359\n.\n↑\nWatt, p. 325.\n↑\nAdamthwaite, Anthony (1977)\nFrance and the Coming of the Second World War\n, London: Frank Cass. pp. 290–292.\nISBN\n978-0714630359\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nWatt, pp. 426–429.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett, p. 454.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 428–429.\n1\n2\nOvery, pp. 124–125, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 247–249.\n↑\nWatt, p. 457.\n↑\nWatt, p. 458.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n34-35.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 458–459.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 459–460.\n↑\nBloch, p. 251.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett, pp. 446–447.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett, p. 447.\n1\n2\n3\nMichalka 1993\n, p.\n169\n↑\nWatt, p. 310.\n1\n2\nWatt, p. 309.\n↑\nWatt, p. 276.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nKaillis, p. 161.\n1\n2\n3\nKaillis, pp. 163–164.\n1\n2\n3\nKaillis, p. 163.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n623\n↑\nBloch, p. 256.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 256–257.\n↑\nBloch, p. 257.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n43\n↑\nBloch, pp. 257–258.\n↑\nWatt, p. 526.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 527–528.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 532–534.\n↑\nWatt, p. 545.\n↑\nWatt, p. 550.\n↑\nWatt, p. 572.\n↑\nWatt, pp. 583–585.\n↑\nBloch, p. 260.\n↑\nOvery, pp. 125–126, in\nThe Third Reich\n.\n↑\nRees, p. 87.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 262–264.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 264–265.\n↑\nBloch, p. 274.\n↑\nOffner, Arnold \"The United States and National Socialist Germany\" pp. 413–427 from\nThe Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement\nWolfgang Mommsen\nand Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), London: George Allen, 1983 pp. 421–422.\n↑\nWeitz, pp. 234–235.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 234.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 236.\n↑\nBloch, p. 272.\n1\n2\nWeitz, p. 239.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 307.\n↑\nWeitz, p. 241.\n↑\nBloch, p. 363.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 296–297.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 384–385.\n1\n2\nMichalka 1985, pp. 276–277.\n↑\nHildebrand, pp. 15–21.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 325.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 308–309.\n↑\nBloch, p. 305.\n1\n2\nKrausnick, Helmut\n\"The Persecution of the Jews\" pp. 1–125, from\nThe Anatomy of the SS State\n, New York: Walker and Company, 1968, p. 57.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nHildebrand, p. 104.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 320–321.\n↑\nBloch, p. 329.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 330.\n↑\nCecil, Robert.\nHitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941\n, David McKay, 1976, p. 114,\nISBN\n0679507159\n.\n↑\nTrial of German Major War Criminals\n, vol. 3, pp. 379–380.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 322.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nBloch, p. 323.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n220\n↑\nBloch, pp. 308–316.\n1\n2\n3\nWeitz, p. 268.\n1\n2\n3\nHillgruber, p. 91.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 344.\n↑\nBloch, p. 353.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 354.\n↑\nBloch, p. 346.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 380.\n1\n2\nBloch, pp. 350–351.\n1\n2\nBloch, p. 351.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 353–354.\n1\n2\n3\nBloch, p. 356.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 356–357.\n1\n2\n3\nWeitz, p. 291.\n↑\nBloch, p. 397.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 365–367.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 365–366.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 366–367.\n↑\nBrowning, Christopher (1990) \"Ribbentrop, Joachim von,\" in\nThe Encyclopedia of the Holocaust\nVol. 3, Israel Gutman (ed.), New York: Macmillan. pg. 1273;\nISBN\n978-0028971650\n↑\nBloch, pp. 338–339, 361, 385–388, 420–422.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 385–388.\n↑\nMichalka 1993\n, p.\n170\n↑\nBloch, pp. 405–406.\n↑\nBloch, p. 407.\n↑\nBloch, p. 408.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 405–407.\n↑\nBloch, p. 425.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 425–426.\n↑\n\"Jacques Antoine Augustin Goffinet -\"\n.\nLes Français Libres\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 25 February 2021\n. Retrieved\n9 December\n2019\n.\n↑\nBiagi, p. 2743.\n1\n2\nShirer, William L. (1 May 1947).\n\"End of a Berlin Diary\"\n.\nThe Atlantic\n: 115.\nISSN\n2151-9463\n. Retrieved\n1 September\n2024\n.\npdf\n↑\nInternational: Herr Brickendrop\n, time.com. Accessed 21 July 2025.\n↑\nBloch, pp. 431–432.\n↑\n\"RIBBENTROP CITED HITLER PROPHECY; Letter to Churchill and Eden Quoted Prediction of His Spiritual Vindication\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. AP. 2 January 1946\n. Retrieved\n1 September\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Von Ribbentrop's letter to Churchill\"\n.\nThe Galveston Daily News\n. AP. 2 January 1946. p.\n1\n. Retrieved\n1 September\n2024\n.\n1\n2\nBiagi, p. 2757.\n↑\n\"Judgment against Ribbentrop\"\nArchived\n12 November 2016 at the\nWayback Machine\n,\nInternational Military Tribunal\nJewish Virtual Library.\n↑\nSnyder, p. 296.\n↑\n\"Forgetfulness Of Hess Held Intentional\".\nVallejo Times-Herald\n. No.\nPage 7. Luther Gibson. 18 October 1945.\n↑\nApplebome, Peter (14 March 2007).\n\"Veteran of the Nuremberg Trials Can't Forget Dialogue With Infamy\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 26 January 2021\n. Retrieved\n22 July\n2018\n.\n↑\nBloch, p. 456.\n↑\nAndrus, Burton C. (1969)\nI Was the Nuremberg Jailor,\nNew York: Coward-McCann, p. 195.\n↑\n\"The Trial of the Century– and of All Time, part two\"\n.\nFlagpole Magazine\n. 17 July 2002. p.\n6. Archived from\nthe original\non 2 March 2009.\n↑\nDarnstädt, Thomas (13 September 2005),\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n,\nDer Spiegel\n, no.\n14, p.\n128,\narchived\nfrom the original on 7 July 2016\n, retrieved\n13 September\n2016\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nThe Ribbentrop Hoard - WWII's Finest GI Trophy\n, 28 June 2023,\narchived\nfrom the original on 26 August 2023\n, retrieved\n26 August\n2023\n↑\n\"The Orders and medals of Joachim von Ribbentrop\"\n.\nwww.axishistory.com\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 26 August 2023\n. Retrieved\n26 August\n2023\n.\nBibliography\nBloch, Michael\n(1992).\nRibbentrop\n. London: Bantam Press.\nISBN\n0-593-01896-6\n.\n; New York: Crown Publishing, 1992.\nISBN\n0-517-59310-6\n.\nonline\nBrowning, Christopher R.\nThe Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland, 1940–43\n. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978.\nISBN\n0-8419-0403-0\n.\nCraig, Gordon. \"The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop\" in\nGordon A. Craig\nand\nFelix Gilbert\n(eds.)\nThe Diplomats 1919–39\n. Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press\n, 1953, pp.\n406–436.\nHildebrand, Klaus\n.\nThe Foreign Policy of the Third Reich\n, Anthony Fothergill (trans.). London: Batsford, 1973.\nISBN\n0-520-02528-8\n.\nHillgruber, Andreas\n.\nGermany and the Two World Wars\n,\nWilliam C. Kirby\n(trans.). Cambridge, Massachusetts:\nHarvard University Press\n, 1981.\nISBN\n0-674-35321-8\n.\nThe Third Reich\n. Leitz, Christian (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1999,\nISBN\n0-631-20700-7\n. Articles:\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf. \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–45\" pp.\n49–94.\nKaillis, Aristotle.\nFascist Ideology\nArchived\n30 May 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\n, London: Routledge, 2000\nISBN\n0415216117\n.\nLukes, Igor, and Erik Goldstein (eds.).\nThe Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II\n. London: Frank Cass Inc, 1999.\nISBN\n0-7146-8056-7\n.\nManvell, Roger\n;\nFraenkel, Heinrich\n(2011) .\nGoering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader\n. London: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMesserschmidt, Manfred\n\"Foreign Policy and Preparation for War\" from\nGermany and the Second World War\n,\nWilhelm Deist\n,\nHans-Erich Vokmann\n&\nWolfram Wette\n(eds.), Vol. I, Clarendon Press: Oxford, United Kingdom, 1990.\nMichalka, Wolfgang. \"From Anti-Comintern Pact to the Euro-Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop's Alternative Concept to Hitler's Foreign Policy Programme\". In H. W. Koch (ed.),\nAspects of the Third Reich\n. London: Macmillan 1985, pp.\n267–284.\nISBN\n0-333-35272-6\n.\nMichalka, Wolfgang (1993). \"Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister\". In\nSmelser, Ronald\n;\nZitelmann, Rainer\n(eds.).\nThe Nazi Elite\n. London: Macmillan.\nISBN\n0-333-56950-4\n.\nNekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich.\nPariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941\n(Columbia University Press, 1997).\nOursler Jr., Fulton. \"Secret Treason\",\nAmerican Heritage\n, 42 (8) (1991).\nOvery, Richard\n(2001).\nInterrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands\n. London:\nAllen Lane\n.\nISBN\n978-0-7139-9350-9\n.\nRees, Laurence\nThe Nazis: A Warning from History\n, New York: New Press, 1997\nISBN\n056349333X\n.\nRothwell, Victor.\nThe Origins of the Second World War\nArchived\n28 March 2023 at the\nWayback Machine\n, Manchester University Press: Manchester, United Kingdom, 2001\nISBN\n0719059585\n.\n*\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSnyder, Louis\n.\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.\nISBN\n0-07-059525-9\n.\nTurner, Henry Ashby\n.\nHitler's Thirty Days To Power: January 1933\n. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1996.\nISBN\n978-0201407143\n.\nWaddington, Geoffrey. \"'An Idyllic and Unruffled Atmosphere of Complete Anglo–German Misunderstanding': Aspects of the Operation of the\nDienststelle Ribbentrop\nin Great Britain 1934–1939\".\nHistory\n, Volume 82, 1997, pp.\n44–74.\nWatt, D. C.\nHow War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939\n. London: Heinemann, 1989.\nISBN\n0-394-57916-X\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard\n(1970).\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36\n. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\nISBN\n0-226-88509-7\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (1980).\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II 1937–39\n. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\nISBN\n0-226-88511-9\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (1994).\nA World At Arms\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n0521618266\n.\nWeitz, John\n(1992).\nHitler's Diplomat: The Life And Times Of Joachim von Ribbentrop\n, New York: Ticknor and Fields.\nISBN\n0-395-62152-6\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John (1967).\nThe Nemesis of Power\n, London: Macmillan.\nWindsor, Wallis (1956).\nThe Heart has its Reasons: The Memoirs of the Duchess of Windsor\n, Bath: Chivers Press.\nFurther reading\nBlandford, Edmund (2000).\nSSIntelligence\n.\nISBN\n1840371471\n.\nFest, Joachim C.\n, and Bullock, Michael (trans.) (1979)[orig. published in German in 1963]. \"Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Degradation of Diplomacy\" in\nThe Face of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin, pp.\n265–282.\nISBN\n978-0201407143\n.\nLoving, Rush Jr. (2022).\nFat Boy and the Champagne Salesman: Göring, Ribbentrop, and the Nazi Invasion of Poland\nIndiana University Press.\nMitrovits, Miklós (2020).\n\"Background to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact\"\n(\nArchived\n21 September 2022 at the\nWayback Machine\n).\nCentral European Horizons\n1.1. pp.\n17–32.\nRich, Norman (1973).\nHitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion\nVol. 1. W. W. Norton.\nRich, Norman (1974).\nHitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order\nVol. 2. W. W. Norton.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original works by or about:\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n.\nInformation about Joachim von Ribbentrop\nin the Reichstag database\nNewspaper clippings about Joachim von Ribbentrop\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\n, in German\nThe Trial of German Major War Criminals\n, access date 1 July 2006.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Leopold von Hoesch",
+      "succeeded_by": "Herbert von Dirksen",
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "born": "Ulrich Friedrich-Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop(1893-04-30)30 April 1893Wesel,Kingdom of Prussia",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged53)Nuremberg,Allied-occupied Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1932–1945)",
+      "spouse": "Anna Elisabeth Henkell​​(m.1920)​",
+      "children": "5, includingRudolf von Ribbentrop",
+      "profession": "Businessman, diplomat",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1918",
+      "unit": "12th Hussar Regiment",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "criminal_status": "Executedby hanging",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 137226
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Wilhelm_Keitel",
+    "name": "Wilhelm Keitel",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Wilhelm Bodewin Johann Gustav Keitel was a German field marshal who held office as chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the high command of Nazi Germany's armed forces, during World War II. He signed a number of criminal orders and directives that led to numerous war crimes.",
+    "description": "German field marshal (1882–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Wilhelm Keitel\nGerman field marshal (1882–1946)\nWilhelm Bodewin Johann Gustav Keitel\n(\nGerman pronunciation:\n[\nˈvɪlhɛlm\nˈkaɪtl̩\n]\n; 22 September 1882\n–\n16 October 1946) was a German\nfield marshal\nwho held office as chief of the\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n(OKW), the high command of\nNazi Germany's armed forces\n, during\nWorld War II\n. He signed a number of\ncriminal orders\nand directives that led to numerous\nwar crimes\n.\nKeitel's rise to the\nWehrmacht\nhigh command began with his appointment as the head of the Armed Forces Office at the\nReich Ministry of War\nin 1935. Having taken command of the\nWehrmacht\nin 1938,\nAdolf Hitler\nreplaced the ministry with the OKW and Keitel became its chief. He was reviled among his military colleagues as Hitler's habitual \"\nyes-man\n\".\nAfter the war, Keitel was indicted by the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nin\nNuremberg\nas one of the \"major war criminals\". He was found guilty on all counts of the indictment:\ncrimes against humanity\n,\ncrimes against peace\n,\ncriminal conspiracy\n, and\nwar crimes\n. He was sentenced to death and executed by hanging in 1946.\nEarly life and career\nWilhelm Keitel was born in the village of Helmscherode near\nGandersheim\nin the\nDuchy of Brunswick\n, Germany. He was the eldest son of Carl Keitel (1854–1934), a middle-class landowner, and his wife Apollonia Vissering (1855–1888). As a youngster his main interests were hunting and riding horses,\nhobbies which he pursued also later in life.\nHe was also interested in farming\nand wanted to take over his family's estates after completing his education at a\ngymnasium\n. This plan failed as his father did not want to retire. Instead, he embarked on a military career in 1901, becoming an officer cadet of the\nPrussian Army\n. As a commoner, he did not join the cavalry, but a field artillery regiment in\nWolfenbüttel\n, serving as\nadjutant\nfrom 1908.\nOn 18 April 1909, Keitel married Lisa Fontaine, a wealthy landowner's daughter at Wülfel near\nHanover\n.\nKeitel was\n1.85 metres (6\nfeet 1\ninch)\ntall, later described as a solidly built and square-jawed Prussian.\nDuring World War I, Keitel served on the\nWestern Front\nand took part in the fighting in\nFlanders\n, where he was severely wounded.\nAfter being promoted to captain, Keitel was posted to the\nstaff\nof an infantry division in 1915.\nAfter the war, Keitel was retained in the newly created\nReichswehr\nof the\nWeimar Republic\nand played a part in organizing the paramilitary\nFreikorps\nunits on the Polish border. In 1924, Keitel was transferred to the\nMinistry of the Reichswehr\nin Berlin, serving with the\nTruppenamt\n('Troop Office'), the post-Versailles disguised\nGerman General Staff\n. Three years later, he returned to field command.\nNow a lieutenant-colonel, Keitel was again assigned to the war ministry in 1929 and was soon promoted to Head of the Organizational Department (\"T-2\"), a post he held until Adolf Hitler took power in 1933. Playing a vital role in the\nGerman rearmament\n, he traveled at least once to the\nSoviet Union\nto inspect secret\nReichswehr\ntraining camps. In the autumn of 1932, he suffered a heart attack and double pneumonia.\nShortly after his recovery, in October 1933, Keitel was appointed as deputy commander of the\n3rd Infantry Division\n; in 1934, he was given command of the 22nd Infantry Division at Bremen.\nRise to the\nWehrmacht\nHigh Command\nKeitel (seated far right) with Hitler in the Sudetenland in 1938.\nIn 1935, at the recommendation of General\nWerner von Fritsch\n, Keitel was promoted to the rank of major general and appointed chief of the Reich Ministry of War's Armed Forces Office (\nWehrmachtsamt\n), which oversaw the army, navy, and air force.\nAfter assuming office, Keitel was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 January 1936.\nOn 21 January 1938, Keitel received evidence revealing that the wife of his superior, War Minister\nWerner von Blomberg\n, was a former prostitute.\nUpon reviewing this information, Keitel suggested that the dossier be forwarded to Hitler's deputy,\nHermann Göring\n, who used it to bring about Blomberg's resignation.\nHitler took command of the\nWehrmacht\nin 1938 and replaced the war ministry with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n), with Keitel as its chief.\nAs a result of his appointment, Keitel assumed the responsibilities of Germany's war minister.\nAlthough not officially appointed a\nReichsminister\n, Keitel was granted\ncabinet-level rank\n.\nWhen von Blomberg was asked by Hitler (out of respect for him, after his dismissal in 1938) who he would recommend to replace him, he had said that Hitler himself should take over the job. He told Hitler that Keitel (who was his son-in-law's father) \"is just the man who runs my office\". Hitler snapped his fingers and exclaimed \"That's exactly the man I'm looking for\". So on 4 February 1938 when Hitler became\nCommander-in-Chief\nof the\nWehrmacht\n, Keitel (to the astonishment of the General Staff, including himself) became chief of staff.\nSoon after his promotion, Keitel convinced Hitler to appoint\nWalther von Brauchitsch\nas Commander-in-Chief of the Army, replacing von Fritsch.\nKeitel was promoted to\nGeneraloberst\n(Colonel General) in November 1938, and in April 1939 he was awarded the\nGolden Party Badge\nby Hitler.\nCriticism of capabilities\nField Marshal\nEwald von Kleist\nlabelled Keitel nothing more than a \"stupid follower of Hitler\" because of his servile \"yes man\" attitude toward Hitler. His sycophancy was well known in the army, and he acquired the nickname 'Lakeitel', a pun derived from\nLakai\n(\"\nlackey\n\") and his surname.\nHermann Göring's description of Keitel as having \"a sergeant's mind inside a field marshal's body\" was a feeling often expressed by his peers. He had been promoted because of his willingness to function as Hitler's mouthpiece.\nHe was known by his peers as a\n\"blindingly loyal toady\"\nof Hitler, nicknamed \"Nickgeselle\", after a popular metal toy nodding donkey, the \"Nickesel\". During the war he was subject to verbal abuse from Hitler, who said to other officers (according to\nGerd von Rundstedt\n) that \"you know he has the brains of a movie usher ... (but he was made the highest ranking officer in the Army) ... because the man's as loyal as a dog\" (said by Hitler with a sly smile).\nKeitel was predisposed to manipulation because of his limited intellect and nervous disposition; Hitler valued his diligence and obedience.\nOn one occasion,\nGeneralleutnant\nBurkhart Müller-Hillebrand\n(\nde\n)\nasked who Keitel was: upon finding out he became horrified at his own failure to salute his superior.\nFranz Halder\n, however, told him: \"Don't worry, it's only Keitel\".\nGerman officers consistently bypassed him and went directly to Hitler.\nWorld War II\nKeitel (far left) and other members of the German high command with Adolf Hitler at a military briefing, (\nc.\n1940\n)\nOn 30 August 1939, immediately prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Keitel was appointed by Hitler to the six-person\nCouncil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich\nwhich was set up to operate as a \"war cabinet\".\nAfter Germany defeated France in the\nBattle of France\nin six weeks, Keitel described Hitler as \"the greatest warlord of all time\".\nKeitel conducted the negotiations of the\nFrench armistice\n, and on\n19 July 1940\nwas promoted to\nGeneralfeldmarschall\n(field marshal).\nThe planning for\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, was begun tentatively by Halder with the redeployment of the\n18th Army\ninto an offensive position against the Soviet Union.\nOn 31 July 1940, Hitler held a major conference that included Keitel, Halder,\nAlfred Jodl\n,\nErich Raeder\n, Brauchitsch, and\nHans Jeschonnek\nwhich further discussed the invasion. The participants did not object to the invasion.\nHitler asked for war studies to be completed\nand\nGeorg Thomas\nwas given the task of completing two studies on economic matters. The first study by Thomas detailed serious problems with fuel and rubber supplies. Keitel bluntly dismissed the problems, telling Thomas that Hitler would not want to see it. This influenced Thomas' second study which offered a glowing recommendation for the invasion based upon fabricated economic benefits.\nIn January 1943, just before the final surrender at\nStalingrad\n, Hitler agreed to the creation of a three-man committee with representatives of the State, the Armed Forces High Command, and the Party in an attempt to centralize control of the war economy and over the home front. The committee members were Keitel, (Chief of OKW)\nHans Lammers\n(Chief of the Reich Chancellery), and\nMartin Bormann\n(Chief of the Party Chancellery). The committee, soon known as the\nDreierausschuß\n(Committee of Three), met eleven times between January and August 1943. However, it had little autonomy, with Hitler reserving most of the final decisions to himself. In addition, it ran up against resistance from cabinet ministers, who headed deeply entrenched spheres of influence and, seeing it as a threat to their power, worked together to undermine it. The result was that nothing changed, and the Committee declined into irrelevance.\nKeitel signing the ratified surrender terms for the German Army in Berlin, 8 May 1945\nKeitel played an important role after the failed\n20 July plot\nin 1944. He sat on the army \"\ncourt of honour\n\" that handed over many officers who were involved, including Field Marshal\nErwin von Witzleben\n, to\nRoland Freisler\n's notorious\nPeople's Court\n. Around 7,000 people were arrested, many of whom were tortured by the Gestapo, and around 5,000 were executed.\nIn April and May 1945, during the\nBattle of Berlin\n, Keitel called for counterattacks to drive back the Soviet forces and relieve Berlin. However, there were insufficient German forces to carry out such counterattacks. After\nHitler's suicide\non 30 April, Keitel stayed on as a member of the short-lived\nFlensburg Government\nunder\nGrand Admiral\nKarl Dönitz\n. Upon arriving in Flensburg,\nAlbert Speer\n, the Minister of Armaments and War Production, said that Keitel grovelled to Dönitz in the same way as he had done to Hitler. On 7 May 1945, Alfred Jodl, on behalf of Dönitz, signed Germany's unconditional surrender on all fronts.\nJoseph Stalin\nconsidered this an affront, so a second signing was arranged at the Berlin suburb of\nKarlshorst\non 8 May. There, Keitel signed the\nGerman Instrument of Surrender\non 8 May 1945. Five days later on 13 May, he was arrested at the request of the United States and interned at\nCamp Ashcan\nin\nMondorf-les-Bains\n.\nJodl succeeded him as Chief of OKW until the final dissolution of the Flensburg Government on 23 May.\nRole in crimes of the\nWehrmacht\nand the Holocaust\nMain article:\nWar crimes of the Wehrmacht\nKeitel had full knowledge of the criminal nature of the planning and the subsequent\ninvasion of Poland\n, agreeing to its aims in principle.\nThe Nazi plans included mass arrests, population transfers, and mass murder. Keitel did not contest the regime's assault upon basic human rights or counter the role of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin the murders.\nThe criminal nature of the invasion was now obvious; local commanders continued to express shock and protest over the events they were witnessing.\nKeitel continued to ignore the protests among the officer corps while they became morally numbed to the atrocities.\nKeitel issued a series of\ncriminal orders\nfrom April 1941.\nThe orders went beyond established codes of conduct for the military and broadly allowed the execution of Jews, civilians, and non-combatants for any reason. Those carrying out the murders were exempted from court-martial or later being tried for war crimes. The orders were signed by Keitel; however, other members of the OKW and the\nOKH\n, including Halder, wrote or changed the wording of his orders. Commanders in the field interpreted and carried out the orders.\nIn the summer and autumn of 1941, German military lawyers unsuccessfully argued that Soviet prisoners of war should be treated in accordance with the\nGeneva Conventions\n. Keitel rebuffed them, writing: \"These doubts correspond to military ideas about wars of chivalry. Our job is to suppress a way of life.\"\nIn September 1941, concerned that some field commanders on the Eastern Front did not exhibit sufficient harshness in implementing the May 1941 order on the \"\nGuidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia\n\", Keitel issued a new order, writing: \"[The] struggle against Bolshevism demands ruthless and energetic action especially also against the Jews, the main carriers of Bolshevism\".\nAlso in September, Keitel issued an order to all commanders, not just those in the occupied Soviet Union, instructing them to use \"unusual severity\" to stamp out resistance. In this context, the guideline stated that execution of 50 to 100 \"Communists\" was an appropriate response to a loss of a German soldier.\nSuch orders and directives further radicalised the army's occupational policies and enmeshed it in the\ngenocide of the Jews\n.\nPlaque commemorating French victims at the\nHinzert concentration camp\n, using the expressions \"\nNacht und Nebel\n\" and \"NN-Deported.\" The inscription translates to: \"No hate, but also no forgetting.\"\nIn December 1941, Hitler instructed the OKW to subject, with the exception of Denmark, Western Europe (which was under military occupation) to the\nNight and Fog Decree\n.\nSigned by Keitel,\nthe decree made it possible for foreign nationals to be transferred to Germany for trial by special courts, or simply handed to the\nGestapo\nfor deportation to concentration camps. The OKW further imposed a blackout on any information concerning the fate of the accused. At the same time, Keitel increased pressure on\nOtto von Stülpnagel\n, the military commander in France, for a more ruthless reprisal policy in the country.\nIn October 1942, Keitel signed the\nCommando Order\nthat authorized the killing of enemy special operations troops even when captured in uniform.\nIn the spring and summer of 1942, as the deportations of the Jews to\nextermination camps\nprogressed, the military initially protested when it came to the Jews that laboured for the benefit of the\nWehrmacht\n. The army lost control over the matter when the\nSS\nassumed command of all Jewish forced labour in July 1942. Keitel formally endorsed the state of affairs in September, reiterating for the armed forces that \"evacuation of the Jews must be carried out thoroughly and its consequences endured, despite any trouble it may cause over the next three or four months\".\nTrial, conviction, and execution\nKeitel's detention report from June 1945\n17 October 1946 newsreel of the\nNuremberg trials\nsentencing\nAfter the war, Keitel faced the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(IMT), where he was examined by Chief Medical Officer\nLt. Col. Rene Juchli\nwho reported that Keitel was suffering from \"high blood pressure, varicose veins, and dysentery\".\nHe was indicted on all four counts before the IMT: conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n, planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\n. Most of the case against him was based on his signature being present on dozens of orders that called for soldiers and political prisoners to be killed or '\ndisappeared\n'.\nIn court, Keitel admitted that he knew many of Hitler's orders were illegal.\nHis defence relied almost entirely on the argument that he was merely\nfollowing orders\nin conformity to \"the leader principle\" (\nFührerprinzip\n) and his\npersonal oath of loyalty to Hitler\n.\nKeitel's body after his execution, showing injuries caused from hitting his head on the trap door\nThe IMT rejected this defence and convicted him on all charges. Although the tribunal's charter allowed \"superior orders\" to be considered a mitigating factor, it found Keitel's crimes were so egregious that \"there is nothing in mitigation\". In its judgment against him, the IMT wrote, \"Superior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and extensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or justification.\" It also noted several instances where he issued illegal orders on his own authority.\nIn his statement before the Tribunal, Keitel said: \"As these atrocities developed, one from the other, step by step, and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, destiny took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences.\"\nTo underscore the criminal rather than military nature of Keitel's acts, the\nAllies\ndenied his request to be shot by\nfiring squad\n. Instead, he was executed at Nuremberg Prison by\nhanging\n.\nOn the day of the execution, Keitel told prison chaplain\nHenry F. Gerecke\n\"You have helped me more than you know. May Christ, my saviour, stand by me all the way. I shall need him so much.\" He then received Communion and was executed later that day.\nKeitel was executed by\nUS Army\nMaster Sergeant\nJohn C. Woods\n.\nHis last words were: \"I call on God Almighty to have mercy on the German people. More than two million German soldiers went to their death for the fatherland before me. I follow now my sons – all for Germany.\"\nThe trap door was small, causing head injuries to Keitel and several other condemned men as they dropped.\nMany of the executed Nazis fell from the gallows with insufficient force to snap their necks, resulting in convulsions that in Keitel's case lasted 24 minutes.\nThe corpses of Keitel and the other nine executed men were, like Hermann Göring's, cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand the ashes were scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nWorks\nBefore his execution, Keitel published his memoirs, which were titled in English as\nIn the Service of the Reich\n. It was later re-edited by\nWalter Görlitz\n(\nde\n)\nas\nThe Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel\n(\nISBN\n978-0-8154-1072-0\n). Another work by Keitel later published in English was\nQuestionnaire on the Ardennes Offensive\n.\nFamily\nKeitel was the uncle of\nKatherine \"Kitty\" Oppenheimer\n, wife of the\nphysicist\nJ. Robert Oppenheimer\n, the director of the\nManhattan Project\n's\nLos Alamos Laboratory\n, where the first\natomic bombs\nwere developed.\nLegacy\nKeitel was frequently depicted in\nWorld War II films\n, such as by\nDieter Mann\nin\nDownfall\n(2004). Notably, East German actor\nGerd Michael Henneberg\nrepeatedly reprised his role as Keitel in several Soviet-East German co-productions directed by\nYuri Ozerov\nin the 1970s and 1980s,\nsuch as\nSoldiers of Freedom\n(1977),\nBattle of Moscow\n(1985) and\nStalingrad\n(1990). He is also briefly depicted in the movie\nValkyrie\n(2008) as played by\nKenneth Cranham\n.\nReferences\n↑\n\"The Execution of Nazi War Criminals\"\n.\nfamous-trials.com\n. Retrieved\n7 October\n2021\n.\n1\n2\nKeitel 2000\n, p.\n13.\n↑\nKeitel 2000\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nMitcham\n&\nMueller 2012\n, p.\n1.\n↑\nGoerlitz 2003\n, p.\n140.\n1\n2\nMargaritis 2019\n, p.\n25.\n1\n2\nMitcham\n&\nMueller 2012\n, p.\n2.\n↑\nGoerlitz 2003\n, pp.\n140–141.\n↑\nMitcham\n&\nMueller 2012\n, pp.\n2–3.\n↑\nMitcham 2001\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1980\n, pp.\n372–74.\n↑\nHildebrand 1986\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nMitcham 2001\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nMitcham 2001\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n313.\n↑\nMegargee 2000\n, pp.\n41–44.\n↑\nMegargee 2000\n, pp.\n44–45.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume IV, pp. 552-553, Document 1915-PS\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n22 April\n2021\n.\n↑\nMegargee 2000\n, p.\n42.\n1\n2\nWistrich 1982\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nStahel 2009\n, p.\n277.\n↑\nKane 2004\n, p.\n708\n.\n1\n2\nWalker 2006\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nMargaritis 2019\n, p.\n26.\n1\n2\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nTucker 2005\n, p.\n691.\n↑\nBroszat 1981\n, pp.\n308–309.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, p.\n300.\n↑\nStahel 2009\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nStahel 2009\n, pp.\n37–39.\n↑\nStahel 2009\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nStahel 2009\n, p.\n86.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n749–750.\n↑\nTucker 2005\n, p.\n681.\n↑\nKnopp 2001\n, p.\n135.\n1\n2\n3\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n20.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n79.\n↑\nHeer et al. 2008\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nHeer et al. 2008\n, pp.\n17–20.\n↑\nMazower 2008\n, p.\n160.\n1\n2\nFörster 1998\n, p.\n276.\n↑\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n171.\n1\n2\nShepherd 2016\n, pp.\n193–194.\n↑\nEditorial staff n.d\n.\n↑\nUSHMM n.d\n.\n↑\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n304.\n↑\n\"ALL SUPERMEN---EXCEPT FOR THE SHAPE THEY ARE IN\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. No.\nPage 1. 18 October 1945.\n1\n2\nde Vabres 2008\n.\n1\n2\nDarnstädt 2005\n.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nWilkes 2002\n.\n↑\nService, Religion News Service Religion News (24 August 2014).\n\"The Strange Story Of The American Pastor Who Ministered To Nazis\"\n.\nHuffPost\n. Retrieved\n5 August\n2021\n.\n↑\nRailton, Nicholas M. \"Henry Gerecke and the Saints of Nuremberg\".\nKirchliche Zeitgeschichte\n, vol. 13, no. 1, 2000, pp. 112–137. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43750887. Accessed 8 February 2021.\n1\n2\nZeller 2007\n.\n↑\nSmith 1946\n.\n↑\nPiper 2007\n.\n↑\nKeitel 1949\n.\n↑\nKean, Sam (2019).\nThe Bastard Brigade\n. Little, Brown. p.\n177.\nISBN\n978-0316381673\n.\n↑\nKasch, Georg.\n\"Schauspieler und Intendant Gerd Michael Henneberg ist tot\"\n.\nwww.nachtkritik.de\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n26 May\n2024\n.\nBibliography\nBrowning, Christopher (2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution\n. University of Nebraska Press and\nYad Vashem\n.\nISBN\n0-8032-1327-1\n.\nBroszat, Martin (1981).\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich\n. New York: Longman Inc.\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2010).\nMoral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II\n. New York and London: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n978-0-00-719576-3\n.\nConot, Robert E. (2000) .\nJustice at Nuremberg\n. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-88184-032-2\n.\nDarnstädt, Thomas (4 April 2005).\n\"EinGlücksfall der Geschichte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n15 October\n2019\n.\nde Vabres, M. (2008).\n\"Judgement: Keitel\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n. Lillian Goldman Law Library\n. Retrieved\n11 November\n2019\n.\nEditorial staff (n.d.).\n\"Night and Fog Decree\"\n.\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n6 October\n2019\n.\nFörster, Jürgen\n(1998). \"Complicity or Entanglement? The Wehrmacht, the War and the Holocaust (pages 266–283)\". In Michael Berenbaum & Abraham Peck (ed.).\nThe Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamiend\n. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-253-33374-2\n.\nGoerlitz, Walter (2003). \"Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont\". In Barnett, Correlli (ed.).\nHitler's Generals\n. Grove Press. pp.\n139–\n175.\nISBN\n978-0802139948\n.\nHeer, Hannes\n; Manoschek, Walter; Pollak, Alexander;\nWodak, Ruth\n(2008).\nThe Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation\n. New York:\nPalgrave Macmillan\n.\nISBN\n978-0230013230\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus (1986).\nThe Third Reich\n. London & New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n0-04-9430327\n.\nKane, Thomas M. (2004). \"Keitel, Wilhelm\". In Bradford, James C. (ed.).\nInternational Encyclopedia of Military History\n. Routledge. pp.\n707–\n708.\nISBN\n978-1-135-95034-7\n.\nKeitel, Wilhelm (1949).\nQuestionnaire on the Ardennes offensive\n. Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe.\nASIN\nB0007K46NA\n.\nKeitel, Wilhelm (2000).\nThe Memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel\n. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.\nISBN\n978-0-8154-1072-0\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2001).\nHitler 1936–1945: Nemesis\n. Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0140272390\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKnopp, Guido (2001) .\nHitlers Krieger\n[\nHitler's Warriors\n]\n(in Swedish). Translated by Irheden, Ulf. Leipzig: Goldmann Verlag.\nISBN\n91-89442-17-2\n.\nMargaritis, Peter (2019).\nCountdown to D-Day: The German Perspective\n. Oxford, UK & PA, US: Casemate.\nISBN\n978-1-61200-769-4\n.\nMazower, Mark\n(2008).\nHitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe\n. London: Allen Lane.\nISBN\n978-0713996814\n.\nMegargee, Geoffrey\n(2006).\nWar of Annihilation. Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941\n. Rowman & Littelefield.\nISBN\n0-7425-4481-8\n.\nMegargee, Geoffrey P.\n(2000).\nInside Hitler's High Command\n. Lawrence: Kansas University Press.\nISBN\n0-7006-1015-4\n.\nMitcham, Samuel\n; Mueller, Gene (2012).\nHitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS\n. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.\nISBN\n978-1-44221-153-7\n.\nMitcham, Samuel W. Jr. (2001).\nHitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles\n. New York: Cooper Square Press.\nISBN\n0-8154-1130-8\n.\nMueller, Gene (1979).\nThe Forgotten Field Marshal: Wilhelm Keitel\n. Durham, NC: Moore Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-87716-105-9\n.\nPiper, Ernst (16 January 2007).\n\"Der Tod durch den Strick dauerte 15 Minuten\"\n.\nSpiegel Online\n(in German). Der Spiegel\n. Retrieved\n17 November\n2019\n.\nStahel, David\n(2009).\nOperation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East\n. Cambridge, UK:\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-521-76847-4\n.\nShepherd, Ben\n(2016).\nHitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0300179033\n.\nShirer, William L. (1990).\nRise And Fall Of The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. Simon and Schuster.\nISBN\n978-0-671-72868-7\n.\nSmith, Kingsbury (16 October 1946).\n\"The Execution of Nazi War Criminals\"\n. Nuremberg Gaol, Germany. International News Service\n. Retrieved\n17 November\n2019\n.\nTucker, Spencer (2005).\nWorld War II: A Student Encyclopedia\n. ABC Clio.\nISBN\n1-85109-857-7\n.\nUSHMM\n(n.d.).\n\"Wilhelm Keitel: Biography\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n. Retrieved\n6 October\n2019\n.\nWalker, Andrew (2006).\nThe Nazi War Trials\n. CPD Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-903047-50-7\n.\nWilkes, Donald E. Jr. (2002).\n\"\n'The Trial of the Century – and of all time'. Part two\"\n.\nPopular Media\n.\n33\n. University of Georgia School of Law\n. Retrieved\n17 November\n2019\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John W. (1980) .\nNemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945\n. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n0-333-06864-5\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: publisher location (\nlink\n)\nWistrich, Robert (1982).\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n. Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc.\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\n.\nZeller, Tom Jr. (17 January 2007).\n\"The Nuremberg Hangings – Not So Smooth Either\"\n.\nNew York Times\n. Retrieved\n15 October\n2019\n.\nExternal links\nWilhelm Keitel\nin the\nGerman National Library\ncatalogue\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XV, Part 3: The Reich Cabinet\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2023\n.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Walter von Reichenau",
+      "succeeded_by": "Position abolished",
+      "born": "Wilhelm Bodewin Johann Gustav Keitel(1882-09-22)22 September 1882Helmscherode, Germany",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged64)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "spouse": "Lisa Fontaine​(m.1909)​",
+      "relatives": "Bodewin Keitel(brother)",
+      "nickname": "\"Lakeitel\"",
+      "allegiance": "Germany",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German ArmyReichsheerWehrmacht",
+      "yearsof_service": "1901–1945",
+      "rank": "Generalfeldmarschall",
+      "commands": "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWorld War II",
+      "awards": "Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross",
+      "criminal_status": "Executedby hanging",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 26144
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Ernst_Kaltenbrunner",
+    "name": "Ernst Kaltenbrunner",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Ernst Kaltenbrunner was an Austrian high-ranking SS official during the Nazi era, major perpetrator of the Holocaust and convicted war criminal. After the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, and a brief period under Heinrich Himmler, Kaltenbrunner was the third Chief of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), which included the offices of Gestapo, Kripo and SD, from January 1943 until the end of World War II in Europe.",
+    "description": "Austrian SS official (1903–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Ernst Kaltenbrunner\nAustrian SS official (1903–1946)\n\"Kaltenbrunner\" redirects here. For people with the surname, see\nKaltenbrunner (surname)\n.\nFor the footballer, see\nErnst Kaltenbrunner (footballer)\n.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n(4 October 1903 – 16 October 1946) was an Austrian high-ranking\nSS\nofficial during the\nNazi era\n, major perpetrator of\nthe Holocaust\nand convicted war criminal.  After the\nassassination of Reinhard Heydrich\nin 1942, and a brief period under\nHeinrich Himmler\n, Kaltenbrunner was the third Chief of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA), which included the offices of\nGestapo\n,\nKripo\nand\nSD\n, from January 1943 until the\nend of World War II in Europe\n.\nKaltenbrunner joined the\nNazi Party\nin 1930 and the SS in 1931, and by 1935 he was considered a leader of the\nAustrian SS\n. In 1938, he assisted in the\nAnschluss\nand was given command of the SS and police force in Austria. In January 1943, Kaltenbrunner was appointed chief of the RSHA, succeeding\nReinhard Heydrich\n, who was assassinated in May 1942.\nA committed\nantisemite\n, Kaltenbrunner played a pivotal role in orchestrating the\nHolocaust\n, which intensified under his leadership. He oversaw the coordination of security and law enforcement agencies involved in widespread extermination, the suppression of resistance movements in occupied territories, extensive arrests, deportations, and executions. He was the highest-ranking member of the SS to face trial (Himmler having died of suicide in May 1945) at the\nNuremberg trials\n, where he was found guilty of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n. Kaltenbrunner was sentenced to death, and was executed by hanging on 16 October 1946.\nPersonal life\nKaltenbrunner was born in\nRied im Innkreis\n, Austria, and growing up had a close relationship with his mother (born Theresia Utwardy).\nHis father Hugo was a lawyer, and Kaltenbrunner spent his early years and primary education in\nRaab\n, later attending the\nRealgymnasium\nin\nLinz\n.\nRaised in a\nnationalist\nfamily, his ideological understanding of the world was shaped to some extent by the\nvölkisch\nPan-Germanism\nmovement in Austria, since his father was an adherent to its ideals.\nLike his father, the younger Kaltenbrunner's pan-Germanism—replete with\nantisemitism\nand the notion that political conflict was a racial struggle\n—was cultivated in the nationalist student fraternities known as\nBurschenschaften\n.\nKaltenbrunner was incidentally also childhood friends with\nAdolf Eichmann\n, the infamous SS officer who later played a key role in implementing the Nazis' \"\nFinal Solution\n\" against Europe's Jews.\nKaltenbrunner's graduation record, 1926\nAfter finishing gymnasium in 1921, Kaltenbrunner first studied chemistry at the\nUniversity of Graz\n, where his father had matriculated, but switched to law in 1923.\nWhile studying at Graz, he joined the Arminia fraternity, became active in student politics, and participated in demonstrations against\nMarxism\nand clerical influence.\nHe obtained his doctorate in 1926.\nKaltenbrunner then worked at a law firm in\nSalzburg\nfor a year before opening his own law office in Linz.\nHe had\ndeep scars\non his face reportedly from\nduelling\nin his student days, although some sources attribute them to a drunk-driving crash.\nBy 1928, Kaltenbrunner was bored, lonely, and unfulfilled according to historian Peter Black; however Kaltenbrunner's work as a provincial lawyer in Linz also brought him into the right-wing \"gymnastic circles in Linz\" where he joined the\nDeutsch-Volkischer Turnverein\n, an organization with close ties to the paramilitary formation of the Austrian\nHeimwehr\n.\nBlack described this latter organization as \"a training ground for the illegal Nazi SA and SS\".\nIn the summer of 1929, Kaltenbrunner joined the\nHeimwehr\n, which Black claims merged his \"emotional need for membership in a community\" with his political ideals.\nOn 14 January 1934, Kaltenbrunner married Elisabeth Eder (20 October 1908 – 20 May 2002), who was also a\nNazi Party\nmember; the couple had three children. In addition to the children from his marriage, Kaltenbrunner had twins, Ursula and Wolfgang (b. 1945) with his long-time mistress, Gisela Gräfin von Westarp (27 June 1920 – 2 June 1983). All the children survived the war.\nSS career\nOn 18 October 1930, Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party as member number 300,179.\nIn 1931, he was the\nBezirksredner\n(district speaker) for the Nazi Party in\nUpper Austria\n. Kaltenbrunner joined the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) on 31 August 1931 after encouragement by then leader of Hitler's bodyguard, SS-\nStandartenführer\nSepp Dietrich\n;\nhis SS number being 13,039.\nBlack writes that \"Kaltenbrunner found in the Nazi movement and the SS what he politically desired and emotionally needed: a world where the ideal of the racial community was prized, where the theory of racial struggle was accepted as an obvious fact, where all doubts about the meaning of existence were swept away.\"\nKaltenbrunner first became a\nRechtsberater\n(legal consultant) for the Nazi Party in 1929 and later held this same position for\nSS Abschnitt (Section) VIII\n, beginning in 1932.\nThat same year he began working at the law practice of his father, who had taken ill.\nIn October 1932,\nErnst Röhm\nappointed Kaltenbrunner as an\nSA- und SS-Gruppenrechtsberater\n, making it his job to provide free legal counsel for members of either unit should they be arrested for \"performing their duty\".\nBy 1933, Kaltenbrunner had become head of the National-Socialist Lawyers' League in\nLinz\n.\nIn January 1934, Kaltenbrunner was briefly jailed at the Kaisersteinbruch detention camp with other Nazis for conspiracy by the\nEngelbert Dollfuss\ngovernment.\nWhile there, he led a hunger strike against the inadequate food rations, poor sanitary conditions, and unfair treatment by the\nHeimwehr\nguards at the camp, which forced the government to release 490 of the party members.\nIn 1935, he was jailed again on suspicion of\nhigh treason\n; more specifically, Kaltenbrunner was accused of spreading Nazi propaganda materials to the army.\nThis charge was dropped, but he was sentenced to six months imprisonment for\nconspiracy\nand he lost his license to practice law.\nAlthough many of the accused and arrested Austrian Nazis emigrated to Germany, Kaltenbrunner remained in Austria—a fact he shared with an acquaintance in 1935—at Himmler's insistence, who saw in the Austrian a useful associate for strengthening the SS there.\nFrom mid-1935 Kaltenbrunner was head of the illegal SS Abschnitt VIII in Linz and was considered a leader of the\nAustrian SS\n. To provide\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nReinhard Heydrich\nand\nHeinz Jost\nwith new information, Kaltenbrunner repeatedly made trips to\nBavaria\n.\nHe would hide on a train and on a ship that traveled to\nPassau\n, then return with money and orders for Austrian comrades.\nDuring his trips between the two countries, he frequently carried detailed reports gathered by the Nazi underground in Austria, including photos Kaltenbrunner had taken in autumn 1936 of confidential documents that detailed Austria's foreign policy.\nDuring January 1937, Himmler appointed Kaltenbrunner chief of the entire Austrian SS.\nKaltenbrunner was arrested again by Austrian authorities on charges of heading the illegal Nazi Party organization (the Nazi Relief Office) in\nOberösterreich\n.\nHe was released in September.\nActing on orders from\nHermann Göring\n, Kaltenbrunner assisted in bringing about the\nAnschluss\nwith Germany (13 March 1938); he was awarded the role of State Secretary for Public Security in the\nSeyss-Inquart cabinet\nof 11 to 13 March 1938.\nControlled from behind the scenes by Himmler, Kaltenbrunner still led, albeit clandestinely, the Austrian SS as part of his duty to\n\"coordinate\"\nand manage the Austrian population – this entailed the\nNazification\nof all aspects of Austrian society.\nThen on 21 March 1938, he was promoted to SS-\nBrigadeführer\n.\nAt the\n10 April 1938 parliamentary election\n, he was elected to the\nReichstag\nas a deputy from\nOstmark\n.\nHe retained this seat until the fall of the Nazi regime on 8 May 1945.\nAmid this activity, he helped establish the\nMauthausen-Gusen concentration camp\nnear Linz.\nMauthausen was the first\nNazi concentration camp\nopened in Austria following the\nAnschluss\n.\nOn 11 September 1938, Kaltenbrunner was promoted to the rank of SS-\nGruppenführer\n(equivalent to a\nlieutenant general\nin the German Army) while holding the position of leader of\nSS-Oberabschnitt\nÖsterreich\n(re-designated\nSS-Oberabschnitt Donau\nin November 1938). Also in 1938, he was appointed\nHigher SS and Police Leader\n(\nHöherer SS- und Polizeiführer\n; HSSPF) for\nOberabschnitt Donau\n, which was the primary SS command in Austria (he held that post until 30 January 1943).\nKaltenbrunner with\nOrdnungspolizei\nofficials in Vienna in 1940 following the 1938\nAnschluss\nWorld War II\nKaltenbrunner,\nHeinrich Himmler\nand\nAugust Eigruber\n(in black) inspect\nMauthausen concentration camp\nin 1941, in the company of camp commander\nFranz Ziereis\n(center left)\nKaltenbrunner with Himmler and Ziereis at Mauthausen in April 1941\nIn June 1940, Kaltenbrunner was appointed Vienna's chief of police and held that additional post for a year. In July 1940, he was commissioned as an SS-\nUntersturmführer\ninto the\nWaffen-SS\nReserve.\nAlongside his many official duties, Kaltenbrunner also developed an\nintelligence network\nacross Austria, moving southeastwards, which eventually brought him to Himmler's attention for appointment as chief of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA) in January 1943.\nThe RSHA was composed of the SiPo (\nSicherheitspolizei\n; the combined forces of the\nGestapo\nand\nKripo\n) along with the SD (\nSicherheitsdienst\n, Security Service).\nKaltenbrunner replaced Heydrich, who had been\nassassinated\nin June 1942. Kaltenbrunner held this position until the end of\nWorld War II\n.\nHardly anyone knew Kaltenbrunner, and upon his appointment, Himmler transferred responsibility both for SS personnel and for economics from the RSHA to the\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\n.\nNonetheless, Kaltenbrunner was promoted to SS-\nObergruppenführer\nund General der Polizei\non 21 June 1943. He also replaced Heydrich as president (serving from 1943 to 1945) of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), the organization today known as\nInterpol\n.\nFearing a collapsing\nhome-front\ndue to the\nAllied\nbombing campaigns\n, and worried that another \"stab-in-the-back\" at home could arise as a result, Kaltenbrunner immediately tightened the Nazi grip within Germany.\nFrom what historian Anthony Read relates, Kaltenbrunner's appointment as RSHA chief came as a surprise given the other possible candidates like the head of the Gestapo,\nHeinrich Müller\n, or even the SD foreign-intelligence chief,\nWalter Schellenberg\n.\nHistorian Richard Grunberger also added the name of\nWilhelm Stuckart\n, the future minister of the German Interior, as another potential candidate for head of the RSHA; however, he suggests that Kaltenbrunner was most likely selected since he was a comparative \"newcomer\", expected to be more \"pliable\" in Himmler's hands.\nLike many of the ideological fanatics in the regime, Kaltenbrunner was a committed antisemite. According to former SS-\nSturmbannführer\nHans Georg Mayer, Kaltenbrunner was present at a December 1940 meeting among\nAdolf Hitler\n,\nJoseph Goebbels\n, Himmler and Heydrich where it was decided to gas all Jews incapable of heavy physical work.\nUnder Kaltenbrunner's command, the genocide of Jews picked up pace as \"the process of extermination was to be expedited and the concentration of the Jews in the Reich itself and the occupied countries were to be liquidated as soon as possible.\"\nKaltenbrunner stayed constantly informed over the status of concentration-camp activities, receiving periodic reports at his office in the RSHA.\nTo\ncombat homosexuality across the greater Reich\n, Kaltenbrunner pushed the\nMinistry of justice\nin July 1943 for an edict mandating\ncompulsory castration\nfor anyone found guilty of this offence. While this was rejected, he still took steps to get\nthe army\nto review some 6,000 cases to prosecute\nhomosexuals\n.\nDuring the summer of 1943, Kaltenbrunner conducted his second inspection of the\nMauthausen-Gusen concentration camp\n. While he was there, 15 prisoners were selected to demonstrate for Kaltenbrunner three methods of killing: by a gunshot to the neck, hanging, and gassing. After the killings were performed, Kaltenbrunner inspected the crematorium and later the quarry.\nIn October 1943, he told\nHerbert Kappler\n, the head of German police and security services in Rome, that the \"eradication of the\nJews in Italy\n\" was of \"special interest\" for \"general security\".\nFour days later, Kappler's SS and police units began\nrounding up and deporting Jews\nby train to\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n.\nIn 1944, during an arranged meeting in\nKlessheim Castle\nnear Salzburg, when Hitler was in the process of strong-arming Admiral\nHorthy\ninto a closer integration between\nHungary\nand Nazi Germany, Kaltenbrunner was present for the negotiations and escorted Horthy out once they were over. Accompanying Horthy and Kaltenbrunner on the journey back to Hungary,\nAdolf Eichmann\nbrought with him a special\nEinsatzkommando\nunit to begin the process of\nrounding up and deporting Hungary's 750,000 Jews\n.\nIt was said that even Himmler feared him, as Kaltenbrunner was an intimidating figure with 1.94m (6'4½\") in height, facial scars, and volatile temper.\nKaltenbrunner was also a longtime friend of\nOtto Skorzeny\nand recommended him for many secret missions, allowing Skorzeny to become one of Hitler's favourite agents. Kaltenbrunner also allegedly headed\nOperation Long Jump\n, an alleged plan to assassinate\nStalin\n,\nChurchill\n, and\nRoosevelt\nin\nTehran\nin 1943.\nKaltenbrunner (front row, second from left) as a spectator at a\nPeople's Court\nshow trial following the failed\n20 July plot\nin 1944\nImmediately in the wake of the\n20 July Plot\non Hitler's life in 1944, Kaltenbrunner was summoned to Hitler's wartime headquarters at the\nWolfsschanze\n(\nWolf's Lair\n) in\nEast Prussia\nto begin the investigation into who had planned the assassination attempt.\nOnce it was revealed that an attempted military coup against Hitler had been launched, Himmler and Kaltenbrunner had to tread carefully, as the military was not under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo or the SD. When the attempt failed, the conspirators were soon identified.\nKaltenbrunner called for the execution of those implicated in the plot.\nAn estimated 5,000 people were eventually executed, with many more sent to concentration camps.\nHistorian\nHeinz Höhne\ncounted Kaltenbrunner among the fanatical Hitler loyalists and described him as being committed \"to the bitter end\".\nField reports from the SD in October 1944 about deteriorating morale in the military prompted Kaltenbrunner to urge the involvement of the RSHA in military court-martial proceedings, but this was rejected by Himmler, who thought it unwise to interfere in\nWehrmacht\n(military) affairs.\nIn December 1944, Kaltenbrunner was granted the additional rank of\nGeneral of the Waffen-SS\n. On 15 November 1944, he was awarded the\nKnights Cross of the War Merit Cross with Swords\n. In addition, he was awarded the Nazi Party\nGolden Party Badge\nand the\nBlutorden\n(\nBlood Order\n).\nUsing his authority as Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner issued a decree on 6 February 1945 that allowed policemen to shoot people at their own discretion deemed \"disloyal\", without any form of judicial review.\nOn 12 March 1945, a meeting took place in\nVorarlberg\nbetween Kaltenbrunner and\nCarl Jacob Burckhardt\n, president of the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n(1945–48).\nJust over a month later, Himmler was informed that SS-\nObergruppenführer\n(general)\nKarl Wolff\nhad been negotiating with the Allies for the capitulation of Italy.\nWhen questioned by Himmler, Wolff explained that he was operating under Hitler's orders and attempting to play separate Allies against one another. Himmler believed him,\nbut Kaltenbrunner did not, and told Himmler that an informant claimed that Wolff had also negotiated with Cardinal\nSchuster\nof\nMilan\nand was about to surrender occupied Italy to the Allies.\nHimmler angrily repeated the allegations; Wolff, feigning offence, challenged Himmler to present these statements to Hitler. Unnerved by Wolff's demands, Himmler backed down, and Hitler sent Wolff back to Italy to continue his purported disruption of the Allies.\nOn 18 April 1945, three weeks before the war ended, Himmler named Kaltenbrunner commander-in-chief of the remaining German forces in southern Europe.\nKaltenbrunner attempted to organize\ncells for post-war sabotage\nin the region and Germany but accomplished little.\nHitler made one of his last appearances on 20 April 1945 outside the subterranean\nFührerbunker\nin Berlin, where he pinned medals on boys from the\nHitler Youth\nfor their bravery.\nKaltenbrunner was among those present, but realizing the end was near, he then fled from Berlin.\nArrest\nOn 12 May 1945 Kaltenbrunner was apprehended along with his adjutant, Arthur Scheidler, and two SS guards in a remote cabin at the top of the\nTotes Gebirge\nmountains near\nAltaussee\n, Austria, by a search party initiated by the\n80th Infantry Division, Third U.S. Army\n. Information had been gained from Johann Brandauer, the assistant\nburgermeister\nof Altaussee, that the party was hiding out with false papers in the cabin. This was supported by an eyewitness sighting by the Altaussee mountain ranger five days earlier. Special Agent Robert E. Matteson from the U.S. Army's\nCounterintelligence Corps\nDetachment organized and led a patrol consisting of Brandauer, four ex-\nWehrmacht\nsoldiers, and a squad of U.S. soldiers to effect the arrest. The party climbed over mountainous and glacial terrain for six hours in darkness before arriving at the cabin.\nAfter a short standoff, all four men exited the cabin and surrendered without a shot fired. Kaltenbrunner claimed to be a doctor and offered a false name. However, upon their arrival back to town his last mistress, Countess Gisela von Westarp, and the wife (Iris) of his adjutant Arthur Scheidler chanced to spot the men being led away; the ladies called out to both men and embraced them. This action resulted in their identification and arrest by U.S. troops.\nIn 2001, Ernst Kaltenbrunner's personal Nazi security seal was found in an\nAlpine lake\nin\nStyria\n, Austria, 56 years after he had thrown it away to hide his identity. The seal was recovered by a Dutch citizen on holiday. The seal has the words\n\"Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\"\n(Chief of the Security Police and SD) engraved on it. Experts have examined the seal and believe it was discarded in the final days of the European war in May 1945.\nNuremberg trials\nKaltenbrunner testifying as a witness on his own behalf at the International Military Tribunal.\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\n, Kaltenbrunner was charged with conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nDue to the areas over which he exercised responsibility as an SS general and as chief of the RSHA, he was acquitted of crimes against peace, but held responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.\nKaltenbrunner wheeled into court during the Nuremberg trials after a brain hemorrhage during interrogation.\nDuring the initial stages of the Nuremberg trials, Kaltenbrunner was absent because of two episodes of\nsubarachnoid hemorrhage\n, which required several weeks of recovery time.\nHe was examined by Chief Medical Officer\nLt. Col. Rene Juchli\nwho reported that Kaltenbrunner was suffering from gallstones.\nAfter his health improved, the tribunal denied his request for pardon. When he was released from a military hospital he pleaded not guilty to the charges of the indictment against him. Kaltenbrunner said all decrees and legal documents that bore his signature were \"\nrubber-stamped\n\" and filed by his adjutant(s). He also said Gestapo Chief\nHeinrich Müller\nhad illegally affixed his signature to numerous documents in question.\nKaltenbrunner argued in his defence that his position as RSHA chief existed only theoretically and said he was only active in matters of espionage and intelligence. He maintained that Himmler, as his superior, was the person culpable for the atrocities committed during his tenure as chief of the RSHA. Kaltenbrunner also asserted that he had no knowledge of the\nFinal Solution\nbefore 1943 and went on to claim that he protested against the ill-treatment of the Jews to Himmler and Hitler.\nFurther denials from Kaltenbrunner included statements that he knew nothing of the\nCommissar Order\nand that he never visited\nMauthausen concentration camp\n, despite documentation of his visit.\nAt one point, Kaltenbrunner went so far as to avow that\nhe\nwas responsible for bringing the\nFinal Solution\nto an end.\nIn response to his denials, people in the courtroom laughed.\nDuring the trial,\nHans Bernd Gisevius\ndescribed Kaltenbrunner as \"even worse than that monster Heydrich\".\nConviction and execution\nOn 30 September 1946, the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(IMT) found Kaltenbrunner not guilty of crimes against peace, but guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity (counts three and four). On 1 October 1946, the IMT sentenced him to death by hanging.\nKaltenbrunner's body after execution by hanging on 16 October 1946\nKaltenbrunner was\nexecuted\non 16 October 1946, around 1:15\nam, in Nuremberg. His body, like those of the other nine executed men and that of\nHermann Göring\n(who committed suicide the previous day), was cremated at the\nEastern Cemetery\nin\nMunich\nand the ashes were scattered in a tributary of the River\nIsar\n.\nDates of rank\nSS-\nMann\n– 31 August 1931\nSS-\nTruppführer\n– 1931\nSS-\nSturmhauptführer\n– 25 September 1932\nSS-\nStandartenführer\n– 20 April 1936\nSS-\nOberführer\n– 20 April 1937\nSS-\nBrigadeführer\n– 21 March 1938\nSS-\nGruppenführer\n– 11 September 1938\nSS-\nUntersturmführer\nder Reserve der Waffen-SS\n– 1 July 1940\nGeneralleutnant\nder Polizei\n– 1 April 1941\nSS-\nObergruppenführer\nund\nGeneral\nder Polizei\n– 21 June 1943\nGeneral der\nWaffen-SS\nund Polizei\n– 1 December 1944\nAwards and decorations\nHonour Chevron for the Old Guard\n(1934)\nSS Honour Ring\n(1938)\nSword of honour of the Reichsführer-SS\n(1938)\nAnschluss Medal\n(1938)\nSudetenland Medal\n(1938) with Prague Castle Bar (1939)\nGolden Party Badge\n(1939)\nSS Long Service Award\nFor 4, 8, and 12 Years Service\nNazi Party Long Service Award\nin Bronze and Silver\nBlood Order\n(31 May 1942)\nGerman Cross\nin Silver (1943)\nKnights Cross of the War Merit Cross\nwith Swords (1944)\nSee also\nAllgemeine SS\nHolocaust (miniseries)\n– TV production in which Kaltenbrunner is portrayed by\nHans Meyer\n.\nInside the Third Reich\n– television film in which Kaltenbrunner is portrayed by\nHans Meyer\n.\nList of\nSS-Obergruppenführer\nList of major perpetrators of the Holocaust\nList of defendants at the International Military Tribunal\nReferences\nNotes\n↑\nPan-Germanists like Kaltenbrunner sought German unity based on racial purity, particularly among the educated German-Austrian elite in the late 19th century. This ideology rejected liberalism, socialism, democracy, Catholicism, Slavic nationalism, and the Habsburg multinational state, blaming them for obstructing a utopian vision of cultural and economic security. Pan-Germans traced these influences to Enlightenment rationalism and the French Revolution, identifying Jews as the chief beneficiaries of modernization and urbanization. They idealized a \"pure\" Germanic society rooted in rural, medieval traditions while portraying Jews and urban culture as corrupting forces. This worldview framed modernity as a threat and called for a \"conservative revolution\" to restore a mythical past.\n↑\nIt was Kaltenbrunner who presented Eichmann with his Nazi membership application in April 1932 and seven months later, it was Kaltenbrunner who suggested to Eichmann that he should also join the SS.\n↑\nSee:\n\"The Nuremberg Trials\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2001-03-12\n. Retrieved\n2016-04-18\n.\n↑\nKaltenbrunner later told his children that he left the\nHeimwehr\nbecause its leaders were \"incompetent and politically fickle\" and because it \"had changed from a nonpartisan, anti-Marxist movement to the political line of the Christian Socials.\"\nAn additionally important factor in Kaltenbrunner joining the Nazis identified by historian Peter Black, was nothing less than the \"Nazis’ commitment to\nAnschluss\n\", since the idealistic Austrian viewed the union between Germany and Austria as one that heralded a glorious future.\n↑\nThis mission was thwarted by Soviet intelligence agent\nGevork Vartanian\n. See the following article:\n\"Armenian intelligence agent, a hero of the Soviet Union Gevorg Vardanian passed away\"\n. 10 January 2012.\n↑\nNoted Hitler biographer, Sir Ian Kershaw, puts the figure of executed persons at exactly 4,980.\n↑\nAccording to a U.S. Army official publication written by Ernest J. Fisher, Jr, \"... Wolff had finally gone to Berlin for a face-to-face confrontation with Hitler and the Reichsfuehrer SS. Two days later Wolff, proving an exception to the rule that those summoned peremptorily to the Fuehrer's headquarters rarely came back, returned to Italy with assurances that nothing had been compromised.\" Through intermediaries, Wolff explained to Dulles that he had convinced Hitler that his discussions with the Allied leaders \"had been only a ploy to gain time and divide the Allied coalition. Satisfied, the Fuehrer ordered him back to his post with no restrictions other than to forbid travel to Switzerland.\"\nGerman journalist Heinz Höhne characterizes this acceptance of Wolff's gambit as a charge for him to \"seek better terms with the U.S. forces\",\nbut this may have been nothing more than another expression for stalling the Allies accordingly, given Hitler's later refusal to surrender under any circumstances and his vitriol against his closest confidants for having independently attempted to negotiate with the Allies.\n↑\nSee:\n\"Hitler – Last Known Film Footage\"\n.\nAwesomeStories.com\n.\nCitations\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n27–29.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n30–31.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n12–21.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n21–26.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nGerwarth 2012\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nEvans 2024\n, pp.\n325–326.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n33–34.\n1\n2\nBartrop\n&\nGrimm 2019\n, pp.\n163–165.\n1\n2\nWistrich 1995\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nSnyder 1976\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nPersico 1995\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n54–55.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n55.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n60–61.\n↑\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n408–409.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\nMiller 2015\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n63.\n1\n2\n3\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n393, 394.\n1\n2\nMiller 2015\n, p.\n394.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n73–74.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n74–75.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n79.\n↑\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n394, 395.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n79–80.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nRosmus 2015\n, p.\n52.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n83.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, pp.\n84–85.\n↑\nBlack 1984\n, p.\n91.\n1\n2\n3\nMiller 2015\n, p.\n395.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n487.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, pp.\n461.\n↑\nErnst Kaltenbrunner entry\nin the\nReichstag\nMembers Database\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n215.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n107.\n1\n2\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n393, 396.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n470, 661.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n661.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n553.\n↑\nGerwarth 2012\n, p.\n289.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, p.\n798.\n↑\nGrunberger 1993\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nBreitman 1994\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nYahil 1990\n, p.\n406.\n↑\nKahn 1978\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nEvans 2010\n, p.\n536.\n↑\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n396–398.\n1\n2\nMiller 2015\n, p.\n398.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, p.\n825.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1947\n, p.\n798.\n↑\nDoerries 2003\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nWest 2013\n, pp.\n140–141.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, p.\n833.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, pp.\n833–837.\n↑\nGraber 1978\n, p.\n180.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n693.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n511.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n542–543.\n↑\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n393, 406, 407.\n↑\nOvery 2010\n, p.\n388.\n↑\nMoorehead 1999\n, pp.\n458–460.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n572.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n573.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n573–574.\n↑\nFisher 1993\n, p.\n517.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n574.\n↑\nEvans 2010\n, p.\n724.\n↑\nBartrop\n&\nGrimm 2022\n, p.\n138.\n1\n2\n3\nCIA–Kent School,\nThe Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner\n.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, pp.\n891–892.\n↑\nLeidig 2001\n.\n↑\nSnyder 1976\n, p.\n190.\n↑\nMarrus 1997\n, pp.\n64–70.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, pp.\n95–96.\n↑\nLos Angeles Times\n, October 1945\n.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, pp.\n367–368.\n↑\nMarrus 1997\n, p.\n214.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, pp.\n364–365.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, p.\n370.\n↑\nJTA Daily\n, 1946\n.\n↑\n\"German Condemns Hitler Hierarchy\"\n. The New York Times. AP. 26 April 1946\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2025\n.\n↑\nMarrus 1997\n, p.\n237.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nDarnstädt 2005\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\nMiller 2015\n, pp.\n406, 407.\nBibliography\nBartrop, P.R.; Grimm, E.E. (2022).\nThe Holocaust: The Essential Reference Guide\n. ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1-4408-7779-7\n.\nBartrop, Paul R.; Grimm, Eve E. (2019-01-11).\nPerpetrating the Holocaust: Leaders, Enablers, and Collaborators\n. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.\nISBN\n979-8-216-12767-3\n.\nBlack, Peter R. (1984).\nErnst Kaltenbrunner: Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich\n. Princeton University Press.\nISBN\n0-691-05397-9\n.\nBreitman, Richard\n(1994). \"Himmler, the Architect of Genocide\". In David Cesarani (ed.).\nThe Final Solution: Origins and Implementation\n. London and New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-15232-7\n.\nCIA–Kent School.\n\"The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner\"\n.\nCIA–Kent School: Center for the Study of Intelligence\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2008-01-09\n. Retrieved\n14 July\n2019\n.\nConot, Robert E.\n(2000).\nJustice at Nuremberg\n. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-88184-032-2\n.\nDarnstädt, Thomas (2005).\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n.\nDoerries, Reinhard R. (2003).\nHitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg\n. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers.\nISBN\n0-7146-5400-0\n.\nEvans, Richard (2010).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2024).\nHitler's People: The Faces of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-59329-643-1\n.\nFisher, Ernst F. Jr. (1993).\nCassino to the Alps: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations\n(PDF)\n. United States Army in World War II. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History.\nOCLC\n31143820\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non September 27, 2012.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2012).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-18772-4\n.\nGraber, G. S. (1978).\nThe History of the SS\n. New York: D. McKay.\nISBN\n0-679-50754-X\n.\nGrunberger, Richard\n(1993).\nHitler's SS\n. New York: Dorset Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56619-152-4\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus\n(1984).\nThe Third Reich\n. London and New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n0-04-943033-5\n.\nHöhne, Heinz\n(2001).\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. New York: Penguin Press.\nISBN\n978-0-14-139012-3\n.\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(1947).\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n(PDF)\n. Vol.\nVII. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.\nJTA Daily (12 April 1946).\n\"Nazi Police Head Who Directed Killing of Jews Says He Was Unaware of Atrocities\"\n(PDF)\n.\nJewish Telegraph Agency\n. Retrieved\n5 January\n2024\n.\nKahn, David\n(1978).\nHitler's Spies: German Intelligence in World War II\n. New York: MacMillan.\nISBN\n0-02-560610-7\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2000).\nHitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-04994-7\n.\nLeidig, Michael (2001).\n\"Nazi chief's seal found in Alpine lake\"\n.\nThe Telegraph\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2008-08-31.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nLos Angeles Times (October 18, 1945). \"ALL SUPERMEN---EXCEPT FOR THE SHAPE THEY ARE IN\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. No.\nPage 1.\nManvell, Roger\n; Fraenkel, Heinrich (2011).\nGoering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMarrus, Michael R.\n(1997).\nThe Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–46: A Documentary History\n. Boston: Bedford Books.\nISBN\n978-0-312-13691-8\n.\nMiller, Michael (2015).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 2\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-25-8\n.\nMoorehead, Caroline (1999) .\nDunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross\n. Carroll & Graf Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-7867-0609-9\n.\nOvery, Richard (2010).\nThe Third Reich: A Chronicle\n. New York: Quercus Publishing Inc.\nISBN\n978-1-62365-456-6\n.\nPersico, Joseph E. (1995).\nNuremberg: Infamy on Trial\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14016-622-4\n.\nRead, Anthony (2005).\nThe Devil's Disciples: Hitler's Inner Circle\n. New York: Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-32697-0\n.\nRosmus, Anna (2015).\nHitlers Nibelungen: Niederbayern im Aufbruch zu Krieg und Untergang\n(in German). Grafenau: Samples Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-938401-32-3\n.\nSnyder, Louis L (1976).\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. London: Robert Hale.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nStackelberg, Roderick (2007).\nThe Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-30861-8\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York; Toronto: NAL Caliber (Penguin Group).\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWest, Nigel (2013).\nHistorical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence\n. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press).\nISBN\n978-0-8108-5822-0\n.\nWistrich, Robert (1995).\nWho's Who In Nazi Germany\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-11888-0\n.\nYahil, Leni (1990).\nThe Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932–1945\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n0-19-504522-X\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Macmillan Publishing.\nISBN\n0-02-897500-6\n.\nFurther reading\nVincent, Marie-Bénédicte (2022).\nKaltenbrunner: Le successeur d'Heydrich\n(in French). Place des éditeurs.\nISBN\n978-2-262-09442-3\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n.\nHolocaust miniseries\nat IMDb\nInformation about Ernst Kaltenbrunner\nin the Reichstag database\nKaltenbrunner defense broadcast during Nuremberg Trial\n, reported by\nMatthew Halton\nand broadcast on April 12, 1946; via the archives of the\nCanadian Broadcasting Corporation\n; 2\nm:36s\nNuremberg film\nat IMDb\nSeventeen Moments of Spring film\nat IMDb\nTestimony of Rudolf Hoess in the Nuremberg Trial",
+    "infobox": {
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Office established",
+      "succeeded_by": "Rudolf Querner",
+      "leader": "Oskar Dressleras Secretary-general",
+      "april–may_1945": "Commander-in-chiefofSouthern Germany",
+      "1943–1945": "Commander of theEinsatzgruppen",
+      "1938–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "march_1938": "State Secretary of Public Security of Austria",
+      "1931–1933": "District Speaker of theNazi PartyinUpper Austria",
+      "born": "(1903-10-04)4 October 1903Ried im Innkreis, Austria-Hungary",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged43)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Execution by hanging",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse": "Elisabeth Eder​(m.1934)​",
+      "domestic_partner": "Gisela Gräfin von Westarp",
+      "children": "5",
+      "alma_mater": "University of Graz",
+      "profession": "Lawyer",
+      "cabinet": "Seyss-Inquart government",
+      "allegiance": "Nazi Germany",
+      "branch": "Schutzstaffel(SS)",
+      "service_years": "1931–1945",
+      "rank": "SS-Obergruppenführer",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed",
+      "convictions": "War crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 34328
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Alfred_Rosenberg",
+    "name": "Alfred Rosenberg",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Alfred Ernst Rosenberg was a Baltic German Nazi theorist, theologian, ideologue and convicted war criminal. Rosenberg was first introduced to Adolf Hitler by Dietrich Eckart, and he held several important posts in the Nazi government. He was the head of the NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs during the entire rule of Nazi Germany (1933–1945), and led Amt Rosenberg, an official Nazi body for cultural policy and surveillance, between 1934 and 1945. During World War II, Rosenberg was the head of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (1941–1945). He helped direct the mass murder of the Slavs. After the war, he was convicted of crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trials in 1946. He was sentenced to death by hanging and executed on 16 October 1946.",
+    "description": "Nazi theorist and war criminal (1893–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Alfred Rosenberg\nNazi theorist and war criminal (1893–1946)\nAlfred Ernst Rosenberg\n(\n12 January\n[\nO.S.\n31 December 1892\n]\n1893\n– 16 October 1946) was a\nBaltic German\nNazi\ntheorist, theologian, ideologue and\nconvicted war criminal\n. Rosenberg was first introduced to\nAdolf Hitler\nby\nDietrich Eckart\n, and he held several important posts in the\nNazi government\n. He was the head of the\nNSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs\nduring the entire rule of\nNazi Germany\n(1933–1945), and led\nAmt Rosenberg\n(\"Rosenberg's bureau\"), an official Nazi body for\ncultural policy\nand\nsurveillance\n, between 1934 and 1945. During\nWorld War II\n, Rosenberg was the head of the\nReich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories\n(1941–1945). He helped direct the mass murder of the\nSlavs\n. After the war, he was convicted of\ncrimes against peace\n; planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n;\nwar crimes\n; and\ncrimes against humanity\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nin 1946. He was sentenced to death by hanging and\nexecuted\non 16 October 1946.\nThe author of a seminal work of\nNazi ideology\n,\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930), Rosenberg is considered one of the main authors of key Nazi ideological creeds, including its\nracial theory\nand its hatred of the Jewish people, the need for\nLebensraum\n, abrogation of the\nTreaty of Versailles\n, and opposition to what was considered \"\ndegenerate\n\" modern art. He was also known for his hatred and rejection of what he regarded as \"negative\" Christianity;\nhowever, he played an important role in the development of German nationalist\nPositive Christianity\n, which rejected the Old Testament.\nEarly life\nFamily\nRosenberg was born on 12 January 1893 in\nReval\n(now\nTallinn\n, Estonia), then in the\nGovernorate of Estonia\nof the\nRussian Empire\n. His mother Elfriede (née Siré), who had\nFrench\nand German ancestry, was the daughter of Louise Rosalie (née Fabricius), born near\nLeal\n(modern\nLihula\n, Estonia) in 1842, and of the railway official Friedrich August Siré, born in\nSaint Petersburg\n, Russia, in 1843.\nBorn in the same city in 1868, Elfriede Siré received the Christian sacrament of\nConfirmation\nin Reval at 17 in 1885. She married Woldemar Wilhelm Rosenberg, a wealthy merchant from Reval, in the\nLutheran Church of Saint Peter and Saint Paul\n(St-Petersburg) in 1886.\nThe young Rosenberg's mother died two months after his birth.\nHis paternal grandfather, Martin Rosenberg, was a master shoemaker and elder of his\nguild\n. Born in\nRiga\nin 1820, and probably partly of\nLatvian\ndescent, he had moved to Reval in the 1850s, where he met Julie Elisabeth Stramm, born in\nJörden\n(now Estonia) in 1835. The two married in the German St. Nicholas parish of Reval in 1856.\nThe\nHungarian-Jewish\njournalist Franz Szell, who was apparently residing in\nTilsit\n,\nPrussia\n,\nGermany\n, spent a year researching in Latvian and Estonian archives before publishing an open letter in 1936, with copies to\nHermann Göring\n,\nJoseph Goebbels\n, Foreign Minister\nKonstantin von Neurath\nand others, accusing Rosenberg of having \"no drop of German blood\" flowing in his veins. Szell wrote that among Rosenberg's ancestors were only \"Latvians, Jews, Mongols, and French.\"\nAs a result of his open letter, Szell was deported by Lithuanian authorities on 15 September 1936.\nHis claims were repeated in the 15 September 1937 issue of the\nVatican\nnewspaper\nL'Osservatore Romano\n.\nEducation and early career\nThe young Rosenberg graduated from the Petri-Realschule (currently\nTallinna Reaalkool\n) and enrolled in architecture studies at the\nRiga Polytechnical Institute\nin the autumn of 1910. In 1915, as the German army was approaching Riga, the entire school evacuated to the\nMoscow Imperial Higher Technical School\n(\nRussian\n:\nИмператорское Московское техническое училище (ИМТУ)\n), where he completed his PhD studies in 1917. During his stays at home in Reval, he attended the art studio of the famed painter\nAnts Laikmaa\n—though he showed promise, there are no records that he ever exhibited.\nDuring the\nGerman occupation of Estonia\nin 1918, Rosenberg served as a drawing teacher at the\nGustav Adolf Gymnasium\nand\nTallinna II Reaalkool\n(current\nTallinn Polytechnic School\n). He gave his first speech on \"\nJewish Marxism\n\" on 30 November, at the\nHouse of the Blackheads\n, after the 28 November 1918 outbreak of the\nEstonian War of Independence\n.\nHe emigrated to Germany with the retreating\nImperial German army\n, along with\nMax Scheubner-Richter\n, who served as something of a mentor to Rosenberg and to his ideology. Arriving in\nMunich\n, he contributed to\nDietrich Eckart\n's publication, the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n(\nEthnic/Nationalist Observer\n). By this time, he was both an\nantisemite\n– influenced by\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain\n's book\nThe Foundations of the Nineteenth Century\n, one of the key proto-Nazi books of\nracial theory\n–\nand an\nanti-Bolshevik\n.\nRosenberg became one of the earliest members of the\nGerman Workers' Party\n–\nlater renamed the\nNational Socialist German Workers' Party\n, better known as the Nazi Party\n–\njoining in January 1919, eight months before\nAdolf Hitler\njoined in September. According to some historians, Rosenberg had also been a member of the\nThule Society\n, along with Eckart,\nalthough\nNicholas Goodrick-Clarke\ncontends that they were only guests.\nThe\nVölkischer Beobachter\nbecame the Nazi party newspaper in December 1920. Eckart was its first editor and after his bout with alcoholism, Rosenberg became its editor in 1923.\nRosenberg was a leading member of\nAufbau Vereinigung\n, Reconstruction Organisation, a conspiratorial organisation of White Russian émigrés which had a critical influence on early Nazi policy.\nRosenberg sympathized and identified with\nTalaat Pasha\nand the\nCommittee of Union and Progress\nthat carried out the\nArmenian genocide\n, also claiming that there was \"a deliberately Jewish policy which had always protected the Armenians\" and that \"during the world war, the Armenians have led the espionage against the Turks, similar to the Jews against Germany\".\nPre-war years\nIn November 1923, after the failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, Hitler, who had been imprisoned for\ntreason\n, appointed Rosenberg as the leader of the Nazi movement. Hitler remarked privately in later years that his choice of Rosenberg, whom he regarded as weak and lazy, was strategic; Hitler did not want the temporary leader of the Nazis to become too popular or hungry for power, because a person with either of those two qualities might not want to cede the party leadership after Hitler's release. However, at the time of the appointment Hitler had no reason to believe that he would soon be released, and Rosenberg had not appeared weak, so this may have been Hitler reading back into history his dissatisfaction with Rosenberg for the job he did.\nOn 1 January 1924, Rosenberg founded the\nGreater German People's Community\n, a Nazi\nfront organization\n. Headquartered in\nMunich\n, it was largely limited to\nBavaria\n, the birthplace of National Socialism, had no substantial presence outside that State and became a haven for Nazi Party members from that area. Prominent members included\nMax Amann\n,\nPhillip Bouhler\n,\nHermann Esser\n,\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\nand\nJulius Streicher\n.\nRosenberg, one of the least charismatic of the Nazi leaders and lacking in leadership qualities, was soon pushed aside by Streicher, a far more ruthless and abrasive personality, who was elected Chairman on 9 July 1924 with Esser, also a coarse, bullying sort, as his Deputy Chairman.\nAdolf Hitler (standing) delivers a speech on the occasion of the refoundation of the NSDAP in February of 1925. Next to him from the perspective of the onlooker: On the right:\nGregor Strasser\nand\nHeinrich Himmler\n. On the left:\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\n,\nWalter Buch\nand Alfred Rosenberg. Behind Hitler the Blutfahne (blood-flag), a central relique within the propaganda of the National-Socialists, can be seen attached to the wall.\nRosenberg was on the rostrum at the refoundation of the\nNSDAP\nin February 1925.\nIn 1929 Rosenberg founded the\nMilitant League for German Culture\n. He later formed the \"\nInstitute for Research on the Jewish Question\n\", the first branch of a projected\nAdvanced School of the NSDAP\n,\ndedicated to identifying and attacking supposed Jewish influence in German culture and to recording the history of Judaism from a radical nationalist perspective. In 1930, he published his book on\nracial theory\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(\nDer Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts\n) which deals with key issues in the Nazi ideology, such as the \"Jewish question\". He condemned\nIslam\nin the book as well which he described as being against European races and as anti-Christian. Rosenberg intended his book as a sequel to\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain\n's above-cited book.\nDespite selling more than a million copies by 1945, its influence within Nazism remains doubtful. It is often said to have been a book that was officially venerated within Nazism, but one that few had actually read beyond the first chapter or even found comprehensible.\nAccording to\nAlbert Speer\n, Hitler called it \"stuff nobody can understand\"\nand disapproved of its pseudo-religious tone.\nContradicting this, other authors noted that Hitler considered it the most important book of party ideology. Rosenberg also played a key role in developing Hitler’s belief in Jewish conspiracies by introducing him to\nThe Protocols of the Elders of Zion\n.\nRosenberg was elected as a\nReichstag\ndeputy at the\nSeptember 1930 parliamentary election\nas a representative of the Nazi Party\nelectoral list\n. He would continue to serve in this capacity until the end of the Nazi regime, representing electoral constituency 33,\nHesse-Darmstadt\n, from\nJuly 1932\n.\nRosenberg helped convince Hitler, whose early speeches focused on revenge against France and Britain,\nthat communism was a serious threat to Germany. \"\nJewish-Bolshevism\n\" became an ideological target for Nazism during the early 1920s.\nIn Rome during November 1932 Rosenberg participated in the\nVolta Conference\nabout Europe. British historian\nSir Charles Petrie\nmet him there and regarded him with great distaste; Petrie was a Catholic and strongly objected to Rosenberg's anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic sentiments.\nThe following year, following the\nNazi seizure of power\n, Rosenberg was named leader of the\nNazi Party's Foreign Policy Office\nin April, and on 2 June 1933 he was named a\nReichsleiter\n, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party.\nIn May 1933 Rosenberg visited Britain, to give the impression that the Nazis would not be a threat and to encourage links between the new regime and the\nBritish Empire\n. It was a notable failure. When Rosenberg laid a wreath bearing a\nswastika\nat\nthe Cenotaph\n,\nJames Edmond Sears\n, a\nLabour Party\ncandidate, slashed it, later threw it in the\nThames\nand was fined 40 shillings for willful damage at Bow Street magistrate's court.\nIn October 1933, Rosenberg was named as a member of\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nOn 27 January 1934, Hitler made Rosenberg the \"Führer's Representative for the Supervision of Intellectual and Ideological Education of the NSDAP.\"\nThis was the origin of the\nAmt Rosenberg\n, or Rosenberg Office, which was an official body for cultural policy and surveillance within the Nazi party. It was also known as the Reich surveillance office.\nWartime activities\nReich Minister Alfred Rosenberg speaks during the 1942 funeral ceremony of\nGauleiter\nKarl Roever\n.\nRosenberg hosted in an official capacity such individuals as\nVidkun Quisling\n.\nIn 1940 Rosenberg was made head of the\nHohe Schule\n(literally \"high school\", but the German phrase refers to a college), the Centre of National Socialist Ideological and Educational Research, out of which the\nEinsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg\n(Reichsleiter Rosenberg Taskforce) developed for the purpose of\nlooting art and cultural goods\n. The ERR were especially active in Paris in looting art stolen from famous Jewish families such as the\nRothschilds\nand that of\nPaul Rosenberg\n.\nHermann Göring\nused the ERR to collect art for his own personal gratification.\nHe created a \"Special Task Force for Music\" (\nSonderstab Musik\n) to collect the best\nmusical instruments\nand scores for use in a university to be built in Hitler's home town of\nLinz\n,\nAustria\n. The orders given to the\nSonderstab Musik\nwere to loot all forms of Jewish property in Germany and of those found in any country taken over by the German army, and any musical instruments or scores were to be immediately shipped to\nBerlin\n.\nReich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories\nAlfred Rosenberg as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories\nFormer Nazi Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin (2014)\nFollowing\nthe invasion\nof the\nUSSR\n, Rosenberg was appointed head of the\nReich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories\n(\nReichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete\n) on 17 July 1941.\nAlfred Meyer\nserved as his deputy and represented him at the\nWannsee Conference\n. Another official of the Ministry,\nGeorg Leibbrandt\n, also attended the conference, at Rosenberg's request.\nRosenberg had presented Hitler with his plan for the organization of the conquered Eastern territories, suggesting the establishment of new administrative districts, to replace the previously\nSoviet\n-controlled territories with new\nReichskommissariats\n. These would be:\nOstland\n(\nBaltic countries\nand\nBelarus\n),\nUkraine\n(\nUkraine\nand nearest territories),\nKaukasien\n(\nCaucasus\narea),\nMoskowien\n(Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of nearest Russian European areas)\nAlthough Rosenberg believed that all of the peoples of the Soviet Union were subhumans because of their\ncommunist\nbeliefs,\nsuch suggestions were intended to encourage certain non-Russian forms of nationalism and promote German interests for the benefit of future\nAryan\ngenerations, in accord with geopolitical \"\nLebensraum\nim Osten\" plans. They would provide a buffer against Soviet expansion in preparation for the total eradication of Communism and\nBolshevism\nby decisive pre-emptive military action.\nFollowing these plans, when\nWehrmacht\nforces invaded Soviet-controlled territory, they immediately implemented the first of the proposed Reichskommissariats of\nOstland\nand\nUkraine\n, under the leadership of\nHinrich Lohse\nand\nErich Koch\n, respectively. The organization of these administrative territories led to conflict between Rosenberg and the\nSS\nover the treatment of\nSlavs\nunder German occupation. As Nazi Germany's chief racial theorist, Rosenberg considered Slavs, though lesser than Germans, to be Aryan. Rosenberg often complained to Hitler and Himmler about the treatment of non-Jewish occupied peoples.\nHe proposed the creation of buffer satellite states made out of Greater Finland, Baltica, Ukraine, and Caucasus.\nDuring an 18 November 1941\npress conference\n, he made the following statements about the\nJewish question\n:\nSome six million Jews still live in the East, and this question can only be solved by a biological extermination of the whole of Jewry in Europe. The Jewish Question will only be solved for Germany when the last Jew has left German territory, and it will only be solved for Europe when not a single Jew stands on the European continent as far as the Urals... And to this end, it is necessary to force them beyond the Urals or otherwise bring about their eradication.\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\nhe said he was ignorant of the\nHolocaust\n, despite the fact that Leibbrandt and Meyer were present at the\nWannsee conference\n.\nWartime propaganda efforts\nPhotograph by\nHeinrich Hoffmann\n, 1941\nSince the invasion of the\nSoviet Union\nintended to impose the\nNew Order\n, it was essentially a war of conquest. German propaganda efforts designed to win over Russian opinion were, at best, patchy and inconsistent. Alfred Rosenberg was one of the few in the Nazi hierarchy who advocated a policy designed to encourage\nanti-Communist\nopinion among the population of the occupied territories. His interest here was mainly in the non-Russian areas such as Ukraine and the Baltic States; however, supporters of the\nRussian Liberation Army\nwere somewhat able to win him over.\nAmongst other things, Rosenberg issued a series of posters announcing the end of the Soviet collective farms (\nkolkhoz\n). He also issued an Agrarian Law in February 1942, annulling all Soviet legislation on farming and restoring family farms for those willing to collaborate with the occupiers. But decollectivisation conflicted with the wider demands of wartime food production, and\nHermann Göring\ndemanded that the collective farms be retained, save for a change of name. Hitler himself denounced the redistribution of land as \"stupid\".\nThere were numerous German armed forces (\nWehrmacht\n) posters asking for assistance in the\nBandenkrieg,\nthe war against the\nSoviet partisans\n, though, once again, German policy had the effect of adding to their problems. Posters for \"volunteer\" labour, with inscriptions such as \"Come work with us to shorten the war\", hid the appalling realities faced by\nRussian workers in Germany\n.  Rosenberg noted that many joined the partisans when volunteers for work details declined and the Germans resorted to force to acquire workers from the East.\nCapture, trial and execution\nRosenberg (right) at the Nuremberg trials, with\nHans Frank\n(centre) and\nAlfred Jodl\n1946 Nuremberg courtroom: Rosenberg (front row, left)\nRosenberg after his hanging\nRosenberg was captured by\nAllied\ntroops on 19 May 1945 in\nFlensburg\n-\nMürwik\n.\nHe was tried at\nNuremberg\nand found guilty of all four counts: conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n; planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n;\nwar crimes\n; and\ncrimes against humanity\n. The final judgment against him named him one of the principal planners of the\ninvasion of Norway\nand the invasion of the Soviet Union. It also held him directly responsible for the systematic plunder of the occupied countries of Europe, as well as the brutal conditions in Eastern Europe.\nDuring his trial he wrote his memoirs, which were published posthumously and with analytical commentary by\nSerge Lang\nand Ernst von Schenck.\nHe was sentenced to death and executed with other condemned co-defendants at Nuremberg Prison on the morning of\n16 October 1946\n.\nHis body, like those of the other nine executed men and that of\nHermann Göring\n, was cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand the ashes were scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nThroughout the trial, it was agreed that Rosenberg had a decisive role in shaping Nazi philosophy and ideology. Examples include: his book\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n, which was published in 1930, where he incited hatred against \"\nLiberal Imperialism\n\" and \"Bolshevik\nMarxism\n\"; furthering the influence of the \"\nLebensraum\n\" idea in Germany during the war; facilitating the persecution of Christian churches and the Jews in particular; and opposition to the\nVersailles Treaty\n.\nAccording to Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, who covered the executions for the\nInternational News Service\n, Rosenberg was the only condemned man who, when asked at the gallows if he had any\nlast statement\nto make, replied with only one word: \"No\".\nViews and influence on Nazi policy\nHitler was a leader oriented towards practical politics, whereas, for Rosenberg, religion and philosophy were key and he was the most culturally influential within the party.\nSeveral accounts of the time before the Nazi ascension to power speak of Hitler as being a mouthpiece for Rosenberg's views, and he clearly exerted a great deal of intellectual influence.\nThe question of Rosenberg's influence in the Nazi Party is controversial. He was perceived as lacking the charisma and political skills of the other Nazi leaders, and was somewhat isolated. In some of his speeches Hitler appeared to be close to Rosenberg's views, rejecting traditional Christianity as a religion based on Jewish culture, preferring an ethnically and culturally pure \"Race\" whose destiny was supposed to be assigned to the German people by \"Providence\". But Hitler rejected Rosenberg's spiritual views on race and instead based his views on biology.\nAfter Hitler's assumption of power he moved to unify the churches into a national church which could be manipulated and controlled.\nHe placed himself in the position of being the man to save Positive Christianity from utter destruction at the hands of the\natheistic antitheist Communists\nof the\nSoviet Union\n.\nThis was especially true immediately before and after the elections of 1932; Hitler wanted to appear non-threatening to major Christian faiths and consolidate his power.\nSome Nazi leaders, such as\nMartin Bormann\n, were\nanti-Christian\nand sympathetic to Rosenberg.\nOnce in power, Hitler and most Nazi leaders sought to unify the Christian denominations in favor of \"positive Christianity\". Hitler privately condemned mystical and pseudoreligious interests as \"nonsense\",\nand maintained that National Socialism was based on science and should avoid mystic and cultic practices.\nHowever, he and\nJoseph Goebbels\nagreed that after the\nEndsieg\n(Final Victory) the\nReich Church\nshould be pressed into evolving into a German\nsocial evolutionist\norganisation proclaiming the cult of race, blood and battle, instead of\nRedemption\nand the\nTen Commandments\nof\nMoses\n, which they deemed outdated and Jewish.\nHeinrich Himmler\n's views were among the closest to Rosenberg's, and their estrangement was perhaps created by Himmler's abilities to put into action what Rosenberg had only written. Also, while Rosenberg thought Christianity should be allowed to die out, Himmler actively set out to create countering pagan rituals.\nLieutenant Colonel William Harold Dunn (1898–1955) wrote a medical and psychiatric report on him in prison to evaluate him as a suicide risk:\nHe gave the impression of clinging to his own theories in a fanatical and unyielding fashion and to have been little influenced by the unfolding during the trial of the cruelty and crimes of the party.\nSummarizing the unresolved conflict between the personal views of Rosenberg and the pragmatism of the Nazi elite:\nThe ruthless pursuit of Nazi aims turned out to mean not, as Rosenberg had hoped, the permeation of German life with the new ideology; it meant concentration of the combined resources of party and state on\ntotal war\n.\nRacial theories\nAs the Nazi Party's chief\nracial theorist\n, Rosenberg oversaw the construction of a human racial \"ladder\" that\njustified\nHitler's racial and ethnic policies\n. Rosenberg built on the works of\nArthur de Gobineau\n,\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain\n,\nMadison Grant\nand the\nKlansman\nLothrop Stoddard\nas well as on the beliefs of Hitler. Rosenberg placed\nBlacks\nand\nJews\nat the very bottom of the ladder, while at the very top stood the \"\nAryan\" race\n. Rosenberg promoted the\nNordic theory\nwhich considered the\nNordic race\nthe \"\nmaster race\n\",\nsuperior to all others, including to other Aryans (Indo-Europeans). He was also influenced by the\nJudeo-Masonic conspiracy theory\npromoted by the Catholic\ncounter-revolutionary\ntradition, such as the book\nLe Juif, le judaïsme et la judaïsation des peuples chrétiens\n(1869) by\nRoger Gougenot des Mousseaux\n, which he translated into German under the title\nThe Eternal Jew\n.\nRosenberg got the racial term\nUntermensch\nfrom the title of Stoddard's 1922 book\nThe Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under-men\n, which had been adopted by the Nazis from that book's German version\nDer Kulturumsturz: Die Drohung des Untermenschen\n(1925).\nRosenberg reshaped the\nNazi racial policy\nover the years, but it always consisted of\nAryan supremacy\n, extreme\nGerman nationalism\nand rabid\nantisemitism\n. Rosenberg also outspokenly opposed\nhomosexuality\n– notably in his\npamphlet\n\"Der Sumpf\" (\"The Swamp\", 1927). He viewed homosexuality as a hindrance to the expansion of the \"racially pure\" Nordic population.\nRosenberg's attitude towards\nSlavs\nwas flexible because it depended on the particular nation which he referred to.\nAs a result of the ideology of \"\nDrang nach Osten\n\" (\"Drive to the East\"), Rosenberg saw his mission as the conquest and colonization of the Slavic East.\nIn\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n, Rosenberg describes Russian Slavs as being overwhelmed by Bolshevism.\nRegarding\nUkrainians\n, he favoured setting up a\nbuffer state\nto ease the pressure on the German eastern frontier, while agreeing with the notion that Russia could be exploited for the benefit of Germany.\nDuring the war, Rosenberg was in favour of collaboration with the\nEast Slavs\nagainst Bolshevism and offering them national independence unlike other Nazis such as Hitler and Himmler who dismissed such ideas.\nRosenberg criticised those who did not subscribe to his racial theories. For example, he attacked\nFascist Italy\nfor what he perceived as its incorrect and improper stance on race and Jewishness.\nReligious theories\nFurther information:\nReligion in Nazi Germany\nRosenberg was raised as a\nLutheran\n, but he rejected what he called \"negative\"\nChristianity\nlater in life.\nInstead, Rosenberg argued for a new \"religion of the blood\", which was based on the supposed innate promptings of the Nordic soul to defend its noble character against racial and cultural degeneration.\nIn his 1920 book\nImmorality in the\nTalmud\n, Rosenberg identified Jews with the\nantichrist\n.\nHe rejected negative Christianity because of its universality, for its doctrine of\noriginal sin\n(as he believed that all ethnic Germans were born noble), and for its teachings on the\nimmortality of the soul\n,\nsaying, \"indeed, absorbing Christianity enfeebled our people.\"\nPublicly, Rosenberg affected to deplore Christianity's degeneration owing to its Jewish influence.\nHe took inspiration from\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain\n's ideas and condemned what he called \"Negative Christianity\" (which was conventional Christianity preached by\nProtestantism\nand\nCatholicism\n), instead Rosenberg was arguing for a so-called\n\"Positive\" Christianity\nwhich was based on the argument that Jesus was not a Jew but a member of an Indo-European enclave which was resident in ancient\nGalilee\nwho fought against\nJudaism\n.\nSignificantly, in his work explicating the Nazi intellectual belief system,\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n, Rosenberg cryptically applauds the early Christian heretic\nMarcion\n(who rejected the Old Testament as well as the notion of Christ as the Jewish Messiah) and the Manichaean-inspired, \"Aryo-Iranian\"\nCathari\n, as being the more authentic interpreters of Christianity versus historically dominant Judaeo-Christianity;\nmoreover these ancient, externally Christian metaphysical forms were more \"organically compatible with the Nordic sense of the spiritual and the Nordic 'blood-soul'.\" For Rosenberg, the anti-intellectual, religious\ndoctrine\nwas inseparable\nfrom serving the interests of the Nordic race, connecting the individual to his racial nature.\nRosenberg stated that \"The general ideas of the\nRoman\nand of the Protestant churches are negative Christianity and do not, therefore, accord with our (German) soul.\"\nHis support for Luther as a great German figure was always ambivalent.\nIn January 1934, Hitler appointed Rosenberg cultural and educational leader of the Reich.\nThe\nSanctum Officium\nin Rome recommended that Rosenberg's\nMyth of the Twentieth Century\nbe put on the\nIndex Librorum Prohibitorum\n(list of books forbidden by the Catholic Church) for scorning and rejecting \"all dogmas of the Catholic Church, and the very fundamentals of the Christian religion\".\nRosenberg has been described as an\natheist\nby some people, including\nHenry F. Gerecke\n, the Lutheran chaplain who communed with some of the Nuremberg prisoners with Lutheran backgrounds, like\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nand\nWilhelm Keitel\n.\nGustave Mark Gilbert\n, Rosenberg's prison psychologist during his trial, reports that Rosenberg described himself having \"always been anti-Catholic\" and criticised the Church's power.\nDue to his criticism of traditional Christianity, some polemical texts have called him a\nneo-pagan\n.\nPublished works\nUnmoral im Talmud\n, 1920,\nErnst Boepple\n's Deutscher Volksverlag, Munich (\"Immorality in the Talmud\")\nDas Verbrechen der Freimaurerei: Judentum, Jesuitismus, Deutsches Christentum\n, 1921 (\"The Crime of Freemasonry: Judaism, Jesuitism, German Christianity\")\nWesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei\n, 1922, Ernst Boepple's Deutscher Volksverlag, Munich (\"Being, principles, and goals of the National Socialist German Worker's Party\")\nPest in Russland. Der Bolschewismus, seine Häupter, Handlanger und Opfer\n, 1922, Ernst Boepple's Deutscher Volksverlag, Munich (\"The Plague in Russia. Bolshevism, its heads, henchmen, and victims\")\nBolschewismus, Hunger, Tod\n, 1922, Ernst Boepple's Deutscher Volksverlag, Munich (\"Bolshevism, hunger, death\")\nDer staatsfeindliche Zionismus.\n(\"Zionism, the Enemy of the State\"), 1922.\nDie Protokolle der Weisen von Zion und die jüdische Weltpolitik\n, 1923 (\"The\nProtocols of the Elders of Zion\nand the Jewish World Politics\")\nThe Jewish Bolshevism\n, Britons Pub. Society, 1923, together with\nErnst Boepple\nDer Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts\n, 1930 (\"The Myth of the 20th Century\")\nDietrich Eckart\n. Ein Vermächtnis\n, 1935 (\"Dietrich Eckart: A Legacy\")\nAn die Dunkelmänner unserer Zeit. Eine Antwort auf die Angriffe gegen den \"Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts\"\n, 1937 (\"The Obscurantists of Our Time: A Response to the Attacks Against 'The Myth of the 20th Century\n'\n\"\n)\nProtestantische Rompilger\n. Der Verrat an Luther und der \"Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts\"\n, 1937 (\"Protestant Rome Pilgrims: The Betrayal of Luther and the 'Myth of the 20th Century\n'\n\"\n)\nPortrait eines Menschheitsverbrechers\n, 1949, with analytical commentary by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck (\"\nMemoirs of Alfred Rosenberg\n: With Commentaries\")\nDie Macht der Form\n, Unknown (\"The Power of Form\")\nDiary\nDuring the\nNuremberg trials\n, Rosenberg's handwritten diary was translated by\nHarry Fiss\n, Chief of Documentation for the American prosecution.\nAfter its use in evidence during the Nuremberg trials, the diary went missing, along with other material which had been given to the prosecutor\nRobert Kempner\n(1899–1993).\nKempner had taken the diary, along with several other documents pertaining to the Nazi prosecutions back to his home.\nThis was considered to be against standard government procedure, and illegal.\nIt was recovered in Lewiston, N.Y., on 13 June 2013 after a lengthy investigation by the\nUnited States Department of Homeland Security\n.\nWritten on 425 loose-leaf pages, with entries dating from 1936 through 1944, it is now the property of the\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n(USHMM) in Washington.\nHenry Mayer, the museum's senior archivist, and the son of a Holocaust survivor, was able to access the material and while \"not given enough time to read [the] diary entry from beginning to end,\" he \"could see that Rosenberg focused on certain subjects, including brutality against Jews and other ethnic groups and forcing the civilian population of occupied Russia to serve Germany.\"\nMeyer also noted Rosenberg's \"hostile comments about Nazi leaders,\" which he described as \"unvarnished.\"\nWhile some parts of the manuscript had been previously published, the majority had been lost for decades. Former\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nagent\nRobert King Wittman\n, who helped track down the diary, said, \"there is no place in the diary where we have Rosenberg or Hitler saying the Jews should be exterminated, all it said was 'move them out of Europe\n'\n\"\n.\nThe New York Times\nsaid of the search for the missing manuscript that \"the tangled journey of the diary could itself be the subject of a television mini-series.\"\nSince the end of 2013, the USHMM has shown the 425-page document (photos and transcripts) on its homepage.\nPersonal life\nRosenberg was married twice.  In 1915, he married\nHilda Leesmann\n(\net\n)\n, an ethnic\nEstonian\n; they divorced in 1923. Two years later, in 1925 he married Hedwig Kramer,\nto whom he remained wed until his execution by the Allies. He and Kramer had two children: a son who died in\ninfancy\nand a daughter, Irene, who was born in 1930.\nHis wife died in 1947.\nSee also\nAntisemitism\nMyth of the Twentieth Century\nNordische Gesellschaft\nRacism\nKirchenkampf\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"No people of Europe is racially homogeneous, also Germany is not. According to the latest research, we accept five races all of which reveal perceptibly different types. But it is beyond question that the true culture bearer for Europe has been in the first place the Nordic race. Great heroes, artists and founders of states have grown from this blood.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 576\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"The Czechs, for their part, were stratified by race into a Nordic-Slavic nobility, and lower orders of an Alpine Dinaric stamp, thus displaying that type which the modern Czech so plainly embodies.\" Page 108, \"The one eyed maniacal Ziska of Trocnow, whose head in the Prague National Museum shows him to have been an eastern hither Asiatic type, was the first expression of this totally destructive Taborite movement, which the\nCzechs\nmust thank for the extermination of the last remaining Germanic powers active within them, as well as the repression of all that was truly Slavic.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 109\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"The entire east is diversified throughout; one will need to speak here of the Russian character, of the Germanised peoples of\nFinland\n,\nEstonia\nand\nLithuania\n, whereat also\nPoland\nhas developed its clearly outlined individuality.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 643\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"In the year 1917, Russian Man finally disintegrated. He fell into two parts. The Nordic Russian blood gave up the struggle, the eastern Mongolian, powerfully stirred up, summoned Chinese and desert peoples to its aid, Jews and Armenians pushed forward to leadership, and the Kalmuch Tartar\nLenin\nbecame master. The demonry of this blood directed itself instinctively against everything which outwardly still had some honest effect, looked manly and Nordic, like a living reproach against a type of man whom Lothrop Stoddard described as 'subhuman'.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 214\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"The hate of Jesus combined with an unfathomable lack of understanding for Jesus that is showing in the works of today's Jewry almost without disguise and culminates in the systematic Jewish Bolshevik persecution of Christianity in Russia goes back almost 2000 years. The personality of\nChrist\nwas the strongest storm against Jewish nature, which the Jew has always felt and known and only Christian over-tolerance could deem it possible to build a bridge. There can be no peace between Christ and the antichrist; there can only be a winner.\"\n\nOriginal in German: \"Der Haß, verbunden mit abgrundtiefer Verständnislosigkeit der Person Jesu gegenüber, der in den Erzeugnissen der heutigen Juden kaum mehr verhüllt zum Ausdruck kommt und in den planmäßigen Christenverfolgungen seitens der jüdischen bolschewistischen Machthaber in Rußland seinen Höhepunkt erreicht hat, dieser Haß dauert jetzt bald 2000 Jahre unverändert fort. Die Persönlichkeit Christi ist der stärkste Ansturm gegen jüdisches Wesen; das hat der Jude von jeher gefühlt und gewußt, einzig christliche Übertoleranz könnte glauben, hier eine Brücke schlagen zu können. Frieden kann es zwischen Christ und Antichrist nicht geben; es siegt entweder der eine oder der andere.\"\n\nRosenberg, Alfred (1943) \nUnmoral im Talmud\n. Franz Eher Verlag, p. 19\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"From the description of Jesus one can select very different features. His personality often makes its appearance as soft and pitying, then, again, bluff and rough. But it is always supported by inward fire. It was in the interest of the Roman church, with its lust for power, to represent subservient humility as the essence of Christ in order to create as many servants as possible for this motivated 'ideal'. To correct this representation is a further ineradicable requirement of the German movement for renewal. Jesus appears to us today as self-confident lord in the best and highest sense of the word.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 604\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"For this reason Jesus, in spite of all Christian churches, signifies a pivotal point in our history. He became the god of the Europeans, yet, not seldom did he appear in a repellent distortion.\n\"If the concentrated feeling of personality which built Gothic cathedrals and inspired a\nRembrandt\nportrait penetrated more clearly into the consciousness of the general public, a new wave of culture would begin. But the prerequisite for this is the overcoming of the former statutory values of the 'Christian' churches.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 391\n↑\nRosenberg quotes Dr. Emil Jung referring to statements by the Syrian Christian preacher\nEphraem\n(4th century): \"Jesus' mother was a Danaite woman (that is, someone who was born in Dan), and he had a Latin as his father. Ephraem sees this to be not unhonorable and adds: 'Jesus thus derived his ancestry from two of the greatest and most famous nations, namely, from the\nSyrians\non the maternal side and from the\nRomans\non the paternal.\n'\n\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\"\n(1930), p. 76\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"Herder once demanded that the religion dedicated to Jesus should become a religion of Jesus. This was what Chamberlain strove for. A completely free man who disposed inwardly over the entire culture of our times, he has shown the deepest sensitivity for the superhuman simplicity of Christ. He represented Jesus as what he had once appeared to be: a mediator between man and god.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\"\n(1930), p. 623\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"It is characteristic of Roman Christianity that where possible it eliminates the personality of its founder, in order to put in its place the church structure of a rulership by priests.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 160\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"The ancient Germanic idea of god is likewise inconceivable without spiritual freedom. Jesus also spoke of the kingdom of heaven within us. The strength of the spiritual search already shows itself in the world wanderer,\nOdin\n, and it can be seen in the seeker and believer,\nEckehart\n, and we see it in all great men from\nLuther\nto\nLagarde\n. This soul also lived within the venerable\nThomas of Aquinas\nand in the majority of the\noccidental fathers of the church\n.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 247\n↑\nRosenberg wrote:\"A keen observer has correctly remarked that the Jesus child of the\nSistine Madonna\nis \"frankly heroic\" in gaze and posture (Wölfflin). That is aptly expressed except that the fundamental ground is lacking as to why the allegedly Jewish family had a heroic look to it. Here, only composition and color distribution, not \"inwardness\" and \"dedication\", are determining. These are the prerequisites to the success of a formative will, once again, the racial ideal of beauty. To see in place of the light-brown haired, light skinned Jesus child a blue black, woolly haired, brown skinned Jew boy would be an impossibility. Equally, we cannot think of a Jewish Mother of God next to the holy, even if the latter had the \"noble face\" of an Offenbach or Disraeli.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 297\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"The Jewish idea of the \"slave of god\", one who receives mercy from an arbitrary, absolutist god, has thus passed over to Rome and Wittenberg, and can be attributed to Paul as the actual creator of this doctrine, which is to say that our churches are not Christian but Pauline. Jesus unquestionably praised the One-Being with god. This was his redemption, his goal. He did not preach a condescending granting of mercy from an almighty being in the face of which even the greatest human soul represented a pure nothingness. This doctrine of mercy is naturally very welcome to every church. With such misinterpretation the church and its leaders appear as the \"representatives of god\". Consequently, they could acquire power by granting mercy through their magic hands.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 237\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"Now we may certainly also say that the love of Jesus Christ has been the love of one who is conscious of his aristocracy of soul and of his strong personality. Jesus sacrificed himself as a master, not as a servant ... And also Martin Luther knew only too well, what he said, when shortly before his death he wrote 'These three words, free – Christian – German, are to the pope and the Roman court nothing but mere poison, death, devil and hell. They can neither suffer, see nor hear them. Nothing else will come of it, that is certain.\n'\n\"\n(\nAgainst the papacy donated by the devil in Rome\n, 1645)\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 622\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"In all seriousness, the Cosmic God was said to be identical with the dubious spiritual assertions of the Old Testament! Hebrew polytheism was elevated to a model of monotheism, and no deeper knowledge had come to Lutheran theology from the original magnificent Aryan-Persian idea of the world and the cosmic comprehension of God. In addition there appeared the revering of Paul, an original sin of protestantism, against which\nLagarde\n, as is known, attacked by the entire official theology of his day, fought in vain.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 11\n↑\nRosenberg wrote: \"However richly talented, however powerful and surpassing in forms it was, until the present, we have still not created a religious form worthy of us: neither\nFrancis of Assisi\n,\nLuther\n,\nGoethe\nnor\nDostoyevsky\nare founders of a religion for us.\"\nThe Myth of the Twentieth Century\n(1930) p. 441\nCitations\n↑\nSources which refer to Rosenberg as a \"Baltic German\" or equivalent include:\nBullock, Alan\n(1964)\nHitler: A Study in Tyranny\n. New York: Harper p.79\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003)\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\nNew York: Penguin. p. 178\nISBN\n0-14-303469-3\nFest, Joachim C.\n(1974)\nHitler\nTranslated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York:Vintage. p. 116\nKershaw, Ian\n(1999)\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\nNew York: Norton. p.158\nISBN\n0-393-04671-0\nShirer, William L.\n(1960)\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\nNew York: Simon & Schuster. p. 48\nWeber, Thomas\n(2017)\nBecoming Hitler: The Making of a Nazi\nNew York: Basic Books. p. 220\nISBN\n978-0-465-03268-6\n↑\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2005)\nThe Third Reich in Power\nNew York:\nPenguin Books\n. pp. 238–40.\nISBN\n0-14-303790-0\n↑\nHexham, Irving\n(2007). \"Inventing 'Paganists': a Close Reading of Richard Steigmann-Gall's the Holy Reich\".\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n42\n(1). Sage Publications:\n59–\n78.\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/0022009407071632\n.\nS2CID\n159571996\n.\n1\n2\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n6.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nHiio 2018\n.\n↑\nPiper 2015\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nStaff (March 2008)\n\"Szell, Franz (fl 1936–1937): correspondence regarding Alfred Rosenberg\" (catalog entry)\nArchived\n16 March 2022 at the\nWayback Machine\nWiener Library Quote: \"Franz Szell, an exiled Hungarian journalist apparently resident in Tilsit, Lithuania spent more than a year in the archives in Latvia and Estonia researching Alfred Rosenberg's family history with a view to publishing the open letter, 936/1.\"\n↑\nStaff (5 September 1936)\n\"Lithuania Deports Writer Who Called Nazi Chief 'non-aryan\n'\n\"\nJewish Telegraph Agency\n↑\nGugenberger, Edouard (2002)\nBoten der Apokalypse. Visionäre des Dritten Reichs\n. Vienna. p. 196\nISBN\n3-8000-3840-4\n↑\n\"Der Nürnberger Prozeß, Hauptverhandlungen, Einhundertachter Tag. Montag, 15. April 1946, Nachmittagssitzung\"\n. zeno.org\n. Retrieved\n16 August\n2015\n.\n↑\nHasenfratz, H. P. (1989). \"Die Religion Alfred Rosenbergs\".\nNumen\n.\n36\n(1):\n113–\n126.\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/3269855\n.\nJSTOR\n3269855\n.\n↑\nEe, Trinidad-Wiseman Oü www. twn (29 April 2022).\n\"Õpetajad läbi kahe sajandi\"\n.\nTallinna Polütehnikum\n.\n↑\nPekka Erelt\nKapo luuras natsijuhi Alfred Rosenbergi järele\nEesti Ekspress\n1\n2\n3\nEvans, Richard J\n(2004).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. London: Penguin Books. pp.\n178–\n179.\nISBN\n0-14-100975-6\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian\n(2000)\nHitler, 1889–1936: Hubris\n, W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 138–139.\nISBN\n9780393320350\n↑\nGoodrick-Clarke 1985\n, pp.\n149, 221\n↑\nGoodrick-Clarke 2003\n, p.\n114\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nKellogg 227–228\n↑\nKieser, Hans-Lukas\n(2018).\nTalaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide\n. Princeton University Press. pp.\n410–\n411.\nISBN\n978-1-4008-8963-1\n.\nLay summary in:\nKieser, Hans-Lukas. \"Pasha, Talat\".\n1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War\n.\n↑\nHofmann, Tessa (2016). \"From Silence to Re-remembrance: The Response of German Media to Massacres and Genocide against the Ottoman Armenians\".\nMass Media and the Genocide of the Armenians: One Hundred Years of Uncertain Representation\n. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp.\n85–\n109.\nISBN\n978-1-137-56402-3\n.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, pp.\n42–43.\n↑\nOrlow, Dietrich (1969).\nThe history of the Nazi Party\n. Pittsburgh.\nISBN\n0-8229-3183-4\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: location missing publisher (\nlink\n)\n↑\nMichael D. Miller & Andreas Schulz: Gauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945, Vol. 3 (Fritz Sauckel – Hans Zimmermann), Fonthill Media, 2021, p. 351,\nISBN\n978-1-781-55826-3\n.\n↑\nGrimsted, Patricia Kennedy (2005). \"Roads to Ratibor: Library and archival plunder by the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg.\"\nHolocaust and Genocide Studies\n, vol. 19, no. 3. pp. 390–458; here: p. 406.\n↑\n\"\nInstitut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage (IEJ)\n\" In:\nGlossary\n.\nJüdisches Museum Berlin (Jewish Museum Berlin)\n. Retrieved 2015-01-18.\n↑\nGoldensohn, Leon\n(2004).\nGellately, Robert\n(ed.).\nThe Nuremberg Interviews\n. New York:\nAlfred A. Knopf\n. pp.\nxvii,\n73–\n75,\n108–\n109, 200, 284.\nISBN\n0-375-41469-X\n.\n↑\nSpeer, Albert\n(1970).\nInside the Third Reich: Memoirs by Albert Speer\n. Translated by\nRichard Winston\n;\nClara Winston\n. New York: Macmillan. p.\n115\n.\n↑\nFitzGerald, Michael (2020).\nThe Nazis and the Supernatural: The Occult Secrets of Hitler's Evil Empire\n. Arcturus Publishing. pp.\n25–\n35.\nISBN\n978-1-3988-0553-8\n. Retrieved\n19 April\n2025\n.\n↑\nAlfred Rosenberg entry\nin the\nReichstag\nMembers Database\n↑\nKershaw, Ian (2013).\nHitler\n. Penguin UK.\nISBN\n978-0-14-190959-2\n.\n↑\nSir Charles Petrie,\nA Historian Looks at His World\n(London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), p. 136.\n↑\nOrlow 1969\n, p.\n74.\n↑\n\"Dr. Rosenberg's Wreath.\"\nTimes\n[London, England] 12 May 1933: 11. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 6 February 2014. \"There was a further charge against [Sears] of wilfully damaging the wreath which was laid on the Cenotaph on Wednesday by Dr Rosenberg on behalf of Herr Hitler\".\n↑\n\"Hitler's wreath at the Cenotaph\"\n.\nGreat War London\n. 11 November 2012\n. Retrieved\n10 October\n2014\n.\n↑\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, pp. 214–215, Document 3530-PS\n1\n2\nShirer, William L.\n(1960)\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\nLondon: Secker & Warburg; London. p. 240\n1\n2\nThe Nazi War Against the Catholic Church\n; National Catholic Welfare Conference; Washington D.C.; 1942\n↑\nAlfred Rosenberg entry\nin\nGerman Biography\n↑\nLöhr, Hanns Christian (2018):\nKunst als Waffe – Der Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Ideologie und Kunstraub im \"Dritten Reich\"\n, Gebr. Mann, pp. 38 ff.\nISBN\n978-3-7861-2806-9\n↑\nVries, Willem de (2000): Kunstraub im Westen, Alfred Rosenberg und der\nSonderstab Musik\n, S. Fischer Verlag.\nISBN\n3-596-14768-9\n↑\nIrving, David\n(1996)\nGoebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich\n, London: Focal Point. p. 769.\nISBN\n1872197132\n↑\nKevin P. Spicer,\nAntisemitism, Christian ambivalence, and the Holocaust\n, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, Indiana University Press, 2007, p. 308\n1\n2\nAndreyev, Caterine (1990)\nVlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Émigré Theories\nLondon: Cambridge University Press. p. 30.\nISBN\n0521389607\n↑\nPeter Longerich, Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews, p. 289\n↑\nAdmin (4 August 2020).\n\"Russian Volunteers in the German Wehrmacht in WWII\"\n.\nFeldgrau\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 29 April 2023\n. Retrieved\n26 September\n2023\n.\n↑\nLeonid Grenkevich,\nThe Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1945: A Critical Historiographical Analysis\n, Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 169–171.\n↑\nHerbert, Ulrich (1997).\nHitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-47000-1\n.\n↑\n\"Allies Capture Nazi Pagan Philosopher\"\n.\nNorthern Star (Lismore, NSW\n: 1876–1954)\n. Lismore, NSW: National Library of Australia. 22 May 1945. p.\n4\n. Retrieved\n30 September\n2013\n.\n↑\n\"The Avalon Project\n: Judgment\n: Rosenberg\"\n. avalon.law.yale.edu.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 14 March 2023\n. Retrieved\n16 August\n2015\n.\n1\n2\nRosenberg, Alfred (1949).\nMemoirs of Alfred Rosenberg, with commentaries\n. Posselt, Eric, Lang, Serge and von Schenck, Ernst. Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. p.\n328.\nOCLC\n871198711\n.\n↑\n\"International Military Tribunal: The Defendants\"\n. ushmm.org.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 31 July 2023\n. Retrieved\n16 August\n2015\n.\n↑\nThomas Darnstädt (2005),\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n,\nDer Spiegel\n, 13 September, no.\n14, p.\n128\n↑\nManvell 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\n↑\n\"Alfred Rosenberg Nuremberg Charges\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 29 August 2000\n. Retrieved\n16 August\n2015\n.\n↑\nRosenberg case for the defense at Nuremberg trials\nArchived\n23 February 2011 at the\nWayback Machine\n(Spanish)\n↑\nSmith, Kingsbury (16 October 1946).\n\"The Execution of Nazi War Criminals\"\n. Nuremberg Gaol, Germany. International News Service\n. Retrieved\n17 November\n2019\n.\n↑\nRichard Steigmann-Gall (2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. Cambridge University Press. p.\n91.\nISBN\n978-0-521-82371-5\n.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nBreuilly, John (2013).\nThe Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism\n. OUP Oxford.\nISBN\n978-0-19-164426-9\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian; Kershaw, Professor of Modern History Ian (1999).\nHitler, 1889–1936: Hubris\n. W.W. Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-04671-7\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian\n(2001).\nThe 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich\n.\nOxford University Press\n. p.\n109.\nISBN\n0-19-280206-2\n.\nOCLC\n47063365\n.\nHitler's evident ability to simulate, even to potentially critical Church leaders, an image of a leader keen to uphold and protect Christianity was crucial to the mediation of such an image to the church-going public by influential members of both major denominations. It was the reason why church-going Christians, so often encouraged by their 'opinion-leaders' in the Church hierarchies, were frequently able to exclude Hitler from their condemnation of the anti-Christian Party radicals, continuing to see in him the last hope of protecting Christianity from Bolshevism.\n↑\nMartino, Maria Grazia (2014).\nThe State as an Actor in Religion Policy: Policy Cycle and Governance Perspectives on Institutionalized Religion\n. Springer.\nISBN\n978-3-658-06945-2\n.\n↑\nWeikart, Richard (2016).\nHitler's Religion: The Twisted Beliefs that Drove the Third Reich\n. Simon and Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-62157-551-1\n.\n↑\nStiegmann-Gall, Richard,\nThe Holy Reich\n, CUP, pp. 243–245\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n141, 212.\n↑\nKoop, Volker (2020).\nMartin Bormann: Hitler's Executioner\n. Frontline Books.\nISBN\n978-1-4738-8695-7\n.\n↑\nHürten, H. \"'Endlösung' für den Katholizismus? Das nationalsozialistische Regime und seine Zukunftspläne gegenüber der Kirche,\" in:\nStimmen der Zeit\n, 203 (1985) pp. 534–546\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n219.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n160.\n↑\nThough Rosenberg does not use the word \"master race\". He uses the word \"Herrenvolk\" (i.e. ruling people) twice in his book\nThe Myth\n, first referring to the\nAmorites\n(saying that\nSayce\ndescribed them as fair skinned and blue eyed) and secondly quoting\nVictor Wallace Germains\n' description of the English in \"The Truth about Kitchener\". (\"The Myth of the Twentieth Century\") – Pages 26, 660 - 1930\n↑\nMichael, R. (2008).\nA History of Catholic Antisemitism: The Dark Side of the Church\n. Springer. p.\n128.\n↑\nLosurdo, Domenico\n(2004).\n\"Toward a Critique of the Category of Totalitarianism\"\n(PDF)\n.\nHistorical Materialism\n.\n12\n(2). Translated by Marella & Jon Morris.\nBrill\n:\n25–\n55, here p. 50.\ndoi\n:\n10.1163/1569206041551663\n.\nISSN\n1465-4466\n.\n↑\nOświęcim, 1940–1945: przewodnik po muzeum\n, Kazimierz Smoleń, Państwowe Muzeum w Oświęcimiu, 1978, p. 12\n↑\nMetapolitics: from Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler, page 221, Peter Viereck, Transaction Publishers 2003\n↑\nHerbert, Ulrich (1997)\nHitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich\nLondon: Cambridge University Press. pp. 260–261\nISBN\n0521470005\n↑\nHertstein, Robert Edwin (1979)\nThe war that Hitler won: Goebbels and the Nazi media campaign\n, UK: Hamish Hamilton. p. 364\nISBN\n0241100917\n↑\nBernhard, Patrick (7 February 2019).\n\"The Great Divide? Notions of Racism in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: New Answers to an Old Problem\"\n.\nJournal of Modern Italian Studies\n.\n24\n(1):\n97–\n114.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/1354571X.2019.1550701\n.\nS2CID\n150519628\n. Retrieved\n28 August\n2023\n.\n↑\nGerecke, Henry F. (25 November 2018).\n\"I Walked to the Gallows with the Nazi Chiefs\"\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 30 May 2023.\n↑\nCecil, 1972, s. 85\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, pp.\n84–85.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n92.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n85.\n↑\n\"Churchmen to Hitler\"\n.\nTime\n. 10 August 1936. Archived from\nthe original\non 29 October 2007\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2008\n.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, pp.\n87–88.\n↑\nBonney, Richard\n(2009).\nConfronting the Nazi War on Christianity: The Kulturkampf Newsletters, 1936–1939\n. Studies in the history of religious and political pluralism. Vol.\n4. Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers. p.\n122.\nISBN\n9783039119042\n.\n↑\n\"Within the NSDAP (as in the German\nvölkisch\nmovement in general) there existed from the outset a group of old Hitler partisans who in contrast to the 'atheists' Alfred Rosenberg, Martin Bormann and others, believed in a union of National Socialism and Protestant Christianity.\"\nBroszat, Martin\n(1981)\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Tjird Reich\n. London: Longman. p. 223\nISBN\n9780582489974\n↑\nCallahan, Daniel ed. (1967)\nThe Secular City Debate\n. New York: Macmillan.  p.152\n↑\nGoldensohn, Leon (2005)\nThe Nuremberg Interviews: An American Psychiatrist's Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses\n. New York: Vintage.  p. 75.\nISBN\n9781400030439\n↑\n\"Apart from [Rosenberg] giving his name and replying 'No' to a question as to whether he had anything to say, this atheist did not utter a word. Despite his disbelief in God he was accompanied by a Protestant chaplain, who followed him to the gallows and stood beside him praying.\"\nHitler's Third Reich: A Documentary History\n, p. 613\n↑\nGilbert, Gustave Mark (1961).\nNuremburg Diary\n.\nSignet Books\n. p.\n110.\n↑\nCairns, John C.; Shirer, William L. (1961).\n\"The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\"\n.\nInternational Journal\n.\n16\n(2): 188.\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/40198487\n.\nISSN\n0020-7020\n.\nJSTOR\n40198487\n.\n↑\nNational Catholic Welfare Conference (1 January 1943).\n\"The Concordat, 1933–1934\"\n.\nThe Nazi war against the Catholic Church\n(PDF)\n.\nWashington, D.C.\n:\nNational Catholic Welfare Conference\n. pp.\n20–\n21.\nOCLC\n19585105\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\n↑\nTragakiss, Tamara (23 November 2005).\n\"Morris Resident Was Translator During Nuremberg War Trials\"\n.\nCt Insider\n. Hearst Media Services Connecticut. Archived from\nthe original\non 21 February 2020\n. Retrieved\n31 December\n2018\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nFenyvesi, Charles (14 June 2012). \"Mysteries of the Lost (and Found) Nazi Diaries\".\nNational Geographic\n.\n1\n2\n3\n\"Long-lost Nazi diary recovered after HSI investigation\"\n.\nwwe.ICE.gov\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 30 May 2014.\n↑\nFederal Officials Reveal Diary of High-Level Nazi Leader Found in WNY\nArchived\n15 October 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\n↑\nKovaleski, Serge F. (31 March 2016).\n\"Tracking an elusive diary from Hitler's inner circle\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. pp.\nC1–2\n. Retrieved\n3 April\n2016\n.\n↑\nCohen, Patricia (13 June 2013).\n\"Diary of a Hitler Aide Resurfaces After a Hunt That Lasted Years\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\n15 June\n2013\n.\n↑\n\"Encontrado el diario de un confidente de Hitler\"\n[\nFound the diary of a confidant of Hitler\n]\n.\nLa Vanguardia\n(in Spanish). Barcelona, Spain. Reuters. 10 June 2013.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 14 October 2013.\n↑\n\"Alfred Rosenberg Diary – United States Holocaust Memorial Museum\"\n. collections.ushmm.org\n. Retrieved\n16 August\n2015\n.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, p.\n52.\n↑\nCecil 1972\n, pp.\n52–53.\nBibliography\nBollmus, Reinhard (1970).\nDas Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner: Studien zum Machtkampf im Nationalsozialistichen Herrschaftssystem\n. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.\nCecil, Robert\n(1972).\nThe Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology\n. Dodd Mead & Co.\nISBN\n0-396-06577-5\n.\nChandler, Albert R. (1945).\nRosenberg's Nazi Myth\n. Greenwood Press.\nGilbert, G. M.\n(1995).\nNuremberg Diary\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n0-306-80661-4\n.\nGoldensohn, Leon\n(2004).\nNuremberg Interviews\n. Knopf.\nISBN\n0-375-41469-X\n.\nGoodrick-Clarke, Nicholas (1985).\nThe Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology – The Ariosophists of Austria and Germany, 1890–1935\n.\nLondon\n:\nI.B. Tauris\n.\nISBN\n0-8147-3054-X\n.\nGoodrick-Clarke, Nicholas (2003).\nBlack Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics of Identity\n. New York: New York University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8147-3155-0\n.\nHiio, Toomas (2018). \"Noch einmal zu Alfred Rosenberg: Anmerkungen zu einer neuen Biografie\".\nForschungen zur Baltischen Geschichte\n.\n13\n:\n161–\n170.\nKellogg, Michael (2005).\nThe Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism\n(PDF)\n. Cambridge:\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-521-07005-8\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 1 April 2025.\nKoop, Volker (2016).\nAlfred Rosenberg: Der Wegbereiter des Holocaust. Eine Biographie\n(in German). Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar.\nISBN\n978-3-412-50549-3\n.\nManvell, Roger (2011) .\nGoering\n. Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nNova, Fritz (1986).\nAlfred Rosenberg: Nazi Theorist of the Holocaust\n. Buccaneer Books.\nISBN\n0-87052-222-1\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nThe Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality\n. New York: W.W. Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-02008-3\n.\nPiper, Ernst (2015).\nAlfred Rosenberg: Hitlers Chefideologe\n(in German). Allitera Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-86906-767-4\n.\nSpeer, Albert\n(1971) .\nInside the Third Reich\n. New York: Avon.\nISBN\n978-0-380-00071-5\n.\nRosenberg, Alfred (1930).\nDer Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts\n.\nRothfeder, Herbert P. (1963).\nA Study of Alfred Rosenberg's Organization for National Socialist Ideology (Michigan, Phil. Diss. 1963)\n. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor.\nRothfeder, Herbert P. (1981).\nAmt Schrifttumspflege: A Study in Literary Control, in: German Studies Review. Vol. IV, Nr. 1, Febr. 1981, pp. 63–78\n.\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard\n(2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n0-521-82371-4\n.\nWhisker, James B. (1990).\nThe Philosophy of Alfred Rosenberg\n. Noontide Press.\nISBN\n0-939482-25-8\n.\nWittman, Robert K.; David Kinney (2016).\nThe Devil's Diary: Alfred Rosenberg and the Stolen Secrets of the Third Reich\n. William Collins.\nISBN\n978-0-00757-560-2\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nAlfred Rosenberg\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nAlfred Rosenberg\n.\nWorks by or about Alfred Rosenberg\nat the\nInternet Archive\nPersonal diary found by ICE 13 June 2013\nArchived\n19 September 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\nAlfred Rosenberg Memoirs\nat Archive.org\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum –\nAlfred Rosenberg\nAlfred Rosenberg\nat\nIMDb\nRosenberg on Churchill\nArchived\n2 January 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\nAlfred Rosenberg - photo\nGreat Grandchild  Tytus L Rosenberg\nRosenberg on Nuremberg Rally\nArchived\n7 October 2012 at the\nWayback Machine\nChapter V, Faith and Thought in National Socialist Germany\n,\nThe War Against the West\n,\nAurel Kolnai\nNewspaper clippings about Alfred Rosenberg\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInformation about Alfred Rosenberg\nin the Reichstag database",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Position established",
+      "succeeded_by": "Position abolished",
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "1930–1933": "Member of theReichstag",
+      "born": "Alfred Ernst Rosenberg(1893-01-12)12 January 1893Reval, Russian Empire",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged53)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Execution by hanging",
+      "nationality": "Baltic German",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouses": "Hilda Leesmann​​(m.1915;div.1923)​Hedwig Kramer​​(m.1925)​",
+      "children": "2",
+      "education": "Engineering",
+      "alma_mater": "Riga Polytechnical InstituteMoscow Highest Technical School",
+      "profession": "Architect, politician, writer",
+      "known_for": "AuthoringThe Myth of the Twentieth Century",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler cabinet",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 60199
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Hans_Frank",
+    "name": "Hans Frank",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Hans Michael Frank was a German Nazi politician, lawyer and convicted war criminal who served as the head of the General Government, an entity created by Germany on part of the German-occupied Polish lands during the Second World War.",
+    "description": "German politician and war criminal (1900–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Hans Frank\nGerman politician and war criminal (1900–1946)\nFor the German fighter ace, see\nHans-Dieter Frank\n.\nHans Michael Frank\n(23 May 1900 – 16 October 1946) was a German\nNazi\npolitician, lawyer and\nconvicted war criminal\nwho served as the head of the\nGeneral Government\n, an entity created by Germany on part of the\nGerman-occupied Polish lands\nduring the\nSecond World War\n.\nBorn in\nKarlsruhe\n, Frank was an early member of the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(DAP), the precursor of the\nNazi Party\n(NSDAP). He took part in the failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, and later became\nAdolf Hitler\n's personal legal adviser as well as the lawyer of the NSDAP. In June 1933, he was named as a\nReichsleiter\n(Reich Leader) of the party. In December 1934, Frank joined the\nHitler Cabinet\nas a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio\n.\nAfter the German\ninvasion of Poland\nin 1939, Frank was appointed Governor-General of the occupied Polish territories. During his tenure, he instituted a reign of terror against the civilian population and became directly involved in the mass murder of Jews.\nHe engaged in the use of\nforced labour\nand oversaw four of the\nextermination camps\n. Frank remained head of the General Government until its collapse in early 1945. During that time, over four million people were murdered under his jurisdiction.\nAfter the war, Frank was found guilty of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nat the\nNuremberg trials\n. He was sentenced to death and executed by hanging in October 1946.\nEarly years\nFrank, the middle child of three, was born in\nKarlsruhe\nto Karl, a lawyer, and his wife, Magdalena (née Buchmaier), a daughter of a prosperous baker. He graduated from high school at Maximilians\ngymnasium\nin\nMunich\n. At seventeen he joined the\nGerman Army\nfighting in\nWorld War I\n, but did not serve time at the front.\nAfter the war, Frank studied law and economics, from 1919 to the summer semester of 1921 at the\nUniversity of Munich\n, between 1921 and 1922 at the\nUniversity of Kiel\n, and back from the winter semester 1922 to 1923 at Munich. On 21 July 1923, he passed the final exam there, obtaining his\nDr. jur.\ndegree in 1924.\nBetween 1919 and 1920, he was a member of the\nThule\nVölkisch\nsociety. He served also in the\nFreikorps\nunder\nFranz Ritter von Epp\n's command, taking part in the crackdown of the\nMünchner Räterepublik\n.\nIn 1919, as did other members of the\nThule Society\n, he joined the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(DAP) at its beginning.\nNazi Party career\nAlthough the DAP evolved quite soon into NSDAP (\nNazi Party\n), Frank waited until September 1923 to become a member of the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA), where he would eventually attain the rank of SA-\nObergruppenführer\nin November 1937.\nIn October 1923, he officially joined the NSDAP. In November of the same year, Frank took part in the \"\nBeer Hall Putsch\n\", the failed\ncoup attempt\nintended to parallel\nMussolini\n's\nMarch on Rome\n. In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, Frank fled to\nAustria\n, returning to Munich only in 1924, after the pending legal proceedings were stayed.\nFrank rose to become\nAdolf Hitler\n's personal legal adviser. As the Nazis rose to power, Frank also served as the party's lawyer. He represented it in over 2,400 cases and spent over $10,000. This sometimes brought him into conflict with other lawyers. Once, a former teacher appealed to him: \"I beg you to leave these people alone! No good will come of it! Political movements that begin in the criminal courts will end in the criminal courts!\"\nIn September–October 1930, Frank served as the defence lawyer at the court-martial in Leipzig of Lieutenants Richard Scheringer, Hans Friedrich Wendt and\nHanns Ludin\n, three\nReichswehr\nofficers charged with membership in the NSDAP.\nThe trial was a media sensation. Hitler himself testified and the defence successfully put the\nWeimar Republic\nitself on trial. Many Army officers developed a sympathetic view of the Nazi movement as a consequence.\nIn October 1928, Frank founded the National Socialist German Jurists Association and became its leader. He was also elected to the\nReichstag\nfrom electoral constituency 8,\nLeignitz\n, in October 1930 and retained this seat until the fall of the Nazi regime in May 1945.\nHead of the\nGeneral Government\nin occupied\nPoland\nOn 10 March 1933, when the Nazis seized control of the Bavarian state government, Frank was made the\nStaatskommissar\n(State Commissioner) in charge of justice, and also was appointed one of the state's representatives to the\nReichsrat\nuntil its\nabolition\non 14 February 1934.\nIn April 1933, he was appointed Minister of Justice for\nBavaria\n, serving until December 1934 when he was named a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio\nin the Reich government.\nOn 2 June 1933, he was made a\nReichsleiter\n, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party, in his capacity as head of the party's legal affairs department. On 26 June 1933, Frank founded the\nAcademy for German Law\n. At its inaugural meeting on 2 October 1933, he was named its Leader (renamed President on 9 August 1934) and would continue in this capacity until 20 August 1942 when he also left his positions as\nReichsleiter\nand head of the Jurists Association. Frank also served as the Chairman of the Academy's Legal Philosophy Committee and was editor of its several publications. In January 1934, Frank was named as one of the three judges on the\nSupreme Party Court\n.\nIn March 1933, in a speech on the Bavarian radio, Frank issued \"a greeting to his oppressed comrades in Austria\" and threatened that, if necessary, the Nazi Party would \"take over the safeguarding of the freedom of the German comrades in Austria\". The Austrian government officially protested in Berlin, but Hitler denied responsibility for Frank's words. In May 1933, Frank went to Vienna, accompanied by the Prussian Minister of Justice\nHanns Kerrl\nand his Ministerial Director\nRoland Freisler\n, to promote Nazi propaganda. Chancellor\nEngelbert Dollfuss\ndeclared their presence in Austria undesirable, and had them deported. In response, Hitler imposed the\nthousand-mark ban\nto weaken the Austrian economy, which was heavily dependent on tourism, and Austrian Nazis launched a wave of terrorist attacks, which ultimately led to the banning of the\nNazi Party in Austria\non 19 June 1933.\nAnnouncement of the execution of 50 Polish hostages as a reprisal for blowing up railway lines near Warsaw\nFrank objected to extrajudicial killings as it weakened the power of the legal system (of which he himself was a prominent member), both at the\nDachau concentration camp\nand during the \"\nNight of the Long Knives\n\".\nFrank's view of what the judicial process required was that:\n[The judge's] role is to safeguard the concrete order of the\nracial community\n, to eliminate dangerous elements, to prosecute all acts harmful to the community, and to arbitrate in disagreements between members of the community. The\nNazi ideology\n, especially as expressed in the Party programme and in the speeches of our\nLeader\n, is the basis for interpreting legal sources.\nFrank visiting Stanislau (now\nIvano-Frankivsk\n).\nUkrainian nationalists parade\nin the streets of the city, October 1941\nOn 7 April 1938, Frank addressed some 10,000 Nazis at the\nNibelungenhalle\n(\nde\n)\nin\nPassau\n.\nGovernor-General in Poland\nMain articles:\nGeneral Government\nand\nGeneral Government administration\nIn September 1939, Frank was assigned as Chief of Administration to\nGerd von Rundstedt\nin the\nGerman military administration in occupied Poland\n.\nBeginning on 26 October 1939, following the completion of the\ninvasion of Poland\n, Frank served as Governor-General of the occupied Polish territories,\noverseeing the\nGeneral Government\n, the area of Poland not directly incorporated into Germany (roughly 90,000\nkm\nout of the 187,000\nkm\nGermany had gained).\nFrank oversaw the segregation of the Jews into\nghettos\n. From the outset, Jews were discriminated against savagely and the rations given to them were slender.\nHe oversaw the\nWarsaw ghetto\nand the use of Polish civilians as\nforced labour\n. In 1942, he lost his positions of authority outside the General Government after annoying Hitler with a series of speeches in\nBerlin\n, Vienna,\nHeidelberg\n, and\nMunich\nand as part of a power struggle with\nFriedrich-Wilhelm Krüger\n, the State Secretary for Security – head of the SS and the police in the General Government. Krüger himself was ultimately replaced by\nWilhelm Koppe\n.\nOn 16 December 1941, Frank spelt out to his senior officials the approaching annihilation of the Jews:\nA great Jewish migration will begin in any case. But what should we do with the Jews? Do you think they will be settled in Ostland, in villages? We were told in Berlin, 'Why all this bother? We can do nothing with them either in\nOstland\nor in the Reichskommissariat. So liquidate them yourselves.' Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feelings of pity. We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and whenever it is possible.\nWhen this was read to him at the Nuremberg trials he said:\nOne has to take the diary as a whole. You cannot go through 43 volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used... Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was shocked at many of the words which I had used... A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased.\nNazi death camps\nin occupied Poland (marked with black and white skulls)\nAn assassination attempt by the\nPolish Secret State\non 29/30 January 1944 (the night preceding the 11th anniversary of Hitler's appointment as\nChancellor of Germany\n) in\nSzarów\nnear\nKraków\nfailed. A special train with Frank travelling to\nLemberg/Lvov/Lviv\nwas derailed after an explosive device discharged but no one was killed.\nAround 100 Polish hostages from Montelupich prison were\nexecuted\nas a punishment for the act.\nDeath camps\nFrank participated in the growth of the politics leading to genocide in Poland. Under his guidance, mass murder became a deliberate policy.\nThe General Government was the location of four out of six\nextermination camps\n, namely:\nBełżec\n,\nTreblinka\n,\nMajdanek\nand\nSobibór\n;\nChełmno\nand\nBirkenau\nfell just outside the borders of the General Government.\nFrank later claimed that the\nextermination of Jews\nwas entirely controlled by\nHeinrich Himmler\nand the\nSS\n, and he – Frank – was unaware of the extermination camps in the General Government until early 1944, an assertion found to be untrue by the\nNuremberg tribunal\n. During his testimony at Nuremberg, Frank claimed he submitted resignation requests to Hitler on 14 occasions, but Hitler would not allow him to resign. Frank fled the General Government in January 1945, as the\nRed Army\nadvanced.\nCapture and trial\nFrank in his cell, November 1945\nFrank (centre) at the Nuremberg trial, with\nAlfred Jodl\nand\nAlfred Rosenberg\n1946\nFrank was captured by American troops on 4 May 1945, at\nTegernsee\nin southern\nBavaria\n.\nHe attempted suicide twice.\nChief Medical Officer Lt. Col.\nRene Juchli\nreported that Frank was suffering from partial paralysis of his left hand as a result of one of his suicide attempts.\nHe was indicted for war crimes and tried before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nin\nNuremberg\nfrom 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946. During the trial he converted, guided by Fr\nSixtus O'Connor\nOFM\n, to Roman Catholicism, and claimed to have had a series of religious experiences.\nFrank voluntarily surrendered 43 volumes of his personal diaries to the\nAllies\n, believing his struggles against other Nazi officials would be enough to secure his defence,\nand which were then used against him as evidence of his guilt.\nFrank confessed to some of the charges, and testified in response to questions from his defence attorney:\nafter having heard the testimony of the witness\nRudolf Höss\n, my\nconscience\ndoes not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most horrible utterances.\nDuring his captivity, he penned a series of letters in which he also left his last thoughts. To his son Norman, he wrote that he preferred to die and join the \"brave soldiers, who were (...) killed in this war\" than \"be dealt in revenge from [migrants], traitors\", from those such as\nWilly Brandt\n.\nDuring their trials, he and\nAlbert Speer\nwere the only defendants to show any degree of remorse for their crimes,\nthough, according to his son Niklas, he portrayed himself as a \"man of the law\", and was not personally acknowledging guilt, rather shifting it to the \"German people\" as a whole.\nAt the same time, he accused the Allies, especially the\nSoviets\n, of their own wartime atrocities. Frank was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity on 1 October 1946 and was sentenced to death by\nhanging\n. The death sentence was carried out at Nuremberg Prison on 16 October by US Army Master Sergeant\nJohn C. Woods\n. Journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith wrote of the execution:\nHans Frank was next in the parade of death. He was the only one of the condemned to enter the chamber with a smile on his countenance. And, although nervous and swallowing frequently, this man, who was converted to Roman Catholicism after his arrest, gave the appearance of being relieved at the prospect of atoning for his evil deeds.\nHe answered to his name quietly and when asked for any last statement, he replied \"I am thankful for the kind treatment during my captivity and I ask God to accept me with mercy.\"\nHis body and those of the other nine executed prisoners and the corpse of\nHermann Göring\nwere cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand the ashes were scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nMemoirs\nFrank's corpse after his execution by hanging\nWhile awaiting execution, he wrote his memoirs,\nIm Angesicht des Galgens\n(In the Face of the Gallows), later published by his widow.\nIn the capacity as his attorney, Frank was privy to personal details of Hitler's life. In his memoirs, Frank made the sensational claim that Hitler had commissioned him to investigate Hitler's family in 1930 after a \"\nblackmail\nletter\" had been received from Hitler's nephew,\nWilliam Patrick Hitler\n, who allegedly threatened to reveal embarrassing facts about his uncle's ancestry. Frank said that the investigation uncovered evidence that\nMaria Schicklgruber\n, Hitler's paternal grandmother, had been working as a cook in the household of a Jewish man named Leopold Frankenberger before she gave birth to Hitler's father,\nAlois\n, out of wedlock. Frank claimed that he had obtained from a relative of Hitler's by marriage a collection of letters between Maria Schicklgruber and a member of the Frankenberger family that discussed a stipend for her after she left the family's employ. According to Frank, Hitler told him that the letters did not prove that the Frankenberger son was his father but rather his grandmother had merely\nextorted\nmoney from Frankenberger by threatening to claim his paternity of her illegitimate child.\nFrank accepted this explanation, but added that it was still just possible that Hitler had some Jewish ancestry. But he thought it unlikely because, \"from his entire demeanor, the fact that Adolf Hitler had no Jewish blood coursing through his veins seems so clearly evident that nothing more need be said on this.\"\nGiven that all Jews had been expelled from the province of Styria (which includes Graz) in the 15th century and were not allowed to return until the 1860s, scholars such as\nIan Kershaw\nand\nBrigitte Hamann\ndismiss as baseless the \"\nFrankenberger hypothesis\n\", which before had only Frank's speculation to support it.\nMore recent scholarship by\nLeonard Sax\npoints out that many Jews lived in places without official sanction and demonstrated the existence of a settled Jewish community in Graz before the law formally permitted their residence.\nNevertheless, there is no evidence outside of Frank's statements for the existence of a \"Leopold Frankenberger\" living in Graz in the 1830s, and Frank's story is inaccurate on several points such as the claim that Maria Schicklgruber came from \"Leonding near Linz\", when in fact she came from the hamlet of Strones near the village of\nDöllersheim\n.\nSome suggest that Frank (who turned against Nazism in his defence after 1945 but remained an anti-Semitic fanatic) made the claim that Hitler had Jewish ancestry as a way of proving that Hitler was really a \"Jew\" and not an \"Aryan\", and in this way \"proved\" that the Third Reich's crimes were the work of the \"Jewish\" Hitler.\nThe full anti-Semitic implications of Frank's story were borne out in a letter entitled \"Was Hitler a Jew?\", written to the editor of a\nSaudi\nnewspaper in 1982 by a German man living in Saudi Arabia.\nThe writer accepted Frank's story as the truth, and added since Hitler was a Jew, \"the Jews should pay Germans reparations for the War, because\none of theirs\ncaused the destruction of Germany\".\nBut Jewish-American author\nRon Rosenbaum\nsuggested another reason for Frank's story:\nOn the other hand, a different version of Frank emerges in the brilliantly vicious, utterly unforgiving portrait of him by his son, Niklas Frank, who (in a memoir called\nIn the Shadow of the Reich\n) depicts his father as a craven coward and weakling, but one not without a kind of animal cunning, an instinct for lying, insinuation, self-aggrandizement. For\nthis\nHans Frank, disgraced and facing death on the gallows for following Hitler, fabricating such a story might be a cunning way of ensuring his place in history as the one man who gave the world the hidden key to the mystery of Hitler's psyche. While at the same time, revenging himself on his former master for having led him to this end by foisting a sordid and humiliating explanation of Hitler on him for all posterity. In any case, it was one Frank knew the victors would find seductive.\nFamily\nOn 2 April 1925, Frank married 29-year-old secretary Brigitte Herbst (29 December 1895 – 9 March 1959) from\nForst (Lausitz)\n. The wedding took place in\nMunich\nand the couple honeymooned in\nVenetia\n. Hans and Brigitte Frank had five children:\nSigrid Frank (born 17 March 1927 and died in South Africa)\nNorman Frank (3 June 1928 – March 2009)\nBrigitte Frank (13 January 1935 – 1981)\nMichael Frank (15 February 1937 – 1990)\nNiklas Frank\n(born 9 March 1939)\nBrigitte Herbst had a reputation for having a more dominant personality than her husband: after 1939, she called herself \"a queen of Poland\" (\"\nKönigin von Polen\n\"), which began as a jest from her husband at the time of his nomination. The marriage was unhappy and became colder from year to year, with Brigitte having many affairs, which weren't unknown amongst her children, including resulting rumours on\nthere being different fathers\n. Frank sought a divorce in 1942, after meeting and falling in love with a former childhood acquaintance who was looking for her son, a soldier who had gone missing on the Eastern Front. Brigitte made great efforts to save their marriage in order to remain the \"First Lady in the General Government\". One of her most famous comments was \"I'd rather be widowed than divorced from a Reichsminister!\" Frank answered: \"So you are my deadly enemy!\"\nBesides making her children intercede for her with their father, she would go on to contact Himmler and\nMrs. Goebbels\n, who would get Hitler to personally forbid Frank from divorcing his wife.\nContrary to Hans's later stance on the concentration camps and ghettos, the children were not isolated from them, despite their parents not discussing them directly with them. The youngest, Niklas, was often taken to a concentration camp by Hilde, their nanny. On one occasion, for Niklas and his brother Norman's enjoyment, the guards made undernourished prisoners sit on a donkey, which would then be made to jump and throw the compulsed riders to the ground. Niklas would also be told that a sad prisoner was a \"witch\", but one whom he did not have to worry about, since she would \"die very soon\". At another point, a Polish servant soiled bed sheets with soot, and his mother screamed that he would be sent to the camps. Niklas, who had befriended the Pole, heard this and began to cry, which made his mother stop scolding the man and start comforting her son. In the end, she let the matter go, and after the war, the man and his wife would credit Niklas with saving their lives.\nAll but Niklas would grieve their father at the time of his execution, feeling he was \"innocent\". Niklas Frank had been shunned early on by his parental figure, because of his father's belief he was instead the son a former family friend,\nKarl Lasch\n,\nand so he instead bonded closer to Hilde, their nanny, and also felt closer to his mother than his father. According to Niklas, his siblings' \"brains\" had been \"poisoned\" by their father.\nNiklas, who in his early adult years became a journalist for the\nTime magazine\nin Germany, would also participate in the early printing of\nSchindler's List\n. In 1987, Niklas Frank wrote a book about his father,\nDer Vater: Eine Abrechnung\n(\"The Father: A Settling of Accounts\"), which was published in English in 1991 as\nIn the Shadow of the Reich\n. The book, first of a trilogy about his family's experiences, was serialized in the magazine\nStern\n, and caused controversy in Germany, and even in some sectors of Poland, because of the scathing way in which the younger Frank depicted his father: Niklas referred to him as \"a slime-hole of a Hitler fanatic\" and questioned his remorse before his execution.\nIn his work, Niklas also created a compilation of Nazi-era films of the Frank family.\nThe scars of having Hans as a parent would seemingly carry on, not quite healed. Michael, the closest to Niklas in their youth, though an ardent defender of their father's innocence, would develop an addiction to milk to the point his wife would struggle to save some for their children, which would go on to cause severe obesity and, in consequence, organ failure.\nMichael died in 1990, at 53 years old.\nNorman, whose last words from his father were that Norman should be silent (which would lead to tensions between him and Niklas, whose work was often about documenting insights into his family), would also become addicted to alcohol. Though he recognized and was critical of his father's political work and Nazi rhetoric of his recorded speeches, Norman followed his father's advice on silence and so was critical of Niklas's work, though he later privately confessed being proud of his brother.\nBrigitte committed suicide in 1981, at 46 years old, and Niklas would claim the motivation was \"because she didn't want to become older\" than their father. Niklas would come to believe this despite the fact that his sister had cancer, but the doctors claimed she could have survived about five to seven years. According to Niklas, she had written in her 16-year-old diary that she didn't want to become older than their father, and made it so it happened. She took her own life by overdosing whilst sleeping with her 8-year-old son, Hans's grandson.\nDespite as a young woman, in 1945, being worried that they wouldn't be forgiven for \"what we have done to the Jews\", worried then of deadly retaliations, Sigrid remained a committed Nazi who emigrated to South Africa during the apartheid regime and, having developed an addiction for tranquilizers, died there.\nNiklas is the sole living child of Hans and Brigitte Frank. Despite severe differences, especially when it came to Hans Frank's memory, Hans's family would remain unestranged all throughout their lives, not letting their differences destroy the relationships, no matter how fiercely they disagreed on the facts of the father's crimes.\nWhilst some, if not all, of Hans's grandchildren have been noticeably affected by the events of their grandfather's life, Niklas's daughter has claimed her father's critical work about her grandfather was a \"wall\" around her, growing up.\nDecorations and awards\nNuremberg Party Day Badge\n, 1929\nGolden Party Badge\n, 1933\nBlood Order\n#532, 1934\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Saints Maurice and Lazarus\n, 1936\nDanzig Cross\n1st Class, 1940\nWar Merit Cross\n2nd Class and 1st Class without Swords, 1940\nNazi Party Long Service Award\nin Gold, Silver and Bronze\nSee also\nCommand responsibility\nGerman war crimes\nOrigin theories of Adolf Hitler\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nNazi crimes against the Polish nation\nNuremberg trials\nNuremberg Trials bibliography\nThe Holocaust in Poland\nHolocaust (miniseries)\n– TV production in which Frank is portrayed\nNotes\nReferences\nCitations\n↑\n\"Holocaust Encyclopedia: Hans Frank\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2016\n.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nHans Frank: Lebenslauf, in: Auszug aus der Dissertation\nDie öffentlichrechtliche juristische Person\n, der maschinenschriftlichen Dissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der Rechte der Hohen Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Christian Albrechts Universität zu Kiel, Referent: Dr. Walter Jellinek, beigegeben. Identifikation der Dissertationsschrift:\nhttp://d-nb.info/570188911\n1\n2\nGeiss, Immanuel; Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang, eds. (1980).\nDeutsche Politik in Polen 1939-1945. Aus dem Diensttagebuch von Hans Frank, Generalgouverneur in Polen\n(in German).\nOpladen\n: Leske + Budrich. p.\n11.\nISBN\n978-3810002969\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nFrank's cross-examination during the Nuremberg trial in:\n\"One Hundred And Eleventh Day – Thursday, 18 April 1946\"\n.\nNuremberg Trial Proceedings\n. Vol.\n12.\nYale Law School\n/\nLillian Goldman Law Library\n/\nThe Avalon Project\n. p.\n20\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2016\n.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n418.\n↑\nEvans, Richard J. (2004).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. Penguin Press, p. 179;\nISBN\n978-1-59420-004-5\n.\n1\n2\nWheeler-Bennett, John (1967).\nThe Nemesis of Power\n, London: Macmillan, pp. 216–220.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n423.\n↑\n\"Joachim Lilla: Ministers of State, senior administrative officials and (NS) officials in Bavaria from 1918 to 1945\"\n. Retrieved\n7 April\n2023\n.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, pp.\n424, 429.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, pp.\n427–428.\n↑\n\"AUSTRIA: Dollfuss v. Undesirables\"\n.\nTime\n. 29 May 1933.\nISSN\n0040-781X\n. Retrieved\n20 January\n2024\n.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nQuoted in Evans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. Penguin Press, p. 73.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-074-8\n.\n↑\nAnna Rosmus\nHitlers Nibelungen\n, Samples Grafenau 2015, p. 145.\n1\n2\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nSpeech by Frank to his senior officials, 16 Dec 1941, repr. in: Office of Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, OCCPAC, quoted in\nPolonsky, Antony\n(2011).\nThe Jews in Poland and Russia\n.\nIII\n1914 to 2008. p. 434.\n↑\nWroński, T. (1974).\nKronika okupowanego Krakowa\n. Wydawnictwo Literackie, p. 320.\n↑\nDąbrowa-Kostka, S. (1972).\nW okupowanym Krakowie\n. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, pp. 160–67.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n218.\n↑\nHousden 2003\n, p.\n219.\n↑\n\"All Supermen – Except For The Shape They Are In\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. No.\nPage 1. 18 October 1945.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\nFrank, Niklas; Navazelskis, Ina (6 June 2016).\n\"Oral history interview with Niklas Frank RG-50.030.0880\"\n(PDF)\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n. Archived from the original on 9 February 2023\n. Retrieved\n21 October\n2024\n.\n{{\ncite web\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (\nlink\n)\n↑\nGilbert, G. M. (1995).\nNuremberg Diary\n. Da Capo Press, p. 19;\nISBN\n978-0-306-80661-2\n.\n1\n2\nSmith, Kingsbury (16 October 1946).\n\"The Execution of Nazi War Criminals\"\n.\nFamous World Trials – Nuremberg Trials 1945–1949\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 12 March 2001\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2016\n.\n↑\nThomas Darnstädt (2005),\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n,\nDer Spiegel\n, 13 September, no.\n14, p.\n128\n↑\nManvell 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, pp.\n21–22.\n↑\nTranslated from Frank's memoirs published posthumously: Frank, Hans (1953).\nIm Angesicht des Galgens. Deutung Hitlers und seiner Zeit aufgrund eigener Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse\n. Friedrich Alfred Beck. p. 330 (in German).\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, pp.\n24–25.\n↑\nSax, L. (2019).\nAus den Gemeinden von Burgenland: Revisiting the question of Adolf Hitler’s paternal grandfather.\nJournal of European Studies, 49(2), 143–162.\nhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0047244119837477\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, pp.\n21, 30–31.\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nRosenbaum 1998\n, p.\n25.\n↑\n\"Hans Frank – Pre-war career, Wartime career, Quotation, Fiction and film,\" in\nCambridge Encyclopedia\n,\n32\n. Retrieved 20 January 2008.\n↑\nSwart, Mia.\n\"\n'I knew my father would be hanged': Remembering Nuremberg\"\n.\nAl Jazeera\n. Retrieved\n21 October\n2024\n.\n↑\nFrank, Niklas (1991).\nIn the Shadow of the Reich\n. Knopf;\nISBN\n978-0-394-58345-7\n.\n↑\nReview\nby\nSusan Benesch\n,\nWashington Monthly\n, November 1991.\n↑\n\"Hans Frank private motion pictures\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n. Retrieved\n21 October\n2024\n.\n1\n2\n3\nGrzebałkowska, Magdalena (27 April 2021).\n\"Syn 'króla Polski'\n\"\n[\nSon of the 'King of Poland'\n]\n.\nwyborcza.pl\n(in Polish)\n. Retrieved\n21 October\n2024\n.\n↑\nNiklas Frank,\nHitler's Children\n(2012 documentary).\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n451.\n1\n2\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2015\n, p.\n452.\nBibliography\nHousden, Martyn (2003).\nHans Frank: Lebensraum and the Holocaust\n. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-0-230-50309-0\n.\nManvell, Roger (2011) .\nGoering\n. Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2015).\nLeaders of the Storm Troops\n. Vol.\n1. Solihull, England: Helion & Company.\nISBN\n978-1-909982-87-1\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nThe Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality\n. New York: W.W. Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-02008-3\n.\nRosenbaum, Ron (1998).\nExplaining Hitler\n. New York: Random House.\nISBN\n9780679431510\n.\nFurther reading\nPiotrowski, Stanislaw (1961).\nHans Frank's Diary\n. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.\nSchenk, Dieter (2006).\nHans Frank: Hitlers Kronjurist und General-Gouverneur\n. Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-10-073562-1\n(in German)\nSands, Philippe\n(2017).\nEast West Street\n. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n978-1-474601917\n.\nExternal links\nInformation about Hans Frank\nin the Reichstag database\n\"The International Military Tribunal for Germany\"\n.\nYale Law School / Lillian Goldman Law Library / The Avalon Project\n.\nTestimony of Frank at Nuremberg\nHans Frank (Character)\non\nIMDb\nNewspaper clippings about Hans Frank\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nPortals\n:\nGermany\nPolitics\nHans Frank\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Heinrich Spangenberger",
+      "succeeded_by": "Otto Georg Thierack",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "1930–1933": "Member of theReichstag",
+      "born": "Hans Michael Frank(1900-05-23)23 May 1900Karlsruhe, Germany",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged46)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "other_politicalaffiliations": "German Workers' Party(DAP)",
+      "spouse": "Brigitte Herbst​(m.1925)​",
+      "children": "5, includingNiklas",
+      "alma_mater": "University of MunichUniversity of Kiel",
+      "profession": "Lawyer",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "criminal_status": "Executedby hanging",
+      "convictions": "War crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death",
+      "spanof_crimes": "8 October 1939–19 January 1945",
+      "targets": "Polish civiliansPolish Jews"
+    },
+    "char_count": 31133
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Wilhelm_Frick",
+    "name": "Wilhelm Frick",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Wilhelm Frick was a German politician of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and convicted war criminal. He served as Minister of the Interior in Adolf Hitler's cabinet from 1933 to 1943 and as the last governor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.",
+    "description": "German Nazi Party politician (1877–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Wilhelm Frick\nGerman Nazi Party politician (1877–1946)\nWilhelm Frick\n(12 March 1877 – 16 October 1946) was a German politician of the\nNazi Party\n(NSDAP) and\nconvicted war criminal\n. He served as\nMinister of the Interior\nin\nAdolf Hitler's cabinet\nfrom 1933 to 1943\nand as the last governor of the\nProtectorate of Bohemia and Moravia\n.\nAs the head of the\nKriminalpolizei\n(criminal police) in Munich, Frick took part in Hitler's failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\nof 1923, for which he was convicted of\nhigh treason\n. He managed to avoid imprisonment and soon afterwards became a leading figure of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in the\nReichstag\n. In 1930, Frick became the first Nazi to hold a ministerial-level post at any level in Germany in Thuringia as state Minister of the Interior.\nAfter Hitler became\nChancellor of Germany\nin 1933, Frick joined the new government and was named Minister of the Interior. Additionally, on 21 May 1935, Frick was named\nGeneralbevollmächtigter für die Reichsverwaltung\n(General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich).\nHe was instrumental in formulating laws that consolidated the Nazi regime (\nGleichschaltung\n), as well as laws that defined the\nNazi racial policy\n, most notoriously the\nNuremberg Laws\n. On 30 August 1939, immediately prior to the outbreak of the\nSecond World War\n, Frick was appointed by Hitler to the six-person\nCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich\nwhich operated as a war cabinet.\nFollowing the rise of the\nSS\n, Frick gradually lost favour within the party, and in 1943 he was replaced by\nHeinrich Himmler\nas interior minister. Frick remained in the cabinet as a minister without portfolio until Hitler's death in 1945.\nAfter World War II, Frick was tried and convicted of\nwar crimes\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nand\nexecuted\nby\nhanging\n.\nEarly life\nBorn in the\nPalatinate\nmunicipality of\nAlsenz\n, then part of the\nKingdom of Bavaria\n, Germany, the last of four children of Protestant teacher Wilhelm Frick sen. (d. 1918) and his wife Henriette (née Schmidt). He attended the\ngymnasium\nin\nKaiserslautern\n, passing his\nAbitur\nexams in 1896. He went on studying\nphilology\nat the\nUniversity of Munich\n, but soon after turned to study law at\nHeidelberg\nand\nHumboldt University of Berlin\n. He  received his doctorate of law in 1901. He joined the Bavarian civil service in 1903, working as an attorney at the\nMunich Police Department\n. He was appointed a\nBezirksamtassessor\nin\nPirmasens\nin 1907 and became acting district executive in 1914. Rejected as unfit, Frick did not serve in World War I. He was promoted to the official rank of a\nRegierungsassessor\nand, at his own request, re-assumed his post at the Munich Police Department in 1917.\nOn 25 April 1910, Frick married Elisabetha Emilie Nagel (1890–1978) in Pirmasens. They had two sons and a daughter. The marriage ended in an ugly divorce in 1934. A few weeks later, on 12 March, Frick remarried in\nMünchberg\nMargarete Schultze-Naumburg (1896–1960), the former wife of the Nazi\nReichstag\nMP\nPaul Schultze-Naumburg\n. Margarete gave birth to a son and a daughter.\nNazi career\nFrick (3rd from left) among the defendants in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch trial, 1924.\nAdolf Hitler\nis 4th from the right.\nIn Munich, Frick witnessed the end of the war and the\nGerman Revolution of 1918–1919\n. He sympathized with right-wing\nFreikorps\nparamilitary units. Chief of Police\nErnst Pöhner\nintroduced him to\nAdolf Hitler\n, whom he helped willingly with obtaining permission to hold political rallies and demonstrations.\nElevated to the rank of an\nOberamtmann\nand head of the Political department of the Munich police from 1923, he and Pöhner participated in Hitler's failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\non 9 November. Frick tried to suppress the\nState Police\n's operation, wherefore he was arrested and imprisoned, and tried for aiding and abetting\nhigh treason\nby the\nPeople's Court\nin April 1924. After several months in custody, he was given a suspended sentence of 15 months' imprisonment and was dismissed from his police job. Later during the disciplinary proceedings, the dismissal was declared unfair and revoked, on the basis that his treasonous intention had not been proven. Frick went on to work at the Munich\nsocial insurance\noffice from 1926 onwards, in the rank of a\nRegierungsrat\n1st class by 1933.\nIn the aftermath of the putsch, Wilhelm Frick was elected a member of the German\nReichstag\nparliament in the\nfederal election of May 1924\n. He had been nominated by the\nNational Socialist Freedom Movement\n, an\nelectoral list\nof the far-right\nGerman Völkisch Freedom Party\nand then\nbanned\nNazi Party\n. On 1 September 1925, Frick joined the re-established Nazi Party. On 20 May 1928, he was one of the first 12 deputies elected to the\nReichstag\nas Nazi Party members. He associated himself with the radical\nGregor Strasser\n; making his name by aggressive anti-democratic and\nantisemitic\nReichstag speeches, he climbed to the post of the Nazi\nparliamentary group leader\n(\nFraktionsführer\n) in 1928.\nHe would continue to be elected to the\nReichstag\nin every subsequent election in the Weimar and Nazi regimes. First elected from the Nazi electoral list in 1928, he was returned as a deputy from electoral constituency 27 (\nPalatinate\n) in 1930 and from constituency 12 (\nThuringia\n) thereafter.\nIn\n1929 Thuringian state election\n, as the price for joining the\ncoalition government\nof the\nLand\n(state) of\nThuringia\n, the NSDAP received the state ministries of the Interior and Education. On 23 January 1930, Frick was appointed to these ministries, becoming the first Nazi to hold a ministerial-level post at any level in Germany (though he remained a member of the Reichstag).\nFrick used his position to dismiss\nCommunist\nand\nSocial Democratic\nofficials and replace them with Nazi Party members, so Thuringia's federal subsidies were temporarily suspended by Reich Minister\nCarl Severing\n. Frick also appointed the eugenicist\nHans F. K. Günther\nas a professor of\nsocial anthropology\nat the\nUniversity of Jena\n, banned several newspapers, and banned\npacifist\ndrama and anti-war films such as\nAll Quiet on the Western Front\n. He was removed from office by a Social Democratic\nmotion of no confidence\nin the Thuringian\nLandtag\nparliament on 1 April 1931.\nReich Minister\nPress session after the first meeting of Hitler's cabinet on 30 January 1933: Frick standing 4th from left\nWhen Reich president\nPaul von Hindenburg\nappointed Hitler chancellor on\n30 January 1933\n, Frick joined his government as\nReichsminister\nof the Interior. Together with Reichstag President\nHermann Göring\n, he was one of only two Nazi\nReichsministers\nin the original Hitler Cabinet, and the only one who actually had a portfolio; Göring served as\nminister without portfolio\nuntil 5 May. Though Frick held a key position, especially in organizing the\nfederal elections of March 1933\n, he initially had far less power than his counterparts in the rest of Europe. Notably, he had no authority over the police; in Germany law enforcement has traditionally been a\nstate\nand local matter. Indeed, the main reason that Hindenburg and\nFranz von Papen\nagreed to give the Interior Ministry to the Nazis was that it was almost powerless at the time. A mighty rival arose in the establishment of the\nPropaganda Ministry\nunder\nJoseph Goebbels\non 13 March.\nFrick's power dramatically increased as a result of the\nReichstag Fire Decree\nand the\nEnabling Act of 1933\n. The provision of the Reichstag Fire Decree giving the cabinet the power to take over state governments on its own authority was actually his idea; he saw the fire as a chance to increase his power and begin the process of Nazifying the country.\nHe was responsible for drafting many of the\nGleichschaltung\nlaws that consolidated the Nazi regime.\nWithin two weeks of the Enabling Act's passage, Frick helped draft the \"\nSecond Law on the Coordination of the States with the Reich\n\" (7 April 1933) appointing\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich Governors) to take over the state governments. He also initiated and drafted the\nLaw Against the Formation of Parties\n(14 July 1933) that formally made the NSDAP the only legal party in Germany. Under the 30 January 1934 \"\nLaw on the Reconstruction of the Reich\n\", which converted Germany into a highly centralized state, state parliaments were dissolved and the newly implemented\nReichsstatthalter\nwere made directly responsible to him. He also drafted the\nLaw on the Abolition of the Reichsrat\n(14 February 1934) that abolished the upper chamber of the Reich parliament.\nFrick also was made a member of\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nOn 10 October 1933, Hitler appointed Frick a\nReichsleiter\n, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party. On 1 May 1934, he replaced\nMinister-President\nGöring as\nPrussian\nMinister of the Interior, which gave him control over the police in Prussia. As a member of the Prussian cabinet, he also became an\nex officio\nmember of the\nPrussian State Council\n.\nBy 1935, he also had near-total control over local government. He had the sole power to appoint the mayors of all municipalities with populations greater than 100,000 (except for the\ncity states\nof\nBerlin\nand\nHamburg\n, where Hitler reserved the right to appoint the mayors himself if he deemed it necessary). He also had considerable influence over smaller towns as well; while their mayors were appointed by the state governors, as mentioned earlier the governors were responsible to him.\nFrick (2nd from left) with\nKonrad Henlein\non visit in Sudetenland, 1938\nFrick was instrumental in the\nracial policy of Nazi Germany\ndrafting laws against\nJewish\ncitizens, like the \"\nLaw for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service\n\" and the notorious\nNuremberg Laws\nin September 1935.\nAlready in July 1933, he had implemented the\nLaw for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring\nincluding\nforced sterilizations\n, which later culminated in the killings of the\nAction T4\n\"euthanasia\" programme supported by his ministry. Frick also took a leading part in\nGermany's re-armament\nin violation of the 1919\nVersailles Treaty\n. He drafted laws introducing universal military conscription and extending the\nWehrmacht\nservice law to\nAustria\nafter the 1938\nAnschluss\n, as well as to the \"\nSudetenland\n\" territories of the\nFirst Czechoslovak Republic\nannexed according to the\nMunich Agreement\n.\nIn the summer of 1938 Frick was named the patron\n(Schirmherr)\nof the\nDeutsches Turn- und Sportfest\nin\nBreslau\n, a patriotic sports festival attended by Hitler and much of the Nazi leadership. In this event he presided the ceremony of \"handing over\" the new\nNazi Reich Sports League\n(NSRL) standard to\nReichssportführer\nHans von Tschammer und Osten\n, marking the further Nazification of sports in Germany. On 11 November 1938, Frick promulgated the Regulations Against Jews' Possession of Weapons.\nFrom the mid-to-late 1930s Frick lost favour irreversibly within the Nazi Party after a power struggle involving attempts to resolve the lack of coordination within the Reich government.\nFor example, in 1933 he tried to restrict the widespread use of \"protective custody\" orders that were used to send people to concentration camps, only to be begged off by\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\n. His power was greatly reduced in June 1936 when Hitler named Himmler the Chief of German Police, which effectively united the police with the SS. On paper, Frick was Himmler's immediate superior. In fact, the police were now independent of Frick's control, since the SS was responsible only to Hitler.\nA long-running power struggle between the two culminated in Frick's being replaced by Himmler as\nReichsminister\nof the Interior in August 1943. However, he remained in the cabinet as a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio. Besides Hitler, he and\nLutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk\nwere the only members of the\nThird Reich's cabinet\nto serve continuously from Hitler's appointment as Chancellor until his death.\nFrick's replacement as\nReichsminister\nof the Interior did not reduce the growing administrative chaos and infighting between party and state agencies.\nFrick was then appointed as\nProtector of Bohemia and Moravia\n, making him Hitler's personal representative in the\nCzech lands\n. Its capital\nPrague\n, where Frick used ruthless methods to counter dissent, was one of the last\nAxis\n-held cities to fall at the\nend of World War II in Europe\n.\nTrial and execution\nFrick in his cell, November 1945\nFrick was arrested, and was arraigned at the\nNuremberg trials\n, where he was the only defendant besides\nRudolf Hess\nwho refused to testify on his own behalf.\nFrick was convicted of planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n, and for his role, as Minister of the Interior, in formulating the\nEnabling Act\nand the\nNuremberg Laws\n—laws under which people were deported to\nconcentration camps\n, many of them being murdered there. Frick was also accused of being one of the most senior people responsible for the existence of the concentration camps.\nThe corpse of Frick after his execution at Nuremberg, October 1946. Injuries were caused from hitting his head on the trap door.\nFrick was sentenced to death on 1 October 1946\n, and was\nhanged\nat Nuremberg Prison on 16 October. Of his execution, journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith wrote:\nThe sixth man to leave his prison cell and walk with handcuffed wrists to the death house was 69-year-old Wilhelm Frick. He entered the execution chamber at 2.05\nam, six minutes after\nRosenberg\nhad been pronounced dead. He seemed the least steady of any so far and stumbled on the thirteenth step of the gallows. His only words were, \"Long live eternal Germany\", before he was hooded and dropped through the trap.\nHis body, along with those of the other nine executed men and the corpse of\nHermann Göring\n, was cremated at the\nOstfriedhof Cemetery\nin\nMunich\n, and the ashes were scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nSee also\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nReferences\n↑\nOffice of United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (1948).\nNazi Conspiracy And Aggression: Supplement B\n. United States Government Printing Office. p.\n408.\n↑\nLisciotto, Carmelo (2007).\n\"SS & Other Nazi Leaders\"\n. Holocaust Research Project\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2024\n.\n↑\nClaudia Koonz\n,\nThe Nazi Conscience\n, p. 103,\nISBN\n0-674-01172-4\n1\n2\n\"Nazi Germany - Government Structure\"\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2023\n.\n↑\nBroszat, Martin (1981).\nThe Hitler State\n. Longman Inc. pp.\n308–\n309.\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n.\n↑\nBiographie, Deutsche.\n\"Frick, Wilhelm - Deutsche Biographie\"\n.\nwww.deutsche-biographie.de\n.\n1\n2\n\"Index Fo-Fy\"\n.\nrulers.org\n.\n↑\nWilhelm Frick entry\nin the\nReichstag Members Database\n↑\n\"Nurnbergprocessen 1\"\n.\nwww.bjornetjenesten.dk\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 14 January 2009\n. Retrieved\n7 December\n2008\n.\n↑\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n.\nNew York City\n:\nPenguin Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0141009759\n.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (\"Red Series\"): Volume 5, pp. 658–659\"\n.\nLibrary of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (\"Red Series\"): Volume 5, p. 231, Document 2481-PS\"\n.\nLibrary of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2023\n.\n↑\nLilla, Joachim (2005).\nDer Preußische Staatsrat 1921–1933: Ein biographisches Handbuch\n. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag. pp.\n31, 295.\nISBN\n978-3-770-05271-4\n.\n↑\nA legalistic follower, rather than an initiator, Frick the servant increasingly lost favour with his master, apparently because he misunderstood the basic nature of the Fuhrer's governance. Whereas the Third Reich thrived on inconsistencies, rivalries, and constant evolutionary change, Frick's juristic mind longed for order and legal stabilization. The incongruity was\ninsuperable\nand it was thus logical enough that in 1943 the minister, whose share of practical power had rapidly diminished in the second half of the 1930s, ultimately even lost his official post.\nUdo Sautter, Canadian Journal of History\n↑\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n, Oxford University Press, p. 204.\n↑\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography: Volume 1\n, Ulric, p. 77.\n↑\n\"Hans Mommsen,\nThe Dissolution of the Third Reich (1943–1945)\n\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 7 August 2008\n. Retrieved\n8 May\n2023\n.\n↑\nTrial:Wilhelm Frick\nArchived\n2 December 2008 at the\nWayback Machine\n↑\n\"The trial of German major war criminals\n: proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg Germany\"\n.\navalon.law.yale.edu\n.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg Trial Defendants: Wilhelm Frick\"\n.\nwww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org\n.\n↑\nJoseph Kingsbury-Smith, who witnessed the execution of Wilhelm Frick and nine other leaders of the Nazi Party on 1st October 1946\n↑\nThomas Darnstädt (2005),\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n,\nDer Spiegel\n, 13 September, no.\n14, p.\n128\n↑\nManvell 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\nSources\nManvell, Roger (2011) .\nGoering\n. Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nThe Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality\n. New York: W.W. Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-02008-3\n.\nFurther reading\nSautter,\nWilhelm Frick: Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates: Eine politische Biographie\n, Canadian Journal of History, April 1993\nExternal links\nQuotations related to\nWilhelm Frick\nat Wikiquote\nMedia related to\nWilhelm Frick\nat Wikimedia Commons\nInformation about Wilhelm Frick\nin the Reichstag database\nNewspaper clippings about Wilhelm Frick\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Paul von Hindenburg(1933–1934)Adolf Hitler(1934–1943; asFührer)",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Konstantin von Neurath(de jure)Kurt Daluege(de facto)",
+      "succeeded_by": "Position abolished",
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1939–1945": "Member of theCouncil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich",
+      "1934–1945": "Member of thePrussian State Council",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theReichstag (Nazi Germany)",
+      "1924–1933": "Member of theReichstag (Weimar Republic)",
+      "born": "(1877-03-12)12 March 1877Alsenz, Germany",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged69)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Execution by hanging",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouses": "Elisabetha Emilie Nagel​​(m.1910;div.1934)​Margarete Schultze-Naumburg​​(m.1934)​",
+      "children": "5",
+      "alma_mater": "University of MunichUniversity of GöttingenUniversity of BerlinUniversity of Heidelberg",
+      "occupation": "Attorney",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed",
+      "convictions": "Crimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 17676
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Julius_Streicher",
+    "name": "Julius Streicher",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Julius Sebastian Streicher was a German publicist, politician and convicted war criminal. A member of the Nazi Party, he served as the Gauleiter of Franconia and a member of the Reichstag, the national legislature. He was the founder and publisher of the virulently antisemitic newspaper Der Stürmer, which became a central element of the Nazi propaganda machine. The publishing firm was financially very successful and made Streicher a multimillionaire.",
+    "description": "German publicist and politician (1885–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Julius Streicher\nGerman publicist and politician (1885–1946)\nJulius Sebastian Streicher\n(12 February 1885 – 16 October 1946) was a German publicist, politician and\nconvicted war criminal\n. A member of the\nNazi Party\n, he served as the\nGauleiter\n(regional leader) of\nFranconia\nand a member of the\nReichstag\n, the national legislature. He was the founder and publisher of the virulently\nantisemitic\nnewspaper\nDer Stürmer\n, which became a central element of the\nNazi propaganda\nmachine. The publishing firm was financially very successful and made Streicher a multimillionaire.\nAfter the war, Streicher was convicted of\ncrimes against humanity\nduring the\nNuremberg trials\n. Specifically, he was found to have continued his vitriolic antisemitic propaganda when he was well aware that Jews were being murdered. For this, he was executed by\nhanging\n.\nStreicher was the first member of the\nNazi\nregime held accountable for\ninciting genocide\nby the Nuremberg Tribunal.\nEarly life\nStreicher was born in\nFleinhausen\n, in the\nKingdom of Bavaria\n, one of nine children of the teacher Friedrich Streicher and his wife Anna (née Weiss). He worked as an elementary school teacher, as his father had. In 1913, Streicher married Kunigunde Roth, a baker's daughter, in\nNuremberg\n. They had two sons, Lothar (born 1915) and Elmar (born 1918).\nStreicher joined the\nGerman Army\nin 1914. For his outstanding combat performance during the\nFirst World War\n, he was awarded the\nIron Cross\n1st and 2nd Class, as well as earning a battlefield commission as an officer (\nlieutenant\n), despite having several reported instances of poor behaviour in his military record,\nand at a time when officers were primarily from aristocratic families. Following the end of World War I, Streicher was demobilised and returned to Nuremberg.\nUpon his return, Streicher took up another teaching position there but something unknown happened in 1919, which turned him into a \"radical anti-Semite\".\nEarly politics\nStreicher was heavily influenced by the endemic\nantisemitism\nfound in pre-war Germany, especially that of\nTheodor Fritsch\n.\nIn February 1919, Streicher became active in the antisemitic\nDeutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund\n(German Nationalist Protection and Defense Federation), one of the various radical-nationalist organizations that sprang up in the wake of the failed\nGerman Communist revolution of 1918\n.\nSuch groups fostered\nthe view that Jews and Bolsheviks were synonymous\n, and that they were traitors trying to subject Germany to Communist rule.\nIn November 1919, Streicher joined the\nDeutschsozialistische Partei\n(\nGerman Socialist Party\n, DSP).\nThis group's platform was close to that of the\nNazi Party\n, or\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei\n(National Socialist German Workers' Party or NSDAP). The DSP had been created in May 1919 as an initiative of\nRudolf von Sebottendorf\nas a child of the\nThule Society\n,\nand its program was based on the ideas of the mechanical engineer Alfred Brunner (1881–1936);\nin 1919, the party was officially inaugurated in\nHanover\n.\nIts leading members included Hans Georg Müller, Max Sesselmann and Friedrich Wiesel, the first two editors of the\nMünchner Beobachter\n. Julius Streicher founded his local branch in 1919 in Nuremberg.\nBy the end of 1919, the DSP had branches in\nDüsseldorf\n, Kiel,\nFrankfurt am Main\n,\nDresden\n, Nuremberg and\nMunich\n.\nStreicher sought to move the German Socialists in a more virulently antisemitic direction—an effort which aroused enough opposition that he left the group and brought his now substantial following to yet another organisation in November 1921, the\nDeutsche Werkgemeinschaft\n(German Working Community, DWG); this group hoped to unite the various antisemitic\nvölkisch\nmovements.\nMeanwhile, Streicher's rhetoric against the Jews continued to intensify to such a degree that the leadership of the DWG thought he was dangerous and criticized him for his obsessive \"hatred of the Jews and foreign races.\"\nNazism\nOn 19 September 1922, Streicher left the DWG after less than one year and formally joined the Nazi Party on 8 October (membership number 17).\nHe brought with him enough members to almost double the size of the Nazi Party overnight.\nHe later claimed that because his political work brought him into contact with\nGerman Jews\n, he \"must therefore have been fated to become later on, a writer and speaker on racial politics\".\nHe visited\nMunich\nin order to hear\nAdolf Hitler\nspeak, an experience that he later said left him transformed. When asked about that moment, Streicher stated:\nIt was on a winter's day in 1922. I sat unknown in the large hall of the\nBürgerbräuhaus\n... suspense was in the air. Everyone seemed tense with excitement, with anticipation. Then suddenly a shout. \"Hitler is coming!\" Thousands of men and women jumped to their feet as if propelled by a mysterious power ... they shouted, \"Heil Hitler! Heil Hitler!\" ... And then he stood on the podium ... Then I knew that in this Adolf Hitler was someone extraordinary ... Here was one who could wrest out of the German spirit and the German heart the power to break the chains of slavery. Yes! Yes! This man spoke as a messenger from heaven at a time when the gates of hell were opening to pull down everything. And when he finally finished, and while the crowd raised the roof with the singing of the \"Deutschland\" song, I rushed to the stage.\nNearly religiously converted by this speech, Streicher believed from this point forward that, \"it was his destiny to serve Hitler\".\nIn May 1923 Streicher founded the sensationalist newspaper\nDer Stürmer\n(\nThe Stormer\n, or, loosely,\nThe Attacker\n).\nFrom the outset, the chief aim of the paper was to promulgate antisemitic\npropaganda\n; the first issue had an excerpt that stated, \"As long as the Jew is in the German household, we will be Jewish slaves. Therefore he must go.\"\nHistorian\nRichard J. Evans\ndescribes the newspaper:\n[\nDer Stürmer\n] rapidly established itself as the place where screaming headlines introduced the most rabid attacks on Jews, full of sexual innuendo, racist caricatures, made-up accusations of ritual murder, and titillating, semi-pornographic stories of Jewish men seducing innocent German girls.\nBeer Hall Putsch\nIn November 1923, Streicher participated in Hitler's first effort to seize power, the failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin Munich.\nStreicher marched with Hitler in the front row of the would-be revolutionaries. For his part, Streicher was arrested, along with other key players that included\nHermann Göring\n(who took a bullet),\nWilhelm Frick\n,\nErnst Pöhner\n,\nMax Amann\n, and\nErnst Röhm\n.\nStreicher was also suspended from teaching.\nHowever, his loyalty to the cause earned him Hitler's lifelong trust and protection; in the years that followed, Streicher would be one of the dictator's few true intimates. Streicher,\nRudolf Hess\n,\nEmil Maurice\n, and\nDietrich Eckart\nwere the only Nazis mentioned in\nMein Kampf\n;\nin the book, Hitler praised him for subordinating the German Socialist Party to the Nazi Party, a move Hitler believed was essential to the Nazis' success.\nContinued activism\nWhen the Nazi Party was banned in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, Streicher in early 1924 joined the\nGreater German People's Community\n(\nGroßdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft\n, GVG) a Nazi\nfront organization\nestablished by\nAlfred Rosenberg\n. Streicher challenged Rosenberg's weak leadership and on 9 July 1924 was elected as Chairman of the GVG in his place.\nWhen Hitler was released from his prison sentence at\nLandsberg am Lech\non 20 December 1924 for his role in the Putsch, Streicher was one of the few remaining followers waiting for him at his Munich apartment.\nHitler – who would value loyalty and faithfulness very highly throughout his life – remained loyal to Streicher even when he landed in trouble with the Nazi hierarchy. Although Hitler would allow suppression of\nDer Stürmer\nat times when it was politically important for the Nazis to be seen as respectable, and although he would admit that Streicher was not a very good administrator, he never withdrew his personal loyalty.\nIn April 1924, Streicher was elected to the Bavarian\nLandtag\n(legislature),\na position which gave him a margin of\nparliamentary immunity\n– a safety net that would help him resist efforts to silence his\nracist\nmessage.\nIn January 1925 he also joined the Nuremberg City Council. Hitler re-founded the Nazi Party on 27 February 1925 in a speech at the\nBürgerbräukeller\nin Munich. Streicher was present and pledged his loyalty; the GVG was soon formally disbanded.\nAs a reward for Streicher's loyalty and dedication, on 2 April he was appointed\nGauleiter\nof\nNordbayern\nthe Bavarian region that included\nUpper\n,\nMiddle\nand\nLower Franconia\n. He established his capital in his home town of\nNuremberg\n. His jurisdiction would undergo several changes in the coming years. On 1 October 1928, it was significantly reduced to the area around Nuremberg-Fürth. On 1 March 1929, it again expanded, absorbing a neighboring Gau. Now encompassing all of Middle Franconia, it was renamed\nGau Mittelfranken\n. Finally, in April 1933, the districts were consolidated and became simply\nGau Franken\n.\nIn the early years of the party's rise,\nGauleiter\nwere essentially party functionaries without real power; but in the final years of the\nWeimar Republic\n, as the Nazi Party grew, so did their power.\nGauleiters\nsuch as Streicher wielded immense power and authority under the Nazi state.\nRise of\nDer Stürmer\nBeginning in 1924, Streicher used\nDer Stürmer\nas a mouthpiece not only for general antisemitic attacks, but for calculated\nsmear campaigns\nagainst specific Jews, such as the\nNuremberg\ncity official Julius Fleischmann, who worked for Streicher's nemesis, mayor\nHermann Luppe\n.\nDer Stürmer\naccused Fleischmann of stealing socks from his quartermaster during combat in\nWorld War I\n.\nFleischmann sued Streicher and disproved the allegations in court, where Streicher was fined 900\nmarks\n.\nDer Stürmer\n'\ns official slogan,\nDie Juden sind unser Unglück\n(the Jews are our misfortune), was deemed non-actionable under German statutes, since it was not a direct incitement to violence.\nPublic reading of\nDer Stürmer\n,\nWorms\n, 1933\nStreicher's opponents complained to authorities that\nDer Stürmer\nviolated a statute against religious offense with his constant promulgation of the \"\nblood libel\n\" – the\nmedieval\naccusation that Jews killed\nChristian\nchildren to use their blood to make\nmatzoh\n.\nStreicher argued that his accusations were based on\nrace\n, not religion, and that his communications were political speech, and therefore protected by the German constitution.\nStreicher orchestrated his early campaigns against Jews to make the most extreme possible claims, short of violating a law that might get the paper shut down. He insisted in the pages of his newspaper that the Jews had caused the worldwide\nDepression\n, and were responsible for the crippling\nunemployment\nand\ninflation\nwhich afflicted Germany during the 1920s. He claimed that Jews were\nwhite-slavers\nresponsible for Germany's prostitution rings. Real unsolved killings in Germany, especially of children or women, were often confidently explained in the pages of\nDer Stürmer\nas cases of \"Jewish\nritual murder\n\".\nOne of Streicher's constant themes was the sexual violation of ethnic German women by Jews, a subject which he used to publish semi-\npornographic\ntracts\nand images detailing degrading sexual acts.\nThe fascination with the pornographic aspects of the propaganda in\nDer Stürmer\nwas an important feature for many antisemites.\nWith the help of his cartoonist\nPhillip \"Fips\" Rupprecht\n, Streicher published image after image of Jewish\nstereotypes\nand sexually charged encounters.\nHis portrayal of Jews as subhuman and evil is considered to have played a critical role in the dehumanization and marginalization of the Jewish minority in the eyes of common Germans – creating the necessary conditions for the later perpetration of the\nHolocaust\n.\nTo protect himself from accountability, Streicher relied on Hitler's protection. Hitler declared that\nDer Stürmer\nwas his favorite newspaper, and saw to it that each weekly issue was posted for public reading in special glassed-in display cases known as \"Stürmerkasten\". The newspaper reached a peak circulation of 600,000 in 1935.\nOne of the possible solutions to the Nazi's perceived problem Streicher mentioned in the pages of\nDer Stürmer\nwas\ntransporting Jews to Madagascar\n.\nStreicher's publishing firm also released three antisemitic books for children, including the 1938\nDer Giftpilz\n(translated into English as\nThe Toadstool\nor\nThe Poisonous Mushroom\n), one of the most widespread pieces of propaganda, which warned about the supposed dangers\nJews\nposed by using the\nmetaphor\nof an attractive yet deadly mushroom. Late in 1936 Streicher also issued\nTrust No Fox on his Green Heath and No Jew on his Oath\n, an infamously anti-Semitic children's picture book by the 18-year-old Elvira Bauer. In the book the Jews are depicted as \"children of the devil\" and Streicher as the great educator and a hero of all German children.\nStreicher did not limit his vituperative attacks to Jews themselves but also launched them against those he perceived as insufficiently hostile towards Jews. For example, he dismissed\nMussolini\nas a Jewish lackey for not being anti-Semitic enough.\nBetween 1935 and the end of the Second World War, upwards of 6,500 people were identified and denounced in\nDer Stürmer\nfor not being sufficiently anti-Semitic.\nStreicher in power\nIn July 1932, Streicher was elected as a deputy of the\nReichstag\nfrom electoral constituency 26,\nFranconia\n, a seat that he would hold throughout the Nazi regime.\nIn April 1933, after Nazi control of the German state apparatus gave the\nGauleiters\nenormous power, Streicher organised a one-day\nboycott\nof Jewish businesses which was used as a dress-rehearsal for other antisemitic commercial measures. As he consolidated his hold on power, he came to more or less rule the city of Nuremberg and his\nGau Franken\n, and boasted that every Jew had been removed from\nHersbruck\n. Among the nicknames provided by his enemies were \"King of Nuremberg\" and the \"Beast of Franconia.\" Because of his role as\nGauleiter\nof Franconia, he also gained the nickname of\nFrankenführer\n.\nStreicher became a member of the\nSA\non 27 January 1934 with the rank of SA-\nGruppenführer\nand was promoted to SA-\nObergruppenführer\non 9 November 1937.\nOn 6 September 1935, Hitler named him to the\nAcademy for German Law\n. The\nNew York Times\ndecried this action with the headline: \"Reich Honors Streicher. Anti-Semitic Leader is Named to Academy for German Law.\"\nThe\nGrand Synagogue of Nuremberg\nwas built in 1874, and was ordered destroyed in 1938 by Julius Streicher\n–\nsupposedly because he disapproved of its architecture\n–\nas part of what came to be known as\nKristallnacht\n.\nStreicher later claimed that he was only \"indirectly responsible\" for passage of the anti-Jewish\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935, and that he felt slighted because he was not directly consulted. Perhaps epitomizing the \"profound anti-intellectualism\" of the Nazi Party, Streicher once opined that, \"If the brains of all university professors were put at one end of the scale, and the brains of the\nFührer\nat the other, which end do you think would tip?\"\nStreicher was ordered to take part in the establishment of the\nInstitute for the Study and Elimination of Jewish Influence on German Church Life\n, that was to be organized together with the\nGerman Christians\n, the\nMinistry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda\n, the\nReich Ministry of Education\nand the Reich Ministry of the Churches. A surgical operation prevented Streicher from participating fully in this endeavor.\nThis antisemitic standpoint concerning the Bible can be traced back to the earliest time of the Nazi movement, for instance\nDietrich Eckart\n's (Hitler's early mentor) book\nBolshevism from Moses to Lenin: A Dialogue Between Adolf Hitler and Me\n, where it was claimed that \"Jewish forgeries\" had been\nadded\nto the\nNew Testament\n.\nIn August 1938, Streicher ordered that the\nGrand Synagogue of Nuremberg\nbe destroyed as part of his contribution to\nKristallnacht\n. Streicher later claimed that his decision was based on his disapproval of its architectural design, which in his opinion \"disfigured the beautiful German townscape.\"\nFall from power\nAuthor and journalist\nJohn Gunther\ndescribed Streicher as \"the worst of the anti-Semites\",\nand his excesses brought condemnation even from other Nazis. Streicher's behaviour was viewed as so irresponsible that he was embarrassing the party leadership;\nchief among his enemies in Hitler's hierarchy was\nReichsmarschall\nHermann Göring\n, who loathed him and later claimed that he forbade his own staff to read\nDer Stürmer\n.\nDespite his special relationship with Hitler, after 1938 Streicher's position began to unravel. He was accused of keeping Jewish property seized after\nKristallnacht\nin November 1938; he was charged with spreading untrue stories about Göring – such as alleging that he was impotent and that his daughter Edda was conceived by\nartificial insemination\n; and he was confronted with his excessive personal behaviour, including unconcealed adultery, several furious verbal attacks on other\nGauleiters\nand striding through the streets of Nuremberg cracking a bullwhip.\nHe was brought before the\nSupreme Party Court\nand judged to be \"unsuitable for leadership.\"\nOn 16 February 1940, he was stripped of his party offices and withdrew from the public eye, although he was permitted to retain the title of a\nGauleiter\n, and to continue publishing\nDer Stürmer\n. Hitler remained committed to Streicher, whom he considered a loyal friend, despite his unsavory reputation.\nStreicher's wife, Kunigunde Streicher, died in 1943 after 30 years of marriage.\nWhen Germany surrendered to the\nAllied\narmies in May 1945, Streicher said later, he decided not to commit\nsuicide\n. Instead, he married his former secretary, Adele Tappe.\nDays later, on 23 May 1945, Streicher was captured in the town of\nWaidring\n,\nAustria\n, by a group of American officers led by Major\nHenry Plitt\nof the\n101st Airborne Division\n.\nTrial and execution\n8 October 1946 newsreel of\nNuremberg Trials\nsentencing\nDuring his trial, Streicher claimed that he had been mistreated by Allied soldiers after his capture.\nHe was examined by Chief Medical Officer\nLt. Col. Rene Juchli\nwho reported that Streicher had partial paralysis of his left leg as a result of an old skiing injury.\nWhen the German version of the\nWechsler-Bellevue\nIQ test\nwas administered by\nGustave Gilbert\n, Streicher had an above average IQ (106), yet still the lowest among the defendants.\nStreicher was not a member of the military and did not take part in planning the Holocaust, or the invasion of other nations. Yet his actions during the war were significant enough, in the prosecutors' judgment, to include him in the trial of Major War Criminals before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n– which sat in Nuremberg, where Streicher had once been an unchallenged authority. He complained throughout the process that all his judges were Jews.\nMost of the evidence against Streicher came from his numerous speeches and articles over the years.\nIn essence, prosecutors contended that Streicher's articles and speeches were so incendiary that he was an\naccessory\nto murder, and therefore as culpable as those who actually ordered the mass extermination of Jews. They further argued that he kept up his antisemitic propaganda even after he was aware that Jews were being slaughtered.\nStreicher was acquitted of\ncrimes against peace\n, but found guilty of\ncrimes against humanity\n, and\nsentenced to death\non 1 October 1946. The judgment against him read, in part:\nFor his 25 years of speaking, writing and preaching hatred of the Jews, Streicher was widely known as \"Jew-Baiter Number One.\" In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the\nvirus\nof anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to active persecution. [...] Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a crime against humanity.\nHe, along with\nHans Fritzsche\n, were the first people to be indicted for what would later be classified as\nincitement to genocide\n,\nthough Fritzsche was acquitted at trial.\nThe body of Julius Streicher after being hanged, 16 October 1946\nDuring his trial, Streicher displayed for the last time the flair for courtroom theatrics that had made him famous in the 1920s. He answered questions from his own defense attorney with diatribes against Jews, the Allies, and the court itself, and was frequently silenced by the court officers. He cited the works of\nTheodore Kaufman\n,\nwho called for the genocide of Germans by mass sterilization\n, as justification for his claims about the Jewry's aggression against Germany.\nHe also peppered his testimony with references to passages of Jewish texts that he also cited in the pages of\nDer Stürmer\n.\nStreicher was\nhanged\nat Nuremberg Prison in the early hours of 16 October 1946, along with the nine other condemned defendants from the first Nuremberg trial. Göring, Streicher's nemesis, had committed\nsuicide\nonly hours earlier. Streicher's was the most melodramatic of the hangings carried out that night. At the bottom of the scaffold he cried out \"\nHeil Hitler\n!\". When he mounted the platform, he delivered his last sneering reference to Jewish scripture, snapping \"\nPurimfest\n!\"\nStreicher's final declaration before the hood went over his head was, \"The\nBolsheviks\nwill hang you one day!\"\nJoseph Kingsbury-Smith, a journalist for the\nInternational News Service\nwho covered the executions,\nsaid in his filed report that after the hood descended over Streicher's head, he said \"Adele, meine liebe Frau!\" (\"Adele, my dear wife!\").\nThe consensus among eyewitnesses was that Streicher did not receive a quick death from\nspinal\nsevering. As with at least several others, the bungled hanging was caused by the hangman,\nMaster Sergeant\nJohn C. Woods\n.\nStreicher's body, along with those of the other nine executed men and the corpse of Hermann Göring, was cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand the ashes were scattered in the\nIsar\nRiver.\nIn literature\nStreicher is portrayed in detail as a criminal psychopath in\nPhilip Kerr\n's detective novel\nThe Pale Criminal\n(1990).\nSee also\nGenocide justification\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nThis system included socialist ideas, such as the takeover of the financial sector by the state, and the cutting-back of the \"interest-based economy\".\n↑\nAccording to Streicher, his dislike of Jews stemmed from an incident when he was five years old, during which he witnessed his mother weeping after claiming to have been cheated by the Jewish owner of a fabric shop.\n↑\nThe\nslanderous\nattacks continued, and lawsuits followed. Like Fleischmann, other outraged German Jews defeated Streicher in court, but his goal was not necessarily legal victory; he wanted the widest possible dissemination of his message, which press coverage often provided. The rules of the court provided Streicher with an arena to humiliate his opponents, and he characterized the inevitable courtroom loss as a badge of honor.\n↑\nStreicher also combed the pages of the\nTalmud\nand the\nOld Testament\nin search of passages potentially depicting Judaism as harsh or cruel.\nIn 1929, this close study of Jewish scripture helped convict Streicher in a case known as \"The Great Nuremberg Ritual Murder Trial.\" His familiarity with Jewish text was proof to the court that his attacks were religious in nature; Streicher was found guilty and imprisoned for two months. In Germany, press reaction to the trial was highly critical of Streicher; but the\nGauleiter\nwas greeted after his conviction by hundreds of cheering supporters, and within months Nazi Party membership surged to its highest levels yet.\n↑\nStreicher's characteristic behaviour is portrayed in the 1944 Hollywood film\nThe Hitler Gang\n.\n↑\nStreicher was a poet, whose work was described as \"quite attractive\", and he painted watercolours as a hobby. He had a strong sexual appetite, which occasionally got him into trouble with the Nazi hierarchy.\n↑\nAt first Streicher claimed to be a painter named \"Joseph Sailer\", but, misunderstanding Plitt's poor German, he came to believe the latter already knew who he was, and quickly admitted his identity.\n↑\nSee the\nLA Times\narticle commemorating Kingsbury-Smith at:\nJ. Kingsbury-Smith; Honored Journalist\nCitations\n↑\nZelnhefer,\nDer Stürmer\n.\n1\n2\nAvalon Project,\nJudgement: Streicher\n.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nSnyder 1976\n, p.\n336.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, p.\n6.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, p.\n8.\n1\n2\n3\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n12–13.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, pp.\n137–138.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n345.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, pp.\n138–139.\n1\n2\nBracher 1970\n, p.\n93.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nFranz-Willing 1962\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, pp.\n12–14.\n↑\nRees 2017\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n343, 345–346.\n1\n2\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nRees 2017\n, p.\n23.\n1\n2\n3\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nFriedman 1998\n, p.\n300.\n↑\nRees 2017\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nDolibois 2000\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nRees 2017\n, pp.\n22–23.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, pp.\n51–52.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, p.\n52.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n99–100.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n921.\n↑\nBullock 1962\n, p.\n124.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n353.\n↑\nFest 1974\n, p.\n219.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n922.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nKeß 2003\n, p.\n250.\n↑\nBartrop\n&\nGrimm 2019\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, pp.\n47–51.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, pp.\n143–150.\n↑\nWistrich 2001\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nWelch 2002\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nKoonz 2005\n, pp.\n232–233.\n↑\nFischer 1995\n, pp.\n135–136.\n↑\nWelch 2002\n, p.\n76–77.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, pp.\n110, 208–214.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, p.\n320.\n↑\nBernhard 2019\n, pp.\n97–114.\n↑\nBytwerk 2004\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nNadler 1969\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n367.\n↑\nWall 1997\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nKater, Mommsen\n&\nPapen 1999\n, p.\n151.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, pp.\n17–24.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nGunther 1940\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, pp.\n52–53.\n↑\nMaser 2000\n, p.\n282.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, pp.\n47, 50–53.\n↑\nBayerische Landesbibliothek,\nJulius Streicher\n.\n↑\nWistrich 1995\n, pp.\n251–252.\n↑\nDavidson 1997\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nDavidson 1997\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nTofahrn 2008\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nUSHMM, \"Henry Plitt Interview\"\n.\n↑\nBytwerk 2001\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nLos Angeles Times\n, October 1945\n.\n↑\nWeitz 1992\n, p.\n332.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, pp.\n54–56.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, pp.\n56–57.\n↑\nSnyder 1989\n, p.\n57.\n↑\nTimmermann 2006\n, pp.\n827–828.\n↑\nLombardo 2010\n, pp.\n228, 236.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, pp.\n381–389.\n↑\nWistrich 1995\n, p.\n252.\n↑\nConot 2000\n, p.\n506.\n↑\nRadlmeier 2001\n, pp.\n345–346.\n↑\nDuff 1999\n, p.\n130.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nKerr 1993\n, pp.\n385–392.\nBibliography\n\"Avalon Project – Yale University\"\n.\nJudgement: Streicher\n. 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Grabert-Verlag, Tübingen.\nISBN\n3-87847-163-7\n.\nKater, Michael; Mommsen, Hans; Papen, Patricia von (1999).\nBeseitigung des jüdischen Einflusses: Antisemitische Forschung, Eliten und Karrieren im Nationalsozialismus\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-59336-098-0\n.\nKerr, Philip\n(1993).\nBerlin Noir\n. Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-0-140-23170-0\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2000).\nHitler: 1889–1936, Hubris\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-39332-035-0\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2001).\nHitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-39332-252-1\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. W.W. Norton & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-393-33761-7\n.\nKeß, Bettina (2003). \"Das Konstrukt \"Mainfranken\": Regional Identität als Mittel zur Machtstabilisation und Standortsicherung\". In Silke Göttsch-Elten; Christel Köhle-Hezinger (eds.).\nKomplexe Welt: Kulturelle Ordunungssysteme als Orientierung\n. Münster: Waxmann Verlag GmbH.\nISBN\n3-8309-1300-1\n.\nKingsbury-Smith, Joseph (16 October 1946).\n\"The Execution of Nazi War Criminals\"\n.\nUniversity of Missouri–Kansas City\n. International News Service (INS)\n. Retrieved\n16 April\n2018\n.\nKoonz, Claudia (2005).\nThe Nazi Conscience\n. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-01842-6\n.\nLombardo, Paul A. (2010).\nThree Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court and Buck v. Bell\n. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8018-9824-2\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2019).\nHitler: A Biography\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19005-673-5\n.\nLos Angeles Times (18 October 1945). \"ALL SUPERMEN---EXCEPT FOR THE SHAPE THEY ARE IN\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. No.\nPage 1.\nManvell, Roger; Fraenkel, Heinrich (2011).\nGoering\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMaser, Werner (2000).\nHermann Göring. Hitlers janusköpfiger Paladin: Die politische Biographie\n(in German). Berlin: Edition q.\nISBN\n978-3-86124-509-4\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2012).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945, Vol. 1\n. R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-21-0\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2021).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. Vol.\n3 (Fritz Sauckel – Hans Zimmermann). Fonthill Media.\nISBN\n978-1-781-55826-3\n.\nNadler, Fritz (1969).\nEine Stadt im Schatten Streichers\n(in German). Nürnberg: Fränkische Verlagsanstalt und Buchdruckerei.\nISBN\n978-3871912665\n.\nOvery, Richard J. (1984).\nGoering: The Iron Man\n. London: Routledge.\nASIN\nB01DMTG9N2\n.\nRadlmeier, Steffen (2001).\nDer Nürnberger Lernprozess: von Kriegsverbrechern und Starreportern\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn.\nISBN\n978-3-82184-725-2\n.\nRees, Laurence (2017).\nThe Holocaust: A New History\n. New York: PublicAffairs.\nISBN\n978-1-61039-844-2\n.\nRoos, Daniel (2014).\nJulius Streicher und \"Der Stürmer\" 1923–1945\n(in German). Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.\nISBN\n978-3-506-77267-1\n.\nRuault, Franco (2006).\n\"Neuschöpfer des deutschen Volkes\" Julius Streicher im Kampf gegen \"Rassenschande\"\n. Beiträge zur Dissidenz (in German). Vol.\n18. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-54499-0\n.\nSnyder, Louis L. (1976).\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. London: Robert Hale.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nSnyder, Louis L. (1989).\nHitler's Elite: Biographical Sketches of Nazis Who Shaped the Third Reich\n. New York: Hippocrene Books.\nISBN\n978-0-87052-738-8\n.\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard (2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. New York; London:\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-52182-371-5\n.\nTimmermann, Wibke Kristin (2006).\n\"Incitement in international criminal law\"\n(PDF)\n.\nInternational Review of the Red Cross\n.\n88\n(864).\nTofahrn, Klaus W. (2008).\nDas Dritte Reich und der Holocaust\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang GmbH.\nISBN\n978-3-63157-702-8\n.\nUSHMM.\n\"Julius Streicher: Biography\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n16 April\n2018\n.\nWall, Donald D. (1997).\nNazi Germany and World War II\n. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-31409-360-8\n.\nWeitz, John (1992).\nHitler's Diplomat: The Life And Times of Joachim von Ribbentrop\n. New York:\nTicknor & Fields\n.\nISBN\n0-395-62152-6\n.\nWelch, David (2002).\nThe Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-41511-910-8\n.\nWistrich, Robert (1995).\nWho's Who In Nazi Germany\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-41511-888-0\n.\nWistrich, Robert (2001).\nHitler and the Holocaust\n. New York: Modern Library Chronicles.\nISBN\n0-679-64222-6\n.\nZelnhefer, Siegfried (5 September 2008).\n\"Der Stürmer. Deutsches Wochenblatt zum Kampf um die Wahrheit\"\n.\nHistorisches Lexikon Bayerns\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n28 April\n2019\n.\nZeller, Tom (2007).\n\"The Nuremberg Hangings – Not So Smooth Either (16 January 2007)\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n((2 vols.)\ned.). New York: Macmillan Publishing.\nISBN\n0-02-897500-6\n.\nFurther reading\nAronsfeld, C. C. (1985). \"\n'Revisionist historians' whitewash Julius Streicher\".\nPatterns of Prejudice\n.\n19\n(3):\n38–\n39.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/0031322X.1985.9969824\n.\nExternal links\nGermany portal\nJournalism portal\nUSHMM.\n\"Henry Plitt Interview\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n16 April\n2018\n.\nSpiegel TV\nshort biography (German)\nCaricatures\nfrom\nDer Stürmer\nDer Giftpilz\n(\"The Poison Mushroom\")\nNuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 12\nTranscript of the testimony of Julius Streicher\nNewspaper clippings about Julius Streicher\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInformation about Julius Streicher\nin the Reichstag database\nJulius Streicher\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "leader": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Office established",
+      "succeeded_by": "Himself",
+      "born": "Julius Sebastian Streicher(1885-02-12)12 February 1885Fleinhausen, Germany",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged61)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1922–1945)",
+      "other_politicalaffiliations": "DSP(1919–1921)DWG(1921–1922)",
+      "spouses": "Kunigunde Roth​​(m.1913;died1943)​Adele Tappe​(m.1945)​",
+      "known_for": "Publisher of propaganda",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1918",
+      "rank": "Leutnant",
+      "unit": "6th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "awards": "Iron Cross",
+      "criminal_status": "Executedby hanging",
+      "conviction": "Crimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 35736
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Walther_Funk",
+    "name": "Walther Funk",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Walther Immanuel Funk was a German economist, Nazi official and convicted war criminal who served as Reichsminister for the Economy from 1938 to 1945 and president of the Reichsbank from 1939 to 1945. Funk oversaw the mobilization of the economy for Germany's rearmament and World War II, and the expropriation of assets of victims from Nazi concentration camps. He was convicted for crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg Tribunal.",
+    "description": "German economist, Nazi politician and convicted war criminal (1890–1960)",
+    "full_text": "Walther Funk\nGerman economist, Nazi politician and convicted war criminal (1890–1960)\nWalther Immanuel Funk\n(18 August 1890\n– 31 May 1960) was a\nGerman\neconomist\n,\nNazi\nofficial and\nconvicted war criminal\nwho served as\nReichsminister\nfor the Economy\nfrom 1938 to 1945 and president of the\nReichsbank\nfrom 1939 to 1945. Funk oversaw the\nmobilization\nof the economy for\nGermany's rearmament\nand\nWorld War II\n, and the\nexpropriation\nof\nassets\nof victims from\nNazi concentration camps\n.\nHe was convicted for crimes against humanity by the\nNuremberg Tribunal\n.\nFunk was a\nfinance\njournalist\nbefore joining the Nazi Party in 1931 and being appointed to a senior post at the\nMinistry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda\n. Funk was appointed as economics minister by\nAdolf Hitler\nto replace\nHjalmar Schacht\n, as well as a member of the\nCouncil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich\nand the\nCentral Planning Board\n. Funk served as economics minister for nearly all of World War II until he was removed on 5 May 1945 after being left out of the\nFlensburg Government\n.\nFunk was tried and convicted as a major\nwar criminal\nby the\nInternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg\nafter the war and sentenced to\nlife in prison\n. Funk was incarcerated in\nWest Berlin\nuntil he was released on health grounds in 1957 and died three years later.\nEarly life\nWalther Immanuel Funk was born on 18 August 1890 in\nDanzkehmen\n(present-day Sosnovka in\nKaliningrad Oblast\n,\nRussia\n) near\nTrakehnen\n,\nEast Prussia\n, the son of\nmerchant\nand\nentrepreneur\nWalther Funk and his wife Sophie (\nnée\nUrbschat). He was the only one of the Nuremberg defendants who was born in the\nformer eastern territories of Germany\n. Funk studied law, economics, and philosophy at the\nUniversity of Berlin\nand the\nUniversity of Leipzig\n, receiving his law\ndoctorate\nin 1912. He subsequently trained as a\njournalist\nat newspapers\nNational-Zeitung\nin\nBerlin\nand\nLeipziger Neueste Nachrichten\nin\nLeipzig\n.\nFollowing the outbreak of\nWorld War I\nin 1914, Funk enlisted in the\nImperial German Army\nand joined the\ninfantry\n. He was\nwounded in action\nand subsequently\ndischarged\nas medically unfit for service in 1916. Following the end of the war in 1918, he worked as a journalist, and in 1924 he became the editor of the\ncentre-right\nfinancial newspaper the\nBerliner Börsenzeitung\n. In 1920, Funk married Luise Schmidt-Sieben.\nPolitical career\nSmashed window of the front of a Jewish shop after\nKristallnacht\nin November 1938\nNazi gold\nin\nMerkers\nSalt Mine\nFunk, who was a\nnationalist\nand\nanti-Marxist\n, resigned from the\nBerliner Börsenzeitung\nin the summer of 1931 and joined the\nNazi Party\n, becoming close to\nGregor Strasser\n, who arranged his first meeting with\nAdolf Hitler\n. Partially because of his interest in\neconomic policy\n, he was elected a\nReichstag\ndeputy in July 1932 and made chairman of the party's Committee on Economic Policy in December 1932, a post that he did not hold for long. After the Nazi Party came to power in 1933, he stepped down from his\nReichstag\nposition and was made\nReich\nChief\nPress Officer\nunder\nJoseph Goebbels\n. The post involved\ncensorship\nof anything deemed critical of Nazi policies.\nIn March 1933, Funk was appointed as a\nState Secretary\n(\nStaatssekretär\n) at the\nReich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda\n.\nIn the summer of 1936, when Hitler commissioned\nAlbert Speer\nfor the rebuilding of central Berlin, it was Funk who proposed his new title of \"Inspector-General of Buildings for the Renovation of the Reich Capital\".\nEconomics minister\nOn 5 February 1938, Funk became General Plenipotentiary for Economics (\nGeneralbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft\n), as well as\nReichsminister\nfor the Economy\nto permanently replace\nHjalmar Schacht\nwho had resigned on 26 November 1937. Funk also succeeded Schacht as Minister of Economics and Labor of\nPrussia\n(\nPreußischer Minister für Wirtschaft und Arbeit\n) and as an\nex officio\nmember of the\nPrussian State Council\n. He would hold all these posts until the fall of the Nazi regime.\nSchacht had been engaged in a power struggle with\nReichsmarschall\nHermann Göring\n, who wanted to tie the economics ministry more closely to his\nFour Year Plan\nOffice. Göring briefly served as Schacht's immediate successor between November 1937 and January 1938 until Funk's appointment.\nSchacht, who knew Funk well, said he was \"extraordinarily musical\" being \"a first-rate connoisseur of music whose personal preferences in life were decidedly for the artistic and literary.\" At a dinner when he sat next to Funk, the orchestra played a melody by\nFranz Lehár\n. Funk remarked \"Ah! Lehár – the Fuhrer is particularly fond of his music.\" Schacht replied, jokingly, \"It's a pity that Lehár is married to a Jewess\", to which Funk immediately responded, \"That's something the Fuhrer must not know on any account!\"\nSpeer relates how Hitler played for him a record of\nFranz Liszt\n's\nLes Préludes\nand said \"This is going to be our victory fanfare for the Russian campaign. Funk chose it!\"\nFunk (right) in August 1944 when his State Secretary,\nFranz Hayler\n, was awarded the Knight's Cross for the\nWar Merit Cross\n.\nBetween April 1938 and March 1939, Funk was also a Director of the\nSwitzerland\n-based multi-national\nBank of International Settlements\n.\nIn January 1939,\nAdolf Hitler\nappointed Funk as President of the\nReichsbank\n. Funk recorded that by 1938 the German state had confiscated\nJewish\nproperty worth two million\nReichsmarks\n, using decrees from Hitler and other top Nazis to force\nGerman Jews\nto leave their property and assets to the state if they emigrated, such as the\nReich Flight Tax\n.\nOn 30 August 1939, immediately prior to the outbreak of the\nSecond World War\n, Funk was appointed by Hitler to the six-person\nCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich\nwhich was set up to operate as a \"\nwar cabinet\n\".\nThroughout the war years, Funk was present at a great many important meetings, including one about the Four Year Plan held in the Great Hall of the\nAir Ministry Building\non 13 February 1942. The meeting included 30 crucial people in the Nazi government and was chaired by Field-Marshal\nErhard Milch\n. Funk sat to the right of Milch, at his request. After much debate,\nAlbert Vogler\nsaid \"there must be one man able to make decisions. Industry did not care who it was.\" After further discussion, Funk stood up and nominated Milch as that man, though Speer whispered to Milch this was not a good idea. Milch declined the position, and five days later Hitler conferred the role on Speer. As he and Funk walked Hitler back to his apartment in the Chancery, Funk promised Speer that he would place everything at his disposal and do all in his power to help him. Speer relates that Funk \"kept the promise, with minor exceptions.\"\nIn September 1943, Funk was appointed as a fourth member of the\nCentral Planning Board\n, which was charged with managing the\nraw materials\nand manpower for Germany's entire\nwar economy\n.\nHe subsequently joined\nRobert Ley\n, Speer and Goebbels in the struggle against the influence on Hitler by\nMartin Bormann\n.\nFunk and Milch were again together for Göring's birthday party on 12 January 1944 when Funk, as he did every year, delivered the birthday speech at the banquet.\nFunk stayed in office until nearly the end of the Nazi regime, and was named by Hitler in his\nlast will and testament\nto continue as\nReichsminister\nfor the Economy in the cabinet of Goebbels after his\nsuicide\non 30 April 1945. However, after Goebbels' own suicide the next day, Funk was not named to the\nFlensburg Government\nformed by\nLutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk\n, effectively ending his tenure as economics minister on 5 May.\nSchwerin von Krosigk, the\nMinister of Finance\n, did not include an economics minister in his new cabinet. On 11 May, Funk was arrested by\nAllied\nforces and sent to\nCamp Ashcan\nin\nLuxembourg\nto await trial.\nNuremberg\nGold\nrings\nof victims from\nBuchenwald concentration camp\n. Funk as\nReichsminister\nfor the Economy and President of the\nReichsbank\naccepted the rings from the SS to be melted down.\nEyeglasses\nof victims at\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n.\nLuggage\ntaken from victims at Auschwitz.\nFunk was tried with other Nazi leaders at the\nNuremberg trials\n. He was accused by Allied prosecutors of having been closely involved in the state confiscation and disposal of the property of German Jews, of conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n, the planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\n. Funk argued that, despite his employment titles, he had very little power in the Nazi regime. He did however, admit to signing the laws that \"\nAryanized\n\" Jewish property and in that respect claimed to be \"morally guilty\". At the Nuremberg trials, American Chief Prosecutor\nRobert H. Jackson\nlabeled Funk as \"The Banker of Gold Teeth\", referring to the practice of extracting\ngold teeth\nfrom\nNazi concentration camp\nvictims, and forwarding the teeth to the\nReichsbank\nfor melting down to yield\nbullion\n. Many other gold items were stolen from victims, such as\njewellery\n,\neyeglasses\nand\nfinger rings\n. Other items stolen from the victims included their\nclothing\n,\nfurniture\n,\nartwork\n, as well as any wealth in\nstocks\n,\nshares\n,\nbusinesses\nand\ncompanies\n. Such business assets were taken by\naryanization\nwith often large and profitable businesses sold for less than their true worth. The monetary proceeds of\nauctions\nof such assets as furniture were passed to the\nReichsbank\nin\nMax Heiliger\naccounts for use by the Nazi state or the\nSS\n. Even the hair of the victims was taken by shaving either just before or just after their murder. When clothing was distributed after the victims were shot by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, blood stains were often visible at and near the bullet holes.\nFunk was clearly distressed during the proceedings and cried during presentation of evidence, such as the murders carried out in the concentration camps, requiring\nsleeping pills\nat night. Schacht relates that he, Funk and\nFranz von Papen\nformed a close intimate circle at Nuremberg, and that he felt Funk was unable to comprehend the serious nature of the duties which he had undertaken. Schacht believed that there were many matters of which Funk had no knowledge whatsoever and that he gave a poor performance in the\nwitness box\n.\nHowever, Speer gave a different version of events. He said that when he first came into contact with Funk at Nuremberg \"he looked extremely worn and downcast.\" But \"Funk reasoned skillfully and in a way that stirred my pity\" in the witness box.\nGöring meanwhile described Funk as \"an insignificant subordinate\", but documentary evidence and his wartime\nbiography\nWalther Funk, A Life for the Economy\nwere used against him during the trial, leading to his conviction on counts 2, 3 and 4 of the\nindictment\nand his sentence of\nlife imprisonment\n. Funk was held at\nSpandau Prison\nalong with other\nsenior Nazis\n.\nLater life and death\nOn 16 May 1957, Funk was granted\ncompassionate release\nbecause of ill health, making last-minute visits to Speer,\nRudolf Hess\n, and\nBaldur von Schirach\nbefore leaving the prison.\nOn 31 May 1960, Funk died of complication from\ndiabetes\nin\nDüsseldorf\n,\nWest Germany\n.\nSee also\nAuschwitz concentration camp\nNazi plunder\nOskar Groening\nMax Heiliger\nReferences\n↑\n\"After the Battle: The Flensburg Government\"\n(PDF)\n. Battle of Britain International Ltd. 2005. p.\n8\n. Retrieved\n3 May\n2021\n.\n↑\nWilliam L. Shirer. (1960). \"Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\". Simon and Schuster. New York. p. 491\n↑\n\"After the Battle: The Flensburg Government\"\n(PDF)\n. Battle of Britain International Ltd. 2005. p.\n8\n. Retrieved\n3 May\n2021\n.\n↑\nMemoirs\nby Franz von Papen, London, 1952, p. 312.\n↑\nInside the Third Reich\nby Albert Speer, London, 1970, p. 76.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume VI, pp. 216–217, Document 3533-PS\"\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n5 May\n2023\n.\n↑\nMy First Seventy-Six Years\n, by Hjalmar Schacht, London 1955, p. 377.\nOnline\n↑\nSchacht, 1955, pp. 340–41, 456.\n↑\nSpeer, 1970, p. 180.\n↑\nBank of International Settlements,\n\"Ninth Annual Report: 1 April 1938 – 31 March 1939\"\npp. 135–37\n↑\nBroszat, Martin (1981).\nThe Hitler State\n. Longman Group Ltd. pp.\n308–\n309.\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n.\n↑\nSpeer, 1970, pp. 200–02.\n↑\nWistrich, Robert (1982).\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n. Macmillan Publishing Co. p.\n87.\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\n.\n↑\nSpeer, 1970, p. 263.\n↑\nSpeer, 1970, p. 322.\n↑\n\"After the Battle: The Flensburg Government\"\n(PDF)\n. Battle of Britain International Ltd. 2005. p.\n8\n. Retrieved\n3 May\n2021\n.\n↑\nSchacht, 1955, pp. 455–56.\n↑\nSpeer, 1970, pp. 508, 515.\n↑\nBird, Eugene (1974).\nThe Loneliest Man in the World\n. London: Secker & Warburg. p.\n121.\nISBN\n0-436-04290-8\n.\nExternal links\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nWalther Funk\n.\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nWalther Funk\n.\nInformation about Walther Funk\nin the Reichstag database\nWorks by or about Walther Funk\nat the\nInternet Archive\nLived in the historic villa at Sven-Hedin-Str. 11\nFunk war crimes dossier\nNewspaper clippings about Walther Funk\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInterrogation of Funk, Walther / Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality / Interrogation Division Summary",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Adolf Hitler(Führer)Karl Dönitz",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf HitlerJoseph Goebbels",
+      "preceded_by": "Office established",
+      "succeeded_by": "Otto Dietrich",
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "born": "(1890-08-18)18 August 1890Danzkehmen,East Prussia,German Empire",
+      "died": "31 May 1960(1960-05-31)(aged69)Düsseldorf,North Rhine-Westphalia,West Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse": "Luise Schmidt-Sieben",
+      "education": "University of BerlinUniversity of Leipzig(LLD)",
+      "profession": "Economist",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased",
+      "convictions": "Crimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Life imprisonment"
+    },
+    "char_count": 13322
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Hjalmar_Schacht",
+    "name": "Hjalmar Schacht",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Horace Greeley Hjalmar Schacht was a German economist, banker, politician, and co-founder of the German Democratic Party. He served as the Currency Commissioner and President of the Reichsbank during the Weimar Republic. He was a fierce critic of his country's post-World War I reparations obligations. He was also central in helping create the group of German industrialists and landowners that pushed Hindenburg to appoint the first Nazi-led government.",
+    "description": "German politician and economist (1877–1970)",
+    "full_text": "Hjalmar Schacht\nGerman politician and economist (1877–1970)\nHorace Greeley Hjalmar Schacht\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈjalmaʁ\nˈʃaxt\n]\n; 22 January 1877\n– 3 June 1970) was a German economist, banker, politician, and co-founder of the\nGerman Democratic Party\n. He served as the Currency Commissioner and President of the\nReichsbank\nduring the\nWeimar Republic\n. He was a fierce critic of his country's post-\nWorld War I reparations\nobligations. He was also central in helping create the\ngroup of German industrialists and landowners\nthat\npushed Hindenburg to appoint the first Nazi-led government\n.\nHe served in\nAdolf Hitler\n's government as President of the Central Bank (\nReichsbank\n) 1933–1939 and as Minister of Economics (August 1934 – November 1937).\nWhile Schacht was for a time feted for his role in the German \"\neconomic miracle\n\", he opposed elements of Hitler's policy of\nGerman re-armament\ninsofar as it violated the\nTreaty of Versailles\nand (in his view) disrupted the German economy. His views in this regard led Schacht to clash with Hitler and\nHermann Göring\n.\nHe resigned as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939. He remained as a minister without portfolio and received the same salary until he left the government in January 1943.\nIn 1944, Schacht was arrested by the\nGestapo\nfollowing the\nassassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944\nbecause he allegedly had contact with the assassins. Subsequently, he was interned in the Ravensbrück, Flossenbürg, and Dachau concentration camps. In the final days of the war, he was one of the 139 special and clan prisoners\nwho were\ntransported\nby the SS from\nDachau\nto\nSouth Tyrol\n. This location is within the area named by Himmler the \"\nAlpine Fortress\n\", and it is speculated that the purpose of the prisoner transport was the intent of holding hostages. They were freed in\nNiederdorf, South Tyrol\non 30 April 1945.\nSchacht was\ntried at Nuremberg\n, but was acquitted despite Soviet objections. Later, a German\ndenazification\ntribunal sentenced him to eight years of hard labour, which was also overturned on appeal.\nEarly life and career\nSchacht was born in\nTingleff\n,\nSchleswig-Holstein\n(now in\nDenmark\n) to William Leonhard Ludwig Maximillian Schacht and Baroness Constanze Justine Sophie von Eggers, a native of Denmark and a granddaughter of the Danish-\nHolsteinian\ncivil servant\nChristian von Eggers\n(\nde\n)\n.\nHis parents, who had spent years in the United States, originally decided on the name Horace Greeley Schacht, in honor of the American journalist\nHorace Greeley\n. However, they yielded to the insistence of the Schacht family grandmother, who firmly believed the child's given name should be Danish. After completing his\nAbitur\nat the\nGelehrtenschule des Johanneums\n, Schacht studied medicine,\nphilology\n,\npolitical science\n, and\nfinance\nat the Universities of\nMunich\n,\nLeipzig\n,\nBerlin\n,\nParis\nand\nKiel\nbefore earning a doctorate at Kiel in 1899 – his thesis was on\nmercantilism\n.\nHe joined the\nDresdner Bank\nin 1903. In 1905, while on a business trip to the United States with board members of the Dresdner Bank, Schacht met the famous American banker\nJ. P. Morgan\n, as well as U.S. president\nTheodore Roosevelt\n. He became deputy director of the Dresdner Bank from 1908 to 1915. He was then a board member of the\nGerman National Bank\n(\nde\n)\nfor the next seven years, until 1922, and after its merger with the\nDarmstädter und Nationalbank\n(\nDanatbank\n), a board member of the Danatbank.\nSchacht was a\nfreemason\n, having joined the lodge\nUrania zur Unsterblichkeit\nin 1908.\nDuring the\nFirst World War\n, Schacht was assigned to the staff of General Karl von Lumm (1864–1930), the Banking Commissioner for\nGerman-occupied Belgium\n, to organize the financing of Germany's purchases in Belgium. He was summarily dismissed by General von Lumm when it was discovered that he had used his previous employer, the Dresdner Bank, to channel the note remittances for nearly 500 million francs of Belgian national bonds destined to pay for the requisitions.\nAfter Schacht's dismissal from public service, he had another brief stint at the Dresdner Bank, and then various positions at other banks. In 1923, Schacht applied and was rejected for the position of head of the\nReichsbank\n, largely as a result of his dismissal from Lumm's service.\nDuring the\nGerman Revolution of 1918–1919\n, Schacht became a\nVernunftrepublikaner\n(a supporter of the Republic by reason rather than conviction) who had reservations over the\nparliamentary democratic system\nof the new\nWeimar Republic\nbut supported it anyway for pragmatic reasons. He helped found the\nleft-liberal\nGerman Democratic Party\n(DDP), which took a leading role in the governing\nWeimar Coalition\n. However, Schacht later became an ally of\nGustav Stresemann\n, the leader of the center-right\nGerman People's Party\n(DVP).\nRise to President of the Reichsbank\nReichsbank President Schacht\nDespite the blemish on his record from his service with von Lumm, on 12 November 1923,\nSchacht became currency commissioner for the\nWeimar Republic\nand participated in the introduction of the\nRentenmark\n, a new currency the value of which was based on a mortgage on all of the properties in Germany.\nGermany entered into a brief period where it had two separate currencies: the\nReichsmark\nmanaged by\nRudolf Havenstein\n, President of the\nReichsbank\n, and the newly created Rentenmark managed by Schacht. Havenstein died on 20 November 1923.\nOn 22 December 1923, after Schacht's economic policies had helped battle\nGerman hyperinflation\nand stabilize the German\nReichsmark\n(\nHelfferich\nPlan), he was appointed President of the Reichsbank at the requests of president\nFriedrich Ebert\nand Chancellor\nGustav Stresemann\n.\nIn 1926, Schacht provided funds for the formation of\nIG Farben\n. He collaborated with other prominent economists to form the 1929\nYoung Plan\nto modify the way that\nwar reparations\nwere paid after Germany incurred large foreign debts under the\nDawes Plan\n.\nIn December 1929, he caused the fall of the\nFinance Minister\nRudolf Hilferding\nby imposing upon the government his conditions for obtaining a loan.\nAfter modifications by\nHermann Müller\n's government to the Young Plan during the Second Conference of The Hague (January 1930), he resigned as Reichsbank president on 7 March 1930. During 1930, Schacht campaigned against the war reparations requirement in the United States.\nSchacht became a friend of the Governor of the Bank of England,\nMontagu Norman\n, both men belonging to the\nAnglo-German Fellowship\nand the\nBank for International Settlements\n. Norman was so close to the Schacht family that he was godfather to one of Schacht's grandchildren.\nInvolvement with the NSDAP (Nazi Party) and government\nBy 1926, Schacht had left the shrinking DDP and began increasingly lending his support to the\nNazi Party\n(NSDAP). He became disillusioned with Stresemann's policies after he believed that closer relations with the United States were failing to provide economic benefits, and after his efforts to negotiate a rapprochement with the United Kingdom by pegging the Reichsmark to the\npound sterling\nfailed. Beginning in 1929, he increasingly criticized German foreign and financial policy since 1924 and demanded the restoration of Germany's\nformer eastern territories\nand\noverseas colonies\n.\nSchacht became closer to the Nazis between 1930 and 1932.\nThough never a member of the NSDAP, Schacht helped to raise funds for the party after meeting with\nAdolf Hitler\n. Close for a short time to\nHeinrich Brüning\n's government, Schacht shifted to the right by entering the\nHarzburg Front\nin October 1931.\nSchacht's disillusionment with the existing Weimar government did not indicate a particular shift in his overall philosophy, but rather arose primarily out of two issues:\nhis objection to the inclusion of\nSocial Democratic Party\nelements in the government, and the effect of their various construction and job-creation projects on public expenditures and borrowings (and the consequent undermining of the government's anti-inflation efforts);\nhis desire to see Germany retake its place on the international stage, and his recognition that \"as the powers became more involved in their own economic problems in 1931 and 1932\n... a strong government based on a broad national movement could use the existing conditions to regain Germany's sovereignty and equality as a world power.\"\nSchacht believed that if the German government was ever to commence a wholesale reindustrialization and rearmament despite the restrictions imposed by Germany's treaty obligations, it would have to be during a period lacking clear international consensus among the\nGreat Powers\n.\nAfter the\nNovember 1932 elections\n, in which the NSDAP saw its vote share fall by four percentage points, Schacht and\nWilhelm Keppler\norganized a petition of industrial and financial leaders, the\nIndustrielleneingabe\n(Industrial petition), requesting president\nPaul von Hindenburg\nto appoint Adolf Hitler as\nChancellor\n. After Hitler took power in January 1933, Schacht won re-appointment as Reichsbank president on 17 March.\nSchacht (left) at a meeting in the Reichsbank transfer commission in 1934\nOn 2 August 1934, when  Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics\nKurt Schmitt\nwent on an extended medical leave of absence, Hitler provisionally appointed Schacht to take over the running of the ministries. The appointment was made permanent on 31 January 1935, after Schmitt formally resigned.\nSchacht supported\npublic-works\nprograms, most notably the construction of\nautobahnen\n(highways) to attempt to alleviate unemployment – policies which had been instituted in Germany by\nKurt von Schleicher\n's government in late 1932, and had in turn influenced\nFranklin D. Roosevelt\n's\nNew Deal\nin the United States. But years later, Roosevelt seemed to \"enjoy\" recalling how Dr. Schacht was \"weeping on his [FDR's] desk about his poor country.\"\nHe also introduced the \"New Plan\", Germany's attempt to achieve economic \"\nautarky\n\", in September 1934. Germany had accrued a massive foreign currency deficit during the\nGreat Depression\n, which continued into the early years of Nazi rule. Schacht negotiated several trade agreements with countries in\nSouth America\nand\nsoutheastern Europe\n, under which Germany would continue to receive raw materials, but would pay in Reichsmarks. This ensured that the deficit would not get any worse, while allowing the German government to deal with the gap that had already developed. Schacht also found an innovative solution to the problem of the government deficit by using\nmefo bills\n.\nSchacht was also made a member of the\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nHe was appointed General\nPlenipotentiary\nfor the War Economy in May 1935 by provision of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935\nand was awarded honorary membership in the NSDAP and the\nGolden Party Badge\nin January 1937.\nSchacht disagreed with what he called \"unlawful activities\" against\nGermany's Jewish minority\nand in August 1935 made a speech denouncing\nJulius Streicher\nand Streicher's writing in the Nazi newspaper\nDer Stürmer\n.\nSchacht and Hitler in 1936\nDuring the economic crisis of 1935–36, Schacht, together with the Price Commissioner Dr.\nCarl Friedrich Goerdeler\n, helped lead the \"free-market\" faction in the German government. They urged Hitler to reduce military spending, turn away from\nautarkic\nand protectionist policies, and reduce state control in the economy. Schacht and Goerdeler were opposed by a faction centering on\nHermann Göring\n.\nGöring was appointed \"Plenipotentiary for the\nFour Year Plan\n\" on 18 October 1936, with broad powers that conflicted with Schacht's authority. Schacht objected to continued high military spending, which he believed would cause inflation, thus coming into conflict with Hitler and Göring.\nIn 1937, Schacht met with Chinese Finance Minister Dr.\nH. H. Kung\n. Schacht told him that \"German-Chinese friendship stemmed in good part from the hard struggle of both for independence\". Kung said, \"China considers Germany its best friend\n... I hope and wish that Germany will participate in supporting the further development of China, the opening up of its sources of raw materials, the upbuilding of its industries and means of transportation.\"\nOn 26 November 1937, Schacht resigned as Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics and as General Plenipotentiary at both his and Göring's request. He had grown increasingly dissatisfied with Göring's near-total ignorance of economics, and was also concerned that Germany was coming close to bankruptcy. His replacement was to be\nWalther Funk\n, who would take over in February 1938, with Göring serving as acting minister in the interim. Hitler, however, knew that Schacht's departure would raise eyebrows outside Germany, and insisted that he remain in the cabinet as\nminister without portfolio\nand as President of the\nReichsbank\n.\nGöring also appointed him to the\nPrussian State Council\n.\nFollowing the\nKristallnacht\nof November 1938, Schacht publicly declared his repugnance at the events and suggested to Hitler that he should use other means if he wanted to be rid of the Jews.\nHe put forward a plan in which Jewish property in Germany would be held in trust, and used as security for loans raised abroad, which would also be guaranteed by the German government. Funds would be made available for\nJewish emigrants\n, to overcome the objections of countries that were hesitant to accept penniless Jews. Hitler accepted the suggestion and authorised him to negotiate with his London contacts. Schacht, in his book\nThe Magic of Money\n(1967), wrote that Montagu Norman and\nLord Bearstead\n, a prominent Jew, had reacted favourably, but\nChaim Weizmann\n, leading spokesman for the\nBritish Zionist Federation\n, opposed the plan.\nA component of the plan was that emigrating Jews would have taken items such as machinery with them on leaving the country, as a means of boosting German exports.\nThe similar\nHaavara Agreement\nallowing German Jews to emigrate to\nMandatory Palestine\nunder similar terms had been signed in 1933.\nOn 20 January 1939, Hitler dismissed Schacht from his post as President of the\nReichsbank\nand replaced him with Funk. Schacht remained a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio, receiving the same salary, but was excluded from participation in the government. He retired to his house in the country, but continued to occasionally voice private criticisms, culminating in a letter to Göring in November 1942. In it, he assailed the government's decision to begin calling up 15-year-olds for service in the airfield defense forces, and cited this as one more item in a litany of factors that he concluded would strengthen the public's \"misgivings as to how this war will actually end\". The response to the letter was that Hitler dismissed him as a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio on 22 January 1943, and he was also dismissed from the Prussian State Council by Göring, who cited his \"defeatist letter, calculated to undermine the German people's powers of resistance\". Another letter from\nMartin Bormann\ndemanded that Schacht return the Golden Party Badge that he had received in 1937. When Schacht returned to his Berlin home, he found that it was being watched by the\nGestapo\n.\nResistance activities\nSchacht was said to be in contact with the\nGerman resistance to Nazism\nas early as 1934, though at that time he still believed the Nazi regime would follow his policies. By 1938, he was disillusioned and was an active participant in the plans for a\ncoup d'état against Hitler\nif he started a war against\nCzechoslovakia\n.\nGoerdeler, his colleague in 1935–36, was the civilian leader of resistance to Hitler. Schacht talked frequently with\nHans Gisevius\n, another resistance figure; when resistance organizer\nTheodor Strünck\n's house (a frequent meeting place) was bombed out, Schacht allowed Strünck and his wife to live in a villa he owned. However, Schacht had remained in the government and, after 1941, Schacht took no active part in any resistance.\nStill, at Schacht's\ndenazification\ntrial (after his acquittal at the\nNuremberg trials\n), it was declared by a judge that \"None of the civilians in the resistance did more or could have done more than Schacht actually did.\"\nAfter the\nattempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944\n, Schacht was arrested on 23 July.\nHe was sent to\nRavensbrück\n, then to\nFlossenbürg\n,\nand finally to\nDachau\n. In late April 1945, he and about 140 other prominent inmates of Dachau were\ntransferred to Tyrol\nby the\nSS\n, which left them there. They were liberated by the\nFifth U.S. Army\non 5 May 1945 in\nNiederdorf, South Tyrol\n,\nDolomites\n,\nItaly\n.\nAfter the war\nSchacht in an Allied internment camp, 1945\nSchacht had supported Hitler's gaining power and had been an important official of the Nazi regime. Thus, he was arrested by the\nAllies\nin 1945. He was put on trial at\nNuremberg\nfor \"conspiracy\" and \"crimes against peace\" (planning and waging wars of aggression), but not war crimes or crimes against humanity.\nSchacht pleaded not guilty to these charges. He cited in his defense that he had lost all official power before the war even began, that he had been in contact with Resistance leaders like\nHans Gisevius\nthroughout the war, and that he had been arrested and imprisoned in a concentration camp himself.\nHis defenders argued that he was just a patriot trying to make the German economy strong. Furthermore, Schacht was not a member of the NSDAP and shared very little of their ideology. The British judges favored acquittal, while the\nSoviet\njudges wanted to convict and execute.\nThe British prevailed, and Schacht was acquitted on 1 October 1946.\nHowever, at a West German\ndenazification\ntrial, Schacht was sentenced to eight years of hard labor. He was freed on appeal in 1948.\nIn 1950,\nJuan Yarur Lolas\n, the Bethlehem-born founder of the\nBanco de Crédito e Inversiones\nand president of the Arab colony in\nSantiago\n, Chile, tried to hire Schacht as a \"financial adviser\" in conjunction with the\nGerman-Chilean community\n.\nHowever, the plan fell through when it became news.\nHe served as a hired consultant for\nAristotle Onassis\n, a Greek businessman, during the 1950s.\nHe also advised the\nIndonesian government\nin 1951 following the invitation of economic minister\nSumitro Djojohadikusumo\n.\nSchacht (left) with\nMohammad Mosaddegh\nof Iran, 1952\nIn 1953, Schacht started a bank,\nDeutsche Außenhandelsbank Schacht & Co.\n, which he led until 1963. He also advised on economics and finance to heads of state of developing countries, in particular the\nNon-Aligned\ncountries; however, some of his suggestions were opposed, one of which was in the Philippines by the former\nBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas\nhead\nMiguel Cuaderno\n, who firmly rebuffed Schacht, stating that his monetary schemes were hardly appropriate for an economy needing capital investment in basic industry and infrastructure.\nSchacht (right) with\nStafford Sands\n, while visiting the\nBahamas\nin 1962\nIndirectly resulting from his founding of the bank, Schacht was the plaintiff in a foundational case in German law on the\n\"general right of personality\"\n. A magazine published an article criticizing Schacht, containing several incorrect statements. Schacht first requested that the magazine publish a correction, and when the magazine refused, he sued the publisher for violation of his personality rights. The district court found the publisher both civilly and criminally liable; on appeal, the appellate court reversed the criminal conviction, but found that the publisher had violated Schacht's general right of personality.\nSchacht died in\nMunich\n, West Germany, on 3 June 1970.\nWorks\nSchacht wrote 26 books\nduring his lifetime, of which at least six have been translated into English:\nThe Stabilisation of the Mark\n. Translated by Butler, Ralph. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1927.\nThe Stabilization of the Mark\n(Reprint). New York: Arno Press. 1979.\nISBN\n0-405-11246-7\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nThe End of Reparations\n. Translated by Gannett, Lewis. New York: J. Cape & H. Smith. 1931\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nAccount Settled\n. Translated by Fitzgerald, Edward. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1949\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\n(Originally titled\nAbrechnung mit Hitler\n,\nwritten during the Nuremberg trials.\n)\nGold for Europe\n. Translated by Stern-Rubarth, Edgar. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. 1950.\nMy First Seventy-Six Years: The Autobiography of Hjalmar Schacht\n. Translated by Pyke, Diana. London: Allan Wingate. 1955\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\n(The Internet Archive also has a\nfreely accessible black-and-white copy\n.)\nAmerican edition:\nConfessions of \"The Old Wizard\": The Autobiography of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht\n. Translated by Pyke, Diana. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1956\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nThe Magic of Money\n. Translated by Erskine, Paul. London: Oldbourne. 1967\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nMiscellaneous\nGustave Gilbert\n, an American Army psychologist, examined the Nazi leaders who were tried at Nuremberg. He administered a German version of the\nWechsler-Bellevue\nIQ test\n. Schacht scored 143, the highest among the leaders tested, after adjustment upwards to take account of his age.\nWhen he stabilized the mark in 1923, Schacht's office was a former\ncharwoman\n's cupboard. When his secretary, Fräulein Steffeck, was later asked about his work there, she described it as follows (from:\nWhen Money Dies\n):\nWhat did he do? He sat on his chair and smoked in his little dark room, which still smelled of old floor cloths. Did he read letters? No, he read no letters. Did he write letters? No, he wrote no letters. He telephoned a great deal – he telephoned in every direction and to every German or foreign place that had anything to do with money and foreign exchange, as well as with the Reichsbank and the Finance Minister. And he smoked. We did not eat much during that time. We usually went home late, often by the last suburban train, travelling third class. Apart from that, he did nothing.\nPortrayal in popular culture\nHjalmar Schacht has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television, and theater productions:\nFelix Basch\nin the 1943 United States propaganda film\nMission to Moscow\nWładysław Hańcza\nin the 1971 Polish film\nEpilogue at Nurnberg\nJames Bradford in the 2000 Canadian/U.S. TV production\nNuremberg\nStoyan Aleksiev in the 2006 British television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\nHjalmar Schacht appears in the following works of fiction:\nIn\nNancy Mitford\n's '\nThe Pursuit of Love\n' (1945), Sir Leicester Kroesig is 'taken for a drive in a Mercedes-Benz by Doctor Schacht'\nSouthern Victory Series\n, an\nalternate history\nepic by\nHarry Turtledove\n. Schacht cameo in Volume 7:\nThe Victorious Opposition\n, as German Ambassador to the United States.\nHjalmar Schacht appears in the following works of nonfiction:\nIn Cathe Mueller Solinin's book ‘Escape from Dachau’ (2023)\nHjalmar Schacht appears in the following video games:\nIn\nParadox Interactive\n's\nHearts of Iron IV\nas a political advisor for the German Reich.\nSee also\nSecret Meeting of 20 February 1933\nNotes\n↑\n\"Clan prisoners\" is a translation of the German-language term\nSippenhäftlinge\n, which means those persons arrested because they were family members of other prisoners.\nReferences\n↑\nAlberge, Dalya (18 April 2015).\n\"Random House told it should pay to quote Joseph Goebbels in biography\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n.\nLondon\n,\nUK\n. Retrieved\n16 May\n2015\n.\n↑\nTooze, Adam (29 June 2006).\nThe Wages of Destruction\n. United Kingdom: Allen Lane. p.\n78.\nISBN\n978-0-7139-9566-4\n.\n↑\nRichard J. Evans\n,\nThe Third Reich in Power 1933–1939\n. Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-074-8\n. p. 153, states that he had no role in government during\nWorld War II\nwhich is untrue\n.\n↑\nSchlingensiepen, Ferdinand (2010).\nDietrich Bonhoeffer 1906-1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance\n.\nA&C Black\n. p.\n372.\nISBN\n9780567217554\n.\nPetropoulos, Jonathan (2008).\nRoyals and the Reich: The Princes Von Hessen in Nazi Germany\n.\nOxford University Press\n. p.\n286.\nISBN\n9780195339277\n.\n↑\nPeter Koblank:\nDie Befreiung der Sonder- und Sippenhäftlinge in Südtirol\n.\nOnline-Edition Mythos Elser 2006.\n↑\nPentzlin, Heinz (1980).\nHjalmar Schacht: Leben und Wirken einer umstrittenen Persönlichkeit\n[\nHjalmar Schacht: Life and Work of a Controversial Personality\n]\n(in German). Berlin; Frankfurt am Main; Vienna: Ullstein. p.\n14.\nISBN\n3-550-07913-3\n.\n↑\n\"Horace Greely Hjalmar Schacht\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n. 8 October 1958\n. Retrieved\n6 March\n2016\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nHjalmar SCHACHT, biography\nArchived\n4 May 2006 at the\nWayback Machine\nby Frédéric Clavert, author of a thesis on Schacht,\nHjalmar Schacht, financier et diplomate 1930–1950\n, Univ. of Strasbourg, France, 2006\n(in French, English, and German)\n↑\n\"Schacht, Hjalmar\" in Munzinger Online/Personen – Internationales Biographisches Archiv, URL:\nhttp://www.munzinger.de/document/00000000515\n(retrieved 6 March 2016)\n↑\nHjalmar Schacht,\nConfessions of the \"Old Wizard\"\n, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), 105.\n1\n2\nPeterson, Edward Norman.\nHjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler\n. Christopher Publishing House (Boston: 1954) pg. 24–31\n1\n2\nTooze, Adam\n(2007) .\nThe Wages of Destruction: The Making & Breaking of the Nazi Economy\n. London: Penguin. pp.\n12–\n17.\nISBN\n978-0-14-100348-1\n.\n↑\nMarsh, David\n(1992).\nThe Most Powerful Bank: Inside Germany's Bundesbank\n. New York: Times Books. p.\n84.\nISBN\n0-8129-2158-5\n.\n↑\nPeterson, Edward Norman.\nHjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler\n. Christopher Publishing House (Boston: 1954) pg. 49–62\n↑\nMarsh, David\n(1992).\nThe Most Powerful Bank: Inside Germany's Bundesbank\n. New York: Times Books. p.\n85.\nISBN\n0-8129-2158-5\n.\n↑\nBraun, Helmut (31 January 2007).\n\"Reparationen (Weimarer Republik)\"\n.\nHistorisches Lexikon Bayerns\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n28 October\n2023\n.\n↑\nNeil Forbes, Doing Business with the Nazis (2013), p. 117\n↑\nSimpson, Amos E.\nHjalmar Schacht in Perspective\n. Mouton Group (Paris: 1969) pg. 30–32\n↑\nSimpson, Amos E.\nHjalmar Schacht in Perspective\n. Mouton Group (Paris: 1969) pg. 179\n↑\nNeebe, Reinhard (2011).\nGroßindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930-1933\n: Paul Silverberg und der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in der Krise der Weimarer Republik\n. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.\nISBN\n978-3-647-35703-4\n.\nOCLC\n775302548\n.\n↑\nProtokolle des preußischen Staatsministeriums (Acta Borussica) Band 12/II (1925–1938) p. 757\n(PDF; 2,14 MB)\n↑\nMeier, Andrew (2022).\nMorganthau\n(1st\ned.). New York: Random House. p.\n444.\nISBN\n9781400068852\n.\n↑\nKlee, Ernst (2007).\nDas Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945\n. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag. p.\n522.\nISBN\n978-3-596-16048-8\n.\n↑\nReich Defense Law of 21 May 1935\nin UConn Library Archives and Special Collections, retrieved 24 December 2020.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume 2 Chapter XVI Part 12 Hjalmar Schacht\"\n.\nAvalon Project\n. Lillian Goldman Law Library. 2008\n. Retrieved\n8 March\n2019\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian.\nHitler Nemesis\n. New York: Norton (2000). pages 18–20\n↑\nClaude A. Buss (2007).\nWar and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia\n(reprint\ned.). READ BOOKS. p.\n405.\nISBN\n978-1-4067-7514-3\n. Retrieved\n21 May\n2011\n.\n↑\nRoss, Albion (27 November 1937). \"Schacht to Retain Reichsbank Post: Hitler Lets Him Quit Economic Ministry, but Keeps Him in Cabinet and as Counselor\".\nThe New York Times\n. p.\n1.\n↑\nLilla, Joachim (2005).\nDer Preußische Staatsrat 1921–1933: Ein biographisches Handbuch\n. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag. p.\n298.\nISBN\n978-3-770-05271-4\n.\n↑\nSchacht, Hjalmar.\nThe Magic of Money\n. Trans. by Paul Erskine. London: Oldbourne (1967). page 59\n↑\nSchacht, Hjalmar (1967).\nThe Magic of Money\n.\n↑\n\"Schacht Plan Exempted\"\n.\nMontreal Gazette\n. 13 December 1938.\n↑\nSchacht, Hjalmar (1956).\nConfessions of the Old Wizard: The Autobiography of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht\n. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. pp.\n374–\n377.\n↑\nGisevius, Hans Bernd (1998).\nTo the Bitter End: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler, 1933–1944\n. New York: Da Capo Press. pp.\n304–306\n.\nISBN\n0-306-80869-2\n.\n↑\nPeterson, Edward Norman.\nHjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler\n. Christopher Publishing House (Boston: 1954) pg. 340\n(in English)\n↑\nPeter Koblank:\nDie Befreiung der Sonder- und Sippenhäftlinge in Südtirol\n, Online-Edition Mythos Elser 2006\n(in German)\n↑\nBiagi, Enzo (1983).\nLa seconda guerra mondiale, una storia di uomini\n[\nThe world war two, a history of men\n]\n(in Italian). Milan: Gruppo editoriale Fabbri. p.\n2757.\n↑\n\"Hjalmar Schacht case for the defence at Nuremberg trials\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 13 February 2012\n. Retrieved\n25 February\n2011\n.\n↑\nTaylor, Telford\n(1992).\nThe Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp.\n564–\n65.\nISBN\n0-394-58355-8\n.\n↑\nTaylor, Telford\n(1992).\nThe Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp.\n587,\n591–\n92.\nISBN\n0-394-58355-8\n.\n1\n2\nAronsfeld, C. C. (8 September 1950).\n\"Nazis in South America\"\n.\nThe Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle\n. p.\n3\n. Retrieved\n31 December\n2016\n–\nvia\nNewspapers.com\n.\nAn effort to secure the immigration of Dr. Schacht, the former Minister of Economy, was made by the Santiago German colony. They worked in league with the local Arab colony, whose President, Juan Yarur, one of the wealthiest industrialists in Chile, was to have engaged the doctor as \"financial adviser.\" Timely publicity helped to frustrate the clever design.\n↑\nNathan J. Citino (2000).\n\"Defending the 'postwar petroleum order': The US, Britain and the 1954 Saudi-Onassis Tanker deal\"\n.\nDiplomacy and Statecraft\n.\n11\n(2): 146.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/09592290008406160\n.\nS2CID\n154961797\n.\n↑\nGlassburner, Bruce (2007).\nThe Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings\n. Equinox Publishing. p.\n86.\nISBN\n978-979-3780-55-9\n.\n↑\nBGH 25 May 1954, BGHZ 13, 334; as summarized in \"Fundamentals of European Civil Law\", Martin Vranken, 1997.\n↑\n\"Frederic Clavert\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 23 July 2011\n. Retrieved\n14 November\n2009\n.\n↑\nThe word\nAbrechnung\nhas the literal meaning of \"deduct\", however this can also mean to \"balance the books\" or to \"settle an account\". Therefore\nAbrechnung mit Hitler\nbest translates as \"Settling Accounts with Hitler\", which is a double entendre in German that is missing from the English title.\n\"Account settled\"\n.\nNational Library of Australia\n. Retrieved\n20 April\n2023\n.\n↑\nTaylor, Telford\n(1992).\nThe Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. p.\n613.\nISBN\n0-394-58355-8\n.\n↑\nAlso Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2011.\nISBN\n978-1258126742\n.\n↑\nGilbert, Gustave\n(1947).\nNuremberg Diary\n. New York: Da Capo Press. p.\n34.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80661-2\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\n↑\nFergusson, Adam. \"Chapter 13: Schacht\".\nWhen Money Dies: The Nightmare of the Weimar Collapse\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 24 May 2009.\n↑\n\"Hjalmar Schacht (Character)\"\n.\nIMDb\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 1 November 2015\n. Retrieved\n20 May\n2008\n.\n↑\n\"German Reich\"\n.\nHearts of Iron 4 Wiki\n. 13 December 2023\n. Retrieved\n13 January\n2024\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nHjalmar Schacht\n.\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nHjalmar Schacht\n.\nFurther reading\nAhamed, Liaquat\n.\nLords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World\n,\nPenguin Books\n, 2009\nISBN\n978-1-59420-182-0\nWeitz, John\n.\nHitler's Banker: Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht\n. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1997.\nISBN\n0-316-92916-6\n.\nExternal links\nSchacht prosecution notes from \"Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression\"\nArchived\n15 December 2018 at the\nWayback Machine\nBusinessweek\nBibliography on Schacht\nNewspaper clippings about Hjalmar Schacht\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInterrogation of: Schacht, Hjalmar / Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality / Interrogation Division Summary, Part 1\n;\nPart 2.\nWorks by or about Hjalmar Schacht\nat the\nInternet Archive\nConfessions of the Old Wizard: The Autobiography of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht\ntranslated by Diana Pyke.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Hans Luther",
+      "succeeded_by": "Walther Funk",
+      "born": "Horace Greeley Hjalmar Schacht(1877-01-22)22 January 1877Tingleff,German Empire",
+      "died": "3 June 1970(1970-06-03)(aged93)Munich,West Germany",
+      "resting_place": "MunichOstfriedhof",
+      "party": "German Democratic Party(1918–1926)Independent (1926–1970)Nazi Party(1937–1943; as honorary member)",
+      "spouses": "Luise Sowa​​(m.1903;died1940)​Manci Vogler​(m.1941)​",
+      "children": "Cordula Schacht[1]",
+      "education": "University of MunichUniversity of LeipzigUniversity of BerlinUniversity of ParisKiel University(PhD)",
+      "profession": "Banker, economist",
+      "awards": "Golden Party Badge",
+      "nickname": "The Dark Wizard of International Finance[2]"
+    },
+    "char_count": 31945
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Karl_Dönitz",
+    "name": "Karl Dönitz",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Karl Dönitz was a German grand admiral and convicted war criminal who, following Adolf Hitler's suicide during the Second World War in April 1945, succeeded him as head of state of Nazi Germany. He held the position until the dissolution of the Flensburg Government following Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies weeks later. As Supreme Commander of the Navy beginning in 1943, he played a major role in the naval history of the war.",
+    "description": "German grand admiral (1891–1980)",
+    "full_text": "Karl Dönitz\nGerman grand admiral (1891–1980)\n\"Dönitz\" redirects here. For the German municipality, see\nDönitz (Altmark)\n. For people with the surname \"Dönitz\", see\nDönitz (surname)\n.\nKarl Dönitz\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈdøːnɪts\n]\n; 16 September 1891 – 24 December 1980) was a German\ngrand admiral\nand convicted\nwar criminal\nwho, following\nAdolf Hitler\n's\nsuicide\nduring the\nSecond World War\nin April 1945, succeeded him as\nhead of state\nof\nNazi Germany\n. He held the position until the dissolution of the\nFlensburg Government\nfollowing\nGermany's unconditional surrender\nto the\nAllies\nweeks later. As\nSupreme Commander of the Navy\nbeginning in 1943, he played a major role in the\nnaval history of the war\n.\nHe began his career in the\nImperial German Navy\nbefore the\nFirst World War\n. In 1918 he was commanding\nUB-68\n, and was captured as a\nprisoner of war\nby British forces. As commander of\nUB-68\n, he attacked a convoy in the\nMediterranean\nwhile on patrol near\nMalta\n. Sinking one ship before the rest of the convoy outran his\nU-boat\n, Dönitz began to formulate the concept of U-boats operating in attack groups\nRudeltaktik\n(German for \"pack tactic\", commonly called a \"wolfpack\") for greater efficiency, rather than operating independently.\nBy the start of the Second World War, Dönitz was supreme commander of the\nKriegsmarine\n'\ns\nU-boat arm (\nBefehlshaber der U-Boote\n[BdU]). In January 1943 he achieved the rank of\nGroßadmiral\n(grand admiral) and replaced Grand Admiral\nErich Raeder\nas Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. He was the main enemy of Allied naval forces in the\nBattle of the Atlantic\n. From 1939 to 1943 the U-boats fought effectively but lost the initiative from\nMay 1943\n. He ordered his submarines into battle until 1945 to relieve the pressure on other branches of the\nWehrmacht\n(armed forces).\n648 U-boats were lost—429 with no survivors. Furthermore, of these, 215 were lost on their first patrol.\nAround 30,000 of the 40,000 men who served in U-boats perished.\nOn 30 April 1945, following the suicide of\nAdolf Hitler\nand in accordance with\nhis last will and testament\n, Dönitz was named Hitler's successor as head of state in what became known as the\nGoebbels cabinet\nafter his second-in-command,\nJoseph Goebbels\n, until Goebbels's suicide led to Dönitz's cabinet being reformed into the\nFlensburg Government\ninstead. On 7 May 1945, he ordered\nAlfred Jodl\n, Chief of Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command (German:\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n(OKW)), to sign the\nGerman Instrument of Surrender\nin\nReims\n,\nFrance\n,\nformally ending\nthe\nWar in Europe\n.\nDönitz remained as head of state with the titles of\nPresident of Germany\nand Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces until his cabinet was dissolved by the Allied powers on 23 May\nde facto\nand on\n5 June\nde jure\n.\nBy his own admission, Dönitz was a dedicated Nazi and supporter of Hitler. Following the war, he was indicted as a major war criminal at the\nNuremberg trials\non three counts: conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\n; planning, initiating, and waging\nwars of aggression\n; and\ncrimes against the laws of war\n. He was found not guilty of committing crimes against humanity, but guilty of committing crimes against peace and war crimes against the laws of war. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment; following his release, he lived in a village near\nHamburg\nuntil his death in late December 1980.\nEarly career and personal life\nOberleutnant zur See\nKarl Dönitz as Watch Officer of\nU-39\nduring World War I\nDönitz was born on 16 September 1891 in\nGrünau\n, near Berlin, to Anna Beyer and Emil Dönitz, an engineer. Karl had an older brother. In 1910, Dönitz enlisted in the\nKaiserliche Marine\n(\"Imperial Navy\").\nOn 27 September 1913, Dönitz was\ncommissioned\nas a\nLeutnant zur See\n(acting sub-lieutenant). When\nWorld War I\nbegan, he served on the\nlight cruiser\nSMS\nBreslau\nin the\nMediterranean Sea\n.\nIn August 1914, the\nBreslau\nand the battlecruiser\nSMS\nGoeben\nwere sold to the\nOttoman Navy\n; the ships were renamed the\nMidilli\nand the\nYavuz Sultan Selim\n, respectively. They began operating out of\nConstantinople\n, under Rear Admiral\nWilhelm Souchon\n, engaging\nRussian\nforces in the\nBlack Sea\n.\nOn 22 March 1916, Dönitz was promoted to\nOberleutnant zur See\n. He requested a transfer to the submarine forces, which became effective on 1 October 1916. He attended the submariner's school at Flensburg-Mürwik and\npassed out\non 3 January 1917.\nHe served as watch officer on\nU-39\n, and from February 1918 onward as commander of\nUC-25\n. On 2 July 1918, he became commander of\nUB-68\n, operating in the Mediterranean.\nOn 4 October, after suffering technical difficulties, Dönitz was forced to surface and scuttled his boat. He was captured by the British and incarcerated in the\nRedmires camp\nnear\nSheffield\n. He remained a prisoner of war until 1919 and in 1920 he returned to Germany.\nKarl Dönitz's sons both died in World War II: Lieutenant Peter Dönitz on May 19, 1943, as a watch officer on the\nU-954\n, Oberleutnant Klaus Dönitz on May 13, 1944, on the\nE-boat\nS-141\n.\nOn 27 May 1916, Dönitz married a nurse named Ingeborg Weber (1893–1962), the daughter of the German general\nErich Weber\n(1860–1933). They had three children, whom they raised as Protestant Christians: a daughter named Ursula (1917–1990) and their sons Klaus (1920–1944) and Peter (1922–1943).\nBoth of Dönitz's sons were killed in action during the Second World War.\nPeter was killed on 19 May 1943 when\nU-954\nwas sunk in the North Atlantic with all hands.\nHitler had issued a policy stating that if a senior officer such as Dönitz lost a son in battle and had other sons in the military, the latter could withdraw from combat and return to civilian life.\nAfter Peter's death, Klaus was forbidden to have any combat role and was allowed to leave the military to begin studying to become a naval doctor. However, on 13 May 1944, his 24th birthday, he persuaded his friends to let him go on the\nE-boat\nS-141\nfor a raid on\nSelsey\n. The boat was sunk by the\nFrench destroyer\nLa Combattante\nand Klaus was killed.\nInterwar period\nHe continued his naval career in the naval arm of the\nWeimar Republic\n's armed forces. On 10 January 1921, he became a\nKapitänleutnant\n(lieutenant) in the new German navy (\nVorläufige Reichsmarine\n). Dönitz commanded\ntorpedo boats\n, becoming a\nKorvettenkapitän\n(lieutenant-commander) on 1 November 1928. On 1 September 1933, he became a\nFregattenkapitän\n(commander) and, in 1934, was put in command of the cruiser\nEmden\n, the ship on which cadets and midshipmen took a year-long world cruise as training.\nIn 1935, the\nReichsmarine\nwas renamed\nKriegsmarine\n. Germany was prohibited by the\nTreaty of Versailles\nfrom possessing a submarine fleet. The\nAnglo-German Naval Agreement\nof 1935 allowed submarines and he was placed in command of the U-boat flotilla\nWeddigen\n, which comprised three boats;\nU-7\n;\nU-8\nand;\nU-9\n. On 1 September 1935, he was promoted to\nKapitän zur See\n(naval captain).\nDönitz opposed Raeder's views that surface ships should be given priority in the\nKriegsmarine\nduring the war,\nbut in 1935 Dönitz doubted U-boat suitability in a naval trade war on account of their slow speed.\nThis phenomenal contrast with Dönitz's wartime policy is explained in the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The accord was viewed by the navy with optimism, Dönitz included. He remarked, \"Britain, in the circumstances, could not possibly be included in the number of potential enemies.\"\nThe statement, made after June 1935, was uttered at a time when the naval staff were sure\nFrance\nand the\nSoviet Union\nwere likely to be Germany's only enemies.\nDönitz's statement was partially correct. Britain was not foreseen as an immediate enemy, but the navy still held onto a cadre of imperial officers, which along with its Nazi-instigated intake, understood war would be certain in the distant future, perhaps not until the mid-1940s.\nDönitz came to recognise the need for more of these vessels. Only 26 were in commission or under construction that summer. In the time before his command of submarines, he perfected the group tactics that first appealed to him in 1917. At this time Dönitz first expressed his procurement policies. His preference for the submarine fleet was in the production of large numbers of small craft. In contrast to other warships, the fighting power of the U-boat, in his opinion, was not dependent on its size as the torpedo, not the gun, was the machine's main weapon. Dönitz had a tendency to be critical of larger submarines and listed a number of disadvantages in their production, operation and tactical use.\nDönitz recommended the\nType VII submarine\nas the ideal submarine. The boat was reliable and had a range of\n6,200 nautical miles (11,500 kilometres)\n. Modifications lengthened this to\n8,700 nautical miles (16,100 kilometres)\n.\nDönitz revived\nHermann Bauer\n's idea of grouping several submarines together into a\nRudeltaktik\n(\"pack tactic\", commonly called \"wolfpack\") to overwhelm a merchant convoy's escorts. Implementation of wolfpacks had been difficult in World War I owing to the limitations of available radios. In the interwar years, Germany had developed ultra high frequency transmitters, while the\nEnigma cipher machine\nwas believed to have made communications secure.\nA 1922 paper written by\nKapitäinleutnant\nWessner of the\nWehrabteilung\n(Defence Ministry) pointed to the success of surface attacks at night and the need to coordinate operations with multiple boats to defeat the escorts.\nDönitz knew of the paper and improved the ideas suggested by Wessner.\nThis tactic had the added advantage that a submarine on the surface was undetectable by\nASDIC\n(an early form of\nsonar\n). Dönitz claimed after the war he would not allow his service to be intimidated by British disclosures about ASDIC and the course of the war had proven him right.\nIn reality, Dönitz harboured fears stretching back to 1937 that the new technology would render the U-boat impotent.\nDönitz published his ideas on night attacks in January 1939 in a booklet called\nDie U-Bootwaffe\nwhich apparently went unnoticed by the British.\nThe Royal Navy's overconfidence in ASDIC encouraged the\nAdmiralty\nto suppose it could deal with submarines whatever strategy they adopted — in this they were proven wrong; submarines were difficult to locate and destroy under operational conditions.\nIn 1939 he expressed his belief that he could win the war with 300 vessels.\nThe Nazi leadership's rearmament programme prioritised land and aerial warfare. From 1933 to 1936, the navy was granted only 13 per cent of total armament expenditure.\nThe production of U-boats, despite the existing\nZ Plan\n, remained low. In 1935 shipyards produced 14 submarines, 21 in 1936, 1 in 1937. In 1938 nine were commissioned and in 1939 18 U-boats were built.\nDönitz's vision may have been misguided. The British had planned for contingency construction programmes for the summer, 1939. At least 78 small escorts and a crash construction programme of \"\nWhale catchers\n\" had been invoked. The British, according to one historian, had taken all the sensible steps necessary to deal with the U-boat menace as it existed in 1939 and were well placed to deal with large numbers of submarines, prior to events in 1940.\nWorld War II\nMain article:\nBattle of the Atlantic\nOn 1 September 1939,\nGermany invaded Poland\n. Britain and France soon declared war on Germany, and\nWorld War II\nbegan. On Sunday 3 September, Dönitz chaired a conference at\nWilhelmshaven\n. At 11:15\nam the British Admiralty sent out a signal \"Total Germany\".\nB-Dienst\nintercepted the message and it was promptly reported to Dönitz. Dönitz paced around the room and his staff purportedly heard him repeatedly say, \"My God! So it's war with England again!\"\nDönitz abandoned the conference to return within the hour a far more composed man. He announced to his officers, \"we know our enemy. We have today the weapon and a leadership that can face up to this enemy. The war will last a long time; but if each does his duty we will win.\"\nDönitz had only 57 boats; of those, 27 were capable of reaching the\nAtlantic Ocean\nfrom their German bases. A small building program was already under way but the number of U-boats did not rise noticeably until the autumn of 1941.\nDönitz's first major action was the cover up of the sinking of the British passenger liner\nAthenia\nlater the same day. Acutely sensitive to international opinion and relations with the\nUnited States\n, the death of more than a hundred civilians was damaging. Dönitz suppressed the truth that the ship was sunk by a German submarine. He accepted the commander's explanation that he genuinely believed the ship was armed. Dönitz ordered the engagement to be struck from the submarine's logbook. Dönitz did not admit the cover up until 1946.\nHitler's original orders to wage war only in accordance with the\nPrize Regulations\nwere not issued in any altruistic spirit but in the belief hostilities with the Western Allies would be brief. On 23 September 1939, Hitler, on the recommendation of Raeder, approved an order that all merchant ships making use of their wireless upon being stopped by U-boats should be sunk or captured. This order marked a considerable step towards unrestricted warfare. Four days later enforcement of Prize Regulations in the North Sea was withdrawn; and on 2 October complete freedom was given to attack darkened ships encountered off the British and French coasts. Two days later the Prize Regulations were cancelled in waters extending as far as 15° West, and on 17 October the German Naval Staff gave U-boats permission to attack without warning all ships identified as hostile. The zone where darkened ships could be attacked with complete freedom was extended to 20° West on 19 October. Practically the only restrictions now placed on U-boats concerned attacks on passenger liners and, on 17 November, they too were allowed to be attacked without warning if clearly identifiable as hostile.\nAlthough the phrase was not used, by November 1939 the BdU was practicing unrestricted submarine warfare. Neutral shipping was warned by the Germans against entering the zone which, by American neutrality legislation, was forbidden to American shipping, and against steaming without lights, zigzagging or taking any defensive precautions. The complete practice of unrestricted warfare was not enforced for fear of antagonising neutral powers, particularly the Americans. Admirals Raeder and Dönitz and the German Naval Staff had always wished and intended to introduce unrestricted warfare as rapidly as Hitler could be persuaded to accept the possible consequences.\nDönitz and Raeder accepted the death of the Z Plan upon the outbreak of war. The U-boat programme would be the only portion of it to survive 1939. Both men lobbied Hitler to increase the planned production of submarines to at least 29 per month.\nThe immediate obstacle to the proposals was\nHermann Göring\n, head of the\nFour Year Plan\n, commander-in-chief of the\nLuftwaffe\nand future successor to Hitler. Göring would not acquiesce and in March 1940 Raeder was forced to drop the figure from 29 to 25, but even that plan proved illusory. In the first half of 1940, two boats were delivered, increased to six in the final half of the year. In 1941 the deliveries increased to 13 to June, and then 20 to December. It was not until late 1941 the number of vessels began to increase quickly.\nFrom September 1939 through to March 1940, 15 U-boats were lost—nine to convoy escorts. The impressive tonnage sunk had little impact on the Allied war effort at that point.\nCommander of the submarine fleet\nDönitz observing the arrival of\nU-94\nat\nSaint-Nazaire\nin France in June 1941\nOn 1 October 1939, Dönitz became a\nKonteradmiral\n(rear admiral) and \"Commander of the Submarines\" (\nBefehlshaber der Unterseeboote\n,\nBdU\n). For the first part of the war, despite disagreements with Raeder where best to deploy his men, Dönitz was given considerable\noperational freedom\nfor his junior rank.\nFrom September until December 1939, U-boats sank 221 ships for 755,237 gross tons, at the cost of nine U-boats.\nOnly 47 merchant ships were sunk in the\nNorth Atlantic\n, a tonnage of 249,195.\nDönitz had difficulty in organising Wolfpack operations in 1939. A number of his submarines were lost en route to the Atlantic, through either the\nNorth Sea\nor the heavily defended\nEnglish Channel\n. Torpedo failures plagued commanders during convoy attacks. Along with successes against single ships, Dönitz authorised the abandonment of pack attacks in the autumn.\nThe\nNorwegian campaign\namplified the defects. Dönitz wrote in May 1940, \"I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon.\"\nHe ordered the removal of\nmagnetic pistols\nin favour of contact fuses and their faulty depth control systems.\nIn no fewer than 40 attacks on Allied warships, not a single sinking was achieved.\nThe statistics show that from the outbreak of war to approximately the spring of 1940, faulty German torpedoes saved 50–60 ships equating to\n300,000\nGRT\n.\nDönitz was encouraged in operations against warships by the sinking of the\naircraft carrier\nCourageous\n. On 28 September 1939 he said, \"it is not true Britain possesses the means to eliminate the U-boat menace.\"\nThe first specific operation—named \"\nSpecial Operation P\n\"—authorised by Dönitz was\nGünther Prien\n's attack on\nScapa Flow\n, which sank the battleship\nRoyal Oak\n.\nThe attack became a propaganda success though Prien purportedly was unenthusiastic about being used that way.\nHistorian\nStephen Roskill\nwrote, \"It is now known that this operation was planned with great care by Admiral Dönitz, who was correctly informed of the weak state of the defences of the eastern entrances. Full credit must also be given to Lieutenant Prien for the nerve and determination with which he put Dönitz's plan into execution.\"\nIn May 1940, 101 ships were sunk—but only nine in the Atlantic—followed by 140 in June; 53 of them in the Atlantic for a total of\n585,496\nGRT\nthat month. The first six months in 1940 cost Dönitz 15 U-boats.\nUntil mid-1940 there remained a chronic problem with the reliability of the\nG7e torpedo\n. As the battles of Norway and Western Europe raged, the\nLuftwaffe\nsank more ships\nthan the U-boats\n. In May 1940, German aircraft sank 48 ships (\n158\nGRT\n), three times that of German submarines.\nThe Allied evacuations from western Europe and\nScandinavia\nin June 1940 attracted Allied warships in large numbers, leaving many of the Atlantic convoys travelling through the\nWestern Approaches\nunprotected. From June 1940, the German submarines began to exact a heavy toll. In the same month, the\nLuftwaffe\nsank just 22 ships (\n195,193\nGRT\n) in a reversal of the previous months.\nGermany's\ndefeat of Norway\ngave the U-boats new bases much nearer to their main area of operations off the Western Approaches. The U-boats operated in groups or 'wolf packs' which were coordinated by radio from land.\nWith the\nfall of France\n, Germany acquired U-boat bases at\nLorient\n,\nBrest\n,\nSaint-Nazaire\n,\nLa Pallice\n/\nLa Rochelle\nand\nBordeaux\n. This extended the range of Type VIIs.\nRegardless, the war with Britain continued. The admiral remained sceptical of\nOperation Sea Lion\n, a planned invasion and expected a long war.\nThe destruction of seaborne trade became German strategy against Britain after the defeat of the\nLuftwaffe\nin the\nBattle of Britain\n.\nHitler was content with\nthe Blitz\nand cutting off Britain's imports. Dönitz gained importance as the prospect of a quick victory faded.\nDönitz concentrated groups of U-boats against the convoys and had them attack on the surface at night.\nIn addition the Germans were helped by Italian submarines which in early 1941 actually surpassed the number of German U-boats.\nHaving failed to persuade the Nazi leadership to prioritise U-boat construction, a task made more difficult by military victories in 1940 which convinced many people that Britain would give up the struggle, Dönitz welcomed the deployment of 26 Italian submarines to his force.\nDönitz complimented Italian bravery and daring, but was critical of their training and submarine designs. Dönitz remarked they lacked the necessary toughness and discipline and consequently were \"of no great assistance to us in the Atlantic.\"\nThe establishment of German bases on the French Atlantic coast allowed for the prospect of aerial support. Small numbers of German aircraft, such as the long-range\nFocke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor\n, sank a large number of ships in the Atlantic in the last quarter of 1940. In the long term, Göring proved an insurmountable problem in effecting cooperation between the navy and the\nLuftwaffe\n.\nIn early 1941, while Göring was on leave, Dönitz approached Hitler and secured from him a\nsingle bomber/maritime patrol unit\nfor the navy. Göring succeeded in overturning this decision and both Dönitz and Raeder were forced to settle for a specialist maritime air command under\nLuftwaffe\ncontrol.\nPoorly supplied,\nFliegerführer Atlantik\nachieved modest success in 1941, but thereafter failed to have an impact as British counter-measures evolved.\nCooperation between the\nKriegsmarine\nand\nLuftwaffe\nremained dysfunctional to the war's end.\nGöring and his unassailable position at the\nReichsluftfahrtministerium\n(\nAir Ministry\n) prevented all but limited collaboration.\nThe U-boat fleet's successes in 1940 and early 1941 were spearheaded by a small number of highly trained and experienced pre-war commanders.\nOtto Kretschmer\n,\nJoachim Schepke\n, and\nGünther Prien\nwere the most famous, but others included\nHans Jenisch\n,\nVictor Oehrn\n,\nEngelbert Endrass\n,\nHerbert Schultze\nand\nHans-Rudolf Rösing\n. Although they were skilled and had impeccable judgement, the shipping lanes they descended upon were poorly defended.\nThe U-boat force did not escape unscathed. Within the space of several days in March 1941, Prien and Schepke were dead and Kretschmer was a prisoner. All of them fell in battle with a convoy system.\nThe number of boats in the Atlantic remained low. Six fewer existed in May 1940 than in September 1939. In January 1941 there were just six on station in the Atlantic—the lowest during the war, while still suffering from unreliable torpedoes. Dönitz insisted that operations continue while \"the smallest prospect of hits\" remained.\nFor his part, Dönitz was involved in the daily operations of his boats and all the major\noperational level\ndecisions. His assistant,\nEberhard Godt\n, was left to manage daily operations as the war continued.\nDönitz was debriefed personally by his captains which helped establish a rapport between leader and led. Dönitz neglected nothing that would make the bond firmer. Often there would be a distribution of medals or awards. As an ex-submariner, Dönitz did not like to contemplate the thought of a man who had done well heading out to sea, perhaps never to return, without being rewarded or receiving recognition. Dönitz acknowledged where decorations were concerned there was no red tape and that awards were \"psychologically important\".\nIntelligence battle\nIntelligence played an important role in the Battle of the Atlantic.\nIn general, BdU intelligence was poor.\nCounter-intelligence was not much better. At the height of the battle in mid-1943 some 2,000 signals were sent from the 110 U-boats at sea.\nRadio traffic compromised his ciphers by giving the Allies more messages to work with. Furthermore, replies from the boats enabled the Allies to use\nHigh-frequency direction finding\n(HF/DF, called \"Huff-Duff\") to locate a U-boat using its radio, track it and attack it.\nThe over-centralised command structure of BdU and its insistence on micro-managing every aspect of U-boat operations with endless signals provided the Allied navies with ample intelligence.\nThe enormous \"paper chase\" [cross-referencing of materials] operations pursued by Allied intelligence agencies was not thought possible by BdU. The Germans did not suspect the Allies had identified the codes broken by B-Dienst.\nConversely, when Dönitz suspected the enemy had penetrated his own communications BdU's response was to suspect internal sabotage and reduce the number of the staff officers to the most reliable, exacerbating the problem of over-centralisation.\nIn contrast to the Allies, the\nWehrmacht\nwas suspicious of civilian scientific advisors and generally distrusted outsiders. The Germans were never as open to new ideas or thinking of war in intelligence terms. According to one analyst BdU \"lacked imagination and intellectual daring\" in the naval war.\nThese Allied advantages failed to avert heavy losses in the June 1940 to May 1941 period, known to U-boat crews as the \"\nFirst Happy Time\n.\"\nIn June 1941, 68 ships were sunk in the North Atlantic (\n318,740\nGRT\n) at a cost of four U-boats, but the German submarines would not eclipse that number for the remainder of the year. Just 10 transports were sunk in November and December 1941.\nOn 7 May 1941, the Royal Navy captured the German Arctic meteorological vessel\nMünchen\nand took its\nEnigma machine\nintact, which allowed the Royal Navy to decode U-boat radio communications in June 1941.\nTwo days later the capture of\nU-110\nwas an intelligence coup for the British. The settings for high-level \"officer-only\" signals, \"short-signals\" (\nKurzsignale\n) and codes standardising messages to defeat HF/DF fixes by sheer speed were found.\nOnly the\nHydra\nsettings for May were missing. The papers were the only stores destroyed by the crew.\nThe capture on 28 June of another weather ship,\nLauenburg\n, enabled British decryption operations to read radio traffic in July 1941. Beginning in August 1941,\nBletchley Park\noperatives could decrypt signals between Dönitz and his U-boats at sea without any restriction.\nThe capture of the\nU-110\nallowed the Admiralty to identify individual boats, their commanders, operational readiness, damage reports, location, type, speed, endurance from working up in the\nBaltic\nto Atlantic patrols.\nOn 1 February 1942, the Germans had introduced the\nM4\ncipher machine, which secured communications until it was cracked in December 1942. Even so, the U-boats achieved their best success against the convoys in March 1943, due to an increase in U-boat numbers, and the protection of the shipping lanes was in jeopardy. Due to the cracked M4 and the use of radar, the Allies began to send air and surface reinforcements to convoys under threat. The shipping lanes were secured, which came as a great surprise to Dönitz.\nThe lack of intelligence and increased numbers of U-boats contributed enormously to Allied losses that year.\nDönitz and his Italian counterpart Admiral\nAngelo Parona\nin 1941\nSignals security aroused Dönitz's suspicions during the war. On 12 January 1942 German supply submarine\nU-459\narrived 800 nautical miles west of\nFreetown\n, well clear of convoy lanes. It was scheduled to rendezvous with an Italian submarine, until intercepted by a warship. The German captain's report coincided with reports of a decrease in sightings and a period of tension between Dönitz and Raeder.\nThe number of U-boats in the Atlantic, by logic, should have increased, not lowered the number of sightings and the reasons for this made Dönitz uneasy. Despite several investigations, the conclusion of the BdU staff was that\nEnigma\nwas impenetrable. His signals officer responded to the\nU-459\nincident with answers ranging from coincidence, direction finding, to Italian treachery.\nGeneral\nErich Fellgiebel\n, Chief Signal Officer of Army High Command and of Supreme Command of Armed Forces (\nChef des Heeresnachrichtenwesens\n), apparently concurred with Dönitz. He concluded that there was \"convincing evidence\" that, after an \"exhaustive investigation\" that the Allied codebreakers had been reading high level communications.\nOther departments in the navy downplayed or dismissed these concerns. They vaguely implied \"some components\" of Enigma had been compromised, but there was \"no real basis for acute anxiety as regards any compromise of operational security\".\nAmerican entry\nFollowing Germany's declaration of war on the United States on 11 December 1941, Dönitz implemented\nOperation Drumbeat\n(\nUnternehmen Paukenschlag\n).\nThe entry of the United States benefited German submarines in the short term. Dönitz intended to strike close to shore in American and Canadian waters and prevent the convoys—the most effective anti–U-boat system—from ever forming. Dönitz was determined to take advantage of Canadian and American unpreparedness before the situation changed.\nThe problem inhibiting Dönitz's plan was a lack of boats. On paper he had 259, but in January 1942, 99 were still undergoing\nsea trials\nand 59 were assigned to training flotillas, leaving only 101 on war operations. 35 of these were under repair in port, leaving 66 operational, of which 18 were low on fuel and returning to base, 23 were en route to areas where fuel and torpedoes needed to be conserved, and one was heading to the\nMediterranean\n. Therefore, on 1 January Dönitz had a fighting strength of 16–25 in the Atlantic (six of them close to\nIceland\non \"Norwegian operations\"), three in the\nArctic Ocean\n, three in the Mediterranean and three operating west of\nGibraltar\n.\nDönitz was severely limited to what he could accomplish in American waters in an initial offensive.\nFrom 13 January 1942, Dönitz planned to begin a surprise offensive from the\nGulf of St. Lawrence\nto\nCape Hatteras\n. Unknown to him,\nUltra\nhad read his Enigma signals and knew the position, size, and intentions of his boats, down to the date the operation was scheduled to begin. The attacks, when they came, were not a surprise.\nOf the 12 U-boats that began the offensive from the\nGrand Banks\nsouthward, just two survived the war.\nThe operation began the\nBattle of the St. Lawrence\n, a series of battles which lasted into 1944.\nIt remained possible for a U-boat to operate in the Gulf into 1944, but countermeasures were strong.\nIn 1942, the global ratio of ships-to-U-boats sunk in Canadian waters was 112:1. The global average was 10.3:1. The solitary kill was achieved by the\nRCAF\n. Canadian operations, as with American efforts, were a failure during this year.\nAlong with conventional U-boat operations Dönitz authorised clandestine activities in Canadian waters, including spying, mine-laying, and recovery of German prisoners of war (as Dönitz wished to extract information from rescued submariners concerning Allied tactics). All of these things tied down Canadian military power and imposed industrial, fiscal, and psychological costs. The impunity with which U-boats carried out these operations in Canadian waters into 1944 provided a propaganda effect.\nOne of these operations was the well-known\nOperation Kiebitz\nto rescue\nOtto Kretschmer\n.\nAdmiral Karl Doenitz (right) in conversation with the leader of the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler. May 1942\nEven with operational problems great success was achieved in American waters. From January to July 1942, Dönitz's submarines were able to attack unescorted ships off the United States' east coast and in the Caribbean Sea; U-boats sank more ships and tonnage than at any other time in the war. After a convoy system was introduced to protect the shipping, Dönitz shifted his U-boats back to the North Atlantic.\nThe period, known in the\nU-boat Arm\nas the \"\nSecond Happy Time\n\", represented one of the greatest naval disasters of all time, and largest defeat suffered by American sea power.\nThe success was achieved with only five U-boats initially\nwhich sank 397 ships in waters protected by the\nUnited States Navy\nwith an additional 23 sunk at the\nPanama Sea Frontier\n.\nDönitz put the successes down to the American failure to initialise a\nblackout\nalong the\nEast Coast of the United States\nand ship captains' insistence on following peace-time safety procedures.\nThe failure to implement a blackout stemmed from the American government's concern it would affect the tourism trade.\nDönitz wrote in his memoirs that the\nlighthouses\nand\nbuoys\n\"shone forth, though perhaps a little less brightly than usually\".\nBy the time improved American air and naval defences had driven German submarines from American shores, 5,000 Allied sailors had been killed for negligible losses in U-boats.\nDönitz ordered simultaneous operations in the\nCaribbean Sea\n. The ensuing\nBattle of the Caribbean\nresulted in immediate dividends for U-boats. In a short time, at least 100 transports had been destroyed or sunk. The sinkings damaged inter-island trade substantially.\nOperation Neuland\nwas among the most damaging naval campaigns in the region.\nOil refinery\nproduction in region declined\nwhile the tanker fleet suffered losses of up to ten per cent within twenty-four hours.\nHowever, ultimately Dönitz could not hope to sink more ships than American industry could build, so he targeted the tanker fleet in the Caribbean and\nGulf of Mexico\nin the hope that depleting oil transports would paralyse shipyard output. 33 transports were sunk in July before Dönitz lost his first crew. The USN introduced effective convoy systems thereafter, ending the \"carnage\".\nDönitz maintained his demands for the concentration of all his crews in the Atlantic. As the military situation in\nNorth Africa\nand on the\nEastern Front\nbegan to deteriorate Hitler diverted a number of submarines to the\nBattle of the Mediterranean\nupon the suggestions of Admiral\nEberhard Weichold\n.\nRaeder and Dönitz resisted the deployment to the Mediterranean to no avail. Hitler felt compelled to act against Allied sea forces which were having an enormous impact on Axis supply lines to North Africa. The decision defied logic, for a victory in the Atlantic would end the war in the Mediterranean.\nThe\nU-boat war in the Mediterranean\nwas a costly failure, despite successes against warships.\nApproximately 60 crews were lost and only one crew managed to withdraw through the\nStrait of Gibraltar\n.\nAlbrecht Brandi\nwas one of Dönitz's highest performers but his record is a matter of controversy; post-war records prove systematic over-claiming of sinkings.\nHe survived his boat's sinking and was smuggled to Germany through\nSpain\n. Dönitz had met his end as a submarine commander in the Mediterranean two decades earlier.\nIn 1942 Dönitz summed up his philosophy in one simple paragraph; \"The enemy's shipping constitutes one single, great entity. It is therefore immaterial where a ship is sunk. Once it has been destroyed it has to be replaced by a new ship; and that's that.\"\nThe remark was the green light to unrestricted submarine warfare and began the\ntonnage war\nproper. BdU intelligence concluded the Americans could produce 15,300,000 tons of shipping in 1942 and 1943—two million tons under actual production figures. Dönitz always calculated the worst-case scenario using the highest figures of enemy production potential. Some 700,000 tons per month needed to be sunk to win the war. The \"second happy time\" reached a peak in June 1942, with 325,000 tons sunk, up from 311,000 in May, 255,000 in April and the highest since the 327,000 tons sunk in March 1942.\nWith support from the Royal Navy and\nRoyal Canadian Navy\n, the new convoy systems compelled Dönitz to withdraw his captains to the mid-Atlantic once again. Nevertheless, there was still cause for optimism. B-Dienst had cracked the convoy ciphers and by July 1942 Dönitz could call upon 311 boats, 140 operational, to conduct a renewed assault. By October 1942 he had 196 operational from 365. Dönitz's force finally reached the desired number both he and Raeder had hoped for in 1939.\nUnaware of it, Dönitz and his men were aided by the\nUltra\nblackout. The addition of a fourth rotor to the Enigma left radio detection the only way to gather intelligence on dispositions and intentions of the German naval forces.\nGerman code breakers\nhad their own success in the capture of the code book to Cipher Code Number 3 from a merchant ship. It was a treble success for the BdU.\nDönitz was content that he now had the naval power to extend U-boat operations to other areas aside the North Atlantic. The Caribbean,\nBrazilian\nwaters with the coast of\nWest Africa\ndesignated operational theatres. Waters in the southern hemisphere to\nSouth Africa\ncould also be attacked with the new\nType IX submarine\n. The strategy was sound and his tactical ideas were effective. The number of boats available allowed him to form Wolfpacks to comb convoy routes from east to west attacking one when found and pursuing it across the ocean. The pack then refuelled from a\nU-boat tanker\nand worked from west to east. Raeder and the operations staff disputed the value in attacking convoys heading westward with empty cargo holds. The tactics were successful but placed great strain on crews who spent up to eight days in constant action.\nNovember 1942 was a new high in the Atlantic. 134 ships were sunk for 807,754 tons. 119 were destroyed by submarines, 83 (508,707 tons) in the Atlantic. The same month Dönitz suffered strategic defeat. His submarines failed to prevent\nOperation Torch\n, even with 196 of them operating in the Atlantic. Dönitz considered it a major self-inflicted defeat. Allied morale radically improved after the victories of Torch, the\nSecond Battle of El Alamein\nand the\nBattle of Stalingrad\n; all occurred within days of one another. The U-boat war was the only military success the Germans enjoyed at the end of the year.\nCommander-in-chief and Grand Admiral\nErich Raeder\nwith\nAdolf Hitler\nshortly after he was replaced by Dönitz as Commander-in-chief and Grand Admiral (February 1943)\nOn 30 January 1943, Dönitz replaced Erich Raeder as Commander-in-chief of the navy (\nOberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine\n) and\nGroßadmiral\n(grand admiral) of the\nNaval High Command\n(\nOberkommando der Marine\n). In a communique to the navy he announced his intentions to retain practical control of the U-boats and his desire to fight to the end for Hitler.\nDönitz's inability to delegate control of the U-boat service has been construed as a weakness in the U-boat arm, contributing to the perception that Dönitz was an \"impatient warrior\", preoccupied with fighting battles and tactics rather than a strategist or organiser.\nDönitz's promotion earned Hitler his undying loyalty. For Dönitz, Hitler had given him a \"true home-coming at last, to a country in which unemployment appeared to have been abolished, the class war no longer tore the nation apart, and the shame of defeat in 1918 was being expunged.\"\nWhen war came, Dönitz became more firmly wedded to his Nazi faith. Hitler recognised his patriotism, professionalism but above all, his loyalty. Dönitz remained so, long after the war was lost. In so doing, he wilfully ignored the genocidal nature of the regime and claimed ignorance of\nThe Holocaust\n.\nIn the last quarter of 1942, 69 submarines had been commissioned taking the total number to 393, with 212 operational.\nDönitz was not satisfied and immediately began a naval construction programme which in contrast to Raeder's, laid all its emphasis on torpedo boats and submarines. Dönitz's proposed expansion ran into difficulties experienced by all of his predecessors; the lack of steel. The navy had no representation on\nAlbert Speer\n's armaments ministry, for naval production was the only sphere not under his control. Dönitz understood this worked against the navy because it lacked the elasticity to cope with breakdowns of production at any point, whereas the other services could make good production by compensating one sector at the expense of another. Without any representatives the battle of priorities was left to Speer and Göring. Dönitz had the sense to place U-boat production under Speer on the provision 40 per month were completed.\nDönitz persuaded Hitler not to scrap the surface fleet\ncapital ships\n, though they played no role in the Atlantic during his time in command.\nDönitz reasoned the destruction of the surface fleet would provide the British with a victory and heap pressure on the U-boats, for these warships were tying down British air and naval forces that would otherwise be sent into the Atlantic.\nNew construction procedures, dispensing with prototypes and the abandonment of modifications reduced construction times from 460,000-man hours to 260–300,000 to meet Speer's quota. In the spring 1944, the\nType XXI submarine\nwas scheduled to reach frontline units. In 1943 the\nCombined Bomber Offensive\nundid German plans. Dönitz and Speer were appalled by the destruction of\nHamburg\n, a major construction site.\nThe battles of 1943 and 1944 were fought with the existing Type VII and\nType IX submarines\n. The Type VII remained the backbone of the fleet in 1943.\nAt the end of 1942, Dönitz was faced with the appearance of\nescort carriers\n, and long-range aircraft working with convoy escorts. To protect his boats against the latter, he ordered his boats to restrict their operations to the\nMid-Atlantic Gap\n, a stretch of ocean out of the range of land-based aircraft.\nAllied air forces had few aircraft equipped with\nASV radar\nfor U-boat detection into April and May 1943, and such units would not exist in\nNewfoundland\nuntil June. Convoys relied on\nRAF Coastal Command\naircraft operating from\nNorthern Ireland\nand Iceland.\nThe aircraft imposed restraints on U-boat captains, who feared them for their ability to sink a submarine or alert surface warships to their position.\nIn 1942 Coastal Command began forming units combined with ASV and\nLeigh Light\nto attack U-boats at night in transit to the Atlantic via the\nBay of Biscay\n, which continued into 1943. The Command was moderately successful after mid-1942.\nGrand Admiral Karl Doenitz receives the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross from Third Reich leader Adolf Hitler. April 1943\n1943 began with continued tactical success for Dönitz in battle. In January\nConvoy TM 1\nwas nearly destroyed. The loss of 100,000 tons of fuel in one convoy represented the most devastating loss percentage of the war—only two of nine tankers reached port. The\nEighth Army\nwere forced to ration their fuel for a time, earning Dönitz the gratitude of the\nAfrika Korps\n.\nThe\nCasablanca Conference\n, held that month, identified the Atlantic as the priority. It was agreed that until the defeat of Dönitz and his men, there could be no amphibious landings in continental Europe.\nUnknown to Dönitz, Bletchley Park had broken the Shark cypher and restored the flow of Enigma information; the Admiralty was able to route convoys around wolfpacks. During January and February 1943 information was decrypted within 24 hours proving operationally useful, although this slipped at the end of the second month contributing to German interceptions.\nEven so, in appalling weather, the Germans sank only 44 ships during the month, even with 100 U-boats at sea, the majority stationed in the mid-Atlantic gap.\nIn February 1943 the strength of Allied defences were ominous for Dönitz. The battle of convoy HX 224 was ended upon the intervention of air power from Iceland. Dönitz sent 20 boats to attack SC 118 and both sides suffered heavy losses—11 merchant ships for three U-boats plus four damaged. It was \"what both sides considered one of the hardest fought battles of the Atlantic war\".\nDespite sending 20 crews into action, Dönitz was concerned that most captains did not press home attacks. The majority of the ships sunk were by one crew, commanded by\nSiegfried von Forstner\n—he sank seven.\nIn March,\nConvoy SC 121\nwas attacked by 31 U-boats in two patrol lines.\nIt was the most successful battle of the war for Dönitz.\nThe battle of\nConvoys HX 229/SC 122\nwas the largest convoy battle, with 40 U-boats involved.\nEach operation was successful but all were fought in the mid-Atlantic.\nAllied losses reached a peak in March 1943. The Admiralty later issued a report on the matter; \"The Germans never came so near [to] disrupting communications between the new world and the old as in the first twenty days of March 1943.\"\nDönitz later conceded the March battles were to be the U-boats' last victories. New Allied techniques, tactics and technology began to turn the tide. By April 1943 U-boat morale was reaching a crisis point.\nNinety-eight new boats were sent into the Atlantic that month and although the training was thorough the crews were inexperienced and it showed. Fifteen U-boats were destroyed in March 1943 and another 15 in April.\nWerner Hartenstein\nand\nJohann Mohr\nwere notable casualties over the course of these eight weeks; the former's decision to rescue survivors of a sunken ship led to Dönitz's\nLaconia Order\n, which later formed part of the criminal case against Dönitz.\nOminous for BdU was the sudden growth of Allied air power. The Allied command accepted that air cover over the mid-Atlantic was inadequate and had drawn attention to the fact that not one VLR (Very Long Range) aircraft was to be found at any Allied air base west of Iceland. The Americans released 255 Liberators for the North Atlantic. At the end of March 1943 20 VLR aircraft were operational rising to 41 by mid-April, all of them flown by British crews. Twenty-eight anti-submarine and 11 anti-shipping squadrons were available to RAF Coastal Command, 619 aircraft in all—a striking change since September 1939.\nThe influx of radar equipped aircraft into mid-Atlantic was matched by air patrols over the Bay of Biscay. Dönitz detected a drop in morale among his captains, as did the British. Dönitz encouraged his commanders to show a \"hunter's instinct\" and \"warrior spirit\" in the face of the air–surface support group threat.\nAlong with air power, the BdU was forced to contend with a large increase in Allied convoy escorts which fuelled from tankers in the convoys allowing escort across the ocean.\nThe escort carrier support groups, protected by\ndestroyers\n, which, in the words of the official naval historian of the Second World War, proved decisive; \"it was the advent of the Support Groups, the Escort Carriers and the Very Long Range Aircraft which turned the tables on the U-boats-and did so with astonishing rapidity\".\nOne hundred eight ships were sunk in the first 20 days of March, and just 15 in the last 10. The official naval historian wrote, \"The collapse of the enemy's offensive, when it came, was so sudden that it took him completely by surprise. We now know that, in fact, a downward trend in the U-boats' recent accomplishments could have forewarned him, but was concealed from him by the exaggerated claims made by their commanders.\"\nIn April Dönitz lost five crews to the Coastal Command ASV Biscay offensive. Encouraged by the isolated successes of\nanti-aircraft artillery\ninstalled on submarines, he ordered crews to stay on the surface and fight it out with the aircraft.\nThe decision caused casualties—four boats were lost in the first week of May alone, and three more by the end.\nFor the month of April Allied losses fell to 56 ships of 327,943 tons.\nIn May 1943 the battle reached a climax with the battles of\nConvoy ONS 5\n,\nConvoy SC 129\n,\nConvoy SC 130\n. Throughout the battles only two ships were sunk in convoy in the Atlantic while an air anti-submarine escort was present.\nDönitz depended on the surface manoeuvrability of his U-boats to locate targets, assemble wolfpacks and the complicated business of positioning his forces ahead of a convoy for an attack. Allied air power determined where and when U-boats could move freely on the surface. It was the combination of convoy escorts and air power that made the Atlantic unsuitable for pack operations.\nThe US Navy introduced the\nK-class blimp\n. They forced a commander to dive to prevent the aircraft marking his position or attacking.\nFrom 10 to 24 May 1943, ten convoys passed through the mid-Atlantic. Six of the 370 ships were sunk; three were stragglers. Thirteen U-boats were sunk; four by warships, seven by aircraft, and two shared.\nBy 24 May, when Dönitz conceded defeat and withdrew the surviving crews from the field of battle, they had already lost 33 U-boats. At the end of May it had risen to 41. Dönitz tried to limit the damage to morale by declaring that the withdrawal was only temporary \"to avoid unnecessary losses in a period when our weapons are shown to be at a disadvantage\" and that \"the battle in the north Atlantic—the decisive area—will be resumed\". Dönitz did make a further attempt to regain the initiative, but the battle never reached the same pitch of intensity or hung in the balance, as during the spring of 1943. The Allied success won the Battle of the Atlantic.\nOn 24 May Dönitz ordered the suspension of Atlantic operations, bringing an end to\nBlack May\n.\nDefeat in the mid-Atlantic left Dönitz in a dilemma. The U-boats had proven unable to elude convoy escorts and attack convoys with success. He was concerned about crew morale suffering from idleness and a loss of experience with the latest Allied developments in anti-submarine warfare. Aside from problems of seaworthiness among machines and crew, there were not enough\nSubmarine pens\nto store idle boats and they were a target for aircraft in port. Dönitz would not withdraw his submarines from combat operations, for he felt the ships, men and aircraft engaged in suppressing the U-boats could then be turned on Germany directly; the U-boat war was to continue.\nHunter-killer era\nFrom mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form\nhunter-killer groups\nconsisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.\nUSN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic.\nArgentia\nhad been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the\nRoyal Canadian Navy\nin early 1943.\nU-boat operations were \"crushed\" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.\nDönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the\nAzores\nwhere land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from\nWest Africa\nto\nSouth America\nand the Caribbean.\nHe hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to \"stem the tide of U-boat losses.\"\nA large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.\nFrom May 1943, one historian wrote \"U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction.\"\nKarl Donitz and\nCemil Cahit Toydemir\nduring a visit to the Eastern Front, July 1943\nDönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the\nUSAAF\nand Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.\nTo counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.\nDönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.\nUS hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.\nIn September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the\nG7es torpedo\n, an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of\nWanze\nradar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the\nMetox radar detector\n. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the\nsubmarine snorkel\n, permitting the submarine to stay submerged.\nDönitz placed much faith in the\nType XXI submarine\n. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a \"true submarine\", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18\nknots\n.\nThat month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations;\nConvoys ONS 18/ON 202\n. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on\nConvoy SC 143\nfailed, even with limited air support from the\nLuftwaffe\n. The battle with\nConvoys ONS 20/ON 206\nin the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle,\nConvoy SL 138/MKS 28\n, developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around\nConvoy SL 139/MKS 30\nended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.\nIntelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.\nDönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.\nThe hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.\nDönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted.\nU-193\nachieved one final success.\nThe end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the\nArctic convoys\nto the\nSoviet Union\n. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of\nScharnhorst\nat the\nBattle of the North Cape\n.\nFrom left to right:\nKluge\n,\nHimmler\n, Dönitz (with his grand admiral's baton) and\nKeitel\nat\nHans Hube\n's funeral, 1944\nDönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and\nType XXIII submarines\n. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for\nNaxos\nwas scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg,\nDanzig\nand\nBremen\nto ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.\nIn early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of\nIreland\n, at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and\nIndian Ocean\n. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.\nThe U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.\nIn the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.\nAdmiral Karl Donitz giving a radio speech after the attempt on Adolf Hitler's life. 21 July 1944\nA major concern to Dönitz was\nOperation Overlord\n, the long predicted landing in France, and what role the U-boat arm and surface forces could play in the defence. He was sensitive to a landing on the Bay of Biscay but retained boats there only for operational readiness. Dönitz ended reconnaissance operations in the region. In the BdU war diary he wrote of ending operations since \"otherwise the strong enemy air activity will lead to high losses which would only be acceptable if an immediate landing on the Biscay coast were expected. As this is no longer considered an acute danger the boats will remain at readiness in the concrete shelters.\"\nKarl Dönitz with students in July 1944\nWhen the\nD-day landings\ntook place on 6 June 1944, the U-boats were ordered into action with the awareness that the western flank of the invasion would be well protected at sea.\nOperational experience with the snorkel was too scant to devise instructions for its use. The narrow, shallow, waters of the\nEnglish Channel\nprovided few opportunities for charging the batteries. Dönitz feared the task was impossible.\nThe\nHolzbein\ngroup based at Brest, sent 15 submarines into action against the\nCherbourg\npeninsula landings part of a 36-strong flotilla.\nOnly eight had snorkels. The seven non-snorkel boats were ordered to attack on the surface.\nThe BdU war diary entry on 6 June 1944 states that \"for those boats without schnorchel this means the last operation\".\nOf the 15, only five got near to the invasion fleet.\nFive of the snorkel boats survived. In exchange for 10 U-boats with the survivors damaged, two\nfrigates\n, four freighters, and one tank landing ship were sunk.\n22 U-boats were sunk from 6 to 30 June 1944.\nOn 5 July 1944, the Allied Operation\nDredger\npermitted hunter-killer groups to roam the Western Approaches and Biscay making it a \"no-go area\" for U-boats.\nU-boat operations against Normandy landings were a fiasco. Dönitz and the high command had been ignorant of the true scale of the naval D-day effort.\nDönitz claimed his men sank five escorts, 12 merchant ships and four landing craft for 20 submarines and 1,000 men, of whom 238 were rescued. Dönitz's claims underplayed German losses, which were, in fact, 41 submarines from 82 in France, a 50 per cent loss rate.\nKarl Donitz among workers at the shipyard, December 1944\nThe collapse of the\nGerman front in Normandy\nleft only the bases in\nGerman-occupied Norway\nnearest to the Atlantic. The newer boats were not forthcoming either. Ninety Type XXI and 31 Type XIII boats were built by the end of 1944. Sixty of the former and 23 of the latter were in service but none were operational. Dönitz was left with the old VIIs to carry the war into 1945. A large number had snorkels, which enabled them to surface only upon reaching port. Submerged, this meant no radio or Enigma communications and far fewer sightings for the Allied intelligence network to exploit. Dönitz ordered his submarines to British coastal waters with some success in November and December 1944, achieving 85,639 tons. Admiral\nAndrew Cunningham\nremarked of the strategy, \"We are having a difficult time with the U-boats....the air are about 90 percent out of business and Asdic is failing us.\" The inshore waters impeded the use of Asdic, which became confused with wrecks, rocks, and tidal swirls. The new types could conceivably have capitalised on these developments but the war was nearly over. On 1 January 1945, Dönitz had 425 submarines; 144 operational. On 1 April 1945, it was 166 from 429. He threw into battle every available weapon as the German Reich collapsed. Dönitz supported the use of\nHuman torpedoes\n; the\nNeger\n,\nMarder\n,\nSeehund\nand\nBiber\nwere all used in\nsuicide missions\non his orders, perhaps inspired by the Japanese\nKamikaze\n.\nMöltenort U-Boat Memorial\nnear\nKiel\nin northern Germany. Approximately 30,000 men died under Dönitz's command.\nOn 30 April 1945\nAdolf Hitler committed suicide\n. Dönitz succeeded him as head of state. Admiral\nHans-Georg von Friedeburg\nsucceeded Dönitz as commander-in-chief of the\nKriegsmarine\n.\nOn 4 May 1945 the\nGerman surrender at Lüneburg Heath\ntook place. Dönitz issued an order to all U-boats to cease combat operations and return to port or surrender to Allied naval vessels. The order was obeyed with a handful of notable exceptions—the\nActions of 5–6 May 1945\n, and\nActions of 7–8 May 1945\noccurred after the surrender. The surrendered U-boats numbered into the hundreds and were destroyed in the postwar\nOperation Deadlight\n. The U-boat war finally came to an end on 9 May 1945, the date of the\nGerman Instrument of Surrender\n.\nPresident of Germany\nMain article:\nDeath of Adolf Hitler\nDönitz admired Hitler and was vocal about the qualities he perceived in Hitler's leadership. In August 1943, he praised his foresightedness and confidence; \"anyone who thinks he can do better than the\nFührer\nis stupid.\"\nDönitz's relationship with Hitler strengthened through to the end of the war, particularly after the\n20 July plot\n, for the naval staff officers were not involved; when news of it came there was indignation in the OKM.\nEven after the war, Dönitz said he could never have joined the conspirators.\nDönitz tried to imbue Nazi ideas among his officers, though the indoctrination of the naval officer corps was not the brainchild of Dönitz, but rather a continuation of the Nazification of the navy begun under his predecessor Raeder.\nNaval officers were required to attend a five-day education course in\nNazi ideology\n.\nDönitz's loyalty to him and the cause was rewarded by Hitler, who, owing to Dönitz's leadership, never felt abandoned by the navy. In gratitude, Hitler appointed the navy's commander as his successor before he committed suicide.\nDönitz's influence on military matters was also evident. Hitler acted on Dönitz's advice in September 1944 to block the\nGulf of Finland\nafter\nFinland\nabandoned the\nAxis powers\n.\nOperation Tanne Ost\nwas a poorly executed disaster.\nDönitz shared Hitler's senseless strategic judgement—with the\nCourland Pocket\non the verge of collapse, and the air and army forces requesting a withdrawal, the two men were preoccupied in planning an attack on an isolated island in the far north.\nHitler's willingness to listen to the naval commander was based on his high opinion of the navy's usefulness at this time. It reinforced isolated coastal garrisons along the\nBaltic\nand evacuated thousands of German soldiers and civilians in order that they might continue to participate in the war effort into the spring of 1945.\nThrough 1944 and 1945, the Dönitz-initiated\nOperation Hannibal\nhad the distinction of being the largest naval evacuation in history.\nThe\nBaltic Fleet\nwas presented with a mass of targets, the subsequent\nSoviet Baltic Sea submarine campaign in 1944\nand\nSoviet Baltic Sea campaign in 1945\ninflicted grievous losses during\nHannibal\n. The most notable was the sinking of the\nMV Wilhelm Gustloff\nby a Soviet submarine.\nThe liner had nearly 10,000 people on board.\nThe evacuations continued after the surrender. From 3 to 9 May 1945, 81,000 of the 150,000 persons waiting on the\nHel Peninsula\nwere evacuated without loss.\nAlbrecht Brandi\n, commander of the eastern Baltic,\ninitiated a counter operation, the\nGulf of Finland campaign\n, but failed to have an impact.\nAdolf Hitler\n(right) meets with Dönitz in the\nFührerbunker\nin Berlin (1945).\nIn the\nfinal days of the war\n, after Hitler had taken refuge in the\nFührerbunker\nbeneath the\nReich Chancellery\ngarden in Berlin,\nReichsmarschall\nHermann Göring\nwas considered the obvious successor to Hitler, followed by\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\n. Göring, however, infuriated Hitler by radioing him in Berlin to ask for permission to assume leadership of the Reich. Himmler also tried to seize power by entering into negotiations with\nCount Bernadotte\n. On 28 April 1945, the BBC reported Himmler had offered surrender to the western Allies and that the offer had been declined.\nFrom mid-April 1945, Dönitz and elements of what remained of the Reich government moved into the buildings of the\nStadtheide Barracks\nin\nPlön\n. In\nhis last will and testament\n, dated 29 April 1945, Hitler named Dönitz his successor as\nStaatsoberhaupt\n(\nHead of state\n), with the titles of\nReichspräsident\n(President) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The same document named Propaganda Minister\nJoseph Goebbels\nas\nHead of government\nwith the title of\nReichskanzler\n(\nChancellor\n). Hitler would not name any successors to hold his titles of Führer or leader of the Nazi Party.\nFurthermore, Hitler declared both Göring and Himmler traitors and expelled them from the party. He committed suicide on 30 April.\nOn 1 May, the day after Hitler's own suicide, Goebbels committed suicide.\nDönitz thus became the sole representative of the collapsing\nGerman Reich\n. On 2 May, the new government of the Reich fled to\nFlensburg\n-\nMürwik\n. That night, 2 May, Dönitz made a nationwide radio address in which he announced Hitler's death and said the war would continue in the East \"to save Germany from destruction by the advancing\nBolshevik\nenemy.\" Dönitz remained in Flensburg–Mürwik until his arrest on 23 May 1945.\nDönitz knew that Germany's position was untenable and the\nWehrmacht\nwas no longer capable of offering meaningful resistance. During his brief period in office, he devoted most of his effort to ensuring the loyalty of the German armed forces and trying to ensure German personnel would surrender to the British or Americans and not the Soviets. He feared vengeful Soviet reprisals, and hoped to strike a deal with the\nWestern Allies\n. In the end, Dönitz's tactics were moderately successful, enabling about 1.8\nmillion German soldiers to escape Soviet capture.\nAs many as 2.2\nmillion may have been evacuated.\nFlensburg Government\nMain article:\nFlensburg Government\nKarl Dönitz (centre, in long, dark coat) followed by\nAlbert Speer\n(bareheaded) and\nAlfred Jodl\n(on Speer's right) during the arrest of the Flensburg Government by British troops\nOn 4 May, Admiral\nHans-Georg von Friedeburg\n, representing Dönitz,\nsurrendered all German forces\nin the\nNetherlands\n,\nDenmark\n, and northwestern Germany to\nField Marshal\nBernard Montgomery\nat\nLüneburg Heath\nsoutheast of\nHamburg\n. A day later, Dönitz sent Friedeburg to\nUS General\nDwight D. Eisenhower\n's headquarters in\nReims\n, France, to negotiate a complete surrender to the Allies.\nThe\nChief of Staff\nof OKW,\nGeneraloberst\n(Colonel-General)\nAlfred Jodl\n, arrived a day later. Dönitz had instructed them to draw out the negotiations for as long as possible so that German troops and refugees could surrender to the Western powers, but when Eisenhower let it be known he would not tolerate their stalling, Dönitz authorised Jodl to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender at 1:30 on the morning of 7 May. Just over an hour later, Jodl signed the documents. The surrender documents included the phrase, \"All forces under German control to cease active operations at 23:01 hours Central European Time on 8 May 1945.\" At Stalin's insistence, on 8 May, shortly before midnight, (\nGeneralfeldmarschall\n)\nWilhelm Keitel\nrepeated the signing in Berlin at\nMarshal\nGeorgy Zhukov\n's headquarters, with General\nCarl Spaatz\nof the\nUSAAF\npresent as Eisenhower's representative. At the time specified,\nWorld War II in Europe ended\n.\nOn 23 May, the\nFlensburg Government\n(also known as the \"Dönitz government\") was dissolved when Dönitz was arrested by an\nRAF Regiment\ntask force.\nGeneraloberst\nJodl,\nReichsminister\nSpeer and other members were also handed over to troops of the Herefordshire Regiment at Flensburg.\nDonitz's\nGroßadmiral's\nceremonial baton, awarded to him by Hitler, can be seen in the regimental museum of the\nKing's Shropshire Light Infantry\nin\nShrewsbury Castle\n.\nHis\nKriegsmarine\nflag, which was removed from his headquarters, can be seen at the RAF Regiment Heritage Centre at\nRAF Honington\nand his car pennant in the regimental museum of the\nHerefordshire Light Infantry\n.\nNazism and antisemitism\nDönitz was a dedicated Nazi and a passionate supporter of Hitler,\nsomething he attempted to obscure after the war.\nRaeder described him as \"a picture-book Nazi and confirmed anti-Semite\".\nSeveral naval officers described him as \"closely tied to Hitler and Nazi ideology.\"\nOn occasion, he spoke of Hitler's humanity.\nHis fervent pro-Hitler attitude led to him being known ironically as \"\nHitler Youth Quex\n\", after the fictionalised hero of a Nazi novel and feature film.\nHe refused to help\nAlbert Speer\nstop the\nscorched earth\npolicy dictated by Hitler\nand is also noted to have declared, \"In comparison to Hitler we are all pipsqueaks. Anyone who believes he can do better than the Führer is stupid.\"\nDönitz and other officers performing the\nNazi salute\nin 1941\nDönitz contributed to the spread of Nazism within the\nKriegsmarine\n. He insisted that officers share his political views and, as head of the\nKriegsmarine\n, formally joined the Nazi Party on 1 February 1944, as member 9,664,999.\nHe was awarded the\nGolden Party Badge\nfor his loyalty to the party later that year. Dönitz's influence over naval officers contributed to none joining the\nattempts to kill Hitler\n.\nFrom an ideological standpoint, Dönitz was\nanti-Marxist\nand\nantisemitic\nand believed that Germany needed to fight the \"poison of Jewry\".\nSeveral antisemitic statements by Dönitz are known.\nWhen\nSweden\nclosed its international waters to Germany, Dönitz blamed this action on their fear and dependence on \"international Jewish capital.\"\nIn August 1944 he declared, \"I would rather eat dirt than see my grandchildren grow up in the filthy, poisonous atmosphere of Jewry.\"\nHis fellow officers noted he was under Hitler's influence, and closely wedded to Nazi ideology.\nOn German Heroes' Day (12 March) of 1944, Dönitz declared that, without Adolf Hitler, Germany would be beset by \"the poison of Jewry,\" and the country destroyed for lack of the \"uncompromising ideology\" of\nNazism\n:\nWhat would have become of our country today, if the Führer had not united us under National Socialism? Divided along party lines, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, because we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we would have long since succumbed under the burden of this war and delivered ourselves to the enemy who would have mercilessly destroyed us.\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\n, Dönitz claimed the statement about the \"poison of Jewry\" was regarding \"the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.\"\nLater, during the Nuremberg trials, Dönitz claimed to know nothing about the\nextermination of Jews\nand declared that \"nobody among my men thought about violence against Jews.\"\nDönitz told\nLeon Goldensohn\n, an American psychiatrist at\nNuremberg\n, \"I never had any idea of the goings-on as far as Jews were concerned. Hitler said each man should take care of his business and mine was U-boats and the Navy.\"\nFollowing the war, Dönitz tried to hide his knowledge of\nthe Holocaust\n. He was present at the October 1943\nPosen Conference\nwhere Himmler described the mass murder of Jews with the intent of making the audience complicit in this crime.\nIt cannot be proven beyond doubt that he was present during Himmler's segment of the conference, which openly discussed the mass murder of European Jews.\nEven after the Nuremberg Trials, with the crimes of the Nazi state well-known, Dönitz remained an antisemite. In April 1953, he told Speer that if it was the choice of the Americans and not the Jews, he would have been released.\nNuremberg war crimes trials\nDönitz's detention report, 1945\nFollowing the war, Dönitz was held as a prisoner of war by the Allies. He was indicted as a major war criminal at the\nNuremberg trials\non three counts. One: conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\n. Two: planning, initiating, and waging\nwars of aggression\n. Three: crimes against the laws of war. Dönitz was found not guilty on count one of the indictment, but guilty on counts two and three.\nDuring the trial, the army psychologist\nGustave Gilbert\nwas allowed to examine Nazi leaders on trial for war crimes. Among other tests, a German version of the\nWechsler–Bellevue\nIQ test was administered. Dönitz and Hermann Göring scored 138, which made them equally the third-highest among the Nazi leaders tested.\nDönitz was also examined by Chief Medical Officer\nLt. Col. Rene Juchli\nwho reported that Dönitz suffered from \"a chronic prostate disorder\".\nAt the trial, Dönitz was charged with waging\nunrestricted submarine warfare\nagainst neutral shipping, permitting Hitler's\nCommando Order\nof 18 October 1942 to remain in full force when he became commander-in-chief of the Navy, and to that extent responsibility for that crime. His defence was that the order excluded men captured in naval warfare, and that the order had not been acted upon by any men under his command. Added to that was his knowledge of 12,000 involuntary foreign workers working in the shipyards, and doing nothing to stop it.\nDönitz was unable to defend himself on this charge convincingly when cross-examined by prosecutor Sir\nDavid Maxwell Fyfe\n.\nOn 25 February 1945, Hitler asked Dönitz whether the\nGeneva Convention\nshould be denounced. Hitler's motives were twofold. The first was that reprisals could be taken against Western Allied prisoners of war; second, it would deter German forces from surrendering to the Western Allies, as was happening on the\nEastern Front\nwhere the convention was in abeyance. Instead of arguing the conventions should never be denounced, Dönitz suggested it was not expedient to do so, so the court found against him on this issue; but as the convention was not denounced by Germany, and British prisoners in camps under Dönitz's jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention, the Court considered these mitigating circumstances.\nAlbert Speer\n, Dönitz, and\nAlfred Jodl\nAmong the war-crimes charges, Dönitz was accused of waging unrestricted submarine warfare for issuing\nWar Order No. 154\nin 1939, and\nanother similar order\nafter the\nLaconia\nincident\nin 1942, not to rescue survivors from ships attacked by submarine. By issuing these two orders, he was found guilty of causing Germany to be in breach of the\nSecond London Naval Treaty\nof 1936. However, as evidence of similar conduct by the Allies was presented at his trial, his sentence was not assessed on the grounds of this breach of international law.\nOn the specific war crimes charge of ordering unrestricted submarine warfare, Dönitz was found \"[not] guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships\", because they were often armed and equipped with radios which they used to notify the admiralty of attack. As stated by the judges:\nDönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936 to which Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930\n... The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, violation of the Protocol\n... The orders, then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol\n... The sentence of Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare.\nHis sentence on unrestricted submarine warfare was not assessed because of similar actions by the Allies. In particular, the\nBritish Admiralty\n, on 8 May 1940, had ordered all vessels in the\nSkagerrak\nsunk on sight, and Admiral\nChester W. Nimitz\n, wartime commander-in-chief of the\nUnited States Pacific Fleet\n, stated the US Navy had\nwaged unrestricted submarine warfare\nagainst\nJapan\nin the Pacific from the day the US officially entered the war. Thus, Dönitz was not charged of waging unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed neutral shipping by ordering all ships in\ndesignated areas in international waters\nto be sunk without warning.\nDönitz was imprisoned for 10 years in\nSpandau Prison\nin what was then\nWest Berlin\n.\nDuring his period in prison he was unrepentant, and maintained that he had done nothing wrong. He also rejected Speer's attempts to persuade him to end his devotion to Hitler and accept responsibility for the wrongs the German Government had committed. Conversely, over 100 senior Allied officers sent letters to Dönitz conveying their disappointment over the unfairness and verdict of his trial.\nLater years and death\nDönitz was released on 1 October 1956 and retired to the small village of\nAumühle\nin Schleswig-Holstein in northern\nWest Germany\n.\nThere, he worked on two books. His memoirs,\nZehn Jahre, Zwanzig Tage\n(\nMemoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days\n), were released in Germany in 1958 and became available in an English translation the following year. This book recounted Dönitz's experiences as U-boat commander (10 years) and President of Germany (20 days). In it, Dönitz explains the Nazi regime as a product of its time, but argues he was not a politician and thus not morally responsible for many of the regime's crimes. He likewise criticises dictatorship as a fundamentally flawed form of government and blames it for many of the Nazi era's failings.\nThe historian Alan P. Rems has written that Dönitz's memoirs are unconvincing and that, \"unimpeded by a meaningful Nuremberg verdict, Dönitz fashioned a legend that could be embraced by the most unregenerate Nazis as well as credulous Allied officers who accepted his sanitized version of history and showered Dönitz with letters of support as a wronged brother-in-arms\".\nGrave in\nAumühle\n, east of\nHamburg\nDönitz's second book,\nMein wechselvolles Leben\n(\nMy Ever-Changing Life\n) is less known, perhaps because it deals with the events of his life before 1934. This book was first published in 1968, and a new edition was released in 1998 with the revised title\nMein soldatisches Leben\n(\nMy Martial Life\n). In 1973, he appeared in the\nThames Television\nproduction\nThe World at War\n, in one of his few television appearances.\nDönitz was unrepentant regarding his role in World War II, saying that he had acted at all times out of duty to his nation.\nIn 1976, Dönitz appeared in\nThe Memory of Justice\n. In the documentary, Dönitz discusses the\nNuremberg trials\nand his experience of 1946 along with\nAlbert Speer\n.\nHe lived out the rest of his life in relative obscurity in Aumühle, occasionally corresponding with collectors of German naval history.\nAround 1974, Dönitz was contacted by the\nneo-Nazi\nconspiracy theorist\nand early\nReichsbürger\nManfred Roeder\n, who tried to prove that the German Reich still existed. Roeder assumed that Dönitz remained the legal head of state, but the former admiral considered the idea ridiculous and firmly stated that he no longer considered himself President of Germany. Regarding this as a resignation declaration, Roeder subsequently declared himself the new leader of Germany and eventually became active as a terrorist.\nDönitz died in Aumühle of a\nheart attack\non Christmas Eve in 1980 at the age of 89.\nAs the last German officer with the rank of\nGroßadmiral\n(grand admiral), he was honoured by many former servicemen and foreign naval officers who came to pay their respects at his funeral on 6 January 1981.\nHe was buried in Waldfriedhof Cemetery in Aumühle without\nmilitary honours\n, and service members were not allowed to wear uniforms to the funeral. Also in attendance were over 100 holders of the\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross\n.\nSummary of career\nPromotions\nDecorations and awards\nGerman\nGeneral Honor Decoration\n(\nAllgemeines Ehrenzeichen\n) (7 June 1913)\nIron Cross\n(1914)\n2nd class (7 September 1914)\n1st class (5 May 1916)\nFriedrich Cross\nof the Duchy of Anhalt, 1st class (17 January 1916)\nKnight of the Royal\nHouse Order of Hohenzollern\nwith Swords (10 June 1918)\nHonour Cross of the World War 1914/1918\n(30 January 1935)\nU-boat War Badge\n1918 Version\nSpecial\nU-boat War Badge\nwith diamonds (1939)\nSudetenland Medal\n(20 December 1939)\nClasp to the Iron Cross\n(1939)\n2nd class (18 September 1939)\n1st class (20 December 1939)\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves\nKnight's Cross on 21 April 1940 as\nKonteradmiral\nand\nBefehlshaber der U-Boote\n(B.d.U.)\n223rd Oak Leaves on 6 April 1943 as\nGroßadmiral\nand\nOberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine\nand\nBefehlshaber der U-Boote\nGolden Party Badge\nof the National Socialist German Workers Party (1943)\nForeign\nOttoman War Medal\n(7 November 1916)\n(Ottoman Empire)\nOrder of the Medjidie\n, 4th class (13 March 1917)\n(Ottoman Empire)\nOrder of the Medjidie\n, 1st class (Ottoman Empire)\nMilitary Order of Savoy\nKnight Cross (20 April 1940) (Kingdom of Italy)\nMilitary Order of Savoy\nCommander's Cross (7 November 1941)\n(Kingdom of Italy)\nOrder of Naval Merit\nin white (10 June 1940) (\nSpanish State\n)\nOrder of Michael the Brave\n, 2nd and 3rd class (7 April 1943) (Kingdom of Romania)\nOrder of Michael the Brave\n, 1st class (Kingdom of Romania)\nOrder of the Rising Sun\n, First Class (11 September 1943) (Empire of Japan)\nOrder of the Cross of Liberty\nGrand Cross with Swords (11 April 1944) (Finland)\nSee also\nBiography portal\nGermany portal\nPolitics portal\nB-Dienst\nGlossary of German military terms\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nNotes\n1\n2\nas Chancellor\n1\n2\nas Leading Minister\n↑\nThe\nBerlin Declaration\n, signed by the Allies on 5 June 1945, did not recognize Dönitz’s civilian government; thus,  they assumed supreme authority over Germany through the Allied Control Council\nReferences\n↑\nKelsen, Hans (August 2014). \"Is a Peace Treaty with Germany Legally Possible and Politically Desirable\".\nAmerican Political Science Association\n:\n1187–\n1193.\ndoi\n:\n10.1017/S0003055400261108\n.\n↑\nGrier 2007\n, p.\n256, Footnote 8, Chapter 10.\n1\n2\nHaarr 2012\n, p.\n493.\n↑\nThames Television (9 January 1974), 10. \"Wolf Pack: U-Boats in the Atlantic (1939–1944)\", retrieved 16 September 2023\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n614–615.\n1\n2\nNiestlé 1998\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nHamilton 1996\n, pp.\n285, 286.\n1\n2\nZabecki 2014\n, p.\n354.\n↑\nKraus\n&\nDönitz 1933\n.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n162–164.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n164–165.\n1\n2\n3\nWilliamson 2007\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nMiller 2000\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nBlair 1998\n, pp.\n283, 338, 569.\n1\n2\nBlair 1998\n, p.\n569.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n345–348.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n186–188.\n1\n2\n3\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n196–197.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n197–198.\n↑\nRohwer 2015\n, pp.\n3–4, 257–262.\n↑\nWestwood 2005\n, pp.\n55–56.\n↑\nHaslop 2013\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n188.\n1\n2\nWestwood 2005\n, pp.\n53–54.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n17.\n1\n2\n3\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n215.\n↑\nOvery 2002\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n16–17.\n1\n2\n3\nTucker 2005\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nPaterson 2003\n, pp.\n10–14.\n1\n2\nRoskill 1954\n, pp.\n103–104.\n1\n2\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n220–221.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nGardner 1999\n, pp.\n58, 62.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n767.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n27–28.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nMorgan\n&\nTaylor 2011\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n21–22.\n1\n2\nRoskill 1954\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nVause 1997\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n261.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n770.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n260.\n↑\nNational Archives 2001\n, p.\n104.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n265.\n1\n2\n3\nTucker 2005\n, p.\n143.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n39–40.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n274.\n1\n2\nNational Archives 2001\n, pp.\n104–117.\n↑\nHooton 2010\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nNeitzel 2003\n, pp.\n448–462.\n↑\nNeitzel 2003\n, p.\n450.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n261–262.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n52–53.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nStern 2003\n, p.\n137.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n230–231.\n↑\nGardner 1999\n, pp.\n1–218.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nGardner 1999\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nBoog et al. 2001\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nStern 2003\n, p.\n171.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n264.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, pp.\n264–265.\n↑\nStern 2003\n, p.\n112.\n1\n2\n3\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n326.\n1\n2\nTucker 2005\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nHinsley 1993\n, p.\n157.\n1\n2\nMacksey 2000\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nMacksey 2000\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nKohnen 1999\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nGannon 1990\n, pp.\n308, 339.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, pp.\n52–54.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nKohnen 1999\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, p.\n55.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, pp.\n55–56.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, pp.\n112–144.\n↑\nMilner 1994\n, pp.\n200–201.\n↑\nMilner 1994\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, pp.\n168–193.\n↑\nHadley 1985\n, pp.\n169, 176.\n1\n2\n3\nGannon 1990\n, p.\n389.\n↑\nGannon 1990\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n410.\n1\n2\nWiggins 1995\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nKelshall 1988\n, p.\n113.\n↑\nKelshall 1988\n, pp.\n43, 45–67.\n↑\nBlair 1998\n, pp.\n505–506.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nBoog et al. 2001\n, p.\n380.\n↑\nVause 1997\n, pp.\n124–125.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n359–361.\n↑\nVause 1997\n, p.\n125.\n1\n2\nPaterson 2007\n, pp.\n6, 19, 182–183, 187.\n↑\nMorgan\n&\nTaylor 2011\n, p.\nxx.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n444.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n444–445.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n444–446.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n454.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n459–461.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n498–500.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n520, 522.\n↑\nHaslop 2013\n, p.\n53.\n1\n2\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n520–522.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n523.\n1\n2\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n652–654.\n↑\nRohwer 1996\n, p.\n86.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n148.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n2.\n1\n2\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nBuckley 1995\n, pp.\n123–124.\n↑\nBuckley 1995\n, p.\n129.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n146–147.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n146, 155.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n149–150.\n↑\nRohwer 2015\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n156.\n1\n2\nRoskill 1954\n, p.\n365.\n↑\nRohwer 2015\n, pp.\n95–191.\n↑\nPrice 1980\n, p.\n132.\n1\n2\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n588, 593–594.\n↑\nBlair 1998\n, pp.\n62, 218, 778.\n↑\nRoskill 1954\n, p.\n364.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n157–158.\n↑\nRoskill 1954\n, pp.\n366–368.\n↑\nRoskill 1954\n, pp.\n367–368.\n1\n2\nRoskill 1954\n, p.\n371.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n179.\n↑\nRoskill 1954\n, pp.\n373, 376.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n179–180.\n↑\nRoskill 1954\n, pp.\n377–378.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, p.\n146.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n.\n↑\nMilner 1994\n, pp.\n24, 28.\n1\n2\n3\nMilner 1994\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n189–190.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n189, 191.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n192–193.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n188–189.\n↑\nMilner 1994\n, pp.\n61–63.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, pp.\n181–229.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n195–196.\n1\n2\nMilner 2011\n, p.\n204.\n↑\nSyrett 1994\n, pp.\n230–260.\n↑\nWiggins 1995\n, p.\n228.\n1\n2\n3\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n205–207.\n↑\nMilner 2011\n, pp.\n216, 218.\n↑\nTarrant 1994\n, p.\n81.\n1\n2\nTarrant 1994\n, pp.\n76, 80–81.\n1\n2\n3\nPaterson 2001\n, pp.\n237–240.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n645.\n↑\nTarrant 1994\n, pp.\n80–81.\n↑\nHendrie 2006\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nPaterson 2001\n, p.\n245.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n645–647.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n650.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, pp.\n658–659.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, pp.\n253, 255.\n↑\nRohwer\n&\nHümmelchen 2005\n, pp.\n406–407, 418.\n↑\nFrieser et al. 2007\n, p.\n227.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, p.\n241.\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n521.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, p.\n211.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, p.\n249.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, pp.\nxxi, 253.\n1\n2\nFrieser et al. 2007\n, p.\n635.\n↑\nThomas 1990\n, p.\n250.\n1\n2\nVego 2003\n, p.\n280.\n↑\nTarrant 1994\n, pp.\n225–226.\n↑\nRohwer\n&\nHümmelchen 2005\n, pp.\n389–390.\n↑\nRohwer 1996\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nMorgan\n&\nTaylor 2011\n, pp.\n322–323.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n943–946.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n949, 950.\n↑\nSteinweis, Rogers\n&\nGrier 2003\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, pp.\n380–381.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n962.\n↑\nKarl Dönitz Speech to the German People – 1 May 1945\n, 22 September 2022\n, retrieved\n16 August\n2023\n↑\nKarl Dönitz Announcement of German Capitulation- 8 May 1945\n, 12 December 2022\n, retrieved\n16 August\n2023\n↑\nLast Wehrmacht Report – 9 May 1945\n, 22 September 2022\n, retrieved\n16 August\n2023\n↑\nOliver 2002\n, p.\n118.\n↑\nSoldiers of the Shropshire Museum: Arrest of the Flensburg Government, 1945\n↑\nTerraine 1989\n, p.\n519.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nSteinweis, Rogers\n&\nGrier 2003\n, pp.\n186–188.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, p.\n154.\n↑\nBeevor 2011\n.\n↑\nSteinweis, Rogers\n&\nGrier 2003\n, p.\n185.\n1\n2\nRems 2015\n.\n↑\nZillmer 1995\n, p.\n141.\n1\n2\nHarris 1999\n, p.\n289.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nSteinweis, Rogers\n&\nGrier 2003\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nSprecher 1999\n, p.\n994.\n↑\nGoldensohn 2004\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nZabecki 2007\n, pp.\n14–17, 95–96.\n↑\nZabecki 2007\n, pp.\n99–100.\n↑\n\"Forgetfulness Of Hess Held Intentional\".\nVallejo Times-Herald\n. No.\nPage 7. Luther Gibson. 18 October 1945.\n↑\nWalker 2006\n, pp.\n100–102.\n↑\nZabecki 2007\n, pp.\n56–63.\n↑\nMadsen 1998\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nMcDonald 2000\n, pp.\n729–730.\n↑\nMoore\n&\nTurner 1995\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nZabecki 2007\n, pp.\n52–54.\n↑\nRonzitti 1988\n, p.\n359.\n↑\nWalker 2006\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nBlair 1998\n, pp.\n704–705.\n↑\n\"GERMANY: GRAND-ADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ RELEASED FROM SPANDAU PRISON AFTER TEN YEARS\"\n.\nReuters Archive Licensing\n. Retrieved\n24 September\n2023\n.\n↑\nDönitz 1997\n, p.\n477.\n↑\nThames Television - Jeremy Isaacs (31 October 1973),\nThe World at War (1973) - Thames Television\n, Thames Television\n, retrieved\n2 August\n2024\n↑\nCowley\n&\nParker 2005\n, p.\n139.\n1\n2\nStetson 1980\n↑\nGinsburg 2022\n, p.\n67.\n1\n2\nVinocur 1981\n1\n2\n\"Thousands at funeral for Hitler's successor – UPI Archives\"\n.\nUPI\n. Retrieved\n16 September\n2023\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nBusch\n&\nRöll 2003\n, p.\n26.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nBusch\n&\nRöll 2003\n, p.\n27.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\nBusch\n&\nRöll 2003\n, p.\n28.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nThomas 1997\n, p.\n123.\n1\n2\nScherzer 2007\n, p.\n275.\n↑\nFellgiebel 2000\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nFellgiebel 2000\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nMatikkala 2017\n, p.\n511.\nSources\nBeevor, Antony\n(2002).\nBerlin – The Downfall 1945\n. Viking-Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03041-5\n.\nBeevor, Antony (2011).\nBerlino 1945\n(in Italian). Bur.\nISBN\n978-88-586-1832-5\n.\nBlair, Clay (1998).\nHitler's U-boat War: Vol. II, The Hunted, 1942–1945\n. Random House.\nISBN\n978-0-679-45742-8\n.\nBoog, Horst\n;\nRahn, Werner\n;\nStumpf, Reinhard\n;\nWegner, Bernd\n(2001).\nGermany and the Second World War: Volume 6: The Global War\n.\nOxford University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-1982-2888-2\n.\nBuckley, John\n(1995).\nThe RAF and Trade Defence, 1919–1945: Constant Endeavour\n. Ryburn Publishing.\nISBN\n1-85331-069-7\n.\nBusch, Rainer; Röll, Hans-Joachim (2003).\nDer U-Boot-Krieg 1939–1945 – Die Ritterkreuzträger der U-Boot-Waffe von September 1939 bis Mai 1945\n[\nThe U-Boat War 1939–1945 – The Knight's Cross Bearers of the U-Boat Force from September 1939 to May 1945\n]\n(in German). Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn Germany: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn.\nISBN\n978-3-8132-0515-2\n.\nCowley, Robert; Parker, Geoffrey (2005).\nThe Reader's Companion to Military History\n. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.\nISBN\n978-0-547-56146-2\n.\nDoenitz, Karl (1959).\nMemoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days Mass Market\n. Translated by Stevens, R.H. In collaboration with David Woodward (First Da Capo Press, 1997\ned.). Boston:\nDa Capo Press\n.\nISBN\n0-306-80764-5\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\nDönitz, Karl (1997) .\nZehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage: Erinnerungen 1935–1945\n[\nTen Years and Twenty Days: Memoirs 1935 – 1945\n]\n(in German) (11th\ned.). Bernard und Graefe.\nISBN\n978-376375186-0\n.\nDollinger, Hans (1997).\nThe Decline and Fall of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan\n. London: Bounty Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7537-0009-9\n.\nLCCN\n67-27047\n.\nFellgiebel, Walther-Peer (2000) .\nDie Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939–1945 – Die Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkrieges aller Wehrmachtteile\n[\nThe Bearers of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939–1945 – The Owners of the Highest Award of the Second World War of all Wehrmacht Branches\n]\n(in German). Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas.\nISBN\n978-3-7909-0284-6\n.\nFrieser, Karl-Heinz\n; Schmider, Klaus; Schönherr, Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard;\nUngváry, Kristián\n;\nWegner, Bernd\n(2007).\nDie Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten\n[\nThe Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts\n]\n.\nDas Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg\n[Germany and the Second World War] (in German). Vol.\nVIII. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.\nISBN\n978-3-421-06235-2\n.\nGannon, Michael\n(1990).\nOperation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II\n. Washington:\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-59114-302-4\n.\nGardner, W. J. R (1999).\nDecoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra\n. Palgrave, McMillan.\nISBN\n978-0-230-51014-2\n.\nGinsburg, Tobias (2022) [1st pub. 2019].\nDie Reise ins Reich: Unter Rechtsextremisten, Reichsbürgern und anderen Verschwörungstheoretikern\n[\nJourney into the Reich: Among far-right extremists, Reich Citizens and other conspiracy theorists\n]\n(2nd\ned.). Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-499-00456-8\n.\nGoldensohn, Leon\n(2004).\nThe Nuremberg Interviews\n. New York.\nISBN\n978-1-4000-3043-9\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: location missing publisher (\nlink\n)\nGrier, Howard D. (2007).\nHitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea. The Third Reich's last hope\n.\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-59114-345-1\n.\nHaarr, Geirr H. (2012).\nThe Gathering Storm: The Naval War in Northern Europe September 1939 – April 1940\n. Seaforth Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-84832-140-3\n.\nHadley, Michael (1985).\nU-Boats Against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters\n. Montreal:\nMcGill–Queen's University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-7735-0811-8\n.\nHamilton, Charles (1996).\nLeaders & Personalities of the Third Reich\n. Vol.\n2. San José, CA: R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-912138-66-4\n.\nHarris, Whitney (1999).\nTyranny on Trial: The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the End of World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946\n. Southern Methodist University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8707-4436-5\n.\nHaslop, Dennis (2013).\nBritain, Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic: A Comparative Study\n. Bloomsbury Academic.\nISBN\n978-1-4725-1163-8\n.\nHendrie, Andrew (2006).\nThe Cinderella Service: RAF Coastal Command 1939–1945\n. Pen & Sword Aviation.\nISBN\n978-1-84415-346-6\n.\nHinsley, Francis\n(1993).\nBritish Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 3, Part 2: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations [Abridged]\n.\nHer Majesty's Stationery Office\n.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03041-5\n.\nHooton, E.R. (2010).\nThe Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power, 1933–1945\n. Classic Publications.\nISBN\n978-1-906537-18-0\n.\nKelshall, Gaylord (1988).\nThe U-Boat War in the Caribbean\n. Washington:\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-55750-452-4\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKohnen, David (1999).\nCommanders Winn and Knowles: winning the U-boat war with intelligence, 1939–1943\n. Enigma Press.\nISBN\n978-8-3861-1034-6\n.\nKraus, Theodor; Dönitz, Karl (1933).\nDie Kreuzerfahrten der Goeben und Breslau\n[\nThe Cruises of Goeben and Breslau\n]\n(in German). Berlin: Ullstein.\nOCLC\n251295583\n.\nMacksey, Kenneth\n(2000).\nWithout Enigma: The Ultra and Fellgiebel Riddles\n. London: Ian Allan.\nISBN\n978-0-7110-2766-4\n.\nMadsen, Chris (1998).\nThe Royal Navy and German naval disarmament, 1942–1947\n. Taylor & Francis.\nISBN\n978-0-7146-4373-1\n.\nMatikkala, Antti (2017).\nKunnian ruletti: Korkeimmat ulkomaalaisille 1941-1944 annetut suomalaiset kunniamerkit\n(in Finnish). Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.\nISBN\n978-952-222-847-5\n.\nMcDonald, Gabrielle (2000).\nSubstantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts: Materials: 002\n. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.\nISBN\n978-90-411-1135-7\n.\nMiller, David (2000).\nU-Boats: The Illustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep\n. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's.\nISBN\n978-1-57488-246-9\n.\nMilner, Marc\n(1994).\nThe U-boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive Against Germany's Submarines, 1943–1945\n.\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-5575-0854-6\n.\nMilner, Marc\n(2011).\nBattle of the Atlantic\n.\nThe History Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-6187-8\n.\nMoore, John Norton; Turner, Robert F. (1995).\nReadings on International Law from the Naval War College Review, 1978–1994\n. Vol.\n65. Naval War College.\nISBN\n978-0-385-04961-0\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nMorgan, Daniel; Taylor, Bruce (2011).\nU-Boat Attack Logs: A Complete Record of Warship Sinkings from Original Sources, 1939–1945\n. Seaforth Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-84832-118-2\n.\nMosley, Leonard\n(1974).\nThe Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering\n. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.\nISBN\n978-0-385-04961-0\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nNational Archives\n(2001).\nThe Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: 1933–1945\n. London:\nPublic Record Office\n.\nISBN\n978-1-905615-30-8\n.\nNeitzel, Sönke\n(2003). \"Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War against Britain, 1939-1945\".\nWar in History\n.\n10\n(4):\n448–\n463.\ndoi\n:\n10.1191/0968344503wh285oa\n.\nISSN\n0968-3445\n.\nOCLC\n437806787\n.\nS2CID\n159960697\n.\nNiestlé, Axel (1998).\nGerman U-boat Losses During World War II: Details of Destruction\n.\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-5575-0641-2\n.\nOliver, Kingsley (2002).\nThe RAF Regiment at War 1942–1946\n. Havertown: Pen and Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78337-981-1\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2002).\nWar and Economy in the Third Reich\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-198-20599-9\n.\nPaterson, Lawrence (2001).\nFirst U-boat Flotilla\n. Leo Cooper.\nISBN\n978-0-8505-2917-3\n.\nPaterson, Lawrence (2003).\nSecond U-boat Flotilla\n. Leo Cooper.\nISBN\n978-1-78337-967-5\n.\nPaterson, Lawrence (2007).\nU-boats in the Mediterranean 1941–1944\n.\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-8117-1655-0\n.\nPrice, Alfred\n(1980).\nAircraft Versus Submarine: The Evolution of the Anti-submarine Aircraft, 1912 to 1980\n. Jane.\nISBN\n978-0-7106-0008-0\n.\nRems, Alan P. (December 2015).\n\"Götterdämmerung German Admirals on Trial\"\n.\nNaval History Magazine\n. Vol.\n26, no.\n6.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 18 August 2019\n. Retrieved\n18 August\n2019\n.\nRohwer, Jürgen\n(1996).\nWar at Sea, 1939–1945\n.\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-5575-0915-4\n.\nRohwer, Jürgen\n(2015).\nCritical Convoy Battles of WWII: Crisis in the North Atlantic, March 1943\n. Stackpole Books.\nISBN\n978-0-8117-1655-0\n.\nRohwer, Jürgen\n; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005).\nChronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two\n. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press.\nISBN\n978-1-59114-119-8\n.\nRonzitti, Natalino (1988).\nThe Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries\n. Martinus Nijhoff.\nISBN\n978-90-247-3652-2\n.\nRoskill, Stephen\n(1954).\nThe War at Sea, 1939–1945: The defensive\n.\nHer Majesty's Stationery Office\n.\nScherzer, Veit (2007).\nDie Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939 von Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm sowie mit Deutschland verbündeter Streitkräfte nach den Unterlagen des Bundesarchives\n[\nThe Knight's Cross Bearers 1939–1945 The Holders of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939 by Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and Allied Forces with Germany According to the Documents of the Federal Archives\n]\n(in German). Jena, Germany: Scherzers Militaer-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-938845-17-2\n.\nShirer, William\n(1983).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Fawcett Crest.\nISBN\n978-0-449-21977-5\n.\nSprecher, Drexel (1999).\nInside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor's Comprehensive Account\n. Vol.\n2.\nUniversity Press of America\n.\nISBN\n978-0-7618-1284-5\n.\nSteinweis, Alan E.; Rogers, Daniel E.; Grier, David (2003).\nThe Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and its Legacy\n. Harris Center for Judaic Studies.\nISBN\n978-0-8032-4299-9\n.\nStern, Robert (2003).\nBattle Beneath the Waves: U-boats at War\n. Castle Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7858-1682-9\n.\nStetson, Damon (26 December 1980).\n\"Doenitz Dies; Gave Up for Nazis; Admiral Doenitz Is Dead; Surrendered for the Nazis\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\n16 September\n2023\n.\nSyrett, David\n(1994).\nThe Defeat of the German U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic\n. Columbia:\nUniversity of South Carolina Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-41022-139-1\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nTarrant, E.V (1994).\nThe Last Year of the Kriegsmarine: May 1944 to May 1945\n. Maryland, MD:\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-5575-0510-1\n.\nTennent, Alan J. (2001).\nBritish and Commonwealth Merchant Ship Losses to Axis Submarines, 1939–1945\n. Stoud: Sutton.\nISBN\n978-0-7509-2760-4\n.\nTerraine, John\n(1989).\nBusiness in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945\n. London: Leo Cooper.\nISBN\n978-0-85052-760-5\n.\nThomas, Charles (1990).\nThe Germany Navy in the Nazi Era\n. London: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-0444-5493-9\n.\nThomas, Franz (1997).\nDie Eichenlaubträger 1939–1945 Band 1: A–K\n[\nThe Oak Leaves Bearers 1939–1945 Volume 1: A–K\n]\n(in German). Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-7648-2299-6\n.\nTucker, Spencer (2005).\nWorld War II: A Student Encyclopedia\n. ABC Clio.\nISBN\n978-1-85109-857-6\n.\nVause, Jordan (1997).\nWolf: U-boat Commanders in World War II\n. Washington, D.C.:\nNaval Institute Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-55750-874-4\n.\nVego, Milan (2003).\nNaval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas\n. London: Frank Cass.\nISBN\n0-7146-5389-6\n.\nVinocur, John (7 January 1981).\n\"WAR VETERANS COME TO BURY, AND TO PRAISE, DOENITZ\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\n16 September\n2023\n.\nWalker, Andrew (2006).\nThe Nazi War Trials\n. CPD.\nISBN\n978-1-903047-50-7\n.\nWestwood, David (2005).\nThe U-Boat War: The German Submarine Service and the Battle of the Atlantic 1935–1945\n. Conway Maritime Press.\nISBN\n978-1-84486-001-2\n.\nWette, Wolfram\n(2007).\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n. Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-674-02577-6\n.\nWiggins, Melanie (1995).\nTorpedoes in the Gulf: Galveston and the U-Boats, 1942–1943\n. Texas:\nTexas A&M University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-8909-6627-3\n.\nWilliamson, Gordon (2007).\nU-Boats vs Destroyer Escorts\n. U.K.: Osprey Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-84603-133-5\n.\nZabecki, David T.\n(2007).\nDönitz: A Defense\n. Merriam Press Military Monograph Series.\nISBN\n978-1-57638-042-0\n.\nZabecki, David T.\n(2014).\nGermany at War: 400 Years of Military History [4 volumes]: 400 Years of Military History\n. ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1-59884-981-3\n.\nZillmer, Eric A. (1995).\nThe Quest for the Nazi Personality: a Psychological Investigation of Nazi War Criminals\n. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.\nISBN\n978-0-8058-1898-7\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nAttribution:\nThis article incorporates text from this source, which is in the\npublic domain\n:\nTucker, Robert W. (1957).\nThe Law of War and Neutrality at Sea\n. U.S. Government Printing Office\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nExternal links\nListen to this article\n(\n37\nminutes\n)\nThis audio file\nwas created from a revision of this article dated 16\nDecember\n2017\n(\n2017-12-16\n)\n, and does not reflect subsequent edits.\n(\nAudio help\n·\nMore spoken articles\n)\nWorks by or about Karl Dönitz\nat the\nInternet Archive\nHistorical Enigma message\nGrand Admiral Dönitz announcing his appointment as Hitler's successor.\nNewspaper clippings about Karl Dönitz\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nPortal\n:\nBiography\nKarl Dönitz\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "head_of_government": "Joseph Goebbels[a]Lutz von Krosigk[b]",
+      "preceded_by": "Erich Raeder",
+      "succeeded_by": "Hans-Georg von Friedeburg",
+      "deputy": "Eberhard Godt",
+      "born": "(1891-09-16)16 September 1891Grünau, Germany",
+      "died": "24 December 1980(1980-12-24)(aged89)Aumühle, West Germany",
+      "resting_place": "Munich Waldfriedhof, Aumühle",
+      "party": "Nazi Party[2]",
+      "spouse": "Ingeborg Weber​​(m.1916;died1962)​",
+      "children": "3",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler's cabinetGoebbels cabinetFlensburg Government",
+      "nickname(s)": "Der Löwe(The Lion)[3]Onkel Karl(Uncle Karl)[3]",
+      "allegiance": "German EmpireWeimar RepublicNazi Germany",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German NavyReichsmarineKriegsmarine",
+      "yearsof_service": "1910–19181920–1945",
+      "rank": "Großadmiral",
+      "commands": "SMUC-25SMUB-68Emden1st U-boat FlotillaFührer der UnterseebooteBefehlshaber der U-BooteOberkommando der MarineSupreme Commander of theWehrmacht",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWorld War IIBattle of the AtlanticConvoy Battles of World War II",
+      "awards": "Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves",
+      "convictions": "Crimes of aggressionWar crimes",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "10 years imprisonment",
+      "imprisonedat": "Spandau Prison"
+    },
+    "char_count": 103082
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Erich_Raeder",
+    "name": "Erich Raeder",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Erich Johann Albert Raeder was a German admiral who played a major role in the naval history of World War II and was convicted of war crimes after the war. He attained the highest possible naval rank, that of grand admiral, in 1939. Raeder led the Kriegsmarine for the first half of the war; he resigned in January 1943 and was replaced by Karl Dönitz. At the Nuremberg trials he was sentenced to life imprisonment but was released early owing to failing health in 1955.",
+    "description": "German admiral (1876–1960)",
+    "full_text": "Erich Raeder\nGerman admiral (1876–1960)\nErich Johann Albert Raeder\n(\n[\nˈeːʁɪç\nˈʁɛːdɐ\n]\n; 24 April 1876 – 6 November 1960)\nwas a German admiral who played a major role in the\nnaval history of World War II\nand was convicted of\nwar crimes\nafter the war. He attained the highest possible naval rank, that of\ngrand admiral\n, in 1939. Raeder led the\nKriegsmarine\nfor the first half of the war; he resigned in January 1943 and was replaced by\nKarl Dönitz\n. At the\nNuremberg trials\nhe was sentenced to\nlife imprisonment\nbut was released early owing to failing health in 1955.\nEarly years\nRaeder was born into a middle-class\nProtestant\nfamily in\nWandsbek\nin the\nPrussian\nprovince of\nSchleswig-Holstein\nin the\nGerman Empire\n. His father was a headmaster.\nRaeder idolised his father Hans Raeder, who as a teacher and a father was noted for his marked authoritarian views, and who impressed upon his son the values of hard work, thrift, religion and discipline – all of which Raeder was to preach throughout his life.\nHans Raeder also taught his children to support the existing government of alleged \"non-political\" experts led by Bismarck who were said to stand \"above politics\" and were alleged to only do what was best for Germany.\nIn the same way, Hans Raeder warned his children that if Germany were to become a democracy, that would be a disaster as it would mean government by men \"playing politics\"-doing what was only best for their petty sectarian interests instead of the nation.\nLike many other middle-class Germans of his time, Hans Raeder strongly disliked the\nSocial Democrats\n, whom he accused of playing \"party politics\" in the\nReichstag\nby promoting working class interests instead of thinking about the national good, a stance that his son also adopted.\nThroughout his entire life, Raeder claimed that he was\napolitisch\n(someone who was \"above politics\", i.e. only thought about the good of the nation instead of his party), and as an \"apolitical\" officer, Raeder thus maintained that his support for sea power was based upon objective consideration of the national good.\nNaval career until World War II\nMain article:\nPre–World War II career of Erich Raeder\nImperial German Navy\nErich Raeder (second from left) and the staff of Vice Admiral\nFranz von Hipper\n(center), 1916\nRaeder joined the\nKaiserliche Marine\n(Imperial Navy) in 1894 and rapidly rose in rank, becoming chief of staff for\nFranz von Hipper\nin 1912. Raeder's rise up the ranks was due mostly to his intelligence and hard work\nthough from 1901 to 1903 Raeder served on the staff of\nPrince Heinrich of Prussia\n, and gained a powerful patron in the process.\nOwing to his cold and distant personality, Raeder was a man whom even his friends often admitted to knowing very little about.\nThe dominating figure of the Navy was Admiral\nAlfred von Tirpitz\n, the autocratic State Secretary of the Navy. Tirpitz's preferred means of obtaining \"world power status\" was through his\nRisikotheorie\n(risk theory) where Germany would build a\nRisikoflotte\n(Risk Fleet) that would make it too dangerous for Britain to risk a war with Germany, and thereby alter the international balance of power decisively in the\nReich\n'\ns\nfavor. Tirpitz transformed the Navy from the small coastal defense force of 1897 into the mighty High Seas Fleet of 1914.\nIn 1904, Raeder, who spoke fluent\nRussian\n, was sent to the\nFar East\nas an observer of the\nRusso-Japanese War\n.\nStarting in 1905, Raeder worked in the public relations section of the Navy, where he first met Tirpitz and began his introduction to politics by briefing journalists to run articles promoting the\nSeemachtideologie\nand meeting politicians who held seats in the\nReichstag\nin order to convert them to the\nSeemachtideologie\n.\nWorking closely with Tirpitz, Raeder was heavily involved in the lobbying the\nReichstag\nto pass the\nThird Navy Law\nof 1906 which committed Germany to building \"all big gun battleships\" to compete with the new British\nDreadnought\nclass\nin the Anglo-German naval race that had only begun at the start of the 20th century.\nRaeder was the captain of\nKaiser Wilhelm II\n's\nprivate yacht\nin the years leading up to World War I. In itself, this was not a rewarding post, but often people in this post were quickly promoted afterwards.\nWorld War I\nRaeder served as Hipper's chief of staff during World War I, as well as in combat posts. He took part in the\nBattle of Dogger Bank\nin 1915 and in the\nBattle of Jutland\nin 1916. Raeder later described Hipper as an admiral who \"hated paperwork\"; accordingly, Hipper delegated considerable power to Raeder, who thus enjoyed more influence than his position as chief of staff would suggest.\nDuring and after World War I the German navy was divided into two schools of thought. One, led by Admiral\nAlfred von Tirpitz\n(1849–1930), consisted of avid followers of the teachings of the American historian\nAlfred Thayer Mahan\n(1840–1914) and believed in building a \"balanced fleet\" centered around the battleship that would seek out and win a decisive\nbattle of annihilation\n(\nEntscheidungsschlacht\n) against the Royal Navy in the event of war.\nThe other school, led by Commander\nWolfgang Wegener\n(1875–1956), argued that because of superior British shipbuilding capacity Germany could never hope to build a \"balanced fleet\" capable of winning an\nEntscheidungsschlacht\n, and so the best use of German naval strength was to build a fleet of cruisers and submarines that would wage a\nguerre de course\n(commerce raiding against an enemy's merchant shipping).\nAfter reading all three of Wegener's papers setting out his ideas, Admiral Hipper decided to submit them to the Admiralty in Berlin, but changed his mind after reading a paper by Raeder attacking the Wegener thesis as flawed.\nThis marked the beginning of a long feud between Raeder and Wegener, with Wegener claiming that his former friend Raeder was jealous of what Wegener insisted were his superior ideas.\nIn May 1916 Raeder played a major role planning a raid by Hipper's battlecruisers that aimed to lure out the British battlecruiser force which would then be destroyed by the main High Seas Fleet.\nThis raid turned into the\nBattle of Jutland\n. Raeder played a prominent role, and was forced midway through the battle to transfer from\nSMS\nLützow\nto\nSMS\nMoltke\nas a result of damage to Hipper's flagship.\nAs chief of staff to Admiral Hipper he was closely involved in a plan of Hipper's for a German battlecruiser squadron to sail across the Atlantic and sweep through the waters off Canada down to the West Indies and on to South America to sink the British cruisers operating in those waters, and thereby force the British to redeploy a substantial part of the\nHome Fleet\nto the New World.\nThough Hipper's plans were rejected\nas far too risky, they significantly influenced Raeder's later thinking.\nOn 14 October 1918, Raeder received a major promotion with appointment as deputy to Admiral\nPaul Behncke\n, the Naval State Secretary.\nRaeder had doubts about submarines, but he spent the last weeks of the war working to achieve the Scheer Programme of building 450 U-boats.\nOn 28 October 1918 the Imperial German\nfleet at Kiel mutinied\nwhen some of the ships' crews refused to sail out for the a final battle against the British\nGrand Fleet\nthat the Admiralty had ordered without the knowledge or approval of the German government.\nRaeder played a major role in attempting to crush the mutiny.\nWeimar Republic\nRaeder's two younger brothers were both killed in action in the First World War, and in 1919 his first marriage, which had been under heavy strain due to war-related stress, ended in divorce.\nFor the puritanical Raeder, the divorce was a huge personal disgrace, and for the rest of his life he always denied his first marriage.\nThe years 1918–1919 were some of the most troubled in his life.\nHigh Seas Fleet mutiny\nIn the winter of 1918–19, Raeder was closely involved in the efforts of the naval officer corps, strongly backed by the Defense Minister\nGustav Noske\nto disband the\nworkers' and soldiers' councils\nestablished after the Kiel mutiny.\nNoske was a\nMajority Social Democrat\nwith firm \"law and order\" views. During this period, Raeder served as the liaison between the naval officer corps and Noske, and it was Raeder who suggested to Noske on 11 January 1919 that\nAdolf von Trotha\nbe appointed commander-in-chief of the Navy.\nTirpitz's attacks on the Emperor's leadership during the war had caused a split in the officer corps between the followers of \"the Master\" and the Kaiser, and Raeder saw Trotha as the only officer acceptable to both factions.\nNoske in turn asked the Navy for volunteers for the\nFreikorps\nto crush uprisings from the Communists.\nThe Navy contributed two brigades to the\nFreikorps\n.\nUnder the\nWeimar Republic\n, the military considered itself\nüberparteilich\n(above party), which did not mean political neutrality as implied.\nThe military argued that there were two types of \"politics\":\nparteipolitisch\n(party politics) which was the responsibility of the politicians, and\nstaatspolitisch\n(state politics) which was the responsibility of the military.\nStaatspolitisch\nconcerned Germany's \"eternal\" interests and the \"historic mission\" of winning world power, which was to be pursued regardless of what the politicians or the people wanted.\nKapp\nputsch\nRaeder in 1928\nAfter the war, in 1920, Raeder was involved in the failed\nKapp Putsch\nwhen, together with almost the entire naval officer corps, he declared himself openly for the \"government\" of\nWolfgang Kapp\nagainst the leaders of the Weimar Republic.\nIn the summer of 1920 Raeder married his second wife, with whom he later had one son.\nAfter the failure of the Kapp\nPutsch\nhe was marginalized in the Navy, being transferred to the Naval Archives, where for two years he played a leading role in writing the official history of the Navy in World War I.\nAfter this, Raeder resumed his steady rise in the navy\nhierarchy\n, becoming\nVizeadmiral\n(vice admiral) in 1925.\nCommander-in-chief\nMain article:\nInterwar naval service of Erich Raeder\nRaeder and\nPaul von Hindenburg\nin Kiel, 1931\nOn 1 October 1928, Raeder was promoted to\nadmiral\nand made chief of the Naval Command (\nChef der Marineleitung\n) of the\nReichsmarine\n, the Weimar Republic Navy. On 1 June 1935, the\nReichsmarine\nwas renamed the\nKriegsmarine\nand Raeder became its commander-in-chief with the title of\nOberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine\n. On 20 April 1936, Raeder was promoted to the new rank of\nGeneraladmiral\nand granted the rank and authority of a\nReichsminister\nbut without the formal title.\nOn 30 January 1937, Hitler conferred the\nGolden Party Badge\non Raeder, thereby enrolling him in the Party (membership number 3,805,228).\nWorld War II\nMain article:\nErich Raeder during World War II\nErhard Milch\n,\nWilhelm Keitel\n,\nWalther von Brauchitsch\n, Raeder and\nMaximilian von Weichs\nat the 1938\nNuremberg Rally\nRaeder believed the navy was unprepared for the start of World War II by at least five years. The surface fleet was inadequate to fight the\nRoyal Navy\nand instead adopted a strategy of convoy raiding. Raeder wanted the Kriegsmarine to play an active part because he feared the budget would be cut after the war. The smaller ships were dispersed around the world in order to force the Royal Navy to disperse their ships to combat them, while the battleships would carry out raids in the\nNorth Sea\n, with a view towards gradually reducing the Royal Navy's strength at home.\nRaeder was unhappy with the outcome of the\nBattle of the River Plate\nand believed that\nHans Langsdorff\nshould not have scuttled the ship, but instead sailed out to engage the Royal Navy. Fleet commander\nHermann Boehm\nwas held responsible and was sacked by Raeder, who also issued orders that ships were to fight until the last shell and either win or sink with their flags flying.\nThe Allies were using Norwegian airfields to transfer aircraft to the Finns fighting against the Soviets in the\nWinter War\n, as well as\nmining Norwegian waters\n, and the Germans were alarmed by these developments. If the Allies were to use Norwegian naval bases or successfully mine Norwegian waters, they could cut off Germany's vital iron ore imports from Sweden and tighten the blockade of Germany. The Allies had made\nplans to invade Norway and Sweden\nin order to cut off those iron ore shipments. Admiral\nRolf Carls\n, commander of the Kriegsmarine in the Baltic Sea region, proposed the invasion of Norway to Raeder in September 1939. Raeder briefed Hitler on the idea in October, but planning did not begin until December 1939. The operation was in low-priority planning until the\nAltmark\nincident\nin February 1940, during which a German tanker carrying 300 Allied prisoners in then-neutral Norwegian waters was boarded by sailors from a Royal Navy destroyer and the prisoners were freed. After this, plans for the Norwegian invasion took on a new sense of urgency.\nThe invasion\nproved costly for the Kriegsmarine, which lost a heavy cruiser, two of its six light cruisers, 10 of its 20 destroyers and six U-boats. In addition, almost all of the other capital ships were damaged and required dockyard repairs, and for a time the German surface fleet had only three light cruisers and four destroyers operational in the aftermath of the Norwegian campaign.\nThe swift victory over\nFrance\nallowed the Kriegsmarine to base itself in ports on France's west coast. This was strategically important as German warships would no longer have to navigate through the dangerous English Channel in order to return to friendly ports, as well as allow them to range farther out into the Atlantic to attack convoys. With the surrender of France, Raeder saw the opportunity to greatly enhance the navy's power by confiscating the ships of the French Navy and manning them with his crews. Hitler however, vetoed this idea, afraid that doing so would push the French navy to join the Royal Navy. British fears of Raeder's plan resulted in the\nAttack on Mers-el-Kébir\n, in which the Royal Navy attacked the French navy despite being at peace with France.\nRaeder with\nOtto Kretschmer\n(left), August 1940\nOn 11 July 1940, Hitler and Raeder agreed to continue building the battleships called for by\nPlan Z\n. Raeder also had bases built at\nTrondheim\non the\nNorwegian Sea\nand at\nSaint-Nazaire\nand\nLorient\non the\nBay of Biscay\n. At this time, Raeder and other senior officers began submitting memos to invade (among others) Shetland, Iceland, the Azores, Iran, Madagascar, Kuwait, Egypt and the Dutch East Indies.\nIn January 1941, the battlecruisers\nScharnhorst\nand\nGneisenau\nwere sent on a successful\ncommerce-raiding mission\nin the Atlantic. On 18 March, following the beginning of\nLend-Lease\n, Raeder wanted to start firing on US warships even if unprovoked. He declined to invade the Azores because of the surface ship losses the previous year. Raeder urged Hitler to declare war on the United States throughout 1941 so the Kriegsmarine could begin sinking American warships escorting British convoys.\nIn April 1941, Raeder planned to follow up the success of\nScharnhorst\nand\nGneisenau\n'\ns commerce-raiding mission with an even larger mission involving a battleship, two battlecruisers and a heavy cruiser under the command of\nLütjens\n, codenamed\nOperation Rheinübung\n. The original plan was to have the battlecruisers\nScharnhorst\nand\nGneisenau\ninvolved in the operation, but\nScharnhorst\nwas undergoing heavy repairs to her engines, and\nGneisenau\nhad just suffered a damaging torpedo hit days before which put her out of action for six months. In the end only the\nBismarck\nand\nPrinz Eugen\nwere sent out on the mission, which ended with\nBismarck\n'\ns sinking. The debacle almost saw the end of using capital ships against merchant shipping.\nHitler was not pleased and saw the resources used in the construction and operation of the large\nBismarck\nas a poor investment.\nIn late 1941, Raeder planned the\n\"channel dash\"\nwhich sent the remaining two battleships in the French ports to Germany, for further operations in Norwegian waters. The plan was to threaten the Lend-Lease convoys to the Soviet Union, to deter an invasion of Norway, and to tie down elements of the Home Fleet that might otherwise have been used in the Atlantic against the U-boat wolfpacks.\nAfter the\nattack on Pearl Harbor\nRaeder, along with Field Marshal\nKeitel\nand Reichsmarschall\nGöring\n, urged Hitler to immediately declare war on the United States in view of the US war plan\nRainbow Five\n, and to begin the U-boat attacks off the US east coast, which was later called the \"\nSecond Happy Time\n\" by German submariners.\nResignation\nMain article:\nResignation and post-war life of Erich Raeder\nRaeder with\nAdolf Hitler\n, 1943\nOn 30 January 1943, following Hitler's outrage over the\nBattle of the Barents Sea\n,\nKarl Dönitz\n, the supreme commander of the Kriegsmarine's U-boat arm, was promoted to grand admiral, and Raeder was named admiral inspector, a ceremonial office. Raeder had failed to inform Hitler of the battle, which Hitler learned about from the foreign press. Hitler thought the\nLützow\nand\nAdmiral Hipper\nlacked fighting spirit, according to\nAlbert Speer\n. The reorganisation fitted Speer's goal of working more closely with Dönitz.\nPost-war\nMain article:\nResignation and post-war life of Erich Raeder\nNuremberg trial\nRaeder with his wife after being released from prison (September 26, 1955)\nRaeder was captured by Soviet troops on 23 June 1945\nand imprisoned in\nMoscow\n. At the end of July, he was taken to\nNuremberg\nto\nstand trial\non the counts of: (1) conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; (2) planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression; and (3) crimes against the laws of war. The most serious charges were that he ordered the carrying out of\nunrestricted submarine warfare\n, the sinking of unarmed and neutral ships, and that, defying the\nSecond London Naval Treaty\n, he approved of the murder or non-rescue of survivors in the water.\nRaeder was found guilty on all counts\nand sentenced to life imprisonment.\nHe was surprised as he had expected to be sentenced to death.\nHis wife, supported by German veterans, led several campaigns to free him until, on account of his ill health, he was released on 26 September 1955.\nDeath\nRaeder's Grave in\nKiel\nRaeder wrote his autobiography,\nMein Leben\n, using a\nghostwriter\n.\nHe died of\nnatural causes\nin\nKiel\non 6 November 1960.\nHis wife had died the previous year. He is buried in the\nNordfriedhof\n(North Cemetery) in Kiel.\nFormer Grand Admiral\nKarl Dönitz\nattended his funeral on 12 November 1960.\nService summary\nDates of Navy rank\nSeekadett\n(Sea cadet): 13 May 1895\nUnterleutnant\nzur See\n(Sub-Lieutenant): 25 October 1897\nLeutnant zur See\n(Lieutenant): 01 January 1899\nOberleutnant zur See\n(Senior Lieutenant): 09 April 1900\nKapitänleutnant\n(Captain-Lieutenant): 21 March 1905\nKorvettenkapitän\n(Lieutenant-Commander): 15 April 1911\nFregattenkapitän\n(Commander): 26 April 1917\nKapitän zur See\n(Captain): 29 November 1919\nKonteradmiral\n(Rear-Admiral): 1 August 1922\nVizeadmiral\n(Vice-Admiral): 10 September 1925\nAdmiral\n(Admiral): 1 October 1928\nGeneraladmiral\n(General-Admiral): 20 April 1936\nGrossadmiral\n(Grand Admiral): 1 April 1939\nAwards and decorations\nOrder of the Double Dragon\n, 3rd class, 2nd Level (China, 10 October 1898)\nChina Medal\n(German Empire, 12 December 1901)\nOrder of the Red Eagle\n, 4th class (Prussia, 22 June 1907)\nHonorary Knight 2nd class of the\nHouse and Merit Order of Peter Frederick Louis\nwith Silver Crown (Oldenburg, 17 September 1907)\nOrder of the Red Eagle, 4th class with Crown (Prussia, 5 September 1911)\nCommander's Cross of the\nOrder of Franz Joseph\n(Austria, 16 September 1911)\nCommander's Cross of the\nOrder of the Redeemer\n(Greece, 14 May 1912)\nOrder of Saint Stanislaus\n, 2nd class (Russia, 16 April 1913)\nIron Cross\n(1914) 2nd Class (19 November 1914) & 1st Class (18 February 1915)\nImtiyaz Medal\nin silver with Swords\nOttoman War Medal\n(also known as the \"Gallipoli Star\" or \"Iron Crescent\")\nFriedrich August Cross\n, 1st and 2nd class (Oldenburg)\nKnight's Cross of the\nRoyal House Order of Hohenzollern\nwith swords (5 June 1916)\nMilitary Merit Order\n, 4th class with swords and crown (Bavaria, 20 December 1916)\nWar Commemorative Medal (Bulgaria, 20 November 1917)\nMilitary Merit Cross\n, 3rd class with war decoration (Austria-Hungary, 4 September 1918)\nHonorary doctorate from the Faculty of Philosophy,\nUniversity of Kiel\n(31 May 1926)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Naval Merit\n(Spain, 16 November 1928)\nCommander's Cross with Star of the\nOrder of Merit\n(Chile, September 1928)\nWorld War Commemorative Medal with swords on (Hungary, 3 June 1931)\nGrand Officer of the\nOrder of Saints Maurice and Lazarus\n(Italy, 7 May 1934)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Military Merit\n(Bulgaria, 28 June 1934)\nCross of Honour\n(9 October 1934)\nOrder of Merit\n, 1st class (Hungary, 5 December 1934)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of the White Rose of Finland\n(27 February 1936)\nWehrmacht Long Service Award\n, 1st class (2 October 1936)\nOlympic Games Decoration\n, 1st class (16 August 1936)\nGolden Party Badge\n(30 January 1937)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Saints Maurice and Lazarus\n(Italy, 20 September 1937)\nOrder of the Rising Sun\n, 1st class (Japan, 9 November 1937)\nWar Memorial Medal (Bulgaria, 30 November 1937)\nGolden Medal of Honour of Hamburg (1 April 1939)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Naval Merit\nin White (Spain, 21 August 1939)\nSudetenland Medal\n(25 October 1938) with \"Prague Castle\" clasp (Sudetenspange) (19 September 1939)\nMemel Medal\n(26 October 1939)\nClasp to the Iron Cross\n, 1st and 2nd class (30 September 1939)\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross\n(nr.1) (30 September 1939) as\nGroßadmiral\nand\nOberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine\nCommander Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword\n(Sweden, 18 October 1940)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of the Sword\n(Sweden, 24 October 1940)\nGrand Cross of the\nMilitary Order of Savoy\n(4 April 1942)\nGrand Cross\nOrder of the Crown of King Zvonimir\nwith swords and other decorations (Croatia, 26 September 1942)\nGrand Cross of the\nOrder of Merit of the Kingdom of Hungary\nwith war ribbon with swords (Hungary, 8 February 1943)\nGrand Cross of\nOrder of St Alexander\nwith swords (Bulgaria, 3 September 1941)\nOrder of Michael the Brave\n, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Class (Romania, 14 October 1941)\nGrand Cross of the Order of the Cross of Liberty\n(Finland, 25 March 1942)\nReferences\nCitations\n1\n2\n3\nThe Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (2 November 2020) [20 July 1998].\n\"Erich Raeder\"\n.\nEncyclopaedia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n13 April\n2021\n.\n1\n2\n\"Erich Raeder 24.IV.1876 – 06.XI.1960\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n14 April\n2021\n.\nObituary.\n1\n2\nThorne, Stephen J. (30 October 2019).\n\"Raeder's Defence: German Admiral Fights for His Doomed Fleet\"\n.\nLegion\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 14 April 2021\n. Retrieved\n14 April\n2021\n.\n1\n2\n3\nBird\nErich Raeder\npp. 1–2.\n1\n2\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 2.\n1\n2\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. xxvi.\n1\n2\nThomas p. 51.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 13.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\npp. 13–14.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\npp. 14–15.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 17.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 18.\n↑\nHerwig p. 73.\n↑\nHerwig pp. 83–85.\n↑\nHansen p. 89.\n↑\nHansen p. 81.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 23.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 89.\n↑\nHansen p. 93.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 31.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 34.\n↑\n\"\n\"Nieder die Regierung! Tod dem Kapitalismus!\" Die Matrosenaufstände 1918\"\n[\n\"Down with the Government! Death to Capitalism!\" The Sailors' Uprisings 1918\n]\n.\nBundesarchiv: 100 Jahre Weimarer Republik\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n30 August\n2024\n.\n1\n2\n3\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 49.\n↑\nBird\nErich Raeder\npp. 35–36.\n1\n2\nBird\nErich Raeder\np. 37.\n↑\nBird\nWeimar\npp. 45–46.\n↑\nBird\nWeimar\npp. 46–52.\n1\n2\n3\nBird\nWeimar\np. 140.\n↑\nThomas pp. 57–58.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume V, pp. 542-543, Document 2879-PS\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n22 April\n2021\n.\n↑\nWistrich, Robert (1982).\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n. Macmillan Publishing Co. p.\n239.\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\n.\n↑\nMurray, Williamson & Millet, Alan A War to Be Won Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000,\nISBN\n9780674006805\n., p. 248\n↑\n\"The Big Leak\"\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 18 August 2018\n. Retrieved\n17 January\n2018\n.\n↑\nSpeer, Albert (1995).\nInside the Third Reich\n. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. pp.\n374–\n375.\nISBN\n978-1-84212-735-3\n.\n↑\nBiagi, Enzo (1983).\nLa seconda guerra mondiale, una storia di uomini\n[\nThe world war two, a history of men\n]\n(in Italian). Milan: Gruppo editoriale Fabbri. p.\n2743.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg Trial Judgements: Erich Raeder\"\n.\nwww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org\n.\n↑\nBiagi, p. 2757\n↑\nBiagi, p. 2759\n↑\nBird, Keith (2013).\nErich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich\n. Naval Institute Press.\nISBN\n978-1612513751\n.\n1\n2\nBird, Keith (2013).\nErich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich\n. Naval Institute Press.\nISBN\n978-1612513751\n.\n↑\n\"Admiral Erich Raeder Is Dead; Led German Navy Under Hitler; Played an Important Role in Developing of Nazi Fleet—Convicted for War Crimes\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 7 November 1960.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\n18 September\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Admiral Erich Raeder Is Dead; Led German Navy Under Hitler; Played an Important Role in Developing of JVczi Fleetu Convicted for War Crimes\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 7 November 1960.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\n23 September\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"GERMANY: KIEL: DOENITZ AT RAEDER FUNERAL\"\n.\nReuters Archive Licensing\n. Retrieved\n18 September\n2023\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nDörr 1996, p. 142.\n↑\nBird, Keith W. (2006).\nErich Raeder\n: Admiral of the Third Reich\n. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press.\nISBN\n978-1612513751\n.\nOCLC\n843883018\n.\n↑\nScherzer p. 611.\nBibliography\nAlexander, Bevin,\nHow Hitler Could Have Won World War II\n, New York: Three Rivers Press. 2000.\nISBN\n0-609-80844-3\n.\nBergen, Doris, \"'Germany Is Our Mission: Christ Is Our Strength!' The Wehrmacht Chaplaincy and the 'German Christian' Movement\" pp.\n522–536 from\nChurch History\nVolume 66, Issue # 3, September 1997.\nBird, Eugene,\nThe Loneliest Man in the World, Rudolph Hess, in Spandau\n, London: Sphere, 1976.\nBird, Keith,\nWeimar, The German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of National Socialism\n, Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977,\nISBN\n90-6032-094-8\n.\nBird, Keith,\nErich Raeder Admiral of the Third Reich\n, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006,\nISBN\n1-55750-047-9\nBuchanan, Patrick,\nChurchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War\n: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World\n, New York: Random House, 2008,\nISBN\n0-307-40516-8\n.\nDörr, Manfred (in German).\nDie Ritterkreuzträger der Überwasserstreitkräfte der Kriegsmarine – Band 2:L–Z\n. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag. 1996.\nISBN\n3-7648-2497-2\n.\nFischer, Kurt (in German).\nGroßadmiral Dr. phil. h.c. Erich Raeder\n. In:\nGerd R. Ueberschär\n(ed.):\nHitlers militärische Elite Band 1: Von der Anfängen des Regimes bis zum Kriegsbeginn\n(pp.\n185–194). Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 1998.\nISBN\n3-89678-083-2\n.\nGilbey, Joseph,\nKriegsmarine: Admiral Raeder's Navy – A Broken Dream\n, 2006.\nGoda, Norman\n:\nTomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path Toward America\n, Texas A&M University, 1998,\nISBN\n0-89096-807-1\n.\nGoda, Norman: \"Black Marks Hitler's Bribery of his Senior Officers During World War II\" pp.\n96–137 from\nCorrupt Histories\nedited by Emmanuel Kreike and William Jordan, University of Rochester Press, 2005,\nISBN\n978-1-58046-173-3\n.\nGoda, Norman,\nTales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War\n, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007,\nISBN\n0-521-86720-7\n.\nHankey, Maurice\nPolitics, Trials and Errors\n, Clark, New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange, 2002,\nISBN\n1-58477-228-X\n.\nHansen, Kenneth \"Raeder versus Wegener Conflict in German Strategy\" pp.\n81–108 from\nU.S. Naval War College Review\n, Volume 58, Issue # 4, Autumn 2005.\nHerwig, Holger, \"The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered\" pp.\n68–105 from\nThe International History Review\n, Volume 10, Issue #1, February 1988.\nKallis, Aristotle,\nFascist Ideology Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany 1922–1945\n, Routledge: London, 2000\nISBN\n0-415-21612-5\n.\nKershaw, Ian,\nFateful Choices Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940–1941\n, Penguin: London, 2007,\nISBN\n978-0-14-311372-0\n.\nMulligan, Timothy P. \"Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship\nBismarck\nBetween Design Limitations and Naval Strategy\" pp.\n1013–1044 from\nThe Journal of Military History\n, Volume 69, Issue # 4, October 2005.\nMurray, Williamson & Millet, Alan,\nA War to Be Won Fighting the Second World War\n, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000,\nISBN\n978-0-674-00680-5\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n,\nDönitz: the Last Führer\n, London: Victor Gollancz, 1984,\nISBN\n978-0-304-35870-0\n.\nRahn, Werner, \"The War at Sea in the Atlantic and in the Arctic Ocean\" pp.\n301–441 from\nGermany and the Second World War Volume VI The Global War Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943\nedited by Günther Roth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001\nISBN\n0-19-822888-0\n.\nRaeder, Erich,\nMy Life\n, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1960.\nScherzer, Veit (2007).\nDie Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939 von Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm sowie mit Deutschland verbündeter Streitkräfte nach den Unterlagen des Bundesarchives\n[\nThe Knight's Cross Bearers 1939–1945 The Holders of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939 by Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and Allied Forces with Germany According to the Documents of the Federal Archives\n]\n(in German). Jena, Germany: Scherzers Militaer-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-938845-17-2\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nThomas, Charles.\nThe German Navy in the Nazi Era\n, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990,\nISBN\n0-87021-791-7\n.\nWette, Wolfram\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006,\nISBN\n0-674-02213-0\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard,\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe\n, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970,\nISBN\n978-0-391-03825-7\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard,\nA World at Arms: A Global History of World War II\n, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005,\nISBN\n978-0-521-61826-7\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John,\nThe Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945\n, London: Macmillan, 1967,\nISBN\n978-1-4039-18123\n.\nExternal links\nRaeder versus Wegener Conflicts in German Naval Strategy\nby Commander Kenneth Hansen\nNewspaper clippings about Erich Raeder\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nRaeder, Erich Johann Albert\nat World War II Graves (includes the plot number)\nPortal\n:\nBiography\nErich Raeder\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "deputy": "Rolf Carls",
+      "preceded_by": "Hans Zenker",
+      "succeeded_by": "Himself(as Oberbefehlshaber der Marine)",
+      "born": "Erich Johann Albert Raeder(1876-04-24)24 April 1876Wandsbek,Schleswig-Holstein,Prussia,Germany",
+      "died": "6 November 1960(1960-11-06)(aged84)[1]Kiel,Schleswig-Holstein,West Germany",
+      "resting_place": "Nordfriedhof cemetery, Kiel[2][3]",
+      "spouse": "Augusta Schultz",
+      "children": "4",
+      "parents": "Hans Friedrich Eduard Raeder (father)Gertrud Wilhelmine Margaretha(mother)",
+      "allegiance": "German EmpireWeimar RepublicNazi Germany",
+      "branch": "Imperial German NavyReichsmarineKriegsmarine",
+      "serviceyears": "1894–1943",
+      "rank": "Großadmiral",
+      "commands": "SMSCöln",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IRaid on YarmouthRaid on HartlepoolBattle of Dogger BankBombardment ofLowestoftBattle of JutlandAction of 19 August 1916World War II",
+      "awards": "See below",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracyto commitcrimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimes",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Life imprisonment"
+    },
+    "char_count": 30832
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Baldur_von_Schirach",
+    "name": "Baldur von Schirach",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Baldur Benedikt von Schirach was a German Nazi politician and convicted war criminal who was the leader (Reichsjugendführer) of the Hitler Youth from 1931 to 1940. From 1940 to 1945, he was the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician (1907–1974)",
+    "full_text": "Baldur von Schirach\nGerman Nazi politician (1907–1974)\nBaldur Benedikt von Schirach\n(\nGerman pronunciation:\n[\nˈbaldʊʁ\nˈbe��nedɪkt\nfɔn\nˈʃiːʁax\n]\n; 9 May 1907 – 8 August 1974) was a German\nNazi\npolitician and\nconvicted war criminal\nwho was the leader (\nReichsjugendführer\n) of the\nHitler Youth\nfrom 1931 to 1940. From 1940 to 1945, he was the\nGauleiter\n(district leader) and\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich governor) of\nVienna\n.\nA member of the\nNazi Party\nfrom the age of 18, Schirach was named national youth leader of the party in 1931. In 1932, he was elected as a deputy to the\nReichstag\n. After Adolf Hitler became\nChancellor of Germany\nin 1933, he was appointed\nJugendführer\n(Youth Leader) of the German Reich, responsible for all youth organizations in the nation. In 1940, Schirach saw action as an infantryman in the\nFrench Campaign\n, for which he was awarded the\nIron Cross, 2nd Class\n. In 1940, Schirach was appointed\nGauleiter\nof the Reichsgau Vienna;\nArtur Axmann\nsucceeded him as leader of the Hitler Youth. A virulent\nantisemite\n, he was responsible for deporting 65,000\nViennese Jews\nto various\nNazi concentration camps\nin\nGerman-occupied Poland\n.\nIn April 1945, facing\nRed Army\nadvance, Schirach fled from Vienna to\nTyrol\n, where he later surrendered to American forces. At the\nNuremberg trials\n, he was convicted of\ncrimes against humanity\nand sentenced to 20 years in prison. After completing his sentence at\nSpandau\nin 1966, Schirach retired to southern Germany. He died in 1974 at the age of 67.\nEarly life and family\nSchirach (far left) watches as Hitler greets his\nChancellery chief\nPhilipp Bouhler\nin Munich 1938.\nSchirach (right) with Hitler,\nBormann\nand\nGöring\nat the\nObersalzberg\nSchirach was born in\nBerlin\n, the youngest of four children of theatre director, grand ducal chamberlain and retired captain of the cavalry\nCarl Baily Norris von Schirach\n(1873–1948) and his\nAmerican\nwife Emma Middleton Lynah Tillou (1872–1944), a descendant of\nArthur Middleton\n, one of the founding fathers of the United States.\nA member of the\nnoble\nSchirach family\n, of\nSorbian\nWest Slavic\norigins, three of his four grandparents were from the United States, chiefly from\nPennsylvania\n.\nEnglish was the first language he learned at home and he did not learn to speak German until the age of six.\nHe had two sisters, Viktoria Benedikta\nand the opera singer\nRosalind von Schirach\n, and a brother, Karl Benedict von Schirach. His brother committed suicide in 1919 at the age of 19.\nSchirach was educated at the\nWilhelm-Ernst-Gymnasium\nfrom 1916 to 1917, followed by the \"Forest Pedagogium\" boarding school at\nBad Berka\n. This was inspired by a similar school founded by\nHermann Lietz\n. He then returned to Weimar where he attended the\nRealgymnasium\nat Museumplatz 3.\nOn 31 March 1932 Schirach married the 19-year-old\nHenriette Hoffmann\n, the daughter of\nHeinrich Hoffmann\n,\nAdolf Hitler\n's personal photographer and friend. Schirach's family was at first vehemently opposed to this marriage, but Hitler insisted.\nOtto Strasser\ndismissively described Schirach as \"a young effeminate\".\nThrough this relationship, Schirach became part of Hitler's inner circle.\nThe young couple were welcome guests at Hitler's \"\nBerghof\n\" holiday home. Henriette von Schirach gave birth to four children: Angelika Benedikta von Schirach (born 1933), lawyer Klaus von Schirach (born 1935), businessman Robert Benedict Wolf von Schirach\n(1938–1980) and\nsinologist\nRichard von Schirach\n(1942–2023). Robert had a son, the lawyer and best-selling German crime-fiction writer\nFerdinand von Schirach\n.\nRichard had children\nAriadne von Schirach\n, philosopher and critic, and\nBenedict Wells\n, a novelist.\nNazi Party career\nReich youth leader\nSchirach joined a\nWehrjugendgruppe\n(paramilitary youth group) at the age of seventeen,\nthe youth division of the\nPreußenbund\n(\nde\n)\n.\nHe first met Hitler aged seventeen, when Hitler gave a speech in Weimar and Schirach was assigned guard duty. Schirach considered this the strongest speech he ever heard from Hitler, and paid attention to the sound of his voice, \"deep and raw, resonant like a cello.\"\nSchirach wrote a poem about the encounter, which was published in\nHans Severus Ziegler\n's newspaper\nDer Nationalsozialist\n. It was set to music by Gerhard Pallman and published in several songbooks. Schirach later described it as one of his \"many bad poems\". In October 1924, Hitler again visited Weimar, and visited the home of Schirach's father.\nSchirach became a member of the\nNazi Party\n(NSDAP) on 29 August 1925 (membership number 17,251). In 1925, he also joined the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) in Weimar.\nHe followed Hitler to\nMunich\n,\nto attend university, and also attended the\nsalons\nof\nElsa\nand\nHugo Bruckmann\n, with whom he lived for a time. In November 1927 Schirach first demonstrated his talents for organisation, packing a room with students for a speech by Hitler. In February 1928 he became a university group leader of the\nNational Socialist German Students' League\n(\nNationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund\n; NSDStB), and on 20 July 1928, he became the national leader (\nReichsführer\n). He worked to broaden the Nazi Party's appeal to the bourgeoisie. Schirach was supported by Hitler in internal elections, who also wanted the Nazi Party to have a broad social base. During this period Schirach was twice challenged to a\nduel\n, and was given a conditional prison sentence for accepting one of them.\nSchirach was skilled at bureaucratic power struggles. He founded the School Children's Leagues (\nSchülerbünde\n) to create competition to the Hitler Youth. He made an ally of\nJoseph Goebbels\n. In 1929 he defeated\nKurt Gruber\nin an internal election, and later convinced Hitler to sideline Gruber.\nIn 1929, he was selected as a\nReichsredner\n(national speaker) and was active in Party propaganda activities. In 1931, he was prosecuted for an anti-\nVersailles\ndemonstration, and used his court appearance to attack the\nWeimar Republic\n. He was given a three-month suspended prison sentence.\nOn 30 October 1931, he was named as\nReichsjugendführer\n(National Youth Leader) of the Nazi Party.\nOn 31 March 1932, Schirach married\nHenriette Hoffmann\n. Hitler and\nErnst Röhm\nwere witnesses to the marriage, and the reception was held in Hitler's apartment. Henriette's wealthy father, Heinrich Hoffmann, paid for them to move into a luxurious apartment by the\nEnglischer Garten\n. With Heinrich Hoffmann, Schirach produced several propaganda books of Hoffmann's photographs, including \"Hitler As No One Knows Him\", \"Youth Around Hitler\", and \"Hitler in His Mountains\". Schirach wrote the captions. The books sold hundreds of thousands of copies, earning Schirach and Hoffmann substantial royalties.\nIn May 1932, Schirach was made\nReichsleiter\nfor Youth Education (\nReichsleiter für Jügenderziehung\n).\nReichsleiter\nwas the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party.\nOn 16 June 1932, he was made\nReichsführer\nof the Party's\nHitler Youth\norganization, and resigned from the Student League. Under Schirach, the Hitler Youth stewarded NSDAP events, and 21 members died in 1932. Schirach described these deaths as \"blood sacrifice\" for propaganda purposes. One example was\nHerbert Norkus\n, a fifteen-year-old boy who was stabbed to death by Communists. In a 31 May 1932 speech, Schirach recounted Norkus's death and called for a \"National Socialist dictatorship\". Schirach gave a memorial speech on the third anniversary of Norkus's death in January 1935.\nSchirach became a member of the\nReichstag\nas a representative of the Party\nelectoral list\nat the 31 July 1932 election. He would continue to serve in that body until the end of the Nazi regime, from November 1933 as a deputy from electoral constituency 7,\nBreslau\n, and from March 1936 as a deputy from electoral constituency 6,\nPomerania\n.\nHe moved the Hitler Youth headquarters to Berlin in 1933 to stay close to Hitler. The building was purchased by an anonymous industrialist.\nAs leader of the Hitler Youth, Schirach helped to build the \"Führer myth\",\nusing his speeches to communicate an emotional connection to Hitler, with themes of laying down one's life for Hitler. He wrote the lyrics to many songs, including the \"song of the Hitler Youth flag\", which was used in the film\nDer Hitlerjunge Quex\n.\nSchirach organised a \"Reich Youth Day\" on 1 October 1932, with between 50,000 and 70,000 adolescents of the Hitler Youth and the\nLeague of German Girls\nattending the\nLuftschiffhafen Potsdam\n(\nde\n)\n(Potsdam Airship Port). It was financed by sales of badges and other propaganda materials. The Hitler Youth also published various magazines, and organised leisure excursions including militaristic activities such as flying, reconnaissance, motorised and mounted \"units\".\nOn 17 May 1938, Schirach said, \"The real, great educational act for a people lies in ingraining in youth blind obedience, unshakeable loyalty, unconditional comradeship and absolute reliability.\"\nOn 5 April 1933, the offices of the Reich Committee of German Youth Leagues were occupied by a unit of the Hitler Youth. From the records they obtained detailed knowledge of all youth groups including their key figures. In a second surprise raid they took control of the Reich League for German Youth Hostels (\nReichsverband fuer deutsche Jugendherbergen\n).\nOn 10 June 1933, Schirach was named\nReichsjugendführer\n(Youth Leader of the German Reich), with responsibility for all youth organizations in the nation. His permission was required to found youth organisations. Also on that date, he was made a\nState Secretary\nin the Reich Interior Ministry. On 23 June 1933, all other youth organisations were retroactively dissolved from 17 June 1933.\nUnder Schirach, the Hitler Youth was nominally run by self-organising youth, with the motto \"youth leads youth\". This echoed\nGoethe\n's line \"Youth educates itself in youth\". However, strict ideological boundaries were imposed. Schirach rejected the idea that Goethe was a \"prophet of humanity\", \"above the fatherland and the nation\", and linked to \"individualistic education\". In a speech to students on 5 November 1941, Schirach alluded to individualism, saying \"The idea is lonely\", but argued \"Academic freedom is not a catchword of liberalism. It is an achievement of the German spirit.\"\nSchirach became a member of the\nAcademy for German Law\nupon its formation in October 1933.\nSchirach appeared frequently at rallies, such as the\nNuremberg rally\nof 1934, when he appeared with Hitler in rousing the\nHitlerjugend\naudience. The event was filmed for\nTriumph of the Will\n, the propaganda film made by\nLeni Riefenstahl\nfor the Nazi Party. Schirach set the militaristic tone of the youth organisation, which participated in military-style exercises, as well as practising use of military equipment such as rifles.\nIn July 1940, when a new play by\nHans Baumann\nwas staged at\nVeste Oberhaus\nin\nPassau\n, Schirach insisted that 2,000 local Hitler Youth members be part of that\nIn 1936, the Hitler Youth was declared the only legal youth organisation. At this point it had approximately six million members. Membership became compulsory in March 1939, with almost eight million members aged 10 and older. On 1 December 1936, Schirach was given the position of State Secretary to the Reich Government, as head of a Supreme Reich Authority (\nOberste Reichsbehörde\n).\nSome sections of the church scouts and\nBundische Jugend\nresisted forced incorporation.\nFor example, in 1934, in the small town of\nWassenberg\n, Catholic Boy Scouts disrupted the transmission of a speech by Schirach. As a result, their scout uniforms were confiscated by the Aachen State Police Office.\nContempt for Schirach was expressed in various songs, such as \"Baldur, darling, be clear about this: When a new spirit stirs you will be dumped as soon as possible.\" (Baldur, Liebling, sei dir darüber im klaren: Wenn ein neuer Geist sich rührt, wirst du schleunigst abserviert.\")\nThe Hitler Youth was a militaristic organisation, with\nErwin Rommel\nserving as liaison officer to the\nWehrmacht\n, in charge of military training for the youth. Rommel attempted to subordinate the Hitler Youth to the Wehrmacht instead of the NSDAP, and managed to trick Schirach into signing a document to that effect. His deputy\nHartmann Lauterbacher\nhad previously rejected the proposal, but Schirach was not attentive to details. Schirach had to send Lauterbacher to Hitler to cancel the proposal. Hitler criticised Schirach and Rommel was removed from his position.\nSchirach was a Protestant Christian, unlike his father and sister, who had left the Church.\nHe stressed that \"the Hitler Youth was neither Protestant nor Catholic, but German\",\nand regularly invoked God in his speeches.\nIn a December 1933 speech he opposed proposals to make the Hitler Youth an explicit alternative to Christianity, saying \"They say of us that we are an anti-Christian movement. They even say that I am an outspoken paganist... I solemnly declare here, before the German public, that I stand on the basis of Christianity, but I declare just as solemnly that I will put down every attempt to introduce confessional matters into our Hitler Youth.\"\nIn March 1936, Schirach purchased\nSchloss Aspenstein\n(\nde\n)\nin\nKochel am See\n. He and Henriette had previously lived in a hunting lodge nearby in\nUrfeld am Walchensee\n. In March 1936,\nManfred von Brauchitsch\nand his brother Harald insulted Henriette. Schirach told them they were not men of honour. Manfred challenged Schirach to a duel, but instead Schirach attacked them with a dog whip. Schirach had immunity as a member of the Reichstag.\nSchirach was promoted to SA-\nObergruppenführer\non 9 November 1937.\nAlso in 1937, Schirach founded the\nAdolf Hitler Schools\nwith\nRobert Ley\n. These were under the control of the Hitler Youth rather than the state education authority. In October 1941, Hitler ruled that their exams were equal to those of state high schools.\nSchirach formed numerous links with other international youth organisations, particularly Fascist Italy. His deputy Hartmann Lauterbacher met\nRobert Baden-Powell\n, founder of the Boy Scouts, and Hitler Youth made cycling trips to England. Trips to England and Hungary were accused of spying. As\nReichsjugendführer\n, Schirach visited France, Turkey, Romania, Slovenia, Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.\nWith the outbreak of war, almost 90% of Hitler Youth leaders were conscripted, and many were killed in the first few months of the war. There was a rise in juvenile crime due to blackouts, and the Hitler Youth was unable to exert control.\nMilitary service\nIn December 1939, Schirach volunteered for military service in the army. After training, he served with the 4th (machine gun) Company of the\nGroßdeutschland\ninfantry regiment in the\nBattle of Sedan\nduring the\nFrench Campaign\n. Initially he was a\ndispatch runner\nin the rank of\nGefreiter\n.\nHe was promoted to\nLeutnant\n, served as a platoon leader and was decorated for bravery with the\nIron Cross\n2nd class, before being recalled to Germany.\nIn Schirach's absence, the Hitler Youth was administered by Hartmann Lauterbacher. In April 1940, Schirach had Lauterbacher sent for military service, replacing him with\nArtur Axmann\non 3 May.\nGauleiter\nand\nReichsstatthalter\nof Vienna\nOn 7 August 1940, Hitler appointed Schirach to succeed\nJosef Bürckel\nas\nGauleiter\nand\nReichsstatthalter\nof the\nReichsgau Vienna\n,\npowerful posts in which he remained until the end of the war.\nHe was sworn in as\nReichsstatthalter\nby Hitler in Berlin on 29 September 1940.\nHe also succeeded Bürckel as\nReich Defense Commissioner\nof\nWehrkreis\n(Military District) XVII, which, in addition to his own Reichsgau, included\nReichsgau Upper Danube\n,\nReichsgau Lower Danube\nand part of\nReichsgau Sudetenland\n. He retained his position as\nReichsleiter\nfor Youth Education.\nBürckel had been widely disliked, partly due to employing mainly functionaries from outside Vienna, and due to his brutal methods. Schirach took a different approach, employing Austrian National Socialists, and ingratiating himself with the Viennese population. He declared his \"love for this blessed and gifted city with its immeasurable cultural treasures\", but stressed its position in the greater German\nVolksgemeinschaft\n(\"people's community\").\nSchirach took up residence in the\nHohe Warte\nvilla of his predecessor Bürckel,\na building now occupied by the Embassy of Egypt. Henriette was delighted with the move.\nThe Schirachs continued to live luxuriously. They had no qualms about stealing public money and property, and the property of Jews. Their house was decorated with furniture, artworks, rugs and tapestries stolen from Jews; the house itself had belonged to a Jew who had fled the country. One stolen painting by\nLucas Cranach the Elder\nwas bought by Schirach, with special permission from Hitler, for 30,000 Reichsmark, more than Schirach's father's annual salary. It was rediscovered in 1999 and sold for $600,000. Another painting by\nPieter Brueghel the Younger\nwas stolen from Jews who were deported to\nTheresienstadt\nwhere they died. It was purchased by Schirach for 24,000 Reichsmark, again with permission from Hitler. It was rediscovered in 2003 and sold for $688,000. The Schirachs bought around 12 paintings from\nAlois Miedl\n. They bought 25 paintings from the\nMühlmann agency\n, totalling 244,000 Reichsmark, selling most of them at a profit.\nIn 1944, Schirach accepted a violin from the State Opera's collection, which was never returned. Schirach also made presents of public property to other people, such as a valuable table to\nGaleazzo Ciano\n, and an Italian Renaissance box to\nRenato Ricci\n.\nAfter the war, Henriette made claims for confiscated furniture and paintings, included those looted from Jews.\nBeginning in October 1940, Schirach was assigned to organise the\nevacuation of 2.5 million children\nfrom cities threatened by\nAllied\nbombing, sometimes to foster parents, but increasingly to purpose-built camps. Separating children from their parents was used as an opportunity to indoctrinate them ideologically.\nSchirach continued his involvement with the Hitler Youth, pursuing links with other European youth organisations. In March 1941, he planned a Fascist youth umbrella organisation with Artur Axmann. He announced the \"European Youth Association\" at the fifth Hitler Youth summer games in Breslau on 28 August 1941. The association was actually formed in September 1942 in Vienna, under the joint presidency of Axmann and\nAldo Vidussoni\n, with representatives from numerous European states and Japan. It was here he gave a notorious speech describing his deportation of the Jews to the East as his \"contribution to European culture\".\nThe closing rally was held on 18 September 1942 on the\nHeldenplatz\n. The residents of Vienna considered the rally a waste of resources, as did Goebbels, who banned reporting on the conference. Goebbels criticised the concept of a \"Europe of nations\" as contrary to goals of German supremacy. The Hitler Youth's European activities were banned on 4 November 1942 by Hitler's decree. Hitler wrote, \"party offices must never forget that the tenets and knowledge of National Socialist ideology correspond to the essence of German blood and hence cannot be transposed onto foreign peoples... Hence the NSDAP and its organisations do not have a European or worldwide mission to fulfil.\"\nIn September 1942, Schirach was given the task of giving a speech to the youth, to counter one Franklin D. Roosevelt had made. Schirach's response to Roosevelt was broadcast on the radio; Goebbels considered it \"an extraordinarily effective and well-founded reply\".\nSchirach also desired to expand Vienna's economic influence, using the Southeastern European Company (\nSüdosteuropa-Gesellschaft\n, SOEG) founded by Josef Bürckel, and the Vienna Autumn Trade Fair. However, the SOEG was dismissed as a \"Viennese breakfast and speeches club without economic impact\" by\nTilo von Wilmowsky\n(\nde\n)\n, director of the\nMitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag\n(\nde\n)\n(MWT, \"Central European Economic Conference\"); the SOEG director\nAugust Heinrichsbauer\n(\nde\n)\nthought the society was \"pie in the sky\";\nUlrich von Hassell\nthought SOEG was \"practically useless\". Schirach tried but failed to merge the MWT into SOEG. From 1942 onwards, Schirach was no longer able to influence economic policy, due to Albert Speer's\nCentral Planning Board\n.\nAs\nGauleiter\n, Schirach took a hard line against \"asocial\" behaviour, establishing an \"Asocials Committee\", which committed people to psychiatric clinics for political reasons.\nOn 16 November 1942, the jurisdiction of the Reich Defense Commissioners was changed from the\nWehrkreis\nto the\nGau\nlevel, and Schirach retained control of civil defence measures over only Reichsgau Vienna.\nSchirach contributed to literature journals, had \"remarkable\" views on art,\nand was an influential patron of the arts.\nHe attended cultural events with his wife, and was president of the Bibliophile Society (\nGesellschaft der Bibliophilen\n).\nHitler wanted to deprive Vienna of its cultural pre-eminence, yet Schirach expanded Vienna's cultural programmes, including an exhibition of rare European documents in the Austrian National Library,\nand displays of Impressionist and Modernist art.\nAt first, Goebbels supported this as a way to keep up morale, and as a \"fig leaf\" for the German war of aggression. As such, Hitler and Goebbels substantially subsidised the Viennese cultural budget from 1941 to 1943.\nSchirach saw the promotion of Viennese culture as a demonstration of his leadership role within the\nReich\n. However, Hitler did not want Vienna to compete with Berlin for cultural status. Hitler wanted Vienna to be \"gradually neutralised\", with\nLinz\npromoted as a cultural \"counterweight\".\nFurthermore, Vienna's cultural programmes did not follow official\nReich\npolicy. Schirach promoted \"Vienna's European mission\", but this was rejected by Hitler and Goebbels. As a result, Schirach fell into disfavour with Hitler. In 1942\nWilhelm Rüdiger\n(\nde\n)\nhad curated an art exhibition in Weimar, \"Young Art in the German Reich\" (\nJunge Kunst im Deutschen Reich\n(\nde\n)\n). Schirach brought it to Vienna and had it expanded with works by artists from the\nOstmark\n. The exhibition was denounced by\nAdolf Ziegler\nand\nBenno von Arent\n. In 1943, Hitler ordered its closure, and Schirach's main cultural advisor [\nGeneral-Kulturreferent\n]\nWalter Thomas\n(\nde\n)\n, who had previously been criticised by Goebbels, was dismissed. Thomas was to be sent to the Eastern front, but he was found medically unfit for service.\nHitler summoned Schirach to the Berghof, saying \"It was my mistake to have sent you to Vienna. It was a mistake that I ever brought these Viennese into the Greater German Reich. I know these people. In my youth I lived among them. They are the enemies of Germany.\" Schirach offered his resignation, which Hitler rejected.\nIn March 1943 Hitler considered ending Schirach's control of Vienna's cultural programmes, and in May 1943 considered sending him away as a diplomat.\nSchirach's conflict with Hitler was misperceived by many in Vienna as a form of resistance to Nazi Germany. It may later have helped the Viennese to suppress their sense of responsibility for the Holocaust. In reality, Schirach was a strong National Socialist who used culture to propagandise for war.\nAn incident at the Berghof on 24 June 1943 intensified Hitler's distaste for Schirach. Schirach's wife Henriette protested to Hitler about deportations of Jewish women she had witnessed in Amsterdam. Hitler was enraged, shouting \"You're sentimental... what have the Jews in Holland got to do with you? It's all sentimentality, humanity claptrap. You have to learn to hate...\" According to Henriette, the Schirachs were told to leave immediately. While it was not the last time Baldur von Schirach saw Hitler,\nthe Schirachs were never again invited to the Berghof. Earlier in the day, Schirach had annoyed Hitler by saying the war had to be stopped. Hitler later said, \"He knows as well as I do that there is no way out. I might as well shoot myself in the head as think of negotiating peace.\" Hitler made it clear he no longer wanted anything to do with Schirach.\nHitler also criticised Schirach's attempt to prevent the movement of armament factories to Vienna. At the Nuremberg trials, Schirach said his conflict with Hitler grew over three days, beginning when Schirach had argued for an autonomous Ukraine within the\nReich\n, rather than the oppressive policy of\nErich Koch\n. Henriette's protest was on the first or second evening. According to Baldur von Schirach, they had planned that she would broach the \"Jewish question\", as he was unable to bring up the subject. On the third evening, Goebbels brought up the subject of Vienna, and Hitler spoke with hatred about the Viennese.\nGoebbels wrote, \"Frau von Schirach in particular behaves like a stupid turkey... The\nFührer\ndoesn't want to know Schirach anymore. Schirach is a weakling, a windbag and an idiot when it comes to deep political matters. He would rather dismiss him from Vienna sooner than later, if only he had a successor.\" Henriette von Schirach had asked Hitler to send Baldur to Munich as\nGauleiter\n, swapping positions with\nPaul Giesler\n; Hitler refused.\nHugo Jury\nlater declined to succeed Schirach. Jury and\nKarl Scharizer\n(\nde\n)\ndefended Schirach, but Scharizer increasingly took over his work. While generally positive about Schirach, Scharizer wrote \"Schirach somehow lives in a different world, in a high tower, as it were, pursuing his hobbies. He thinks about foreign policy and wants to sort it out... Without noticing, Schirach lives a life that is not in keeping with the times. He cannot empathize with the life and way of living of the common people.\"\nAccording to\nFrederic Spotts\n, Schirach \"was a man who thought of himself as a National Socialist poet laureate; he had great cultural pretensions but no political ambitions.\"\nHe wrote \"flamboyant Nazi poetry\";\nhe was a \"prima donna\", \"concerned with personal prestige and therefore artistic quality rather than with party doctrine.\"\nContra Spotts, Oliver Rathkolb portrayed Schirach as an ideological anti-Semite, politically ambitious and relatively skilled at bureaucratic politics,\nfor whom his appointment as Gauleiter of Vienna \"ultimately amounted to a political setback... a clear sign he had become less important politically.\"\nOn Whitsun 1943, two Austrian\nNKVD\nagents, Josef Angermann and his radio operator Georg Kennerknect, were parachute-dropped into Vienna, with a mission to assassinate Schirach. According to Johann Sanitzer, a Gestapo counter-intelligence agent, Schirach was number four on their death list, behind Hitler and\nHermann Göring\n(Sanitzer did not remember who was number three). They were identified by the Gestapo, but\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\ndecided not to publicise their capture so as not to increase his rival Schirach's popularity.\nSchirach was notoriously anxious about\nAllied air raids\n, fleeing in public view to his\nGaugefechtsstand Wien\n(\"\nGau\nCommand Center Vienna\") whenever air raid sirens sounded. He had sent his children away to the Schloss Aspenstein, followed by Henriette in late autumn 1944 (their art collection was shipped separately). Schirach's mother Emma had burned to death on 16 July 1944 when a plane crashed into her house in Wiesbaden and she attempted to rescue her dog. Schirach evacuated approximately one third of the children of Vienna, and in September 1944 organised the rescue of 2,000 children from Slovakia, which had become contested territory – an operation in which 15 men died. Hitler and Goebbels thought Schirach had not done enough to protect Vienna from air raids, but there was little he could do due to the centralised armaments policy. In 1941, Göring had ordered him to stop building air raid shelters.\nFlak towers\nwere constructed from 1942. Schirach's December 1943 proposal to evacuate 300,000 women and children from Vienna was rejected.\nOn 25 September 1944, Schirach became the commander of the\nVolkssturm\nunits in his Gau.\nOn 24 February 1945, Hitler called a meeting of most of his\nGauleiter\nin Berlin. Attendees included Schirach and Hugo Jury. Hitler ordered that Vienna was to be held at any price, as part of a policy of \"total warfare\". Schirach ignored recommendations by\nAlbrecht Schubert\n,\nLudwig Merker\n,\nHans Dellbrügge\n(\nde\n)\nand\nHanns Blaschke\nto declare Vienna a\n\"free city\"\n. However, Austrian soldiers ignored Schirach's orders, and planned defence measures did not exist.\nVienna\ncame under attack\nby the\nRed Army\non 2 April 1945. On 4 April 1945, he moved to the vaulted cellars of the Vienna\nHofburg\n.\nOtto Skorzeny\ndescribed the atmosphere: \"On the floor lay splendid rugs, on the walls hung paintings of battles and portraits of generals from the eighteenth century. In this antechamber, people ate, drank and were noisy.\" Skorzeny invited Schirach to undertake a reconnaissance trip to see the unmanned barricades, but Schirach refused. Another witness, Karl Zischka, described people consuming champagne and caviar: \"everyone believed in victory. Everyone believed in the miracle weapon that was yet to be deployed somehow.\"\nBy 9 April, the Red Army were approaching the city centre. Schirach was aware that a military resistance group led by Major\nCarl Szokoll\nhad made contact with them. Schirach broadcast a final call for citizens to fight \"to the last man\" and then departed his headquarters. He moved initially to Flandorf, north of Vienna, where he acted as a liaison officer between\nSepp Dietrich\nof the\n6th Panzer Army\nand\nWilhelm Bittrich\nof the\nII SS Panzer Corps\n, with the rank of lieutenant. Dietrich concentrated on retreat. Schirach worked for Dietrich for three weeks. He stayed briefly in\nAltmelon\n, then the entire company moved west.\nSchirach was determined to avoid being captured by the Red Army. He went to\nGmunden\non 1 May. After news came of Hitler's suicide, he fled west with his adjutant and close colleague Fritz Wieshofer,\nand their chauffeur Franz Ram. At\nSchwaz\ntheir car broke down. On 2 May, he discarded his uniform, grew a moustache and posed as a crime writer, \"Dr Richard Falk\".\nOn 4 June 1945, he finally surrendered to the American town commandant and was arrested by the 103rd\nCounterintelligence Corps\n.\nHe was interned in Rum prison camp outside Innsbruck, where he was treated well and allowed to see Henriette for a few hours in June. In August he was moved to a US interrogation camp at Oberursel, where he signed a declaration that he was responsible for building the Hitler Youth until 1940, and considered himself responsible for the organisation even up to the end of the war. On 10 September 1945 he was flown to Nuremberg to be put on trial, believing he would be sentenced to death.\nDeportation of the Jews\nSchirach was an\nanti-Semite\n,\nresponsible for sending most of the\nJews from Vienna\nto\nNazi concentration camps\n. During his tenure, 65,000 Jews were deported. In a speech on 15 September 1942, he said that their deportation was a \"contribution to European culture\".\nHe attacked \"unscrupulous Jewish moneymaking\" and claimed that\n\"Jewry attempted with all available means to spoil the healthy youth... Ethos is alien to the Jew... every Jew at large in Europe is a danger to European culture. If one wished to confront me with the accusation that I have deported tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews to the eastern ghetto from this city that was once the metropolis of Jewry, I must answer that I consider it an active contribution to European culture.\"\nIn a speech on 6 June 1942, shortly after the assassination of\nReinhard Heydrich\nby Czechslovak agents, Schirach declared,\nWhen I came here in 1940, I told our\nFührer\nthat I consider my main task to be making this city free of Jews. This evening, I can tell you that in the autumn of this year, 1942, we will experience the celebration of a Vienna purified of Jews [sustained thunderous applause]. Now, as far as the Czechs in this city are concerned... I give my subordinate offices of the state and the party the order after the complete evacuation of the Jews to remove all Czechs [sustained thunderous applause]... just as I will make this city free of Jews, I will also make it free of Czechs! [sustained rapturous applause]\nSchirach later worried this speech would damage his reputation in artistic circles. Discussion of the \"Czech question\" in public was quickly forbidden by Hitler's secretary\nMartin Bormann\nand Goebbels.\nSchirach promoted the anti-Semitic writer\nColin Ross\n.\nOn 12 May 1942, Schirach heard a private speech by\nArthur Greiser\n, in which Greiser said that of 800,000 Jews interned in the\nLitzmannstadt ghetto\n, only 45,000 slaves remained alive. Greiser said,\n\"Now you will quite rightly ask why there so few Jews left today in the ghetto and outside it too, and here I say to you as a National Socialist: I cannot answer this question in such a circle in detail. I can only answer by saying that the Jews there are of course becoming fewer [in number], down to the 45,000 who actually work – and the Viennese Jews we have received in the meantime, they too have already been put to work... Some of them did not want to stay in the ghetto at all, because they didn't like it there, and they wanted to be better situated and make their peace with their Jew god, and we gave them a hand with that and... [Great amusement and strong applause].\"\nSchirach had also heard a speech by\nHeinrich Himmler\nin\nPosen\non 6 October 1943, in which Himmler had described his decision to \"exterminate\" women and children as well as men. Schirach later claimed that he instructed his colleague Hans Dellbrügge to reduce capacity for deportations, however there is no evidence for this claim. According to Wilhelm Bienenfeld, a Viennese Jew, Schirach must have known about the deportations because of the number of people who asked him to intervene. He refused to intervene on numerous occasions, including on behalf of five retired members of the\nVienna Philharmonic\norchestra, of which he was patron, or on behalf of family friend\nJosef Krips\n.\nThe only case in which Schirach made a great effort on behalf of a Jew was the case of Alice Strauss, the Jewish daughter-in-law of composer\nRichard Strauss\n.\nThe Strausses had moved to Vienna so they could be afforded the protection of Schirach.\nHowever, 25 of her relatives were murdered in Nazi concentration camps.\nIn January 1944, Alice and Franz Strauss were abducted by the Viennese Gestapo and imprisoned for two nights. Strauss's personal appeal to Schirach saved them,\nallowing him to take them back to his estate at\nGarmisch-Partenkirchen\n, where they remained under house arrest until the end of the war.\nLater during the war, Schirach pleaded for a moderate treatment of the eastern European peoples and criticised the conditions in which Jews were being deported.\nMartin Bormann told Schirach to use deportation of Jews as a means to alleviate housing shortages, rather than diverting resources from the war effort to the building of new apartments.\nOn 16 August 1943, Schirach visited\nMauthausen concentration camp\n. He was not shown the gas facility, but saw the camp crematorium being used to burn only \"bodies that had died normal deaths\". He saw a performance by the camp symphony orchestra. He asked commandant\nFranz Ziereis\nif prisoners ever left the camp, and was told that they did.\nTrial and conviction\nSchirach at the\nNuremberg trials\n(in second row, second from right)\nSchirach was one of the major Nazis put on\ntrial at Nuremberg\nby the International Military Tribunal. He was indicted for\ncrimes against humanity\nfor his role in the deportation of the Viennese Jews to certain death in German concentration camps located in\nGerman-occupied Poland\n. He was also indicted for\ncrimes against peace\nfor his role in building up the Hitler Youth.\nAt the trial, Schirach was one of only a few defendants (along with\nAlbert Speer\nand\nHans Frank\n) to denounce Hitler. Schirach's strategy was very different from other defendants such as Göring, who didn't want any of the defendants to say anything against Hitler. Like Speer, Schirach rejected legal responsibility for the Holocaust. Schirach admitted to being a former anti-Semite, but attributed these views to his reading of the American\nHenry Ford\n's\nThe International Jew\n: \"I read it and became anti-Semitic.\" He was also influenced by\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain\nand\nAdolf Bartels\n, who was Schirach's private tutor. Nonetheless, according to\nOliver Rathkolb\n, anti-Semitism was deeply rooted in German elites from before 1914, and was especially part of Schirach's Weimar environment.\nSchirach repudiated his anti-Semitism, and denounced Hitler and the Holocaust:\nIt is the greatest, the most devilish mass murder known to history... The murder was ordered by Adolf Hitler, as is obvious from his last will and testament... He and Himmler jointly committed that crime which, for all time, will be a stain in the annals of our history. It is a crime which fills every German with shame.\nHe had prepared this statement carefully.\nSchirach called his former adjutants Gustav Höpken and Fritz Wieshofer as witnesses, as well as\nHartmann Lauterbacher\n. Höpken denied that Schirach had seen Reinhard Heydrich's reports about German war crimes, and portrayed him as a supporter of the Christian churches. Weishofer claimed that Schirach's office had made interventions on behalf of individual Jews. Lauterbacher claimed that Schirach had forbidden the Hitler Youth to take part in pogroms and looting in November 1938, although this was after the pogroms had taken place. Schirach played up his 1943 break with Hitler, and his American ancestry. His lawyer was Dr Fritz Sauter, a well-known defence lawyer from Munich who had been a member of the Nazi Party. Sauter also defended\nWalther Funk\nand others at Nuremberg. Sauter argued that Schirach had confessed to his mistakes and was determined to rectify them: \"Such a defendant must be given consideration for trying to repair as far as he can the damage which he caused in good faith.\"\nSchirach claimed he had not known about the\nextermination camps\n; however, the trial detailed his involvement in deportations of Jews and his speeches defending his actions. During Schirach's\ncross-examination\n,\nThomas J. Dodd\npresented documents which had passed through Schirach's office, which showed that tens of thousands of Jews had been sent from Vienna to Riga, and tens of thousands of Jews in Riga had been shot. Schirach denied having seen the documents.\nSchirach claimed to have first heard of the exterminations through Colin Ross, in 1944.\nRegarding the accusation of crimes against peace for his leadership of the Hitler Youth, he presented the Hitler Youth as a youth organisation like the Boy Scouts, rather than a paramilitary organisation responsible for war crimes:\nI have educated this generation in faith and loyalty to Hitler. The Youth Organization which I built up bore his name. I believed that I was serving a leader who would make our people and the youth of our country great and happy and free. Millions of young people believed this, together with me, and saw their ultimate ideal in National Socialism. Many died for it. Before God, before the German nation, and before my German people I alone bear the guilt of having trained our young people for a man whom I for many long years had considered unimpeachable, both as a leader and as the head of the State, of creating for him a generation who saw him as I did. The guilt is mine in that I educated the youth of Germany for a man who murdered by the millions. I believed in this man, that is all I can say for my excuse and for the characterization of my attitude. This is my own—my own personal guilt. I was responsible for the youth of the country. I was placed in authority over the young people, and the guilt is mine alone. The younger generation is guiltless. It grew up in an anti-Semitic state, ruled by anti-Semitic laws. Our youth was bound by these laws and saw nothing criminal in racial politics. But if anti-Semitism and racial laws could lead to an Auschwitz, then Auschwitz must mark the end of racial politics and the death of anti-Semitism. Hitler is dead. I never betrayed him; I never tried to overthrow him; I remained true to my oath as an officer, a youth leader, and an official. I was no blind collaborator of his; neither was I an opportunist. I was a convinced National Socialist from my earliest days—as such, I was also an anti-Semite. Hitler's racial policy was a crime which led to disaster for 5,000,000 Jews and for all the Germans. The younger generation bears no guilt. But he who, after Auschwitz, still clings to racial politics has rendered himself guilty.\nHe claimed that members of the Hitler Youth were innocent of any of the\nGerman war crimes\n:\nIn this hour, when I can speak for the last time to the Military Tribunal of the four victorious powers, I should like, with a clear conscience, to confirm the following on behalf of our German youth: that it is completely innocent of the abuses and degeneration of the Hitler regime which were established during this Trial, that it never wanted this war, and that neither in peace nor in war did it participate in any crimes.\nDodd also presented a telegram from Schirach arguing for a violent air attack on a British cultural town in response to the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich.\nOne of the biggest problems for the prosecution was lack of evidence. The trial was taking place so soon after the war that comprehensive evidence had not yet been assembled. The inexperienced prosecutor Dodd was not able to penetrate Schirach's defence strategy. The Soviet prosecution also had problems with translation, and a witness statement of a massacre by the Hitler Youth in Lviv in 1941 that was submitted too late.\nAccording to\nGustave Gilbert\n, an American psychologist who observed Schirach over the course of the trial, Göring attempted to \"turn\" Schirach. A separate dining area was established for Schirach, Speer,\nHans Fritzsche\nand Walther Funk to remove Schirach and Funk from Göring's influence. Gilbert administered the\nWechsler–Bellevue intelligence test\nto the defendants; Schirach displayed an\nIQ\nof 130. Over the course of the trial, Schirach was interviewed daily by psychiatrist\nDouglas Kelley\n.\nSchirach was also examined by Chief Medical Officer\nLt. Col. Rene Juchli\nwho reported that Schirach was suffering from \"inflammation of the left eardrum\"..\nWhile on trial and expecting to be hanged, Schirach along with Speer and Fritzsche received the\nEucharist\nfrom Lutheran Pastor\nHenry F. Gerecke\n.\nSchirach was acquitted of crimes against peace, but he was found guilty on 1 October 1946 of crimes against humanity.\nThe court concluded that despite the warlike nature of the Hitler Youth, Schirach was not involved in Hitler's plans for aggressive war. However, regarding his deportation of Vienna's Jews, the court found that Schirach knew they would face a miserable life at best, and that bulletins describing their extermination were in his office. He was sentenced to 20 years in\nSpandau Prison\n, Berlin.\nLater life\nOn 20 July 1949, his wife Henriette von Schirach (1913–1992) divorced him while he was in prison. However, she travelled to London in 1958, with financial support from the\nDaily Mail\n, to lobby\nBritish Foreign Secretary\nSelwyn Lloyd\nfor a reduction of his prison sentence. She was unsuccessful.\nShe described her husband as \"in no way a criminal, but an idealist, and much too good for politics.\"\nUnlike other prisoners, he had no one else to lobby for his release.\nIn December 1963, he was sent for two weeks to the\nBritish Military Hospital\nto treat a blood clot in his femoral artery.\nIn February 1965 he was again taken to military hospital for an operation on the retina of his right eye, which was unsuccessful. After the operation, he suffered a thrombosis.\nSchirach was released from prison on 1 October 1966, after serving his full sentence. He agreed to a series of interviews with\nStern\nmagazine. Schirach described his trial as a \"\nshow trial\n\". The 1,500 pages of transcripts were compiled into his memoirs, \"I believed in Hitler\" (\nIch glaubte an Hitler\n, 1967), and were the basis of a biography by\nJochen von Lang\n(\nde\n)\n. His memoirs were much less successful than his wife Henriette's fantastical memoir \"The Price of Glory\", although he received generous fees from\nStern\n.\nIn an interview with\nNBC\nshortly after his release, he expressed regret over having not done enough to prevent atrocities from being committed.\nSchirach was interviewed in English by British journalist\nDavid Frost\n. In the interview, he reflects on his imprisonment, meeting with Hitler, and the deportation of the Jews. Contrary to his testimony at Nuremberg, he denied his antisemitism. He again claimed to have no knowledge of the extermination, and deflected guilt in regard to discriminatory education laws: \"the whole generation was wrong\". He described Hitler as \"a man without measure [i.e. without any sense of measure]\n, a man with great gifts, a man who in some ways could be considered a genius\".\nAfter his release from prison, Schirach moved first to the Stubenrauch villa in Munich, which his son Robert rented for him. In 1968, he moved to an estate in Deibhalde,\nTrossingen\n, owned by\nFritz Kiehn\n(1885–1980),\na businessman who had been a Nazi member of the Reichstag and an SS-\nHauptsturmführer\non Heinrich Himmler's personal staff. His son Robert married Kiehn's granddaughter Elke, and Robert became managing director of one of Kiehn's companies. Baldur was looked after by Kiehn's daughter Gretl, ex-wife of Fritz Wieshofer and mother of Elke from her first marriage, and they holidayed together.\nAround 1966,\nHelmut Wobisch\n(\nde\n)\n, lead trumpeter and then managing director of the Vienna Philharmonic, who had been a member of the\nSS\nand an informant of the\nSD\n, travelled to Schirach to give him the Philharmonic's \"ring of honour\", to replace one Schirach had been given on 27 March 1942. After the war, the Philharmonic's board was full of SS men.\nSchirach later turned down further interviews, saying he ought not to comment on public matters due to his role under Hitler.\nIn 1971, with his eyesight failing, Schirach moved to the Pension Müllen, the former Montroyal hotel in\nKröv\nan der Mosel, which was run by two former\nBDM\nleaders Ida and Käthe Müllen. He consumed alcohol to excess. He died there on 8 August 1974, aged 67, of coronary thrombosis, and was buried in Kröv. Käthe Müllen chose his epitaph, \"I was one of you\" (\nIch war einer von Euch\n).\nSchirach did not leave a large fortune: his mother's American property had been seized in 1944 and his father's American assets were confiscated in 1947. After Carl's death in 1948, Baldur and Rosalind inherited the fortune, but it continued to be managed by the\nOffice of Alien Property Custodian\n.\nThe right to use his grave site was repeatedly extended, until it was finally removed in Spring 2015.\nBooks\nHitler as no one knows him\n(1932,\nHitler wie ihn keiner kennt\n)\nThe Hitler Youth\n(1943)\nHitler Youth Yearbook 1934 (\nHitlerjugend Jahrbuch\n)\nAdolf Hitler's Reich: A Photographic Record of the Creation of Greater Germany, 1933 to 1940\n(1940,\nDas Reich Adolf Hitlers: ein Bildbuch vom Werden Grossdeutschlands 1933 bis 1940\n)\nRevolution der Erziehung\n(\nRevolution of Education\n) by Baldur von Schirach\nDie Hitler-Jugend – Idee und Gestalt\n(\nThe Hitler Youth – Idea and Character\n) by Baldur von Schirach\nDie Fahne der Verfolgten\n(\nThe Flag of the Persecuted\n), collection of poetry\nGoethe an uns\n(\nGoethe to Us\n) by Baldur von Schirach\nDas Lied der Getreuen\n(\nThe Lay of the Faithful\n); more poetry\nSee also\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nThe Holocaust in Austria\nReferences\nNotes\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n29\n30\n31\n32\n33\n34\n35\n36\n37\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n48\n49\n50\n51\n52\n53\n54\n55\n56\n57\n58\n59\n60\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n66\n67\n68\n69\n70\n71\n72\n73\n74\n75\n76\n77\n78\n79\n80\n81\n82\n83\n84\n85\n86\n87\n88\n89\n90\n91\n92\n93\n94\n95\nOliver Rathkolb\nand John Heath (trans.) \"Baldur von Schirach: Nazi Leader and Head of the Hitler Youth\", 2022.\nISBN\n9781399020961\n↑\nMichael H. Kater\n,\nHitler Youth\n, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 17,\nISBN\n0674039351\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2021).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. Vol.\n3 (Fritz Sauckel – Hans Zimmermann). Fonthill Media.\nISBN\n978-1-781-55826-3\n.\n↑\nHarrison, Marjorie Mary Butler (1959).\nPennsylvania descendants of Thomas Norris of Maryland, 1630–1959 and allied families\n. Ann Arbor, Mich., Edwards Bros. p.\n38\n. Retrieved\n16 June\n2023\n.\n↑\nWalter Charles Langer\n(1972).\nMind Of Adolf Hitler\n. Basic Books / United States Office of Strategic Services. p.\n97.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04620-1\n. Retrieved\n17 July\n2023\n.\nHis family was violently opposed to the marriage but Hitler insisted.\n↑\nStrasser, Otto (1940).\nHitler and I\n. Houghton Mifflin. p.\n71\n. Retrieved\n17 July\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Marriage notice, Robert Benedict Wolf von Schirach and Elke Fähndrich\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German). 31 July 1962\n. Retrieved\n16 January\n2024\n.\n↑\nFerdinand von Schirach (23 September 2011).\n\"A Third Reich Past: Why I Cannot Answer Questions about My Grandfather\"\n.\nSpiegel Online\n.\n↑\n\"Von Schirach: Der verschrobene Star hinter 'Schuld'\"\n,\nFocus\n, 21 February 2015\n↑\nInterview mit Ariadne von Schirach: Spross einer bekannten Familie\n, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 May 2014\n↑\nMuseum, Stiftung Deutsches Historisches.\n\"Gerade auf LeMO gesehen: LeMO Biografie\"\n.\nwww.dhm.de\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n21 June\n2022\n.\n↑\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression – Volume 2 Chapter XVI Part 16\n. United States. Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n13 July\n2023\n.\nIn the meantime I gained control over the Reich League for German Youth Hostels [Reichsverband fuer deutsche Jugendherbergen] in a similar manner to the one employed with the Reich Committee.\n1\n2\nRosmus, Anna\n(2015).\nHitlers Nibelungen\n(in German). Grafenau: Samples Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3938401323\n.\n1\n2\nSchepping, Wilhelm (1993). Vieregg, Hildegard; Siefken, Hinrich (eds.).\nOppositionelles Singen Jugendlicher im Dritten Reich\n(PDF)\n. University of Nottingham. pp.\n89–\n109.\nISBN\n0900572779\n. Retrieved\n18 August\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Katholische Pfadfinder störten die Übertragung einer Sendung Baldur von Schirachs | Portal Rheinische Geschichte\"\n.\nwww.rheinische-geschichte.lvr.de\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n3 August\n2023\n.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard (2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. Cambridge University Press. p.\n143.\nISBN\n978-0-521-82371-5\n. Retrieved\n26 June\n2023\n.\n↑\nSpaeter, Helmuth, \"The History of Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland\" p. 70 (English edition)\n↑\nSpaeter, Helmuth, p. 137\n1\n2\nRobert S. Wistrich (2001).\nWho's who in Nazi Germany\n. Psychology Press. p.\n122.\nISBN\n978-0-415-26038-1\n. Retrieved\n20 September\n2010\n.\n1\n2\n\"The Avalon Project\n: Judgment\n: von Schirach\"\n.\nyale.edu\n. 22 May 2000. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 May 2000\n. Retrieved\n5 March\n2024\n.\n↑\nCarvajal, Doreen; Smale, Alison (15 July 2016).\n\"Nazi Art Loot Returned ... to Nazis\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\n18 September\n2017\n–\nvia www.nytimes.com.\n↑\n\"Art Experts Blast Bavarian Museums' Attempt to Rebut Nazi Loot Claims\"\n.\nArtnet News\n. 29 June 2016\n. Retrieved\n22 November\n2025\n.\nust a few days ago, German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung published findings of a bombshell report prepared by the London-based Commission for Looted Art in Europe (CLAE) showing that, after World War II, Germany returned Nazi-looted artworks to Nazi-connected families, rather than the victims they were stolen from. The CLAE's investigation was sparked by a claim from the family of Gottlieb and Mathilde Kraus, who fled Vienna in 1938. Many names are involved. Among other things, it includes a detailed account of how one Henriette Hoffmann-von Schirach—daughter of Hitler's close friend and photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, and wife of the notorious 'Gauleiter' [Hitler's district governor] of Vienna, Baldur von Schirach—came by one painting, Picture of a Dutch Square, by Jan van der Heyden, that originally belonged to the Kraus family.\n↑\n\"Nazi-Looted Art returned by Germany to the high-ranking Nazis who looted it rather than returning it to rightful owners Looted Art Commission - 2016-06-27\"\n.\nwww.lootedartcommission.com\n. Retrieved\n22 November\n2025\n.\nAnne Webber, Co-Chair of CLAE, said CLAE's research shows that in the 1950s and 1960s Henriette Hoffmann-von Schirach recovered scores of paintings from Bavaria. It seems that Bavaria thought restitution meant restitution to the Nazis rather than to their victims.\n1\n2\n\"Baldur von Schirach, 67, Dies; Head of Hitler Youth 1933–40\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 9 August 1974\n. Retrieved\n14 January\n2024\n.\n↑\nGerwin Strobl (2007).\nThe swastika and the stage: German theatre and society, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge University Press. pp.\n9–.\nISBN\n978-0-521-88076-3\n. Retrieved\n20 September\n2010\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nFrederic Spotts\n(2003).\nHitler and the power of aesthetics\n. Woodstock: Overlook Press.\nISBN\n1585673455\n.\n↑\nBelow, Nicolaus von (2001).\nAt Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937–1945\n. Greenhill Books. p.\n173.\nISBN\n978-1-85367-468-6\n. Retrieved\n26 June\n2023\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian (2001).\nHitler 1936–1945: Nemesis\n. Penguin Books Limited.\nISBN\n978-0-14-192581-3\n. Retrieved\n24 June\n2023\n.\n↑\nO'Sullivan, Donal (2010).\nDealing with the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation in the Second World War\n. Peter Lang. p.\n264.\nISBN\n978-1-4331-0581-4\n. Retrieved\n12 July\n2023\n.\n↑\nTyas, Stephen (2017).\nSS-Major Horst Kopkow: From the Gestapo to British Intelligence\n. Fonthill Media\n. Retrieved\n12 July\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Detailed Interrogation Report of Johann Sanitzer, Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV 2\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of strategic Services. July 1945. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 28 February 2017.\n↑\nBerghoff, Hartmut; Rauh, Cornelia (2015).\nThe Respectable Career of Fritz K.: The Making and Remaking of a Provincial Nazi Leader\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n9781782385943\n–\nvia Google Books.\n1\n2\nGilliam, Bryan; Youmans, Charles (2001). \"Richard Strauss\".\nStrauss, Richard\n.\nGrove Music Online\n.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.40117\n.\nISBN\n978-1-56159-263-0\n.\n(subscription required)\n(This article is very different from the one in the 1980\nGrove\n; in particular, the analysis of Strauss's behavior during the Nazi period is more detailed.)\n↑\n\"Music; Richard Strauss and Hitler's Reich: Jupiter in Hell\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 6 January 2002.\n↑\n\"Baldur von Schirach\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 3 April 2010\n. Retrieved\n18 March\n2006\n.\n1\n2\nTrial of The Major War Criminals before The Internal Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. One hundred and thirty-eighth day, Friday, 24 May 1946\n(PDF)\n. International Military Tribunal Nuremberg. 1948\n. Retrieved\n26 June\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"The trial of German major war criminals\n: proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg Germany\"\n.\navalon.law.yale.edu\n. Retrieved\n13 January\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Two Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Saturday, 31 August 1946\"\n. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 22.\n↑\n\"ALL SUPERMEN---EXCEPT FOR THE SHAPE THEY ARE IN\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. No.\nPage 1. 18 October 1945.\n↑\nRailton, Nicholas M. (2000).\n\"Henry Gerecke and the Saints of Nuremberg\"\n.\nKirchliche Zeitgeschichte\n.\n13\n(1): 127.\nJSTOR\n43750887\n.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg Trial Judgements: Baldur von Schirach\"\n.\nwww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 6 May 2021\n. Retrieved\n22 May\n2021\n.\nThe Tribunal finds that von Schirach, while he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office.\n1\n2\n3\nGoda, Norman J. W. (2007).\nTales from Spandau: Nazi criminals and the Cold War\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.\n215.\nISBN\n9780521867207\n.\n\"Schirach had had few advocates since 1945. Unlike the conservative lobby in Baden-Württemberg that pressed for von Neurath, the veterans' lobby that pressed from the freedom of Raeder and Dönitz, and the former Nazi business lobby that worked behind the scenes for Speer, there was no lobby of former Hitler Youth members who saw in von Schirach a justification of their time in Nazi Youth organizations.\n↑\nSigmund, Anna Maria (2000).\nWomen of the Third Reich\n. NDE Pub. p.\n206.\nISBN\n978-1-55321-105-1\n. Retrieved\n24 June\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Klaus von Schirach\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German). 23 February 1965\n. Retrieved\n14 January\n2024\n.\n↑\nBaldur Von Schirach: That Is My Moral Guilt Before History... I did not do enough. – 1966\n, retrieved\n15 June\n2022\n↑\n\"ZDF-Krimi-Autor hat Wurzeln in Trossingen\"\n.\nwww.schwaebische.de\n(in German). 16 February 2015\n. Retrieved\n17 July\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Vienna Philharmonic acknowledges honouring Nazi war criminal\"\n.\nReuters\n. 11 March 2013\n. Retrieved\n17 July\n2023\n.\n↑\n\"Ich war einer von Euch\"\n(PDF)\n.\nTrierischer Volksfreund\n. 11–12 January 2014\n. Retrieved\n15 January\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Diskussion um letzte Ruhestätte des Kriegsverbrechers Baldur von Schirach\"\n.\nTrierischer Volksfreund\n(in German). 15 August 2013\n. Retrieved\n15 January\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Grabstätte des Kriegsverbrechers Baldur von Schirach in Kröv beseitigt\"\n.\nDie Bürgerbeauftragte des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n15 January\n2024\n.\nFurther reading\nFest, Joachim C.\nand Bullock, Michael (trans.) \"Baldur von Schirach and the 'Mission of the Younger Generation'\" in\nThe Face of the Third Reich\nNew York: Penguin, 1979 (orig. published in German in 1963), pp.\n332–354.\nISBN\n978-0201407143\n.\nOliver Rathkolb\nand John Heath (trans.) \"Baldur von Schirach: Nazi Leader and Head of the Hitler Youth\", 2022.\nISBN\n9781399020961\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nBaldur von Schirach\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nBaldur von Schirach\n.\nTimeline of Schirach's life\n(in German)\nBaldur von Schirach\nat\nFind a Grave\nShort biography of Baldur von Schirach\nBaldur von Schirach, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum\nBiography: Baldur von Schirach\nInterview with David Frost\nNewspaper clippings about Baldur von Schirach\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInformation about Baldur von Schirach\nin the Reichstag database",
+    "infobox": {
+      "deputy": "Karl NabersbergHartmann LauterbacherArtur Axmann",
+      "preceded_by": "Josef Bürckel",
+      "succeeded_by": "Office abolished",
+      "leader": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1944–1945": "Commander of theVolkssturminReichsgau Wien",
+      "1940–1945": "Deputy to theFührerfor Inspection of theHitler Youth",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "1932-1933": "Member of theReichstag",
+      "born": "Baldur Benedikt von Schirach(1907-05-09)9 May 1907Berlin, Germany",
+      "died": "8 August 1974(1974-08-08)(aged67)Kröv, West Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse": "Henriette Hoffmann​​(m.1932;div.1949)​",
+      "children": "4, includingRichard von Schirach",
+      "civilian_awards": "Hitler Youth Golden Honour Badge with Diamonds and RubiesGolden Party Badge",
+      "allegiance": "Nazi Germany",
+      "branch/service": "German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1939–1940",
+      "rank": "Leutnant",
+      "unit": "Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland",
+      "battles/wars": "Battle of France",
+      "military_awards": "Iron Cross, 2nd class",
+      "conviction": "Crimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "20 years imprisonment"
+    },
+    "char_count": 58727
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Fritz_Sauckel",
+    "name": "Fritz Sauckel",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Ernst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel was a German Nazi politician and convicted war criminal. As General Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment (Arbeitseinsatz) from March 1942 until the end of the Second World War, he oversaw the mobilization of forced labour for the benefit of the German war effort.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician (1894–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Fritz Sauckel\nGerman Nazi politician (1894–1946)\nErnst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel\n(27 October 1894 – 16 October 1946) was a German\nNazi\npolitician and\nconvicted war criminal\n. As General\nPlenipotentiary\nfor Labour Deployment (\nArbeitseinsatz\n) from March 1942 until the end of the\nSecond World War\n, he oversaw the mobilization of\nforced labour\nfor the benefit of the German war effort.\nBorn in\nHaßfurt\nin Bavaria, Sauckel worked as a seaman from a young age. During the\nFirst World War\n, he was interned in France as an\nenemy alien\n. He joined the\nNazi Party\nin 1923 and established himself as a leading party organiser in\nThuringia\n. He was appointed\nGauleiter\nof Thuringia in 1927 and, following Hitler's appointment as chancellor,\nReichsstatthalter\nin 1933; he would retain both positions until the end of the Nazi regime.\nDuring the Second World War, Sauckel was responsible for regional defense until 1942, when he was appointed General Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment, working directly under\nHermann Göring\n's\nFour Year Plan\noffice. In this capacity, he deported some five million workers from occupied territories for forced labour in German industries, often by brutal coercion. In addition, he authorized the use of\nprisoners of war\nin response to ever-increasing demands.\nAt the end of the war, Sauckel was arrested by American troops in\nSalzburg\n. He was among the\n24 major war criminals\naccused in the\nNuremberg trials\nbefore the International Military Tribunal. He was found guilty of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n, sentenced to death, and executed by hanging in October 1946.\nEarly years\nBorn in\nHaßfurt\n(\nKingdom of Bavaria\n), as the only child of a postman and a seamstress, Sauckel attended the local\nvolksschule\nand the\ngymnasium\nin\nSchweinfurt\n,  leaving in 1909 without graduating when his mother fell ill. He joined the\nmerchant marine\nof\nNorway\nand\nSweden\nwhen he was 15, first on a Norwegian three-masted\nschooner\n, and later on Swedish and German vessels. Starting off as a\ncabin boy\n, he went on to sail throughout the world, rising to the rank of\nVollmatrose\n(\nable seaman\n). At the outbreak of\nWorld War I\nin 1914, he was on a German vessel\nen route\nto\nAustralia\nwhen the vessel was captured by French naval forces. He was subsequently\ninterned\nas an\nenemy alien\nin France from August 1914 until 20 October 1919. While interned, he studied mathematics, languages and economics.\nWhen released, he returned to Germany and found factory work for the next few years in Schweinfurt as an apprentice\nlocksmith\nand\ntoolmaker\nin the\nErsten Automatischen Gußstahlkugel-Fabrik & Cie\n(\nde\n)\nball-bearing\nworks. In 1919 he joined the\nDeutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund\n, the largest and most influential\nanti-Semitic\norganization in\nWeimar Germany\n. He served as its local manager for\nLower Franconia\nuntil 1921. Moving  to\nThuringia\n, he studied\nengineering\nat a technical school in\nIlmenau\nfrom 1922 to 1923, but was expelled for his political activities.\nNazi career\nSauckel joined the\nNazi Party\n(NSDAP) in January 1923 (member 1,395) and cofounded an\nOrtsgruppe\n(Local Group) in Ilmenau, serving as its\nOrtsgruppenführer\n. He also enrolled in the\nSA\n, the party’s paramilitary organization. He planned a \"March on Berlin\" with about 80 followers in conjunction with\nAdolf Hitler\n’s\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin\nMunich\non 9 November 1923. However, he and 22 followers were arrested and briefly detained in\nCoburg\nbefore the march could get under way. Despite the forced dissolution of the party in the wake of the failed\nputsch\n, Sauckel remained politically active, establishing a right wing organization called\nBund Teja\n, giving speeches, founding an SA\nfront organization\nin Thuringia named\nDeutscher Wanderverein\nand serving as the\nBezirksleiter\n(District Leader) for\nThuringian Forest\n. He also became in 1924 the publisher of a small newspaper in Ilmenau, which in 1925 would merge with another paper and develop into the official organ of the Party in Thuringia,\nDer Nationalsozialist\n. Published in\nWeimar\n, he would serve as its editor from 1927 until 1945. Sauckel thus established his credentials as an\nAlter Kämpfer\n(old fighter) with whom Hitler always retained strong bonds of loyalty. In 1924 he married Elisabeth Wetzel, with whom he had ten children.\nAfter the ban on the party was lifted, Sauckel became the business manager for\nGau Thuringia\nunder\nGauleiter\nArtur Dinter\nin March 1925 and formally rejoined the party on 6 April. On 6 February 1927, he was also named Deputy\nGauleiter\nand Gau\nOrganisationsleiter\n, in charge of personnel issues. Sauckel succeeded Dinter as\nGauleiter\nof Thuringia on 30 September 1927 and would retain this position until the end of the Nazi regime.\nOn\n8 December 1929\n, Sauckel was elected to the\nLandtag of Thuringia\nas one of six Nazi deputies that would hold the balance of power there between the leftist (24) and center-right (23) parties.\nOn 23 January 1930, a\ncoalition government\ntook office in Thuringia which for the first time in Germany included Nazi ministers,\nWilhelm Frick\nand\nWilly Marschler\n. Sauckel, though not included as a State cabinet minister, became the leader of the Nazi faction in the\nLandtag\n. Following the\n31 July 1932 election\n, the Nazis captured 42.5% of the votes and 26 seats, and Sauckel became the new Leading\nMinister of State\n(equivalent to\nMinister-President\n) as well as the\ninterior minister\nfrom which portfolio he controlled all the State police and security apparatus.\nFollowing Hitler's appointment as\nChancellor of Germany\non 30 January 1933, Sauckel was appointed to the new position of\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich Governor)  of Thuringia on 5 May 1933, a post he would retain until May 1945. The new post was created to provide more centralized control over the State governments. On 8 May he left the Thuringian cabinet and was succeeded by\nWilly Marschler\n.\nOn 9 November 1933, Sauckel was promoted to SA-\nGruppenführer\nand, on 12 November, he was elected to the\nReichstag\nfrom electoral constituency 12 (\nThuringia\n), retaining this seat until the fall of the Nazi regime in May 1945.\nSauckel in his Gauleiter uniform, 1937\nOn 9 September 1934, Sauckel joined the\nSS\nas an SS-\nGruppenführer\nat the invitation of\nHeinrich Himmler\nand was assigned to SS-\nOberabschnitt Mitte\n(Senior Section Central) based in Weimar until 1 April 1936 when he was transferred to the staff of the\nReichsführer-SS\n.\nUpon the death of\nWilhelm Friedrich Loeper\nSauckel was appointed to succeed him as the acting\nReichsstatthalter\nof both\nAnhalt\nand\nBrunswick\nfrom 30 November 1935 to 20 April 1937.\nOn 23 January 1937 Sauckel was made the head of the Main Office for the\nFour Year Plan\nin Thuringia. He was also given an honorary rank of\nSA-Obergruppenführer\non 9 November 1937.\nWorld War II\nAt the start of\nWorld War II\non 1 September 1939, Sauckel was named\nReich Defense Commissioner\n(\nReichsverteidigungskommissar\n) for\nWehrkreis\n(Military District) IX headquartered in\nKassel\n. This district comprised Gau Thuringia along with\nGau Electoral Hesse\n, the eastern half of\nGau Hesse-Nassau\nand smaller parts of four neighboring Gaue. In this position, he was entrusted with supervising civil defense measures over a large area, including air raid defenses and evacuations, as well as control over the war economy, rationing and suppression of the black market. On 16 November 1942, the jurisdiction of the Reich Defense Commissioners was changed from the\nWehrkreis\nto the Gau level, and he remained Commissioner for only his Gau of Thuringia.\nA member of the SS since 1934, he was promoted to honorary\nSS-Obergruppenführer\non 30 January 1942.\nHe was a holder of the\nGolden Party Badge\n.\nGeneral Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment\nOn 21 March 1942, Sauckel was appointed to the position for which he would be forever linked in history, General Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment (\nGeneralbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz\n) on the recommendation of\nMartin Bormann\n.\nIdentity document issued to a Polish forced labourer in 1942, together with a letter \"P\" patch that Poles were required to wear.\nSauckel worked directly under\nReichsmarschall\nHermann Göring\nwithin the Four Year Plan Office, obtaining and allocating labour for German industry and agriculture. On 27 March 1942, Göring issued a decree naming Sauckel the Leader of the Department of Labor Allocation within the Four Year Plan. In response to increased demands for labour from German war industries, Hitler issued a decree on 30 September 1942 granting Sauckel extraordinary powers over both civil and military authorities in the\noccupied territories\n. His agents were authorized “to issue directives to the competent military and civilian authorities” to ensure an adequate supply of labourers.\nSauckel therefore met the ever-increasing requirement for manpower with people from the occupied territories. Voluntary numbers were insufficient and\nforced civilian labour\nwas introduced within a few months. Of an estimated five million foreign workers brought to Germany, only around 200,000 came voluntarily, according to a March 1944 statement by Sauckel introduced as evidence at the\nNuremberg trials\n.\nStreet\nroundup\nof random civilians in\nWarsaw\n's\nŻoliborz\ndistrict, 1941\nThe majority of the acquired workers originated from the Eastern territories, especially in\nPoland\nand the\nSoviet Union\nwhere the methods used to gain workers were very harsh. The\nArmy\nwas used to\npressgang\nlocal people and most were taken by force to the Reich. In addition to forced civilian labourers, Sauckel authorized the use of\nprisoners of war\n. Conditions of work were extremely poor and discipline severe, especially for\nconcentration camp\nprisoners. All the latter were unpaid and provided with starvation rations, barely keeping those workers alive. Such\nslave labour\nwas widely used in many German industries, including coal mining, steel making, and armaments manufacture. The use of forced and slave labour continually increased throughout the war, especially after\nAlbert Speer\n, the\nReichsminister of Armaments and War Production\n, in April 1942 brought about the formation of the\nCentral Planning Board\n, which determined the labor requirements of industry, agriculture and all other components of the German war economy, and requisitioned that labor through Sauckel’s office.\nIt has been estimated that over 12 million such laborers eventually were brought forcibly to Germany to work, often by brutal coercion.\nWoman with\nOstarbeiter\nbadge in\nAuschwitz\nFinal months of the war\nOn 1 July 1944, following the division of the Prussian\nProvince of Saxony\n, Sauckel was named\nOberpräsident\nof the\nRegierungsbezirk\n(Government District) Erfurt, which became part of Thuringia. On 25 September 1944, Sauckel was named leader of the\nVolkssturm\nforces in his Gau. On 27 October 1944 he was given a cash award of\n250,000\nℛ\n︁\nℳ\n︁\nin honor of his 50th birthday and for his contributions to the Reich. On 10 April 1945, only a day after declaring Weimar a fortress city and exhorting his\nVolkssturm\nforces to resist the approaching American Army, Sauckel fled the city by car. After the end of the war, he was arrested in\nSalzburg\nby members of the US Army\nCounterintelligence Corps\non 12 May 1945. He was interned in the 7th Army Interrogation Center in\nAugsburg\n,\nCamp King\nin\nOberursel\nand, finally, in\nNuremberg\n.\nTrial and execution\nSauckel's body after execution, October 16, 1946\nOn 20 November 1945, Sauckel was put on trial before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nas a major war criminal. He was indicted on all four charges of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war crimes and crimes against humanity. He defended the\nArbeitseinsatz\nas \"nothing to do with exploitation. It is an economic process for supplying labour\". He denied that it was slave labour or that it was common to deliberately work people to death (extermination by labour) or to mistreat them. Yet, documents put into evidence showed that he was complicit in exploiting the labourers:\nAll the men [prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers] must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.\nIt has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him.\n—\nLetter from Fritz Sauckel to\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, 20 April 1942,\nReport on Labor Mobilization Program\nRobert Servatius\n, Sauckel's counsel, portrayed Sauckel as a representative of the labour classes of Germany; an earnest and unpretentious party man assiduously committed to promoting the collective utility of the working class. This portrait was contrary to that of Speer, whom Servatius juxtaposed against Sauckel as a technical genius and entrepreneurial administrator. Sauckel surmised that Speer bore greater legal and moral responsibility by virtue of the fact that the former merely met the demands of the latter, in accordance with protocol. This strategy did not yield to his favour, however, as the ratio in the final judgement against the respective defendants outlined that Speer's tasks were numerous, with the forced labour program comprising only one facet of his ministerial responsibilities, while Sauckel was singularly responsible for his office as General Plenipotentiary.\nSauckel was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and was hanged at Nuremberg Prison on 16 October 1946, 11 days before his 52nd birthday after receiving Communion.\nHis last words were recorded as \"\nIch sterbe unschuldig, mein Urteil ist ungerecht. Gott beschütze Deutschland. Möge es leben und eines Tages wieder groß werden. Gott beschütze meine Familie.\n\"\n(\"I die an innocent man, my sentence is unjust. God protect Germany. May it live and one day become great again. God protect my family.\") Albert Speer escaped the death sentence and served 20 years at\nSpandau prison\n, one of the most controversial verdicts of the Nuremberg trials. The discrepancy of an effective subordinate facing death with the superior facing a prison sentence has faced much attention and criticism in historical analysis, including by\nGitta Sereny\n, who later interviewed Speer concerning his responsibility for slave labour.\nSauckel's body, as were those of the other nine executed men and the corpse of Hermann Göring, was cremated at\nOstfriedhof (Munich)\nand the ashes were scattered in the river\nIsar\n.\nPortrayal in popular culture\nFritz Sauckel has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theatre productions;\nKen Kramer\nin the 2000 Canadian/U.S. T.V. production\nNuremberg\nOliver Stern\nin the 2005 German docudrama\nSpeer und Er\nPaul Brennen\nin the 2006 British television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\nSee also\nForced labour in Germany during World War II\nEastern worker\nList SS-Obergruppenführer\nService du travail obligatoire\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\nLiterature\nSteffen Raßloff:\nFritz Sauckel. Hitler \"Muster-Gauleiter\"\n(Thüringen. Blätter zur Landeskunde 36). Erfurt 2004. (\nPDF\n) (\ntranslation into English\n)\nSteffen Raßloff:\nFritz Sauckel. Hitlers \"Muster-Gauleiter\" und \"Sklavenhalter\"\n(Schriften der Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen. Bd. 29). 3. Auflage, Erfurt 2008.\nISBN\n978-3-937967-18-9\n(\nPDF\n)\nReferences\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n11–12.\n↑\nGreve, Swantje (26 June 2017). \"Der Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz und das Reichsarbeitsministerium\". In Nützenadel, Alexander (ed.).\nDas Reichsarbeitsministerium im Nationalsozialismus: Verwaltung – Politik – Verbrechen\n. Geschichte des Reichsarbeitsministeriums im Nationalsozialismus (in German). Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag. p.\n389.\nISBN\n9783835340817\n. Retrieved\n6 January\n2023\n.\nNach der Entlassung arbeitete er als Hilsarbeiter in Schweinfurt, begann eine Lehre als Metallarbeiter und besuchte seit 1921 das Technikum in Ilmenau, das er jedoch ohne Abschluss 1924 wieder verließ.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n12–14.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n14–15.\n↑\nBroszat, Martin\n: Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany, Berg Publishers Ltd., 1987, pp. 76-77\nISBN\n978-0-854-96517-5\n.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n16.\n1\n2\nKlee, Ernst\n(2011).\nDas Personen Lexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945?\n(in German). Koblenz: Edition Kramer. p.\n520.\nISBN\n978-398114834-3\n.\n1\n2\nKarl Höffkes: Hitlers Politische Generale. Die Gauleiter des Dritten Reiches: ein biographisches Nachschlagewerk. Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 1986, p.282,\nISBN\n3-87847-163-7\n.\n1\n2\nWilliams 2017\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nDer Große Ploetz: Die Enzyklopädie der Weltgeschichte, Verlag Herder GmbH, 2019, Page 978,\nISBN\n978-3-451-80892-0\n.\n↑\nBroszat, Martin\n: The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich. New York: Longman Inc., 1981, p. 122,\nISBN\n0-582-49200-9\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n27–29.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, p.\n44.\n↑\n\"Trials of the War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Volume II: The Milch Case, p. 374\"\n(PDF)\n. United States Printing Office. 1950\n. Retrieved\n9 November\n2021\n.\n↑\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann, eds. (1997).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Da Capo Press. p.\n19.\nISBN\n0-306-80793-9\n.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2021\n, pp.\n39–41.\n↑\nTrials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals\n. Vol.\nII. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1950. p. 407 (doc. 016-PS).\nOnline edition\n,\nInternet Archive\n.\n↑\n\"The Strange Story of the American Pastor Who Ministered to Nazis\"\n. 24 August 2014.\n↑\nRailton, Nicholas M. “Henry Gerecke and the Saints of Nuremberg.” Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, vol. 13, no. 1, 2000, pp. 112–137. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43750887. Accessed 8 Feb. 2021.\n↑\nKern, Erich\n(1963).\nDeutschland im Abgrund: das falsche Gericht\n(in German). p.\n264.\n↑\n\"Gitta Sereny 1995 Interview with Charlie Rose about her book 'Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth'\n\"\n.\nYouTube\n. 5 June 2021.\n↑\nDarnstädt, Thomas (2005).\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German). No.\n14 - 13 September. p.\n128.\n↑\nManvell, Roger (2011) .\nGoering\n. London: Skyhorse. p.\n393.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\n↑\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nInterrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945\n. New York City: Viking. p.\n205\n.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03008-8\n.\nBibliography\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2021).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and their Deputies, 1925-1945\n. Vol.\n3. Stroud: Fonthill Media.\nISBN\n978-1-781-55826-3\n.\nWilliams, Max (2017).\nSS Elite: The Senior Leaders of Hitler's Praetorian Guard\n. Oxford, England: Fonthill Media.\nISBN\n978-1-78155-638-2\n.\nExternal links\nInformation about Fritz Sauckel\nin the Reichstag database\nFritz Sauckel\nin the\nGerman National Library\ncatalogue\nBiography and literature\nNewspaper clippings about Fritz Sauckel\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nTestimony of Sauckel at Nuremberg (page 72 onwards)\nArchived\n2005-09-15 at the\nWayback Machine\nFritz Sauckel\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Erwin Baum",
+      "succeeded_by": "Willy Marschler",
+      "prime_minister": "Willy Marschler",
+      "1935—1937": "ActingReichsstatthalterof theFree State of Anhalt",
+      "1935–1937": "ActingReichsstatthalterof theFree State of Brunswick",
+      "1933—1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "1929—1934": "Member of theLandtag of Thuringia",
+      "born": "(1894-10-27)27 October 1894Haßfurt, Kingdom of Bavaria, German Empire",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged51)Nuremberg Prison, Bavaria, Allied-occupied Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse": "Elisabeth Wetzel",
+      "children": "10",
+      "occupation": "Merchantsailor",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed by hanging",
+      "convictions": "War crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 19345
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Alfred_Jodl",
+    "name": "Alfred Jodl",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Alfred Josef Ferdinand Jodl was a German Army Generaloberst and convicted war criminal, who served as the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – the German Armed Forces High Command – throughout World War II.",
+    "description": "German general and war criminal (1890–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Alfred Jodl\nGerman general and war criminal (1890–1946)\n\"Jodl\" redirects here. For other people with the surname Jodl, see\nJodl (disambiguation)\n.\nAlfred Josef Ferdinand Jodl\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈjoːdl̩\n]\n; born\nAlfred Josef Baumgärtler\n;\n10 May 1890 – 16 October 1946) was a German\nArmy\nGeneraloberst\n(the rank was equal to a four-star full general) and\nconvicted\nwar criminal\n,  who served as the Chief of the Operations Staff of the\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n– the German Armed Forces High Command – throughout\nWorld War II\n.\nAfter the war, Jodl was indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n, planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\nat the Allied-organized\nNuremberg trials\n. The principal charges against him related to his signing of the criminal\nCommando\nand\nCommissar Orders\n. Found guilty on all charges, he was sentenced to death and\nexecuted in Nuremberg\nin 1946.\nEarly life and career\nAlfred Jodl (second from right) as a captain of the\nReichswehr\nwith his brother Ferdinand (second from left), 1926\nAlfred Jodl was educated at a military cadet school in\nMunich\n, from which he graduated in 1910.\nFerdinand Jodl\n, who also became an army general, was his younger brother. He was the nephew of philosopher and psychologist\nFriedrich Jodl\nat the\nUniversity of Vienna\n.\nJodl was raised Roman Catholic but rejected the faith later in life.\nFrom 1914 to 1916, he served with a field artillery regiment on the\nWestern Front\n, being awarded the\nIron Cross\n2nd Class for gallantry in November 1914, and for being wounded in action. In 1917, he served briefly on the\nEastern Front\nbefore returning to the West as a staff officer. In 1918, he was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class for gallantry in action. After the defeat of the German Empire in 1918, he continued his career as a professional soldier with the much-reduced German Army (\nReichswehr\n).\nJodl married twice: in 1913 and (after becoming a widower) in 1944.\nWorld War II\n(front row, from l. to r.)\nReichspressechef\nOtto Dietrich\n,\nWilhelm Keitel\n, Hitler, Jodl, and\nMartin Bormann\n, at the\nFührer Headquarters\nof\nFelsennest\n, June 1940\nJodl's appointment as a\nmajor\nin the operations branch of the\nTruppenamt\n('Troop Office') in the Army High Command in the last years of the\nWeimar Republic\nput him under the command of General\nLudwig Beck\n.\nIn September 1939, Jodl first met\nAdolf Hitler\n. During the build-up to the Second World War, Jodl was nominally assigned as commander of the\n44th Division\nfrom October 1938 to August 1939 after the\nAnschluss\n.\nHe was chosen by Hitler to be Chief of the Operations Staff of the newly formed\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n(OKW) on 23 August 1939, just prior to the German\ninvasion of Poland\n.\nJodl acted as chief of staff during the\ninvasion of Denmark\nand\nNorway\n. Following the\nFall of France\n, Jodl was optimistic of Germany's success over Britain, writing on 30 June 1940 that \"The final German victory over England is now only a question of time.\"\nJodl signed the\nCommissar Order\nof 6 June 1941 (in which Soviet\npolitical commissars\nwere to be shot) and the\nCommando Order\nof 28 October 1942 (in which\nAllied\ncommandos\n, including properly uniformed soldiers as well as\ncombatants\nwearing civilian clothes, such as\nMaquis\nand\npartisans\n, were to be executed immediately without trial if captured behind German lines).\nJodl, seated between\nWilhelm Oxenius\nand\nHans-Georg von Friedeburg\n, signing the\nGerman Instrument of Surrender\nin Reims, 7 May 1945\nJodl spent most of the war at the\nWolf's Lair\n, Hitler's forward command post in\nEast Prussia\n. On 1 February 1944, he was promoted to the rank of\nGeneraloberst\n('colonel general', a\nfour-star\nrank). He was among those slightly injured during the\n20 July plot\nof 1944 against Hitler, during which he suffered a concussion.\nOn 6 May 1945, Jodl was awarded the\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross\nby\nGrand admiral\nKarl Dönitz\n, who had succeeded Hitler on 30 April 1945 as head of Germany and its armed forces.\nFollowing regional surrenders of German forces in Europe, Jodl was sent by Dönitz to respond to the demand for  \"immediate, simultaneous and\nunconditional surrender\non all fronts.\"\nJodl signed the\nGerman Instrument of Surrender\non 7 May 1945 in\nReims\non behalf of the OKW.\nThe surrender to all the Allies was concluded on 8 May in Berlin. On 13 May, on the arrest of\nGeneralfeldmarschall\nWilhelm Keitel\n, Jodl succeeded him as Chief of OKW.\nTrial and conviction\nJodl being arrested by British troops on 23 May 1945, at the Sportschool of the\nMürwik Naval School\nnear\nFlensburg\nJodl was arrested, along with the rest of the\nFlensburg Government\nof Dönitz, by British troops on 23 May 1945 and transferred to\nCamp Ashcan\nand later put before the International Military Tribunal at the\nNuremberg trials\n. He was accused of\nconspiracy\nto commit\ncrimes against peace\n; planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\n,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n. The principal charges against him related to his signature of the Commando Order and the Commissar Order, both of which ordered that certain classes of prisoners of war were to be summarily executed upon capture. When confronted with the 1941 mass shootings of\nSoviet POWs\n, Jodl claimed the only prisoners shot were \"not those that could not, but those that did not want to walk\".\nAdditional charges at his trial included unlawful deportation and abetting execution. Presented as evidence was his signature on an order that transferred Danish citizens, including Jews, to\nNazi concentration camps\n. Although he denied his role in this activity of the regime, the court sustained his complicity based on the evidence it had examined, with the French judge,\nHenri Donnedieu de Vabres\n, dissenting.\nJodl's body after his execution, 16 October 1946\nHis wife Luise attached herself to her husband's defence team.\nSubsequently, interviewed by\nGitta Sereny\n, researching her biography of\nAlbert Speer\n, Luise alleged that in many instances the Allied prosecution made charges against Jodl based on documents that they refused to share with the defence. Jodl nevertheless proved that some of the charges made against him were untrue, such as the charge that he had helped Hitler gain control of Germany in 1933.\nJodl pleaded not guilty \"before God, before history and my people\". Found guilty on all four charges, he was hanged at Nuremberg Prison on 16 October 1946.\nJodl's last words were reportedly \"I salute you, my eternal Germany\" (\n\"Ich grüße Dich, mein ewiges Deutschland\"\n).\nHis remains, like those of the other nine executed men and\nHermann Göring\n(who had killed himself prior to his scheduled execution), were cremated at\nOstfriedhof\nand the ashes were scattered in the\nWenzbach\n, a small tributary of the River\nIsar\nto prevent the establishment of a permanent burial site which might be enshrined by\nNeo-Nazis\n. A cross commemorating him was later added to the family grave on the\nFrauenchiemsee\nin Bavaria. In 2018, the local council ordered the cross to be removed;\nhowever, in March 2019, a Munich Court upheld Jodl's relatives' right to maintain the family grave, while noting the family's willingness to remove his name.\nPosthumous legal action\nOn 28 February 1953, after his widow Luise sued to reclaim her pension and his estate, a\nWest German\ndenazification\ncourt posthumously declared Jodl not guilty of breaking international law, based on Henri Donnedieu de Vabres's 1949 disapproval of Jodl's conviction.\nThis not guilty declaration was revoked by the\nMinister of Political Liberation for Bavaria\n(\nde\n)\non 3 September 1953, following objections from the United States; the consequences of the acquittal on Jodl's estate were, however, maintained.\nPromotions\n10 July 1910 Fähnrich (Officer Cadet)\n28 October 1912 Leutnant (2nd Lieutenant)\n26 September 1919 received new Patent from 28 October 1910\n14 January 1916 Oberleutnant (1st Lieutenant) with Patent from\n28 September 1921\nRittmeister\n(Captain) with effect from 1 July 1921\n1 February 1922 received Rank Seniority (RDA) from 18 October 1918\n30 August 1922 renamed to Hauptmann with effect from 1 October 1922\nHe was initially promoted to cavalry captain (Rittmeister) as he was serving in Fahr-Abteilung 7 in 1920. He rank designation changed to Hauptmann on being accepted as a general staff officer and on return to the artillery branch.\n1 February 1931 Major with Rank Seniority (RDA) from 1 May 1929\n1 October 1933 Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel)\n1 August 1935 Oberst (Colonel)\n31 March 1939 Generalmajor  (Major General) with effect from 1 April 1939\n19 July 1940 Generalleutnant (Lieutenant General)  with Rank Seniority (RDA) from 1 July 1940\nHe was simultaneously promoted to Generalleutnant and General der Artillerie on the same day in effect skipping the former rank.\n19 July 1940\nGeneral der Artillerie\nwith Rank Seniority (RDA) from 1 July 1940\n30 January 1944\nGeneraloberst\nwith Rank Seniority (RDA) from 1 February 1944\nAwards and decorations\nBavarian Prince Regent Luitpold Medal in Bronze (\nPrinzregent-Luitpold-Medaille\n) on the ribbon of the Anniversary Medal for the Army\non 3 March 1911\nIron Cross\n(1914), 2nd and 1st Class\n2nd Class on 20 November 1914\n1st Class on 3 May 1918\nMilitary Merit Order (Bavaria)\n, 4th Class with Swords (BMV4X/BM4X) on 12 August 1915\nMilitary Merit Cross (Austria-Hungary)\n, 3rd Class with War Decoration (ÖM3K) on 14 June 1917\nWound Badge\n(1918) in Black\nReich Sports Badge (\nDeutsches Reichssportabzeichen\n) in Bronze and Gold\nBronze in 1921\nGold in 1931\nChilean Order of Merit\n, Officer's Cross on 16 March 1934\nHonour Cross of the World War 1914/1918\nwith Swords on 5 December 1934\nWehrmacht Long Service Award\n, 4th to 1st Class\nOrder of the Crown of Italy\n, Commander's Cross on 29 September 1937 (permission to accept and wear by\nHitler\non 18 November 1937)\nfor supporting\nMussolini\nand high-ranking Italian officers during the Wehrmacht maneuvers in September 1937; Jodl spoke and wrote Italian and French fluently\nRoyal\nHungarian Order of Merit\n, Commander's Cross (permission to accept and wear by Hitler on 12 August 1938)\nAnschluss Medal\non 21 November 1938\nSudetenland Medal\nRepetition Clasp 1939 to the Iron Cross 1914, 2nd and 1st Class\n2nd Class on 30 September 1939\n1st Class on 23 December 1939\nImperial Order of the Yoke and Arrows\n,\nEncomienda con Placa\nNo. 94 (Grand Commander / Grand Officer with star/plaque) on 20 January 1941\nOrder of the Cross of Liberty\n(Finland), 1st Class with Star and Swords on 25 Match 1942\nOrder of the Sacred Treasure\n(Japan), Grand Cross on 26 September 1942\nGolden Party Badge\non 30 January 1943\nOrder of Michael the Brave\n(Romania), 3rd and 2nd Class on 23 December 1943\nWound Badge \"20 July 1944\"\nin Black\nKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves\non 10 May 1945 as\nGeneraloberst\nand\nChef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes im OKW\n(Dönitz-Erlaß)\nReferences\n↑\nTofahrn 2008\n, pp.\n129–130.\n↑\nO'Keeffe 2013\n, p.\n172.\n↑\nTofahrn 2008\n, p.\n129.\n↑\nJodl 1946\n, p.\n663.\n↑\nRailton, Nicholas M. \"Henry Gerecke and the Saints of Nuremberg.\" Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, vol. 13, no. 1, 2000, pp. 112–137.\nJSTOR\n43750887\n. Accessed 8 Feb. 2021.\n↑\nGörlitz 1989\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nGörlitz 1989\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nEncyclopedia Britannica\n.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n758.\n↑\nSpartacus Educational\n.\n1\n2\nScherzer 2007\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian (2012).\nThe End; Germany 1944–45\n. Penguin. p. 370\n↑\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n519.\n↑\n\"After the Battle: The Flensburg Government\"\n(PDF)\n. Battle of Britain International Ltd. 2005. p.\n11\n. Retrieved\n2 May\n2021\n.\n↑\nCrowe 2013\n, p.\n87.\n↑\ntercer-reich.com 2011\n.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n578.\n↑\nUMKC\n.\n↑\nMaser 2005\n, pp.\n349–350.\n↑\nDarnstädt 2005\n, p.\n128.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nPassauer Neue Pressee 2018\n.\n↑\nDer Spiegel 2019\n.\n↑\nBayerische Staatkanzlei 2019\n, § 40.\n↑\nBuchheim\n&\nFutselaar 2014\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nDavidson 1997\n, p.\n363.\n↑\nScheurig 1997\n, p.\n428.\n↑\nMilitär-Handbuch des Königsreich Bayern\n, 1914, p. 119\n1\n2\nThomas 1997\n, p.\n328.\nSources\n\"Defendants in the Major War Figures Trial\"\n. University of Missouri-Kansas City: School of Law. Archived from\nthe original\non 20 May 2009.\n\"Alfred Jodl | German general\"\n.\nEncyclopedia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n10 February\n2018\n.\n\"Alfred Jodl\"\n.\nAlfred Jodl Second World War\n. Retrieved\n14 January\n2020\n.\n\"VG München, Urteil vom 26. März 2019 – M 12 K 18.1936\"\n[\nAdministrative court Munich, judgment of 26 March 2019\n]\n(in German). Bayerische Staatkanzlei. Archived from\nthe original\non 16 April 2019\n. Retrieved\n25 August\n2020\n.\n\"Los argumentos de la defensa de ALFRED JODL en los juicios de Nuremberg\"\n.\ntercer-reich.com\n(in Spanish). 23 March 2011. Archived from\nthe original\non 30 November 2018\n. Retrieved\n7 December\n2020\n.\n\"Streit über Gedenkstein: Familie von NS-Kriegsverbrecher darf Scheingrab behalten\"\n[\nDisputed memorial stone: family of war criminal allowed to keep gravestone\n]\n(in German).\nDer Spiegel\n, (newspaper). 8 April 2019\n. Retrieved\n25 August\n2020\n.\n\"Das Jodl-Kreuz auf der Fraueninsel kommt weg - Grab bleibt bestehen\"\n[\nJodl's cross on the Fraueninsel to be removed, grave will remain\n]\n(in German). Passauer Neue Pressee, (newspaper). 23 February 2018. Archived from\nthe original\non 10 July 2018\n. Retrieved\n24 August\n2020\n.\nBuchheim, Eveline; Futselaar, Ralf (2014).\nUnder Fire: Women and World War II: Yearbook of Women's History/Jaarboek voor Vrouwengeschiedenis 34\n. Uitgeverij Verloren.\nISBN\n978-90-8704-475-6\n.\nCrowe, David M. (2013).\nCrimes of State Past and Present: Government-Sponsored Atrocities and International Legal Responses\n. Routledge.\nISBN\n978-1317986829\n.\nDavidson, Eugene (1997).\nThe Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg\n. University of Missouri Press.\nISBN\n0-8262-1139-9\n.\nDarnstädt, Thomas (13 September 2005).\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n. No.\n14.\nGörlitz, Walter (1989). \"Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont\". In Barnett, Correlli (ed.).\nHitler's Generals\n. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.\nISBN\n978-0802139948\n.\nHeiber, Helmut;\nGlantz, David M.\n, eds. (2004).\nHitler and his generals. Military Conferences 1942–1945\n. New York: Enigma Books.\nISBN\n1-929631-28-6\n.\nJodl, Alfred (1946). \"A Short Historical Consideration of German War Guilt\". In Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality (ed.).\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume VIII\n(PDF)\n. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.\nManvell, Roger\n;\nFraenkel, Heinrich\n(2011) .\nGoering: The Rise and Fall of the Notorious Nazi Leader\n. London: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMaser, Werner\n(2005).\nNürnberg: Tribunal der Sieger\n[\nNuremberg: Trial of Victors\n]\n(in German). Verlag Antaios.\nISBN\n978-3-935063-37-1\n.\nO'Keeffe, William J. (2013).\nA Literary Occupation: Responses of German writers in service in occupied Europe\n. Amsterdam: Rodopi.\nISBN\n978-9042037700\n. Retrieved\n1 December\n2018\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nInterrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945\n. New York: Viking.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03008-8\n.\nScherzer, Veit (2007).\nDie Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939 von Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm sowie mit Deutschland verbündeter Streitkräfte nach den Unterlagen des Bundesarchives\n[\nThe Knight's Cross Bearers 1939–1945 The Holders of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939 by Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and Allied Forces with Germany According to the Documents of the Federal Archives\n]\n(in German). Jena, Germany: Scherzers Militaer-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-938845-17-2\n.\nScheurig, Bodo (1997).\nAlfred Jodl. Gehorsam und Verhängnis\n. Berlin: Propyläen.\nISBN\n3-549-07228-7\n.\nSereny, Gitta (1995).\nAlbert Speer: His Battle with Truth\n. New York: Knopf.\nISBN\n0-394-52915-4\n.\nShepherd, Ben\n(2016).\nHitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich\n. Yale University Press.\nISBN\n9780300179033\n.\nShirer, William (1990).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n0-671-72868-7\n.\nThomas, Franz (1997).\nDie Eichenlaubträger 1939–1945 Band 1: A–K\n[\nThe Oak Leaves Bearers 1939–1945 Volume 1: A–K\n]\n(in German). Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-7648-2299-6\n.\nTofahrn, Klaus W. (2008).\nDas Dritte Reich und der Holocaust\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH.\nISBN\n978-3-63157-702-8\n.\nExternal links\nAlfred Jodl\n– United States Holocaust Memorial Museum\nNewspaper clippings about Alfred Jodl\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nPortal\n:\nBiography\nAlfred Jodl\nat Wikipedia's\nsister projects\n:\nMedia\nfrom Commons\nQuotations\nfrom Wikiquote",
+    "infobox": {
+      "deputy": "Walter Warlimont",
+      "preceded_by": "Wilhelm Keitel",
+      "succeeded_by": "Office abolished",
+      "born": "Alfred Josef Baumgärtler(1890-05-10)10 May 1890Würzburg, Bavaria, Germany",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged56)Nuremberg Prison, Bavaria, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Execution by hanging",
+      "spouses": "Irma Gräfin von Bullion[1]​​(m.1913;died1944)​Luise von Benda[2]​​(m.1945)​",
+      "relations": "Ferdinand Jodl(brother)",
+      "relatives": "Friedrich Jodl(uncle)",
+      "allegiance": "German EmpireWeimar RepublicNazi Germany",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German ArmyReichswehrGerman Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1910–1945",
+      "rank": "Generaloberst",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWorld War II",
+      "awards": "Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 16702
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Franz_von_Papen",
+    "name": "Franz von Papen",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen, Erbsälzer zu Werl und Neuwerk was a German politician, diplomat, Prussian nobleman and army officer. A national conservative, he served as Chancellor of Germany in 1932, and then as Vice-Chancellor under Adolf Hitler from 1933 to 1934. A committed monarchist, Papen is largely remembered for his role in bringing Hitler to power.",
+    "description": "German politician (1879–1969)",
+    "full_text": "Franz von Papen\nGerman politician (1879–1969)\n\"Papen\" redirects here. For other people with the surname, see\nPapen (surname)\n.\nFranz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen,\nErbsälzer\nzu Werl und Neuwerk\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈfʁants\nfɔn\nˈpaːpn̩\n]\n; 29 October 1879\n–\n2 May 1969) was a German politician, diplomat, Prussian nobleman and army officer. A\nnational conservative\n, he served as\nChancellor of Germany\nin 1932, and then as\nVice-Chancellor\nunder\nAdolf Hitler\nfrom 1933 to 1934. A committed\nmonarchist\n, Papen is largely remembered for his role in\nbringing Hitler to power\n.\nBorn into a wealthy and powerful family of\nWestphalian\nCatholic\naristocrats, Papen served in the\nPrussian Army\nfrom 1898 onward and was trained as an officer of the\nGerman General Staff\n. He served as a\nmilitary attaché\nin Mexico and the United States from 1913 to 1915, while also covertly organising acts of\nsabotage\nin the United States and quietly backing and financing Mexican forces in the\nMexican Revolution\non behalf of German\nmilitary intelligence\n. After being expelled as\npersona non grata\nby the\nUnited States State Department\nin 1915, he served as a battalion commander on the\nWestern Front\nof\nWorld War I\nand finished his war service in the\nMiddle Eastern theatre\nas a lieutenant colonel.\nAsked to become chancellor of the\nWeimar Republic\nby President\nPaul von Hindenburg\nin 1932, Papen ruled by\npresidential decree\n. He launched the\nPreußenschlag\ncoup against the\nSocial Democratic Party\n-led Government in the\nFree State of Prussia\n. His failure to secure a base of support in the\nReichstag\nled to his removal by Hindenburg and replacement by his former ally, General\nKurt von Schleicher\n.\nDetermined to return to power, Papen, believing that\nAdolf Hitler\ncould be controlled once he was in the government, pressured Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor and Papen as vice-chancellor in 1933 in a cabinet ostensibly not under\nNazi Party\ndomination. Seeing\nmilitary dictatorship\nas the only alternative to a Nazi Party chancellor, Hindenburg consented. Papen and his allies were quickly marginalized by Hitler and he left the government after the\nNight of the Long Knives\nin 1934, during which the Nazis placed him under\nhouse arrest\n, ransacked his office and murdered some of his close associates.\nSubsequently, Papen served the\nGerman Foreign Office\nas the ambassador in\nVienna\nfrom 1934 to 1938 and in\nAnkara\nfrom 1939 to 1944. He joined the Nazi Party in 1938.\nAfter the\nSecond World War\n, Papen was indicted for\nNazi war crimes\nin the\nNuremberg trials\nbefore the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nbut was acquitted of all charges. In 1947, a West German\ndenazification\ncourt found Papen to have acted as the main culprit in\ncrimes relating to the Nazi government\n. Papen was given a sentence of eight years' imprisonment at hard labour, but was released on\nappeal\nin 1949. Papen's memoirs were published in 1952 and 1953; he died in 1969.\nEarly life and education\nPapen was born into a wealthy and noble\nCatholic\nfamily in\nWerl\n,\nWestphalia\n, the third child of\nFriedrich von Papen-Köningen\n(1839–1906) and his wife Anna Laura von Steffens (1852–1939).\nHis father, a cavalry officer in the\nPrussian Army\n, had served in the\nSecond Schleswig War\n, the\nAustro-Prussian War\n, and the\nFranco-Prussian War\n, taking part in the battles of\nDybbøl\n,\nKöniggrätz\n, and\nSedan\n, and in the\nSiege of Paris\n. He was also a friend of Kaiser\nWilhelm II\n, whom he had met as a student in\nBonn\n, where both men had been members of the\nCorps Borussia Bonn\n; after his military career, he held several posts in local politics, including that of honorary deputy mayor (\nBürgermeister\n) of\nWerl\n. Members of the Papen family, which held\nerbsälzer\nstatus, had enjoyed the hereditary right to mine brine salt at Werl since 1298, a fact of which Franz was very proud; he always believed in the superiority of the aristocracy over commoners.\nPapen was sent to a\ncadet school\nin\nBensberg\nof his own volition at the age of 11 in 1891. His four years there were followed by three years of training at the\nPreußische Hauptkadettenanstalt\nin\nLichterfelde\n. He was trained as a\nHerrenreiter\n(\"gentleman rider\").\nHe served for a period as a military attendant in the\nKaiser\n's Palace and as a second lieutenant in his father's old unit, the\nWestphalian Uhlan Regiment No. 5\nin\nDüsseldorf\n. Papen joined the\nGerman General Staff\nas a captain in March 1913.\nOn 3 May 1905, he married\nMartha von Boch-Galhau\n(1880–1961), the daughter of\nRené von Boch-Galhau\n, a wealthy Saarland industrialist and member of the\nVilleroy & Boch\ndynasty of ceramics manufacturers; her dowry made him a very rich man.\nAn excellent horseman and a man of much charm, Papen cut a dashing figure and during this time, befriended\nKurt von Schleicher\n.\nFluent in both French and English, he travelled widely all over Europe, the Middle East and North America.\nHe was devoted to Kaiser\nWilhelm II\n.\nInfluenced by the books of General\nFriedrich von Bernhardi\n, Papen was a\nmilitarist\nthroughout his life.\nMilitary attaché and spymaster in Washington, D.C.\nHe entered the diplomatic service in December 1913 as a\nmilitary attaché\nto the German ambassador in the United States.\nIn early 1914 he travelled to\nMexico\n(to which he was also accredited) and observed the\nMexican Revolution\n. At one time, when the anti-Huerta Zapatistas were advancing on Mexico City, Papen organised a group of European volunteers to fight for Mexican General\nVictoriano Huerta\n.\nIn the spring of 1914, as German military attaché to Mexico, Papen was deeply involved in selling arms to the government of General Huerta, believing he could place Mexico in the German sphere of influence, though the collapse of Huerta's regime in July 1914 ended that hope.\nIn April 1914, Papen personally observed the\nUnited States occupation of Veracruz\nwhen the US seized the city of\nVeracruz\n, despite orders from Berlin to stay in Mexico City.\nDuring his time in Mexico, Papen acquired the love of international intrigue and adventure that characterised his later diplomatic postings in the United States, Austria and Turkey.\nOn 30 July 1914, Papen arrived in\nWashington, D.C.\n, from Mexico to take up his post as German military attaché to the United States.\nPapen as the German Military Attaché for Washington, D.C. in 1915\nDuring the\nFirst World War\n, Papen tried to buy weapons for Germany in the United States, but the British blockade made shipping arms to Germany almost impossible.\nOn 22 August 1914, Papen hired US private detective Paul Koenig, based in\nNew York City\n, to conduct a sabotage and bombing campaign against businesses in New York owned by citizens from the Allied nations.\nPapen, who was given an unlimited fund of cash to draw on by Berlin, attempted to block the British, French and Russian governments from buying war supplies in the United States.\nPapen set up a front company that tried to\npreclusively purchase\nevery hydraulic press in the US for the next two years to limit artillery shell production by US firms with contracts with the Allies.\nTo enable German citizens living in the Americas to return to Germany, Papen set up an operation in New York to forge US passports.\nStarting in September 1914, Papen abused his\ndiplomatic immunity\nas German military attaché, violating US laws to start organising plans for incursions into\nCanada\nfor a campaign of\nsabotage\nagainst canals, bridges and railroads.\nIn October 1914, Papen became involved with what was later dubbed \"the\nHindu–German Conspiracy\n\", by covertly arranging with\nIndian nationalists\nbased in\nCalifornia\nfor\narms trafficking\nto the latter for a planned uprising against the\nBritish Raj\n.\nIn February 1915, Papen also covertly organised the\nVanceboro international bridge bombing\n, in which his diplomatic immunity protected him from arrest.\nAt the same time, he remained involved in plans to restore Huerta to power, and arranged for the arming and financing of a planned invasion of Mexico.\nPapen departing New York City on 22 December 1915, after being declared\npersona non grata\nby the U.S. government and recalled to Germany\nPapen's covert operations were known to\nBritish intelligence\n, which shared its information with the US government.\nHis correspondence and other materials had been translated by Mary Jenkins, a graduate in German from\nUniversity of Oxford\n. He had kept his\nchequebook\nstubs which provided the names of spies he had employed.\nAs a result, for complicity in the planning of acts of sabotage\nthe US government declared Papen\npersona non grata\non 3 December 1915.\nHe was recalled to Germany and, upon his return, he was awarded the\nIron Cross\n.\nPapen remained involved in covert operations in the Americas. In February 1916, he contacted Mexican Colonel Gonzalo Enrile, living in\nCuba\n, in an attempt to arrange German support for\nFélix Díaz\n, the would-be strongman of Mexico.\nPapen served as an intermediary between\nRoger Casement\nof the\nIrish Volunteers\nand German naval intelligence for the purchase and delivery of arms to be used in\nDublin\nduring the\nEaster Rising\nof 1916. He remained involved in further covert operations with\nIndian nationalists\nas well. In April 1916, a US federal\ngrand jury\nreturned an indictment against Papen for a plot to blow up Canada's\nWelland Canal\n; he remained under indictment until he became Chancellor of Germany in mid-1932, at which time the charges were dropped.\nArmy service in World War I\nAs a Catholic, Papen belonged to the\nCentre Party\n, the centrist party that almost all German Catholics supported, but during the course of the war, the nationalist conservative Papen became estranged from his party.\nPapen disapproved of\nMatthias Erzberger\n's cooperation with Social Democrats, and regarded the\nReichstag Peace Resolution\nof 19 July 1917 as almost treason.\nLater in World War I, Papen returned to the army on active service, at first on the\nWestern Front\n. In 1916 Papen took command of the 2nd Battalion of the\n93rd Reserve Infantry Regiment\nof the\n4th Guards Infantry Division\nfighting in\nFlanders\n.\nOn 22 August 1916, Papen's battalion took heavy losses while successfully resisting a British attack during the\nBattle of the Somme\n.\nBetween November 1916 – February 1917, Papen's battalion was engaged in almost continuous heavy fighting.\nHe was awarded the\nIron Cross, 1st Class\n. On 11 April 1917, Papen fought at\nVimy Ridge\n, where his battalion was defeated with heavy losses by the\nCanadian Corps\n.\nAfter Vimy, Papen asked for a transfer to the Middle East, which was approved.\nFrom June 1917 Papen served as an officer on the General Staff in the Middle East, and then as an officer attached to the\nOttoman\narmy in\nPalestine\n.\nDuring his time in Constantinople, Papen befriended\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n. Between October–December 1917, Papen took part in the heavy fighting in the\nSinai and Palestine Campaign\n.\nHe was promoted to the rank of\nOberstleutnant\n.\nAfter the Turks signed an armistice with the Allies on 30 October 1918, the German\nAsia Corps\nwas ordered home, and Papen was in the mountains at\nKarapinar\nwhen he heard on 11 November 1918 that the war was over.\nThe new republic ordered soldiers' councils to be organised in the German Army, including the Asian corps, which General\nOtto Liman von Sanders\nattempted to obey, and which Papen refused to obey.\nSanders ordered Papen arrested for his insubordination, which caused Papen to leave his post without permission as he fled to Germany in civilian clothing to personally meet Field Marshal\nPaul von Hindenburg\n, who had the charges dropped.\nCatholic politician\nAfter leaving the German Army in the spring of 1919, Papen purchased the\nHaus Merfeld\n, a country estate in\nDülmen\n, and became a\ngentleman farmer\n.\nIn April 1920, during the\nCommunist uprising in the Ruhr\n, Papen took command of a\nFreikorps\nunit to protect Catholicism from the \"\nRed marauders\n\".\nImpressed with his leadership of his\nFreikorps\nunit, Papen was urged to pursue a career in politics.\nIn the fall of 1920, the president of the Westphalian Farmer's Association, Baron Engelbert von Kerkerinck zur Borg, told Papen his association would campaign for him if he ran for the Prussian\nLandtag\n.\nPapen entered politics and renewed his connection with the\nCentre Party\n. As a\nmonarchist\nPapen positioned himself as part of the\nnational conservative\nwing of the party that rejected both\nrepublicanism\nand the\nWeimar Coalition\nwith the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD). In reality, Papen's political ideology was much closer to that of the\nGerman National People's Party\n(DNVP) and he seems to have belonged to the Centre Party out of loyalty to the\nCatholic Church in Germany\nand in the hope that he could shift his party's platform towards restoring the\nconstitutional monarchy\ndeposed in 1918.\nDespite this ambiguity, Papen was undoubtedly a highly powerful dealmaker within the\npolitical party\n, particularly as the largest shareholder and the chief of the editorial board in the party's Catholic newspaper\nGermania\n, the most prestigious of the German Catholic media sources at the time.\nPapen was a member of the\nLandtag of Prussia\nfrom 1921 to 1928 and from 1930 to 1932, representing a heavily Catholic constituency in rural Westphalia.\nHowever, he rarely attended Landtag sessions and never spoke at them during his elected mandate.\nHe subsequently tried to have his name entered as a candidate for the Centre Party for the Reichstag elections of May 1924, but this was blocked by the party leadership.\nIn February 1925, Papen was one of the six Centre deputies in the Landtag who voted with the German National People's Party and the\nGerman People's Party\nagainst the SPD-Centre\ncoalition government\n.\nPapen was nearly expelled from the party for disobeying orders from his party leadership through his votes in the Landtag.\nIn the 1925 presidential elections, Papen surprised his party by supporting the DNVP candidate\nPaul von Hindenburg\nover the Centre Party's own candidate\nWilhelm Marx\n. Papen, along with two of his future cabinet ministers, was a member of\nArthur Moeller van den Bruck\n's exclusive Berlin\nDeutscher Herrenklub\n(German Gentlemen's Club).\nIn March 1930, Papen welcomed the coming of\npresidential government\n.\nBut with chancellor\nHeinrich Brüning\n's presidential government's dependence upon the Social Democrats in the\nReichstag\nto \"tolerate\" it by not voting to cancel laws passed under\nArticle 48\n, Papen grew more critical.\nIn a speech before a group of farmers in October 1931, Papen called for Brüning to disallow the SPD and base his presidential government on \"tolerance\" from the\nNSDAP\ninstead.\nPapen demanded that Brüning transform the \"concealed dictatorship\" of a presidential government into a dictatorship that would unite all of the German right under its banner.\nIn the March–April\n1932 German presidential election\n, Papen voted for Hindenburg on the grounds he was the best man to unite the right, while in the Prussian Landtag's election for the Landtag speaker, Papen voted for the Nazi\nHans Kerrl\n.\nChancellorship\nSee also:\nPapen cabinet\nPapen (left) with his eventual successor, Defence Minister\nKurt von Schleicher\n, watching a horse race in Berlin-\nKarlshorst\nOn 1 June 1932, Papen was suddenly promoted to high office when President Hindenburg appointed him\nchancellor\n, an appointment he owed to General\nKurt von Schleicher\n, an old friend from the pre-war General Staff, and an influential advisor of President Hindenburg. Schleicher selected Papen because his conservative, aristocratic background and military career made him acceptable to Hindenburg and would create the groundwork for a possible coalition between the Centre Party and the Nazis.\nIt was Schleicher, who himself became Defence Minister, who was responsible for selecting the entire cabinet.\nThe day before, Papen had promised party chairman\nLudwig Kaas\nhe would not accept any appointment. After Papen broke his pledge, Kaas branded him the \"\nEphialtes\nof the Centre Party\", after the infamous traitor of the\nBattle of Thermopylae\n. On 31 May 1932, in order to forestall being expelled from the party, Papen resigned from it.\nThe\ncabinet over which Papen presided\nwas labelled the \"cabinet of barons\" or \"cabinet of monocles\".\nPapen had little support in the\nReichstag\n; the only parties committed to supporting him were the\nnational conservative\nGerman National People's Party\n(DNVP) and the\nconservative liberal\nGerman People's Party\n(DVP). The Centre Party refused its support for him on account of his betrayal of\nChancellor Brüning\n.\nSchleicher's planned Centre-Nazi coalition thus failed to materialize, and the Nazis now had little reason to prop up Papen's weak government.\nPapen grew very close to Hindenburg and first met\nAdolf Hitler\nin June 1932.\nPapen's cabinet (2 June 1932)\nPapen consented on 31 May to Hitler's and Hindenburg's agreement of 30 May that the\nNazi Party\nwould tolerate Papen's government if fresh elections were called, the ban on the\nSA\ncancelled, and the Nazis granted access to the radio network.\nAs agreed, the Papen government dissolved the Reichstag on 4 June and called\na national election by 31 July 1932\n, in the hope that the Nazis would win the largest number of seats in the Reichstag, which would allow him the majority he needed to establish an authoritarian government.\nIn a so-called \"presidential government\", Papen would rule by Article 48, having emergency decrees signed by President Hindenburg.\nOn 16 June 1932, the new government lifted the ban on the SA and the SS, eliminating the last remaining rationale for Nazi support for Papen.\nPapen in June 1932\nIn June and July 1932, Papen represented Germany at the\nLausanne conference\nwhere, on 9 July, an agreement was reached for Germany to make a one-time payment of 3 million Reichsmarks in bonds to the\nBank for International Settlements\n. The redemption of the bonds, which would not start for at least three years, was to be the last of Germany's reparations payments.\nPapen nevertheless immediately repudiated the commitment upon his return to Berlin.\nThe treaty signed at the Lausanne Conference was not ratified by any of the countries involved,\nand Germany never resumed paying reparations after the expiration of the\nHoover Moratorium\nin 1932.\nThrough Article 48, Papen enacted on 4 September economic policies that cut the payments offered by the unemployment insurance fund, subjected jobless Germans seeking unemployment insurance to a means test, and lowered wages (including those reached by collective bargaining), while arranging tax cuts for corporations and the rich.\nThese austerity policies made Papen deeply unpopular with the general population but had the backing of the business elite.\nNegotiations between the Nazis, the Centre Party, and Papen for a new Prussian government began on 8 June but broke down due to the Centre Party's hostility to its deserter Papen.\nOn 11 July 1932 Papen received the support of the cabinet and the President for a decree allowing the national government to take over the Prussian government, which was dominated by the SPD. This move was later justified through the false rumour that the Social Democrats and the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD) were planning a merger.\nThe political violence of the so-called\nAltona Bloody Sunday\nclash between Nazis, Communists, and the police on 17 July, gave Papen his pretext.\nOn 20 July, Papen launched a coup against the SPD coalition government of Prussia in the so-called\nPreußenschlag\n(Prussian Coup). Berlin was put on military lockdown, and Papen informed the members of the Prussian cabinet that they were being removed from office. Papen declared himself Commissioner (\nReichskommissar\n) of Prussia by way of another emergency decree that he elicited from Hindenburg, further weakening the democracy of the Weimar Republic.\nPapen viewed the coup as a gift to the Nazis, who had been informed of it by 9 July, and were now supposed to support his government.\nOn 23 July, Papen instructed German representatives to walk out of the\nWorld Disarmament Conference\nafter the French delegation warned that allowing Germany\nGleichberechtigung\n(\"equality of status\") in armaments would lead to another world war. Papen stated that Germany would not return to the conference until the other powers agreed to consider his demand for equal status.\nPapen arriving for the Reichstag session of 12 September 1932\nIn the Reichstag election of 31 July the Nazis won the largest number of seats. To combat the rise in SA and SS political terrorism that began right after the elections, Papen on 9 August brought in via Article 48 a new law that drastically streamlined the judicial process in death penalty cases while limiting the right of appeal.\nNew special courts were also created.\nA few hours later in the town of Potempa,\nfive SA men murdered Communist labourer Konrad Pietrzuch\n.\nThe \"Potempa Five\" were promptly arrested, then convicted and sentenced to death on 23 August by a special court.\nThe Potempa case generated enormous media attention, and Hitler made it clear that he would not support Papen's government if the \"Five\" were executed. On 2 September, Papen in his capacity as Commissioner of Prussia acquiesced to Hitler's demands and commuted the sentences of the \"Five\" to life imprisonment.\nOn 11 August, the public holiday of Constitution Day, which commemorated the adoption of the Weimar Constitution in 1919, Papen and his Interior Minister Baron\nWilhelm von Gayl\ncalled a press conference to announce plans for a new constitution that would, in effect, turn Germany into a dictatorship.\nTwo days later, Schleicher and Papen offered the position of vice-chancellor to Hitler, who rejected it.\nReichstag on 12 September 1932 – Papen (standing, left) demands the floor and is ignored by Speaker\nGöring\n(right).\nWhen the new Reichstag assembled on 12 September, Papen hoped to destroy the growing alliance between the Nazis and the Centre Party.\nThat day at the President's estate in Neudeck, Papen, Schleicher, and Gayl obtained in advance from Hindenburg a decree to dissolve the Reichstag, then secured another decree to suspend elections beyond the constitutional 60 days.\nThe Communists tabled a\nmotion of no confidence\nin the Papen government.\nPapen had anticipated this move by the Communists, but had been assured that there would be an immediate objection. However, when no one objected, Papen placed the red folder containing the dissolution decree on Reichstag president\nHermann Göring\n's desk. He demanded the floor in order to read it, but Göring pretended not to see him; the Nazis and the Centre Party had decided to support the Communist motion.\nThe motion carried by 512 votes to 42.\nRealizing that he did not have nearly enough support to go through with his plan to suspend elections, Papen decided to call another election to punish the Reichstag for the vote of no-confidence.\nPapen and Schleicher in 1932\nOn 27 October, the Supreme Court of Germany issued a ruling that Papen's coup deposing the Prussian government was illegal, but allowed Papen to retain control of Prussia.\nIn November 1932, Papen violated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles by approving a program of refurbishment for the German Navy of an aircraft carrier, six battleships, six cruisers, six destroyer flotillas, and 16 submarines, intended to allow Germany to control both the North Sea and the Baltic.\nIn the\nNovember 1932 election\n, the Nazis lost seats, but Papen was still unable to secure a Reichstag that could be counted on not to pass another vote of no-confidence in his government.\nPapen's attempt to negotiate with Hitler failed.\nUnder pressure from Schleicher, Papen resigned on 17 November and formed a caretaker government.\nHe told his cabinet that he planned to have martial law declared, which would allow him to rule as a dictator.\nHowever, at a cabinet meeting on 2 December, Papen was informed by Schleicher's associate General\nEugen Ott\nabout the dubious results of\nReichswehr\nwar games, that showed there was no way to maintain order against the Nazis and Communists.\nRealizing that Schleicher was moving to replace him, Papen asked Hindenburg to dismiss Schleicher as Defence Minister. Instead, Hindenburg appointed Schleicher as chancellor.\nBringing Hitler to power\nAfter his resignation, Papen regularly visited Hindenburg, missing no opportunity to attack Schleicher in these visits.\nSchleicher had promised Hindenburg that he would never attack Papen in public when he became chancellor, but in a bid to distance himself from the very unpopular Papen, Schleicher in a series of speeches in December 1932 – January 1933 did just that, upsetting Hindenburg.\nPapen was embittered by the way his former best friend, Schleicher, had brought him down, and was determined to become chancellor again.\nOn 4 January 1933, Hitler and Papen met in secret at the banker\nKurt Baron von Schröder\n's house in Cologne to discuss a common strategy against Schleicher.\nOn 9 January 1933, Papen and Hindenburg agreed to form a new government that would bring in Hitler.\nOn the evening of 22 January in a meeting at the villa of\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nin Berlin, Papen made the concession of abandoning his claim to the chancellorship and committed to support Hitler as chancellor in a proposed \"Government of National Concentration\", in which Papen would serve as\nvice-chancellor\nand\nMinister-President of Prussia\n.\nOn 23 January, Papen presented to Hindenburg his idea for Hitler to be made chancellor, while keeping him \"boxed\" in.\nOn the same day Schleicher, to avoid a vote of no-confidence in the Reichstag when it reconvened on 31 January, asked the president to declare a state of emergency. Hindenburg declined and Schleicher resigned at midday on 28 January. Hindenburg formally gave Papen the task of forming a new government.\nThe\nHitler cabinet\non 30 January 1933\nIn the morning of 29 January, Papen met with Hitler and Hermann Göring at his apartment, where it was agreed that Papen would serve as vice-chancellor and Commissioner for Prussia.\nIt was in the same meeting that Papen first learned that Hitler wanted to dissolve the Reichstag when he became chancellor and, once the Nazis had won a majority of the seats in the ensuing elections, to activate the Enabling Act in order to be able to enact laws without the involvement of the Reichstag.\nWhen the people around Papen voiced their concerns about putting Hitler in power, he asked them, \"What do you want?\" and reassured them, \"I have the confidence of Hindenburg! In two months, we'll have pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he'll squeal.\"\nEditor-in-Chief\nTheodor Wolff\ncommented in an editorial in the\nBerliner Tagblatt\non January 29, 1933: \"The strongest natures, those with the iron forehead or the board before the head, will insist on the anti-parliamentary solution, on the closing of the\nReichstag House\n, on the\ncoup d'état\n.\"\nIn the end, the president, who had previously vowed never to let Hitler become chancellor, appointed Hitler to the post at 11:30\nam on 30 January 1933, with Papen as vice-chancellor.\nWhile Papen's intrigues appeared to have brought Hitler into power, the crucial dynamic was in fact provided by the Nazi Party's electoral support, which made military dictatorship the only alternative to Nazi rule for Hindenburg and his circle.\nAt the formation of\nHitler's cabinet\non 30 January, only three Nazis held cabinet portfolios: Hitler, Göring, and\nWilhelm Frick\n. The other eight posts were held by conservatives close to Papen, including the DNVP chairman,\nAlfred Hugenberg\n. Additionally, as part of the deal that allowed Hitler to become chancellor, Papen was granted the right to attend every meeting between Hitler and Hindenburg. Moreover, cabinet decisions were made by majority vote. Papen naively believed that his conservative friends' majority in the cabinet and his closeness to Hindenburg would keep Hitler in check.\nVice-chancellor\nHitler and his allies instead quickly marginalised Papen and the rest of the cabinet. For example, as part of the deal between Hitler and Papen, Göring had been appointed\ninterior minister of Prussia\n, thus putting the largest police force in Germany under Nazi control. Göring frequently acted without consulting his nominal superior, Papen. On 1 February 1933, Hitler presented to the cabinet an Article 48 decree law that had been drafted by Papen in November 1932 allowing the police to take people into \"protective custody\" without charges. It was signed into law by Hindenburg on 4 February as the \"Decree for the Protection of the German People\".\nOn the evening of 27 February 1933, Papen joined Hitler, Göring and Goebbels at the\nburning Reichstag\nand told him that he shared their belief that this was the signal for Communist revolution.\nOn 18 March 1933, in his capacity as\nReich\nCommissioner for Prussia, Papen freed the \"\nPotempa Five\n\" under the grounds the murder of Konrad Pietzuch was an act of self-defense, making the five SA men \"innocent victims\" of a miscarriage of justice.\nNeither Papen nor his conservative allies waged a fight against the\nReichstag Fire Decree\nin late February or the\nEnabling Act\nin March. After the Enabling Act was passed, serious deliberations more or less ceased at cabinet meetings if they took place at all, which subsequently neutralised Papen's attempt to \"box\" Hitler in through cabinet-based decision-making.\nAt the Reichstag election of 5 March 1933, Papen was elected as a deputy in an electoral alliance with Hugenberg's\nDNVP\n. Papen endorsed Hitler's plan, presented at a cabinet meeting on 7 March 1933, to destroy the Centre Party by severing the Catholic Church from it.\nThis was the origin of the\nReichskonkordat\nthat Papen was to negotiate with the Catholic Church later in the spring of 1933.\nOn 5 April 1933, Papen founded a new political party called the League of German Catholics Cross and Eagle, which was intended as a conservative Catholic party that would hold the NSDAP in check while at the same time working with the NSDAP.\nBoth the Centre Party and the Bavarian People's Party declined to merge into Papen's new party while the rival Coalition of\nCatholic Germans\n, which was sponsored by the NSDAP, proved more effective at recruiting German Catholics.\nPapen at the signing of the\nReichskonkordat\nin Rome on 20 July 1933\nOn 8 April Papen travelled to the\nVatican\nto offer a\nReichskonkordat\nthat defined the German state's relationship with the Catholic Church. During his stay in Rome, Papen met the Italian Prime Minister\nBenito Mussolini\nand failed to persuade him to drop his support for the Austrian chancellor Dollfuss.\nPapen was euphoric at the\nReichskonkordat\nthat he negotiated with Cardinal\nEugenio Pacelli\nin Rome, believing that this was a diplomatic success that restored his status in Germany, guaranteed the rights of German Catholics in the Third Reich, and required the disbandment of the Centre Party and the Bavarian People's Party, thereby achieving one of Papen's main political goals since June 1932.\nDuring Papen's absence, the\nLandtag\nof Prussia\nelected Göring as prime minister on 10 April. Papen saw the end of the Centre Party that he had engineered as one of his greatest achievements.\nLater in May 1933, he was forced to disband the League of German Catholics Cross and Eagle owing to lack of public interest.\nPapen with Hitler on 1 May 1933\nIn September 1933, Papen visited Budapest to meet the Hungarian Prime Minister\nGyula Gömbös\n, and to discuss how Germany and Hungary might best co-operate against Czechoslovakia.\nThe Hungarians wanted the\nvolksdeutsche\n(ethnic German) minorities in the Banat, Transylvania, Slovakia and Carpathia to agitate to return to Hungary in co-operation with the Magyar minorities, a demand that Papen refused to meet.\nIn September 1933, when the Soviet Union ended its secret military co-operation with Germany, the Soviets justified their move under the grounds that Papen had informed the French of the Soviet support for German violations of the Versailles Treaty.\nOn 3 October 1933, Papen was named a member of the\nAcademy for German Law\nat its inaugural meeting.\nThen, on 14 November 1933, Papen was appointed the\nReich\nCommissioner for the Saar.\nThe\nSaarland\nwas under the rule of the League of Nations and a referendum was scheduled for 1935 under which the Saarlanders had the option to return to Germany, join France, or retain the status quo.\nAs a conservative Catholic whose wife was from the Saarland, Papen had much understanding of the heavily Catholic region, and he gave numerous speeches urging the Saarlanders to vote to return to Germany.\nPapen was successful in persuading the majority of the Catholic clergy in the Saarland to campaign for a return to Germany, and 90% of the Saarland voted to return to Germany in the 1935 referendum.\nPapen began covert talks with other conservative forces with the aim of convincing Hindenburg to restore the balance of power back to the conservatives.\nBy May 1934, it had become clear that Hindenburg was dying, with doctors telling Papen that the president only had a few months left to live.\nPapen together with\nOtto Meissner\n, Hindenburg's chief of staff, and Major\nOskar von Hindenburg\n, Hindenburg's son, drafted a \"political will and last testament\", which the president signed on 11 May 1934.\nAt Papen's request, the will called for the dismissal of certain Nazi ministers from the cabinet, and regular cabinet meetings, which would have achieved Papen's plan of January 1933 for a broad governing coalition of the right.\nThe Marburg speech\nMain article:\nMarburg speech\nWith the Army command recently having hinted at the need for Hitler to control the SA, Papen delivered an\naddress\nat the\nUniversity of Marburg\non 17 June 1934 where he called for the restoration of some freedoms, demanded an end to the calls for a \"second revolution\" and advocated the cessation of SA terror in the streets.\nPapen intended to \"tame\" Hitler with the Marburg speech, and gave the speech without any effort at co-ordination beforehand with either Hindenburg or the\nReichswehr\n.\nThe speech was crafted by Papen's speech writer,\nEdgar Julius Jung\n, with the assistance of Papen's secretary\nHerbert von Bose\nand Catholic leader\nErich Klausener\n, and Papen had first seen the text of the speech only two hours before he delivered it at the University of Marburg.\nThe \"Marburg speech\" was well received by the graduating students of Marburg university who all loudly cheered the vice-chancellor.\nExtracts were reproduced in the\nFrankfurter Zeitung\n, the most prestigious newspaper in Germany, and from there picked up by the foreign press.\nThe speech incensed Hitler, and its publication was suppressed by the Propaganda Ministry.\nPapen told Hitler that unless the ban on the Marburg speech was lifted and Hitler declared himself willing to follow the line recommended by Papen in the speech, he would resign and would inform Hindenburg why he had resigned.\nHitler outwitted Papen by telling him that he agreed with all of the criticism of his regime made in the Marburg speech; told him Goebbels was wrong to ban the speech and he would have the ban lifted at once; and promised that the SA would be put in their place, provided Papen agreed not to resign and would meet with Hindenburg in a joint interview with him.\nPapen accepted Hitler's suggestions.\nNight of the Long Knives\nThe architects of the purge: Hitler,\nGöring\n,\nGoebbels\n, and\nHess\n. Only\nHimmler\nand\nHeydrich\nare missing.\nTwo weeks after the Marburg speech, Hitler responded to the armed forces' demands to suppress the ambitions of\nErnst Röhm\nand the SA by purging the SA leadership. The purge, known as the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, took place between 30 June and 2 July 1934. Though Papen's bold speech against some of the excesses committed by the Nazis had angered Hitler, the latter was aware that he could not act directly against the vice-chancellor without offending Hindenburg. Instead, in the Night of the Long Knives, the Vice-Chancellery, Papen's office, was ransacked by the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS); his associates\nHerbert von Bose\n,\nErich Klausener\nand\nEdgar Julius Jung\nwere shot. Papen himself was placed under house arrest at his villa with his telephone line cut. Some accounts indicate that this \"protective custody\" was ordered by Göring, who felt the ex-diplomat could be useful in the future.\nReportedly Papen arrived at the Chancellery, exhausted from days of house arrest without sleep, to find the chancellor seated with other Nazi ministers around a round table, with no place for Papen but a hole in the middle. He insisted on a private audience with Hitler and announced his resignation, stating, \"My service to the Fatherland is over!\" The following day, Papen's resignation as vice-chancellor was formally accepted and publicised, with no successor appointed. When Hindenburg died on 2 August, the last conservative obstacle to complete Nazi rule was gone.\nAmbassador to Austria\nPapen at\nBerlin Tempelhof Airport\nin July 1934, just before departing for Vienna\nHitler offered Papen the assignment of German ambassador to\nVienna\n, which Papen accepted.\nPapen was a German nationalist who always believed that Austria was destined to join Germany in an\nAnschluss\n(\nannexation\n), and felt that a success in bringing that about might restore his career.\nDuring his time as ambassador to Austria, Papen stood outside the normal chain of command of the\nAuswärtiges Amt\n(Foreign Office) as he refused to take orders from\nKonstantin von Neurath\n, his own former Foreign Minister. Instead, Papen reported directly to Hitler.\nPapen met often with Austrian Chancellor\nKurt von Schuschnigg\nto assure him that Germany did not wish to annex his country, and only wanted the banned Austrian Nazi Party to participate in Austrian politics.\nIn late 1934-early 1935, Papen took a break from his duties as German ambassador in Vienna to lead the\nDeutsche Front\n(\"German Front\") in the\nSaarland plebiscite\non 13 January 1935, where the League of Nations observers monitoring the vote noted Papen's \"ruthless methods\" as he campaigned for the region to return to Germany.\nPapen on his way to\nBerchtesgaden\n, 21 February 1938\nPapen also contributed to achieving Hitler's goal of undermining Austrian sovereignty and bringing about the\nAnschluss\n.\nOn 28 August 1935, Papen negotiated a deal under which the German press would cease its attacks on the Austrian government, in return for which the Austrian press would cease its attacks on Germany's.\nPapen played a major role in negotiating the 1936 Austro-German agreement under which Austria declared itself a \"German state\" whose foreign policy would always be aligned with Berlin's and allowed for members of the \"national opposition\" to enter the Austrian cabinet in exchange for which the Austrian Nazis abandoned their terrorist campaign against the government.\nThe treaty Papen signed in Vienna on 11 July 1936 promised that Germany would not seek to annex Austria and largely placed Austria in the German sphere of influence, greatly reducing Italian influence on Austria.\nIn July 1936, Papen reported to Hitler that the Austro-German treaty he had just signed was the \"decisive step\" towards ending Austrian independence, and it was only a matter of time before the\nAnschluss\ntook place.\nIn the summer and fall of 1937, Papen pressured the Austrians to include more Nazis in the government.\nIn September 1937, Papen returned to Berlin when\nBenito Mussolini\nvisited Germany, serving as Hitler's adviser on Italo-German talks about Austria.\nPapen joined the Nazi Party in 1938.\nPapen was dismissed from his mission in Austria on 4 February 1938, but Hitler drafted him to arrange a meeting between the German dictator and Schuschnigg at\nBerchtesgaden\n.\nThe ultimatum that Hitler presented to Schuschnigg at the meeting on 12 February 1938 led to the Austrian government's capitulation to German threats and pressure, and paved the way for the\nAnschluss\nthat year.\nAmbassador to Turkey\nPapen later served the German government as\nAmbassador to Turkey\nfrom 1939 to 1944. In April 1938, after the retirement of the previous ambassador,\nFriedrich von Keller\non his 65th birthday, the German foreign minister\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nattempted to appoint Papen as ambassador in Ankara, but the appointment was vetoed by the Turkish president\nMustafa Kemal Atatürk\nwho remembered Papen well with considerable distaste when he had served alongside him in World War I.\nIn November 1938 and in February 1939, the new Turkish president General\nİsmet İnönü\nagain vetoed Ribbentrop's attempts to have Papen appointed as German ambassador to Turkey.\nIn April 1939, Turkey accepted Papen as ambassador.\nPapen was keen to return to Turkey, where he had served during World War I.\nPapen arrived in Turkey on 27 April 1939, just after the signing of a UK-Turkish declaration of friendship.\nİnönü wanted Turkey to join the UK-inspired \"peace front\" that was meant to stop Germany.\nOn 24 June 1939, France and Turkey signed a declaration committing them to upholding collective security in the Balkans.\nOn 21 August 1939, Papen presented Turkey with a diplomatic note threatening economic sanctions and the cancellation of all arms contracts if Turkey did not cease leaning towards joining the UK-French \"peace front\", a threat that Turkey rebuffed.\nOn 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, and two days later on 3 September 1939 the UK and France declared war on Germany.\nPapen claimed later to have been opposed to Hitler's foreign policy in 1939, and was very depressed when he heard the news of the German attack on Poland on the radio.\nPapen continued his work of representing the\nReich\nin Turkey under the grounds that resigning in protest \"would indicate the moral weakening in Germany\", which was something he could never do.\nOn 19 October 1939, Papen suffered a notable setback when Turkey signed a treaty of alliance with France and the UK.\nDuring the\nPhoney War\n, the conservative Catholic Papen found himself to his own discomfort working together with Soviet diplomats in Ankara to pressure Turkey not to enter the war on the Allied side.\nIn June 1940, with France's\ndefeat\n, İnönü abandoned his pro-Allied neutrality, and Papen's influence in Ankara dramatically increased.\nBetween 1940 and 1942 Papen signed three economic agreements that placed Turkey in the German economic sphere of influence.\nPapen hinted more than once to Turkey that Germany was prepared to support Bulgarian claims to Thrace if Turkey did not prove more accommodating to Germany.\nIn May 1941, when the Germans dispatched an expeditionary force to Iraq to fight against the UK in the\nAnglo-Iraqi War\n, Papen persuaded Turkey to allow arms in Syria to be shipped along a railroad linking Syria to Iraq.\nIn June 1941, Papen successfully negotiated a Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression with Turkey, signed on 17 June 1941, which prevented Turkey from entering the war on the Allied side.\nAfter\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the invasion of the Soviet Union that began on 22 June 1941, Papen persuaded Turkey to close the Turkish straits to Soviet warships, but was unable to have the straits closed to Soviet merchant ships as he demanded.\nPapen claimed after the war to have done everything within his power to save Turkish Jews living in countries occupied by Germany from deportation to the death camps, but an examination of the\nAuswärtige Amt\n'\ns\nrecords does not support him.\nDuring the war, Papen used his connections with Turkish Army officers with whom he served in World War I to try to influence Turkey into joining the Axis, held parties at the German embassy which were attended by leading Turkish politicians and used \"special funds\" to bribe Turks into following a pro-German line.\nAs an ambassador to Turkey, Papen survived a Soviet assassination attempt on 24 February 1942 by agents from the\nNKVD\n:\na bomb exploded prematurely, killing the bomber and no one else, although Papen was slightly injured. In 1943, Papen frustrated a UK attempt to have Turkey join the war on the Allied side by getting Hitler to send a letter to Inönü assuring him that Germany had no interest in invading Turkey and by threatening to have the\nLuftwaffe\nbomb\nIstanbul\nif Turkey joined the Allies.\nIn the summer and fall of 1943, realizing the war was lost, Papen attended secret meetings with the agents of the US\nOffice of Strategic Services\n(OSS) in Istanbul.\nPapen exaggerated his power in Germany to the OSS, and asked for US support to make him dictator of a post-Hitler Germany.\nUS President\nFranklin D. Roosevelt\nrejected the offer when he heard of it and told the OSS to stop talking to Papen.\nFrom October 1943, Papen and the German embassy gained access to the \"Cicero\" documents of\nsecret agent\nElyesa Bazna\n, including information and the\nTehran Conference\n, which Papen revealed selectively to Inönu to strain Allied-Turkish relations.\nIn January 1944, Papen, after learning via the \"Cicero\" documents of a UK plan to have the Royal Air Force use airfields in Turkey to bomb the oil fields of\nPloiești\nin Romania, told the Turkish foreign minister\nHüseyin Numan Menemencioğlu\nthat if Turkey allowed the RAF to use Turkish air fields to bomb Ploiești, the Luftwaffe would use its bases in Bulgaria and Greece to bomb and destroy Istanbul and Izmir.\nOn 20 April 1944, Turkey, wishing to ingratiate itself with the Allies, ceased selling\nchromium\nto Germany.\nOn 26 May 1944 Menemencioğlu announced that Turkey was reducing exports to Germany by 50%, and on 2 August 1944 Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany, forcing Papen to return to Berlin.\nAfter\nPope Pius XI\ndied in February 1939, his successor\nPope Pius XII\ndid not renew Papen's honorary title of\nPapal chamberlain\n. As\nnuncio\n, the future\nPope John XXIII\n, Angelo Roncalli, became acquainted with Papen in Greece and Turkey during World War II. The German government considered appointing Papen ambassador to the\nHoly See\n, but Pope Pius XII, after consulting\nKonrad von Preysing\n,\nBishop of Berlin\n, rejected this proposal. In August 1944, Papen had his last meeting with Hitler after arriving back in Germany from Turkey. Here, Hitler awarded Papen the\nKnight's Cross\nof the\nWar Merit Cross\n.\nIn September 1944, Papen settled at his estate at\nWallerfangen\nin the Saarland that had been given to him by his father-in-law.\nOn 29 November 1944, Papen could hear in the distance the guns of the advancing US Third Army, which caused him and his family to flee deeper into Germany.\nPost-war years\nPapen at the\nNuremberg trials\nPapen was captured along with his son Franz Jr. at his own home on 14 April 1945.\nPapen was forced by the US to visit a\nconcentration camp\nto see firsthand the nature of the regime he had fostered and served from start to finish.\nPapen in April 1964 wearing a\ntyrolean hat\nPapen was one of the defendants at the main\nNuremberg War Crimes Trial\n. The investigating tribunal found no solid evidence to support claims that Papen had been involved in the\nannexation of Austria\n.\nThe court acquitted him, stating that while he had committed a number of \"political immoralities\", these actions were not punishable under the \"conspiracy to commit\ncrimes against peace\n\" written in Papen's indictment. The Soviets wanted to execute him.\nPapen was subsequently sentenced to eight years' hard labour by a West German\ndenazification\ncourt, but he was released on appeal in 1949. Until 1954, Papen was forbidden to publish in\nWest Germany\n, and so he wrote a series of articles in newspapers in Spain, attacking the Federal Republic from a conservative Catholic position in much the same terms that he had attacked the Weimar Republic.\nPapen unsuccessfully tried to restart his political career in the 1950s; he lived at the Castle of Benzenhofen near\nRavensburg\nin\nUpper Swabia\n.\nPope John XXIII\nrestored his title of\nPapal Chamberlain\non 24 July 1959. Papen was also a\nKnight of Malta\n, and he was awarded the Grand Cross of the\nPontifical Order of Pius IX\n.\nVon Papen's grave in\nWallerfangen\n,\nSaarland\nPapen published a number of books and memoirs, in which he defended his policies and dealt with the years 1930 to 1933 as well as early Western\nCold War\npolitics. Papen praised the\nSchuman Plan\nto pacify relations between France and West Germany as \"wise and statesmanlike\" and claimed to believe in the economic and military unification and integration of Western Europe.\nIn 1952 and 1953, Papen published his memoirs in two volumes in Switzerland.\nRight up until his death in 1969, Papen gave speeches and wrote articles in the newspapers, defending himself against the charge that he had played a crucial role in having Hitler appointed chancellor and that he had served a criminal regime; these led to vitriolic exchanges with West German historians, journalists and political scientists.\nFranz von Papen died in\nObersasbach\n, West Germany, on 2 May 1969 at the age of 89.\nIn popular culture\nFranz von Papen has been portrayed by these actors in these film, television and theatrical productions:\nPaul Everton\n(\nde\n)\n(de) in the 1918 US film\nThe Eagle's Eye\nCurt Furburg in the 1943 US film\nBackground to Danger\nWalter Kingsford\nin the 1944 US film\nThe Hitler Gang\nJohn Wengraf\nin the 1952 US film\n5 Fingers\nPeter von Zerneck in the 1973 US TV production\nPortrait: A Man Whose Name Was John\nDennis St John\nin the 2000 Canadian/US TV production\nNuremberg\nErland Josephson\nin the 2003 Italian/UK TV production\nThe Good Pope: Pope John XXIII\nRobert Russell in the 2003 Canadian/US TV production\nHitler: The Rise of Evil\nGeorgi Novakov in the 2006 UK television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\nDainius Svobonas in the 2019–2023 UK television documentary\nRise of the Nazis\nPéter Tunyogi in the 2024 TV mini-series\nHitler and the Nazis: Evil on Trial\nBurkhart Siedhoff in the 2017–present German\nneo-noir\nTV series\nBabylon Berlin\nPublications\nAppell an das deutsche Gewissen. Reden zur nationalen Revolution\n, Stalling, Oldenburg, 1933 (\nOCLC\n490719263\n)\nMemoirs\n(German title:\nDer Wahrheit eine Gasse\n), Translated by Brian Connell, Andre Deutsch, London, 1952 (\nOCLC\n86049352\n)\nEuropa, was nun? Betrachtungen zur Politik der Westmächte\n, Göttinger Verlags-Anstalt, Göttingen, 1954 (\nOCLC\n4027794\n)\nVom Scheitern einer Demokratie. 1930–1933\n, Hase und Koehler, Mainz, 1968 (\nOCLC\n1970844\n)\nSee also\nBiography portal\nGermany portal\nPolitics portal\nConservatism portal\nChristianity portal\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nReferences\nCitations\n1\n2\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n2.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, pp.\n33–34, 71.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n172.\n1\n2\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n26.\n1\n2\n3\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n11.\n1\n2\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nMcMaster 1918\n, pp.\n258–261.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, pp.\n33–34.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nPomar, Norman; Allen, Thomas (1997).\nThe Spy Book\n. New York: Random House. p.\n584.\n↑\nHubbard-Hall, Claire (2024).\nHer Secret Service: The Forgotten Women of British Intelligence\n. W&N. p.\n352.\nISBN\n1399603434\n.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n164.\n↑\n\"Attaches 'Objectionable'\n\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 4 December 1915. p.\n1.\nProQuest\n97693015\n. Retrieved\n25 June\n2025\n.\n↑\nBisher 2016\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nCurrent Biography 1941\n, pp. 651–653.\n1\n2\nJones 2005\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n25.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, pp.\n25–26.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n26.\n↑\nIhrig, Stefan (2016).\nJustifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismark to Hitler\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p.\n352.\n1\n2\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\n3\nJones 2005\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1967\n, p.\n247.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n244–245.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n40.\n1\n2\n3\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nJones 2005\n, pp.\n194–195.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n247.\n1\n2\n3\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n41.\n1\n2\nJones 2005\n, p.\n205.\n1\n2\n3\nJones 2005\n, p.\n206.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n245.\n1\n2\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n367.\n↑\n\"Germany: Hitler Into Chancellor\"\n.\nTime\n. 6 February 1933\n. Retrieved\n4 February\n2022\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n245–246.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n248.\n↑\n\"The Result of the Lausanne Conference\"\n.\nWorld Affairs\n.\n95\n(2). Sage Publications, Inc.:\n75–\n77 September 1932.\nJSTOR\n20662122\n.\n↑\nNicolls, Anthony.\nWeimar and the Rise of Hitler\n, London: Macmillan 2000. page 156.\n↑\nAbelshauser, Werner; Ritschl, Albrecht; Fisch, S.; Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig; Hoffmann, Dierk O., eds. (2016).\nWirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1917–1990\n[\nEconomic Policy in Germany 1917–1990\n]\n(in German). Berlin: De Gruyter. p.\n575.\nISBN\n978-3110465266\n.\n↑\n\"Lausanne Conference\"\n.\nU-S-History.com\n. Retrieved\n4 November\n2023\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, pp.\n17–18.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n250.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nDorplaen 1964\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nDorplaen 1964\n, pp.\n343–344.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n252.\n↑\nSchulze 2001\n, pp.\n241–243.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1967\n, p.\n250.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n254.\n1\n2\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n381.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n257.\n↑\nBeck, Hermann (2013).\nThe Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933\n. Oxford: Berghahn Books. p.\n81.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n255.\n↑\nDorplaen 1964\n, p.\n362.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n258.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n172.\n↑\nDorplaen 1964\n, p.\n363.\n1\n2\nEvans 2003\n, pp.\n297–298.\n↑\nKolb 1988\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nDorplaen 1964\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nBird, Keith (2006).\nErich Raeder Admiral of the Third Reich\n. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. p.\n90.\n1\n2\n3\nKolb 1988\n, p.\n122.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n261.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n264.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, pp.\n395–396, 417.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n268.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nBlum, George P. (1998).\nThe Rise of Fascism In Europe\n. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. pp.\n110–111\n.\nISBN\n0-313-29934-X\n.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, pp.\n145–146.\n↑\nUllrich, Volker (1 February 2017).\n\"Adolf Hitler 'Wait Calmly'\n\"\n.\nZeit Online\n.\n↑\n\"Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler with his Cabinet (January 30, 1933)\"\n.\nGermany History in Documents and Images\n.\n↑\n\"\n\"Eine Mischung von Korruption, Hintertreppe und Günstlingswirtschaft\"\n\"\n. April 2020.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n273.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n273–275.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n411.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n457.\n↑\nBessel, Richard\n(September 1977). \"The Potempa Murder\".\nCentral European History\n.\n10\n(3): 252.\ndoi\n:\n10.1017/S0008938900018471\n.\nS2CID\n146143269\n.\n1\n2\n3\nJones 2005\n, p.\n192.\n↑\nJones 2005\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nJones 2005\n, pp.\n191–192.\n↑\nJones 2005\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nJones 2005\n, p.\n190.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n80.\n↑\nHans Frank (Ed.):\nJahrbuch der Akademie für Deutsches Recht\n, 1st Edition, 1933–1934. Schweitzer Verlag, München/Berlin/Leipzig, p. 256.\n1\n2\n3\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n291.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n55.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1967\n, pp.\n314–315.\n1\n2\n3\nWheeler-Bennett 1967\n, p.\n314.\n1\n2\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n509.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, pp.\n509–510.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n744.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n29.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n510.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nRead 2004\n, pp.\n369–370.\n↑\n\"Germany: Crux of Crisis\"\n.\nTime\n. 16 July 1934.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n106.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nKallis, Aristotle A.:\nFascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945\n, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 81.\nISBN\n978-0-415-21612-8\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n233.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nChurchill, W. (1948).\nThe Gathering Storm\n, p. 132.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n236.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, pp.\n330–331.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1967\n, p.\n376.\n↑\nWeinberg 1970\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n331.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n279.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n281.\n↑\nGerman Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, A Guide to Current Research and Resources By Christoph M. Kimmich, p. 27\n↑\nHildebrand 1986\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nWatt 1989\n, pp.\n279–280.\n1\n2\nWatt 1989\n, p.\n280.\n↑\nWeinberg 1980\n, p.\n591.\n↑\nWatt 1989\n, pp.\n280–281.\n↑\nWatt 1989\n, pp.\n281–282.\n↑\nWatt 1989\n, p.\n305.\n↑\nWatt 1989\n, p.\n310.\n1\n2\n3\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n390.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, pp.\n392–393.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n392.\n↑\nWeinberg 2005\n, p.\n78.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n404.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, pp.\n397–398.\n↑\nHale 2000\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, pp.\n398–399.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n400.\n↑\nGuttstadt 2013\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nGuttstadt 2013\n, p.\n41–42.\n↑\nPavel Sudoplatov\n,\nSpecial Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness – A Soviet Spymaster\n(Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1994),\nISBN\n0-316-77352-2\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n406.\n1\n2\nBauer 1996\n, p.\n134.\n↑\nBauer 1996\n, p.\n125.\n↑\nWires, Richard\nThe Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to British Secrets in World War II\n, Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1999 page 49.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n407.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n408.\n↑\nHale 2000\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nHale 2000\n, p.\n91.\n↑\nFranz von Papen,\nMemoirs\n, p. 532.\n1\n2\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n428.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n427.\n↑\nHagerman 1993\n, p.\n277.\n↑\nGrzebyk 2013\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n445.\n↑\nTurner 1996\n, p.\n238.\n↑\nFranz von Papen,\nMemoirs\n, pp. 586–587.\n↑\nRolfs 1995\n, p.\n441.\n↑\nWistrich 1982\n, p.\n232.\n↑\n\"Franz von Papen (Character)\"\n.\nIMDb.com\n. Retrieved\n20 May\n2008\n.\n↑\n\"Hitler and the Nazis: Evil on Trial\"\n.\nIMDB\n. Retrieved\n15 June\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Who was who in Babylon Berlin\n?\"\n. Retrieved\n8 August\n2024\n.\nSources\nBauer, Yehuda (1996).\nJews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933–1945\n. New Haven: Yale University Press.\nBisher, Jamie (2016).\nThe Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914–1922\n. Jefferson: McFarland.\nBraatz, Werner Ernst (1953).\nFranz von Papen and the Movement of Anschluss with Austria, 1934–1938: An Episode in German Diplomacy\n. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.\nDorplaen, Andreas (1964).\nHindenburg and the Weimar Republic\n. Princeton: Princeton University Press.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n.\nNew York City\n:\nPenguin Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0141009759\n.\nEvans, Richard (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14303-790-3\n.\nGrzebyk, Patrycja (2013).\nCriminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression\n. New York: Routledge.\nGuttstadt, Corry (2013).\nTurkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nHagerman, Bart (1993).\nWar Stories\n: The Men of The Airborne\n(1st\ned.). Paducah, KY: Turner Pub. Co.\nISBN\n1563110970\n.\nHale, William (2000).\nTurkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000\n. London: Psychology Press.\nHildebrand, Klaus\n(1986).\nThe Third Reich\n. London & New York: Routledge.\nJones, Larry Eugene (2005). \"Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic\".\nCentral European History\n.\n38\n(2):\n191–\n217.\ndoi\n:\n10.1163/156916105775563670\n.\nS2CID\n145606603\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(1998).\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York: Norton.\nISBN\n9780393320350\n.\nKolb, Eberhard (1988).\nThe Weimar Republic\n. London: Unwin Hyman.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2019) .\nHitler: A Life\n[\nHitler: Biographie\n]\n. Oxford:\nOxford University Press\n.\nMcMaster, John B. (1918).\nThe United States in the World War\n. Vol.\n2. New York; London: D. Appleton & Co.\nPapen, Franz von (1952).\nMemoirs\n. London: Andre Deutsch.\nRead, Anthony (2004).\nThe Devil's Disciples: Hitler's Inner Circle\n. New York: Norton.\nISBN\n978-039304-800-1\n.\nRolfs, Richard (1995).\nThe Sorcerer's Apprentice: The Life Of Franz von Papen\n. Lanham: University Press of America.\nISBN\n0-7618-0163-4\n.\nSchulze, Hagen (2001).\nGermany: A New History\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.\nShirer, William (1990).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nSudoplatov, Pavel.\nSpecial Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness – A Soviet Spymaster\n. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994.\nTurner, Henry Ashby\n(1996).\nHitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933\n. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.\nISBN\n9780201407143\n.\nWatt, D.C. (1989).\nHow War Came The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939\n. New York: Pantheon Books.\nWeinberg, Gerhard\n(1970).\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe\n. Chicago:\nUniversity of Chicago Press\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (1980).\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II\n. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (2005).\nA World In Arms\n. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.\nWheeler-Bennett, John W. (1967).\nNemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945\n. London: Macmillan.\nWistrich, Robert S.\n(1982).\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n. Macmillan Publishing Co.\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\n.\nFurther reading\nBracher, Karl Dietrich\nDie Auflösung der Weimarer Republik; eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie\nVillingen: Schwarzwald, Ring-Verlag, 1971.\nBracher, Karl Dietrich.\nThe German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism\n. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.\nEvans, Richard J.\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin, 2006.\nFest, Joachim C.\nand Bullock, Michael (trans.) \"Franz von Papen and the Conservative Collaboration\" in\nThe Face of the Third Reich\nNew York: Penguin, 1979 (orig. published in German in 1963), pp.\n229–246.\nISBN\n978-0201407143\n.\nJones, Larry Eugene. \"From Democracy to Dictatorship: The Fall of Weimar and the Triumph of Nazism, 1930–1933\". in\nThe Oxford Handbook of the Weimar Republic\n(2022) pp 95–108.\nexcerpt\nWeinberg, Gerhard (2005).\nHitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II\n. New York: Enigma Books.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (1996).\nGermany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History\n. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nExternal links\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nFranz von Papen\n.\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nFranz von Papen\n.\nBiographical timeline\nVice-Chancellor Franz von Papen speaks in Trier about the Saarland referendum, 1934\nPapen at the Republic Day celebrations in Turkey, 1941\nNewspaper clippings about Franz von Papen\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInformation about Franz von Papen\nin the Reichstag database",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Paul von Hindenburg",
+      "preceded_by": "Theodor Roeingh",
+      "succeeded_by": "Kurt von Schleicher",
+      "nominated_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "chancellor": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "constituency": "DNVPNational List",
+      "born": "Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen(1879-10-29)29 October 1879Werl,Prussia, Germany",
+      "died": "2 May 1969(1969-05-02)(aged89)Sasbach,Baden-Württemberg, West Germany",
+      "resting_place": "Wallerfangen, Germany",
+      "party": "Centre Party(1918–1932)Independent(1932–1938)Nazi Party(NSDAP; 1938–1945)",
+      "spouse": "Martha von Boch-Galhau​​(m.1905;died1961)​",
+      "children": "5",
+      "alma_mater": "Preußische Hauptkadettenanstalt",
+      "profession": "Politician/Diplomat,military officer",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1898–1919",
+      "rank": "Oberstleutnant",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWestern FrontBattle of the SommeBattle of Vimy RidgeMiddle Eastern theatreSinai and Palestine Campaign",
+      "awards": "Iron Cross, 1st ClassWar Merit Cross"
+    },
+    "char_count": 62206
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Arthur_Seyss-Inquart",
+    "name": "Arthur Seyss-Inquart",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Arthur Seyss-Inquart was an Austrian Nazi politician and convicted war criminal who served as Chancellor of Austria in 1938 for two days before the Anschluss. His positions in Nazi Germany included deputy governor to Hans Frank in the General Government of Occupied Poland, and Reichskommissar for the German-occupied Netherlands. In the latter role, he shared responsibility for the deportation of Dutch Jews and the shooting of hostages.",
+    "description": "Austrian Nazi politician (1892–1946)",
+    "full_text": "Arthur Seyss-Inquart\nAustrian Nazi politician (1892–1946)\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n(\nGerman\n:\nSeyß-Inquart\n;\nAustrian German pronunciation:\n[\nˈartuːɐ̯\nsaɪs\nˈɪŋkvart\n]\n; 22 July 1892\n–\n16 October 1946) was an Austrian\nNazi\npolitician and\nconvicted war criminal\nwho served as\nChancellor of Austria\nin 1938 for two days before the\nAnschluss\n. His positions in\nNazi Germany\nincluded deputy governor to\nHans Frank\nin the\nGeneral Government of Occupied Poland\n, and\nReichskommissar\nfor the\nGerman-occupied Netherlands\n. In the latter role, he shared responsibility for the\ndeportation of Dutch Jews\nand the shooting of hostages.\nDuring\nWorld War I\n, Seyss-Inquart fought for the\nAustro-Hungarian Army\nwith distinction. After the war he became a successful lawyer, and went on to join the governments of\nChancellors\nEngelbert Dollfuss\nand\nKurt Schuschnigg\n. In 1938, Schuschnigg resigned in the face of a German invasion, and Seyss-Inquart was appointed his successor. The newly installed Nazis proceeded to transfer power to Germany, and Austria subsequently became the German province of\nOstmark\n, with Seyss-Inquart as its governor (\nReichsstatthalter\n).\nDuring\nWorld War II\n, Seyss-Inquart served briefly as the Deputy Governor General in\noccupied Poland\nand, following the fall of the\nLow Countries\nin 1940, he was appointed\nReichskommissar\nof the\noccupied Netherlands\n. He was a member of the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) and held the rank of SS-\nObergruppenführer\n. He instituted a reign of terror, with Dutch civilians subjected to forced labour and the vast majority of Dutch Jews deported and murdered.\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\n, Seyss-Inquart was found guilty of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n, sentenced to death, and\nexecuted\nby hanging.\nEarly life\nSeyss-Inquart in 1925\nSeyss-Inquart was born in 1892 in\nStannern\n(\nCzech\n:\nStonařov\n), a German-speaking village in the neighbourhood of the predominantly German-speaking town of\nIglau\n(\nCzech\n:\nJihlava\n). This area constituted a German linguistic island in the midst of a Czech-speaking region; this may have contributed to the outspoken national consciousness of the family, and the young Arthur in particular. Iglau was an important town in\nMoravia\n, one of the\nCzech provinces\nof the\nAustro-Hungarian Empire\n, in which there was increasing rivalry between\nGermans\nand\nCzechs\n. His parents were the school principal Emil Zajtich (who changed his surname to Seyss-Inquart) and Augusta Hirenbach. His father was Czech and his mother was German.\nThe family moved to\nVienna\nin 1907. Seyss-Inquart later studied\nlaw\nat the\nUniversity of Vienna\n. At the beginning of\nWorld War I\nin August 1914 Seyss-Inquart enlisted with the\nAustrian Army\nand was given a commission with the\nTyrolean\nKaiserjäger\n, subsequently serving in\nRussia\n,\nRomania\nand\nItaly\n. He was decorated for bravery on a number of occasions and he completed his final examinations for his degree while recovering from wounds in 1917. Seyss-Inquart had five older siblings: Hedwig (born 1881), Richard (born 3 April 1883, became a Roman Catholic priest, but left the priesthood, married in a civil ceremony and became\nOberregierungsrat\n[senior government counsel] and prison superior by 1940 in the\nOstmark\n), Irene (born 1885), Henriette (born 1887) and Robert (born 1891).\nIn 1911, Seyss-Inquart met Gertrud Maschka. The couple married in December 1916 and had three children: Ingeborg Carolina Augusta Seyss-Inquart (born 18 September 1917), Richard Seyss-Inquart (born 22 August 1921) and Dorothea Seyss-Inquart (born 7 May 1928).\nPolitical career and the\nAnschluss\nSeyss-Inquart with Hitler,\nHimmler\n,\nHeydrich\n, Kaltenbrunner and\nBormann\nin Vienna, 1938\nSeyss-Inquart went into law after the war and in 1921 set up his own practice. During the early years of the\nAustrian First Republic\n, he was close to the\nFatherland Front\n. A successful lawyer, Seyss-Inquart was invited to join the\ncabinet\nof Chancellor\nEngelbert Dollfuss\nin 1933. Following Dollfuss' murder in 1934, he became a State Councillor from 1937 under\nKurt Schuschnigg\n. A keen mountaineer, Seyss-Inquart became the head of the German-Austrian Alpine Club. He later became a devotee of\nHeinrich Himmler\n's concepts of racial purity and sponsored various expeditions to\nTibet\nand other parts of Asia in hopes of proving\nAryan racial concepts\nand theories. Seyss-Inquart was not initially a member of the\nAustrian National Socialist\nparty, though he was sympathetic to many of their views and actions.\nBy 1938, however, Seyss-Inquart knew which way the political wind was blowing and became a respectable frontman for the Austrian National Socialists.\nIn February 1938, Seyss-Inquart was appointed Austrian\nMinister of the Interior\nby Schuschnigg, after Hitler had threatened Schuschnigg with military actions against Austria in the event of non-compliance. On 11 March 1938, faced with a German invasion aimed at preventing a\nplebiscite\non independence, Schuschnigg resigned as Austrian Chancellor.  Under growing pressure from Berlin, President\nWilhelm Miklas\nreluctantly appointed Seyss-Inquart his successor. On the next day, German troops crossed the border of Austria at the\ntelegraphed\ninvitation of Seyss-Inquart.  This telegram had actually been drafted beforehand and was released after the troops had begun to march, so as to justify the action in the eyes of the international community. Before his triumphant entry into\nVienna\n, Hitler had planned to leave Austria as a pro-Nazi puppet state headed by Seyss-Inquart. However, the acclamation for the German army from the majority of the Austrian population led Hitler to change course and opt for a full\nAnschluss\n, in which Austria was incorporated into\nNazi Germany\nas the province of\nOstmark\n. Only then, on 13 March 1938, did Seyss-Inquart join the Nazi Party.\nHead of Ostmark and Southern Poland\nSeyss-Inquart drafted the legislative act reducing Austria to a province of Germany and signed it into law on 13 March. With Hitler's approval, he became Governor (\nReichsstatthalter\n) of the newly named Ostmark, thus becoming Hitler's personal representative in Austria.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\nserved as chief minister and\nJosef Burckel\nas Commissioner for the Reunion of Austria (concerned with the \"Jewish Question\"). On 10 April 1938, Seyss-Inquart was elected as a deputy to the\nReichstag\nfrom Ostmark and would retain this seat until May 1945.\nHe also received an honorary\nSS\nrank of\nGruppenführer\nand in May 1939 he was made a\nReichsminister\nwithout Portfolio\nin\nHitler's cabinet\n.  Almost as soon as he took office, he ordered the confiscation of Jewish property and sent Jews to concentration camps. Late in his regime, he collaborated in the deportation of Jews from Austria.\nFollowing the invasion of\nPoland\nin 1939, Seyss-Inquart was named as the\nChief of Civil Administration\nfor Southern Poland, but did not take up that post before the\nGeneral Government\nwas created, in which he became Deputy to the\nGovernor General\nHans Frank\n, remaining in this position until 18 May 1940.\nHe fully supported the heavy-handed policies put into effect by Frank, including persecution of Jews. He was also aware of the\nAbwehr\n'\ns murder of Polish intellectuals.\nReichskommissar in the Netherlands\nSeyss-Inquart in\nThe Hague\n(1940)\nFollowing the capitulation of the\nNetherlands\non 15 May 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed\nReichskommissar\nfor the Occupied Netherlands. He directed the civil administration, imposed complete economic subordination to Germany, and carried out Nazi policies. In April 1941, he was promoted to SS-\nObergruppenführer\n.\nAmong the Dutch people he was mockingly referred to as \"\nZes en een kwart\n\" (\"six and a quarter\"), a play on his name, and the fact that Seyss-Inquart suffered from a limp. He supported the Dutch\nNSB\nand allowed them to create the paramilitary\nNederlandse Landwacht\n, which acted as an auxiliary police force. Other political parties were banned in late 1941 and many former government officials were imprisoned at\nKamp Sint-Michielsgestel\n. The administration of the country was controlled by Seyss-Inquart and he answered directly to Hitler.\nHe oversaw the politicisation of cultural groups from the\nNederlandsche Kultuurkamer\n\"right down to the chessplayers' club\", and set up a number of other politicised associations.\nHe introduced measures to combat resistance, and when there was a widespread strike in\nAmsterdam\n,\nArnhem\nand\nHilversum\nin May 1943, special\nsummary court-martial\nprocedures were brought in, and a collective fine of 18 million\nguilders\nwas imposed. During the occupation, Seyss-Inquart authorized about 800 executions, although some reports put the total at over 1,500. These included executions under the so-called \"Hostage Law\", the killing of political prisoners who were close to being liberated\n, the\nPutten raid\n, and the reprisal executions of 117 Dutchmen for the attack on SS and Police Leader\nHanns Albin Rauter\n. Although the majority of Seyss-Inquart's powers were transferred to the military commander in the Netherlands and the\nGestapo\nin July 1944, he remained a force to be reckoned with. It is thought he met with\nHaj Amin al-Husseini\n, an exiled leader of Palestinian Arabs,\nGrand Mufti of Jerusalem\n, somewhere in Germany in 1943.\nThere were three\nconcentration camps\nin the Netherlands: the smaller\nKZ Herzogenbusch\nnear\nVught\n,\nKamp Amersfoort\nnear\nAmersfoort\n, and\nWesterbork transit camp\n(a \"Jewish assembly camp\"); there were a number of other camps variously controlled by the military, the police, the SS, or Seyss-Inquart's administration. These included a \"voluntary labour recruitment\" camp at\nOmmen\n(\nCamp Erika\n). In total around 530,000 Dutch civilians were forced to work for the Germans, of whom 250,000 were sent to factories in Germany. There was an unsuccessful attempt by Seyss-Inquart to send only workers aged 21 to 23 to Germany, and he refused demands in 1944 for a further 250,000 Dutch workers and in that year sent only 12,000 people.\nObjects\nridiculing\nSeyss-Inquart, including a cigarette extinguisher made of coins adding up to 6\n1\n⁄\n4\ncents. Zes-en-een-kwart (six-and-a-quarter) was a commonly used\nnickname\nfor Seyss-Inquart. The quarter also refers to his crippled leg.\nSeyss-Inquart was an unwavering\nanti-Semite\n; within a few months of his arrival in the Netherlands, he took measures to remove Jews from the government, the press and leading positions in industry. Anti-Jewish measures intensified after 1941: approximately 140,000 Jews were registered, a \"ghetto\" was created in Amsterdam and a transit camp was set up at\nWesterbork\n. In February 1941, 600 Jews were sent to\nBuchenwald\n, a concentration camp located within Germany's borders, and to\nMauthausen\n, located in Upper Austria. Later, the Dutch Jews were sent to\nAuschwitz\n, the notorious complex operated by Nazi Germany in occupied Poland. As Allied forces approached in September 1944, the remaining Jews at Westerbork were removed to\nTheresienstadt\n, the SS-established concentration camp/ghetto in the Nazi German-occupied region of Czechoslovakia. Of the 140,000 registered, only 30,000\nDutch Jews\nsurvived the war.\nWhen the\nAllies\nadvanced into the Netherlands in late 1944, the Nazi regime had attempted to enact a\nscorched earth\npolicy, and some docks and harbours were destroyed. Seyss-Inquart, however, was in agreement with Armaments Minister\nAlbert Speer\nover the futility of such actions, and with the open connivance of many military commanders, they greatly limited the implementation of the scorched-earth orders.\nAt the very end of the Dutch \"\nhunger winter\n\" in April 1945, Seyss-Inquart was with difficulty persuaded by the Allies to allow airplanes to\ndrop food for the starving Dutch civilians of the occupied north-west of the country\n. Although he knew the war was lost, Seyss-Inquart did not want to surrender.\nBefore Hitler committed suicide in April 1945, he named a new government headed by Grand Admiral\nKarl Dönitz\nin his\nlast will and testament\n, in which Seyss-Inquart replaced\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n, who had long since fallen out of favour, as Foreign Minister. It was a token of the high regard Hitler felt for his Austrian comrade, at a time when he was rapidly disowning or being abandoned by so many of his other key lieutenants. Unsurprisingly, at such a late stage in the war, Seyss-Inquart failed to achieve anything in his new office.\nHe remained in his posts until 5 May 1945, when, after a meeting with Dönitz to confirm his rescission of the scorched earth orders, he was arrested on the\nElbe Bridge\nin\nHamburg\nby two soldiers of the\nRoyal Welch Fusiliers\n, one of whom was Norman Miller (birth name: Norbert Mueller), a German Jew from Nuremberg who had escaped to Britain at the age of 15 on a\nKindertransport\n.\nThe Anglo-Dutch art dealer\nEdward Speelman\nwas also involved in Seyss-Inquart's arrest.\nNuremberg trials\nSeyss-Inquart's body after execution\nAt the\nNuremberg trials\n, Seyss-Inquart was defended by Gustav Steinbauer and faced four charges: conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against humanity.\nDuring the trial,\nGustave Gilbert\n, an American army psychologist, was allowed to examine the Nazi leaders who were tried at Nuremberg for war crimes. Among other tests, a German version of the\nWechsler-Bellevue\nIQ test\nwas administered. Arthur Seyss-Inquart scored 141, the second highest among the defendants, behind\nHjalmar Schacht\n.\nIn his final statement, Seyss-Inquart denied knowledge of various war crimes including the shooting of hostages, and said that while he had moral objections to the deportation of Jews, there must sometimes be justifications for mass evacuations, and pointed to the\nAllies forcibly resettling millions of Germans after the war\n. He added that his \"conscience was untroubled\" as he improved the conditions of the Dutch people while\nCommissioner\n. Seyss-Inquart concluded by saying, \"My last word is the principle by which I have always acted and to which I will adhere to my last breath: I believe in Germany.\"\nSeyss-Inquart was acquitted of conspiracy, but convicted on all other counts and sentenced to death by hanging. The final judgment against him cited his involvement in harsh suppression of Nazi opponents and atrocities against the Jews during all his billets, but particularly stressed his reign of terror in the Netherlands. It was these atrocities that sent him to the gallows.\nUpon hearing of his death sentence, Seyss-Inquart was fatalistic: \"Death by hanging... well, in view of the whole situation, I never expected anything different. It's all right.\"\nBefore his execution, Seyss-Inquart returned to the\nCatholic Church\n, receiving absolution in the sacrament of\nconfession\nfrom\nprison chaplain\nFather Bruno Spitzl.\nSeyss-Inquart was hanged in Nuremberg Prison on 16 October 1946, at the age of 54, together with nine other Nuremberg defendants. He was the last to mount the scaffold, and his\nlast words\nwere the following: \"I hope that this execution is the last act of the tragedy of the Second World War and that the lesson taken from this world war will be that peace and understanding should exist between peoples. I believe in Germany.\"\nHis body, with those of the other nine executed men and that of\nHermann Göring\n(who had committed suicide the previous day), was cremated at the\nOstfriedhof\nin\nMunich\n, and their ashes were scattered into the River\nIsar\n.\nCultural references\nIn\nDoris Orgel\n's children's novel,\nThe Devil in Vienna\n, the narrator refers to Seyss-Inquart’s rise as she observes the changing political atmosphere in her Vienna.  In\nOtto Preminger\n's movie\nThe Cardinal\n, Seyss-Inquart is played by\nErik Frey\n.\nIn the manga\nHellsing\n(and its anime adaptation Hellsing Ultimate) the Major names one of his Zeppelins for Seyss-Inquart.\nSee also\nList of SS-Obergruppenführer\nNazi plunder\nThe Holocaust in the Netherlands\nKajetan Mühlmann\nReferences\n↑\n\"Arthur Seyss-Inquart\"\n.\nencyclopedia.ushmm.org\n. Retrieved\n17 June\n2021\n.\n↑\nGerard., Aalders (2004).\nNazi looting\n: the plunder of Dutch Jewry during the Second World War\n. Berg.\nISBN\n1-85973-722-6\n.\nOCLC\n53223516\n.\n↑\n\"Final moments of Nazis executed at Nuremberg\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n. 11 September 2009\n. Retrieved\n17 June\n2021\n.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg Trial Judgements: Arthur Seyss-Inquart\"\n.\nwww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org\n. Retrieved\n17 June\n2021\n.\n↑\n\"Arthur Seyss-Inquart\n: Nazi Germany\"\n.\nSpartacus Educational\n. Retrieved\n9 December\n2024\n.\n↑\nSnyder, Louis L.\n(1976).\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. McGraw-Hill. p.\n320.\n1\n2\n\"Judgement\n: Seyss-Inquart\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n.\n↑\nArthur Seyss-Inquart entry\nin the\nReichstag\nMembers Database\n↑\nPositions Held by Seyss-Inquart, Document 2910-PS, p. 579\nin Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol.V, Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946,  Retrieved 3 January 2021.\n↑\nBiondi, Robert (2000).\nSS Officers List: SS-Standartenführer to SS-Oberstgruppenführer (As of 30 January 1942)\n.\nSchiffer Publishing\n. p.\n7.\nISBN\n978-0764310614\n.\n↑\n\"Biographical Sketch: Seyss-Inquart, Arthur\"\n.\nDonovan Nuremberg Trials Collection\n.\nCornell University Law Library\n/\nOSS\nResearch and Analysis Branch. 27 August 1945. Archived from\nthe original\non 27 October 2018\n. Retrieved\n27 October\n2018\n.\n↑\nAderet, Ofer (15 June 2017).\n\"Never-before-seen Photos of Palestinian Mufti With Hitler Ties Visiting Nazi Germany\"\n.\nHaaretz\n. Tel Aviv, Israel: Haaretz Daily Newspaper Ltd (Haaretz Group). Archived from\nthe original\non 9 February 2018.\n↑\nHarry L. Coles; Albert K. Weinberg (1964).\n\"Chapter XXVIII: Piecemeal Liberation of the Netherlands Amid Serious Civilian Distress\"\n.\nUnited States Army in World War II: Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors\n.\nU.S. Army Center of Military History\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 16 December 2008\n. Retrieved\n27 October\n2018\n.\n. Cf. also\nDwight Eisenhower\n,\nCrusade in Europe\n, London: Heinemann, 1949 (third printing), p. 455\n↑\nThe Flash (A Fortnightly Edition Published by The Royal Welch Fusiliers), 10 December 1945, Front Page\n↑\n\"Speelman, Edward Joseph (Oral history)\"\n.\nImperial War Museums\n. Retrieved\n28 January\n2022\n.\n↑\nTom.\n\"Max J. Friedländers bevrijdende zomer van 1945\"\n.\nRKD Nederlands Instituut voor Kunstgeschiedenis\n(in Dutch)\n. Retrieved\n28 January\n2022\n.\nNiet minder opgetogen was hij over de ontvangst van de Engelse uitgave van zijn boek Von Kunst und Kennerschaft uit handen van de Engelse kunsthandelaar Edward Speelman. Het manuscript, dat door Bruno Cassirer stiekem mee naar Engeland was genomen en daar in 1942 als On Art and Connoisseurship was uitgegeven, kreeg Friedländer nu voor het eerst onder ogen. Wat de overhandiging extra bijzonder maakte, was het feit dat Speelman, die tijdens de oorlog in het Britse leger had gediend, een belangrijke rol had gespeeld bij de arrestatie van Arthur Seyss-Inquart, de voormalige Rijkscommissaris van het bezette Nederland.\n↑\n\"Final statement Arthur Seyss-Inquart\"\n.\nTracesOfWar.com\n(in Dutch).\nSTIWOT\n. Retrieved\n2 October\n2018\n.\n↑\nG. M. Gilbert\n,\nNuremberg Diary\n(1947), Farrar Straus, page 433.\n↑\nDoino, William Jr. (3 August 2017).\n\"The saint who captivated the secular world\"\n.\nCatholic Herald\n.\n↑\nThomas Darnstädt (2005),\n\"Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte\"\n,\nDer Spiegel\n, 13 September (in German), vol.\n14, no.\n14, p.\n128\n↑\nManvell 2011\n, p.\n393.\n↑\nOvery 2001\n, p.\n205.\nFurther reading\nDieter A. Binder (2010).\n\"Seyss-Inquart, Arthur\"\n.\nNeue Deutsche Biographie\n(in German). Vol.\n24. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. pp.\n302–\n303\n.\n(\nfull text online\n).\nDieter A. Binder:\n\"\nSeyss-Inquart Arthur\n\". In:\nÖsterreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950\n(ÖBL). Vol.\n12,\nAustrian Academy of Sciences\n, Vienna 2005,\nISBN\n3-7001-3580-7\n, p.\n213\nf.\n(Direct links to \"\np.\n213\n\", \"\np.\n214\n\")\nGraf, Wolfgang:\nÖsterreichische SS-Generäle. Himmlers verlässliche Vasallen.\nHermagoras-Verlag, Klagenfurt/Ljubljana/Wien 2012,\nISBN\n978-3-7086-0578-4\n.\nKoll, Johannes:\nArthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in den Niederlanden (1940–1945)\n. Böhlau, Wien [u.\na.] 2015,\nISBN\n978-3-205-79660-2\n.\nKoll, Johannes:\nFrom the Habsburg Empire to the Third Reich: Arthur Seyß-Inquart and National Socialism.\nIn:\nGünter Bischof\n, Fritz Plasser, Eva Maltschnig (Hrsg.):\nAustrian Lives\n(=\nContemporary Austrian Studies, Bd. 21). University of New Orleans Press/Innsbruck University Press, New Orleans/Innsbruck 2012, S. 123–146,\nISBN\n978-3-902811-61-5\n.\nManvell, Roger (2011).\nGoering\n: the rise and fall of the notorious Nazi leader\n. London: Frontline Books.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nOCLC\n787859366\n.\nOvery, Richard J.\n(2001).\nInterrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945\n. New York: Viking.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03008-8\n.\nZebhauser, Helmuth:\nAlpinismus im Hitlerstaat. Gedanken, Erinnerungen, Dokumente.\nDokumente des Alpinismus, Band 1. Rother, München 1998,\nISBN\n3-7633-8102-3\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nArthur Seyß-Inquart\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n.\nInformation about Arthur Seyss-Inquart\nin the Reichstag database\nArthur Seyss-Inquart at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\nat\nIMDb\nNewspaper clippings about Arthur Seyss-Inquart\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Wilhelm Miklas",
+      "vice-chancellor": "Edmund Glaise-Horstenau",
+      "preceded_by": "Alexander von Falkenhausen(as Military Governor)",
+      "succeeded_by": "Office abolished",
+      "governor-general": "Hans Frank",
+      "april–may_1945": "Reichsministerof Foreign Affairs",
+      "1939–1945": "Reichsministerwithout portfolio",
+      "1938–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "march_1938": "Minister of Defence of Austria",
+      "february–march_1938": "Minister of the Interior of Austria",
+      "1937–1938": "State Councillor of Austria",
+      "born": "(1892-07-22)22 July 1892Stannern, Austria-Hungary",
+      "died": "16 October 1946(1946-10-16)(aged54)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Execution by hanging",
+      "party": "Independent(1933–1938)Nazi Party(1938–1945)",
+      "spouse": "Gertrud Maschka​(m.1916)​",
+      "children": "3",
+      "cabinet": "Seyss-Inquart",
+      "allegiance": "Austria-Hungary",
+      "branch/service": "Austro-Hungarian Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1918",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "criminal_status": "Executed",
+      "convictions": "Crimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death"
+    },
+    "char_count": 21322
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Albert_Speer",
+    "name": "Albert Speer",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Berthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer was a German architect who served as Minister of Armaments and War Production in Nazi Germany during most of World War II. A close friend and ally of Adolf Hitler, he was convicted at the Nuremberg trials and served 20 years in prison.",
+    "description": "German architect (1905–1981)",
+    "full_text": "Albert Speer\nGerman architect (1905–1981)\nFor other uses, see\nAlbert Speer (disambiguation)\n.\nBerthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer\n(\n/\nʃ\np\nɛər\n/\n;\nGerman:\n[\nˈʃpeːɐ̯\n]\n; 19 March 1905\n– 1 September 1981) was a German architect who served as\nMinister of Armaments and War Production\nin\nNazi Germany\nduring most of\nWorld War II\n. A close friend and ally of\nAdolf Hitler\n, he was convicted at the\nNuremberg trials\nand served 20 years in prison.\nAn architect by training, Speer joined the\nNazi Party\nin 1931. His architectural skills made him increasingly prominent within the Party, and he became a member of Hitler's inner circle. Hitler commissioned him to design and construct structures, including the\nReich Chancellery\nand the\nNazi Party rally grounds\nin\nNuremberg\n. In 1937, Hitler appointed Speer as General Building Inspector for Berlin. In this capacity he was responsible for the Central Department for Resettlement that\nevicted Jewish tenants\nfrom their homes in Berlin. In February 1942, Speer was appointed as\nReich Minister of Armaments and War Production\n. Using misleading statistics, he promoted himself as having performed an armaments miracle that was widely credited with keeping Germany in the war.\nIn 1944, Speer established a\ntask force\nto increase production of fighter aircraft. It became instrumental in exploiting\nslave labor\nfor the benefit of the German war effort.\nAfter the war, Speer was among\nthe 24 \"major war criminals\"\ncharged by the International Military Tribunal for Nazi atrocities. He was found guilty of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n, principally for the use of slave labor, narrowly avoiding a death sentence. Having served his full term, Speer was released in 1966. He used his writings from the time of imprisonment as the basis for two autobiographical books,\nInside the Third Reich\nand\nSpandau: The Secret Diaries\n. Speer's books were a success; the public was fascinated by the inside view of the Third Reich he provided. He died of a stroke in 1981.\nThrough his autobiographies and interviews, Speer carefully constructed an image of himself as a man who deeply regretted having failed to discover the crimes of the Third Reich. He continued to deny explicit knowledge of, and responsibility for,\nthe Holocaust\n. This image dominated his\nhistoriography\nin the decades following the war, giving rise to the \"Speer myth\": the perception of him as an\napolitical\ntechnocrat\nresponsible for revolutionizing the German war machine. The myth began to fall apart in the 1980s, when the armaments miracle was attributed to Nazi propaganda. Twenty-five years after Speer's death,\nAdam Tooze\nwrote in\nThe Wages of Destruction\nthat the idea that Speer was an apolitical technocrat was \"absurd\".\nMartin Kitchen\n, writing in\nSpeer: Hitler's Architect\n, stated that much of the increase in Germany's arms production was actually due to systems instituted by Speer's predecessor (\nFritz Todt\n) and that Speer was intimately aware of and involved in the\nFinal Solution\n, evidence of which has been conclusively shown in the decades following the Nuremberg trials.\nEarly years and personal life\nSpeer was born in\nMannheim\n, into an upper-middle-class family. He was the second of three sons of Luise Máthilde Wilhelmine (Hommel) and\nAlbert Friedrich Speer\n.\nIn 1918, the family leased their Mannheim residence and moved to a home they had in Heidelberg.\nHenry T. King\n, deputy prosecutor at the\nNuremberg trials\nwho later wrote a book about Speer said, \"Love and warmth were lacking in the household of Speer's youth.\"\nHis brothers, Ernst and Hermann, bullied him throughout his childhood.\nSpeer was active in sports, taking up skiing and mountaineering.\nHe followed in the footsteps of his father and grandfather and studied architecture.\nSpeer began his architectural studies at the University of Karlsruhe instead of a more highly acclaimed institution because the\nhyperinflation crisis of 1923\nlimited his parents' income.\nIn 1924, when the crisis had abated, he transferred to the \"much more reputable\" Technische Hochschule München (now\nTechnical University of Munich\n).\nIn 1925, he transferred again, this time to the Technische Hochschule Berlin-Chalottenburg (now\nTechnische Universität Berlin\n) where he studied under\nHeinrich Tessenow\n, whom Speer greatly admired.\nAfter passing his exams in 1927, Speer became Tessenow's assistant, a high honor for a man of 22.\nAs such, Speer taught some of his classes while continuing his own postgraduate studies.\nIn Munich Speer began a close friendship, ultimately spanning over 50 years, with\nRudolf Wolters\n, who also studied under Tessenow.\nIn mid-1922, Speer began courting Margarete (Margret) Weber (1905–1987), the daughter of a successful craftsman who employed 50 workers. The relationship was frowned upon by Speer's class-conscious mother, who felt the Webers were socially inferior. Despite this opposition, the two married in Berlin on 28 August 1928; seven years elapsed before Margarete was invited to stay at her in-laws' home.\nThe couple would have six children together, but Albert Speer grew increasingly distant from his family after 1933. He remained so even after his release from imprisonment in 1966, despite their efforts to forge closer bonds.\nParty architect and government functionary\nJoining the Nazis (1931–1934)\nSpeer shows Hitler a project at\nObersalzberg\n.\nIn January 1931, Speer applied for Nazi Party membership, and on 1 March 1931, he became member number 474,481.\nThe same year, with stipends shrinking amid the Depression, Speer surrendered his position as Tessenow's assistant and moved to Mannheim, hoping to make a living as an architect. After he failed to do so, his father gave him a part-time job as manager of his properties. In July\n1932, the Speers visited Berlin to help out the Party before the\nReichstag\nelections\n. While they were there his friend, Nazi Party official\nKarl Hanke\nrecommended the young architect to\nJoseph Goebbels\nto help renovate the Party's Berlin headquarters. When the commission was completed, Speer returned to Mannheim and remained there as Hitler took office in January\n1933.\nThe organizers of the 1933\nNuremberg Rally\nasked Speer to submit designs for the rally, bringing him into contact with Hitler for the first time. Neither the organizers nor\nRudolf Hess\nwere willing to decide whether to approve the plans, and Hess sent Speer to Hitler's Munich apartment to seek his approval.\nThis work won Speer his first national post, as Nazi Party \"Commissioner for the Artistic and Technical Presentation of Party Rallies and Demonstrations\".\nShortly after Hitler came into power, he began to make plans to rebuild the chancellery. At the end of 1933, he contracted\nPaul Troost\nto renovate the entire building. Hitler appointed Speer, whose work for Goebbels had impressed him, to manage the building site for Troost.\nAs Chancellor, Hitler had a residence in the building and came by every day to be briefed by Speer and the building supervisor on the progress of the renovations. After one of these briefings, Hitler invited Speer to lunch, to the architect's great excitement.\nSpeer quickly became part of Hitler's inner circle; he was expected to call on him in the morning for a walk or chat, to provide consultation on architectural matters, and to discuss Hitler's ideas. Most days he was invited to dinner.\nIn the English version of his memoirs, Speer says that his political commitment merely consisted of paying his \"monthly dues\". He assumed his German readers would not be so gullible and told them the Nazi Party offered a \"new mission\". He was more forthright in an interview with William Hamsher in which he said he joined the party in order to save \"Germany from Communism\".\nAfter the war, he claimed to have had little interest in politics at all and had joined almost by chance. Like many of those in power in the Third Reich, he was not an ideologue, \"nor was he anything more than an instinctive anti-Semite.\"\nHistorian\nMagnus Brechtken\n, discussing Speer, said he did not give anti-Jewish public speeches and that his\nanti-Semitism\ncan best be understood through his actions—which were anti-Semitic.\nBrechtken added that, throughout Speer's life, his central motives were to gain power, rule, and acquire wealth.\nNazi architect (1934–1937)\nMain article:\nNazi architecture\nThe\nCathedral of Light\nabove the\nZeppelintribune\nWhen Troost died on 21 January 1934, Speer effectively replaced him as the Party's chief architect. Hitler appointed Speer as head of the Chief Office for Construction, which placed him nominally on Hess' staff.\nOne of Speer's first commissions after Troost's death was the\nZeppelinfeld\nstadium in\nNuremberg\n. It was used for Nazi propaganda rallies and can be seen in\nLeni Riefenstahl\n's propaganda film\nTriumph of the Will\n. The building was able to hold 340,000 people.\nSpeer insisted that as many events as possible be held at night, both to give greater prominence to his lighting effects and to hide the overweight Nazis.\nNuremberg was the site of many official Nazi buildings. Many more buildings were planned. If built, the\nGerman Stadium\nin Nuremberg would have accommodated 400,000 spectators.\nSpeer modified\nWerner March\n's design for the\nOlympic Stadium\nbeing built for the\n1936 Summer Olympics\n. He added a stone exterior that pleased Hitler.\nSpeer designed the German Pavilion for the\n1937 international exposition in Paris\n.\nBerlin's General Building Inspector (1937–1942)\nModel of the Große Halle (also called Ruhmeshalle or Volkshalle) with the\nReichstag building\nand the\nBrandenburg Gate\nOn 30 January 1937, Hitler appointed Speer as General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital. This carried with it the rank of\nState Secretary\nin the Reich government and gave him extraordinary powers over the Berlin city government.\nHe was to report directly to Hitler, and was independent of both the mayor and the\nGauleiter\nof Berlin.\nHitler ordered Speer to develop plans to\nrebuild Berlin\n. These centered on a three-mile-long grand boulevard running from north to south, which Speer called the\nPrachtstrasse\n, or Street of Magnificence;\nhe also referred to it as the \"North–South Axis\".\nAt the northern end of the boulevard, Speer planned to build the\nVolkshalle\n, a huge domed assembly hall over\n210 metres (700\nft)\nhigh, with floor space for 180,000 people. At the southern end of the avenue, a great triumphal arch, almost\n120 metres (400\nft)\nhigh and able to fit the\nArc de Triomphe\ninside its opening, was planned. The existing Berlin railroad termini were to be dismantled, and two large new stations built.\nSpeer hired Wolters as part of his design team, with special responsibility for the\nPrachtstrasse\n.\nThe outbreak of World War II in 1939 led to the postponement, and later the abandonment, of these plans,\nwhich, after Nazi capitulation, Speer himself considered as “awful”.\nThe Volkshalle's Great Dome can be seen at the top of this model of Hitler's plan for Berlin.\nPlans to build a new Reich Chancellery had been underway since 1934. Land had been purchased by the end of 1934 and starting in March 1936 the first buildings were demolished to create space at\nVoßstraße\n.\nSpeer was involved virtually from the beginning. In the aftermath of the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, he had been commissioned to renovate the\nBorsig Palace\non the corner of Voßstraße and\nWilhelmstraße\nas headquarters of the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA).\nHe completed the preliminary work for the new chancellery by May 1936. In June 1936 he charged a personal honorarium of 30,000 Reichsmark and estimated the chancellery would be completed within three to four years. Detailed plans were completed in July 1937 and the first shell of the new chancellery was complete on 1 January 1938. On 27 January 1938, Speer received plenipotentiary powers from Hitler to finish the new chancellery by 1 January 1939. For propaganda Hitler claimed during the topping-out ceremony on 2 August 1938, that he had ordered Speer to complete the new chancellery that year.\nShortages of labor meant the construction workers had to work in ten-to-twelve-hour shifts.\nThe\nSS\nbuilt two\nconcentration camps\nin 1938 and used the inmates to quarry stone for its construction. A brick factory was built near the\nOranienburg concentration camp\nat Speer's behest; when someone commented on the poor conditions there, Speer stated, \"The Yids got used to making bricks while in Egyptian captivity\".\nThe chancellery was completed in early January 1939.\nThe building itself was hailed by Hitler as the \"crowning glory of the greater German political empire\".\nHitler in Paris in 1940 with Speer (left) and sculptor\nArno Breker\nDuring the Chancellery project, the\npogrom\nof\nKristallnacht\ntook place. Speer made no mention of it in the first draft of\nInside the Third Reich\n. It was only on the urgent advice of his publisher that he added a mention of seeing the ruins of the Central Synagogue in Berlin from his car.\nKristallnacht\naccelerated Speer's ongoing efforts to dispossess Berlin's Jews from their homes. From 1939 on, Speer's Department used the\nNuremberg Laws\nto evict Jewish tenants of non-Jewish landlords in Berlin, to make way for non-Jewish tenants displaced by redevelopment or bombing.\nEventually, 75,000 Jews were displaced by these measures.\nSpeer denied he knew they were being put on\nHolocaust trains\nand claimed that those displaced were, \"Completely free and their families were still in their apartments\".\nHe also said: \"\n... en route to my ministry on the city highway, I could see\n... crowds of people on the platform of nearby Nikolassee Railroad Station. I knew that these must be Berlin Jews who were being evacuated. I am sure that an oppressive feeling struck me as I drove past. I presumably had a sense of somber events.\"\nMatthias Schmidt\nsaid Speer had personally inspected concentration camps and described his comments as an \"outright farce\".\nMartin Kitchen described Speer's often repeated line that he knew nothing of the \"dreadful things\" as hollow—not only was he fully aware of the fate of the Jews, he actively participated in their persecution.\nAs Germany started World War II in Europe, Speer instituted quick-reaction squads to construct roads or clear away debris; before long, these units would be used to clear bomb sites.\nSpeer used forced Jewish labor on these projects, in addition to regular German workers.\nConstruction stopped on the Berlin and Nüremberg plans at the outbreak of war. Though stockpiling of materials and other work continued, this slowed to a halt as more resources were needed for the armament industry.\nSpeer's offices undertook building work for each branch of the military, and for the SS, using slave labor.\nSpeer's building work made him among the wealthiest of the Nazi elite.\nMinister of Armaments\nAppointment and increasing power\nAlbert Speer at an exhibition in\nLisbon\nin 1942 with the President of Portugal,\nÓscar Carmona\n, second from left\nAs one of the younger and more ambitious men in Hitler's inner circle, Speer was approaching the height of his power. In 1938, Prussian\nMinister President\nHermann Göring\nhad appointed him to the\nPrussian State Council\n.\nIn September 1941, he was made a deputy to the\nReichstag\n, succeeding to a vacancy created by the death of\nAlter Kämpfer\nHermann Kriebel\n.\nHe represented electoral constituency 2 (\nBerlin West\n).\nOn 8 February 1942,\nReich Minister of Armaments and Munitions\nFritz Todt\ndied in a plane crash shortly after taking off from Hitler's\neastern headquarters\nat\nRastenburg\n. Speer arrived there the previous evening and accepted Todt's offer to fly with him to Berlin. Speer cancelled some hours before take-off because the previous night he had been up late in a meeting with Hitler.\nHitler appointed Speer in Todt's place.\nMartin Kitchen\n, a British historian, says that the choice was not surprising. Speer was loyal to Hitler, and his experience building prisoner of war camps and other structures for the military qualified him for the job.\nSpeer succeeded Todt not only as Reich Minister but in all his other powerful positions, including Inspector General of German Roadways, Inspector General for Water and Energy and Head of the Nazi Party's Office of Technology.\nAt the same time, Hitler also appointed Speer as head of the\nOrganisation Todt\n, a massive, government-controlled construction company.\nCharacteristically Hitler did not give Speer any clear remit; he was left to fight his contemporaries in the regime for power and control. As an example, he wanted to be given power over all armaments issues under Göring's\nFour Year Plan\n. Göring was reluctant to grant this. However, Speer secured Hitler's support, and on 1 March 1942, Göring signed a decree naming Speer \"General Plenipotentiary for Armament Tasks\" in the Four Year Plan.\nSpeer proved to be ambitious, unrelenting and ruthless.\nSpeer set out to gain control not just of armaments production in the army, but in the whole armed forces.\nIt did not immediately dawn on his political rivals that his calls for rationalization and reorganization were hiding his desire to sideline them and take control.\nBy April 1942, Speer had persuaded Göring to create a three-member\nCentral Planning Board\nwithin the Four Year Plan, which he used to obtain supreme authority over procurement and allocation of raw materials and scheduling of production in order to consolidate German war production in a single agency.\nSpeer was fêted at the time, and in the post-war era, for performing an \"armaments miracle\" in which German war production dramatically increased. This miracle was brought to a halt in the summer of 1943 by, among other factors, the\nfirst\nsustained\nAllied\nbombing\n.\nOther factors probably contributed to the increase more than Speer himself. Germany's armaments production had already begun to result in increases under his predecessor, Todt. Naval armaments were not under Speer's supervision until October 1943, nor the Luftwaffe's armaments until June of the following year. Yet each showed comparable increases in production despite not being under Speer's control.\nAnother factor that produced the boom in ammunition was the policy of allocating more coal to the steel industry.\nProduction of every type of weapon peaked in June and July 1944, but there was now a severe shortage of fuel. After August 1944, oil from the Romanian fields was no longer available. Oil production became so low that any possibility of offensive action became impossible and weaponry lay idle.\nAs Minister of Armaments, Speer was responsible for supplying weapons to the army.\nWith Hitler's full agreement, he decided to prioritize tank production, and he was given unrivaled power to ensure success.\nHitler was closely involved with the design of the tanks, but kept changing his mind about the specifications. This delayed the program, and Speer was unable to remedy the situation. In consequence, despite tank production having the highest priority, relatively little of the armaments budget was spent on it. This led to a significant German Army failure at the\nBattle of Prokhorovka\nin 1943, a major turning point on the\nEastern Front\nagainst the Soviet\nRed Army\n.\nSpeer (wearing\nOrganisation Todt\narmband) and\nHeer\ngeneral\nEduard Dietl\nat\nRovaniemi Airport\nin Finland, December 1943\nAs head of Organisation Todt, Speer was directly involved in the construction and alteration of concentration camps. He agreed to expand\nAuschwitz\nand some other camps, allocating 13.7 million Reichsmarks for the work to be carried out. This allowed an extra 300 huts to be built at Auschwitz, increasing the total human capacity to 132,000. Included in the building works was material to build\ngas chambers\n, crematoria and morgues. The SS called this \"Professor Speer's Special Programme\".\nSpeer realized that with six million workers drafted into the armed forces, there was a labor shortage in the war economy, and not enough workers for his factories. In response, Hitler appointed\nFritz Sauckel\nas a \"manpower dictator\" to obtain new workers.\nSpeer and Sauckel cooperated closely to meet Speer's labor demands.\nHitler gave Sauckel a free hand to obtain labor, something that delighted Speer, who had requested 1,000,000 \"voluntary\" laborers to meet the need for armament workers. Sauckel had whole villages in France, Holland and Belgium forcibly rounded up and shipped to Speer's factories.\nSauckel obtained new workers often using the most brutal methods.\nIn occupied areas of the Soviet Union, that had been subject to partisan action, civilian men and women were rounded up en masse and sent to work forcibly in Germany.\nBy April 1943, Sauckel had supplied 1,568,801 \"voluntary\" laborers, forced laborers, prisoners of war and concentration camp prisoners to Speer for use in his armaments factories. It was for the maltreatment of these people that Speer was principally convicted at the\nNuremberg trials\n.\nConsolidation of arms production\nSpeer with Luftwaffe field marshal\nErhard Milch\nand aircraft designer\nWilly Messerschmitt\n, May 1944\nFollowing his appointment as Minister of Armaments, Speer was in control of armaments production solely for the Army. He coveted control of the production of armaments for the\nLuftwaffe\nand\nKriegsmarine\nas well. He set about extending his power and influence with unexpected ambition.\nHis close relationship with Hitler provided him with political protection, and he was able to outwit and outmaneuver his rivals in the regime. Hitler's cabinet was dismayed at his tactics, but, regardless, he was able to accumulate new responsibilities and more power.\nBy July 1943, he had gained control of armaments production for the\nLuftwaffe\nand\nKriegsmarine\n.\nIn August 1943, he took control of most of the Ministry of Economics, to become, in\nAdmiral Dönitz\n's words, \"Europe's economic dictator\". His formal title was changed on 2 September 1943, to \"Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production\". He had become one of the most powerful people in Nazi Germany.\nSpeer and his hand-picked director of submarine construction\nOtto Merker\n(\nde\n)\nbelieved that the shipbuilding industry was being held back by outdated methods, and revolutionary new approaches imposed by outsiders would dramatically improve output.\nThis belief proved incorrect, and Speer and Merker's attempt to build the\nKriegsmarine\n'\ns new generation of submarines, the\nType XXI\nand\nType XXIII\n, as\nprefabricated\nsections at different facilities rather than at single dockyards contributed to the failure of this strategically important program. The designs were rushed into production, but the completed submarines were crippled by construction flaws. While dozens of submarines were built, few ever entered service.\nIn December 1943, Speer visited Organisation Todt workers in\nLapland\n, where he seriously damaged his knee and was incapacitated for several months.\nHe was under the dubious care of Professor\nKarl Gebhardt\nat a medical clinic called Hohenlychen where patients \"mysteriously failed to survive\".\nIn mid-January 1944, Speer had a lung embolism and fell seriously ill. Concerned about retaining power, he did not appoint a deputy and continued to direct work of the Armaments Ministry from his bedside. Speer's illness coincided with the Allied \"\nBig Week\n\", a series of bombing raids on the German aircraft factories that were a devastating blow to aircraft production.\nHis political rivals used the opportunity to undermine his authority and damage his reputation with Hitler. He lost Hitler's unconditional support and began to lose power.\nMinister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Generaloberst Alfred Jodl and Minister of Armaments Albert Speer brought New Year's greetings \"to the Führer\" on January 1, 1945.\nIn response to the Allied Big Week, Adolf Hitler authorized the creation of a\nFighter Staff committee\n. Its aim was to ensure the preservation and growth of fighter aircraft production. The task force was established by 1 March 1944, orders of Speer, with support from\nErhard Milch\nof the Reich Aviation Ministry.\nProduction of German fighter aircraft more than doubled between 1943 and 1944.\nThe growth, however, consisted in large part of models that were becoming obsolescent and proved easy prey for Allied aircraft.\nOn 1 August 1944, Speer merged the Fighter Staff into a newly formed\nArmament Staff committee\n.\nThe Fighter Staff committee was instrumental in bringing about the increased exploitation of\nslave labor\nin the war economy.\nThe SS provided 64,000 prisoners for 20 separate projects from various concentration camps including\nMittelbau-Dora\n. Prisoners worked for\nJunkers\n,\nMesserschmitt\n,\nHenschel\nand\nBMW\n, among others.\nTo increase production, Speer introduced a system of punishments for his workforce. Those who feigned illness, slacked off, sabotaged production or tried to escape were denied food or sent to concentration camps. In 1944, this became endemic; over half a million workers were arrested.\nBy this time, 140,000 people were working in Speer's underground factories. These factories were death-traps; discipline was brutal, with regular executions. There were so many corpses at the Dora underground factory, for example, that the crematorium was overwhelmed. Speer's own staff described the conditions there as \"hell\".\nThe largest technological advance under Speer's command came through the rocket program. It began in 1932 but had not supplied any weaponry. Speer enthusiastically supported the program and in March 1942 made an order for A4 rockets, the predecessor of the world's first ballistic missile, the\nV-2 rocket\n. The rockets were researched at a facility in\nPeenemünde\nalong with the\nV-1 flying bomb\n. The V-2's first target was Paris on 8 September 1944. The program, while advanced, proved to be an impediment to the war economy. The large capital investment was not repaid in military effectiveness.\nThe rockets were built at an underground factory at\nMittelwerk\n. Labor to build the A4 rockets came from the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp. Of the 60,000 people who ended up at the camp, 20,000 died due to the appalling conditions.\nOn 14 April 1944, Speer lost control of Organisation Todt to his deputy,\nFranz Xaver Dorsch\n.\nHe opposed the\nassassination attempt against Hitler\non 20 July 1944. He was not involved in the plot, and played a minor role in the regime's efforts to regain control over Berlin after Hitler survived.\nAfter the plot Speer's rivals attacked some of his closest allies and his management system fell out of favor with radicals in the party. He lost yet more authority.\nDefeat of Nazi Germany\nSpeer (left),\nKarl Dönitz\nand\nAlfred Jodl\n(right) after their arrest by the British Army in\nFlensburg\nin Northern Germany in May 1945\nLosses of territory and a dramatic expansion of the Allied strategic bombing campaign caused the collapse of the German economy from late 1944. Air attacks on the transport network were particularly effective, as they cut the main centres of production off from essential coal supplies.\nIn January 1945, Speer told Goebbels that armaments production could be sustained for at least a year.\nHowever, he concluded that the war was lost after Soviet forces captured the important\nSilesian\nindustrial region later that month.\nNevertheless, Speer believed that Germany should continue the war for as long as possible with the goal of winning better conditions from the Allies than the\nunconditional surrender\nthey insisted upon.\nDuring January and February, Speer claimed that his ministry would deliver \"decisive weapons\" and a large increase in armaments production which would \"bring about a dramatic change on the battlefield\".\nSpeer gained control over the railways in February, and asked\nHeinrich Himmler\nto supply concentration camp prisoners to work on their repair.\nSurvivors of the\nMühldorf concentration camp\nupon liberation in 1945. Mühldorf supplied slave workers for the\nWeingut I\nproject.\nBy mid-March, Speer had accepted that Germany's economy would collapse within the next eight weeks. While he sought to frustrate directives to destroy industrial facilities in areas at risk of capture, so that they could be used after the war, he still supported the war's continuation. Speer provided Hitler with a memorandum on 15 March, which detailed Germany's dire economic situation and sought approval to cease demolitions of infrastructure. Three days later, he also proposed to Hitler that Germany's remaining military resources be concentrated along the\nRhine\nand\nVistula\nrivers in an attempt to prolong the fighting. This ignored military realities, as the German armed forces were unable to match the Allies' firepower and were facing total defeat.\nHitler rejected Speer's proposal to cease demolitions. Instead, he issued the \"\nNero Decree\n\" on 19 March, which called for the destruction of all infrastructure as the army retreated. Speer was appalled by this order, and persuaded several key military and political leaders to ignore it.\nDuring a meeting with Speer on 28/29 March, Hitler rescinded the decree and gave him authority over demolitions.\nSpeer ended them, though the army continued to blow up bridges.\nBy April, little was left of the armaments industry, and Speer had few official duties.\nSpeer visited the\nFührerbunker\non 22 April for the last time. He met Hitler and toured the damaged Chancellery before leaving Berlin to return to Hamburg.\nSpeer would later claim in his memoirs that during this visit he \"confessed to Hitler [...] that he was disobeying his 'scorched-earth' policy\",\nan assertion which has been described as \"pure invention\"\nby historian\nRichard J. Evans\n. On 29 April, the day before committing suicide, Hitler dictated a\nfinal political testament\nwhich dropped Speer from the successor government. Speer was to be replaced by his subordinate,\nKarl-Otto Saur\n.\nSpeer was disappointed that Hitler had not selected him as his successor.\nAfter Hitler's death, Speer offered his services to Hitler's successor,\nKarl Dönitz\n.\nOn 2 May, Dönitz asked\nLutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk\nto form a new government, and discussions went on about the formation of the administration for the next few days. On May 5, Schwerin von Krosigk presented his cabinet (known as the\nFlensburg government\n) and Speer was named as Minister of Industry and Production.\nSpeer provided information to the Allies, regarding the effects of the air war, and on a broad range of subjects, beginning on 10 May. On 23 May, two weeks after the surrender of German forces, British troops arrested the members of the Flensburg Government and brought Nazi Germany to a formal end.\nPost-war\nNuremberg trial\nMain article:\nNuremberg trials\nSpeer at the Nuremberg trial\nSpeer was taken to several internment centres for Nazi officials and interrogated. In September 1945, he was told that he would be tried for\nwar crimes\n, and several days later, he was moved to Nuremberg and incarcerated there.\nSpeer was indicted on four counts: participating in a common plan or\nconspiracy\nfor the accomplishment of\ncrime against peace\n; planning, initiating and waging\nwars of aggression\nand other crimes against peace; war crimes; and\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nThe chief United States prosecutor,\nRobert H. Jackson\n, of the\nU.S. Supreme Court\nsaid, \"Speer joined in planning and executing the program to dragoon prisoners of war and foreign workers into German war industries, which waxed in output while the workers waned in starvation.\"\nSpeer's attorney, Hans Flächsner, successfully contrasted Speer with other defendants\nand portrayed him as an artist thrust into political life who had always remained a non-ideologue.\nSpeer was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, principally for the use of slave labor and forced labor. He was acquitted on the other two counts. He had claimed that he was unaware of Nazi extermination plans, and the Allies had no proof that he was aware. His claim was revealed to be false in a private correspondence written in 1971 and publicly disclosed in 2007.\nOn 1 October 1946, he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.\nWhile three of the eight judges (two Soviet and American\nFrancis Biddle\n) advocated the death penalty for Speer, the other judges did not, and a compromise sentence was reached after two days of discussions.\nImprisonment\nOn 18 July 1947, Speer was transferred to\nSpandau Prison\nin Berlin to serve his prison term.\nThere he was known as Prisoner Number Five.\nSpeer's parents died while he was incarcerated. His father, who died in 1947, despised the Nazis and was silent upon meeting Hitler. His mother died in 1952. As a Nazi Party member, she had greatly enjoyed dining with Hitler.\nWolters and longtime Speer secretary Annemarie Kempf, while not permitted direct communication with Speer in Spandau, did what they could to help his family and carry out the requests Speer put in letters to his wife—the only written communication he was officially allowed. Beginning in 1948, Speer had the services of Toni Proost, a sympathetic Dutch orderly, to smuggle mail and his writings.\nSpeer spent most of his sentence at\nSpandau Prison\n.\nIn 1949, Wolters opened a bank account for Speer and began fundraising among those architects and industrialists who had benefited from Speer's activities during the war. Initially, the funds were used only to support Speer's family, particularly for the children's education. However, increasingly the money was used for other purposes, such as for payments to messengers including Proost and for bribes to those who might be able to secure Speer's release. Once Speer became aware of the existence of the fund, he sent detailed instructions about what to do with the money.\nThe prisoners were forbidden to write memoirs. Speer was able to have his writings sent to Wolters, however, and they eventually amounted to 20,000 pages.\nHe had completed his memoirs by November 1953, and they became the basis of\nInside the Third Reich\n.\nIn\nSpandau Diaries\n, Speer aimed to present himself as a tragic hero who had made a\nFaustian bargain\nfor which he endured a harsh prison sentence.\nMuch of Speer's energy was dedicated to keeping fit, both physically and mentally, during his long confinement.\nSpandau had a large enclosed yard where inmates were allocated plots of land for gardening. Speer created an elaborate garden complete with lawns, flower beds, shrubbery, and fruit trees.\nTo make his daily walks around the garden more engaging, Speer embarked on an imaginary trip around the globe. Speer started his “walk” from Berlin and went eastward across the entirety of Eurasia, crossed the Bering Strait into Alaska and then traveled south down the west coast of North America. Carefully measuring distance travelled each day, he mapped distances to real-world geography. He had walked more than\n30,000 kilometres (19,000\nmi)\n, ending his sentence near\nGuadalajara\n, Mexico.\nSpeer also read, studied architectural journals, and brushed up on English and French. In his writings, Speer claimed to have finished five thousand books while in prison. His sentence of twenty years amounted to 7,305 days, which only allotted one and a half days per book.\nSpeer's supporters maintained calls for his release. Among those who pledged support for his sentence to be commuted were\nCharles de Gaulle\nand US diplomat\nGeorge Wildman Ball\n.\nWilly Brandt\nwas an advocate of his release,\nand put an end to the de-Nazification proceedings against him,\nwhich could have caused his property to be confiscated.\nSpeer's efforts for an early release came to naught. The Soviet Union, having demanded a death sentence at trial, was unwilling to entertain a reduced sentence.\nSpeer served a full term and was released at midnight on 1 October 1966.\nRelease and later life\nSpeer's release from prison was a worldwide media event. Reporters and photographers crowded both the street outside Spandau and the lobby of the\nHotel Berlin\nwhere Speer spent the night.\nHe said little, reserving most comments for a major interview published in\nDer Spiegel\nin November 1966.\nAlthough he stated he hoped to resume an architectural career, his sole project, a collaboration for a brewery, was unsuccessful.\nInstead, he revised his Spandau writings into two autobiographical books,\nInside the Third Reich\n(in German,\nErinnerungen\n, or\nReminiscences\n) and\nSpandau: The Secret Diaries\n. He later published a work about Himmler and the SS, which has been published in English as\nThe Slave State: Heinrich Himmler's Masterplan for SS Supremacy\nor\nInfiltration: How Heinrich Himmler Schemed to Build an SS Industrial Empire\n(in German,\nDer Sklavenstaat - Meine Auseinandersetzung mit der SS\n). Speer was aided in shaping the works by\nJoachim Fest\nand\nWolf Jobst Siedler\nfrom the publishing house\nUllstein\n.\nHe found himself unable to re-establish a relationship with his children, even with his son\nAlbert\n, who had also become an architect. According to Speer's daughter\nHilde Schramm\n, \"One by one, my sister and brothers gave up. There was no communication.\"\nHe provided financial support for his brother Hermann after the war. However, his other brother Ernst died at the\nBattle of Stalingrad\n, despite repeated requests from his parents for Speer to repatriate him.\nFollowing his release from Spandau, Speer donated the\nChronicle\n, his personal diary, to the\nGerman Federal Archives\n. It had been edited by Wolters and made no mention of the Jews.\nDavid Irving\ndiscovered discrepancies between the deceptively edited\nChronicle\nand independent documents. Speer asked Wolters to destroy the material he had omitted from his donation but Wolters refused and retained an original copy.\nWolters' friendship with Speer deteriorated, and one year before Speer's death, Wolters gave Matthias Schmidt access to the unedited\nChronicle\n. Schmidt authored the first book highly critical of Speer.\nSpeer's memoirs were a phenomenal success. The public was fascinated by an inside view of the Third Reich and a major war criminal became a popular figure almost overnight. Importantly, he provided an alibi to older Germans who had been Nazis. If Speer, who had been so close to Hitler, had not known the full extent of the crimes of the Nazi regime and had just been \"following orders\", then they could tell themselves and others they too had done the same.\nSo great was the need to believe this \"Speer myth\" that Fest and Siedler were able to strengthen it—even in the face of mounting historical evidence to the contrary.\nDeath\nSpeer's grave in\nHeidelberg\nSpeer made himself widely available to historians and other enquirers.\nIn October 1973, he made his first trip to Britain, flying to London to be interviewed on the BBC\nMidweek\nprogramme.\nIn the same year, he appeared on the television programme\nThe World at War\n. Speer returned to London in 1981 to participate in the BBC\nNewsnight\nprogramme. He suffered a stroke and died in London on 1 September.\nHe had remained married to his wife, but he had formed a relationship with a German woman living in London and was with her at the time of his death.\nHis daughter,\nMargret Nissen\n, wrote in her 2005 memoirs that after his release from Spandau he spent all of his time constructing the \"Speer Myth\".\nThe Speer myth\nThe \"good Nazi\"\nAfter his release from Spandau, Speer portrayed himself as the \"good Nazi\".\nHe was well-educated, middle class, and\nbourgeois\n, and could contrast himself with those who, in the popular mind, typified \"Bad Nazis\".\nIn his memoirs and interviews, he had distorted the truth and made so many major omissions that his lies became known as \"myths\".\nSpeer even invented his own birth's circumstances, stating falsely that he was born at midday amid crashes of thunder and bells of the nearby Christ Church, whereas it was between three and five o'clock, and the church was built only some years after.\nSpeer took his myth-making to a mass media level and his \"cunning apologies\" were reproduced frequently in post-war Germany.\nIsabell Trommer\nwrites in her biography of Speer that Fest and Siedler were co-authors of Speer's memoirs and co-creators of his myths.\nIn return they were paid handsomely in royalties and other financial inducements.\nSpeer, Siedler and Fest had constructed an image of the \"good Nazi\" remained in place for decades, despite historical evidence indicating that it was false.\nSpeer during a visit to a munitions factory in May 1944\nSpeer had carefully constructed an image of himself as an apolitical technocrat who deeply regretted having failed to discover the monstrous crimes of the Third Reich.\nThis construction was accepted almost at face value by historian\nHugh Trevor-Roper\nwhen investigating the death of Adolf Hitler for\nBritish Intelligence\nand in writing\nThe Last Days of Hitler\n. Trevor-Roper frequently refers to Speer as \"a technocrat [who] nourished a technocrat's philosophy\", one who cared only for his building projects or his ministerial duties, and who thought that politics was irrelevant, at least until Hitler's\nNero Decree\nwhich Speer, according to his own telling, worked assiduously to counter. Trevor-Roper\n–\nwho calls Speer an administrative genius whose basic instincts were peaceful and constructive\n–\ndoes take Speer to task, however, for his failure to recognize the immorality of Hitler and Nazism, calling him \"the real criminal of Nazi Germany\":\nFor ten years he sat at the very centre of political power; his keen intelligence diagnosed the nature and observed the mutations of Nazi government and policy; he saw and despised the personalities around him; he heard their outrageous orders and understood their fantastic ambitions; but he did nothing.  Supposing politics to be irrelevant, he turned aside and built roads and bridges and factories, while the logical consequences of government by madmen emerged. Ultimately, when their emergence involved the ruin of all his work, Speer accepted the consequences and acted.  Then it was too late; Germany had been destroyed.\nAfter Speer's death,\nMatthias Schmidt\npublished a book that demonstrated that Speer had ordered the eviction of Jews from their Berlin homes.\nBy 1999, historians had amply demonstrated that Speer had lied extensively.\nEven so, public perceptions of Speer did not change substantially until\nHeinrich Breloer\naired the biographical film\nSpeer und Er\non television in 2004. The film began a process of demystification and critical reappraisal of Speer.\nAdam Tooze\nin his book\nThe Wages of Destruction\nsaid Speer had manoeuvred himself through the ranks of the regime skillfully and ruthlessly and that the idea he was a technocrat blindly carrying out orders was \"absurd\".\nTrommer said Speer was not an apolitical technocrat; instead, he was, in reality,  one of the most powerful and unscrupulous leaders in the entire Nazi regime.\nKitchen said Speer had deceived the Nuremberg Tribunal and post-war Germany.\nBrechtken said that if Speer's extensive involvement in the Holocaust had been known at the time of his trial he would have been sentenced to death.\nThe image of the \"good Nazi\" was supported by numerous Speer myths.\nIn addition to the myth that he was an apolitical technocrat, he claimed he did not have full knowledge of the Holocaust or the persecution of the Jews. Another myth posits that Speer revolutionized the German war machine after his appointment as Minister of Armaments. He was credited with a dramatic increase in the shipment of arms that was widely reported as keeping Germany in the war.\nAnother myth centered around a nonexistent plan to assassinate Hitler with poisonous gas. The idea for this myth came to him after he recalled the panic when car fumes came through an air ventilation system. He fabricated the additional details.\nBrechtken wrote that Speer's most brazen lie was fabricated during an interview with a French journalist in 1952. The journalist described an invented scenario in which Speer had refused Hitler's orders and Hitler had left with tears in his eyes. Speer liked the scenario so much that he included it in his memoirs. The journalist had unwittingly collaborated in creating one of his myths.\nSpeer also sought to portray himself as an opponent of Hitler's leadership. Despite his opposition to the\n20 July plot\n, he falsely claimed in his memoirs to have been sympathetic to the plotters. He maintained Hitler was cool towards him for the remainder of his life after learning they had included him on a list of potential ministers. This formed a key element of the myths Speer encouraged.\nSpeer also falsely claimed that he had realised the war was lost at an early stage, and thereafter worked to preserve the resources needed for the civilian population's survival.\nIn reality, Speer had sought to prolong the war until further resistance was impossible, thus contributing to the large number of deaths and the extensive destruction Germany suffered during the final months of the war.\nDenial of responsibility\nNew prisoners awaiting disinfection in the garage yard of\nMauthausen concentration camp\nSpeer maintained at the Nuremberg trials and in his memoirs that he had no direct knowledge of the Holocaust. He admitted only to being uncomfortable around Jews in the published version of the\nSpandau Diaries\n.\nIn his final statement at Nuremberg, Speer gave the impression of apologizing, although he did not directly admit any personal guilt and the only victim he mentioned was the German people.\nHistorian Martin Kitchen states that Speer was actually \"fully aware of what had happened to the Jews\" and was \"intimately involved in the 'Final Solution\n'\n\"\n.\nBrechtken said Speer only admitted to a generalized responsibility for the Holocaust to hide his direct and actual responsibility.\nSpeer was photographed with slave laborers at\nMauthausen concentration camp\nduring a visit on 31 March 1943; he also visited\nGusen concentration camp\n. Although survivor\nFrancisco Boix\ntestified at the Nuremberg trials about Speer's visit,\nTaylor writes that, had the photo been available, he would have been hanged.\nIn 2005,\nThe Daily Telegraph\nreported that documents had surfaced indicating that Speer had approved the allocation of materials for the expansion of\nAuschwitz concentration camp\nafter two of his assistants inspected the facility on a day when almost a thousand Jews were massacred.\nHeinrich Breloer, discussing the construction of Auschwitz, said Speer was not just a cog in the work—he was the \"terror itself\".\nSpeer did not deny being present at the\nPosen speeches\nto Nazi leaders at a conference in Posen (\nPoznań\n) on 6 October 1943, but claimed to have left the auditorium before Himmler said during his speech: \"The grave decision had to be taken to cause this people to vanish from the earth\",\nand later, \"The Jews must be exterminated\".\nSpeer is mentioned several times in the speech, and Himmler addresses him directly.\nIn 2007,\nThe Guardian\nreported that a letter from Speer dated 23 December 1971, had been found in a collection of his correspondence with Hélène Jeanty, the widow of a Belgian resistance fighter. In the letter, Speer says, \"There is no doubt—I was present as Himmler announced on October 6, 1943, that all Jews would be killed.\"\nArmaments miracle\nThe German city of\nCologne\nin ruins at the end of the war\nSpeer was credited with an \"armaments miracle\". During the winter of 1941–42, in the light of Germany's disastrous defeat in the\nBattle of Moscow\n, the German leadership including\nFriedrich Fromm\n,\nGeorg Thomas\nand\nFritz Todt\nhad come to the conclusion that the war could not be won.\nThe rational position to adopt was to seek a political solution that would end the war without defeat. Speer in response used his propaganda expertise to display a new dynamism of the war economy.\nHe produced spectacular statistics, claiming a sixfold increase in munitions production, a fourfold increase in artillery production, and he sent further propaganda to the newsreels of the country. He was able to curtail the discussion that the war should be ended.\nThe armaments \"miracle\" was a myth; Speer had used statistical manipulation to support his claims.\nThe production of armaments did rise; however, this was due to the normal causes of reorganization before Speer came to office, the relentless mobilization of slave labor and a deliberate reduction in the quality of output to favor quantity. By July 1943 Speer's armaments propaganda became irrelevant because a catalogue of dramatic defeats on the battlefield meant the prospect of losing the war could no longer be hidden from the German public.\nArchitectural legacy\nSchwerbelastungskörper\nin 2011\nLittle remains of Speer's personal architectural works, other than the plans and photographs. No buildings designed by Speer during the Nazi era are extant in Berlin, other than the four entrance pavilions and underpasses leading to the Victory Column, or\nSiegessäule\n,\nand the\nSchwerbelastungskörper\n, a heavy load-bearing body built around 1941. The concrete cylinder,\n14 metres (46\nft)\nhigh, was used to measure ground\nsubsidence\nas part of feasibility studies for a massive\ntriumphal arch\nand other large structures planned within Hitler's post-war renewal project for the city of Berlin as the\nworld capital Germania\n. The cylinder is now a protected landmark and is open to the public.\nThe\ntribune\nof the\nZeppelinfeld\nstadium in Nuremberg, though partly demolished, can also be seen.\nDuring the war, the Speer-designed\nNew Reich Chancellery\nwas largely destroyed by air raids and in the\nBattle of Berlin\n. The exterior walls survived, but they were eventually dismantled by the Soviets. Unsubstantiated rumors have claimed that the remains were used for other building projects such as the\nHumboldt University\n,\nMohrenstraße metro station\nand Soviet war memorials in Berlin.\nSee also\nBiography portal\nSpeer Goes to Hollywood\nDownfall\n, 2004 German film where he was portrayed by actor\nHeino Ferch\nNuremberg\n, 2000 Canadian-American miniseries where he was portrayed by actor\nHerbert Knaup\nLegion Speer\nTransportflotte Speer\nTransportkorps Speer\nHermann Giesler\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nUntil 2 September 1943, the position's official name was Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions.\n↑\nOn 31 January 1931, he also joined the Motor Unit of the SA being a member until autumn 1932. On 20 July 1942, Speer was enrolled by order of Heinrich Himmler as a SS Man/member of\nPersonal Staff Reichsführer-SS\n[SS Number 46104]. However his application was never completed, becoming\nnolle prosequi\n.\n↑\nFor a treatise on this aspect of the war including Speer's involvement see: Randall, Hansen,\nDisobeying Hitler: German Resistance in the Last Year of WWII\n, Faber & Faber, 2014, 1st edition,\nISBN\n978-0-571-28451-1\n.\n↑\nSee the official website of Berlin at:\nhttps://www.berlin.de/en/attractions-and-sights/3560160-3104052-victory-column.en.html\nCitations\n��\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n174–175.\n↑\nSchubert 2006\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nKing 1997\n, p.\n27.\n1\n2\n3\nTaylor 2010\n, p.\n124.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n11–13.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n17–18.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n18–19.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n34–36.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n71–73.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n33–34.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n47–49.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n327–328.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n24.\n↑\nNazi conspiracy and aggression 1946\n, pp.\n256–257.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n25–26.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n100–101.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n41.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n101–103.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n106.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n41–42.\n↑\nHamsher 1970\n.\n1\n2\n3\nReinecke 2017\n.\n↑\nBrechtken 2017\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n60.\n1\n2\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n60.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nSpeer 1970\n, p.\n118.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n140.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n65–70.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n550.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n46–47.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n46–49.\n1\n2\n3\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n53–56.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n72.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n120.\n1\n2\nSchmidt 1984\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nSchmidt 1984\n, p.\n190.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n322.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n115.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n78.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n39–40.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n75–76.\n↑\nLilla 2005\n, pp.\n239, 298.\n↑\nBrechtken 2017\n, p.\n147.\n1\n2\nWistrich 1982\n, p.\n291.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n117–118.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n120–121.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n6.\n↑\nCarroll 2018\n, p.\n234.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n122.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n148–149.\n↑\nU.S. Government 1950\n, p.\n374.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n597–598.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n368–370.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n575–576.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n232–233.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n145–147.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n147–148.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n156.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n151–152.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n159.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n146–150.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n165–166.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n160.\n1\n2\n3\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n7–8.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n167–169.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n614.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n616–618.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n8–9.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n188–189.\n↑\nBoog, Krebs\n&\nVogel 2006\n, p.\n347.\n↑\nOvery 2002\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n582–584.\n↑\nUziel 2012\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nBuggeln 2014\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nBuggeln 2014\n, pp.\n46–48.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n215.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n221.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n216.\n↑\nSpeer 1970\n, pp.\n432–433.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n204–205.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n648–651.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n652.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n259.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 2012\n, p.\n289.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n254.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n261–262.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n652–653.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n262–263.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n265–267.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n269–270.\n↑\nKershaw 2012\n, p.\n291.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n275.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n263–270.\n1\n2\nEvans 1997\n, p.\n202.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n234.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n277.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n273–281.\n↑\nJaskot 2002\n, pp.\n140–141.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n288.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n561.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n285.\n↑\nConot 1983\n, p.\n471.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n139–140.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n287–288.\n1\n2\nConnolly 2007\n.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n281–282.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n288.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n314–315.\n1\n2\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n292–297.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n316.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n325.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n321–322.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n323.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n316.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n316, 325.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n316–317.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n319.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n319.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n324.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n299–300.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n320–321.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n324–325.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, pp.\n320–321.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n333–334.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n329–330.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n664–665.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n339–343.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, pp.\n226–227.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n359–361.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n335.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n366.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n354.\n↑\nAsher 2003\n.\n↑\nFest 1999\n, p.\n337.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n362–363.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n327–360.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n362.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nSeelow 2018\n.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nTrommer 2016\n, p.\n80.\n1\n2\nSchwendemann 2016\n.\n↑\nTrommer 2016\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n345–346.\n↑\nTrevor-Roper 1995\n, pp.\n68–70, 214–215.\n↑\nTrevor-Roper 1995\n, pp.\n214–215.\n↑\nSchmidt 1984\n, p.\n186.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n360–362.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n553.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n552.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n296–297.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n653.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, pp.\n100, 322.\n↑\nPike 2003\n, p.\n340, fn 40\n.\n↑\nTaylor 2010\n, pp.\n204–205.\n1\n2\nConnolly 2005\n.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, pp.\n167–168.\n1\n2\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n345.\n1\n2\n3\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n554.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n555.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, pp.\n552–557.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nMuseen der Stadt Nürnberg\n.\n↑\nKitchen 2015\n, p.\n56.\nBibliography\nPrinted sources\nBoog, Horst\n; Krebs, Gerhard;\nVogel, Detlef\n(2006),\nGermany and the Second World War: Volume VII: The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia, 1943–1944/5\n, London: Clarendon Press,\nISBN\n978-0198228899\nBrechtken, Magnus\n(2017),\nAlbert Speer: Eine deutsche Karriere\n, Germany: Siedler Verlag,\nISBN\n978-3827500403\nBuggeln, Marc (2014),\nSlave Labor in Nazi Concentration Camps\n, Oxford University Press,\nISBN\n978-0198707974\nCarroll, Berenice Anita (2018),\nDesign for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich\n, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.,\nISBN\n978-3111359588\nConot, Robert (1983),\nJustice at Nuremberg\n, New York: Harper & Row,\nISBN\n978-0-88184-032-2\nEvans, Richard J.\n(1997),\nRereading German History: From Unification to Reunification 1800-1996\n, London: Routledge,\nISBN\n978-0-41-515899-2\nFest, Joachim\n(1999),\nSpeer: The Final Verdict\n, translated by Ewald Osers and Alexandra Dring, Harcourt,\nISBN\n978-0-15-100556-7\nHamsher, William (1970),\nAlbert Speer-Victim of Nuremberg?\n, Leslie Frewin Publishers Ltd,\nISBN\n978-0091015107\nJaskot, Paul B. (2002),\nThe Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy\n, London and New York: Taylor & Francis,\nISBN\n978-1-13459-462-7\nKershaw, Ian\n(2012),\nThe End: Hitler's Germany, 1944–45\n, London: Penguin Books,\nISBN\n978-0-141-01421-0\nKing, Henry T.\n(1997),\nThe Two Worlds of Albert Speer: Reflections of a Nuremberg Prosecutor\n, University Press of America,\nISBN\n978-0-7618-0872-5\nKitchen, Martin\n(2015),\nSpeer: Hitler's Architect\n, Yale University Press,\nISBN\n978-0-300-19044-1\nLilla, Joachim (2005),\nDer Preußische Staatsrat 1921–1933: Ein biographisches Handbuch\n, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag,\nISBN\n978-3-770-05271-4\nOffice of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality (1946), \"Document 3568-PS\",\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n,\nVI\n, Washington: United States Government Printing Office\nOvery, Richard\n(2002) ,\nWar and Economy in the Third Reich\n, Oxford: Clarendon Press,\nISBN\n978-0-19-820599-9\nPike, David Wingeate (2003),\nSpaniards in the Holocaust: Mauthausen, Horror on the Danube\n,\nRoutledge\n,\nISBN\n978-1-134-58713-1\nPriemel, Kim Christian\n(2016),\nThe Betrayal: The Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence\n, Oxford University Press,\nISBN\n978-0-19-256374-3\nSchmidt, Matthias (1984),\nAlbert Speer: The End of a Myth\n, St. Martin's Press,\nISBN\n978-0-312-01709-5\nSchubert, Philipp (2006),\nAlbert Speer: Architekt – Günstling Hitlers – Rüstungsminister – Hauptkriegsverbrecher\n, Munich: GRIN Verlag,\nISBN\n978-3-638-59047-1\nSereny, Gitta\n(1995),\nAlbert Speer: His Battle with Truth\n, Knopf,\nISBN\n978-0-394-52915-8\nSpeer, Albert (1970),\nInside the Third Reich\n, New York: Avon Books,\nISBN\n978-0380000715\nTaylor, Blaine (2010),\nHitler's Engineers: Fritz Todt and Albert Speer – Master Builders of the Third Reich\n, Translated by\nRichard and Clara Winston\n, Havertown, PA and Newbury, England: Casemate Publishers,\nISBN\n978-1-932033-68-7\nTooze, Adam\n(2006),\nThe Wages of Destruction\n, London: Allen Lane,\nISBN\n978-0-7139-9566-4\nTrevor-Roper, Hugh\n(1995) ,\nThe Last Days of Hitler\n(seventh\ned.), London: Pan Books,\nISBN\n978-1-4472-1861-6\nTrommer, Isabell (2016),\nRechtfertigung und Entlastung: Albert Speer in der Bundesrepublik\n, Campus Verlag GmbH,\nISBN\n978-3593505299\nUziel, Daniel\n(2012),\nArming the Luftwaffe: The German Aviation Industry in World War II\n, McFarland,\nISBN\n978-0-7864-6521-7\nvan der Vat, Dan\n(1997),\nThe Good Nazi: The Life and Lies of Albert Speer\n, Internet Archive, George Weidenfeld & Nicolson,\nISBN\n978-0-297-81721-5\n–\nvia Internet Archive\nWistrich, Robert\n(1982),\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n, Macmillan Publishing Co.,\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\nOnline sources\nAsher, Edgar (21 November 2003), \"The day I met Hitler's Architect\",\nChicago Jewish Star\n, pp.\n7, 9\nConnolly, Kate (11 May 2005),\n\"Wartime reports debunk Speer as the good Nazi\"\n,\nThe Daily Telegraph\n, UK\n, retrieved\n11 January\n2014\nConnolly, Kate (13 March 2007),\n\"Letter proves Speer knew of Holocaust plan\"\n,\nThe Guardian\n, retrieved\n7 May\n2017\nReinecke, Stefan (22 June 2017),\n\"Historiker über Albert Speer: \"Er tat alles für den Endsieg\"\n\"\n,\nDie Tageszeitung: Taz\n, Germany\n, retrieved\n22 June\n2017\nSchwendemann, Heinrich (30 November 2016),\n\"Rechtfertigung und Entlastung. Albert Speer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland\"\n,\nRezensiert für H-Soz-Kult von\n, Germany,\nISBN\n9783593505299\n, retrieved\n12 April\n2019\nSeelow, A. (2018), \"Demystifying Hitler's Favorite Architect. Review of: Magnus Brechtken, Albert Speer. Eine deutsche Karriere\",\nArchitectural Histories\n,\n6\n(1):\n1–\n11,\ndoi\n:\n10.5334/ah.334\nOfficial website of the Memorium Nuremberg Trials\n, Museen der Stadt Nürnberg\n, retrieved\n5 November\n2014\nU.S. Government (1950),\nTrials of the War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals\n(PDF)\n, vol.\nII: The Milch Case, United States Printing Office, archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 10 June 2021\n, retrieved\n27 June\n2021\nFurther reading\nCausey, Charles M. (2016),\nThe Lion and the Lamb: The True Holocaust Story of a Powerful Nazi Leader and a Dutch Resistance Worker\n, Westbow Press,\nISBN\n978-1-51276-109-2\nKrier, Léon\n(1985),\nAlbert Speer's life: Architecture, 1932–1942\n, Archives D'Architecture Moderne,\nISBN\n978-2-87143-006-3\nSchroeter, Wolfgang (2018),\nAlbert Speer: Aufstieg und Fall eines Mythos\n(in German), Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh,\nISBN\n978-3-657-78913-9\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nAlbert Speer\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nAlbert Speer\n.\nNewspaper clippings about Albert Speer\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\n\"Speer cross-examination\"\n,\nlaw2.umkc.edu\n, University of Missouri–Kansas City\n, retrieved\n8 January\n2012\nFrancisco Boix identifies Speer at Nuremberg\nAlbert Speer: Chief Architect of the Third Reich - warfarehistorynetwork.com",
+    "infobox": {
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Position created",
+      "succeeded_by": "Position abolished",
+      "head_of_state": "Karl Dönitz",
+      "head_of_government": "Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk",
+      "born": "Berthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer(1905-03-19)19 March 1905Mannheim, Germany",
+      "died": "1 September 1981(1981-09-01)(aged76)London, England",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1931–1945)",
+      "education": "Technische Universität BerlinTechnical University of MunichUniversity of Karlsruhe",
+      "profession": "Architect, government official, author",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler cabinetSchwerin von Krosigk cabinet",
+      "convictions": "War crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "20 years imprisonment",
+      "targets": "Millions ofslave laborers;Soviet prisoners of warand others",
+      "imprisonedat": "Spandau Prison"
+    },
+    "char_count": 62011
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Konstantin_von_Neurath",
+    "name": "Konstantin von Neurath",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Konstantin Hermann Karl Freiherr von Neurath was a German politician, diplomat and convicted Nazi war criminal who served as Foreign Minister of Germany between 1932 and 1938.",
+    "description": "German diplomat and war criminal (1873–1956)",
+    "full_text": "Konstantin von Neurath\nGerman diplomat and war criminal (1873–1956)\nKonstantin Hermann Karl Freiherr\nvon Neurath\n(2 February 1873 – 14 August 1956) was a German politician, diplomat and\nconvicted\nNazi\nwar criminal who served as\nForeign Minister of Germany\nbetween 1932 and 1938.\nBorn to a\nSwabian\nnoble family, Neurath began his diplomatic career in 1901. He fought in\nWorld War I\nand was awarded the\nIron Cross\nfor his service. After the war, Neurath served as\nminister\nto Denmark,\nambassador\nto Italy and ambassador to Britain. In 1932, he was appointed Foreign Minister by Chancellor\nFranz von Papen\n, and he continued to hold the post under\nAdolf Hitler\n.\nIn the early years of the\nNazi\nregime, Neurath was regarded as playing a key role in Hitler's foreign policy pursuits in undermining the\nTreaty of Versailles\nand in territorial expansion in the prelude to\nWorld War II\n. However, he was often averse to Hitler's aims for tactical, not necessarily ideological, reasons. That aversion eventually induced Hitler to replace Neurath in 1938 with the more compliant\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n, a fervent Nazi. Neurath served as\nReich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia\nbetween 1939 and 1943, but his authority was only nominal after September 1941.\nNeurath was tried as a war criminal at the\nNuremberg trials\nand was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his compliance and actions in Nazi Germany. He received an early release in 1954 and then retired to his family estate, where he died two years later.\nEarly life\nNeurath was born at the manor of Kleinglattbach (since 1972 part of\nVaihingen an der Enz\n) in\nWürttemberg\n, the scion of a\nSwabian\nFreiherren\nnoble family and political dynasty of the Kingdom of Württemberg. His grandfather,  Constantin Franz von Neurath, had served as Foreign Minister under King\nCharles I of Württemberg\n(reigned 1864–1891), and his father, Konstantin Sebastian von Neurath (died 1912), had been a\nFree Conservative\nmember of the German\nReichstag\nand\nChamberlain\nof King\nWilliam II of Württemberg\n.\nKonstantin von Neurath during his military service, 1893\nNeurath studied law\nin Tübingen\nand\nin Berlin\n. After graduating in 1897, he initially joined a local law firm in his home town. In 1901, he entered into civil service and worked for the\nForeign Office\nin Berlin. In 1903, he was assigned to the\nGerman embassy in London\n, at first as Vice-Consul and from 1909 as\nLegationsrat\n(legation counsel). After the visit of the\nPrince of Wales\nto the\nKingdom of Württemberg\nin 1904, as Lord Chamberlain to King William II, Neurath was created an\nHonorary Knight Grand Cross\nof the\nRoyal Victorian Order\n.\nNeurath's career was decisively advanced by Secretary of State\nAlfred von Kiderlen-Waechter\n. In 1914, he was sent to the embassy in\nConstantinople\n.\nDuring\nWorld War I\n, he served as an officer with an\ninfantry\nregiment until 1916, when he was badly wounded. In December 1914, he was awarded the\nIron Cross\n. He returned to the German diplomatic service in the\nOttoman Empire\n(1914–1916), where he wrote a memorandum on the German embassy's official position regarding the\nArmenian genocide\nto German consulates in the Ottoman Empire.\nThe memorandum justified the actions of the Ottoman government during the Armenian Genocide while also attempting to present the German government as protesting against the \"excesses\" of the genocide. In 1917, he temporarily quit the diplomatic service to succeed his uncle\nJulius von Soden\nas head of the royal Württemberg government.\nOn 30 May 1901, Neurath married Marie Auguste Moser von Filseck (1875–1960) in\nStuttgart\n. His son, Konstantin, was born in 1902, followed by his daughter, Winifred, in 1904.\nPolitical career\nNeurath in 1920\nIn 1919, Neurath, with the approval by President\nFriedrich Ebert\n, returned to diplomacy and joined the embassy in\nCopenhagen\nas\nMinister\nto\nDenmark\n. From 1921 to 1930, he was the ambassador to Rome and was not overly impressed with\nItalian fascism\n. After the death of Chancellor\nGustav Stresemann\nin 1929, Neurath was already considered for the post of Foreign Minister in the\ncabinet\nof Chancellor\nHermann Müller\nby President\nPaul von Hindenburg\n, but his appointment failed because of the objections raised by the governing parties. In 1930, Neurath returned to head the embassy in London.\nNeurath was recalled to Germany in 1932 and became\nReichsminister\nof Foreign Affairs as an\nindependent politician\nin the \"Cabinet of Barons\" under Chancellor\nFranz von Papen\nin June. He continued to hold that position under Chancellor\nKurt von Schleicher\nin December and then under\nAdolf Hitler\nfrom the\nMachtergreifung\non 30 January 1933. During the early days of Hitler's rule, Neurath lent an aura of respectability to Hitler's expansionist foreign policy.\nIn May 1933, the American\nchargé d'affaires\nreported, \"Baron von Neurath has shown such a remarkable capacity for submitting to what in normal times could only be considered as affronts and indignities on the part of the Nazis, that it is still quite a possibility that the latter should be content to have him remain as a figurehead for some time yet\".\nHe was involved in the German withdrawal from the\nLeague of Nations\nin 1933, the negotiations of the\nAnglo-German Naval Agreement\n(1935) and the\nremilitarisation of the Rhineland\n. Neurath was also made a member of\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nTo mark the fourth anniversary of the regime on 30 January 1937, Hitler determined to enroll all the remaining non-Nazi ministers in the Nazi Party and to confer upon them personally the\nGolden Party Badge\n.\nBy his acceptance, Neurath officially joined the Nazi Party (membership number 3,805,229). Additionally, in September 1937, he was given the honorary rank of a\nGruppenführer\nin the\nSS\n, equivalent in the\nWehrmacht\nrank to a\nGeneralleutnant\n.\nOn 5 November 1937, the conference was held between the Reich's top military-foreign policy leadership and Hitler, which was recorded in the so-called\nHossbach Memorandum\n. At the conference, Hitler stated that it was the time for war or, more accurately, wars, as what Hitler envisioned were a series of localised wars in Central and Eastern Europe in the near future. Hitler argued that because the wars were necessary to provide Germany with\nLebensraum\n,\nautarky\nand the\narms race\nwith France and Britain made it imperative to act before the Western powers developed an insurmountable lead in the arms race. He further declared that Germany must be ready for war as early as 1938 and at the latest by 1943.\nOf those invited to the conference, objections arose from Neurath, War Minister\nGeneralfeldmarschall\nWerner von Blomberg\nand Army Commander-in-Chief,\nGeneraloberst\nWerner von Fritsch\n. They all believed that any German aggression in Eastern Europe was bound to trigger a war with France because of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, the so-called\ncordon sanitaire\n. They further believed that if a Franco-German war broke out, it would quickly escalate to a European war since Britain would almost certainly intervene, rather than risk the prospect of France's defeat.\nMoreover, they contended that Hitler's assumption was flawed that Britain and France would ignore the projected wars because they had started their rearmament later than Germany.\nThe opposition expressed by Fritsch, Blomberg and Neurath was concerned entirely with the assessment that Germany could not start a war in the heart of Europe without Anglo-French involvement, and more time was needed to rearm. However, they did not express any moral opposition to aggression or disagreement with Hitler's basic idea of annexing Austria or Czechoslovakia.\nThat said, offering moral or humanitarian arguments to Hitler — just three years after the\nNight of the Long Knives\n— would have been futile if not dangerous.\nIn response to the reservations expressed at the conference, Hitler tightened his control of the military-foreign policy making apparatus by removing those who expressed reservations at the November conference: Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath. On 4 February 1938, Neurath was sacked as Foreign Minister with Blomberg and Fritsch also losing their posts (the\nBlomberg–Fritsch Affair\n). Neurath was succeeded by\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nbut remained in government as a\nminister without portfolio\nto allay the concerns that his removal would have caused internationally. Neurath was also named as president of the\nSecret Cabinet Council\n, a purported super-cabinet to advise Hitler on foreign affairs. On paper, it appeared that Neurath had been promoted. However, this body only existed on paper;\nHermann Göring\nsubsequently testified that it never met, \"not for a minute\".\nIn March 1939, Neurath was appointed\nReichsprotektor\nof occupied\nBohemia and Moravia\n,\nserving as Hitler's personal representative in the protectorate. Hitler chose Neurath in part to pacify the international outrage over the\nGerman occupation of Czechoslovakia\n.\nSoon after his arrival at\nPrague Castle\n, Neurath instituted harsh press censorship and banned political parties and trade unions. He ordered a harsh crackdown on protesting students in October and November 1939 (1,200 student protesters went to concentration camps and nine were executed). He also supervised the persecution of\nCzech Jews\naccording to the\nNuremberg Laws\n. Draconian as those measures were, Neurath's rule overall was fairly mild by Nazi standards. Notably, he tried to restrain the excesses of his police chief,\nKarl Hermann Frank\n.\nHowever, in September 1941, Hitler decided that Neurath's rule was too lenient and so stripped him of his day-to-day powers.\nReinhard Heydrich\nwas named as his deputy\nbut in truth held the real power. Heydrich was\nassassinated\nin 1942\nand succeeded by\nKurt Daluege\n.\nNeurath officially remained as\nReichsprotektor\n. He tried to resign in 1941, but his resignation was not accepted until August 1943,\nwhen he was succeeded by the former Interior Minister\nWilhelm Frick\n. On 21 June 1943, Neurath had been raised to the honorary rank of an\nSS-\nObergruppenführer\n, the equivalent to a three-star general.\nLate in the war, Neurath had contacts with the\nGerman resistance\n.\nNeurath as defendant in Nuremberg, 1946\nTrial and imprisonment\nThe\nAllies\nprosecuted Neurath at the\nNuremberg trials\nin 1946.\nOtto von Lüdinghausen appeared for his defence. The prosecution accused him of \"\nconspiracy\nto commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression;\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n\". Neurath's defence strategy was predicated on the fact that his successor and fellow defendant, Ribbentrop, was more culpable for the atrocities committed in the Nazi state than Neurath was.\nThe International Military Tribunal acknowledged that most of Neurath's crimes against humanity were conducted during his short tenure as nominal Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, especially in quelling the\nCzech resistance\n, and in the\nsummary execution\nof several university students. The tribunal came to the consensus that Neurath had been a willing and active participant in war crimes but held no such prominent position during the height of the Third Reich's tyranny and so had been only a minor adherent to the atrocities committed. He was found guilty by the Allies on all four counts and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.\nNeurath was held as a war criminal in\nSpandau Prison\nuntil November 1954,\nwhen he was released in the wake of the\nParis Conference\n, officially because of his ill health, as he had suffered a\nheart attack\n.\nLater life\nHe retired to his family's estates in\nEnzweihingen\n, where he died two years later, aged 83.\nSee also\nList of rulers of the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia\nList\nSS-Obergruppenführer\nWitnesses and testimonies of the Armenian genocide\nEndnotes\n↑\nRegarding personal names:\nFreiherr\nis a former title (translated as\n'\nBaron\n'\n). In Germany since 1919, it forms part of family names. The feminine forms are\nFreifrau\nand\nFreiin\n.\n↑\n\"No. 27675\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 10 May 1904. p.\n2999.\n↑\nIhrig, Stefan\nJustifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler\n, Harvard:\nHarvard University Press\n, 2016\nISBN\n978-0-674-50479-0\n↑\nWeinberg, Gerhard\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36\n, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 36.\n↑\nKlee, Ernst (2007).\nDas Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945\n. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag. p.\n434.\nISBN\n978-3-596-16048-8\n.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume V, pp. 543-544, Document 2879-PS\"\n(PDF)\n. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946\n. Retrieved\n10 April\n2021\n.\n↑\nMesserschmidt, Manfred\n\"Foreign Policy and Preparation for War\" from\nGermany and the Second World War\nVolume I, Clarendon Press: Oxford, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, 1990, pp. 636–637\n↑\nCarr, William\nArms, Autarky and Aggression\nEdward Arnold: London, United Kingdom, 1972, pp. 73–78\n1\n2\nWeinberg, Gerhard\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany\n, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 39–40\n↑\nWeinberg, Gerhard\nThe Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II\n, pp. 39–40.\n1\n2\n3\nWilliam Shirer,\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n(Touchstone Edition) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990)\n↑\n\"\n'Protector' Takes His Post In Prague; Von Neurath Replaces Army Rule Over Bohemia-Moravia With Civil Authority\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 6 April 1939\n. Retrieved\n6 July\n2025\n.\n↑\n\"Czech State Gets Gestapo Master; Heydrich, Chief Lieutenant of Himmler, Succeeds Von Neurath as Protector\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. AP. 28 September 1941\n. Retrieved\n6 July\n2025\n.\n↑\nDaniel T. Brigham (5 June 1942).\n\"Heydrich Is Dead; Czech Toll At 178\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\n6 July\n2025\n.\n↑\n\"Daluege Shift Confirmed\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 31 May 1942\n. Retrieved\n6 July\n2025\n.\n↑\n\"Neurath Ouster Stressed\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. 25 August 1943\n. Retrieved\n6 July\n2025\n.\n1\n2\n\"Konstantin von Neurath\"\n.\nencyclopedia.ushmm.org\n. Retrieved\n13 February\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Konstantin, baron von Neurath | German Diplomat, Nazi, WW2 | Britannica\"\n.\nwww.britannica.com\n. 29 January 2024\n. Retrieved\n13 February\n2024\n.\nReferences\nCraig, Gordon \"The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop\" pp.\n406–436 from\nThe Diplomats 1919–39\nedited by\nGordon A. Craig\nand\nFelix Gilbert\n, Princeton:\nPrinceton University Press\n, 1953.\nHeineman, John Louis\nHitler's First Foreign Minister\n: Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman\n, Berkeley\n:\nUniversity of California Press\n, 1979\nISBN\n0-520-03442-2\n.\nIhrig, Stefan\nJustifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler\n, Harvard:\nHarvard University Press\n, 2016\nISBN\n978-0-674-50479-0\n.\nNekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich.\nPariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941\n(Columbia University Press, 1997).\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nKonstantin von Neurath\n.\nNewspaper clippings about Konstantin von Neurath\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "appointed_by": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "preceded_by": "Heinrich Brüning",
+      "succeeded_by": "Joachim von Ribbentrop",
+      "president": "Paul von HindenburgAdolf Hitler(asFührer)",
+      "chancellor": "Franz von PapenKurt von SchleicherAdolf Hitler",
+      "born": "Konstantin Hermann Karl von Neurath(1873-02-02)2 February 1873Kleinglattbach, German Empire",
+      "died": "14 August 1956(1956-08-14)(aged83)Enzweihingen, West Germany",
+      "party": "Nazi Party(1937–1945)",
+      "spouse": "Marie Auguste Moser von Filseck​​(m.1901)​",
+      "children": "2",
+      "alma_mater": "Friedrich Wilhelm UniversityUniversity of Tübingen",
+      "occupation": "Diplomat",
+      "profession": "Lawyer",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler Cabinet",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1916",
+      "unit": "Grenadier Regiment \"Queen Olga\" (26th Division)",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "awards": "Iron Cross, 1st classWound Badge",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "15 years imprisonment"
+    },
+    "char_count": 15082
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Hans_Fritzsche",
+    "name": "Hans Fritzsche",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "August Franz Anton Hans Fritzsche was a German journalist and broadcaster who was the Ministerialdirektor at the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda of Nazi Germany. He was the preeminent German broadcaster of his time, as part of efforts to present a more popular and entertaining side of the Nazi regime, and his voice was recognised by the majority of Germans.",
+    "description": "German Nazi official",
+    "full_text": "Hans Fritzsche\nGerman Nazi official\n\"Hans Fritsche\" redirects here. For the German Wehrmacht officer, see\nList of Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross recipients (F)\n.\nAugust Franz Anton Hans Fritzsche\n(21 April 1900 – 27 September 1953)\nwas a German journalist and broadcaster who was the\nMinisterialdirektor\nat the\nReich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda\nof\nNazi Germany\n. He was the preeminent German broadcaster of his time, as part of efforts to present a more popular and entertaining side of the Nazi regime, and his voice was recognised by the majority of Germans.\nAfter serving in the\nImperial German Army\nin the\nFirst World War\n, Fritzsche joined\nAlfred Hugenberg\n's\nGerman National People's Party\n. He began his broadcasting career in 1932, and a year later his agency was incorporated into\nJoseph Goebbels\n's Propaganda Ministry, upon which he also became a member of the\nNazi Party\n. He became head of the ministry's Press Division in 1938, and head of the Radio Division in 1942. Despite his prominence in German radio, Fritzsche played no significant role in the formulation of policy.\nFritzsche was present in the Berlin\nFührerbunker\nduring the last days of\nAdolf Hitler\n. After Hitler's death, he surrendered to the\nRed Army\n. He was indicted for war crimes in the\nNuremberg trials\nbefore the International Military Tribunal but was acquitted of all charges. In January 1947, a German\ndenazification\ncourt sentenced him to nine years of hard labour. He was released under an amnesty in 1950 and died three years later.\nBiography\nFritzsche was born in\nBochum\n(a city in the\nRuhr\nregion) to a Prussian postal clerk. He volunteered in the\nGerman Army\nin 1917 as a private soldier,\nand served in Flanders. After the war, he studied at the universities of\nGreifswald\nand\nBerlin\n, but did not pass his examinations.\nIn 1923 he joined the conservative\nGerman National People's Party\nheaded by\nAlfred Hugenberg\nand also became a journalist for the Hugenberg Press, which promoted nationalistic opinions not very different from the Nazis.\nIn September 1932, he began his broadcasting career as head of the\nDrahtloser Dienst\n(the Wireless News service, a government agency), and started his first broadcast, a daily program called \"Hans Fritzsche speaking\" (\nEs spricht Hans Fritzsche\n).\nFollowing the\nNazi seizure of power\n, the Wireless News service with Fritzsche as its head, was incorporated into\nJoseph Goebbels\n'\nPropaganda Ministry\non 1 May 1933. Fritzsche joined the Nazi Party that same day.\nHe later joined the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA). He also was made a member of the\nAcademy for German Law\n.\nIn 1938, Fritzsche became head of the Press Division. In November 1942, he became head of the Radio Division. Fritzsche had no involvement in creating policy.\nDuring the war, Fritzsche was Germany's most prominent radio commentator.\nIn April 1945, he was present in the\nBerlin\nFührerbunker\nduring the last days of\nAdolf Hitler\nand Goebbels. After\nHitler's suicide\non 30 April 1945, Goebbels assumed Hitler's role as chancellor.\nOn 1 May, Goebbels completed his sole official act as chancellor. He dictated a letter to Soviet Army General\nVasily Chuikov\n, requesting a temporary ceasefire and ordered German General\nHans Krebs\nto deliver it. Chuikov commanded the Soviet forces in central Berlin.\nAfter this was rejected since the Soviets demanded unconditional capitulation, Goebbels decided that further efforts were futile.\nGoebbels then launched into a tirade berating the generals, reminding them Hitler forbade them to surrender. Fritzsche left the room to try to take matters into his own hands. He went to his nearby office on Wilhelmplatz and wrote a surrender letter addressed to Soviet Marshall\nGeorgy Zhukov\n. An angry and drunk General\nWilhelm Burgdorf\nfollowed Fritzsche to his office.\nThere he asked Fritzsche if he intended to surrender Berlin. Fritzsche replied that he was going to do just that. Burgdorf shouted that Hitler had forbidden surrender and as a civilian he had no authority to do so. Burgdorf then pulled his pistol to shoot Fritzsche, but a radio technician knocked the gun and the bullet misfired, hitting the ceiling. Several men then hustled Burgdorf out of the office and he returned to the bunker.\nFritzsche then left his office and went over to the Soviet lines and offered to surrender the city.\nMilitary tribunal\n17 October 1946 newsreel of\nNuremberg Trials\nsentencing\nFritzsche was taken prisoner by Soviet\nRed Army\nsoldiers. At first he was held prisoner in a basement and then sent to Moscow for interrogation at\nLubyanka Prison\nwhere, according to his own account, three gold teeth were yanked from his mouth upon arrival. He was confined to a \"standing coffin\", a\n3-square-foot (0.28\nm\n)\ncell where it was impossible to sleep, and placed on a bread and hot water diet. He eventually signed a confession.\nLater, he wrote his account of Soviet prison while on trial at Nuremberg,\nwhich was published in Switzerland.\nFritzsche was sent to Nuremberg, and tried before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n. He was charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against peace,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n. In his positions in the propaganda apparatus of the Nazi State, Fritzsche played a role to further the conspiracy to commit atrocities and to launch the war of aggression. According to journalist and author\nWilliam L. Shirer\n, it was unclear to the attendees why he was charged. Shirer remarked that \"no-one in the courtroom, including Fritzsche, seemed to know why he was there – he was too small a fry – unless it were as a ghost for Goebbels\".\nAccording to the IMT prosecution, he \"incited and encouraged the commission of War Crimes by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German People those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities\". Fritzsche was acquitted because the court was \"not  prepared  to  hold  that  [his  broadcasts]  were  intended  to incite  the  German  people  to  commit  atrocities  on  conquered  peoples\".\nHe was one of only three defendants to be acquitted at Nuremberg (along with\nHjalmar Schacht\nand\nFranz von Papen\n).\nNuremberg prosecutor\nAlexander Hardy\nlater said that evidence not available to the prosecution at the time proved Fritzsche not only knew of the extermination of European Jews but also \"played an important part in bringing [Nazi crimes] about,\" and would have resulted in his conviction and execution.\nFritzsche was classified as Group I (Major Offenders) by a\ndenazification\ncourt, which sentenced him to nine years of hard labor in a labor camp on 31 January 1947.\nHe was released under an amnesty in September 1950. He married his second wife, Hildegard Springer, in 1950.\nFritzsche died of cancer in 1953. His wife died by suicide the same year.\nFritzsche, along with\nAlbert Speer\nand\nBaldur von Schirach\n, were eventually communed by Lutheran Pastor\nHenry F. Gerecke\nand were administered the\nEucharist\n.\nAccording to British intelligence, Fritzsche, in the early 1950s, was part of the\nNaumann Circle\n, a group of ex-Nazis who aimed to infiltrate the\nFree Democratic Party\nand eventually restore the Nazi state.\nPublications\nFritzsche, Hans (1953). as told to Hildegard Springer-Fritzsche (ed.).\nThe Sword in The Scales\n. Translated by Diana Pyke, Heinrich Fraenkel. London: Allan Wingate.\nAccount of the Nuremberg trials.\nSee also\nDownfall\n, 2004 German film where he was portrayed by actor\nMichael Brandner\nReich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda\nReferences\nCitations\n1\n2\n3\nChristopher H. Sterling: Encyclopedia of Radio. Routledge, 2003\n1\n2\nEugene Davidson: The Trial of the Germans. University of Missouri Press, 1997.\n1\n2\nWistrich, Robert (1982).\nWho's Who in Nazi Germany\n. Macmillan Publishing Co. p.\n85.\nISBN\n0-02-630600-X\n.\n1\n2\n\"Hans Fritzsche | German journalist\"\n.\nEncyclopedia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n2021-04-21\n.\n↑\n\"Hans Fritzsche, 53, Hitler Radio Chief\".\nNew York Times\n. 29 September 1953. p.\n29.\n↑\nGassert, Philipp (2001). \"\n\"This is Hans Fritzsche\": A Nazi Broadcaster and His Audience\".\nJournal of Radio Studies\n.\n8\n:\n81–\n103.\ndoi\n:\n10.1207/s15506843jrs0801_8\n.\nS2CID\n144590782\n.\n↑\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n, pp. 949–950, 955.\n↑\nFest, Joachim (2004) .\nInside Hitler's Bunker\n, pp. 135–137.\n↑\nVinogradov, V. K. (2005).\nHitler's Death: Russia's Last Great Secret from the Files of the KGB\n, p. 324.\n↑\nFest (2004) .\nInside Hitler's Bunker\n, p. 137.\n1\n2\nFest (2004) .\nInside Hitler's Bunker\n, pp. 137–139.\n1\n2\n\"\nWhy They Confess: The remarkable case of Hans Fritzsche\n\", Konrad Heiden,\nLife Magazine\n, 20 June 1949, pp. 92–94, 96, 99–100, 102, 105. Retrieved 2012-04-16.\n↑\nHier spricht Hans Fritzsche\n, Zurich: Interverlag.\n↑\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n.\nNew York City\n:\nSimon & Schuster\n.\n↑\nTimmermann 2006\n, p.\n828.\n↑\nFritzsche case for the defence at Nuremberg trials\nArchived\n2017-12-29 at the\nWayback Machine\n(in Spanish)\n1\n2\nGordon 2014\n, p.\n579.\n↑\nTimmermann 2006\n, p.\n829.\n↑\nSchmidt, Dana Adams (1947-02-01).\n\"Germans Give Fritzsche 9 Years; Hitler Photographer Receives 10; Germans Give Fritzsche 9 Years; Hitler Photographer Receives 10\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\n2022-09-21\n.\n↑\nRailton, Nicholas M. “Henry Gerecke and the Saints of Nuremberg.” Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, vol. 13, no. 1, 2000, pp. 112–137. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43750887. Accessed 8 Feb. 2021.\n↑\nFritzsche prüfte Werbekraft.\nIn:\nDie Welt\n.\n7. Februar 1953.\nSources\nGordon, Gregory S. (2014). \"The Forgotten Nuremberg Hate Speech Case: Otto Dietrich and the Future of Persecution Law\".\nOhio State Law Journal\n.\n75\n:\n571–\n607.\nSSRN\n2457641\n.\nTimmermann, Wibke Kristin\n(2006).\n\"Incitement in international criminal law\"\n(PDF)\n.\nInternational Review of the Red Cross\n.\n88\n(864):\n823–\n852.\ndoi\n:\n10.1017/S1816383107000793\n.\nS2CID\n146648227\n.\nFurther reading\nGordon, Gregory S.\n(2017).\nAtrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, Fruition\n.\nOxford University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-19-061270-2\n.\nHardy, Alexander G. (1967).\nHitler's Secret Weapon: The \"Managed\" Press and Propaganda Machine of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Vantage Press.\nExternal links\nMedia related to\nHans Fritzsche\nat Wikimedia Commons\nQuotations related to\nHans Fritzsche\nat Wikiquote\nNewspaper clippings about Hans Fritzsche\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "born": "(1900-04-21)21 April 1900Bochum,Province of Westphalia,Kingdom of Prussia,German Empire",
+      "died": "27 September 1953(1953-09-27)(aged53)Cologne,North Rhine-Westphalia,West Germany",
+      "nationality": "German",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "other_politicalaffiliations": "German National People's Party",
+      "spouse": "Hildegard Fritzsche",
+      "alma_mater": "University of GreifswaldHumboldt University of Berlin",
+      "occupation": "Ministerialdirektorin theMinistry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda",
+      "profession": "Journalist, Government Official",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1917–1918",
+      "rank": "Soldat",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I"
+    },
+    "char_count": 10368
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Martin_Bormann",
+    "name": "Martin Bormann",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Martin Ludwig Bormann was a German Nazi Party official and head of the Nazi Party Chancellery, private secretary to Adolf Hitler, and a war criminal. Bormann gained immense power by using his position as Hitler's private secretary to control the flow of information and access to Hitler. He used his position to create an extensive bureaucracy and involve himself as much as possible in the decision-making.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician (1900–1945)",
+    "full_text": "Martin Bormann\nGerman Nazi politician (1900–1945)\nFor his son, see\nMartin Adolf Bormann\n.\nMartin Ludwig Bormann\n(17 June 1900 – 2 May 1945) was a German\nNazi Party\nofficial and head of the\nNazi Party Chancellery\n, private secretary to\nAdolf Hitler\n, and a war criminal. Bormann gained immense power by using his position as Hitler's private secretary to control the flow of information and access to Hitler. He used his position to create an extensive bureaucracy and involve himself as much as possible in the decision-making.\nBormann joined a paramilitary\nFreikorps\norganisation in 1922 while working as manager of a large estate. He served nearly a year in prison as an accomplice to his friend\nRudolf Höss\n(later commandant of\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n) in the murder of\nWalther Kadow\n. Bormann joined the Nazi Party in 1927 and the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) in 1937. He initially worked in the party's insurance service, and transferred in July 1933 to the office of\nDeputy Führer\nRudolf Hess\n, where he served as chief of staff.\nBormann gained acceptance into Hitler's inner circle and accompanied him everywhere, providing briefings and summaries of events and requests. He was appointed as Hitler's personal secretary on 12 April 1943.\nAfter Hess's solo flight to Britain on 10 May 1941 to seek peace negotiations with the British government, Bormann assumed Hess's former duties, with the title of Head of the\nParteikanzlei\n(\nParty Chancellery\n). He had final approval over civil service appointments, and helped review and approve legislation. He was a leading proponent of reducing the influence of Christian churches and favoured harsh treatment of\nJews\nand\nSlavs\nin the areas conquered by Germany during World War II.\nBormann returned with Hitler to the\nFührerbunker\nin Berlin on 16 January 1945 as the\nRed Army\napproached the city. After\nHitler committed suicide\n, Bormann and others attempted to flee Berlin on 2 May to avoid capture by the Soviets. Bormann probably committed suicide on a bridge near\nLehrter station\n. His body was buried nearby on 8 May 1945, but was not found and confirmed as Bormann's until 1973; the identification was reaffirmed in 1998 by\nDNA tests\n. The missing Bormann was tried\nin absentia\nby the International Military Tribunal in the\nNuremberg trials\nof 1945 and 1946. He was convicted of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nand sentenced to death by hanging.\nEarly life and education\nBorn in\nWegeleben\n(now in\nSaxony-Anhalt\n) in the\nKingdom of Prussia\nin the\nGerman Empire\n, Bormann was the son of Theodor Bormann (1862–1903), a post office employee, and his second wife, Antonie Bernhardine Mennong. The family was\nLutheran\n. He had two half-siblings (Else and Walter Bormann) from his father's earlier marriage to Louise Grobler, who died in 1898. Antonie Bormann gave birth to three sons, one of whom died in infancy. Martin and\nAlbert\n(1902–1989) survived to adulthood. Theodor died when Bormann was three, and his mother soon remarried.\nBormann's studies at an agricultural trade high school were interrupted when he joined the 55th Field Artillery Regiment as a gunner in June 1918, in the final months of\nWorld War I\n. He never saw action, but served garrison duty until February 1919. After working a short time in a cattle feed mill, Bormann became estate manager of a large farm in\nMecklenburg\n.\nShortly after starting work at the estate, Bormann joined an\nantisemitic\nlandowners association.\nWhile\nhyperinflation in the Weimar Republic\nmeant that money was worthless, foodstuffs stored on farms and estates became ever more valuable. Many estates, including Bormann's, had\nFreikorps\nunits stationed on site to guard the crops from pillaging.\nBormann joined the\nFreikorps\norganisation headed by\nGerhard Roßbach\nin 1922, acting as section leader and treasurer.\nOn 17 March 1924 Bormann was sentenced to a year in Elisabethstrasse Prison as an accomplice to his friend\nRudolf Höss\nin the murder of\nWalther Kadow\n.\nThe perpetrators believed Kadow had tipped off the\nFrench occupation\nauthorities in the\nRuhr District\nthat fellow\nFreikorps\nmember\nAlbert Leo Schlageter\nwas carrying out\nsabotage\noperations against French industries. Schlageter was arrested and was executed on 26 May 1923. On the night of 31 May, Höss, Bormann and several others took Kadow into a meadow out of town, where he was beaten and had his throat cut.\nAfter one of the perpetrators confessed, police dug up the body and laid charges in July.\nBormann was released from prison in February 1925.\nHe joined the\nFrontbann\n, a short-lived\nNazi Party\nparamilitary organisation created to replace the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA; storm detachment or assault division), which had been banned in the aftermath of the failed\nMunich Putsch\n. Bormann returned to his job at Mecklenburg and remained there until May 1926, when he moved in with his mother in Oberweimar.\nCareer in the Nazi Party\nIn 1927, Bormann joined the Nazi Party. His membership number was 60,508.\nHe joined the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) on 1 January 1937 with number 278,267.\nBy special order of\nHeinrich Himmler\nin 1938, Bormann was granted SS number 555 to reflect his\nAlter Kämpfer\n(Old Fighter) status.\nEarly career\nBormann took a job with\nDer Nationalsozialist\n, a weekly paper edited by Nazi Party member\nHans Severus Ziegler\n, who was deputy\nGauleiter\n(party leader) for\nThuringia\n. After joining the Nazi Party in 1927, Bormann began duties as regional press officer, but his lack of public-speaking skills made him ill-suited to this position. He soon put his organisational skills to use as business manager for the\nGau\n(region).\nIn October 1928, Bormann moved to Munich where he worked in the SA insurance office. Initially the Nazi Party provided coverage through insurance companies for members who were hurt or killed in the frequent violent skirmishes with members of other political parties. As insurance companies were unwilling to pay out claims for such activities, in 1930 Bormann set up the\nHilfskasse der NSDAP\n(Nazi Party Auxiliary Fund), a benefits and relief fund directly administered by the party. Each party member was required to pay premiums and might receive compensation for injuries sustained while conducting party business. Payments out of the fund were made solely at Bormann's discretion. He began to gain a reputation as a financial expert, and many party members felt personally indebted to him after receiving benefits from the fund.\nIn addition to its stated purpose, the fund was used as a last-resort source of funding for the Nazi Party, which was chronically short of money at that time.\nAfter the Nazi Party's success in the\n1930 general election\n, where they won 107 seats, party membership grew dramatically.\nBy 1932 the fund was collecting\n3 million\nℛ\n︁\nℳ\n︁\nper year.\nBormann also worked on the staff of the SA from 1928 to 1930, and while there he founded the National Socialist Automobile Corps, precursor to the\nNational Socialist Motor Corps\n. The organisation was responsible for co-ordinating the donated use of motor vehicles belonging to party members, and later expanded to training members in automotive skills.\nReichsleiter\nand head of the party chancellery\nAfter the\nMachtergreifung\n(Nazi Party seizure of power) in January 1933, the relief fund was repurposed to provide general accident and property insurance, so Bormann resigned from its administration. He applied for a transfer and was accepted as chief of staff in the office of\nRudolf Hess\n, the\nDeputy Führer\n, on 1 July 1933.\nBormann also served as personal secretary to Hess from July 1933 until 12 May 1941.\nHess's department was responsible for settling disputes within the party and acted as an intermediary between the party and the state regarding policy decisions and legislation.\nBormann used his position to create an extensive bureaucracy and involve himself in as much of the decision-making as possible.\nOn 10 October 1933 Hitler named Bormann\nReichsleiter\n(national leader – the second highest political rank) of the Nazi Party.\nAt the\nNovember 1933 parliamentary election\n, Bormann was elected as a\nReichstag\ndeputy from electoral constituency 5 (\nFrankfurt an der Oder\n); he was reelected in 1936 and 1938.\nBy June 1934, Bormann was gaining acceptance into Hitler's inner circle and accompanied him everywhere, providing briefings and summaries of events and requests.\nBormann in 1939\nIn 1935, Bormann was appointed as overseer of renovations at the\nBerghof\n, Hitler's property at\nObersalzberg\n. In the early 1930s, Hitler bought the property, which he had been renting since 1925 as a vacation retreat. After he became\nchancellor\n, Hitler drew up plans for expansion and remodelling of the main house and put Bormann in charge of construction. Bormann commissioned the construction of barracks for the SS guards, roads and footpaths, garages for motor vehicles, a guesthouse, accommodation for staff, and other amenities. Retaining title in his own name, Bormann bought up adjacent farms until the entire complex covered\n10 square kilometres (3.9\nsq\nmi)\n. Members of the inner circle built houses within the perimeter, beginning with\nHermann Göring\n,\nAlbert Speer\n, and Bormann himself.\nBormann commissioned the building of the\nKehlsteinhaus\n(Eagle's Nest), a tea house high above the Berghof, as a gift to Hitler on his fiftieth birthday (20 April 1939). Hitler seldom used the building, but Bormann liked to impress guests by taking them there.\nWhile Hitler was in residence at the Berghof, Bormann was constantly in attendance and acted as Hitler's personal secretary. In this capacity, he began to control the flow of information and access to Hitler.\nDuring this period, Hitler gave Bormann control of his personal finances. In addition to salaries as chancellor and president, Hitler's income included money raised through royalties collected on his book\nMein Kampf\nand the use of his image on postage stamps. Bormann set up the\nAdolf Hitler Fund of German Trade and Industry\n, which collected money from German industrialists on Hitler's behalf. Some of the funds received through this programme were disbursed to various party leaders, but Bormann retained most of it for Hitler's personal use.\nBormann and others took notes of Hitler's thoughts expressed over dinner and in monologues late into the night and preserved them. The material was published after the war as\nHitler's Table Talk\n.\nHistorian Mikael Nilsson contends that Bormann (along with\nHenry Picker\nand\nHeinrich Heim\n, who transcribed the material) distorted the table talks so that the content would be useful to help him win disagreements within the Nazi leadership. Picker noted Bormann would make him insert fictitious statements, and that Bormann wanted their notes to fit in with his own fight against the churches. Nilsson notes that Bormann seemed willing to pursue his anti-Christian stance behind Hitler's back.\nThe office of the Deputy Führer had final approval over civil service appointments, and Bormann reviewed the personnel files and made the decisions regarding appointments. This power impinged on the purview of Minister of the Interior\nWilhelm Frick\n, and was an example of the overlapping responsibilities typical of the Nazi regime.\nBormann travelled everywhere with Hitler, including trips to Austria in 1938 after the\nAnschluss\n(the annexation of Austria into\nNazi Germany\n), and to the\nSudetenland\nafter the signing of the\nMunich Agreement\nlater that year.\nBormann was placed in charge of organising the 1938\nNuremberg Rally\n, a major annual party event.\nBormann (in front beside Hitler) in Paris, June 1940\nHitler intentionally played top party members against one another and the Nazi Party against the civil service. In this way, he fostered distrust, competition, and infighting among his subordinates to consolidate and maximise his own power.\nHe typically did not give written orders; instead he communicated with them verbally or had them conveyed through Bormann.\nFalling out of favour with Bormann meant that access to Hitler was cut off.\nBormann proved to be a master of intricate political infighting. Along with his ability to control access to Hitler, this enabled him to curtail the power of\nJoseph Goebbels\n, Göring, Himmler,\nAlfred Rosenberg\n,\nRobert Ley\n,\nHans Frank\n, Speer, and other high-ranking officials, many of whom became his enemies. This ruthless and continuous infighting for power, influence, and Hitler's favour came to characterise the inner workings of the Third Reich.\nAs\nWorld War II\nprogressed, Hitler's attention became focused on foreign affairs and the conduct of the war to the exclusion of all else. Hess, not directly engaged in either of these endeavours, became increasingly sidelined from the affairs of the nation and from Hitler's attention; Bormann had successfully supplanted Hess in many of his duties and usurped his position at Hitler's side. Hess was concerned that Germany would face a war on two fronts as plans progressed for\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the invasion of the\nSoviet Union\nscheduled to take place later that year. He flew solo to Britain on 10 May 1941 to seek peace negotiations with the British government.\nHe was arrested on arrival and spent the rest of the war as a British prisoner, eventually receiving a life sentence\n–\nfor crimes against peace (planning and preparing a war of aggression), and conspiracy with other German leaders to commit crimes\n–\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nin 1946.\nSpeer later said Hitler described Hess's departure as one of the worst blows of his life, as he considered it a personal betrayal.\nHitler ordered Hess to be shot should he return to Germany and abolished the post of Deputy Führer on 12 May 1941, assigning Hess's former duties to Bormann, with the title of Head of the\nParteikanzlei\n(\nParty Chancellery\n).\nIn this position he was responsible for all Nazi Party appointments, and was answerable only to Hitler.\nBy a Führer decree (\nFührererlass\n) on 29 May, Bormann also succeeded Hess on the six-member\nCouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Reich\n, which operated as a war cabinet. He simultaneously was awarded cabinet rank equivalent to a\nReichsminister\nwithout portfolio\n.\nAssociates began to refer to him as the \"\nBrown\nEminence\n\", although never to his face.\nBormann's power and effective reach broadened considerably during the war.\nBy early 1943, the war produced a labour crisis for the regime. Hitler created a three-man committee with representatives of the State, the army, and the Party in an attempt to centralise control of the war economy. The committee members were\nHans Lammers\n(head of the\nReich Chancellery\n), Field Marshal\nWilhelm Keitel\n, chief of the\nOberkommando der Wehrmacht\n(Armed Forces High Command; OKW), and Bormann, who controlled the Party. The committee was intended to independently propose measures regardless of the wishes of various ministries, with Hitler reserving most final decisions to himself. The committee, soon known as the\nDreierausschuß\n(Committee of Three), met eleven times between January and August 1943. However, they ran up against resistance from Hitler's cabinet ministers, who headed deeply entrenched spheres of influence and were excluded from the committee. Seeing it as a threat to their power, Goebbels, Göring, and Speer worked together to bring it down. The result was that nothing changed, and the Committee of Three declined into irrelevance.\nRole in\nKirchenkampf\nArticle 24 of the\nNational Socialist Program\n, issued in 1920, advocated for\npositive Christianity\n,\nand a\nReichskonkordat\n(Reich Concordat) treaty with the\nVatican\nwas signed in 1933, purporting to guarantee religious freedom for Catholics. But many Nazis believed that Christianity was fundamentally incompatible with Nazism. Bormann, who was strongly anti-Christian, agreed.\nHistorian\nAlan Bullock\ncomments that out of political expediency, Hitler intended to postpone the elimination of the Christian churches until after the war,\nbut his repeated hostile statements against the church indicated to his subordinates that a continuation of the\nKirchenkampf\n(church struggle) would be tolerated and even encouraged.\nRichard Steigmann-Gall\ndisagrees with this view.\nBormann was one of the leading proponents of the ongoing campaign against the Christian churches.\nSpeer notes in his memoirs that while drafting plans for\nWelthauptstadt Germania\n, the planned rebuilding of Berlin, he was told by Bormann that churches were not to be allocated any building sites.\nHowever, on the subject of religion, Bormann's decisions were often countermanded, frequently by Hitler himself.\nAs part of the campaign against the\nCatholic Church\n, hundreds of monasteries in Germany and Austria were confiscated by the Gestapo and their occupants were expelled.\nIn 1941, the Catholic Bishop of Münster,\nClemens August Graf von Galen\n, publicly protested against this persecution and against\nAction T4\n, the Nazi\ninvoluntary euthanasia\nprogramme under which the mentally ill, physically deformed, and incurably sick were to be killed. In a series of sermons that received international attention, he criticised the programme as illegal and immoral. His sermons led to a widespread\nprotest movement among church leaders\n, the strongest protest against a Nazi policy up until that point. Bormann and others called for Galen to be hanged, but Hitler and Goebbels concluded that Galen's death would only be viewed as a martyrdom and lead to further unrest. Hitler decided to deal with the issue when the war was over.\nSteigmann-Gall comments that \"absent is firm evidence\" that Nazism sought to eliminate Christianity.\nGeorge Mosse\nwrote of Bormann's beliefs:\n[He believed that] God is present, but as a world-force which presides over the laws of life which the Nazis alone have understood. This non-Christian theism, tied to Nordic blood, was current in Germany long before Bormann wrote down his own thoughts on the matter. It must now be restored, and the catastrophic mistakes of the past centuries, which had put the power of the state into the hands of the Church, must be avoided. The Gauleiters are advised to conquer the influence of the Christian Churches by keeping them divided, encouraging particularism among them...\nRichard Overy\ndescribes Bormann as an atheist.\nPersonal Secretary to the\nFührer\nPreoccupied with military matters and spending most of his time at his military headquarters on the\neastern front\n, Hitler came to rely more and more on Bormann to handle the domestic policies of the country. On 12 April 1943, Hitler officially appointed Bormann as Personal Secretary to the\nFührer\n.\nSpeer described Bormann as having\nde facto\ncontrol over all domestic matters, and this new appointment gave him the power to act in an official capacity in any matter.\nHistorian\nJonathan Petropoulos\nnotes that all\nFührer\ndecrees were routed through Lammers at the Reich Chancellery, where state affairs were handled.\nBormann (behind and to Hitler's right) on the\nOld Bridge, Maribor\n, Yugoslavia, April 1941 (now Maribor, Slovenia)\nBormann was invariably the advocate of extremely harsh, radical measures when it came to the treatment of\nJews\n, the conquered eastern peoples, and prisoners of war.\nHe signed the decree of 31 May 1941 extending the 1935\nNuremberg Laws\nto the annexed territories of the East.\nThereafter, he signed the decree of 9 October 1942 prescribing that the permanent\nFinal Solution\nin\nGreater Germany\ncould no longer be solved by emigration, but only by the use of \"ruthless force in the special camps of the East\", that is, extermination in\nNazi death camps\n.\nA further decree, signed by Bormann on 1 July 1943, gave\nAdolf Eichmann\nabsolute powers over Jews, who now came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Gestapo.\nHistorian\nRichard J. Evans\nestimates that 5.5 to 6 million Jews, representing two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe, were exterminated by the Nazi regime in the course of\nThe Holocaust\n.\nKnowing Hitler viewed the\nSlavs\nas inferior, Bormann opposed the introduction of German criminal law into the conquered eastern territories. He lobbied for and eventually achieved a strict separate penal code that implemented\nmartial law\nfor the Polish and Jewish inhabitants of these areas. The \"Edict on Criminal Law Practices against Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern Territories\", promulgated 4 December 1941, permitted corporal punishment and death sentences for even the most trivial of offences.\nBormann supported the hard-line approach of\nErich Koch\n,\nReichskommissar\nin\nReichskommissariat Ukraine\n, in his brutal treatment of Slavic people.\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, serving as head of the\nReich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories\n, favoured a more moderate policy. After touring collective farms around\nVinnytsia\n, Ukraine, Bormann was concerned about the health and good physical constitution of the population, as he was concerned that they could constitute a danger to the regime. After discussion with Hitler, he issued a policy directive to Rosenberg that read in part:\nThe Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. As to food, they are to not get more than necessary. We are the masters; we come first.\nBormann and Himmler shared responsibility\nfor the\nVolkssturm\n(people's militia), which drafted all remaining able-bodied men aged 16 to 60 into a last-ditch militia founded on 18 October 1944. Poorly equipped and trained, the men were sent to fight on the eastern front, where nearly 175,000 of them were killed without having any discernible impact on the Soviet advance.\nIn early 1945, Bormann edited the\nBormann dictations\nof supposed remarks made by Hitler to Bormann; the authenticity as well as the degree of editing applied by Bormann to Hitler's original remarks are disputed among historians.\nLast days in Berlin\nOn 16 January 1945, Hitler transferred his headquarters to the\nFührerbunker\n(\"Leader's bunker\") in Berlin, where he (along with Bormann, Bormann's secretary\nElse Krüger\n, and others) remained until the end of April.\nThe\nFührerbunker\nwas located under the Reich Chancellery garden in the government district of the city centre. The\nBattle of Berlin\n, the final major Soviet offensive of the war, began on 16 April 1945.\nBy 19 April, the\nRed Army\nstarted to encircle the city.\nOn 20 April, his 56th birthday, Hitler made his last trip above ground. In the ruined garden of the Reich Chancellery, he awarded\nIron Crosses\nto boy soldiers of the\nHitler Youth\n.\nThat afternoon, Berlin was bombarded by Soviet artillery for the first time.\nOn 23 April,\nAlbert Bormann\nleft the bunker complex and flew to the Obersalzberg. He and several others had been ordered by Hitler to leave Berlin.\nIn the early morning hours of 29 April 1945,\nWilhelm Burgdorf\n, Goebbels,\nHans Krebs\nand Bormann witnessed and signed\nHitler's last will and testament\n. In the will, Hitler described Bormann as \"my most faithful Party comrade\" and named him executor of the estate.\nThat same night Hitler married\nEva Braun\nin a civil ceremony.\nAs Soviet forces continued to fight their way into the centre of Berlin, Hitler and Braun\ncommitted suicide\non the afternoon of 30 April. Braun took\ncyanide\nand Hitler shot himself.\nPursuant to Hitler's instructions, their bodies were carried up to the Reich Chancellery garden and burned. In accordance with Hitler's last wishes, Bormann was named as\nParty Minister\n,\nthus officially confirming that he held the top position in the Party. Grand Admiral\nKarl Dönitz\nwas appointed as the new\nReichspräsident\n(President of Germany) and Goebbels became\nhead of government\nand\nChancellor of Germany\n.\nHitler did not name any successor to the title Führer.\nGoebbels and his wife\nMagda\ncommitted suicide the next day.\nThe Battle in Berlin ended when General der Artillerie\nHelmuth Weidling\n, commander of the Berlin Defence Area, unconditionally surrendered the city to General\nVasily Chuikov\n, commander of the\nSoviet 8th Guards Army\non 2 May.\nDeath, rumours of survival and discovery of remains\n1 October 1946 newsreel of\nNuremberg trials\nsentencing\nAxmann's account of Bormann's death\nAt around 11:00 pm on 1 May, Bormann left the\nFührerbunker\nwith SS doctor\nLudwig Stumpfegger\n,\nHitler Youth\nleader\nArtur Axmann\n, and Hitler's pilot\nHans Baur\n, part of one of the groups attempting to break out of the Soviet encirclement.\nBormann carried with him a copy of Hitler's last will and testament.\nThe group left the\nFührerbunker\nand travelled on foot via an\nU-Bahn\nsubway tunnel to the\nFriedrichstraße station\n, where they surfaced.\nSeveral members of the party attempted to cross the\nSpree\nRiver at the\nWeidendammer Bridge\nwhile crouching behind a\nTiger tank\n. The tank was hit by an anti-tank round and Bormann and Stumpfegger were knocked to the ground.\nBormann, Stumpfegger, and several others eventually crossed the river on their third attempt.\nBormann, Stumpfegger, and Axmann walked along the railway tracks to\nLehrter station\n, where Axmann decided to leave the others and go in the opposite direction.\nWhen he encountered a Red Army patrol, Axmann doubled back. He saw two bodies, which he later identified as Bormann and Stumpfegger, on a bridge near the railway shunting yard.\nHe did not have time to check thoroughly, so he did not know how they died.\nSince the Soviets never admitted to finding Bormann's body, his fate remained in doubt for many years.\nTried at Nuremberg\nin absentia\nDuring the chaotic days after the war, contradictory reports arose as to Bormann's whereabouts. Sightings were reported in Argentina, Spain, and elsewhere.\nBormann's wife was placed under surveillance in case he tried to contact her.\nJakob Glas, Bormann's long-time chauffeur, insisted that he saw Bormann in Munich in July 1946.\nIn case Bormann was still alive, multiple public notices about the upcoming\nNuremberg trials\nwere placed in newspapers and on the radio in October and November 1945 to notify him of the proceedings against him.\nThe trial got under way on 20 November 1945. Lacking evidence confirming Bormann's death, the International Military Tribunal tried him\nin absentia\n, as permitted under article 12 of their charter.\nHe was charged with three counts: conspiracy to wage a war of aggression,\nwar crimes\n, and\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nHis prosecution was assigned to Lieutenant Thomas F. Lambert Jr. and his defence to Friedrich Bergold.\nThe prosecution stated that Bormann participated in planning and co-signed virtually all of the\nantisemitic\nlegislation put forward by the regime.\nBergold unsuccessfully proposed that the court could not convict Bormann because he was already dead. Due to the shadowy nature of Bormann's activities, Bergold was unable to refute the prosecution's assertions as to the extent of his involvement in decision making.\nBormann was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and acquitted of conspiracy to wage a war of aggression. On 1 October 1946, he was sentenced to death by hanging, with the provision that if he were later found alive, any new facts brought to light by that time could be taken into consideration to reduce or overturn the sentence.\nDiscovery of remains\nOver the following decades, several organisations, including the\nCIA\nand\nWest German\ngovernment, attempted to locate Bormann without success.\nIn 1964, the West German government offered a reward of 100,000\nDeutsche Marks\n(equivalent to approximately €248,000 or US$270,000 in 2023\n) for information leading to Bormann's capture.\nSightings were reported all over the world, including Australia, Denmark, Italy, and South America.\nIn his autobiography, army intelligence officer\nReinhard Gehlen\nclaimed that Bormann had been a Soviet spy and had escaped to Moscow.\nNazi hunter\nSimon Wiesenthal\nbelieved that Bormann was living in South America.\nThe West German government declared that its hunt for Bormann was over in 1971.\nIn 1963, a retired postal worker named Albert Krumnow told police that around 8 May 1945, the Soviets had ordered him and his colleagues to bury two bodies found near a railway bridge near Lehrter station (now\nBerlin Hauptbahnhof\n). One was dressed in a\nWehrmacht\nuniform and the other was clad only in his underwear.\nOn the second body, Krumnow's colleague, a man named Wagenpfohl, found an SS doctor's paybook identifying him as Ludwig Stumpfegger.\nWagenpfohl gave the paybook to his boss, postal chief Berndt, who turned it over to the Soviets. They in turn destroyed it. Wagenpfohl wrote to Stumpfegger's wife on 14 August 1945, informing her that her husband's body was \"interred with the bodies of several other dead soldiers in the grounds of the Alpendorf in Berlin NW 40, Invalidenstrasse 63.\"\nExcavations on 20–21 July 1965 at the site specified by Axmann and Krumnow failed to locate the bodies.\nHowever, on 7 December 1972, construction workers uncovered human remains near Lehrter station in West Berlin, only\n12\nm (39\nft)\nfrom the spot where Krumnow claimed to have buried them.\nAt the subsequent autopsies, fragments of glass were found in the jaws of both skeletons, suggesting that the men had committed suicide\nby biting\ncyanide\ncapsules to avoid capture.\nDental records reconstructed from memory in 1945 by\nHugo Blaschke\nidentified one skeleton as Bormann's, and damage to the collarbone was consistent with injuries that Bormann's sons reported he had sustained in a riding accident in 1939.\nForensic examiners determined that the size of the skeleton and shape of the skull were identical to Bormann's.\nLikewise, the second skeleton was deemed to be Stumpfegger's, since it was of similar height to his last known proportions.\nComposite photographs, in which images of the skulls were overlaid on photographs of the men's faces, were completely congruent.\nFacial reconstruction was undertaken in early 1973 on both skulls to confirm the identities of the bodies.\nSoon afterward, the West German government declared Bormann dead. Bormann's family was not permitted to\ncremate\nthe body, in case further forensic examination later proved necessary. The family refused burial and refused to take possession of the remains. The bones were placed in a vault at the\nPublic Prosecutor's Office\nin Karlsruhe, which was at the time being shared with the\nFederal Court of Justice\n.\nOn 4 May 1998, the remains were conclusively identified as Bormann's after German authorities ordered\ngenetic testing\non fragments of the skull.\nThe testing was led by\nWolfgang Eisenmenger\n, Professor of Forensic Science at\nLudwig Maximilian University of Munich\n.\nTests using\nDNA\nfrom one of his relatives identified the skull as that of Bormann.\nAfter being released to his family, Bormann's remains were cremated and his ashes were scattered over the\nBaltic Sea\non 16 August 1999.\nThis was done in part to prevent\nneo-Nazis\nfrom using any potential tomb containing Bormann's remains to create a neo-Nazi monument.\nPersonal life\nOn 2 September 1929, Bormann married 19-year-old\nGerda Buch\n(\nde\n)\n(23 October 1909 – 23 March 1946),\nwhose father, Major\nWalter Buch\n, served as a chairman of the\nUntersuchung und Schlichtungs-Ausschuss\n(\nUSCHLA\n; Investigation and Settlement Committee), which was responsible for settling disputes within the party. Hitler was a frequent visitor to the Buch house, and it was here that Bormann met him. Hess and Hitler served as witnesses at his wedding.\nBormann also had a series of mistresses, including\nManja Behrens\n, an actress.\nMartin and Gerda Bormann had ten children:\nMartin Adolf Bormann\n(14 April 1930 – 11 March 2013);\ncalled\nKrönzi\n(short for\nKronprinz\n, \"crown prince\");\nborn \"Adolf Martin Bormann\", named after Hitler, his godfather.\nIlse Bormann (9 July 1931 – 1958);\nHer twin sister, Ehrengard, died shortly after birth.\nSince Ilse was named after her godmother,\nIlse Hess\n, her name was changed to \"Eike\" after Rudolf Hess's flight to Britain in 1941.\nIrmgard Bormann (born 25 or 28 July 1933)\nRudolf Gerhard Bormann (born 31 August 1934);\nnamed after his godfather Rudolf Hess. His name was changed to \"Helmut\" after Hess's flight to Scotland.\nHeinrich Hugo Bormann (born 13 June 1936); named after his godfather Heinrich Himmler.\nEva Ute Bormann (born 4 May 1938)\nGerda Bormann (born 4 August 1940)\nFritz Hartmut Bormann (born 3 April 1942)\nVolker Bormann (18 September 1943 – 1946)\nGerda Bormann and the children fled Obersalzberg for Italy on 25 April 1945 after an\nAllied air attack\n. She died of cancer on 23 March 1946 in\nMerano\n, Italy.\nBormann's nine remaining children survived the war and were cared for in foster homes.\nThe eldest son, Martin, was ordained a Roman Catholic priest and worked in Africa as a\nmissionary\n. He later left the priesthood and married.\nAwards and decorations\nFrontbann Badge\n(1932)\nGolden Party Badge\n(1934)\nOlympic Games Decoration\nFirst Class (1936)\nHonour Chevron for the Old Guard\nSS-Honour Ring\n(1937)\nHonour Sword\nof the\nReichsführer-SS\n(1937)\nBlood Order\n(1938)\nNazi Party Long Service Award\nin Bronze and Silver\nGrand Officer and Knight of the Grand Cross of the\nOrder of the Crown of Italy\nSee also\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nList SS-Obergruppenführer\nSS-\nStandartenführer\nWilhelm Zander\n, Bormann's adjutant\nNotes\n↑\nHöss, who later served as commandant of\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n, was sentenced to ten years. He was released in 1928 as part of a general amnesty.\n↑\nIn practice, this requirement was usually circumvented.\n↑\nThe Bormann family also had a house in the Munich suburb of\nPullach\n.\n↑\nGerman:\nder brauner Schatten\n. The term is a reference to\nCardinal Richelieu\n(termed the \"Red Eminence\"), the power behind the throne in the court of\nLouis XIII\n.\n↑\nBormann was in charge of organisation and Himmler looked after providing training and equipment.\nCitations\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n364, 378.\n↑\nMoll 2016\n, p.\n285.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n752.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n16–18.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n22–23.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n11–12.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n12.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n13.\n1\n2\nLang 1979\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n13–14.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n37, 99.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, pp.\n146, 148.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n45–46.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n49–51.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n60.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n20.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n57.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n55.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n74–77.\n1\n2\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n148.\n1\n2\nLang 1979\n, p.\n78.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n79.\n↑\nReichstag Database\n.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n84, 86.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n128–129.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n108–109.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nFest 1970\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n131–132.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nNilsson 2020\n, pp.\n12, 113, 143, 197.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n118, 121.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n123.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n323.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n377.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n837.\n↑\nSereny 1996\n, p.\n321.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n168, 742.\n↑\nSereny 1996\n, p.\n240.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, p.\n838.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n191.\n1\n2\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n77.\n1\n2\nHamilton 1984\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n749–753.\n↑\nGriech-Polelle 2023\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n253.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n234, 240.\n↑\nBullock 1999\n, p.\n389.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n382.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n175.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, p.\n242.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, pp.\n224–270.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n221.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n97–99.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nMosse 2003\n, p.\n240.\n↑\nOvery 2005\n, p.\n465.\n↑\nSpeer 1971\n, pp.\n333–334.\n↑\nPetropoulos 1999\n, p.\n87.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n152.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n179–181.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n78–79.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n858–859.\n↑\nSchirrmacher 2007\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n154.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n894.\n1\n2\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, pp.\n217–233.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n251.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n255.\n↑\nBartrop\n&\nDickerman 2017\n, p.\n1069.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n391.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n343.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n955.\n↑\nMI5,\nHitler's Last Days\n.\n1\n2\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n949, 950.\n↑\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, pp.\n286–287.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n386.\n1\n2\n3\nBeevor 2002\n, pp.\n382–383.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n151.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n382.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n397.\n1\n2\nLe Tissier 2010\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nTrevor-Roper 2002\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n383.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n158–159.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n172, 174.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n173.\n1\n2\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n167–168.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n169.\n1\n2\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n169, 171.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n229.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n127, 144.\n↑\n\"German Inflation Rate Calculator 2025 to calculate Price Change\"\n.\nwww.inflation-online.de\n. Retrieved\n7 December\n2025\n.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n98–99, 101.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n162–164.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, p.\n165.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, p.\n191.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n417.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, p.\n200.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n136–137.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n421–422.\n1\n2\n3\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n217–218.\n↑\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n285.\n↑\nKershaw 2016\n, p.\n481.\n1\n2\n3\nLang 1979\n, p.\n432.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n436.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n343–344, 410, 437.\n↑\nBBC News 1998\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n154.\n↑\nKaracs 1998\n.\n↑\n\"Nazi's Remains Are Scattered at Sea\"\n.\nLos Angeles Times\n. 30 August 2025\n. Retrieved\n12 May\n2025\n.\n↑\nStaunton, Denis.\n\"Bormann's ashes are dumped in the Baltic\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n. 28 August 1999\n. Retrieved\n13 May\n2025\n.\n1\n2\nTofahrn 2008\n, p.\n110.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n52–53.\n↑\nMcGovern 1968\n, pp.\n20–21.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n326.\n↑\nTraueranzeigen: Martin Bormann\n.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n53.\n1\n2\nMcGovern 1968\n, p.\n189.\n1\n2\nLang 1979\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nWilliams 2015\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, pp.\n387–388.\n↑\nWilson 2013\n, p.\n322.\n↑\nLang 1979\n, p.\n388.\nBibliography\nBartrop, Paul R.; Dickerman, Michael, eds. (2017).\nThe Holocaust: An Encyclopedia and Document Collection\n. Vol.\n1. Sanda Barbara; Denver: ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1-4408-4083-8\n.\nBeevor, Antony\n(2002).\nBerlin: The Downfall 1945\n. New York: Viking-Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03041-5\n.\n\"Bormann's body 'identified'\n\"\n. BBC News. 4 May 1998\n. Retrieved\n13 May\n2025\n.\nBullock, Alan\n(1999) .\nHitler: A Study in Tyranny\n. New York: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n978-1-56852-036-0\n.\n\"Datenbank der deutschen Parlamentsabgeordneten, Basis: Parlamentsalmanache/Reichstagshandbücher 1867–1938\"\n. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags\n. Retrieved\n24 March\n2025\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFest, Joachim C.\n(1970).\nThe Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership\n. New York: Pantheon.\nISBN\n978-0-394-73407-1\n.\nGriech-Polelle, Beth A. (2023).\nAnti-Semitism and the Holocaust: Language, Rhetoric and the Traditions of Hatred\n. London: Bloomsbury.\nISBN\n978-1-350-15864-1\n.\nHamilton, Charles (1984).\nLeaders & Personalities of the Third Reich, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n0-912138-27-0\n.\n\"Hitler's last days: Preparations for death\"\n. Security Service (MI5)\n. Retrieved\n8 January\n2020\n.\nJoachimsthaler, Anton\n(1999) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, the Evidence, the Truth\n. Trans. Helmut Bögler. London: Brockhampton Press.\nISBN\n978-1-86019-902-8\n.\nKaracs, Imre (4 May 1998).\n\"DNA test closes book on mystery of Martin Bormann\"\n.\nThe Independent\n. London: Independent Print Limited\n. Retrieved\n8 January\n2020\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2016).\nTo Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949\n. New York:\nPenguin Books\n.\nISBN\n978-0-14-310992-1\n.\nLang, Jochen von (1979).\nThe Secretary. Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler\n. New York: Random House.\nISBN\n978-0-394-50321-9\n.\nLe Tissier, Tony (2010) .\nRace for the Reichstag: The 1945 Battle for Berlin\n. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-84884-230-4\n.\nLevy, Alan\n(2006) .\nNazi Hunter: The Wiesenthal File\n(Revised 2002\ned.). London: Constable & Robinson.\nISBN\n978-1-84119-607-7\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nMcGovern, James (1968).\nMartin Bormann\n. New York: William Morrow & Company.\nOCLC\n441132\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMoll, Martin (2016). Spencer C. Tucker (ed.).\nWorld War II: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 volumes]\n. Vol.\n1. Santa Barbara; Denver: ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1-4408-4593-2\n.\nMosse, George\n(2003).\nNazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich\n. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.\nISBN\n978-0-299-19304-1\n.\nNilsson, Mikael (2020).\nHitler Redux: The Incredible History of Hitler's So-Called Table Talks\n. London; New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-1-000-17329-1\n.\nPetropoulos, Jonathan\n(1 February 1999).\nArt as Politics in the Third Reich\n. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-4809-8\n.\nOvery, Richard\n(2005) .\nThe Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia\n. London: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-191224-0\n.\nSchirrmacher, Thomas (2007).\nHitlers Kriegsreligion. Die Verankerung der Weltanschauung Hitlers in seiner religiösen Begrifflichkeit und seinem Gottesbild\n.\nSereny, Gitta\n(1996) .\nAlbert Speer: His Battle With Truth\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-679-76812-8\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSpeer, Albert\n(1971) .\nInside the Third Reich\n. New York: Avon.\nISBN\n978-0-380-00071-5\n.\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard\n(2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-82371-5\n.\nTofahrn, Klaus W. (2008).\nDas Dritte Reich und der Holocaust\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-57702-8\n.\n\"Traueranzeigen: Martin Bormann\"\n(in German). Westfälische Rundschau. 15 March 2013\n. Retrieved\n8 January\n2020\n.\nTrevor-Roper, Hugh\n(2002) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler\n. London: Pan Books.\nISBN\n978-0-330-49060-3\n.\nWhiting, Charles\n(1996) .\nThe Hunt for Martin Bormann: The Truth\n. London: Pen & Sword.\nISBN\n0-85052-527-6\n.\nWilliams, Max (2015).\nSS Elite: The Senior Leaders of Hitler's Praetorian Guard\n. Vol.\nI. Fonthill Media LLC.\nISBN\n978-1-78155-433-3\n.\nWilson, James (2013).\nHitler's Alpine Headquarters\n. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78303-004-0\n.\nExternal links\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nMartin Bormann\n.\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nMartin Bormann\n.\nMartin Bormann: \"The Brown Eminence\"\nby the Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team\nInformation about Martin Bormann\nin the Reichstag database\nNewspaper clippings about Martin Bormann\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Rudolf Hess(asDeputyFührer)",
+      "succeeded_by": "Office abolished",
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "deputy": "Gerhard Klopfer",
+      "deputyführer": "Rudolf Hess",
+      "january–august_1943": "Member of the \"Committee of Three\"",
+      "1941–1945": "Reichsministerwithout portfolio",
+      "1933–1945": "Manager of theAdolf Hitler Fund of German Trade and Industry",
+      "born": "Martin Ludwig Bormann(1900-06-17)17 June 1900Wegeleben, Germany",
+      "died": "2 May 1945(1945-05-02)(aged44)Berlin, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Suicidebyhydrogen cyanide",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse": "Gerda Buch​(m.1929)​",
+      "children": "10, includingMartin Adolf Bormann",
+      "relatives": "Walter Buch(father-in-law)Albert Bormann(brother)",
+      "cabinet": "Hitler cabinetGoebbels cabinet",
+      "nickname": "Brown Eminence",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German ArmySchutzstaffel",
+      "yearsof_service": "1918–19191927–1945",
+      "rank": "SS-Obergruppenführer",
+      "unit": "55th Field Artillery Regiment",
+      "service_number": "278,267 (SS)",
+      "criminal_status": "Deceased before arraignment",
+      "convictions": "Conspiracy to commit crimes against peaceCrimes of aggressionWar crimesCrimes against humanity",
+      "trial": "Nuremberg trials",
+      "criminal_penalty": "Death-in-Absentia"
+    },
+    "char_count": 43213
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Robert_Ley",
+    "name": "Robert Ley",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Robert Ley was a German Nazi politician and head of the German Labour Front during its entire existence, from 1933 to 1945. He also held many other high positions in the Nazi Party, including Gauleiter, Reichsleiter and Reichsorganisationsleiter.",
+    "description": "German Nazi politician (1890–1945)",
+    "full_text": "Robert Ley\nGerman Nazi politician (1890–1945)\nFor the cruise ship, see\nRobert Ley\n(ship)\n. For the American sportscaster, see\nBob Ley\n.\nRobert Ley\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈlaɪ\n]\n; 15 February 1890 – 25 October 1945) was a German\nNazi\npolitician and head of the\nGerman Labour Front\nduring its entire existence, from 1933 to 1945. He also held many other high positions in the\nNazi Party\n, including\nGauleiter\n,\nReichsleiter\nand\nReichsorganisationsleiter\n.\nThe son of a farmer from the\nRhine Province\n, Ley saw action in both the\neastern\nand\nwestern\nfronts of the\nFirst World War\nand received the\nIron Cross Second Class\n. After the war he resumed his studies in chemistry, obtained his doctorate, and worked for\nIG Farben\nas a food chemist. Radicalised following the\nFrench occupation of the Ruhr\n, Ley joined the Nazi Party in 1925 and subsequently became the\nGauleiter\nof Southern Rhineland (later Rhineland). Steadily rising through the ranks, he was elected to the\nReichstag\nin 1930, and replaced\nGregor Strasser\nas\nReichsorganisationsleiter\nin 1932.\nIn 1933, Hitler appointed Ley head of the newly founded German Labour Front following the suppression of the trade unions. In addition to facilitating\nGerman rearmament\n, Ley also presided over the creation of a number of programs, including\nStrength Through Joy\nand the\nVolkswagen\n. Ley's influence declined after the outbreak of the\nSecond World War\n, his role as leader of the German workforce supplanted by\nFritz Todt\n(and later\nAlbert Speer\n) and his alcoholism gradually coming into focus. Nevertheless, he retained Hitler's favour, and remained part of Hitler's inner circle until the last months of the war.\nLey was captured by American paratroopers near the Austrian border at the end of the war. He died by suicide in October 1945 while awaiting\ntrial at Nuremberg\nfor\ncrimes against humanity\nand\nwar crimes\n.\nEarly life\nLey was born in Niederbreidenbach (now a part of\nNümbrecht\n) in the\nRhine Province\n, the seventh of 11 children of a farmer, Friedrich Ley, and his wife Emilie (\nnée\nWald). He studied\nchemistry\nat the universities of\nJena\n,\nBonn\n, and\nMünster\n. He volunteered for the army on the outbreak of\nWorld War I\nin 1914 and spent two years in the 10th Foot Artillery Regiment and saw action on both the\neastern\nand\nwestern\nfronts.\nIn 1916 he was promoted to\nLeutnant\nand trained as an aerial artillery spotter\nwith Artillery Flier Detachment 202. In July 1917 his aircraft was shot down over\nFrance\nand he was taken\nprisoner of war\n. It has been suggested that he suffered a traumatic brain injury in the crash; for the rest of his life he spoke with a\nstammer\nand suffered bouts of erratic behaviour, aggravated by heavy drinking.\nHe earned the\nIron Cross\n, 2nd class and the\nWound Badge\n, in silver.\nAfter the war Ley was released from captivity in January 1920 and returned to university, gaining a doctorate later that year. He was employed as a food chemist by a branch of the giant\nIG Farben\ncompany, based in\nLeverkusen\nin the\nRuhr\n. Enraged by the\nFrench occupation of the Ruhr\nin 1924, Ley became an\nultra-nationalist\nand joined the\nNazi Party\nsoon after reading\nAdolf Hitler\n's speech at his trial following the\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin\nMunich\n. Ley proved unswervingly loyal to Hitler, which led Hitler to ignore complaints about his arrogance, incompetence and drunkenness.\nLey's impoverished upbringing and his experience as head of the largely\nworking-class\nRhineland party region meant that he was sympathetic to the\nStrasserite\nelements in the party, but he always sided with Hitler in inner party disputes. This helped him survive the hostility of other party officials such as the party treasurer,\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\n, who regarded him as an incompetent drunk.\nRise in the Nazi Party\nLey rejoined the re-founded Nazi Party in March 1925, shortly after the party's ban was lifted (membership number 18,441). He was named Deputy\nGauleiter\nof the Southern Rhineland (later,\nRhineland\n) that month, and was promoted to\nGauleiter\non 17 July.\nIn September 1925, he became a member of the\nNational Socialist Working Association\n, a short-lived group of northern and western German\nGauleiters\n, organized and led by\nGregor Strasser\n, which advocated a more working-class focus for the Party and unsuccessfully sought to amend the\nParty program\n.\nAt a meeting on 24 January 1926, however, Ley joined with others in raising objections to Strasser's proposed new draft program and it was shelved.\nShortly thereafter, the Working Association was dissolved following the\nBamberg Conference\n.\nIn March 1928, Ley became the editor and publisher of a virulently\nanti-Semitic\nNazi newspaper, the\nWestdeutscher Beobachter\n(West German Observer) in\nCologne\n. On 20 May 1928, he was elected to the\nPrussian Landtag\n, and also was appointed to the Rhenish provincial legislature. He was first elected to the\nReichstag\nin September 1930 from electoral constituency 20,\nCologne-Aachen\n, a seat he retained until May 1945. He remained as the\nGauleiter\nof Rhineland until 1 June 1931 when his\nGau\nwas divided into two and new leaders named.\nOn 21 October 1931, Ley was brought to Munich party headquarters as the Deputy to Strasser, then the head of party organization. Ley was styled\nReichsorganisationsinspekteur\nand conducted inspection visits to the various\nGaue\n. On 10 June 1932, following a further organizational restructuring by Strasser, Ley was named one of two\nReichsinspecteurs\nwith oversight of approximately half the\nGaue\n. Furthermore, he was made the Acting\nLandesinspekteur\nfor Bavaria with direct responsibility for the six Bavarian\nGaue\n.\nThis was a short-lived initiative by Strasser to centralize control over the\nGaue\n. However, it was unpopular with the\nGauleiters\nand was repealed on Strasser's fall from power. Strasser resigned on 8 December 1932 in a break with Hitler over the future direction of the Party. Hitler himself took over as\nReichsorganisationsleiter\nand installed Ley as his\nStabschef\n(Chief of Staff). The positions of\nReichsinspecteur\nand\nLandesinspekteur\nwere abolished.\nWhen Hitler became\nReich Chancellor\nin January 1933, Ley accompanied him to Berlin. On 2 June 1933, Ley was among those raised to\nReichsleiter\n, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party.\nThis was followed on 14 September 1933 by his appointment to the reconstituted\nPrussian State Council\nby Prussian\nMinister-President\nHermann Göring\n. On 3 October 1933, Ley was named to\nHans Frank\n's\nAcademy for German Law\nand, on 10 November 1934, Hitler finally formally promoted Ley to the position of\nReichsorganisationsleiter\n. Ley would retain these positions until the fall of the Nazi regime.\nLabour Front head\nFlag of Robert Ley's German Labour Front\nEdward, Duke of Windsor\nreviewing\nSS\nguards with Robert Ley, 1937\nBy April, 1933 Hitler decided to have the Nazi Party take over the\ntrade union\nmovement. On 10 May 1933, Hitler appointed Ley head of the newly founded\nGerman Labour Front\n(\nDeutsche Arbeitsfront\n, DAF). The DAF took over the existing Nazi trade union formation, the\nNational Socialist Factory Cell Organisation\n(\nNationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation\n, NSBO) as well as the main trade union federation. But Ley's lack of administrative ability meant that the NSBO leader,\nReinhold Muchow\n, a member of\nthe Strasserite wing of the Nazi Party\n, soon became the dominant figure in the DAF, overshadowing Ley. Muchow began a purge of the DAF administration, rooting out ex-\nSocial Democrats\nand ex-\nCommunists\nand placing his own militants in their place.\nThe NSBO cells continued to agitate in the factories on issues of wages and conditions, annoying the employers, who soon complained to Hitler and other Nazi leaders that the DAF was as bad as the Communists had been.\nPhilipp Bouhler\n,\nKarl Freiherr Michel von Tüßling\n, and Robert Ley, in white uniform, with his wife Inge (Munich, July 1939)\nHitler had no sympathy with the\nsyndicalist\ntendencies of the NSBO, and in January 1934 a new Law for the Ordering of National Labour effectively suppressed independent working-class factory organisations, even Nazi ones, and put questions of wages and conditions in the hands of the\nTrustees of Labour\n(\nTreuhänder der Arbeit\n), dominated by the employers. Around this time Muchow died in a tavern brawl and Ley's control over the DAF was re-established. The NSBO was completely suppressed and the DAF became little more than an arm of the state for the more efficient deployment and disciplining of labour to serve the needs of the regime, particularly its massive expansion of the arms industry.\nAs head of the Labour Front, Ley invited\nEdward, Duke of Windsor\n, and\nWallis, Duchess of Windsor\n, to conduct\na tour of Germany\nin 1937, months after Edward had\nabdicated\nthe British throne. Ley served as their host and their personal chaperone. During the visit, Ley's alcoholism was noticed, and at one point he crashed the Windsors' car into a gate.\nOnce his power was established, Ley began to abuse it in a way that was conspicuous even by the standards of the Nazi regime. On top of his generous salaries as DAF head,\nReichsorganisationsleiter\n, and\nReichstag\ndeputy, he pocketed the large profits of the\nWestdeutscher Beobachter\n, and freely embezzled DAF funds for his personal use.\nBy 1938 he owned a luxurious estate near\nCologne\n, a string of villas in other cities, a fleet of cars, a private railway carriage and a large art collection. He increasingly devoted his time to \"womanising and heavy drinking, both of which often led to embarrassing scenes in public.\"\nOn 29 December 1942 his second wife Inge Ursula Spilcker (1916–1942) shot herself after a drunken brawl.\nLey's subordinates took their lead from him, and the DAF became a notorious centre of\ncorruption\n, all paid for with the compulsory dues paid by German workers. One historian says: \"The DAF quickly began to gain a reputation as perhaps the most corrupt of all the major institutions of the\nThird Reich\n. For this, Ley himself had to shoulder a large part of the blame.\"\nStrength Through Joy\nThe KDF-Schiff\nRobert Ley\n, March 1939\nThe KDF-Schiff\nWilhelm Gustloff\n, 23 September 1939\nHitler and Ley were aware that the suppression of the trade unions and the prevention of wage increases by the Trustees of Labour system, when coupled with their relentless demands for increased productivity to hasten\nGerman rearmament\n, created a real risk of working-class discontent. In November 1933, as a means of preventing labour disaffection, the DAF established\nStrength Through Joy\n(\nKraft durch Freude\n, KdF), to provide a range of benefits and amenities to the German working class and their families. These included subsidised holidays both at resorts across Germany and in \"safe\" countries abroad (particularly\nItaly\n). Two of the world's first purpose-built cruise-liners, the\nWilhelm Gustloff\nand the\nRobert Ley\n, were built to take KdF members on\nMediterranean\ncruises.\nOther KdF programs included concerts,\nopera\nand other forms of entertainment in factories and other workplaces, free physical education and\ngymnastics\ntraining and coaching in sports such as football, tennis and sailing. All this was paid for by the DAF, at a cost of\n29 million\nℛ\n︁\nℳ\n︁\na year by 1937, and ultimately by the workers themselves through their dues, although the employers also contributed. KdF was one of the Nazi regime's most popular programs, and played a large part in reconciling the working class to the regime, at least before 1939.\nThe DAF and KdF's most ambitious program was the \"people's car,\" the\nVolkswagen\n, originally a project undertaken at Hitler's request by the car-maker\nFerdinand Porsche\n. When the German car industry was unable to meet Hitler's demand that the Volkswagen be sold at\n1,000\nℛ\n︁\nℳ\n︁\nor less, the project was taken over by the DAF. This brought Ley's old socialist tendencies back into prominence. The party, he said, had taken over where private industry had failed, because of the \"short-sightedness, malevolence,\nprofiteering\nand stupidity\" of the business class. Now working for the DAF, Porsche built a new Volkswagen factory at\nFallersleben\n, at a huge cost which was partly met by raiding the DAF's accumulated assets and misappropriating the dues paid by DAF members. The Volkswagen was sold to German workers on an installment plan, and the first models appeared in February 1939. The outbreak of war, however, meant that none of the 340,000 workers who paid for a car ever received one.\nWartime role\nLey said in a speech in 1939: \"We National Socialists have monopolized all resources and all our energies during the past seven years so as to be able to be equipped for the supreme effort of battle.\"\n(→\nGerman rearmament\n) After\nthe beginning\nof\nWorld War II\nin September 1939, Ley's importance declined. The militarisation of the workforce and the diversion of resources to the war greatly reduced the role of the DAF, and the KdF was largely curtailed. Ley's drunkenness and erratic behaviour were less tolerated in wartime, and he was supplanted by Armaments Minister\nFritz Todt\nand his successor\nAlbert Speer\nas the czar of the German workforce (the head of the\nOrganisation Todt\n(OT)). As German workers were increasingly conscripted, foreign workers, first\n\"guest workers\"\nfrom France and later slave labourers from Poland, Ukraine and other eastern countries, were brought in to replace them. Ley played some role in this program, but was overshadowed by\nFritz Sauckel\n, General Plenipotentiary for the Distribution of Labour (\nGeneralbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz\n) from March 1942.\nNevertheless, Ley was deeply implicated in the\nmistreatment of foreign slave workers\n. In October 1942 he attended a meeting in\nEssen\nwith\nPaul Pleiger\n(head of the giant\nHermann Göring Works\nindustrial combine) and leaders of the German coal industry. A verbatim account of the meeting was kept by one of the managers. A recent historian writes:\nThe key item on the agenda was the question of 'how to treat the Russians.'... Robert Ley, as usual, was drunk. And when Ley got drunk he was prone to speak his mind. With so much at stake, there was no room for compassion or civility. No degree of coercion was too much, and Ley expected the mine managers to back up their foremen in meting out the necessary discipline. As Ley put it: 'When a Russian pig has to be beaten, it would be the ordinary German worker who would have to do it.'\nDespite his failings, Ley retained Hitler's favour; until the last months of the war he was part of Hitler's inner circle along with\nMartin Bormann\nand\nJoseph Goebbels\n.\nIn November 1940 he was given a new role, as Reich Commissioner for Social Housing Construction (\nReichskommissar für den sozialen Wohnungsbau\n), later shortened to Reich Housing Commissioner (\nReichswohnungskommissar\n).\nHere his job was to prepare for the effects on German housing of the expected\nAllied air attacks on German cities\n, which began to increase in intensity from 1941 onwards. In this role he became a key ally of Armaments Minister Albert Speer, who recognised that German workers must be adequately housed if productivity was to be maintained. As the air war against Germany increased from 1943, \"\ndehousing\n\" German workers became an objective of the Allied\narea bombing\ncampaign, and Ley's organisation was increasingly unable to cope with the resulting housing crisis.\nHe was aware in general terms of the Nazi regime's\nprogramme of extermination\nof the Jews of Europe. Ley encouraged it through the virulent anti-Semitism of his publications and speeches. In February 1941 he was present at a meeting along with Speer, Bormann and Field Marshal\nWilhelm Keitel\nat which Hitler had set out his views on the \"\nJewish question\"\nat some length, making it clear that he intended the \"disappearance\" of the Jews one way or another.\nAccording to American historian\nJeffrey Herf\n, Ley issued some of the most overt propaganda accusing Jews of plotting the extermination of Germans and threatening to do the reverse. In December 1939, he said that in the event of a British victory:\n... the German people, man, woman, and child would be exterminated [ausgerottet]... The Jew would be wading in blood. Funeral pyres would be built on which the Jews would burn us... we want to prevent this. Hence it should be rather the Jews who fry, rather they who should burn, they who should starve, they who should be exterminated.\nIn April 1945, Ley became enamored with the idea of creating a \"\ndeath ray\n\" after receiving a letter from an unnamed inventor: \"I've studied the documentation; there's no doubt about it. This will be the decisive weapon!\" Once Ley gave Speer a list of materials, including a particular model circuit breaker, Speer found that the circuit breaker had not been manufactured in 40 years.\nPostwar: arrest and suicide\nLey is arrested in his pyjamas by\nUS paratroopers\nin May 1945.\nThe cell where Robert Ley hanged himself\nAs Nazi Germany collapsed in early 1945, Ley was among the government figures who remained fanatically loyal to Hitler.\nHe last saw Hitler on 20 April 1945, Hitler's birthday, in the\nFührerbunker\nin central\nBerlin\n. The next day he left for southern\nBavaria\n, in the expectation that Hitler would make his last stand in the \"\nNational Redoubt\n\" in the alpine areas. When Hitler refused to leave Berlin, Ley was effectively unemployed.\nOn 16 May he was captured by American paratroopers of the\n101st Airborne Division\nin a shoemaker's house in the village of\nSchleching\n.\nLey told them he was \"Dr Ernst Distelmeyer,\" but he was identified by\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\n, the treasurer of the Nazi Party and a long-time enemy. After his arrest, he declared: \"You can torture or beat me or impale me on a stake. But I will never doubt the greater deeds of Hitler.\"\nAt the\nNuremberg Trials\n, Ley was indicted under Count One (\"The Common Plan or Conspiracy to wage an aggressive war in violation of international law or treaties\"), Count Three (War Crimes, including among other things \"mistreatment of prisoners of war or civilian populations\") and Count Four (\"\nCrimes Against Humanity\n– murder, extermination, enslavement of civilian populations, persecution on the basis of racial, religious or political grounds\").\nLey was apparently indignant at being regarded as a\nwar criminal\n, telling the American psychiatrist\nDouglas Kelley\nand psychologist\nGustave Gilbert\nwho had seen and tested him in prison: \"Stand us against a wall and shoot us, well and good, you are victors. But why should I be brought before a Tribunal like a c-c-c- ... I can't even get the word out!\".\nOn 24 October, three days after receiving the indictment, Ley\nstrangled himself to death\nin his prison cell using a noose made by tearing a towel into strips, fastened to the toilet pipe.\nThe Chief Medical Office of the\nMilitary Tribunal\n,\nLt. Col Rene Juchli\n, made a report to\nMajor General\nWilliam J. Donovan\nregarding the effect the suicide had on other prisoners, stating \"It appears to be the unanimous consensus of opinion among the witnesses that no bereavement was indicated over the self-inflicted death of the late Dr. Ley.\"\nSee also\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nList of people who died by suicide by hanging\nReferences\nCitations\n↑\n\"Dr. Ley's Brain: Study by Army Doctors Show Nazi Suicide was Medically Degenerate\".\nLife\n. February 4, 1946. p.\n45.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, p.\n191.\n↑\nSmelser 1988\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n458.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, p.\n214.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n459.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, pp.\n190–192.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nNoakes 1966\n, pp.\n26–27.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, pp.\n192–194.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nOrlow 1969\n, pp.\n293–295.\n↑\nOrlow 1973\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, pp.\n197–198.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n460.\n↑\nBrendon, P. (2016).\nEdward VIII (Penguin Monarchs): The Uncrowned King.\nLondon: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-24119-642-7\n.\n↑\nCadbury, D. (2015).\nPrinces at War: The British Royal Family's Private Battle in the Second World War.\nLondon: Bloomsbury.\nISBN\n978-1-40884-509-7\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n463.\n↑\nJackson 1946\n.\n↑\nTooze 2006\n, p.\n529.\n↑\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n477.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2017\n, pp.\n206–207.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n350.\n↑\nHerf 2005\n, p.\n57.\n↑\nSpeer 1970\n, p.\n464.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n774.\n↑\nRapport, Northwood\n&\nMarshall 1948\n, pp.\n741–744.\n↑\nUllrich, Volker (2020).\nEight days in May\n. Liveright Publishing Corporation. p.\n262.\nISBN\n978-1-63149-827-5\n.\n↑\nNuremberg Indictment\n.\n↑\nJack El-Hai\n:\nThe Nazi and the Psychiatrist: Hermann Göring, Dr Douglas M. Kelley, and a Fatal Meeting of Minds at the End of WWII\n, Publisher: PublicAffairs, 2013,\nISBN\n161039156X\n1\n2\nSereny 1995\n, p.\n573.\n↑\nJuchli, Rene H.\n\"Observations and impressions of the Prison Population concerning the incident of Dr. Robert Ley's death\"\n.\ndigital.library.cornell.edu\n. Cornell University Library\n. Retrieved\n6 March\n2025\n.\nBibliography\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. London: Allen Lane.\nISBN\n978-0-7139-9649-4\n.\nHerf, Jeffrey\n(2005). \"The \"Jewish War\": Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry\".\nHolocaust and Genocide Studies\n.\n19\n(1):\n51–\n80.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/hgs/dci003\n.\nS2CID\n143944355\n.\nJackson, Robert\n(July 26, 1946).\n\"Summation of Robert Jackson in the Nuremberg Major War Figures Trial\"\n.\nlaw2.umkc.edu\n. Retrieved\n10 February\n2012\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2000).\nHitler, 1936–45: Nemesis\n. New York: W.W. Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-04994-7\n.\n\"The Avalon Project: Indictment of the International Military Tribunal\"\n.\navalon.law.yale.edu\n. Retrieved\n10 February\n2012\n.\nMiller, Michael; Schulz, Andreas (2017).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945, Volume II (Georg Joel - Dr. Bernhard Rust)\n. R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-32-6\n.\nOrlow, Dietrich (1969).\nThe History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933\n. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.\nISBN\n0-8229-3183-4\n.\nNoakes, Jeremy (October 1966). \"Conflict and Development in the NSDAP 1924–1927\".\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n1\n(4). Sage Publications, Ltd.:\n3–\n36.\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/002200946600100401\n.\nS2CID\n154357701\n.\nOrlow, Dietrich (1973).\nThe History of the Nazi Party: 1933–1945\n. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.\nISBN\n0-8229-3253-9\n.\nRapport, Leonard; Northwood, Arthur Jr; Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood (1948).\nRendezvous With Destiny: A History of The 101st Airborne Division\n. Washington: Infantry Journal Press.\nOCLC\n4166870\n.\nSereny, Gitta\n(1995).\nAlbert Speer: His Battle With Truth\n. London: Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-0-333-64519-2\n.\nSmelser, Ronald\n(1988).\nRobert Ley: Hitler's Labor Front Leader\n. Oxford: Berg.\nISBN\n978-0-85496-161-0\n.\nSpeer, Albert\n(1970).\nInside the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n0-684-82949-5\n.\nTooze, Adam\n(2006).\nThe Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy\n. London: Allen Lane.\nISBN\n978-0-7139-9566-4\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nRobert Ley\n.\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nRobert Ley\n.\nLey's 1936 speech to Nazi Party factory activists\nNewspaper clippings about Robert Ley\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW\nInformation about Robert Ley\nin the Reichstag database\nOfficial report on the death of Ley\nby Chief medical officer\nLt. Col. Rene H. Juchli",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Heinrich Haake",
+      "succeeded_by": "Position abolished",
+      "leader": "Adolf Hitler",
+      "1940—1945": "Reichskommissarfor Social Housing Construction",
+      "1933—1945": "Member of thePrussian State Council",
+      "1933–1945": "Member of theGreater German Reichstag",
+      "june_–_december_1932": "Reichsinspecteurof theNazi Party",
+      "1930–1933": "Member of theReichstag",
+      "born": "(1890-02-15)15 February 1890Niederbreidenbach, Germany",
+      "died": "25 October 1945(1945-10-25)(aged55)Nuremberg, Germany",
+      "causeofdeath": "Suicide by hanging",
+      "party": "Nazi Party",
+      "spouse(s)": "Elisabeth Schmidt​​(m.1921;div.1938)​Inge Spilcker​​(m.1938;died1942)​",
+      "children": "5",
+      "alma_mater": "University of JenaUniversity of BonnUniversity of Münster",
+      "known_for": "Head of theGerman Labour Front(1933–1945)",
+      "allegiance": "German Empire",
+      "branch/service": "Imperial German Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "1914–1920",
+      "rank": "Leutnant",
+      "unit": "10th Foot Artillery Regiment",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I",
+      "awards": "Iron Cross2nd classWound Badge, in silver"
+    },
+    "char_count": 23360
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Gustav_Krupp_von_Bohlen_und_Halbach",
+    "name": "Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach",
+    "type": "defendant",
+    "summary": "Gustav Georg Friedrich Maria Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was a German diplomat and industrialist. From 1909 to 1945, he headed Friedrich Krupp AG, a heavy industry conglomerate, and led the company through two world wars along with his son Alfried, providing significant weapons and materials for the German war effort.",
+    "description": "German foreign service official, businessman and accused war criminal (1870–1950)",
+    "full_text": "Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\nGerman foreign service official, businessman and accused war criminal (1870–1950)\nGustav Georg Friedrich Maria Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\n(born\nGustav von Bohlen und Halbach\n; 7 August 1870 – 16 January 1950) was a German diplomat and industrialist. From 1909 to 1945, he headed\nFriedrich Krupp AG\n, a\nheavy industry\nconglomerate, and led the company through two world wars along with his son\nAlfried\n, providing significant weapons and materials for the German war effort.\nBorn in\nThe Hague\ninto a German family with a long history in diplomatic service, Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach was the Prussian consul at the Vatican when he married\nBertha Krupp\n, the heiress of the Krupp family, at the behest of Emperor\nWilhelm II\n. He was allowed to add the Krupp name to his own and subsequently became chairman of the company. Under Krupp, the company had a near monopoly in heavy arms manufacture in Germany at the outbreak of the\nFirst World War\n, and was responsible for the production of\nBig Bertha\n, the\nParis Gun\nand the\nU-boat\n.\nKrupp took part in the\nGerman rearmament\nin secret shortly after the signature of the\nTreaty of Versailles\n. An avowed monarchist, he was initially opposed to the Nazis, but eventually became a fervent supporter of\nAdolf Hitler\nand offered significant financial support for the\nNSDAP\n. From the late 1930s on he was gradually reduced to a figurehead of the company due to deteriorating health, and in 1943 he was formally succeeded by his son. At the end of\nWorld War II\n, plans to prosecute him as a\nwar criminal\nat the\nNuremberg trials\nwere dropped as he was bedridden, senile and deemed medically unfit to stand trial. Krupp died in Austria in 1950.\nEarly life\nThe young Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach ca. 1900 (left)\nGustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was born 7 August 1870 in\nThe Hague, Netherlands\n, to American-born\nGustav von Bohlen und Halbach\n, and Sophie (\nnée\nBohlen).\nHis paternal grandfather,\nArnold Halbach\n, served as Prussian consul in Philadelphia from 1828 to 1838.\nHe was a grandson of\nHenry Bohlen\nand related to\nCharles E. Bohlen\nand\nKaroline of Wartensleben\non his mother's side.\nHe married\nBertha Krupp\nin October 1906. Bertha had inherited her family's company in 1902 at age 16 after the death of her father,\nFriedrich Alfred Krupp\n.\nGerman Emperor Kaiser William II\npersonally led a search for a suitable spouse for Bertha, as the Krupp empire could not be headed by a woman. Gustav was picked from his previous post at the Vatican.\nThe Kaiser announced at the wedding that Gustav would be allowed to add the Krupp name to his own. Gustav became company chairman in 1909.\nAfter 1910, the Krupp company became a member and major funder of the\nPan-German League\n(Alldeutscher Verband) which mobilised popular support in favour of two army bills, in 1912 and 1913, to raise Germany's standing army to 738,000 men.\nWorld War I\nThe Krupp Armament-Works, 1915\nBy\nWorld War I\n, the company had a near\nmonopoly\nin heavy arms manufacture in Germany. At the start of the war, the company lost access to most of its overseas markets, but this was more than offset by increased demand for weapons by Germany and her allies (\nCentral Powers\n). In 1902, before Krupp's marriage, the company leased a\nfuse\npatent to\nVickers Limited\nof the\nUnited Kingdom\n. Among the company's products was a 94-ton\nhowitzer\nnamed\nBig Bertha\n, after Krupp's wife, and the\nParis Gun\n.\nGustav also won the lucrative contract for Germany's\nU-boats\n, which were built at the family's shipyard in\nKiel\n. Krupp's estate, the Villa Hügel, had a suite of rooms for Wilhelm II whenever he came to visit.\nInterwar years\nGustav and Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, 1927\nPortrait of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and family, 1928 by\nNicola Perscheid\n.\nAlfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\n, third from left.\nDuring the\noccupation of the Ruhr\nin 1923, the directorate of the Krupp works ordered its employees to cease work, in line with the German policy of\npassive resistance\nto the occupation. A French military court sentenced Gustav Krupp to 15 years forced labour, though he was released on parole after six months once the German government abandoned its passive resistance strategy.\nThe\nVersailles Treaty\nprevented Germany from making armaments and\nsubmarines\n, forcing Krupp to significantly reduce his labour force. His company diversified to agricultural equipment, vehicles and consumer goods. However, using the profits from the Vickers patent deal and subsidies from the\nWeimar government\n, Krupp secretly began the rearming of Germany with the ink barely dry on the treaty of Versailles\n. It secretly continued to work on\nartillery\nthrough subsidiaries in\nSweden\n, and built submarine pens in the\nNetherlands\n. In the 1930s, it restarted manufacture of\ntanks\nsuch as the\nTiger I\nand other war materials, again using foreign subsidiaries.\nKrupp was a member of the\nPrussian State Council\nfrom 1921 to 1933. While Krupp was an avowed\nmonarchist\n, his first loyalty was to whoever held power. He once left a business meeting in disgust when another industrialist, who was the one hosting the meeting, referred to the late President\nFriedrich Ebert\nas \"that saddlemaker\"\n(Der Sattelhersteller)\n.\nKrupp initially opposed the\nNazis\n. However, after Hitler became chancellor of Germany, at the\nsecret meeting with Adolf Hitler and leading German industrialists\non February 20, 1933, he contributed one million\nReichsmark\nto the Nazi party's fund for the\nMarch 1933 election\n, which enabled Hitler to take control of the government. After Hitler won power, Krupp became, as\nFritz Thyssen\nlater put it, \"a super Nazi\",\nand contributed to the\nAdolf Hitler Fund of German Trade and Industry\nwhich was established in June 1933 to support the Nazis. As president of the\nReichsverband\nof German industry he led the effort to expel its Jewish members.\nLike many German nationalists, Krupp believed that the Nazis could be used to end the Republic, and then be pushed aside to restore the Kaiser and the old elites. When all parties were abolished and civil liberties suspended following the\nReichstag fire and Hitler's grab for absolute power\n, Krupp found that he and the rest of the old elites were firmly in the grip of the Nazis; the movement they had hoped to ride back into power upon had instead emasculated them. Despite this, Krupp was always flexible, and cooperated with Hitler's dictatorship.\nI wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for I had to expect that many people would not understand me\n—\nKrupp in an interview for\nKrupp\nmagazine on 1 March 1942\nHitler had tried to gain entry to the Krupp factories in 1929, but was rebuffed because Krupp felt he would see some of the secret armament work there and reveal it to the world. Bertha Krupp never liked Hitler even though she never complained when the company's bottom line rose through the armaments contracts and production. She referred to him as \"that certain gentleman\"\n(Dieser gewisse Herr)\nand pleaded illness when Hitler came on an official tour in 1934. Her daughter Irmgard acted as hostess.\nWorld War II\nGustav Krupp receives the\nGolden Party Badge\nof the\nNSDAP\nfrom\nAdolf Hitler\nin the German city of\nEssen\n, 1940\nKrupp suffered failing health from 1939 onwards, and a\nstroke\nleft him partially\nparalysed\nin 1941. He became a figurehead until he formally handed over the running of the business to his son\nAlfried\nin 1943.\nKrupp industries, under both his leadership and later that of his son, was offered facilities in eastern Europe and made extensive use of forced labor during the war.\nOn 25 July 1943 the\nRoyal Air Force\nattacked the Krupp Works with 627 heavy bombers, dropping 2,032 long tons of bombs in an\nOboe\n-marked attack. Upon his arrival at the works the next morning, Krupp suffered a fit from which he never recovered.\nNuremberg Trials\nFollowing the Allied victory, plans to prosecute Gustav Krupp as a\nwar criminal\nat the 1945\nNuremberg Trials\nwere dropped because by then he was bedridden and senile. Despite his personal absence from the prisoners' dock, however, Krupp remained technically still under indictment and liable to prosecution in subsequent proceedings.\nDeath\nKrupp died at his residence near\nWerfen\n,\nSalzburg\nin\nAustria\non 16 January 1950.\nHis widow died in 1957.\nHe had eight children including\nAlfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\n(1907–1967), the last owner of Krupp (succeeded by his\nAlfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation\n). His grandson Eckbert Georg Klaus von Bohlen und Halbach (born 1956) married Princess Désirée of\nHohenzollern\n(born 1963), daughter of\nPrincess Birgitta of Sweden\nand\nPrince Johann Georg of Hohenzollern\n.\nSee also\nSecret Meeting of 20 February 1933\nReferences\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nGustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\n.\n1\n2\n\"Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\"\n. Trial Watch. 2008. Archived from\nthe original\non 18 May 2009\n. Retrieved\n1 October\n2008\n.\n1\n2\n3\n\"Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\"\n.\nbritannica\n. 2008\n. Retrieved\n1 October\n2008\n.\n1\n2\n3\nManchester, William.\nThe Arms of Krupp\n. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1968.\n↑\nGerald V. Bull (Author), Charles H. Murphy (Author) (1988).\nParis Kanonen-The Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschutze and Project Harp\n: the Application of Major Calibre Guns to Atmospheric and Space Research)\n(May 1991\ned.). Presidio Press. p.\n246.\nISBN\n3-8132-0304-2\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\n|\nlast=\nhas generic name (\nhelp\n)\n↑\nKnickerbocker, H.R. (1932).\nGermany - Fascist or Soviet?\n. The Bodley Head. p.\n170.\n↑\nShirer, William\n.\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n.\nNew York City\n:\nSimon & Schuster\n, 1960.\n↑\nGustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\nat\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n↑\n\"GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH\"\n. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. 20 May 2008\n. Retrieved\n1 October\n2008\n.\n↑\nGunston, Bill (15 January 2004).\nNight Fighters: A Development and Combat History: A Development and Combat History\n. The History Press.\nISBN\n9780752495125\n.\n↑\n\"Krupp Ill, U.S. Seeks to Indict Son. British Ask Absentia Trial of Father\"\n.\nNew York Times\n. 13 November 1945\n. Retrieved\n24 December\n2013\n.\nImplications that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach is not and never will be physically available for trial with the other major German war criminals ...\n↑\nClapham, Andrew (2003). \"Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg Trials to the dawn of the International Criminal\". In Philippe Sands (ed.).\nFrom Nuremberg to the Hague: the future of international criminal justice\n. Cambrifge University Press. p.\n37\n.\nISBN\n0-521-82991-7\n.\nThe tribunal's eventual decision was that Gustav Krupp could not be tried because of his condition but that 'the charges against him in the Indictment should be retained for trial thereafter if the physical and mental condition of the defendant should permit'.\n↑\n\"Frau Krupp Dies In Germany At 71. Ex-Head of Munition Works Was Bertha for Whom Big Gun of '18 Was Named\"\n.\nNew York Times\n. 22 September 1957\n. Retrieved\n24 December\n2013\n.\nExternal links\nNewspaper clippings about Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "born": "7 August 1870The Hague,Netherlands",
+      "died": "16 January 1950(1950-01-16)(aged79)Werfen,Salzburg,Allied-occupied Austria",
+      "almamater": "University of Heidelberg",
+      "occupations": "Chairman of the board ofFriedrich Krupp AG, 1909–1945",
+      "spouse": "Bertha Krupp",
+      "children": "8, includingAlfried Krupp",
+      "father": "Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach"
+    },
+    "char_count": 11462
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Nuremberg_trials",
+    "name": "Nuremberg trials",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The Nuremberg trials were international criminal trials held by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States against leaders of the defeated Nazi Germany for plotting and carrying out invasions of several countries across Europe and committing atrocities against their citizens in the Second World War.",
+    "description": "Trials of Nazi German leaders",
+    "full_text": "Nuremberg trials\nTrials of Nazi German leaders\n\"International Military Tribunal\" redirects here. For the Tokyo Trial, see\nInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East\n. For the 1947 film, see\nNuremberg Trials\n(film)\n.\nThe\nNuremberg trials\nwere\ninternational criminal trials\nheld by\nFrance\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, the\nUnited Kingdom\n, and the\nUnited States\nagainst leaders of the defeated\nNazi Germany\nfor plotting and carrying out\ninvasions\nof several countries across\nEurope\nand committing\natrocities\nagainst their citizens in the\nSecond World War\n.\nBetween 1939 and 1945, Nazi Germany invaded many countries across Europe, inflicting 27 million deaths in the\nSoviet Union\nalone. Proposals for how to punish the defeated Nazi leaders ranged from a\nshow trial\n(the Soviet Union) to\nsummary executions\n(the\nUnited Kingdom\n). In mid-1945,\nFrance\n, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the\nUnited States\nagreed to convene a joint tribunal in\nNuremberg\n,\noccupied Germany\n, with the\nNuremberg Charter\nas its legal instrument. Between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946, the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(\nIMT\n) tried 22 of the most important surviving leaders of Nazi Germany in the\npolitical\n,\nmilitary\n, and economic spheres, as well as six German organizations. The purpose of the trial was not only to try the defendants but also to assemble irrefutable evidence of\nNazi war crimes\n, offer a history lesson to the defeated Germans, and delegitimize the traditional German elite.\nThe IMT verdict followed the prosecution in declaring the\ncrime\nof plotting and waging\naggressive war\n\"the supreme international crime\" because \"it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole\".\nMost defendants were also charged with\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n,\nthe Holocaust\nsignificantly contributing to the trials.\nTwelve further trials\nwere conducted by the United States against lower-level perpetrators and focused more on the Holocaust. Controversial at the time for their\nretroactive criminalization\nof aggression, the trials' innovation of holding individuals responsible for violations of international law is considered \"the true beginning of\ninternational criminal law\n\".\nOrigin\nJews arriving at\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n, 1944. According to legal historian\nKirsten Sellars\n, the\nextermination camps\n\"formed the moral core of the Allies' case against the Nazi leaders\".\nBetween 1939 and 1945,\nNazi Germany\ninvaded many European countries\n, including\nPoland\n,\nDenmark\n,\nNorway\n,\nthe Netherlands\n,\nBelgium\n,\nLuxembourg\n,\nFrance\n,\nYugoslavia\n,\nGreece\n, and the\nSoviet Union\n.\nGerman\naggression\nwas accompanied by immense brutality in occupied areas;\nwar losses in the Soviet Union alone\nincluded 27 million dead\n, mostly civilians, which was one seventh of the prewar population.\nThe legal reckoning was premised on the extraordinary nature of Nazi criminality, particularly the\nperceived singularity\nof\nthe systematic murder of millions of Jews\n.\nIn early 1942, representatives of nine\ngovernments-in-exile\nfrom German-occupied Europe issued\na declaration\nto demand an international court to try the German crimes committed in occupied countries. The United States and United Kingdom refused to endorse this proposal, citing the failure of\nwar crimes prosecutions\nfollowing\nWorld War I\n.\nThe London-based\nUnited Nations War Crimes Commission\n—without Soviet participation—first met in October 1943 and became bogged down in the scope of its mandate, with Belgian jurist\nMarcel de Baer\nand Czech legal scholar\nBohuslav Ečer\narguing for a broader definition of\nwar crimes\nthat would include \"the crime of war\".\nOn 1 November 1943, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States issued the\nMoscow Declaration\n, warning Nazi leadership of the signatories' intent to \"pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth ... in order that justice may be done\".\nThe declaration stated high-ranking Nazis who had committed crimes in several countries would be dealt with jointly, while others would be tried where they had committed their crimes.\nSoviet jurist\nAron Trainin\ndeveloped the concept of\ncrimes against peace\n(waging\naggressive war\n) which would later be central to the proceedings at Nuremberg.\nTrainin's ideas were reprinted in the West and widely adopted.\nOf all the\nAllies\n, the Soviet Union lobbied most intensely for trying the defeated German leaders for aggression in addition to war crimes.\nThe Soviet Union wanted to hold a\ntrial with a predetermined outcome\nsimilar to the 1930s\nMoscow trials\n, in order to demonstrate the Nazi leaders' guilt and build a case for\nwar reparations\nto rebuild the\nSoviet economy\n, which had been devastated by the war.\nThe United States insisted on a trial that would be seen as legitimate as a means of reforming Germany and demonstrating the superiority of the Western system.\nThe\nUnited States Department of War\nwas drawing up plans for an international tribunal in late 1944 and early 1945. The\nBritish government\nstill preferred the\nsummary execution\nof Nazi leaders, citing the failure of trials following World War I and qualms about\nretroactive criminality\n.\nThe form that retribution would take was left unresolved at the\nYalta Conference\nin February 1945.\nOn 2 May, at the\nSan Francisco Conference\n, United States president\nHarry S. Truman\nannounced the formation of an international military tribunal.\nOn 8 May,\nGermany surrendered unconditionally\n, bringing\nan end to the war in Europe\n.\nEstablishment\nNuremberg charter\nAron Trainin\n(center, with moustache) speaks at the London Conference.\nAerial view of the Palace of Justice in 1945, with the prison attached behind it\nRuins of\nNuremberg\n,\nc.\n1945\nAt the London Conference, held from 26 June to 2 August 1945, representatives of\nFrance\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, the\nUnited Kingdom\n, and the\nUnited States\nnegotiated the form that the trial would take. Until the end of the negotiations, it was not clear that any trial would be held at all.\nThe offences that would be prosecuted were crimes against peace,\ncrimes against humanity\n, and war crimes.\nAt the conference, it was debated whether wars of aggression were prohibited in existing\ncustomary international law\n; regardless, before the charter was adopted there was no law providing for criminal responsibility for aggression.\nDespite misgivings from other Allies, American negotiator and\nSupreme Court\njustice\nRobert H. Jackson\nthreatened the United States' withdrawal if aggression was not prosecuted because it had been the rationale for\nAmerican entry into World War II\n.\nHowever, Jackson conceded on defining crimes against peace; the other three Allies were opposed because it would undermine the freedom of action of the\nUnited Nations Security Council\n.\nWar crimes already existed in international law as criminal violations of the\nlaws and customs of war\n, but these did not apply to a government's treatment of its own citizens.\nLegal experts sought a way to try crimes against German citizens, such as the\nGerman Jews\n.\nA Soviet proposal for a charge of \"crimes against civilians\" was renamed \"crimes against humanity\" at Jackson's suggestion\nafter previous uses of the term in the\npost-World War I\nCommission of Responsibilities\nand in failed efforts to prosecute the perpetrators of the\nArmenian genocide\n.\nThe British proposal to define crimes against humanity was largely accepted, with the final wording being \"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population\".\nThe final version of the charter limited the tribunal's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity to those committed as part of a war of aggression.\nBoth the United States (concerned that its\nJim Crow\nsystem of\nracial segregation\nnot be labeled a crime against humanity) and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid giving an international court jurisdiction over a government's treatment of its own citizens.\nThe charter upended the traditional view of\ninternational law\nby holding individuals,\nrather than states\n, responsible for breaches.\nThe other three Allies' proposal to limit the definition of the crimes to acts committed by the defeated Axis was rejected by Jackson. Instead, the charter limited the jurisdiction of the court to Germany's actions.\nArticle 7 prevented the defendants from claiming\nsovereign immunity\n,\nand Article 8 meant that the plea of acting under\nsuperior orders\nwas not a valid defence, although it might be treated in mitigation.\nThe trial was held under modified\ncommon law\n.\nThe negotiators decided that the tribunal's permanent seat would be in Berlin, while the trial would be held at the\nPalace of Justice\nin\nNuremberg\n.\nLocated in the\nAmerican occupation zone\n, Nuremberg was a symbolic location as the site of\nNazi rallies\n. The Palace of Justice was relatively intact but needed to be renovated for the trial due to\nbomb damage\n; it had an attached prison where the defendants could be held.\nOn 8 August, the Nuremberg Charter was signed in London.\nJudges and prosecutors\nIn early 1946, there were a thousand employees from the four countries' delegations in Nuremberg, of which about two thirds were from the United States.\nBesides legal professionals, there were many social-science researchers, psychologists, translators, interpreters, and\ngraphic designers\n, the last to make the many charts used during the trial.\nEach state appointed a prosecution team and two judges, one being a deputy without voting rights.\nJackson (whom historian\nKim Christian Priemel\ndescribed as \"a versatile politician and a remarkable orator, if not a great legal thinker\") was appointed the United States' chief prosecutor.\nThe United States prosecution believed\nNazism\nwas the product of a German deviation from the West (the\nSonderweg\nthesis) and sought to correct this deviation with a trial that would serve both retributive and educational purposes.\nAs the largest delegation, it would take on the bulk of the prosecutorial effort.\nAt Jackson's recommendation, the United States appointed judges\nFrancis Biddle\nand\nJohn Parker\n.\nThe British chief prosecutor was\nHartley Shawcross\n,\nAttorney General for England and Wales\n, assisted by his predecessor\nDavid Maxwell Fyfe\n.\nAlthough the chief British judge,\nSir Geoffrey Lawrence\n(\nLord Justice of Appeal\n), was the nominal president of the tribunal, in practice Biddle exercised more authority.\nThe French prosecutor,\nFrançois de Menthon\n, had just overseen trials of the leaders of\nVichy France\n;\nhe resigned in January 1946 and was replaced by\nAuguste Champetier de Ribes\n.\nThe French judges were\nHenri Donnedieu de Vabres\n, a professor of criminal law, and deputy\nRobert Falco\n, a judge of the\nCour de Cassation\nwho had represented France at the London Conference.\nThe French government tried to appoint staff untainted by collaboration with the Vichy regime; some appointments, including Champetier de Ribes, were of those who had been in the\nFrench resistance\n.\nExpecting a show trial, the Soviet Union\ninitially appointed as chief prosecutor\nIona Nikitchenko\n, who had presided over the Moscow trials, but he was made a judge and replaced by\nRoman Rudenko\n, a show trial prosecutor\nchosen for his skill as an orator.\nThe Soviet judges and prosecutors were not permitted to make any major decisions without consulting a commission in Moscow led by Soviet politician\nAndrei Vyshinsky\n; the resulting delays hampered the Soviet effort to set the agenda.\nThe influence of the Soviet delegation was also constrained by limited English proficiency, lack of interpreters, and unfamiliarity with diplomacy and international institutions.\nRequests by\nChaim Weizmann\n, the president of the\nWorld Zionist Organization\n, as well as the\nProvisional Government of National Unity\nin Poland, for an active role in the trial justified by their representation of victims of Nazi crimes were rejected.\nThe Soviet Union invited prosecutors from its allies, including Poland,\nCzechoslovakia\n, and\nYugoslavia\n; Denmark and Norway also sent a delegation.\nAlthough the Polish delegation was not empowered to intervene in the proceedings, it submitted evidence and an indictment, succeeding at drawing some attention to crimes committed against Polish Jews and non-Jews.\nIndictment\nHanding over the indictment to the tribunal, 18 October 1945\nThe work of drafting the indictment was divided up by the national delegations. The British worked on aggressive war; the other delegations were assigned the task of covering crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the\nWestern Front\n(France) and the\nEastern Front\n(the Soviet Union). The United States delegation outlined the overall Nazi conspiracy and criminality of Nazi organizations.\nThe British and American delegations decided to work jointly in drafting the charges of conspiracy to wage aggressive war. On 17 September, the various delegations met to discuss the indictment.\nThe charge of\nconspiracy\n, absent from the charter, held together the wide array of charges and defendants\nand was used to charge the top Nazi leaders, as well as bureaucrats who had never killed anyone or perhaps even directly ordered killing. It was also an end run on the charter's limits on charging crimes committed before the beginning of World War II.\nConspiracy charges were central to the cases against propagandists and industrialists: the former were charged with providing the ideological justification for war and other crimes, while the latter were accused of enabling Germany's war effort.\nThe charge, a brainchild of\nWar Department\nlawyer\nMurray C. Bernays\n, and perhaps inspired by his previous work prosecuting\nsecurities fraud\n,\nwas spearheaded by the United States and less popular with the other delegations, particularly France.\nThe problem of translating the indictment and evidence into the three official languages of the tribunal—English, French, and Russian—as well as German was severe due to the scale of the task and difficulty of recruiting interpreters, especially in the Soviet Union.\nVyshinsky demanded extensive corrections to the charges of crimes against peace, especially regarding the role of the\nGerman–Soviet pact\nin starting World War II.\nJackson also separated out an overall conspiracy charge from the other three charges, aiming that the American prosecution would cover the overall Nazi conspiracy while the other delegations would flesh out the details of Nazi crimes.\nThe division of labor, and the haste with which the indictment was prepared, resulted in duplication, imprecise language, and lack of attribution of specific charges to individual defendants.\nDefendants\nMain article:\nList of defendants at the International Military Tribunal\nThe defendants in the dock\nSome of the most prominent Nazis—\nAdolf Hitler\n,\nHeinrich Himmler\n, and\nJoseph Goebbels\n—had died by suicide and therefore could not be tried.\nThe prosecutors aimed to prosecute key leaders in German politics, business, and the military.\nMost of the defendants had surrendered to the United States or United Kingdom.\nThe defendants, who were largely unrepentant,\nincluded former cabinet ministers:\nFranz von Papen\n(who had\nbrought Hitler to power\n),\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n(\nforeign minister\n),\nKonstantin von Neurath\n(\nforeign minister\n),\nWilhelm Frick\n(\ninterior minister\n), and\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, minister for the occupied eastern territories.\nAlso prosecuted were leaders of the German economy, such as\nGustav Krupp\nof the\nKrupp AG\nconglomerate, former\nReichsbank\npresident\nHjalmar Schacht\n, and economic planners\nAlbert Speer\nand\nWalther Funk\n, along with Speer's subordinate and head of the\nforced labor program\n,\nFritz Sauckel\n.\nWhile the British were skeptical of prosecuting economic leaders, the French had a strong interest in highlighting German\neconomic imperialism\n.\nThe military leaders were\nHermann Göring\n—the most infamous surviving Nazi and the main target of the trial\n—\nWilhelm Keitel\n,\nAlfred Jodl\n,\nErich Raeder\n, and\nKarl Dönitz\n.\nAlso on trial were propagandists\nJulius Streicher\nand\nHans Fritzsche\n;\nRudolf Hess\n, Hitler's deputy who had flown to Britain in 1941;\nHans Frank\n, governor-general of the\nGeneral Governorate\nof Poland;\nHitler Youth\nleader\nBaldur von Schirach\n;\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n,\nReich Commissioner for the Netherlands\n; and\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, leader of Himmler's\nReich Security Main Office\n.\nObservers of the trial found the defendants mediocre and contemptible.\nAlthough the list of defendants was finalized on 29 August,\nas late as October, Jackson demanded the addition of new names, but was denied.\nOf the 24 men indicted,\nMartin Bormann\nwas\ntried\nin absentia\n, as the Allies were unaware of his death; Krupp was too ill to stand trial; and\nRobert Ley\nhad died by suicide before the start of the trial.\nFormer Nazis were allowed to serve as counsel\nand by mid-November all defendants had lawyers. The defendants' lawyers jointly appealed to the court, claiming it did not have jurisdiction against the accused, but this motion was rejected. Defense lawyers saw themselves as acting on behalf of their clients and the German nation.\nInitially, the Americans had planned to try fourteen organizations and their leaders, but this was narrowed to six: the\nReich Cabinet\n, the Leadership Corps of the\nNazi Party\n, the\nGestapo\n, the\nSA\n, the\nSS\nand the\nSD\n, and the\nGeneral Staff\nand\nHigh Command\nof the\nGerman military\n(Wehrmacht).\nThe aim was to have these organizations declared criminal, so that their members could be tried expeditiously for membership in a criminal organization.\nSenior American officials believed that convicting organizations was a good way of showing that not just the top German leaders were responsible for crimes, without condemning the entire German people.\nEvidence\nUnited States Army\nclerks with evidence\nOver the summer, all of the national delegations struggled to gather evidence for the upcoming trial.\nThe American and British prosecutors focused on documentary evidence and affidavits rather than testimony from survivors. This strategy increased the credibility of their case, since survivor testimony was considered less reliable and more vulnerable to accusations of bias, but reduced public interest in the proceedings.\nThe American prosecution drew on reports of the\nOffice of Strategic Services\n, an American intelligence agency, and information provided by the\nYIVO Institute for Jewish Research\nand the\nAmerican Jewish Committee\n,\nwhile the French prosecution presented many documents that it had obtained from the\nCenter of Contemporary Jewish Documentation\n.\nThe prosecution called 37 witnesses compared to the defense's 83\n, not including 19 defendants who testified on their own behalf.\nThe prosecution examined 110,000 captured German documents\nand entered 4,600 into evidence,\nalong with\n30 kilometres (19\nmi)\nof film and 25,000 photographs.\nThe charter allowed the\nadmissibility\nof any evidence deemed to have\nprobative\nvalue, including\ndepositions\n.\nBecause of the loose evidentiary rules, photographs, charts, maps, and films played an important role in making incredible crimes believable.\nAfter the American prosecution submitted many documents at the beginning of the trial, the judges insisted that all of the evidence be read into the record, which slowed the trial.\nThe structure of the charges also caused delays as the same evidence ended up being read out multiple times, when it was relevant to both conspiracy and the other charges.\nCourse of the trial\nThe International Military Tribunal began trial on 20 November 1945,\nafter postponement requests from the Soviet prosecution, who wanted more time to prepare its case, were rejected.\nAll defendants\npleaded\nnot guilty.\nJackson made clear that the trial's purpose extended beyond convicting the defendants. Prosecutors wanted to assemble irrefutable evidence of Nazi crimes, establish individual responsibility and the crime of aggression in international law, provide a history lesson to the defeated Germans, delegitimize the traditional German elite,\nand allow the Allies to distance themselves from\nappeasement\n.\nJackson maintained that while the United States did \"not seek to convict the whole German people of crime\", neither did the trial \"serve to absolve the whole German people except 21 men in the dock\".\nNevertheless, defense lawyers (although not most of the defendants) often argued that the prosecution was trying to promote\nGerman collective guilt\nand forcefully countered this\nstrawman\n.\nAccording to Priemel, the conspiracy charge \"invited apologetic interpretations: narratives of absolute,\ntotalitarian\ndictatorship, run by society's lunatic fringe, of which the Germans had been the first victims rather than agents, collaborators, and\nfellow travellers\n\".\nIn contrast, the evidence presented on the Holocaust convinced some observers that\nGermans must have been aware of this crime\nwhile it was ongoing.\nAmerican and British prosecution\nNazi Concentration and Prison Camps\n(1945)\nPresenting information on German aggression, 4 December\nOn 21 November, Jackson gave the opening speech for the prosecution.\nHe described the fact that the defeated Nazis received a trial as \"one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason\".\nFocusing on aggressive war, which he described as the root of the other crimes, Jackson promoted an\nintentionalist\nview of the Nazi state and its overall criminal conspiracy. The speech was favorably received by the prosecution, the tribunal, the audience, historians, and even the defendants.\nMuch of the American case focused on the development of the Nazi conspiracy before the outbreak of war.\nThe American prosecution became derailed during attempts to provide evidence on the first act of aggression,\nagainst Austria\n.\nOn 29 November, the prosecution was unprepared to continue presenting on the\ninvasion of Czechoslovakia\n, and instead screened\nNazi Concentration and Prison Camps\n. The film, compiled from footage of the\nliberation of Nazi concentration camps\n, shocked both the defendants and the judges, who adjourned the trial.\nIndiscriminate selection and disorganized presentation of documentary evidence without tying it to specific defendants hampered the American prosecutors' work on the conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity.\nThe Americans summoned\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommander\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, who testified about the murder of 80,000 people by those under his command, and SS general\nErich von dem Bach-Zelewski\n, who admitted that German\nanti-partisan warfare\nwas little more than a cover for the mass murder of Jews.\nEvidence about\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n's crimes is presented, 2 January 1946.\nThe British prosecution covered the charge of crimes against peace, which was largely redundant to the American conspiracy case.\nOn 4 December, Shawcross gave the opening speech, much of which had been written by Cambridge professor\nHersch Lauterpacht\n.\nUnlike Jackson, Shawcross attempted to minimize the novelty of the aggression charges, elaborating its precursors in the conventions of\nHague\nand\nGeneva\n, the\nLeague of Nations Covenant\n, the\nLocarno Treaty\n, and the\nKellogg–Briand Pact\n.\nThe British took four days to make their case,\nwith Maxwell Fyfe detailing treaties broken by Germany.\nIn mid-December the Americans switched to presenting the case against the indicted organizations,\nwhile in January both the British and Americans presented evidence against individual defendants.\nBesides the organizations mentioned in the indictment, American, and British prosecutors also mentioned the complicity of the German\nForeign Office\n,\narmy\n, and\nnavy\n.\nFrench prosecution\nFrom 17 January to 7 February 1946, France presented its charges and supporting evidence.\nIn contrast to the other prosecution teams, the French prosecution delved into Germany's development in the nineteenth century, arguing that it had diverged from the West due to\npan-Germanism\nand imperialism. They argued that Nazi ideology, which derived from these earlier ideas, was the\nmens rea\n—criminal intent—of the crimes on trial.\nThe French prosecutors, more than their British or American counterparts, emphasized the complicity of many Germans;\nthey barely mentioned the charge of aggressive war and instead focused on forced labor, economic plunder, and massacres.\nProsecutor\nEdgar Faure\ngrouped together various German policies, such as the annexation of\nAlsace–Lorraine\n, under the label of\nGermanization\n, which he argued was a crime against humanity.\nUnlike the British and American prosecution strategies, which focused on using German documents, French prosecutors took the perspective of the victims, submitting postwar police reports.\nEleven witnesses, including victims of Nazi persecution, were called; resistance fighter and\nAuschwitz\nsurvivor\nMarie Claude Vaillant-Couturier\ntestified about crimes she had witnessed.\nThe French charges of war crimes were accepted by the tribunal, except for the execution of hostages.\nDue to the narrow definition of crimes against humanity in the charter, the only part of the Germanization charges accepted by the judges was the\ndeportation of Jews from France\nand other parts of Western Europe.\nSoviet prosecution\nRoman Rudenko\nopens the Soviet case.\nOn 8 February, the Soviet prosecution opened its case with a speech by Rudenko that covered all four prosecution charges, highlighting a wide variety of crimes committed by the German occupiers as part of their destructive and unprovoked invasion.\nRudenko tried to emphasize common ground with the other Allies while rejecting any similarity between Nazi and Soviet rule.\nThe next week, the Soviet prosecution produced\nFriedrich Paulus\n—a German\nfield marshal\ncaptured after the\nBattle of Stalingrad\n—as a witness and questioned him about the preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.\nPaulus incriminated his former associates, pointing to Keitel, Jodl, and Göring as the defendants most responsible for the war.\nMore so than other delegations, Soviet prosecutors showed the gruesome details of German atrocities, especially the death by starvation of 3 million\nSoviet prisoners of war\nand several hundred thousand\nresidents of Leningrad\n.\nAlthough Soviet prosecutors dealt most extensively with the\nsystematic murder of Jews in eastern Europe\n, at times they blurred the fate of Jews with that of other Soviet nationalities.\nAlthough these aspects had already been covered by the American prosecution, Soviet prosecutors introduced new evidence from\nExtraordinary State Commission\nreports and interrogations of senior enemy officers.\nLev Smirnov\npresented evidence on the\nLidice massacre\nin Czechoslovakia, adding that German invaders had\ndestroyed thousands of villages and murdered their inhabitants\nthroughout eastern Europe.\nThe Soviet prosecution emphasized the racist aspect of policies such as the deportation of millions of civilians to Germany for\nforced labor\n,\nthe murder of children,\nsystematic looting of occupied territories, and theft or destruction of\ncultural heritage\n.\nThe Soviet prosecution also attempted to fabricate German responsibility for the\nKatyn massacre\n, which had in fact been committed by the\nNKVD\n. Although Western prosecutors never publicly rejected the Katyn charge for fear of casting doubt on the entire proceedings, they were skeptical.\nThe defense presented evidence of Soviet responsibility,\nand Katyn was not mentioned in the verdict.\nInspired by the films shown by the American prosecution, the Soviet Union commissioned three films for the trial:\nThe German Fascist Destruction of the Cultural Treasures of the Peoples of the USSR\n,\nAtrocities Committed by the German Fascist Invaders in the USSR\n, and\nThe German Fascist Destruction of Soviet Cities\n, using footage from Soviet filmmakers as well as shots from German newsreels.\nThe second included footage of the liberations of\nMajdanek\nand\nAuschwitz\nand was considered even more disturbing than the American concentration camp film.\nSoviet witnesses included several survivors of German crimes, including two civilians who lived through the siege of Leningrad, a peasant whose village was destroyed in anti-partisan warfare, a Red Army doctor who endured several prisoner-of-war camps\nand two Holocaust survivors—\nSamuel Rajzman\n, a survivor of\nTreblinka extermination camp\n, and poet\nAbraham Sutzkever\n, who described the murder of tens of thousands of Jews from\nVilna\n.\nThe Soviet prosecution case was generally well received and presented compelling evidence for the suffering of the Soviet people and the Soviet contributions to victory.\nDefense\nHermann Göring\nunder cross-examination\nA member of the Soviet delegation addresses the tribunal.\nFrom March to July 1946, the defense presented its counterarguments.\nBefore the prosecution finished, it was clear that their general case was proven, but it remained to determine the individual guilt of each defendant.\nNone of the defendants tried to assert that the Nazis' crimes had not occurred.\nSome defendants denied involvement in certain crimes or implausibly claimed ignorance of them, especially the Holocaust.\nA few defense lawyers inverted the arguments of the prosecution to assert that the Germans' authoritarian mindset and obedience to the state exonerated them from any personal guilt.\nMost rejected that Germany had deviated from Western civilization, arguing that few Germans could have supported Hitler because Germany was a civilized country.\nThe defendants tried to blame their crimes on Hitler, who was mentioned 12,000 times during the trial—more than the top five defendants combined. Other absent and dead men, including Himmler,\nReinhard Heydrich\n,\nAdolf Eichmann\n, and Bormann, were also blamed.\nTo counter claims that conservative defendants had enabled the\nNazi rise to power\n, defense lawyers blamed the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n, trade unions, and other countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Germany.\nIn contrast, most defendants avoided incriminating each other.\nMost defendants argued their own insignificance within the Nazi system,\nthough Göring took the opposite approach, expecting to be executed but vindicated in the eyes of the German people.\nThe charter did not recognize a\ntu quoque\ndefense\n—asking for exoneration on the grounds that the Allies had committed the same crimes with which the defendants were charged.\nAlthough defense lawyers repeatedly equated the\nNuremberg Laws\nto legislation found in other countries, Nazi concentration camps to Allied detention facilities, and the deportation of Jews to the\nexpulsion of Germans\n, the judges rejected their arguments.\nAlfred Seidl\n(\nde\n)\nrepeatedly tried to disclose the secret protocols of the German–Soviet pact; although he was eventually successful, it was legally irrelevant and the judges rejected his attempt to bring up the\nTreaty of Versailles\n.\nSix defendants were charged with the\nGerman invasion of Norway\n, and their lawyers argued that this invasion was undertaken to prevent a\nBritish invasion of that country\n; a cover-up prevented the defense from capitalizing on this argument.\nFleet admiral\nChester Nimitz\ntestified that the\nUnited States Navy\nhad also used\nunrestricted submarine warfare\nagainst\nJapan\nin the Pacific\n; Dönitz's counsel successfully argued that this meant that it could not be a crime.\nThe judges barred most evidence on Allied misdeeds from being heard in court.\nMany defense lawyers complained about various aspects of the trial procedure and attempted to discredit the entire proceedings.\nIn order to appease them, the defendants were allowed a free hand with their witnesses and a great deal of irrelevant testimony was heard.\nThe defendants' witnesses sometimes managed to exculpate them, but other witnesses—including\nRudolf Höss\n, the former commandant of Auschwitz, and\nHans Bernd Gisevius\n, a member of the\nGerman resistance\n—bolstered the prosecution's case.\nIn the context of the brewing\nCold War\n—for example, in early March 1946,\nWinston Churchill\ndelivered the\nIron Curtain speech\n—the trial became a means of condemning not only Germany but also the Soviet Union.\nClosing\nOn 31 August, closing arguments were presented.\nOver the course of the trial, crimes against humanity and especially against Jews (who were mentioned as victims of Nazi atrocities far more than any other group) came to upstage the aggressive war charge.\nIn contrast to the opening prosecution statements, all eight closing statements highlighted the Holocaust. The French and British prosecutors made this the main charge, as opposed to that of aggression. All prosecutors except the Americans mentioned the concept of\ngenocide\n, which had been recently invented by the Polish-Jewish jurist\nRaphael Lemkin\n.\nBritish prosecutor Shawcross quoted from witness testimony about a murdered Jewish family from\nDubno\n, Ukraine.\nDuring the closing statements, most defendants disappointed the judges with lies and denials. Speer managed to give the impression of apologizing without assuming personal guilt or naming any victims other than the German people.\nOn 2 September, the court recessed, and the judges retreated into seclusion to decide the verdict and sentences, which had been under discussion since June. The verdict was drafted by British deputy judge\nNorman Birkett\n. All eight judges participated in the deliberations, but the deputies could not vote.\nVerdict\nThe International Military Tribunal agreed with the prosecution that aggression was the gravest charge, stating in its judgment that because \"war is essentially an evil thing\", \"to initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole\".\nThe work of the judges was made more difficult due to the broadness of the crimes listed in the Nuremberg Charter.\nThe judges did not attempt to define the crime of aggression\nand did not mention the retroactivity of the charges in the verdict.\nDespite the lingering doubts of some of the judges,\nthe official interpretation of the IMT held that all of the charges had a solid basis in customary international law and that the trial was procedurally fair.\nThe judges were aware that both the Allies and the Axis had planned or committed acts of aggression, writing the verdict carefully to avoid discrediting either the Allied governments or the tribunal.\nThe judges ruled that there had been a premeditated conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, whose goals were \"the disruption of the European order\" and \"the creation of a\nGreater Germany\nbeyond\nthe frontiers of 1914\n\".\nContrary to Jackson's argument that the conspiracy began with the founding of the Nazi Party in 1920, the verdict dated the planning of aggression to the 1937\nHossbach Memorandum\n.\nThe conspiracy charge caused significant dissent on the bench; Donnedieu de Vabres wanted to scrap it. Through a compromise proposed by the British judges, the charge of conspiracy was narrowed to a conspiracy to wage aggressive war.\nOnly eight defendants were convicted on that charge, all of whom were also found guilty of crimes against peace.\nAll 22 defendants were charged with crimes against peace, and 12 were convicted.\nThe war crimes and crimes against humanity charges held up the best, with only two defendants charged on those grounds being acquitted.\nThe judges determined that crimes against humanity concerning German Jews before 1939 were not under the court's jurisdiction because the prosecution had not proven a connection to aggressive war.\nNewsreel of the sentencing\nFour organizations were ruled to be criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the Gestapo, and the SD, although some lower ranks and subgroups were excluded.\nThe verdict only allowed for individual criminal responsibility if willing membership and knowledge of the criminal purpose could be proved, complicating\ndenazification\nefforts.\nThe SA, Reich Cabinet, General Staff and High Command were not ruled to be criminal organizations.\nAlthough the Wehrmacht leadership was not considered an organization within the meaning of the charter,\nmisrepresentation of the verdict as an exoneration would become one of the foundations of the\nclean Wehrmacht myth\n.\nThe trial had nevertheless resulted in the coverage of\nits systematic criminality\nin the German press.\nSentences were debated at length by the judges. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death: Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, and Bormann.\nOn 16 October,\nten were hanged\n, with Göring killing himself the day before. Seven defendants (Hess, Funk, Raeder, Dönitz, Schirach, Speer, and Neurath) were sent to\nSpandau Prison\nto serve their sentences.\nAll three acquittals (Papen, Schacht, and Fritzsche) were based on a deadlock between the judges; these acquittals surprised observers. Despite being accused of the same crimes, Sauckel was sentenced to death, while Speer was given a prison sentence because the judges considered that he could reform.\nNikichenko released a dissent approved by Moscow that rejected all the acquittals, called for a death sentence for Hess, and convicted all the organizations.\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\nMain article:\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\nTelford Taylor\nopens for the prosecution in the\nMinistries trial\n, 6 January 1948.\nMonowitz\nprisoners unload cement from trains for\nIG Farben\n, presented as evidence at the\nIG Farben trial\n.\nInitially, it was planned to hold a second international tribunal for German industrialists, but this was never held because of differences between the Allies.\nTwelve military trials\nwere convened solely by the United States in the same courtroom that had hosted the International Military Tribunal.\nPursuant to\nLaw No. 10\nadopted by the\nAllied Control Council\n, United States forces arrested almost 100,000 Germans as war criminals.\nThe\nOffice of Chief Counsel for War Crimes\nidentified 2,500 major war criminals, of whom 177 were tried. Many of the worst offenders were not prosecuted, for logistical or financial reasons.\nOne set of trials focused on the actions of German professionals: the\nDoctors' trial\nfocused on\nhuman experimentation\nand\neuthanasia murders\n, the\nJudges' trial\non the\nrole of the judiciary in Nazi crimes\n, and the\nMinistries trial\non the culpability of bureaucrats of German government ministries, especially the\nForeign Office\n.\nAlso on trial were industrialists\n—in the\nFlick trial\n, the\nIG Farben trial\n, and the\nKrupp trial\n—for using forced labor, looting property from Nazi victims, and funding SS atrocities.\nMembers of the SS were tried in the\nPohl trial\n, which focused on members of the\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\nthat oversaw SS economic activity, including the\nNazi concentration camps\n;\nthe\nRuSHA trial\nof\nNazi racial policies\n; and the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial\n, in which members of the\nmobile killing squads\nwere tried for the murder of more than one million people behind the Eastern Front.\nLuftwaffe\ngeneral\nErhard Milch\nwas tried\nfor using slave labor and deporting civilians. In the\nHostages case\n, several generals were tried for executing thousands of hostages and prisoners of war, looting, using forced labor, and deporting civilians in the\nBalkans\n. Other generals were tried in the\nHigh Command Trial\nfor plotting wars of aggression, issuing\ncriminal orders\n, deporting civilians, using slave labor, and looting in the Soviet Union.\nThese trials emphasized the crimes committed during the Holocaust.\nThe trials heard 1,300 witnesses, entered more than 30,000 documents into evidence, and generated 132,855 pages of transcripts, with the judgments totaling 3,828 pages.\nOf 177 defendants, 142 were convicted and 25 sentenced to death;\nthe severity of sentencing was related to the defendant's proximity to mass murder.\nLegal historian\nKevin Jon Heller\nargues that the trials' greatest achievement was \"their inestimable contribution to the form and substance of international criminal law\", which had been left underdeveloped by the IMT.\nContemporary reactions\nPress at the International Military Tribunal\nGermans read\nSüddeutsche Zeitung\nreporting the verdict, 1 October 1946\nIn all, 249 journalists were accredited to cover the IMT\nand 61,854 visitor tickets were issued.\nIn France, the sentence for Rudolf Hess and acquittal of organizations were met with outrage from the media and especially from organizations for deportees and resistance fighters, as they were perceived as too lenient.\nIn the United Kingdom, although a variety of responses were reported, it was difficult to sustain interest in a long trial.\nWhere the prosecution was disappointed by some of the verdicts, the defense could take satisfaction.\nMany Germans at the time of the trials focused on finding food and shelter.\nDespite this, a majority read press reports about the trial.\nIn a 1946 poll, 78 percent of Germans assessed the trial as fair, but four years later that had fallen to 38 percent, with 30 percent considering it unfair.\nAs time went on, more Germans considered the trials illegitimate\nvictor's justice\nand an imposition of collective guilt, which they rejected—instead considering themselves victims of the war.\nAs the Cold War began, the rapidly changing political environment began to affect the effectiveness of the trials.\nThe educational purpose of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals was a failure, in part because of the resistance to war crimes trials in German society, but also because of the United States Army's refusal to publish the trial record in German for fear it would undermine the fight against communism.\nThe German churches, both Catholic and Protestant, were vocal proponents of amnesty.\nThe pardon of convicted war criminals also had cross-party support in\nWest Germany\n, which was established in 1949.\nThe Americans satisfied these wishes to bind West Germany to the\nWestern Bloc\n,\nbeginning early releases of Nuremberg Military Tribunal convicts in 1949.\nIn 1951,\nHigh Commissioner\nJohn J. McCloy\noverturned most of the sentences\nand the last three prisoners, all convicted at the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial, were released in 1958.\nThe German public took the early releases as confirmation of what they saw as the illegitimacy of the trials.\nThe IMT defendants required Soviet permission for release; Speer was not successful in obtaining early release, and Hess remained in prison until his death in 1987.\nBy the late 1950s, the West German consensus on release began to erode, due to greater openness in\npolitical culture\nand new revelations of Nazi criminality, including the first trials of Nazi perpetrators in West German courts.\nLegacy\nBenjamin Ferencz\n, chief prosecutor of the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial\n, in the\nPalace of Justice\ncourtroom, 2012\nThe International Military Tribunal, and its charter, \"marked the true beginning of\ninternational criminal law\n\".\nThe trial has met a mixed reception ranging from glorification to condemnation.\nThe reaction was initially predominantly negative, but has become more positive over time.\nThe selective prosecution exclusively of the defeated Axis and hypocrisy of all four Allied powers has garnered the most persistent criticism. Such actions as the German–Soviet pact,\nthe\nexpulsion of millions of Germans from central and eastern Europe\n,\ndeportation of civilians for forced labor,\nand violent suppression of anti-colonial uprisings would have been deemed illegal according to the definitions of international crimes in the Nuremberg charter.\nAnother controversy resulted from trying defendants for acts that were not criminal at the time,\nparticularly crimes against peace.\nEqually novel but less controversial were crimes against humanity, the conspiracy charge, and criminal penalties on individuals for breaches of international law.\nBesides these criticisms, the trials have been taken to task for the distortion that comes from fitting historical events into legal categories.\nThe\nInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East\n(Tokyo Trial) borrowed many of its ideas from the IMT, including all four charges, and was intended by the\nTruman Administration\nto shore up the IMT's legal legacy.\nOn 11 December 1946, the\nUnited Nations General Assembly\nunanimously passed a resolution affirming \"the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal\".\nIn 1950, the\nInternational Law Commission\ndrafted the\nNuremberg principles\nto codify international criminal law, although the Cold War prevented the adoption of these principles until the 1990s.\nThe 1948\nGenocide Convention\nwas much more restricted than Lemkin's original concept and its effectiveness was further limited by Cold War politics.\nIn the 1990s, a revival of international criminal law included the establishment of\nad hoc\ninternational criminal tribunals\nfor\nYugoslavia\n(ICTY) and\nRwanda\n(ICTR), which were widely viewed as part of the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. A permanent\nInternational Criminal Court\n(ICC), proposed in 1953, was established in 2002.\nThe trials were the first use of\nsimultaneous interpretation\n, which stimulated technical advances in translation methods.\nThe Palace of Justice houses a museum on the trial and the courtroom became a tourist attraction, drawing 13,138 visitors in 2005.\nThe IMT is one of the most well-studied trials in history, and it has also been the subject of an abundance of books and scholarly publications, along with motion pictures such as\nJudgment at Nuremberg\n(1961),\nThe Memory of Justice\n(1976)\nand\nNuremberg\n(2025).\nNotes\n↑\nFrench\n:\nTribunal militaire international\n;\nGerman\n:\nInternationaler Militärgerichtshof\n;\nRussian\n:\nМеждународный военный трибунал\n,\nromanized\n:\nMezhdunarodnyy voyennyy tribunal\n.\n↑\nAlexander Volchkov\n(Soviet Union),\nNorman Birkett\n(UK),\nJohn J. Parker\n(US) and\nRobert Falco\n(France).\nReferences\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n165.\n1\n2\nSayapin 2014\n, p.\n148.\n1\n2\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1092.\n↑\nSayapin 2014\n, pp.\n151–159.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n27–28.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n56.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n32, 64.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n30–31.\n1\n2\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 4.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n49–50.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n31, 36, 54.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n4, 107.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n3.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n26–27, 31.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n67, 74–75.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n45–46.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n84.\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n85–86.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n87–88.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n832–833.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n84–85, 88–89.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n98–100.\n1\n2\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n834.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n30, 34.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n68, 73.\n↑\nBassiouni 2011\n, pp.\nxxx–xxxi, 94.\n↑\nBassiouni 2011\n, pp.\nxxxi, 33.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n373.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nAcquaviva 2011\n, pp.\n884–885.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, pp.\n102–103, 114, 120, 135.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n839–840.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n9–10.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n85.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n31.\n1\n2\n3\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n21.\n1\n2\n3\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n2, 112.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n71, 90.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n3, 6.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n91.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n53, 73–74.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n88.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n115.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 10.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n75, 89.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 11–12.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n204.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n9, 78.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n217.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n88–89.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nFleming 2022\n, p.\n209.\n↑\nFleming 2022\n, pp.\n209, 220.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n80.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n80–81.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n102.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n112–113.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n18, 69, 111.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n99.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n82–83.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n84–86.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n100–101.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n27.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n28–29.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n82, 139.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n82, 127.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n83–84.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n83, 106, 133.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n92–93.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n27–28.\n1\n2\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n841.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n24–26.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n116–117.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 19.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n148.\n↑\nMouralis 2016\n, fn 82.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n104.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n124.\n1\n2\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nMouralis 2016\n, paragraph 3.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n159.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n133.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n106.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n107.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n107–108.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, pp.\n20–21.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n104–105.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, pp.\n69–70.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n89, 108.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n384.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, pp.\n380–381.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n382.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n383.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n199–200.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 15.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n110–111.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 16.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 17.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n115.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 18.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 20–21.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 17–18.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n216–218.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n109.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n221–222.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n223.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n116, 118.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n230–231.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n232.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n225–226, 335.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n247, 329.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n180, 202, 233.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n231–232.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n233, 236–237, 239.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n237, 239.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n240, 242.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n125.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n20.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n127–128.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n130–131.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n135.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n133–134.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n287.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n148.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n149–150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n131–132.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n129–130.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, pp.\n23–24.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n171.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n119, 150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n62, 120.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n138, 141.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n370, 372.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n160–161.\n1\n2\nSayapin 2014\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n375.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n371.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n142–143.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n840–841.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n164–165.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n109, 144.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n371–372, 387.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n378.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n387.\n↑\nSayapin 2014\n, pp.\n150–151.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n386.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n25.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n383.\n1\n2\n3\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n383–384.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n143–144.\n↑\nBrüggemann 2018\n, p.\n405.\n↑\nBrüggemann 2018\n, pp.\n405–406, 447–448.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n147–148.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n387, 390–391.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n380.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n353, 400.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n1.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n11–12.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n370.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n273, 308.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n85, 89.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n3, 4, 92–94, 100–101.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n294–296, 298.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n247, 310, 315.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n87, 96, 104.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n1, 4.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n1–2.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n400–401.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 27, 34.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, pp.\n46–47.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n149.\n1\n2\nSafferling 2020\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n99.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n353–354.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n372–373.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n356–357.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n105–107.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n365.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n366.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n351.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n367.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n366–367.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n360.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n111–112.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\nvi.\n↑\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1091.\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n172.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n148, 343, 402.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n833–834.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n205, 348.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n343.\n1\n2\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1089.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n137.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n402, 417.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n412.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n837.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n175.\n1\n2\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n411.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n290.\n↑\nAcquaviva 2011\n, p.\n896.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, pp.\n31–32.\nSources\nFurther information:\nNuremberg Trials bibliography\nAcquaviva, Guido (2011).\n\"At the Origins of Crimes Against Humanity: Clues to a Proper Understanding of the\nNullum Crimen\nPrinciple in the Nuremberg Judgment\"\n.\nJournal of International Criminal Justice\n.\n9\n(4):\n881–\n903.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/jicj/mqr010\n.\nBassiouni, M. Cherif\n(2011).\nCrimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application\n.\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-139-49893-7\n.\nBrüggemann, Jens (2018).\nMänner von Ehre?: die Wehrmachtgeneralität im Nürnberger Prozess 1945/46\n: zur Entstehung einer Legende\n[\nMen of honor?: the Wehrmacht generals in the Nuremberg trial 1945/46: the emergence of a legend\n]\n(in German).\nFerdinand Schöningh\n.\nISBN\n978-3-506-79259-4\n.\nDouglas, Lawrence\n(2001).\nThe Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-300-10984-9\n.\nEchternkamp, Jörg\n(2020).\nPostwar Soldiers: Historical Controversies and West German Democratization, 1945–1955\n.\nBerghahn Books\n.\nISBN\n978-1-78920-558-9\n.\nFleming, Michael\n(2022).\nIn the Shadow of the Holocaust: Poland, the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and the Search for Justice\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-009-11660-2\n.\nGemählich, Matthias (2019).\n\"«\nNotre combat pour la paix\n»\n: la France et le procès de Nuremberg (1945–1946)\"\n[\n\"Our fight for peace\": France and the Nuremberg trial (1945–1946)\n]\n.\nRevue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande\n(in French).\n51\n(2):\n507–\n525.\ndoi\n:\n10.4000/allemagne.2053\n.\nISSN\n0035-0974\n.\nHeller, Kevin Jon\n(2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n.\nOxford University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-19-923233-8\n.\nHirsch, Francine\n(2020).\nSoviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal after World War II\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-937795-4\n.\nMouralis, Guillaume\n[in French]\n(2016).\n\"Le procès de Nuremberg: retour sur soixante-dix ans de recherche\"\n[\nThe Nuremberg trial: a look back at seventy years of research\n]\n.\nCritique Internationale\n(in French).\n73\n(4): 159.\ndoi\n:\n10.3917/crii.073.0159\n.\nMouralis, Guillaume (2019).\nLe moment Nuremberg: Le procès international, les lawyers et la question raciale\n[\nThe Nuremberg moment: The international trial, the lawyers and the racial question\n]\n(in French).\nPresses de Sciences Po\n.\nISBN\n978-2-7246-2422-9\n.\nMusa, Shavana (2016). \"The British and the Nuremberg Trial\".\nBritish Influences on International Law, 1915–2015\n.\nBrill Nijhoff\n. pp.\n367–\n386.\nISBN\n978-90-04-28417-3\n.\nPriemel, Kim Christian\n(2016).\nThe Betrayal: The Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-256374-3\n.\nSafferling, Christoph J. M.\n[in German]\n(2020).\n\"German Participation in the Nuremberg Trials and Its Implications for Today\"\n.\nThe Nuremberg War Crimes Trial and its Policy Consequences Today\n.\nNomos\n. pp.\n41–\n54.\ndoi\n:\n10.5771/9783845280400-41\n.\nISBN\n978-3-8487-3688-1\n.\nSayapin, Sergey (2014).\nThe Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State\n.\nT.M.C. Asser Press\n.\nISBN\n978-90-6704-927-6\n.\nSellars, Kirsten (2010).\n\"Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo\"\n.\nEuropean Journal of International Law\n.\n21\n(4):\n1085–\n1102.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/ejil/chq070\n.\nSellars, Kirsten (2013).\n'Crimes Against Peace' and International Law\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-107-02884-5\n.\nSharples, Caroline (2013). \"Holocaust on Trial: Mass Observation and British Media Responses to the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945–1946\".\nBritain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and Genocide\n.\nPalgrave Macmillan UK\n. pp.\n31–\n50.\nISBN\n978-1-137-35077-0\n.\nTomuschat, Christian (2006).\n\"The Legacy of Nuremberg\"\n.\nJournal of International Criminal Justice\n.\n4\n(4):\n830–\n844.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/jicj/mql051\n.\nWeinke, Annette (2006).\nDie Nürnberger Prozesse\n[\nThe Nuremberg trials\n]\n(in German).\nC.H.Beck\n.\nISBN\n978-3-406-53604-5\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nNuremberg Trials\n.\nTranscript\nand other documents from the\nAvalon Project\nby\nYale Law School\nLillian Goldman Law Library\nNuremberg: Army Television – Release Version\n—\nA documentary produced in 1950, available online in the\nNational Archives\nCatalog\nConsists of footage from German films documenting Nazi personalities and activities interwoven with film shot during the trials\n—\nincluding testimony and statements from defendants, prosecuting attorneys, judges, and witnesses. It also contains flashbacks of a variety of Nazi crimes against humanity.\n49°27′16″N\n11°02′54″E\n\n/\n\n49.45444°N 11.04833°E\n\n/\n49.45444; 11.04833",
+    "infobox": {
+      "indictment": "Conspiracy,crimes against peace,war crimes,crimes against humanity,mass murder,unethical human experimentation,false imprisonment,hate crimes",
+      "started": "20 November 1945",
+      "decided": "1 October 1946",
+      "defendants": "24 (see list)",
+      "witnesses": "37 prosecution, 83 defense",
+      "transcripts": "Harvard Law SchoolYale Law School",
+      "related_actions": "Subsequent Nuremberg trialsInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East",
+      "judges_sitting": "Iona Nikitchenko(Soviet Union)Geoffrey Lawrence(UK)Francis Biddle(US)Donnedieu de Vabres(France)and deputies[b]"
+    },
+    "char_count": 58559
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Nuremberg_principles",
+    "name": "Nuremberg principles",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The Nuremberg principles are a set of guidelines for determining what constitutes a war crime. The document was created by the International Law Commission of the United Nations to codify the legal principles underlying the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi party members following World War II.",
+    "description": "Guidelines for determining what constitutes a war crime",
+    "full_text": "Nuremberg principles\nGuidelines for determining what constitutes a war crime\nFor the denaturalization of German Jews, see\nNuremberg Laws\n. For the set of research ethics principles for human experimentation, see\nNuremberg Code\n.\nThe\nNuremberg principles\nare a set of guidelines for determining what constitutes a\nwar crime\n. The document was created by the\nInternational Law Commission\nof the\nUnited Nations\nto\ncodify\nthe legal principles underlying the\nNuremberg Trials\nof\nNazi\nparty members following\nWorld War II\n.\nGroup of defendants at the Nuremberg trials, from which the Nuremberg principles were established\nThe principles\nPrinciple I\nAny person who commits an act which constitutes a\ncrime under international law\nis responsible therefor and liable to punishment.\nPrinciple II\nThe fact that\ninternal law\ndoes not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under\ninternational law\ndoes not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.\nPrinciple III\nThe fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law, acted as\nHead of State\nor\nresponsible government\nofficial\n, does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.\nPrinciple IV\nMain article:\nSuperior orders\nThe fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.\nThis principle could be paraphrased as follows: \"It is not an acceptable excuse to say 'I was just following my superior's orders'\".\nPrevious to the time of the\nNuremberg Trials\n, this excuse was known in common parlance as \"\nsuperior orders\n\".\nAfter the prominent, high-profile event of the Nuremberg Trials, that excuse is now referred to by many as the \"\nNuremberg Defense\n\".  In recent times, a third term, \"\nlawful orders\n\" has become common parlance for some people.\nAll three terms are in use today, and they all have slightly different nuances of meaning, depending on the context in which they are used.\nNuremberg Principle IV is legally supported by the\njurisprudence\nfound in\ncertain articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which deal indirectly with conscientious objection\n.\nIt is also supported by\nthe principles found in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status\nwhich was issued by the Office of the\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees\n(UNHCR). Those principles deal with the conditions under which\nconscientious objectors\ncan apply for refugee status in another country if they face persecution in their own country for refusing to participate in an illegal war.\nPrinciple V\nAny person charged with a crime under international law has the\nright to a fair trial\non the facts and law.\nPrinciple VI\nThe crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:\n(a)\nCrimes against peace\n:\n(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a\nwar of aggression\nor a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;\n(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).\n(b)\nWar crimes\n:\nViolations of the\nlaws or customs of war\nwhich include, but are not limited to,\nmurder\n, ill-treatment or\ndeportation\nto\nslave labor\nor for any other purpose of\ncivilian\npopulation\nof or in\noccupied territory\n; murder or ill-treatment of\nprisoners of war\nor\npersons on the Seas\n, killing of\nhostages\n,\nplunder\nof\npublic\nor\nprivate property\n, wanton destruction of\ncities\n,\ntowns\n, or\nvillages\n, or devastation not justified by\nmilitary necessity\n.\n(c)\nCrimes against humanity\n:\nMurder, extermination, enslavement,\ndeportation\nand other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, or\npersecutions\non political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.\nLeaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.\nPrinciple VII\nComplicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.\nThe principles' power or lack of power\nSee also:\nSources of international law\nand\nInternational legal theory\nIn the period just prior to the June 26, 1945 signing of the\nCharter of the United Nations\n, the\ngovernments\nparticipating in its drafting were opposed to conferring on the\nUnited Nations\nlegislative power\nto enact binding\nrules\nof\ninternational law\n. As a corollary, they also rejected proposals to confer on the\nGeneral Assembly\nthe power to impose certain general conventions on states by some form of majority vote. There was, however, strong support for conferring on the General Assembly the more limited powers of study and recommendation, which led to the adoption of Article 13 in\nChapter IV of the Charter\n.\nIt obliges the\nUnited Nations General Assembly\nto initiate studies and to make recommendations that encourage the progressive development of international law and its\ncodification\n. The Nuremberg Principles were developed by UN organs under that limited mandate.\nUnlike treaty law,\ncustomary international law\nis not written. To prove that a certain rule is customary one has to show that it is reflected in state practice and that there exists a conviction in the\ninternational community\nthat such practice is required as a matter of law. (For example, the\nNuremberg Trials\nwere a \"practice\" of the \"international law\" of the Nuremberg Principles; and that \"practice\" was supported by the international community.) In this context, \"practice\" relates to official state practice and therefore includes formal statements by states. A contrary practice by some states is possible. If this contrary practice is condemned by other states then the rule is confirmed.\nIn 1947, under\nUN General Assembly\nResolution 177 (II), paragraph (a), the\nInternational Law Commission\nwas directed to \"formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the\nNuremberg Tribunal\nand in the judgment of the Tribunal.\" In the course of the consideration of this subject, the question arose as to whether or not the commission should ascertain to what extent the principles contained in the Charter and judgment constituted principles of international law. The conclusion was that since the Nuremberg Principles had been affirmed by the General Assembly, the task entrusted to the commission was not to express any appreciation of these principles as principles of international law but merely to formulate them. The text above was adopted by the Commission at its second session. The Report of the commission also contains commentaries on the principles (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp.\n374–378).\nExamples of the principles supported and not supported\nFor examples relating to Principle VI, see\nList of war crimes\n.\nFor examples relating to Principle IV (from before, during, and after the Nuremberg Trials), see\nSuperior Orders\n.\nThe 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court\nConcerning Nuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's responsibility, it could be argued that a version of the\nSuperior Orders\ndefense can be found as a defense to international crimes in the\nRome Statute\nof the\nInternational Criminal Court\n. (The Rome Statute was agreed upon in 1998 as the foundational document of the International Criminal Court, established to try those individuals accused of serious international crimes.)  Article 33, titled \"Superior Orders and prescription of law,\"\nstates:\n1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:\n(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;\n(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and\n(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.\n2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.\nThere are two interpretations of this Article:\nThis formulation, especially (1)(a), whilst effectively prohibiting the use of the Nuremberg Defense in relation to charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, does however, appear to allow the Nuremberg Defense to be used as a protection against charges of war crimes, provided the relevant criteria are met.\nNevertheless, this interpretation of ICC Article 33 is open to debate: For example, Article 33 (1)(c) protects the defendant only if \"the order was not manifestly unlawful.\" The \"order\" could be considered \"unlawful\" if we consider\nNuremberg Principle IV\nto be the applicable \"law\"  in this case.  If so, then the defendant is not protected.  Discussion as to whether or not Nuremberg Principle IV is the applicable law in this case is found in\na discussion of the Nuremberg Principles' power or lack of power\n.\nSee also:\nStates Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court\nCanada\nMain article:\nJeremy Hinzman\nNuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's responsibility, was also at issue in\nCanada\nin the case of\nHinzman v. Canada.\nJeremy Hinzman\nwas a\nU.S. Army\ndeserter\nwho claimed\nrefugee\nstatus in Canada as a\nconscientious objector\n, one of\nmany Iraq War resisters\n. Hinzman's lawyer,\nJeffry House\n, had previously raised the issue of the\nlegality of the Iraq War\nas having a bearing on their case. The\nFederal Court\nruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.\nIn the decision, Justice\nAnne L. Mactavish\naddressed the issue of personal responsibility:\nAn individual must be involved at the policy-making level to be culpable for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not expected to make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a conflict. Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal war-time conduct is otherwise proper.\nOn Nov 15, 2007, a quorum  of the\nSupreme Court of Canada\nconsisting of Justices\nMichel Bastarache\n,\nRosalie Abella\n, and\nLouise Charron\nrefused an application to have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.\nSee also\nCommand responsibility\nGeneva Conventions\nInternational Criminal Court\nInternational legal theory\nLaws of war\nLondon Charter of the International Military Tribunal\nNuremberg Code\nNuremberg Trials\nRule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project\nRule of law\nRule According to Higher Law\nSources of international law\nFootnotes\n↑\n\"Charter of the United Nations, Chapter IV: The General Assembly\"\n. United Nations. June 26, 1945.\nArchived\nfrom the original on November 28, 2010\n. Retrieved\nDecember 23,\n2010\n.\n↑\n\"International Law Commission\"\n.\nlegal.un.org\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2021-05-06\n. Retrieved\n2021-05-09\n.\n↑\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n(ICRC)\nCustomary international humanitarian law\nArchived\n2009-06-28 at the\nWayback Machine\n↑\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n(ICRC)\nReferences\nPrinciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950: Introduction\nArchived\n2016-03-14 at the\nWayback Machine\n↑\nRome Statute of the International Criminal Court (16 January 2002) [10 November 1998].\n\"Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Part 3: General Principles of Criminal Law; Article 33: Superior orders and prescription of law\"\n. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 19 October 2013\n. Retrieved\n21 March\n2010\n.\n↑\nMernagh, M. (2006-05-18).\n\"AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow\"\n. Toronto's Now Magazine. Archived from\nthe original\non 2007-03-24\n. Retrieved\n2008-06-02\n.\n↑\n\"Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 420\"\n. Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. pp.\n(see\nHeld,\nPara. (1)). Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-02-16\n. Retrieved\n2008-06-16\n.\n↑\nMernagh, M. (2006-05-18).\n\"AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow\"\n. Toronto's Now Magazine. Archived from\nthe original\non 2011-06-05\n. Retrieved\n2008-06-02\n.\n↑\nHinzman v. Canada\nArchived\n2013-06-28 at the\nWayback Machine\nFederal Court decision. Paras (157) and (158). Accessed 2008-06-18\n↑\nRoman Goergen (February 23, 2011).\n\"Sanctuary Denied\"\n.\nIn These Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 11 March 2011\n. Retrieved\n6 March\n2011\n.\n↑\nCBC News (2007-11-15).\n\"Top court refuses to hear cases of U.S. deserters\"\n. CBC News.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2008-06-05\n. Retrieved\n2008-06-02\n.\n↑\n\"Supreme Court of Canada – Decisions – Bulletin of November 16, 2007, (See Sections 32111 and 32112)\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non July 21, 2011.\nReferences\nPrinciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950.\nArchived\n2012-09-12 at the\nWayback Machine\non the website of the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n(ICRC)\nPrinciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950.\nArchived\n2018-02-19 at the\nWayback Machine\non the website of the\nUnited Nations\n(\nUN\n)\nFurther reading\nIntroductory note by Antonio Cassese\nArchived\n2014-04-10 at the\nWayback Machine\nfor General Assembly resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1946 (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal) on the website of the\nUN Audiovisual Library of International Law\nArchived\n2013-09-11 at the\nWayback Machine\nNuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal\nArchived\n2014-02-14 at the\nWayback Machine\ncontained in the\nAvalon Project\narchive at\nYale Law School\nJudgment\n: The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity\nArchived\n2011-07-20 at the\nWayback Machine\ncontained in the\nAvalon Project\narchive at\nYale Law School\nExternal links\nIstván Deák, Retribution against Heads of State and Prime Ministers",
+    "infobox": {},
+    "char_count": 14452
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "London_Charter_of_the_International_Military_Tribunal",
+    "name": "London Charter of the International Military Tribunal",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The Nuremberg trials were international criminal trials held by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States against leaders of the defeated Nazi Germany for plotting and carrying out invasions of several countries across Europe and committing atrocities against their citizens in the Second World War.",
+    "description": "Trials of Nazi German leaders",
+    "full_text": "Nuremberg trials\nTrials of Nazi German leaders\n\"International Military Tribunal\" redirects here. For the Tokyo Trial, see\nInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East\n. For the 1947 film, see\nNuremberg Trials\n(film)\n.\nThe\nNuremberg trials\nwere\ninternational criminal trials\nheld by\nFrance\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, the\nUnited Kingdom\n, and the\nUnited States\nagainst leaders of the defeated\nNazi Germany\nfor plotting and carrying out\ninvasions\nof several countries across\nEurope\nand committing\natrocities\nagainst their citizens in the\nSecond World War\n.\nBetween 1939 and 1945, Nazi Germany invaded many countries across Europe, inflicting 27 million deaths in the\nSoviet Union\nalone. Proposals for how to punish the defeated Nazi leaders ranged from a\nshow trial\n(the Soviet Union) to\nsummary executions\n(the\nUnited Kingdom\n). In mid-1945,\nFrance\n, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the\nUnited States\nagreed to convene a joint tribunal in\nNuremberg\n,\noccupied Germany\n, with the\nNuremberg Charter\nas its legal instrument. Between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946, the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(\nIMT\n) tried 22 of the most important surviving leaders of Nazi Germany in the\npolitical\n,\nmilitary\n, and economic spheres, as well as six German organizations. The purpose of the trial was not only to try the defendants but also to assemble irrefutable evidence of\nNazi war crimes\n, offer a history lesson to the defeated Germans, and delegitimize the traditional German elite.\nThe IMT verdict followed the prosecution in declaring the\ncrime\nof plotting and waging\naggressive war\n\"the supreme international crime\" because \"it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole\".\nMost defendants were also charged with\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n,\nthe Holocaust\nsignificantly contributing to the trials.\nTwelve further trials\nwere conducted by the United States against lower-level perpetrators and focused more on the Holocaust. Controversial at the time for their\nretroactive criminalization\nof aggression, the trials' innovation of holding individuals responsible for violations of international law is considered \"the true beginning of\ninternational criminal law\n\".\nOrigin\nJews arriving at\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n, 1944. According to legal historian\nKirsten Sellars\n, the\nextermination camps\n\"formed the moral core of the Allies' case against the Nazi leaders\".\nBetween 1939 and 1945,\nNazi Germany\ninvaded many European countries\n, including\nPoland\n,\nDenmark\n,\nNorway\n,\nthe Netherlands\n,\nBelgium\n,\nLuxembourg\n,\nFrance\n,\nYugoslavia\n,\nGreece\n, and the\nSoviet Union\n.\nGerman\naggression\nwas accompanied by immense brutality in occupied areas;\nwar losses in the Soviet Union alone\nincluded 27 million dead\n, mostly civilians, which was one seventh of the prewar population.\nThe legal reckoning was premised on the extraordinary nature of Nazi criminality, particularly the\nperceived singularity\nof\nthe systematic murder of millions of Jews\n.\nIn early 1942, representatives of nine\ngovernments-in-exile\nfrom German-occupied Europe issued\na declaration\nto demand an international court to try the German crimes committed in occupied countries. The United States and United Kingdom refused to endorse this proposal, citing the failure of\nwar crimes prosecutions\nfollowing\nWorld War I\n.\nThe London-based\nUnited Nations War Crimes Commission\n—without Soviet participation—first met in October 1943 and became bogged down in the scope of its mandate, with Belgian jurist\nMarcel de Baer\nand Czech legal scholar\nBohuslav Ečer\narguing for a broader definition of\nwar crimes\nthat would include \"the crime of war\".\nOn 1 November 1943, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States issued the\nMoscow Declaration\n, warning Nazi leadership of the signatories' intent to \"pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth ... in order that justice may be done\".\nThe declaration stated high-ranking Nazis who had committed crimes in several countries would be dealt with jointly, while others would be tried where they had committed their crimes.\nSoviet jurist\nAron Trainin\ndeveloped the concept of\ncrimes against peace\n(waging\naggressive war\n) which would later be central to the proceedings at Nuremberg.\nTrainin's ideas were reprinted in the West and widely adopted.\nOf all the\nAllies\n, the Soviet Union lobbied most intensely for trying the defeated German leaders for aggression in addition to war crimes.\nThe Soviet Union wanted to hold a\ntrial with a predetermined outcome\nsimilar to the 1930s\nMoscow trials\n, in order to demonstrate the Nazi leaders' guilt and build a case for\nwar reparations\nto rebuild the\nSoviet economy\n, which had been devastated by the war.\nThe United States insisted on a trial that would be seen as legitimate as a means of reforming Germany and demonstrating the superiority of the Western system.\nThe\nUnited States Department of War\nwas drawing up plans for an international tribunal in late 1944 and early 1945. The\nBritish government\nstill preferred the\nsummary execution\nof Nazi leaders, citing the failure of trials following World War I and qualms about\nretroactive criminality\n.\nThe form that retribution would take was left unresolved at the\nYalta Conference\nin February 1945.\nOn 2 May, at the\nSan Francisco Conference\n, United States president\nHarry S. Truman\nannounced the formation of an international military tribunal.\nOn 8 May,\nGermany surrendered unconditionally\n, bringing\nan end to the war in Europe\n.\nEstablishment\nNuremberg charter\nAron Trainin\n(center, with moustache) speaks at the London Conference.\nAerial view of the Palace of Justice in 1945, with the prison attached behind it\nRuins of\nNuremberg\n,\nc.\n1945\nAt the London Conference, held from 26 June to 2 August 1945, representatives of\nFrance\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, the\nUnited Kingdom\n, and the\nUnited States\nnegotiated the form that the trial would take. Until the end of the negotiations, it was not clear that any trial would be held at all.\nThe offences that would be prosecuted were crimes against peace,\ncrimes against humanity\n, and war crimes.\nAt the conference, it was debated whether wars of aggression were prohibited in existing\ncustomary international law\n; regardless, before the charter was adopted there was no law providing for criminal responsibility for aggression.\nDespite misgivings from other Allies, American negotiator and\nSupreme Court\njustice\nRobert H. Jackson\nthreatened the United States' withdrawal if aggression was not prosecuted because it had been the rationale for\nAmerican entry into World War II\n.\nHowever, Jackson conceded on defining crimes against peace; the other three Allies were opposed because it would undermine the freedom of action of the\nUnited Nations Security Council\n.\nWar crimes already existed in international law as criminal violations of the\nlaws and customs of war\n, but these did not apply to a government's treatment of its own citizens.\nLegal experts sought a way to try crimes against German citizens, such as the\nGerman Jews\n.\nA Soviet proposal for a charge of \"crimes against civilians\" was renamed \"crimes against humanity\" at Jackson's suggestion\nafter previous uses of the term in the\npost-World War I\nCommission of Responsibilities\nand in failed efforts to prosecute the perpetrators of the\nArmenian genocide\n.\nThe British proposal to define crimes against humanity was largely accepted, with the final wording being \"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population\".\nThe final version of the charter limited the tribunal's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity to those committed as part of a war of aggression.\nBoth the United States (concerned that its\nJim Crow\nsystem of\nracial segregation\nnot be labeled a crime against humanity) and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid giving an international court jurisdiction over a government's treatment of its own citizens.\nThe charter upended the traditional view of\ninternational law\nby holding individuals,\nrather than states\n, responsible for breaches.\nThe other three Allies' proposal to limit the definition of the crimes to acts committed by the defeated Axis was rejected by Jackson. Instead, the charter limited the jurisdiction of the court to Germany's actions.\nArticle 7 prevented the defendants from claiming\nsovereign immunity\n,\nand Article 8 meant that the plea of acting under\nsuperior orders\nwas not a valid defence, although it might be treated in mitigation.\nThe trial was held under modified\ncommon law\n.\nThe negotiators decided that the tribunal's permanent seat would be in Berlin, while the trial would be held at the\nPalace of Justice\nin\nNuremberg\n.\nLocated in the\nAmerican occupation zone\n, Nuremberg was a symbolic location as the site of\nNazi rallies\n. The Palace of Justice was relatively intact but needed to be renovated for the trial due to\nbomb damage\n; it had an attached prison where the defendants could be held.\nOn 8 August, the Nuremberg Charter was signed in London.\nJudges and prosecutors\nIn early 1946, there were a thousand employees from the four countries' delegations in Nuremberg, of which about two thirds were from the United States.\nBesides legal professionals, there were many social-science researchers, psychologists, translators, interpreters, and\ngraphic designers\n, the last to make the many charts used during the trial.\nEach state appointed a prosecution team and two judges, one being a deputy without voting rights.\nJackson (whom historian\nKim Christian Priemel\ndescribed as \"a versatile politician and a remarkable orator, if not a great legal thinker\") was appointed the United States' chief prosecutor.\nThe United States prosecution believed\nNazism\nwas the product of a German deviation from the West (the\nSonderweg\nthesis) and sought to correct this deviation with a trial that would serve both retributive and educational purposes.\nAs the largest delegation, it would take on the bulk of the prosecutorial effort.\nAt Jackson's recommendation, the United States appointed judges\nFrancis Biddle\nand\nJohn Parker\n.\nThe British chief prosecutor was\nHartley Shawcross\n,\nAttorney General for England and Wales\n, assisted by his predecessor\nDavid Maxwell Fyfe\n.\nAlthough the chief British judge,\nSir Geoffrey Lawrence\n(\nLord Justice of Appeal\n), was the nominal president of the tribunal, in practice Biddle exercised more authority.\nThe French prosecutor,\nFrançois de Menthon\n, had just overseen trials of the leaders of\nVichy France\n;\nhe resigned in January 1946 and was replaced by\nAuguste Champetier de Ribes\n.\nThe French judges were\nHenri Donnedieu de Vabres\n, a professor of criminal law, and deputy\nRobert Falco\n, a judge of the\nCour de Cassation\nwho had represented France at the London Conference.\nThe French government tried to appoint staff untainted by collaboration with the Vichy regime; some appointments, including Champetier de Ribes, were of those who had been in the\nFrench resistance\n.\nExpecting a show trial, the Soviet Union\ninitially appointed as chief prosecutor\nIona Nikitchenko\n, who had presided over the Moscow trials, but he was made a judge and replaced by\nRoman Rudenko\n, a show trial prosecutor\nchosen for his skill as an orator.\nThe Soviet judges and prosecutors were not permitted to make any major decisions without consulting a commission in Moscow led by Soviet politician\nAndrei Vyshinsky\n; the resulting delays hampered the Soviet effort to set the agenda.\nThe influence of the Soviet delegation was also constrained by limited English proficiency, lack of interpreters, and unfamiliarity with diplomacy and international institutions.\nRequests by\nChaim Weizmann\n, the president of the\nWorld Zionist Organization\n, as well as the\nProvisional Government of National Unity\nin Poland, for an active role in the trial justified by their representation of victims of Nazi crimes were rejected.\nThe Soviet Union invited prosecutors from its allies, including Poland,\nCzechoslovakia\n, and\nYugoslavia\n; Denmark and Norway also sent a delegation.\nAlthough the Polish delegation was not empowered to intervene in the proceedings, it submitted evidence and an indictment, succeeding at drawing some attention to crimes committed against Polish Jews and non-Jews.\nIndictment\nHanding over the indictment to the tribunal, 18 October 1945\nThe work of drafting the indictment was divided up by the national delegations. The British worked on aggressive war; the other delegations were assigned the task of covering crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the\nWestern Front\n(France) and the\nEastern Front\n(the Soviet Union). The United States delegation outlined the overall Nazi conspiracy and criminality of Nazi organizations.\nThe British and American delegations decided to work jointly in drafting the charges of conspiracy to wage aggressive war. On 17 September, the various delegations met to discuss the indictment.\nThe charge of\nconspiracy\n, absent from the charter, held together the wide array of charges and defendants\nand was used to charge the top Nazi leaders, as well as bureaucrats who had never killed anyone or perhaps even directly ordered killing. It was also an end run on the charter's limits on charging crimes committed before the beginning of World War II.\nConspiracy charges were central to the cases against propagandists and industrialists: the former were charged with providing the ideological justification for war and other crimes, while the latter were accused of enabling Germany's war effort.\nThe charge, a brainchild of\nWar Department\nlawyer\nMurray C. Bernays\n, and perhaps inspired by his previous work prosecuting\nsecurities fraud\n,\nwas spearheaded by the United States and less popular with the other delegations, particularly France.\nThe problem of translating the indictment and evidence into the three official languages of the tribunal—English, French, and Russian—as well as German was severe due to the scale of the task and difficulty of recruiting interpreters, especially in the Soviet Union.\nVyshinsky demanded extensive corrections to the charges of crimes against peace, especially regarding the role of the\nGerman–Soviet pact\nin starting World War II.\nJackson also separated out an overall conspiracy charge from the other three charges, aiming that the American prosecution would cover the overall Nazi conspiracy while the other delegations would flesh out the details of Nazi crimes.\nThe division of labor, and the haste with which the indictment was prepared, resulted in duplication, imprecise language, and lack of attribution of specific charges to individual defendants.\nDefendants\nMain article:\nList of defendants at the International Military Tribunal\nThe defendants in the dock\nSome of the most prominent Nazis—\nAdolf Hitler\n,\nHeinrich Himmler\n, and\nJoseph Goebbels\n—had died by suicide and therefore could not be tried.\nThe prosecutors aimed to prosecute key leaders in German politics, business, and the military.\nMost of the defendants had surrendered to the United States or United Kingdom.\nThe defendants, who were largely unrepentant,\nincluded former cabinet ministers:\nFranz von Papen\n(who had\nbrought Hitler to power\n),\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n(\nforeign minister\n),\nKonstantin von Neurath\n(\nforeign minister\n),\nWilhelm Frick\n(\ninterior minister\n), and\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, minister for the occupied eastern territories.\nAlso prosecuted were leaders of the German economy, such as\nGustav Krupp\nof the\nKrupp AG\nconglomerate, former\nReichsbank\npresident\nHjalmar Schacht\n, and economic planners\nAlbert Speer\nand\nWalther Funk\n, along with Speer's subordinate and head of the\nforced labor program\n,\nFritz Sauckel\n.\nWhile the British were skeptical of prosecuting economic leaders, the French had a strong interest in highlighting German\neconomic imperialism\n.\nThe military leaders were\nHermann Göring\n—the most infamous surviving Nazi and the main target of the trial\n—\nWilhelm Keitel\n,\nAlfred Jodl\n,\nErich Raeder\n, and\nKarl Dönitz\n.\nAlso on trial were propagandists\nJulius Streicher\nand\nHans Fritzsche\n;\nRudolf Hess\n, Hitler's deputy who had flown to Britain in 1941;\nHans Frank\n, governor-general of the\nGeneral Governorate\nof Poland;\nHitler Youth\nleader\nBaldur von Schirach\n;\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n,\nReich Commissioner for the Netherlands\n; and\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, leader of Himmler's\nReich Security Main Office\n.\nObservers of the trial found the defendants mediocre and contemptible.\nAlthough the list of defendants was finalized on 29 August,\nas late as October, Jackson demanded the addition of new names, but was denied.\nOf the 24 men indicted,\nMartin Bormann\nwas\ntried\nin absentia\n, as the Allies were unaware of his death; Krupp was too ill to stand trial; and\nRobert Ley\nhad died by suicide before the start of the trial.\nFormer Nazis were allowed to serve as counsel\nand by mid-November all defendants had lawyers. The defendants' lawyers jointly appealed to the court, claiming it did not have jurisdiction against the accused, but this motion was rejected. Defense lawyers saw themselves as acting on behalf of their clients and the German nation.\nInitially, the Americans had planned to try fourteen organizations and their leaders, but this was narrowed to six: the\nReich Cabinet\n, the Leadership Corps of the\nNazi Party\n, the\nGestapo\n, the\nSA\n, the\nSS\nand the\nSD\n, and the\nGeneral Staff\nand\nHigh Command\nof the\nGerman military\n(Wehrmacht).\nThe aim was to have these organizations declared criminal, so that their members could be tried expeditiously for membership in a criminal organization.\nSenior American officials believed that convicting organizations was a good way of showing that not just the top German leaders were responsible for crimes, without condemning the entire German people.\nEvidence\nUnited States Army\nclerks with evidence\nOver the summer, all of the national delegations struggled to gather evidence for the upcoming trial.\nThe American and British prosecutors focused on documentary evidence and affidavits rather than testimony from survivors. This strategy increased the credibility of their case, since survivor testimony was considered less reliable and more vulnerable to accusations of bias, but reduced public interest in the proceedings.\nThe American prosecution drew on reports of the\nOffice of Strategic Services\n, an American intelligence agency, and information provided by the\nYIVO Institute for Jewish Research\nand the\nAmerican Jewish Committee\n,\nwhile the French prosecution presented many documents that it had obtained from the\nCenter of Contemporary Jewish Documentation\n.\nThe prosecution called 37 witnesses compared to the defense's 83\n, not including 19 defendants who testified on their own behalf.\nThe prosecution examined 110,000 captured German documents\nand entered 4,600 into evidence,\nalong with\n30 kilometres (19\nmi)\nof film and 25,000 photographs.\nThe charter allowed the\nadmissibility\nof any evidence deemed to have\nprobative\nvalue, including\ndepositions\n.\nBecause of the loose evidentiary rules, photographs, charts, maps, and films played an important role in making incredible crimes believable.\nAfter the American prosecution submitted many documents at the beginning of the trial, the judges insisted that all of the evidence be read into the record, which slowed the trial.\nThe structure of the charges also caused delays as the same evidence ended up being read out multiple times, when it was relevant to both conspiracy and the other charges.\nCourse of the trial\nThe International Military Tribunal began trial on 20 November 1945,\nafter postponement requests from the Soviet prosecution, who wanted more time to prepare its case, were rejected.\nAll defendants\npleaded\nnot guilty.\nJackson made clear that the trial's purpose extended beyond convicting the defendants. Prosecutors wanted to assemble irrefutable evidence of Nazi crimes, establish individual responsibility and the crime of aggression in international law, provide a history lesson to the defeated Germans, delegitimize the traditional German elite,\nand allow the Allies to distance themselves from\nappeasement\n.\nJackson maintained that while the United States did \"not seek to convict the whole German people of crime\", neither did the trial \"serve to absolve the whole German people except 21 men in the dock\".\nNevertheless, defense lawyers (although not most of the defendants) often argued that the prosecution was trying to promote\nGerman collective guilt\nand forcefully countered this\nstrawman\n.\nAccording to Priemel, the conspiracy charge \"invited apologetic interpretations: narratives of absolute,\ntotalitarian\ndictatorship, run by society's lunatic fringe, of which the Germans had been the first victims rather than agents, collaborators, and\nfellow travellers\n\".\nIn contrast, the evidence presented on the Holocaust convinced some observers that\nGermans must have been aware of this crime\nwhile it was ongoing.\nAmerican and British prosecution\nNazi Concentration and Prison Camps\n(1945)\nPresenting information on German aggression, 4 December\nOn 21 November, Jackson gave the opening speech for the prosecution.\nHe described the fact that the defeated Nazis received a trial as \"one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason\".\nFocusing on aggressive war, which he described as the root of the other crimes, Jackson promoted an\nintentionalist\nview of the Nazi state and its overall criminal conspiracy. The speech was favorably received by the prosecution, the tribunal, the audience, historians, and even the defendants.\nMuch of the American case focused on the development of the Nazi conspiracy before the outbreak of war.\nThe American prosecution became derailed during attempts to provide evidence on the first act of aggression,\nagainst Austria\n.\nOn 29 November, the prosecution was unprepared to continue presenting on the\ninvasion of Czechoslovakia\n, and instead screened\nNazi Concentration and Prison Camps\n. The film, compiled from footage of the\nliberation of Nazi concentration camps\n, shocked both the defendants and the judges, who adjourned the trial.\nIndiscriminate selection and disorganized presentation of documentary evidence without tying it to specific defendants hampered the American prosecutors' work on the conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity.\nThe Americans summoned\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommander\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, who testified about the murder of 80,000 people by those under his command, and SS general\nErich von dem Bach-Zelewski\n, who admitted that German\nanti-partisan warfare\nwas little more than a cover for the mass murder of Jews.\nEvidence about\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n's crimes is presented, 2 January 1946.\nThe British prosecution covered the charge of crimes against peace, which was largely redundant to the American conspiracy case.\nOn 4 December, Shawcross gave the opening speech, much of which had been written by Cambridge professor\nHersch Lauterpacht\n.\nUnlike Jackson, Shawcross attempted to minimize the novelty of the aggression charges, elaborating its precursors in the conventions of\nHague\nand\nGeneva\n, the\nLeague of Nations Covenant\n, the\nLocarno Treaty\n, and the\nKellogg–Briand Pact\n.\nThe British took four days to make their case,\nwith Maxwell Fyfe detailing treaties broken by Germany.\nIn mid-December the Americans switched to presenting the case against the indicted organizations,\nwhile in January both the British and Americans presented evidence against individual defendants.\nBesides the organizations mentioned in the indictment, American, and British prosecutors also mentioned the complicity of the German\nForeign Office\n,\narmy\n, and\nnavy\n.\nFrench prosecution\nFrom 17 January to 7 February 1946, France presented its charges and supporting evidence.\nIn contrast to the other prosecution teams, the French prosecution delved into Germany's development in the nineteenth century, arguing that it had diverged from the West due to\npan-Germanism\nand imperialism. They argued that Nazi ideology, which derived from these earlier ideas, was the\nmens rea\n—criminal intent—of the crimes on trial.\nThe French prosecutors, more than their British or American counterparts, emphasized the complicity of many Germans;\nthey barely mentioned the charge of aggressive war and instead focused on forced labor, economic plunder, and massacres.\nProsecutor\nEdgar Faure\ngrouped together various German policies, such as the annexation of\nAlsace–Lorraine\n, under the label of\nGermanization\n, which he argued was a crime against humanity.\nUnlike the British and American prosecution strategies, which focused on using German documents, French prosecutors took the perspective of the victims, submitting postwar police reports.\nEleven witnesses, including victims of Nazi persecution, were called; resistance fighter and\nAuschwitz\nsurvivor\nMarie Claude Vaillant-Couturier\ntestified about crimes she had witnessed.\nThe French charges of war crimes were accepted by the tribunal, except for the execution of hostages.\nDue to the narrow definition of crimes against humanity in the charter, the only part of the Germanization charges accepted by the judges was the\ndeportation of Jews from France\nand other parts of Western Europe.\nSoviet prosecution\nRoman Rudenko\nopens the Soviet case.\nOn 8 February, the Soviet prosecution opened its case with a speech by Rudenko that covered all four prosecution charges, highlighting a wide variety of crimes committed by the German occupiers as part of their destructive and unprovoked invasion.\nRudenko tried to emphasize common ground with the other Allies while rejecting any similarity between Nazi and Soviet rule.\nThe next week, the Soviet prosecution produced\nFriedrich Paulus\n—a German\nfield marshal\ncaptured after the\nBattle of Stalingrad\n—as a witness and questioned him about the preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.\nPaulus incriminated his former associates, pointing to Keitel, Jodl, and Göring as the defendants most responsible for the war.\nMore so than other delegations, Soviet prosecutors showed the gruesome details of German atrocities, especially the death by starvation of 3 million\nSoviet prisoners of war\nand several hundred thousand\nresidents of Leningrad\n.\nAlthough Soviet prosecutors dealt most extensively with the\nsystematic murder of Jews in eastern Europe\n, at times they blurred the fate of Jews with that of other Soviet nationalities.\nAlthough these aspects had already been covered by the American prosecution, Soviet prosecutors introduced new evidence from\nExtraordinary State Commission\nreports and interrogations of senior enemy officers.\nLev Smirnov\npresented evidence on the\nLidice massacre\nin Czechoslovakia, adding that German invaders had\ndestroyed thousands of villages and murdered their inhabitants\nthroughout eastern Europe.\nThe Soviet prosecution emphasized the racist aspect of policies such as the deportation of millions of civilians to Germany for\nforced labor\n,\nthe murder of children,\nsystematic looting of occupied territories, and theft or destruction of\ncultural heritage\n.\nThe Soviet prosecution also attempted to fabricate German responsibility for the\nKatyn massacre\n, which had in fact been committed by the\nNKVD\n. Although Western prosecutors never publicly rejected the Katyn charge for fear of casting doubt on the entire proceedings, they were skeptical.\nThe defense presented evidence of Soviet responsibility,\nand Katyn was not mentioned in the verdict.\nInspired by the films shown by the American prosecution, the Soviet Union commissioned three films for the trial:\nThe German Fascist Destruction of the Cultural Treasures of the Peoples of the USSR\n,\nAtrocities Committed by the German Fascist Invaders in the USSR\n, and\nThe German Fascist Destruction of Soviet Cities\n, using footage from Soviet filmmakers as well as shots from German newsreels.\nThe second included footage of the liberations of\nMajdanek\nand\nAuschwitz\nand was considered even more disturbing than the American concentration camp film.\nSoviet witnesses included several survivors of German crimes, including two civilians who lived through the siege of Leningrad, a peasant whose village was destroyed in anti-partisan warfare, a Red Army doctor who endured several prisoner-of-war camps\nand two Holocaust survivors—\nSamuel Rajzman\n, a survivor of\nTreblinka extermination camp\n, and poet\nAbraham Sutzkever\n, who described the murder of tens of thousands of Jews from\nVilna\n.\nThe Soviet prosecution case was generally well received and presented compelling evidence for the suffering of the Soviet people and the Soviet contributions to victory.\nDefense\nHermann Göring\nunder cross-examination\nA member of the Soviet delegation addresses the tribunal.\nFrom March to July 1946, the defense presented its counterarguments.\nBefore the prosecution finished, it was clear that their general case was proven, but it remained to determine the individual guilt of each defendant.\nNone of the defendants tried to assert that the Nazis' crimes had not occurred.\nSome defendants denied involvement in certain crimes or implausibly claimed ignorance of them, especially the Holocaust.\nA few defense lawyers inverted the arguments of the prosecution to assert that the Germans' authoritarian mindset and obedience to the state exonerated them from any personal guilt.\nMost rejected that Germany had deviated from Western civilization, arguing that few Germans could have supported Hitler because Germany was a civilized country.\nThe defendants tried to blame their crimes on Hitler, who was mentioned 12,000 times during the trial—more than the top five defendants combined. Other absent and dead men, including Himmler,\nReinhard Heydrich\n,\nAdolf Eichmann\n, and Bormann, were also blamed.\nTo counter claims that conservative defendants had enabled the\nNazi rise to power\n, defense lawyers blamed the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n, trade unions, and other countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Germany.\nIn contrast, most defendants avoided incriminating each other.\nMost defendants argued their own insignificance within the Nazi system,\nthough Göring took the opposite approach, expecting to be executed but vindicated in the eyes of the German people.\nThe charter did not recognize a\ntu quoque\ndefense\n—asking for exoneration on the grounds that the Allies had committed the same crimes with which the defendants were charged.\nAlthough defense lawyers repeatedly equated the\nNuremberg Laws\nto legislation found in other countries, Nazi concentration camps to Allied detention facilities, and the deportation of Jews to the\nexpulsion of Germans\n, the judges rejected their arguments.\nAlfred Seidl\n(\nde\n)\nrepeatedly tried to disclose the secret protocols of the German–Soviet pact; although he was eventually successful, it was legally irrelevant and the judges rejected his attempt to bring up the\nTreaty of Versailles\n.\nSix defendants were charged with the\nGerman invasion of Norway\n, and their lawyers argued that this invasion was undertaken to prevent a\nBritish invasion of that country\n; a cover-up prevented the defense from capitalizing on this argument.\nFleet admiral\nChester Nimitz\ntestified that the\nUnited States Navy\nhad also used\nunrestricted submarine warfare\nagainst\nJapan\nin the Pacific\n; Dönitz's counsel successfully argued that this meant that it could not be a crime.\nThe judges barred most evidence on Allied misdeeds from being heard in court.\nMany defense lawyers complained about various aspects of the trial procedure and attempted to discredit the entire proceedings.\nIn order to appease them, the defendants were allowed a free hand with their witnesses and a great deal of irrelevant testimony was heard.\nThe defendants' witnesses sometimes managed to exculpate them, but other witnesses—including\nRudolf Höss\n, the former commandant of Auschwitz, and\nHans Bernd Gisevius\n, a member of the\nGerman resistance\n—bolstered the prosecution's case.\nIn the context of the brewing\nCold War\n—for example, in early March 1946,\nWinston Churchill\ndelivered the\nIron Curtain speech\n—the trial became a means of condemning not only Germany but also the Soviet Union.\nClosing\nOn 31 August, closing arguments were presented.\nOver the course of the trial, crimes against humanity and especially against Jews (who were mentioned as victims of Nazi atrocities far more than any other group) came to upstage the aggressive war charge.\nIn contrast to the opening prosecution statements, all eight closing statements highlighted the Holocaust. The French and British prosecutors made this the main charge, as opposed to that of aggression. All prosecutors except the Americans mentioned the concept of\ngenocide\n, which had been recently invented by the Polish-Jewish jurist\nRaphael Lemkin\n.\nBritish prosecutor Shawcross quoted from witness testimony about a murdered Jewish family from\nDubno\n, Ukraine.\nDuring the closing statements, most defendants disappointed the judges with lies and denials. Speer managed to give the impression of apologizing without assuming personal guilt or naming any victims other than the German people.\nOn 2 September, the court recessed, and the judges retreated into seclusion to decide the verdict and sentences, which had been under discussion since June. The verdict was drafted by British deputy judge\nNorman Birkett\n. All eight judges participated in the deliberations, but the deputies could not vote.\nVerdict\nThe International Military Tribunal agreed with the prosecution that aggression was the gravest charge, stating in its judgment that because \"war is essentially an evil thing\", \"to initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole\".\nThe work of the judges was made more difficult due to the broadness of the crimes listed in the Nuremberg Charter.\nThe judges did not attempt to define the crime of aggression\nand did not mention the retroactivity of the charges in the verdict.\nDespite the lingering doubts of some of the judges,\nthe official interpretation of the IMT held that all of the charges had a solid basis in customary international law and that the trial was procedurally fair.\nThe judges were aware that both the Allies and the Axis had planned or committed acts of aggression, writing the verdict carefully to avoid discrediting either the Allied governments or the tribunal.\nThe judges ruled that there had been a premeditated conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, whose goals were \"the disruption of the European order\" and \"the creation of a\nGreater Germany\nbeyond\nthe frontiers of 1914\n\".\nContrary to Jackson's argument that the conspiracy began with the founding of the Nazi Party in 1920, the verdict dated the planning of aggression to the 1937\nHossbach Memorandum\n.\nThe conspiracy charge caused significant dissent on the bench; Donnedieu de Vabres wanted to scrap it. Through a compromise proposed by the British judges, the charge of conspiracy was narrowed to a conspiracy to wage aggressive war.\nOnly eight defendants were convicted on that charge, all of whom were also found guilty of crimes against peace.\nAll 22 defendants were charged with crimes against peace, and 12 were convicted.\nThe war crimes and crimes against humanity charges held up the best, with only two defendants charged on those grounds being acquitted.\nThe judges determined that crimes against humanity concerning German Jews before 1939 were not under the court's jurisdiction because the prosecution had not proven a connection to aggressive war.\nNewsreel of the sentencing\nFour organizations were ruled to be criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the Gestapo, and the SD, although some lower ranks and subgroups were excluded.\nThe verdict only allowed for individual criminal responsibility if willing membership and knowledge of the criminal purpose could be proved, complicating\ndenazification\nefforts.\nThe SA, Reich Cabinet, General Staff and High Command were not ruled to be criminal organizations.\nAlthough the Wehrmacht leadership was not considered an organization within the meaning of the charter,\nmisrepresentation of the verdict as an exoneration would become one of the foundations of the\nclean Wehrmacht myth\n.\nThe trial had nevertheless resulted in the coverage of\nits systematic criminality\nin the German press.\nSentences were debated at length by the judges. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death: Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, and Bormann.\nOn 16 October,\nten were hanged\n, with Göring killing himself the day before. Seven defendants (Hess, Funk, Raeder, Dönitz, Schirach, Speer, and Neurath) were sent to\nSpandau Prison\nto serve their sentences.\nAll three acquittals (Papen, Schacht, and Fritzsche) were based on a deadlock between the judges; these acquittals surprised observers. Despite being accused of the same crimes, Sauckel was sentenced to death, while Speer was given a prison sentence because the judges considered that he could reform.\nNikichenko released a dissent approved by Moscow that rejected all the acquittals, called for a death sentence for Hess, and convicted all the organizations.\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\nMain article:\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\nTelford Taylor\nopens for the prosecution in the\nMinistries trial\n, 6 January 1948.\nMonowitz\nprisoners unload cement from trains for\nIG Farben\n, presented as evidence at the\nIG Farben trial\n.\nInitially, it was planned to hold a second international tribunal for German industrialists, but this was never held because of differences between the Allies.\nTwelve military trials\nwere convened solely by the United States in the same courtroom that had hosted the International Military Tribunal.\nPursuant to\nLaw No. 10\nadopted by the\nAllied Control Council\n, United States forces arrested almost 100,000 Germans as war criminals.\nThe\nOffice of Chief Counsel for War Crimes\nidentified 2,500 major war criminals, of whom 177 were tried. Many of the worst offenders were not prosecuted, for logistical or financial reasons.\nOne set of trials focused on the actions of German professionals: the\nDoctors' trial\nfocused on\nhuman experimentation\nand\neuthanasia murders\n, the\nJudges' trial\non the\nrole of the judiciary in Nazi crimes\n, and the\nMinistries trial\non the culpability of bureaucrats of German government ministries, especially the\nForeign Office\n.\nAlso on trial were industrialists\n—in the\nFlick trial\n, the\nIG Farben trial\n, and the\nKrupp trial\n—for using forced labor, looting property from Nazi victims, and funding SS atrocities.\nMembers of the SS were tried in the\nPohl trial\n, which focused on members of the\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\nthat oversaw SS economic activity, including the\nNazi concentration camps\n;\nthe\nRuSHA trial\nof\nNazi racial policies\n; and the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial\n, in which members of the\nmobile killing squads\nwere tried for the murder of more than one million people behind the Eastern Front.\nLuftwaffe\ngeneral\nErhard Milch\nwas tried\nfor using slave labor and deporting civilians. In the\nHostages case\n, several generals were tried for executing thousands of hostages and prisoners of war, looting, using forced labor, and deporting civilians in the\nBalkans\n. Other generals were tried in the\nHigh Command Trial\nfor plotting wars of aggression, issuing\ncriminal orders\n, deporting civilians, using slave labor, and looting in the Soviet Union.\nThese trials emphasized the crimes committed during the Holocaust.\nThe trials heard 1,300 witnesses, entered more than 30,000 documents into evidence, and generated 132,855 pages of transcripts, with the judgments totaling 3,828 pages.\nOf 177 defendants, 142 were convicted and 25 sentenced to death;\nthe severity of sentencing was related to the defendant's proximity to mass murder.\nLegal historian\nKevin Jon Heller\nargues that the trials' greatest achievement was \"their inestimable contribution to the form and substance of international criminal law\", which had been left underdeveloped by the IMT.\nContemporary reactions\nPress at the International Military Tribunal\nGermans read\nSüddeutsche Zeitung\nreporting the verdict, 1 October 1946\nIn all, 249 journalists were accredited to cover the IMT\nand 61,854 visitor tickets were issued.\nIn France, the sentence for Rudolf Hess and acquittal of organizations were met with outrage from the media and especially from organizations for deportees and resistance fighters, as they were perceived as too lenient.\nIn the United Kingdom, although a variety of responses were reported, it was difficult to sustain interest in a long trial.\nWhere the prosecution was disappointed by some of the verdicts, the defense could take satisfaction.\nMany Germans at the time of the trials focused on finding food and shelter.\nDespite this, a majority read press reports about the trial.\nIn a 1946 poll, 78 percent of Germans assessed the trial as fair, but four years later that had fallen to 38 percent, with 30 percent considering it unfair.\nAs time went on, more Germans considered the trials illegitimate\nvictor's justice\nand an imposition of collective guilt, which they rejected—instead considering themselves victims of the war.\nAs the Cold War began, the rapidly changing political environment began to affect the effectiveness of the trials.\nThe educational purpose of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals was a failure, in part because of the resistance to war crimes trials in German society, but also because of the United States Army's refusal to publish the trial record in German for fear it would undermine the fight against communism.\nThe German churches, both Catholic and Protestant, were vocal proponents of amnesty.\nThe pardon of convicted war criminals also had cross-party support in\nWest Germany\n, which was established in 1949.\nThe Americans satisfied these wishes to bind West Germany to the\nWestern Bloc\n,\nbeginning early releases of Nuremberg Military Tribunal convicts in 1949.\nIn 1951,\nHigh Commissioner\nJohn J. McCloy\noverturned most of the sentences\nand the last three prisoners, all convicted at the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial, were released in 1958.\nThe German public took the early releases as confirmation of what they saw as the illegitimacy of the trials.\nThe IMT defendants required Soviet permission for release; Speer was not successful in obtaining early release, and Hess remained in prison until his death in 1987.\nBy the late 1950s, the West German consensus on release began to erode, due to greater openness in\npolitical culture\nand new revelations of Nazi criminality, including the first trials of Nazi perpetrators in West German courts.\nLegacy\nBenjamin Ferencz\n, chief prosecutor of the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial\n, in the\nPalace of Justice\ncourtroom, 2012\nThe International Military Tribunal, and its charter, \"marked the true beginning of\ninternational criminal law\n\".\nThe trial has met a mixed reception ranging from glorification to condemnation.\nThe reaction was initially predominantly negative, but has become more positive over time.\nThe selective prosecution exclusively of the defeated Axis and hypocrisy of all four Allied powers has garnered the most persistent criticism. Such actions as the German–Soviet pact,\nthe\nexpulsion of millions of Germans from central and eastern Europe\n,\ndeportation of civilians for forced labor,\nand violent suppression of anti-colonial uprisings would have been deemed illegal according to the definitions of international crimes in the Nuremberg charter.\nAnother controversy resulted from trying defendants for acts that were not criminal at the time,\nparticularly crimes against peace.\nEqually novel but less controversial were crimes against humanity, the conspiracy charge, and criminal penalties on individuals for breaches of international law.\nBesides these criticisms, the trials have been taken to task for the distortion that comes from fitting historical events into legal categories.\nThe\nInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East\n(Tokyo Trial) borrowed many of its ideas from the IMT, including all four charges, and was intended by the\nTruman Administration\nto shore up the IMT's legal legacy.\nOn 11 December 1946, the\nUnited Nations General Assembly\nunanimously passed a resolution affirming \"the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal\".\nIn 1950, the\nInternational Law Commission\ndrafted the\nNuremberg principles\nto codify international criminal law, although the Cold War prevented the adoption of these principles until the 1990s.\nThe 1948\nGenocide Convention\nwas much more restricted than Lemkin's original concept and its effectiveness was further limited by Cold War politics.\nIn the 1990s, a revival of international criminal law included the establishment of\nad hoc\ninternational criminal tribunals\nfor\nYugoslavia\n(ICTY) and\nRwanda\n(ICTR), which were widely viewed as part of the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. A permanent\nInternational Criminal Court\n(ICC), proposed in 1953, was established in 2002.\nThe trials were the first use of\nsimultaneous interpretation\n, which stimulated technical advances in translation methods.\nThe Palace of Justice houses a museum on the trial and the courtroom became a tourist attraction, drawing 13,138 visitors in 2005.\nThe IMT is one of the most well-studied trials in history, and it has also been the subject of an abundance of books and scholarly publications, along with motion pictures such as\nJudgment at Nuremberg\n(1961),\nThe Memory of Justice\n(1976)\nand\nNuremberg\n(2025).\nNotes\n↑\nFrench\n:\nTribunal militaire international\n;\nGerman\n:\nInternationaler Militärgerichtshof\n;\nRussian\n:\nМеждународный военный трибунал\n,\nromanized\n:\nMezhdunarodnyy voyennyy tribunal\n.\n↑\nAlexander Volchkov\n(Soviet Union),\nNorman Birkett\n(UK),\nJohn J. Parker\n(US) and\nRobert Falco\n(France).\nReferences\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n165.\n1\n2\nSayapin 2014\n, p.\n148.\n1\n2\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1092.\n↑\nSayapin 2014\n, pp.\n151–159.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n27–28.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n56.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n32, 64.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n30–31.\n1\n2\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 4.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n8.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n49–50.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n31, 36, 54.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n4, 107.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n3.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n26–27, 31.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n67, 74–75.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n45–46.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n84.\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n85–86.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n87–88.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n832–833.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n84–85, 88–89.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n98–100.\n1\n2\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n834.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n30, 34.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n68, 73.\n↑\nBassiouni 2011\n, pp.\nxxx–xxxi, 94.\n↑\nBassiouni 2011\n, pp.\nxxxi, 33.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n373.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nAcquaviva 2011\n, pp.\n884–885.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, pp.\n102–103, 114, 120, 135.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n839–840.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n9–10.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n85.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n31.\n1\n2\n3\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n21.\n1\n2\n3\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n2, 112.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n71, 90.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n3, 6.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n91.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n53, 73–74.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n88.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n115.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 10.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n75, 89.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 11–12.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n204.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n9, 78.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n217.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n88–89.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nFleming 2022\n, p.\n209.\n↑\nFleming 2022\n, pp.\n209, 220.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n80.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n80–81.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n102.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n112–113.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n18, 69, 111.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n99.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n82–83.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n84–86.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n100–101.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n27.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n28–29.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n5.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n82, 139.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n82, 127.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n83–84.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n83, 106, 133.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n92–93.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n27–28.\n1\n2\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n841.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n205.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n24–26.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n116–117.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 19.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n148.\n↑\nMouralis 2016\n, fn 82.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n104.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n124.\n1\n2\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nMouralis 2016\n, paragraph 3.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n159.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n133.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n106.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n107.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n107–108.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, pp.\n20–21.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n104–105.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, pp.\n69–70.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n89, 108.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n384.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n121–122.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, pp.\n380–381.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n382.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n383.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n199–200.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 15.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n110–111.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 16.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 17.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n115.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraph 18.\n1\n2\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 20–21.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 17–18.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n216–218.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n109.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n221–222.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n223.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n116, 118.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n230–231.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n232.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n225–226, 335.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n247, 329.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n180, 202, 233.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n231–232.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n233, 236–237, 239.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n237, 239.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n240, 242.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n125.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n20.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n127–128.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n130–131.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n135.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n133–134.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n287.\n1\n2\n3\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n148.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n149–150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n131–132.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nDouglas 2001\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n129–130.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, pp.\n23–24.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n171.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n119, 150.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n62, 120.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n138, 141.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n370, 372.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n160–161.\n1\n2\nSayapin 2014\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n375.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n371.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n142–143.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n840–841.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, pp.\n164–165.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n109, 144.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n371–372, 387.\n↑\nMusa 2016\n, p.\n378.\n1\n2\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n387.\n↑\nSayapin 2014\n, pp.\n150–151.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n386.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n25.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n383.\n1\n2\n3\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n383–384.\n1\n2\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n143–144.\n↑\nBrüggemann 2018\n, p.\n405.\n↑\nBrüggemann 2018\n, pp.\n405–406, 447–448.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n147–148.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n387, 390–391.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n380.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n353, 400.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n1.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n11–12.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n370.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n273, 308.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n85, 89.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n3, 4, 92–94, 100–101.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n294–296, 298.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n247, 310, 315.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n87, 96, 104.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n1, 4.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n1–2.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n400–401.\n↑\nGemählich 2019\n, paragraphs 27, 34.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, pp.\n46–47.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n149.\n1\n2\nSafferling 2020\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n99.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n100.\n↑\nEchternkamp 2020\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n353–354.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n372–373.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n356–357.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n105–107.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n365.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n366.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n351.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n367.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, pp.\n366–367.\n↑\nHeller 2011\n, p.\n360.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nWeinke 2006\n, pp.\n111–112.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\nvi.\n↑\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1091.\n1\n2\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n172.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n148, 343, 402.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, pp.\n833–834.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, pp.\n205, 348.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n343.\n1\n2\nSellars 2010\n, p.\n1089.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n137.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, pp.\n402, 417.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n412.\n↑\nTomuschat 2006\n, p.\n837.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n175.\n1\n2\nWeinke 2006\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n411.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nMouralis 2019\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nSellars 2013\n, p.\n290.\n↑\nAcquaviva 2011\n, p.\n896.\n↑\nHirsch 2020\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nPriemel 2016\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nSharples 2013\n, pp.\n31–32.\nSources\nFurther information:\nNuremberg Trials bibliography\nAcquaviva, Guido (2011).\n\"At the Origins of Crimes Against Humanity: Clues to a Proper Understanding of the\nNullum Crimen\nPrinciple in the Nuremberg Judgment\"\n.\nJournal of International Criminal Justice\n.\n9\n(4):\n881–\n903.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/jicj/mqr010\n.\nBassiouni, M. Cherif\n(2011).\nCrimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application\n.\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-1-139-49893-7\n.\nBrüggemann, Jens (2018).\nMänner von Ehre?: die Wehrmachtgeneralität im Nürnberger Prozess 1945/46\n: zur Entstehung einer Legende\n[\nMen of honor?: the Wehrmacht generals in the Nuremberg trial 1945/46: the emergence of a legend\n]\n(in German).\nFerdinand Schöningh\n.\nISBN\n978-3-506-79259-4\n.\nDouglas, Lawrence\n(2001).\nThe Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-300-10984-9\n.\nEchternkamp, Jörg\n(2020).\nPostwar Soldiers: Historical Controversies and West German Democratization, 1945–1955\n.\nBerghahn Books\n.\nISBN\n978-1-78920-558-9\n.\nFleming, Michael\n(2022).\nIn the Shadow of the Holocaust: Poland, the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and the Search for Justice\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-009-11660-2\n.\nGemählich, Matthias (2019).\n\"«\nNotre combat pour la paix\n»\n: la France et le procès de Nuremberg (1945–1946)\"\n[\n\"Our fight for peace\": France and the Nuremberg trial (1945–1946)\n]\n.\nRevue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande\n(in French).\n51\n(2):\n507–\n525.\ndoi\n:\n10.4000/allemagne.2053\n.\nISSN\n0035-0974\n.\nHeller, Kevin Jon\n(2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n.\nOxford University Press\n.\nISBN\n978-0-19-923233-8\n.\nHirsch, Francine\n(2020).\nSoviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal after World War II\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-937795-4\n.\nMouralis, Guillaume\n[in French]\n(2016).\n\"Le procès de Nuremberg: retour sur soixante-dix ans de recherche\"\n[\nThe Nuremberg trial: a look back at seventy years of research\n]\n.\nCritique Internationale\n(in French).\n73\n(4): 159.\ndoi\n:\n10.3917/crii.073.0159\n.\nMouralis, Guillaume (2019).\nLe moment Nuremberg: Le procès international, les lawyers et la question raciale\n[\nThe Nuremberg moment: The international trial, the lawyers and the racial question\n]\n(in French).\nPresses de Sciences Po\n.\nISBN\n978-2-7246-2422-9\n.\nMusa, Shavana (2016). \"The British and the Nuremberg Trial\".\nBritish Influences on International Law, 1915–2015\n.\nBrill Nijhoff\n. pp.\n367–\n386.\nISBN\n978-90-04-28417-3\n.\nPriemel, Kim Christian\n(2016).\nThe Betrayal: The Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-256374-3\n.\nSafferling, Christoph J. M.\n[in German]\n(2020).\n\"German Participation in the Nuremberg Trials and Its Implications for Today\"\n.\nThe Nuremberg War Crimes Trial and its Policy Consequences Today\n.\nNomos\n. pp.\n41–\n54.\ndoi\n:\n10.5771/9783845280400-41\n.\nISBN\n978-3-8487-3688-1\n.\nSayapin, Sergey (2014).\nThe Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State\n.\nT.M.C. Asser Press\n.\nISBN\n978-90-6704-927-6\n.\nSellars, Kirsten (2010).\n\"Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo\"\n.\nEuropean Journal of International Law\n.\n21\n(4):\n1085–\n1102.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/ejil/chq070\n.\nSellars, Kirsten (2013).\n'Crimes Against Peace' and International Law\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-107-02884-5\n.\nSharples, Caroline (2013). \"Holocaust on Trial: Mass Observation and British Media Responses to the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945–1946\".\nBritain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and Genocide\n.\nPalgrave Macmillan UK\n. pp.\n31–\n50.\nISBN\n978-1-137-35077-0\n.\nTomuschat, Christian (2006).\n\"The Legacy of Nuremberg\"\n.\nJournal of International Criminal Justice\n.\n4\n(4):\n830–\n844.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/jicj/mql051\n.\nWeinke, Annette (2006).\nDie Nürnberger Prozesse\n[\nThe Nuremberg trials\n]\n(in German).\nC.H.Beck\n.\nISBN\n978-3-406-53604-5\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nNuremberg Trials\n.\nTranscript\nand other documents from the\nAvalon Project\nby\nYale Law School\nLillian Goldman Law Library\nNuremberg: Army Television – Release Version\n—\nA documentary produced in 1950, available online in the\nNational Archives\nCatalog\nConsists of footage from German films documenting Nazi personalities and activities interwoven with film shot during the trials\n—\nincluding testimony and statements from defendants, prosecuting attorneys, judges, and witnesses. It also contains flashbacks of a variety of Nazi crimes against humanity.\n49°27′16″N\n11°02′54″E\n\n/\n\n49.45444°N 11.04833°E\n\n/\n49.45444; 11.04833",
+    "infobox": {
+      "indictment": "Conspiracy,crimes against peace,war crimes,crimes against humanity,mass murder,unethical human experimentation,false imprisonment,hate crimes",
+      "started": "20 November 1945",
+      "decided": "1 October 1946",
+      "defendants": "24 (see list)",
+      "witnesses": "37 prosecution, 83 defense",
+      "transcripts": "Harvard Law SchoolYale Law School",
+      "related_actions": "Subsequent Nuremberg trialsInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East",
+      "judges_sitting": "Iona Nikitchenko(Soviet Union)Geoffrey Lawrence(UK)Francis Biddle(US)Donnedieu de Vabres(France)and deputies[b]"
+    },
+    "char_count": 58559
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Subsequent_Nuremberg_trials",
+    "name": "Subsequent Nuremberg trials",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The subsequent Nuremberg trials were twelve military tribunals for war crimes committed by the leaders of Nazi Germany (1933–1945). The Nuremberg Military Tribunals occurred after the Nuremberg trials, held by the International Military Tribunal, which concluded in October 1946. The subsequent Nuremberg trials were held by U.S. military courts and dealt with the cases of crimes against humanity committed by the business community of Nazi Germany, specifically the crimes of using slave labor and plundering occupied countries, and the war-crime cases of Wehrmacht officers who committed atrocities against Allied prisoners of war, partisans, and guerrillas.",
+    "description": "1946–1949 trials of Nazi leadership",
+    "full_text": "Subsequent Nuremberg trials\n1946–1949 trials of Nazi leadership\nJudges of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals pose for a group photo.\nAuschwitz survivor\nPhilipp Auerbach\n(\nde\n)\ntestifies for the prosecution in the\nMinistries Trial\n.\nThe\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\n(also\nNuremberg Military Tribunals\n; 1946–1949) were twelve\nmilitary tribunals\nfor\nwar crimes\ncommitted by the leaders of\nNazi Germany\n(1933–1945). The Nuremberg Military Tribunals occurred after the\nNuremberg trials\n, held by the International Military Tribunal, which concluded in October 1946. The subsequent Nuremberg trials were held by U.S. military courts and dealt with the cases of\ncrimes against humanity\ncommitted by the business community of Nazi Germany, specifically the crimes of using\nslave labor\nand\nplundering occupied countries\n, and the war-crime cases of\nWehrmacht\nofficers who committed atrocities against Allied prisoners of war,\npartisans\n, and\nguerrillas\n.\nBackground\nThe Allies had initially planned to convene several international trials for war crimes at the International Military Tribunal, but failed because the Allies could not agree upon the proper legal management and disposition of military and civilian war criminals; however, the Control Council Law No. 10 (20 December 1945) of the\nAllied Control Council\nempowered the military authorities of every occupation zone in Germany to place on trial people and soldiers suspected of being war criminals. Based on this law, the U.S. authorities proceeded after the end of the initial Nuremberg Trial against the major war criminals to hold another twelve trials in Nuremberg. The judges in all these trials were American, and so were the prosecutors; the chief of counsel for the prosecution was Brigadier General\nTelford Taylor\n. In the other occupation zones, similar trials took place.\nTrials\nThe twelve U.S. trials after the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) took place from 9 December 1946 to 13 April 1949.\nThe trials were as follows:\nResult\nThe Nuremberg process initiated 3,887 cases of which about 3,400 were dropped. 489 cases went to trial, involving 1,672 defendants. A total of 1,416 of them were found guilty; fewer than 200 were executed, and another 279 defendants were sentenced to life in prison. By the 1950s almost all of them had been released.\nMany of the longer prison sentences were reduced substantially by an amnesty under the decree of high commissioner\nJohn J. McCloy\nin 1951, after intense political pressure. Ten outstanding death sentences from the\nEinsatzgruppen\nTrial were converted to prison terms. Many others who had received prison sentences were released outright.\nCriticism\nSome of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals have been criticised for their conclusion that \"morale bombing\" of civilians, including its\nnuclear variety\n, was legal, and for their judgment that, in certain situations, executing civilians in reprisal was permissible.\nJudges\nSee also\nAuschwitz Trial\nheld in\nKraków\n, Poland in 1947 against 40 SS-staff of the\nAuschwitz concentration camp\ndeath factory\nFrankfurt Auschwitz Trials\n, 1963–1965\nMajdanek Trials\n, held against\nMajdanek extermination camp\nofficials. Longest Nazi war crimes trial in history, spanning over 30 years\nChełmno Trials\nof the\nChełmno extermination camp\npersonnel, held in Poland and Germany. The cases were decided almost twenty years apart\nSobibor Trial\nheld in\nHagen\n, Germany in 1965, concerning the\nSobibor extermination camp\nBelzec Trial\nbefore the 1st\nMunich\nDistrict Court in the mid-1960s, eight SS-men of the\nBelzec extermination camp\nBelsen Trial\nin Lüneburg, 1945\nCommand responsibility\ndoctrine of hierarchical accountability\nDachau Trials\nheld within the walls of the former\nDachau concentration camp\n, 1945–1948\nMauthausen-Gusen camp trials\n, 1946–1947\nRavensbrück Trial\nResearch Materials: Max Planck Society Archive\nReferences\n↑\n\"Nuremberg Trials\"\n.\nHistory\n. A&E Television Networks\n. Retrieved\n25 November\n2019\n.\n1\n2\nKevin Jon Heller\n(2011).\nThe Trials. Introduction: the indictments, biographical information, and the verdicts\n. The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. pp.\n85–.\nISBN\n9780199554317\n. Retrieved\n10 January\n2015\n.\n↑\nNelson, Anne (April 2009).\nRed Orchestra: The Story of the Berlin Underground and the Circle of Friends Who Resisted Hitler\n. Random House. pp.\n305\n–6.\nISBN\n9781588367990\n.\nsubsequent nuremberg trials 200 nazi.\n↑\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford:\nOxford University Press\n. p.\n3\n.\nFurther reading\nBaars, Grietje (2013).\n\"Capitalism's Victor's Justice? The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII\"\n. In Heller, Kevin; Simpson, Gerry (eds.).\nThe Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-967114-4\n.\nDubois, Josiah E.\n(1952).\nThe Devil's Chemists\n(PDF)\n. Boston, MA:\nBeacon Press\n.\nASIN\nB000ENNDV6\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 2012-06-17.\nPriemel, Kim C.; Stiller, Alexa, eds. (2012).\nReassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\n: Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n978-0-85745-532-1\n.\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2012).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-165286-8\n.\nExternal links\nThe NMT proceedings\nat the Mazal Library.\nAn overview\n.",
+    "infobox": {},
+    "char_count": 5449
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Doctors%27_trial",
+    "name": "Doctors' trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "United States of America v. Karl Brandt, et al., commonly known as the Doctors' Trial, was the first of the twelve \"Subsequent Nuremberg trials\" for war crimes and crimes against humanity after the end of World War II between 1946 and 1947. The accused were 20 physicians and 3 SS officials charged for their involvement in the Aktion T4 programme and Nazi human experimentation.",
+    "description": "Post-World War II trial of German doctors for war crimes",
+    "full_text": "Doctors' Trial\nNot to be confused with\nDoctors' plot\nor\nclinical trial\n.\nFor a list of Nazi doctors, see\nList of Nazi doctors\n.\nPost-World War II trial of German doctors for war crimes\nUnited States of America v. Karl Brandt, et al.\n, commonly known as the\nDoctors' Trial\n, was the first of the twelve \"\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\n\" for\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nafter the end of\nWorld War II\nbetween 1946 and 1947. The accused were 20\nphysicians\nand 3\nSS\nofficials charged for their involvement in the\nAktion T4\nprogramme and\nNazi human experimentation\n.\nThe Doctors' Trial was held by\nUnited States\nauthorities at the\nPalace of Justice\nin\nNuremberg\nin the\nAmerican occupation zone\nbefore US\nmilitary courts\n, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n.\nSeven of the accused were sentenced to\ndeath by hanging\n, five were sentenced to\nlife imprisonment\n, four were given prison sentences from 10 to 20 years, and seven were\nacquitted\n.\nThe judges, heard before Military Tribunal I, were\nWalter B. Beals\n(presiding judge) from\nWashington\n,\nHarold L. Sebring\nfrom\nFlorida\n, and\nJohnson T. Crawford\nfrom\nOklahoma\n, with Victor C. Swearingen, a former special assistant to the\nAttorney General of the United States\n, as an alternate judge. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n, and the chief prosecutor was James M. McHaney. The\nindictment\nwas filed on 25 October 1946; the trial lasted from 9 December that year until 20 August 1947.\nCase\nWitnesses at the Doctors' Trial.\nTwenty of the defendants were\nphysicians\nand three were\nSS\nofficials (\nViktor Brack\n,\nRudolf Brandt\n, and\nWolfram Sievers\n), all of whom were accused of being involved in\nNazi human experimentation\nand the\nAktion T4\nprogramme of\ninvoluntary euthanasia\n. The physicians came from a variety of civilian and military backgrounds, and some were members of the SS. Other Nazi physicians such as\nPhilipp Bouhler\n,\nErnst-Robert Grawitz\n,\nLeonardo Conti\n, and\nEnno Lolling\nhad died by suicide, while\nJosef Mengele\n, one of the leading Nazi doctors, had evaded capture.\nIn his opening statement, Taylor summarized the crimes of the defendants.\n\"The defendants in this case are charged with murders, tortures, and other atrocities committed in the name of\nmedical science\n. The victims of these crimes numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A handful only are still alive; a few of the survivors will appear in this courtroom. But most of these miserable victims were slaughtered outright or died in the course of the tortures to which they were subjected. For the most part, they are nameless, dead. To their murderers, these wretched people were not individuals at all. They came in wholesale lots and were treated worse than animals.\"\nIndictment\nThe accused faced four charges, including:\nConspiracy to commit\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nas described in counts 2 and 3;\nWar crimes: performing medical experiments, without the subjects' consent, on\nprisoners of war\nand\ncivilians\nof\noccupied countries\n, in the course of which experiments the defendants committed\nmurders\n, brutalities, cruelties,\ntortures\n, atrocities, and other inhuman acts. Also planning and performing the\nmass murder\nof prisoners of war and civilians of occupied countries, stigmatized as aged, insane, incurably ill, deformed, and so on, by gas, lethal injections, and diverse other means in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums during the\nEuthanasia Program\nand participating in the mass murder of\nconcentration camp\ninmates.\nCrimes against humanity: committing crimes described under count 2 also on German nationals.\nMembership in a criminal organization, the\nSS\n.\nThe tribunal largely dropped count 1, stating that the charge was beyond its jurisdiction.\nI\n— Indicted\nG\n— Indicted and found guilty\nAll of the criminals sentenced to death were\nhanged\non 2 June 1948 at\nLandsberg Prison\n.\nFor some, the difference between receiving a prison term and the death sentence was membership in the\nSS\n, \"an organization declared criminal by the judgement of the International Military Tribunal\". However, some SS medical personnel received prison sentences. The degree of personal involvement and/or presiding over groups involved was a factor in others.\nSee also\nCommand responsibility\nDeclaration of Geneva\nDeclaration of Helsinki\nEuthanasia trials\nMedical ethics\nMedical torture\nNazi eugenics\nNuremberg Code\nNuremberg principles\nNuremberg trials\nBruno Beger\nHans Conrad Julius Reiter\nClaus Schilling\nHermann Stieve\nList of medical ethics cases\nReferences\n1\n2\nHolocaust Encyclopedia\nDoctors' trial\n.\n↑\n\"The Doctors Trial: From the Indictment\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2007-10-13\n. Retrieved\n2007-10-11\n.\n↑\nHamilton 1984\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nRuff, Siegfried, et al.\nSicherheit und Rettung in der Luftfahrt\n. Koblenz\n: Bernard & Graefe, c1989.\n↑\nLifton 1986\n, p.\n275.\n↑\nSpitz, Vivien (2005).\nDoctors from Hell: The Horrific Account of Nazi Experiments on Humans\n. Boulder, Colorado: Sentient Publications. p.\n265.\nISBN\n978-1-59181-032-2\n.\n↑\nFulbrook, Mary (2018).\nReckonings: Legacies of Nazi Persecution and the Quest for Justice\n. Oxford:\nOxford University Press\n. pp.\n266–\n267.\nISBN\n978-0-19-881123-7\n.\n↑\nHeathcote, Gina; Bertotti, Sara; Jones, Emily; Labenski, Sheri A. (2022-08-25).\nThe Law of War and Peace: A Gender Analysis: Volume One\n.\nBloomsbury Academic\n. p.\n194.\nISBN\n978-1-78699-669-5\n.\n↑\nMikaberidze, Alexander (2013-06-25).\nAtrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia\n[\n2 Volumes\n]\n: An Encyclopedia\n.\nABC-CLIO\n.\nISBN\n9781598849264\n.\nWorks cited\nHamilton, Charles (1984).\nLeaders & Personalities of the Third Reich\n. Vol.\n1. R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n0-912138-27-0\n.\n\"The Doctors Trial: The Medical Case of the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings\"\n.\nHolocaust Encyclopedia\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 13 May 2025\n. Retrieved\n13 May\n2025\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay (1986).\nThe Nazi doctors: medical killing and the psychology of genocide\n.\nBasic Books\n.\nFurther reading\nTrials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals - Vol. I - The Medical Case\n. US National Archives: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1950\n. Retrieved\n6 September\n2025\n.\nTrials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals - Vol. II - The Medical Case (continued)\n. US National Archives: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1950\n. Retrieved\n6 September\n2025\n.\nHanauske-Abel, H. (1996).\n\"Not a slippery slope or sudden subversion: German medicine and National Socialism in 1933\"\n.\nBritish Medical Journal\n.\n313\n(7070):\n1453–\n1463.\ndoi\n:\n10.1136/bmj.313.7070.1453\n.\nISSN\n0959-8138\n.\nPMC\n2352969\n.\nPMID\n8973235\n.\n(subscription required)\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-955431-7\n.\nLifton-Robert, Robert J. (2000) [1st. Pub. 1986 London:Macmillan].\nThe Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide\n. Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04905-9\n.\nPellegrino, E. (15 August 1997). \"The Nazi Doctors and Nuremberg: Some Moral Lessons Revisited\".\nAnnals of Internal Medicine\n.\n127\n(4):\n307–\n308.\nCiteSeerX\n10.1.1.694.9894\n.\ndoi\n:\n10.7326/0003-4819-127-4-199708150-00010\n.\nPMID\n9265432\n.\nS2CID\n30547329\n.\n(subscription required)\nSeidelman, W. (1996).\n\"Nuremberg lamentation: for the forgotten victims of medical science\"\n.\nBritish Medical Journal\n.\n313\n(7070):\n1463–\n1467.\ndoi\n:\n10.1136/bmj.313.7070.1463\n.\nISSN\n0959-8138\n.\nPMC\n2352986\n.\nPMID\n8973236\n.\n(subscription required)\nSpitz, Vivien (2005).\nDoctors from Hell\n. Sentient Publications.\nISBN\n978-1-59181-032-2\n.\nWeindling, P.J. (2005).\nNazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed Consent\n. Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-1-4039-3911-1\n.\nExternal links\nMedia related to\nDoctors' Trial\nat Wikimedia Commons\n\"Transcripts\"\n.\nThe Nuremberg Trials Project\n. Harvard Law School Library. Archived from\nthe original\non 2011-04-15.\n– Partial transcript from the trial\nCohen, Baruch C.\n\"The Ethics Of Using Medical Data From Nazi Experiments\"\n. Jewish Law.\nBiddiss, M (June 1997).\n\"Disease and dictatorship: the case of Hitler's Reich\"\n.\nJournal of the Royal Society of Medicine\n.\n90\n(6):\n342–\n346.\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/014107689709000616\n.\nPMC\n1296317\n.\nPMID\n9227388\n.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "court": "Palace of Justice, Nuremberg",
+      "full_case_name": "United States of America v.Karl Brandtet al.",
+      "started": "9December1946(1946-12-09)",
+      "decided": "20 August 1947",
+      "judges_sitting": "Walter B. Beals(presiding)Harold L. SebringJohnson T. CrawfordVictor C. Swearingen (alternate)"
+    },
+    "char_count": 8337
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Judges%27_Trial",
+    "name": "Judges' Trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The Judges' Trial was the third of the 12 trials for war crimes the U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany in Nuremberg after the end of World War II. These twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the International Military Tribunal, but took place in the same rooms at the Palace of Justice. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"Subsequent Nuremberg Trials\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).",
+    "description": "Post-WWII war crimes trial",
+    "full_text": "Judges' Trial\nPost-WWII war crimes trial\nA witness testifies in the Judges' Trial\nView of Judges' trial from visitors' gallery\n49°27.2603′N\n11°02.9103′E\n\n/\n\n49.4543383°N 11.0485050°E\n\n/\n49.4543383; 11.0485050\nThe\nJudges' Trial\n(\nGerman\n:\nJuristenprozess\n; or, the\nJustice Trial\n, or, officially,\nThe United States of America vs. Josef Altstötter, et al.\n) was the third of the 12 trials for\nwar crimes\nthe\nU.S.\nauthorities held in their occupation zone in\nGermany\nin\nNuremberg\nafter the end of\nWorld War II\n. These twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, but took place in the same rooms at the\nPalace of Justice\n. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"\nSubsequent Nuremberg Trials\n\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).\nThe defendants in this case were 16 German jurists and lawyers. Nine had been officials of the\nReich Ministry of Justice\n, the others were prosecutors and judges of the\nSpecial Courts\nand\nPeople's Courts\nof\nNazi Germany\n. They were—among other charges—held responsible for implementing and furthering the Nazi \"racial purity\" program through the eugenic and racial laws.\nThe judges in this case, held in Military Tribunal III, were\nCarrington T. Marshall\n(presiding judge), former Chief Justice of the\nSupreme Court of Ohio\n;\nJames T. Brand\n, Associate Justice of the\nSupreme Court of Oregon\n; Mallory B. Blair, formerly judge of the\nThird Court of Appeals of Texas\n; and\nJustin Woodward Harding\nof the Bar of the State of Ohio as an alternate judge. Marshall had to retire because of illness on June 19, 1947, at which point Brand became president and Harding a full member of the tribunal. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n; his deputy was\nCharles M. La Follette\n. The\nindictment\nwas presented on January 4, 1947; the trial lasted from March 5 to December 4, 1947. Ten of the defendants were found guilty; four received sentences of lifetime imprisonment (all four were released by 1957), and six received prison sentences of varying lengths (five, seven or 10 years; all but one, who died in 1950, were released by 1951). Four persons were acquitted of all charges.\nIndictment\nParticipating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n;\nWar crimes through the abuse of the judicial and penal process, resulting in\nmass murder\n,\ntorture\n,\nplunder\nof\nprivate property\n.\nCrimes against humanity on the same grounds, including\nslave labor\ncharges.\nMembership in a criminal organization, the\nNSDAP\nor\nSS\nleadership corps.\nCount 4 applied only to Altstötter, Cuhorst, Engert, Joel (with respect to the SS) and to Cuhorst, Oeschy, Nebelung, and Rothaug concerning the NSDAP leadership. Both organizations had been found criminal previously by the\nIMT\n.\nCount 1 was dropped: the court declared the charge to be outside its jurisdiction. Judge Blair filed a dissenting opinion that stated that the court should have made a statement that the Military Tribunals of the NMT in fact\ndid\nhave jurisdiction over charges of \"conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity\".\nAll defendants pleaded \"not guilty\".\nDefendants\nThe highest-ranking officials of the Nazi judicial system could not be tried:\nFranz Gürtner\n, Minister of Justice, died in 1941;\nOtto Georg Thierack\n, Minister of Justice since 1942, had committed suicide, as had\nReichsgericht\nPresident\nErwin Bumke\n;\nRoland Freisler\n, the President of the\nPeople's Court\nsince 1942, was killed in a 1945\nbombing raid on Berlin\n;\nGünther Vollmer\n, the\nGauführer\nof Nazi jurists, had been killed in 1945. One who was alive but not tried was\nHans Globke\n, who played a significant role in drafting and interpreting the infamous\nNuremberg Laws\nand worked at the Reich Ministry of the Interior for the duration of the war.\nAfter the war ended Globke served as Chief of Staff for Adenauer in the West German Government from 1953 to 1963. He was still under scrutiny for his involvement with the Nazi Party when in 1963 East Germany held a show trial where he was convicted in absentia of War Crimes and sentenced to life in prison. However, East German law was not recognized in West Germany where Globke lived, so he ended up not serving any time. He died at age 74 in February 1973 at his home in the city of\nBonn\n.\nAll convicts were found guilty on all charges brought before them, except Rothaug, who was found guilty only on count 3 of the indictment, while he was found not guilty on counts 2 and 4. However, the court commented in its judgment that:\nBy his manner and methods he made his court an instrumentality of terror and won the fear and hatred of the population. From the evidence of his closest associates as well as his victims, we find that Oswald Rothaug represented in Germany the personification of the secret Nazi intrigue and cruelty. He was and is a sadistic and evil man. Under any civilized judicial system he could have been impeached and removed from office or convicted of malfeasance in office on account of the scheming malevolence with which he administered injustice.\nThe public considered the sentences generally too low.\nMost of the convicts were released already in the early 1950s; some (Lautz, Rothenberger, Schlegelberger) even received retirement pensions in\nWest Germany\n. The guide to German law entitled\nDas Recht der Gegenwart\nis still being published under the name Franz Schlegelberger (\nISBN\n3-8006-2260-2\n).\nIn popular culture\nThe Judges' Trial was the inspiration for the 1959 teleplay\nJudgment at Nuremberg\n, and the 1961 movie adaptation,\nJudgment at Nuremberg\n, starring\nSpencer Tracy\n,\nBurt Lancaster\n,\nRichard Widmark\n,\nMarlene Dietrich\n,\nMaximilian Schell\n,\nJudy Garland\n,\nMontgomery Clift\n,\nWerner Klemperer\nand\nWilliam Shatner\n.\nReferences\n↑\n\"Death register of the registry office Starnberg No. 60/1963\"\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 28,\n2024\n.\n↑\nSchott, Susanne (2001).\nCurt Rothenberger – eine politische Biographie\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n25 November\n2023\n.\n↑\nHunt, Richard M. (June 1968). \"\nNazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich\n. George L. Mosse , Salvator Attanasio\".\nThe Journal of Modern History\n.\n40\n(2):\n295–\n297.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/240203\n.\nISSN\n0022-2801\n.\n↑\nBourhis, Eric Le; Tcherneva, Irina; Voisin, Vanessa (2022-10-25). Bourhis, Eric le (ed.).\nSeeking Accountability for Nazi and War Crimes in East and Central Europe\n. Boydell & Brewer, University of Rochester Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1017/9781800108028\n.\nISBN\n978-1-80010-802-8\n.\n↑\nMazal\n.\nExternal links\nDescription of the trial\nfrom the\nU.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nThe Justice Trial\narchived by the University of Missouri, Kansas City",
+    "infobox": {},
+    "char_count": 6759
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Einsatzgruppen_trial",
+    "name": "Einsatzgruppen trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The United States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al., commonly known as the Einsatzgruppen trial, was the ninth of the twelve \"subsequent Nuremberg trials\" for war crimes and crimes against humanity after the end of World War II between 1947 and 1948. The accused were 24 former SS leaders who, as commanders of the Einsatzgruppen, were responsible for the mass killing of more than a million victims in the Eastern Front.",
+    "description": "Ninth of the 12 trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis",
+    "full_text": "Einsatzgruppen trial\nNinth of the 12 trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis\nThe United States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.\n, commonly known as the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial\n, was the ninth of the twelve \"\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\n\" for\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nafter the end of\nWorld War II\nbetween 1947 and 1948. The accused were 24 former\nSS\nleaders who, as commanders of the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, were responsible for the\nmass killing\nof more than a million victims in the\nEastern Front\n.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrial was held by\nUnited States\nauthorities at the\nPalace of Justice\nin\nNuremberg\nin the\nAmerican occupation zone\nbefore US\nmilitary courts\n, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n. All of the accused were found guilty: fourteen were sentenced to\ndeath by hanging\nand eight received prison sentences ranging from\nlife imprisonment\nto\ntime served\n. Two were only convicted of being a member of an illegal organization, one committed\nsuicide\nbefore the\narraignment\n, and one was removed from the trial for medical reasons.\nOtto Ohlendorf\n,\nErich Naumann\n,\nPaul Blobel\n, and\nWerner Braune\nwere executed in 1951 while the others sentenced to death had their sentences\ncommuted\n.\nThe trial marked the first use of the term\ngenocide\nin legal context, being used by both the\nprosecution\nand by the judges in the verdict.\nThe case\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere\nSS\nmobile\ndeath squads\n, operating behind the front line in\nNazi-occupied Eastern Europe\n. From 1941 to 1945, they murdered around 2 million people; 1.3 million\nJews\n, up to 250,000\nRomani\n, and around 500,000 so-called \"\npartisans\n\",\npeople with disabilities\n, political\ncommissars\n,\nSlavs\n, homosexuals and others.\nThe 24 defendants in this trial were all commanders of these\nEinsatzgruppen\nunits and faced charges of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n. The tribunal stated in its judgment:\n... in this case the defendants are not simply accused of planning or directing wholesale killings through channels. They are not charged with sitting in an office hundreds and thousands of miles away from the slaughter. It is asserted with particularity that these men were in the field actively superintending, controlling, directing, and taking an active part in the bloody harvest.\nThe judges in this case, heard before Military Tribunal II-A, were\nMichael Musmanno\n(presiding judge and naval officer) from\nPennsylvania\n, John J. Speight from\nAlabama\n, and Richard D. Dixon from\nNorth Carolina\n. The chief of counsel for the prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n; the chief prosecutor for this case was\nBenjamin B. Ferencz\n. The\nindictment\nwas filed initially on July 3 and then amended on July 29, 1947, to also include the defendants Steimle, Braune, Haensch, Strauch, Klingelhöfer, and von Radetzky. The trial lasted from September 29, 1947, until April 10, 1948.\nIndictment\nCrimes against humanity\nthrough persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds,\nmurder\n, extermination,\nimprisonment\n, and other inhumane acts committed against\ncivilian\npopulations\n, including German nationals and nationals of other countries, as part of an organized scheme of\ngenocide\n.\nWar crimes\nfor the same reasons, and for wanton destruction and devastation not justified by\nmilitary necessity\n.\nMembership of criminal organizations, the SS, the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD), or the\nGestapo\n, which had been declared criminal organizations previously in the international\nNuremberg Military Tribunals\n.\nAll defendants were charged on all counts. All defendants pleaded \"not guilty\". The tribunal found all of them guilty on all counts, except Rühl and Graf, who were found guilty only on count 3. Fourteen defendants were sentenced to death. However, only four of them were executed. Nine of those condemned had their sentences reduced. Another, Eduard Strauch, couldn't be executed since he had been transferred to Belgian custody after his conviction.\nDefendants\nThe presiding judge, Michael Musmanno, explained his rationale for sentencing while testifying at the\nFrankfurt Auschwitz trials\nin the 1960s. He had chosen to impose death sentences in all cases where the defendant had actively participated in murder and failed to present mitigating circumstances. For example, although\nErwin Schulz\nconfessed to presiding over the execution of 90 to 100 men in Ukraine, he received a 20-year sentence since he had protested an order to exterminate all Jewish women and children, and immediately resigned when he was unable to get the order retracted.\nSuperior orders\nwas rejected as a defense.\nOf the 14 death sentences, only four were carried out; the others were commuted to prison terms of varying lengths in 1951. In 1958, all convicts were released from prison.\nQuotes from the judgment\nThe Last Jew in Vinnitsa\n. A member of\nEinsatzgruppe D\nshoots a person kneeling before a filled mass grave.\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunal in its judgement stated the following:\n[The facts] are so beyond the experience of normal man and the range of man-made phenomena that only the most complete judicial inquiry, and the most exhaustive trial, could verify and confirm them. Although the principal accusation is murder,\n... the charge of purposeful homicide in this case reaches such fantastic proportions and surpasses such credible limits that believability must be bolstered with assurance a hundred times repeated.\n...\na crime of such unprecedented brutality and of such inconceivable savagery that the mind rebels against its own thought image and the imagination staggers in the contemplation of a human degradation beyond the power of language to adequately portray.\nThe number of deaths resulting from the activities with which these defendants have been connected and which the prosecution has set at one million is but an abstract number. One cannot grasp the full cumulative terror of murder one million times repeated.\nIt is only when this grotesque total is broken down into units capable of mental assimilation that one can understand the monstrousness of the things we are in this trial contemplating. One must visualize not one million people but only ten persons – men, women, and children, perhaps all of one family – falling before the executioner's guns. If one million is divided by ten, this scene must happen one hundred thousand times, and as one visualizes the repetitious horror, one begins to understand the meaning of the prosecution's words, \"It is with sorrow and with hope that we here disclose the deliberate slaughter of more than a million innocent and defenseless men, women, and children.\"\nSee also\nCommissar Order\n, an order stating that\nSoviet\npolitical commissars were to be shot on the battlefield.\nList of\nEinsatzgruppen\nwith all known\nEinsatzgruppen\nNuremberg executions\nNotes\n↑\nBenjamin Ferencz\n:\nOpening Statement of the Prosecution\n, vorgetragen am 29.\nSeptember 1947. In:\nTrials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10.\nVol. 4. District of Columbia 1950, S. 30.\n↑\n\"Ben Ferencz recalls his work on the Einsatzgruppen Trial\"\n.\njudicature.duke.edu\n. 2021-12-28\n. Retrieved\n2023-10-20\n.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n257.\n↑\n\"Extermination camp\"\n.\nEncyclopaedia Britannica\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2015-06-23\n. Retrieved\nAugust 6,\n2021\n.\n1\n2\nNuremberg Military Tribunal,\nUnited States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.\n(Einsatzgruppen trial), Judgement (via Internet Archive).\n1\n2\n3\n4\n\"Five death sentences were confirmed: the sentence against Oswald Pohl, as well as those passed against the leaders of the Mobile Killing Units, Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Erich Naumann, and Otto Ohrlendorf. . . . In the early morning hours of 7 June, the Nazi criminals were hanged in the Landesburg prison courtyard.\"  Norbert Frei,\nAdenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration\n.  Columbia University Press, 2002.\np. 165\nand\np. 173\n1\n2\n3\nNuremberg Military Tribunal,\nUnited States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.\n(Einsatzgruppen trial), Judgment, pages 585-586. Internet Archive.\n↑\n\"Tonbandmitschnitt des 1. Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozesses\"\n.\nwww.auschwitz-prozess.de\n. Retrieved\n2023-01-24\n.\nReferences\nTrials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nürnberg, October 1946 – April 1949\n, Volume IV, (\"Green Series) (the \"Einsatzgruppen case\")\nDescription\nfrom the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.\nEinsatzgruppen trials.\nAnother description.\nFerencz, Benjamin\n, “A Prosecutor's Personal Account: From Nuremberg to Rome\",\nJournal of International Affairs,\n52: No. 2, Columbia University, Spring 1999\nBenjamin Ferencz,\nMémoires de Ben, procureur à Nuremberg et avocat de la Paix mondiale\n, Michalon, Paris, 2012 (French).\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-955431-7\n.\nRhodes, Richard\n(2002).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York:\nVintage Books\n.\nISBN\n978-0-375-70822-0\n.\nExternal links\nMedia related to\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nat Wikimedia Commons",
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+  {
+    "page_title": "IG_Farben_trial",
+    "name": "IG Farben trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The United States of America vs. Carl Krauch, et al., also known as the IG Farben Trial, was the sixth of the twelve trials for war crimes the U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany after the end of World War II. IG Farben was the private German chemicals company allied with the Nazis that manufactured the Zyklon B gas used to commit genocide against millions of European Jews, Roma, homosexuals, socialists and other innocent civilians in the Holocaust.",
+    "description": "Post-WWII war crimes trial",
+    "full_text": "IG Farben Trial\nPost-WWII war crimes trial\nTelford Taylor\nopens the case against the defendants.\nThe United States of America vs. Carl Krauch, et al.\n, also known as the\nIG Farben Trial\n, was the sixth of the\ntwelve trials\nfor\nwar crimes\nthe U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany after the end of\nWorld War II\n.\nIG Farben\nwas the private German chemicals company allied with the Nazis that manufactured the\nZyklon B\ngas used to commit genocide against millions of\nEuropean Jews\n,\nRoma\n, homosexuals, socialists and\nother innocent civilians\nin the\nHolocaust\n.\nThe twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, but took place in the same rooms at the\nPalace of Justice\n. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"\nSubsequent Nuremberg Trials\n\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT). The IG Farben Trial was the second of three trials of leading industrialists of\nNazi Germany\nfor their conduct during the Nazi regime. (The two other industrialist trials were the\nFlick Trial\nand the\nKrupp Trial\n.)\nThe defendants in this case had all been directors of IG Farben, a large German conglomerate of chemical firms. The company had been a major factor already in\nWorld War I\n, when their development of the\nHaber–Bosch process\nfor nitrogen fixation compensated for Germany's being cut off from the Chilean nitrate trade and allowed IG Farben to produce synthetic nitrate and extract and process nitrogen for use in agricultural fertilizer. (Nitrate is an important component for the fabrication of explosives such as\ngunpowder\n,\ndynamite\nor\nTNT\n.) In World War II,\nDegesch\n(42.5 per cent owned by IG Farben) was the trademark holder of\nZyklon B\n, the poison gas used at some Nazi extermination camps.\nIG Farben also developed\nprocesses\nfor synthesizing\ngasoline\nand\nrubber\nfrom\ncoal\n, and thereby contributed much to Germany's ability to wage a war despite having been cut off from all major\noil fields\n. The charges consequently centered on preparing to wage an aggressive war, but also on\nslave labor\nand plundering.\nThe judges in this case, heard before Military Tribunal VI, were\nCurtis Grover Shake\n(presiding judge), former Chief Judge of the\nIndiana Supreme Court\n;\nJames Morris\nfrom\nNorth Dakota\n;\nPaul M. Hebert\n,\ndean\nof the Law School of\nLouisiana State University\n; and\nClarence F. Merrell\n, a lawyer from\nIndiana\n, and friend of Judge Shake, as an alternate judge. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n. The\nindictment\nwas filed on May 3, 1947; the trial lasted from August 27, 1947, until July 30, 1948. Of the 24 defendants\narraigned\n, 13 were found guilty on one or the other counts of the indictment and sentenced to prison terms ranging from one and one half to eight years, including time already served; 10 defendants were acquitted of all charges. Max Brüggemann (Farben's chief legal advisor) was removed from the trial and his case discontinued on September 9, 1947, for medical reasons.\nIndictment\nIG Farben defendants read indictments\nMonowitz prisoners unload cement from trains for IG Farben. Photograph entered into evidence at the trial.\nPlanning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries.\nWar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nthrough the\nplundering\nand spoliation of\noccupied territories\n, and the seizure of plants in Austria,\nCzechoslovakia\n, Poland, Norway, France, and Russia.\nWar crimes and crimes against humanity through participation in the\nenslavement\nand\ndeportation\nto\nslave labor\non a gigantic scale of concentration camp inmates and\ncivilians\nin occupied countries, and of\nprisoners of war\n, and the mistreatment,\nterrorization\n,\ntorture\n, and\nmurder\nof enslaved persons.\nMembership in a criminal organization, the\nSS\n.\nActing as leaders in a conspiracy to commit the crimes mentioned under counts 1, 2, and 3.\nAll defendants were indicted on counts 1, 2, 3, and 5. Only\nChristian Schneider\n,\nHeinrich Bütefisch\n, and\nErich von der Heyde\nwere charged on count 4, \"Membership in the SS\". The SS had been declared a criminal organization previously by the IMT.\nDespite the extensive evidence presented by the prosecution that showed that the company had been deeply involved in Germany's rearmament after World War I from the onset, the tribunal rejected the charges for preparing an aggressive war and for conspiracy to that end. On count three (\"slave labor\"), the judgement \"allowed the defendants the benefit of the defense of 'necessity\n'\n\"\n(Telford Taylor, \"The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials\";\nInternational Conciliation\n, No. 450, April 1949). Only in the case of\nAuschwitz\n, where IG Farben had constructed a plant next to the concentration camp with the clear intent to use inmates as slave workers, did the tribunal consider the evidence sufficient to prove that IG Farben acted on its own initiative. The tribunal concluded that the defendants could be held responsible only for this one case.\nJudge Hebert filed a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the defense of \"necessity\" did not apply and that\nall\ndefendants should have been found guilty on count 3 of the indictment. He stated that:\n...\nthe record shows that Farben willingly cooperated and gladly utilized each new source of manpower as it developed. Disregard of basic human rights did not deter these defendants.\nWilling cooperation with the slave labor utilization of the Third Reich was a matter of corporate policy that permeated the whole Farben organization\n... For this reason, criminal responsibility goes beyond the actual immediate participants at Auschwitz. It includes other Farben Vorstand plant-managers and embraces all who knowingly participated in the shaping of the corporate policy.\nJudge Hebert filed his statement on December 28, 1948, nearly 5 months after the judgement.\nDefendants\nI\n— Indicted\nG\n— Indicted and found guilty\nThe defendants Ilgner and Kugler were released immediately after the judgement since they had already been in custody longer than their sentence.\nBibliography\nGrietje Baars:\nCapitalism´s Victor´s Justice? The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII\n. In:\nThe Hidden Histories of War Crime Trials\n. Heller and Simpson, Oxford University Press 2013,\nISBN\n978-0-19-967114-4\n.\nKevin Jon Heller\n:\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law.\nOxford University Press, 2011,\nISBN\n978-0-19-955431-7\n.\nFlorian Jeßberger:\nVon den Ursprüngen eines „Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrechts“: Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht.\nIn:\nJuristenzeitung.\n2009.\nStefan H. Lindner:\nDas Urteil im I.G.-Farben-Prozess\n. In:\nNMT – Die Nürnberger Militärtribunale zwischen  Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit und Rechtschöpfung\n. Priemel und Stiller, Hamburger Edition 2013,\nISBN\n978-3-86854-577-7\nReferences\n↑\nHayes, Peter (2004).\nFrom Cooperation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich\n. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p.\n279\n.\nISBN\n0-521-78227-9\n.\n↑\n\"The Mazal Library\"\n. Mazal.org. Archived from\nthe original\non 2012-07-17\n. Retrieved\n2013-01-05\n.\n↑\n\"The Mazal Library\"\n. Mazal.org. Archived from\nthe original\non 2012-07-17\n. Retrieved\n2013-01-05\n.\n↑\n\"The Mazal Library\"\n. Mazal.org. Archived from\nthe original\non 2012-07-17\n. Retrieved\n2013-01-05\n.\nExternal links\nTrial proceedings\nfrom the Mazal Library.\n\"The I. G. Farben Case\"\n(PDF)\n.\nTrials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, October 1946\n– April 1949\n.\nVIII\n. Washington, D.C.: Nuernberg Military Tribunals, United States Government Printing Office. 1952. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non February 7, 2010.\nAnother description\nThe Authentic Records from the Nuremberg Tribunal Against the Oil and Drug Cartel\nArchived\n2019-07-03 at the\nWayback Machine\nThe “relay of life” to the next generation - IG Farben connection",
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+  {
+    "page_title": "Krupp_trial",
+    "name": "Krupp trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The United States of America vs. Alfried Krupp, et al., commonly known as the Krupp trial, was the tenth of twelve trials for war crimes that U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone at Nuremberg, Germany, after the end of World War II. It concerned the forced labor enterprises of the Krupp Group and other crimes committed by the company.",
+    "description": "Post WWII war crimes trial",
+    "full_text": "Krupp trial\nPost WWII war crimes trial\nProsecutor\nTelford Taylor\n(standing, center) opens the case against the defendants\nThe United States of America vs. Alfried Krupp, et al.\n, commonly known as the\nKrupp trial\n, was the tenth of twelve trials for\nwar crimes\nthat U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone at\nNuremberg\n, Germany, after the end of\nWorld War II\n. It concerned the forced labor enterprises of the\nKrupp\nGroup and other crimes committed by the company.\nThese twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, but took place in the same rooms at the\nPalace of Justice\n. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"\nsubsequent Nuremberg Trials\n\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT). The Krupp Trial was the third of three trials of German\nindustrialists\n; the other two were the\nFlick Trial\nand the\nIG Farben Trial\n.\nThe case\nIn the Krupp Trial, twelve former directors of the\nKrupp\nGroup were accused of having enabled the armament of the German military forces and thus having actively participated in the\nNazis\n' preparations for an aggressive war, and also for having used\nslave laborers\nin their companies. The main defendant was\nAlfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\n, CEO of the Krupp Holding since 1943 and son of\nGustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach\nwho had been a defendant in the main\nTrial of the Major War Criminals\nbefore the IMT (where he was considered medically unfit for trial).\nThe judges in this case, heard before Military Tribunal III-A, were\nHu C. Anderson\n(presiding judge), president of the\ncourt of appeals\nof\nTennessee\n,\nEdward J. Daly\nfrom\nConnecticut\n, and\nWilliam J. Wilkins\nfrom\nSeattle, Washington\n. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n; the Chief Trial Counsel was\nH. Russell Thayer\n, and\nBenjamin B. Ferencz\nparticipated as a Special Counsel. The\nindictment\nwas presented on November 17, 1947; the trial lasted from December 8, 1947, until July 31, 1948. One defendant (Pfirsch) was acquitted, the others received prison sentences between three and twelve years, and the main defendant Alfried Krupp was ordered to sell all his possessions.\nDefendants at the Krupp Trial, from left; Alfried Krupp,\nEwald Löser\n, Eduard Houdremont, Erich Müller, Friedrich Janssen, Karl Pfirsch, and Karl Eberhardt\nKrupp Punishement Cage for slave laborers\nKrupp Punishement Cage for slave laborers\nThe main defendant Alfried Krupp always denied any guilt. In 1947, he stated:\nThe economy needed a steady or growing development. Because of the rivalries between the many political parties in Germany and the general disorder there was no opportunity for prosperity. ... We thought that Hitler would give us such a healthy environment. Indeed he did do that. ... We Krupps never cared much about [political] ideas. We only wanted a system that worked well and allowed us to work unhindered. Politics is not our business.\n—\nAlfried Krupp, in\nGolo Mann\n's manuscript first published in (\nFriz 1988\n).\nIndeed, the Krupp holding did flourish under the Nazi regime. According to conservative estimates, the Krupp enterprises used nearly 100,000 persons in the\nslave labour programme\n, about 23,000 of which were prisoners of war.\nIndictment\nCrimes against peace\nby participating in the planning and waging of wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties;\nCrimes against humanity\nby participating in the plundering, devastation, and exploitation of occupied countries;\nCrimes against humanity by participating in the murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, and use for slave labor of civilians who came under German control, German nationals, and prisoners of war;\nParticipating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace.\nAll defendants were charged under counts 1, 3, and 4; count 2 excluded the defendants Lehmann and Kupke. Counts 1 and 4 were soon dropped due to lack of evidence.\nDefendants\nAll eleven defendants found guilty were convicted on the forced labor charge (count 3), and of the ten charged on count 2 (economic spoliation), six were convicted. On January 31, 1951, two and a half years after the sentences, ten (all except Löser) were released from prison. Since no buyer for the Krupp Holding had been found, Alfried Krupp resumed control of the firm in 1953.\nReferences\nTrial proceedings\n(partial).\nDescription of the trial\nfrom the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.\nTranscript\nof a German radio broadcast from 1999 on the Krupp trial and the\nIG Farben Trial\n(in German, with English quotations).\nKrupp Trial transcript\nKrupp Trial exhibit D-382\nFriz, D. M. (1988).\nAlfried Krupp und Berthold Beitz\n—\nder Erbe und sein Statthalter\n(in German). Zürich: Orell-Füssli.\nISBN\n3-280-01852-8\n.",
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+  {
+    "page_title": "Ministries_Trial",
+    "name": "Ministries Trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The Ministries Trial was the eleventh of the twelve trials for war crimes the U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany in Nuremberg after the end of World War II. These twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the International Military Tribunal, but took place in the same rooms at the Palace of Justice. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"subsequent Nuremberg trials\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).",
+    "description": "Trial",
+    "full_text": "Ministries Trial\nTrial\nTheodor von Hornbostel testifies for the prosecution during the Ministries Trial\nThe\nMinistries Trial\n(or, officially, the\nUnited States of America vs. Ernst von Weizsäcker, et al.\n) was the eleventh of the twelve trials for\nwar crimes\nthe U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany in\nNuremberg\nafter the end of\nWorld War II\n. These twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, but took place in the same rooms at the\nPalace of Justice\n. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\n\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).\nThis case is also known as the\nWilhelmstrasse Trial\n, so-named because both the\nReich Chancellery\nand the\nGerman Foreign Office\nwere located at the\nWilhelmstrasse\n, a street in Berlin that was often used as a\nmetonym\nfor overall German governmental administration. The defendants in this case were officials of various\nReich\nministries, facing various charges for their roles in\nNazi Germany\nand thus their participation in or\nresponsibility\nfor the numerous atrocities committed both in Germany and in occupied countries during the war.\nThe judges in this case, heard before Military Tribunal VI, were\nWilliam C. Christianson\n(presiding judge) from\nMinnesota\n, Robert F. Maguire from\nOregon\nand\nLeon W. Powers\nfrom\nIowa\n. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n; the chief prosecutor was\nRobert Kempner\n. The\nindictment\nwas filed on 15 November 1947; the hearings lasted from 6 January 1948 until 18 November that year. Five months later, on 11 April 1949, the judges presented their 833-page judgment. Sentences were handed down on 13 April 1949. Of all the twelve trials, this was the one that lasted longest and ended last. Of the 21 defendants\narraigned\n, two were acquitted, and 18 others were found guilty on at least one count of their indictments and received prison sentences ranging from three years to 25 years. In addition, one defendant,\nErnst Wilhelm Bohle\n, pleaded guilty, becoming the only defendant to do so in the\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\n.\nIndictment\nTelford Taylor\ndelivers the prosecution's opening statement.\nThe defendants were all indicted on at least one of seven counts:\nCount 1:\nCrime against peace\nCount 2: Taking part in a common plan or conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes (later dropped by the NMT in all trials)\nCount 3:\nWar crimes\nagainst\nprisoners of war\nCount 4:\nCrimes against humanity\nthrough atrocities against German nationals on political, racial, and religious grounds between 1933 and 1939 (count dropped)\nCount 5: War crimes and crimes against humanity through atrocities against civilian population\nCount 6: War crimes and crimes against humanity through the plundering and spoliation of the\noccupied territories\nCount 7: War crimes and crimes against humanity through the enslavement and deportation of concentration camp prisoners and civilians in the occupied countries for slave labor\nCount 8: Membership in a criminal organization, the NSDAP and the SS\nDefendants\n^1\nStuckart was tried again in 1950 before a\ndenazification\ncourt and sentenced as a\nMitläufer\n(follower) a fine of\nDM\n50,000.\nHerbert Backe\n, the former minister for agriculture who should also have been tried, committed suicide on 6 April 1947 while in custody awaiting the trial.\nReferences\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nMinistries trial\n.\nDescription\nfrom the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.\nAnother description\nTranscript\nof a German radio broadcast from 1999 (in German).\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-955431-7\n.",
+    "infobox": {},
+    "char_count": 3815
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "High_Command_Trial",
+    "name": "High Command Trial",
+    "type": "trial",
+    "summary": "The High Command Trial, also known initially as Case No. 12, and later as Case No. 72, was the last of the twelve trials for war crimes the U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone of Germany in Nuremberg after the end of World War II. These twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the International Military Tribunal, but took place in the same rooms at the Palace of Justice. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"subsequent Nuremberg trials\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).",
+    "description": "War crimes trial",
+    "full_text": "High Command Trial\nWar crimes trial\nThe\nHigh Command Trial\n(officially,\nThe United States of America vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al.\n), also known initially as\nCase No. 12\n(the 13 Generals' Trial),\nand later as\nCase No. 72\n(the German high command trial: Trial of\nWilhelm von Leeb\nand thirteen others),\nwas the last of the twelve trials for\nwar crimes\nthe\nU.S.\nauthorities held in their occupation zone of\nGermany\nin\nNuremberg\nafter the end of\nWorld War II\n.\nThese twelve trials were all held before U.S. military courts, not before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, but took place in the same rooms at the\nPalace of Justice\n. The twelve U.S. trials are collectively known as the \"\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\n\" or, more formally, as the \"Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals\" (NMT).\nBackground\nHigh Command Trial courtroom\nThe accused in this trial were high-ranking generals of the German\nWehrmacht\n(including two\nfield marshals\nof the Army, one field marshal of the air force and one\ngeneral admiral\n), some of whom had been members of the\nHigh Command\nof\nNazi Germany\n's military forces. They were charged with having participated in or planned or facilitated the execution of the numerous war crimes and atrocities committed in countries occupied by the German forces during the war.\nThe judges in this case, heard before Military Tribunal V-A, were the American John C. Young (presiding judge), Winfield B. Hale, and Justin W. Harding. The Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution was\nTelford Taylor\n. The\nindictment\nwas filed on November 28, 1947; the trial lasted from December 30 that year until October 28, 1948.\nIndictment\nThe accused faced four charges of having committed\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n:\nCrimes against peace\nby waging aggressive war against other nations and violating international treaties.\nWar crimes by being responsible for murder, ill-treatment and other crimes against\nprisoners of war\nand enemy belligerents.\nCrimes against humanity by participating or ordering the murder, torture, deportation,\nhostage\n-taking, etc. of civilians .\nParticipating and organizing the formulations and execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit aforementioned crimes.\nAll defendants were indicted on all counts and pleaded \"not guilty\". Count 4 of the indictment, the conspiracy charge, was soon dropped by the tribunal because it was already covered by the other charges. On count 1, the tribunal considered all of the accused not guilty and stated that they were not the policy-makers and that preparing for war and fighting a war 'on orders' was not a criminal offense under the applicable international law of the time.\nDefendants and judgments\nOf the 14 defendants indicted,\nOtto Schniewind\nand\nHugo Sperrle\nwere acquitted on all counts.\nJohannes Blaskowitz\ncommitted suicide during the trial and the 11 remaining defendants received prison sentences ranging from three years to lifetime imprisonment. All sentences included time already served in custody since 7 April 1945. The table below shows, with respect to each charge, whether the accused were either indicted but not convicted (I) or indicted and found guilty (G) and is listed by defendant, charge and outcome.\nAftermath\nPublic opinion in Germany was against the trial. Many denied the facts found by the U.S. judges, extolled the defense of obedience to\nsuperior orders\nand praised the soldierly qualities of the defendants. Particularly active were the\nProtestant\nand\nCatholic\nChurches.\nAfter the emergence of the\nFederal Republic\n,\nGerman Chancellor\nKonrad Adenauer\nand the\nBundestag\nweighed in on the side of the defendants. German leverage increased as the urgency of\nrearming Germany\ngrew. Under these intense pressures, in 1950, U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy established a review panel chaired by Judge David Peck of New York and, on its recommendation, reduced the sentences of three of the six High Command defendants who were still in prison. After further proceedings by mixed commissions composed of Allied and German members, the last of the High Command defendants returned home in 1954.\nSee also\nCommand responsibility\nSubsequent Nuremberg trials\nNotes\n↑\nWeb Genocide Documentation Centre,\nCase No. 12\nArchived\n2012-04-01 at the\nWayback Machine\n(the 13 Generals' trial); euRathlon, UWE Bristol.\n↑\nWeb Genocide Documentation Centre,\nCase No. 72\nArchived\n2005-02-21 at the\nWayback Machine\n(The German high command trial: Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and thirteen others), UWE Bristol.\n↑\nThere was also a \"High Command Case\" in the\ntrial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal\n. In\nthat\ncase, the German supreme command of the armed forces (\nOKW\n–\nOberkommando Wehrmacht\n) was acquitted of the charge of having been a criminal organization.\n1\n2\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n95.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n218.\n1\n2\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n219.\n↑\nHeiber 2004\n, p.\n938.\n↑\nBurleigh 1997\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nHebert 2010\n, pp.\n216–217.\n1\n2\n3\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n3.\n1\n2\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n151.\n↑\nHebert 2010\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nHebert 2010\n, pp.\n185–186.\n↑\nSee Detlev F. Vagts, Book Review, American Journal of International Law vol. 104 (2010), p. 548, at 549; reviewing Valerie Geneviève Hébert,\nHitler's Generals on Trial: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg\n. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010.\nReferences\nLaw Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol.\nXII, 1949\nof the\nUnited Nations War Crimes Commission\n.\nBurleigh, Michael\n(1997).\nEthics and Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1017/CBO9780511806162\n.\nISBN\n978-0-521-58816-4\n.\nHebert, Valerie (2010).\nHitler's Generals on Trial: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg\n. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.\nISBN\n978-0-7006-1698-5\n.\nHeiber, Helmut;\nWeinberg, Gerhard L.\n;\nGlantz, David\n(2004).\nHitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942–1945\n. Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-1929631285\n.\nHeller, Kevin Jon (2011).\nThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-955431-7\n.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "court": "Nuremberg",
+      "full_case_name": "The United States of America vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al",
+      "indictment": "28 November 1947",
+      "decided": "28 October 1948,Nuremberg"
+    },
+    "char_count": 6133
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Robert_H._Jackson",
+    "name": "Robert H. Jackson",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Robert Houghwout Jackson was an American lawyer, jurist, and politician who served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1941 until his death in 1954. He had previously served as United States Solicitor General and United States Attorney General, and is the only person to have held all three of those offices. Jackson was also notable for his work at the Nuremberg trials prosecuting Nazi war criminals following World War II. Jackson developed a reputation as one of the best writers on the Supreme Court and one of the most committed to enforcing due process as protection from overreaching federal agencies.",
+    "description": "US Supreme Court justice from 1941 to 1954 (1892–1954)",
+    "full_text": "Robert H. Jackson\nUS Supreme Court justice from 1941 to 1954 (1892–1954)\nFor the photographer, see\nRobert H. Jackson (photographer)\n.\nRobert Houghwout Jackson\n(February 13, 1892\n– October 9, 1954) was an American lawyer, jurist, and politician who served as an\nassociate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court\nfrom 1941 until his death in 1954. He had previously served as\nUnited States Solicitor General\nand\nUnited States Attorney General\n, and is the only person to have held all three of those offices. Jackson was also notable for his work at the\nNuremberg trials\nprosecuting Nazi war criminals following\nWorld War II\n. Jackson developed a reputation as one of the best writers on the Supreme Court and one of the most committed to enforcing\ndue process\nas protection from overreaching federal agencies.\nJackson was the most recent\nU.S. Supreme Court\njustice who did not earn a\nlaw degree\n. He was\nadmitted to the bar\nvia the older tradition of an internship under an established lawyer (\"\nreading law\n\") after studying at\nAlbany Law School\nfor a year.\nJackson is recognized for his advice that, \"Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect, in no uncertain terms, to make no statement to the police under any circumstances\",\nand for his\naphorism\ndescribing the Supreme Court, \"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.\"\nHe was viewed as a moderate\nliberal\n,\nand is known for his dissents in\nTerminiello v. City of Chicago\n,\nZorach v. Clauson\n,\nEverson v. Board of Education\n, and\nKorematsu v. United States\n, as well as his majority opinion in\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette\nand his concurring opinion in\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer\n. Justice\nAntonin Scalia\n, who occupied the seat once held by Jackson, considered Jackson to be \"the best legal stylist of the 20th century\".\nEarly life\nJackson was born on his family's farm in\nSpring Creek Township, Warren County, Pennsylvania\n, on February 13, 1892, and was raised in\nFrewsburg, New York\n.\nThe son of William Eldred Jackson and Angelina Houghwout, he graduated from Frewsburg High School in 1909\nand spent the next year as a post-graduate student attending\nJamestown High School\n, where he worked to improve his writing skills.\nJackson decided on a legal career; since attendance at college or law school was not a requirement if a student learned under the tutelage of an established attorney, at age 18 he began to\nread law\nwith the\nJamestown, New York\n, firm in which his uncle, Frank Mott, was a partner.\nHis uncle soon introduced him to\nFranklin Delano Roosevelt\n, who was then serving as a member of the\nNew York State Senate\n. Jackson attended\nAlbany Law School\nof\nUnion University\nfrom 1911 to 1912.\nAt the time, students at Albany Law School had three options: taking individual courses without receiving a degree, completing a two-year program and receiving an\nLL.B.\ndegree, or demonstrating the knowledge required of a first-year student and then taking the second year of the two-year program, which produced a\ncertificate of completion\n.\nJackson chose the third option; he successfully completed the second-year courses, and received his certificate in 1912.\nAfter his year at Albany Law School, Jackson returned to Jamestown to complete his studies.\nHe attained\nadmission to the bar\nin 1913 at age twenty-one,\nthen joined a law practice in Jamestown.\nIn 1916, he married Irene Alice Gerhardt, in Albany.\nIn 1917, Jackson was recruited to work for Penney, Killeen & Nye, a leading\nBuffalo\nfirm, primarily defending the\nInternational Railway Company\nin trials and appeals.\nIn late 1918, Jackson was recruited back to Jamestown to serve as the city's\ncorporation counsel\n.\nOver the next 15 years, he built a successful practice, and became a leading lawyer in New York State; he also enhanced his reputation nationally, through leadership roles with bar associations and other legal organizations.\nIn 1930, Jackson was elected to membership in the American Law Institute; in 1933, he was elected Chairman of the American Bar Association's Conference of Bar Association Delegates (a predecessor to today's ABA House of Delegates).\nJackson became active in politics as a\nDemocrat\n;\nin 1916\n, he spearheaded Jamestown's local\nWilson for President\norganization.\nIn the years during and after\nWorld War I\n, he was a member of the\nNew York State Democratic Committee\n.\nHe also continued his association with Roosevelt; when Roosevelt served as\nGovernor of New York\nfrom 1929 to 1933, he appointed Jackson to a commission which reviewed the state judicial system and proposed reforms.\nHe served on that commission from 1931 to 1939.\nJackson also turned down Roosevelt's offer to appoint him to the\nNew York Public Service Commission\n, because he preferred to remain in private practice.\nFederal appointments, 1934–1938\nIn 1932\n, Jackson was active in Franklin Roosevelt's presidential campaign as chairman of an organization called Democratic Lawyers for Roosevelt.\n(Another Robert H. Jackson was also active in the Roosevelt campaign.\nThat Jackson (1880–1973) was Secretary of the\nDemocratic National Committee\n, and was a resident of\nNew Hampshire\n.)\nIn 1934, Jackson agreed to join the Roosevelt administration; he served initially as Assistant General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Internal Revenue (today's\nInternal Revenue Service\n), where he was in charge of 300 lawyers who tried cases before the Board of Tax Appeals.\nIn 1936, Jackson became\nAssistant Attorney General\n, heading the\nTax Division of the Department of Justice\n, and in 1937, he became Assistant Attorney General, heading the\nAntitrust Division\n.\nJackson was a supporter of the\nNew Deal\n, litigating against corporations and utilities holding companies.\nHe participated in the 1934 prosecution of\nSamuel Insull\n,\nthe 1935 income tax case against\nAndrew Mellon\n,\nand the 1937 anti-trust case against\nAlcoa\n, in which the Mellon family held an important interest.\nU.S. Solicitor General, 1938–1940\nIn March 1938, Jackson became\nUnited States Solicitor General\n, succeeding\nStanley Forman Reed\n, who had been appointed to the Supreme Court. Jackson served as Solicitor General until January 1940, working as the government's chief advocate before the\nU.S. Supreme Court\n.\nDuring his time in this post, he argued 44 cases to the Supreme Court on behalf of the federal government, and lost only six.\nHis record of accomplishment caused Justice\nLouis Brandeis\nto once remark that Jackson should be Solicitor General for life.\nRoosevelt regarded Jackson as a possible successor to the presidency in 1940, and worked with his staff on an effort to raise Jackson's public profile.\nTheir plan was to mention Jackson favorably in presidential remarks as often as possible, and to have Jackson take part frequently in Roosevelt's public appearances.\nRoosevelt and his advisers next intended for Jackson to become the Democratic nominee for Governor of New York in 1938. They abandoned their effort to create a groundswell of support for Jackson's gubernatorial candidacy when they ran into resistance from state Democratic Party leaders.\nIn addition, Roosevelt's decision to run for a third term in 1940 rendered moot the need to identify and promote a successor.\nInstead of running for Governor or President, Jackson joined Roosevelt's cabinet when he was appointed as Attorney General.\nU.S. Attorney General, 1940–1941\nJackson was appointed as\nUnited States Attorney General\nby Roosevelt, on January 4, 1940, replacing\nFrank Murphy\n, whom Roosevelt had appointed to the Supreme Court. As Attorney General, Jackson supported a bill introduced by\nSam Hobbs\nthat would have legalized\nwiretapping\nby the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n, or any other government agency, if it was suspected that a\nfelony\nwas occurring.\nThe bill was opposed by\nFederal Communications Commission\n(FCC) chairman\nJames Lawrence Fly\n, and it did not pass.\nWhile in office, he also helped President Roosevelt organize the\nLend-Lease\nagreement, which allowed the United States to supply materials to help with the war effort to the Allied forces, before formally entering World War II.\nU.S. Supreme Court, 1941–1954\nOn June 12, 1941, Roosevelt nominated Jackson as an\nassociate justice\nof the U.S. Supreme Court, to fill the vacancy created when\nHarlan Fiske Stone\nreplaced\nCharles Evans Hughes\nas\nchief justice\n.\nJackson was confirmed by the\nUnited States Senate\non July 7, 1941,\nand took the\njudicial oath of office\non July 11, 1941.\nOn the Court, he was known for his eloquent writing style and championing of individual liberties.\nIn 1943, Jackson wrote the majority opinion in\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette\n, which overturned a public school regulation making it mandatory to\nsalute the flag\n, and imposing penalties of expulsion and prosecution upon students who failed to comply. Jackson's stirring language in\nBarnette\nconcerning individual rights is widely quoted. Jackson's concurring opinion in 1952's\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer\n(forbidding President\nHarry Truman\n's seizure of steel mills during the\nKorean War\nto avert a strike), in which Jackson formulated a three-tier test for evaluating claims of Presidential power, remains one of the most widely cited opinions in Supreme Court history.\nFeud with Hugo Black\nJustices Jackson and\nHugo Black\nhad profound professional and personal disagreements dating back to October 1941, the first term during which they served together on the Supreme Court. According to\nDennis Hutchinson\n, editor of\nThe Supreme Court Review\n, Jackson objected to Black's practice of importing his personal preferences into his jurisprudence.\nHutchinson quotes Jackson as having remarked, \"With few exceptions, we all knew which side of a case Black would vote on when he read the names of the parties.\"\nWhile Hutchinson points out that Jackson objected to Black's style of jurisprudence in such cases as\nMinersville v. Gobitis\n(1940) and\nUnited States v. Bethlehem Steel\n(1942), Black's involvement in the\nJewell Ridge\ncase struck Jackson as especially injudicious.\nIn\nJewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers\n(1945), the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether to grant the coal company's petition for a rehearing, on the grounds that the victorious miners were, in a previous matter, represented by Crampton P. Harris, who was Justice Black's former law partner and personal lawyer. Despite this apparent conflict of interest, Black lobbied the Court for a\nper curiam\ndenial of the petition. Justice Jackson objected, with the result that Jackson filed a concurrence disassociating himself from the ruling and, by implication, criticizing Black for not addressing the conflict of interest. Jackson also strongly objected to Black's judicial conduct in\nJewell Ridge\nfor another reason. As Jackson later alleged, while Justice Murphy was preparing his opinion, Black urged that the Court hand down its decision without waiting for the opinion and dissent. In Jackson's eyes, the \"...only apparent reason behind this proposal was to announce the decision in time to influence the contract negotiations during the coal strike\" between the coal company and the miners, which were taking place at the time.\nJackson probably regarded Black's conduct as unbecoming of a Supreme Court Justice in another related matter. On April 3, 1945, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare held a dinner, at which it honored Justice Black as the 1945 recipient of the Thomas Jefferson Award.\nFred M. Vinson\nspoke at the dinner. While Jackson declined an invitation to the event, citing a conflict arising out of the fact that a number of leading sponsors of the dinner were then litigants before the Supreme Court, Black attended the dinner and received his award. Crampton Harris, counsel in two pending cases,\nJewell Ridge\nand\nCIO v. McAdory\n(1945), was one of the sponsors.\nJackson later took these grievances public in two cables from Nuremberg. Jackson had informally been promised the Chief Justiceship by Roosevelt; however, the seat came open while Jackson was in Germany, and Roosevelt was dead. President\nHarry S. Truman\nwas faced with two factions, one recommending Jackson for the seat, and the other advocating for\nHugo Black\n. In an attempt to avoid controversy, Truman appointed Vinson. Jackson blamed machinations by Black for his being passed over for the seat, and publicly exposed some of Black's controversial behavior and feuding within the Court. The controversy was heavily covered in the press, casting the\nNew Deal\nCourt in a negative light, and had the effect of tarnishing Jackson's reputation in the years that followed.\nOn June 8, 1946, Jackson sent a cable to President Truman. Jackson's cable to Truman began with an insincere offer of congratulations to the President for his appointment of Vinson. However, the cable then quickly addressed the rumor, which Jackson had gotten wind of in Nuremberg, according to which Truman had appointed Fred Vinson, in part, to avert a resignation on the part of Justice Black. Rumors had been circulating in Washington that Black would resign in the event that Truman chose Jackson as\nChief Justice\nStone's successor. \"I would be loath to believe that you would concede to any man a veto over court appointments.\"\nJackson closed his cable by stating that he could not continue his service as an Associate Justice under Vinson if an associate \"had something on [him]\", which would disqualify him from serving, or if he, Truman, regarded Jackson's opinion in the\nJewell Ridge\ncase as a \"gratuitous insult\" to Justice Black.\nAfter receiving a response from Truman in which he denied having given consideration to, or having even heard of, the rumor of Black's threatened resignation, Jackson rashly fired off a second cable to\nCongress\n, on June 10. This cable stated Jackson's reasons for his belief that Justice Black faced a conflict of interest in\nJewell Ridge\n, from which he wrongfully, at least, in Jackson's eyes, did not\nrecuse himself\n, and ended with Jackson's threat that if such a practice \"is ever repeated while I am on the bench, I will make my\nJewell Ridge\nopinion look like a letter of recommendation by comparison.\"\nDennis v. United States\nMain article:\nDennis v. United States\n\"Clear and present danger\" test\nMain article:\nClear and present danger\nIn 1919, the Supreme Court decided\nSchenck v. United States\n.\nIn Schenck, the petitioners, members of the\nSocialist Party\n, were convicted of violating the\nEspionage Act of 1917\nfor printing and distributing\ncirculars\nasserting that American citizens had a right to oppose the draft during\nWorld War I\nbecause, among other things, it violated the United States Constitution.\nThe\nSchenck\ndecision promulgated the \"clear and present danger test,\" which provided the standard for sustaining a conviction when speech is relied upon as evidence that an offense has been committed.\nJustice\nHolmes\n, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the decision of the lower court positing:\nWe admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done ... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances, and are of such a nature as to create a \"clear and present danger\" that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.\nBackground\nIn 1951, the Supreme Court decided\nDennis v. United States\n.\nIn Dennis, the petitioners were zealous\nCommunists\nwho organized for the purpose of teaching the \"Marxist-Leninist Doctrine.\"\nThe principal texts used to teach the doctrine were:\nHistory of the Communist Party of the\nSoviet Union\n;\nFoundations of Leninism\nby\nStalin\n;\nThe Communist Manifesto\nby\nMarx\nand\nEngels\n; and\nState and Revolution\nby\nLenin\n.\nThe Petitioners were convicted for violating clause 2 and clause 3 of the Smith Act which, among other things, made it unlawful to conspire to organize a group which advocates the overthrow of the United States government by force or violence.\nThe issue before the Supreme Court was \"[w]hether either §2 or §3 of the\nSmith Act\n, inherently, or as construed and applied in the instant case, violates the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights ...\"\nJackson's concurrence\nIn\nDennis\n, Jackson concluded that the \"clear and present danger test\" should not be applied.\nTo this end, Jackson analyzed: the effect Communism had outside the United States; the nature of Communists; and the problems with applying the test. Jackson's analysis can be summarized as follows:\nOn the effect that Communists historically had on foreign countries, Jackson analyzed their effect on\nCzechoslovakia\n.\nIn Czechoslovakia, a Communist organization disguised as a competing political faction secretly established its roots in key control positions \"of police and information services.\"\nDuring a period of national crisis, a clandestine Communist organization appeared and overthrew the Czechoslovakian government. Establishing control of mass communication and industry, the Communist organization's rule was one of \"oppression and terror.\" Ironically, as Jackson points out, the Communist organization suppressed the very freedoms which made its conspiracy possible.\nOn the nature of Communists, Jackson characterized them as an extraordinarily dedicated and highly selective group, disciplined and indoctrinated by Communist policy.\nThe goal of Party members is to secretly infiltrate key positions of government, industry, and unions and to leverage their power once in such positions.\nJackson goes on to say that, although \"Communist[s] have no scruples against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob disorder,\" they \"advocate force only when prudent,\" which \"may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception may be enough.\"\nOn the problems with applying the clear and present danger test in\nDennis\n, Jackson deemed significant that the test was authored \"before the era of World War II revealed the subtlety and efficacy of modernized revolutionary technique used by totalitarian parties.\"\nJackson believed that the application of the test should be limited to cases bearing strong enough likeness to those for which it was originally crafted – i.e., \"...criminality of hot-headed speech on a street corner, or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of Jehovah Witness school children to salute our flag.\"\nExpressing strong concern that the expansive construction the Court had recently given the test in\nBridges v. California,\nJackson asserted that the test provided Communists with \"unprecedented immunities,\" while the \"Government is captive in a judge-made verbal trap.\"\nJackson goes on to describe the application of the test to Communists, when determining the constitutionality of the Smith Act facially, or as applied as one of \"...apprais[ing] imponderables, including international and national phenomena, which baffle the best informed foreign offices and our most experienced politicians.\"\nJackson concludes his First Amendment analysis in\nDennis\nby asserting that:\nThe authors of the \"clear and present danger test\" never applied it to a case like this, nor would I. If applied as it is proposed here, it means that the Communist plotting is protected during its period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organization and preparation are immune from the law; the Government can move only after imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late.\nConclusion\nIn the end, the Court applied its own version of the \"clear and present danger test\" in\nDennis\n,\nessentially disregarding the analytical elements of probability and temporality which had previously appeared to be requirements of the doctrine.\nJackson, however, as one commentator put it, expressed in\nDennis\n(at least with regards to Communists) that, \"when used as part of a conspiracy to act illegally, speech loses its First Amendment protection.\"\nKorematsu v. United States\nMain article:\nKorematsu v. United States\nBackground\nFollowing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, there was great suspicion surrounding Japanese-Americans, particularly those residing on the West Coast of the United States. Roosevelt issued\nExecutive Order 9066\non February 19, 1942, giving the\nWar Department\npermission to declare some zones \"military zones\" in which they could prohibit certain people from accessing prescribed areas. With this executive order, the War Department was able to declare that all United States citizens of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from areas in California that were deemed unsafe for Japanese-American habitation for national security purposes, and it forced them into internment camps.\nFred Korematsu\n, born to Japanese parents on American soil, believed that this was an unconstitutional infringement on an individual's civil liberty. The question that came before the Supreme Court was whether the Executive and Legislative branches went beyond their war powers by depriving citizens of rights with no criminal basis.\nJackson's dissent\nThe Supreme Court decided that the President and Congress did not stretch their war powers too far by choosing national security over an individual's rights in a time of war. Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion for this case, and Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion. The opening paragraph of Jackson's dissent illustrated his view of the case:\nKorematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes him a citizen of the United States by nativity, and a citizen of California by residence. No claim is made that he is not loyal to this country. There is no suggestion that apart from the matter involved here, he is not law-abiding and well- disposed. Korematsu, however, has been convicted of an act not commonly a crime. It consists merely of being present in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived.\nJackson warned of the danger that this great allowance of executive power presented, through the War Department's ability to deprive individuals of their rights in favor of national security in time of war:\nBut if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. That is what the Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not. I cannot say, from any evidence \tbefore me, that the orders of General DeWitt were not reasonably expedient military precautions, nor could I say that they were. But even if they were permissible military \tprocedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional. If, as the Court holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order will be constitutional, and have done with it.\nJackson was not concerned in evaluating the validity of DeWitt's claim that the internment of Japanese citizens on the West Coast was necessary for national security purposes, but whether this would set a precedent of war-time racial discrimination that would be used to strip individual liberties.\nBut once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principles of racial discrimination in criminal procedure, and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking, and expands it to new purposes.\nRobert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, in 1953: second from the left, in the back row. Also pictured are, from the left, in the bottom row: Felix Frankfurter; Hugo Black; Earl Warren (Chief Justice); Stanley Reed; William O. Douglas. In the back row, from left: Tom Clark; Robert H. Jackson; Harold Burton; Sherman Minton\nBrown v. Board of Education\nMain article:\nBrown v. Board of Education\nOne of Jackson's\nlaw clerks\nduring 1952 – 53,\nWilliam H. Rehnquist\n, was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971, and became chief justice in 1986. In December 1971, after Rehnquist's nomination had been approved by the\nSenate Judiciary Committee\nand was pending before the full Senate, a 1952\nmemorandum\ncame to light that he had written as Jackson's law clerk in connection with the landmark case\nBrown v. Board of Education\nthat argued in favor of affirming the separate-but-equal doctrine of\nPlessy v. Ferguson\n. Rehnquist wrote a brief letter attributing the views to Jackson, and was confirmed. In his 1986 hearing, he was questioned about the matter. His explanation of the memorandum was disputed in both 1971 and 1986 by Jackson's former secretary, and scholars have questioned its plausibility. However, the papers of Justices Douglas and Frankfurter indicate that Jackson voted for\nBrown\nin 1954 only after changing his mind.\nThe views of Justice Jackson about\nBrown\ncan be found in his 1954 unpublished draft concurrence.\nThe \"Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson, March 15th, 1954\", is available with Jackson's papers in the\nLibrary of Congress\n, but did not become publicly available until after Rehnquist's 1986 hearing for chief justice. Jackson's draft concurrence in\nBrown\n, divided into four parts, shows how he struggled with how to write an effective opinion to strike down segregation. In Part 1 of Jackson's draft concurrence in\nBrown\n, he wrote that he went to school where \"Negro pupils were very few\" and that he was \"predisposed to the conclusion that segregation elsewhere has outlived whatever justification it may have had.\" Despite his own opinions regarding desegregation, Jackson acknowledged the inability of the Court to \"eradicate\" the \"fears, prides and prejudices\" that made segregation an important social practice in the South. Jackson thus concluded that the Northerners on the Court should be sensitive to the conditions that brought segregation to the South.\nIn Part 2 of the draft\nmemorandum\n, Jackson described the legal framework for forbidding segregation in \"Does Existing Law Condemn Segregation?\". Jackson notes that it was difficult for the Court, which expected \"not to make new law, but only to declare existing law,\" to overturn a decision of such longevity as\nPlessy\n. Looking at the doctrine of\noriginal intent\nwith regard to the\nFourteenth Amendment\n, Jackson found no evidence that segregation was prohibited, particularly since states that had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had segregated schools at the time. Jackson concluded, \"I simply cannot find in the conventional material of constitutional interpretation any justification for saying\" that segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment.\nPart 3 of the draft memorandum, titled \"Enforcement Power Limits\", describes enforcement by Congress of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson addressed the possibility of leaving enforcement to Congress, particularly because the \"courts have no power to enforce general declarations of law.\" Jackson noted that while segregation was already fading in some states, it would be difficult to overcome in those states where segregation was firmly established. While Jackson recognized the difficulties in the Supreme Court enforcing its judgment, he did not want the task to be left to the lower courts, as suggested by the Government. Jackson concluded that the Court must act because \"our representative system has failed\", and even though this \"premise is not a sound basis for judicial action.\"\nFinally, in Part 4 of the draft memorandum, \"Changed Conditions\", Jackson began by stating that prior to\nBrown\n, segregation was legal. According to Jackson, the premise for overruling\nPlessy\nwas the now erroneous \"factual assumption\" that \"there were differences between the Negro and the white races, viewed as a whole.\" The draft asserted that the \"spectacular\" progress of African-Americans, under adverse circumstances, \"enabled [them] to outgrow the system and to overcome the presumptions on which it was based.\" Jackson emphasized that the changed conditions, along with the importance of a public education, required the Court to strike down the concept of \"separate but equal\" in public education. While Jackson could not justify the decision in\nBrown\nin law, he did so on the basis of a political and social imperative. It is unknown if Jackson ever intended to publish this concurrence.\nJackson was in the hospital from March 30 to May 17, 1954. It is reported that Chief Justice Warren visited Jackson in the hospital several times, and discussed both Jackson's draft opinion and Warren's drafts. One suggestion that Warren took from Jackson was adding the following sentence: \"Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world.\"\nThis quote is tied to the arguments in Part 4 of Jackson's draft opinion. On May 17, 1954, Jackson went to the Court from the hospital, so that he could be there the day that the\nBrown\ndecision was handed down. When the\nBrown\ndecision was handed down, a full court was present, to emphasize the unanimity of the decision. Robert H. Jackson died on October 9, 1954, and so there was not enough time between\nBrown\nand the death of Jackson to fully explore his views on desegregation.\nProcedural due process\nJackson was a staunch defender (along with\nFelix Frankfurter\n) of\nprocedural due process\n, for the\nrule of law\nthat protects members of the public from overreaching by government agencies. One of his hymns to due process is often quoted:\nProcedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which compromise substantive law.\n\nIf it be conceded that in some way [the agency could take the action it did], does it matter what the procedure is? Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedure matters not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures, than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which are bound to occur on\nex parte\nconsideration.\nChief U.S. Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany, Robert H. Jackson,1945-46\nInternational Military Tribunal, 1945–1946\nMain article:\nNuremberg trials\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nOpening address for the United States\nRobert H. Jackson, Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–46\nIn 1945, President\nHarry S. Truman\nappointed Jackson (who took a leave of absence from the Supreme Court), as U.S. Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. He helped draft the\nLondon Charter of the International Military Tribunal\n, which created the legal basis for the Nuremberg Trials. He then served in\nNuremberg, Germany\n, as United States Chief Prosecutor at the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n.\nJackson pursued his prosecutorial role with a great deal of vigor. His opening and closing arguments before the Nuremberg court were widely celebrated.\nIn the words of defendant\nAlbert Speer\n, the Nazi\nMinister of Armaments and War Production\n,\nThe trial began with the grand, devastating opening address by the Chief American Prosecutor, Justice Robert H. Jackson. But I took comfort from one sentence in it which he accused the defendants of guilt for the regime's crimes, but not the German people.\nHowever, some believe that his cross-examination skills were generally weak, and it was British prosecutor\nDavid Maxwell Fyfe\nwho got the better of\nHermann Göring\nin cross-examination, rather than Jackson, who was rebuked by the Tribunal for losing his temper and being repeatedly baited by Göring during the proceedings.\nDeath and legacy\nOn March 30, 1954, Jackson suffered a massive\nheart attack\n. He was confined to the hospital until May 17 when he returned to the Court for the announcement of the\nBrown\ndecision. He remained functioning in his position as Justice until October 4, 1954. On Saturday, October 9, 1954, Jackson had another heart attack. At 11:45\na.m. he died at age 62.\nFuneral services were held in Washington's National Cathedral\nand later in Jamestown's St. Luke's Church. All eight of the other Supreme Court Justices traveled together to Jamestown, New York, to attend his funeral service; the last time, for security purposes, that the Supreme Court all traveled together. Other prominent guests included\nThomas E. Dewey\n.\nHe was interred near his boyhood home in\nFrewsburg, New York\n. His headstone reads \"He kept the ancient landmarks and built the new.\"\nJackson was the last justice to die while in active service to the Court until the passing of his former law clerk, William Rehnquist, on September 3, 2005, and the last Associate Justice to die while in active service until\nAntonin Scalia\n, who occupied the seat Jackson once held, on February 13, 2016.\nThe Robert H. Jackson Center\nin Jackson's hometown of Jamestown, New York, offers guided tours to visitors who can see exhibits on Jackson's life, collections of his writings, and photos from the International Military Tribunal.\nAn extensive collection of Jackson's personal and judicial papers is archived at the Manuscript Division of the\nLibrary of Congress\nand is open for research. Smaller collections are available at several other repositories.\nThere are statues dedicated to Jackson outside the Robert H. Jackson Center in Jamestown, New York, as well as the Robert H. Jackson field at the Chautauqua County-Jamestown Airport. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York main courthouse, which is located in Buffalo and opened in November 2011, is dedicated to Jackson and is named the\nRobert H. Jackson United States Courthouse\n.\nHonors and awards\nAwarded the Medal for Merit by President Harry Truman on February 7, 1947.\nPortrayal in popular culture\nJackson has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television, and theater productions:\nAndrzej Łapicki\n, in the 1970 Polish TV production\nEpilog norymberski\n, by\nJerzy Antczak\nHenderson Forsythe\n, in the 1991 telefilm\nSeparate but Equal\nAlec Baldwin\n, in the 2000 Canadian/U.S. TV production\nNuremberg\nEdmund Dehn, in the 2005 German TV miniseries\nSpeer und Er\nColin Stinton\n, in the 2006 British television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\nMichael Shannon\n, in the 2025 U.S. film\nNuremberg\nSee also\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nAuthor: Robert Houghwout Jackson\nList of justices of the Supreme Court of the United States\nList of United States Supreme Court cases by the Stone Court\nList of United States Supreme Court cases by the Vinson Court\nList of United States Supreme Court cases by the Warren Court\nSeparation of powers under the United States Constitution\nReferences\n1\n2\n\"Solicitor General: Robert H. Jackson\"\n.\nDepartment of Justice\n. October 31, 2014\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 23,\n2022\n.\n↑\nWatts v. Indiana\nArchived\nJanuary 2, 2015, at the\nWayback Machine\n, 338 U.S. 49, 59.\n↑\nBrown v. Allen\n,\n344\nU.S.\n443\n, 540\n(1953).\n↑\nGibson, Tobias.\n\"Robert Jackson\"\n.\nThe First Amendment Encyclopedia\n. University of Minnesota\n. Retrieved\nAugust 18,\n2022\n.\n↑\nGarner, Bryan A. (2018).\nNino and me\n: my unusual friendship with Justice Antonin Scalia\n. New York, NY. p.\n101.\nISBN\n978-1-5011-8149-8\n.\nOCLC\n992743005\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: location missing publisher (\nlink\n)\n↑\nDowns, John Phillips (1921).\nHistory of Chautauqua County New York and its People\n. Vol.\nIII. Boston, MA: American Historical Society. p.\n357.\nISBN\n9785872000877\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 19, 2020\n. Retrieved\nMarch 9,\n2017\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\n↑\n\"Author biographies\"\n.\nPennsylvania Center For the Book\n. Archived from\nthe original\non January 4, 2018\n. Retrieved\nMarch 2,\n2017\n.\n↑\nHalpern, Philip. \"Robert H. Jackson, 1892-1954\".\nStanford Law Review\n.\nJSTOR\n1226289\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nHistory of Chautauqua County New York and its People\n.\n↑\nShimsky, MaryJane (2007).\n\"Hesitating Between Two Worlds\": The Civil Rights Odyssey of Robert H. Jackson\n. Vol.\nI. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest LLC. p.\n63.\nISBN\n9780549262305\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 9,\n2017\n.\n1\n2\n\"Hesitating Between Two Worlds\"\n.\n↑\n\"Society Notes: Jackson-Gerhardt\"\n.\nKingston Daily Freeman\n. Kingston, NY. April 24, 1916. p.\n3.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nRaful, Lawrence (2006).\nThe Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law Since 1945\n. Munich, Germany: K. G. Saur Verlag. p.\n129.\nISBN\n978-3-598-11756-5\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nThe Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law Since 1945\n.\n↑\nHockett, Jeffrey D. (1996).\nNew Deal Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson\n. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. pp.\n224, 226.\nISBN\n978-0-8476-8211-9\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nMalcolm, James (1918).\nThe New York Red Book\n. Albany, NY: J. B. Lyon Company. p.\n47.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nThomas E., Baker; Stack, John F. (2006).\nAt War with Civil Rights and Civil Liberties\n. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. p.\n75.\nISBN\n978-0-7425-3598-5\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nNew York, State Government of (1939).\nManual for the use of the Legislature of the State of New York\n. Albany, New York: J. B. Lyon Company Printers. p.\n661\n. Retrieved\nApril 14,\n2022\n.\n↑\nNew York, State Government of (1931).\nManual for the use of the Legislature of the State of New York\n. Albany, New York: J. B. Lyon Company Printers. p.\n463\n. Retrieved\nApril 14,\n2022\n.\n↑\nNew Deal Justice\n.\n↑\n\"Democratic Lawyers Organization Formed\"\n.\nPoughkeepsie Eagle-News\n. Poughkeepsie, NY. October 25, 1932. p.\n2.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nJackson, Robert H. (2003).\nThat Man: An Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt\n. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p.\n8\n.\nISBN\n978-0-19-516826-6\n.\n↑\nThat Man: An Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt\n.\n↑\n\"Biography, Robert H. Jackson, 1941-1954\"\n.\nTimeline of the Justices\n. Washington, DC: Supreme Court Historical Society.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nShultz, David (2005).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court\n. New York, NY: Facts on File, Inc. p.\n232.\nISBN\n978-0-8160-5086-4\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 10,\n2017\n.\n↑\nShlaes, Amity\n(2007).\nThe Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression\n(1st\ned.). New York:\nHarperCollins\n. pp.\n344\n–349.\nISBN\n978-0-06-621170-1\n.\n↑\nShlaes, Amity\n(2007).\nThe Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression\n(1st\ned.). New York:\nHarperCollins\n. pp.\n189\n–191.\nISBN\n978-0-06-621170-1\n.\n↑\nSchlesinger, Arthur Meier\n(2003) .\nThe Coming of the New Deal, 1933–1935\n. Age of Roosevelt (1st Mariner Books\ned.). Boston:\nHoughton Mifflin\n. p.\n569.\nISBN\n0-618-34086-6\n.\nOCLC\n51978038\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on November 8, 2021\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 20,\n2008\n.\n↑\nShlaes, Amity\n(October 2, 2006).\n\"The Greenspan Of His Day, a book review of Mellon: An American Life (by David Cannadine)\"\n.\nNew York Sun\n. New York City.\nArchived\nfrom the original on May 6, 2008\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 20,\n2008\n.\nMellon's opponents never did win convictions.\n↑\n\"Self-Defense\"\n.\nTIME\n. April 15, 1935. Archived from\nthe original\non May 6, 2008\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 20,\n2008\n.\n↑\n\"Round for Mellon\"\n.\nTIME\n. May 24, 1937. Archived from\nthe original\non May 6, 2008\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 20,\n2008\n.\n↑\nBlack, Ryan C.; Owens, Ryan J. (2012).\nThe Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court\n. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. p.\n18.\nISBN\n978-1-107-01529-6\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 11,\n2017\n.\n↑\n\"Of the World: The Court Loses a Justice\"\n.\nLIFE\n. New York, NY: Time, Inc. October 18, 1954. p.\n51.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 11,\n2017\n.\n↑\nCushman, Clare (2013).\nThe Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies\n. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press. p.\n370.\nISBN\n978-1-60871-832-0\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on March 12, 2017\n. Retrieved\nMarch 11,\n2017\n.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nThat Man: An Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt\n, pp.\nxv–xvi.\n↑\nU.S. House Subcommittee no. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, To Authorize Wire Tapping. Hearings on H.R. 2266, H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, 1, 257\n↑\nChilds, Marquis W. (March 18, 1941). \"House Committee Approval Likely on Wire-Tapping\".\nSt. Louis Post-Dispatch\n. p.\n3.\nSection A.\n↑\n\"Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present)\"\n. Washington, D.C.: United States Senate\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 19,\n2022\n.\n↑\nMcMillion, Barry J. (January 28, 2022).\nSupreme Court Nominations, 1789 to 2020: Actions by the Senate, the Judiciary Committee, and the President\n(PDF)\n(Report). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 19,\n2022\n.\n↑\n\"Justices 1789 to Present\"\n. Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court of the United States\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 19,\n2022\n.\n↑\nHutchinson, Dennis J. (1989).\n\"The Black-Jackson Feud\"\n.\nThe Supreme Court Review\n.\n1988\n:\n203–\n243.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/scr.1988.3109625\n.\nISSN\n0081-9557\n.\n↑\nId. at 230.\n↑\nId. at 208.\n↑\nId. at 236–37\n↑\nId. at 220.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nDennis v. United States\n↑\nId. at 221.\n↑\nSchenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).\n↑\nSchenck at 49–51.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\n, 341 U.S. 494, 505–507. see also,\nBrandenburg v. Ohio\n, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).\n↑\n249 U.S. 47, 52.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\np. 582 (Douglas, J. Dissenting)\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 495; see also, 54 Stat. 671.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 495–496.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\np. 570.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 565–566.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 564.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 564–565.\n1\n2\nDennis v. United States\nat 568.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 568 n.12 (1951) (distinguishing\nWhitney v. California\n274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) from\nBridges v. California\n, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)).\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 570.\n↑\nDennis v. United States\nat 510–511.\n↑\nErwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 961, 962 (Aspen 2ed. 2002)\n↑\nMartin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of The McCarthy Era, 73 UCINLR 9, 51 (2004).\n↑\nWilliam C. Banks; Rodney Smolla (May 6, 2010).\nConstitutional Law: Structure and Rights in Our Federal System\n. LexisNexis. pp.\n462–\n465.\nISBN\n978-0-327-17509-4\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 19, 2020\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\nRandy E. Barnett; Howard E. Katz (December 9, 2014).\nConstitutional Law: Cases in Context\n. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. pp.\n705–\n707.\nISBN\n978-1-4548-2920-1\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 18, 2020\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\nEncyclopedia of Supreme Court Quotations\n. M.E. Sharpe. 2000. pp.\n227–\n231.\nISBN\n978-0-7656-1825-2\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 18, 2020\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\nWilliam O. Douglas\nwrote: \"In the original conference there were only four who voted that segregation in the public schools was unconstitutional. Those four were Black, Burton, Minton, and myself.\" See Bernard Schwartz,\nDecision: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases\nArchived\nJanuary 24, 2016, at the\nWayback Machine\n, page 96 (Oxford 1996). Likewise, Justice\nFelix Frankfurter\nwrote: \"I have no doubt that if the segregation cases had reached decision last term, there would have been four dissenters – Vinson, Reed, Jackson, and Clark.\"  Id.\n1\n2\nSchwartz, Bernard (1988). \"Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and the \"Brown\" Case\".\nSupreme Court Review\n.\n1988\n(1988):\n245–\n267.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/scr.1988.3109626\n.\nJSTOR\n3109626\n.\nS2CID\n147205671\n.\n↑\nTushnet, Mark; Lezin, Katya (1991). \"What really happened in Brown v. Board of Education\".\nColumbia Law Review\n.\n91\n(8). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 8:\n1867–\n1930.\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/1123035\n.\nJSTOR\n1123035\n.\n↑\nJackson, Robert (March 15, 1954). \"Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson\". Brown file, Robert H Jackson Papers. Library of Congress.\n{{\ncite journal\n}}\n:\nCite journal requires\n|\njournal=\n(\nhelp\n)\n↑\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei\n, 345 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)\n↑\nThe Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson:\nhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=law_globalstudies\nArchived\nAugust 6, 2020, at the\nWayback Machine\n↑\nMenand, Louis (September 18, 2017). \"Drop Your Weapons\".\nThe New Yorker\n.\nNew York\n:\nCondé Nast\n.\nThe chief U.S. prosecutor, Robert Jackson, characterized German aggression in his celebrated opening statement ...\n↑\nSpeer, Albert,\nInside the Third Reich\n, page 513, Macmillan, New York 1970 (1982 reprint by Bonanza)\nISBN\n0-517-38579-1\n↑\nAnn Tusa and John Tusa,\nThe Nuremberg Trial\n(London, Macmillan, 1983), pp 269–293.\n↑\nFeldman, Noah (October 2010).\nScorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Greatest Supreme Court Justices\n. New York, NY:\nHachette Book Group\n. pp.\n403–\n405.\n↑\n\"1,000 AT RITES FOR JACKSON IN WASHINGTON (October 13, 1954)\"\n.\nChicago Tribune\n. Archived from\nthe original\non March 1, 2018\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\nBarrett, John Q. (2016).\n\"President Eisenhower and Justice Jackson's Funeral (1954)\"\n(PDF)\n.\nThe Jackson List\n.\n↑\nLeslie Alan Horvitz; Christopher Catherwood (May 14, 2014).\nEncyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide\n. Infobase Publishing. pp.\n250–\n251.\nISBN\n978-1-4381-1029-5\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 18, 2020\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\n\"About\"\n.\nRobert H Jackson Center\n. March 28, 2015.\nArchived\nfrom the original on June 25, 2017\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2017\n.\n↑\nGSA,\nRobert H. Jackson United States Courthouse, Buffalo, NY\nArchived\nJune 26, 2013, at\narchive.today\n; Barry A. Muskat,\nGreat Buildings: Inside the federal courthouse\nArchived\nMay 11, 2015, at the\nWayback Machine\n,\nBuffalo Spree\n(Feb. 2012).\nBibliography\nAbraham, Henry J.,\nJustices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court. 3d ed.\nNew York, NY:\nOxford University Press\n, 1992.\nISBN\n0-19-506557-3\n.\nCushman, Clare,\nThe Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789–1995\n(2nd ed.) (\nSupreme Court Historical Society\n).\nCongressional Quarterly\nBooks, 2001\nISBN\n1-56802-126-7\n;\nISBN\n978-1-56802-126-3\n.\nDepartment of State.\nReport of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative, to the International Conference on Military Trials\n. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.\nFrank, John P.,\nThe Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions\n(Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds.). New York, NY:\nChelsea House\nPublishers, 1995\nISBN\n0-7910-1377-4\n,\nISBN\n978-0-7910-1377-9\n.\nGerhart, Eugene.\nRobert H. Jackson: Country Lawyer, Supreme Court Justice, America's Advocate\n. Getzville, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 2003.\nISBN\n1575887738\n,\nISBN\n978-1575887739\n.\nHarris, Whitney.\nTyranny on Trial: The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the End of World War II, at Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-46\n. College Station, TX:\nTexas A & M University Press\n, 1999\nISBN\n0870744364\n,\nISBN\n978-0870744365\n.\nHockett, Jeffrey D..\nNew Deal Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson\n. Lanham, MD:\nRowman & Littlefield\nPublishers, 1996\nISBN\n0-8476-8210-2\nISBN\n9780847682102\n.\nJackson, Robert H.\nThe Case Against the Nazi War Criminals\n. New York, NY:\nAlfred A. Knopf\n, 1946.\nJackson, Robert H.\nFBI Law Enforcement Bulletin\n, Volume 9, No. 3, March 1940. Federal Bureau of Investigation.\nJackson, Robert H.\nGeneral Welfare and Industrial Prosperity: Address prepared by Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General of the United States, for Delivery at the Convention in Rockford, Illinois, on September 14th, 1938\n. The Department of Justice, 1938.\nJackson, Robert.\nThe Meaning of Liberalism: An Address by Robert H. Jackson to the Liberal Voters' League of Montgomery Co., MD, Rockville, MD, November 22nd, 1938\n. 1938.\nJackson, Robert H.\nThe Nürnberg Case, as Presented by Robert H. Jackson\n. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.\nJackson, Robert H.\nThe Reminiscences of Robert H. Jackson\n. Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court of United States, 1955.\nJackson, Robert H.\nStruggle for Judicial Supremacy\n. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941.\nJackson, Robert H. (1955).\nThe Supreme Court in the American System of Government\n. Cambridge, MA:\nHarvard University Press\n–\nvia\nInternet Archive\n.\nJackson, Robert H.\nStatement by Robert H. Jackson to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate\n. The Department of Justice, 1937.\nJackson, Robert H.\nThat Man: An Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt\n. John Q. Barrett, ed.. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.\nISBN\n0195168267\n.\nJackson, Robert H.\nTrial of German War Criminals: Opening Address by Robert H. Jackson\n. Literacy Licensing, LLC, 2003.\nISBN\n1258767759\n.\nJarrow, Gail.\nNew Deal Lawyer, Supreme Court Justice, Nuremberg Prosecutor\n. Honesdale, PA: Calkins Creek, 2008.\nISBN\n1590785118\n.\nMassa, Stephen J.\nJustice Jackson and the Perpetrators: Robert H. Jackson, the Third Reich, WWII, Nuremberg, the Defendants\n. Eagles Publishing, 2012.\nISBN\n0986012629\nMartin, Fenton S. and Goehlert, Robert U.,\nThe U.S. Supreme Court: A Bibliography\n. Congressional Quarterly Books, 1990.\nISBN\n0-87187-554-3\n.\nNielsen, James.\nRobert H. Jackson: The Middle Ground\n. 6 La. L. Rev. / The\nUniversity of Louisiana\n, 1945.\nO'Brien, David M.\nJustice Robert H. Jackson's Unpublished Opinion in Brown v. Board: Conflict, Compromise, and Constitutional Interpretation\n. Lawrence, KS:\nUniversity Press of Kansas\n, 2017.\nISBN\n0700625186\n.\nShubert, Glendon.\nDispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the Judicial Opinions of Robert H. Jackson\n. Indianapolis, IN:\nBobbs-Merrill Company\n, 1969.\nISBN\n1299346685\n.\nTusa, Ann and Tusa, John,\nThe Nuremberg Trial\n. London: Macmillan, 1983.\nISBN\n0-333-27463-6\n.\nUnited States of America.\nNomination of Robert H. Jackson to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Hearings, Seventy-Seventh Congress, First\nSession.\n1941.\nUrofsky, Melvin I.,\nThe Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary\n. New York:\nGarland Publishing\n, 1994. 590 pp.\nISBN\n0-8153-1176-1\n;\nISBN\n978-0-8153-1176-8\n.\nWhite, G. Edward\n.\nRobert H. Jackson: A Life in Judgment\n. Oxford University Press, 2025.\nISBN\n978-0197778432\nOlivier Beauvallet and Yves Ternon,\nRobert H. Jackson\n: Faire campagne pour la justice.\nMichalon,\n2025.\nISBN\n978-2-347-00398-2\nExternal links\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nRobert H. Jackson\n.\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nRobert H. Jackson\n.\nThe Robert H. Jackson Center's website\nThe International Humanitarian Law Dialogs\nThe Jackson List: Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court, Nuremberg, and related topics\nThe Nuremberg Timeline (Timeline of the International Military Tribunal)\nJackson's Nuremberg Report\nDiscussion of the concept of supreme crime\nintroduced by Justice Jackson, as Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials, with applications to today\nNuremberg opening statement\nArchived\nOctober 10, 2013, at the\nWayback Machine\nNuremberg closing statement\nArchived\nOctober 10, 2013, at the\nWayback Machine\nRobert H. Jackson\nat\nIMDb\nJustice Robert H. Jackson (Character)\non\nIMDb\nWorks by or about Robert H. Jackson\nat the\nInternet Archive\nRobert H. Jackson\nat\nFind a Grave",
+    "infobox": {
+      "nominated_by": "Franklin D. Roosevelt",
+      "preceded_by": "E. Barrett Prettyman",
+      "succeeded_by": "Morrison Shafroth",
+      "president": "Franklin D. Roosevelt",
+      "born": "Robert Houghwout Jackson(1892-02-13)February 13, 1892Spring Creek,Pennsylvania, U.S.",
+      "died": "October 9, 1954(1954-10-09)(aged62)Washington, D.C., U.S.",
+      "resting_place": "Maple Grove Cemetery Frewsburg, New York",
+      "party": "Democratic",
+      "spouse": "Irene Alice Gerhardt​​(m.1916)​",
+      "children": "2",
+      "education": "Albany Law School",
+      "awards": "Medal for Merit"
+    },
+    "char_count": 52823
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Telford_Taylor",
+    "name": "Telford Taylor",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Telford Taylor was an American lawyer and professor. Taylor was known for his role as lead counsel in the prosecution of war criminals after World War II, his opposition to McCarthyism in the 1950s, and his outspoken criticism of American actions during the Vietnam War.",
+    "description": "American lawyer (1908–1998)",
+    "full_text": "Telford Taylor\nAmerican lawyer (1908–1998)\nTelford Taylor\n(February 24, 1908 – May 23, 1998) was an American lawyer and professor. Taylor was known for his role as lead counsel in the prosecution of war criminals after\nWorld War II\n, his opposition to\nMcCarthyism\nin the 1950s, and his outspoken criticism of American actions during the\nVietnam War\n.\nWith the\nUS Army\n, Taylor served with the\nMilitary Intelligence Corps\nduring WWII. He reached the rank of\nbrigadier general\nin 1946, following the war. During the prosecution of\nAxis\nwar criminals, he served as lead counsel for the prosecution in the 12\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\nbefore US military courts, after serving as assistant to\nRobert H. Jackson\nin the initial trial before the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n.\nFollowing the Nuremberg trials, Taylor opened a private law practice, but remained politically active.\nBackground\nTaylor was born on February 24, 1908, in\nSchenectady, New York\n. His parents were John Bellamy Taylor (a relative of\nEdward Bellamy\n) and Marcia Estabrook Jones. He attended\nWilliams College\nand\nHarvard Law School\n, where he received his law degree in 1932.\nCareer\nEarly career\nDuring the 1930s, Taylor worked for several government agencies. By 1935, he provided legal counsel (assisted by\nMax Lowenthal\namong others) to a subcommittee of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee chaired by\nBurton K. Wheeler\nand whose members included the newly elected\nHarry S. Truman\n.\nIn 1940, he became\ngeneral counsel\nfor the\nFederal Communications Commission\n.\nWorld War II and Nuremberg\nTelford Taylor's opening address at the\nJudges' trial\nFollowing the outbreak of World War II, Taylor joined\nArmy Intelligence\nas a major on October 5, 1942,\nleading the American group at\nBletchley Park\nthat was responsible for analyzing information obtained from intercepted German communications using\nUltra\ndecryption. He was promoted to\nlieutenant colonel\nin 1943 and visited England, where he helped negotiate the\n1943 BRUSA Agreement\n. In 1944, he was promoted to full\ncolonel\nand was assigned to the team of\nRobert H. Jackson\n, which helped work out the\nLondon Charter of the International Military Tribunal\n, the legal basis for the\nNuremberg trials\n.\nAt the Nuremberg trials, Taylor initially served as an assistant to chief counsel\nRobert H. Jackson\nand, in that function, was the U.S. prosecutor in the\nHigh Command case\n. The indictment in that case called for the\nGeneral Staff of the Army\nand the High Command of the German Armed Forces to be considered criminal organizations; the witnesses were several of the surviving German\nfield marshals\n. Both organizations were acquitted.\nWhen Jackson resigned his position as prosecutor after the first (and only) trial before the IMT and returned to the US, Taylor was promoted to\nbrigadier general\nand succeeded him on October 17, 1946, as chief counsel for the remaining twelve trials before the US\nNuremberg Military Tribunals\n. In these trials at Nuremberg, 163 of the 200 defendants who were tried were found guilty in some or all of the charges of the indictments.\nWhile Taylor was not wholly satisfied with the outcomes of the Nuremberg trials, he considered them a success because they set a precedent and defined a legal base for\ncrimes against peace\nand\nhumanity\n. In 1950, the United Nations codified the most important statements from these trials in the seven\nNuremberg principles\n.\nTelford Taylor advised\nWilliam L. Shirer\nin the late 1950s when Shirer was writing\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n, loaning documents and books from his personal collection.\nShirer's monumental history of\nNazi Germany\nbecame a surprise best-seller when it was published by Simon & Schuster in 1960, and has remained in print ever since.\nMcCarthyism and Vietnam\nAfter the Nuremberg trials, Taylor returned to civilian life in the United States, opening a private law practice in New York City. He became increasingly concerned with Senator\nJoseph McCarthy\n's activities, which he criticized strongly. In a speech at\nWest Point\nin 1953, he called McCarthy \"a dangerous adventurer,\" branded his tactics \"a vicious weapon of the extreme right against their political opponents,\" and criticized President\nDwight Eisenhower\nfor not stopping McCarthy's \"shameful abuse of Congressional investigatory power.\" He defended several victims of\nMcCarthyism\n, alleged\ncommunists\nor perjurers, including labor leader\nHarry Bridges\nand\nJunius Scales\n. Although he lost these two cases (Bridges' sentence of five years in prison was later voided by the\nSupreme Court\n, and Scales' six-year sentence was commuted after one year), he remained unfazed by McCarthy's attacks on him, and responded by writing the book,\nGrand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations\n, which was published in 1955.\nIn 1959, he served as a technical advisor and narrator on the television production\nJudgment at Nuremberg\n.\nIn 1961 Taylor attended the\nEichmann trial\nin Israel as a semiofficial observer and expressed concerns about the trial being held on a defective statute,\nciting international justice and ethical issues.\nTaylor became a full professor at\nColumbia University\nin 1962, where he would be named Nash Professor of Law in 1974. In 1966, he was elected a Fellow of the\nAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences\n.\nHe was one of very few professors there who refused to sign a statement issued by the\nColumbia Law School\nthat termed the\nmilitant student protests at Columbia\nin 1968 as being beyond the \"allowable limits\" of\ncivil disobedience\n. Taylor was very critical of the conduct of US troops in the\nVietnam War\n, and in 1971 urged President\nRichard Nixon\nto set up a national commission to investigate the conflict. He strongly criticized the\ncourt-martial\nof Lieutenant\nWilliam Calley\n, the commanding officer of the US troops involved in the\nMy Lai massacre\nbecause it did not include higher-ranking officers.\nTaylor regarded the\n1972 bombing campaign\ntargeting the\nNorth Vietnamese\ncapital,\nHanoi\n, as \"senseless and immoral.\" He offered to describe and explain his views to CBS, but the network declined to air them because they considered them \"too hot to handle.\"\n. In December 1972, he visited Hanoi along with musician and activist\nJoan Baez\nand others, among them was Michael Allen, the associate dean of the\nYale Divinity School\n.\nTaylor published his views in a book,\nNuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy\n, in 1970. He argued that by the standards employed at the Nuremberg trials, U.S. conduct in\nVietnam\nand\nCambodia\n, while different in some ways, was equally criminal as that of the Nazis during World War II. For that reason, he favored prosecuting US aviators who had participated in bombing missions over North Vietnam.\nShortly after the end of the Vietnam War, Taylor said over the past few decades since World War II, some of his historical views had changed. His views on Germany hadn't changed, but they had on the United States.\n\"Most of these things are not done by monsters. They're done by very ordinary people, people very much like you and me. These things are results of pressures and circumstances to which human frailty succumbs. And a large part of it isn't really due to any intrinsic sadism or a desire to inflict pain - it's the degeneration of standards under pressures, boredom, fear, other influences of this kind. Well, I guess that I did think before that Americans, in their history, had been somewhat more immune to these pressures and that the historical record was a better one. The moral standards we tried to attain in peace and war were higher. I guess I still think we try to attain the higher values; but, yes, and succeed sometimes - succeed less often, I guess, than I thought before.\"\n\n\"Since I read\nBury My Heart at Wounded Knee\nand I guess it was born in upon me that these things had happened before. The feeling that I'd had for a long time that these things didn't go on in the American armed forces, alas, it isn't so. They sometimes do.\"\nLater life\nTaylor in retirement\nIn 1976, Taylor, who had already been a visiting professor at\nHarvard\nand\nYale Law School\n, accepted a new post at the\nBenjamin N. Cardozo School of Law\nat\nYeshiva University\n, becoming a founding member of the faculty while continuing to teach at Columbia. His 1979 book,\nMunich: The Price of Peace,\nwon the\nNational Book Critics Circle Award\nfor the \"best work of general nonfiction\". In the 1980s, he extended his legal activities into sports and became a \"\nspecial master\n\" for dispute resolution in the\nNBA\n.\nTaylor retired in 1994.\nPersonal life and death\nTaylor married twice; first to Mary Ellen Walker in 1937. He was survived by their three children, Joan, Ellen, and John.\nWhile serving at Bletchley Park, he had an affair with\nChristine Brooke-Rose\n, who later became a writer and critic but was then a British officer at Bletchley. The affair led to the end of Brooke-Rose's marriage, although Taylor's to Walker endured for some years thereafter.\nIn 1974 he married Toby Golick, having two children who both survived him, Benjamin and Samuel.\nTaylor also had one child, Ursula Rechnagel, with Julie Rechnagel, both of whom also survived him.\nHe died at age 90 on May 23, 1998, at St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital in\nManhattan\n, after suffering a stroke.\nDecorations\nHere is the list of his decorations:\nBibliography\nSword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich\n, Simon & Schuster 1952; reprinted 1980.\nISBN\n0-8446-0934-X\nGrand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations\n, Simon & Schuster 1955; reprinted 1974.\nISBN\n0-306-70620-2\nThe March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940 (Great War Stories)\n, Simon & Schuster 1958; reprinted 1991.\nISBN\n0-933852-94-0\nThe Breaking Wave: The Second World War in the Summer of 1940\n, Simon & Schuster 1967;\nISBN\n0-671-10366-0\nGuilt, Responsibility and the Third Reich\n, Heffer 1970; 20 pages;\nISBN\n0-85270-044-X\nNuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy\n, Times Books 1970;\nISBN\n0-8129-0210-6\n(with\nConstance Baker Motley\n&\nJames Feibleman\n)\nPerspectives on Justice\n, Northwestern University Press 1974;\nISBN\n0-8101-0453-9\nCourts of Terror: Soviet Criminal Justice and Jewish Emigration\n, Knopf 1976;\nISBN\n0-394-40509-9\nMunich: The Price of Peace\n, Hodder & Staughton 1979; reprinted 1989.\nISBN\n0-88184-447-0\nThe Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir\n, Knopf 1992;\nISBN\n0-394-58355-8\nWikiquote has quotations related to\nTelford Taylor\n.\nReferences\nMain sources:\nSeverop, Richard (May 24, 1998).\n\"Telford Taylor, Who Prosecuted Top Nazis At the Nuremberg War Trials, Is Dead at 90\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\nOctober 12,\n2019\n.\nFerencz, B.\n:\nTelford Taylor: Pioneer of International Criminal Law\n,\nColumbia Journal of Transnational Law,\n37\n(3)\n, 1999. URL last accessed 2006-12-12.\nTelford Taylor\nfrom the Cardozo School of Law at the\nYeshiva University\n.\nOther sources:\n↑\nLowenthal, Max\n;\nHess, Jerry N.\n(1967).\n\"Oral History Interview with Max Lowenthal\"\n. Harry S. Truman Library & Museum\n. Retrieved\nAugust 19,\n2017\n.\n↑\n\"Telford Taylor Leaves FCC To Accept Majority in Army\".\nBroadcasting and Broadcast Advertising\n.\n24\n(14). Washington, D.C.: Broadcasting Publications, Inc.: 16 October 5, 1942.\n↑\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n(ICRC)\nReferences\nPrinciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950: Introduction\n↑\nWilliam L. Shirer,\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 1179.\n↑\nTaylor, Telford (1955).\nGrand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations\n. Simon and Schuster.\n↑\n\"Large Questions in the Eichmann Case; One who prosecuted Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg considers the coming trial in Israel and asks if it will contribute to the growth of international law and justice. Questions in the Eichmann Case\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nISSN\n0362-4331\n. Retrieved\nMay 19,\n2024\n.\n↑\n\"Book of Members, 1780–2010: Chapter T\"\n(PDF)\n. American Academy of Arts and Sciences\n. Retrieved\nApril 22,\n2011\n.\n↑\nCarmody, Deirdre (January 2, 1973).\n\"4 Who Visited Hanoi Tell of Destruction\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\n↑\nDorn, Harold (2010).\n\"Death from the Heavens: A History of Strategic Bombing (review)\"\n.\nTechnology and Culture\n.\n51\n(4):\n1035–\n1036.\ndoi\n:\n10.1353/tech.2010.0063\n.\nISSN\n1097-3729\n.\nS2CID\n107043561\n.\n↑\nThe Memory of Justice (1976) - IMDb\n, retrieved\nDecember 18,\n2023\n↑\nRecollections of Brooke-Rose quoted in Smith, Michael. The Secrets of Station X. Biteback Publishing. 2011.\n↑\nSevero, Richard (May 24, 1998).\n\"Telford Taylor, Who Prosecuted Top Nazis At the Nuremberg War Trials, Is Dead at 90\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\nDecember 28,\n2020\n.\n↑\n\"Military Times, Hall of Valor\"\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on November 28, 2014\n. Retrieved\nNovember 13,\n2014\n.\n↑\n\"Recommendation for Award of OBE\"\n. Retrieved\nNovember 13,\n2014\n.\nFurther reading:\nEssays on the laws of war and war crimes tribunals in honor of Telford Taylor\n:\nColumbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 37(3)\nExternal links\nTaylor's presentation of the High Command case\non April 1, 1946, at the\nNuremberg trial\n.\nA short biography\nfrom\nColumbia University\n.\nTelford Taylor\nWhen people kill a people\n,\nNew York Times\n, March 28, 1982. \"...In such an analysis, as far as wartime actions against enemy nationals are concerned, the\nGenocide Convention\nadded virtually nothing to what was already covered ... by the internationally accepted\nlaws of land warfare\n...\".\nGuide to Telford Taylor Papers\nat the Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Columbia University\nWorks by or about Telford Taylor\nat the\nInternet Archive",
+    "infobox": {
+      "born": "(1908-02-24)February 24, 1908Schenectady, New York, U.S.",
+      "died": "May 23, 1998(1998-05-23)(aged90)Manhattan,New York, U.S.",
+      "place_of_burial": "Morningside CemeteryGaylordsville, Connecticut",
+      "allegiance": "United States of America",
+      "branch": "United States Army",
+      "service_years": "1942–1949",
+      "rank": "Brigadier General",
+      "service_number": "0-918566",
+      "conflicts": "World War II",
+      "awards": "Distinguished Service Medal",
+      "otherwork": "Lawyer, college professor"
+    },
+    "char_count": 13707
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Thomas_J._Dodd",
+    "name": "Thomas J. Dodd",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Thomas Joseph Dodd was an American attorney and diplomat who served as a United States Senator and Representative from Connecticut.",
+    "description": "U.S. federal and Nuremberg Trials prosecutor, Congressman, and Senator",
+    "full_text": "Thomas J. Dodd\nU.S. federal and Nuremberg Trials prosecutor, Congressman, and Senator\nThomas Joseph Dodd\n(May 15, 1907 – May 24, 1971) was an American attorney and diplomat who served as a\nUnited States\nSenator\nand\nRepresentative\nfrom\nConnecticut\n.\nDodd came from a political family; his father Thomas Joseph Dodd was a delegate to the\n1936 Democratic National Convention\n. \nDodd worked under\nRobert H. Jackson\nin the\nNuremberg trials\nprosecuting Nazi war criminals following\nWorld War II\n.\nDodd served in the House of Representatives from 1953 to 1957. He lost a Senate election in\n1956\nto incumbent Senator\nPrescott S. Bush\n. Dodd defeated Connecticut's other incumbent Senator\nWilliam Purtell\nin\n1958\n. Dodd was re-elected in\n1964\n. In 1967 he was censured in the Senate's first modern ethics case since\nJoseph McCarthy\n. Dodd lost reelection in\n1970\nto\nLowell Weicker\n.\nDodd was the father of\nChristopher Dodd\n, who served in the Senate from 1981 to 2011, and\nThomas J. Dodd Jr.\n, who was a U.S. Ambassador from 1993 to 2001.\nEarly life\nDodd was born in\nNorwich\n,\nNew London County\n, Connecticut, to Abigail Margaret (née O'Sullivan) and Thomas Joseph Dodd, a building contractor; all four of his grandparents were immigrants from\nIreland\n. His paternal grandparents were farmers in the Housatonic River valley with large commercial tobacco leaf farms located near Kent and New Milford.\nHis father would serve as a delegate to the\n1936 Democratic National Convention\n.\nDodd graduated from\nSaint Anselm College\n's preparatory school, run by Benedictine monks in\nGoffstown, New Hampshire\n, in 1926.\nHe graduated from\nProvidence College\nin 1930 with a degree in philosophy, and from\nYale Law School\nin 1933. In 1934, Dodd married Grace Murphy of\nWesterly, Rhode Island\n.  They had six children.\nHe served as a special agent for the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nin 1933 and 1934, the highlight of his career there being his participation in an unsuccessful attempt to capture\nJohn Dillinger\nat\nLittle Bohemia Lodge\n.\nHe was then Connecticut director of the\nNational Youth Administration\nfrom 1935 to 1938. He was assistant to five successive\nUnited States Attorneys General\n(\nHomer Cummings\n,\nFrank Murphy\n,\nRobert Jackson\n,\nFrancis Biddle\nand\nTom Clark\n) from 1938 to 1945.\nAs a special agent for the Attorney General, Dodd was basically a trial-level federal prosecutor.  He worked primarily on criminal and civil liberties cases, including the prosecution of the\nKu Klux Klan\nin the 1930s.\nIn 1942, he was sent to Hartford to prosecute a major spy ring case in which five men (\nAnastasy Vonsiatsky\n, Wilhelm Kunze, and others) were accused of violating the\nEspionage Act of 1917\nby conspiring to gather and deliver US Army, Navy, and defense information to Germany or Japan. Four of the five pleaded guilty; Dodd tried and won the conviction of the fifth man, Reverend Kurt Emil Bruno Molzahn.\nDodd became vice chairman of the Board of Review and later executive trial counsel for the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality at\nNuremberg\n,\nGermany\n, in 1945 and 1946. He practiced law privately in\nHartford, Connecticut\n, from 1947 to 1953.\nNuremberg trials\nBoth Supreme Court Justice\nRobert H. Jackson\n, chief prosecutor for the U.S., and Dodd insisted upon a fair and legal trial to prosecute the Nazi war criminals. Dodd accepted Jackson's offer to join him in Germany.  Dodd expected the position to last only several months, but he wound up spending 15 months there. Dodd suggested\nHeidelberg\nas the location for the\nInternational Military Tribunal\n, since it had survived the war almost completely unscathed, but Nuremberg was eventually chosen.\nIn October 1945, Jackson named Dodd to his senior Trial Board for the Nuremberg Trials, and later in 1946, named him Executive Trial Counsel, putting him in the number-two position at the trials. In the summer of 1946, Jackson appointed Dodd as the acting Chief of Counsel while he returned to DC. Dodd finally returned to the U.S. in October 1946.\nHe described the delegation as \"an autopsy on history's most horrible catalogue of human crime.\"\nDodd cross-examined defendants\nWilhelm Keitel\n,\nAlfred Rosenberg\n,\nHans Frank\n,\nWalther Funk\n,\nBaldur von Schirach\n,\nFritz Sauckel\nand\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n.  In addition to cross-examining, Dodd drafted indictments against the defendants, showed films of\nconcentration camps\n, provided evidence of\nslave labor\nprograms, and presented evidence of economic preparations by the\nNazis\nfor an aggressive war.\nThrough his evidence, Dodd showed that\nErich Koch\n, the\nReichskommissar\nfor\nUkraine\n, and defendant\nHans Frank\n, the Governor-General of\nPoland\n, were responsible for the plan to deport one million\nPoles\nfor slave labor.\nHe also showed evidence that defendant\nWalther Funk\nturned the\nReichsbank\ninto a depository for gold teeth and other valuables seized from the concentration camp victims. Dodd showed a motion picture of the vaults in Frankfurt where\nAllied\ntroops found cases of these valuables, containing dentures, earrings, silverware and candelabra.\nHe showed many items of evidence, such as a shrunken, stuffed and preserved human head of one of the concentration camp victims that had been used as a paperweight by the commandant of\nBuchenwald\nConcentration Camp.\nFinal pleas were made on August 31, 1946, and the Tribunal announced its judgment on October 1, 1946.\nDodd assisted the Allied prosecuting team in convicting all but three of the defendants.\nAll but one of the defendants had claimed innocence, including\nHermann Göring\n, whom Dodd had charged with ordering\nReinhard Heydrich\nto set the\nHolocaust\nin motion.\nIn addition to prosecuting the individual defendants, Dodd demanded in his summation to the Tribunal that all six of the indicted Nazi organizations be convicted of\ncrimes against humanity\n, on the same grounds of the crimes against humanity ascribed to the individual defendants. These six organizations were the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Reich Cabinet, the\nGestapo\n, the Storm Troopers (\nSA\n), the Armed Forces, and the Elite Guard (\nSS\n). Dodd said that these organizations should not escape liability on the grounds that they were too large, part of a political party, etc.\nDodd was given several awards in recognition of his work at the Nuremberg trials. Jackson awarded him the Medal of Freedom in July 1946 and President\nHarry Truman\nawarded him the Certificate of Merit, which Jackson personally delivered to him in Hartford in the fall of 1946.\nDodd also received the Czechoslovak\nOrder of the White Lion\n.\nIn 1949, the Polish government had intended to award Dodd with a badge of honor called the Officer's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta, but Dodd rejected the medal due to his commitment to human rights and views that the Polish government was imposing a tyranny similar to that imposed by the Nazis, and accepting an honor from the President of Poland would be like accepting one from the Nazis.\nCongress\nDodd was elected as a\nDemocrat\nto the House of Representatives in 1952 and served two terms. He lost a Senate election in\n1956\nto\nPrescott S. Bush\nbut was elected in\n1958\nto Connecticut's other Senate seat and then re-elected in\n1964\n.\nBefore becoming a U.S. senator, Dodd was hired to lobby for\nGuatemala\nin the United States for $50,000 a year by the dictator\nCarlos Castillo Armas\n.\nAccording to the North American Congress on Latin America, Dodd \"had perhaps the coziest relationship with the Castillo Armas government.\"\nAfter a short trip to Guatemala in 1955, Dodd urged the House of Representatives to increase aid to the country in\nCentral America\n. Dodd's amendment passed and Guatemala received $15 million of U.S. aid in 1956.\nDodd was unapologetic when criticized for his lobbying efforts on behalf of the Guatemalan dictatorship. When a Republican organizer challenged Dodd on his lobbying, Dodd stated, \"I am a practicing attorney and I am proud of the fact that the anti-communist government of Guatemala has asked me to handle its legal affairs in the U.S. Of course I will not represent the government of Guatemala or any other private client if I am elected to the Senate.\"\nIn 1961, Dodd visited the\nCongo\nto investigate the civil war caused by the secession of the\nProvince of Katanga\n.\nIn addition to his work in the Congo, Dodd opened what became nearly three years of intermittent hearings. The results of the three committee staff monitoring reports of television content in 1954, 1961, and 1964 showed incidents of violence. Senator Dodd and\nEstes Kefauver\nwere the two men responsible for informing the public of the effects of violence on juveniles.\nIn 1964, Dodd was locked in a somewhat bitter and tough re-election bid against popular former Governor\nJohn Davis Lodge\n, the younger brother of the Ambassador to\nSouth Vietnam\nand former U.S. Senator\nHenry Cabot Lodge Jr.\n, who had just won a series of Republican presidential primaries, starting with New Hampshire earlier that year without campaigning but on the strength of the Lodge family name alone. Worried that this respectful allure might empower John Lodge, Dodd reached out to President\nLyndon B. Johnson\nfor assistance. Johnson had been keeping his choice of\nrunning mate\nsecret and so on the Wednesday of the\nDemocratic National Convention\n, before the evening on which the running mate would be announced, Johnson summoned both Dodd and his colleague, whom Johnson had chosen to be his running mate, Senator\nHubert H. Humphrey\nof Minnesota, to the White House. While Dodd was never seriously considered as a running mate, the ensuing summons by the President added a lot of suspense and free press to Dodd, who successfully used it to raise his name and record before the voters. It also allowed Johnson that much more excitement in naming a running mate, a choice that had come down in the press and public opinion between Humphrey and Minnesota's other senator, the urbane\nEugene McCarthy\n.\nAided in part by Johnson, who enthusiastically endorsed Dodd on a campaign swing through Connecticut later and then Johnson's subsequent landslide over Arizona Senator\nBarry Goldwater\n, who seized the\nRepublican\npresidential nomination from Lodge's brother and a number of other establishment Republicans, Dodd won his own landslide over the younger Lodge by 30%, thereby shuttering the younger Lodge's nascent political career.\nIn the fall of 1965, Dodd tried to get\nMartin Luther King Jr.\narrested for violating the never-successfully used\nLogan Act\nof 1799, claiming that King's public stance against the\nVietnam War\nwas a\nfelony\nper the Logan Act's intent of preventing unauthorized negotiations from undermining the government's position.\nAs chairman of the\nSenate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency\n, Dodd worked to restrict the purchase of\nmail order\nhandguns and later shotguns and rifles. Those efforts culminated in the\nGun Control Act of 1968\n, which Dodd introduced, including certain registration requirements.\nDodd played an instrumental role in the prohibition of\nLSD\nin the United States by presiding over subcommittee hearings purportedly investigating the drug's effects on youth. Notably, the Harvard psychologist and LSD proponent\nTimothy Leary\nwas called to testify. Although Leary urged lawmakers to enact a strictly regulated framework in which LSD would remain legal, Dodd and his colleagues drafted a ban which was later adopted. That event was one episode in the prelude towards an all-out \"\nwar on drugs\n\" in the 1970s.\nSenate censure and loss of office\nIn 1967 Dodd became the first Senator\ncensured\nby the US Senate since\nJoseph McCarthy\nin 1954,\nand was one of only six people censured by the Senate in the 20th century. The censure was a condemnation and finding that he had converted campaign funds to his personal accounts and spent the money.\nBeyond the Senate Ethics Committee's formal disciplinary action, other sources (such as investigative\njournalist Drew Pearson\nand Jack Anderson's\nCongress in Crisis\n) suggest\nDodd's corruption was far broader in scope, and there were accusations of\nalcoholism\n.\nIn response to these accusations, Dodd filed a lawsuit against Pearson claiming that Pearson had illegally interfered with his private property.  Although the district court granted a partial judgment to Dodd, the appellate court ruled in favor of Pearson on the grounds that Dodd's property had not been physically abused.\nIn\n1970\n, the Democrats endorsed for his seat\nJoseph Duffey\n, who won the nomination in the\nprimary\n. Dodd then entered the race as an independent, taking just under a quarter of the vote, in a three-way race which he and Duffey lost to Republican\nLowell Weicker\n. Dodd finished third, with 266,500 votes–far exceeding Weicker's 86,600-vote margin over Duffey.\nDeath and legacy\nMonths after his defeat, Dodd died of a\nheart attack\nat his home in\nOld Lyme, New London County\n, Connecticut. His son\nChristopher Dodd\nwas elected to the Senate from Connecticut as a Democrat in\n1980\n.\nThomas J. Dodd Memorial Stadium\nin\nNorwich\nwas named in his honor.\nIn 1995, the\nThomas J. Dodd Research Center\nwas established at the\nUniversity of Connecticut\n. The Center houses the Human Rights Institute, Archives & Special Collections at the University of Connecticut Library, and the Center for Judaic Studies at the\nUniversity of Connecticut\n.\nPresidents Bill Clinton and Joe Biden have visited the Dodd Center during their terms.\nIn 2003, the\nUniversity of Connecticut\nestablished the\nThomas J. Dodd Prize in International Justice and Human Rights\n.\nThe state of New Hampshire proclaimed April 25, 2008, as Thomas J. Dodd Day; that same day, the\nNew Hampshire Institute of Politics\nat\nSaint Anselm College\nrenamed its Center for International Affairs as the Senator Thomas J. Dodd Center for the Study of International Affairs and Law.\nThe center seeks to promote understanding of the forces that drive politics and the political economy in the global world; to sensitize students to the cultures of other countries, and to spur interest in the needs and problems of other nations and countries.\nIn popular culture\nHe has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theater productions;\nHrothgar Mathews\nin the 2000 Canadian/U.S. television miniseries\nNuremberg\n.\nRupert Vansittart\nin the 2006 British television docudrama\nNuremberg: Nazis on Trial\n.\nProtest singer\nPhil Ochs\nreferences Dodd in his song \"\nDraft Dodger Rag\n\": \"I believe in God and Senator Dodd and keeping old\nCastro\ndown.\"\nSee also\nBiography portal\nList of United States senators expelled or censured\nList of federal political scandals in the United States\nReferences\n↑\nBattle, Robert.\n\"The Ancestors of Chris Dodd\"\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 4,\n2007\n.\n↑\nIndex to Politicians: Dodd\n. The Political Graveyard. Retrieved on 19 October 2011.\n↑\n\"Celebration in honor of Thomas Dodd - News\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non January 30, 2010\n. Retrieved\nJanuary 6,\n2010\n.\n1\n2\n\"Thomas J. Dodd, 1907-1971\"\n.\nThomas J. Dodd Research Center\n.\nUniversity of Connecticut\n. December 23, 2006. Archived from\nthe original\non September 10, 2006\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 4,\n2007\n.\n↑\nDodd, Thomas in\nAmerican National Biography\n, American Council of Learned Societies, 2000.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nBarrett, John Q. (March 2005).\n\"From Justice Jackson to Thomas J. Dodd to Nuremberg\"\n(PDF)\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non October 24, 2007\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 4,\n2007\n.\n↑\n\"Prosecutor Calls Kunze Liar and Nazi at Molzahn Trial\". Associated Press. August 15, 1942. p.\n4.\n↑\nDodd, Chris\n(February 15, 2005).\nProsecuting The Peace Of The World: The Experiences Of Thomas J. Dodd At The International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-46\n(Speech).\nUnited States Supreme Court\n,\nWashington, D.C.\nRetrieved\nSeptember 4,\n2007\n.\n↑\nBoyd, James (1968).\nAbove the Law. The Rise and Fall of Senator Thomas J. Dodd\n. New York: The New American Library. p.\n12.\nOCLC\n233961\n.\n↑\n\"Ukraine Murder Chief Still Hunted by Allies\".\nLos Angeles Times\n. December 12, 1945. p.\n4.\n↑\n\"Funk Claims Aides Handled 'Stained' Gold\".\nThe Washington Post\n. May 8, 1946. p.\n2.\n↑\n\"The Nuremberg Trials\"\n.\nAmerican Experience\n. Season 18. Episode 6. January 30, 2006.\nPBS\n. Archived from\nthe original\non February 15, 2006.\nTranscript\n.\n↑\n\"TimesMachine: Tuesday October 1, 1946 - NYTimes.com\"\n–\nvia TimesMachine.\n↑\nMcLaughlin, Kathleen (September 1, 1946). \"20 of 21 Nazis Claim Innocence As Nuremberg Trial Is Concluded\".\nThe New York Times\n. p.\n1.\n↑\n\"Convictions Asked for 6 Nazi Groups\".\nThe New York Times\n. August 30, 1946. p.\n5.\n↑\n\"Rejects Polish Badge of Honor as a Dishonor\".\nChicago Daily Tribune\n. April 26, 1949. p.\n8.\n↑\n\"Nazi Trial Prosecutor Rejects Polish Medal\".\nThe Washington Post\n. April 26, 1949. p.\n13.\n↑\nGerassi, John (1966) .\nThe Great Fear in Latin America\n. New York: Collier Books. p.\n183.\nOCLC\n17447442\n.\n1\n2\nNorth American Congress on Latin America. \"Guatemala\", North American Congress on Latin America, Berkeley, 1974, p. 84-85.\n↑\nPearson, Drew; Pearson, Jack (April 5, 1967).\n\"Tom Dodd's Law Practice\"\n.\nStar–Banner\n.\nOcala, Florida\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 29,\n2020\n–\nvia\nGoogle News Archive\n.\n↑\nSterling, Christopher Hastings., and John Michael. Kittross. Stay Tuned: a Concise History of American Broadcasting. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1990. Print.\n↑\nSkipper, John C. (January 10, 2014).\nShowdown at the 1964 Democratic Convention: Lyndon Johnson, Mississippi and Civil Rights\n. McFarland.\nISBN\n9780786491315\n.\n↑\nNathanson, Iric (May 24, 2011).\n\"Loyal lieutenant: On the ticket with LBJ\"\n.\nMinnPost\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 29,\n2020\n.\n↑\n\"Our Campaigns - CT US Senate Race - Nov 03, 1964\"\n.\nwww.ourcampaigns.com\n. Retrieved\nJuly 16,\n2024\n.\n↑\nGarrow, David J. (April 4, 2017).\n\"When Martin Luther King Came Out Against Vietnam\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on April 4, 2017\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 29,\n2020\n.\n↑\nZimring, Franklin E. (1975).\n\"Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968\"\n.\nThe Journal of Legal Studies\n.\n4\n(1):\n133–\n198.\ndoi\n:\n10.1086/467528\n.\nISSN\n0047-2530\n.\nOCLC\n1754648\n.\nS2CID\n53360391\n. Archived from\nthe original\non December 6, 2006\n. Retrieved\nMarch 13,\n2007\n.\n↑\nDigital Scholarship Lab.\n\"History Engine: Tools for Collaborative Education and Research - Episodes\"\n.\nrichmond.edu\n. Retrieved\nAugust 3,\n2015\n.\n↑\n\"Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: An Historical Overview\"\n(PDF)\n.\nsgp.fas.org\n. June 14, 2011\n. Retrieved\nOctober 21,\n2025\n.\n↑\n\"DODD, Thomas Joseph - Biographical Information\"\n.\ncongress.gov\n. Retrieved\nAugust 3,\n2015\n.\n↑\n\"Elections\"\n.\nUPI\n. Retrieved\nAugust 3,\n2015\n.\n1\n2\nMartin, Douglas (April 17, 2009).\n\"Michael O'Hare, Figure in Ethics Case, Dies at 73\"\n.\nNew York Times\n.\n.\n↑\nPearson, Drew & Anderson, Jack (1968). \"The Case against Congress: A Compelling Indictment of Corruption on Capitol Hill\". New York: Simon and Schuster.\n{{\ncite journal\n}}\n:\nCite journal requires\n|\njournal=\n(\nhelp\n)\n.\n↑\nPearson v. Dodd. 11 Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts Cases and Materials 81-84. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 1969. Print.\n↑\nDodd Center Website,\n\"Thomas J. Dodd Research Center\n|\nUConn\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non May 11, 2008\n. Retrieved\nNovember 20,\n2008\n.\n↑\nDodd Prize website,\nhttp://doddprize.uconn.edu/about.htm\n1\n2\n\"NHIOP Research Center Dedicated to Late Sen. Thomas Dodd '26\"\n.\nSaint Anselm College\nAlumni Net\n. April 25, 2008. Archived from\nthe original\non July 17, 2011\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 29,\n2020\n.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg (2000) (TV)\"\n.\nIMDb.com\n. Retrieved\nMay 20,\n2008\n.\n↑\n\"Nuremberg: Nazis on Trial (2006) (TV)\"\n.\nIMDb.com\n. Retrieved\nMay 20,\n2008\n.\nExternal links\nThomas J. Dodd\nat\nFind a Grave\nUnited States Congress.\n\"Thomas J. Dodd (id: D000390)\"\n.\nBiographical Directory of the United States Congress\n.\nFinding aid for the Thomas J. Dodd Papers\nat the\nUniversity of Connecticut Archives and Special Collections",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "Abraham A. Ribicoff",
+      "succeeded_by": "Edwin H. May Jr.",
+      "born": "Thomas Joseph Dodd(1907-05-15)May 15, 1907Norwich, Connecticut, U.S.",
+      "died": "May 24, 1971(1971-05-24)(aged64)Old Lyme, Connecticut, U.S.",
+      "party": "Democratic",
+      "spouse": "Grace Murphy",
+      "children": "6, includingChrisandThomas",
+      "education": "Providence College(BA)Yale University(LLB)"
+    },
+    "char_count": 19957
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Hartley_Shawcross",
+    "name": "Hartley Shawcross",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Hartley William Shawcross, Baron Shawcross,, known from 1945 to 1959 as Sir Hartley Shawcross, was an English barrister and Labour politician who served as the lead British prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal. He also served as Britain's principal delegate to the United Nations immediately after the Second World War and as Attorney General for England.",
+    "description": "English barrister and politician",
+    "full_text": "Hartley Shawcross\nEnglish barrister and politician\nHartley William Shawcross, Baron Shawcross\n,\nGBE\n,\nPC\n,\nQC\n(4 February 1902 – 10 July 2003), known from 1945 to 1959 as\nSir Hartley Shawcross\n, was an English\nbarrister\nand\nLabour\npolitician who served as the lead British prosecutor at the\nNuremberg War Crimes tribunal\n. He also served as Britain's principal delegate to the\nUnited Nations\nimmediately after the\nSecond World War\nand as\nAttorney General for England\n.\nEarly life\nHartley William Shawcross was born in\nGiessen, Germany\n, elder son of British parents, John Shawcross,\nMA (Oxon)\n(1871–1966) and Hilda Constance (died 1942), daughter of G. Asser.\nAt this time, his father was teaching English at\nGiessen University\n. His younger brother,\nChristopher\n(1905–1973), was a barrister and Labour party politician.\nShawcross attended\nDulwich College\n, the\nLondon School of Economics\nand the\nUniversity of Geneva\nand read for the Bar at\nGray's Inn\n, where he won\nfirst-class honours\n.\nCareer\nShawcross interviewed on CBS-TV's\nLongines Chronoscope\n(1954)\nDuring his initial career as a barrister, Shawcross was part of the legal team hired by the colliery owners at the inquiry into the\nGresford Colliery disaster\nin 1934,\nStafford Cripps\nin counterpart representing the miners' union.\nHe joined the\nLabour Party\nand was\nMember of Parliament\nfor\nSt Helens\n,\nLancashire\n, from 1945\nto\n1958\n, being appointed to be\nAttorney General\nin 1945\nuntil 1951. In 1946, when debating the repeal of laws against\ntrade unions\nin the\nHouse of Commons\n, Shawcross allegedly said \"We are the masters now\",\na phrase that came to haunt him.\nHe was\nknighted\nin 1945 upon his appointment as Attorney-General\nand named Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom at the\nNuremberg trials\n.\nNuremberg Trials\nShawcross's advocacy before the Nuremberg Trial was passionate. His most famous line was: \"There comes a point when a man must refuse to answer to his leader if he is also to answer to his own conscience\".\nHe avoided the crusading\nstyle of\nAmerican\n,\nSoviet\n, and French prosecutors. Shawcross's opening speech, which lasted two days, 26 and 27 July 1946, sought to undermine any belief that the Nuremberg Trials were \"victor's justice\" in the sense of being revenge exacted against defeated foes. He focused on the\nrule of law\nand demonstrated that the laws that the defendants had broken, expressed in international treaties and agreements, were those to which prewar Germany had been a party. In his closing speech, he ridiculed any notion that any of the defendants could have remained ignorant of\nAktion T4\n, extermination of thousands of Germans because they were old or mentally ill. He used the same argument in respect of millions of other people \"annihilated in the\ngas chambers\nor by shooting\" and maintained that each of the 22 defendants was a party to \"common murder in its most ruthless forms\".\nAttorney-General and UN Factotum\nAs\nAttorney-General\n, he prosecuted\nWilliam Joyce\n(\"\nLord Haw-Haw\n\") and\nJohn Amery\nfor\ntreason\n,\nKlaus Fuchs\nand\nAlan Nunn May\nfor giving atomic secrets to the\nSoviet Union\n, and\nJohn George Haigh\n, 'the acid bath murderer'.\nFrom 1945 to 1949, he was Britain's principal delegate to the\nUnited Nations\nand was involved in the official adoption of the\nFlag of the United Nations\nin 1946,\nbut he was recalled in 1948 to lead for the government's interest at the\nLynskey tribunal\n. In 1951, he briefly served as\nPresident of the Board of Trade\nuntil the Labour government's defeat in the election of that year.\nShawcross lent his name to a Parliamentary principle\n, in a defence of his conduct regarding an\nillegal strike\n, that the Attorney-General \"is not to be put, and is not put, under pressure by his colleagues in the matter\" of whether or not to establish\ncriminal proceedings\n.\nIn 1951, he replaced\nHarold Wilson\nas President of the Board of Trade after Wilson and the\nBevanite\nmembers of the Cabinet resigned in protest of the introduction of\nprescription charges\nfor the\nNational Health Service\nby Chancellor of the Exchequer\nHugh Gaitskell\n.\nReturn to opposition\nShawcross ended his law career in 1951, the same year as the defeat of the second\nAttlee ministry\n. He was expected to become a\nConservative\n, earning him the nickname \"Sir Shortly Floorcross\", but instead he remained true to his Labour roots.\nDuring the committal hearing for the suspected serial killer doctor\nJohn Bodkin Adams\nin January 1957, he was seen dining with the defendant's suspected lover,\nSir Roland Gwynne\n(Mayor of Eastbourne from 1929–31), and\nLord Goddard\n, the\nLord Chief Justice\n, at a hotel in Lewes.\nThe meeting added to concerns that the Adams trial was the subject of concerted judicial and political interference.\nShawcross resigned from\nParliament\nin 1958, saying he was tired of party politics.\nElevation\nShawcross was made one of Britain's first\nlife peers\non 14 February 1959 as\nBaron Shawcross\n, of\nFriston\nin the\nCounty of Sussex\n,\nand sat in the\nHouse of Lords\nas a\ncrossbencher\n.\nDefending press freedom\nIn 1961, he was appointed the chairman of the second\nRoyal Commission on the Press\n. In 1967 he became one of the directors of\nThe Times\nresponsible for ensuring its editorial independence. He resigned on being appointed chairman of the\nPress Council\nin 1974.\nFrom 1974 to 1978, he was chairman of the\nPress Council\nand is described as \"forthright in his condemnation both of journalists who committed excesses and of proprietors who profited from them\" and as a \"doughty defender of press freedom\".\nIn October 1974, he poured scorn on a Labour Party pamphlet that recommended the application of \"internal democracy\" to editorial policy, saying \"This means that... there would be some sort of committee consisting at the best of a mixture of van drivers, press operators, electricians and the rest, with no doubt a few journalists, but more probably composed of trade union officials, to deal with editorial policy.\"\nIn 1983, Shawcross chaired a Tribunal of Enquiry to handle a protest over the outcome of the\n1983 British Saloon Car Championship\n.\nChancellor of the University of Sussex\nFrom 1965 to 1985 Shawcross was Chancellor of the\nUniversity of Sussex\n.\nLater years\nIn the\n1974 New Year Honours\n, Lord Shawcross was appointed a\nKnight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire\n(GBE).\nShawcross held a number of company directorships including with\nEMI\n,\nRank Hovis MacDougall\n, Caffyns Motors Ltd, Morgan et Cie SA, and\nTimes Newspapers\n, and chairman of\nUpjohn & Co Ltd\n. He had served as chairman of the\nInternational Chamber of Commerce\n's Commission on Unethical Practices and of\nMorgan Guaranty Trust Company\n's Internal Advisory Council.\nIn the 1980s, Shawcross was sympathetic towards\nMargaret Thatcher\nand the\nSocial Democratic Party\n, but never joined another political party.\nPhilanthropy and awards\nIn 1957, he was among a group of eminent British lawyers who founded\nJUSTICE\n, the human rights and law reform organisation and he became its first chairman, a position he held until 1972.\nHe was instrumental in the foundation of the\nUniversity of Sussex\nand served as chancellor of the university from 1965–85.\nHe was the President of the charity Attend\n(then National Association of Leagues of Hospital Friends) from 1962–72.\nPersonal life\nLord Shawcross's gravestone – Jevington, East Sussex.\nLord Shawcross was married three times. His first wife, Alberta Rosita Shyvers (m. 24 May 1924), suffered from\nmultiple sclerosis\nand died by\nsuicide\non 30 December 1943.\nHis second wife, Joan Winifred Mather (m. 21 September 1944), died in a riding accident on the\nSussex Downs\non 26 January 1974. They had three children: the author and historian\nWilliam Shawcross\n, Hume Shawcross and Dr Joanna Shawcross.\nAt the age of 95, he married Susanne Monique (née Jansen), formerly wife of Gerald B. Huiskamp,\non 18 April 1997 in\nGibraltar\n. His family had opposed the marriage out of concern for Shawcross' declining abilities in old age, and had him placed under the supervision of the\nCourt of Protection\n; they won a court ruling \"after the humiliation of medical and psychological tests\" concluded Shawcross was \"was incapable of rational decision\", but Shawcross and his future wife eloped to Gibraltar, where the courts ruled the opposite.\nLady Shawcross died on 2 March 2013.\nShawcross was a member of the\nRoyal Yacht Squadron\nand the\nRoyal Cornwall Yacht Club\n.\nFrom 1947 to 1960 he was the owner of\nVanity V\n, a\n12-metre class\nracing yacht designed by\nWilliam Fife\nto the Third International Rule, built in 1936, which he kept at his home in Cornwall.\nA later skipper of the boat, John Crill, recalls being told that Lord Shawcross, \"when the election was due in about 1951, had\nVanity V\nrepainted with a vast 'Vote Labour' banner all the way along her topsides\".\nLord Shawcross died on 10 July 2003 at home at\nCowbeech\n, East Sussex, at the age of 101 and is buried in the churchyard of St Andrew's Church, Jevington, East Sussex.\nArms\nReferences\n↑\nBurke's Peerage and Baronetage, 106th edition, Charles Mosley, Burke's Peerage Ltd, 1999, p. 2594\n↑\nBurke's Peerage and Baronetage, 106th edition, Charles Mosley, Burke's Peerage Ltd, 1999, p. 2594\n↑\nBurke's Peerage and Baronetage, 106th edition, Charles Mosley, Burke's Peerage Ltd, 1999, p. 2594\n↑\nWalker, Sir Henry, CBE LlD (Commissioner)\n;\nBrass, John, MInstCE MIMinE (Assessor)\n;\nJones, Joseph, CBE JP (Assessor)\n(January 1937),\nReports on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Gresford Colliery, Denbigh on 22nd September, 1934\n, retrieved\n21 September\n2018\n–\nvia Durham Mining Museum\n{{\ncitation\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (\nlink\n)\nSection B of report.\n↑\n\"No. 37238\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 24 August 1945. p.\n4294.\n↑\n\"No. 37222\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 14 August 1945. p.\n4135.\n↑\nThis is the wording usually quoted, and is attested by eyewitness\nLord Bruce\nin a\nNew Statesman\narticle\n, but it is still a matter of dispute. For full details see\nWikiquote\n,\nHartley Shawcross, Baron Shawcross\n.\n↑\n\"No. 37243\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 28 August 1945. p.\n4345.\n↑\n\"NAZIS LEADERS LOSING HOPE\"\n.\nExaminer (Launceston, Tas.\n: 1900 – 1954)\n. 29 July 1946. p.\n1\n. Retrieved\n3 January\n2020\n.\n↑\nTrial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal\n. Vol.\n19. 1946. pp.\n432–\n528.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nBeloff, Michael (2007). \"Shawcross, Hartley William, Baron Shawcross (1902–2003), barrister, politician, and businessman\".\nOxford Dictionary of National Biography\n(online\ned.). Oxford University Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/ref:odnb/92268\n.\n(Subscription,\nWikipedia Library\naccess or\nUK public library membership\nrequired.)\n↑\n\"United Nations Flag Approved by General Assembly's Legal Committee\"\n.\nUnited Nations Photo\n.\n↑\nShawcross, Hartley (29 January 1951).\n\"Prosecutions (Attorney-General's Responsibility)\"\n.\nHansard\n. House of Commons Debates (c681).\n↑\nHeintzman, Ralph (16 May 2020).\n\"The real meaning of the SNC-Lavalin affair\"\n. The Globe and Mail Inc.\n↑\nThorpe, Andrew (1997).\nA History of the British Labour Party\n. London: Macmillan Education UK. p.\n133.\ndoi\n:\n10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0\n.\nISBN\n978-0-333-56081-5\n.\n↑\nCullen, Pamela V. (2006).\nA Stranger in Blood: The Case Files on Dr John Bodkin Adams\n. London, UK: Elliott & Thompson.\nISBN\n978-1-904027-19-5\n.\n↑\n\"No. 41637\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 17 February 1959. p.\n1164.\n1\n2\n3\n\"Obituaries: Lord Shawcross\"\n.\nThe Daily Telegraph\n. 11 July 2003\n. Retrieved\n17 July\n2011\n.\n↑\n\"No. 46162\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n(Supplement). 1 January 1974. p.\n7.\n1\n2\nMosley, Charles, ed. (1982).\nDebrett's Handbook 1982, Distinguished People in British Life\n. Debrett's Peerage Limited. p.\n1405.\nISBN\n0-905649-38-9\n.\n↑\n\"Lord Shawcross\"\n.\nThe Times\n. 11 July 2003.\nISSN\n0140-0460\n.\n↑\n\"Attend VIPs\n|\nAttend\"\n.\n↑\nBurke's Peerage 1999, vol. 2, p. 2594\n↑\nVat, Dan van der (11 July 2003).\n\"Lord Shawcross of Friston\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n.\n↑\n\"Peerage News: The Baroness Shawcross\"\n. 6 March 2013.\n↑\n\"Page on the yacht \"Vanity V\"\n\"\n.\nWebsite of the International Twelve Metre Association (ITMA)\n. 20 January 2020\n. Retrieved\n5 February\n2024\n.\n↑\nWhite, Michael (11 July 2003).\n\"Lord Shawcross dies at 101\n|\nPolitics\n|\nthe Guardian\"\n.\nThe Guardian\n.\n↑\n\"Nazi war crimes prosecutor dies\"\n. 10 July 2003.\n↑\nhttps://www.lovethesouthdowns.org.uk/places/st-andrews-jevington\nRetrieved 23 September 2024\n↑\nDebrett's Peerage\n. 2003. p.\n1461.\nBibliography\nShawcross, H. (1995).\nLife Sentence\n. London: Constable.\nISBN\n978-0-09-474980-1\n.\nExternal links\nQuotations related to\nHartley Shawcross\nat Wikiquote\nHansard\n1803–2005:\ncontributions in Parliament by Hartley Shawcross\nPortraits of Hartley Shawcross\nat the\nNational Portrait Gallery, London\nObituary,\nThe Independent\n, 11 July 2003 by James Morton\nA film clip\n\"Longines Chronoscope with Sir Hartley Shawcross\"\nis available for viewing at the\nInternet Archive\nAppearance on Desert Island Discs (7 July 1991)\nNewspaper clippings about Hartley Shawcross\nin the\n20th Century Press Archives\nof the\nZBW",
+    "infobox": {
+      "prime_minister": "Clement Attlee",
+      "preceded_by": "William Albert Robinson",
+      "succeeded_by": "Leslie Spriggs",
+      "born": "Hartley William Shawcross(1902-02-04)4 February 1902Giessen,Grand Duchy of Hesse,German Empire",
+      "died": "10 July 2003(2003-07-10)(aged101)Cowbeech, East Sussex, England",
+      "nationality": "British",
+      "party": "Labour(before 1959)",
+      "other_politicalaffiliations": "Crossbencher(1959–2003)",
+      "spouses": "Alberta Rosita Shyvers​​(m.1924;died1943)​Joan Winifred Mather​​(m.1944;died1974)​Susanne Monique Huiskamp​​(m.1997)​",
+      "children": "3 (by Mather; includingWilliam)",
+      "education": "Dulwich College",
+      "alma_mater": "London School of EconomicsUniversity of Geneva",
+      "awards": "Knight Bachelor(1945)"
+    },
+    "char_count": 13037
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "François_de_Menthon",
+    "name": "François de Menthon",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Count François de Menthon was a French politician and professor of law.",
+    "description": "French politician (1900–1984)",
+    "full_text": "François de Menthon\nFrench politician (1900–1984)\nFrançois de Menthon\nCount\nFrançois de Menthon\n(8 January 1900 – 2 June 1984)\nwas a French politician and professor of law.\nEarly and private life\nMenthon was born in\nMontmirey-la-Ville\nin\nJura\n. He was a son of an old noble family from\nMenthon-Saint-Bernard\n. He studied law in\nDijon\n, where he joined\nAction catholique de la Jeunesse française\n(ACJF). He also studied in\nParis\n. He was president of ACJF from 1927 to 1930, and was also the founder of the\nJeunesse ouvrière chrétienne\n(JOC, a Christian working youth movement). He became a professor of political economy at the\nUniversity of Nancy\n. He and his wife Nicole had four sons and two daughters.\nSecond World War\nHe was mobilised at the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, becoming a captain in the\nFrench Army\n. He was severely wounded and captured in June 1940. He spent three months in a hospital in\nSaint-Dié\n, but escaped and joined the\nFrench Resistance\nin\nHaute Savoie\nin September 1940.\nMenthon received\nJean Moulin\nseveral times at his family's seat at the\nChâteau de Menthon-Saint-Bernard\n. He founded the first resistance cell of the\nLiberté\nResistance movement in\nAnnecy\nin November 1940, and a second one in\nLyon\nshortly afterwards. He also edited the\nLiberté\nunderground newspaper, with the first two editions printed in Annecy and later ones in\nMarseille\n. He was a leader in the\nCombat\nResistance movement, created by the merger of Liberté with\nHenri Frenay\n's\nMouvement de Libération Nationale\ntowards the end of 1941. Menthon was captured returning from a meeting with Frenay, and interrogated at\nBaumettes prison\nin Marseille, but he was released.\nHe left France in July 1943 to join General\nCharles de Gaulle\nin London, and followed him to\nAlgiers\nwhere Menthon served as Commissioner of Justice in the\nComité Français de Libération Nationale\n(CFLNC) from September 1943 to September 1944. He later became a Companion of the\nOrdre de la Libération\n, and was also an Officier of the\nLégion d'Honneur\nand received the\nCroix de Guerre\n.\nPolitical career\nAfter the\nLiberation of France\n, Menthon was\nMinister of Justice\nin de Gaulle's\nProvisional Government of the French Republic\nfrom 10 September 1944 to 8 May 1945, and then became\nAttorney General of France\n. He led the\nCommission d'Épuration\nto root out collaborators, and oversaw the trials of Marshal\nPhilippe Pétain\nand other members of the\nVichy regime\n. He came under attack for the zeal with which the purge was prosecuted, and resigned.\nDe Gaulle nominated him as the French lead prosecutor at the\nNuremberg War Crimes Tribunal\n. He gave his opening speech, defining a\ncrime against humanity\nas: \"crime contre le statut d'être humain motivé par une idéologie qui est un crime contre l'esprit visant à rejeter l'humanité dans la barbarie\" (\"crime against human laws, motivated by an ideology that is a crime against the spirit, returning humanity to barbarism\"). He resigned in January 1946 to take up active politics and was replaced by\nAuguste Champetier de Ribes\n.\nMenthon was a founding member of the\nMouvement Républicain Populaire\n(MRP). His political convictions were founded on humanistic and Christian principles.  He served as a\ndéputé\nfor\nSavoy\nin the French\nAssemblée Nationale\nfrom 1946 to 1958.  He was Minister for the National Economy in\nGeorges Bidault\n's first ministry, from 24 June to 16 December 1946. He was also involved in European politics, and was president of\nParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe\nfrom 1952 to 1954 (known as the Consultative Assembly until 1974) and was involved in the discussions to choose the design for the\nFlag of Europe\n. His promising political career was shortened by disagreements with de Gaulle and he returned to his university career at the University of Nancy in 1958.\nHe was mayor of\nMenthon-Saint-Bernard\nfrom 1945 to 1977, and served as chairman of the\nAssociation des maires et conseiller général\nfor 22 years.\nMenthon died in\nMenthon-Saint-Bernard\n, in Haute-Savoie.\nReferences\n1\n2\nAutorité BnF\n↑\nMunzinger-Archiv\nExternal links\nhttp://www.ordredelaliberation.fr/fr_compagnon/672.html\nArchived\n2015-05-18 at the\nWayback Machine",
+    "infobox": {},
+    "char_count": 4194
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Roman_Rudenko",
+    "name": "Roman Rudenko",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Roman Andreyevich Rudenko was a Soviet lawyer and statesman.",
+    "description": "Soviet lawyer",
+    "full_text": "Roman Rudenko\nSoviet lawyer\nRoman Andreyevich Rudenko\n(\nRussian\n:\nРома́н Андре́евич Руде́нко\n,\nUkrainian\n:\nРоман Андрійович Руденко\n;\n7 August\n[\nO.S.\n25 July\n]\n1907\n– 23 January 1981) was a\nSoviet\nlawyer\nand statesman.\nProcurator-General\nof the\nUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic\nfrom 1944 to 1953, Rudenko became Procurator-General of the entire\nSoviet Union\nafter 1953. He is well known internationally for acting as chief prosecutor for the USSR at the 1946 trial of the major\nNazi war criminals\nin\nNuremberg\n. He was also chief prosecutor at the \"\nTrial of the Sixteen\n\" (Polish Underground leaders) held in Moscow the year before. At the time he served at Nuremberg, Rudenko held the rank of Lieutenant-General within the USSR Procuracy.\nIn 1961 Rudenko was elected to the\nCPSU Central Committee\n. In 1972 he was awarded the Soviet honorary title of\nHero of Socialist Labour\n.\nUkrainian SSR to 1953\nRudenko was one of the chief commandants of\nNKVD special camp Nr. 7\n, a former Nazi concentration camp, until its closure in 1950.\nOf the 60,000 prisoners incarcerated there under his supervision, at least 12,000 died due to malnutrition and disease.\nIn October 1951, as Procurator-General of the Ukrainian SSR, he personally led prosecution in the trial of\nOUN\nmember Mykhailo Stakhur who in October 1949 killed the writer\nYaroslav Halan\n.\nSoviet Union 1953–1981\nAfter the arrest of\nLavrentiy Beria\nin 1953, Rudenko was a judge at the closed trial at which Stalin's last secret police chief was sentenced to death.\nIn 1960, he acted as the chief prosecutor in\nU-2\npilot\nFrancis Gary Powers\n'\nespionage\ntrial.\nAs\nProcurator General of the Soviet Union\n, Rudenko played a major role in devising measures to deal with the growing dissident movement within the USSR.\nRoman Rudenko on a commemorative Russian stamp\nIn 1967, he and then KGB chairman\nVladimir Semichastny\nsubmitted proposals as to how to deal with those defending the writers\nYuli Daniel\nand\nAndrei Sinyavsky\nduring and after their trial, without provoking a strong reaction abroad or within the country. This included mention of the \"mental illness\" suffered by several prominent dissidents.\nOne measure, proposed jointly with\nYuri Andropov\nin late 1972, was to reduce the number of arrests and convictions by reinforcing the issue of \"prophylactic\" warnings to individuals, cautioning them that their activities could lead to prosecution under\nArticles 70 and 190\nof the RSFSR Criminal Code\n.\nReferences\n↑\nМетрическая книга Николаевской церкви м. Носовка. 1907\n// Государственный архив Черниговской области. Ф. 679. Оп. 10. Д. 1325. Л. 189об–190.\n(russian)\n↑\nA lot of sources give other dates of birth:\nJuly 30\n[\nO.S.\nJuly 17\n]\n1907\nor July 7, 1907.\n↑\nUtley, Freda (1949). \"6. The Nuremberg Judgments\".\nThe High Cost of Vengeance\n. Henry Regnery Company.\n↑\n\"The Soviet special camp No.7 / No. 1 1945 – 1950\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 24 September 2015\n. Retrieved\n22 April\n2009\n.\n↑\nPowers, Francis (2004).\nOperation Overflight: A Memoir of the U-2 Incident\n. Potomac Books, Inc. p.\n120.\nISBN\n9781574884227\n.\n↑\nJoint KGB-Procurator-General's Memorandum to Central Committee, 27 January 1967 (Pb 32/5), Bukovsky Archive online\n.\n↑\nJoint KGB-Procurator-General's Memorandum to Central Committee, 16 November 1972 (Pb 67/XVI), Bukovsky Archive online\n.\nFurther reading\nRobert E. Conot\n,\nJustice at Nuremberg\n, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1984,\nISBN\n0-88184-032-7\nАлександр Звягинцев. «Руденко». Молодая гвардия, 2007 г.\nISBN\n978-5-235-03081-7",
+    "infobox": {
+      "premier": "Georgy MalenkovNikolai BulganinNikita KhrushchevAlexei KosyginNikolai Tikhonov",
+      "preceded_by": "Grigory Safonov",
+      "succeeded_by": "Alexander Rekunkov",
+      "born": "7 August[O.S.25 July]1907Nosivka,Nezhinsky Uyezd,Chernihiv Governorate,Russian Empire",
+      "died": "23 January 1981(1981-01-23)(aged73)Moscow,Russian SFSR,Soviet Union",
+      "nationality": "Soviet",
+      "party": "Communist Party of the Soviet Union(1926–1981)",
+      "profession": "Lawyer,civil servant"
+    },
+    "char_count": 3511
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Geoffrey_Lawrence,_1st_Baron_Oaksey",
+    "name": "Geoffrey Lawrence, 1st Baron Oaksey",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Geoffrey Lawrence, 3rd Baron Trevethin, 1st Baron Oaksey, was the lead British judge during the Nuremberg trials after Second World War, and President of the International Military Tribunal.",
+    "description": "British judge (1880–1971)",
+    "full_text": "Geoffrey Lawrence, 1st Baron Oaksey\nBritish judge (1880–1971)\nGeoffrey Lawrence, 3rd Baron Trevethin, 1st Baron Oaksey\n,\nDSO\n,\nTD\n,\nPC\n,\nDL\n(2 December 1880 – 28 August 1971) was the lead British\njudge\nduring the\nNuremberg trials\nafter\nSecond World War\n, and President of the International Military Tribunal.\nBiography\nThe Lawrence family came from\nBuilth Wells\nin\nRadnorshire\n,\nWales\n. Lawrence was born in London, England on 2 December 1880.\nGeoffrey Lawrence was the youngest son of\nLord Trevethin\n, briefly\nLord Chief Justice of England\nin 1921–22. He attended\nHaileybury\n(where\nClement Attlee\nwas his junior) and\nNew College\n,\nOxford\n.\nLawrence was called to the Bar by the\nInner Temple\nin 1906, and later joined the chambers of\nSir Robert Finlay\n. The chambers specialised in taking appellate cases to the highest courts—the\nHouse of Lords\nfor domestic cases, and the\nJudicial Committee of the Privy Council\nfor appeals from the Dominions and Colonies. Finlay came to rely on Lawrence, although for cases from\nCanada\n, Lawrence acted as lead counsel with Finlay as junior.\nOn 26 September 1914, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the\nRoyal Field Artillery\nTerritorial Force\n(2nd\nEast Anglian Brigade\n).\nHe was promoted to temporary lieutenant on 20 November 1914.\nHe served in\nFrance\nwith the\nRoyal Artillery\n, was\nmentioned in dispatches\ntwice and as a major, was appointed to the\nDistinguished Service Order\n(DSO) in 1918.\nAfter the war he continued in membership of the\nTerritorial Army\nuntil 1937.\nOn returning to the Bar Lawrence continued to take cases to the Privy Council. An interest in horses, inherited from his father, led to his appointment as Attorney for the\nJockey Club\nfrom 1922. Soon after he was appointed as\nRecorder\nof Oxford, a part-time judgeship.\nIn 1927 Lawrence was made a\nKing's Counsel\nand appointed\nAttorney General\nto the Prince of Wales (later\nEdward VIII\n). With this appointment came membership of the Council of the\nDuchy of Cornwall\n. Lawrence served in this capacity until, in 1932, he was appointed as a judge of the\nKing's Bench Division\n, receiving the customary\nknighthood\n.\nTwo weeks after the\nKristallnacht\nin 1938, Lawrence helped\nCornelia Oberlander\nflee\nNazi Germany\n.\nAs a judge, Lawrence tended to keep out of the limelight by neither issuing sensational judgments nor drawing attention to himself. When\nLord Goddard\nwas chosen as a\nLaw Lord\n, Lawrence succeeded him as a\nLord Justice of Appeal\nin 1944.\nNuremberg trials\nSir Geoffrey Lawrence (left) and\nFrancis Biddle\n(right) talking at the opening session of the Nuremberg trials.\nHe was chosen as an experienced judge to be the lead to\nNorman Birkett\nin the British delegation to the Judicial group in the\nNuremberg trials\n, though not (as some thought) arising out of his friendship with Attlee who was by then Prime Minister. He was then elected as President of all the Judges, more through the lack of enemies than any other factor. His conduct of the trials was praised by many of those involved who appreciated his striving to understand the relevance of each piece of evidence, and willingness to stop long-winded counsel.\nLawrence was not considered an exceptional legal talent but won acclaim for delivering a very clear judgment (largely penned by Birkett) that expressed the moral sense of the Court's conclusions. After the trials, Lawrence was raised to the\npeerage\nas\nBaron Oaksey\n, of\nOaksey\nin the\nCounty of Wilts\n., on 13 January 1947 (he also inherited the Barony of Trevethin from his brother on 25 June 1959 but was always known as Lord Oaksey).\nAs a senior legal figure in the House of Lords, he served as a\nLord of Appeal in Ordinary\nfrom 1947 and on the\nJudicial Committee of the Privy Council\nuntil he retired in 1957.\nPersonal life\nLawrence married Marjorie Frances Alice (1898–1984) on 22 December 1921.\nShe served in the\nATS\nin the Second World War, gaining the\nOBE\n, and became a magistrate after the war. They had a country estate at Oaksey in Wiltshire, where Lawrence bred championship\nGuernsey cattle\n. They had three daughters and a son. Their son\nJohn\nwas a well known amateur\njockey\nand horse racing journalist; he too only used the title Lord Oaksey.\nRetirement and death\nIn retirement, Lord Oaksey, as he now was, dedicated himself to his farm, judging several county agricultural shows.\nLord Oaksey died on 28 August 1971 in\nOaksey\n,\nWiltshire\n,\nEngland\n.\nArms\nReferences\n1\n2\n3\n4\nHeuston, R. F. V. \"Lawrence, Geoffrey, third Baron Trevethin and first Baron Oaksey\".\nOxford Dictionary of National Biography\n(online\ned.). Oxford University Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1093/ref:odnb/37661\n.\n(Subscription,\nWikipedia Library\naccess or\nUK public library membership\nrequired.)\n↑\n\"Lord Trevethin And Oaksey\".\nThe Times\n. 30 August 1971. p.\n8.\n↑\n\"Lord Oaksey, Nuremberg trials judge\".\nThe Daily Telegraph\n. 30 August 1971. p.\n4.\n↑\n\"No. 28973\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 13 November 1914. p.\n9275.\n↑\n\"No. 29038\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n. 12 January 1915. p.\n391.\n↑\n\"No. 30450\"\n.\nThe London Gazette\n(Supplement). 28 December 1917. p.\n23.\n↑\nGreen, Penelope (9 June 2021).\n\"Cornelia Oberlander, a Farsighted Landscape Architect, Dies at 99\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 27 June 2021\n. Retrieved\n28 June\n2021\n.\n↑\n\"Lord Oaksey, Presiding Judge at Nuremberg Trials, Is Dead\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. London, England. 30 August 1971.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 15 June 2021\n. Retrieved\n28 June\n2021\n.\n↑\nDebrett's Peerage\n. 1936.\nExternal links\nPortraits of Geoffrey Lawrence, 3rd Baron Trevethin and 1st Baron Oaksey\nat the\nNational Portrait Gallery, London",
+    "infobox": {
+      "preceded_by": "The Lord Macmillan",
+      "succeeded_by": "The Lord Denning",
+      "born": "Geoffrey Lawrence2 December 1880London, England",
+      "died": "28 August 1971(1971-08-28)(aged90)Oaksey,Wiltshire, England",
+      "citizenship": "United Kingdom",
+      "party": "Crossbencher",
+      "alma_mater": "New College, Oxford",
+      "occupation": "Barrister,judge",
+      "profession": "Law",
+      "allegiance": "United Kingdom",
+      "branch/service": "British Army",
+      "unit": "Royal Artillery",
+      "battles/wars": "World War IWestern Front"
+    },
+    "char_count": 5598
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Francis_Biddle",
+    "name": "Francis Biddle",
+    "type": "person",
+    "summary": "Francis Beverley Biddle was an American lawyer and judge who was the United States Attorney General during World War II. He also served as the primary American judge during Nuremberg trials following World War II and a United States circuit judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.",
+    "description": "Lawyer, judge, and 58th US Attorney General",
+    "full_text": "Francis Biddle\nLawyer, judge, and 58th US Attorney General\nFrancis Beverley Biddle\n(May 9, 1886 – October 4, 1968) was an American lawyer and judge who was the\nUnited States Attorney General\nduring\nWorld War II\n. He also served as the primary American judge during\nNuremberg trials\nfollowing\nWorld War II\nand a\nUnited States circuit judge\nof the\nCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit\n.\nEarly life and education\nBiddle was born in\nParis\n, France, while his family was living abroad.\nHe was one of four sons of Frances Brown (née Robinson) and\nAlgernon Sydney Biddle\n, a law professor at the\nUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School\nof the\nBiddle family\n. He was also a great-great-grandson of\nEdmund Randolph\n(1753–1813) the\nseventh\nGovernor of Virginia\n, the second\nUnited States Secretary of State\n, and the first\nUnited States Attorney General\n.\nHe graduated from\nGroton School\n, where he participated in boxing.\nHe earned  a\nBachelor of Arts\ndegree in 1909 from\nHarvard College\nand a\nBachelor of Laws\nin 1911 from\nHarvard Law School\n.\nCareer\nBiddle first worked as a private secretary to\nSupreme Court\nJustice\nOliver Wendell Holmes Jr.\nfrom 1911 to 1912.\nHe spent the next 27 years by\npracticing law\nin\nPhiladelphia\n,\nPennsylvania\n. In 1912, he supported the presidential candidacy of former\nUS President\nTheodore Roosevelt\n's renegade\nBull Moose Party\n. He was a special assistant to the\nUnited States Attorney\nfor the\nEastern District of Pennsylvania\nfrom 1922 to 1926.\nDuring\nWorld War I\n, he served as Private in the\nUnited States Army\nfrom October 23 to November 30, 1918.\nAfter he enlisted, he was detailed to the\nField Artillery Central Officer's training school\nat\nCamp Taylor, Kentucky\nbut the war ended during his training and he was discharged.\nRoosevelt administration\nIn the 1930s, Biddle was appointed to a number of important governmental roles. In 1934 President\nFranklin D. Roosevelt\nnominated him to become Chairman of the\nNational Labor Relations Board\n. On February 9, 1939, Roosevelt nominated Biddle to the\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit\n, to a seat vacated by\nJoseph Buffington\n. The\nUnited States Senate\nconfirmed Biddle on February 28, 1939, and he received his commission on March 4, 1939. He served only one year in the role before resigning on January 22, 1940, to become the\nUnited States Solicitor General\n.\nThis also turned out to be a short-lived position when Roosevelt nominated him to the position of\nAttorney General of the United States\nin 1941. During this time he also served as chief counsel to the Special Congressional Committee to Investigate the Tennessee Valley Authority from 1938 to 1939.\nWorld War II\nDuring\nWorld War II\n, Biddle used the\nEspionage Act of 1917\nto attempt to shut down \"vermin publications\", which included\nFather Coughlin\n's publication entitled\nSocial Justice\n.\nBiddle prosecuted several prominent\nleft-wing\nindividuals and organizations under the\nSmith Act\n. In 1941, he authorized the prosecution of 29\nSocialist Workers Party\nmembers in a move that was criticized by the\nAmerican Civil Liberties Union\n.\nUnder the act, he also tried unsuccessfully to have\ntrade unionist\nHarry Bridges\ndeported.\nIn 1942, Biddle became involved in a case in which a\nmilitary tribunal\nappointed by Roosevelt tried eight captured Nazi agents for\nespionage\nand for planning\nsabotage\nin the United States as part of the German\nOperation Pastorius\n.\nLieutenant Colonel\nKenneth Royall\nchallenged Roosevelt's decision to prosecute the Germans in military tribunals by citing\nEx parte Milligan\n(1866), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the\nfederal government\ncould not establish military tribunals to try civilians in areas that civilian courts were functioning, even during wartime. Biddle responded that the Germans were not entitled to have access to civilian courts because of their status as\nunlawful combatants\n. The US Supreme Court upheld that decision in\nEx parte Quirin\n(1942) by ruling that the military commission that was set up to try the Germans was lawful. On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to death. Five days later, six of the eight were executed in the\nelectric chair\non the third floor of the District of Columbia jail. The other two were given prison terms since they had willingly turned their comrades over to the\nFBI\n. In 1948, both men were released from prison and returned to Germany.\nJapanese American Internment\nBiddle was one of the few top officials, along with FBI Director\nJ. Edgar Hoover\nand Secretary of Interior\nHarold L. Ickes\n, who opposed the wartime\ninternment of Japanese Americans\nfrom the start.\n.\nIn 1943, after the internment had already taken place, he asked Roosevelt for the camps to be closed: \"The present practice of keeping loyal American citizens in concentration camps for longer than is necessary is dangerous and repugnant to the principles of our government.\"\nRoosevelt resisted, however, and the camps would not be closed for another year. In a postwar memoir, Biddle wrote that \"American citizens of Japanese origin were not even handled like aliens of the other enemy nationalities\n—\nGermans and Italians\n—\non a selective basis, but as untouchables, a group who could not be trusted and had to be shut up only because they were of Japanese descent.\"\nAfrican American civil rights\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nFrancis Biddle to All U.S. Attorneys: Circular No. 3591 Re: Involuntary Servitude, Slavery, and Peonage\n.\nBiddle strengthened his department's efforts on behalf of\nAfrican-American\ncivil rights\nby instructing\nUnited States attorneys\nto direct their prosecutions against\nforced labor\nin the\nSouth\naway from the usual practice of charging \"\npeonage\n\", which required them to find an element of debt, toward bringing charges of \"\nslavery\n\" and \"\ninvoluntary servitude\n\" against employers and local officials.\nOn February 10, 1942, Biddle ordered the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nto probe into the\nlynching of Cleo Wright\nin\nSikeston\n,\nMissouri\n, which was the United States' first federal investigation of a civil rights case.\nTruman administration\nBiddle (far right) with other judges at the\nNuremberg trials\n(from left):\nIona Nikitchenko\nof the\nSoviet Union\nand\nNorman Birkett\nand\nGeoffrey Lawrence\nof the\nUnited Kingdom\nAt President\nHarry S. Truman\n's request, Biddle resigned after Roosevelt's death. Shortly afterward, Truman appointed Biddle as a judge at the\nNuremberg trials\n.\nTom C. Clark\n, Biddle's successor, told the story that Biddle was the first government official whose resignation Truman sought and that it was quite a difficult task. Biddle was amused by Truman's stammering, but after it was over, he threw his arm around the President and said, \"See, Harry, now that wasn't so hard.\"\nIn 1947, he was nominated by Truman as the US representative on the\nUnited Nations Economic and Social Council\n. However, after the\nRepublican Party\nrefused to act on the nomination, Biddle asked Truman to withdraw his name.\nIn 1950, he was named as chairman of the\nAmericans for Democratic Action\n, a position that he held for three years.\nOne decade later, he wrote two volumes of memoirs:\nA Casual Past\nin 1961 and\nIn Brief Authority\nin 1962. His final position came as chairman of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Commission from which he resigned in 1965.\nPersonal life\nOn April 27, 1918, Biddle was married to the poet\nKatherine Garrison Chapin\n. They had two sons:\nEdmund Randolph Biddle (1920–2000),\nwho married Frances M. Disner\nGarrison Chapin Biddle (1923–1930)\nBiddle died on October 4, 1968, of a\nheart attack\nat his summer home in\nWellfleet, Massachusetts\n, on\nCape Cod\n, at the age of 82. Biddle was interred at the\nSt. Thomas' Church\nCemetery in\nWhitemarsh Township, Pennsylvania\n.\nWriting\nBiddle's writing skills had long been in evidence prior to the release of his memoirs. In 1927, he wrote a novel about\nPhiladelphia\nsociety,\nThe Llanfear Pattern\n. In 1942, he wrote of his close association with Oliver Wendell Holmes 30 years earlier with a biography of the jurist,\nMr. Justice Holmes\n, which was adapted into a 1946 Broadway play and a 1950 film entitled\nThe Magnificent Yankee\n.\nDemocratic Thinking and the War\nwas published in 1944. His 1949 book,\nThe World's Best Hope\n, looked at the role of the United States in the post-war era. He was elected a fellow of the\nAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences\nin 1963.\nIn popular culture\nBiddle was portrayed by\nLen Cariou\nin the 2000 miniseries\nNuremberg\n. Biddle was also the subject of the 2004 play\nTrying\nby\nJoanna McClelland Glass\n, who had served as Biddle's personal secretary from 1967 to 1968.\nSee also\nList of law clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States (Seat 2)\nBiography\nportal\nReferences\n1\n2\n3\n4\nTwenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia\n: 1938\n1\n2\nTwenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia\n: 1939\n1\n2\nTwenty-Third Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia\n: 1937\n↑\nAnnual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission, Volumes 49-64 (1932)\n↑\nLabor Information Bulletin, Volumes 1-3 (1934)\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nFrancis Biddle\nat the\nBiographical Directory of Federal Judges\n, a publication of the\nFederal Judicial Center\n.\n↑\nPolitical Graveyard: Biddle, Francis Beverley (1886–1968)\n1\n2\nWhitman, Alden (October 5, 1968).\n\"Francis Biddle Is Dead at 82; Roosevelt's Attorney General; First Chairman of N.L.R.B. Was Nuremberg Judge -Backed Liberal Causes\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Retrieved\nApril 11,\n2016\n.\n↑\nHarvard's Military Record in the World War (1921)\n↑\n\"The Press: Coughlin Quits\"\n.\nTime\n. May 18, 1942. Archived from\nthe original\non October 14, 2010\n. Retrieved\nMarch 13,\n2011\n.\n↑\nThe New York Times\n:\n\"18 are Sentenced in Sedition Trial\", December 9, 1941\n, accessed June 20, 2012\n↑\nSteele,\nFree Speech\n, 208-11;\nThe New York Times\n:\nLewis Wood, \"Bridges Ordered Deported at Once\", May 29, 1942\n, accessed June 22, 2012\n↑\n\"Erschießen oder erhängen?\"\n[\nShoot them or hang them?\n]\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German). Vol.\n15/1998. April 6, 1998\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 23,\n2019\n.\nAm Ende begnadigte Roosevelt Dasch zu 30 Jahren, Burger zu lebenslanger Haft. Nachfolger Harry S. Truman ließ beide 1948 nach Deutschland abschieben. [In the end Roosevelt commuted Dasch's sentence to 30 years imprisonment and Burger's to life-long imprisonment. His successor Harry S. Truman had both of them deported to Germany.]\n↑\nNeiwert, David\n(2005).\nStrawberry Days\n. Palgrave Macmillan. p.\n124.\nISBN\n978-1403967923\n.\n↑\nBeito, David T. (2023).\nThe New Deal's War on the Bill of Rights: The Untold Story of FDR's Concentration Camps, Censorship, and Mass Surveillance\n(First\ned.). Oakland: Independent Institute. pp.\n194–\n195.\nISBN\n978-1598133561\n.\n↑\nNeiwert, David\n(2005).\nStrawberry Days\n. Palgrave Macmillan. p.\n195.\nISBN\n978-1403967923\n.\n↑\nWeglyn, Michi Nishiura\n(1976).\nYears of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps\n. New York: William Morrow & Company. p.\n68.\nISBN\n978-0688079963\n.\n↑\nBlackmon, Doublas A. (2008).\nSlavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II\n. New York: Anchor Books. pp.\n377–\n379.\nISBN\n9780385722704\n.\n↑\nCapeci, Dominic J. (1998).\nThe Lynching of Cleo Wright\n.\nUniversity Press of Kentucky\n. p.\n49.\nISBN\n9780813120485\n.\n↑\nO'Neill, James (January 2, 2001).\n\"Edmund R. Biddle, 79, Professor, Poet\"\n.\nPhilly.com\n. Archived from\nthe original\non September 23, 2015\n. Retrieved\nApril 11,\n2016\n.\n↑\n\"Miss Disner Fiancee of Edmund R. Biddle\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. January 26, 1951\n. Retrieved\nApril 11,\n2016\n.\n↑\n\"Mrs. Edmund Biddle Has Son\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. July 10, 1952\n. Retrieved\nApril 11,\n2016\n.\n↑\n\"Book of Members, 1780–2010: Chapter B\"\n(PDF)\n. American Academy of Arts and Sciences\n. Retrieved\nJune 25,\n2011\n.\n↑\n\"Trying times at Rosebud Theatre\"\n.\nThe Strathmore Times\n. Retrieved\nAugust 17,\n2012\n.\n↑\nJones, Kenneth (April 19, 2004).\n\"Victory Gardens Keeps Trying: Joanna Glass With Fritz Weaver Extends Two Weeks\"\n.\nPlaybill\n. Archived from\nthe original\non January 31, 2013\n. Retrieved\nAugust 17,\n2012\n.\nFurther reading\nFisher, Adrian S. \"Francis Biddle.\"\nHarvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review\n9 (1974): 423+\n.\nHelfman, Tara. \"Francis Biddle and the Nuremberg Legacy: Waking the human conscience.\"\nThe Journal Jurisprudence\n15 (2012): 353+.\nonline\nPahl, Thomas L. \"The Dilemma of a Civil Libertarian: Francis Biddle and the Smith Act.\"\nJournal of the Minnesota Academy of Science\n34.2 (1967): 161–164.\npnline\nRowe, James. \"Francis Biddle.\"\nHarvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review\n9 (1974): 422.\nWinfield, Betty Houchin. \"With Liberty and Justice for All: Attorneys General During the Stress of War.\" in\nJournalism and Terrorism\n(2002).\nonline\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nFrancis Biddle\n.\nFrancis Biddle Collection of International Military Tribunal Nuremberg Trial Documents and Related Material\nat\nSyracuse University Libraries\nSpecial Collections Research Center\nDensho Encyclopedia\narticle on Biddle's role in Japanese American internment\nWorks by or about Francis Biddle\nat the\nInternet Archive\nSpeeches of Attorney General Francis Beverly Biddle",
+    "infobox": {
+      "president": "Franklin D. Roosevelt",
+      "preceded_by": "Lloyd K. Garrison[5]",
+      "succeeded_by": "J. Warren Madden(new agency established through theNLRA)",
+      "appointed_by": "Franklin D. Roosevelt",
+      "born": "Francis Beverley Biddle(1886-05-09)May 9, 1886Paris, France",
+      "died": "October 4, 1968(1968-10-04)(aged82)Wellfleet, Massachusetts, U.S.",
+      "party": "Democratic",
+      "spouse": "Katherine Garrison Chapin",
+      "children": "2",
+      "education": "Harvard University(BA,LLB)",
+      "branch/service": "United States Army",
+      "yearsof_service": "October 23-November 30,1918",
+      "rank": "Private",
+      "unit": "Field Artillery",
+      "battles/wars": "World War I"
+    },
+    "char_count": 13234
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Schutzstaffel",
+    "name": "Schutzstaffel",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "The Schutzstaffel was a major paramilitary organisation under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany, and later throughout German-occupied Europe during World War II.",
+    "description": "Nazi paramilitary organisation (1925–1945)",
+    "full_text": "Schutzstaffel\nNazi paramilitary organisation (1925–1945)\n\"SS\" and \"German SS\" redirect here. For the German letter 'ss', see\nß\n. For other uses, see\nSS (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nSchutzstaffel\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈʃʊtsˌʃtafl̩\n]\n;\nlit.\n'\nProtection Squadron\n'\n;\nSS\n; also stylised with\nSS runes\nas\nᛋᛋ\n) was a major\nparamilitary\norganisation under\nAdolf Hitler\nand the\nNazi Party\nin\nNazi Germany\n, and later throughout\nGerman-occupied Europe\nduring\nWorld War II\n.\nIt began with a small guard unit known as the\nSaal-Schutz\n(\"Hall Security\") made up of party volunteers to provide security for party meetings in\nMunich\n. In 1925,\nHeinrich Himmler\njoined the unit, which had by then been reformed and given its final name. Under his direction (1929–1945) it grew from a small paramilitary formation during the\nWeimar Republic\nto one of the most powerful organisations in Nazi Germany. From the time of the Nazi Party's rise to power until the regime's collapse in 1945, the SS was the foremost agency of security,\nmass surveillance\n, and\nstate terrorism\nwithin Germany and German-occupied Europe.\nThe two main constituent groups were the\nAllgemeine SS\n(General SS) and\nWaffen-SS\n(Armed SS). The\nAllgemeine SS\nwas responsible for enforcing the\nracial policy of Nazi Germany\nand general policing, whereas the\nWaffen-SS\nconsisted of the combat units of the SS, with a sworn allegiance to Hitler. A third component of the SS, the\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV; \"\nDeath's Head\nUnits\"\n), ran the\nconcentration camps\nand\nextermination camps\n. Additional subdivisions of the SS included the\nGestapo\nand the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) organisations. They were tasked with the detection of actual or potential enemies of the Nazi state, the neutralisation of any opposition, policing the German people for their commitment to\nNazi ideology\n, and providing domestic and foreign intelligence.\nThe SS was the organisation most responsible for the genocidal murder of\nan estimated 6 million Jews and millions of other victims\nduring\nthe Holocaust\n.\nMembers of all of its branches committed\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nduring World War II (1939–1945). The SS was also involved in commercial enterprises and\nexploited concentration camp inmates as slave labour\n. After Nazi Germany's defeat, the SS and the Nazi Party were judged by the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nat Nuremberg to be criminal organisations.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, the highest-ranking surviving SS main department chief, was found guilty of crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trials and hanged in 1946.\nOrigins\nForerunner of the SS\nNazi Party\nsupporters and stormtroopers in Munich during the\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, 1923\nBy 1923, the\nNazi Party\nled by\nAdolf Hitler\nhad created a small volunteer guard unit known as the\nSaal-Schutz\n(Hall Security) to provide security at their meetings in\nMunich\n.\nThe same year, Hitler ordered the formation of a small bodyguard unit dedicated to his personal service. He wished it to be separate from the \"suspect mass\" of the party, including the paramilitary\nSturmabteilung\n(\"Storm Battalion\"; SA), which he did not trust.\nThe new formation was designated the\nStabswache\n(Staff Guard).\nOriginally the unit was composed of eight men, commanded by\nJulius Schreck\nand\nJoseph Berchtold\n, and was modelled after the\nErhardt Naval Brigade\n, a\nFreikorps\nof the time. The unit was renamed\nStoßtrupp\n(Shock Troops) in May 1923.\nThe\nStoßtrupp\nwas abolished after the failed 1923\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, an attempt by the Nazi Party to seize power in Munich.\nIn 1925, Hitler ordered Schreck to organise a new bodyguard unit, the\nSchutzkommando\n(Protection Command).\nIt was tasked with providing personal protection for Hitler at party functions and events. That same year, the\nSchutzkommando\nwas expanded to a national organisation and renamed successively the\nSturmstaffel\n(Storm Squadron), and finally the\nSchutzstaffel\n(Protection Squad; SS).\nOfficially, the SS marked its foundation on 9 November 1925 (the second anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch).\nThe new SS protected party leaders throughout Germany. Hitler's personal SS protection unit was later enlarged to include combat units.\nEarly commanders\nSchreck, a founding member of the SA and a close confidant of Hitler, became the first SS chief in March 1925.\nOn 15 April 1926, Joseph Berchtold succeeded him as chief of the SS. Berchtold changed the title of the office to\nReichsführer-SS\n(Reich Leader-SS).\nBerchtold was considered more dynamic than his predecessor but became increasingly frustrated by the authority the SA had over the SS.\nThis led to him transferring leadership of the SS to his deputy,\nErhard Heiden\n, on 1 March 1927.\nUnder Heiden's leadership, a stricter code of discipline was enforced than would have been tolerated in the SA.\nBetween 1925 and 1929, the SS was considered to be a small\nGruppe\n(battalion) of the SA.\nExcept in the Munich area, the SS was unable to maintain any momentum in its membership numbers, which declined from 1,000 to 280 as the SA continued its rapid growth.\nAs Heiden attempted to keep the SS from dissolving,\nHeinrich Himmler\nbecame his deputy in September 1927. Himmler displayed better organisational abilities than Heiden.\nThe SS established\na number\nof\nGaue\n(regions or provinces). The SS-Gaue consisted of\nSS-Gau Berlin\n,\nSS-Gau Berlin Brandenburg\n,\nSS-Gau Franken\n,\nSS-Gau Niederbayern\n,\nSS-Gau Rheinland-Süd\n, and\nSS-Gau Sachsen\n.\nHimmler appointed\nHeinrich Himmler\n(with glasses, to the left of\nAdolf Hitler\n) was an early supporter of the Nazi Party.\nWith Hitler's approval, Himmler assumed the position of\nReichsführer-SS\nin January 1929.\nThere are differing accounts of the reason for Heiden's dismissal from his position as head of the SS. The party announced that it was for \"family reasons\".\nUnder Himmler, the SS expanded and gained a larger foothold. He considered the SS an elite, ideologically driven National Socialist organisation, a \"conflation of\nTeutonic knights\n, the\nJesuits\n, and\nJapanese Samurai\n\".\nHis ultimate aim was to turn the SS into the most powerful organisation in Germany and the most influential branch of the party.\nHe expanded the SS to 3,000 members in his first year as its leader.\nIn 1929, the\nSS-Hauptamt\n(main SS office) was expanded and reorganised into five main offices dealing with general administration, personnel, finance, security, and race matters. At the same time, the SS-Gaue were divided into three\nSS-Oberführerbereiche\nareas, namely the\nSS-Oberführerbereich Ost\n,\nSS-Oberführerbereich West\n, and\nSS-Oberführerbereich Süd\n.\nThe lower levels of the SS remained largely unchanged. Although officially still considered a sub-organisation of the SA and answerable to the\nStabschef\n(SA Chief of Staff), it was also during this time that Himmler began to establish the independence of the SS from the SA.\nThe SS grew in size and power due to its exclusive loyalty to Hitler, as opposed to the SA, which was seen as semi-independent and a threat to Hitler's hegemony over the party, mainly because they demanded a \"second revolution\" beyond the one that brought the Nazi Party to power.\nBy the end of 1933, the membership of the SS reached 209,000.\nUnder Himmler's leadership, the SS continued to gather greater power as more and more state and party functions were assigned to its jurisdiction. Over time the SS became answerable only to Hitler, a development typical of the organisational structure of the entire Nazi regime, where legal norms were replaced by actions undertaken under the\nFührerprinzip\n(leader principle), where Hitler's will was considered to be above the law.\nIn the latter half of 1934, Himmler oversaw the creation of\nSS-Junkerschule\n, institutions where SS officer candidates received leadership training, political and ideological indoctrination, and military instruction. The training stressed ruthlessness and toughness as part of the SS value system, which helped foster a sense of superiority among the men and taught them self-confidence.\nThe first schools were established at\nBad Tölz\nand\nBraunschweig\n, with additional schools opening at\nKlagenfurt\nand\nPrague\nduring the war.\nIdeology\nMain article:\nIdeology of the SS\nThe SS was regarded as the Nazi Party's elite unit.\nIn keeping with the\nracial policy of Nazi Germany\n, in the early days all SS officer candidates had to provide proof of\nAryan ancestry\nback to 1750 and for other ranks to 1800.\nOnce the war started and it became more difficult to confirm ancestry, the regulation was amended to proving only the candidate's grandparents were Aryan, as spelled out in the\nNuremberg Laws\n.\nOther requirements were complete obedience to the\nFührer\nand a commitment to the German people and nation.\nHimmler also tried to institute physical criteria based on appearance and height, but these requirements were only loosely enforced, and over half the SS men did not meet the criteria.\nInducements such as higher salaries and larger homes were provided to members of the SS since they were expected to produce more children than the average German family as part of their commitment to Nazi Party doctrine.\nThe crypt at\nWewelsburg\nwas repurposed by Himmler as a place to memorialise dead SS members.\nArtwork commemorating the Holocaust hangs on the walls (2013).\nCommitment to SS ideology was emphasised throughout the recruitment, membership process, and training.\nMembers of the SS were indoctrinated in the racial policy of Nazi Germany and were taught that it was necessary to remove from Germany people deemed by that policy as inferior.\nEsoteric\nrituals and the awarding of regalia and insignia for milestones in the SS man's career suffused SS members even further with Nazi ideology.\nMembers were expected to renounce their Christian faith, and Christmas was replaced with a\nsolstice celebration\n.\nChurch weddings were replaced with SS\nEheweihen\n, a pagan ceremony invented by Himmler.\nThese pseudo-religious rites and ceremonies often took place near SS-dedicated monuments or in special SS-designated places.\nIn 1933, Himmler bought\nWewelsburg\n, a castle in\nWestphalia\n. He initially intended it to be used as an SS training centre, but its role came to include hosting SS dinners and neo-pagan rituals.\nIn 1936, Himmler wrote in the pamphlet \"The SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organisation\":\nWe shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevik revolution of subhumans be able to be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without.\nThe SS ideology included the application of brutality and terror as a solution to military and political issues.\nThe SS stressed total loyalty and obedience to orders unto death. Hitler used this as a powerful tool to further his aims and those of the Nazi Party. The SS was entrusted with the commission of war crimes such as the murder of Jewish civilians. Himmler once wrote that an SS man \"hesitates not for a single instant, but executes unquestioningly...\" any\nFührer-Befehl\n(\nFührer\norder).\nTheir official motto was\n\"\nMeine Ehre heißt Treue\n\"\n(My Honour is Loyalty).\nAs part of its race-centric functions during World War II, the SS oversaw the isolation and displacement of\nJews\nfrom the populations of the conquered territories, seizing their assets and deporting them to concentration camps and\nghettos\n, where they were used as slave labour or immediately murdered.\nChosen to implement the\nFinal Solution\nordered by Hitler, the SS were the main group responsible for the institutional murder and\ndemocide\nof more than 20 million people during the Holocaust, including approximately 5.2 million\nto 6 million\nJews and 10.5 million\nSlavs\n.\nA significant number of victims were members of other racial or ethnic groups such as the 258,000\nRomani\n.\nThe SS was involved in murdering people viewed as threats to\nrace hygiene\nor Nazi ideology, including the mentally or physically disabled, homosexuals, and political dissidents. Members of trade unions and those perceived to be affiliated with groups that opposed the regime (religious, political, social, and otherwise), or those whose views were contradictory to the goals of the Nazi Party government, were rounded up in large numbers; these included clergy of all faiths,\nJehovah's Witnesses\n,\nFreemasons\n,\nCommunists\n, and\nRotary Club\nmembers.\nAccording to the judgements rendered at the\nNuremberg trials\n, as well as many war crimes investigations and trials conducted since then, the SS was responsible for the majority of Nazi war crimes. In particular, it was the primary organisation that carried out the Holocaust.\nPre-war Germany\nReinhard Heydrich\n(right) was Himmler's protégé and a leading SS figure until his assassination in 1942.\nAfter Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power on 30 January 1933, the SS was considered a state organisation and a branch of the government.\nLaw enforcement gradually became the purview of the SS, and many SS organisations became\nde facto\ngovernment agencies.\nThe SS established a\npolice state\nwithin Nazi Germany, using the secret state police and security forces under Himmler's control to suppress resistance to Hitler.\nIn his role as\nMinister President of Prussia\n,\nHermann Göring\nhad in 1933 created a Prussian\nsecret police\nforce, the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\nor\nGestapo\n, and appointed\nRudolf Diels\nas its head. Concerned that Diels was not ruthless enough to use the Gestapo effectively to counteract the power of the SA, Göring handed over its control to Himmler on 20 April 1934.\nAlso on that date, in a departure from long-standing German practice that law enforcement was a state and local matter, Hitler appointed Himmler chief of all German police outside Prussia. Himmler named his deputy and protégé\nReinhard Heydrich\nchief of the Gestapo on 22 April 1934. Heydrich also continued as head of the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD; security service).\nThe Gestapo's transfer to Himmler was a prelude to the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, in which most of the SA leadership were arrested and subsequently executed.\nThe SS and Gestapo carried out most of the murders. On 20 July 1934, Hitler detached the SS from the SA, which was no longer an influential force after the purge. The SS became an elite corps of the Nazi Party, answerable only to Hitler. Himmler's title of\nReichsführer-SS\nnow became his actual rank\n– and the highest rank in the SS, equivalent to the rank of\nfield marshal\nin the army (his previous rank was\nObergruppenführer\n).\nAs Himmler's position and authority grew, so in effect did his rank.\nOn 17 June 1936, all police forces throughout Germany were united under the purview of Himmler and the SS.\nHimmler and Heydrich thus became two of the most powerful men in the country's administration.\nPolice and intelligence forces brought under their administrative control included the SD, Gestapo,\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo; criminal investigative police), and\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo; regular uniformed police).\nIn his capacity as police chief, Himmler was nominally subordinate to Interior Minister\nWilhelm Frick\n. In practice, since the SS answered only to Hitler, the de facto merger of the SS and the police made the police independent of Frick's control.\nIn September 1939, the security and police agencies, including the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; security police) and SD (but not the Orpo), were consolidated into the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA), headed by Heydrich.\nThis further increased the collective authority of the SS.\nDuring\nKristallnacht\n(9–10 November 1938), SS security services clandestinely coordinated violence against Jews as the SS, Gestapo, SD, Kripo, SiPo, and regular police did what they could to ensure that while Jewish synagogues and community centres were destroyed, Jewish-owned businesses and housing remained intact so that they could later be seized.\nIn the end, thousands of Jewish businesses, homes, and graveyards were vandalised and looted, particularly by members of the SA. Some 500 to 1,000 synagogues were destroyed, mostly by arson.\nOn 11 November, Heydrich reported a death toll of 36 people, but later assessments put the number of deaths at up to two thousand.\nOn Hitler's orders, around 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and sent to concentration camps by 16 November.\nAs many as 2,500 of these people died in the following months.\nIt was at this point that the SS state began in earnest its campaign of terror against political and religious opponents, who they imprisoned without trial or judicial oversight for the sake of \"security, re-education, or prevention\".\nIn September 1939, the authority of the SS expanded further when the senior SS officer in each military district also became its chief of police.\nMost of these\nSS and police leaders\nheld the rank of SS-\nGruppenführer\nor above and answered directly to Himmler in all SS matters within their district. Their role was to police the population and oversee the activities of the SS men within their district.\nBy declaring an emergency, they could bypass the district administrative offices for the SS, SD, SiPo,\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV; concentration camp guards), and Orpo, thereby gaining direct operational control of these groups.\nHitler's personal bodyguards\nMain article:\nAdolf Hitler's bodyguard\nTroop inspection of the\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\nin Berlin, 1938\nAs the SS grew in size and importance, so too did Hitler's personal protection forces.\nThree main SS groups were assigned to protect Hitler. In 1933, his larger personal bodyguard unit (previously the\n1st SS-Standarte\n) was called to Berlin to replace the Army Chancellery Guard, assigned to protect the\nChancellor of Germany\n.\nSepp Dietrich\ncommanded the new unit, previously known as SS-Stabswache Berlin; the name was changed to\nSS-Sonderkommando Berlin\n. In November 1933, the name was changed to\nLeibstandarte Adolf Hitler\n. In April 1934, Himmler modified the name to\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\n(LSSAH). The LSSAH guarded Hitler's private residences and offices, providing an outer ring of protection for the Führer and his visitors.\nLSSAH men manned sentry posts at the entrances to the old\nReich Chancellery\nand the new Reich Chancellery.\nThe number of LSSAH guards was increased during special events.\nAt the\nBerghof\n, Hitler's residence in the\nObersalzberg\n, a large contingent of the LSSAH patrolled an extensive cordoned security zone.\nFrom 1941 forward, the\nLeibstandarte\nbecame four distinct entities, the\nWaffen-SS\ndivision (unconnected to Hitler's protection but a formation of the\nWaffen-SS\n), the Berlin Chancellory Guard, the SS security regiment assigned to the Obersalzberg, and a Munich-based bodyguard unit which protected Hitler when he visited his apartment and the\nBrown House\nNazi Party headquarters in Munich.\nAlthough the unit was nominally under Himmler, Dietrich was the real commander and handled day-to-day administration.\nTwo other SS units composed the inner ring of Hitler's protection. The\nSS-Begleitkommando des Führers\n(Escort Command of the Führer), formed in February 1932, served as Hitler's protection escort while he was travelling. This unit consisted of eight men who served around the clock protecting Hitler in shifts.\nLater the\nSS-Begleitkommando\nwas expanded and became known as the\nFührerbegleitkommando\n(\nFührer\nEscort Command; FBK). It continued under separate command and remained responsible for Hitler's protection.\nThe\nFührer Schutzkommando\n(\nFührer\nProtection Command; FSK) was a protection unit founded by Himmler in March 1933.\nOriginally it was only charged with protecting Hitler while he was inside the borders of\nBavaria\n. In early 1934, they replaced the\nSS-Begleitkommando\nfor Hitler's protection throughout Germany.\nThe FSK was renamed the\nReichssicherheitsdienst\n(Reich Security Service; RSD) in August 1935.\nJohann Rattenhuber\n, chief of the RSD, for the most part, took his orders directly from Hitler.\nThe current FBK chief acted as his deputy. Wherever Hitler was in residence, members of the RSD and FBK would be present. RSD men patrolled the grounds and FBK men provided close security protection inside. The RSD and FBK worked together for security and personal protection during Hitler's trips and public events, but they operated as two groups and used separate vehicles.\nBy March 1938, both units wore the standard field grey uniform of the SS.\nThe RSD uniform had the SD diamond on the lower left sleeve.\nConcentration camps founded\nCrematorium at\nDachau concentration camp\n, May 1945 (photo taken after liberation)\nThe SS was closely associated with Nazi Germany's concentration camp system. On 26 June 1933, Himmler appointed SS-\nOberführer\nTheodor Eicke\nas\ncommandant\nof\nDachau concentration camp\n, one of the first Nazi concentration camps.\nIt was created to consolidate the many small camps that had been set up by various police agencies and the Nazi Party to house political prisoners.\nThe organisational structure Eicke instituted at Dachau stood as the model for all later concentration camps.\nAfter 1934, Eicke was named commander of the\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV), the SS formation responsible for running the concentration camps under the authority of the SS and Himmler.\nKnown as the \"Death's Head Units\", the SS-TV was first organised as several battalions, each based at one of Germany's major concentration camps. Leadership at the camps was divided into five departments: commander and adjutant, political affairs division, protective custody, administration, and medical personnel.\nBy 1935, Himmler secured Hitler's approval and the finances necessary to establish and operate additional camps.\nSix concentration camps\nhousing 21,400 inmates (mostly political prisoners) existed at the start of the war in September 1939.\nBy the end of the war, hundreds of camps of varying size and function had been created, holding nearly 715,000 people, most of whom were targeted by the regime because of their race.\nThe concentration camp population rose in tandem with the defeats suffered by the Nazi regime; the worse the catastrophe seemed, the greater the fear of subversion, prompting the SS to intensify their repression and terror.\nSS in World War II\nBy the outbreak of World War\nII, the SS had consolidated into its final form, which comprised three main organisations: the\nAllgemeine SS\n,\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n, and the\nWaffen-SS\n, which was founded in 1934 as the\nSS-Verfügungstruppe\n(SS-VT) and renamed in 1940.\nThe\nWaffen-SS\nevolved into a second German army alongside the\nWehrmacht\nand operated in tandem with them, especially with the\nHeer\n(German Army).\nHowever, it never obtained total \"independence of command\", nor was it ever a \"serious rival\" to the German Army. Members were never able to join the ranks of the German High Command and it was dependent on the army for heavy weaponry and equipment.\nAlthough SS ranks generally had equivalents in the other services, the SS rank system did not copy the terms and ranks used by the\nWehrmacht\n'\ns branches. Instead, it used the ranks established by the post-World War I\nFreikorps\nand the SA. This was primarily done to emphasise the SS as being independent of the\nWehrmacht\n.\nInvasion of Poland\nPolish Jews arrested by the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) and police, September 1939\nIn the September 1939\ninvasion of Poland\n, the LSSAH and SS-VT fought as separate mobile infantry regiments.\nThe LSSAH became notorious for torching villages without military justification.\nMembers of the LSSAH committed war crimes in numerous towns, including the murder of 50 Polish Jews in\nBłonie\nand the massacre of 200 civilians, including children, who were machine-gunned in\nZłoczew\n. Shootings also took place in\nBolesławiec\n,\nTorzeniec\n,\nGoworowo\n,\nMława\n, and\nWłocławek\n.\nSome senior members of the\nWehrmacht\nwere not convinced the units were fully prepared for combat. Its units took unnecessary risks and had a higher casualty rate than the army.\nGeneraloberst\nFedor von Bock\nwas quite critical; following an April 1940 visit of the\nSS-Totenkopf\ndivision, he found their battle training was \"insufficient\".\nHitler thought the criticism was typical of the army's \"outmoded conception of chivalry.\"\nIn its defence, the SS insisted that its armed formations had been hampered by having to fight piecemeal and were improperly equipped by the army.\nAfter the invasion, Hitler entrusted the SS with extermination actions codenamed\nOperation Tannenberg\nand\nAB-Aktion\nto remove potential leaders who could form a resistance to German occupation. The murders were committed by\nEinsatzgruppen\n(task forces; deployment groups), assisted by local paramilitary groups. Men for the\nEinsatzgruppen\nunits were drawn from the SS, the SD, and the police.\nSeven\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere deployed in Poland, and four were particularly active in carrying out mass killings.\nVictims included\nPolish nationalists\n, Roman Catholic clergy, Jews, members of the nobility and\nintelligentsia\n, as well as activists, scholars, teachers, and former officers. By the end of 1939, SS units aided by ethnic German auxiliaries had murdered approximately 50,000 Poles, including 7,000 Polish Jews, with broader estimates of Polish civilian deaths reaching up to 65,000 during this period.\nEinsatzgruppe\nWoyrsch\nbegan large-scale shootings, especially of Jews, in towns such as\nTarnów\nand\nKatowice\nand\nSosnowiec\nduring the first weeks of September 1939.\nWhen the army leadership registered complaints about the brutality being meted out by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, Heydrich informed them that he was acting \"in accordance with the special order of the\nFührer\n.\"\nMurder of civilians by\nEinsatzgruppen\nin\nKórnik\n, Poland, 1939\nSatisfied with their performance in Poland, Hitler allowed further expansion of the armed SS formations but insisted new units remain under the operational control of the army.\nWhile the\nSS-Leibstandarte\nremained an independent regiment functioning as Hitler's personal bodyguards, the other regiments—\nSS-Deutschland\n,\nSS-Germania,\nand\nSS-Der Führer\n—were combined to form the\nSS-Verfügungs-Division\n.\nA second SS division, the\nSS-Totenkopf\n, was formed from SS-TV concentration camp guards, and a third, the\nSS-Polizei\n, was created from police volunteers.\nThe SS gained control over its own recruitment, logistics, and supply systems for its armed formations at this time.\nThe SS, Gestapo, and SD were in charge of the provisional military administration in Poland until the appointment of\nHans Frank\nas Governor-General on 26 October 1939.\nBattle of France\nHimmler inspecting a\nSturmgeschütz III\nof the\n1st SS Panzer Division\n\"Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\"\nin\nMetz\n, France, September 1940\nOn 10 May 1940, Hitler launched the\nBattle of France\n, a major offensive against France and the\nLow Countries\n.\nThe SS supplied two of the 89 divisions employed.\nThe LSSAH and elements of the SS-VT participated in the ground invasion\nof the Netherlands\n.\nSimultaneously, airborne troops were dropped to capture key Dutch airfields, bridges, and railways. In the five-day campaign, the LSSAH linked up with army units and airborne troops after several clashes with Dutch defenders.\nSS troops did not take part in the thrust through the\nArdennes\nand the river\nMeuse\n.\nInstead, the\nSS-Totenkopf\nwas summoned from the army reserve to fight in support of\nGeneralmajor\nErwin Rommel\n's\n7th Panzer Division\nas they advanced toward the\nEnglish Channel\n.\nOn 21 May, the British launched an armoured counterattack against the flanks of the 7th Panzer Division and\nSS-Totenkopf\n. The Germans then trapped the British and French troops in a huge pocket at\nDunkirk\n.\nOn 27 May, 4 Company\nSS-Totenkopf\nperpetrated the\nLe Paradis massacre\n, where 97 men of the 2nd Battalion,\nRoyal Norfolk Regiment\nwere machine-gunned after surrendering, with survivors finished off with\nbayonets\n. Two men survived.\nBy 28 May the\nSS-Leibstandarte\nhad taken\nWormhout\n,\n10 miles (16\nkm)\nfrom Dunkirk. There, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion were responsible for the\nWormhoudt massacre\n, where 81 British and French soldiers were murdered after they surrendered.\nAccording to historian Charles Sydnor, the \"fanatical recklessness in the assault, suicidal defence against enemy attacks, and savage atrocities committed in the face of frustrated objectives\" exhibited by the\nSS-Totenkopf\ndivision during the invasion were typical of the SS troops as a whole.\nAt the close of the campaign, Hitler expressed his pleasure with the performance of the\nSS-Leibstandarte\n, telling them: \"Henceforth it will be an honour for you, who bear my name, to lead every German attack.\"\nThe SS-VT was renamed the\nWaffen-SS\nin a speech made by Hitler in July 1940.\nHitler then authorised the enlistment of \"people perceived to be of related stock\", as Himmler put it, to expand the ranks.\nDanes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes, and Finns volunteered to fight in the\nWaffen-SS\nunder the command of German officers.\nThey were brought together to form the new division\nSS-Wiking\n.\nIn January 1941, the\nSS-Verfügungs\nDivision was renamed\nSS-Reich\nDivision (Motorised), and was renamed as the\n2nd SS Panzer Division\n\"Das Reich\"\nwhen it was reorganised as a\nPanzergrenadier\ndivision in 1942.\nCampaign in the Balkans\nIn April 1941, the German Army\ninvaded Yugoslavia\nand\nGreece\n. The LSSAH and\nDas Reich\nwere attached to separate army\nPanzer corps\n.\nFritz Klingenberg\n, a company commander in the\nDas Reich\ndivision, led his men across Yugoslavia to the capital,\nBelgrade\n, where a small group in the vanguard accepted the surrender of the city on 13 April. A few days later Yugoslavia surrendered.\nSS police units immediately began taking hostages and carrying out reprisals, a practice that became common. In some cases, they were joined by the\nWehrmacht\n.\nSimilar to Poland, the war policies of the Nazis in the Balkans resulted in brutal occupation and racist mass murder. Serbia became the second country (after\nEstonia\n) declared\nJudenfrei\n(free of Jews).\nIn Greece, the\nWehrmacht\nand\nWaffen-SS\nencountered resistance from the\nBritish Expeditionary Force\n(BEF) and the\nGreek Army\n.\nThe fighting was intensified by the mountainous terrain, with its heavily defended narrow passes. The LSSAH was at the forefront of the German push.\nThe BEF evacuated by sea to\nCrete\n, but had to flee again in late May when the Germans arrived.\nLike Yugoslavia, the conquest of Greece brought its Jews into danger, as the Nazis immediately took a variety of measures against them.\nInitially confined in ghettos, most were transported to\nAuschwitz concentration camp\nin March 1943, where they were murdered in the\ngas chambers\non arrival. Of Greece's 80,000 Jews, only 20 per cent survived the war.\nWar in the east\nOn 22 June 1941, Hitler launched\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the invasion of the\nSoviet Union\n.\nThe expanding war and the need to control occupied territories provided the conditions for Himmler to further consolidate the police and military organs of the SS.\nRapid acquisition of vast territories in the East placed considerable strain on the SS police organisations as they struggled to adjust to the changing security challenges.\nThe 1st and 2nd SS Infantry Brigades, which had been formed from surplus concentration camp guards of the SS-TV, and the\nSS Cavalry Brigade\nmoved into the Soviet Union behind the advancing armies. At first, they fought\nSoviet partisans\n, but by the autumn of 1941, they left the anti-partisan role to other units and actively took part in the Holocaust. While assisting the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, they formed firing parties that participated in the liquidation of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union.\nOn 31 July 1941, Göring gave Heydrich written authorisation to ensure the cooperation of administrative leaders of various government departments to undertake genocide of the Jews in territories under German control.\nHeydrich was instrumental in carrying out these exterminations, as the Gestapo was ready to organise deportations in the West and his\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere already conducting extensive murder operations in the East.\nOn 20 January 1942, Heydrich chaired a meeting, called the\nWannsee Conference\n, to discuss the implementation of the plan.\nDuring battles in the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942, the\nWaffen-SS\nsuffered enormous casualties. The LSSAH and\nDas Reich\nlost over half their troops to illness and combat casualties.\nIn need of recruits, Himmler began to accept soldiers who did not fit the original SS racial profile.\nIn early 1942,\nSS-Leibstandarte\n,\nSS-Totenkopf\n, and\nSS-Das Reich\nwere withdrawn to the West to refit and were converted to\nPanzergrenadier\ndivisions.\nThe SS-Panzer Corps returned to the Soviet Union in 1943 and participated in the\nThird Battle of Kharkov\nin February and March.\nThe Holocaust\nMurder of Jews by\nEinsatzgruppen\nin\nIvanhorod\n, Ukraine, 1942\nThe SS was built on a culture of violence, which was exhibited in its most extreme form by the mass murder of civilians and prisoners of war on the\nEastern Front\n.\nAugmented by personnel from the Kripo, Orpo (Order Police), and\nWaffen-SS\n,\nthe\nEinsatzgruppen\nreached a total strength of 3,000 men.\nEinsatzgruppen\nA, B, and C were attached to\nArmy Groups North\n,\nCentre\n, and\nSouth\n;\nEinsatzgruppe\nD was assigned to the\n11th Army\n. The\nEinsatzgruppe\nfor Special Purposes operated in eastern Poland starting in July 1941.\nHistorian\nRichard Rhodes\ndescribes them as being \"outside the bounds of morality\"; they were \"judge, jury and executioner all in one\", with the authority to kill anyone at their discretion.\nFollowing Operation Barbarossa, these\nEinsatzgruppen\nunits, together with the\nWaffen-SS\nand Order Police as well as with assistance from the\nWehrmacht\n, engaged in the mass murder of the Jewish population in occupied eastern Poland and the Soviet Union.\nThe greatest extent of\nEinsatzgruppen\naction occurred in 1941 and 1942 in Ukraine and Russia.\nBefore the invasion there were five million registered Jews throughout the Soviet Union, with three million of those residing in the territories occupied by the Germans; by the time the war ended, over two million of these had been murdered.\nThe extermination activities of the\nEinsatzgruppen\ngenerally followed a standard procedure, with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nchief contacting the nearest\nWehrmacht\nunit commander to inform him of the impending action; this was done so they could coordinate and control access to the execution grounds.\nInitially, the victims were shot, but this method proved impracticable for an operation of this scale.\nAlso, after Himmler observed the shooting of 100 Jews at\nMinsk\nin August 1941, he grew concerned about the impact such actions were having on the mental health of his SS men. He decided that alternate methods of murder should be found, which led to the introduction of\ngas vans\n.\nHowever, these were not popular with the men, as they regarded removing the dead bodies from the van and burying them to have been unpleasant. Prisoners or auxiliaries were often assigned to do this task so as to spare the SS men the trauma.\nAnti-partisan operations\nFurther information:\nBandenbekämpfung\nIn response to the army's difficulties in dealing with Soviet partisans, Hitler decided in July 1942 to transfer anti-partisan operations to the police. This placed the matter under Himmler's purview.\nAs Hitler had ordered on 8 July 1941 that all Jews were to be regarded as partisans, the term \"anti-partisan operations\" was used as a euphemism for the murder of Jews as well as actual combat against resistance elements.\nIn July 1942 Himmler ordered that the term \"partisan\" should no longer be used; instead resisters to Nazi rule would be described as \"bandits\".\nHimmler set the SS and SD to work on developing additional anti-partisan tactics and launched a\npropaganda\ncampaign.\nSometime in June 1943, Himmler issued the\nBandenbekämpfung\n(bandit fighting) order, simultaneously announcing the existence of the\nBandenkampfverbände\n(bandit fighting formations), with\nSS-Obergruppenführer\nErich von dem Bach-Zelewski\nas its chief. Employing troops primarily from the SS police and\nWaffen-SS\n, the\nBandenkampfverbände\nhad four principal operational components: propaganda, centralised control and coordination of security operations, training of troops, and battle operations.\nOnce the\nWehrmacht\nhad secured territorial objectives, the\nBandenkampfverbände\nfirst secured communications facilities, roads, railways, and waterways. Thereafter, they secured rural communities and economic installations such as factories and administrative buildings. An additional priority was securing agricultural and forestry resources. The SS oversaw the collection of the harvest, which was deemed critical to strategic operations.\nAny Jews in the area were rounded up and killed. Communists and people of Asiatic descent were killed presumptively under the assumption that they were Soviet agents.\nDeath camps\nJews from\nCarpathian Ruthenia\narriving at\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n, 1944\nAfter the start of the war, Himmler intensified the activity of the SS within Germany and in Nazi-occupied Europe. Increasing numbers of Jews and German citizens deemed politically suspect or social outsiders were arrested.\nAs the Nazi regime became more oppressive, the concentration camp system grew in size and lethal operation, and grew in scope as the economic ambitions of the SS intensified.\nIntensification of the killing operations took place in late 1941 when the SS began construction of stationary gassing facilities to replace the use of\nEinsatzgruppen\nfor mass murders.\nVictims at these new\nextermination camps\nwere killed with the use of carbon monoxide gas from automobile engines.\nDuring\nOperation Reinhard\n, run by officers from the\nTotenkopfverbände\n, who were sworn to secrecy, three extermination camps were built in occupied Poland:\nBełżec\n(operational by March 1942),\nSobibór\n(operational by May 1942), and\nTreblinka\n(operational by July 1942),\nwith squads of\nTrawniki men\n(Eastern European collaborators) overseeing hundreds of\nSonderkommando\nprisoners,\nwho were forced to work in the gas chambers and crematoria before being murdered themselves.\nOn Himmler's orders, by early 1942 the concentration camp at Auschwitz was greatly expanded to include the addition of gas chambers, where victims were killed using the pesticide\nZyklon B\n.\nFor administrative reasons, all concentration camp guards and administrative staff became full members of the\nWaffen-SS\nin 1942. The concentration camps were placed under the command of the\nSS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt\n(\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\n; WVHA) under\nOswald Pohl\n.\nRichard Glücks\nserved as the\nInspector of Concentration Camps\n, which in 1942 became office \"D\" under the WVHA.\nExploitation and extermination became a balancing act as the military situation deteriorated. The labour needs of the war economy, especially for skilled workers, meant that some Jews escaped the genocide.\nOn 30 October 1942, due to severe labour shortages in Germany, Himmler ordered that large numbers of able-bodied people in Nazi-occupied Soviet territories be taken prisoner and sent to Germany as\nforced labour\n.\nBy 1944, the SS-TV had been organised into three divisions: staff of the concentration camps in Germany and Austria, in the occupied territories, and of the extermination camps in Poland. By 1944, it became standard practice to rotate SS members in and out of the camps, partly based on manpower needs, but also to provide easier assignments to wounded\nWaffen-SS\nmembers.\nThis rotation of personnel meant that nearly the entire SS knew what was going on inside the concentration camps, making the entire organisation liable for war crimes and\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nBusiness empire\nAt\nMauthausen-Gusen concentration camp\n, inmates were forced to carry heavy granite blocks out of the quarry on the \"Stairs of Death\".\nIn 1934, Himmler founded the first SS business venture,\nNordland-Verlag\n, a publishing house that released propaganda material and SS training manuals. Thereafter, he purchased\nAllach Porcelain\n, which then began to produce SS memorabilia.\nBecause of the labour shortage and a desire for financial gain, the SS started exploiting concentration camp inmates as slave labour.\nMost of the SS businesses lost money until Himmler placed them under the administration of Pohl's\nVerwaltung und Wirtschaftshauptamt Hauptamt\n(Administration and Business office; VuWHA) in 1939.\nEven then, most of the enterprises did not fare well, as SS men were not selected for their business experience, and the workers were starving.\nIn July 1940 Pohl established the\nDeutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe GmbH\n(German Businesses Ltd; DWB), an umbrella corporation under which he took over administration of all SS business concerns.\nEventually, the SS founded nearly 200 holding companies for their businesses.\nIn May 1941 the VuWHA founded the\nDeutsche Ausrüstungswerke\nGmbH (German Equipment Works; DAW), which was created to integrate the SS business enterprises with the burgeoning concentration camp system.\nHimmler subsequently established four major new concentration camps in 1941: Auschwitz,\nGross-Rosen\n,\nNatzweiler-Struthof\n, and\nNeuengamme\n. Each had at least one factory or quarry nearby where the inmates were forced to work.\nHimmler took a particular interest in providing labourers for\nIG Farben\n, which was constructing a synthetic rubber factory at\nAuschwitz III–Monowitz\n.\nThe plant was almost ready to commence production when it was overrun by Soviet troops in 1945.\nThe life expectancy of inmates at Monowitz averaged about three months.\nThis was typical of the camps, as inmates were underfed and lived under disastrously bad living conditions. Their workload was intentionally made impossibly high, under the policy of\nextermination through labour\n.\nIn 1942, Himmler consolidated all of the offices for which Pohl was responsible into one, creating the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office (\nWirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt\n; WVHA).\nThe entire concentration camp system was placed under the authority of the WVHA.\nThe SS owned Sudetenquell GmbH, a mineral water producer in the\nSudetenland\n. By 1944, the SS had purchased 75 per cent of the mineral water producers in Germany and were intending to acquire a monopoly.\nSeveral concentration camps produced building materials such as stone, bricks, and cement for the SS-owned\nDeutsche Erd- und Steinwerke\n(German Earth And Stone Works; DEST).\nIn the occupied Eastern territories, the SS acquired a monopoly in brick production by seizing all 300 extant brickworks.\nThe DWB also founded the\nOst-Deutsche Baustoffwerke\n(East German Building Supply Works; GmbH or ODBS) and\nDeutsche Edelmöbel\nGmbH (German Noble Furniture). These operated in factories the SS had confiscated from Jews and Poles.\nThe SS owned experimental farms, bakeries, meat packing plants, leather works, clothing and uniform factories, and small arms factories.\nUnder the direction of the WVHA, the SS sold camp labour to various factories at a rate of three to six\nReichsmarks\nper prisoner per day.\nThe SS confiscated and sold the property of concentration camp inmates, confiscated their investment portfolios and their cash, and profited from their dead bodies by\nselling their hair to make felt\nand melting down their dental work to obtain gold from the fillings.\nThe total value of assets looted from the victims of Operation Reinhard alone (not including Auschwitz) was listed by\nOdilo Globocnik\nas 178,745,960.59 Reichsmarks. Items seized included\n2,909.68\nkg (6,414.7\nlb)\nof gold worth 843,802.75 RM, as well as\n18,733.69\nkg (41,300.7\nlb)\nof silver,\n1,514\nkg (3,338\nlb)\nof platinum, 249,771.50 American dollars, 130 diamond solitaires, 2,511.87 carats of brilliants, 13,458.62 carats of diamonds, and 114\nkg of pearls.\nAccording to Nazi legislation, Jewish property belonged to the state, but many SS camp commandants and guards stole items such as diamonds or currency for personal gain or took seized foodstuffs and alcohol to sell on the black market.\nMilitary reversals\nOn 5 July 1943, the Germans launched the\nBattle of Kursk\n, an offensive designed to eliminate the\nKursk\nsalient.\nThree SS armored divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps (\n1. SS \"LSSAH\"\n,\n2. SS \"Das Reich\"\nand\n3. SS \"Totenkopf\n\") participated alongside Wehrmacht Panzer divisions.\nDue to stiff Soviet resistance, Hitler halted the attack by the evening of 12 July. On 17 July he called off the operation and ordered a withdrawal.\nThereafter, the Germans were forced onto the defensive as the\nRed Army\nbegan the liberation of Western Russia.\nThe losses incurred by the\nWaffen-SS\nand the\nWehrmacht\nduring the Battle of Kursk occurred nearly simultaneously with the\nAllied assault into Italy\n, opening a two-front war for Germany.\nNormandy landings\nTroops of the\nIndian Legion\nof the\nWaffen-SS\nguarding the\nAtlantic Wall\nin\nBordeaux\n, France, 21 March 1944\nAlarmed by the raids on\nSt Nazaire\nand\nDieppe\nin 1942, Hitler had ordered the construction of fortifications he called the\nAtlantic Wall\nall along the Atlantic coast, from Spain to Norway, to protect against an expected Allied invasion.\nConcrete gun emplacements were constructed at strategic points along the coast, and wooden stakes, metal tripods, mines, and large anti-tank obstacles were placed on the beaches to delay the approach of landing craft and impede the movement of tanks.\nIn addition to several static infantry divisions, eleven panzer and\nPanzergrenadier\ndivisions were deployed nearby.\nFour of these formations were\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions.\nIn addition, the\nSS-Das Reich\nwas located in\nSouthern France\n, the LSSAH was in Belgium refitting after fighting in the Soviet Union, and the newly formed panzer division\nSS-Hitlerjugend\n, consisting of 17- and 18-year-old\nHitler Youth\nmembers supported by combat veterans and experienced\nNCOs\n, was stationed west of Paris.\nThe creation of the\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nwas a sign of Hitler's desperation for more troops, especially ones with unquestioning obedience.\nThe\nNormandy landings\ntook place beginning on 6 June 1944. The\n21st Panzer Division\nunder\nGeneralmajor\nEdgar Feuchtinger\n, positioned south of\nCaen\n, was the only panzer division close to the beaches. The division included 146 tanks and 50\nassault guns\n, plus supporting infantry and artillery.\nAt 02:00,\nGeneralleutnant\nWilhelm Richter, commander of the\n716th Static Infantry Division\n, ordered the 21st Panzer Division into position to counter-attack. However, as the division was part of the armoured reserve, Feuchtinger was obliged to seek clearance from\nOKW\nbefore he could commit his formation.\nFeuchtinger did not receive orders until nearly 09:00, but in the meantime, on his own initiative he put together a battle group (including tanks) to fight the British forces east of the\nOrne\n.\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nbegan to deploy in the afternoon of 6 June, with its units undertaking defensive actions the following day. They also took part in the\nBattle for Caen\n(June–August 1944).\nOn 7–8 and 17 June, members of the\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nshot and killed twenty Canadian prisoners of war in the\nArdenne Abbey massacre\n.\nThe Allies continued to make progress in the liberation of France, and on 4 August Hitler ordered a counter-offensive (\nOperation Lüttich\n) from\nVire\ntowards\nAvranches\n.\nThe operation included LSSAH,\nDas Reich\n,\n2nd\n, and\n116th Panzer Divisions\n, with support from infantry and elements of the\n17th SS Panzergrenadier Division\n\"Götz von Berlichingen\"\nunder\nSS-Oberstgruppenführer\nPaul Hausser\n. These forces were to mount an offensive near\nMortain\nand drive west through Avranches to the coast. The Allied forces were prepared for this offensive, and an air assault on the combined German units proved devastating.\nOn 21 August, 50,000 German troops, including most of the LSSAH, were encircled by the Allies in the\nFalaise Pocket\n.\nRemnants of the LSSAH which escaped were withdrawn to Germany for refitting.\nParis was liberated\non 25 August, and the last of the German forces withdrew over the\nSeine\nby the end of August, ending the Normandy campaign.\nBattle for Germany\nGerman infantry travelling on foot in the Ardennes, December 1944\nWaffen-SS\nunits that had survived the summer campaigns were withdrawn from the front line to refit. Two of them, the\n9th SS\nand\n10th SS Panzer Divisions\n, did so in the\nArnhem\nregion of Holland in early September 1944. Coincidentally, on 17 September, the Allies launched in the same area\nOperation Market Garden\n, a combined airborne and land operation designed to seize control of the lower\nRhine\n.\nThe 9th and 10th Panzers were among the units that repulsed the attack.\nIn December 1944, Hitler launched the Ardennes Offensive, also known as the\nBattle of the Bulge\n, a significant counterattack against the western Allies through the Ardennes with the aim of reaching\nAntwerp\nwhile encircling the Allied armies in the area.\nThe offensive began with an artillery barrage shortly before dawn on 16 December. Spearheading the attack were two panzer armies composed largely of\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions.\nThe battlegroups found advancing through the forests and wooded hills of the Ardennes difficult in the winter weather, but they initially made good progress in the northern sector. They soon encountered strong resistance from the US\n2nd\nand\n99th Infantry Divisions\n. By 23 December, the weather improved enough for Allied air forces to attack the German forces and their supply columns, causing fuel shortages. In increasingly difficult conditions, the German advance slowed and was stopped.\nHitler's failed offensive cost 700 tanks and most of their remaining mobile forces in the west,\nas well as most of their irreplaceable reserves of manpower and materiel.\nDuring the battle, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nJoachim Peiper\nleft a path of destruction, which included\nWaffen-SS\nsoldiers under his command murdering American\nPOWs\nand unarmed Belgian civilians in the\nMalmedy massacre\n.\nCaptured SS soldiers who were part of\nKampfgruppe Peiper\nwere tried during the\nMalmedy massacre trial\nfollowing the war for this massacre and several others in the area. Many of the perpetrators were sentenced to hang, but the sentences were commuted. Peiper was imprisoned for eleven years for his role in the murders.\nAmerican POWs murdered by SS forces led by\nJoachim Peiper\nin the\nMalmedy massacre\nduring the\nBattle of the Bulge\n, December 1944\nIn the east, the Red Army resumed its offensive on 12 January 1945. German forces were outnumbered twenty to one in aircraft, eleven to one in infantry, and seven to one in tanks on the Eastern Front.\nBy the end of the month, the Red Army had made bridgeheads across the\nOder\n, the last geographic obstacle before Berlin.\nThe western Allies continued to advance as well, but not as rapidly as the Red Army.\nThe Panzer Corps conducted a successful defensive operation on 17–24 February at the\nHron\nRiver, stalling the Allied advance towards Vienna.\nThe\n1st\nand\n2nd SS Panzer Corps\nmade their way towards Austria but were slowed by damaged railways.\nBudapest fell on 13 February.\nHitler ordered Dietrich's\n6th Panzer Army\nto move into Hungary to protect the\nNagykanizsa\noilfields and refineries, which he deemed the most strategically valuable fuel reserves on the Eastern Front.\nFrühlingserwachsen\n(\nOperation Spring Awakening\n), the final German offensive in the east, took place in early March. German forces attacked near Lake Balaton, with 6th Panzer Army advancing north towards Budapest and 2nd Panzer Army moving east and south.\nDietrich's forces at first made good progress, but as they drew near the Danube, the combination of muddy terrain and strong Soviet resistance brought them to a halt.\nBy 16 March, the battle was lost.\nEnraged by the defeat, Hitler ordered the\nWaffen-SS\nunits involved to remove their\ncuff titles\nas a mark of disgrace. Dietrich refused to carry out the order.\nBy this time, on both the Eastern and Western Front, the activities of the SS were becoming clear to the Allies, as the concentration and extermination camps were being overrun.\nAllied troops were filled with disbelief and repugnance at the evidence of Nazi brutality in the camps.\nOn 9 April 1945,\nKönigsberg\nfell to the Red Army, and on 13 April Dietrich's SS unit was forced out of Vienna.\nThe\nBattle of Berlin\nbegan at 03:30 on 16 April with a massive artillery barrage.\nWithin the week, fighting was taking place inside the city. Among the many elements defending Berlin were French, Latvian, and Scandinavian\nWaffen-SS\ntroops.\nHitler, now residing in the\nFührerbunker\nunder the Reich Chancellery, continued to hope that his remaining SS soldiers could rescue the capital. In spite of the hopelessness of the situation, members of the SS patrolling the city continued to shoot or hang soldiers and civilians for what they considered to be acts of cowardice or defeatism.\nThe Berlin garrison surrendered on 2 May, two days after\nHitler committed suicide\n.\nAs members of SS expected little mercy from the Red Army, they attempted to move westward to surrender to the western Allies instead.\nSS units and branches\nMain article:\nUnits and commands of the Schutzstaffel\nReich Security Main Office\nHeydrich held the title of\nChef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n(Chief of the Security Police and SD) until 27 September 1939, when he became chief of the newly established Reich Security Main Office (RSHA).\nFrom that point forward, the RSHA was in charge of SS security services. It had under its command the SD, Kripo, and Gestapo, as well as several offices to handle finance, administration, and supply.\nHeinrich Müller\n, who had been chief of operations for the Gestapo, was appointed Gestapo chief at this time.\nArthur Nebe\nwas chief of the Kripo, and the two branches of SD were commanded by a series of SS officers, including\nOtto Ohlendorf\nand\nWalter Schellenberg\n. The SD was considered an elite branch of the SS, and its members were better educated and typically more ambitious than those within the ranks of the\nAllgemeine SS\n.\nMembers of the SD were specially trained in criminology, intelligence, and counterintelligence. They also gained a reputation for ruthlessness and unwavering commitment to Nazi ideology.\nHeydrich was attacked in Prague on 27 May 1942 by a British-trained team of Czech and Slovak soldiers who had been sent by the\nCzechoslovak government-in-exile\nto assassinate him in\nOperation Anthropoid\n. He died from his injuries a week later.\nHimmler ran the RSHA personally until 30 January 1943, when Heydrich's positions were taken over by Kaltenbrunner.\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nThis section is about the units within the SS. For the Jewish inmates of death camps who were forced to assist in camp operations, see\nSonderkommandos\n.\nBeginning in 1938 and throughout World War II, the SS enacted a procedure where offices and units of the SS could form smaller sub-units, known as\nSS-Sonderkommandos\n, to carry out special tasks, including large-scale murder operations. The use of\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nwas widespread. According to former SS-\nSturmbannführer\nWilhelm Höttl\n, not even the SS leadership knew how many\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nwere constantly being formed, disbanded, and reformed for various tasks, especially on the Eastern Front.\nAn\nSS-Sonderkommando\nunit led by SS-\nSturmbannführer\nHerbert Lange\nmurdered 1,201 psychiatric patients at the\nTiegenhof\npsychiatric hospital in the\nFree City of Danzig\n,\n1,100 patients in\nOwińska\n, 2,750 patients at\nKościan\n, and 1,558 patients at\nDziałdowo\n, as well as hundreds of Poles at\nFort VII\n, where the mobile gas van and gassing bunker were developed.\nIn 1941–42,\nSS-Sonderkommando Lange\nset up and managed the first extermination camp, at\nChełmno\n, where 152,000 Jews were killed using gas vans.\nAfter the\nBattle of Stalingrad\nended in February 1943, Himmler realised that Germany would likely lose the war and ordered the formation of\nSonderkommando\n1005\n, a special task force under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n. The unit's assignment was to visit mass graves on the Eastern Front to exhume bodies and burn them in an attempt to cover up the genocide. The task remained unfinished at the end of the war, and many mass graves remain unmarked and unexcavated.\nThe\nEichmann Sonderkommando\nwas a task force headed by\nAdolf Eichmann\nthat arrived in Budapest on 19 March 1944, the same day that\nAxis forces invaded Hungary\n. Their task was to take a direct role in the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. The\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nenlisted the aid of antisemitic elements from the Hungarian gendarmerie and pro-German administrators from within the Hungarian Interior Ministry.\nRound-ups began on 16 April, and from 14 May, four trains of 3,000 Jews per day left Hungary and travelled to the camp at Auschwitz II-Birkenau, arriving along a newly built spur line that terminated a few hundred metres from the gas chambers.\nBetween 10 and 25 per cent of the people on each train were chosen as forced labourers; the rest were killed within hours of arrival.\nUnder international pressure, the Hungarian government halted deportations on 6 July 1944, by which time over 437,000 of Hungary's 725,000 Jews had been murdered.\nEinsatzgruppen\nSS murders in\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 1941; a teenage boy is brought to view his dead family before being shot himself\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad its origins in the ad hoc\nEinsatzkommando\nformed by Heydrich following the\nAnschluss\nin Austria in March 1938.\nTwo units of\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere stationed in the Sudetenland in October 1938. When military action turned out not to be necessary because of the\nMunich Agreement\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere assigned to confiscate government papers and police documents. They secured government buildings, questioned senior civil servants, and arrested as many as 10,000 Czech communists and German citizens.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nalso followed\nWehrmacht\ntroops and killed potential partisans.\nSimilar groups were used in 1939 for the\noccupation of Czechoslovakia\n.\nHitler felt that the planned extermination of the Jews was too difficult and important to be entrusted to the military.\nIn 1941 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere sent into the Soviet Union to begin large-scale genocide of Jews, Romani people, and communists.\nHistorian\nRaul Hilberg\nestimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand related agencies murdered more than two million people, including 1.3 million Jews.\nThe largest mass shooting perpetrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwas at\nBabi Yar\noutside\nKiev\n, where 33,771 Jews were massacred in a single operation on 29–30 September 1941.\nIn the\nRumbula massacre\n(November–December 1941), 25,000 victims from the\nRiga ghetto\nwere murdered.\nIn another set of mass shootings (December 1941 – January 1942), the\nEinsatzgruppe\nmassacred over 10,000 Jews at\nDrobytsky Yar\nin\nKharkov\n.\nThe last\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere disbanded in mid-1944 (although some continued to exist on paper until 1945) due to the German retreat on both fronts and the consequent inability to continue extermination activities. Former\nEinsatzgruppen\nmembers were either assigned duties in the\nWaffen-SS\nor concentration camps. Twenty-four\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders were tried for war crimes following the war.\nSS Court Main Office\nThe\nSS Court Main Office\n(\nHauptamt SS-Gericht\n) was an internal legal system for conducting investigations, trials, and punishment of the SS and police. It had more than 600 lawyers on staff in the main offices in Berlin and Munich. Proceedings were conducted at 38 regional SS courts throughout Germany. It was the only authority authorised to try SS personnel, except for SS members who were on active duty in the\nWehrmacht\n(in such cases, the SS member in question was tried by a standard military tribunal). Its creation placed the SS beyond the reach of civilian legal authority. Himmler personally intervened as he saw fit regarding convictions and punishment.\nHistorian\nKarl Dietrich Bracher\ndescribes this court system as one factor in the creation of the Nazi totalitarian police state, as it removed objective legal procedures, rendering citizens defenceless against the \"summary justice of the SS terror.\"\nSS Cavalry\nShortly after Hitler seized power in 1933, most horse riding associations were taken over by the SA and SS.\nMembers received combat training to serve in the\nReiter-SS\n(SS Cavalry Corps).\nThe first SS cavalry regiment, designated\nSS-Totenkopf Reitstandarte 1\n, was formed in September 1939. Commanded by then SS-\nStandartenführer\nHermann Fegelein\n, the unit was assigned to Poland, where they took part in the extermination of Polish intelligentsia.\nAdditional squadrons were added in May 1940, for a total of fourteen.\nThe unit was split into two regiments in December 1939, with Fegelein in charge of both. By March 1941 their strength was 3,500 men.\nIn July 1941, they were assigned to the\nPripyat Marshes massacres\n, tasked with rounding up and exterminating Jews and partisans in the\nPripyat swamps\n.\nThe two regiments were amalgamated into the\nSS Cavalry Brigade\non 31 July, twelve days after the operation started.\nFegelein's final report, dated 18 September 1941, states that they killed 14,178 Jews, 1,001 partisans, and 699 Red Army soldiers, with 830 prisoners taken.\nHistorian Henning Pieper estimates the actual number of Jews killed was closer to 23,700.\nThe SS Cavalry Brigade took serious losses in November 1941 in the\nBattle of Moscow\n, with casualties of up to 60 per cent in some squadrons.\nFegelein was appointed as commander of the\n8th SS Cavalry Division\n\"Florian Geyer\"\non 20 April 1943. This unit saw service in the Soviet Union in attacks on partisans and civilians.\nIn addition, SS Cavalry regiments served in Croatia and Hungary.\nSS Medical Corps\nHungarian Jews\non the\nJudenrampe\n(Jewish ramp) after disembarking from the\ntransport trains\n. Photo from the\nAuschwitz Album\n, May 1944\nMain article:\nSS Medical Corps\nThe SS Medical Corps were initially known as the\nSanitätsstaffel\n(sanitary units). After 1931, the SS formed the headquarters office\nAmt\nV as the central office for SS medical units. An SS medical academy was established in Berlin in 1938 to train\nWaffen-SS\nphysicians.\nSS medical personnel did not often provide actual medical care; their primary responsibility was medicalised genocide.\nAt Auschwitz, about three quarters of new arrivals, including almost all children, women with small children, all the elderly, and all those who appeared on brief and superficial inspection by an SS doctor not to be completely fit were killed within hours of arrival.\nIn their role as\nDesinfektoren\n(disinfectors), SS doctors also made selections among existing prisoners as to their fitness to work and supervised the murder of those deemed unfit. Inmates in deteriorating health were examined by SS doctors, who decided whether or not they would be able to recover in less than two weeks. Those too ill or injured to recover in that time frame were killed.\nAt Auschwitz, the actual delivery of gas to the victims was always handled by the SS, on the order of the supervising SS doctor.\nMany of the SS doctors also conducted inhumane medical experiments on camp prisoners.\nThe most well-known SS doctor,\nJosef Mengele\n, served as a medical officer at Auschwitz under the command of\nEduard Wirths\nof the camp's medical corps.\nMengele undertook selections even when he was not assigned to do so in the hope of finding subjects for his experiments.\nHe was particularly interested in locating sets of twins.\nIn contrast to most of the doctors, who viewed undertaking selections as one of their most stressful and horrible duties, Mengele undertook the task with a flamboyant air, often smiling or whistling a tune.\nAfter the war, many SS doctors were charged with war crimes for their medical experiments and for their role in gas chamber selections.\nOther SS units\nAhnenerbe\nThe\nAhnenerbe\n(Ancestral Heritage Organisation) was founded in 1935 by Himmler and became part of the SS in 1939.\nIt was an umbrella agency for more than fifty organisations tasked with studying German racial identity and ancient Germanic traditions and language.\nThe agency sponsored archaeological expeditions in Germany, Scandinavia, the Middle East, Tibet, and elsewhere to search for evidence of Aryan roots, influence, and superiority.\nFurther planned expeditions were postponed indefinitely at the start of the war.\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\nThe\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\n(\nlit.\n'\nSS Women’s Auxiliary Corps\n'\n) were female auxiliary members of the\nWaffen-SS\n.\nThe organization was created to free men for combat by assigning women to non-combat support roles such as administration, communications, and logistics.\nEstablished in 1942 under the direction of\nErnst Sachs\n, it was Himmler's intention to create a \"sister organisation to the Schutzstaffel\".\nAround 10,000 women served in the\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\n, in addition to 15,000 police auxiliaries. They were present in diverse areas, from the offices of the\nReich Security Main Office\nin Berlin to the\nconcentration camps\n.\nIn 1942, Himmler set up the\nReichsschule für SS Helferinnen\n(Reich School for SS Helpers) in\nOberehnheim\nto train women in communications, again to free up men for combat roles. Himmler intended to replace all female civilian employees in his service with\nSS-Helferinnen\nmembers, as they were selected and trained according to Nazi ideology.\nThe school was closed on 22 November 1944 due to the Allied advance.\nSS-Gefolge\nMain article:\nFemale guards in Nazi concentration camps\nThe\nSS-Gefolge\n(\nlit.\n'\nSS entourage\n'\n) served as civilian employees without formal SS membership or combat training. They were affiliated with the\nWaffen-SS\n. Their roles were primarily administrative, working as guards and auxiliaries in concentration camps, with 3,517 female guards (comprising 10% of the total in January 1945), including around 200 at Auschwitz. Often trained at\nRavensbrück\n, they took loyalty oaths and enforced camp policies tied to\nThe Holocaust\n,\nsterilization\n, and\neuthanasia\n, and supervised prisoners, aiding\nNazi racial policies\n.\nForeign legions and volunteers\nSee also:\nWaffen-SS foreign volunteers and conscripts\nGrand Mufti of Jerusalem\nAmin al-Husseini\ngreeting Bosnian\nWaffen-SS\nvolunteers before their departure to the Eastern Front, 1943\nBeginning in 1940, Himmler opened up\nWaffen-SS\nrecruiting to ethnic Germans that were not German citizens.\nIn March 1941, the SS Main Office established the\nGermanische Leitstelle\n(Germanic Guidance Office) to establish\nWaffen-SS\nrecruiting offices in Nazi-occupied Europe.\nThe majority of the resulting foreign\nWaffen-SS\nunits wore a distinctive national collar patch and preceded their SS rank titles with the prefix\nWaffen\ninstead of SS. Volunteers from Scandinavian countries filled the ranks of two divisions, the\nSS-Wiking\nand\nSS-Nordland\n.\nSwiss German speakers joined in substantial numbers.\nBelgian Flemings joined Dutchmen to form the\nSS-Nederland\nlegion,\nand their Walloon compatriots joined the\nSS-Wallonien\n.\nBy the end of 1943 about a quarter of the SS were ethnic Germans from across Europe,\nand by June 1944, half the\nWaffen-SS\nwere foreign nationals.\nAdditional\nWaffen-SS\nunits were added from the\nUkrainians\n,\nAlbanians\nfrom\nKosovo\n, Serbians, Croatians, Turkic, Caucasians, Cossack, and Tatars. The Ukrainians and Tatars, who had suffered persecution under\nJoseph Stalin\n, were likely motivated primarily by opposition to the Soviet government rather than ideological agreement with the SS.\nThe exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem\nAmin al-Husseini\nwas made an SS-\nGruppenführer\nby Himmler in May 1943.\nHe subsequently used antisemitism and anti-Serb racism to recruit a\nWaffen-SS\ndivision of\nBosnian Muslims\n, the\nSS-Handschar\n.\nThe year-long Soviet\noccupation of the Baltic states\nat the beginning of World War II resulted in volunteers for\nLatvian\nand\nEstonian\nWaffen-SS\nunits. The\nEstonian Legion\nhad 1,280 volunteers under training by the end of 1942.\nApproximately 25,000 men served in the Estonian SS division, with thousands more conscripted into Police Front battalions and border guard units.\nMost of the Estonians were fighting primarily to regain their independence and as many as 15,000 of them died fighting alongside the Germans.\nIn early 1944, Himmler even contacted Pohl to suggest releasing Muslim prisoners from concentration camps to supplement his SS troops.\nThe\nIndian Legion\nwas a\nWehrmacht\nunit formed in August 1942 chiefly from disaffected Indian soldiers of the\nBritish Indian Army\ncaptured in the\nNorth African Campaign\n. In August 1944 it was transferred to the auspices of the\nWaffen-SS\nas the\nIndische Freiwilligen-Legion der Waffen-SS\n.\nThere was also a French volunteer division,\nSS-Charlemagne\n, which was formed in 1944 mainly from the remnants of the\nLegion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism\nand French\nSturmbrigade\n.\nRanks and uniforms\nMain article:\nUniforms and insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nSee also:\nRunic insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nThe SS established its own symbolism, rituals, customs, ranks, and uniforms to set itself apart from other organisations. Before 1929, the SS wore the same brown uniform as the SA, with the addition of a black tie and a black cap with a\nTotenkopf\n(death's head) skull and bones symbol, moving to an all-black uniform in 1932.\nIn 1935, the SS combat formations adopted a service uniform in field grey for everyday wear. The SS also developed its own field uniforms, which included reversible smocks and helmet covers printed with\ncamouflage\npatterns.\nUniforms were manufactured in hundreds of licensed factories, with some workers being prisoners of war performing forced labour. Many were produced in concentration camps.\nHitler and the Nazi Party understood the power of emblems and insignia to influence public opinion.\nThe stylised lightning bolt logo of the SS was chosen in 1932. The logo is a pair of runes from a set of 18\nArmanen runes\ncreated by\nGuido von List\nin 1906. It is similar to the ancient\nSowilō\nrune, which symbolises the sun, but was renamed as \"Sig\" (victory) in List's iconography.\nThe\nTotenkopf\nsymbolised the wearer's willingness to fight unto the death, and also served to frighten the enemy.\nSS membership estimates 1925–1945\nAfter 1933 a career in the SS became increasingly attractive to Germany's social elite, who began joining the movement in great numbers, usually motivated by political opportunism. By 1938 about one-third of the SS leadership were members of the\nupper middle class\n. The trend reversed after the first Soviet counter-offensive of 1942.\nSS offices\nBy 1942 all activities of the SS were managed through twelve main offices.\nPersonal Staff\nReichsführer-SS\nKommandostab Reichsführer-SS\n(Command Staff\nReichsführer-SS\n)\nSS Main Office\n(SS-HA)\nSS-Führungshauptamt\n(SS Main Operational Office; SS-FHA)\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA)\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\n(WVHA)\nOrdnungspolizei Hauptamt\n(Main Office of the Order Police)\nSS Court Main Office\nSS Race and Settlement Main Office\n(RuSHA)\nSS Personnel Main Office\nHauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle\n(Racial German Assistance Main Office; VOMI)\nSS Education Office\nMain Office of the\nReich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood\n(RKFDV)\nAustrian SS\nMain article:\nAustrian SS\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, Himmler,\nAugust Eigruber\n, and other SS officials visiting Mauthausen concentration camp, 1941\nThe term \"Austrian SS\" is often used to describe that portion of the SS membership from Austria, but it was never a recognised branch of the SS. In contrast to SS members from other countries, who were grouped into either the Germanic-SS or the Foreign Legions of the\nWaffen-SS\n, Austrian SS members were regular SS personnel. It was technically under the command of the SS in Germany but often acted independently concerning Austrian affairs. The Austrian SS was founded in 1930 and by 1934 was acting as a covert force to bring about the\nAnschluss\nwith Germany, which occurred in March 1938. Early Austrian SS leaders were Kaltenbrunner and\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n.\nAustrian SS members served in every branch of the SS. Austrians constituted 8 per cent of Nazi Germany's population and 13 per cent of the SS; 40 per cent of the staff and 75 per cent of commanders at death camps were Austrian.\nAfter the\nAnschluss\n, the Austrian SS was folded into\nSS-Oberabschnitt Donau\n. The third regiment of the\nSS-Verfügungstruppe\n(\nDer Führer\n) and the fourth\nTotenkopf\nregiment (\nOstmark\n) were recruited in Austria shortly thereafter. On Heydrich's orders, mass arrests of potential enemies of the Reich began immediately after the\nAnschluss\n.\nMauthausen\nwas the first concentration camp opened in Austria following the\nAnschluss\n.\nBefore the invasion of the Soviet Union, Mauthausen was the harshest of the camps in the Greater German Reich.\nThe\nHotel Metropole\nwas transformed into the headquarters for the Gestapo in Vienna in April 1938. With a staff of 900 (80 per cent of whom were recruited from the Austrian police), it was the largest Gestapo office outside Berlin. An estimated 50,000 people were interrogated or tortured there.\nThe Gestapo in Vienna was headed by\nFranz Josef Huber\n, who also served as chief of the\nCentral Agency for Jewish Emigration in Vienna\n. Although its de facto leaders were Adolf Eichmann and later\nAlois Brunner\n, Huber was nevertheless responsible for the mass deportation of Austrian Jews.\nPost-war activity and aftermath\nFollowing Nazi Germany's collapse, the SS ceased to exist.\nNumerous members of the SS, many of them still committed Nazis, remained at large in Germany and across Europe.\nOn 21 May 1945, the British captured Himmler, who was in disguise and carrying a fraudulent passport. At an internment camp near\nLüneburg\n, he committed suicide by biting down on a cyanide capsule.\nSeveral other leading members of the SS fled, but some were quickly captured.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, chief of the RSHA and the highest-ranking surviving SS main department chief upon Himmler's suicide, was captured and arrested in the\nBavarian Alps\n.\nHe was among the 22 defendants put on trial at the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nin 1945–46.\nSome SS members were subject to\nsummary execution\n, torture, and beatings at the hands of freed prisoners, displaced persons, or Allied soldiers.\nAmerican soldiers of the 157th Regiment, who entered the concentration camp at Dachau in April 1945 and viewed the acts committed by the SS,\nshot some of the remaining SS camp guards\n.\nOn 15 April 1945, British troops entered Bergen-Belsen. They placed the SS guards on starvation rations, made them work without breaks, forced them to deal with the remaining corpses, and stabbed them with bayonets or struck them with their rifle butts if they slowed their pace.\nSome members of the\nUS Army Counter Intelligence Corps\ndelivered captured SS camp guards to\ndisplaced person camps\n, where they knew they would be subject to summary execution.\nInternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg\nMain article:\nNuremberg trials\nThe body of Ernst Kaltenbrunner after his execution on 16 October 1946\nThe Allies commenced legal proceedings against captured Nazis, establishing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945.\nThe first\nwar crimes\ntrial of 24 prominent figures such as Göring,\nAlbert Speer\n,\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n,\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, Hans Frank, and Kaltenbrunner took place beginning in November 1945. They were accused of four counts: conspiracy, waging a war of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in violation of international law.\nTwelve received the death penalty, including Kaltenbrunner, who was convicted of crimes against humanity and executed on 16 October 1946.\nThe former commandant at Auschwitz,\nRudolf Höss\n, who testified on behalf of Kaltenbrunner and others, was tried and executed in 1947.\nAdditional SS trials and convictions followed.\nMany defendants attempted to exculpate themselves using the excuse that they were merely following\nsuperior orders\n, which they had to obey unconditionally as part of their\nsworn oath\nand duty. The courts did not find this to be a legitimate defence.\nA trial of 40 SS officers and guards from Auschwitz took place in Kraków in November 1947. Most were found guilty, and 23 received the death penalty.\nThe twelve\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\ntook place in 1946–1949; also, an estimated 37,000 members of the SS were tried and convicted in Soviet courts. Sentences included hangings and long terms of hard labour.\nPiotr Cywiński\n, director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum, estimates that of the 70,000 members of the SS involved in crimes in concentration camps, only about 1,650 to 1,700 were tried after the war.\nThe International Military Tribunal declared the SS a criminal organisation in 1946.\nEscapes\nSee also:\nRatlines (World War II aftermath)\nRed Cross\npassport under the name of \"Ricardo Klement\" that\nAdolf Eichmann\nused to enter Argentina in 1950\nAfter the war, many former Nazis fled to South America, especially to Argentina, where they were welcomed by\nJuan Perón\n's regime.\nIn the 1950s, former Dachau inmate Lothar Hermann discovered that\nBuenos Aires\nresident Ricardo Klement was, in fact, Adolf Eichmann, who had in 1948 obtained false identification and a landing permit for Argentina through an organisation directed by Bishop\nAlois Hudal\n, an Austrian cleric with Nazi sympathies, then living in Italy.\nEichmann was captured in Buenos Aires on 11 May 1960 by\nMossad\n, the Israeli intelligence agency. At his trial in Jerusalem in 1961, he was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. Eichmann was quoted as having stated, \"I will jump into my grave laughing because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews [or Reich enemies, as he later claimed to have said] on my conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction.\"\nFranz Stangl\n, the commandant of Treblinka, also escaped to South America with the assistance of Hudal's network. He was deported to Germany in 1967 and was sentenced to life in prison in 1970. He died in 1971.\nMengele, worried that his capture would mean a death sentence, fled Germany on 17 April 1949.\nAssisted by a network of former SS members, he travelled to\nGenoa\n, where he obtained a passport under the alias \"Helmut Gregor\" from the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n. He sailed to Argentina in July.\nAware that he was still a wanted man, he moved to Paraguay in 1958 and Brazil in 1960. In both instances he was assisted by former\nLuftwaffe\npilot\nHans-Ulrich Rudel\n.\nMengele suffered a stroke while swimming and drowned in 1979.\nThousands of Nazis, including former SS members such as Trawniki guard\nJakob Reimer\nand Circassian collaborator\nTscherim Soobzokov\n, fled to the United States under the guise of refugees, sometimes using forged documents.\nOther SS men, such as Soobzokov, SD officer\nWilhelm Höttl\n, Eichmann aide\nOtto von Bolschwing\n, and accused war criminal\nTheodor Saevecke\n, were employed by American intelligence agencies against the Soviets. As\nCIA\nofficer Harry Rositzke noted, \"It was a visceral business of using any bastard so long as he was anti-Communist.\n... The eagerness or desire to enlist collaborators means that sure, you didn't look at their credentials too closely.\"\nSimilarly, the Soviets used SS personnel after the war; Operation Theo, for instance, disseminated \"subversive rumours\" in Allied-occupied Germany.\nSimon Wiesenthal\nand others have speculated about the existence of a Nazi fugitive network code-named\nODESSA\n(an acronym for\nOrganisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen\n, Organisation of former SS members) that allegedly helped war criminals find refuge in\nLatin America\n.\nBritish writer\nGitta Sereny\n, who conducted interviews with SS men, considers the story untrue and attributes the escapes to postwar chaos and Hudal's Vatican-based network. While the existence of ODESSA remains unproven, Sereny notes that \"there certainly were various kinds of Nazi aid organisations after the war—it would have been astonishing if there hadn't been.\"\nSee also\nGermanic SS\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nHIAG\nList of SS personnel\nList of\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions\nMyth of the clean\nWehrmacht\nInformational notes\n↑\nBuchenwald\n,\nDachau\n,\nFlossenbürg\n,\nMauthausen\n,\nRavensbrück\n, and\nSachsenhausen\n.\n↑\nNot to be confused with\nSS-Sonderkommandos\n, ad hoc SS units that used the same name.\n↑\nIn an act of reprisal, upwards of 10,000 Czechs were arrested; 1,300 were shot, including all male inhabitants from the nearby town of\nLidice\n(where Heydrich's assassins had supposedly been harboured), and the town was razed.\nCitations\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n26.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n137.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nMichael\n&\nDoerr 2002\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n14, 16.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n16.\n1\n2\n3\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n26–29.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n17, 19.\n1\n2\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n604.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n30.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n12.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n45–46.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n1–2.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n113.\n1\n2\nBurleigh\n&\nWippermann 1991\n, pp.\n272–273.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n45–47, 300–305.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n2–3.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n308–314.\n↑\nBaranowski 2010\n, pp.\n196–197.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n901.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n903.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n606.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n146, 147.\n↑\nStackelberg 2002\n, p.\n116.\n1\n2\nJacobsen 1999\n, pp.\n82, 93.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n62–67.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n63–65.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n19.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n148–149.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n65–66.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n150–151.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n608.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n111–113.\n↑\nHimmler 1936\n.\n1\n2\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nHimmler 1936\n, p.\n134.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n60–61.\n1\n2\n3\nRummel 1992\n, pp.\n12–13.\n↑\nRummel 1992\n, p.\n12.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1946\n.\n1\n2\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n1\n2\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n157.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, pp.\n66–71.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n13–14.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n313, 316.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n9, 17, 26–27, 30, 46–47.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nDear\n&\nFoot 1995\n, pp.\n814–815.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n204.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n470.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, pp.\n70–71.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, pp.\n512–514.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n584.\n1\n2\nRead 2005\n, p.\n515.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n590.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n591.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n61–62.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n144, 148, 169, 176–177.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n165.\n↑\nSpielvogel 1992\n, pp.\n102–108.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n8, 9.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n9, 12, 17–19.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n157, 160, 165.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n166.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n181–186.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n17–19.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n157, 160, 165, 166, 181–186.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n19, 33.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n32, 48, 57.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n36–48.\n↑\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n288.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n32.\n1\n2\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nFelton 2014\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n36, 48.\n↑\nFelton 2014\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nPadfield 2001\n, pp.\n128–129.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n222.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n106–108.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n366–367.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n108–109.\n↑\nAyçoberry 1999\n, p.\n273.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n23.\n1\n2\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n156.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n285–287.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n18, 287.\n↑\nMollo 1991\n, pp.\n1–3.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nButler 2001\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n114, 159–161.\n1\n2\n3\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nStone 2011\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n144–145.\n1\n2\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n90–92.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n14–15.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n109–111.\n↑\nWestermann 2025\n.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, pp.\n17–18.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, p.\n246.\n↑\nReynolds 1997\n, pp.\n6, 7.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n33–35.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n229.\n↑\nHellwinkel 2014\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n147.\n1\n2\n3\nStein 2002\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nButler 2003\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nManning 1999\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nSydnor 1977\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n251.\n↑\nSydnor 1977\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n143.\n1\n2\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n150, 153.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n213–214.\n↑\nMattson 2002\n, pp.\n77, 104.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n162, 163.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n297.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, pp.\n110–111.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n110.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n163, 165.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n163–166.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nFrusetta 2012\n, p.\n266.\n↑\nGlantz 2001\n, pp.\n7–9.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, p.\n409.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nWindrow\n&\nBurn 1992\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nHeer\n&\nNaumann 2000\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n696–697.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n171.\n↑\nReynolds 1997\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n173.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, pp.\n69–70, 94–108.\n↑\nKrausnik 1968\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n159–160.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n227.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n256–257.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n547.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n199.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n243.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n70–71.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n625.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n198.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n626, 629.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n627.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n71–77.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n152–154.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n628–629.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, pp.\n26–27.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n208.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n279–280.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n283.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n283, 287, 290.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n295, 299–300.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n29.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n559.\n1\n2\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n182–183.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nGruner 2012\n, pp.\n174–175.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n629.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n265.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n258–263.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n119, 120.\n↑\nMazower 2008\n, pp.\n312–313.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n485.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n482.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n480–481.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n480.\n↑\nSteinbacher 2005\n, p.\n129.\n↑\nSteinbacher 2005\n, p.\n56.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n316.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n484.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n114–115.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n115–116.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n483.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, p.\n128.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1950\n.\n↑\nBaxter 2014\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n486.\n↑\nForczyk 2017\n, pp.\n13–15.\n↑\nZetterling\n&\nFrankson 2016\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n488–489.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n68, 70.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, p.\n350.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, pp.\n54–56.\n↑\nWhitmarsh 2009\n, pp.\n12, 13.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, pp.\n60, 63, 122, 275.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n219.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n295.\n↑\nRempel 1989\n, p.\n233.\n↑\nWhitmarsh 2009\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, p.\n282.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n297.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, pp.\n399–400.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n222–223.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, p.\n420.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n1085–1086.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n701.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, pp.\n439–442.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, pp.\n765–766.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, p.\n465.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, pp.\n767–769.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n769.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n232.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, p.\n468.\n↑\nParker 2012\n, p.\n278.\n↑\nKershaw 2011\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n83.\n1\n2\nDuffy 2002\n, p.\n293.\n↑\nZiemke 1968\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nSeaton 1971\n, p.\n537.\n↑\nDuffy 2002\n, p.\n294.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n238.\n↑\nZiemke 1968\n, p.\n450.\n↑\nMessenger 2001\n, pp.\n167–168.\n↑\nWachsmann 2015\n, pp.\n542–548.\n↑\nFritz 2004\n, pp.\n50–55.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n237.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2011\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n246.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n328, 330, 338.\n↑\nMoorhouse 2012\n, pp.\n364–365.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n248–249.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n21–22.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n494–495.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n495–496.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n661.\n↑\nDiner 2006\n, p.\n123.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nMontague 2012\n, pp.\n188–190.\n↑\nFriedlander 1997\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n220.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n258–260, 262.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n195.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n408.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, pp.\n168, 172.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n173.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, pp.\n160, 183.\n1\n2\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n436.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n405, 412.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n109.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n15–16.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n257.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n120–123.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n210–214.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n274.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n37, 40, 41.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, p.\n214.\n↑\nKrüger\n&\nWedemeyer-Kolwe 2009\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nKrüger\n&\nWedemeyer-Kolwe 2009\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n224–225.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, p.\n38.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n308.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n52–53.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n81–90.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n119–120.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n310.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nStockert 1997\n, p.\n229.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n225–230.\n↑\nProctor 1988\n, p.\n86.\n↑\nLifton 1986\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n235–237.\n↑\nLifton 1986\n, pp.\n148–149.\n↑\nPiper 1994\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nLifton\n&\nHackett 1994\n, p.\n304.\n↑\nYahil 1990\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nYahil 1990\n, p.\n369.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n248–249.\n↑\nPosner\n&\nWare 1986\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPosner\n&\nWare 1986\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nLifton 1985\n.\n↑\nPringle 2006\n, pp.\n294–296.\n1\n2\nSpielvogel 1992\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n132–133.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n128–131, 139, 142.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nOepen, Rosen\n&\nWunsch 2020\n, p.\n339.\n↑\nMiles\n&\nCross 2008\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nMühlenberg 2011b\n, pp.\n38–44.\n↑\nSchwarz 1997\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nCentury 2011\n.\n↑\nRempel 1989\n, pp.\n223–224.\n↑\nMühlenberg 2011a\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nRuda 2023\n, p.\n389.\n↑\nHayes 1991\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n160.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n212–213.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n214–219.\n↑\nGutmann 2017\n, Chapter 3.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n272–273.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n321–323.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n458.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n200–204.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n199.\n↑\nHale 2011\n, pp.\n264–266.\n↑\nBishop 2005\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nBishop 2005\n, pp.\n93–94.\n↑\nMüller 2012\n, p.\n169.\n↑\nMotadel 2014\n, p.\n242.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n326–330.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n88–92.\n↑\nGivhan 1997\n.\n1\n2\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, pp.\n132–134 and note 13.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n26.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n49.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, p.\n133.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nSnyder 1994\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n609.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n724.\n↑\nYerger 1997\n, pp.\n13–21.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n205–206.\n↑\nArt 2006\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, pp.\n120–121.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n107.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nAnderson 2011\n.\n↑\nMang 2003\n, pp.\n1–5.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n580.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n739–741.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n736.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n410.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, pp.\n803–804.\n↑\nMacDonogh 2009\n, p.\n3.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, pp.\n565–568.\n↑\nLowe 2012\n, pp.\n83–84.\n↑\nLowe 2012\n, pp.\n84–87.\n↑\nBrzezinski 2005\n.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n741.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n741–742.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n743.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n804.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n240–241.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n743–744.\n↑\nBurleigh 2010\n, p.\n549.\n↑\nBosacki, Uhlig\n&\nWróblewski 2008\n.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n906.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n143–144.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nArendt 2006\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n746–747.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, p.\n263.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n264–265.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n269, 273.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n294–295.\n↑\nLichtblau 2014\n, pp.\n2–3, 10–11.\n↑\nLichtblau 2014\n, pp.\n29–30, 32–37, 67–68.\n↑\nBiddiscombe 2000\n, pp.\n131–143.\n↑\nSegev 2010\n, pp.\n106–108.\n↑\nSereny 1974\n, p.\n274.\nBibliography\nAllen, Michael Thad (2002).\nThe Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps\n. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-2677-5\n.\nAnderson, Christopher (1 November 2011).\n\"Crossing the Painful Threshold of Memory\"\n.\nVienna Review\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 March 2016\n. Retrieved\n16 March\n2016\n.\nArendt, Hannah\n(2006).\nEichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303988-4\n.\nArt, David (2006).\nThe Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-85683-6\n.\nAyçoberry, Pierre (1999).\nThe Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945\n. New York: The New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-635-7\n.\nBaranowski, Shelley (2010).\nNazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-67408-9\n.\nBaxter, Ian (2014).\nNazi Concentration Camp Commandants 1933–1945: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives\n. Images of War. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78159-388-2\n.\nBeevor, Antony\n(2002).\nThe Fall of Berlin, 1945\n. New York; London: Viking.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03041-5\n.\nBessel, Richard\n(2006).\nNazism and War\n. New York: Modern Library.\nISBN\n978-0-8129-7557-4\n.\nBiddiscombe, Perry (2000). \"The Problem with Glass Houses: The Soviet Recruitment and Deployment of SS Men as Spies and Saboteurs\".\nIntelligence and National Security\n.\n15\n(3):\n131–\n145.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/02684520008432620\n.\nISSN\n0268-4527\n.\nS2CID\n153452361\n.\nBishop, Chris (2005).\nHitler's Foreign Divisions: 1940–45\n. London: Amber.\nISBN\n978-1-904687-37-5\n.\nBlood, Philip W. (2006).\nHitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe\n. Potomac Books.\nISBN\n978-1-59797-021-1\n.\nBosacki, Marcin; Uhlig, Dominik; Wróblewski, Bogdan (21 May 2008).\n\"Nikt nie chce osądzić zbrodniarza\"\n.\nGazecie Wyborczej\n(in Polish). Agora SA. Archived from\nthe original\non 7 September 2009\n. Retrieved\n30 December\n2017\n.\nBracher, Karl Dietrich (1970).\nThe German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism\n. Praeger Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-03-037556-9\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-510479-0\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R.\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8032-1327-2\n.\nBrzezinski, Matthew\n(24 July 2005).\n\"Giving Hitler Hell\"\n.\nThe Washington Post\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS – Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nBurleigh, Michael\n; Wippermann, Wolfgang (1991).\nThe Racial State: Germany 1933–1945\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-39802-2\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2000).\nThe Third Reich: A New History\n. New York: Hill and Wang.\nISBN\n978-0-8090-9325-0\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2010).\nMoral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II\n. New York: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n978-0-06-058097-1\n.\nButler, Rupert\n(2001).\nSS-Leibstandarte: The History of the First SS Division, 1934–45\n. Staplehurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-86227-117-3\n.\nButler, Rupert (2003).\nThe Black Angels\n. Staplehurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-86227-117-3\n.\nCesarani, David\n(2005) .\nEichmann: His Life and Crimes\n. London: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-09-944844-0\n.\nCentury, Rachel (January 2011).\n\"Review of\nDas SS-Helferinnenkorps: Ausbildung, Einsatz und Entnazifizierung der weiblichen Angehörigen der Waffen-SS 1942–1949\n\"\n.\nReviews in History\n. Review no. 1183\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nCook, Stan; Bender, R. James (1994).\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: Uniforms, Organization, & History\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-0-912138-55-8\n.\nDear, Ian;\nFoot, M.R.D.\n, eds. (1995).\nThe Oxford Guide to World War II\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-534096-9\n.\nDiner, Dan (2006).\nBeyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust\n. Los Angeles; Berkeley: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-520-21345-6\n.\nDuffy, Christopher\n(2002).\nRed Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945\n. Edison, New Jersey: Castle Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7858-1624-9\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFelton, Mark\n(2014).\nGuarding Hitler: The Secret World of the Führer\n. Barnsley: Pen & Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78159-305-9\n.\nFlaherty, Thomas H., ed. (2004) .\nThe Third Reich: The SS\n. Time-Life.\nISBN\n978-1-84447-073-0\n.\nForczyk, Robert (2017).\nKursk 1943: The Southern Front\n. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-47281-692-4\n.\nFord, Ken; Zaloga, Steven J. (2009).\nOverlord: The D-Day Landings\n. Oxford; New York: Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1-84603-424-4\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-18507-9\n.\nFriedlander, Henry\n(1997).\nThe Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution\n. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-4675-9\n.\nFritz, Stephen (2004).\nEndkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-2325-7\n.\nFritz, Stephen (2011).\nOstkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-3416-1\n.\nFrusetta, James (2012). \"The Final Solution in Southwestern Europe\". In\nFriedman, Jonathan C.\n(ed.).\nThe Routledge History of the Holocaust\n. New York: Taylor & Francis. pp.\n264–\n276.\nISBN\n978-0-415-52087-4\n.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nGivhan, Robin (15 August 1997).\n\"Clothier Made Nazi Uniforms\"\n.\nLos Angeles Times\n. The Washington Post\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nGlantz, David (11 October 2001),\nThe Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay\n, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs,\nClemson University\n, archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 18 February 2015.\nGruner, Wolf (2012). \"Forced Labor in Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy, 1938–45\". In\nFriedman, Jonathan C.\n(ed.).\nThe Routledge History of the Holocaust\n. New York: Taylor & Francis. pp.\n168–\n180.\nISBN\n978-0-415-52087-4\n.\nGutmann, Martin R. (2017).\nBuilding a Nazi Europe: The SS's Germanic Volunteers\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-107-15543-5\n.\nHale, Christopher\n(2011).\nHitler's Foreign Executioners: Europe's Dirty Secret\n. Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-5974-5\n.\nHayes, Peter (1991).\nLessons and Legacies Virgin Islands: New Currents in Holocaust Research\n. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8101-2001-3\n.\nHeadland, Ronald (1992).\nMessages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941–1943\n. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8386-3418-9\n.\nHeer, Hannes\n; Naumann, Klaus (2000).\nWar of Extermination: The German Military in World War II 1941–1944\n. New York: Berghahn.\nISBN\n978-1-57181-232-2\n.\nHein, Bastian (2015).\nDie SS: Geschichte und Verbrechen\n(in German). Munich: C.H. Beck.\nISBN\n978-3-406-67513-3\n.\nHellwinkel, Lars (2014).\nHitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940–1945\n. Barnsley: Seaforth.\nISBN\n978-1-84832-199-1\n.\nHilberg, Raul\n(1985).\nThe Destruction of the European Jews\n. New York: Holmes & Meier.\nISBN\n978-0-8419-0910-6\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus\n(1984).\nThe Third Reich\n. London; New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-04-943033-4\n.\nHimmler, Heinrich (1936).\nDie Schutzstaffel als antibolschewistische Kampforganisation\n[\nThe SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organization\n]\n(in German). Franz Eher Verlag.\nHoffmann, Peter\n(2000).\nHitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer 1921–1945\n. New York: Da Capo.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80947-7\n.\nHöhne, Heinz\n(2001).\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-139012-3\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-6026-4\n.\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(1946).\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n(PDF)\n. Vol.\n1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. pp.\n70–\n71.\nInternational Military Tribunal (1950).\n\"Report on the Administrative Development of Operation Reinhardt: Document NO-059: Odilo Globocnik, January 1944. Attachment NO-062: Detailed List of Money, Precious Metals, Jewels, Other Valuables, and Textiles\"\n(PDF)\n.\nNuremberg Trials. The Green Series\n. Vol.\n5. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. pp.\n728–\n731.\nOCLC\n315875936\n.\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf (1999). \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1945\". In Christian Leitz (ed.).\nThe Third Reich: The Essential Readings\n. Oxford: Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-20700-9\n.\nJoachimsthaler, Anton\n(1999).\nThe Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, The Evidence, The Truth\n. London: Brockhampton Press.\nISBN\n978-1-86019-902-8\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2001).\nHitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-32252-1\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2011).\nThe End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-314-5\n.\nKoehl, Robert (2004).\nThe SS: A History 1919–45\n. Stroud: Tempus.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-2559-7\n.\nKrausnik, Helmut (1968). \"The Persecution of the Jews\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nKrüger, Arnd\n; Wedemeyer-Kolwe, Bernd (2009).\nVergessen, verdrängt, abgelehnt – Zur Geschichte der Ausgrenzung im Sport\n(in German). Münster: Lit Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-643-10338-3\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLaqueur, Walter\n; Baumel, Judith Tydor (2001).\nThe Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-08432-0\n.\nLevy, Alan\n(2006) .\nNazi Hunter: The Wiesenthal File\n(Revised 2002\ned.). London: Constable & Robinson.\nISBN\n978-1-84119-607-7\n.\nLichtblau, Eric\n(2014).\nThe Nazis Next Door\n. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.\nISBN\n978-0-547-66919-9\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay\n(21 July 1985).\n\"What Made This Man? Mengele\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 28 September 2013\n. Retrieved\n11 January\n2014\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay\n(1986).\nThe Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04905-9\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay; Hackett, Amy (1994).\n\"The Auschwitz Prisoner Administration\"\n. In Gutman, Yisrael; Berenbaum, Michael (eds.).\nAnatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp\n. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. pp.\n363–378\n.\nISBN\n978-0-253-32684-3\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nLowe, Keith (2012).\nSavage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II\n. New York: Picador.\nISBN\n978-1-250-03356-7\n.\nMacDonogh, Giles\n(2009).\nAfter the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00337-2\n.\nMang, Thomas (2003).\n\"Gestapo-Leitstelle Wien – \"Mein Name ist Huber\"\n\"\n[\nHead Gestapo Agency of Vienna: \"My name is Huber\"\n]\n(PDF)\n.\nDöw Mitteilungen\n(in German).\n164\n:\n1–\n5.\nManning, Jeanne (1999).\nA Time to Speak\n. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner.\nISBN\n978-1-56311-560-8\n.\nMattson, Gregory L. (2002).\nSS-Das Reich: The History of the Second SS Division, 1944–45\n. Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7603-1255-1\n.\nMazower, Mark\n(2008).\nHitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-188-2\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. London: Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1-78200-088-4\n.\nMessenger, Charles (2001).\nHitler's Gladiator: The Life and Military Career of Sepp Dietrich\n. London: Brassey's.\nISBN\n978-1-57488-315-2\n.\nMichael, Robert; Doerr, Karin (2002).\nNazi-Deutsch/Nazi-German: An English Lexicon of the Language of the Third Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.\nISBN\n978-0313321061\n.\nMiles, Rosalind; Cross, Robin (26 February 2008).\nHell Hath No Fury: True Stories of Women at War from Antiquity to Iraq\n. New York: Crown.\nISBN\n978-0-307-40994-2\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMiller, Michael; Schulz, Andreas (2012).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders Of The Nazi Party And Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-21-0\n.\nMollo, Andrew\n(1991).\nUniforms of the SS: Volume 3: SS-Verfügungstruppe\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-872004-51-8\n.\nMoorhouse, Roger\n(2012).\nBerlin at War\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-02855-9\n.\nMontague, Patrick (2012).\nChelmno and the Holocaust: The History of Hitler's First Death Camp\n. London: I.B. Tauris. pp.\n188–\n190.\nISBN\n978-1-84885-722-3\n.\nMotadel, David (2014).\nIslam and Nazi Germany's War\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-72460-0\n.\nMühlenberg, Jutta (2011a).\nDas SS-Helferinnenkorps: Ausbildung, Einsatz und Entnazifizierung der weiblichen Angehörigen der Waffen-SS, 1942–1949\n(PDF)\n(in German). Hamburg: VerlagsgesmbH.\nISBN\n978-3-86854-500-5\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 4 March 2016\n. Retrieved\n12 October\n2014\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nMühlenberg, Jutta (2011b). \"Die Entnazifizierung ehemaliger SS-Helferinnen in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone\n: Verfahrensweisen, Entlastungsstrategien und Lügengeschichten\".\nAriadne: Forum für Frauen- und Geschlechtergeschichte\n(in German) (59):\n38–\n44.\ndoi\n:\n10.25595/1574\n.\nMüller, Rolf-Dieter (2012).\nThe Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers\n. New York: I.B. Taurus.\nISBN\n978-1-78076-072-8\n.\nMurray, Williamson\n;\nMillett, Allan R.\n(2001).\nA War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War\n. Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-00680-5\n.\nOepen, Joachim; Rosen, Wolfgang; Wunsch, Stefan, eds. (2020).\nGeschichte in Köln 67 (2020): Zeitschrift für Stadt- und Regionalgeschichte\n(in German). Böhlau Köln.\nISBN\n978-3-412-52004-5\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n(2001) .\nHimmler: Reichsführer-SS\n. London: Cassel & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-304-35839-7\n.\nParker, Danny S. (2012).\nFatal Crossroads: The Untold Story of the Malmédy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo.\nISBN\n978-0-306-81193-7\n.\nPieper, Henning (2015).\nFegelein's Horsemen and Genocidal Warfare: The SS Cavalry Brigade in the Soviet Union\n. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-1-137-45631-1\n.\nPiper, Franciszek (1994).\n\"Gas Chambers and Crematoria\"\n. In Gutman, Yisrael; Berenbaum, Michael (eds.).\nAnatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp\n. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. pp.\n157–182\n.\nISBN\n978-0-253-32684-3\n.\nPosner, Gerald L.\n;\nWare, John\n(1986).\nMengele: The Complete Story\n. New York: McGraw-Hill.\nISBN\n978-0-07-050598-8\n.\nPringle, Heather\n(2006).\nThe Master Plan: Himmler's Scholars and the Holocaust\n. London: Fourth Estate.\nISBN\n978-0-00-714812-7\n.\nProctor, Robert (1988).\nRacial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-74578-0\n.\nRead, Anthony\n(2005).\nThe Devil's Disciples: Hitler's Inner Circle\n. New York; London: Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-32697-0\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald\n(1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRempel, Gerhard (1989).\nHitler's Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS\n. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-4299-7\n.\nReynolds, Michael Frank (1997).\nSteel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy: The Story of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions in the 1944 Normandy Campaign\n. Steelhurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-873376-90-4\n.\nRhodes, Richard\n(2003).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-375-70822-0\n.\nRossino, Alexander B.\n(2003).\nHitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity\n. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.\nISBN\n978-0-7006-1234-5\n.\nRuda, Adrian (2023).\nDer Totenkopf als Motiv: Eine historisch-kulturanthropologische Analyse zwischen Militär und Moden\n(in German). Böhlau Köln.\nISBN\n978-3-412-52891-1\n.\nRummel, Rudolph\n(1992).\nDemocide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder\n. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1-56000-004-4\n.\nSchwarz, Gudrun (1997).\nEine Frau an seiner Seite. Ehefrauen in der »SS-Sippengemeinschaft«\n(in German). Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.\nISBN\n978-3-930908-32-5\n.\nSeaton, Albert (1971).\nThe Russo-German War, 1941–45\n. New York: Praeger Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-213-76478-4\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(2010).\nSimon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends\n. New York: Schocken Books.\nISBN\n978-0-385-51946-5\n.\nSereny, Gitta\n(1974).\nInto That Darkness: From Mercy Killings to Mass Murder\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-394-71035-8\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSnyder, Louis\n(1994) .\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson\n(1992).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. New York: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13-393182-2\n.\nStackelberg, Roderick (2002).\nHitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies\n. London; New York: Taylor & Francis.\nISBN\n978-0-203-00541-5\n.\nStackelberg, Roderick (2007).\nThe Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-30861-8\n.\nStein, George (2002) .\nThe Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939–1945\n. Cerberus Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1841451008\n.\nSteinbacher, Sybille (2005) .\nAuschwitz: A History\n. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck.\nISBN\n978-0-06-082581-2\n.\nStockert, Peter (1997).\nDie Eichenlaubträger 1939–1945 Band 2\n[\nThe Oak Leaves Bearers 1939–1945 Volume 2\n]\n(in German). Bad Friedrichshall, Germany: Friedrichshaller Rundblick.\nISBN\n978-3-9802222-9-7\n.\nStone, David\n(2011).\nShattered Genius: The Decline and Fall of the German General Staff in World War II\n. Philadelphia: Casemate.\nISBN\n978-1-61200-098-5\n.\nStreim, Alfred (1989). \"The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen, pages 436–454\". In\nMarrus, Michael\n(ed.).\nThe Nazi Holocaust, Part 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder, Volume 2\n. Westpoint, Connecticut: Meckler.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nSydnor, Charles W (1977).\nSoldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933–1945\n. Princeton University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-691-05255-7\n.\nOCLC\n1202023457\n.\nWachsmann, Nikolaus\n(2010). \"The Dynamics of Destruction\". In\nCaplan, Jane\n; Wachsmann, Nikolaus (eds.).\nConcentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-42651-0\n.\nWachsmann, Nikolaus (2015).\nKL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps\n. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.\nISBN\n978-0-374-11825-9\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1-4087-0304-5\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard\n(1994).\nA World at Arms: A Global History of World War II\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-44317-3\n.\nWestermann, Edward B.\n(6 June 2025).\n\"Einsatzgruppen: Nazi killing units\"\n. Encyclopædia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n17 June\n2025\n.\nWhitmarsh, Andrew (2009).\nD-Day in Photographs\n. Stroud: History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-5095-7\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography (Vol. 1)\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-5-6\n.\nWilmot, Chester\n(1997) .\nThe Struggle For Europe\n. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions.\nISBN\n978-1-85326-677-5\n.\nWindrow, Martin\n; Burn, Jeffrey (1992).\nThe Waffen-SS\n. Men At Arms. London: Osprey.\nISBN\n978-0-85045-425-3\n.\nYahil, Leni\n(1990).\nThe Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-504522-2\n.\nYenne, Bill (2010).\nHitler's Master of the Dark Arts: Himmler's Black Knights and the Occult Origins of the SS\n. Minneapolis: Zenith.\nISBN\n978-0-7603-3778-3\n.\nYerger, Mark C. (1997).\nAllgemeine-SS: The Commands, Units, and Leaders of the General SS\n. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer.\nISBN\n978-0-7643-0145-2\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: MacMillan.\nISBN\n978-0-02-897500-9\n.\nZetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2016).\nKursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis\n. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.\nISBN\n978-1-13526-817-6\n.\nZiegler, Herbert (2014).\nNazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership, 1925–1939\n. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1515/9781400860364\n.\nISBN\n978-0-691-60636-1\n.\nJSTOR\nj.ctt7zvdt8\n.\nZiemke, Earl F (1968).\nStalingrad to Berlin: the German defeat in the east\n. Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army.\nOCLC\n1169880509\n.\nFurther reading\nBrowder, George C. (1990).\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. Lexington: University of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-1697-6\n.\nGellately, Robert\n(1990).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-822869-1\n.\nJohnson, Eric\n(1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04906-6\n.\nMiller, Michael (2015).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 2\n. San Jose, CA: Bender.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-25-8\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(1988).\nSoldiers of Evil: The Commandants of the Nazi Concentration Camps\n. New York: McGraw Hill.\nISBN\n978-0-07-056058-1\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nSS (Nazi Germany)\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nComprehensive report of Einsatzgruppe A up to 15 October 1941\nJudgment of Nuremberg Trials on the SS\nSS\nat the\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\nTestimonies concerning SS crimes in occupied Poland in \"Chronicles of Terror\" testimony database",
+    "infobox": {
+      "formed": "4 April 1925[1]",
+      "preceding_agencies": "Sturmabteilung(SA)Stabswache",
+      "dissolved": "8 May 1945 (de facto)10 October 1945 (de jure)",
+      "type": "Paramilitary",
+      "jurisdiction": "Nazi GermanyandGerman-occupied Europe",
+      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin52°30′25″N13°22′58″E/���52.50694°N 13.38278°E/52.50694; 13.38278",
+      "employees": "800,000 (c.1944)",
+      "reichsführerresponsible": "Heinrich Himmler(longest serving)Julius Schreck(first)Karl Hanke(last)",
+      "parent_agency": "Nazi PartySturmabteilung(until July 1934)",
+      "child_agencies": "Allgemeine SSWaffen-SSSS-Totenkopfverbände(SS-TV)Sicherheitspolizei(SiPo; until 1939, when folded into theRSHA)Sicherheitsdienst(SD)Ordnungspolizei(Orpo)"
+    },
+    "char_count": 115203
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Gestapo",
+    "name": "Gestapo",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "The Geheime Staatspolizei, abbreviated Gestapo ( ), was the official secret police of Nazi Germany and in German-occupied Europe.",
+    "description": "Secret police of Nazi Germany",
+    "full_text": "Gestapo\nSecret police of Nazi Germany\nNot to be confused with the\nGestapu\n, a military faction in Indonesia.\nLaw enforcement agency\nThe\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n(\n[\nɡəˈhaɪmə\nˈʃtaːtspoliˌtsaɪ\n]\n,\nlit.\n'\nSecret State Police\n'\n),\nabbreviated\nGestapo\n(\n[\nɡəˈstaːpo\n]\n),\nwas the official\nsecret police\nof\nNazi Germany\nand in\nGerman-occupied Europe\n.\nThe force was created by\nHermann Göring\nin 1933 by combining the various political police agencies of\nPrussia\ninto one organisation. On 20 April 1934, oversight of the Gestapo passed to the head of the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS),\nHeinrich Himmler\n, who was also appointed Chief of German Police by Hitler in 1936. Instead of being exclusively a Prussian state agency, the Gestapo became a national one as a sub-office of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police). From 27 September 1939, it was administered by the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA). It became known as\nAmt\n(Dept) 4 of the RSHA and was considered a sister organisation to the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD; Security Service).\nThe Gestapo committed widespread atrocities during its existence. The power of the Gestapo was used to focus upon political opponents, ideological dissenters (clergy and religious organisations), career criminals, the\nSinti\nand\nRoma\npopulation, handicapped persons, homosexuals, and, above all, the Jews.\nThose arrested by the Gestapo were often held without judicial process, and\npolitical prisoners\nthroughout Germany—and from 1941, throughout the occupied territories under the\nNight and Fog Decree\n(\nGerman\n:\nNacht und Nebel\n)—simply\ndisappeared\nwhile in Gestapo custody.\nContrary to popular perception, the Gestapo was actually a relatively small organization with limited surveillance capability; still it proved extremely effective due to the willingness of ordinary Germans to report on fellow citizens. During\nWorld War II\n, the Gestapo played a key role in\nthe Holocaust\n. After the war ended, the Gestapo was declared a criminal organisation by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at the\nNuremberg trials\n, and several top Gestapo members were sentenced to death.\nHistory\nRudolf Diels\n, first Commander of the Gestapo; 1933–1934\nAfter\nAdolf Hitler\nbecame\nChancellor of Germany\n,\nHermann Göring\n—future commander of the\nLuftwaffe\nand the number-two man in the\nNazi Party\n—was named\nInterior Minister\nof\nPrussia\n.\nThis gave Göring command of the largest police force in Germany. Soon afterward, Göring detached the political and intelligence sections from the police and filled their ranks with Nazis. On 26 April 1933, Göring merged the two units as the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n, which was abbreviated by a post office clerk for a\nfranking\nstamp and became known as the \"Gestapo\".\nHe originally wanted to name it the Secret Police Office (\nGeheimes Polizeiamt\n), but the German initials, \"GPA\", were too similar to those of the\nSoviet\nState Political Directorate\n(\nGosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie\n, or GPU).\nThe first commander of the Gestapo was\nRudolf Diels\n, a protégé of Göring. Diels was appointed with the title of chief of\nAbteilung Ia\n(Department 1a) of the\nPrussian Secret Police\n.\nDiels was best known as the primary interrogator of\nMarinus van der Lubbe\nafter the\nReichstag fire\n. In late 1933, the Reich Interior Minister\nWilhelm Frick\nwanted to integrate all the police forces of the German states under his control. Göring outflanked him by removing the Prussian political and intelligence departments from the state interior ministry.\nGöring took over the Gestapo in 1934 and urged Hitler to extend the agency's authority throughout Germany. This represented a radical departure from German tradition, which held that law enforcement was (mostly) a\nLand\n(state) and local matter. In this, he ran into conflict with\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) chief\nHeinrich Himmler\nwho was police chief of the second most powerful German state,\nBavaria\n. Frick did not have the political power to take on Göring by himself so he allied with Himmler. With Frick's support, Himmler (pushed on by his right-hand man,\nReinhard Heydrich\n) took over the political police in state after state. Soon only Prussia was left.\nHeinrich Himmler\nand\nHermann Göring\nat the meeting to formally hand over control of the Gestapo (Berlin, 1934)\nConcerned that Diels was not ruthless enough to effectively counteract the power of the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA), Göring handed over control of the Gestapo to Himmler on 20 April 1934.\nAlso on that date, Hitler appointed Himmler chief of all German police outside Prussia. Heydrich, named chief of the Gestapo by Himmler on 22 April 1934, also continued as head of the SS Security Service (\nSicherheitsdienst\n, SD).\nHimmler and Heydrich both immediately began installing their own personnel in select positions, several of whom were directly from the\nBavarian Political Police\n, such as\nHeinrich Müller\n,\nFranz Josef Huber\n, and\nJosef Meisinger\n.\nMany of the Gestapo employees in the newly established offices were young and highly educated in a wide variety of academic fields and moreover, represented a new generation of National Socialist adherents, who were hard-working, efficient, and prepared to carry the Nazi state forward through the persecution of their political opponents.\nBy the spring of 1934, Himmler's SS controlled the SD and the Gestapo, but for him, there was still a problem, as technically the SS (and the Gestapo by proxy) was subordinated to the SA, which was under the command of\nErnst Röhm\n.\nHimmler wanted to free himself entirely from Röhm, whom he viewed as an obstacle.\nRöhm's position was menacing as more than 4.5 million men fell under his command once the\nmilitias\nand veterans organisations were absorbed by the SA,\na fact which fuelled Röhm's aspirations; his dream of fusing the SA and\nReichswehr\ntogether was undermining Hitler's relationships with the leadership of Germany's armed forces.\nSeveral Nazi chieftains, among them Göring, Joseph Goebbels, Rudolf Hess, and Himmler, began a concerted campaign to convince Hitler to take action against Röhm.\nBoth the SD and Gestapo released information concerning an imminent\nputsch\nby the SA.\nOnce persuaded, Hitler acted by setting Himmler's SS into action, who then proceeded to murder over 100 of Hitler's identified antagonists. The Gestapo supplied the information which implicated the SA and ultimately enabled Himmler and Heydrich to emancipate themselves entirely from the organisation.\nFor the Gestapo, the next two years following the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, a term describing the putsch against Röhm and the SA, were characterised by \"behind-the-scenes political wrangling over policing\".\n1938 Gestapo border inspection stamp applied when leaving Germany\nOn 17 June 1936, Hitler decreed the unification of all police forces in Germany and named Himmler as Chief of German Police.\nThis action effectively merged the police into the SS and removed it from Frick's control. Himmler was nominally subordinate to Frick as police chief, but as\nReichsführer-SS\n, he answered only to Hitler. This move also gave Himmler operational control over Germany's entire detective force.\nThe Gestapo became a national state agency. Himmler also gained authority over all of Germany's uniformed law enforcement agencies, which were amalgamated into the new\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo; Order Police), which became a national agency under SS general\nKurt Daluege\n.\nShortly thereafter, Himmler created the\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo; Criminal Police), merging it with the Gestapo into the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police), under Heydrich's command.\nHeinrich Müller was at that time the Gestapo operations chief.\nHe answered to Heydrich, Heydrich answered only to Himmler, and Himmler answered only to Hitler.\nThe Gestapo had the authority to investigate cases of\ntreason\n, espionage,\nsabotage\nand criminal attacks on the Nazi Party and Germany. The basic Gestapo law passed by the government in 1936 gave the Gestapo\ncarte blanche\nto operate without\njudicial review\n—in effect, putting it above the law.\nThe Gestapo was specifically exempted from responsibility to administrative courts, where citizens normally could sue the state to conform to laws. As early as 1935, a Prussian administrative court had ruled that the Gestapo's actions were not subject to judicial review. The SS officer\nWerner Best\n, one-time head of legal affairs in the Gestapo,\nsummed up this policy by saying, \"As long as the police carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting legally\".\nOn 27 September 1939, the security and police agencies of Nazi Germany—with the exception of the Order Police—were consolidated into the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA), headed by Heydrich.\nThe Gestapo became\nAmt IV\n(Department IV) of RSHA and Müller became the Gestapo Chief, with Heydrich as his immediate superior.\nAfter Heydrich's 1942 assassination, Himmler assumed the leadership of the RSHA until January 1943, when\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\nwas appointed chief.\nMüller remained the Gestapo Chief. His direct subordinate\nAdolf Eichmann\nheaded the Gestapo's Office of Resettlement and then its Office of Jewish Affairs (\nReferat IV B4\nor Sub-Department IV, Section B4).\nDuring the Holocaust, Eichmann's department within the Gestapo coordinated the mass deportation of European Jews to the Nazis'\nextermination camps\n.\nThe power of the Gestapo included the use of what was called,\nSchutzhaft\n—\"protective custody\", a\neuphemism\nfor the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings.\nAn oddity of the system was that the prisoner had to sign his own\nSchutzhaftbefehl\n, an order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment—presumably out of fear of personal harm. In addition,\npolitical prisoners\nthroughout Germany—and from 1941, throughout the occupied territories under the\nNight and Fog Decree\n(\nGerman\n:\nNacht und Nebel\n)—simply\ndisappeared\nwhile in Gestapo custody.\nUp to 30 April 1944, at least 6,639 persons were arrested under\nNacht und Nebel\norders.\nHowever, the total number of people who disappeared as a result of this decree is not known.\nCounterintelligence\nThe\nPolish government-in-exile\nin London during World War II received sensitive military information about Nazi Germany from agents and informants throughout Europe. After\nGermany conquered Poland\n(in the autumn of 1939), Gestapo officials believed that they had neutralised Polish intelligence activities. However, certain Polish information about the movement of German police and SS units to the East during 1941\nGerman invasion\nof the\nSoviet Union\nwas similar to information British intelligence secretly obtained through intercepting and decoding German police and SS messages sent by\nradio telegraphy\n.\nIn 1942, the Gestapo discovered a cache of Polish intelligence documents in\nPrague\nand were surprised to see that Polish agents and informants had been gathering detailed military information and smuggling it out to London, via\nBudapest\nand\nIstanbul\n. The Poles identified and tracked German military trains to the Eastern front and identified four\nOrder Police battalions\nsent to occupied areas of the Soviet Union in October 1941 that engaged in\nwar crimes\nand\nmass murder\n.\nPolish agents also gathered detailed information about the morale of German soldiers in the East. After uncovering a sample of the information the Poles had reported, Gestapo officials concluded that Polish intelligence activity represented a very serious danger to Germany. As late as 6 June 1944, Heinrich Müller—concerned about the leakage of information to the Allies—set up a special unit called\nSonderkommando Jerzy\nthat was meant to root out the Polish intelligence network in western and southwestern Europe.\nIn Austria, there were groups still loyal to the\nHabsburgs\n, who unlike most across the Greater German Reich, remained determined to resist the Nazis. These groups became a special focus of the Gestapo because of their insurrectionist goals—the overthrow of the Nazi regime, the re-establishment of an independent Austria under Habsburg leadership—and Hitler's hatred of the Habsburg family. Hitler vehemently rejected the centuries' old Habsburg pluralist principles of \"live and let live\" with regard to ethnic groups, peoples, minorities, religions, cultures and languages.\nHabsburg loyalist\nKarl Burian\n's (who was later executed) plan to blow up the Gestapo headquarters in Vienna represented a unique attempt to act aggressively against the Gestapo. Burian's group had also set up a secret courier service to\nOtto von Habsburg\nin Belgium. Individuals in Austrian resistance groups led by\nHeinrich Maier\nalso managed to pass along the plans and the location of production facilities for\nV-1\n,\nV-2 rockets\n,\nTiger tanks\n, and aircraft (\nMesserschmitt Bf 109\n,\nMesserschmitt Me 163 Komet\n, etc.) to the Allies.\nThe Maier group informed very early about the mass murder of Jews. The resistance group, later discovered by the Gestapo because of a double agent of the Abwehr, was in contact with\nAllen Dulles\n, the head of the US\nOffice of Strategic Services\nin Switzerland. Although Maier and the other group members were severely tortured, the Gestapo did not uncover the essential involvement of the resistance group in\nOperation Crossbow\nand\nOperation Hydra\n.\nSuppression of resistance and persecution\nEarly in the regime's existence, harsh measures were meted out to political opponents and those who resisted\nNazi doctrine\n, such as members of the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD); a role originally performed by the SA until the SD and Gestapo undermined their influence and took control of Reich security.\nBecause the Gestapo seemed\nomniscient\nand\nomnipotent\n, the atmosphere of fear they created led to an overestimation of their reach and strength; a faulty assessment which hampered the operational effectiveness of underground resistance organisations.\nTrade unions\nShortly after the Nazis came to power, they decided to dissolve the 28 federations of the General German Trade Union Confederation, because Hitler—after noting their success in the works council elections—intended to consolidate all German workers under the Nazi government's administration, a decision he made on 7 April 1933.\nAs a preface to this action, Hitler decreed May 1 as National Labor Day to celebrate German workers, a move the trade union leaders welcomed. With their trade union flags waving, Hitler gave a rousing speech to the 1.5 million people assembled on Berlin's\nTempelhofer Feld\nthat was nationally broadcast, during which he extolled the nation's revival and working class solidarity.\nOn the following day, the newly formed Gestapo officers, who had been shadowing some 58 trade union leaders, arrested them wherever they could find them—many in their homes.\nMeanwhile, the SA and police occupied trade union headquarters, arrested functionaries, confiscated their property and assets; all by design so as to be replaced on 12 May by the\nGerman Labour Front\n(DAF), a Nazi organisation placed under the leadership of\nRobert Ley\n.\nFor their part, this was the first time the Gestapo operated under its new name since its 26 April 1933 founding in Prussia.\nReligious dissent\nMany parts of Germany (where religious dissent existed upon the Nazi seizure of power) saw a rapid transformation; a change as noted by the Gestapo in conservative towns such as Würzburg, where people acquiesced to the regime either through accommodation, collaboration, or simple compliance.\nIncreasing religious objections to Nazi policies led the Gestapo to carefully monitor church organisations. For the most part, members of the church did not offer political resistance but simply wanted to ensure that organizational doctrine remained intact.\nHowever, the Nazi regime sought to suppress any source of ideology other than its own, and set out to muzzle or crush the churches in the so-called\nKirchenkampf\n. When Church leaders (\nclergy\n) voiced their misgiving about the\neuthanasia\nprogram and Nazi racial policies, Hitler intimated that he considered them \"traitors to the people\" and went so far as to call them \"the destroyers of Germany\".\nThe extreme\nanti-semitism\nand\nneo-pagan\nheresies of the Nazis caused some Christians to outright resist,\nand\nPope Pius XI\nto issue the encyclical\nMit brennender Sorge\ndenouncing Nazism and warning Catholics against joining or supporting the Party. Some pastors, like the Protestant clergyman\nDietrich Bonhoeffer\n, paid for their opposition with their lives.\nIn an effort to counter the strength and influence of spiritual resistance, Nazi records reveal that the Gestapo's\nReferat B1\nmonitored the activities of bishops very closely—instructing that agents be set up in every diocese, that the bishops' reports to the\nVatican\nshould be obtained and that the bishops' areas of activity must be found out. Deans were to be targeted as the \"eyes and ears of the bishops\" and a \"vast network\" established to monitor the activities of ordinary clergy: \"The importance of this enemy is such that inspectors of security police and of the security service will make this group of people and the questions discussed by them their special concern\".\nIn\nDachau: The Official History 1933–1945\n, Paul Berben wrote that clergy were watched closely, and frequently denounced, arrested and sent to\nNazi concentration camps\n: \"One priest was imprisoned in Dachau for having stated that there were good folk in England too; another suffered the same fate for warning a girl who wanted to marry an S.S. man after abjuring the Catholic faith; yet another because he conducted a service for a deceased communist\". Others were arrested simply on the basis of being \"suspected of activities hostile to the State\" or that there was reason to \"suppose that his dealings might harm society\".\nOver 2,700\nCatholic\n,\nProtestant\n, and\nOrthodox\nclergy were imprisoned at Dachau alone. After Heydrich (who was staunchly anti-Catholic and anti-Christian) was assassinated in Prague, his successor, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, relaxed some of the policies and then disbanded Department IVB (religious opponents) of the Gestapo.\nHomosexuality\nViolence and arrest were not confined to that opposing political parties, membership in trade unions, or those with dissenting religious opinions, but also homosexuality. It was viewed negatively by Hitler.\nHomosexuals were correspondingly considered a threat to the\nVolksgemeinschaft\n(National Community).\nFrom the Nazis rise to national power in 1933, the number of court verdicts against homosexuals steadily increased and only declined once the Second World War started.\nIn 1934, a special Gestapo office was set up in Berlin to deal with homosexuality.\nDespite male homosexuality being considered a greater danger to \"national survival\", lesbianism was likewise viewed as unacceptable—deemed gender nonconformity—and a number of individual reports on lesbians can be found in Gestapo files.\nBetween 1933 and 1935, some 4,000 men were arrested; between 1936 and 1939, another 30,000 men were convicted.\nIf homosexuals showed any signs of sympathy to the Nazis' identified racial enemies, they were considered an even greater danger.\nAccording to Gestapo case files, the majority of those arrested for homosexuality were males between eighteen and twenty-five years of age.\nStudent opposition\nBetween June 1942 and March 1943, student protests were calling for an end to the Nazi regime. These included the non-violent resistance of\nHans\nand\nSophie Scholl\n, two leaders of the\nWhite Rose\nstudent group.\nHowever, resistance groups and those who were in moral or political opposition to the Nazis were stalled by the fear of reprisals from the Gestapo. Fearful of an internal overthrow, the forces of the Gestapo were unleashed on the opposition. Groups like the\nWhite Rose\nand others, such as the\nEdelweiss Pirates\n, and the\nSwing Youth\n, were placed under close Gestapo observation. Some participants were sent to concentration camps. Leading members of the most famous of these groups, the White Rose, were arrested by the police and turned over to the Gestapo. For several leaders the punishment was death.\nDuring the first five months of 1943, the Gestapo arrested thousands suspected of resistance activities and carried out numerous executions. Student opposition leaders were executed in late February, and a major opposition organisation, the\nOster Circle\n, was destroyed in April 1943.\nEfforts to resist the Nazi regime amounted to very little and had only minor chances of success, particularly since a broad percentage of the German people did not support such actions.\nGeneral opposition and military conspiracy\nBetween 1934 and 1938, opponents of the Nazi regime and their fellow travellers began to emerge. Among the first to speak out were religious dissenters but following in their wake were educators,\naristocratic\nbusinessmen, office workers, teachers, and others from nearly every walk of life.\nMost people quickly learned that open opposition was dangerous since Gestapo informants and agents were widespread. However, a significant number of them still worked against the National Socialist government.\nIn May 1935, the Gestapo broke up and arrested members of the \"Markwitz Circle\", a group of former socialists in contact with\nOtto Strasser\n, who sought Hitler's downfall.\nFrom the mid-1930s into the early 1940s—various groups made up of communists, idealists, working-class people, and far-right conservative opposition organisations covertly fought against Hitler's government, and several of them fomented plots that included Hitler's assassination. Nearly all of them, including: the Römer Group, Robby Group,\nSolf Circle\n,\nSchwarze Reichswehr\n, the Party of the Radical Middle Class,\nJungdeutscher Orden\n,\nSchwarze Front\nand\nStahlhelm\nwere either discovered or infiltrated by the Gestapo. This led to corresponding arrests, being sent to concentration camps and execution.\nOne of the methods employed by the Gestapo to contend with these resistance factions was 'protective detention' which facilitated the process in expediting dissenters to concentration camps and against which there was no\nlegal defence\n.\nPhotograph from 1939: shown from left to right are\nFranz Josef Huber\n,\nArthur Nebe\n,\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nReinhard Heydrich\nand\nHeinrich Müller\nplanning the investigation of the bomb assassination attempt on\nAdolf Hitler\non 8 November 1939 in\nMunich\n.\nEarly efforts to resist the Nazis with aid from abroad were hindered when the opposition's peace feelers to the Western\nAllies\ndid not meet with success. This was partly because of the\nVenlo incident\nof 9 November 1939,\nin which SD and Gestapo agents, posing as anti-Nazis in the\nNetherlands\n, kidnapped two British\nSecret Intelligence Service\n(SIS) officers after having lured them to a meeting to discuss peace terms. This prompted\nWinston Churchill\nto ban any further contact with the German opposition.\nLater, the British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazis because they were fearful that the Soviet Union would believe they were attempting to make deals behind their back.\nThe German opposition was in an unenviable position by the late spring and early summer of 1943. On one hand, it was next to impossible for them to overthrow Hitler and the party; on the other, the Allied demand for an unconditional surrender meant no opportunity for a compromise peace, which left the military and conservative aristocrats who opposed the regime no option (in their eyes) other than continuing the military struggle.\nDespite the fear of the Gestapo after mass arrests and executions in the spring, the opposition still plotted and planned. One of the more famous schemes,\nOperation Valkyrie\n, involved a number of senior German officers and was carried out by Colonel\nClaus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg\n. In an attempt to assassinate Hitler, Stauffenberg planted a bomb underneath a conference table inside the\nWolf's Lair\nfield headquarters.\nKnown as the\n20 July plot\n, this assassination attempt failed and Hitler was only slightly injured. Reports indicate that the Gestapo was caught unaware of this plot as they did not have sufficient protections in place at the appropriate locations nor did they take any preventative steps.\nStauffenberg and his group were shot on 21 July 1944; meanwhile, his fellow conspirators were rounded up by the Gestapo and sent to a concentration camp. Thereafter, there was a show trial overseen by\nRoland Freisler\n, followed by their execution.\nSome Germans were convinced that it was their duty to apply all possible expedients to end the war as quickly as possible.\nSabotage\nefforts were undertaken by members of the\nAbwehr\n(military intelligence) leadership, as they recruited people known to oppose the Nazi regime.\nThe Gestapo cracked down ruthlessly on dissidents in Germany, just as they did everywhere else. Opposition became more difficult. Arrests, torture, and executions were common. Terror against \"state enemies\" had become a way of life to such a degree that the Gestapo's presence and methods were eventually normalised in the minds of people living in Nazi Germany.\nOrganisation\nIn January 1933, Hermann Göring, Hitler's\nminister without portfolio\n, was appointed the head of the Prussian Police and began filling the political and intelligence units of the Prussian Secret Police with\nNazi Party\nmembers.\nA year after the organisation's inception, Göring wrote in a British publication about having created the organisation on his own initiative and how he was \"chiefly responsible\" for the elimination of the\nMarxist\nand Communist threat to Germany and\nPrussia\n.\nDescribing the activities of the organisation, Göring boasted about the utter ruthlessness required for Germany's recovery, the establishment of concentration camps for that purpose, and even went on to claim that excesses were committed in the beginning, recounting how beatings took place here and there.\nOn 26 April 1933, he reorganised the force's\nAmt III\nas the\nGestapa\n(better-known by the \"\nsobriquet\n\" Gestapo),\na secret state police intended to serve the Nazi cause.\nLess than two weeks later in early May 1933, the Gestapo moved into their Berlin headquarters at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8.\nAs a result of its 1936 merger with the Kripo (National criminal police) to form sub-units of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police), the Gestapo was officially classified as a government agency. Himmler's subsequent appointment to\nChef der Deutschen Polizei\n(Chief of German Police) and status as\nReichsführer-SS\nmade him independent of Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick's nominal control.\nThe SiPo was placed under the direct command of Reinhard Heydrich who was already chief of the Nazi Party's intelligence service, the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD).\nThe idea was to fully identify and integrate the party agency (SD) with the state agency (SiPo). Most SiPo members joined the SS and held a rank in both organisations. Nevertheless, in practice there was jurisdictional overlap and operational conflict between the SD and Gestapo.\nHeinrich Müller\n, Chief of the Gestapo; 1939–1945\nIn September 1939, the SiPo and SD were merged into the newly created\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n(RSHA;\nReich Security Main Office\n). Both the Gestapo and Kripo became distinct departments within the RSHA.\nAlthough the\nSicherheitspolizei\nwas officially disbanded, the term SiPo was figuratively used to describe any RSHA personnel throughout the remainder of the war. In lieu of naming convention changes, the original construct of the SiPo, Gestapo, and Kripo cannot be fully comprehended as \"discrete entities\", since they ultimately formed \"a conglomerate in which each was wedded to each other and the SS through its Security Service, the SD\".\nThe creation of the RSHA represented the formalisation, at the top level, of the relationship under which the SD served as the intelligence agency for the security police. A similar co-ordination existed in the local offices. Within Germany and areas which were incorporated within the Reich for the purpose of civil administration, local offices of the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD were formally separate. They were subject to co-ordination by inspectors of the security police and SD on the staffs of the local higher SS and police leaders, however, and one of the principal functions of the local SD units was to serve as the intelligence agency for the local Gestapo units. In the occupied territories, the formal relationship between local units of the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD was slightly closer.\nThe Gestapo became known as RSHA\nAmt IV\n(\"Department or Office IV\") with Heinrich Müller as its chief.\nIn January 1943, Himmler appointed Ernst Kaltenbrunner RSHA chief; almost seven months after\nHeydrich had been assassinated\n.\nThe specific internal departments of\nAmt IV\nwere as follows:\nDepartment A (Political Opponents)\nCommunists (A1)\nCounter-sabotage (A2)\nReactionaries, liberals, and opposition (A3)\nProtective services (A4)\nDepartment B (Sects and Churches)\nCatholicism (B1)\nProtestantism (B2)\nFreemasons\nand other churches (B3)\nJewish affairs (B4)\nDepartment C (Administration and Party Affairs), central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel including all officials.\nFiles, card, indexes, information, and administration (C1)\nProtective custody (C2)\nPress office (C3)\nNSDAP matters (C4)\nDepartment D (Occupied Territories), administration for regions outside the\nReich\n.\nProtectorate affairs, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, regions of Yugoslavia, Greece (D1)\n1st Belgrade Special Combat detachment\nGeneral Government(D2)\nConfidential office – hostile foreigners,\nemigrants\n(D3)\nOccupied territories – France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark (D4)\nOccupied Eastern territories (D5)\nDepartment E (Security and counterintelligence)\nIn the\nReich\n(E1)\nPolicy and economic formation (E2)\nWest (E3)\nScandinavia (North)(E4)\nEast (E5)\nSouth (E6)\nIn 1941\nReferat N\n, the central command office of the Gestapo was formed. However, these internal departments remained and the Gestapo continued to be a department under the RSHA umbrella. The local offices of the Gestapo, known as Gestapo\nLeitstellen\nand\nStellen\n, answered to a local commander known as the\nInspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n(Inspector of the Security Police and Security Service) who, in turn, was under the dual command of\nReferat N\nof the Gestapo and also his local\nSS and Police Leader\n.\nIn total, there were some fifty-four regional Gestapo offices across the German federal states.\nThe Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and Police Leaders, and supplied personnel as needed to formations such as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nPersonnel assigned to these auxiliary duties were often removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of branches of the SS.\nIt was the Gestapo chief, SS-\nBrigadierführer\nHeinrich Müller, who kept Hitler abreast of the killing operations in the Soviet Union and who issued orders to the four\nEinsatzgruppen\nthat their continual work in the east was to be \"presented to the Führer.\"\nFemale criminal investigation career\nAccording to regulations issued by the Reich Security Main Office in 1940, women who had been trained in\nsocial work\nor having a similar education could be hired as female detectives. Female youth leaders, lawyers, business administrators with experience in social work, female leaders in the\nReichsarbeitsdienst\nand personnel administrators in the\nBund Deutscher Mädel\nwere hired as detectives after a one-year course, if they had several years professional experience. Later, nurses, kindergarten teachers, and trained female commercial employees with an aptitude for police work were hired as female detectives after a two-year course as\nKriminaloberassistentin\nand could promote to a\nKriminalsekretärin\n. After another two or three years in that grade, the female detective could advance to\nKriminalobersekretärin\n. Further promotions to\nKriminalkommissarin\nand\nKriminalrätin\nwere also possible.\nMembership\nGestapo members in\nKlatovy\n,\nGerman-occupied Czechoslovakia\nIn 1933, there was no purge of the German police forces.\nThe vast majority of Gestapo officers came from the police forces of the Weimar Republic; members of the SS, the SA, and the Nazi Party also joined the Gestapo but were less numerous.\nBy March 1937, the Gestapo employed an estimated 6,500 people in fifty-four regional offices across the Reich.\nAdditional staff were added in March 1938 consequent the annexation of Austria and again in October 1938 with the acquisition of the\nSudetenland\n.\nIn 1939, only 3,000 out of the total of 20,000 Gestapo men held SS ranks, and in most cases, these were honorary.\nOne man who served in the Prussian Gestapo in 1933 recalled that most of his co-workers \"were by no means all Nazis. For the most part they were young professional civil service officers...\"\nThe Nazis valued police competence more than politics, so in general in 1933, almost all of the men who served in the various state police forces under the\nWeimar Republic\nstayed on in their jobs.\nIn\nWürzburg\n, which is one of the few places in Germany where most of the Gestapo records survived, every member of the Gestapo was a career policeman or had a police background.\nThe Canadian historian\nRobert Gellately\nwrote that most Gestapo men were not Nazis, but at the same time were not opposed to the Nazi regime, which they were willing to serve, in whatever task they were called upon to perform.\nOver time, membership in the Gestapo included ideological training, particularly once Werner Best assumed a leading role for training in April 1936. Employing biological metaphors, Best emphasised a doctrine which encouraged members of the Gestapo to view themselves as 'doctors' to the 'national body' in the struggle against \"pathogens\" and \"diseases\"; among the implied sicknesses were \"communists, Freemasons, and the churches—and above and behind all these stood the Jews\".\nHeydrich thought along similar lines and advocated both defensive and offensive measures on the part of the Gestapo, so as to prevent any subversion or destruction of the National Socialist body.\nWhether trained as police originally or not, Gestapo agents themselves were shaped by their socio-political environment. Historian\nGeorge C. Browder\ncontends that there was a four-part process (\nauthorisation\n, bolstering, routinisation, and\ndehumanisation\n) in effect, which legitimised the psycho-social atmosphere conditioning members of the Gestapo to\nradicalised\nviolence.\nBrowder also describes a sandwich effect, where from above; Gestapo agents were subjected to ideologically oriented\nracism\nand criminal biological theories; and from below, the Gestapo was transformed by SS personnel who did not have the proper police training, which showed in their propensity for unrestrained violence.\nThis admixture certainly shaped the Gestapo's public image which they sought to maintain despite their increasing workload; an image which helped them identify and eliminate enemies of the Nazi state.\nPopulation ratios, methods, and effectiveness\nContrary to popular belief, the Gestapo was not the all-pervasive, omnipotent agency in German society.\nIn Germany proper, many towns and cities had fewer than 50 official Gestapo personnel. For example, in 1939 Stettin and Frankfurt am Main only had a total of 41 Gestapo men combined.\nIn\nDüsseldorf\n, the local Gestapo office of only 281 men were responsible for the entire Lower Rhine region, which comprised 4 million people.\nIn lower Franconia, which included\nWürzburg\n, there were only twenty-two Gestapo officers overseeing 840,000 or more inhabitants; this meant that the Nazi secret police \"was reliant on Germans spying on each other\".\nThese \"V-men\", as undercover Gestapo agents were known, were used to infiltrate\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD) and Communist opposition groups, but this was more the exception than the rule.\nThe Gestapo office in\nSaarbrücken\nhad 50 full-term informers in 1939.\nThe District Office in\nNuremberg\n, which had the responsibility for all of northern\nBavaria\n, employed a total of 80–100 full-term informers between 1943 and 1945.\nThe majority of Gestapo informers were not full-term employees working undercover, but were rather ordinary citizens who chose to denounce other people to the Gestapo.\nAccording to Canadian historian\nRobert Gellately\n's analysis of the local offices established, the Gestapo was—for the most part—made up of bureaucrats and clerical workers who depended upon denunciations by citizens for their information. Gellately argued that it was because of the widespread willingness of Germans to inform on each other to the Gestapo that Germany between 1933 and 1945 was a prime example of\npanopticism\n.\nThe Gestapo—at times—was overwhelmed with denunciations and most of its time was spent sorting out the credible from the less credible denunciations.\nMany of the local offices were understaffed and overworked, struggling with the paper load caused by so many denunciations.\nGellately has also suggested that the Gestapo was \"a reactive organisation...constructed within German society and whose functioning was structurally dependent on the continuing co-operation of German citizens\".\nAfter 1939, when many Gestapo personnel were called up for war-related work such as service with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, the level of overwork and understaffing at the local offices increased.\nFor information about what was happening in German society, the Gestapo continued to be mostly dependent upon denunciations.\n80% of all Gestapo investigations were started in response to information provided by denunciations by ordinary Germans; while 10% were started in response to information provided by other branches of the German government and another 10% started in response to information that the Gestapo itself unearthed.\nThe information supplied by denunciations often led the Gestapo in determining who was arrested.\nThe popular picture of the Gestapo with its spies everywhere terrorising German society has been rejected by many historians as a myth invented after the war as a cover for German society's widespread complicity in allowing the Gestapo to work.\nWork done by\nsocial historians\nsuch as\nDetlev Peukert\n, Robert Gellately, Reinhard Mann, Inge Marssolek, René Otto,\nKlaus-Michael Mallmann\nand Paul Gerhard, which by focusing on what the local offices were doing has shown the Gestapo\n'\ns almost total dependence on denunciations from ordinary Germans, and very much discredited the older \"\nBig Brother\n\" picture with the Gestapo having its eyes and ears everywhere.\nFor example, of the 84 cases in\nWürzburg\nof\nRassenschande\n(\"race defilement\"—sexual relations with non-\nAryans\n), 45 (54%) were started in response to denunciations by ordinary people, two (2%) by information provided by other branches of the government, 20 (24%) via information gained during interrogations of people relating to other matters, four (5%) from information from (Nazi) NSDAP organisations, two (2%) during \"political evaluations\" and 11 (13%) have no source listed while none were started by Gestapo\n'\ns own \"observations\" of the people of Würzburg.\nAn examination of 213 denunciations in\nDüsseldorf\nshowed that 37% were motivated by personal conflicts, no motive could be established in 39%, and 24% were motivated by support for the Nazi regime.\nThe Gestapo always showed a special interest in denunciations concerning\nsexual matters\n, especially cases concerning\nRassenschande\nwith Jews or between Germans and foreigners, in particular\nPolish slave workers\n; the Gestapo applied even harsher methods to the foreign workers in the country, especially those from Poland,\nJews, Catholics and\nhomosexuals\n.\nAs time went by, anonymous denunciations to the Gestapo caused trouble to various\nNSDAP\nofficials, who often found themselves being investigated by the Gestapo.\nOf the political cases, 61 people were investigated for suspicion of belonging to the KPD, 44 for the SPD and 69 for other political parties.\nMost of the political investigations took place between 1933 and 1935 with the all-time high of 57 cases in 1935.\nAfter that year, political investigations declined with only 18 investigations in 1938, 13 in 1939, two in 1941, seven in 1942, four in 1943 and one in 1944.\nThe \"other\" category associated with non-conformity included everything from a man who drew a caricature of Hitler to a Catholic teacher suspected of being lukewarm about teaching National Socialism in his classroom.\nThe \"administrative control\" category concerned those who were breaking the law concerning residency in the city.\nThe \"conventional criminality\" category concerned economic crimes such as\nmoney laundering\n,\nsmuggling\nand homosexuality.\nWhile the total number of Gestapo officials was limited when contrasted against the represented populations, the average\nVolksgenosse\n(Nazi term for the \"member of the German people\") was typically not under observation, so the statistical ratio between Gestapo officials and inhabitants is \"largely worthless and of little significance\" according to some recent scholars.\nAs historian Eric Johnson remarked, \"The Nazi terror was selective terror\", with its focus upon political opponents, ideological dissenters (clergy and religious organisations), career criminals, the\nSinti\nand\nRoma\npopulation,\nhandicapped persons\n, homosexuals and above all, upon the Jews.\n\"Selective terror\" by the Gestapo, as mentioned by Johnson, is also supported by historian Richard Evans who states that, \"Violence and intimidation rarely touched the lives of most ordinary Germans.\nDenunciation\nwas the exception, not the rule, as far as the behaviour of the vast majority of Germans was concerned.\"\nThe involvement of ordinary Germans in denunciations also needs to be put into perspective so as not to exonerate the Gestapo. As Evans makes clear, \"...it was not the ordinary German people who engaged in\nsurveillance\n, it was the Gestapo; nothing happened until the Gestapo received a denunciation, and it was the Gestapo's active pursuit of deviance and dissent that was the only thing that gave denunciations meaning.\"\nThe Gestapo's effectiveness remained in the ability to \"project\" omnipotence...they co-opted the assistance of the German population by using denunciations to their advantage; proving in the end a powerful, ruthless and effective organ of terror under the Nazi regime that was seemingly everywhere.\nLastly, the Gestapo's effectiveness, while aided by denunciations and the watchful eye of ordinary Germans, was more the result of the co-ordination and co-operation amid the various police organs within Germany, the assistance of the SS, and the support provided by the various Nazi Party organisations; all of them together forming an organised persecution network.\nTorture\nThe Gestapo employed torture as a routine method to extract confessions, punish political enemies, and enforce ideological conformity in Nazi Germany, the official evidence for which was destroyed by the Nazis with Gestapo case-files being rarely found.\nNormal methods of investigation by the Gestapo included various forms of\nblackmail\n, threats, and\nextortion\nto secure \"confessions\".\nBeyond that, sleep deprivation and various forms of harassment were also used as investigative methods.\nThe Gestapo periodically was known for\nplanting evidence\nto resolve a case, especially if it concerned a Jewish person.\nHistorical research based on surviving Gestapo files has shown that torture was not limited to high-profile cases but was frequently used at the local level, especially in situations involving accusations of hiding Jews, listening to foreign radio broadcasts, or engaging in communist activity.\nBrutality on the part of interrogators—often prompted by denunciations and followed with\nroundups\n—enabled the Gestapo to uncover numerous resistance networks and in many ways, made them seem like they knew everything and could do anything they wanted.\nA simple denunciation could even lead to a person's death once in the Gestapo's hands.\nIn his study of Gestapo files from Bavaria, historian Robert Gellately noted that many individuals were subjected to brutal treatment as part of routine investigative procedures.\nHistorian Eric A. Johnson further corroborates this brutal treatment in cities like Cologne, where detainees were physically and mentally abused to obtain names of collaborators or co-conspirators.\nOnce an individual was brought in by the Gestapo, Richard Evans asserted that one could expect in many cases \"brutal violence and\ntorture\n\" and a course of interrogation that often \"ended in the courts, the prisons and the camps.\"\nMany detainees bypassed the courts entirely through a mechanism known as\nSchutzhaft\n(\"protective custody\"). Once a\nSchutzhaftbefehl\nwas signed by someone deemed an authority—often a simple administrative form—the detainee was shipped to a camp, frequently following brutal interrogation in Gestapo prisons. This allowed the Gestapo to imprison individuals indefinitely without trial and transfer them directly to concentration camps such as Dachau, Buchenwald, or Ravensbrück.\nOperations in Nazi-occupied territories\nAs an instrument of Nazi power, terror, and repression, the Gestapo operated throughout occupied Europe.\nMuch like their affiliated organisations, the SS and the SD, the Gestapo \"played a leading part\" in enslaving and deporting workers from occupied territory, torturing and executing civilians, singling out and murdering Jews, and subjecting Allied prisoners of war to terrible treatment.\nTo this end, the Gestapo was \"a vital component both in Nazi repression and the Holocaust.\"\nOnce the German armies advanced into enemy territory, they were accompanied by\nEinsatzgruppen\nstaffed by officers from the Gestapo and Kripo, who usually operated in the rear areas to administer and police the occupied land.\nWhenever a region came fully under German military occupational jurisdiction, the Gestapo administered all executive actions under the military commander's authority, albeit operating relatively independent of it.\nA former partisan and Soviet officer named Hersch Gurewicz attested to the torture methods used by the Gestapo. He recalled a partisan was strapped to a table in a room and \"a German turned the lever and the table moved apart in sections like a rack. The man screamed and his leg bones snapped through his skin. The lever turned again and his arms ripped in jagged tears. After the man fainted, his torturers shot him dead.\"\nHe also claimed that he had been strapped down and a wire slowly forced up his nose, into his lung, causing him to go unconscious. Later he was tied to a horse, which was made to gallop full speed, and recalled being smashed into the ground repeatedly, before being knocked out by a solid object.\nOccupation meant administration and policing, a duty assigned to the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo even before hostilities began, as was the case for Czechoslovakia.\nCorrespondingly, Gestapo offices were established in a territory once occupied.\nSome locals aided the Gestapo, whether as professional police auxiliaries or in other duties. Nonetheless, operations performed either by German members of the Gestapo or auxiliaries from willing collaborators of other nationalities were inconsistent in both disposition and effectiveness. Varying degrees of pacification and police enforcement measures were necessary in each place, dependent on how cooperative or resistant the locals were to Nazi mandates and racial policies.\nThroughout the Eastern territories, the Gestapo and other Nazi organisations co-opted the assistance of indigenous police units, nearly all of whom were uniformed and able to carry out drastic actions.\nMany of the auxiliary police personnel operating on behalf of German Order Police, the SD, and Gestapo were members of the\nSchutzmannschaft\n, which included staffing by Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians.\nWhile in many countries the Nazis occupied in the East, the local domestic police forces supplemented German operations, noted Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg, asserts that \"those of Poland were least involved in anti-Jewish actions.\"\nNonetheless, German authorities ordered the mobilisation of reserve Polish police forces, known as the\nBlue Police\n, which strengthened the Nazi police presence and carried out numerous \"police\" functions; in some cases, its functionaries even identified and rounded up Jews or performed other unsavory duties on behalf of their German masters.\nIn places like Denmark, there were some 550 uniformed Danes in Copenhagen working with the Gestapo, patrolling and terrorising the local population at the behest of their German overseers, many of whom were arrested after the war.\nOther Danish civilians, like in many places across Europe, acted as Gestapo informants but this should not be seen as wholehearted support for the Nazi program, as motives for cooperation varied.\nWhereas in France, the number of members in the\nCarlingue\n(French Gestapo) who worked on behalf of the Nazis was upwards of 30,000 to 32,000; they conducted operations nearly indistinguishable from their German equivalents.\nNuremberg trials\nMain articles:\nNuremberg trials\nand\nthe Holocaust\nGestapo building at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8, after the 1945 bombing\nBetween 14 November 1945 and 3 October 1946, the Allies established an\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(IMT) to try 22 major Nazi war criminals and six groups for\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nNineteen of the 22 were convicted, and twelve—Martin Bormann (in absentia), Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Hermann Göring, Alfred Jodl, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Wilhelm Keitel, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz Sauckel, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Julius Streicher—were given the death penalty. Three—Walther Funk, Rudolf Hess, Erich Raeder—received life terms; and the remaining four—Karl Dönitz, Konstantin von Neurath, Albert Speer, and Baldur von Schirach—received shorter prison sentences. Three others—Hans Fritzsche, Hjalmar Schacht, and Franz von Papen—were acquitted. At that time, the Gestapo was condemned as a criminal organisation, along with the SS.\nHowever, Gestapo leader\nHeinrich Müller\nwas never tried, as he disappeared at the end of the war.\nGerman Gestapo agents arrested after the liberation of\nLiège\n, Belgium are pictured in a cell at the\nCitadel of Liège\n, October 1944\nLeaders, organisers, investigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes specified were declared responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. The official positions of defendants as heads of state or holders of high government offices were not to free them from responsibility or mitigate their punishment; nor was that a defendant acted pursuant to an order of a superior to excuse him from responsibility, although it might be considered by the IMT in mitigation of punishment.\nAt the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation, the IMT was authorised to declare (in connection with any act of which the individual was convicted) that the group or organisation to which he belonged was a criminal organisation. When a group or organisation was thus declared criminal, the competent national authority of any signatory had the right to bring persons to trial for membership in that organisation, with the criminal nature of the group or organisation assumed proved.\nThe IMT subsequently convicted three of the groups: the Nazi leadership corps, the SS (including the SD) and the Gestapo. Gestapo members Hermann Göring, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\nwere individually convicted. While three groups were acquitted of collective war crimes charges, this did not relieve individual members of those groups from conviction and punishment under the\ndenazification\nprogramme. Members of the three convicted groups, however, were subject to apprehension by\nBritain\n, the\nUnited States\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, and\nFrance\n.\nThese groups—the Nazi Party and government leadership, the German\nGeneral staff and High Command\n(OKW); the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA); the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS), including the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD); and the Gestapo—had an aggregate membership exceeding two million, making a large number of their members liable to trial when the organisations were convicted.\nAftermath\nSee also:\nRatlines (World War II)\nIn 1997,\nCologne\ntransformed the former regional Gestapo headquarters in Cologne—the\nEL-DE Haus\n—into a museum to document the Gestapo's actions.\nAfter the war, U.S.\nCounterintelligence Corps\nemployed the former Lyon Gestapo chief\nKlaus Barbie\nfor his anti-communist efforts and also helped him escape to\nBolivia\n.\nLeadership\nTimeline\nPrincipal agents and officers\nHeinrich Baab\n(SiPo-SD Frankfurt)\nKlaus Barbie\n(SiPo-SD Lyon)\nWerner Best\n(SiPo-SD Copenhagen)\nKarl Bömelburg\n(Head of Gestapo, Southern France)\nTheodor Dannecker\n(SiPo-SD Paris)\nRudolf Diels\n(Gestapo Chief 1933–1934)\nAdolf Eichmann\n(RSHA Berlin)\nGerhard Flesch\nHermann Göring\n(Founder of the Gestapo)\nViktor Harnischfeger (Düsseldorf Gestapo Criminal Commissar)\nReinhard Heydrich\n(SD, SiPo, Gestapo Chief 1934–1939, RSHA Chief 1939–1942)\nHeinrich Himmler\n(\nReichsführer-SS\n)\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n(RSHA Chief 1943–1945)\nHerbert Kappler\n(SD Chief Rome)\nWerner Knab\nHelmut Knochen\n(Paris)\nKurt Lischka\n(Paris)\nErnst Misselwitz\n(\nHauptscharführer\nSiPo-SD Paris)\nHeinrich Müller\n(Gestapo Chief 1939–1945)\nCarl Oberg\n(Paris)\nPierre Paoli\n(Head of Gestapo, Central France)\nOswald Poche\n(Chief of Frankfurt Lindenstrasse station)\nHenry Rinnan\n(Norwegian agent)\nKarl Eberhard Schöngarth\n(SiPo-SD General Government; Netherlands)\nMax Wielen\nRanks and uniforms\nThe Gestapo was a secretive plainclothes agency and agents typically wore civilian suits. There were strict protocols protecting the identity of Gestapo field personnel. When asked for identification, an operative was required only to present his warrant disc and not a picture identification. This disc identified the operative as a member of the Gestapo without revealing personal information, except when ordered to do so by an authorised official.\nLeitstellung\n(district office) staff did wear the grey SS service uniform, but with\npolice-pattern shoulderboards\n, and SS rank insignia on the left collar patch. The right collar patch was black without the\nsig runes\n. The SD sleeve diamond (SD\nRaute\n) insignia was worn on the lower left sleeve, even by SiPo men who were not in the SD. Uniforms worn by Gestapo men assigned to the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin occupied territories, were at first indistinguishable from the Waffen-SS field uniform. Complaints from the Waffen-SS led to a change of rank insignia shoulder boards from those of the Waffen-SS to those of the\nOrdnungspolizei\n.\nThe Gestapo maintained police detective ranks which were used for all officers, both those who were and who were not concurrently SS members.\nJunior career =\neinfacher Vollzugsdienst der Sicherheitspolizei (Laufbahn U 18: SS-Unterführer der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD)\n.\nSenior career =\nleitender Vollzugsdienst der Sicherheitspolizei (Laufbahn XIV: SS-Führer der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD)\nSources:\nRank insignia\nSource:\nSee also\nGeheime Feldpolizei\nHamburg State Police Headquarters\nNotes\n↑\nOperation Crossbow was one preliminary missions for\nOperation Overlord\n. See:\nOperation Crossbow – Preliminary missions for the Operation Overlord\n↑\nBonhoeffer was an active opponent of Nazism in the German resistance movement. Arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, he was sent to\nBuchenwald\nand later to Flossenbürg concentration camp where he was executed.\n↑\nThe stricter laws did not apply to lesbians as their behaviour was never officially criminalised, even though their behaviours were labelled \"deviant\".\n↑\nMore than that, the Anglo-American common language and capital interests kept Stalin at a distance since he felt the other Allied powers were hoping the fascists and Communists would destroy one another.\n↑\nPetschek Palace\nwas the Gestapo headquarters in Prague. See for instance the following article in Radio Prague International:\nhttps://english.radio.cz/petscheks-palace-once-headquarters-nazi-secret-police-8575365\n↑\nThere were reports that Müller ended up in the foreign secret service at Washington D.C., some allege he was in Moscow working for the Soviets, still others claimed he escaped to South America—but none of the myths have ever been proven; all of which adds to the \"mysterious power of the Gestapo\".\n↑\nAlthough an agent in uniform wore the collar insignia of the equivalent SS rank, he was still addressed as, e.g.,\nHerr Kriminalrat\n, not\nSturmbannführer\n. The stock character of the \"Gestapo Major\", usually dressed in the prewar black SS uniform, is a figment of Hollywood's imagination.\nCitations\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nWallbaum 2009\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n235.\n1\n2\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n483–485.\n1\n2\nSnyder 1994\n, p.\n242.\n↑\nDelarue 1964\n, pp.\n393–394.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n64–65.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n433.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n64–66.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, p.\n80.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, pp.\n82–83.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n159.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n14–15.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n15.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n204.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n201.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n156.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n271.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n469, 470.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n131.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n661.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nUSHMM, \"Law and Justice in the Third Reich\"\n.\n↑\nGruchmann 1981\n, p.\n395.\n↑\nManchester 2003\n, p.\n519.\n↑\nSmith 2004\n, pp.\n262–274.\n↑\nUS National Archives, \"German Police Records Opened at the National Archives\"\n.\n↑\nBreitman 2005\n, p.\n139.\n↑\nBoeckl-Klamper, Mang\n&\nNeugebauer 2018\n, pp.\n299–305.\n↑\nBroucek 2008\n, p.\n414.\n↑\nThurner 2017\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nBoeckl-Klamper, Mang\n&\nNeugebauer 2018\n, p.\n300.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n126–140.\n↑\nMerson 1985\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n311–312.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n312.\n1\n2\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n312–313.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n94–100.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n30–40.\n↑\nSchmid 1947\n, pp.\n61–63.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, pp.\n42–47.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n727.\n↑\nBerben 1975\n, pp.\n141–142.\n↑\nBerben 1975\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, pp.\n251–252.\n1\n2\nGellately 2020\n, p.\n176.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n160.\n1\n2\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n181.\n↑\nGellately 2020\n, pp.\n176–177.\n1\n2\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n180.\n↑\nGellately 2020\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n21–29.\n↑\nWilliamson 2002\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, pp.\n29–30.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, pp.\n30–32.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nOvery 1997\n, pp.\n245–281.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n86–87.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, pp.\n245–249.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n323.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n532.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n537.\n↑\nSpielvogel 1992\n, p.\n256.\n↑\nPeukert 1989\n, pp.\n198–199.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n97–98.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n150, 162.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, p.\n72.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n134, 135.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n103.\n1\n2\n3\nAvalon Project, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n160, 161.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n48–49, 230–233.\n↑\nState of Israel 1992\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n671.\n↑\nAhlers 2001\n, pp.\n33–36.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n50.\n1\n2\n3\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n34.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n54–55.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n33–34.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n88–90.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n186–193.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nTrentmann 2023\n, p.\n41.\n1\n2\n3\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n181.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n132–150.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n11–12, 22.\n1\n2\nRees 1997\n, p.\n65.\n1\n2\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n175.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n136.\n1\n2\n3\nRees 1997\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, pp.\n168–169.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n49, 146.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n151–152.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n48.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n114.\n1\n2\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n83–140.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n130.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n74–80.\n↑\nAyçoberry 1999\n, p.\n272.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n119–123.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n85–89.\n↑\nUlrich 1998\n, pp.\n60–81.\n↑\nLemkin 2008\n, pp.\n15–17.\n↑\nRussell 2002\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nUSHMM, \"Gestapo\"\n.\n1\n2\nRussell 2002\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, pp.\n43–44.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nCrankshaw 2002\n, pp.\n147–148.\n↑\nHesse, Kufeke\n&\nSander 2010\n, pp.\n177–179, 350–352.\n1\n2\nHilberg 1992\n, p.\n92.\n↑\nHilberg 1992\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nSkibińska 2012\n, pp.\n84, 88–89, 94–106.\n↑\nHolbraad 2017\n, pp.\n46–47.\n↑\nHolbraad 2017\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nRajsfus 1995\n, pp.\n51–52.\n↑\nBernstein 1947\n, pp.\n267–275.\n↑\nEvans 2010\n, pp.\n741–743.\n1\n2\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nBernstein 1947\n, pp.\n246–259.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n158–161.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n159–161.\n↑\nThe National Socialist Document Center of Cologne\n.\n↑\nBönisch\n&\nWiegrefe 2011\n.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, pp.\n106–107.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n33–36.\n↑\nBanach 2013\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n38–39, 54.\nBibliography\nAhlers, Sieglinde (2001). \"Frauen in der Polizei\". In Doris Freer (ed.).\nVon Griet zu Emma: Beiträge zur Geschichte von Frauen in Duisburg vom Mittelalter bis heute\n(PDF)\n. Duisburg: Frauenbüro.\nOCLC\n248422045\n.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 29 November 2020.\n\"Avalon Project – Yale University\"\n.\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office\n. Retrieved\n8 September\n2014\n.\nAyçoberry, Pierre (1999).\nThe Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945\n. New York: The New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-635-7\n.\nBanach, Jens (2013). \"Polizei im NS-System – Ausbildung und Rekrutierung in der Sicherheitspolizei\". In Hans Jürgen Lange (ed.).\nDie Polizei der Gesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der inneren Sicherheit\n(in German). Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.\nISBN\n978-3-663-09757-0\n.\nBauz, Ingrid; Sigrid Brüggemann; Roland Maier, eds. (2013).\nDie Geheime Staatspolizei in Württemberg und Hohenzollern\n. Stuttgart: Schmetterling.\nISBN\n3-89657-138-9\n.\nBenz, Wolfgang (2007).\nA Concise History of the Third Reich\n. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-520-25383-4\n.\nBerben, Paul (1975).\nDachau, 1933–45: The Official History\n. London: Norfolk Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85211-009-6\n.\nBernstein, Victor H. (1947).\nFinal Judgment: The Story of Nuremberg\n. New York: Boni & Gaer.\nISBN\n978-1-163-16417-4\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\nBoeckl-Klamper, Elisabeth; Mang, Thomas; Neugebauer, Wolfgang (2018).\nGestapo-Leitstelle Wien, 1938–1945\n(in German). Wien: Edition Steinbauer.\nISBN\n978-3-90249-483-2\n.\nBönisch, Georg; Wiegrefe, Klaus (20 January 2011).\n\"From Nazi to Criminal to Post-War Spy: German Intelligence Hired Klaus Barbie as Agent\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n.\nBreitman, Richard (2005).\nU.S. Intelligence and the Nazis\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-61794-9\n.\nBroucek, Peter (2008).\nMilitärischer Widerstand: Studien zur österreichischen Staatsgesinnung und NS-Abwehr\n(in German). Wien: Böhlau.\nISBN\n978-3-20577-728-1\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-820297-4\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS: Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnick, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2000).\nThe Third Reich: A New History\n. New York: Hill and Wang.\nISBN\n978-0-8090-9325-0\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nCraig, William (1973).\nEnemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad\n(1st\ned.). Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n1-56852-368-8\n.\nCrankshaw, Edward (2002).\nGestapo: Instrument of Tyranny\n. Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill Books.\nISBN\n978-1-85367-481-5\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2014).\nThe Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-966921-9\n.\nDelarue, Jacques (1964).\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Dell.\nISBN\n978-0-913729-45-8\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\nDelarue, Jacques (2008) .\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-60239-246-5\n.\nEvans, Richard (2005).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2006).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard (2010).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFlaherty, T. H. (2004) .\nThe Third Reich: The SS\n. Time-Life Books, Inc.\nISBN\n978-1-84447-073-0\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-18507-9\n.\nGellately, Robert (1992).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-820297-4\n.\nGellately, Robert (2020).\nHitler's True Believers: How Ordinary People Became Nazis\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19068-990-2\n.\nGruchmann, Lothar (1981).\n\"\n'Nacht und Nebel' Justiz. Die Mitwirkung deutscher Strafgerichte an der Bekämpfung des Widerstandes in den besetzten westeuropäischen Ländern 1942–1944\"\n.\nVierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte\n(in German).\n29\n(3). Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH:\n342–\n396.\nJSTOR\n30195217\n.\nHesse, Klaus; Kufeke, Kay; Sander, Andreas (2010).\nTopography of Terror: Gestapo, SS and Reich Security Main Office on Wilhelm- and Prinz-Alberecht Strasse: A Documentation\n. Berlin: Stiftung Topographie des Terrors.\nISBN\n978-3-94177-207-6\n.\nHilberg, Raul (1992).\nPerpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945\n. New York: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n0-8419-0910-5\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus (1984).\nThe Third Reich\n. London and New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-04-943033-4\n.\nHoffmann, Peter (1977).\nThe History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.\nISBN\n978-0-262-08088-0\n.\nHöhne, Heinz (2001).\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. New York: Penguin Press.\nISBN\n978-0-14-139012-3\n.\nHolbraad, Carsten (2017).\nDanish Reactions to German Occupation\n. London: UCL Press.\nISBN\n978-1-91130-751-8\n.\nJohnson, Eric (1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04908-0\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-39306-757-6\n.\nKrausnick, Helmut\n, et al. (1968).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York; Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\nLemkin, Raphael (2008).\nAxis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress\n. Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-58477-901-8\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2019).\nHitler: A Biography\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19251-574-2\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael; Paul, Gerhard (1994). \"Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent? Gestapo, Society, and Resistance\". In David Crew (ed.).\nNazism and German Society, 1933–1945\n. New York and London: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-08240-2\n.\nManchester, William (2003).\nThe Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Dynasty that Armed Germany at War\n. New York & Boston: Back Bay Books.\nManvell, Roger; Fraenkel, Heinrich (2011).\nGoering\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMcDonough, Frank (2005).\nOpposition and Resistance in Nazi Germany\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-00358-2\n.\nMcDonough, Frank (2017).\nThe Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler's Secret Police\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-51071-465-6\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMerson, Allan (1985).\nCommunist Resistance in Nazi Germany\n. New York: New York University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85315-601-7\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMollo, Andrew (1992).\nUniforms of the SS. Vol. 5. Sicherheitsdienst und Sicherheitspolizei 1931–1945\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-87200-462-4\n.\nMuseenkoeln.de.\n\"NSDOK\"\n.\nNS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt Köln\n. Retrieved\n30 April\n2019\n.\nOvery, Richard (1997).\nWhy the Allies Won\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-31619-3\n.\nPeukert, Detlev (1989).\nInside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life\n. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-04480-5\n.\nRajsfus, Maurice (1995).\nLa police de Vichy: les forces de l'ordre françaises au service de la Gestapo, 1940–1944\n[\nThe Vichy Police Force: The French Security Forces in the Service of the Gestapo, 1940–1944\n]\n(in French). Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur.\nISBN\n978-2-86274-358-5\n.\nRees, Laurence (1997).\nThe Nazis: A Warning from History\n. New York: New Press.\nISBN\n978-0-563-49333-4\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald (1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRussell, Edward Frederick Langley (2002).\nThe Scourge of the Swastika: A History of Nazi War Crimes During World War II\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n1-85367-498-2\n.\nSchmid, Heinrich (1947).\nApokalyptisches Wetterleuchten: Ein Beitrag der Evangelischen Kirche zum Kampf im Dritten Reich\n(in German). München: Verag der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in Bayern.\nASIN\nB00279MGQS\n.\nShirer, William (1990).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nSmith, Michael (2004). \"Bletchley Park and the Holocaust\".\nIntelligence and National Security\n.\n19\n(2):\n262–\n274.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/0268452042000302994\n.\nS2CID\n154692491\n.\nSkibińska, Alina (2012). \"Perpetrators Self-Portrait: The Accused Village Administrators, Commune Heads, Fire Chiefs, Forest Rangers, and Gamekeepers\". In Jan Gross (ed.).\nThe Holocaust in Occupied Poland: New Findings and New Interpretations\n. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-63163-124-9\n.\nSnyder, Louis\n(1994) .\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson (1992).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. New York: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13-393182-2\n.\nState of Israel (1992).\nThe Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem\n. Vol.\n1. Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice.\nISBN\n978-9-65279-010-1\n.\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard (2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. New York and London: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-82371-5\n.\nThurner, Christoph (2017).\nThe CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS's Maier-Messner Group\n. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.\nISBN\n978-1-47662-991-9\n.\nTrentmann, Frank (2023).\nOut of the Darkness: The Germans, 1942–2022\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.\nISBN\n978-1-52473-291-2\n.\nTuchel, Johannes; Schattenfroh, Reinhold (1987).\nZentrale des Terrors. Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8: Hauptquartier der Gestapo\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main, Olten, and Wien: Büchergilde Gutenberg.\nISBN\n978-3-7632-3340-3\n.\nUlrich, Herbert (1998). \"\n'Von der Gegenerbekampfung zur \"rassischen Generalprävention\". \"Schutzhaft\" und Konzentrationslager in der Konzeption der Gestapo-Führung, 1933–1939'\n\". In Herbert Ulrich; Karin Orth; Christoph Dieckmann (eds.).\nDie nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Entwicklung und Struktur\n(in German). Vol.\n1. Göttingen: Wallstein.\nISBN\n3-89244-289-4\n.\nUSHMM.\n\"Gestapo\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n10 August\n2017\n.\nUSHMM.\n\"Law and Justice in the Third Reich\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n10 August\n2017\n.\nUS National Archives (2000).\n\"Press Release nr00-52: German Police Records Opened at the National Archives\"\n.\nUnited States National Archives\n. Retrieved\n5 March\n2014\n.\nWallbaum, Klaus (2009).\nDer Überläufer: Rudolf Diels (1900–1957), der erste Gestapo-Chef des Hitler-Regimes\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-59818-4\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1-4087-0304-5\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography: Volume 1\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-5-6\n.\nWilliamson, David (2002).\nThe Third Reich\n(3rd\ned.). London: Longman Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-582-36883-5\n.\nFurther reading\nGerwarth, Robert (2012).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-18772-4\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n(2001) .\nHimmler: Reichsführer-SS\n. London: Cassel & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-304-35839-7\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nGestapo\n.\nFestung Furulund – magasinet – Dagbladet.no\n(in Norwegian)\nCollection of testimonies concerning Gestapo activity in occupied Poland during WWII in \"Chronicles of Terror\" database",
+    "infobox": {
+      "formed": "26April 1933;92 years ago(1933-04-26)",
+      "preceding_agency": "Prussian Secret Police(founded 1851)",
+      "dissolved": "8May1945;80 years ago(1945-05-08)",
+      "employees": "32,000 (1944est.)[1]",
+      "legal_jurisdiction": "GermanyOccupied Europe",
+      "general_nature": "Secret police",
+      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße8,Berlin52°30′25″N13°22′58″E/52.50694°N 13.38278°E/52.50694; 13.38278",
+      "ministers_responsible": "Hermann Göring1933–1934,Minister President of PrussiaWilhelm Frick1936–1943,Interior MinisterHeinrich Himmler, Chief of the German Police, 1936–1945; Interior Minister, 1943–1945",
+      "agency_executives": "Rudolf Diels(1933–1934)[2]Reinhard Heydrich(1934–1939)Heinrich Müller(1939–1945)",
+      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSReich Security Main OfficeSicherheitspolizei"
+    },
+    "char_count": 74467
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Sturmabteilung",
+    "name": "Sturmabteilung",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "The Sturmabteilung was the original paramilitary organisation under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party of Germany. It played a significant role in Hitler's rise to power in the 1920s and early 1930s. Its primary purposes were providing protection for Nazi rallies and assemblies, disrupting the meetings of opposing parties, fighting against the paramilitary units of the opposing parties, especially the Roter Frontkämpferbund of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and intimidating Romani, trade unionists, and especially Jews.",
+    "description": "Nazi Party's original paramilitary wing",
+    "full_text": "Sturmabteilung\nNazi Party's original paramilitary wing\nFor the assault detachments of the German Army during World War I, see\nStormtroopers (Imperial Germany)\n. For the youth groups, see\nJungsturm (disambiguation)\n. For other uses of stormtrooper, see\nStormtrooper (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nSturmabteilung\n(\n[\nˈʃtʊʁmʔapˌtaɪlʊŋ\n]\n;\nSA\n;\nlit.\n'\nStorm Division\n'\nor loosely 'stormtroopers') was the original\nparamilitary\norganisation under\nAdolf Hitler\nand the\nNazi Party\nof Germany. It played a significant role in\nHitler's rise to power\nin the 1920s and early 1930s. Its primary purposes were providing protection for Nazi rallies and assemblies, disrupting the meetings of opposing parties, fighting against the paramilitary units of the opposing parties, especially the\nRoter Frontkämpferbund\nof the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD) and the\nReichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold\nof the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD), and intimidating\nRomani\n,\ntrade unionists\n, and especially\nJews\n.\nThe SA were colloquially called\nBrownshirts\n(\nBraunhemden\n) because of the colour of their\nuniform's shirts\n, similar to\nBenito Mussolini\n's\nBlackshirts\n. The official SA uniform was a brown shirt with a brown tie. The colour came about because a large shipment of\nLettow\n-\nshirts\n, originally intended for the German\ncolonial troops\nin\nGermany's former East Africa colony\nbut which never reached its destination because of naval blockades,\nwas purchased in 1921 by\nGerhard Roßbach\nfor use by his\nFreikorps\nparamilitary unit. They were later used for his\nSchill Youth\norganization in Salzburg, and in 1924 were adopted by the Schill Youth in Germany.\nThe \"Schill Sportversand\" then became the main supplier for the SA's brown shirts. The SA developed pseudo-military titles for its members, with\nranks\nthat were later adopted by several other Nazi Party groups.\nAfter Hitler rose to Nazi Party leadership in 1921, he formalized the party's militant supporters into the SA as a group that was to protect party gatherings. In 1923, owing to his growing distrust of the SA, Hitler ordered the creation of\na bodyguard unit\n, which was abolished after the failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\nlater that year. Not long after Hitler's release from prison, he ordered the creation of another bodyguard unit in 1925 that ultimately became the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS). During the\nNight of the Long Knives\n(\ndie Nacht der langen Messer\n) purge in 1934, the SA's then-leader\nErnst Röhm\nwas arrested and executed. The SA continued to exist but lost almost all its influence and was effectively superseded by the SS, which took part in the purge. The SA remained in existence until after\nNazi Germany's final capitulation\nto the\nAllies\nin 1945, after which it was disbanded and outlawed by the\nAllied Control Council\n.\nRise\nThe term\nSturmabteilung\npredates the founding of the\nNazi Party\nin 1919. Originally it was applied to the specialized assault troops of\nImperial Germany\nin\nWorld War I\nwho used\ninfiltration tactics\nbased on being organized into small squads of a few soldiers each. The first official German\nstormtrooper\nunit was authorized on March 2, 1915, on the Western Front. The German high command ordered the\nVIII Corps\nto form a detachment to test experimental weapons and develop tactics that could break the deadlock on the\nWestern Front\n. On October 2, 1916,\nGeneralquartiermeister\nErich Ludendorff\nordered all German armies in the west to form a battalion of stormtroopers.\nThey were first used during the\n8th Army\n's\nsiege\nof\nRiga\n, and again at the\nBattle of Caporetto\n. Wider use followed on the Western Front in the\nGerman spring offensive\nin March 1918, when Allied lines were successfully pushed back tens of kilometers.\nThe DAP (\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n,\nGerman Workers' Party\n) was formed in\nMunich\nin January 1919, and Adolf Hitler joined it in September of that year. His talents for speaking, publicity and\npropaganda\nwere quickly recognized.\nBy early 1920 he had gained authority in the party, which changed its name to the NSDAP (\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\nor National Socialist German Workers' Party) in February 1920.\nThe party's executive committee added \"Socialist\" to the name over Hitler's objections, to help the party appeal to left-wing workers.\nThe precursor to the\nSturmabteilung\nhad acted informally and on an\nad hoc\nbasis for some time before this. Hitler, with an eye to helping the party to grow through propaganda, convinced the leadership committee to invest in an advertisement in the\nMünchener Beobachter\n(later renamed the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n) for a mass meeting in the\nHofbräuhaus\n, to be held in Munich on October 16, 1919. Some 70 people attended, and a second such meeting was advertised for November 13 in the\nEberl-Bräu\nbeer hall, also in Munich. About 130 people attended; there were hecklers, but Hitler's military friends promptly ejected them by force, and the agitators \"flew down the stairs with gashed heads\". The next year on February 24, he announced the party's\nTwenty-Five Point program\nat a mass meeting of some 2,000 people at the Hofbräuhaus. Protesters tried to shout Hitler down, but his former army companions, armed with rubber\ntruncheons\n, ejected the dissenters. The basis for the SA had been formed.\nHitler and\nHermann Göring\nwith SA stormtroopers in front of\nFrauenkirche, Nuremberg\nin 1928\nA permanent group of party members, who would serve as the\nSaalschutzabteilung\n(meeting hall protection detachment) for the DAP, gathered around\nEmil Maurice\nafter the February 1920 incident at the Hofbräuhaus. There was little organization or structure to this group. The group was also called the \"Stewards Troop\" (\nOrdnertruppen\n) around this time.\nMore than a year later, on August 3, 1921, Hitler redefined the group as the \"Gymnastic and Sports Division\" of the party (\nTurn- und Sportabteilung\n), perhaps to avoid trouble with the government.\nIt was by now well recognized as an appropriate, even necessary, function or organ of the party. The future SA developed by organizing and formalizing the groups of ex-soldiers and beer-hall brawlers who were to protect gatherings of the Nazi Party from disruptions from\nSocial Democrats\n(SPD) and\nCommunists\n(KPD), and to disrupt meetings of the other political parties. By September 1921 the name\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) was being used informally for the group.\nHitler was the official head of the Nazi Party by this time.\nThe Nazi Party held a large public meeting in the Munich Hofbräuhaus on November 4, 1921, which attracted many Communists and other enemies of the Nazis. After Hitler had spoken for some time, the meeting erupted into a mêlée in which a small company of SA thrashed the opposition. The Nazis called this event the\nSaalschlacht\n(\ntransl.\nMeeting hall battle\n), and it assumed legendary proportions in SA lore with the passage of time. Thereafter, the group was officially known as the\nSturmabteilung\n.\nThe leadership of the SA passed from Maurice to the young\nHans Ulrich Klintzsch\nin this period. He had been a naval officer and a member of the\nEhrhardt\nBrigade\n, which had taken part in the failed\nKapp Putsch\nattempted coup. When he took over command of the SA, he was a member of the notorious\nOrganisation Consul\n(OC).\nThe Nazis under Hitler began to adopt the more professional management techniques of the military.\nIn 1922, the Nazi Party created a youth section, the\nJugendbund\n, for young men between the ages of 14 and 18 years. Its successor, the\nHitler Youth\n(\nHitlerjugend\nor HJ), remained under SA command until May 1932.\nHermann Göring\njoined the Nazi Party in 1922 after hearing a speech by Hitler. He was given command of the SA as the\nOberster SA-Führer\nin 1923.\nHe was later appointed an SA-\nObergruppenführer\n(general) and held this rank on the SA rolls until 1945.\nThe SA unit in\nNuremberg\n, 1929\nFrom April 1924 until late February 1925, the SA was reorganized into a front organization known as the\nFrontbann\nto circumvent\nBavaria\n's ban on the Nazi Party and its organs. (This had been instituted after the abortive\nBeer Hall Putsch\nof November 1923). While Hitler was in prison,\nErnst Röhm\nhelped to create the\nFrontbann\nas a legal alternative to the then-outlawed SA. In April 1924, Röhm had also been given authority by Hitler to rebuild the SA in any way he saw fit. When in April 1925 Hitler and Ludendorff disapproved of the proposals under which Röhm was prepared to integrate the 30,000-strong\nFrontbann\ninto the SA, Röhm resigned from all political movements and military brigades on May 1, 1925. He felt great contempt for the \"legalistic\" path the party leaders wanted to follow and sought seclusion from public life.\nThroughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, members of the SA were often involved in street fights, called\nZusammenstöße\n(collisions), with members of the Communist Party (KPD). In 1929, the SA added a Motor Corps for better mobility and a faster mustering of units.\nIt also acquired an independent source of funds: royalties from its own\nSturm Cigarette Company\n. Previously, the SA had been financially dependent on the party leadership, as it charged no membership fees;\nthe SA recruited particularly among the many unemployed in the economic crisis.\nThe SA used violence against shops and shopkeepers stocking competing cigarette brands; it also punished any SA member caught with non-Sturm cigarettes.\nSturm marketing was also used to make military service more appealing. Cigarettes were sold with collectible sets of images of historical German army uniforms.\nMarketing for the SA's\nSturm Cigarette Company\nalso promoted military service.\nIn September 1930, as a consequence of the\nStennes revolt\nin Berlin, Hitler assumed supreme command of the SA as its new\nOberster SA-Führer\n. He sent a personal request to Röhm, asking him to return to serve as the SA's chief of staff. Röhm accepted this offer and began his new assignment on January 5, 1931. He brought radical new ideas to the SA and appointed several close friends to its senior leadership.\nPreviously, the SA formations were subordinate to the Nazi Party leadership of each\nGau\n. Röhm established new\nGruppen\nthat had no regional Nazi Party oversight. Each Gruppe extended over several regions and was commanded by a SA-\nGruppenführer\nwho answered only to Röhm or Hitler. Under Röhm as its popular leader and\nStabschef\n(Staff Chief), the SA grew in importance within the Nazi power structure and expanded to have thousands of members. In the early 1930s, the Nazis expanded from an extremist fringe group to the largest political party in Germany, and the SA expanded with it. By January 1932, the SA numbered approximately 400,000.\nMany of these stormtroopers believed in the\nstrasserist\npromise of\nnazism\n. They expected the Nazi regime to take more radical economic action, such as breaking up the vast landed estates of the aristocracy, once they obtained national power.\nBy the time Hitler assumed power in January 1933, SA membership had increased to approximately 2,000,000—twenty times as large as the number of troops and officers in the\nReichswehr\n(German Army).\nFall\nThe SA unit in\nBerlin\nin 1932\nAfter Hitler and the Nazis obtained national power, the SA leadership also became increasingly eager for power. By the end of 1933, the SA numbered more than 3 million men, and many believed they were the replacement for the \"antiquated\"\nReichswehr\n. Röhm's ideal was to absorb the army (then limited by law to no more than 100,000 men) into the SA, which would be a new \"people's army\". This deeply offended and alarmed the professional army leaders and threatened Hitler's goal of co-opting the\nReichswehr\n. The SA's increasing power and ambitions also posed a threat to other Nazi leaders.\nOriginally an adjunct to the SA, the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) was placed under the control of\nHeinrich Himmler\n, in part to restrict the power of the SA and their leaders.\nThe younger SS had evolved to be more than a bodyguard unit for Hitler and demonstrated that it was better suited to carry out Hitler's policies, including those of a criminal nature.\nAlthough some of the conflicts between the SS and SA were based on personal rivalries of leaders, the mass of members had key socio-economic differences and related conflicts. SS members generally came from the\nmiddle class\n, while the SA had its base among the unemployed and\nworking class\n. Politically speaking, the SA was more radical than the SS, with its leaders arguing the Nazi revolution had not ended when Hitler achieved power, but rather needed to implement\nStrasserism\nin Germany. Hitler believed that the defiant and rebellious culture encouraged before the seizure of power had to give way to using these forces for community organization. But the SA members resented tasks such as canvassing and fundraising, considering them\nKleinarbeit\n(\"little work\"), which had typically been performed by women before the Nazi seizure of power.\nRudolf Diels\n, the first\nGestapo\nchief, estimated that in 1933 Berlin, 70 percent of new SA recruits were former Communists.\nIn 1933, General\nWerner von Blomberg\n, the Minister of Defence, and General\nWalter von Reichenau\n, the chief of the\nReichswehr\n's Ministerial Department, became increasingly concerned about the growing power of the SA. Röhm had been given a seat on the National Defence Council and began to demand more say over military matters. On October 2, 1933, Röhm sent a letter to Reichenau that said: \"I regard the\nReichswehr\nnow only as a training school for the German people. The conduct of war, and therefore of mobilization as well, in the future is the task of the SA.\"\nSA knife\nBlomberg and von Reichenau began to conspire with Göring and Himmler against Röhm and the SA. Himmler asked\nReinhard Heydrich\nto assemble a dossier on Röhm. Heydrich recognized that for the SS to gain full national power, the SA had to be broken.\nHe manufactured evidence to suggest that Röhm had been paid 12 million marks by French agents to overthrow Hitler. Hitler liked Röhm and initially refused to believe the dossier provided by Heydrich. Röhm had been one of his first supporters and, without his ability to obtain army funds in the early days of the movement, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have ever become established. The SA under Röhm's leadership had also played a vital role in destroying the opposition during the elections of 1932 and 1933.\nNight of the Long Knives\nMain article:\nNight of the Long Knives\nThe architects of the purge: Hitler,\nGöring\n,\nGoebbels\n, and\nHess\n. Only\nHimmler\nand\nHeydrich\nare absent.\nHitler had his own reasons for wanting Röhm removed. Some of his powerful supporters had been complaining about Röhm for some time. The generals opposed Röhm's desire to have the SA, a force of by then over three million men, absorb the much smaller German Army into its ranks under his leadership.\nSince the officers had developed the\nReichswehr\nas a professional force of 100,000, they believed that it would be destroyed if merged with millions of untrained SA thugs.\nFurthermore, the army commanders were greatly concerned about reports of a huge cache of weapons in the hands of SA members.\nIndustrialists, who had provided the funds for the Nazi victory, were unhappy with Röhm's socialistic views on the economy and his claims that the real revolution had still to take place.\nPresident Hindenburg\ninformed Hitler in June 1934 that if a move to curb the SA was not forthcoming, he would dissolve the government and declare\nmartial law\n.\nHitler was also concerned that Röhm and the SA had the power to remove him as leader. Göring and Himmler played on this fear by constantly feeding Hitler with new information on Röhm's proposed coup. A masterstroke was to claim that\nGregor Strasser\n, whom Hitler felt had betrayed him, was part of the planned conspiracy against him. With this news, Hitler ordered all the SA leaders to attend a meeting in the Hanselbauer Hotel\nin\nBad Wiessee\n.\nOn June 30, 1934, Hitler, accompanied by SS units, arrived at Bad Wiessee, where he personally placed Röhm and other high-ranking SA leaders under arrest. Over the next 48 hours, 200 other senior SA officers were arrested on the way to Wiessee. Many were shot and killed as soon as they were captured, but Hitler decided to pardon Röhm because of his past services to the movement. On July 1, after much pressure from Göring and Himmler, Hitler agreed that Röhm should die. Hitler insisted that Röhm should first be allowed to commit suicide. When Röhm refused to do so, he was shot by two SS officers,\nTheodor Eicke\nand\nMichael Lippert\n.\nThough the names of 85 victims are known, estimates place the total number killed at between 150 and 200 men, the rest of whom remain unidentified.\nSome Germans were shocked by the executions, but many others perceived Hitler to have restored \"order\" to the country. Goebbels' propaganda highlighted the \"Röhm-Putsch\" in the days that followed. The\nhomosexuality of Röhm\nand other SA leaders was made public to add \"shock value\", although Hitler and other Nazi leaders had known for years about the sexuality of Röhm and other named SA leaders.\nAfter the purge\nAfter the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, the SA continued to operate, under the leadership of\nStabschef\nViktor Lutze\n, but the group was significantly downsized. Within a year's time, the SA membership was reduced by more than 40%.\nHowever, the Nazis increased attacks against Jews in the early 1930s and used the SA to carry these out.\nIn November 1938, after the assassination of German diplomat\nErnst vom Rath\nby\nHerschel Grynszpan\n(a Polish Jew), the SA was used for \"demonstrations\" against the act. In violent riots, members of the SA shattered the glass storefronts of about 7,500 Jewish stores and businesses. The events were referred to as\nKristallnacht\n('Night of Broken Glass', more literally 'Crystal Night').\nJewish homes were ransacked throughout Germany. This\npogrom\ndamaged, and in many cases destroyed, about 200\nsynagogues\n(constituting nearly all Germany had), many Jewish cemeteries, more than 7,000 Jewish shops, and 29 department stores. Some Jews were beaten to death and more than 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and taken to\nconcentration camps\n.\nThereafter, the SA became overshadowed by the SS; by 1939 it had little remaining significance in the Nazi Party, though it was never formally disbanded and continued to exist until the war ended. In January 1939, the role of the SA was officially established as a training school for the armed forces, with the establishment of the SA\nWehrmannschaften\n(SA Military Units).\nWith the start of World War II in September 1939, the SA lost most of its remaining members to military service in the\nWehrmacht\n(armed forces).\nIn January 1941, long-standing rivalries between the\nAuswärtiges Amt\n(Foreign Office) and the SS exploded with the attempted coup d'état in Bucharest that saw SS back the coup by the Iron Guard under its leader\nHoria Sima\nagainst the Prime Minister, General\nIon Antonescu\n, while the\nAuswärtiges Amt\ntogether with the Wehrmacht backed Antonescu. In the aftermath of the coup, the Foreign Minister\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nmade an effort to curb the power of the SS to conduct a foreign policy independent of the\nAuswärtiges Amt\n. Taking an advantage of the long-standing rivalries between the SS and the SA, in 1941, Ribbentrop appointed an assemblage of SA men to head the German embassies in Eastern Europe, with\nManfred Freiherr von Killinger\ngoing to Romania,\nSiegfried Kasche\nto Croatia,\nAdolf-Heinz Beckerle\nto Bulgaria,\nDietrich von Jagow\nto Hungary, and\nHanns Ludin\nto Slovakia in order to ensure that there would be minimal co-operation with the SS.\nThe role of the SA ambassadors was that of \"quasi-\nReich\ngovernors\" as they aggressively supervised the internal affairs of the nations they were stationed in, making them very much unlike traditional ambassadors.\nThe SA leaders ambassadors fulfilled Ribbentrop's hopes in that all had distant relations with the SS, but as a group they were notably inept as diplomats with Beckerle being so crude and vulgar in his manners that King\nBoris III\nalmost refused to allow him to present his credentials at the\nVrana Palace\n.\nAs the ambassador in\nBratislava\n, Ludin arranged the deportation of 50,000 Slovak Jews to Auschwitz in 1942.\nOn 23–24 August 1944, Killinger notably bungled the German response to\nKing Michael I's Coup\nthat saw King\nMichael I of Romania\ndismiss Antonescu, sign an armistice with the Allies, and declare war on Germany, thereby costing the\nReich\nits largest source of oil.\nOf the SA ambassadors, Killinger and Jagow committed suicide in 1944 and 1945 respectively while Kasche and Ludin were executed for war crimes in 1947 in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia respectively. Beckerle spent 11 years in a Soviet POW camp, was released to West Germany in 1955, was charged with war crimes in 1966 for his role in the deportation of Macedonian Jews, which were dropped on grounds of ill health in 1968 and died in 1976 at a retirement home in West Germany.\nIn 1943, Viktor Lutze was killed in an automobile accident, and\nWilhelm Schepmann\nwas appointed as leader.\nSchepmann did his best to run the SA for the remainder of the war, attempting to restore the group as a predominant force within the Nazi Party and to mend years of distrust and bad feelings between the SA and SS. On the night of 29–30 March 1945, Austrian SA members were involved in a death march of Hungarian Jews from a work camp at Engerau (modern\nPetržalka\n,\nSlovakia\n) to\nBad Deutsch-Altenburg\nthat saw 102 of the Jews being killed, being either shot or beaten to death.\nIn April 1945,\nKreisstabsführer des Kremser Volkssturms\n(District\nChief of Staff\nof the\nKrems\nMilitia) and\nSA-Standartenführer\n(\nColonel\nof the SA) Leo Pilz led a contingent of\nVolkssturm\nmilitiamen during the\nStein Prison massacre\n, during which 400–500 prisoners were\nsummarily executed\n.\nPost-war\n, Pilz and four others were sentenced to death by the\nPeople's Court\nof\nVienna\n.\nThe SA ceased to exist in May 1945 when Nazi Germany collapsed. It was formally disbanded and outlawed by the\nAllied Control Council\nenacting Control Council Law No. 2 on October 10, 1945.\nIn 1946, the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nat\nNuremberg\nformally ruled that the SA was not a\ncriminal organization\n.\nLeadership\nMain articles:\nSupreme SA Leader\nand\nStabschef\nErnst Röhm\n, SA Chief of Staff, 1931–1934\nThe leader of the SA was known as the\nOberster SA-Führer\n, translated as Supreme SA-Leader. The following men held this position:\nEmil Maurice\n(1920–1921)\nHans Ulrich Klintzsch\n(1921–1923)\nHermann Göring\n(1923)\nNone\n(1923–1925)\nFranz Pfeffer von Salomon\n(1926–1930)\nAdolf Hitler\n(1930–1945)\nIn September 1930, to quell the Stennes Revolt and to try to ensure the personal loyalty of the SA to himself, Hitler assumed command of the entire organization and remained\nOberster SA-Führer\nfor the remainder of the group's existence until 1945. The day-to-day running of the SA was conducted by the\nStabschef-SA\n(SA Chief of Staff), a position Hitler designated for Ernst Röhm.\nAfter Hitler's assumption of the supreme command of the SA, it was the\nStabschef-SA\nwho was generally accepted as the Commander of the SA, acting in Hitler's name. The following personnel held the position of\nStabschef-SA\n:\nOtto Wagener\n(1929–1931)\nErnst Röhm\n(1931–1934)\nViktor Lutze\n(1934–1943)\nMax Jüttner\n(acting, May–August 1943)\nWilhelm Schepmann\n(1943–1945)\nOrganization\nSA organization\nThe SA was organized into several large regional\nGruppen\n(\"Groups\"). The group leader answered only to the\nStabschef-SA\nor Hitler.\nEach\nGruppe\nwas made up of subordinate\nBrigaden\n(\"Brigades\").\nSubordinate to the\nBrigaden\nwere the smaller\nregiment\n-sized\nStandarten\n.\nSA-Standarten\noperated in every major German city and were split into even smaller units, known as\nSturmbanne\nand\nStürme\n.\nThe command nexus for the entire SA was the\nOberste SA-Führung\n, located in\nStuttgart\n. The SA supreme command had many sub-offices to handle supply, finance and recruiting.\nAn SA-\nSturmmann\nof the Marine-\nSturmabteilung\n. His collar denotes that he is part of\nSturm 22 /\nStandarte\n1\n.\nThe SA also had several military training units. The largest was the\nSA-Marine\n, which served as an auxiliary to the\nKriegsmarine\n(German Navy) and performed\nsearch and rescue\noperations as well as harbor defense. The SA also had an \"army\" wing, similar to the\nWaffen-SS\n, known as\nFeldherrnhalle\n. This formation expanded from regimental size in 1940 to a fully-fledged armored corps (\nPanzerkorps Feldherrnhalle\n) in 1945. As for units formed outside of Germany, after the success of the\ninvasion of Poland\nin 1939, an SA unit, \"Great Government\" was formed. The units were renamed SA\nWehrschützen-Bereitschaften\nin 1942. The title was abbreviated to SA\nWehrbereitschaften\n, thereafter.\nOrganization structure August 1934–1945\nOberste SA-Führung\n(Supreme SA-Command & Control)\nGruppe\n(Group): consisting of several brigades\nBrigade\n: 3 to 9\nStandarten\nStandarte\n(\nStandard\n,\nregiment\nsized unit)\n: 3 to 5\nSturmbanner\nSturmbann\n(\nStorm\njurisdiction,\nbattalion\n-sized unit)\n: 3 to 5\nStürme\nSturm\n(Storm,\ncompany\nsized sub-unit)\n: 3 to 4\nTrupps\nTrupp\n(\nTroop\n,\nplatoon\n-sized sub-unit)\n: 3 to 4\nScharen\nSchar\n(\nsection\n)\n: 1 or 2\nRotten\n(squads or teams)\nRotte\n(\nsquad\nor team)\n: 4 to 8 SA-Men\nSA-Mann\n(SA-Man/SA-Trooper)\n\"Beefsteaks\" within the ranks\nSee also:\nBeefsteak Nazi\nand\nStrasserism\nIn his 1936\nHitler: A Biography\n, German historian\nKonrad Heiden\nremarked that within the SA ranks, there were \"large numbers of former Communists and Social Democrats\" and that \"many of the storm troops were called 'beefsteaks' – brown outside and red within.\"\nThe influx of non-Nazis into the\nSturmabteilung\nmembership was so prevalent that SA men would joke that \"In our storm troop there are three Nazis, but we shall soon have spewed them out.\"\nThe number of \"beefsteaks\" was estimated to be large in some cities, especially in northern Germany, where the influence of\nGregor Strasser\nand\nStrasserism\nwas significant.\nThe head of the Gestapo from 1933 to 1934,\nRudolf Diels\n, reported that \"70 percent\" of the new SA recruits in the city of Berlin had been communists.\nThis is evidenced further by historians, \"As for the prior youth group memberships, nearly half of the SS members and nearly one-third of the instant stormtroopers were with the Free Corps, vigilantes, or militant veterans' groups during their first 25 years of life. They also came in disproportionate numbers from left-wing youth groups such as the Socialist or Communist Youth or the Red Front (RFB).\"\nHistorians have argued that since most SA members came from working-class families or were unemployed, they were more amenable to\nMarxist\n-leaning socialism, expecting Hitler to fulfill the 25-point\nNational Socialist Program\n.\nHistorian\nThomas Friedrich\nstates that the repeated efforts by the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD) to appeal to the working-class backgrounds of the SA were \"doomed to failure\", because most SA men were focused on the nationalistic cult of Hitler and destroying the \"Marxist enemy\", a term that was used to identify both the KPD and the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD).\nThe \"beefsteak\" name also referred to party-switching between Nazi and Communist party members, particularly involving those within the SA ranks.\nSee also\nGermany portal\nPolitics portal\nCorps colors of the\nSturmabteilung\nUniforms and insignia of the\nSturmabteilung\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMilitia\nPolitical color\nPolitical uniform\nNational Action (UK)\n– Neo-nazi organization which uses logo based on SA\nSA-Feldjägerkorps\n(SA Field Police)\nSimilar paramilitary organizations\nAlbanian Fascist Party\n– Albania (\"Blackshirts\")\nBajrang Dal\n– India\nBlack Brigades\n– Italy\nBlackshirts\n– Italy\nBritish Union of Fascists\n– United Kingdom (\"Blackshirts\")\nBlue Shirts Society\n– China (\nKuomintang\n)\nBlueshirts\n– Ireland\nBlueshirts\n– Spain\nBlack Shorts\n–\nparody of the blackshirts in the writings of\nP. G. Wodehouse\nFreikorps\n– independent paramilitary organizations of ex-German Army soldiers and unemployed workers who fought against Communist uprisings after World War I\nSudetendeutsches Freikorps\n– paramilitary organizations of the\nNazi Germany\nGreenshirts\n– Ireland\nGold shirts\n– Mexico\nGreyshirts\n– ethnically Dutch South Africans (\nAfrikaaners\n)\nHirden\n– paramilitary wing of the\nNS\n, the Norwegian National Socialist party 1940–45.\nIntegralismo\nIron Guard\n– Romania (\"Greenshirts\")\nItalian Social Republic\n– (\"Blackshirts\")\nMilitia organizations in the United States\nNational Socialist Motor Corps\n– another Nazi Party organization\nNational Socialist Flyers Corps\n– another Nazi Party organization\nParti national social chrétien\n– Canada (\"Blueshirts\")\nPortuguese Legion\n– Portugal\nRed Shirts\n– United States\nSilver Legion of America\n– United States (\"Silvershirts\")\nSquadrismo\nTatenokai\nWeimar\nparamilitary groups\nYokusan Sonendan\nWeerbaarheidsafdeling\n– paramilitary arm of the\nNSB\n, the Dutch fascist and later National Socialist political party 1931–45.\nNotes\n↑\nBefore the end of 1919, Hitler had already been appointed head of propaganda for the party, with party founder\nAnton Drexler\n's backing.\n↑\nAt a special party congress held July 29, 1921, Hitler was appointed chairman. He announced that the party would stay headquartered in Munich and that those who did not like his leadership should just leave; he would not entertain debate on such matters. The vote was 543 for Hitler, and 1 against.\n↑\nThe OC's most infamous action was probably the brazen daylight assassination of the foreign minister\nWalther Rathenau\n, in early 1922. Klintzsch was also a member of the somewhat more reputable\nViking League\n(\nBund Wiking\n).\n↑\nThe NSDAP and its organs and instruments (including the\nVölkischer Beobachter\nand the SA) were banned in Bavaria (and other parts of Germany) following Hitler's abortive attempt to overthrow the\nWeimar\nRepublic\nin the\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin November 1923. The Bavarian ban was lifted in February 1925 after Hitler pledged to adhere to legal and constitutional means in his quest for political power.\nSee\nVerbotzeit\n.\n↑\nThe SA-Brigade was also designated as\nSA-Untergruppe\n(SA-Subgroup).\nCitations\n↑\n\"What Was the Sturmabteilung?\"\n.\nThe Collector\n. February 7, 2024.\nIn September 1923, during the Deutsche Tag (German Day) in Nuremberg, the SA became part of the Deutsche Bund, an alliance of several far-right, nationalist groups.\n↑\n\"The SA\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\nNovember 23,\n2024\n.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n220.\n↑\nRoßbach, Gerhard\n(1950).\nMein Weg durch die Zeit. Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse\n. Weilburg/Lahn\n: Vereinigte Weilburger Buchdruckereien.\n↑\nDrury 2003\n.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, pp.\n94–98.\n↑\nManchester 2003\n, p.\n342.\n↑\nWilliam L. Shirer,\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n(1960) p. 42\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n112.\n1\n2\n3\nCampbell 1998\n, pp.\n19–20.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n111.\n1\n2\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n928.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n807.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n14.\n1\n2\nLindner\n.\n1\n2\nSiemens 2013\n.\n↑\nKlußmann, Uwe (November 29, 2012).\n\"Conquering the Capital: The Ruthless Rise of the Nazis in Berlin\"\n.\nSpiegel Online\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 28, 2019\n. Retrieved\nOctober 6,\n2019\n.\n1\n2\nGoodman\n&\nMartin 2002\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nMcNab 2011\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nBullock 1958\n, p.\n80.\n↑\n\"SA\"\n.\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n. Retrieved\nJuly 28,\n2017\n.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n304–306.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n17, 19–21.\n↑\nBaranowski 2010\n, pp.\n196–197.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–314.\n↑\nClaudia Koonz\n,\nThe Nazi Conscience\n, p. 87\n1\n2\nBrown 2009\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nAlford 2002\n, p.\n5.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nGunther, John\n(1940).\nInside Europe\n. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp.\n53–\n54.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 2005\n, pp.\n319–320.\n↑\n\"Hotel Hanslbauer in Bad Wiessee: Scene of the Arrest of Ernst Röhm and his Followers (June 30, 1934) – Image\"\n.\nghi-dc.org\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on October 6, 2018\n. Retrieved\nApril 28,\n2011\n.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–312.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n313.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nGermanNotes,\n\"Kristallnacht\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non April 19, 2005\n. Retrieved\nNovember 26,\n2007\n.\n↑\nThe deportation\nArchived\nOctober 6, 2018, at the\nWayback Machine\nof\nRegensburg\nJews to\nDachau\nconcentration camp\n(\nYad Vashem\nPhoto Archives 57659)\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n20, 21.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n22.\n1\n2\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nJacobsen 1999\n, p.\n62.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n411.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nGarscha 2012\n, pp.\n307–308.\n↑\nKonstantin Ferihumer (2017).\n\"Der Fall Sonderer: Eine vergangenheitspolitische Kurzbiografie (The Sonderer Case: A short political biography of the past)\"\n(PDF)\n.\nDOEW.at\n(in German).\nVienna\n,\nAustria\n:\nDocumentation Centre of Austrian Resistance\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non June 18, 2025\n. Retrieved\nJune 18,\n2025\n.\n↑\nStein Trial (1946)\non the website of the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (in German). Retrieved 2025-06-19.\n↑\n\"Schutzstaffel (SS), 1925–1945 – Historisches Lexikon Bayerns\"\n.\nwww.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on April 3, 2020\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 19,\n2021\n.\n↑\n\"The Sturmabteilung or SA\"\n.\nHistory Learning Site\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on May 16, 2015\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 22,\n2013\n.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n50.\n1\n2\nYerger 1997\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nYerger 1997\n, pp.\n11, 12.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nLittlejohn 1990\n, pp.\n5, 7.\n1\n2\n3\nLittlejohn 1990\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nLittlejohn 1990\n, pp.\n39–40.\n1\n2\nHeiden 1938\n, p.\n390.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nMerkl, Peter H. (1975).\nPolitical Violence Under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis\n. Princeton University Press. p.\n586.\nISBN\n978-0-691-07561-7\n.\n↑\nBendersky, Joseph W. (2007).\nA Concise History of Nazi Germany\n. Rowman & Littlefield. p.\n96.\nISBN\n978-0-7425-5363-7\n.\n↑\nFriedrich 2012\n, pp.\n213, 215.\nBibliography\nAlford, Kenneth (2002).\nNazi Millionaires: The Allied Search for Hidden SS Gold\n. Casemate Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-9711709-6-4\n.\nBaranowski, Shelley (2010).\nNazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-67408-9\n.\nBloch, Michael (1992).\nRibbentrop\n. New York: Crown Publishers.\nISBN\n0517593106\n.\nBrown, Timothy S. (2009).\nWeimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n9781845459086\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 2, 2023\n. Retrieved\nAugust 15,\n2015\n.\nBullock, Alan\n(1958).\nHitler: A Study in Tyranny\n. New York: Harper.\nCampbell, Bruce (1998).\nThe SA Generals and The Rise of Nazism\n.\nUniversity Press of Kentucky\n.\nISBN\n0-8131-2047-0\n.\nDrury, Ian (2003).\nGerman Stormtrooper 1914–1918\n.\nOsprey Publishing\n.\nFriedrich, Thomas (2012).\nHitler's Berlin: Abused City\n. Translated by Spencer, Stewart. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-16670-5\n.\nGarscha, Wilfrid (2012). \"Ordinary Austrians: Common War Criminals of World War II\". In Bischof, Günter; Plasser, Fritz; Maltschnig, Eva (eds.).\nAustrian Lives\n. University of New Orleans Press. pp.\n304–\n326.\nISBN\n978-1-60801-140-7\n.\nGoodman, Joyce; Martin, Jane (2002).\nGender, colonialism and education: the politics of experience\n. London; Portland, OR: Woburn Press.\nISBN\n0-7130-0226-3\n.\nHeiden, Konrad\n(1938).\nHitler: A Biography\n. London: Constable & Co. Ltd.\nHoffmann, Peter\n(2000) .\nHitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer 1921–1945\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-30680-947-7\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf (1999). \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1945\". In Leitz, Christian (ed.).\nThe Third Reich The Essential Readings\n. Blackwell. pp.\n49–\n94.\nISBN\n9-780631-207009\n.\nLindner, Erik.\n\"Zwölf Millionen f��r Göring\"\n.\nCicero Online\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 26, 2018\n. Retrieved\nAugust 20,\n2018\n.\nLittlejohn, David (1990).\nThe Sturmabteilung: Hitler's Stormtroopers 1921–1945\n. London: Osprey Publishing.\nManchester, William (2003).\nThe Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Dynasty That Armed Germany at War\n. Back Bay.\nISBN\n0-316-52940-0\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2011).\nHitler's Masterplan: The Essential Facts and Figures for Hitler's Third Reich\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1907446962\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-78200-088-4\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2015).\nLeaders of the Storm Troops\n. Vol.\n1. Solihull, England: Helion & Company.\nISBN\n978-1-909982-87-1\n.\nMitcham, Samuel W. Jr. (1996).\nWhy Hitler?: The Genesis of the Nazi Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.\nISBN\n0-275-95485-4\n.\nSiemens, Daniel (September 11, 2013).\n\"Nazi storm-troopers' cigarettes\"\n(University department)\n.\nUCL SSEES Research Blog\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on October 6, 2019\n. Retrieved\nAugust 25,\n2018\n.\nToland, John\n(1976).\nAdolf Hitler\n. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.\nISBN\n0-385-03724-4\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John\n(2005) .\nThe Nemesis of Power\n. London: Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-1-4039-1812-3\n.\nYerger, Mark C. (1997).\nAllgemeine-SS: The Commands, Units, and Leaders of the General SS\n. Schiffer Publishing Ltd.\nISBN\n0-7643-0145-4\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Macmillan Publishing.\nISBN\n0-02-897500-6\n.\nFurther reading\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nSturmabteilung\n.\nBessel, Richard\n(1984).\nPolitical Violence and The Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925–1934\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n0-300-03171-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nFischer, Conan (1983).\nStormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis, 1929–35\n. Allen & Unwin.\nISBN\n0-04-943028-9\n.\nHalcomb, Jill (1985).\nThe SA: A Historical Perspective\n. Crown/Agincourt Publishers.\nISBN\n0-934870-13-6\n.\nHatch, Nicholas H. (trans. and ed.) (2000).\nThe Brown Battalions: Hitler's SA in Words and Pictures\n. Turner.\nISBN\n1-56311-595-6\n.\nMaracin, Paul (2004).\nThe Night of the Long Knives: 48 Hours that Changed the History of the World\n. The Lyons Press.\nMerkl, Peter H. (1980).\nThe Making of a Stormtrooper\n.\nPrinceton University Press\n.\nISBN\n0-691-07620-0\n.\nMitchell, Otis C. (2008).\nHitler's Stormtroopers\n.\nMcFarland & Company\n.\nISBN\n9780786477296\n.\nReiche, Eric G. (1986).\nThe Development of the SA in Nürnberg 1922–1934\n.\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n9780521524315\n.\nSiemens, Daniel (2018).\nStormtroopers. A new history of Hitler's Brownshirts\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n9780300196818\n.\nWackerfuss, Andrew (2015).\nStormtrooper Families: Homosexuality and Community in the Early Nazi Movement\n.\nHarrington Park Press\n.\nISBN\n9781939594051\n.",
+    "infobox": {
+      "also_known_as": "Brownshirts (Braunhemden)",
+      "leader": "Oberster SA-FührerStabschef",
+      "dates_of_operation": "October5,1921(1921-10-05)–May8,1945(1945-05-08)",
+      "country": "Germany",
+      "allegiance": "Adolf Hitler,Nazi Party",
+      "motives": "ProtectionIntimidation",
+      "headquarters": "SA High Command,Barerstraße,Munich48°08′38″N11°34′03″E/48.14389°N 11.56750°E/48.14389; 11.56750",
+      "ideology": "Nazism",
+      "politicalposition": "Far-right[1]",
+      "major_actions": "Kristallnacht",
+      "status": "Dissolved",
+      "size": "4 million (April 1934)[2]",
+      "part_of": "Nazi Party",
+      "allies": "Der Stahlhelm(1933–1935)(merged)",
+      "opponents": "ReichsbannerRotfrontkämpferbund"
+    },
+    "char_count": 39123
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Sicherheitsdienst",
+    "name": "Sicherheitsdienst",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "Sicherheitsdienst, full title Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS, or SD, was the intelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany. Established in 1931, the SD was the first Nazi intelligence organization and the Gestapo was considered its sister organization through the integration of SS members and operational procedures. The SD was administered as an independent SS office between 1933 and 1939. That year, the SD was transferred over to the Reich Security Main Office, as one of its seven departments. Its first director, Reinhard Heydrich, intended for the SD to bring every single individual within the Third Reich's reach under \"continuous supervision\".",
+    "description": "Intelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany",
+    "full_text": "Sicherheitsdienst\nIntelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany\nSicherheitsdienst\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈzɪçɐhaɪtsˌdiːnst\n]\n, \"Security Service\"), full title\nSicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS\n(\"Security Service of the\nReichsführer-SS\n\"), or\nSD\n, was the\nintelligence agency\nof the\nSS\nand the\nNazi Party\nin\nNazi Germany\n. Established in 1931, the SD was the first Nazi intelligence organization and the\nGestapo\n(formed in 1933) was considered its\nsister organization\nthrough the integration of SS members and operational procedures. The SD was administered as an independent SS office between 1933 and 1939. That year, the SD was transferred over to the\nReich Security Main Office\n(\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n; RSHA), as one of its seven departments.\nIts first director,\nReinhard Heydrich\n, intended for the SD to bring every single individual within the Third Reich's reach under \"continuous supervision\".\nFollowing Germany's defeat in\nWorld War II\n, the tribunal at the\nNuremberg trials\nofficially declared that the SD was a criminal organisation, along with the rest of Heydrich's RSHA (including the Gestapo) both individually and as branches of the SS in the collective.\nHeydrich was\nassassinated in 1942\n; his successor,\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, was convicted of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nat the Nuremberg trials, sentenced to death and hanged in 1946.\nHistory\nOrigins\nThe SD, one of the oldest security organizations of the SS, was first formed in 1931 as the\nIc-Dienst\n(Intelligence Service\n) operating out of a single apartment and reporting directly to\nHeinrich Himmler\n. Himmler appointed a former junior naval officer,\nReinhard Heydrich\n, to organise the small agency.\nThe office was renamed\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) in the summer of 1932.\nThe SD became more powerful after the\nNazi Party\ntook control of Germany in 1933 and the SS started infiltrating all leading positions of the security apparatus of the Reich.  Even before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, the SD was a veritable \"watchdog\" over the SS and over members of the Nazi Party and played a critical role in consolidating political-police powers into the hands of Himmler and Heydrich.\nGrowth of SD and SS power\nReinhard Heydrich\nin 1940\nOnce Hitler was appointed Chancellor by German President\nPaul von Hindenburg\n, he quickly made efforts to manipulate the aging president. On 28 February 1933, Hitler convinced Hindenburg to\ndeclare a state of emergency\nwhich suspended all civil liberties throughout Germany, due at least in part to the\nReichstag fire\non the previous night. Hitler assured Hindenburg throughout that he was attempting to stabilize the tumultuous political scene in Germany by taking a \"defensive measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the state\".\nWasting no time, Himmler set the SD in motion as they began creating an extensive card-index of the Nazi regime's political opponents, arresting labor organizers, socialists, Jewish leaders, journalists, and communists in the process, sending them to the newly established prison facility near Munich,\nDachau\n.\nHimmler's SS and SD made their presence felt at once by helping rid the regime of its known political enemies and its perceived ones, as well. As far as Heydrich and Himmler were concerned, the SD left their mission somewhat vaguely defined so as to \"remain an instrument for all eventualities\".\nOne such eventuality would soon arise.\nFor a while, the SS competed with the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) for influence within Germany. Himmler distrusted the SA and came to deplore the \"rabble-rousing\" brownshirts (despite once having been a member) and what he saw as indecent sexual deviants amid its leadership.\nAt least one pretext to secure additional influence for Himmler's SS and Heydrich's SD in \"protecting\" Hitler and securing his absolute trust in their intelligence collection abilities, involved thwarting a plot from\nErnst Röhm\n's SA using subversive means.\nOn 20 April 1934\nHermann Göring\nhanded over control of the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n(\nGestapo\n) to Himmler. Heydrich, named chief of the Gestapo by Himmler on 22 April 1934, also continued as head of the SD.\nThese events further extended Himmler's control of the security mechanism of the Reich, which by proxy also strengthened the surveillance power of Heydrich's SD, as both entities methodically infiltrated every police agency in Germany.\nSubsequently, the SD was made the sole \"party information service\" on 9 June 1934.\nUnder pressure from the\nReichswehr\n(German armed forces)\nleadership\n(whose members viewed the enormous armed forces of the SA as an existential threat) and with the collusion of Göring,\nJoseph Goebbels\n, the Gestapo and SD, Hitler was led to believe that Röhm's SA posed a serious conspiratorial threat requiring a drastic and immediate solution.\nFor its part, the SD provided fictitious information that there was an assassination plot on Hitler's life and that an SA putsch to assume power was imminent since the SA were allegedly amassing weapons.\nAdditionally, reports were coming into the SD and Gestapo that the vulgarity of the SA's behavior was damaging the party and was even making\nantisemitism\nless palatable.\nOn 30 June 1934 the SS and Gestapo acted in coordinated mass arrests that continued for two days. The SS took one of its most decisive steps in eliminating its competition for command of security within Germany and established itself firmly in the Nazi hierarchy, making the SS and its intelligence organ, the SD, responsible only to the Führer. The purge became known as the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, with up to 200 people killed in the action.\nMoreover, the brutal crushing of the SA and its leadership sent a clear message to everyone that opposition to Hitler's regime could be fatal.\nIt struck fear across the Nazi leadership as to the tangible concern of the reach and influence of Himmler's intelligence collection and policing powers.\nSD and Austria\nDuring the autumn of 1937, Hitler secured\nMussolini\n's support to annex\nAustria\n(Mussolini was originally apprehensive of the Nazi takeover of Austria) and informed his generals of his intentions to invade both Austria and\nCzechoslovakia\n.\nGetting Mussolini to approve political intrigue against Austria was a major accomplishment, as the Italian\nDuce\nhad expressed great concern previously in the wake of an Austrian SS unit's\nattempt to stage a coup\nnot more than three weeks after the\nRöhm affair\n, an episode that embarrassed the SS, enraged Hitler, and ended in the assassination of Austrian Chancellor\nEngelbert Dollfuss\non 25 July 1934.\nNonetheless, to facilitate the incorporation of Austria into the greater Reich, the SD and Gestapo went to work arresting people immediately, using lists compiled by Heydrich.\nHeydrich's SD and Austrian SS members received financing from Berlin to harass Austrian Chancellor\nvon Schuschnigg\n's government all throughout 1937. One section of the SD that was nothing more than a front for subversive activities against Austria ironically promoted \"German-Austrian peace\".\nThroughout the events leading to the\nAnschluß\nand even after the Nazis marched into Austria on 12 March 1938, Heydrich – convinced that only his SD could pull off a peaceful union between the two German-speaking nations – organized demonstrations, conducted clandestine operations, ordered\nterror\nattacks, distributed propaganda materials, encouraged the intimidation of opponents, and had his SS and SD personnel round up prominent anti-Nazis, most of whom ended up in\nMauthausen concentration camp\nThe coordinated efforts of the\nSiPo\nand Heydrich's SD during the first days of the\nAnschluß\neffectively eliminated all forms of possible political, military and economic resistance within Austria.\nOnce the annexation became official, the Austrian police were immediately subordinated to Heydrich's SD, the SS and Gestapo.\nMachinations by the SD, the Gestapo, and the SS helped to bring Austria fully into Hitler's grasp and on 13 March 1938, he signed into law the union with Austria as tears streamed down his face.\n\"Case Green\" and the Sudetenland\nConcomitant to its machinations against Austria, the SD also became involved in subversive activities throughout Czechoslovakia. Focusing on the\nSudetenland\nwith its 3 million ethnic Germans and the disharmony there which the Czech government could not seem to remedy, Hitler set Heydrich's SD in motion in what came to be known as\n\"Case Green\"\n.\nPassed off as a mission to liberate\nSudeten Germans\nfrom alleged Czech persecution, Case Green was in fact a contingency plan to outright invade and destroy the country, as Hitler intended to \"wipe Czechoslovakia off the map.\"\nThis operation was akin to earlier SD efforts in Austria; however, unlike Austria, the Czechs fielded their own Secret Service, against which Heydrich had to contend.\nOnce \"Case Green\"  began, Heydrich's SD spies began covertly gathering intelligence, even going so far as having SD agents use their spouses and children in the cover scheme. The operation covered every conceivable type of intelligence data, using a myriad of cameras and photographic equipment, focusing efforts on important strategic locations like government buildings, police stations, postal services, public utilities, logistical routes, and above all, airfields.\nHitler worked out a sophisticated plan to acquire the Sudetenland, including manipulating Slovak nationalists to vie for independence and the suppression of this movement by the Czech government. Under directions from Heydrich, SD operative\nAlfred Naujocks\nwas re-activated to engage in sabotage activities designed to incite a response from the Slovaks and the Czechs, a mission that ultimately failed.\nIn June 1938 a directive from the SD head office indicated that Hitler issued an order at\nJueterbog\nto his generals to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.\nTo hasten a presumed heavy response from the French, British, and Czechs, Hitler then upped the stakes and claimed that the Czechs were slaughtering Sudeten Germans. He demanded the unconditional and prompt cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in order to secure the safety of endangered ethnic Germans.\nAround this time, early plots by select members of the German General Staff emerged, plans which included ridding themselves of Hitler.\nEventually a diplomatic showdown pitting Hitler against the governments of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, and France, whose tepid reaction to the Austrian Anschluss had precipitated this crisis to some degree, ensued. The Sudetenland Crisis came to an end when\nNeville Chamberlain\nand Hitler signed the\nMunich Agreement\non 29 September 1938, effectively ceding the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany.\nInvolvement in international affairs by the SD certainly did not end there and the agency remained active in foreign operations to such a degree that the head of the Reich Foreign Ministry office,\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n, complained of their meddling, since Hitler would apparently make decisions based on SD reports without consulting him.\nAccording to historian\nRichard Breitman\n, there was animosity between the SS leadership and Ribbentrop's Foreign Office atop their \"jurisdictional disputes\".\nIntrigue against Poland\nAside from its participation in diminishing the power of the SA and its scheme to kill Röhm, the SD took part in international intrigue, first by activities in Austria, again in Czechoslovakia, and then by helping provoke the \"reactive\" war against Poland. Code-named \"\nOperation Himmler\n\" and part of Hitler's plan to justify an attack upon Poland, the SD's clandestine activity for this mission included faking a Polish attack against \"innocent Germans\" at a German radio station in\nGleiwitz\n.\nThe SD took concentration-camp inmates condemned to die, and fitted them with Polish Army uniforms which\nHeinz Jost\nhad acquired from Admiral\nWilhelm Canaris\n'\nAbwehr\n(military intelligence).\nLeading this mission and personally selected by Heydrich was SS veteran\nAlfred Naujocks\n, who later reported during a War Criminal proceeding that he brought a Polish-speaking German along so he could broadcast a message in Polish from the German radio station \"under siege\" to the effect that it was time for an all out confrontation between Germans and Poles. To add documented proof of this attack, the SD operatives placed the fictitious Polish troops (killed by lethal injection, then shot for appearance) around the \"attacked\" radio station with the intention of taking members of the press to the site of the incident.\nImmediately in the wake of the staged incidents on 1 September 1939, Hitler proclaimed from the Reichstag in a famous radio address that German soldiers had been \"returning\" fire since 5:45 in the morning, setting the Second World War in Europe into motion.\nTasks and general structure\nGerman passport extended by the SD in Norway, March 1945\nThe SD was tasked with the detection of actual or potential enemies of the Nazi leadership and the neutralization of such opposition, whether internal or external. To fulfill this task, the SD developed an organization of agents and informants throughout the Reich and later throughout\nthe occupied territories\n, all part of the development of an extensive SS state and a\ntotalitarian regime\nwithout parallel.\nThe organization consisted of a few hundred full-time agents and several thousand informants. Historian George C. Browder writes that SD regiments were comparable to SS regiments, in that:\nSD districts (\nBezirke\n) emerged covering several Party circuits (\nKreis\n) or an entire district (\nGau\n). Below this level, SD sub-districts (\nUnterbezirke\n) slowly developed. They were originally to cover a single\nKreis\n, and, in turn, to be composed of wards (\nRevier\n), but such an ambitious network never emerged. Eventually, the SD-sub-districts acquired the simple designation of 'outposts' (\nAussenstellen\n) as the lowest level-office in the field structure.\nThe SD was mainly an information-gathering agency, while the Gestapo—and to a degree the Criminal Police (\nKriminalpolizei\nor Kripo)—was the executive agency of the political-police system. The SD and Gestapo did have integration through SS members holding dual positions in each branch. Nevertheless, there was some jurisdictional overlap and operational conflict between the SD and Gestapo.\nIn addition, the Criminal Police kept a level of independence since its structure had been longer-established.\nAs part and parcel of its intelligence operations, the SD carefully tracked foreign opinion and criticism of Nazi policies, censoring when necessary and likewise publishing hostile political cartoons in the SS weekly magazine,\nDas Schwarze Korps\n.\nAn additional task assigned to the SD and the Gestapo involved keeping tabs on the morale of the German population at large,\nwhich meant they were charged to \"carefully supervise the political health of the German ethnic body\" and once any symptoms of \"disease and germs\" appeared, it was their job to \"remove them by every appropriate means\".\nRegular reports—including opinion polls, press dispatches, and information bulletins were established. These were monitored and reviewed by the head of the Inland-SD,\nOtto Ohlendorf\n(responsible for intelligence and security within Germany) and by the former Heidelberg professor and SD member\nReinhard Höhn\n. This activity aimed to control and assess the \"life domain\" or\nLebensgebiet\nof the German population.\nGathered information was then distributed by the SD through secret internal political reports entitled\nMeldungen aus dem Reich\n(reports from the Reich) to the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, enabling Hitler's régime to evaluate the general morale and attitude of the German people so they could be manipulated by the\nNazi propaganda\nmachine in timely fashion.\nWhen the\nNuremberg Laws\nwere passed in 1935, the SD reported that the measures against the Jews were well received by the German populace.\nIn 1936, the police were divided into the\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo or Order Police) and the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo or Security Police).\nThe Orpo consisted mainly of the\nSchutzpolizei\n(urban police), the\nGendarmerie\n(rural police) and the\nGemeindepolizei\n(municipal police). The SiPo was composed of the Kripo and the Gestapo. Heydrich became Chief of the SiPo and continued as Chief of the SD.\nContinued escalation of antisemitic policies in the spring of 1937 from the SD's Department of Jewish Affairs (\nGerman\n:\nAbteilung II/112: Juden\n) – staffed by members like\nAdolf Eichmann\n,\nHerbert Hagen\n, and\nTheodor Dannecker\n– led to the eventual\nremoval (\nEntfernung\n) of Jews from Germany\n; regardless of concerns about where they were headed.\nAdolf Eichmann's original task (in his capacity as deputy for the Jewish Affairs department within the SD) was at first to remove any semblance of \"Jewish influence from all spheres of public life\", which included the encouragement of wholesale Jewish emigration. Official bureaucratization increased apace with numerous specialized offices formed, aiding towards the overall persecution of the Jews.\nBecause the Gestapo and the SD had parallel duties, Heydrich tried to reduce any confusion or related territorial disputes through a decree on 1 July 1937, clearly defining the SD's areas of responsibility as those dealing with \"learning (\nWissenschaft\n), art, party and state, constitution and administration, foreign lands, Freemasonry and associations\" whereas the \"Gestapo's jurisdiction was Marxism, treason, and emigrants\".\nAdditionally, the SD was responsible for matters related to \"churches and sects, pacifism, the Jews, right-wing movements\", as well as \"the economy, and the Press\", but the SD was instructed to \"avoid all matters which touched the 'state police executive powers' (\nstaatspolizeiliche Vollzugsmaßnahmen\n) since these belonged to the Gestapo, as did all individual cases.\"\nIn 1938, the SD was made the intelligence organization for the State as well as for the Nazi Party,\nsupporting the Gestapo and working with the General and Interior Administration. As such, the SD came into immediate, fierce competition with German military intelligence, the\nAbwehr,\nwhich was headed by Admiral Canaris. The competition stemmed from Heydrich and Himmler's intention to absorb the\nAbwehr\nand Admiral Canaris' view of the SD as an amateur upstart. Canaris refused to give up the autonomy that his military intelligence organ possessed. Additional problems also existed, like the racial exemption for members of the\nAbwehr\nfrom the Nazi Aryan-screening process, and then there was competition for resources which occurred throughout Nazi Germany's existence.\nOn 27 September 1939, the SiPo became a part of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA) under Heydrich:\nSD-Inland became\nAmt\n(department) III (internal intelligence – within Germany) under\nOtto Ohlendorf\nthe Gestapo became\nAmt\nIV under\nHeinrich Müller\nthe Kripo became\nAmt\nV under\nArthur Nebe\nSD-Ausland became\nAmt\nVI (foreign intelligence – outside Germany) under\nWalter Schellenberg\nFrom February 1944 forward, the sections of the\nAbwehr\nwere incorporated into\nAmt\nVI.\nThe SD's relationship with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nMain article:\nEinsatzgruppen\nSee also:\nBandenbekämpfung\nFollow-up letter from\nReinhard Heydrich\nto the German diplomat\nMartin Luther\nasking for administrative assistance in the implementation of the Final Solution genocide, 26 February 1942\nThe SD was the overarching agency under which the\nEinsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n, also known as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, was subordinated; this was one of the principal reasons for the later war-crimes indictment against the organization by the Allies.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen's\npart in the Holocaust has been well documented. Its mobile killing units were active in the implementation of the\nFinal Solution\n(the plan for\ngenocide\n) in the territories overrun by the Nazi war machine.\nThis SD subsidiary worked closely with the Wehrmacht in persecuting Jews, communists, partisans, and other groups, as well.\nStarting with the invasion of Poland throughout the campaign in the East, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nruthlessly killed anyone suspected of being an opponent of the regime, either real or imagined.\nThe men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere recruited from the SD, Gestapo, Kripo, Orpo, and Waffen-SS.\nOn 31 July 1941, Göring gave written authorisation to SD Chief Heydrich to ensure a government-wide cooperative effort in the implementation of the so-called\nFinal Solution to the Jewish question\nin territories under German control.\nAn SD headquarter's memorandum indicated that the SD was tasked to accompany military invasions and assist in pacification efforts. The memo explicitly stated:\nThe SD will, where possible, follow up immediately behind the troops as they move in and, as in the Reich, will assume responsibility for the security of political life. Within the Reich, security measures are the responsibility of the Gestapo with SD cooperation. In occupied territory, measures will be under the direction of a senior SD commander; Gestapo officials will be allotted to individual\nEinsatzstäbe\n. It will be necessary to make available for special deployment a unit of\nVerfügungstruppe\nor\nTotenkopf\n[Death Head] formations.\nCorrespondingly, SD affiliated units, including the\nEinsatzgruppen\nfollowed German troops into Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia, Poland, Lithuania, as well as Russia.\nSince their task included cooperating with military leadership and vice versa, suppression of opposition in the occupied territories was a joint venture.\nThere were territorial disputes and disagreement about how some of these policies were to be implemented.\nNonetheless, by June 1941, the SS and the SD task forces were systematically shooting Jewish men of military age, which soon turned to \"gunning down\" old people, women, and children in the occupied areas.\nOn 20 January 1942, Heydrich chaired a meeting, now called the\nWannsee Conference\n, to discuss the implementation of the plan.\nFacilities such as Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz have their origins in the planning actions undertaken by Heydrich.\nHeydrich remained chief of the Security Police (SiPo) and the SD (through the RSHA) until his assassination in 1942, after which Ernst Kaltenbrunner was named chief by Himmler on 30 January 1943, and remained there until the end of the war.\nThe SD was declared a criminal organization after the war and its members were\ntried as war criminals at Nuremberg\n.\nWhatever their original purpose, the SD and SS were ultimately created to identify and eradicate internal enemies of the State, as well as to pacify, subjugate, and exploit conquered territories and peoples.\nOrganization\nThe SS Security Service, known as the SS\nSD-Amt\n, became the official security organization of the Nazi Party in 1934. Consisting at first of paid agents and a few hundred unpaid informants scattered across Germany, the SD was quickly professionalized under Heydrich, who commissioned National Socialist academics and lawyers to ensure that the SS and its Security Service in particular, operated \"within the framework of National Socialist ideology.\"\nHeydrich was given the power to select men for the SS Security Service from among any SS subdivisions since Himmler considered the organization of the SD as important.\nIn September 1939, the SD was divided into two departments, the interior department (\nInland-SD\n) and the foreign department (\nAusland-SD\n), and placed under the authority of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA).\nInland-SD\nThe Interior Security Service  (\nInland-SD\n), responsible for intelligence and security within Germany, was known earlier as Department II and later, when placed under the Reich Security Main Office, as its Department III. It was originally headed by\nHermann Behrends\nand from September 1939 by Otto Ohlendorf.\nIt was within this organization that\nAdolf Eichmann\nbegan working out the details for the\nFinal Solution to the Jewish Question\n.\nDepartment III was divided into the following sections:\nSection A (Law and Legal Structures)\nSection B (Race and Ethnic Matters)\nSection C (Cultural and Religious Matters)\nSection D (Industry and Commerce)\nSection E (High Society)\nAusland-SD\nThe Foreign Security Service (\nAusland-SD\n), responsible for intelligence activities beyond the boundaries of Germany, was known earlier as Department III and later, after September 1939, as Department VI of the Reich Security Main Office.\nIt was nominally commanded by Heydrich, but run by his chief of staff\nHeinz Jost\n.\nIn March 1942 Jost was fired and replaced by\nWalter Schellenberg\n, a deputy of Heydrich. After the\n20 July plot\nin 1944, Department VI took over the functions of the Military Intelligence Service (\nAbwehr\n). Department VI was divided into the following sections:\nSection A (Organization and Administration)\nSection B (Espionage in the West)\nSection C (Espionage in the Soviet Union and Japan)\nSection D (Espionage in the American sphere)\nSection E (Espionage in Eastern Europe)\nSection F (Technical Matters)\nSecurity forces\nSD personnel during a\nłapanka\n(random arrest) in occupied Poland\nThe SD and the SiPo were the main sources of officers for the\nsecurity forces\nin occupied territories. SD-SiPo led battalions were typically placed under the command of the\nSS and Police Leaders\n, reporting directly to the RSHA in Berlin. The SD also maintained a presence at all\nconcentration camps\nand supplied personnel, on an as-needed basis, to such special action troops as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nIn fact, all members of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwore the SD sleeve diamond on their uniforms.\nThe SD-SiPo was the primary agency, in conjunction with the\nOrdnungspolizei\n, assigned to maintain order and security in the\nNazi ghettos\nestablished by the Germans throughout occupied Eastern Europe.\nOn 7 December 1941, the same day as the Japanese\nattack on Pearl Harbor\n, the first extermination camp was opened at Chelmno near Lodz by\nErnst Damzog\n, the SD and SiPo commander in occupied\nPoznań\n(Posen). Damzog had personally selected the staff for the killing centre and later supervised the daily operation of the camp, which was under the command of\nHerbert Lange\n.\nOver a span of approximately 15 months, 150,000 people were killed there.\nInfiltration\nAccording to the book\nPiercing the Reich\n, the SD was infiltrated in 1944 by a former Russian national who was working for the Americans. The agent's parents had fled the\nRussian Revolution\n, and he had been raised in Berlin, and then moved to Paris. He was recruited by\nAlbert Jolis\nof the\nOffice of Strategic Services\n(OSS)\nSeventh Army\ndetachment. The mission was codenamed RUPPERT.\nHow extensive the SD's knowledge was about the early plots to kill Hitler by key members of the military remains a contested subject and a veritable unknown. According to British historian\nJohn Wheeler-Bennett\n, \"in view of the wholesale destruction of Gestapo archives it is improbable that this knowledge will ever be forthcoming. That the authorities were aware of serious 'defeatism' is certain, but it is doubtful whether they suspected anyone of outright treason.\"\nPersonnel\nGiven the nature of the intelligence operations assigned to the SD, there were clear delineations between what constituted a full member (\nMitglied\n) of the SD and those who were considered \"associates\" (\nMitarbeiter\n) with a further subset for clerical support personnel (typists, file clerks, etc.) who were connoted as V-persons (\nVertrauensleute\n).\nAll SD personnel, whether simply associates or full members were required to swear an oath of secrecy, had to meet all the requirements for SS membership, were assigned SD code numbers (\nChiffre Nummer\n) and if they were \"above the level of V-person\" they had to carry \"an SD identification card.\"\nThe vast majority of early SD members were relatively young, but the officers were typically older by comparison; nevertheless, the average age of an SD member was approximately 2 years older than the average Nazi Party member.\nMuch like the Nazi revolution in general, membership in the SS and the SD appealed more to the impressionable youth.\nMost SD members were Protestant by faith, had served in the military, and generally had a significant amount of education, representing \"an educated elite\" in the general sense – with about 14 percent of them earning doctorate degrees.\nHeydrich viewed the SD as spiritual-elite leaders within the SS and the \"cream of the cream of the NSDAP.\"\nAccording to historian George C. Browder, \"SD men represented no pathological or psychically susceptible group. Few were wild or extreme Nazi fanatics. In those respects they were 'ordinary men'. Yet in most other respects, they were an extraordinary mix of men, drawn together by a unique mix of missions.\"\nAlong with members of the Gestapo, SD personnel were \"regarded with a mixture of fear and foreboding,\" and people wanted as little to do with them as possible.\nBelonging to the security apparatus of Nazi Germany obviously had its advantages but it was also fraught with occupationally related social disadvantages as well, and if post-war descriptions of the SD by historians are any indication, membership therein implied being a part of a \"ubiquitous secret society\" which was \"sinister\" and a \"messenger of terror\" not just for the German population, but within the \"ranks of the Nazi Party itself.\"\nUniforms and insignia\nMain article:\nUniforms and insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nThe SD used\nSS-ranks\n. When in uniform they wore the grey\nWaffen-SS\nuniform first with army and then with\nOrdnungspolizei\nrank insignia on the shoulder straps, and SS rank insignia on the left collar patch. The right collar patch was black without the\nrunes. The branch color of the SD was green. The SD sleeve diamond (SD\nRaute\n) insignia was worn on the lower left sleeve.\nSD diamond. Here with white piping, as used by members of the\nGestapo\nwhen in uniform (if members of the SS).\nSD men in Poland 1939. The SD men are wearing army shoulder straps, akin to the\nWaffen-SS\n,\nexcept for the\nRottenführer\nin the front seat, who is wearing the older shoulder straps of the\nAllgemeine SS\n.\nM43 field tunic, with SS rank insignia and SD diamond on lower part of sleeve\nSee also\nBandenbekämpfung\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of SS personnel\nOperation Bolivar\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nThe \"Ic\" abbreviation in German military staff structures designated \"military intelligence\"\n↑\nFollowing the Sudetenland Crisis, the SD then took part in operations against Poland.\n↑\nFor more on the creation of this organization, see: Browder, George C.\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004, .\n↑\nAt the end of March 1941, Hitler communicated his intention to 200 senior Wehrmacht officers about his decision to eradicate political criminals in the occupied regions, a task many of them were only too happy to hand-over to Himmler's\nEinsatzgruppen\nand SiPo.\n↑\nVictor Klemperer, one of the few Jews who survived the Nazi regime through his marriage to a German, claims that the real enemy of the Nazis was always the Jew, no matter who or what actually stood before them.\n↑\nFrom September 1939, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ncame under the overall command of the RSHA. See: Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 20, Day 194.\n↑\nTwenty-four\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders (men with the SD sleeve diamond on their uniforms) were tried after the war, becoming infamous for their brutality.\n↑\nSo severe were the interior policies of the Nazis under the watchful eye of the Department III, that when slave labor was brought into Germany to supplement the workforce during the war, German citizens who showed any kindness to foreign workers by giving them food or clothing were often punished.\n↑\nMany leading men in the SD had broad-ranging responsibilities across the network of interlocking Nazi agencies charged with the Reich's security;\nWerner Best\nproves a telling example in this regard, as he was not only an SD functionary, he was also an \"\nEinsatzgruppen\n-organizer,\" the head of the military government in France, and \"the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark.\"\n↑\nThe SD also maintained local offices in Germany's cities and larger towns. The small offices were known as\nSD-Unterabschnitte\n, and the larger offices were referred to as\nSD-Abschnitte\n. All SD offices answered to a local commander known as the\nInspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\nwho, in turn, was under the dual command of the RSHA and local\nSS and Police Leaders\n.\nCitations\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n44 fn.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n140–144.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n166–167.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\" (1946)\n.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n410–411.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, pp.\n56–57.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n125.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n191–194.\n↑\nDistel\n&\nJakusch 1978\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n47–51.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n93–131.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n60–63.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n129.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n67–78.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n113.\n↑\nKulva 1984\n, pp.\n582–600.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–313.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, pp.\n521–522.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n65–66.\n↑\nBeller 2007\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n134–140.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nFest 2002\n, p.\n548.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n141–142.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n403.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n144–145.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n281–282.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nFest 2002\n, pp.\n554–557.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n366–384.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, pp.\n121–125.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n283.\n↑\nBreitman 1991\n, p.\n222.\n↑\nWeinberg 2005\n, p.\n748.\n↑\nWilliams 2003\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n518–520.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, pp.\n350–362.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n109.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n134, 135.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n166–187.\n↑\nKoonz 2005\n, p.\n238.\n↑\nWall 1997\n, pp.\n183–187.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, p.\n103.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n107–108.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n107–116.\n↑\nKoonz 2005\n, p.\n190.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n68–69.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n106–107.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n66–67.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nWall 1997\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n11–25.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n172–187.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n113, 123–124.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n354–356.\n↑\nKlemperer 2000\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, pp.\n94–98.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, pp.\n96–97.\n↑\nMüller 2012\n, p.\n153.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n178–187.\n↑\nFrei 2008\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n696–697.\n↑\nWright 1968\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n274.\n↑\nMayer 2012\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n130.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n134–135.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n135, 141.\n↑\nStephenson 2008\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n355–356.\n↑\nDoerries 2007\n, pp.\n21, 80.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n357–358.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n116–117.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n120–121.\n↑\nGregor 2008\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nSpielvogel 2004\n, p.\n278.\n↑\nFriedlander 1995\n, pp.\n136–140, 286–289.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nPersico 1979\n, pp.\n103–107.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1954\n, p.\n475.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n133–134.\n↑\nKater 1983\n, pp.\n141, 261.\n↑\nZiegler 1989\n, pp.\n59–79.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n136–138.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n143.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n210.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n33–36.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n42–43.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n37–39.\n1\n2\n3\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n38–39, 54.\nBibliography\nBeller, Steven (2007).\nA Concise History of Austria\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-52147-886-1\n.\nBenz, Wolfgang (2007).\nA Concise History of the Third Reich\n. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-52025-383-4\n.\nBlandford, Edmund L. (2001).\nSS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service\n. Edison, NJ: Castle Books.\nISBN\n978-0-78581-398-9\n.\nBracher, Karl-Dietrich (1970).\nThe German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism\n. New York: Praeger Publishers.\nASIN\nB001JZ4T16\n.\nBreitman, Richard (1991).\nThe Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.\nISBN\n978-0-39456-841-6\n.\nBrowder, George C. (1990).\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-81311-697-6\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19820-297-4\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R.\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution\n: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n0-8032-1327-1\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS – Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00211-026-6\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2014).\nThe Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19966-921-9\n.\nDederichs, Mario R. (2006).\nHeydrich: The Face of Evil\n. Newbury: Greenhill Books.\nISBN\n978-1-85367-803-5\n.\nDelarue, Jacques (2008).\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-60239-246-5\n.\nDistel, Barbara; Jakusch, Ruth (1978).\nConcentration Camp Dachau, 1933–1945'\n. Munich: Comité International de Dachau.\nISBN\n978-3-87490-528-2\n.\nDoerries, Reinhard R. (2007).\nHitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg\n. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-41544-932-8\n.\nFest, Joachim (2002) .\nHitler\n. Orlando, FL: Harcourt.\nISBN\n978-0-15602-754-0\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-63118-507-9\n.\nFrei, Norbert (2008). \"Auschwitz and the Germans: History, Knowledge, and Memory\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nFriedlander, Henry\n(1995).\nThe Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution\n. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80782-208-1\n.\nFritz, Stephen G. (2011).\nOstkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-81313-416-1\n.\nGellately, Robert (1992).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19820-297-4\n.\nGerwarth, Robert (2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nGregor, Neil (2008). \"Nazism–A Political Religion\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nHöhne, Heinz (2001) .\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14139-012-3\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, MA: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-74566-026-4\n.\nJohnson, Eric (1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04908-0\n.\nKater, Michael H. (1983).\nThe Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67460-655-5\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2000) .\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393320350\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2001) .\nHitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis\n. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393322521\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKlemperer, Victor (2000).\nLanguage of the Third Reich: LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii\n. New York and London: Continuum.\nISBN\n978-0-82649-130-5\n.\nKoonz, Claudia (2005).\nThe Nazi Conscience\n. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-067401-842-6\n.\nKulva, Otto Dov (1984).\n\"Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze und die deutsche Bevölkerung im Lichte geheimer NS-Lage und Stimmungsberichte\"\n(PDF)\n.\nVierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte\n(in German).\n32\n(1). Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH:\n582–\n624.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 13 September 2014\n. Retrieved\n12 September\n2014\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nMayer, Arno (2012).\nWhy Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The \"Final Solution\" in History\n. New York: Verso Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-84467-777-1\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. London: Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMollo, Andrew (1992).\nUniforms of the SS. Vol. 5. Sicherheitsdienst und Sicherheitspolizei 1931–1945\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-87200-462-4\n.\nMüller, Rolf-Dieter (2012).\nHitler's Wehrmacht, 1935–1945\n. München: Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag.\nISBN\n978-3-48671-298-8\n.\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\"\n.\nYale Law School—The Avalon Project\n. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1946\n. Retrieved\n8 September\n2014\n.\nPersico, Joseph E. (1979).\nPiercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents During World War II\n. New York: Viking Press.\nISBN\n0-670-55490-1\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald\n(1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRhodes, Richard (2003).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-37570-822-0\n.\nShirer, William (1990) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson (2004).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13189-877-6\n.\nStephenson, Jill (2008). \"Germans, Slavs, and the Burden of Work in Rural Southern Germany during the Second World War\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nWall, Donald D. (1997).\nNazi Germany and World War II\n. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-31409-360-8\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (2005).\nHitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II\n. New York: Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-1-92963-191-9\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John W. (1954).\nNemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945\n. New York: St. Martin's Press.\nASIN\nB0007DL1S0\n.\nWette, Wolfram\n(2007).\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67402-577-6\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography (Vol. 1)\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n0-9537577-5-7\n.\nWilliams, Max (2003).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography, Volume 2—Enigma\n. Church Stretton: Ulric Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-6-3\n.\nWright, Gordon (1968).\nThe Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945\n. New York: Harper & Row.\nISBN\n0-0613140-8-0\n.\nZiegler, Herbert (1989).\nNazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership, 1925–1939\n. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-691-60636-1\n.\nExternal links\nMedia related to\nSicherheitsdienst\nat Wikimedia Commons",
+    "infobox": {
+      "formed": "9 June 1931",
+      "preceding_agency": "Ic-Dienst1931",
+      "dissolved": "8 May 1945",
+      "type": "Intelligence agency",
+      "jurisdiction": "GermanyOccupied Europe",
+      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin",
+      "employees": "6,482c.February 1944[1]",
+      "minister_responsible": "Heinrich Himmler1931–45",
+      "agency_executives": "Reinhard Heydrich, 1931–1942Heinrich Himmler, 1942–1943 (acting)Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 1943–1945",
+      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSReich Security Main Office"
+    },
+    "char_count": 43941
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Nazi_Party",
+    "name": "Nazi Party",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "The Nazi Party, officially the National Socialist German Workers' Party, was a far-right political party in Germany active between 1920 and 1945 that created and supported the ideology of Nazism. Its precursor, the German Workers' Party, existed from 1919 to 1920. The Nazi Party emerged from the extremist German nationalist, racist, and populist Freikorps paramilitary culture, which fought against communist uprisings in post–World War I Germany. The party was created to draw workers away from communism and into völkisch nationalism. Initially, Nazi political strategy focused on anti-big business, anti-bourgeoisie, and anti-capitalism, disingenuously using socialist rhetoric to gain the support of the lower middle class; that was later downplayed to gain the support of business leaders. By the 1930s, the party's main focus shifted to antisemitic and anti-Marxist themes. The party had little popular support until the Great Depression, when worsening living standards and widespread unemployment drove Germans into political extremism.",
+    "description": "Far-right political party in Germany (1920–1945)",
+    "full_text": "Nazi Party\nFar-right political party in Germany (1920–1945)\nThis article is about the political party that existed in Germany from 1920 to 1945. For other uses, see\nNazi Party (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nNazi Party\n,\nofficially the\nNational Socialist German Workers' Party\n(\nGerman\n:\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\nor\nNSDAP\n), was a\nfar-right\npolitical party in Germany active between 1920 and 1945 that created and supported the ideology of\nNazism\n. Its precursor, the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n; DAP), existed from 1919 to 1920. The Nazi Party emerged from the\nextremist\nGerman nationalist\n(\"\nVölkisch\nnationalist\n\"),\nracist\n, and\npopulist\nFreikorps\nparamilitary culture, which fought against\ncommunist\nuprisings in post–\nWorld War I\nGermany.\nThe party was created to draw workers away from communism and into\nvölkisch\nnationalism.\nInitially, Nazi political strategy focused on anti-\nbig business\n, anti-\nbourgeoisie\n, and\nanti-capitalism\n, disingenuously using socialist rhetoric to gain the support of the\nlower middle class\n;\nthat was later downplayed to gain the support of business leaders. By the 1930s, the party's main focus shifted to\nantisemitic\nand\nanti-Marxist\nthemes.\nThe party had little popular support until the\nGreat Depression\n, when worsening living standards and widespread unemployment drove Germans into political extremism.\nCentral to Nazism were\nthemes of racial segregation\nexpressed in the idea of a \"people's community\" (\nVolksgemeinschaft\n).\nThe party aimed to unite \"racially desirable\" Germans as national comrades while excluding those deemed to be either political dissidents, physically or intellectually inferior, or of a\nforeign race\n(\nFremdvölkische\n).\nThe Nazis sought to strengthen the Germanic people, the \"\nAryan\nmaster race\n\", through racial purity and\neugenics\n, broad social welfare programs, and a collective subordination of individual rights, which could be sacrificed for the good of the state on behalf of the people. To protect the supposed purity and strength of the Aryan race, the Nazis sought to disenfranchise, segregate, and eventually\nexterminate\nJews\n,\nRomani\n,\nSlavs\n, the\nphysically\nand\nmentally disabled\n,\nhomosexuals\n,\nJehovah's Witnesses\n, and political opponents.\nThe persecution reached its climax when the party-controlled German state set in motion the\nFinal Solution\n–\nan industrial system of genocide that carried out mass murders of\naround 6\nmillion Jews and millions of other targeted victims\nin what has become known as\nthe Holocaust\n.\nAdolf Hitler\n, the party's leader since 1921, was appointed\nChancellor of Germany\nby President\nPaul von Hindenburg\non 30\nJanuary 1933, and quickly seized power afterwards. Hitler established a\ntotalitarian\nregime known as the\nThird Reich\nand became dictator with\nabsolute power\n.\nFollowing the military defeat of Germany in\nWorld War II\n, the party was declared illegal.\nThe Allies attempted to purge German society of Nazi elements in a process known as\ndenazification\n.\nSeveral top leaders\nwere tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity in the\nNuremberg trials\n, and executed. The use of symbols associated with the party is still outlawed in many European countries, including Germany and Austria.\nName\nThe renaming of the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(DAP) to the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) was partially driven by a desire to draw upon both left-wing and right-wing ideals, with \"\nSocialist\n\" and \"Workers'\" appealing to the left, and \"\nNational\n\" and \"German\" appealing to the right.\nNazi\n, the informal and originally derogatory term for a party member, abbreviates the party's name (\nNationalsozialist\n[\nnatsi̯oˈnaːlzotsi̯aˌlɪst\n]\n), and was coined in analogy with\nSozi\n(pronounced\n[\nˈzoːtsiː\n]\n), an abbreviation of\nSozialdemokrat\n(member of the rival\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n).\nMembers of the party referred to themselves as\nNationalsozialisten\n(National Socialists), but some did occasionally embrace the colloquial\nNazi\n(such as\nLeopold von Mildenstein\nin his article series\nEin Nazi fährt nach Palästina\npublished in\nDer Angriff\nin 1934). The term\nParteigenosse\n(party member) was commonly used among Nazis, with its corresponding feminine form\nParteigenossin\n.\nBefore the rise of the party, \"Nazi\" had been used as a colloquial and derogatory word for a backward\npeasant\n, or an awkward and clumsy person. It derived from Ignaz, a shortened version of\nIgnatius\n,\nwhich was a common name in the Nazis' home region of\nBavaria\n. Opponents seized on this, and the long-existing\nSozi\n, to attach a dismissive nickname to the National Socialists.\nIn 1933, when\nAdolf Hitler\nassumed power in the German government, the usage of \"Nazi\" diminished in Germany, although Austrian anti-Nazis continued to use the term.\nThe use of \"\nNazi Germany\n\" and \"Nazi regime\" was popularised by anti-Nazis and German exiles abroad. Thereafter, the term spread into other languages and eventually was brought back to Germany after World War II.\nIn English, the term is not considered slang and has such derivatives as\nNazism\nand\ndenazification\n.\nHistory\nOrigins and early years: 1918–1923\nThe Nazi Party grew out of smaller political groups with a nationalist orientation that formed in the last years of\nWorld War I\n. In 1918, a league called the\nFreier Arbeiterausschuss für einen guten Frieden\n(Free Workers' Committee for a good Peace)\nwas created in\nBremen\n, Germany. On 7 March 1918,\nAnton Drexler\n, an avid German nationalist, formed a branch of this league in\nMunich\n.\nDrexler was a local locksmith who had been a member of the militarist\nFatherland Party\nduring World War I and was bitterly opposed to the\narmistice\nof November 1918 and the revolutionary upheavals that followed. Drexler followed the views of militant nationalists of the day, such as opposing the\nTreaty of Versailles\n, having\nantisemitic\n, anti-monarchist and anti-Marxist views, as well as believing in the superiority of Germans whom they claimed to be part of the\nAryan\n\"\nmaster race\n\" (\nHerrenvolk\n). However, he also accused international capitalism of being a Jewish-dominated movement and denounced capitalists for war profiteering in World War I.\nDrexler saw the political violence and instability in Germany as the result of the\nWeimar Republic\nbeing out-of-touch with the masses, especially the lower classes.\nDrexler emphasised the need for a synthesis of\nvölkisch\nnationalism with a form of economic\nsocialism\n, in order to create a popular nationalist-oriented workers' movement that could challenge the rise of communism and\ninternationalist politics\n.\nThese were all well-known themes popular with various\nWeimar paramilitary groups\nsuch as the\nFreikorps\n.\nNazi Party badge emblem\nDrexler's movement received attention and support from some influential figures. Supporter\nDietrich Eckart\n, a well-to-do journalist, brought military figure\nFelix Graf von Bothmer\n, a prominent supporter of the concept of \"national socialism\", to address the movement.\nLater in 1918,\nKarl Harrer\n(a journalist and member of the\nThule Society\n) convinced Drexler and several others to form the\nPolitischer Arbeiter-Zirkel\n(Political Workers' Circle).\nThe members met periodically for discussions with themes of nationalism and racism directed against Jewish people.\nIn December 1918, Drexler decided that a new political party should be formed, based on the political principles that he endorsed, by combining his branch of the Workers' Committee for a good Peace with the Political Workers' Circle.\nOn 5 January 1919, Drexler created a new political party and proposed it should be named the \"German Socialist Workers' Party\", but Harrer objected to the term \"socialist\"; so the term was removed and the party was named the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n, DAP).\nTo ease concerns among potential middle-class supporters, Drexler made clear that unlike Marxists the party supported the middle-class and that its socialist policy was meant to give\nsocial welfare\nto German citizens deemed part of the Aryan race.\nThey became one of many\nvölkisch\nmovements\nthat existed in Germany. Like other\nvölkisch\ngroups, the DAP advocated the belief that through\nprofit-sharing\ninstead of\nsocialisation\nGermany should become a unified \"people's community\" (\nVolksgemeinschaft\n) rather than a society divided along class and party lines.\nThis ideology was explicitly antisemitic. As early as 1920, the party was raising money by selling a tobacco called\nAnti-Semit\n.\nFrom the outset, the DAP was opposed to non-nationalist political movements, especially on the left, including the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD) and the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD). Members of the DAP saw themselves as fighting against \"\nBolshevism\n\" and anyone considered a part of or aiding so-called \"\ninternational Jewry\n\". The DAP was also deeply opposed to the\nTreaty of Versailles\n.\nThe DAP did not attempt to make itself public and meetings were kept in relative secrecy, with public speakers discussing what they thought of Germany's present\nstate of affairs\n, or writing to like-minded societies in\nNorthern Germany\n.\nNSDAP membership book\nThe DAP was a comparatively small group with fewer than 60 members.\nNevertheless, it attracted the attention of the German authorities, who were suspicious of any organisation that appeared to have subversive tendencies. In July 1919, while stationed in\nMunich\n, army\nGefreiter\nAdolf Hitler\nwas appointed a\nVerbindungsmann\n(intelligence agent) of an\nAufklärungskommando\n(reconnaissance unit) of the\nReichswehr\n(army) by\nCaptain Mayr\n, the head of the\nEducation and Propaganda Department\n(Dept Ib/P) in\nBavaria\n. Hitler was assigned to influence other soldiers and to infiltrate the DAP.\nWhile Hitler was initially unimpressed by the meetings and found them disorganised, he enjoyed the discussion that took place.\nWhile attending a party meeting on 12 September 1919 at Munich's\nSterneckerbräu\n, Hitler became involved in a heated argument with a visitor, Professor Baumann, who questioned the soundness of\nGottfried Feder\n's arguments against capitalism; Baumann proposed that Bavaria should break away from\nPrussia\nand found a new South German nation with\nAustria\n. In vehemently attacking the man's arguments, Hitler made an impression on the other party members with his oratorical skills; according to Hitler, the \"professor\" left the hall acknowledging unequivocal defeat.\nDrexler encouraged him to join the DAP.\nOn the orders of his army superiors, Hitler applied to join the party\nand within a week was accepted as party member 555 (the party began counting membership at 500 to give the impression they were a much larger party).\nAmong the party's earlier members were\nErnst Röhm\nof the Army's District Command VII; Dietrich Eckart, who has been called the spiritual father of National Socialism;\nthen-\nUniversity of Munich\nstudent\nRudolf Hess\n;\nFreikorps\nsoldier\nHans Frank\n; and\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, often credited as the philosopher of the movement. All were later prominent in the Nazi regime.\nHitler later claimed to be the seventh party member. He was, in fact, the seventh executive member of the party's central committee\nand he would later wear the\nGolden Party Badge\nnumber one. Anton Drexler drafted a letter to Hitler in 1940—which was never sent—that contradicts Hitler's later claim:\nNo one knows better than you yourself, my Führer, that you were never the seventh member of the party, but at best the seventh member of the committee... And a few years ago I had to complain to a party office that your first proper membership card of the DAP, bearing the signatures of Schüssler and myself, was falsified, with the number 555 being erased and number 7 entered.\nAlthough Hitler initially wanted to form his own party, he claimed to have been convinced to join the DAP because it was small and he could eventually become its leader.\nHe consequently encouraged the organisation to become less of a debating society, which it had been previously, and more of an active political party.\nNormally, enlisted army personnel were not allowed to join political parties. In this case, Hitler had Captain\nKarl Mayr\n's permission to join the DAP. Further, Hitler was allowed to stay in the army and receive his weekly pay of 20 gold marks a week.\nUnlike many other members of the organisation, this continued employment provided him with enough money to dedicate himself more fully to the DAP.\nHitler's first DAP speech was held in the\nHofbräukeller\non 16 October 1919. He was the second speaker of the evening, and spoke to 111 people.\nHitler later declared that this was when he realised he could really \"make a good speech\".\nAt first, Hitler spoke only to relatively small groups, but his considerable oratory and propaganda skills were appreciated by the party leadership. With the support of Anton Drexler, Hitler became chief of propaganda for the party in early 1920.\nHitler began to make the party more public, and organised its biggest meeting yet of 2,000 people on 24 February 1920 in the\nStaatliches Hofbräuhaus in München\n. Such was the significance of this particular move in publicity that\nKarl Harrer\nresigned from the party in disagreement.\nIt was in this speech that Hitler enunciated the\ntwenty-five points of the German Workers' Party manifesto\nthat had been drawn up by Drexler, Feder and himself.\nThrough these points he gave the organisation a much bolder stratagem\nwith a clear foreign policy (abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, a\nGreater Germany\n, Eastern expansion and exclusion of Jews from citizenship) and among his specific points were: confiscation of\nwar profits\n, abolition of unearned incomes, the State to share profits of land and land for national needs to be taken away without compensation.\nIn general, the manifesto was\nantisemitic\n,\nanti-capitalist\n,\nanti-democratic\n,\nanti-Marxist\nand\nanti-liberal\n.\nTo increase its appeal to larger segments of the population, on the same day as Hitler's\nHofbräuhaus\nspeech on 24 February 1920, the DAP changed its name to the\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\n(\"National Socialist German Workers' Party\", or Nazi Party).\nThe name was intended to draw upon both left-wing and right-wing ideals, with \"Socialist\" and \"Workers'\" appealing to the left, and \"National\" and \"German\" appealing to the right.\nThe word \"Socialist\" was added by the party's executive committee (at the suggestion of\nRudolf Jung\n), over Hitler's initial objections,\nin order to help appeal to left-wing workers.\nIn 1920, the Nazi Party officially announced that only persons of \"pure Aryan descent [\nrein arischer Abkunft\n]\" could become party members and if the person had a spouse, the spouse also had to be a \"racially pure\" Aryan. Party members could not be related either directly or indirectly to a so-called \"non-Aryan\".\nEven before it had become legally forbidden by the\nNuremberg Laws\nin 1935, the Nazis banned sexual relations and marriages between party members and Jews.\nParty members found guilty of\nRassenschande\n(\"racial defilement\") were persecuted heavily. Some members were even sentenced to death.\nHitler quickly became the party's most active orator, appearing in public as a speaker 31 times within the first year after his self-discovery.\nCrowds began to flock to hear his speeches.\nHitler always spoke about the same subjects: the Treaty of Versailles and\nthe Jewish question\n.\nThis deliberate technique and effective publicising of the party contributed significantly to his early success,\nabout which a contemporary poster wrote: \"Since Herr Hitler is a brilliant speaker, we can hold out the prospect of an extremely exciting evening\".\nOver the following months, the party continued to attract new members,\nwhile remaining too small to have any real significance in German politics.\nBy the end of the year, party membership was recorded at 2,000,\nmany of whom Hitler and Röhm had brought into the party personally, or for whom Hitler's oratory had been their reason for joining.\nHitler's membership card in the DAP (later NSDAP). The membership number (7) was altered from the original.\nHitler's talent as an orator and his ability to draw new members, combined with his characteristic ruthlessness, soon made him the dominant figure. However, while Hitler and Eckart were on a fundraising trip to Berlin in June 1921, a mutiny broke out within the party in Munich. Members of its executive committee wanted to merge with the rival\nGerman Socialist Party\n(DSP).\nUpon returning to Munich on 11 July, Hitler angrily tendered his resignation. The committee members realised that his resignation would mean the end of the party.\nHitler announced he would rejoin on condition that he would replace Drexler as party chairman, and that the party headquarters would remain in Munich.\nThe committee agreed, and he rejoined the party on 26 July as member 3,680. Hitler continued to face some opposition within the NSDAP, as his opponents had\nHermann Esser\nexpelled from the party and they printed 3,000 copies of a pamphlet attacking Hitler as a traitor to the party.\nIn the following days, Hitler spoke to several packed houses and defended himself and Esser to thunderous applause.\nHitler's strategy proved successful; at a special party congress on 29 July 1921, he replaced Drexler as party chairman by a vote of 533\nto\n1.\nThe committee was dissolved, and Hitler was granted nearly absolute powers in the party as its sole leader.\nHe would hold the post for the remainder of his life. Hitler soon acquired the title\nFührer\n(\"leader\") and after a series of sharp internal conflicts it was accepted that the party would be governed by the\nFührerprinzip\n(\"leader principle\"). Under this principle, the party was a highly centralised entity that functioned strictly from the top down, with Hitler at the apex. Hitler saw the party as a revolutionary organisation, whose aim was the overthrow of the\nWeimar Republic\n, which he saw as controlled by the socialists, Jews and the \"\nNovember criminals\n\", a term invented to describe alleged elements of society who had 'betrayed the German soldiers' in 1918. The\nSA\n(\"storm troopers\", also known as \"Brownshirts\") were founded as a party militia in 1921 and began violent attacks on other parties.\nMein Kampf\nin its first edition cover\nFor Hitler, the twin goals of the party were always German nationalist expansionism and\nantisemitism\n. These two goals were fused in his mind by his belief that Germany's external enemies—Britain, France and the Soviet Union—were controlled by the Jews and that Germany's future wars of national expansion would necessarily entail a war of annihilation against them.\nFor Hitler and his principal lieutenants, national and racial issues were always dominant. This was symbolised by the adoption as the party emblem of the\nswastika\n. In German nationalist circles, the swastika was considered a symbol of an \"\nAryan race\n\" and it symbolised the replacement of the Christian Cross with allegiance to a National Socialist State.\nThe Nazi Party grew significantly during 1921 and 1922, partly through Hitler's oratorical skills, partly through the SA's appeal to unemployed young men, and partly because there was a backlash against socialist and liberal politics in Bavaria as Germany's economic problems deepened and the weakness of the Weimar regime became apparent. The party recruited former World War\nI soldiers, to whom Hitler as a decorated frontline veteran could particularly appeal, as well as small businessmen and disaffected former members of rival parties. Nazi rallies were often held in beer halls, where downtrodden men could get free beer. The\nHitler Youth\nwas formed for the children of party members. The party also formed groups in other parts of Germany.\nJulius Streicher\nin\nNuremberg\nwas an early recruit and became editor of the racist magazine\nDer Stürmer\n. In December 1920, the Nazi Party had acquired a newspaper, the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n, of which its leading ideologist Alfred Rosenberg became editor. Others to join the party around this time were\nHeinrich Himmler\nand World War I flying ace\nHermann Göring\n.\nAdoption of Italian fascism: The Beer Hall Putsch\nOn 31 October 1922, a\nfascist\nparty with similar policies and objectives came into power in Italy, the\nNational Fascist Party\n, under the leadership of the charismatic\nBenito Mussolini\n. The Fascists, like the Nazis, promoted a national rebirth of their country, as they opposed communism and liberalism; appealed to the working-class; opposed the\nTreaty of Versailles\n; and advocated the territorial expansion of their country. Hitler was inspired by Mussolini and the Fascists, beginning to adopt elements of their program for the Nazi Party and himself.\nThe Italian Fascists also used a straight-armed\nRoman salute\nand wore black-shirted uniforms; Hitler would later borrow their use of the straight-armed salute as a\nNazi salute\n.\nWhen the Fascists took control of Italy through their\ncoup d'état\ncalled the \"\nMarch on Rome\n\", Hitler began planning his own coup less than a month later.\nIn January 1923, France occupied the\nRuhr\nindustrial region as a result of Germany's failure to meet its\nreparations\npayments. This led to economic chaos, the resignation of\nWilhelm Cuno\n's government and an attempt by the German Communist Party (KPD) to stage a revolution. The reaction to these events was an upsurge of nationalist sentiment. Nazi Party membership grew sharply to about 20,000,\ncompared to the approximate 6,000 at the beginning of 1923.\nBy November 1923, Hitler had decided that the time was right for an attempt to seize power in Munich, in the hope that the\nReichswehr\n(the post-war German military) would mutiny against the Berlin government and join his revolt. In this, he was influenced by former General\nErich Ludendorff\n, who had become a supporter—though not a member—of the Nazis.\nNazis during the\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin Munich\nOn the night of 8 November, the Nazis used a patriotic rally in a Munich beer hall to launch an attempted\nputsch\n(\"coup d'état\"). This so-called\nBeer Hall Putsch\nattempt failed almost at once when the local\nReichswehr\ncommanders refused to support it. On the morning of 9 November, the Nazis staged a march of about 2,000 supporters through Munich in an attempt to rally support. The two groups exchanged fire, after which 15 putschists, four police officers, and a bystander lay dead.\nHitler, Ludendorff and a number of others were arrested and were tried for treason in March 1924. Hitler and his associates were given very lenient prison sentences. While Hitler was in prison, he wrote his semi-autobiographical political manifesto\nMein Kampf\n(\"My Struggle\").\nThe Nazi Party was banned on 9 November 1923; however, with the support of the nationalist\nVölkisch-Social Bloc\n(\nVölkisch-Sozialer Block\n), it continued to operate under the name \"German Party\" (\nDeutsche Partei\nor DP) from 1924 to 1925.\nThe Nazis failed to remain unified in the DP, as in the north, the right-wing\nVolkish\nnationalist supporters of the Nazis moved to the new\nGerman Völkisch Freedom Party\n, leaving the north's left-wing Nazi members, such as\nJoseph Goebbels\nretaining support for the party.\nRise to power: 1925–1933\nFurther information:\nAdolf Hitler's rise to power\n\"Rise of Nazism\" redirects here. For the culmination of the rise, see\nNazi seizure of power\n.\nAdolf Hitler (standing) delivers a speech on the occasion of the refoundation of the NSDAP in February of 1925. Next to him from the perspective of the onlooker: On the right: Gregor Strasser and Heinrich Himmler. On the left: Franz Xaver Schwarz, Walter Buch and Alfred Rosenberg. Behind Hitler the Blutfahne (blood-flag), a central relique within the propaganda of the National-Socialists, can be seen attached to the wall.\nHitler with Nazi Party members in 1930\nPardoned by the Bavarian Supreme Court, Hitler was released from prison on 20 December 1924, against the state prosecutor's objections.\nOn 16 February 1925, Hitler convinced the Bavarian authorities to lift the ban on the NSDAP and the party was formally refounded on 26 February 1925, with Hitler as its undisputed leader. It was at this time Hitler began referring to himself as \"\nder\nFührer\n\".\nThe new Nazi Party was no longer a paramilitary organisation and disavowed any intention of taking power by force. In any case, the economic and political situation had stabilised and the extremist upsurge of 1923 had faded, so there was no prospect of further revolutionary adventures. Instead, Hitler intended to alter the party's strategy to achieving power through what he called the \"path of legality\".\nThe Nazi Party of 1925 was divided into the \"Leadership Corps\" (\nKorps der politischen Leiter\n) appointed by Hitler and the general membership (\nParteimitglieder\n). The party and the SA were kept separate and the legal aspect of the party's work was emphasised. In a sign of this, the party began to admit women. The SA and the\nSS\nmembers (the latter founded in 1925 as Hitler's bodyguard, and known originally as the\nSchutzkommando\n) had to all be regular party members.\nIn the 1920s the Nazi Party expanded beyond its Bavarian base. At this time, it began surveying voters in order to determine what they were dissatisfied with in Germany, allowing Nazi propaganda to be altered accordingly.\nCatholic Bavaria maintained its right-wing nostalgia for a Catholic monarch;\nand\nWestphalia\n, along with working-class \"Red Berlin\", were always the Nazis' weakest areas electorally, even during the Third Reich itself. The areas of strongest Nazi support were in rural Protestant areas such as\nSchleswig-Holstein\n,\nMecklenburg\n,\nPomerania\nand\nEast Prussia\n. Depressed working-class areas such as\nThuringia\nalso produced a strong Nazi vote, while the workers of the\nRuhr\nand\nHamburg\nlargely remained loyal to the\nSocial Democrats\n, the\nCommunist Party of Germany\nor the Catholic\nCentre Party\n. Nuremberg remained a Nazi Party stronghold, and the first\nNuremberg Rally\nwas held there in 1927. These rallies soon became massive displays of Nazi paramilitary power and attracted many recruits. The Nazis' strongest appeal was to the lower middle-classes—farmers, public servants, teachers and small businessmen—who had suffered most from the inflation of the 1920s, so who feared Bolshevism more than anything else. The small business class was receptive to Hitler's antisemitism, since it blamed Jewish big business for its economic problems. University students, disappointed at being too young to have served in the War of 1914–1918 and attracted by the Nazis' radical rhetoric, also became a strong Nazi constituency. By 1929, the party had 130,000 members.\nThe party's nominal Deputy Leader was\nRudolf Hess\n, but he had no real power in the party. By the early 1930s, the senior leaders of the party after Hitler were\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nJoseph Goebbels\nand\nHermann Göring\n. Beneath the Leadership Corps were the party's regional leaders, the\nGauleiters\n, each of whom commanded the party in his\nGau\n(\"region\"). Goebbels began his ascent through the party hierarchy as\nGauleiter\nof Berlin-Brandenburg in 1926. Streicher was\nGauleiter\nof\nFranconia\n, where he published his antisemitic newspaper\nDer Stürmer\n. Beneath the\nGauleiter\nwere lower-level officials, the\nKreisleiter\n(\"county leaders\"),\nZellenleiter\n(\"cell leaders\") and\nBlockleiter\n(\"block leaders\"). This was a strictly hierarchical structure in which orders flowed from the top and unquestioning loyalty was given to superiors. Only the SA retained some autonomy. Being composed largely of unemployed workers, many SA men took the Nazis' socialist rhetoric seriously. At this time, the\nHitler salute\n(borrowed from the\nItalian fascists\n) and the greeting \"Heil Hitler!\" were adopted throughout the party.\nNazi Party election poster used in\nVienna\nin 1930 (translation: \"We demand freedom and bread\")\nThe Nazis contested elections to the national parliament (the\nReichstag\n) and to the state legislature (the\nLandtage\n) from 1924, although at first with little success. The \"\nNational Socialist Freedom Movement\n\" polled 3% of the vote in the\nDecember 1924\nReichstag\nelections\nand this fell to 2.6% in\n1928\n. State elections produced similar results. Despite these poor results and despite Germany's relative political stability and prosperity during the later 1920s, the Nazi Party continued to grow. This was partly because Hitler, who had no administrative ability, left the party organisation to the head of the secretariat,\nPhilipp Bouhler\n, the party treasurer\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\nand business manager\nMax Amann\n. The party had a capable propaganda head in\nGregor Strasser\n, who was promoted to national organizational leader in January 1928. These men gave the party efficient recruitment and organizational structures. The party also owed its growth to the gradual fading away of competitor nationalist groups, such as the\nGerman National People's Party\n(DNVP). As Hitler became the recognised head of the German nationalists, other groups declined or were absorbed. In the late 1920s, seeing the party's lack of breakthrough into the mainstream, Goebbels proposed that instead of focusing all of their propaganda in major cities where there was competition from other political movements, they should instead begin holding rallies in rural areas where they would be more effective.\nDespite these strengths, the Nazi Party might never have come to power had it not been for the\nGreat Depression\nand its effects on Germany. By 1930, the German economy was beset with mass unemployment and widespread business failures. The Social Democrats and Communists were bitterly divided and unable to formulate an effective solution: this gave the Nazis their opportunity and Hitler's message, blaming the crisis on the Jewish financiers and the\nBolsheviks\n, resonated with wide sections of the electorate. At the\nSeptember 1930\nReichstag\nelections\n, the Nazis won 18% of the votes and became the second-largest party in the\nReichstag\nafter the Social Democrats. Hitler proved to be a highly effective campaigner, pioneering the use of radio and aircraft for this purpose. His dismissal of Strasser and his appointment of Goebbels as the party's propaganda chief were major factors. While Strasser had used his position to promote his own leftish version of national socialism, Goebbels was completely loyal to Hitler, and worked only to improve Hitler's image.\nThe 1930 elections changed the German political landscape by weakening the traditional nationalist parties, the DNVP and the DVP, leaving the Nazis as the chief alternative to the discredited Social Democrats and the Zentrum, whose leader,\nHeinrich Brüning\n, headed a weak minority government. The inability of the democratic parties to form a united front, the self-imposed isolation of the Communists and the continued decline of the economy, all played into Hitler's hands. He now came to be seen as\nde facto\nleader of the opposition and donations poured into the Nazi Party's coffers. Some major business figures, such as\nFritz Thyssen\n, were Nazi supporters and gave generously\nand some Wall Street figures were allegedly involved,\nbut many other businessmen were suspicious of the extreme nationalist tendencies of the Nazis and preferred to support the traditional conservative parties instead.\nIn 1930, as the price for joining a\ncoalition government\nof the\nLand\n(state) of\nThuringia\n, the Nazi Party received the state ministries of the\nInterior\nand Education. On 23 January 1930,\nWilhelm Frick\nwas appointed to these ministries, becoming the first Nazi to hold a ministerial-level post at any level in Germany.\nGerman NSDAP Donation Token 1932, Free State of Prussia elections\nIn 1931 the Nazi Party altered its strategy to engage in perpetual campaigning across the country, even outside of election time.\nDuring 1931 and into 1932, Germany's political crisis deepened. Hitler ran for president against the incumbent\nPaul von Hindenburg\nin March 1932, polling 30% in the first round and 37% in the second against Hindenburg's 49% and 53%. By now the SA had 400,000 members and its running street battles with the SPD and Communist paramilitaries (who also fought each other) reduced some German cities to combat zones. Paradoxically, although the Nazis were among the main instigators of this disorder, part of Hitler's appeal to a frightened and demoralised middle class was his promise to restore law and order. Overt antisemitism was played down in official Nazi rhetoric, but was never far from the surface. Germans voted for Hitler primarily because of his promises to revive the economy (by unspecified means), to restore German greatness and overturn the\nTreaty of Versailles\nand to save Germany from communism. On 24 April 1932, the\nFree State of Prussia elections\nto the\nLandtag\nresulted in 36% of the votes and 162 seats for the NSDAP.\nOn 20 July 1932, the Prussian government was ousted by a coup, the\nPreussenschlag\n; a few days later at the\nJuly 1932\nReichstag\nelection\nthe Nazis made another leap forward, polling 37% and becoming the largest party in parliament by a wide margin. Furthermore, the Nazis and the Communists between them won 52% of the vote and a majority of seats. Since both parties opposed the established political system and neither would join or support any ministry, this made the formation of a majority government impossible. The result was weak ministries governing by decree. Under\nComintern\ndirectives, the Communists maintained their policy of treating the Social Democrats as the main enemy, calling them \"\nsocial fascists\n\", thereby splintering opposition to the Nazis.\nLater, both the Social Democrats and the Communists accused each other of having facilitated\nHitler's rise to power\nby their unwillingness to compromise.\nChancellor\nFranz von Papen\ncalled another\nReichstag\nelection in November, hoping to find a way out of this impasse. The electoral result was the same, with the Nazis and the Communists winning 50% of the vote between them and more than half the seats, rendering this\nReichstag\nno more workable than its predecessor. However, support for the Nazis had fallen to 33.1%, suggesting that the Nazi surge had passed its peak—possibly because the worst of the Depression had passed, possibly because some middle-class voters had supported Hitler in July as a protest, but had now drawn back from the prospect of actually putting him into power. The Nazis interpreted the result as a warning that they must seize power before their moment passed. Had the other parties united, this could have been prevented, but their shortsightedness made a united front impossible. Papen, his successor\nKurt von Schleicher\nand the nationalist press magnate\nAlfred Hugenberg\nspent December and January in political intrigues that eventually persuaded President Hindenburg that it was safe to appoint Hitler as Reich Chancellor, at the head of a cabinet including only a minority of Nazi ministers—which he did on 30 January 1933.\nAscension and consolidation\nReichsparteitag\n(Nuremberg Rally): Nazi Party leader\nAdolf Hitler\nand SA-leader\nErnst Röhm\n, August 1933\nIn\nMein Kampf\n, Hitler directly attacked both left-wing and right-wing politics in Germany.\nHowever, a majority of scholars identify\nNazism\nin practice as being a\nfar-right\nform of politics.\nWhen asked in an interview in 1934 whether the Nazis were \"bourgeois right-wing\" as alleged by their opponents, Hitler responded that Nazism was not exclusively for any class and indicated that it favoured neither the left nor the right, but preserved \"pure\" elements from both \"camps\" by stating: \"From the camp of bourgeois tradition, it takes national resolve, and from the materialism of the Marxist dogma, living, creative Socialism\".\nThe votes that the Nazis received in the 1932 elections established the Nazi Party as the largest parliamentary faction of the Weimar Republic government. Hitler was appointed as\nChancellor of Germany\non 30 January 1933.\nThe\nReichstag\nfire\non 27 February 1933 gave Hitler a pretext for suppressing his political opponents. The following day he persuaded the Reich's President\nPaul von Hindenburg\nto issue the\nReichstag\nFire Decree\n, which suspended most\ncivil liberties\n. The NSDAP won the\nparliamentary election on 5 March 1933\nwith 44% of votes, but failed to win an absolute majority. After the election, hundreds of thousands of new members joined the party for opportunistic reasons, most of them civil servants and white-collar workers. They were nicknamed the \"casualties of March\" (\nGerman:\nMärzgefallenen\n) or \"March violets\" (\nGerman:\nMärzveilchen\n).\nTo protect the party from too many non-ideological turncoats who were viewed by the so-called \"old fighters\"\n(alte Kämpfer)\nwith some mistrust,\nthe party issued a freeze on admissions that remained in force from May 1933 to 1937.\nOn 23 March, the parliament passed the\nEnabling Act of 1933\n, which gave the cabinet the right to enact laws without the consent of parliament. In effect, this gave Hitler dictatorial powers. Now possessing virtually absolute power, the Nazis established\ntotalitarian\ncontrol as they abolished labour unions and other political parties and imprisoned their political opponents, first at\nwilde Lager\n, improvised camps, then in\nconcentration camps\n.\nNazi Germany\nhad been established, yet the\nReichswehr\nremained impartial. Nazi power over Germany remained virtual, not absolute.\nAfter taking power: intertwining of party and state\nThe Nazis embarked on a campaign of\nGleichschaltung\n(coordination) to exert their control over all aspects of German government and society. During June and July 1933, all competing parties were either outlawed or dissolved themselves and subsequently the\nLaw Against the Formation of Parties\nof 14 July 1933 legally established the Nazi Party's monopoly. On 1 December 1933, the\nLaw to Secure the Unity of Party and State\nentered into force, which was the base for a progressive intertwining of party structures and state apparatus.\nBy this law, the SA—actually a party division—was given quasi-governmental authority and their\nStabschef\nbecame a cabinet\nminister without portfolio\n. By virtue of the 30 January 1934\nLaw on the Reconstruction of the Reich\n, the\nLänder\n(states) lost their sovereignty and were demoted to administrative divisions of the\nReich\ngovernment. Effectively, they lost most of their power to the\nGaue\nthat were originally just regional divisions of the party, but took over most competencies of the state administration in their respective sectors.\nDuring the\nRöhm Purge\nof 30 June to 2 July 1934 (also known as the \"Night of the Long Knives\"), Hitler disempowered the SA's leadership—most of whom belonged to the\nStrasserist\n(national revolutionary) faction within the NSDAP—and ordered them killed. He accused them of having conspired to stage a\ncoup d'état\n, but it is believed that this was only a pretense to justify the suppression of any intraparty opposition. The purge was executed by the SS, assisted by the Gestapo and Reichswehr units. Aside from Strasserist Nazis, they also murdered anti-Nazi conservative figures like former chancellor von Schleicher.\nAfter this, the SA continued to exist but lost much of its importance, while the role of the SS grew significantly. Formerly only a sub-organisation of the SA, it was made into a separate organisation of the NSDAP in July 1934.\nUpon the death of President Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, Hitler merged the offices of party leader, head of state and chief of government in one, taking the title of\nFührer\nund Reichskanzler\nby passage of the\nLaw Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich\n. The\nChancellery of the Führer\n, officially an organisation of the Nazi Party, took over the functions of the Office of the President (a government agency), blurring the distinction between structures of party and state even further. The SS increasingly exerted police functions, a development which was formally documented by the merger of the offices of\nReichsführer-SS\nand Chief of the German Police on 17 June 1936, as the position was held by\nHeinrich Himmler\nwho derived his authority directly from Hitler.\nThe\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD, formally the \"Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS\") that had been created in 1931 as an intraparty intelligence became the\nde facto\nintelligence agency of Nazi Germany. It was put under the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA) in 1939, which then coordinated SD, Gestapo and\ncriminal police\n, therefore functioning as a hybrid organisation of state and party structures.\nAdolf Hitler in\nBonn\nin 1938\nDefeat and abolition\nOfficially, Nazi Germany lasted only 12 years. The\nInstrument of Surrender\nwas signed by representatives of the German High Command at\nBerlin\n, on 8 May 1945, when the war ended in Europe.\nThe party was formally abolished on 10 October 1945 by the\nAllied Control Council\n, followed by the process of\ndenazification\nalong with\ntrials of major war criminals\nbefore the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg.\nPart of the\nPotsdam Agreement\ncalled for the destruction of the Nazi Party alongside the requirement for the reconstruction of the German political life.\nIn addition, the Control Council Law no. 2 Providing for the Termination and Liquidation of the Nazi Organization specified the abolition of 52 other Nazi affiliated and supervised organisations and outlawed their activities.\nThe denazification was carried out in Germany and continued until the onset of the Cold War.\nBetween 1939 and 1945, the Nazi Party led regime, assisted by\ncollaborationist\ngovernments and recruits from occupied countries, was responsible for the deaths of at least twenty million people,\nincluding 5.5 to 6\nmillion Jews (representing two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe),\nand between 200,000 and 1,500,000\nRomani people\n.\nThe estimated total number includes the killing of nearly two million non-Jewish\nPoles\n,\nover three million\nSoviet prisoners of war\n,\ncommunists\n, and other political opponents, homosexuals, the physically and mentally disabled.\nPolitical programme\nMain article:\nNational Socialist Program\nThe National Socialist Programme was a formulation of the policies of the party. It contained 25 points and is therefore also known as the \"25-point plan\" or \"25-point programme\". It was the official party programme, with minor changes, from its proclamation as such by Hitler in 1920, when the party was still the German Workers' Party, until its dissolution.\nParty composition\nCommand structure\nTop leadership\nAdolf Hitler and\nRudolf Hess\nin\nWeimar\nin 1930\nAt the top of the Nazi Party was the party chairman (\"\nDer Führer\n\"), who held absolute power and full command over the party. All other party offices were subordinate to his position and had to depend on his instructions. In 1934, Hitler founded a separate body for the chairman,\nChancellery of the Führer\n, with its own sub-units.\nBelow the Führer's chancellery was first the \"Staff of the Deputy Führer\", headed by\nRudolf Hess\nfrom 21 April 1933 to 10 May 1941; and then the \"\nParty Chancellery\n\" (\nParteikanzlei\n), headed by\nMartin Bormann\n.\nFollowing Hitler's suicide on 30 April 1945, Bormann would be named as Party Minister, which gave him the top position in the Nazi Party itself;\nunlike Hitler, however, Bormann would not have a leadership role over the government of Nazi Germany.\nBormann, whose fate would remain unknown for several decades, would soon afterwards commit suicide as well on 2 May 1945 while trying to flee Berlin around the time Soviet Union forces\ncaptured the city\n.\nHis remains were first identified in 1972, then again in 1998 through DNA testing.\nReichsleiter\nDirectly subjected to the Führer were the\nReichsleiter\n(\"Reich Leader(s)\"—the singular and plural forms are identical in German), whose number was gradually increased to eighteen. They held power and influence comparable to the Reich Ministers' in\nHitler's Cabinet\n. The eighteen\nReichsleiter\nformed the \"Reich Leadership of the Nazi Party\" (\nReichsleitung der NSDAP\n), which was established at the so-called\nBrown House\nin Munich. Unlike a\nGauleiter\n, a\nReichsleiter\ndid not have individual geographic areas under their command, but were responsible for specific spheres of interest.\nNazi Party offices\nThe Nazi Party had a number of party offices dealing with various political and other matters. These included:\nRassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(RPA): \"NSDAP Office of Racial Policy\"\nAußenpolitische Amt der NSDAP\n(APA): \"NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs\"\nKolonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(KPA): \"NSDAP Office of Colonial Policy\"\nWehrpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(WPA): \"NSDAP Office of Military Policy\"\nAmt Rosenberg\n(ARo): \"\nRosenberg\nOffice\"\nParamilitary groups\nThe\nSA\nin Berlin in 1932. The group had nearly two million members at the end of 1932.\nIn addition to the Nazi Party proper, several paramilitary groups existed which \"supported\" Nazi aims. All members of these paramilitary organisations were required to become regular Nazi Party members first and could then enlist in the group of their choice. An exception was the\nWaffen-SS\n, considered the military arm of the SS and Nazi Party, which during the Second World War allowed members to enlist without joining the Nazi Party. Foreign volunteers of the Waffen-SS were also not required to be members of the Nazi Party, although many joined local nationalist groups from their own countries with the same aims. Police officers, including members of the\nGestapo\n, frequently held SS rank for administrative reasons (known as \"rank parity\") and were likewise not required to be members of the Nazi Party.\nA vast system of\nNazi Party paramilitary ranks\ndeveloped for each of the various paramilitary groups. This was part of the process of\nGleichschaltung\nwith the paramilitary and auxiliary groups swallowing existing associations and federations after the Party was flooded by millions of membership applications.\nThe major Nazi Party paramilitary groups were as follows:\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS): \"Protection Squadron\" (both\nAllgemeine SS\nand\nWaffen-SS\n)\nSturmabteilung\n(SA): \"Storm Division\"\nNationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps\n(NSFK): \"National Socialist Flyers Corps\"\nNationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps\n(NSKK): \"National Socialist Motor Corps\"\nThe\nHitler Youth\nwas a paramilitary group divided into an adult leadership corps and a general membership open to boys aged fourteen to eighteen. The\nLeague of German Girls\nwas the equivalent group for girls.\nAffiliated organisations\nCertain nominally independent organisations had their own legal representation and own property, but were supported by the Nazi Party. Many of these associated organisations were labour unions of various professions. Some were older organisations that were Nazified according to the\nGleichschaltung\npolicy after the 1933 takeover.\nReich League of German Officials (union of civil servants, predecessor to\nGerman Civil Service Federation\n)\nGerman Labour Front\n(DAF)\nNational Socialist German Doctors' League\nNational Socialist League for the Maintenance of the Law (NSRB, 1936–1945, earlier National Socialist German Lawyers' League)\nNational Socialist War Victim's Care\n(NSKOV)\nNational Socialist Teachers League\n(NSLB)\nNational Socialist People's Welfare\n(NSV)\nReich Labour Service\n(RAD)\nGerman Faith Movement\nGerman Colonial League\n(RKB)\nGerman Red Cross\nKyffhäuser League\nTechnical Emergency Relief\n(TENO)\nReich's Union of Large Families\nReichsluftschutzbund\n(RLB)\nReichskolonialbund\n(RKB)\nBund Deutscher Osten\n(BDO)\nGerman American Bund\nThe employees of large businesses with international operations such as\nDeutsche Bank\n,\nDresdner Bank\n, and\nCommerzbank\nwere mostly party members.\nAll German businesses abroad were also required to have their own Nazi Party\nAusland-Organization\nliaison men, which enabled the party leadership to obtain updated and excellent intelligence on the actions of the global corporate elites.\nRegional administration\nSee also:\nAdministrative divisions of Nazi Germany\nand\nList of Gauleiters\nAdministrative units of the Nazi Party in 1944\nFor the purpose of centralisation in the\nGleichschaltung\nprocess, a rigidly hierarchal structure was established in the Nazi Party, which it later carried through in the whole of Germany in order to consolidate total power under the person of\nHitler\n(\nFührerstaat\n). It was regionally sub-divided into a number of\nGaue\n(singular:\nGau\n) headed by a\nGauleiter\n, who received their orders directly from Hitler. The name (originally a term for sub-regions of the\nHoly Roman Empire\nheaded by a\nGaugraf\n) for these new provincial structures was deliberately chosen because of its\nmediaeval\nconnotations. The term is approximately equivalent to the English\nshire\n.\nWhile the Nazis maintained the nominal existence of state and regional governments in Germany itself, this policy was not extended to territories acquired after 1937. Even in German-speaking areas such as Austria, state and regional governments were formally disbanded as opposed to just being dis-empowered.\nAfter the\nAnschluss\na new type of administrative unit was introduced called a\nReichsgau\n. In these territories the\nGauleiters\nalso held the position of\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich Governor) thereby formally combining the spheres of both party and state offices. The establishment of this type of district was subsequently carried out for any further territorial annexations of Germany both before and during\nWorld War II\n. Even the former territories of\nPrussia\nwere never formally re-integrated into what was then Germany's largest state after being re-taken in the 1939 Polish campaign.\nThe\nGaue\nand\nReichsgaue\n(state or province) were further sub-divided into\nKreise\n(counties) headed by a\nKreisleiter\n, which were in turn sub-divided into\nZellen\n(cells) and\nBlöcke\n(blocks), headed by a\nZellenleiter\nand\nBlockleiter\nrespectively.\nA reorganisation of the\nGaue\nwas enacted on 1 October 1928. The given numbers were the official ordering numbers. The statistics are from 1941, for which the\nGau\norganisation of that moment in time forms the basis. Their size and populations are not exact; for instance, according to the official party statistics the\nGau\nKurmark/Mark Brandenburg was the largest in the German Reich.\nBy 1941, there were 42 territorial\nGaue\nfor Greater Germany.\nOf these, 10 were designated as Reichsgaue: 7 of them for Austria, one for the\nSudetenland\n(annexed from\nCzechoslovakia\n) and two for the areas annexed from\nPoland\nand the\nFree City of Danzig\nafter the joint\ninvasion of Poland\nby\nNazi Germany\nand the\nSoviet Union\nin 1939 at the onset of World War II.\nGetting the leadership of the individual\nGaue\nto co-operate with one another proved difficult at times since there was constant administrative and financial jockeying for control going on between them.\nThe first table below describes the organizational structure for the\nGaue\nthat existed before their dissolution in 1945.\nInformation on former\nGaue\n(that were either renamed, or dissolved by being divided or merged with other\nGaue\n) is provided in the second table.\nNazi Party\nGaue\nLater Gaue:\nFlanders\n, existed from 15 December 1944 (\nGauleiter\nin German exile:\nJef van de Wiele\n)\nWallonia\n, existed from 8 December 1944 (\nGauleiter\nin German exile:\nLéon Degrelle\n)\nGaue\ndissolved before 1945\nThe numbering is not based on any official former ranking, but merely listed alphabetically.\nGaue\nthat were simply renamed without territorial changes bear the designation\nRN\nin the column \"later became.\"\nGaue\nthat were divided into more than one\nGau\nbear the designation\nD\nin the column \"later became.\"\nGaue\nthat were merged with other\nGaue\n(or occupied territory) bear the designation\nM\nin the column \"together with.\"\nAssociated organisations abroad\nSee also:\nNSDAP/AO\nGaue\nin Switzerland\nThe irregular Swiss branch of the Nazi Party also established a number of Party\nGaue\nin that country, most of them named after their regional capitals. These included\nGau\nBasel\n-\nSolothurn\n,\nGau\nSchaffhausen\n,\nGau\nLuzern\n,\nGau\nBern\nand\nGau\nZürich\n.\nThe\nGau Ostschweiz\n(East Switzerland) combined the territories of three cantons:\nSt. Gallen\n,\nThurgau\nand\nAppenzell\n.\nMembership\nGeneral membership\nMain article:\nList of Nazi Party members\nThe general membership of the Nazi Party mainly consisted of the urban and rural\nlower middle classes\n. 7% belonged to the upper class, another 7% were\npeasants\n, 35% were industrial workers and 51% were what can be described as middle class. In early 1933, just before Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship, the party showed an under-representation of \"workers\", who made up 30% of the membership but 46% of German society. Conversely, white-collar employees (19% of members and 12% of Germans), the self-employed (20% of members and 10% of Germans) and civil servants (15% of members and 5% of the German population) had joined in proportions greater than their share of the general population.\nThese members were affiliated with local branches of the party, of which there were 1,378 throughout the country in 1928. In 1932, the number had risen to 11,845, reflecting the party's growth in this period.\nWhen it came to power in 1933, the Nazi Party had over\n2 million\nmembers. In 1939, the membership total rose to 5.3 million with 81% being male and 19% being female. It continued to attract many more and by 1945 the party reached its peak of 8 million with 63% being male and 37% being female (about 10% of the German population of 80 million).\nMilitary membership\nSee also:\nNazism and the Wehrmacht\nNazi members with military ambitions were encouraged to join the Waffen-SS, but a great number enlisted in the\nWehrmacht\nand even more were drafted for service after World War II began. Early regulations required that all\nWehrmacht\nmembers be non-political and any Nazi member joining in the 1930s was required to resign from the Nazi Party.\nHowever, this regulation was soon waived and full Nazi Party members served in the\nWehrmacht\nin particular after the outbreak of World War II. The\nWehrmacht\nReserves also saw a high number of senior Nazis enlisting, with\nReinhard Heydrich\nand\nFritz Todt\njoining the\nLuftwaffe\n, as well as\nKarl Hanke\nwho served in the army.\nThe British historian\nRichard J. Evans\nwrote that junior officers in the army were inclined to be especially zealous National Socialists with a third of them having joined the Nazi Party by 1941. Reinforcing the work of the junior leaders were the National Socialist Leadership Guidance Officers, which were created with the purpose of indoctrinating the troops for the \"war of extermination\" against Soviet Russia.\nAmong higher-ranking officers, 29% were NSDAP members by 1941.\nStudent membership\nIn 1926, the party formed a special division to engage the student population, known as the\nNational Socialist German Students' League\n(NSDStB). A group for university lecturers, the\nNational Socialist German University Lecturers' League\n(NSDDB), also existed until July 1944.\nWomen membership\nThe\nNational Socialist Women's League\nwas the\nwomen's organization\nof the party and by 1938 it had approximately 2 million members.\nMembership outside Germany\nParty members who lived outside Germany were pooled into the\nAuslands-Organisation\n(\nNSDAP/AO\n, \"Foreign Organization\"). The organisation was limited only to so-called \"\nImperial Germans\n\" (citizens of the German Empire); and \"Ethnic Germans\" (\nVolksdeutsche\n), who did not hold German citizenship were not permitted to join.\nUnder\nBeneš decree\nNo. 16/1945 Coll.\n, in case of citizens of Czechoslovakia membership of the Nazi Party was punishable by between five and twenty years of imprisonment.\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\nwas a branch of the Nazi Party founded in 1919, created for Germans with\nVolksdeutsche\nstatus.\nIt is not to be confused with the post-war right-wing\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\n(\nde\n)\n, which was founded in 1949.\nNotable members included:\nOswald Menghin\n(\nVienna\n)\nHermann Neubacher\nwho was responsible for invading Yugoslavia.\nRudolf Much\n(\nVienna\n)\nArthur Seyß-Inquart\n(\nVienna\n)\nParty symbols\nNazi flags\n: The Nazi Party used a right-facing\nswastika\nas their symbol and the red and black colours were said to represent\nBlut und Boden\n(\"blood and soil\"). Another definition of the flag describes the colours as representing the ideology of National Socialism, the swastika representing the Aryan race and the Aryan nationalist agenda of the movement; white representing Aryan racial purity; and red representing the socialist agenda of the movement. Black, white and red were in fact the colours of the old\nNorth German Confederation\nflag (invented by\nOtto von Bismarck\n, based on the Prussian colours black and white and the red used by northern German states). In 1871, with the foundation of the German Reich the flag of the North German Confederation became the German\nReichsflagge\n(\"Reich flag\"). Black, white and red became the colours of the nationalists through the following history (for example\nWorld War I\nand the\nWeimar Republic\n).\nThe\nParteiflagge\ndesign, with the centred swastika disc, served as the party flag from 1920. Between 1933 (when the Nazi Party came to power) and 1935, it was used as the National flag (\nNationalflagge\n) and Merchant flag (\nHandelsflagge\n), but interchangeably with the\nblack-white-red horizontal tricolour\n. In 1935, the black-white-red horizontal tricolour was scrapped (again) and the\nflag with the off-centre swastika and disc\nwas instituted as the national flag, and remained as such until 1945. The flag with the centred disk continued to be used after 1935, but exclusively as the\nParteiflagge\n, the flag of the party.\nGerman eagle\n: The Nazi Party used the traditional German eagle, standing atop a swastika inside a wreath of oak leaves. It is also known as the \"Iron Eagle\". When the eagle is looking to its left shoulder, it symbolises the Nazi Party and was called the\nParteiadler\n. In contrast, when the eagle is looking to its right shoulder, it symbolises the country (\nReich\n) and was therefore called the\nReichsadler\n. After the Nazi Party came to national power in Germany, they replaced the traditional version of the German eagle with the modified party symbol throughout the country and all its institutions.\nRanks and rank insignia\nMain article:\nRanks and insignia of the Nazi Party\n1: Anwärter (not party member), 2:\nAnwärter, 3:\nHelfer, 4:\nOberhelfer, 5:\nArbeitsleiter, 6:\nOberarbeitsleiter, 7:\nHauptarbeitsleiter, 8:\nBereitschaftsleiter, 9:\nOberbereitschaftsleiter, 10:\nHauptbereitschaftsleiter\n11:\nEinsatzleiter, 12:\nObereinsatzleiter, 13:\nHaupteinsatzleiter, 14:\nGemeinschaftsleiter, 15:\nObergemeinschaftsleiter, 16:\nHauptgemeinschaftsleiter, 17:\nAbschnittsleiter, 18:\nOberabschnittsleiter, 19:\nHauptabschnittsleiter\n20:\nBereichsleiter, 21:\nOberbereichsleiter, 22:\nHauptbereichsleiter, 23:\nDienstleiter, 24:\nOberdienstleiter, 25:\nHauptdienstleiter, 26:\nBefehlsleiter, 27:\nOberbefehlsleiter, 28:\nHauptbefehlsleiter, 29:\nGauleiter, 30:\nReichsleiter\nSlogans and songs\nNazi slogans: \"\nSieg Heil\n!\n\"; \"\nHeil Hitler\n\"\nNazi anthem:\nHorst-Wessel-Lied\nElection results\nSee also:\nNazi Party election results\nGerman Reichstag\nSee also:\nReichstag (Weimar Republic)\nPresidential election\nSee also:\nPresident of Germany (1919–1945)\nVolkstag of Danzig\nSee also:\nVolkstag\nSee also\nModern history portal\nGermany portal\nBusiness collaboration with Nazi Germany\nCollaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of books about Nazi Germany\nList of companies involved in the Holocaust\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMass suicides in 1945 Nazi Germany\nNeo-Nazism\nSocialist Reich Party\nVolkssturm\nNotes\n↑\nOfficially called the \"Reich Committee for the German People's Initiative against the Young Plan and the War Guilt Lie\" (\nReichsausschuß für die Deutsche Volksinitiative gegen den Young-Plan und die Kriegsschuldlüge\n)\n↑\nEnglish:\n/\nˈ\nn\nɑː\nt\ns\ni\n,\nˈ\nn\næ\nt\ns\ni\n/\nNA(H)T\n-see\n↑\nPronounced\n[\nnatsi̯oˈnaːlzotsi̯aˌlɪstɪʃə\nˈdɔʏtʃə\nˈʔaʁbaɪtɐpaʁˌtaɪ\n]\n↑\nor\nSozialdemokrat\n(\npronounced\n[\nzoˈtsi̯aːldemoˌkʁaːt\n]\n, \"\nsocial democrat\n\")\n↑\nSome sources say the name change happened on 1 April 1920.\n↑\nHitler's original name suggested was the Social Revolutionary Party (German:\nSozialrevolutionäre Partei\n).\n↑\n\"Social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism.\n... These organisations (ie Fascism and social democracy) are not antipodes, they are twins.\" (\nJ.V. Stalin\n:\nConcerning the International Situation\n(September 1924), in\nWorks\n, Volume 6, 1953; p. 294.) This later led\nOtto Wille Kuusinen\nto conclude that \"The aims of the fascists and the social-fascists are the same.\" (Report To the 10th Plenum of ECCI, in\nInternational Press Correspondence\n, Volume 9, no. 40, (20 August 1929), p. 848.)\n↑\nHitler stated: \"Today our left-wing politicians in particular are constantly insisting that their craven-hearted and obsequious foreign policy necessarily results from the disarmament of Germany, whereas the truth is that this is the policy of traitors [...] But the politicians of the Right deserve exactly the same reproach. It was through their miserable cowardice that those ruffians of Jews who came into power in 1918 were able to rob the nation of its arms.\"\n↑\nThe 43rd\nGau\nknown as the\nAuslandsorganisation\nwas non-territorial.\nCitations\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, pp.\n164–65.\n↑\nSteves 2010\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nT. W. Mason,\nSocial Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the \"National Community\", 1918–1939,\nOxford: UK, Berg Publishers, 1993, p. 77.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2011\n, pp.\n22, 23.\n↑\nDavidson 1997\n, p.\n241.\n↑\nOrlow 2010\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPfleiderer, Doris (2007).\n\"Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid gegen den Youngplan, in: Archivnachrichten 35 / 2007\"\n[\nInitiative and Referendum against the Young Plan, in: Archived News 35 / 2007\n]\n(PDF)\n.\nLandesarchiv Baden-Württemberg\n(in German). p.\n43.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 4 December 2022\n. Retrieved\n26 November\n2022\n.\n↑\nJones, Larry E. (Oct., 2006).\n\"Nationalists, Nazis, and the Assault against Weimar: Revisiting the Harzburg Rally of October 1931\"\nArchived\n26 April 2023 at the\nWayback Machine\n.\nGerman Studies Review.\nVol. 29, No. 3. pp. 483–94.\nJohns Hopkins University Press\n.\n↑\nJones 2003\n.\n↑\nFritzsche 1998\n, pp.\n143, 185, 193, 204–05, 210.\n↑\nEatwell, Roger (1997).\nFascism\n: a history\n. New York: Penguin Books. pp.\nxvii–\nxxiv, 21,\n26–\n31,\n114–\n40, 352.\nISBN\n0-14-025700-4\n.\nOCLC\n37930848\n.\n1\n2\n\"The Nazi Party\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 31 January 2023\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2022\n.\n↑\nGrant 2004\n, pp.\n30–34, 44.\n↑\nMitchell 2008\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nRay, Michael.\n\"Were the Nazis Socialists?\"\n.\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n.\n↑\nMcDonough 2003\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMajer 2013\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nWildt 2012\n, pp.\n96–97.\n↑\nGigliotti\n&\nLang 2005\n, p.\n14.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nArendt 1951\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nCurtis 1979\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nBurch 1964\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nMaier 2004\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nElzer 2003\n, p.\n602.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 26:00–31:04.\n1\n2\nMautner 1944\n, p.\n93–100.\n↑\nHitler 1936\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nGottlieb\n&\nMorgensen 2007\n, p.\n247.\n1\n2\nHarper n.d\n.\n1\n2\nRabinbach\n&\nGilman 2013\n, p.\n4.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n34.\n1\n2\n3\nSpector 2004\n, p.\n137.\n↑\nGriffen 1995\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nAbel 2012\n, p.\n55.\n1\n2\nCarlsten 1982\n, p.\n91.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nFest 1979\n, pp.\n37–38.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n71–82.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 23:00–24:30.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n75, 76.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nBlamires 2006\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nJaman 1956\n, p.\n88.\n1\n2\nRees 2006\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 15:00–25:00.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 24:00–25:00.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n140.\n1\n2\nJaman 1956\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n37.\n↑\nJohnson 1984\n, p.\n133.\n1\n2\n3\nFest 1979\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1997\n, p.\n629.\n↑\nCarruthers 2015\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nLepage 2009\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nChilders, Thomas\n(2001).\n\"The Weimar Republic and the Rise of the Nazi Party\"\n.\nA History of Hitler's Empire, 2nd Edition\n. Episode 3.\nThe Great Courses\n.  Event occurs at 26:00–31:04\n. Retrieved\n27 March\n2023\n.\n↑\nKonrad Heiden\n, \"Les débuts du national-socialisme\", Revue d'Allemagne, VII, No. 71 (Sept. 15, 1933), p. 821.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nEhrenreich 2007\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nWeikart 2009\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nGordon 1984\n, p.\n265.\n↑\nFest 1979\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nFranz-Willing 2001\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n38.\n↑\nFest 1979\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n100, 101.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n102.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n103.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n83, 103.\n↑\nHakim 1995\n, p.\n?.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n110.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 29:00–30:00.\n↑\nJablonsky 1989\n, pp.\n20–26, 30.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nHanns Hubert Hofmann\n:\nDer Hitlerputsch. Krisenjahre deutschen Geschichte 1920–1924\n. Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, München 1961, S. 211, 272; als\nKarl Kulm\nbei\nHans Günter Hockerts\n:\n„Hauptstadt der Bewegung“\n. In: Richard Bauer et al. (Hrsg.):\nMünchen – „Hauptstadt der Bewegung“. Bayerns Metropole und der Nationalsozialismus\n. 2. Auflage. Edition Minerva, München 2002, S. 355\nf.\n↑\n\"Einsatz für Freiheit und Demokratie\"\n. 11 June 2015. Archived from\nthe original\non 11 June 2015\n. Retrieved\n25 October\n2023\n.\n1\n2\nJablonsky 1989\n, p.\n57.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n239.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 13:45–14:12.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 15:50–16:10.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n26–29.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 17:00–17:27.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 23:30–24:00.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n224.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 30:35–30:57.\n↑\nHitler 2010\n, p.\n287.\n↑\nFritzsche 1998\n, p.\n?;\nEatwell 1996\n, pp.\nxvii–xxiv, 21, 26–31, 114–40, 352;\nGriffin 2000\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nDomarus 2007\n, pp.\n171–73.\n1\n2\nBeck 2013\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nKolb 2005\n, pp.\n224–225.\n↑\nKuntz 2011\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nSchaarschmidt 2014\n, pp.\n104–05.\n↑\nEvans 2015\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n20.\n↑\nKuntz 2011\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\nx–xi.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n25.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n25, 26.\n↑\nLewkowicz 2008\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nCogen 2016\n, p.\n226.\n↑\nJudt 2006\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nJunker 2004\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nRummel 1994\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nFischel 1998\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nBauer\n&\nRozett 1990\n, p.\n1799.\n↑\nHancock 2004\n, pp.\n383–96.\n1\n2\nHolocaust Memorial Museum\n.\n↑\nSnyder 2010\n, p.\n184.\n↑\nNiewyk\n&\nNicosia 2000\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nGoldhagen 1996\n, p.\n290.\n1\n2\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nTrevor-Roper 2002\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n154.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n217–218.\n↑\nKaracs 1998\n.\n↑\nSteber\n&\nGotto 2018\n, p.\n91.\n↑\nSimpson 2002\n, pp.\n149, 257, 299.\n↑\nFarrell 2008\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nMaterna\n&\nRibbe 1995\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nGerman Historical Institute 2008\n.\n↑\nBroszat 1985\n, pp.\n44–47.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n18–41.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n41–50.\n↑\nWolf 1969\n, pp.\n121, 253, 283.\n↑\nSchom 1998\n.\n↑\nHistorischer Verein des Kantons Bern 1973\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nGlaus 1969\n, p.\n147.\n1\n2\nPanayi 2007\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nThe History Place 2015\n.\n↑\nEvans 1989\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nBartov 1986\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nMusiał 2009\n.\n↑\nRosar 1971\n, p.\n?.\nBibliography\nAbel, Theodore Fred (2012) .\nThe Nazi Movement\n. Aldine Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1412846134\n.\nArendt, Hannah\n(1951).\nThe Origins of Totalitarianism\n. London; New York; San Diego: Harvest Book.\nOCLC\n52814049\n.\nBartov, Omer\n(1986).\nThe Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare\n. New York: St. Martin's Press.\nISBN\n978-0312224868\n.\nBauer, Yehuda\n; Rozett, Robert (1990).\n\"Appendix\"\n. In\nGutman, Israel\n(ed.).\nEncyclopedia of the Holocaust\n. New York: Macmillan Library Reference. pp.\n1797–1802\n.\nISBN\n0028960904\n.\nBeck, Hermann (2013).\nThe Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933: The\nMachtergreifung\nin a New Light\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n978-0857454102\n.\nBlamires, Cyprian P. (2006).\nWorld Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia\n. ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1576079409\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 22 June 2013\n. Retrieved\n13 March\n2013\n.\nBroszat, Martin (1985).\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich\n. 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Oxon: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-1409443636\n.\nCurtis, Michael (1979).\nTotalitarianism\n. New Brunswick (US); London: Transactions Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0878552887\n.\nDavidson, Eugene (1997).\nThe Making of Adolf Hitler: The Birth and Rise of Nazism\n. University of Missouri Press.\nISBN\n978-0826211170\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 27 September 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2015\n.\nDelarue, Jacques (2008).\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. Frontline Books.\nISBN\n978-1602392465\n.\nDomarus, Max (2007). Romane, Patrick (ed.).\nThe Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary\n. Bolchazy-Carducci Pub.\nISBN\n978-0865166271\n.\nEatwell, Roger (1996).\nFascism, A History\n. Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-0140257007\n.\nEhrenreich, Eric (2007).\nThe Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Science, and the Final Solution\n. Indiana University Press.\nISBN\n978-0253116871\n.\nElzer, Herbert, ed. (2003).\nDokumente Zur Deutschlandpolitik\n. Vol.\nFirst half band – Appendix B, Section XI, §39. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftverlag.\nISBN\n3486566679\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 30 November 2015\n. Retrieved\n6 April\n2015\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(1989).\nIn Hitler's Shadow West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape the Nazi Past\n(f\ned.). New York: Pantheon.\nISBN\n978-0394576862\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0143034698\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0143037903\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0143116714\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2015).\nThe Third Reich in History and Memory\n. Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0190228392\n.\nFarrell, Joseph (2008).\nNazi International: The Nazis' Postwar Plan to Control Finance, Conflict, Physics and Space\n. 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Retrieved\n28 August\n2015\n.\nHitler, Adolf\n(1936).\nDie Reden des Führers am Parteitag der Ehre, 1936\n(in German). Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 25 October 2012\n. Retrieved\n25 March\n2014\n.\nParteigenossen! Parteigenossinnen! Nationalsozialisten!\nHitler, Adolf\n(2010).\nMein Kampf\n. Bottom of the Hill Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1935785071\n.\nHolocaust Memorial Museum.\n\"Introduction to the Holocaust\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 30 June 2012\n. Retrieved\n23 October\n2017\n.\nHöhne, Heinz\n(2000) .\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS (Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS)\n. London: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0141390123\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. John Wiley & Sons.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-7004-1\n.\nJablonsky, David (1989).\nThe Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit, 1923–1925\n. Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0714633220\n.\nJaman, T. L. (1956).\nThe Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany\n. New York: New York University Press.\nJoachimsthaler, Anton\n(1999) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, the Evidence, the Truth\n. Trans. Helmut Bögler. London: Brockhampton Press.\nISBN\n978-1-86019-902-8\n.\nJohnson, Paul (1984).\nA History of the Modern World: From 1917 to the 1980s\n. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n978-0297782261\n.\nJones, Daniel\n(2003) . Roach, Peter; Hartmann, James; Setter, Jane (eds.).\nEnglish Pronouncing Dictionary\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n3125396832\n.\nJudt, Tony (2006).\nPostwar: A History of Europe Since 1945\n. London: Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-1440624766\n.\nJunker, Detlef (2004).\nThe United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, Volume 1\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0521791120\n.\nKaracs, Imre (4 May 1998).\n\"DNA test closes book on mystery of Martin Bormann\"\n.\nThe Independent\n. London: Independent Print Limited.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 7 November 2017\n. Retrieved\n1 May\n2024\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(1998).\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n0393046710\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2000).\nHitler, 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393067576\n.\nKoehl, Robert (2004).\nThe SS: A History 1919–45\n. Stroud: Tempus.\nISBN\n978-0752425597\n.\nKolb, Eberhard\n(2005) .\nThe Weimar Republic\n. London; New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0415344418\n.\nKuntz, Dieter (2011).\nHitler and the functioning of the Third Reich\n. Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0415779562\n.\nLepage, Jean-Denis G.G. (2009).\nHitler Youth, 1922–1945: An Illustrated History\n. McFarland.\nISBN\n978-0786452811\n.\nLewkowicz, Nicolas (2008).\nThe German Question and the Origins of the Cold War\n. Milan: Ipoc Press.\nISBN\n978-8895145273\n.\nMaier, Hans, ed. (2004).\nTotalitarianism and Political Religions: Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships\n. Translated by Bruhn, Jodi. Oxon (UK); New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0714656090\n.\nMajer, Diemut (2013).\n\"Non-Germans\" Under The Third Reich: The Nazi Judicial and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 1939–1945\n. Texas Tech University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.\nISBN\n978-0896728370\n.\nMaterna, Ingo; Ribbe, Wolfgang, eds. (1995).\nBrandenburgische Geschichte\n(in German). De Gruyter Akademie Forschung.\nISBN\n978-3050025087\n. Retrieved\n12 November\n2010\n.\nMautner, Franz H. (1944). \"Nazi und Sozi\".\nModern Language Notes\n.\n59\n(2):\n93–\n100.\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/2910599\n.\nISSN\n0149-6611\n.\nJSTOR\n2910599\n.\nDass\nNazi\neine Abkürzung von\nNationalsozialist\nist ... [u]nd zwar eine Verkürzung des Wortes auf seine ersten zwei Silben, aber nicht eine Zusammenziehung aus\nNa\ntionalso\nzi\nalist' ...[... that\nNazi\nis an abbreviation of\nNationalsozialist\n... and to be precise a truncation of the word to its first two syllables, not a contraction of\nNa\ntionalso\nzi\nalist' ...]\nMcDonough, Frank (2003).\nHitler and the Rise of the Nazi Party\n. Pearson/Longman.\nISBN\n978-0582506060\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe Third Reich\n. Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1906626518\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2011).\nHitler's Masterplan: The Essential Facts and Figures for Hitler's Third Reich\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1907446962\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1782000884\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2012).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. Vol.\n1 (Herbert Albrecht – H. Wilhelm Hüttmann). R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-21-0\n.\nMitcham, Samuel W.\n(1996).\nWhy Hitler?: The Genesis of the Nazi Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.\nISBN\n978-0275954857\n.\nMitchell, Otis C. (2008).\nHitler's Stormtroopers and the Attack on the German Republic, 1919–1933\n. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.\nISBN\n978-0786477296\n.\nMusiał, Bogdan\n(2009).\n\"Fakty wypaczone przez Erikę Steinbach\"\n.\nRzeczpospolita\n(in Polish). Rzeczpospolita. Archived from\nthe original\non 3 March 2012\n. Retrieved\n24 June\n2009\n.\nNiewyk, Donald L.; Nicosia, Francis R. (2000).\nThe Columbia Guide to the Holocaust\n. New York: Columbia University Press.\nISBN\n978-0231112000\n.\nOrlow, Dietrich (2010).\nThe Nazi Party 1919–1945: A Complete History\n. Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-0982491195\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 1 October 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2015\n.\nRabinbach, Anson; Gilman, Sander, eds. (2013).\nThe Third Reich Sourcebook\n. Berkeley: California University Press.\nISBN\n978-0520955141\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 5 September 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2015\n.\nPanayi, P. (2007).\nLife and Death in a German Town: Osnabrück from the Weimar Republic to World War II and Beyond\n. New York: Tauris Academic Studies.\nRees, Laurence (2006).\nThe Nazis: A Warning From History\n. BBC Books.\nISBN\n978-0563493334\n.\nRosar, Wolfgang (1971).\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft. Seyss-Inquart und der Anschluß\n(in German). Wien: Europa-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3203503844\n.\nRummel, Rudolph\n(1994).\nDeath by Government\n. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1560001454\n.\nSchaarschmidt, Thomas (2014).\nMobilizing German Society for War: The National Socialist\nGaue\n. Visions of Community in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press.\nSchom, Alan Morris\n(1998). \"NSDAP and Affiliated Meetings in Northern Switzerland for the Week of May 10–18, 1935\".\nA Survey of Nazi and Pro-Nazi Groups in Switzerland: 1930–1945\n. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Archived from\nthe original\non 6 June 2011\n. Retrieved\n17 October\n2010\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1990) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1991) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. London: Arrow Books.\nISBN\n978-0099421764\n.\nSimpson, Christopher (2002).\nWar Crimes of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank: Office of Military Government (U.S.) Reports\n. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0841914070\n.\nSnyder, Timothy\n(2010).\nBloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0465002399\n.\nSpector, Robert (2004).\nWorld Without Civilization: Mass Murder and the Holocaust, History, and Analysis\n. University of America Press.\nISBN\n978-0761829638\n.\nSteber, Martina; Gotto, Bernhard (2018).\nVisions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0199689590\n.\nSteves, Rick (2010).\nRick Steves' Snapshot Munich, Bavaria & Salzburg\n. Berkeley, California; New York: Avalon Travel.\nISBN\n978-1598806892\n.\nThough the Nazis eventually gained power in Berlin, they remembered their roots, dubbing Munich \"Capital of the Movement\". The Nazi headquarters stood near today's obelisk on Brienner Strasse...\nTrevor-Roper, Hugh\n(2002) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler\n. London: Pan Books.\nISBN\n978-0-330-49060-3\n.\nvan der Vat, Dan\n(1997).\nThe Good Nazi: The Life and Lies of Albert Spee\n. George Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n0297817213\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1408703045\n.\nWeikart, Richard (2009).\nHitler's Ethic\n. Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-0230623989\n.\nWhiting, Charles\n(1996) .\nThe Hunt for Martin Bormann: The Truth\n. London: Pen & Sword.\nISBN\n0-85052-527-6\n.\nWildt, Michael (2012).\nHitler's Volksgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence Against Jews in Provincial Germany, 1919–1939\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n978-0857453228\n.\nWolf, Walter (1969).\nFaschismus in der Schweiz\n. Flamberg. Archived from\nthe original\non 18 October 2015.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1997) .\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-3068079-3-0\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nNational Socialist German Workers' Party\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nProgram of the Nazi Party, its \"Manifesto\"\nText of\nMein Kampf\n(in German)\nDie Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 1920–1933\nArchived\n7 February 2009 at the\nWayback Machine\nat\nLebendiges Museum Online\n.\n(in German)\nDie Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 1933–1945\nArchived\n6 July 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\nat\nLebendiges Museum Online\n.\nOrganisationsbuch NSDAP\nAn encyclopedic reference guide to the Nazi Party, organisations, uniforms, flags etc. published by the party itself",
+    "infobox": {
+      "abbreviation": "NSDAP",
+      "chairman": "Anton Drexler(24 February 1920 – 29 July 1921)[1]",
+      "führer": "Adolf Hitler(29 July 1921 – 30 April 1945)",
+      "party_minister": "Martin Bormann(30 April 1945 – 2 May 1945)",
+      "founded": "24February 1920;105 years ago(1920-02-24)",
+      "banned": "10October1945;80 years ago(1945-10-10)",
+      "precededby": "German Workers' Party",
+      "headquarters": "Brown House, Munich, Germany[2]",
+      "newspaper": "Völkischer Beobachter",
+      "student_wing": "National Socialist German Students' Union",
+      "youth_wing": "Hitler Youth",
+      "women's_wing": "National Socialist Women's League",
+      "paramilitary_wings": "SASSMotor CorpsFlyers Corps",
+      "sports_body": "National Socialist League of the Reich for Physical Exercise",
+      "overseas_wing": "NSDAP/AO",
+      "labour_wing": "NSBO(1928–35),DAF(1933–45)[3]",
+      "membership": "Fewer than 60 (1920)8.5million (1945)[4]",
+      "ideology": "Nazism",
+      "politicalposition": "Far-right[5][6]",
+      "political_alliance": "National Socialist Freedom Movement(1924)Anti-Young Plancampaign (1929)[a]Harzburg Front(1931)[8]",
+      "colours": "BlackWhiteRed(official,German Imperial colours)Brown(customary)",
+      "slogan": "Deutschland erwache!('Germany, awake!') (unofficial)",
+      "anthem": "\"Horst-Wessel-Lied\""
+    },
+    "char_count": 83084
+  },
+  {
+    "page_title": "Einsatzgruppen",
+    "name": "Einsatzgruppen",
+    "type": "organization",
+    "summary": "Einsatzgruppen were Schutzstaffel (SS) paramilitary death squads of Nazi Germany that were responsible for mass murder, primarily by shooting, during World War II (1939–1945) in German-occupied Europe. The Einsatzgruppen had an integral role in the implementation of the so-called \"Final Solution to the Jewish question\" in territories conquered by Nazi Germany, and were involved in the murder of much of the intelligentsia and cultural elite of Poland, including members of the Catholic priesthood. Almost all of the people they murdered were civilians, beginning with the intelligentsia and swiftly progressing to Soviet political commissars, Jews, and Romani people, as well as actual or alleged partisans throughout Eastern Europe.",
+    "description": "Nazi paramilitary death squads, part of the SS",
+    "full_text": "Einsatzgruppen\nNazi paramilitary death squads, part of the SS\nFor other uses, see\nOrganisation Todt § Administrative units\n.\nEinsatzgruppen\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈaɪnzatsˌɡʁʊpm̩\n]\n,\nlit.\n'\ndeployment groups\n'\n;\nalso '\ntask forces\n')\nwere\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) paramilitary\ndeath squads\nof\nNazi Germany\nthat were responsible for mass murder, primarily by shooting, during\nWorld War II\n(1939–1945) in\nGerman-occupied Europe\n. The\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad an integral role in the implementation of the so-called \"\nFinal Solution\nto the\nJewish question\n\" (\nDie Endlösung der Judenfrage\n) in territories conquered by Nazi Germany, and were involved in the murder of much of the\nintelligentsia\nand cultural elite of Poland, including members of the\nCatholic priesthood\n.\nAlmost all of the people they murdered were civilians, beginning with the intelligentsia and swiftly progressing to Soviet\npolitical commissars\n,\nJews\n, and\nRomani people\n, as well as actual or alleged\npartisans\nthroughout Eastern Europe.\nUnder the direction of\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\nand the supervision of SS-\nObergruppenführer\nReinhard Heydrich\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\noperated in territories occupied by the\nWehrmacht\n(German armed forces) following the\ninvasion of Poland\nin September 1939 and the\ninvasion of the Soviet Union\nin June 1941. The\nEinsatzgruppen\nworked hand-in-hand with the\nOrder Police battalions\non the Eastern Front to carry out operations ranging from the murder of a few people to operations which lasted over two or more days, such as the massacre at\nBabi Yar\n(with 33,771 Jews murdered in two days), and the\nRumbula massacre\n(with about 25,000 Jews murdered in two days of shooting). As ordered by Nazi leader\nAdolf Hitler\n, the\nWehrmacht\ncooperated with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, providing logistical support for their operations, and participated in the mass murders. Historian\nRaul Hilberg\nestimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, related agencies, and foreign auxiliary personnel murdered more than two million people, including 1.3 million of the 5.5 to 6 million Jews murdered during the\nHolocaust\n.\nAfter the close of World War II, 24 officers, including multiple commanding officers, of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere prosecuted in the\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nin 1947–48, charged with\ncrimes against humanity\nand\nwar crimes\n. Fourteen death sentences and two life sentences were handed out. However, only four of these death sentences were carried out. Four additional\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were later tried and executed by other nations.\nFormation and Aktion T4\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere formed under the direction of SS-\nObergruppenführer\nReinhard Heydrich\nand operated by the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) before and during\nWorld War II\n.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad their origins in the ad hoc\nEinsatzkommando\nformed by Heydrich to secure government buildings and documents following the\nAnschluss\nin\nAustria\nin March 1938.\nOriginally part of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(Security Police; SiPo), two units of\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere stationed in the\nSudetenland\nin October 1938. When military action turned out not to be necessary due to the\nMunich Agreement\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere assigned to confiscate government papers and police documents. They also secured government buildings, questioned senior civil servants, and arrested as many as 10,000 Czech communists and German citizens.\nFrom September 1939, the\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n(Reich Security Main Office; RSHA) had overall command of the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nAs part of the drive by the Nazi regime to remove so-called \"undesirable\" elements from the German population, from September to December 1939 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand others took part in\nAktion T4\n, a program of systematic murder of persons with physical and mental disabilities and patients of psychiatric hospitals. Aktion T4 mainly took place from 1939 to 1941, but the murders continued until the end of the war. Initially the victims were shot by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand others, but\ngas chambers\nwere put into use by spring 1940.\nInvasion of Poland\nMain articles:\nIntelligenzaktion\nand\nOperation Tannenberg\nExecution of Poles in\nKórnik\n, 20 October 1939\nPolish women led to mass execution in a forest near\nPalmiry\nIn response to\nAdolf Hitler\n's plan to\ninvade Poland\non 1 September 1939, Heydrich re-formed the\nEinsatzgruppen\nto travel in the wake of the German armies.\nMembership at this point was drawn from the SS, the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(Security Service; SD), the police, and the\nGestapo\n.\nHeydrich placed SS-\nObergruppenführer\nWerner Best\nin command, who assigned\nHans-Joachim Tesmer\n(\nde\n)\nto choose personnel for the task forces and their subgroups, called\nEinsatzkommandos\n, from among educated people with military experience and a strong ideological commitment to Nazism.\nSome had previously been members of paramilitary groups such as the\nFreikorps\n.\nHeydrich instructed the First Quartermaster of the\nWehrmacht Heer\nEduard Wagner\nin meetings in late July that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nshould undertake their operations in cooperation with the\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Order Police; Orpo) and military commanders in the area.\nArmy intelligence was in constant contact with\nEinsatzgruppen\nto coordinate their activities with other units.\nInitially numbering 2,700 men (and ultimately 4,250 in Poland),\nthe\nEinsatzgruppen\n's mission was to murder members of the Polish leadership most clearly identified with Polish national identity: the intelligentsia,\nmembers of the clergy\n, teachers, and members of the nobility.\nAs stated by Hitler: \"...\nthere must be no Polish leaders; where Polish leaders exist they must be killed, however harsh that sounds\".\nSS-\nBrigadeführer\nLothar Beutel\n, commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nIV, later testified that Heydrich gave the order for these murders at a series of meetings in mid-August.\nThe\nSonderfahndungsbuch Polen\n–\nlists of people to be murdered\n–\nhad been drawn up by the SS as early as May 1939, using dossiers collected by the SD from 1936 forward.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nperformed these murders with the support of the\nVolksdeutscher Selbstschutz\n, a paramilitary group consisting of ethnic Germans living in Poland during\nOperation Tannenberg\n.\nMembers of the SS, the\nWehrmacht\n, and the\nOrdnungspolizei\nalso shot civilians during the Polish campaign.\nApproximately 65,000 civilians were murdered by the end of 1939. In addition to leaders of Polish society, they murdered Jews, prostitutes,\nRomani people\n, and the mentally ill. Psychiatric patients in Poland were initially murdered by shooting, but by spring 1941\ngas vans\nwere widely used.\nSeven\nEinsatzgruppen\nof battalion strength (around 500 men) operated in Poland. Each was subdivided into five\nEinsatzkommandos\nof company strength (around 100 men).\nEinsatzgruppe\nI, commanded by SS-\nStandartenführer\nBruno Streckenbach\n, acted with\n14th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nII, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nEmanuel Schäfer\n, acted with\n10th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nIII, SS-\nObersturmbannführer und Regierungsrat\nHerbert Fischer\n, acted with\n8th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nIV, SS-\nBrigadeführer\nLothar Beutel\n, acted with\n4th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nV, SS-\nStandartenfürer\nErnst Damzog\n, acted with\n3rd Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nVI, SS-\nOberführer\nErich Naumann\n, acted in\nWielkopolska\nEinsatzgruppe\nVII, SS-\nObergruppenführer\nUdo von Woyrsch\nand SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Rasch\n, acted in\nUpper Silesia\nand\nCieszyn Silesia\nThough they were formally under the command of the army, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nreceived their orders from Heydrich and for the most part acted independently of the army.\nMany senior army officers were only too glad to leave these genocidal actions to the task forces, as the murders violated the rules of warfare as set down in the\nGeneva Conventions\n. However, Hitler had decreed that the army would have to tolerate and even offer logistical support to the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwhen it was tactically possible to do so. Some army commanders complained about unauthorised shootings, looting, and rapes committed by members of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand the\nVolksdeutscher Selbstschutz\n, to little effect.\nFor example, when\nGeneraloberst\nJohannes Blaskowitz\nsent a memorandum of complaint to Hitler about the atrocities, Hitler dismissed his concerns as \"childish\", and Blaskowitz was relieved of his post in May 1940. He continued to serve in the army but never received promotion to\nfield marshal\n.\nThe final task of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin Poland was to round up the remaining Jews and concentrate them in\nghettos\nwithin major cities with good railway connections. The intention was to eventually remove all the Jews from Poland, but at this point their final destination had not yet been determined.\nTogether, the\nWehrmacht\nand the\nEinsatzgruppen\nalso drove tens of thousands of Jews eastward into\nSoviet-controlled territory\n.\nPreparations for Operation Barbarossa\nMain articles:\nThe Holocaust in Belarus\n,\nThe Holocaust in Ukraine\n,\nThe Holocaust in Russia\n, and\nHunger Plan\nOn 13 March 1941, in the lead-up to\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the planned invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler dictated his \"Guidelines in Special Spheres re: Directive No. 21 (Operation Barbarossa)\". Sub-paragraph B specified that\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\nwould be given \"special tasks\" on direct orders from the Führer, which he would carry out independently.\nThis directive was intended to prevent friction between the\nWehrmacht\nand the SS in the upcoming offensive.\nHitler also specified that criminal acts against civilians perpetrated by members of the\nWehrmacht\nduring the upcoming campaign would not be prosecuted in the military courts, and thus would go unpunished.\nIn a speech to his leading generals on 30 March 1941, Hitler described his envisioned war against the Soviet Union. General\nFranz Halder\n, the Army's Chief of Staff, described the speech:\nStruggle between two ideologies. Scathing evaluation of Bolshevism, equals antisocial criminality. Communism immense future danger\n... This a fight to the finish. If we do not accept this, we shall beat the enemy, but in thirty years we shall again confront the Communist foe. We don't make war to preserve the enemy\n... Struggle against Russia: Extermination of Bolshevik Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia\n... Commissars and\nGPU\npersonnel are criminals and must be treated as such. The struggle will differ from that in the west. In the east harshness now means mildness for the future.\nThough General Halder did not record any mention of Jews, German historian\nAndreas Hillgruber\nargued that because of Hitler's frequent contemporary statements about the coming war of annihilation against \"\nJudeo-Bolshevism\n\", his generals would have understood Hitler's call for the destruction of the Soviet Union as also comprising a call for the destruction of its Jewish population.\nThe genocide was often described using euphemisms such as \"special tasks\" and \"executive measures\";\nEinsatzgruppe\nvictims were often described as having been shot while trying to escape.\nIn May 1941, Heydrich verbally passed on the order to murder the Soviet Jews to the SiPo NCO School in\nPretzsch\n, where the commanders of the reorganised\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere being trained for Operation Barbarossa.\nIn spring 1941, Heydrich and General Eduard Wagner successfully completed negotiations for co-operation between the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand the German Army to allow the implementation of the \"special tasks\".\nFollowing the Heydrich-Wagner agreement on 28 April 1941, Field Marshal\nWalther von Brauchitsch\nordered that when Operation Barbarossa began, all German Army commanders were to immediately identify and register all Jews in occupied areas in the Soviet Union, and fully co-operate with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nIn further meetings held in June 1941 Himmler outlined to top SS leaders the regime's intention to reduce the population of the Soviet Union by 30 million people, not only through direct murder of those considered\nracially inferior\n, but by depriving the remainder of food and other necessities of life.\nOrganisation starting in 1941\nFurther information:\nList of Einsatzgruppen\nFor Operation Barbarossa, initially four\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere created, each numbering 500–990 men to comprise a total force of 3,000.\nEinsatzgruppen\nA, B, and C were to be attached to\nArmy Groups North\n,\nCentre\n, and\nSouth\n;\nEinsatzgruppe\nD was assigned to the\n11th Army\n. The\nEinsatzgruppe\nfor Special Purposes operated in eastern Poland starting in July 1941.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere under the control of the RSHA, headed by Heydrich and later by his successor, SS-\nObergruppenführer\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n. Heydrich gave them a mandate to secure the offices and papers of the Soviet state and Communist Party;\nto liquidate all the higher cadres of the Soviet state; and to instigate and encourage\npogroms\nagainst Jewish populations.\nThe men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere recruited from the SD, Gestapo,\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo), Orpo, and\nWaffen-SS\n.\nEach\nEinsatzgruppe\nwas under the operational control of the\nHigher SS Police Chiefs\nin its area of operations.\nIn May 1941, General Wagner and SS-\nBrigadeführer\nWalter Schellenberg\nagreed that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin front-line areas were to operate under army command, while the army provided the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwith all necessary logistical support.\nGiven their main task was defeating the enemy, the army left the pacification of the civilian population to the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, who offered support as well as prevented subversion.\nThis did not preclude their participation in acts of violence against civilians, as many members of the\nWehrmacht\nassisted the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin rounding up and murdering Jews of their own accord.\nNaked Jewish women from the\nMizocz ghetto\n, some of whom are holding infants, wait in a line before their execution by the\nOrder Police\nwith the assistance of Ukrainian auxiliaries.\nMembers of the Order Police execute those who survived the initial shooting.\nHeydrich acted under orders from\nReichsführer-SS\nHimmler, who supplied security forces on an \"as needed\" basis to the local\nSS and Police Leaders\n.\nLed by SD, Gestapo, and Kripo officers,\nEinsatzgruppen\nincluded recruits from the Orpo, Security Service and\nWaffen-SS\n, augmented by uniformed volunteers from the local auxiliary police force.\nEach\nEinsatzgruppe\nwas supplemented with\nWaffen-SS\nand\nOrder Police battalions\nas well as support personnel such as drivers and radio operators.\nOn average, the Order Police formations were larger and better armed, with heavy machine-gun detachments, which enabled them to carry out operations beyond the capability of the SS.\nEach\ndeath squad\nfollowed an assigned army group as they advanced into the Soviet Union.\nDuring the course of their operations, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders received assistance from the\nWehrmacht\n.\nActivities ranged from the murder of targeted groups of individuals named on carefully prepared lists, to joint citywide operations with\nSS Einsatzgruppen\nwhich lasted for two or more days, such as the massacres at\nBabi Yar\n, perpetrated by the\nPolice Battalion 45\n, and at\nRumbula\n, by Battalion 22, reinforced by local\nSchutzmannschaften\n(auxiliary police).\nThe SS brigades, wrote historian\nChristopher Browning\n, were \"only the thin cutting edge of German units that became involved in political and racial mass murder.\"\nMany\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were highly educated; for example, nine of seventeen leaders of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA held doctorate degrees.\nThree\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere commanded by holders of doctorates, one of whom (SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Rasch\n) held a double doctorate.\nAdditional\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere created as additional territories were occupied.\nEinsatzgruppe\nE operated in\nIndependent State of Croatia\nunder three commanders, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nLudwig Teichmann\n(\nde\n)\n, SS-\nStandartenführer\nGünther Herrmann\n, and lastly SS-\nStandartenführer\nWilhelm Fuchs\n. The unit was subdivided into five\nEinsatzkommandos\nlocated in\nVinkovci\n,\nSarajevo\n,\nBanja Luka\n,\nKnin\n, and\nZagreb\n.\nEinsatzgruppe\nF worked with Army Group South.\nEinsatzgruppe\nG operated in\nRomania\n,\nHungary\n, and\nUkraine\n, commanded by SS-\nStandartenführer\nJosef Kreuzer\n(\nde\n)\n.\nEinsatzgruppe\nH was assigned to\nSlovakia\n.\nEinsatzgruppen\nK and L, under SS-\nOberführer\nEmanuel Schäfer\nand SS-\nStandartenführer\nLudwig Hahn\n, worked alongside\n5th\nand\n6th Panzer Armies\nduring the\nArdennes offensive\n.\nHahn had previously been in command of\nEinsatzgruppe Griechenland\nin Greece.\nOther\nEinsatzgruppen\nand\nEinsatzkommandos\nincluded\nEinsatzgruppe Iltis\n(operated in Carinthia, on the border between Slovenia and Austria) under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n,\nEinsatzgruppe Jugoslawien\n(Yugoslavia)\nEinsatzkommando Luxemburg\n(Luxembourg),\nEinsatzgruppe Norwegen\n(Norway) commanded by SS-\nOberführer\nFranz Walter Stahlecker,\nEinsatzgruppe Serbien\n(Yugoslavia) under SS-\nStandartenführer\nWilhelm Fuchs\nand SS-\nGruppenführer\nAugust Meysner,\nEinsatzkommando Tilsit\n(\nde\n)\n(Lithuania, Poland),\nand\nEinsatzgruppe Tunis\n(\nTunis\n), commanded by SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nWalter Rauff\n.\nKillings in the Soviet Union\nFurther information:\nEinsatzgruppen reports\nVileyka\nMap of the\nEinsatzgruppen\noperations behind\nthe German-Soviet frontier\nwith the location of the first shooting of Jewish men, women and children, 30 July 1941\nAfter the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the\nEinsatzgruppen\n's main assignment was to kill civilians, as in Poland, but this time its targets specifically included\nSoviet Communist Party\ncommissars\nand Jews.\nIn a letter dated 2 July 1941 Heydrich communicated to his SS and Police Leaders that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere to execute all senior and middle ranking\nComintern\nofficials; all senior and middle ranking members of the central, provincial, and district committees of the Communist Party; extremist and radical Communist Party members;\npeople's commissars\n; and Jews in party and government posts. Open-ended instructions were given to execute \"other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, agitators, etc.).\" He instructed that any pogroms spontaneously initiated by the population of the occupied territories were to be quietly encouraged.\nOn 8 July, Heydrich announced that all Jews were to be regarded as partisans, and gave the order for all male Jews between the ages of 15 and 45 to be shot.\nOn 17 July Heydrich ordered that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere to murder all Jewish\nRed Army\nprisoners of war, plus all Red Army prisoners of war from Georgia and Central Asia, as they too might be Jews.\nUnlike in Germany, where the\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935 defined as Jewish anyone with at least three Jewish grandparents, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ndefined as Jewish anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent; in either case, whether or not the person practised the religion was irrelevant.\nThe unit was also assigned to exterminate Romani people and the mentally ill. It was common practice for the\nEinsatzgruppen\nto shoot hostages.\nAs the invasion began, the Germans pursued the fleeing Red Army, leaving a security vacuum. Reports surfaced of Soviet guerrilla activity in the area, with local Jews immediately suspected of collaboration. Heydrich ordered his officers to incite anti-Jewish pogroms in the newly occupied territories.\nPogroms, some of which were orchestrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, broke out in\nLatvia\n,\nLithuania\n, and Ukraine.\nWithin the first few weeks of Operation Barbarossa, 10,000 Jews had been murdered in 40 pogroms, and by the end of 1941 some 60 pogroms had taken place, claiming as many as 24,000 victims.\nHowever,\nSS-Brigadeführer\nFranz Walter Stahlecker\n, commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA,\nreported to his superiors\nin mid-October that the residents of\nKaunas\nwere not spontaneously starting pogroms, and secret assistance by the Germans was required.\nA similar reticence was noted by\nEinsatzgruppe\nB in Russia and Belarus and\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in Ukraine; the further east the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntravelled, the less likely the residents were to be prompted into murdering their Jewish neighbours.\nJews forced to dig their own graves in\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 5 July 1941\nA teenage boy stands beside his murdered family shortly before his own murder.\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 5 July 1941.\nAll four main\nEinsatzgruppen\ntook part in mass shootings from the early days of the war.\nInitially the targets were adult Jewish men, but by August the net had been widened to include women, children, and the elderly—the entire Jewish population. Initially there was a semblance of legality given to the shootings, with trumped-up charges being read out (arson, sabotage, black marketeering, or refusal to work, for example) and victims being murdered by a firing squad. As this method proved too slow, the\nEinsatzkommandos\nbegan to take their victims out in larger groups and shot them next to, or even inside, mass graves that had been prepared. Some\nEinsatzkommandos\nstarted to use automatic weapons, with survivors being murdered with a pistol shot.\nAs word of the massacres got out, many Jews fled; in Ukraine, 70 to 90 per cent of the Jews ran away. This was seen by the leader of\nEinsatzkommando\nVI as beneficial, as it would save the regime the costs of deporting the victims further east over the Urals.\nIn other areas the invasion was so successful that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad insufficient forces to immediately murder all the Jews in the conquered territories.\nA situation report from\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in September 1941 noted that not all Jews were members of the Bolshevist apparatus, and suggested that the total elimination of Jewry would have a negative impact on the economy and the food supply. The Nazis began to round their victims up into concentration camps and ghettos and rural districts were for the most part rendered\nJudenfrei\n(free of Jews).\nJewish councils were set up in major cities and forced labour gangs were established to make use of the Jews as slave labour until they were all dead, a goal that was postponed until 1942.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nused public hangings as a terror tactic against the local population. An\nEinsatzgruppe\nB report, dated 9 October 1941, described one such hanging. Due to suspected partisan activity near Demidov, all male residents aged 15 to 55 were put in a camp to be screened. The screening produced seventeen people who were identified as \"partisans\" and \"Communists\". Five members of the group were hanged while 400 local residents were assembled to watch; the rest were shot.\nBabi Yar\nMain article:\nBabi Yar\nThe largest mass shooting perpetrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntook place on 29 and 30 September 1941 at Babi Yar, a ravine northwest of\nKiev\ncity center in Ukraine that had fallen to the Germans on 19 September.\nThe perpetrators included a company of\nWaffen-SS\nattached to\nEinsatzgruppe\nC under Rasch, members of\nSonderkommando\n4a under SS-\nObergruppenführer\nFriedrich Jeckeln\n, and some Ukrainian auxiliary police.\nThe Jews of Kiev were told to report to a certain street corner on 29 September; anyone who disobeyed would be shot. Since word of massacres in other areas had not yet reached Kiev and the assembly point was near the train station, they assumed they were being deported. People showed up at the rendezvous point in large numbers, laden with possessions and food for the journey.\nAfter being marched\nthree kilometres (two miles)\nnorthwest of the city centre, the victims encountered a barbed wire barrier and numerous Ukrainian police and German troops. Thirty or forty people at a time were told to leave their possessions and were escorted through a narrow passageway lined with soldiers brandishing clubs. Anyone who tried to escape was beaten. Soon the victims reached an open area, where they were forced to strip, and then were herded down into the ravine. People were forced to lie down in rows on top of the bodies of other victims, and they were shot in the back of the head or the neck by members of the execution squads.\nThe murders continued for two days, claiming a total of 33,771 victims.\nSand was shovelled and bulldozed over the bodies and the sides of the ravine were dynamited to bring down more material.\nAnton Heidborn, a member of\nSonderkommando\n4a, later testified that three days later that there were still people alive among the corpses. Heidborn spent the next few days helping smooth out the \"millions\" of banknotes taken from the victims' possessions.\nThe clothing was taken away, destined to be re-used by German citizens.\nJeckeln's troops shot more than 100,000 Jews by the end of October.\nKillings in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia\nMain articles:\nThe Holocaust in Lithuania\n,\nThe Holocaust in Latvia\n, and\nThe Holocaust in Estonia\nMassacre of Jews in Lietūkis garage on 27 June 1941 during the\nKaunas pogrom\nEinsatzgruppe\nA operated in\nBaltic states\nof Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (the three Baltic countries which had been occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940–1941). According to its own reports to Himmler,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA murdered almost 140,000 people in the five months following the 1941 German invasion: 136,421 Jews, 1,064 Communists, 653 people with mental illnesses, 56 partisans, 44 Poles, five Romani, and one Armenian were reported murdered between 22 June and 25 November 1941.\nUpon entering\nKaunas\n, Lithuania, on 25 June 1941, the\nEinsatzgruppe\nreleased the criminals from the local jail and encouraged them to join the pogrom which was underway.\nBetween 23 and 27 June 1941, 4,000 Jews were murdered on the streets of Kaunas and in nearby open pits and ditches.\nParticularly active in the Kaunas pogrom was the so-called \"Death Dealer of Kaunas\", a young man who murdered Jews with a crowbar at the Lietukis Garage before a large crowd that cheered each murder with much applause; he occasionally paused to play the Lithuanian national anthem \"\nTautiška giesmė\n\" on his accordion before resuming the murders.\nAs\nEinsatzgruppe\nA advanced into Lithuania, it actively recruited local nationalists and antisemitic groups. In July 1941, local Lithuanian collaborators, pejoratively called \"White Armbands\" (\nLithuanian\n:\nBaltaraiščiai\n,\nlit.\n'\nPeople with white armbands\n'\n), joined the massacres.\nA pogrom in the Latvian capital\nRiga\nin early July 1941 killed 400 Jews. Latvian nationalist\nViktors Arājs\nand his supporters undertook a campaign of arson against synagogues.\nOn 2 July,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA commander Stahlecker appointed Arājs to head the\nArajs Kommando\n,\na\nSonderkommando\nof about 300 men, mostly university students. Together,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA and the\nArājs Kommando\nmurdered 2,300 Jews in Riga on 6–7 July.\nWithin six months, Arājs and collaborators would murder about half of Latvia's Jewish population.\nLocal officials, the\nSelbstschutz\n, and the\nHilfspolizei\n(Auxiliary Police) played a key role in rounding up and massacring local Jews in German-occupied Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.\nThese groups also helped the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand other killing units to identify Jews.\nFor example, in Latvia, the\nHilfspolizei\n, consisting of auxiliary police organised by the Germans and recruited from former Latvian army and police officers, ex-\nAizsargi\n, members of the\nPērkonkrusts\n, and university students, assisted in the murder of Latvia's Jewish citizens.\nSimilar units were created elsewhere, and provided much of the manpower for the Holocaust in Eastern Europe.\nWith the creation of units such as the\nArājs Kommando\nin Latvia and the\nRollkommando Hamann\nin Lithuania,\nthe attacks changed from the spontaneous mob violence of the pogroms to more systematic massacres.\nWith extensive local help,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA was the first\nEinsatzgruppe\nto attempt to systematically exterminate all the Jews in its area.\nLatvian historian\nModris Eksteins\nwrote:\nOf the roughly 83,000 Jews who fell into German hands in Latvia, not more than 900 survived; and of the more than 20,000 Western Jews sent into Latvia, only some 800 lived through the deportation until liberation. This was the highest percentage of eradication in all of Europe.\nPit where bodies were burned after the\nPonary massacre\nIn late 1941, the\nEinsatzkommandos\nsettled into headquarters in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn.\nEinsatzgruppe\nA grew less mobile and faced problems because of its small size. The Germans relied increasingly on the Latvian\nArājs Kommando\nand similar groups to perform massacres of Jews.\nSuch extensive and enthusiastic collaboration with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhas been attributed to several factors. Since the\nRussian Revolution of 1905\n, the\nKresy Wschodnie\nand other borderlands had experienced a political culture of violence.\nThe 1940–1941 Soviet occupation had been profoundly traumatic for residents of the Baltic states and areas that had been part of Poland until 1939; the population was brutalised and terrorised, and the existing familiar structures of society were destroyed.\nHistorian\nErich Haberer\nhas suggested that many survived and made sense of the \"totalitarian atomization\" of society by seeking conformity with communism.\nAs a result, by the time of the German invasion in 1941, many had come to see conformity with a totalitarian regime as socially acceptable behaviour; thus, people simply transferred their allegiance to the German regime when it arrived.\nSome who had collaborated with the Soviet regime sought to divert attention from themselves by naming Jews as collaborators and murdering them.\nRumbula\nMain article:\nRumbula massacre\nIn November 1941 Himmler was dissatisfied with the pace of the exterminations in Latvia, as he intended to move Jews from Germany into the area. He assigned SS-\nObergruppenführer\nJeckeln, one of the perpetrators of the Babi Yar massacre, to liquidate the\nRiga ghetto\n. Jeckeln selected a site about\n10\nkm (6\nmi)\nsoutheast of Riga near the Rumbula railway station, and had 300 Russian prisoners of war prepare the site by digging pits in which to bury the victims. Jeckeln organised around 1,700 men, including 300 members of the\nArajs Kommando\n, 50 German SD men, and 50 Latvian guards, most of whom had already participated in mass-murdering of civilians. These troops were supplemented by Latvians, including members of the Riga city police, battalion police, and ghetto guards. Around 1,500 able-bodied Jews would be spared execution so their slave labour could be exploited; a thousand men were relocated to a fenced-off area within the ghetto and 500 women were temporarily housed in a prison and later moved to a separate nearby ghetto, where they were put to work mending uniforms.\nAlthough Rumbula was on the rail line, Jeckeln decided that the victims should travel on foot from Riga to the execution ground. Trucks and buses were arranged to carry children and the elderly. The victims were told that they were being relocated, and were advised to bring up to\n20\nkg (44\nlb)\nof possessions. The first day of executions, 30 November 1941, began with the perpetrators rousing and assembling the victims at 4:00\nam. The victims were moved in columns of a thousand people toward the execution ground. As they walked, some SS men went up and down the line, shooting people who could not keep up the pace or who tried to run away or rest.\nWhen the columns neared the prepared execution site, the victims were driven some\n270 metres (300\nyd)\nfrom the road into the forest, where any possessions that had not yet been abandoned were seized. Here the victims were split into groups of fifty and taken deeper into the forest, near the pits, where they were ordered to strip. The victims were driven into the prepared trenches, made to lie down, and shot in the head or the back of the neck by members of Jeckeln's bodyguard. Around 13,000 Jews from Riga were murdered at the pits that day, along with a thousand Jews from Berlin who had just arrived by train. On the second day of the operation, 8 December 1941, the remaining 10,000 Jews of Riga were murdered in the same way. About a thousand were murdered on the streets of the city or on the way to the site, bringing the total number of victims for the two-day extermination to 25,000 people. For his part in organising the massacre, Jeckeln was promoted to Leader of the SS Upper Section,\nOstland\n.\nSecond sweep\nThe\nIvanhorod\nEinsatzgruppen\nphotograph\n: the murdering of Jews in\nIvanhorod\n,\nUkraine\n, 1942. A woman is attempting to protect a child with her own body just before they are fired upon with rifles at close range.\nA member of\nEinsatzgruppe D\nis about to shoot a man sitting by a mass grave in\nWinniza\n,\nUkraine\n, in 1942. Present in the background are members of the\nGerman Army\n, the\nGerman Labor Service\n, and former\nHitler Youth\n.\nThe back of the photograph is inscribed \"\nThe last Jew in Vinnitsa\n\".\nEinsatzgruppe\nB, C, and D did not immediately follow\nEinsatzgruppe\nA's example in systematically murdering all Jews in their areas. The\nEinsatzgruppe\ncommanders, with the exception of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA's Stahlecker, were of the opinion by the fall of 1941 that it was impossible to murder the entire Jewish population of the Soviet Union in one sweep, and thought the murders should stop.\nAn\nEinsatzgruppe\nreport dated 17 September advised that the Germans would be better off using any skilled Jews as labourers rather than shooting them.\nAlso, in some areas poor weather and a lack of transportation led to a slowdown in deportations of Jews from points further west.\nThus, an interval passed between the first round of\nEinsatzgruppen\nmassacres in summer and fall, and what American historian\nRaul Hilberg\ncalled the second sweep, which started in December 1941 and lasted into the summer of 1942.\nDuring the interval, the surviving Jews were forced into ghettos.\nEinsatzgruppe\nA had already murdered almost all Jews in its area, so it shifted its operations into Belarus to assist\nEinsatzgruppe\nB. In\nDnepropetrovsk\nin February 1942,\nEinsatzgruppe\nD reduced the city's Jewish population from 30,000 to 702 over the course of four days.\nThe German Order Police and local collaborators provided the extra manpower needed to perform all the shootings. Haberer wrote that, as in the Baltic states, the Germans could not have murdered so many Jews so quickly without local help. He points out that the ratio of Order Police to auxiliaries was 1 to 10 in both Ukraine and Belarus. In rural areas the proportion was 1 to 20. This meant that most Ukrainian and Belarusian Jews were murdered by fellow Ukrainians and Belarusians commanded by German officers rather than by Germans.\nThe second wave of exterminations in the Soviet Union met with armed resistance in some areas, though the chance of success was poor. Weapons were typically primitive or home-made. Communications were impossible between ghettos in various cities, so there was no way to create a unified strategy. Few in the ghetto leadership supported resistance for fear of reprisals on the ghetto residents. Mass break-outs were sometimes attempted, though survival in the forest was nearly impossible due to the lack of food and the fact that escapees were often tracked down and murdered.\nTransition to gassing\nSee also:\nFinal Solution\nMagirus-Deutz\nvan found near\nChełmno extermination camp\nis the same type as those used as\ngas vans\n.\nAfter a time, Himmler found that the killing methods used by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere inefficient: they were costly, demoralising for the troops, and sometimes did not kill the victims quickly enough.\nMany of the troops found the massacres to be difficult if not impossible to perform. Some of the perpetrators suffered physical and mental health problems, and many turned to drink.\nAs much as possible, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders militarized the genocide. The historian Christian Ingrao notes an attempt was made to make the shootings a collective act without individual responsibility. Framing the shootings in this way was not psychologically sufficient for every perpetrator to feel absolved of guilt.\nBrowning notes three categories of potential perpetrators: those who were eager to participate right from the start, those who participated in spite of moral qualms because they were ordered to do so, and a significant minority who refused to take part.\nA few men spontaneously became excessively brutal in their killing methods and their zeal for the task. Commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nD, SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, particularly noted this propensity towards excess, and ordered that any man who was too eager to participate or too brutal should not perform any further executions.\nDuring a visit to\nMinsk\nin August 1941, Himmler witnessed an\nEinsatzgruppen\nmass execution first-hand and concluded that shooting Jews was too stressful for his men.\nBy November he made arrangements for any SS men suffering ill health from having participated in executions to be provided with rest and mental health care.\nHe also decided a transition should be made to gassing the victims, especially the women and children, and ordered the recruitment of expendable native auxiliaries who could assist with the murders.\nGas vans, which had been used previously to murder mental patients, began to see service by all four main\nEinsatzgruppen\nfrom 1942.\nHowever, the gas vans were not popular with the\nEinsatzkommandos\n, because removing the dead bodies from the van and burying them was a horrible ordeal. Prisoners or auxiliaries were often assigned to do this task so as to spare the SS men the trauma.\nSome of the early mass murders at\nextermination camps\nused carbon monoxide fumes produced by diesel engines, similar to the method used in gas vans, but by as early as September 1941 experiments were begun at\nAuschwitz\nusing\nZyklon B\n, a cyanide-based pesticide gas.\nPlans for the total eradication of the Jewish population of Europe—eleven million people—were formalised at the\nWannsee Conference\n, held on 20 January 1942. Some would be\nworked to death\n, and the rest would be murdered in the implementation of the\nFinal Solution\nof the\nJewish question\n(\nGerman:\nDie Endlösung der Judenfrage\n).\nPermanent killing centres at Auschwitz,\nBelzec\n,\nChelmno\n,\nMajdanek\n,\nSobibor\n,\nTreblinka\n, and other Nazi extermination camps replaced mobile death squads as the primary method of mass-murder.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nremained active, however, and were put to work fighting partisans, particularly in Belarus.\nAfter the\ndefeat at Stalingrad\nin February 1943, Himmler realised that Germany would likely lose the war, and ordered the formation of a special task force,\nSonderaktion 1005\n, under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n. The unit's assignment was to visit mass graves all along the\nEastern Front\nto exhume bodies and burn them in an attempt to cover up the genocide. The task remained unfinished at the end of the war, and many mass graves remain unmarked and unexcavated.\nBy 1944 the Red Army had begun to push the German forces out of Eastern Europe, and the\nEinsatzgruppen\nretreated alongside the\nWehrmacht\n. By late 1944, most\nEinsatzgruppen\npersonnel had been folded into\nWaffen-SS\ncombat units or transferred to permanent death camps. Hilberg estimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand related agencies killed more than two million people, including 1.3 million Jews.\nThe total number of Jews murdered during the war is estimated at 5.5 to six million people.\nPlans for the Middle East and Britain\nAccording to research by German historians\nKlaus-Michael Mallmann\nand\nMartin Cüppers\n(\nde\n)\n,\nEinsatzkommando Egypt\n, led by\nWalter Rauff\n, was formed in 1942 in\nAthens\n. The unit was to enter\nEgypt\nand\nMandatory Palestine\nonce German forces arrived there.\nAccording to Mallmann and Cüppers, the unit's purpose was to carry out mass-murder of the Jewish populations in those areas. Given its initially small staff of only 24 men, Mallmann and Cüppers point to the further history of the unit, when it was quickly enlarged to more than four times its original strength during its deployment in Tunisia. Furthermore they assume that the commando would have been supported in the annihilation of the Jews by local collaborators, like it happened  with the Einsatzgruppen in Eastern Europe.\nFormer Iraqi prime minister\nRashid Ali al-Gaylani\nand the\nGrand Mufti of Jerusalem\nHaj Amin al-Husseini\nplayed roles, engaging in antisemitic radio propaganda, preparing to recruit volunteers, and in raising an\nArab-German Battalion\nthat would also follow\nEinsatzkommando\nEgypt to the Middle East.\nOn 20 July 1942 Rauff was sent to\nTobruk\nto report to Field Marshal\nErwin Rommel\n, Commander of the\nAfrika Korps\n. Since Rommel was 500\nkm away at the\nFirst Battle of El Alamein\n, it is unlikely that the two met.\nThe plans for\nEinsatzgruppe\nEgypt were set aside after the Allied victory at the\nSecond Battle of El Alamein\n.\nHad\nOperation Sea Lion\n—the German plan for an invasion of the United Kingdom—been launched, six\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere scheduled to follow the invasion force into Britain. They were provided with a list called the\nSonderfahndungsliste, G.B.\n('Special Search List, G.B'), known as\nThe Black Book\nafter the war, of 2,300 people to be immediately imprisoned by the Gestapo. The list included Churchill, members of the cabinet, prominent journalists and authors, and members of the\nCzechoslovak government-in-exile\n.\nJäger Report\nMain article:\nJäger Report\nPage 6 of the\nJäger Report\nshows the number of people murdered by\nEinsatzkommando\nIII alone in the five-month period covered by the report as 137,346.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nkept official records of many of their massacres and provided detailed reports to their superiors. The\nJäger Report\n, filed by Commander SS-\nStandartenführer\nKarl Jäger\non 1 December 1941 to his superior, Stahlecker (head of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA), covers the activities of\nEinsatzkommando\nIII in Lithuania over the five-month period from 2 July 1941 to 25 November 1941.\nJäger's report provides an almost daily running total of the liquidations of 137,346 people, the vast majority of them Jews.\nThe report documents the exact date and place of massacres, the number of victims, and their breakdown into categories (Jews, Communists, criminals, and so on).\nWomen were shot from the very beginning, but initially in fewer numbers than men.\nChildren were first included in the tally starting in mid-August, when 3,207 people were murdered in\nRokiškis\non 15–16 August 1941.\nFor the most part the report does not give any military justification for the murders; people were murdered solely because they were Jews.\nIn total, the report lists over 100 executions in 71 different locations. Jäger wrote: \"I can state today that the goal of solving the Jewish problem in Lithuania has been reached by\nEinsatzkommando\n3. There are no more Jews in Lithuania, apart from working Jews and their families.\"\nIn a February 1942 addendum to the report, Jäger increased the total number of victims to 138,272, giving a breakdown of 48,252 men, 55,556 women, and 34,464 children. Only 1,851 of the victims were non-Jewish.\nJäger escaped capture by the Allies when the war ended. He lived in Heidelberg under his own name until his report was discovered in March 1959.\nArrested and charged, Jäger committed suicide on 22 June 1959 in\nHohenasperg Fortress\nwhile awaiting trial for his crimes.\nInvolvement of the\nWehrmacht\nMain article:\nWar crimes of the Wehrmacht\nThe murders took place with the knowledge and support of the German Army in the east.\nAs ordered by Hitler, the\nWehrmacht\ncooperated with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, providing logistical support for their operations, and participated in the mass killings.\nOn 10 October 1941 Field Marshal\nWalther von Reichenau\ndrafted an order to be read to the\nGerman Sixth Army\non the Eastern Front. Now known as the\nSeverity Order\n, it read in part:\nThe most important objective of this campaign against the Jewish-Bolshevik system is the complete destruction of its sources of power and the extermination of the Asiatic influence in European civilization\n... In this eastern theatre, the soldier is not only a man fighting in accordance with the rules of the art of war, but also the ruthless standard bearer of a national conception\n... For this reason the soldier must learn fully to appreciate the necessity for the severe but just retribution that must be meted out to the subhuman species of Jewry.\nField Marshal\nGerd von Rundstedt\nof Army Group South expressed his \"complete agreement\" with the order. He sent out a circular to the generals under his command urging them to release their own versions and to impress upon their troops the need to exterminate the Jews.\nGeneral\nErich von Manstein\n, in an order to his troops on 20 November, stated that \"the Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all.\"\nManstein sent a letter to\nEinsatzgruppe\nD commanding officer Ohlendorf complaining that it was unfair that the SS was keeping all of the murdered Jews' wristwatches for themselves instead of sharing with the Army.\nBeyond this trivial complaint, the Army and the\nEinsatzgruppen\nworked closely and effectively. On 6 July 1941\nEinsatzkommando\n4b of\nEinsatzgruppe\nC reported that \"Armed forces surprisingly welcome hostility against the Jews\".\nFew complaints about the murders were ever raised by\nWehrmacht\nofficers.\nOn 8 September,\nEinsatzgruppe\nD reported that relations with the German Army were \"excellent\".\nIn the same month, Stahlecker of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA wrote that Army Group North had been exemplary in co-operating with the exterminations and that relations with the\n4th Panzer Army\n, commanded by General\nErich Hoepner\n, were \"very close, almost cordial\".\nIn the south, the Romanian Army worked closely with\nEinsatzgruppe\nD to massacre Ukrainian Jews,\nmurdering around 26,000 Jews in the\nOdessa massacre\n.\nThe German historian\nPeter Longerich\nthinks it probable that the\nWehrmacht\n, along with the\nOrganization of Ukrainian Nationalists\n(OUN), incited the\nLviv pogroms\n, during which 8,500 to 9,000 Jews were murdered by the native population and\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in July 1941.\nMoreover, most people on the home front in Germany had some idea of the massacres being committed by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nBritish historian\nHugh Trevor-Roper\nnoted that although Himmler had forbidden photographs of the murders, it was common for both the men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand for bystanders to take pictures to send to their loved ones, which he felt suggested widespread approval of the massacres.\nOfficers in the field were well aware of the killing operations being conducted by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nThe\nWehrmacht\ntried to justify their considerable involvement in the\nEinsatzgruppen\nmassacres as being anti-partisan operations rather than racist attacks, but Hillgruber wrote that this was just an excuse. He states that those German generals who claimed that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere a necessary anti-partisan response were lying, and maintained that the slaughter of about 2.2\nmillion defenceless civilians for reasons of racist ideology cannot be justified.\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrials\nMost of the surviving perpetrators of Nazi war crimes were never charged, and returned unremarked to civilian life. The West German government only charged about 100 former\nEinsatzgruppen\nmembers with war crimes.\nAs time went on, it became more difficult to obtain prosecutions; witnesses grew older and were less likely to be able to offer valuable testimony. Funding for trials was inadequate, and the governments of Austria and Germany became less interested in obtaining convictions for wartime events, preferring to forget the Nazi past.\n1947–1948 trial\nMain article:\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nAfter the close of World War II, 24 senior leaders of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere prosecuted in the\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nin 1947–48, part of the\nSubsequent Nuremberg Trials\nheld under United States military authority. The men were charged with\ncrimes against humanity\n,\nwar crimes\n, and membership in the SS (which had been declared a criminal organization). Fourteen death sentences and two life sentences were among the judgments; only four executions were carried out, on 7 June 1951; the rest were reduced to lesser sentences. Four additional\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were later tried and executed by other nations.\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, 1943\nSeveral\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders, including Ohlendorf, claimed at the trial to have received an order before Operation Barbarossa requiring them to murder all Soviet Jews.\nTo date no evidence has been found that such an order was ever issued.\nGerman prosecutor Alfred Streim noted that if such an order had been given, post-war courts would only have been able to convict the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders as\naccomplices\nto mass murder. However, if it could be established that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad committed mass murder without orders, then they could have been convicted as\nperpetrators\nof mass murder, and hence could have received stiffer sentences, including capital punishment.\nStreim postulated that the existence of an early comprehensive order was a fabrication created for use in Ohlendorf's defence. This theory is now widely accepted by historians.\nLongerich notes that most orders received by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders—especially when they were being ordered to carry out criminal activities—were vague, and couched in terminology that had a specific meaning for members of the regime. Leaders were given briefings about the need to be \"severe\" and \"firm\"; all Jews were to be viewed as potential enemies who had to be dealt with ruthlessly.\nBritish historian\nIan Kershaw\nargues that Hitler's apocalyptic remarks before Barbarossa about the necessity for a war without mercy to \"annihilate\" the forces of \"Judeo-Bolshevism\" were interpreted by\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders as permission and encouragement to engage in extreme antisemitic violence, with each\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommander to use his own discretion about how far he was prepared to go.\nAccording to Erwin Schulz, one of only two of Ohlendorf's codefendants to not attest to his version of events, he only received an order to exterminate all Jews in mid-August 1941. Unlike Ohlendorf, however, Schulz, unwilling to kill women and children, had refused to carry out this order and was subsequently discharged from this duty in a move that did not harm his career in any way.\nPrior to the invasion, Schulz testified that Heydrich had told him:\nThat every one should be sure to understand that, in this fight, Jews would definitely take their part and that, in this fight, everything was set at stake, and the one side which gave in would be the one to be overcome. For that reason, all measures had to be taken against the Jews in particular. The experience in Poland had shown this.\n1958 trial\nMain article:\nUlm Einsatzkommando trial\nThe crimes of the Einsatzgruppen came into wider public awareness with the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial in 1958. At the trial, ten former members of\nEinsatzkommando Tilsit\n(\nde\n)\nwere on trial accused of murdering around 5,500 Jewish men, women, and children in the German-Lithuanian border area in mid-1941. Among them were the heads of the Tilsit task force\nHans-Joachim Böhme\n(\nde\n;\nfr\n;\nru\n;\nsv\n)\n,\nBernhard Fischer-Schweder\n(\nde\n)\n, and the head of the Tilsit SD section\nWerner Hersmann\n(\nde\n)\n.\nThe responsible senior public prosecutor,\nErwin Schüle\n(\nde\n)\n, used as evidence documents from the American Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg, existing specialist literature, SS personnel files, and surviving \"USSR event reports\".\nSee also\nExecutions in the Valley of Death\nFunctionalism versus intentionalism\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMyth of the clean\nWehrmacht\nPorajmos\nReferences\nExplanatory notes\n↑\nSingular:\nEinsatzgruppe\n; Official full name:\nEinsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n.\nCitations\n↑\nWolf 2020\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n4.\n1\n2\nEdeiken 2000\n.\n1\n2\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n436.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n405, 412.\n↑\nNuremberg Trial, Vol. 20, Day 194\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n138–141.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n425.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n144.\n1\n2\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n11, 20.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n12.\n↑\nBrowning\n&\nMatthäus 2004\n, pp.\n16–18.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n143.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n144–145.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n429.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n430–432.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n25–26.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n227–228.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n242–245.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n521–522.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n95–96.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n14, 48.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n94–95.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n94–96.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n181.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nThomas 1987\n, p.\n265.\n1\n2\nRees 1997\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n30–31.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n31–32.\n1\n2\nBrowning 1998\n, pp.\n10–12.\n1\n2\nEinsatzgruppen judgment\n, pp.\n414–416.\n↑\nBrowning 1998\n, pp.\n135–136, 141–142.\n↑\nRobertson\n.\n↑\nBrowning 1998\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n186.\n↑\nBrowning\n&\nMatthäus 2004\n, pp.\n225–226.\n1\n2\nMacLean 1999\n, p.\n23.\n1\n2\n3\nMuseum of Tolerance\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n419.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2012\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nConze, Frei et al. 2010\n.\n↑\nCrowe 2007\n, p.\n267.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nCüppers 2006\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nLarsen 2008\n, p.\nxi.\n↑\nShelach 1989\n, p.\n1169.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, p.\n130.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n523.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n198.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, pp.\n62–70.\n↑\nUrban 2001\n.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n526.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n193–195.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n208.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n196–202.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n208, 211.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n211.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n211–212.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n212–213.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, pp.\n57–58.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n179.\n1\n2\n3\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n227.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n173–176.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n317.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n41.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n67–68.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n179.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n68–69.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n69.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n69–70.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n74–75.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n206–209.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n208–210.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n210–214.\n↑\nBerenbaum 2006\n, p.\n93.\n1\n2\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n342.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n549.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, pp.\n342–343.\n1\n2\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n78.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n353–354.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n52, 124, 168.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n199–200.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n165–166.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n547–548.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n551.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n548.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n243.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n280–281.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n555–556.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n279–280.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n248.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n258–260, 262.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n257.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n���\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n124–125.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n127–130.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n103, 117–118.\n↑\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n357.\n↑\nKrumenacker 2006\n.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n783–784.\n1\n2\n3\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n215.\n1\n2\n3\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n216.\n↑\nRabitz 2011\n.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n276.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n244–247.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nMayer 1988\n, p.\n250.\n↑\nSmelser\n&\nDavies 2008\n, p.\n43.\n1\n2\n3\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n301.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n79.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n88.\n↑\nKlee, Dressen\n&\nRiess 1991\n, p.\nxi.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, pp.\n200–201.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n275–276.\n↑\nSegev 2010\n, pp.\n226, 250, 376.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n274–275.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n187–189.\n↑\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n189–190.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n258–259.\n↑\nLower 2005\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nFischer\n&\nLorenz 2007\n, p.\n64 f.\n↑\nMix 2008\n.\nSources\nBerenbaum, Michael\n(2006).\nThe World Must Know\n. Contributors: Arnold Kramer, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (2nd\ned.). USHMM and Johns Hopkins University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80188-358-3\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R. (1998) .\nOrdinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland\n. London; New York: Penguin.\nBrowning, Christopher\n;\nMatthäus, Jürgen\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8032-1327-2\n.\nConze, Eckart; Frei, Norbert; Hayes, Peter; Zimmermann, Moshe (2010).\nDas Amt und die Vergangenheit\n: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik\n(in German). Munich: Karl Blessing.\nISBN\n978-3-89667-430-2\n.\nCraig, William\n(1973).\nEnemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad\n. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n978-1-56852-368-2\n.\nCrowe, David (2007) .\nOskar Schindler: The Untold Account of his Life, Wartime Activities and the True Story Behind the List\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00253-5\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2012) .\nDie Gestapo: Herrschaft und Terror im Dritten Reich\n. Becksche Reihe (in German). Munich: Beck.\nISBN\n978-3-406-62898-6\n.\nEdeiken, Yale F. (22 August 2000).\n\"Introduction to the Einsatzgruppen\"\n. Holocaust History Project. Archived from\nthe original\non 7 October 2015\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\n\"Einsatzgruppen case\"\n(PDF)\n.\nTrials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10\n(PDF)\n. Green Series. Vol.\n4. Nürnberg. October 1946 – April 1949\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: location missing publisher (\nlink\n)\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFischer, Torben; Lorenz, Matthias N. (2007).\nLexikon der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945\n(in German). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-8394-0773-8\n.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nHaberer, Erich (2001). \"Intention and Feasibility: Reflections on Collaboration and the Final Solution\".\nEast European Jewish Affairs\n.\n31\n(2):\n64–\n81.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/13501670108577951\n.\nISSN\n1350-1674\n.\nOCLC\n210897979\n.\nS2CID\n143574047\n.\n{{\ncite journal\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nHeadland, Ronald (1992).\nMessages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Security Police and the Security Service\n. London: Associated University Presses.\nISBN\n978-0-8386-3418-9\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 29 September 2024\n. Retrieved\n18 January\n2016\n.\nHilberg, Raul\n(1985).\nThe Destruction of the European Jews\n. New York: Holmes & Meier.\nISBN\n978-0-8419-0832-1\n.\nHillgruber, Andreas\n(1989). \"War in the East and the Extermination of the Jews\". In Marrus, Michael (ed.).\nPart 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder, Volume 1\n. The Nazi Holocaust. Westpoint, CT: Meckler. pp.\n85–\n114.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, MA: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-6026-4\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution\n. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-12427-9\n.\nKlee, Ernst\n; Dressen, Willi; Riess, Volker (1991).\n\"The Good Old Days\" – The Holocaust as Seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders\n. Trans. Burnstone, Deborah. New York: MacMillan.\nISBN\n978-0-02-917425-8\n.\nKrumenacker, Thomas (7 April 2006).\n\"Nazis Planned Holocaust for Palestine: historians\"\n. Red Orbit. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 December 2017\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLarsen, Stein Ugelvik (2008).\nMeldungen aus Norwegen 1940–1945: Die geheimen Lagesberichte des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Norwegen, 1\n(in German). Munich: Oldenburg.\nISBN\n978-3-486-55891-3\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nLower, Wendy (2005).\nNazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine\n. London and Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80782-960-8\n.\nMacLean, French L. (1999).\nThe Field Men: The SS Officers Who Led the Einsatzkommandos—The Nazi Mobile Killing Units\n.\nSchiffer Publishing\n. Madison, WI: Schiffer.\nISBN\n978-0-7643-0754-6\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael\n; Cüppers, Martin (2006).\nCrescent and Swastika: The Third Reich, the Arabs and Palestine\n. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.\nISBN\n978-3-534-19729-3\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael; Cüppers, Martin; Smith, Krista (2010).\nNazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine\n. New York: Enigma.\nISBN\n978-1-929631-93-3\n.\nMarrus, Michael\n(2000).\nThe Holocaust in History\n. Toronto: Key Porter.\nISBN\n978-1-55263-120-1\n.\nMayer, Arno J\n(1988).\nWhy Did The Heavens Not Darken?\n. New York: Pantheon.\nISBN\n978-0-394-57154-6\n.\nMix, Andreas (27 April 2008).\n\"NS-Prozesse: Als Westdeutschland aufwachte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2023\n.\n\"Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume 20, Day 194\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library\n. Retrieved\n10 January\n2013\n.\nRabitz, Cornelia (21 June 2011).\n\"Biography of Nazi criminal meets resistance from small German town\"\n.\ndw.de\n.\nDeutsche Welle\n. Retrieved\n9 September\n2016\n.\nRees, Laurence\n(1997).\nThe Nazis: A Warning From History\n. Foreword by Sir Ian Kershaw. New York: New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-551-0\n.\nRhodes, Richard\n(2002).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage Books.\nISBN\n978-0-375-70822-0\n.\nRobertson, Struan.\n\"The genocidal missions of Reserve Police Battalion 101 in the General Government (Poland) 1942–1943\"\n.\nHamburg Police Battalions during the Second World War\n. Regionalen Rechenzentrum der Universität Hamburg. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 February 2008\n. Retrieved\n2 January\n2015\n.\nRossino, Alexander B.\n(2003).\nHitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity\n. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.\nISBN\n978-0-7006-1234-5\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(2010).\nSimon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends\n. New York: Doubleday.\nISBN\n978-0-385-51946-5\n.\nShelach, Menachem (1989). \"Sajmište: An Extermination Camp in Serbia\". In\nMarrus, Michael Robert\n(ed.).\nThe Victims of the Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews\n. Vol.\n2. Westport, CT: Meckler.\nShepherd, Ben H.\n(2016).\nHitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich\n. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-17903-3\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSmelser, Ronald\n; Davies, Edward (2008).\nThe Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-83365-3\n.\nStaff.\n\"Book review:\nTasks of the Einsatzgruppen\nby Alfred Streim\"\n.\nMuseum of Tolerance Online Multimedia Learning Center, Annual 4, Chapter 9\n. Los Angeles:\nSimon Wiesenthal Center\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 26 August 2012\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\nStreim, Alfred (1989). \"The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen\". In\nMarrus, Michael\n(ed.).\nThe Nazi Holocaust, Part 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder\n. Vol.\n2. Westpoint, CT: Meckler. pp.\n436–\n454.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nThomas, David (April 1987). \"Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941–45\".\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n22\n(2):\n261–\n301.\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/002200948702200204\n.\nJSTOR\n260933\n.\nS2CID\n161288059\n.\nUrban, Thomas (1 September 2001).\n\"Poszukiwany Hermann Schaper\"\n.\nRzeczpospolita\n(in Polish) (204). Archived from\nthe original\non 24 November 2007\n. Retrieved\n5 January\n2015\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWette, Wolfram\n(2007).\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67402-577-6\n.\nWolf, Gerhard (born 1954).\n2010 PhD dissertation (in German) and 2020 translation (in English)\n.\nThese are commercially published editions of Gerhard Wolf's dissertation submitted for his 2010 PhD at\nHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\n2012 German-language original.\nIdeologie und Herrschaftsrationalität nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen\n(in German).\nHamburg\n:\nHamburger Edition\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\nISBN\n978-3-8685-4245-5\n,\n3-8685-4245-0\n;\nOCLC\n1039842033\n&\n794319959\n.\n2020 English translation.\nIdeology and the Rationality of Domination: Nazi Germanization Policies in Poland\n. Translated by Wayne Yung (born 1971).\nBloomington\n:\nIndiana University Press\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/j.ctv10h9f66\n;\nJSTOR\nj.ctv10h9f66\n;\nLCCN\n2019-54996\n(print);\nLCCN\n2019-54997\n(eBook);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4807-3\n,\n0-2530-4807-9\n(hard cover);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4808-0\n,\n0-2530-4808-7\n(eBook, pdf);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4809-7\n,\n0-2530-4809-5\n(eBook);\nOCLC\n1139013187\n(all editions)\n.\nLimited preview\n–\nvia\nGoogle Books\n.\nLimited preview\n–\nvia\nGoogle Books\n.\nFurther reading\nBenishay, Guitel (3 May 2016).\n\"Le journal de bord du chef SS en Tunisie découvert\"\n.\nLPH info\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 12 December 2021\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2020\n.\nCohen, Nir (17 April 2015).\n\"Inside the diary of SS officer known as gas chamber 'mastermind'\n\"\n.\nYnetnews\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2020\n.\nEarl, Hilary (2009).\nThe Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945–1958: Atrocity, Law, and History\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-45608-1\n.\nFörster, Jürgen\n(1998). \"Complicity or Entanglement? The Wehrmacht, the War and the Holocaust\". In Berenbaum, Michael; Peck, Abraham (eds.).\nThe Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined\n. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp.\n266\n–283.\nISBN\n978-0-253-33374-2\n.\nKrausnick, Helmut\n; Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich (1981).\nDie Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942\n(in German). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.\nISBN\n978-3-421-01987-5\n.\nSnyder, Timothy\n(2010).\nBloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00239-9\n.\nStang, Knut (1996).\nKollaboration und Massenmord. Die litauische Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-30895-0\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nComprehensive report of Einsatzgruppe A up to 15 October 1941\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum article on\nEinsatzgruppen\n\"Einsatzgruppen\"\nThe Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team",
+    "infobox": {
+      "formed": "c.1939",
+      "preceding_agency": "Einsatzkommando",
+      "jurisdiction": "Germanyand German-occupied Europe",
+      "headquarters": "RSHA,Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin52°30′26″N13°22′57″E/52.50722°N 13.38250°E/52.50722; 13.38250",
+      "employees": "c. 3,000 (1941)",
+      "minister_responsible": "Heinrich Himmler,Reichsführer-SS",
+      "agency_executives": "SS-ObergruppenführerReinhard Heydrich, Director (1939–1942)SS-ObergruppenführerErnst Kaltenbrunner, Director (1943–1945)",
+      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSand RSHA"
+    },
+    "char_count": 67955
+  }
+]
\ No newline at end of file