wikipedia/organizations.json

[
  {
    "page_title": "Schutzstaffel",
    "name": "Schutzstaffel",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "The Schutzstaffel was a major paramilitary organisation under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany, and later throughout German-occupied Europe during World War II.",
    "description": "Nazi paramilitary organisation (1925–1945)",
    "full_text": "Schutzstaffel\nNazi paramilitary organisation (1925–1945)\n\"SS\" and \"German SS\" redirect here. For the German letter 'ss', see\nß\n. For other uses, see\nSS (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nSchutzstaffel\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈʃʊtsˌʃtafl̩\n]\n;\nlit.\n'\nProtection Squadron\n'\n;\nSS\n; also stylised with\nSS runes\nas\nᛋᛋ\n) was a major\nparamilitary\norganisation under\nAdolf Hitler\nand the\nNazi Party\nin\nNazi Germany\n, and later throughout\nGerman-occupied Europe\nduring\nWorld War II\n.\nIt began with a small guard unit known as the\nSaal-Schutz\n(\"Hall Security\") made up of party volunteers to provide security for party meetings in\nMunich\n. In 1925,\nHeinrich Himmler\njoined the unit, which had by then been reformed and given its final name. Under his direction (1929–1945) it grew from a small paramilitary formation during the\nWeimar Republic\nto one of the most powerful organisations in Nazi Germany. From the time of the Nazi Party's rise to power until the regime's collapse in 1945, the SS was the foremost agency of security,\nmass surveillance\n, and\nstate terrorism\nwithin Germany and German-occupied Europe.\nThe two main constituent groups were the\nAllgemeine SS\n(General SS) and\nWaffen-SS\n(Armed SS). The\nAllgemeine SS\nwas responsible for enforcing the\nracial policy of Nazi Germany\nand general policing, whereas the\nWaffen-SS\nconsisted of the combat units of the SS, with a sworn allegiance to Hitler. A third component of the SS, the\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV; \"\nDeath's Head\nUnits\"\n), ran the\nconcentration camps\nand\nextermination camps\n. Additional subdivisions of the SS included the\nGestapo\nand the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) organisations. They were tasked with the detection of actual or potential enemies of the Nazi state, the neutralisation of any opposition, policing the German people for their commitment to\nNazi ideology\n, and providing domestic and foreign intelligence.\nThe SS was the organisation most responsible for the genocidal murder of\nan estimated 6 million Jews and millions of other victims\nduring\nthe Holocaust\n.\nMembers of all of its branches committed\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nduring World War II (1939–1945). The SS was also involved in commercial enterprises and\nexploited concentration camp inmates as slave labour\n. After Nazi Germany's defeat, the SS and the Nazi Party were judged by the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nat Nuremberg to be criminal organisations.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, the highest-ranking surviving SS main department chief, was found guilty of crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trials and hanged in 1946.\nOrigins\nForerunner of the SS\nNazi Party\nsupporters and stormtroopers in Munich during the\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, 1923\nBy 1923, the\nNazi Party\nled by\nAdolf Hitler\nhad created a small volunteer guard unit known as the\nSaal-Schutz\n(Hall Security) to provide security at their meetings in\nMunich\n.\nThe same year, Hitler ordered the formation of a small bodyguard unit dedicated to his personal service. He wished it to be separate from the \"suspect mass\" of the party, including the paramilitary\nSturmabteilung\n(\"Storm Battalion\"; SA), which he did not trust.\nThe new formation was designated the\nStabswache\n(Staff Guard).\nOriginally the unit was composed of eight men, commanded by\nJulius Schreck\nand\nJoseph Berchtold\n, and was modelled after the\nErhardt Naval Brigade\n, a\nFreikorps\nof the time. The unit was renamed\nStoßtrupp\n(Shock Troops) in May 1923.\nThe\nStoßtrupp\nwas abolished after the failed 1923\nBeer Hall Putsch\n, an attempt by the Nazi Party to seize power in Munich.\nIn 1925, Hitler ordered Schreck to organise a new bodyguard unit, the\nSchutzkommando\n(Protection Command).\nIt was tasked with providing personal protection for Hitler at party functions and events. That same year, the\nSchutzkommando\nwas expanded to a national organisation and renamed successively the\nSturmstaffel\n(Storm Squadron), and finally the\nSchutzstaffel\n(Protection Squad; SS).\nOfficially, the SS marked its foundation on 9 November 1925 (the second anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch).\nThe new SS protected party leaders throughout Germany. Hitler's personal SS protection unit was later enlarged to include combat units.\nEarly commanders\nSchreck, a founding member of the SA and a close confidant of Hitler, became the first SS chief in March 1925.\nOn 15 April 1926, Joseph Berchtold succeeded him as chief of the SS. Berchtold changed the title of the office to\nReichsführer-SS\n(Reich Leader-SS).\nBerchtold was considered more dynamic than his predecessor but became increasingly frustrated by the authority the SA had over the SS.\nThis led to him transferring leadership of the SS to his deputy,\nErhard Heiden\n, on 1 March 1927.\nUnder Heiden's leadership, a stricter code of discipline was enforced than would have been tolerated in the SA.\nBetween 1925 and 1929, the SS was considered to be a small\nGruppe\n(battalion) of the SA.\nExcept in the Munich area, the SS was unable to maintain any momentum in its membership numbers, which declined from 1,000 to 280 as the SA continued its rapid growth.\nAs Heiden attempted to keep the SS from dissolving,\nHeinrich Himmler\nbecame his deputy in September 1927. Himmler displayed better organisational abilities than Heiden.\nThe SS established\na number\nof\nGaue\n(regions or provinces). The SS-Gaue consisted of\nSS-Gau Berlin\n,\nSS-Gau Berlin Brandenburg\n,\nSS-Gau Franken\n,\nSS-Gau Niederbayern\n,\nSS-Gau Rheinland-Süd\n, and\nSS-Gau Sachsen\n.\nHimmler appointed\nHeinrich Himmler\n(with glasses, to the left of\nAdolf Hitler\n) was an early supporter of the Nazi Party.\nWith Hitler's approval, Himmler assumed the position of\nReichsführer-SS\nin January 1929.\nThere are differing accounts of the reason for Heiden's dismissal from his position as head of the SS. The party announced that it was for \"family reasons\".\nUnder Himmler, the SS expanded and gained a larger foothold. He considered the SS an elite, ideologically driven National Socialist organisation, a \"conflation of\nTeutonic knights\n, the\nJesuits\n, and\nJapanese Samurai\n\".\nHis ultimate aim was to turn the SS into the most powerful organisation in Germany and the most influential branch of the party.\nHe expanded the SS to 3,000 members in his first year as its leader.\nIn 1929, the\nSS-Hauptamt\n(main SS office) was expanded and reorganised into five main offices dealing with general administration, personnel, finance, security, and race matters. At the same time, the SS-Gaue were divided into three\nSS-Oberführerbereiche\nareas, namely the\nSS-Oberführerbereich Ost\n,\nSS-Oberführerbereich West\n, and\nSS-Oberführerbereich Süd\n.\nThe lower levels of the SS remained largely unchanged. Although officially still considered a sub-organisation of the SA and answerable to the\nStabschef\n(SA Chief of Staff), it was also during this time that Himmler began to establish the independence of the SS from the SA.\nThe SS grew in size and power due to its exclusive loyalty to Hitler, as opposed to the SA, which was seen as semi-independent and a threat to Hitler's hegemony over the party, mainly because they demanded a \"second revolution\" beyond the one that brought the Nazi Party to power.\nBy the end of 1933, the membership of the SS reached 209,000.\nUnder Himmler's leadership, the SS continued to gather greater power as more and more state and party functions were assigned to its jurisdiction. Over time the SS became answerable only to Hitler, a development typical of the organisational structure of the entire Nazi regime, where legal norms were replaced by actions undertaken under the\nFührerprinzip\n(leader principle), where Hitler's will was considered to be above the law.\nIn the latter half of 1934, Himmler oversaw the creation of\nSS-Junkerschule\n, institutions where SS officer candidates received leadership training, political and ideological indoctrination, and military instruction. The training stressed ruthlessness and toughness as part of the SS value system, which helped foster a sense of superiority among the men and taught them self-confidence.\nThe first schools were established at\nBad Tölz\nand\nBraunschweig\n, with additional schools opening at\nKlagenfurt\nand\nPrague\nduring the war.\nIdeology\nMain article:\nIdeology of the SS\nThe SS was regarded as the Nazi Party's elite unit.\nIn keeping with the\nracial policy of Nazi Germany\n, in the early days all SS officer candidates had to provide proof of\nAryan ancestry\nback to 1750 and for other ranks to 1800.\nOnce the war started and it became more difficult to confirm ancestry, the regulation was amended to proving only the candidate's grandparents were Aryan, as spelled out in the\nNuremberg Laws\n.\nOther requirements were complete obedience to the\nFührer\nand a commitment to the German people and nation.\nHimmler also tried to institute physical criteria based on appearance and height, but these requirements were only loosely enforced, and over half the SS men did not meet the criteria.\nInducements such as higher salaries and larger homes were provided to members of the SS since they were expected to produce more children than the average German family as part of their commitment to Nazi Party doctrine.\nThe crypt at\nWewelsburg\nwas repurposed by Himmler as a place to memorialise dead SS members.\nArtwork commemorating the Holocaust hangs on the walls (2013).\nCommitment to SS ideology was emphasised throughout the recruitment, membership process, and training.\nMembers of the SS were indoctrinated in the racial policy of Nazi Germany and were taught that it was necessary to remove from Germany people deemed by that policy as inferior.\nEsoteric\nrituals and the awarding of regalia and insignia for milestones in the SS man's career suffused SS members even further with Nazi ideology.\nMembers were expected to renounce their Christian faith, and Christmas was replaced with a\nsolstice celebration\n.\nChurch weddings were replaced with SS\nEheweihen\n, a pagan ceremony invented by Himmler.\nThese pseudo-religious rites and ceremonies often took place near SS-dedicated monuments or in special SS-designated places.\nIn 1933, Himmler bought\nWewelsburg\n, a castle in\nWestphalia\n. He initially intended it to be used as an SS training centre, but its role came to include hosting SS dinners and neo-pagan rituals.\nIn 1936, Himmler wrote in the pamphlet \"The SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organisation\":\nWe shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevik revolution of subhumans be able to be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without.\nThe SS ideology included the application of brutality and terror as a solution to military and political issues.\nThe SS stressed total loyalty and obedience to orders unto death. Hitler used this as a powerful tool to further his aims and those of the Nazi Party. The SS was entrusted with the commission of war crimes such as the murder of Jewish civilians. Himmler once wrote that an SS man \"hesitates not for a single instant, but executes unquestioningly...\" any\nFührer-Befehl\n(\nFührer\norder).\nTheir official motto was\n\"\nMeine Ehre heißt Treue\n\"\n(My Honour is Loyalty).\nAs part of its race-centric functions during World War II, the SS oversaw the isolation and displacement of\nJews\nfrom the populations of the conquered territories, seizing their assets and deporting them to concentration camps and\nghettos\n, where they were used as slave labour or immediately murdered.\nChosen to implement the\nFinal Solution\nordered by Hitler, the SS were the main group responsible for the institutional murder and\ndemocide\nof more than 20 million people during the Holocaust, including approximately 5.2 million\nto 6 million\nJews and 10.5 million\nSlavs\n.\nA significant number of victims were members of other racial or ethnic groups such as the 258,000\nRomani\n.\nThe SS was involved in murdering people viewed as threats to\nrace hygiene\nor Nazi ideology, including the mentally or physically disabled, homosexuals, and political dissidents. Members of trade unions and those perceived to be affiliated with groups that opposed the regime (religious, political, social, and otherwise), or those whose views were contradictory to the goals of the Nazi Party government, were rounded up in large numbers; these included clergy of all faiths,\nJehovah's Witnesses\n,\nFreemasons\n,\nCommunists\n, and\nRotary Club\nmembers.\nAccording to the judgements rendered at the\nNuremberg trials\n, as well as many war crimes investigations and trials conducted since then, the SS was responsible for the majority of Nazi war crimes. In particular, it was the primary organisation that carried out the Holocaust.\nPre-war Germany\nReinhard Heydrich\n(right) was Himmler's protégé and a leading SS figure until his assassination in 1942.\nAfter Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power on 30 January 1933, the SS was considered a state organisation and a branch of the government.\nLaw enforcement gradually became the purview of the SS, and many SS organisations became\nde facto\ngovernment agencies.\nThe SS established a\npolice state\nwithin Nazi Germany, using the secret state police and security forces under Himmler's control to suppress resistance to Hitler.\nIn his role as\nMinister President of Prussia\n,\nHermann Göring\nhad in 1933 created a Prussian\nsecret police\nforce, the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\nor\nGestapo\n, and appointed\nRudolf Diels\nas its head. Concerned that Diels was not ruthless enough to use the Gestapo effectively to counteract the power of the SA, Göring handed over its control to Himmler on 20 April 1934.\nAlso on that date, in a departure from long-standing German practice that law enforcement was a state and local matter, Hitler appointed Himmler chief of all German police outside Prussia. Himmler named his deputy and protégé\nReinhard Heydrich\nchief of the Gestapo on 22 April 1934. Heydrich also continued as head of the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD; security service).\nThe Gestapo's transfer to Himmler was a prelude to the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, in which most of the SA leadership were arrested and subsequently executed.\nThe SS and Gestapo carried out most of the murders. On 20 July 1934, Hitler detached the SS from the SA, which was no longer an influential force after the purge. The SS became an elite corps of the Nazi Party, answerable only to Hitler. Himmler's title of\nReichsführer-SS\nnow became his actual rank\n– and the highest rank in the SS, equivalent to the rank of\nfield marshal\nin the army (his previous rank was\nObergruppenführer\n).\nAs Himmler's position and authority grew, so in effect did his rank.\nOn 17 June 1936, all police forces throughout Germany were united under the purview of Himmler and the SS.\nHimmler and Heydrich thus became two of the most powerful men in the country's administration.\nPolice and intelligence forces brought under their administrative control included the SD, Gestapo,\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo; criminal investigative police), and\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo; regular uniformed police).\nIn his capacity as police chief, Himmler was nominally subordinate to Interior Minister\nWilhelm Frick\n. In practice, since the SS answered only to Hitler, the de facto merger of the SS and the police made the police independent of Frick's control.\nIn September 1939, the security and police agencies, including the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; security police) and SD (but not the Orpo), were consolidated into the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA), headed by Heydrich.\nThis further increased the collective authority of the SS.\nDuring\nKristallnacht\n(9–10 November 1938), SS security services clandestinely coordinated violence against Jews as the SS, Gestapo, SD, Kripo, SiPo, and regular police did what they could to ensure that while Jewish synagogues and community centres were destroyed, Jewish-owned businesses and housing remained intact so that they could later be seized.\nIn the end, thousands of Jewish businesses, homes, and graveyards were vandalised and looted, particularly by members of the SA. Some 500 to 1,000 synagogues were destroyed, mostly by arson.\nOn 11 November, Heydrich reported a death toll of 36 people, but later assessments put the number of deaths at up to two thousand.\nOn Hitler's orders, around 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and sent to concentration camps by 16 November.\nAs many as 2,500 of these people died in the following months.\nIt was at this point that the SS state began in earnest its campaign of terror against political and religious opponents, who they imprisoned without trial or judicial oversight for the sake of \"security, re-education, or prevention\".\nIn September 1939, the authority of the SS expanded further when the senior SS officer in each military district also became its chief of police.\nMost of these\nSS and police leaders\nheld the rank of SS-\nGruppenführer\nor above and answered directly to Himmler in all SS matters within their district. Their role was to police the population and oversee the activities of the SS men within their district.\nBy declaring an emergency, they could bypass the district administrative offices for the SS, SD, SiPo,\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV; concentration camp guards), and Orpo, thereby gaining direct operational control of these groups.\nHitler's personal bodyguards\nMain article:\nAdolf Hitler's bodyguard\nTroop inspection of the\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\nin Berlin, 1938\nAs the SS grew in size and importance, so too did Hitler's personal protection forces.\nThree main SS groups were assigned to protect Hitler. In 1933, his larger personal bodyguard unit (previously the\n1st SS-Standarte\n) was called to Berlin to replace the Army Chancellery Guard, assigned to protect the\nChancellor of Germany\n.\nSepp Dietrich\ncommanded the new unit, previously known as SS-Stabswache Berlin; the name was changed to\nSS-Sonderkommando Berlin\n. In November 1933, the name was changed to\nLeibstandarte Adolf Hitler\n. In April 1934, Himmler modified the name to\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\n(LSSAH). The LSSAH guarded Hitler's private residences and offices, providing an outer ring of protection for the Führer and his visitors.\nLSSAH men manned sentry posts at the entrances to the old\nReich Chancellery\nand the new Reich Chancellery.\nThe number of LSSAH guards was increased during special events.\nAt the\nBerghof\n, Hitler's residence in the\nObersalzberg\n, a large contingent of the LSSAH patrolled an extensive cordoned security zone.\nFrom 1941 forward, the\nLeibstandarte\nbecame four distinct entities, the\nWaffen-SS\ndivision (unconnected to Hitler's protection but a formation of the\nWaffen-SS\n), the Berlin Chancellory Guard, the SS security regiment assigned to the Obersalzberg, and a Munich-based bodyguard unit which protected Hitler when he visited his apartment and the\nBrown House\nNazi Party headquarters in Munich.\nAlthough the unit was nominally under Himmler, Dietrich was the real commander and handled day-to-day administration.\nTwo other SS units composed the inner ring of Hitler's protection. The\nSS-Begleitkommando des Führers\n(Escort Command of the Führer), formed in February 1932, served as Hitler's protection escort while he was travelling. This unit consisted of eight men who served around the clock protecting Hitler in shifts.\nLater the\nSS-Begleitkommando\nwas expanded and became known as the\nFührerbegleitkommando\n(\nFührer\nEscort Command; FBK). It continued under separate command and remained responsible for Hitler's protection.\nThe\nFührer Schutzkommando\n(\nFührer\nProtection Command; FSK) was a protection unit founded by Himmler in March 1933.\nOriginally it was only charged with protecting Hitler while he was inside the borders of\nBavaria\n. In early 1934, they replaced the\nSS-Begleitkommando\nfor Hitler's protection throughout Germany.\nThe FSK was renamed the\nReichssicherheitsdienst\n(Reich Security Service; RSD) in August 1935.\nJohann Rattenhuber\n, chief of the RSD, for the most part, took his orders directly from Hitler.\nThe current FBK chief acted as his deputy. Wherever Hitler was in residence, members of the RSD and FBK would be present. RSD men patrolled the grounds and FBK men provided close security protection inside. The RSD and FBK worked together for security and personal protection during Hitler's trips and public events, but they operated as two groups and used separate vehicles.\nBy March 1938, both units wore the standard field grey uniform of the SS.\nThe RSD uniform had the SD diamond on the lower left sleeve.\nConcentration camps founded\nCrematorium at\nDachau concentration camp\n, May 1945 (photo taken after liberation)\nThe SS was closely associated with Nazi Germany's concentration camp system. On 26 June 1933, Himmler appointed SS-\nOberführer\nTheodor Eicke\nas\ncommandant\nof\nDachau concentration camp\n, one of the first Nazi concentration camps.\nIt was created to consolidate the many small camps that had been set up by various police agencies and the Nazi Party to house political prisoners.\nThe organisational structure Eicke instituted at Dachau stood as the model for all later concentration camps.\nAfter 1934, Eicke was named commander of the\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n(SS-TV), the SS formation responsible for running the concentration camps under the authority of the SS and Himmler.\nKnown as the \"Death's Head Units\", the SS-TV was first organised as several battalions, each based at one of Germany's major concentration camps. Leadership at the camps was divided into five departments: commander and adjutant, political affairs division, protective custody, administration, and medical personnel.\nBy 1935, Himmler secured Hitler's approval and the finances necessary to establish and operate additional camps.\nSix concentration camps\nhousing 21,400 inmates (mostly political prisoners) existed at the start of the war in September 1939.\nBy the end of the war, hundreds of camps of varying size and function had been created, holding nearly 715,000 people, most of whom were targeted by the regime because of their race.\nThe concentration camp population rose in tandem with the defeats suffered by the Nazi regime; the worse the catastrophe seemed, the greater the fear of subversion, prompting the SS to intensify their repression and terror.\nSS in World War II\nBy the outbreak of World War\nII, the SS had consolidated into its final form, which comprised three main organisations: the\nAllgemeine SS\n,\nSS-Totenkopfverbände\n, and the\nWaffen-SS\n, which was founded in 1934 as the\nSS-Verfügungstruppe\n(SS-VT) and renamed in 1940.\nThe\nWaffen-SS\nevolved into a second German army alongside the\nWehrmacht\nand operated in tandem with them, especially with the\nHeer\n(German Army).\nHowever, it never obtained total \"independence of command\", nor was it ever a \"serious rival\" to the German Army. Members were never able to join the ranks of the German High Command and it was dependent on the army for heavy weaponry and equipment.\nAlthough SS ranks generally had equivalents in the other services, the SS rank system did not copy the terms and ranks used by the\nWehrmacht\n'\ns branches. Instead, it used the ranks established by the post-World War I\nFreikorps\nand the SA. This was primarily done to emphasise the SS as being independent of the\nWehrmacht\n.\nInvasion of Poland\nPolish Jews arrested by the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) and police, September 1939\nIn the September 1939\ninvasion of Poland\n, the LSSAH and SS-VT fought as separate mobile infantry regiments.\nThe LSSAH became notorious for torching villages without military justification.\nMembers of the LSSAH committed war crimes in numerous towns, including the murder of 50 Polish Jews in\nBłonie\nand the massacre of 200 civilians, including children, who were machine-gunned in\nZłoczew\n. Shootings also took place in\nBolesławiec\n,\nTorzeniec\n,\nGoworowo\n,\nMława\n, and\nWłocławek\n.\nSome senior members of the\nWehrmacht\nwere not convinced the units were fully prepared for combat. Its units took unnecessary risks and had a higher casualty rate than the army.\nGeneraloberst\nFedor von Bock\nwas quite critical; following an April 1940 visit of the\nSS-Totenkopf\ndivision, he found their battle training was \"insufficient\".\nHitler thought the criticism was typical of the army's \"outmoded conception of chivalry.\"\nIn its defence, the SS insisted that its armed formations had been hampered by having to fight piecemeal and were improperly equipped by the army.\nAfter the invasion, Hitler entrusted the SS with extermination actions codenamed\nOperation Tannenberg\nand\nAB-Aktion\nto remove potential leaders who could form a resistance to German occupation. The murders were committed by\nEinsatzgruppen\n(task forces; deployment groups), assisted by local paramilitary groups. Men for the\nEinsatzgruppen\nunits were drawn from the SS, the SD, and the police.\nSeven\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere deployed in Poland, and four were particularly active in carrying out mass killings.\nVictims included\nPolish nationalists\n, Roman Catholic clergy, Jews, members of the nobility and\nintelligentsia\n, as well as activists, scholars, teachers, and former officers. By the end of 1939, SS units aided by ethnic German auxiliaries had murdered approximately 50,000 Poles, including 7,000 Polish Jews, with broader estimates of Polish civilian deaths reaching up to 65,000 during this period.\nEinsatzgruppe\nWoyrsch\nbegan large-scale shootings, especially of Jews, in towns such as\nTarnów\nand\nKatowice\nand\nSosnowiec\nduring the first weeks of September 1939.\nWhen the army leadership registered complaints about the brutality being meted out by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, Heydrich informed them that he was acting \"in accordance with the special order of the\nFührer\n.\"\nMurder of civilians by\nEinsatzgruppen\nin\nKórnik\n, Poland, 1939\nSatisfied with their performance in Poland, Hitler allowed further expansion of the armed SS formations but insisted new units remain under the operational control of the army.\nWhile the\nSS-Leibstandarte\nremained an independent regiment functioning as Hitler's personal bodyguards, the other regiments—\nSS-Deutschland\n,\nSS-Germania,\nand\nSS-Der Führer\n—were combined to form the\nSS-Verfügungs-Division\n.\nA second SS division, the\nSS-Totenkopf\n, was formed from SS-TV concentration camp guards, and a third, the\nSS-Polizei\n, was created from police volunteers.\nThe SS gained control over its own recruitment, logistics, and supply systems for its armed formations at this time.\nThe SS, Gestapo, and SD were in charge of the provisional military administration in Poland until the appointment of\nHans Frank\nas Governor-General on 26 October 1939.\nBattle of France\nHimmler inspecting a\nSturmgeschütz III\nof the\n1st SS Panzer Division\n\"Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler\"\nin\nMetz\n, France, September 1940\nOn 10 May 1940, Hitler launched the\nBattle of France\n, a major offensive against France and the\nLow Countries\n.\nThe SS supplied two of the 89 divisions employed.\nThe LSSAH and elements of the SS-VT participated in the ground invasion\nof the Netherlands\n.\nSimultaneously, airborne troops were dropped to capture key Dutch airfields, bridges, and railways. In the five-day campaign, the LSSAH linked up with army units and airborne troops after several clashes with Dutch defenders.\nSS troops did not take part in the thrust through the\nArdennes\nand the river\nMeuse\n.\nInstead, the\nSS-Totenkopf\nwas summoned from the army reserve to fight in support of\nGeneralmajor\nErwin Rommel\n's\n7th Panzer Division\nas they advanced toward the\nEnglish Channel\n.\nOn 21 May, the British launched an armoured counterattack against the flanks of the 7th Panzer Division and\nSS-Totenkopf\n. The Germans then trapped the British and French troops in a huge pocket at\nDunkirk\n.\nOn 27 May, 4 Company\nSS-Totenkopf\nperpetrated the\nLe Paradis massacre\n, where 97 men of the 2nd Battalion,\nRoyal Norfolk Regiment\nwere machine-gunned after surrendering, with survivors finished off with\nbayonets\n. Two men survived.\nBy 28 May the\nSS-Leibstandarte\nhad taken\nWormhout\n,\n10 miles (16\nkm)\nfrom Dunkirk. There, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion were responsible for the\nWormhoudt massacre\n, where 81 British and French soldiers were murdered after they surrendered.\nAccording to historian Charles Sydnor, the \"fanatical recklessness in the assault, suicidal defence against enemy attacks, and savage atrocities committed in the face of frustrated objectives\" exhibited by the\nSS-Totenkopf\ndivision during the invasion were typical of the SS troops as a whole.\nAt the close of the campaign, Hitler expressed his pleasure with the performance of the\nSS-Leibstandarte\n, telling them: \"Henceforth it will be an honour for you, who bear my name, to lead every German attack.\"\nThe SS-VT was renamed the\nWaffen-SS\nin a speech made by Hitler in July 1940.\nHitler then authorised the enlistment of \"people perceived to be of related stock\", as Himmler put it, to expand the ranks.\nDanes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes, and Finns volunteered to fight in the\nWaffen-SS\nunder the command of German officers.\nThey were brought together to form the new division\nSS-Wiking\n.\nIn January 1941, the\nSS-Verfügungs\nDivision was renamed\nSS-Reich\nDivision (Motorised), and was renamed as the\n2nd SS Panzer Division\n\"Das Reich\"\nwhen it was reorganised as a\nPanzergrenadier\ndivision in 1942.\nCampaign in the Balkans\nIn April 1941, the German Army\ninvaded Yugoslavia\nand\nGreece\n. The LSSAH and\nDas Reich\nwere attached to separate army\nPanzer corps\n.\nFritz Klingenberg\n, a company commander in the\nDas Reich\ndivision, led his men across Yugoslavia to the capital,\nBelgrade\n, where a small group in the vanguard accepted the surrender of the city on 13 April. A few days later Yugoslavia surrendered.\nSS police units immediately began taking hostages and carrying out reprisals, a practice that became common. In some cases, they were joined by the\nWehrmacht\n.\nSimilar to Poland, the war policies of the Nazis in the Balkans resulted in brutal occupation and racist mass murder. Serbia became the second country (after\nEstonia\n) declared\nJudenfrei\n(free of Jews).\nIn Greece, the\nWehrmacht\nand\nWaffen-SS\nencountered resistance from the\nBritish Expeditionary Force\n(BEF) and the\nGreek Army\n.\nThe fighting was intensified by the mountainous terrain, with its heavily defended narrow passes. The LSSAH was at the forefront of the German push.\nThe BEF evacuated by sea to\nCrete\n, but had to flee again in late May when the Germans arrived.\nLike Yugoslavia, the conquest of Greece brought its Jews into danger, as the Nazis immediately took a variety of measures against them.\nInitially confined in ghettos, most were transported to\nAuschwitz concentration camp\nin March 1943, where they were murdered in the\ngas chambers\non arrival. Of Greece's 80,000 Jews, only 20 per cent survived the war.\nWar in the east\nOn 22 June 1941, Hitler launched\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the invasion of the\nSoviet Union\n.\nThe expanding war and the need to control occupied territories provided the conditions for Himmler to further consolidate the police and military organs of the SS.\nRapid acquisition of vast territories in the East placed considerable strain on the SS police organisations as they struggled to adjust to the changing security challenges.\nThe 1st and 2nd SS Infantry Brigades, which had been formed from surplus concentration camp guards of the SS-TV, and the\nSS Cavalry Brigade\nmoved into the Soviet Union behind the advancing armies. At first, they fought\nSoviet partisans\n, but by the autumn of 1941, they left the anti-partisan role to other units and actively took part in the Holocaust. While assisting the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, they formed firing parties that participated in the liquidation of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union.\nOn 31 July 1941, Göring gave Heydrich written authorisation to ensure the cooperation of administrative leaders of various government departments to undertake genocide of the Jews in territories under German control.\nHeydrich was instrumental in carrying out these exterminations, as the Gestapo was ready to organise deportations in the West and his\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere already conducting extensive murder operations in the East.\nOn 20 January 1942, Heydrich chaired a meeting, called the\nWannsee Conference\n, to discuss the implementation of the plan.\nDuring battles in the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942, the\nWaffen-SS\nsuffered enormous casualties. The LSSAH and\nDas Reich\nlost over half their troops to illness and combat casualties.\nIn need of recruits, Himmler began to accept soldiers who did not fit the original SS racial profile.\nIn early 1942,\nSS-Leibstandarte\n,\nSS-Totenkopf\n, and\nSS-Das Reich\nwere withdrawn to the West to refit and were converted to\nPanzergrenadier\ndivisions.\nThe SS-Panzer Corps returned to the Soviet Union in 1943 and participated in the\nThird Battle of Kharkov\nin February and March.\nThe Holocaust\nMurder of Jews by\nEinsatzgruppen\nin\nIvanhorod\n, Ukraine, 1942\nThe SS was built on a culture of violence, which was exhibited in its most extreme form by the mass murder of civilians and prisoners of war on the\nEastern Front\n.\nAugmented by personnel from the Kripo, Orpo (Order Police), and\nWaffen-SS\n,\nthe\nEinsatzgruppen\nreached a total strength of 3,000 men.\nEinsatzgruppen\nA, B, and C were attached to\nArmy Groups North\n,\nCentre\n, and\nSouth\n;\nEinsatzgruppe\nD was assigned to the\n11th Army\n. The\nEinsatzgruppe\nfor Special Purposes operated in eastern Poland starting in July 1941.\nHistorian\nRichard Rhodes\ndescribes them as being \"outside the bounds of morality\"; they were \"judge, jury and executioner all in one\", with the authority to kill anyone at their discretion.\nFollowing Operation Barbarossa, these\nEinsatzgruppen\nunits, together with the\nWaffen-SS\nand Order Police as well as with assistance from the\nWehrmacht\n, engaged in the mass murder of the Jewish population in occupied eastern Poland and the Soviet Union.\nThe greatest extent of\nEinsatzgruppen\naction occurred in 1941 and 1942 in Ukraine and Russia.\nBefore the invasion there were five million registered Jews throughout the Soviet Union, with three million of those residing in the territories occupied by the Germans; by the time the war ended, over two million of these had been murdered.\nThe extermination activities of the\nEinsatzgruppen\ngenerally followed a standard procedure, with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nchief contacting the nearest\nWehrmacht\nunit commander to inform him of the impending action; this was done so they could coordinate and control access to the execution grounds.\nInitially, the victims were shot, but this method proved impracticable for an operation of this scale.\nAlso, after Himmler observed the shooting of 100 Jews at\nMinsk\nin August 1941, he grew concerned about the impact such actions were having on the mental health of his SS men. He decided that alternate methods of murder should be found, which led to the introduction of\ngas vans\n.\nHowever, these were not popular with the men, as they regarded removing the dead bodies from the van and burying them to have been unpleasant. Prisoners or auxiliaries were often assigned to do this task so as to spare the SS men the trauma.\nAnti-partisan operations\nFurther information:\nBandenbekämpfung\nIn response to the army's difficulties in dealing with Soviet partisans, Hitler decided in July 1942 to transfer anti-partisan operations to the police. This placed the matter under Himmler's purview.\nAs Hitler had ordered on 8 July 1941 that all Jews were to be regarded as partisans, the term \"anti-partisan operations\" was used as a euphemism for the murder of Jews as well as actual combat against resistance elements.\nIn July 1942 Himmler ordered that the term \"partisan\" should no longer be used; instead resisters to Nazi rule would be described as \"bandits\".\nHimmler set the SS and SD to work on developing additional anti-partisan tactics and launched a\npropaganda\ncampaign.\nSometime in June 1943, Himmler issued the\nBandenbekämpfung\n(bandit fighting) order, simultaneously announcing the existence of the\nBandenkampfverbände\n(bandit fighting formations), with\nSS-Obergruppenführer\nErich von dem Bach-Zelewski\nas its chief. Employing troops primarily from the SS police and\nWaffen-SS\n, the\nBandenkampfverbände\nhad four principal operational components: propaganda, centralised control and coordination of security operations, training of troops, and battle operations.\nOnce the\nWehrmacht\nhad secured territorial objectives, the\nBandenkampfverbände\nfirst secured communications facilities, roads, railways, and waterways. Thereafter, they secured rural communities and economic installations such as factories and administrative buildings. An additional priority was securing agricultural and forestry resources. The SS oversaw the collection of the harvest, which was deemed critical to strategic operations.\nAny Jews in the area were rounded up and killed. Communists and people of Asiatic descent were killed presumptively under the assumption that they were Soviet agents.\nDeath camps\nJews from\nCarpathian Ruthenia\narriving at\nAuschwitz concentration camp\n, 1944\nAfter the start of the war, Himmler intensified the activity of the SS within Germany and in Nazi-occupied Europe. Increasing numbers of Jews and German citizens deemed politically suspect or social outsiders were arrested.\nAs the Nazi regime became more oppressive, the concentration camp system grew in size and lethal operation, and grew in scope as the economic ambitions of the SS intensified.\nIntensification of the killing operations took place in late 1941 when the SS began construction of stationary gassing facilities to replace the use of\nEinsatzgruppen\nfor mass murders.\nVictims at these new\nextermination camps\nwere killed with the use of carbon monoxide gas from automobile engines.\nDuring\nOperation Reinhard\n, run by officers from the\nTotenkopfverbände\n, who were sworn to secrecy, three extermination camps were built in occupied Poland:\nBełżec\n(operational by March 1942),\nSobibór\n(operational by May 1942), and\nTreblinka\n(operational by July 1942),\nwith squads of\nTrawniki men\n(Eastern European collaborators) overseeing hundreds of\nSonderkommando\nprisoners,\nwho were forced to work in the gas chambers and crematoria before being murdered themselves.\nOn Himmler's orders, by early 1942 the concentration camp at Auschwitz was greatly expanded to include the addition of gas chambers, where victims were killed using the pesticide\nZyklon B\n.\nFor administrative reasons, all concentration camp guards and administrative staff became full members of the\nWaffen-SS\nin 1942. The concentration camps were placed under the command of the\nSS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt\n(\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\n; WVHA) under\nOswald Pohl\n.\nRichard Glücks\nserved as the\nInspector of Concentration Camps\n, which in 1942 became office \"D\" under the WVHA.\nExploitation and extermination became a balancing act as the military situation deteriorated. The labour needs of the war economy, especially for skilled workers, meant that some Jews escaped the genocide.\nOn 30 October 1942, due to severe labour shortages in Germany, Himmler ordered that large numbers of able-bodied people in Nazi-occupied Soviet territories be taken prisoner and sent to Germany as\nforced labour\n.\nBy 1944, the SS-TV had been organised into three divisions: staff of the concentration camps in Germany and Austria, in the occupied territories, and of the extermination camps in Poland. By 1944, it became standard practice to rotate SS members in and out of the camps, partly based on manpower needs, but also to provide easier assignments to wounded\nWaffen-SS\nmembers.\nThis rotation of personnel meant that nearly the entire SS knew what was going on inside the concentration camps, making the entire organisation liable for war crimes and\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nBusiness empire\nAt\nMauthausen-Gusen concentration camp\n, inmates were forced to carry heavy granite blocks out of the quarry on the \"Stairs of Death\".\nIn 1934, Himmler founded the first SS business venture,\nNordland-Verlag\n, a publishing house that released propaganda material and SS training manuals. Thereafter, he purchased\nAllach Porcelain\n, which then began to produce SS memorabilia.\nBecause of the labour shortage and a desire for financial gain, the SS started exploiting concentration camp inmates as slave labour.\nMost of the SS businesses lost money until Himmler placed them under the administration of Pohl's\nVerwaltung und Wirtschaftshauptamt Hauptamt\n(Administration and Business office; VuWHA) in 1939.\nEven then, most of the enterprises did not fare well, as SS men were not selected for their business experience, and the workers were starving.\nIn July 1940 Pohl established the\nDeutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe GmbH\n(German Businesses Ltd; DWB), an umbrella corporation under which he took over administration of all SS business concerns.\nEventually, the SS founded nearly 200 holding companies for their businesses.\nIn May 1941 the VuWHA founded the\nDeutsche Ausrüstungswerke\nGmbH (German Equipment Works; DAW), which was created to integrate the SS business enterprises with the burgeoning concentration camp system.\nHimmler subsequently established four major new concentration camps in 1941: Auschwitz,\nGross-Rosen\n,\nNatzweiler-Struthof\n, and\nNeuengamme\n. Each had at least one factory or quarry nearby where the inmates were forced to work.\nHimmler took a particular interest in providing labourers for\nIG Farben\n, which was constructing a synthetic rubber factory at\nAuschwitz III–Monowitz\n.\nThe plant was almost ready to commence production when it was overrun by Soviet troops in 1945.\nThe life expectancy of inmates at Monowitz averaged about three months.\nThis was typical of the camps, as inmates were underfed and lived under disastrously bad living conditions. Their workload was intentionally made impossibly high, under the policy of\nextermination through labour\n.\nIn 1942, Himmler consolidated all of the offices for which Pohl was responsible into one, creating the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office (\nWirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt\n; WVHA).\nThe entire concentration camp system was placed under the authority of the WVHA.\nThe SS owned Sudetenquell GmbH, a mineral water producer in the\nSudetenland\n. By 1944, the SS had purchased 75 per cent of the mineral water producers in Germany and were intending to acquire a monopoly.\nSeveral concentration camps produced building materials such as stone, bricks, and cement for the SS-owned\nDeutsche Erd- und Steinwerke\n(German Earth And Stone Works; DEST).\nIn the occupied Eastern territories, the SS acquired a monopoly in brick production by seizing all 300 extant brickworks.\nThe DWB also founded the\nOst-Deutsche Baustoffwerke\n(East German Building Supply Works; GmbH or ODBS) and\nDeutsche Edelmöbel\nGmbH (German Noble Furniture). These operated in factories the SS had confiscated from Jews and Poles.\nThe SS owned experimental farms, bakeries, meat packing plants, leather works, clothing and uniform factories, and small arms factories.\nUnder the direction of the WVHA, the SS sold camp labour to various factories at a rate of three to six\nReichsmarks\nper prisoner per day.\nThe SS confiscated and sold the property of concentration camp inmates, confiscated their investment portfolios and their cash, and profited from their dead bodies by\nselling their hair to make felt\nand melting down their dental work to obtain gold from the fillings.\nThe total value of assets looted from the victims of Operation Reinhard alone (not including Auschwitz) was listed by\nOdilo Globocnik\nas 178,745,960.59 Reichsmarks. Items seized included\n2,909.68\nkg (6,414.7\nlb)\nof gold worth 843,802.75 RM, as well as\n18,733.69\nkg (41,300.7\nlb)\nof silver,\n1,514\nkg (3,338\nlb)\nof platinum, 249,771.50 American dollars, 130 diamond solitaires, 2,511.87 carats of brilliants, 13,458.62 carats of diamonds, and 114\nkg of pearls.\nAccording to Nazi legislation, Jewish property belonged to the state, but many SS camp commandants and guards stole items such as diamonds or currency for personal gain or took seized foodstuffs and alcohol to sell on the black market.\nMilitary reversals\nOn 5 July 1943, the Germans launched the\nBattle of Kursk\n, an offensive designed to eliminate the\nKursk\nsalient.\nThree SS armored divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps (\n1. SS \"LSSAH\"\n,\n2. SS \"Das Reich\"\nand\n3. SS \"Totenkopf\n\") participated alongside Wehrmacht Panzer divisions.\nDue to stiff Soviet resistance, Hitler halted the attack by the evening of 12 July. On 17 July he called off the operation and ordered a withdrawal.\nThereafter, the Germans were forced onto the defensive as the\nRed Army\nbegan the liberation of Western Russia.\nThe losses incurred by the\nWaffen-SS\nand the\nWehrmacht\nduring the Battle of Kursk occurred nearly simultaneously with the\nAllied assault into Italy\n, opening a two-front war for Germany.\nNormandy landings\nTroops of the\nIndian Legion\nof the\nWaffen-SS\nguarding the\nAtlantic Wall\nin\nBordeaux\n, France, 21 March 1944\nAlarmed by the raids on\nSt Nazaire\nand\nDieppe\nin 1942, Hitler had ordered the construction of fortifications he called the\nAtlantic Wall\nall along the Atlantic coast, from Spain to Norway, to protect against an expected Allied invasion.\nConcrete gun emplacements were constructed at strategic points along the coast, and wooden stakes, metal tripods, mines, and large anti-tank obstacles were placed on the beaches to delay the approach of landing craft and impede the movement of tanks.\nIn addition to several static infantry divisions, eleven panzer and\nPanzergrenadier\ndivisions were deployed nearby.\nFour of these formations were\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions.\nIn addition, the\nSS-Das Reich\nwas located in\nSouthern France\n, the LSSAH was in Belgium refitting after fighting in the Soviet Union, and the newly formed panzer division\nSS-Hitlerjugend\n, consisting of 17- and 18-year-old\nHitler Youth\nmembers supported by combat veterans and experienced\nNCOs\n, was stationed west of Paris.\nThe creation of the\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nwas a sign of Hitler's desperation for more troops, especially ones with unquestioning obedience.\nThe\nNormandy landings\ntook place beginning on 6 June 1944. The\n21st Panzer Division\nunder\nGeneralmajor\nEdgar Feuchtinger\n, positioned south of\nCaen\n, was the only panzer division close to the beaches. The division included 146 tanks and 50\nassault guns\n, plus supporting infantry and artillery.\nAt 02:00,\nGeneralleutnant\nWilhelm Richter, commander of the\n716th Static Infantry Division\n, ordered the 21st Panzer Division into position to counter-attack. However, as the division was part of the armoured reserve, Feuchtinger was obliged to seek clearance from\nOKW\nbefore he could commit his formation.\nFeuchtinger did not receive orders until nearly 09:00, but in the meantime, on his own initiative he put together a battle group (including tanks) to fight the British forces east of the\nOrne\n.\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nbegan to deploy in the afternoon of 6 June, with its units undertaking defensive actions the following day. They also took part in the\nBattle for Caen\n(June–August 1944).\nOn 7–8 and 17 June, members of the\nSS-Hitlerjugend\nshot and killed twenty Canadian prisoners of war in the\nArdenne Abbey massacre\n.\nThe Allies continued to make progress in the liberation of France, and on 4 August Hitler ordered a counter-offensive (\nOperation Lüttich\n) from\nVire\ntowards\nAvranches\n.\nThe operation included LSSAH,\nDas Reich\n,\n2nd\n, and\n116th Panzer Divisions\n, with support from infantry and elements of the\n17th SS Panzergrenadier Division\n\"Götz von Berlichingen\"\nunder\nSS-Oberstgruppenführer\nPaul Hausser\n. These forces were to mount an offensive near\nMortain\nand drive west through Avranches to the coast. The Allied forces were prepared for this offensive, and an air assault on the combined German units proved devastating.\nOn 21 August, 50,000 German troops, including most of the LSSAH, were encircled by the Allies in the\nFalaise Pocket\n.\nRemnants of the LSSAH which escaped were withdrawn to Germany for refitting.\nParis was liberated\non 25 August, and the last of the German forces withdrew over the\nSeine\nby the end of August, ending the Normandy campaign.\nBattle for Germany\nGerman infantry travelling on foot in the Ardennes, December 1944\nWaffen-SS\nunits that had survived the summer campaigns were withdrawn from the front line to refit. Two of them, the\n9th SS\nand\n10th SS Panzer Divisions\n, did so in the\nArnhem\nregion of Holland in early September 1944. Coincidentally, on 17 September, the Allies launched in the same area\nOperation Market Garden\n, a combined airborne and land operation designed to seize control of the lower\nRhine\n.\nThe 9th and 10th Panzers were among the units that repulsed the attack.\nIn December 1944, Hitler launched the Ardennes Offensive, also known as the\nBattle of the Bulge\n, a significant counterattack against the western Allies through the Ardennes with the aim of reaching\nAntwerp\nwhile encircling the Allied armies in the area.\nThe offensive began with an artillery barrage shortly before dawn on 16 December. Spearheading the attack were two panzer armies composed largely of\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions.\nThe battlegroups found advancing through the forests and wooded hills of the Ardennes difficult in the winter weather, but they initially made good progress in the northern sector. They soon encountered strong resistance from the US\n2nd\nand\n99th Infantry Divisions\n. By 23 December, the weather improved enough for Allied air forces to attack the German forces and their supply columns, causing fuel shortages. In increasingly difficult conditions, the German advance slowed and was stopped.\nHitler's failed offensive cost 700 tanks and most of their remaining mobile forces in the west,\nas well as most of their irreplaceable reserves of manpower and materiel.\nDuring the battle, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nJoachim Peiper\nleft a path of destruction, which included\nWaffen-SS\nsoldiers under his command murdering American\nPOWs\nand unarmed Belgian civilians in the\nMalmedy massacre\n.\nCaptured SS soldiers who were part of\nKampfgruppe Peiper\nwere tried during the\nMalmedy massacre trial\nfollowing the war for this massacre and several others in the area. Many of the perpetrators were sentenced to hang, but the sentences were commuted. Peiper was imprisoned for eleven years for his role in the murders.\nAmerican POWs murdered by SS forces led by\nJoachim Peiper\nin the\nMalmedy massacre\nduring the\nBattle of the Bulge\n, December 1944\nIn the east, the Red Army resumed its offensive on 12 January 1945. German forces were outnumbered twenty to one in aircraft, eleven to one in infantry, and seven to one in tanks on the Eastern Front.\nBy the end of the month, the Red Army had made bridgeheads across the\nOder\n, the last geographic obstacle before Berlin.\nThe western Allies continued to advance as well, but not as rapidly as the Red Army.\nThe Panzer Corps conducted a successful defensive operation on 17–24 February at the\nHron\nRiver, stalling the Allied advance towards Vienna.\nThe\n1st\nand\n2nd SS Panzer Corps\nmade their way towards Austria but were slowed by damaged railways.\nBudapest fell on 13 February.\nHitler ordered Dietrich's\n6th Panzer Army\nto move into Hungary to protect the\nNagykanizsa\noilfields and refineries, which he deemed the most strategically valuable fuel reserves on the Eastern Front.\nFrühlingserwachsen\n(\nOperation Spring Awakening\n), the final German offensive in the east, took place in early March. German forces attacked near Lake Balaton, with 6th Panzer Army advancing north towards Budapest and 2nd Panzer Army moving east and south.\nDietrich's forces at first made good progress, but as they drew near the Danube, the combination of muddy terrain and strong Soviet resistance brought them to a halt.\nBy 16 March, the battle was lost.\nEnraged by the defeat, Hitler ordered the\nWaffen-SS\nunits involved to remove their\ncuff titles\nas a mark of disgrace. Dietrich refused to carry out the order.\nBy this time, on both the Eastern and Western Front, the activities of the SS were becoming clear to the Allies, as the concentration and extermination camps were being overrun.\nAllied troops were filled with disbelief and repugnance at the evidence of Nazi brutality in the camps.\nOn 9 April 1945,\nKönigsberg\nfell to the Red Army, and on 13 April Dietrich's SS unit was forced out of Vienna.\nThe\nBattle of Berlin\nbegan at 03:30 on 16 April with a massive artillery barrage.\nWithin the week, fighting was taking place inside the city. Among the many elements defending Berlin were French, Latvian, and Scandinavian\nWaffen-SS\ntroops.\nHitler, now residing in the\nFührerbunker\nunder the Reich Chancellery, continued to hope that his remaining SS soldiers could rescue the capital. In spite of the hopelessness of the situation, members of the SS patrolling the city continued to shoot or hang soldiers and civilians for what they considered to be acts of cowardice or defeatism.\nThe Berlin garrison surrendered on 2 May, two days after\nHitler committed suicide\n.\nAs members of SS expected little mercy from the Red Army, they attempted to move westward to surrender to the western Allies instead.\nSS units and branches\nMain article:\nUnits and commands of the Schutzstaffel\nReich Security Main Office\nHeydrich held the title of\nChef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n(Chief of the Security Police and SD) until 27 September 1939, when he became chief of the newly established Reich Security Main Office (RSHA).\nFrom that point forward, the RSHA was in charge of SS security services. It had under its command the SD, Kripo, and Gestapo, as well as several offices to handle finance, administration, and supply.\nHeinrich Müller\n, who had been chief of operations for the Gestapo, was appointed Gestapo chief at this time.\nArthur Nebe\nwas chief of the Kripo, and the two branches of SD were commanded by a series of SS officers, including\nOtto Ohlendorf\nand\nWalter Schellenberg\n. The SD was considered an elite branch of the SS, and its members were better educated and typically more ambitious than those within the ranks of the\nAllgemeine SS\n.\nMembers of the SD were specially trained in criminology, intelligence, and counterintelligence. They also gained a reputation for ruthlessness and unwavering commitment to Nazi ideology.\nHeydrich was attacked in Prague on 27 May 1942 by a British-trained team of Czech and Slovak soldiers who had been sent by the\nCzechoslovak government-in-exile\nto assassinate him in\nOperation Anthropoid\n. He died from his injuries a week later.\nHimmler ran the RSHA personally until 30 January 1943, when Heydrich's positions were taken over by Kaltenbrunner.\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nThis section is about the units within the SS. For the Jewish inmates of death camps who were forced to assist in camp operations, see\nSonderkommandos\n.\nBeginning in 1938 and throughout World War II, the SS enacted a procedure where offices and units of the SS could form smaller sub-units, known as\nSS-Sonderkommandos\n, to carry out special tasks, including large-scale murder operations. The use of\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nwas widespread. According to former SS-\nSturmbannführer\nWilhelm Höttl\n, not even the SS leadership knew how many\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nwere constantly being formed, disbanded, and reformed for various tasks, especially on the Eastern Front.\nAn\nSS-Sonderkommando\nunit led by SS-\nSturmbannführer\nHerbert Lange\nmurdered 1,201 psychiatric patients at the\nTiegenhof\npsychiatric hospital in the\nFree City of Danzig\n,\n1,100 patients in\nOwińska\n, 2,750 patients at\nKościan\n, and 1,558 patients at\nDziałdowo\n, as well as hundreds of Poles at\nFort VII\n, where the mobile gas van and gassing bunker were developed.\nIn 1941–42,\nSS-Sonderkommando Lange\nset up and managed the first extermination camp, at\nChełmno\n, where 152,000 Jews were killed using gas vans.\nAfter the\nBattle of Stalingrad\nended in February 1943, Himmler realised that Germany would likely lose the war and ordered the formation of\nSonderkommando\n1005\n, a special task force under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n. The unit's assignment was to visit mass graves on the Eastern Front to exhume bodies and burn them in an attempt to cover up the genocide. The task remained unfinished at the end of the war, and many mass graves remain unmarked and unexcavated.\nThe\nEichmann Sonderkommando\nwas a task force headed by\nAdolf Eichmann\nthat arrived in Budapest on 19 March 1944, the same day that\nAxis forces invaded Hungary\n. Their task was to take a direct role in the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. The\nSS-Sonderkommandos\nenlisted the aid of antisemitic elements from the Hungarian gendarmerie and pro-German administrators from within the Hungarian Interior Ministry.\nRound-ups began on 16 April, and from 14 May, four trains of 3,000 Jews per day left Hungary and travelled to the camp at Auschwitz II-Birkenau, arriving along a newly built spur line that terminated a few hundred metres from the gas chambers.\nBetween 10 and 25 per cent of the people on each train were chosen as forced labourers; the rest were killed within hours of arrival.\nUnder international pressure, the Hungarian government halted deportations on 6 July 1944, by which time over 437,000 of Hungary's 725,000 Jews had been murdered.\nEinsatzgruppen\nSS murders in\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 1941; a teenage boy is brought to view his dead family before being shot himself\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad its origins in the ad hoc\nEinsatzkommando\nformed by Heydrich following the\nAnschluss\nin Austria in March 1938.\nTwo units of\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere stationed in the Sudetenland in October 1938. When military action turned out not to be necessary because of the\nMunich Agreement\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere assigned to confiscate government papers and police documents. They secured government buildings, questioned senior civil servants, and arrested as many as 10,000 Czech communists and German citizens.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nalso followed\nWehrmacht\ntroops and killed potential partisans.\nSimilar groups were used in 1939 for the\noccupation of Czechoslovakia\n.\nHitler felt that the planned extermination of the Jews was too difficult and important to be entrusted to the military.\nIn 1941 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere sent into the Soviet Union to begin large-scale genocide of Jews, Romani people, and communists.\nHistorian\nRaul Hilberg\nestimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand related agencies murdered more than two million people, including 1.3 million Jews.\nThe largest mass shooting perpetrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwas at\nBabi Yar\noutside\nKiev\n, where 33,771 Jews were massacred in a single operation on 29–30 September 1941.\nIn the\nRumbula massacre\n(November–December 1941), 25,000 victims from the\nRiga ghetto\nwere murdered.\nIn another set of mass shootings (December 1941 – January 1942), the\nEinsatzgruppe\nmassacred over 10,000 Jews at\nDrobytsky Yar\nin\nKharkov\n.\nThe last\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere disbanded in mid-1944 (although some continued to exist on paper until 1945) due to the German retreat on both fronts and the consequent inability to continue extermination activities. Former\nEinsatzgruppen\nmembers were either assigned duties in the\nWaffen-SS\nor concentration camps. Twenty-four\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders were tried for war crimes following the war.\nSS Court Main Office\nThe\nSS Court Main Office\n(\nHauptamt SS-Gericht\n) was an internal legal system for conducting investigations, trials, and punishment of the SS and police. It had more than 600 lawyers on staff in the main offices in Berlin and Munich. Proceedings were conducted at 38 regional SS courts throughout Germany. It was the only authority authorised to try SS personnel, except for SS members who were on active duty in the\nWehrmacht\n(in such cases, the SS member in question was tried by a standard military tribunal). Its creation placed the SS beyond the reach of civilian legal authority. Himmler personally intervened as he saw fit regarding convictions and punishment.\nHistorian\nKarl Dietrich Bracher\ndescribes this court system as one factor in the creation of the Nazi totalitarian police state, as it removed objective legal procedures, rendering citizens defenceless against the \"summary justice of the SS terror.\"\nSS Cavalry\nShortly after Hitler seized power in 1933, most horse riding associations were taken over by the SA and SS.\nMembers received combat training to serve in the\nReiter-SS\n(SS Cavalry Corps).\nThe first SS cavalry regiment, designated\nSS-Totenkopf Reitstandarte 1\n, was formed in September 1939. Commanded by then SS-\nStandartenführer\nHermann Fegelein\n, the unit was assigned to Poland, where they took part in the extermination of Polish intelligentsia.\nAdditional squadrons were added in May 1940, for a total of fourteen.\nThe unit was split into two regiments in December 1939, with Fegelein in charge of both. By March 1941 their strength was 3,500 men.\nIn July 1941, they were assigned to the\nPripyat Marshes massacres\n, tasked with rounding up and exterminating Jews and partisans in the\nPripyat swamps\n.\nThe two regiments were amalgamated into the\nSS Cavalry Brigade\non 31 July, twelve days after the operation started.\nFegelein's final report, dated 18 September 1941, states that they killed 14,178 Jews, 1,001 partisans, and 699 Red Army soldiers, with 830 prisoners taken.\nHistorian Henning Pieper estimates the actual number of Jews killed was closer to 23,700.\nThe SS Cavalry Brigade took serious losses in November 1941 in the\nBattle of Moscow\n, with casualties of up to 60 per cent in some squadrons.\nFegelein was appointed as commander of the\n8th SS Cavalry Division\n\"Florian Geyer\"\non 20 April 1943. This unit saw service in the Soviet Union in attacks on partisans and civilians.\nIn addition, SS Cavalry regiments served in Croatia and Hungary.\nSS Medical Corps\nHungarian Jews\non the\nJudenrampe\n(Jewish ramp) after disembarking from the\ntransport trains\n. Photo from the\nAuschwitz Album\n, May 1944\nMain article:\nSS Medical Corps\nThe SS Medical Corps were initially known as the\nSanitätsstaffel\n(sanitary units). After 1931, the SS formed the headquarters office\nAmt\nV as the central office for SS medical units. An SS medical academy was established in Berlin in 1938 to train\nWaffen-SS\nphysicians.\nSS medical personnel did not often provide actual medical care; their primary responsibility was medicalised genocide.\nAt Auschwitz, about three quarters of new arrivals, including almost all children, women with small children, all the elderly, and all those who appeared on brief and superficial inspection by an SS doctor not to be completely fit were killed within hours of arrival.\nIn their role as\nDesinfektoren\n(disinfectors), SS doctors also made selections among existing prisoners as to their fitness to work and supervised the murder of those deemed unfit. Inmates in deteriorating health were examined by SS doctors, who decided whether or not they would be able to recover in less than two weeks. Those too ill or injured to recover in that time frame were killed.\nAt Auschwitz, the actual delivery of gas to the victims was always handled by the SS, on the order of the supervising SS doctor.\nMany of the SS doctors also conducted inhumane medical experiments on camp prisoners.\nThe most well-known SS doctor,\nJosef Mengele\n, served as a medical officer at Auschwitz under the command of\nEduard Wirths\nof the camp's medical corps.\nMengele undertook selections even when he was not assigned to do so in the hope of finding subjects for his experiments.\nHe was particularly interested in locating sets of twins.\nIn contrast to most of the doctors, who viewed undertaking selections as one of their most stressful and horrible duties, Mengele undertook the task with a flamboyant air, often smiling or whistling a tune.\nAfter the war, many SS doctors were charged with war crimes for their medical experiments and for their role in gas chamber selections.\nOther SS units\nAhnenerbe\nThe\nAhnenerbe\n(Ancestral Heritage Organisation) was founded in 1935 by Himmler and became part of the SS in 1939.\nIt was an umbrella agency for more than fifty organisations tasked with studying German racial identity and ancient Germanic traditions and language.\nThe agency sponsored archaeological expeditions in Germany, Scandinavia, the Middle East, Tibet, and elsewhere to search for evidence of Aryan roots, influence, and superiority.\nFurther planned expeditions were postponed indefinitely at the start of the war.\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\nThe\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\n(\nlit.\n'\nSS Women’s Auxiliary Corps\n'\n) were female auxiliary members of the\nWaffen-SS\n.\nThe organization was created to free men for combat by assigning women to non-combat support roles such as administration, communications, and logistics.\nEstablished in 1942 under the direction of\nErnst Sachs\n, it was Himmler's intention to create a \"sister organisation to the Schutzstaffel\".\nAround 10,000 women served in the\nSS-Helferinnenkorps\n, in addition to 15,000 police auxiliaries. They were present in diverse areas, from the offices of the\nReich Security Main Office\nin Berlin to the\nconcentration camps\n.\nIn 1942, Himmler set up the\nReichsschule für SS Helferinnen\n(Reich School for SS Helpers) in\nOberehnheim\nto train women in communications, again to free up men for combat roles. Himmler intended to replace all female civilian employees in his service with\nSS-Helferinnen\nmembers, as they were selected and trained according to Nazi ideology.\nThe school was closed on 22 November 1944 due to the Allied advance.\nSS-Gefolge\nMain article:\nFemale guards in Nazi concentration camps\nThe\nSS-Gefolge\n(\nlit.\n'\nSS entourage\n'\n) served as civilian employees without formal SS membership or combat training. They were affiliated with the\nWaffen-SS\n. Their roles were primarily administrative, working as guards and auxiliaries in concentration camps, with 3,517 female guards (comprising 10% of the total in January 1945), including around 200 at Auschwitz. Often trained at\nRavensbrück\n, they took loyalty oaths and enforced camp policies tied to\nThe Holocaust\n,\nsterilization\n, and\neuthanasia\n, and supervised prisoners, aiding\nNazi racial policies\n.\nForeign legions and volunteers\nSee also:\nWaffen-SS foreign volunteers and conscripts\nGrand Mufti of Jerusalem\nAmin al-Husseini\ngreeting Bosnian\nWaffen-SS\nvolunteers before their departure to the Eastern Front, 1943\nBeginning in 1940, Himmler opened up\nWaffen-SS\nrecruiting to ethnic Germans that were not German citizens.\nIn March 1941, the SS Main Office established the\nGermanische Leitstelle\n(Germanic Guidance Office) to establish\nWaffen-SS\nrecruiting offices in Nazi-occupied Europe.\nThe majority of the resulting foreign\nWaffen-SS\nunits wore a distinctive national collar patch and preceded their SS rank titles with the prefix\nWaffen\ninstead of SS. Volunteers from Scandinavian countries filled the ranks of two divisions, the\nSS-Wiking\nand\nSS-Nordland\n.\nSwiss German speakers joined in substantial numbers.\nBelgian Flemings joined Dutchmen to form the\nSS-Nederland\nlegion,\nand their Walloon compatriots joined the\nSS-Wallonien\n.\nBy the end of 1943 about a quarter of the SS were ethnic Germans from across Europe,\nand by June 1944, half the\nWaffen-SS\nwere foreign nationals.\nAdditional\nWaffen-SS\nunits were added from the\nUkrainians\n,\nAlbanians\nfrom\nKosovo\n, Serbians, Croatians, Turkic, Caucasians, Cossack, and Tatars. The Ukrainians and Tatars, who had suffered persecution under\nJoseph Stalin\n, were likely motivated primarily by opposition to the Soviet government rather than ideological agreement with the SS.\nThe exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem\nAmin al-Husseini\nwas made an SS-\nGruppenführer\nby Himmler in May 1943.\nHe subsequently used antisemitism and anti-Serb racism to recruit a\nWaffen-SS\ndivision of\nBosnian Muslims\n, the\nSS-Handschar\n.\nThe year-long Soviet\noccupation of the Baltic states\nat the beginning of World War II resulted in volunteers for\nLatvian\nand\nEstonian\nWaffen-SS\nunits. The\nEstonian Legion\nhad 1,280 volunteers under training by the end of 1942.\nApproximately 25,000 men served in the Estonian SS division, with thousands more conscripted into Police Front battalions and border guard units.\nMost of the Estonians were fighting primarily to regain their independence and as many as 15,000 of them died fighting alongside the Germans.\nIn early 1944, Himmler even contacted Pohl to suggest releasing Muslim prisoners from concentration camps to supplement his SS troops.\nThe\nIndian Legion\nwas a\nWehrmacht\nunit formed in August 1942 chiefly from disaffected Indian soldiers of the\nBritish Indian Army\ncaptured in the\nNorth African Campaign\n. In August 1944 it was transferred to the auspices of the\nWaffen-SS\nas the\nIndische Freiwilligen-Legion der Waffen-SS\n.\nThere was also a French volunteer division,\nSS-Charlemagne\n, which was formed in 1944 mainly from the remnants of the\nLegion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism\nand French\nSturmbrigade\n.\nRanks and uniforms\nMain article:\nUniforms and insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nSee also:\nRunic insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nThe SS established its own symbolism, rituals, customs, ranks, and uniforms to set itself apart from other organisations. Before 1929, the SS wore the same brown uniform as the SA, with the addition of a black tie and a black cap with a\nTotenkopf\n(death's head) skull and bones symbol, moving to an all-black uniform in 1932.\nIn 1935, the SS combat formations adopted a service uniform in field grey for everyday wear. The SS also developed its own field uniforms, which included reversible smocks and helmet covers printed with\ncamouflage\npatterns.\nUniforms were manufactured in hundreds of licensed factories, with some workers being prisoners of war performing forced labour. Many were produced in concentration camps.\nHitler and the Nazi Party understood the power of emblems and insignia to influence public opinion.\nThe stylised lightning bolt logo of the SS was chosen in 1932. The logo is a pair of runes from a set of 18\nArmanen runes\ncreated by\nGuido von List\nin 1906. It is similar to the ancient\nSowilō\nrune, which symbolises the sun, but was renamed as \"Sig\" (victory) in List's iconography.\nThe\nTotenkopf\nsymbolised the wearer's willingness to fight unto the death, and also served to frighten the enemy.\nSS membership estimates 1925–1945\nAfter 1933 a career in the SS became increasingly attractive to Germany's social elite, who began joining the movement in great numbers, usually motivated by political opportunism. By 1938 about one-third of the SS leadership were members of the\nupper middle class\n. The trend reversed after the first Soviet counter-offensive of 1942.\nSS offices\nBy 1942 all activities of the SS were managed through twelve main offices.\nPersonal Staff\nReichsführer-SS\nKommandostab Reichsführer-SS\n(Command Staff\nReichsführer-SS\n)\nSS Main Office\n(SS-HA)\nSS-Führungshauptamt\n(SS Main Operational Office; SS-FHA)\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA)\nSS Main Economic and Administrative Office\n(WVHA)\nOrdnungspolizei Hauptamt\n(Main Office of the Order Police)\nSS Court Main Office\nSS Race and Settlement Main Office\n(RuSHA)\nSS Personnel Main Office\nHauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle\n(Racial German Assistance Main Office; VOMI)\nSS Education Office\nMain Office of the\nReich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood\n(RKFDV)\nAustrian SS\nMain article:\nAustrian SS\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, Himmler,\nAugust Eigruber\n, and other SS officials visiting Mauthausen concentration camp, 1941\nThe term \"Austrian SS\" is often used to describe that portion of the SS membership from Austria, but it was never a recognised branch of the SS. In contrast to SS members from other countries, who were grouped into either the Germanic-SS or the Foreign Legions of the\nWaffen-SS\n, Austrian SS members were regular SS personnel. It was technically under the command of the SS in Germany but often acted independently concerning Austrian affairs. The Austrian SS was founded in 1930 and by 1934 was acting as a covert force to bring about the\nAnschluss\nwith Germany, which occurred in March 1938. Early Austrian SS leaders were Kaltenbrunner and\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\n.\nAustrian SS members served in every branch of the SS. Austrians constituted 8 per cent of Nazi Germany's population and 13 per cent of the SS; 40 per cent of the staff and 75 per cent of commanders at death camps were Austrian.\nAfter the\nAnschluss\n, the Austrian SS was folded into\nSS-Oberabschnitt Donau\n. The third regiment of the\nSS-Verfügungstruppe\n(\nDer Führer\n) and the fourth\nTotenkopf\nregiment (\nOstmark\n) were recruited in Austria shortly thereafter. On Heydrich's orders, mass arrests of potential enemies of the Reich began immediately after the\nAnschluss\n.\nMauthausen\nwas the first concentration camp opened in Austria following the\nAnschluss\n.\nBefore the invasion of the Soviet Union, Mauthausen was the harshest of the camps in the Greater German Reich.\nThe\nHotel Metropole\nwas transformed into the headquarters for the Gestapo in Vienna in April 1938. With a staff of 900 (80 per cent of whom were recruited from the Austrian police), it was the largest Gestapo office outside Berlin. An estimated 50,000 people were interrogated or tortured there.\nThe Gestapo in Vienna was headed by\nFranz Josef Huber\n, who also served as chief of the\nCentral Agency for Jewish Emigration in Vienna\n. Although its de facto leaders were Adolf Eichmann and later\nAlois Brunner\n, Huber was nevertheless responsible for the mass deportation of Austrian Jews.\nPost-war activity and aftermath\nFollowing Nazi Germany's collapse, the SS ceased to exist.\nNumerous members of the SS, many of them still committed Nazis, remained at large in Germany and across Europe.\nOn 21 May 1945, the British captured Himmler, who was in disguise and carrying a fraudulent passport. At an internment camp near\nLüneburg\n, he committed suicide by biting down on a cyanide capsule.\nSeveral other leading members of the SS fled, but some were quickly captured.\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, chief of the RSHA and the highest-ranking surviving SS main department chief upon Himmler's suicide, was captured and arrested in the\nBavarian Alps\n.\nHe was among the 22 defendants put on trial at the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nin 1945–46.\nSome SS members were subject to\nsummary execution\n, torture, and beatings at the hands of freed prisoners, displaced persons, or Allied soldiers.\nAmerican soldiers of the 157th Regiment, who entered the concentration camp at Dachau in April 1945 and viewed the acts committed by the SS,\nshot some of the remaining SS camp guards\n.\nOn 15 April 1945, British troops entered Bergen-Belsen. They placed the SS guards on starvation rations, made them work without breaks, forced them to deal with the remaining corpses, and stabbed them with bayonets or struck them with their rifle butts if they slowed their pace.\nSome members of the\nUS Army Counter Intelligence Corps\ndelivered captured SS camp guards to\ndisplaced person camps\n, where they knew they would be subject to summary execution.\nInternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg\nMain article:\nNuremberg trials\nThe body of Ernst Kaltenbrunner after his execution on 16 October 1946\nThe Allies commenced legal proceedings against captured Nazis, establishing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945.\nThe first\nwar crimes\ntrial of 24 prominent figures such as Göring,\nAlbert Speer\n,\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n,\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, Hans Frank, and Kaltenbrunner took place beginning in November 1945. They were accused of four counts: conspiracy, waging a war of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in violation of international law.\nTwelve received the death penalty, including Kaltenbrunner, who was convicted of crimes against humanity and executed on 16 October 1946.\nThe former commandant at Auschwitz,\nRudolf Höss\n, who testified on behalf of Kaltenbrunner and others, was tried and executed in 1947.\nAdditional SS trials and convictions followed.\nMany defendants attempted to exculpate themselves using the excuse that they were merely following\nsuperior orders\n, which they had to obey unconditionally as part of their\nsworn oath\nand duty. The courts did not find this to be a legitimate defence.\nA trial of 40 SS officers and guards from Auschwitz took place in Kraków in November 1947. Most were found guilty, and 23 received the death penalty.\nThe twelve\nsubsequent Nuremberg trials\ntook place in 1946–1949; also, an estimated 37,000 members of the SS were tried and convicted in Soviet courts. Sentences included hangings and long terms of hard labour.\nPiotr Cywiński\n, director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum, estimates that of the 70,000 members of the SS involved in crimes in concentration camps, only about 1,650 to 1,700 were tried after the war.\nThe International Military Tribunal declared the SS a criminal organisation in 1946.\nEscapes\nSee also:\nRatlines (World War II aftermath)\nRed Cross\npassport under the name of \"Ricardo Klement\" that\nAdolf Eichmann\nused to enter Argentina in 1950\nAfter the war, many former Nazis fled to South America, especially to Argentina, where they were welcomed by\nJuan Perón\n's regime.\nIn the 1950s, former Dachau inmate Lothar Hermann discovered that\nBuenos Aires\nresident Ricardo Klement was, in fact, Adolf Eichmann, who had in 1948 obtained false identification and a landing permit for Argentina through an organisation directed by Bishop\nAlois Hudal\n, an Austrian cleric with Nazi sympathies, then living in Italy.\nEichmann was captured in Buenos Aires on 11 May 1960 by\nMossad\n, the Israeli intelligence agency. At his trial in Jerusalem in 1961, he was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. Eichmann was quoted as having stated, \"I will jump into my grave laughing because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews [or Reich enemies, as he later claimed to have said] on my conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction.\"\nFranz Stangl\n, the commandant of Treblinka, also escaped to South America with the assistance of Hudal's network. He was deported to Germany in 1967 and was sentenced to life in prison in 1970. He died in 1971.\nMengele, worried that his capture would mean a death sentence, fled Germany on 17 April 1949.\nAssisted by a network of former SS members, he travelled to\nGenoa\n, where he obtained a passport under the alias \"Helmut Gregor\" from the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross\n. He sailed to Argentina in July.\nAware that he was still a wanted man, he moved to Paraguay in 1958 and Brazil in 1960. In both instances he was assisted by former\nLuftwaffe\npilot\nHans-Ulrich Rudel\n.\nMengele suffered a stroke while swimming and drowned in 1979.\nThousands of Nazis, including former SS members such as Trawniki guard\nJakob Reimer\nand Circassian collaborator\nTscherim Soobzokov\n, fled to the United States under the guise of refugees, sometimes using forged documents.\nOther SS men, such as Soobzokov, SD officer\nWilhelm Höttl\n, Eichmann aide\nOtto von Bolschwing\n, and accused war criminal\nTheodor Saevecke\n, were employed by American intelligence agencies against the Soviets. As\nCIA\nofficer Harry Rositzke noted, \"It was a visceral business of using any bastard so long as he was anti-Communist.\n... The eagerness or desire to enlist collaborators means that sure, you didn't look at their credentials too closely.\"\nSimilarly, the Soviets used SS personnel after the war; Operation Theo, for instance, disseminated \"subversive rumours\" in Allied-occupied Germany.\nSimon Wiesenthal\nand others have speculated about the existence of a Nazi fugitive network code-named\nODESSA\n(an acronym for\nOrganisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen\n, Organisation of former SS members) that allegedly helped war criminals find refuge in\nLatin America\n.\nBritish writer\nGitta Sereny\n, who conducted interviews with SS men, considers the story untrue and attributes the escapes to postwar chaos and Hudal's Vatican-based network. While the existence of ODESSA remains unproven, Sereny notes that \"there certainly were various kinds of Nazi aid organisations after the war—it would have been astonishing if there hadn't been.\"\nSee also\nGermanic SS\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nHIAG\nList of SS personnel\nList of\nWaffen-SS\ndivisions\nMyth of the clean\nWehrmacht\nInformational notes\n↑\nBuchenwald\n,\nDachau\n,\nFlossenbürg\n,\nMauthausen\n,\nRavensbrück\n, and\nSachsenhausen\n.\n↑\nNot to be confused with\nSS-Sonderkommandos\n, ad hoc SS units that used the same name.\n↑\nIn an act of reprisal, upwards of 10,000 Czechs were arrested; 1,300 were shot, including all male inhabitants from the nearby town of\nLidice\n(where Heydrich's assassins had supposedly been harboured), and the town was razed.\nCitations\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n26.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n137.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nMichael\n&\nDoerr 2002\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n14, 16.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n16.\n1\n2\n3\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n26–29.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n17, 19.\n1\n2\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n604.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n30.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n12.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n45–46.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n1–2.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n113.\n1\n2\nBurleigh\n&\nWippermann 1991\n, pp.\n272–273.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n45–47, 300–305.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n2–3.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n308–314.\n↑\nBaranowski 2010\n, pp.\n196–197.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n901.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n903.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n606.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n146, 147.\n↑\nStackelberg 2002\n, p.\n116.\n1\n2\nJacobsen 1999\n, pp.\n82, 93.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n62–67.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n63–65.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n19.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n148–149.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n65–66.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n150–151.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n608.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n111–113.\n↑\nHimmler 1936\n.\n1\n2\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nHimmler 1936\n, p.\n134.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n60–61.\n1\n2\n3\nRummel 1992\n, pp.\n12–13.\n↑\nRummel 1992\n, p.\n12.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1946\n.\n1\n2\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n1\n2\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n157.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, pp.\n66–71.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n13–14.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n313, 316.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n9, 17, 26–27, 30, 46–47.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nDear\n&\nFoot 1995\n, pp.\n814–815.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n204.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n470.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, pp.\n70–71.\n↑\nRead 2005\n, pp.\n512–514.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n584.\n1\n2\nRead 2005\n, p.\n515.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n590.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n591.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n61–62.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n144, 148, 169, 176–177.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n165.\n↑\nSpielvogel 1992\n, pp.\n102–108.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n8, 9.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n9, 12, 17–19.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n157, 160, 165.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n166.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n181–186.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n17–19.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n157, 160, 165, 166, 181–186.\n↑\nCook\n&\nBender 1994\n, pp.\n19, 33.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n32, 48, 57.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n36–48.\n↑\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n288.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n32.\n1\n2\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nFelton 2014\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, pp.\n36, 48.\n↑\nFelton 2014\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nPadfield 2001\n, pp.\n128–129.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n222.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n63.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n106–108.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n366–367.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n108–109.\n↑\nAyçoberry 1999\n, p.\n273.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n23.\n1\n2\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n156.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n285–287.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n18, 287.\n↑\nMollo 1991\n, pp.\n1–3.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nButler 2001\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n114, 159–161.\n1\n2\n3\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nHein 2015\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nStone 2011\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n144–145.\n1\n2\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n90–92.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n14–15.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n109–111.\n↑\nWestermann 2025\n.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, pp.\n17–18.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, p.\n246.\n↑\nReynolds 1997\n, pp.\n6, 7.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n33–35.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n229.\n↑\nHellwinkel 2014\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n147.\n1\n2\n3\nStein 2002\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nButler 2003\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nManning 1999\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nSydnor 1977\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n251.\n↑\nSydnor 1977\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n143.\n1\n2\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n150, 153.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n213–214.\n↑\nMattson 2002\n, pp.\n77, 104.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n162, 163.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n297.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, pp.\n110–111.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n110.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n163, 165.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n163–166.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n111.\n↑\nFrusetta 2012\n, p.\n266.\n↑\nGlantz 2001\n, pp.\n7–9.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, p.\n409.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nWindrow\n&\nBurn 1992\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nHeer\n&\nNaumann 2000\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n696–697.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n171.\n↑\nReynolds 1997\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n173.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, pp.\n69–70, 94–108.\n↑\nKrausnik 1968\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n159–160.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n164.\n↑\nBessel 2006\n, p.\n119.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n227.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n256–257.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n547.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n199.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n243.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n70–71.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n625.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n198.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n626, 629.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n627.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n71–77.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nBlood 2006\n, pp.\n152–154.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n628–629.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, pp.\n26–27.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n208.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n279–280.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n283.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n283, 287, 290.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n295, 299–300.\n↑\nWachsmann 2010\n, p.\n29.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n559.\n1\n2\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n182–183.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nGruner 2012\n, pp.\n174–175.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n629.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n265.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n258–263.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n114.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n119, 120.\n↑\nMazower 2008\n, pp.\n312–313.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n485.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n482.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n480–481.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n480.\n↑\nSteinbacher 2005\n, p.\n129.\n↑\nSteinbacher 2005\n, p.\n56.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n316.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n484.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n114–115.\n↑\nAllen 2002\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n115–116.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n483.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, p.\n128.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nInternational Military Tribunal 1950\n.\n↑\nBaxter 2014\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n486.\n↑\nForczyk 2017\n, pp.\n13–15.\n↑\nZetterling\n&\nFrankson 2016\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n488–489.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n68, 70.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, p.\n350.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, pp.\n54–56.\n↑\nWhitmarsh 2009\n, pp.\n12, 13.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, pp.\n60, 63, 122, 275.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n219.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n295.\n↑\nRempel 1989\n, p.\n233.\n↑\nWhitmarsh 2009\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nFord\n&\nZaloga 2009\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, p.\n282.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n297.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, pp.\n399–400.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n222–223.\n↑\nWilmot 1997\n, p.\n420.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n1085–1086.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n701.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, pp.\n439–442.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, pp.\n765–766.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, p.\n465.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, pp.\n767–769.\n↑\nWeinberg 1994\n, p.\n769.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n232.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, p.\n468.\n↑\nParker 2012\n, p.\n278.\n↑\nKershaw 2011\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n83.\n1\n2\nDuffy 2002\n, p.\n293.\n↑\nZiemke 1968\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nBeevor 2002\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nSeaton 1971\n, p.\n537.\n↑\nDuffy 2002\n, p.\n294.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n238.\n↑\nZiemke 1968\n, p.\n450.\n↑\nMessenger 2001\n, pp.\n167–168.\n↑\nWachsmann 2015\n, pp.\n542–548.\n↑\nFritz 2004\n, pp.\n50–55.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n237.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2011\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n246.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n328, 330, 338.\n↑\nMoorhouse 2012\n, pp.\n364–365.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, pp.\n248–249.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n21–22.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n494–495.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n495–496.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n661.\n↑\nDiner 2006\n, p.\n123.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nMontague 2012\n, pp.\n188–190.\n↑\nFriedlander 1997\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n220.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n258–260, 262.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n195.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n408.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, pp.\n168, 172.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n173.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, pp.\n160, 183.\n1\n2\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n436.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n405, 412.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n161.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n109.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n15–16.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n257.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n120–123.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, pp.\n210–214.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n274.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n37, 40, 41.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, p.\n214.\n↑\nKrüger\n&\nWedemeyer-Kolwe 2009\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nKrüger\n&\nWedemeyer-Kolwe 2009\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n224–225.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, p.\n38.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n308.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n52–53.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n81–90.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n81–82.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n119–120.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n310.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nPieper 2015\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nStockert 1997\n, p.\n229.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n225–230.\n↑\nProctor 1988\n, p.\n86.\n↑\nLifton 1986\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n235–237.\n↑\nLifton 1986\n, pp.\n148–149.\n↑\nPiper 1994\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nLifton\n&\nHackett 1994\n, p.\n304.\n↑\nYahil 1990\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nYahil 1990\n, p.\n369.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n248–249.\n↑\nPosner\n&\nWare 1986\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPosner\n&\nWare 1986\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nLifton 1985\n.\n↑\nPringle 2006\n, pp.\n294–296.\n1\n2\nSpielvogel 1992\n, p.\n108.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n132–133.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, pp.\n128–131, 139, 142.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nOepen, Rosen\n&\nWunsch 2020\n, p.\n339.\n↑\nMiles\n&\nCross 2008\n, pp.\n163–164.\n↑\nMühlenberg 2011b\n, pp.\n38–44.\n↑\nSchwarz 1997\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nCentury 2011\n.\n↑\nRempel 1989\n, pp.\n223–224.\n↑\nMühlenberg 2011a\n, p.\n27.\n↑\nRuda 2023\n, p.\n389.\n↑\nHayes 1991\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n160.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n212–213.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, pp.\n214–219.\n↑\nGutmann 2017\n, Chapter 3.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n272–273.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n321–323.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n458.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n200–204.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n199.\n↑\nHale 2011\n, pp.\n264–266.\n↑\nBishop 2005\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nBishop 2005\n, pp.\n93–94.\n↑\nMüller 2012\n, p.\n169.\n↑\nMotadel 2014\n, p.\n242.\n↑\nStein 2002\n, p.\n189.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n326–330.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n90.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n88–92.\n↑\nGivhan 1997\n.\n1\n2\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nYenne 2010\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, pp.\n132–134 and note 13.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n26.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n49.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, p.\n133.\n↑\nZiegler 2014\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nSnyder 1994\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nLaqueur\n&\nBaumel 2001\n, p.\n609.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n724.\n↑\nYerger 1997\n, pp.\n13–21.\n↑\nStackelberg 2007\n, p.\n302.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n205–206.\n↑\nArt 2006\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, pp.\n120–121.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n107.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nAnderson 2011\n.\n↑\nMang 2003\n, pp.\n1–5.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n580.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n739–741.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n736.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n410.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, pp.\n803–804.\n↑\nMacDonogh 2009\n, p.\n3.\n↑\nMurray\n&\nMillett 2001\n, pp.\n565–568.\n↑\nLowe 2012\n, pp.\n83–84.\n↑\nLowe 2012\n, pp.\n84–87.\n↑\nBrzezinski 2005\n.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n741.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n741–742.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n743.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n804.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n240–241.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n743–744.\n↑\nBurleigh 2010\n, p.\n549.\n↑\nBosacki, Uhlig\n&\nWróblewski 2008\n.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n906.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n143–144.\n↑\nCesarani 2005\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nArendt 2006\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n746–747.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, p.\n263.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n264–265.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n269, 273.\n↑\nLevy 2006\n, pp.\n294–295.\n↑\nLichtblau 2014\n, pp.\n2–3, 10–11.\n↑\nLichtblau 2014\n, pp.\n29–30, 32–37, 67–68.\n↑\nBiddiscombe 2000\n, pp.\n131–143.\n↑\nSegev 2010\n, pp.\n106–108.\n↑\nSereny 1974\n, p.\n274.\nBibliography\nAllen, Michael Thad (2002).\nThe Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps\n. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-2677-5\n.\nAnderson, Christopher (1 November 2011).\n\"Crossing the Painful Threshold of Memory\"\n.\nVienna Review\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 March 2016\n. Retrieved\n16 March\n2016\n.\nArendt, Hannah\n(2006).\nEichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303988-4\n.\nArt, David (2006).\nThe Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-85683-6\n.\nAyçoberry, Pierre (1999).\nThe Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945\n. New York: The New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-635-7\n.\nBaranowski, Shelley (2010).\nNazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-67408-9\n.\nBaxter, Ian (2014).\nNazi Concentration Camp Commandants 1933–1945: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives\n. Images of War. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78159-388-2\n.\nBeevor, Antony\n(2002).\nThe Fall of Berlin, 1945\n. New York; London: Viking.\nISBN\n978-0-670-03041-5\n.\nBessel, Richard\n(2006).\nNazism and War\n. New York: Modern Library.\nISBN\n978-0-8129-7557-4\n.\nBiddiscombe, Perry (2000). \"The Problem with Glass Houses: The Soviet Recruitment and Deployment of SS Men as Spies and Saboteurs\".\nIntelligence and National Security\n.\n15\n(3):\n131–\n145.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/02684520008432620\n.\nISSN\n0268-4527\n.\nS2CID\n153452361\n.\nBishop, Chris (2005).\nHitler's Foreign Divisions: 1940–45\n. London: Amber.\nISBN\n978-1-904687-37-5\n.\nBlood, Philip W. (2006).\nHitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe\n. Potomac Books.\nISBN\n978-1-59797-021-1\n.\nBosacki, Marcin; Uhlig, Dominik; Wróblewski, Bogdan (21 May 2008).\n\"Nikt nie chce osądzić zbrodniarza\"\n.\nGazecie Wyborczej\n(in Polish). Agora SA. Archived from\nthe original\non 7 September 2009\n. Retrieved\n30 December\n2017\n.\nBracher, Karl Dietrich (1970).\nThe German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism\n. Praeger Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-03-037556-9\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-510479-0\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R.\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8032-1327-2\n.\nBrzezinski, Matthew\n(24 July 2005).\n\"Giving Hitler Hell\"\n.\nThe Washington Post\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS – Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nBurleigh, Michael\n; Wippermann, Wolfgang (1991).\nThe Racial State: Germany 1933–1945\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-39802-2\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2000).\nThe Third Reich: A New History\n. New York: Hill and Wang.\nISBN\n978-0-8090-9325-0\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2010).\nMoral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II\n. New York: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n978-0-06-058097-1\n.\nButler, Rupert\n(2001).\nSS-Leibstandarte: The History of the First SS Division, 1934–45\n. Staplehurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-86227-117-3\n.\nButler, Rupert (2003).\nThe Black Angels\n. Staplehurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-86227-117-3\n.\nCesarani, David\n(2005) .\nEichmann: His Life and Crimes\n. London: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-09-944844-0\n.\nCentury, Rachel (January 2011).\n\"Review of\nDas SS-Helferinnenkorps: Ausbildung, Einsatz und Entnazifizierung der weiblichen Angehörigen der Waffen-SS 1942–1949\n\"\n.\nReviews in History\n. Review no. 1183\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nCook, Stan; Bender, R. James (1994).\nLeibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: Uniforms, Organization, & History\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-0-912138-55-8\n.\nDear, Ian;\nFoot, M.R.D.\n, eds. (1995).\nThe Oxford Guide to World War II\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-534096-9\n.\nDiner, Dan (2006).\nBeyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust\n. Los Angeles; Berkeley: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-520-21345-6\n.\nDuffy, Christopher\n(2002).\nRed Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945\n. Edison, New Jersey: Castle Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7858-1624-9\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFelton, Mark\n(2014).\nGuarding Hitler: The Secret World of the Führer\n. Barnsley: Pen & Sword.\nISBN\n978-1-78159-305-9\n.\nFlaherty, Thomas H., ed. (2004) .\nThe Third Reich: The SS\n. Time-Life.\nISBN\n978-1-84447-073-0\n.\nForczyk, Robert (2017).\nKursk 1943: The Southern Front\n. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-47281-692-4\n.\nFord, Ken; Zaloga, Steven J. (2009).\nOverlord: The D-Day Landings\n. Oxford; New York: Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1-84603-424-4\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-18507-9\n.\nFriedlander, Henry\n(1997).\nThe Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution\n. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-4675-9\n.\nFritz, Stephen (2004).\nEndkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-2325-7\n.\nFritz, Stephen (2011).\nOstkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-3416-1\n.\nFrusetta, James (2012). \"The Final Solution in Southwestern Europe\". In\nFriedman, Jonathan C.\n(ed.).\nThe Routledge History of the Holocaust\n. New York: Taylor & Francis. pp.\n264–\n276.\nISBN\n978-0-415-52087-4\n.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nGivhan, Robin (15 August 1997).\n\"Clothier Made Nazi Uniforms\"\n.\nLos Angeles Times\n. The Washington Post\n. Retrieved\n27 April\n2020\n.\nGlantz, David (11 October 2001),\nThe Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay\n, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs,\nClemson University\n, archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 18 February 2015.\nGruner, Wolf (2012). \"Forced Labor in Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy, 1938–45\". In\nFriedman, Jonathan C.\n(ed.).\nThe Routledge History of the Holocaust\n. New York: Taylor & Francis. pp.\n168–\n180.\nISBN\n978-0-415-52087-4\n.\nGutmann, Martin R. (2017).\nBuilding a Nazi Europe: The SS's Germanic Volunteers\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-107-15543-5\n.\nHale, Christopher\n(2011).\nHitler's Foreign Executioners: Europe's Dirty Secret\n. Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-5974-5\n.\nHayes, Peter (1991).\nLessons and Legacies Virgin Islands: New Currents in Holocaust Research\n. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8101-2001-3\n.\nHeadland, Ronald (1992).\nMessages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941–1943\n. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8386-3418-9\n.\nHeer, Hannes\n; Naumann, Klaus (2000).\nWar of Extermination: The German Military in World War II 1941–1944\n. New York: Berghahn.\nISBN\n978-1-57181-232-2\n.\nHein, Bastian (2015).\nDie SS: Geschichte und Verbrechen\n(in German). Munich: C.H. Beck.\nISBN\n978-3-406-67513-3\n.\nHellwinkel, Lars (2014).\nHitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940–1945\n. Barnsley: Seaforth.\nISBN\n978-1-84832-199-1\n.\nHilberg, Raul\n(1985).\nThe Destruction of the European Jews\n. New York: Holmes & Meier.\nISBN\n978-0-8419-0910-6\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus\n(1984).\nThe Third Reich\n. London; New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-04-943033-4\n.\nHimmler, Heinrich (1936).\nDie Schutzstaffel als antibolschewistische Kampforganisation\n[\nThe SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organization\n]\n(in German). Franz Eher Verlag.\nHoffmann, Peter\n(2000).\nHitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer 1921–1945\n. New York: Da Capo.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80947-7\n.\nHöhne, Heinz\n(2001).\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-139012-3\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-6026-4\n.\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(1946).\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n(PDF)\n. Vol.\n1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. pp.\n70–\n71.\nInternational Military Tribunal (1950).\n\"Report on the Administrative Development of Operation Reinhardt: Document NO-059: Odilo Globocnik, January 1944. Attachment NO-062: Detailed List of Money, Precious Metals, Jewels, Other Valuables, and Textiles\"\n(PDF)\n.\nNuremberg Trials. The Green Series\n. Vol.\n5. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. pp.\n728–\n731.\nOCLC\n315875936\n.\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf (1999). \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1945\". In Christian Leitz (ed.).\nThe Third Reich: The Essential Readings\n. Oxford: Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-20700-9\n.\nJoachimsthaler, Anton\n(1999).\nThe Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, The Evidence, The Truth\n. London: Brockhampton Press.\nISBN\n978-1-86019-902-8\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2001).\nHitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-32252-1\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2011).\nThe End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-314-5\n.\nKoehl, Robert (2004).\nThe SS: A History 1919–45\n. Stroud: Tempus.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-2559-7\n.\nKrausnik, Helmut (1968). \"The Persecution of the Jews\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nKrüger, Arnd\n; Wedemeyer-Kolwe, Bernd (2009).\nVergessen, verdrängt, abgelehnt – Zur Geschichte der Ausgrenzung im Sport\n(in German). Münster: Lit Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-643-10338-3\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLaqueur, Walter\n; Baumel, Judith Tydor (2001).\nThe Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-08432-0\n.\nLevy, Alan\n(2006) .\nNazi Hunter: The Wiesenthal File\n(Revised 2002\ned.). London: Constable & Robinson.\nISBN\n978-1-84119-607-7\n.\nLichtblau, Eric\n(2014).\nThe Nazis Next Door\n. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.\nISBN\n978-0-547-66919-9\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay\n(21 July 1985).\n\"What Made This Man? Mengele\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 28 September 2013\n. Retrieved\n11 January\n2014\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay\n(1986).\nThe Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04905-9\n.\nLifton, Robert Jay; Hackett, Amy (1994).\n\"The Auschwitz Prisoner Administration\"\n. In Gutman, Yisrael; Berenbaum, Michael (eds.).\nAnatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp\n. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. pp.\n363–378\n.\nISBN\n978-0-253-32684-3\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nLowe, Keith (2012).\nSavage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II\n. New York: Picador.\nISBN\n978-1-250-03356-7\n.\nMacDonogh, Giles\n(2009).\nAfter the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00337-2\n.\nMang, Thomas (2003).\n\"Gestapo-Leitstelle Wien – \"Mein Name ist Huber\"\n\"\n[\nHead Gestapo Agency of Vienna: \"My name is Huber\"\n]\n(PDF)\n.\nDöw Mitteilungen\n(in German).\n164\n:\n1–\n5.\nManning, Jeanne (1999).\nA Time to Speak\n. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner.\nISBN\n978-1-56311-560-8\n.\nMattson, Gregory L. (2002).\nSS-Das Reich: The History of the Second SS Division, 1944–45\n. Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-0-7603-1255-1\n.\nMazower, Mark\n(2008).\nHitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-1-59420-188-2\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. London: Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1-78200-088-4\n.\nMessenger, Charles (2001).\nHitler's Gladiator: The Life and Military Career of Sepp Dietrich\n. London: Brassey's.\nISBN\n978-1-57488-315-2\n.\nMichael, Robert; Doerr, Karin (2002).\nNazi-Deutsch/Nazi-German: An English Lexicon of the Language of the Third Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.\nISBN\n978-0313321061\n.\nMiles, Rosalind; Cross, Robin (26 February 2008).\nHell Hath No Fury: True Stories of Women at War from Antiquity to Iraq\n. New York: Crown.\nISBN\n978-0-307-40994-2\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMiller, Michael; Schulz, Andreas (2012).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders Of The Nazi Party And Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. San Jose, California: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-21-0\n.\nMollo, Andrew\n(1991).\nUniforms of the SS: Volume 3: SS-Verfügungstruppe\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-872004-51-8\n.\nMoorhouse, Roger\n(2012).\nBerlin at War\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-02855-9\n.\nMontague, Patrick (2012).\nChelmno and the Holocaust: The History of Hitler's First Death Camp\n. London: I.B. Tauris. pp.\n188–\n190.\nISBN\n978-1-84885-722-3\n.\nMotadel, David (2014).\nIslam and Nazi Germany's War\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-72460-0\n.\nMühlenberg, Jutta (2011a).\nDas SS-Helferinnenkorps: Ausbildung, Einsatz und Entnazifizierung der weiblichen Angehörigen der Waffen-SS, 1942–1949\n(PDF)\n(in German). Hamburg: VerlagsgesmbH.\nISBN\n978-3-86854-500-5\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 4 March 2016\n. Retrieved\n12 October\n2014\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nMühlenberg, Jutta (2011b). \"Die Entnazifizierung ehemaliger SS-Helferinnen in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone\n: Verfahrensweisen, Entlastungsstrategien und Lügengeschichten\".\nAriadne: Forum für Frauen- und Geschlechtergeschichte\n(in German) (59):\n38–\n44.\ndoi\n:\n10.25595/1574\n.\nMüller, Rolf-Dieter (2012).\nThe Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers\n. New York: I.B. Taurus.\nISBN\n978-1-78076-072-8\n.\nMurray, Williamson\n;\nMillett, Allan R.\n(2001).\nA War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War\n. Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-00680-5\n.\nOepen, Joachim; Rosen, Wolfgang; Wunsch, Stefan, eds. (2020).\nGeschichte in Köln 67 (2020): Zeitschrift für Stadt- und Regionalgeschichte\n(in German). Böhlau Köln.\nISBN\n978-3-412-52004-5\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n(2001) .\nHimmler: Reichsführer-SS\n. London: Cassel & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-304-35839-7\n.\nParker, Danny S. (2012).\nFatal Crossroads: The Untold Story of the Malmédy Massacre at the Battle of the Bulge\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo.\nISBN\n978-0-306-81193-7\n.\nPieper, Henning (2015).\nFegelein's Horsemen and Genocidal Warfare: The SS Cavalry Brigade in the Soviet Union\n. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-1-137-45631-1\n.\nPiper, Franciszek (1994).\n\"Gas Chambers and Crematoria\"\n. In Gutman, Yisrael; Berenbaum, Michael (eds.).\nAnatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp\n. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. pp.\n157–182\n.\nISBN\n978-0-253-32684-3\n.\nPosner, Gerald L.\n;\nWare, John\n(1986).\nMengele: The Complete Story\n. New York: McGraw-Hill.\nISBN\n978-0-07-050598-8\n.\nPringle, Heather\n(2006).\nThe Master Plan: Himmler's Scholars and the Holocaust\n. London: Fourth Estate.\nISBN\n978-0-00-714812-7\n.\nProctor, Robert (1988).\nRacial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis\n. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-674-74578-0\n.\nRead, Anthony\n(2005).\nThe Devil's Disciples: Hitler's Inner Circle\n. New York; London: Norton.\nISBN\n978-0-393-32697-0\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald\n(1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRempel, Gerhard (1989).\nHitler's Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS\n. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8078-4299-7\n.\nReynolds, Michael Frank (1997).\nSteel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy: The Story of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions in the 1944 Normandy Campaign\n. Steelhurst: Spellmount.\nISBN\n978-1-873376-90-4\n.\nRhodes, Richard\n(2003).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-375-70822-0\n.\nRossino, Alexander B.\n(2003).\nHitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity\n. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.\nISBN\n978-0-7006-1234-5\n.\nRuda, Adrian (2023).\nDer Totenkopf als Motiv: Eine historisch-kulturanthropologische Analyse zwischen Militär und Moden\n(in German). Böhlau Köln.\nISBN\n978-3-412-52891-1\n.\nRummel, Rudolph\n(1992).\nDemocide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder\n. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1-56000-004-4\n.\nSchwarz, Gudrun (1997).\nEine Frau an seiner Seite. Ehefrauen in der »SS-Sippengemeinschaft«\n(in German). Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.\nISBN\n978-3-930908-32-5\n.\nSeaton, Albert (1971).\nThe Russo-German War, 1941–45\n. New York: Praeger Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-213-76478-4\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(2010).\nSimon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends\n. New York: Schocken Books.\nISBN\n978-0-385-51946-5\n.\nSereny, Gitta\n(1974).\nInto That Darkness: From Mercy Killings to Mass Murder\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-394-71035-8\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSnyder, Louis\n(1994) .\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson\n(1992).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. New York: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13-393182-2\n.\nStackelberg, Roderick (2002).\nHitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies\n. London; New York: Taylor & Francis.\nISBN\n978-0-203-00541-5\n.\nStackelberg, Roderick (2007).\nThe Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-30861-8\n.\nStein, George (2002) .\nThe Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939–1945\n. Cerberus Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1841451008\n.\nSteinbacher, Sybille (2005) .\nAuschwitz: A History\n. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck.\nISBN\n978-0-06-082581-2\n.\nStockert, Peter (1997).\nDie Eichenlaubträger 1939–1945 Band 2\n[\nThe Oak Leaves Bearers 1939–1945 Volume 2\n]\n(in German). Bad Friedrichshall, Germany: Friedrichshaller Rundblick.\nISBN\n978-3-9802222-9-7\n.\nStone, David\n(2011).\nShattered Genius: The Decline and Fall of the German General Staff in World War II\n. Philadelphia: Casemate.\nISBN\n978-1-61200-098-5\n.\nStreim, Alfred (1989). \"The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen, pages 436–454\". In\nMarrus, Michael\n(ed.).\nThe Nazi Holocaust, Part 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder, Volume 2\n. Westpoint, Connecticut: Meckler.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nSydnor, Charles W (1977).\nSoldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933–1945\n. Princeton University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-691-05255-7\n.\nOCLC\n1202023457\n.\nWachsmann, Nikolaus\n(2010). \"The Dynamics of Destruction\". In\nCaplan, Jane\n; Wachsmann, Nikolaus (eds.).\nConcentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories\n. New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-42651-0\n.\nWachsmann, Nikolaus (2015).\nKL: A History of the Nazi Concentration Camps\n. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.\nISBN\n978-0-374-11825-9\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1-4087-0304-5\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard\n(1994).\nA World at Arms: A Global History of World War II\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-44317-3\n.\nWestermann, Edward B.\n(6 June 2025).\n\"Einsatzgruppen: Nazi killing units\"\n. Encyclopædia Britannica\n. Retrieved\n17 June\n2025\n.\nWhitmarsh, Andrew (2009).\nD-Day in Photographs\n. Stroud: History Press.\nISBN\n978-0-7524-5095-7\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography (Vol. 1)\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-5-6\n.\nWilmot, Chester\n(1997) .\nThe Struggle For Europe\n. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions.\nISBN\n978-1-85326-677-5\n.\nWindrow, Martin\n; Burn, Jeffrey (1992).\nThe Waffen-SS\n. Men At Arms. London: Osprey.\nISBN\n978-0-85045-425-3\n.\nYahil, Leni\n(1990).\nThe Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-504522-2\n.\nYenne, Bill (2010).\nHitler's Master of the Dark Arts: Himmler's Black Knights and the Occult Origins of the SS\n. Minneapolis: Zenith.\nISBN\n978-0-7603-3778-3\n.\nYerger, Mark C. (1997).\nAllgemeine-SS: The Commands, Units, and Leaders of the General SS\n. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer.\nISBN\n978-0-7643-0145-2\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: MacMillan.\nISBN\n978-0-02-897500-9\n.\nZetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2016).\nKursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis\n. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.\nISBN\n978-1-13526-817-6\n.\nZiegler, Herbert (2014).\nNazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership, 1925–1939\n. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.\ndoi\n:\n10.1515/9781400860364\n.\nISBN\n978-0-691-60636-1\n.\nJSTOR\nj.ctt7zvdt8\n.\nZiemke, Earl F (1968).\nStalingrad to Berlin: the German defeat in the east\n. Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army.\nOCLC\n1169880509\n.\nFurther reading\nBrowder, George C. (1990).\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. Lexington: University of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-8131-1697-6\n.\nGellately, Robert\n(1990).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-822869-1\n.\nJohnson, Eric\n(1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04906-6\n.\nMiller, Michael (2015).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 2\n. San Jose, CA: Bender.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-25-8\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(1988).\nSoldiers of Evil: The Commandants of the Nazi Concentration Camps\n. New York: McGraw Hill.\nISBN\n978-0-07-056058-1\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nSS (Nazi Germany)\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nComprehensive report of Einsatzgruppe A up to 15 October 1941\nJudgment of Nuremberg Trials on the SS\nSS\nat the\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\nTestimonies concerning SS crimes in occupied Poland in \"Chronicles of Terror\" testimony database",
    "infobox": {
      "formed": "4 April 1925[1]",
      "preceding_agencies": "Sturmabteilung(SA)Stabswache",
      "dissolved": "8 May 1945 (de facto)10 October 1945 (de jure)",
      "type": "Paramilitary",
      "jurisdiction": "Nazi GermanyandGerman-occupied Europe",
      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin52°30′25″N13°22′58″E/52.50694°N 13.38278°E/52.50694; 13.38278",
      "employees": "800,000 (c.1944)",
      "reichsführerresponsible": "Heinrich Himmler(longest serving)Julius Schreck(first)Karl Hanke(last)",
      "parent_agency": "Nazi PartySturmabteilung(until July 1934)",
      "child_agencies": "Allgemeine SSWaffen-SSSS-Totenkopfverbände(SS-TV)Sicherheitspolizei(SiPo; until 1939, when folded into theRSHA)Sicherheitsdienst(SD)Ordnungspolizei(Orpo)"
    },
    "char_count": 115203
  },
  {
    "page_title": "Gestapo",
    "name": "Gestapo",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "The Geheime Staatspolizei, abbreviated Gestapo ( ), was the official secret police of Nazi Germany and in German-occupied Europe.",
    "description": "Secret police of Nazi Germany",
    "full_text": "Gestapo\nSecret police of Nazi Germany\nNot to be confused with the\nGestapu\n, a military faction in Indonesia.\nLaw enforcement agency\nThe\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n(\n[\nɡəˈhaɪmə\nˈʃtaːtspoliˌtsaɪ\n]\n,\nlit.\n'\nSecret State Police\n'\n),\nabbreviated\nGestapo\n(\n[\nɡəˈstaːpo\n]\n),\nwas the official\nsecret police\nof\nNazi Germany\nand in\nGerman-occupied Europe\n.\nThe force was created by\nHermann Göring\nin 1933 by combining the various political police agencies of\nPrussia\ninto one organisation. On 20 April 1934, oversight of the Gestapo passed to the head of the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS),\nHeinrich Himmler\n, who was also appointed Chief of German Police by Hitler in 1936. Instead of being exclusively a Prussian state agency, the Gestapo became a national one as a sub-office of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police). From 27 September 1939, it was administered by the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA). It became known as\nAmt\n(Dept) 4 of the RSHA and was considered a sister organisation to the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD; Security Service).\nThe Gestapo committed widespread atrocities during its existence. The power of the Gestapo was used to focus upon political opponents, ideological dissenters (clergy and religious organisations), career criminals, the\nSinti\nand\nRoma\npopulation, handicapped persons, homosexuals, and, above all, the Jews.\nThose arrested by the Gestapo were often held without judicial process, and\npolitical prisoners\nthroughout Germany—and from 1941, throughout the occupied territories under the\nNight and Fog Decree\n(\nGerman\n:\nNacht und Nebel\n)—simply\ndisappeared\nwhile in Gestapo custody.\nContrary to popular perception, the Gestapo was actually a relatively small organization with limited surveillance capability; still it proved extremely effective due to the willingness of ordinary Germans to report on fellow citizens. During\nWorld War II\n, the Gestapo played a key role in\nthe Holocaust\n. After the war ended, the Gestapo was declared a criminal organisation by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at the\nNuremberg trials\n, and several top Gestapo members were sentenced to death.\nHistory\nRudolf Diels\n, first Commander of the Gestapo; 1933–1934\nAfter\nAdolf Hitler\nbecame\nChancellor of Germany\n,\nHermann Göring\n—future commander of the\nLuftwaffe\nand the number-two man in the\nNazi Party\n—was named\nInterior Minister\nof\nPrussia\n.\nThis gave Göring command of the largest police force in Germany. Soon afterward, Göring detached the political and intelligence sections from the police and filled their ranks with Nazis. On 26 April 1933, Göring merged the two units as the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n, which was abbreviated by a post office clerk for a\nfranking\nstamp and became known as the \"Gestapo\".\nHe originally wanted to name it the Secret Police Office (\nGeheimes Polizeiamt\n), but the German initials, \"GPA\", were too similar to those of the\nSoviet\nState Political Directorate\n(\nGosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie\n, or GPU).\nThe first commander of the Gestapo was\nRudolf Diels\n, a protégé of Göring. Diels was appointed with the title of chief of\nAbteilung Ia\n(Department 1a) of the\nPrussian Secret Police\n.\nDiels was best known as the primary interrogator of\nMarinus van der Lubbe\nafter the\nReichstag fire\n. In late 1933, the Reich Interior Minister\nWilhelm Frick\nwanted to integrate all the police forces of the German states under his control. Göring outflanked him by removing the Prussian political and intelligence departments from the state interior ministry.\nGöring took over the Gestapo in 1934 and urged Hitler to extend the agency's authority throughout Germany. This represented a radical departure from German tradition, which held that law enforcement was (mostly) a\nLand\n(state) and local matter. In this, he ran into conflict with\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) chief\nHeinrich Himmler\nwho was police chief of the second most powerful German state,\nBavaria\n. Frick did not have the political power to take on Göring by himself so he allied with Himmler. With Frick's support, Himmler (pushed on by his right-hand man,\nReinhard Heydrich\n) took over the political police in state after state. Soon only Prussia was left.\nHeinrich Himmler\nand\nHermann Göring\nat the meeting to formally hand over control of the Gestapo (Berlin, 1934)\nConcerned that Diels was not ruthless enough to effectively counteract the power of the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA), Göring handed over control of the Gestapo to Himmler on 20 April 1934.\nAlso on that date, Hitler appointed Himmler chief of all German police outside Prussia. Heydrich, named chief of the Gestapo by Himmler on 22 April 1934, also continued as head of the SS Security Service (\nSicherheitsdienst\n, SD).\nHimmler and Heydrich both immediately began installing their own personnel in select positions, several of whom were directly from the\nBavarian Political Police\n, such as\nHeinrich Müller\n,\nFranz Josef Huber\n, and\nJosef Meisinger\n.\nMany of the Gestapo employees in the newly established offices were young and highly educated in a wide variety of academic fields and moreover, represented a new generation of National Socialist adherents, who were hard-working, efficient, and prepared to carry the Nazi state forward through the persecution of their political opponents.\nBy the spring of 1934, Himmler's SS controlled the SD and the Gestapo, but for him, there was still a problem, as technically the SS (and the Gestapo by proxy) was subordinated to the SA, which was under the command of\nErnst Röhm\n.\nHimmler wanted to free himself entirely from Röhm, whom he viewed as an obstacle.\nRöhm's position was menacing as more than 4.5 million men fell under his command once the\nmilitias\nand veterans organisations were absorbed by the SA,\na fact which fuelled Röhm's aspirations; his dream of fusing the SA and\nReichswehr\ntogether was undermining Hitler's relationships with the leadership of Germany's armed forces.\nSeveral Nazi chieftains, among them Göring, Joseph Goebbels, Rudolf Hess, and Himmler, began a concerted campaign to convince Hitler to take action against Röhm.\nBoth the SD and Gestapo released information concerning an imminent\nputsch\nby the SA.\nOnce persuaded, Hitler acted by setting Himmler's SS into action, who then proceeded to murder over 100 of Hitler's identified antagonists. The Gestapo supplied the information which implicated the SA and ultimately enabled Himmler and Heydrich to emancipate themselves entirely from the organisation.\nFor the Gestapo, the next two years following the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, a term describing the putsch against Röhm and the SA, were characterised by \"behind-the-scenes political wrangling over policing\".\n1938 Gestapo border inspection stamp applied when leaving Germany\nOn 17 June 1936, Hitler decreed the unification of all police forces in Germany and named Himmler as Chief of German Police.\nThis action effectively merged the police into the SS and removed it from Frick's control. Himmler was nominally subordinate to Frick as police chief, but as\nReichsführer-SS\n, he answered only to Hitler. This move also gave Himmler operational control over Germany's entire detective force.\nThe Gestapo became a national state agency. Himmler also gained authority over all of Germany's uniformed law enforcement agencies, which were amalgamated into the new\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo; Order Police), which became a national agency under SS general\nKurt Daluege\n.\nShortly thereafter, Himmler created the\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo; Criminal Police), merging it with the Gestapo into the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police), under Heydrich's command.\nHeinrich Müller was at that time the Gestapo operations chief.\nHe answered to Heydrich, Heydrich answered only to Himmler, and Himmler answered only to Hitler.\nThe Gestapo had the authority to investigate cases of\ntreason\n, espionage,\nsabotage\nand criminal attacks on the Nazi Party and Germany. The basic Gestapo law passed by the government in 1936 gave the Gestapo\ncarte blanche\nto operate without\njudicial review\n—in effect, putting it above the law.\nThe Gestapo was specifically exempted from responsibility to administrative courts, where citizens normally could sue the state to conform to laws. As early as 1935, a Prussian administrative court had ruled that the Gestapo's actions were not subject to judicial review. The SS officer\nWerner Best\n, one-time head of legal affairs in the Gestapo,\nsummed up this policy by saying, \"As long as the police carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting legally\".\nOn 27 September 1939, the security and police agencies of Nazi Germany—with the exception of the Order Police—were consolidated into the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA), headed by Heydrich.\nThe Gestapo became\nAmt IV\n(Department IV) of RSHA and Müller became the Gestapo Chief, with Heydrich as his immediate superior.\nAfter Heydrich's 1942 assassination, Himmler assumed the leadership of the RSHA until January 1943, when\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\nwas appointed chief.\nMüller remained the Gestapo Chief. His direct subordinate\nAdolf Eichmann\nheaded the Gestapo's Office of Resettlement and then its Office of Jewish Affairs (\nReferat IV B4\nor Sub-Department IV, Section B4).\nDuring the Holocaust, Eichmann's department within the Gestapo coordinated the mass deportation of European Jews to the Nazis'\nextermination camps\n.\nThe power of the Gestapo included the use of what was called,\nSchutzhaft\n—\"protective custody\", a\neuphemism\nfor the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings.\nAn oddity of the system was that the prisoner had to sign his own\nSchutzhaftbefehl\n, an order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment—presumably out of fear of personal harm. In addition,\npolitical prisoners\nthroughout Germany—and from 1941, throughout the occupied territories under the\nNight and Fog Decree\n(\nGerman\n:\nNacht und Nebel\n)—simply\ndisappeared\nwhile in Gestapo custody.\nUp to 30 April 1944, at least 6,639 persons were arrested under\nNacht und Nebel\norders.\nHowever, the total number of people who disappeared as a result of this decree is not known.\nCounterintelligence\nThe\nPolish government-in-exile\nin London during World War II received sensitive military information about Nazi Germany from agents and informants throughout Europe. After\nGermany conquered Poland\n(in the autumn of 1939), Gestapo officials believed that they had neutralised Polish intelligence activities. However, certain Polish information about the movement of German police and SS units to the East during 1941\nGerman invasion\nof the\nSoviet Union\nwas similar to information British intelligence secretly obtained through intercepting and decoding German police and SS messages sent by\nradio telegraphy\n.\nIn 1942, the Gestapo discovered a cache of Polish intelligence documents in\nPrague\nand were surprised to see that Polish agents and informants had been gathering detailed military information and smuggling it out to London, via\nBudapest\nand\nIstanbul\n. The Poles identified and tracked German military trains to the Eastern front and identified four\nOrder Police battalions\nsent to occupied areas of the Soviet Union in October 1941 that engaged in\nwar crimes\nand\nmass murder\n.\nPolish agents also gathered detailed information about the morale of German soldiers in the East. After uncovering a sample of the information the Poles had reported, Gestapo officials concluded that Polish intelligence activity represented a very serious danger to Germany. As late as 6 June 1944, Heinrich Müller—concerned about the leakage of information to the Allies—set up a special unit called\nSonderkommando Jerzy\nthat was meant to root out the Polish intelligence network in western and southwestern Europe.\nIn Austria, there were groups still loyal to the\nHabsburgs\n, who unlike most across the Greater German Reich, remained determined to resist the Nazis. These groups became a special focus of the Gestapo because of their insurrectionist goals—the overthrow of the Nazi regime, the re-establishment of an independent Austria under Habsburg leadership—and Hitler's hatred of the Habsburg family. Hitler vehemently rejected the centuries' old Habsburg pluralist principles of \"live and let live\" with regard to ethnic groups, peoples, minorities, religions, cultures and languages.\nHabsburg loyalist\nKarl Burian\n's (who was later executed) plan to blow up the Gestapo headquarters in Vienna represented a unique attempt to act aggressively against the Gestapo. Burian's group had also set up a secret courier service to\nOtto von Habsburg\nin Belgium. Individuals in Austrian resistance groups led by\nHeinrich Maier\nalso managed to pass along the plans and the location of production facilities for\nV-1\n,\nV-2 rockets\n,\nTiger tanks\n, and aircraft (\nMesserschmitt Bf 109\n,\nMesserschmitt Me 163 Komet\n, etc.) to the Allies.\nThe Maier group informed very early about the mass murder of Jews. The resistance group, later discovered by the Gestapo because of a double agent of the Abwehr, was in contact with\nAllen Dulles\n, the head of the US\nOffice of Strategic Services\nin Switzerland. Although Maier and the other group members were severely tortured, the Gestapo did not uncover the essential involvement of the resistance group in\nOperation Crossbow\nand\nOperation Hydra\n.\nSuppression of resistance and persecution\nEarly in the regime's existence, harsh measures were meted out to political opponents and those who resisted\nNazi doctrine\n, such as members of the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD); a role originally performed by the SA until the SD and Gestapo undermined their influence and took control of Reich security.\nBecause the Gestapo seemed\nomniscient\nand\nomnipotent\n, the atmosphere of fear they created led to an overestimation of their reach and strength; a faulty assessment which hampered the operational effectiveness of underground resistance organisations.\nTrade unions\nShortly after the Nazis came to power, they decided to dissolve the 28 federations of the General German Trade Union Confederation, because Hitler—after noting their success in the works council elections—intended to consolidate all German workers under the Nazi government's administration, a decision he made on 7 April 1933.\nAs a preface to this action, Hitler decreed May 1 as National Labor Day to celebrate German workers, a move the trade union leaders welcomed. With their trade union flags waving, Hitler gave a rousing speech to the 1.5 million people assembled on Berlin's\nTempelhofer Feld\nthat was nationally broadcast, during which he extolled the nation's revival and working class solidarity.\nOn the following day, the newly formed Gestapo officers, who had been shadowing some 58 trade union leaders, arrested them wherever they could find them—many in their homes.\nMeanwhile, the SA and police occupied trade union headquarters, arrested functionaries, confiscated their property and assets; all by design so as to be replaced on 12 May by the\nGerman Labour Front\n(DAF), a Nazi organisation placed under the leadership of\nRobert Ley\n.\nFor their part, this was the first time the Gestapo operated under its new name since its 26 April 1933 founding in Prussia.\nReligious dissent\nMany parts of Germany (where religious dissent existed upon the Nazi seizure of power) saw a rapid transformation; a change as noted by the Gestapo in conservative towns such as Würzburg, where people acquiesced to the regime either through accommodation, collaboration, or simple compliance.\nIncreasing religious objections to Nazi policies led the Gestapo to carefully monitor church organisations. For the most part, members of the church did not offer political resistance but simply wanted to ensure that organizational doctrine remained intact.\nHowever, the Nazi regime sought to suppress any source of ideology other than its own, and set out to muzzle or crush the churches in the so-called\nKirchenkampf\n. When Church leaders (\nclergy\n) voiced their misgiving about the\neuthanasia\nprogram and Nazi racial policies, Hitler intimated that he considered them \"traitors to the people\" and went so far as to call them \"the destroyers of Germany\".\nThe extreme\nanti-semitism\nand\nneo-pagan\nheresies of the Nazis caused some Christians to outright resist,\nand\nPope Pius XI\nto issue the encyclical\nMit brennender Sorge\ndenouncing Nazism and warning Catholics against joining or supporting the Party. Some pastors, like the Protestant clergyman\nDietrich Bonhoeffer\n, paid for their opposition with their lives.\nIn an effort to counter the strength and influence of spiritual resistance, Nazi records reveal that the Gestapo's\nReferat B1\nmonitored the activities of bishops very closely—instructing that agents be set up in every diocese, that the bishops' reports to the\nVatican\nshould be obtained and that the bishops' areas of activity must be found out. Deans were to be targeted as the \"eyes and ears of the bishops\" and a \"vast network\" established to monitor the activities of ordinary clergy: \"The importance of this enemy is such that inspectors of security police and of the security service will make this group of people and the questions discussed by them their special concern\".\nIn\nDachau: The Official History 1933–1945\n, Paul Berben wrote that clergy were watched closely, and frequently denounced, arrested and sent to\nNazi concentration camps\n: \"One priest was imprisoned in Dachau for having stated that there were good folk in England too; another suffered the same fate for warning a girl who wanted to marry an S.S. man after abjuring the Catholic faith; yet another because he conducted a service for a deceased communist\". Others were arrested simply on the basis of being \"suspected of activities hostile to the State\" or that there was reason to \"suppose that his dealings might harm society\".\nOver 2,700\nCatholic\n,\nProtestant\n, and\nOrthodox\nclergy were imprisoned at Dachau alone. After Heydrich (who was staunchly anti-Catholic and anti-Christian) was assassinated in Prague, his successor, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, relaxed some of the policies and then disbanded Department IVB (religious opponents) of the Gestapo.\nHomosexuality\nViolence and arrest were not confined to that opposing political parties, membership in trade unions, or those with dissenting religious opinions, but also homosexuality. It was viewed negatively by Hitler.\nHomosexuals were correspondingly considered a threat to the\nVolksgemeinschaft\n(National Community).\nFrom the Nazis rise to national power in 1933, the number of court verdicts against homosexuals steadily increased and only declined once the Second World War started.\nIn 1934, a special Gestapo office was set up in Berlin to deal with homosexuality.\nDespite male homosexuality being considered a greater danger to \"national survival\", lesbianism was likewise viewed as unacceptable—deemed gender nonconformity—and a number of individual reports on lesbians can be found in Gestapo files.\nBetween 1933 and 1935, some 4,000 men were arrested; between 1936 and 1939, another 30,000 men were convicted.\nIf homosexuals showed any signs of sympathy to the Nazis' identified racial enemies, they were considered an even greater danger.\nAccording to Gestapo case files, the majority of those arrested for homosexuality were males between eighteen and twenty-five years of age.\nStudent opposition\nBetween June 1942 and March 1943, student protests were calling for an end to the Nazi regime. These included the non-violent resistance of\nHans\nand\nSophie Scholl\n, two leaders of the\nWhite Rose\nstudent group.\nHowever, resistance groups and those who were in moral or political opposition to the Nazis were stalled by the fear of reprisals from the Gestapo. Fearful of an internal overthrow, the forces of the Gestapo were unleashed on the opposition. Groups like the\nWhite Rose\nand others, such as the\nEdelweiss Pirates\n, and the\nSwing Youth\n, were placed under close Gestapo observation. Some participants were sent to concentration camps. Leading members of the most famous of these groups, the White Rose, were arrested by the police and turned over to the Gestapo. For several leaders the punishment was death.\nDuring the first five months of 1943, the Gestapo arrested thousands suspected of resistance activities and carried out numerous executions. Student opposition leaders were executed in late February, and a major opposition organisation, the\nOster Circle\n, was destroyed in April 1943.\nEfforts to resist the Nazi regime amounted to very little and had only minor chances of success, particularly since a broad percentage of the German people did not support such actions.\nGeneral opposition and military conspiracy\nBetween 1934 and 1938, opponents of the Nazi regime and their fellow travellers began to emerge. Among the first to speak out were religious dissenters but following in their wake were educators,\naristocratic\nbusinessmen, office workers, teachers, and others from nearly every walk of life.\nMost people quickly learned that open opposition was dangerous since Gestapo informants and agents were widespread. However, a significant number of them still worked against the National Socialist government.\nIn May 1935, the Gestapo broke up and arrested members of the \"Markwitz Circle\", a group of former socialists in contact with\nOtto Strasser\n, who sought Hitler's downfall.\nFrom the mid-1930s into the early 1940s—various groups made up of communists, idealists, working-class people, and far-right conservative opposition organisations covertly fought against Hitler's government, and several of them fomented plots that included Hitler's assassination. Nearly all of them, including: the Römer Group, Robby Group,\nSolf Circle\n,\nSchwarze Reichswehr\n, the Party of the Radical Middle Class,\nJungdeutscher Orden\n,\nSchwarze Front\nand\nStahlhelm\nwere either discovered or infiltrated by the Gestapo. This led to corresponding arrests, being sent to concentration camps and execution.\nOne of the methods employed by the Gestapo to contend with these resistance factions was 'protective detention' which facilitated the process in expediting dissenters to concentration camps and against which there was no\nlegal defence\n.\nPhotograph from 1939: shown from left to right are\nFranz Josef Huber\n,\nArthur Nebe\n,\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nReinhard Heydrich\nand\nHeinrich Müller\nplanning the investigation of the bomb assassination attempt on\nAdolf Hitler\non 8 November 1939 in\nMunich\n.\nEarly efforts to resist the Nazis with aid from abroad were hindered when the opposition's peace feelers to the Western\nAllies\ndid not meet with success. This was partly because of the\nVenlo incident\nof 9 November 1939,\nin which SD and Gestapo agents, posing as anti-Nazis in the\nNetherlands\n, kidnapped two British\nSecret Intelligence Service\n(SIS) officers after having lured them to a meeting to discuss peace terms. This prompted\nWinston Churchill\nto ban any further contact with the German opposition.\nLater, the British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazis because they were fearful that the Soviet Union would believe they were attempting to make deals behind their back.\nThe German opposition was in an unenviable position by the late spring and early summer of 1943. On one hand, it was next to impossible for them to overthrow Hitler and the party; on the other, the Allied demand for an unconditional surrender meant no opportunity for a compromise peace, which left the military and conservative aristocrats who opposed the regime no option (in their eyes) other than continuing the military struggle.\nDespite the fear of the Gestapo after mass arrests and executions in the spring, the opposition still plotted and planned. One of the more famous schemes,\nOperation Valkyrie\n, involved a number of senior German officers and was carried out by Colonel\nClaus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg\n. In an attempt to assassinate Hitler, Stauffenberg planted a bomb underneath a conference table inside the\nWolf's Lair\nfield headquarters.\nKnown as the\n20 July plot\n, this assassination attempt failed and Hitler was only slightly injured. Reports indicate that the Gestapo was caught unaware of this plot as they did not have sufficient protections in place at the appropriate locations nor did they take any preventative steps.\nStauffenberg and his group were shot on 21 July 1944; meanwhile, his fellow conspirators were rounded up by the Gestapo and sent to a concentration camp. Thereafter, there was a show trial overseen by\nRoland Freisler\n, followed by their execution.\nSome Germans were convinced that it was their duty to apply all possible expedients to end the war as quickly as possible.\nSabotage\nefforts were undertaken by members of the\nAbwehr\n(military intelligence) leadership, as they recruited people known to oppose the Nazi regime.\nThe Gestapo cracked down ruthlessly on dissidents in Germany, just as they did everywhere else. Opposition became more difficult. Arrests, torture, and executions were common. Terror against \"state enemies\" had become a way of life to such a degree that the Gestapo's presence and methods were eventually normalised in the minds of people living in Nazi Germany.\nOrganisation\nIn January 1933, Hermann Göring, Hitler's\nminister without portfolio\n, was appointed the head of the Prussian Police and began filling the political and intelligence units of the Prussian Secret Police with\nNazi Party\nmembers.\nA year after the organisation's inception, Göring wrote in a British publication about having created the organisation on his own initiative and how he was \"chiefly responsible\" for the elimination of the\nMarxist\nand Communist threat to Germany and\nPrussia\n.\nDescribing the activities of the organisation, Göring boasted about the utter ruthlessness required for Germany's recovery, the establishment of concentration camps for that purpose, and even went on to claim that excesses were committed in the beginning, recounting how beatings took place here and there.\nOn 26 April 1933, he reorganised the force's\nAmt III\nas the\nGestapa\n(better-known by the \"\nsobriquet\n\" Gestapo),\na secret state police intended to serve the Nazi cause.\nLess than two weeks later in early May 1933, the Gestapo moved into their Berlin headquarters at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8.\nAs a result of its 1936 merger with the Kripo (National criminal police) to form sub-units of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo; Security Police), the Gestapo was officially classified as a government agency. Himmler's subsequent appointment to\nChef der Deutschen Polizei\n(Chief of German Police) and status as\nReichsführer-SS\nmade him independent of Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick's nominal control.\nThe SiPo was placed under the direct command of Reinhard Heydrich who was already chief of the Nazi Party's intelligence service, the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD).\nThe idea was to fully identify and integrate the party agency (SD) with the state agency (SiPo). Most SiPo members joined the SS and held a rank in both organisations. Nevertheless, in practice there was jurisdictional overlap and operational conflict between the SD and Gestapo.\nHeinrich Müller\n, Chief of the Gestapo; 1939–1945\nIn September 1939, the SiPo and SD were merged into the newly created\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n(RSHA;\nReich Security Main Office\n). Both the Gestapo and Kripo became distinct departments within the RSHA.\nAlthough the\nSicherheitspolizei\nwas officially disbanded, the term SiPo was figuratively used to describe any RSHA personnel throughout the remainder of the war. In lieu of naming convention changes, the original construct of the SiPo, Gestapo, and Kripo cannot be fully comprehended as \"discrete entities\", since they ultimately formed \"a conglomerate in which each was wedded to each other and the SS through its Security Service, the SD\".\nThe creation of the RSHA represented the formalisation, at the top level, of the relationship under which the SD served as the intelligence agency for the security police. A similar co-ordination existed in the local offices. Within Germany and areas which were incorporated within the Reich for the purpose of civil administration, local offices of the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD were formally separate. They were subject to co-ordination by inspectors of the security police and SD on the staffs of the local higher SS and police leaders, however, and one of the principal functions of the local SD units was to serve as the intelligence agency for the local Gestapo units. In the occupied territories, the formal relationship between local units of the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD was slightly closer.\nThe Gestapo became known as RSHA\nAmt IV\n(\"Department or Office IV\") with Heinrich Müller as its chief.\nIn January 1943, Himmler appointed Ernst Kaltenbrunner RSHA chief; almost seven months after\nHeydrich had been assassinated\n.\nThe specific internal departments of\nAmt IV\nwere as follows:\nDepartment A (Political Opponents)\nCommunists (A1)\nCounter-sabotage (A2)\nReactionaries, liberals, and opposition (A3)\nProtective services (A4)\nDepartment B (Sects and Churches)\nCatholicism (B1)\nProtestantism (B2)\nFreemasons\nand other churches (B3)\nJewish affairs (B4)\nDepartment C (Administration and Party Affairs), central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel including all officials.\nFiles, card, indexes, information, and administration (C1)\nProtective custody (C2)\nPress office (C3)\nNSDAP matters (C4)\nDepartment D (Occupied Territories), administration for regions outside the\nReich\n.\nProtectorate affairs, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, regions of Yugoslavia, Greece (D1)\n1st Belgrade Special Combat detachment\nGeneral Government(D2)\nConfidential office – hostile foreigners,\nemigrants\n(D3)\nOccupied territories – France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark (D4)\nOccupied Eastern territories (D5)\nDepartment E (Security and counterintelligence)\nIn the\nReich\n(E1)\nPolicy and economic formation (E2)\nWest (E3)\nScandinavia (North)(E4)\nEast (E5)\nSouth (E6)\nIn 1941\nReferat N\n, the central command office of the Gestapo was formed. However, these internal departments remained and the Gestapo continued to be a department under the RSHA umbrella. The local offices of the Gestapo, known as Gestapo\nLeitstellen\nand\nStellen\n, answered to a local commander known as the\nInspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n(Inspector of the Security Police and Security Service) who, in turn, was under the dual command of\nReferat N\nof the Gestapo and also his local\nSS and Police Leader\n.\nIn total, there were some fifty-four regional Gestapo offices across the German federal states.\nThe Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and Police Leaders, and supplied personnel as needed to formations such as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nPersonnel assigned to these auxiliary duties were often removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of branches of the SS.\nIt was the Gestapo chief, SS-\nBrigadierführer\nHeinrich Müller, who kept Hitler abreast of the killing operations in the Soviet Union and who issued orders to the four\nEinsatzgruppen\nthat their continual work in the east was to be \"presented to the Führer.\"\nFemale criminal investigation career\nAccording to regulations issued by the Reich Security Main Office in 1940, women who had been trained in\nsocial work\nor having a similar education could be hired as female detectives. Female youth leaders, lawyers, business administrators with experience in social work, female leaders in the\nReichsarbeitsdienst\nand personnel administrators in the\nBund Deutscher Mädel\nwere hired as detectives after a one-year course, if they had several years professional experience. Later, nurses, kindergarten teachers, and trained female commercial employees with an aptitude for police work were hired as female detectives after a two-year course as\nKriminaloberassistentin\nand could promote to a\nKriminalsekretärin\n. After another two or three years in that grade, the female detective could advance to\nKriminalobersekretärin\n. Further promotions to\nKriminalkommissarin\nand\nKriminalrätin\nwere also possible.\nMembership\nGestapo members in\nKlatovy\n,\nGerman-occupied Czechoslovakia\nIn 1933, there was no purge of the German police forces.\nThe vast majority of Gestapo officers came from the police forces of the Weimar Republic; members of the SS, the SA, and the Nazi Party also joined the Gestapo but were less numerous.\nBy March 1937, the Gestapo employed an estimated 6,500 people in fifty-four regional offices across the Reich.\nAdditional staff were added in March 1938 consequent the annexation of Austria and again in October 1938 with the acquisition of the\nSudetenland\n.\nIn 1939, only 3,000 out of the total of 20,000 Gestapo men held SS ranks, and in most cases, these were honorary.\nOne man who served in the Prussian Gestapo in 1933 recalled that most of his co-workers \"were by no means all Nazis. For the most part they were young professional civil service officers...\"\nThe Nazis valued police competence more than politics, so in general in 1933, almost all of the men who served in the various state police forces under the\nWeimar Republic\nstayed on in their jobs.\nIn\nWürzburg\n, which is one of the few places in Germany where most of the Gestapo records survived, every member of the Gestapo was a career policeman or had a police background.\nThe Canadian historian\nRobert Gellately\nwrote that most Gestapo men were not Nazis, but at the same time were not opposed to the Nazi regime, which they were willing to serve, in whatever task they were called upon to perform.\nOver time, membership in the Gestapo included ideological training, particularly once Werner Best assumed a leading role for training in April 1936. Employing biological metaphors, Best emphasised a doctrine which encouraged members of the Gestapo to view themselves as 'doctors' to the 'national body' in the struggle against \"pathogens\" and \"diseases\"; among the implied sicknesses were \"communists, Freemasons, and the churches—and above and behind all these stood the Jews\".\nHeydrich thought along similar lines and advocated both defensive and offensive measures on the part of the Gestapo, so as to prevent any subversion or destruction of the National Socialist body.\nWhether trained as police originally or not, Gestapo agents themselves were shaped by their socio-political environment. Historian\nGeorge C. Browder\ncontends that there was a four-part process (\nauthorisation\n, bolstering, routinisation, and\ndehumanisation\n) in effect, which legitimised the psycho-social atmosphere conditioning members of the Gestapo to\nradicalised\nviolence.\nBrowder also describes a sandwich effect, where from above; Gestapo agents were subjected to ideologically oriented\nracism\nand criminal biological theories; and from below, the Gestapo was transformed by SS personnel who did not have the proper police training, which showed in their propensity for unrestrained violence.\nThis admixture certainly shaped the Gestapo's public image which they sought to maintain despite their increasing workload; an image which helped them identify and eliminate enemies of the Nazi state.\nPopulation ratios, methods, and effectiveness\nContrary to popular belief, the Gestapo was not the all-pervasive, omnipotent agency in German society.\nIn Germany proper, many towns and cities had fewer than 50 official Gestapo personnel. For example, in 1939 Stettin and Frankfurt am Main only had a total of 41 Gestapo men combined.\nIn\nDüsseldorf\n, the local Gestapo office of only 281 men were responsible for the entire Lower Rhine region, which comprised 4 million people.\nIn lower Franconia, which included\nWürzburg\n, there were only twenty-two Gestapo officers overseeing 840,000 or more inhabitants; this meant that the Nazi secret police \"was reliant on Germans spying on each other\".\nThese \"V-men\", as undercover Gestapo agents were known, were used to infiltrate\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD) and Communist opposition groups, but this was more the exception than the rule.\nThe Gestapo office in\nSaarbrücken\nhad 50 full-term informers in 1939.\nThe District Office in\nNuremberg\n, which had the responsibility for all of northern\nBavaria\n, employed a total of 80–100 full-term informers between 1943 and 1945.\nThe majority of Gestapo informers were not full-term employees working undercover, but were rather ordinary citizens who chose to denounce other people to the Gestapo.\nAccording to Canadian historian\nRobert Gellately\n's analysis of the local offices established, the Gestapo was—for the most part—made up of bureaucrats and clerical workers who depended upon denunciations by citizens for their information. Gellately argued that it was because of the widespread willingness of Germans to inform on each other to the Gestapo that Germany between 1933 and 1945 was a prime example of\npanopticism\n.\nThe Gestapo—at times—was overwhelmed with denunciations and most of its time was spent sorting out the credible from the less credible denunciations.\nMany of the local offices were understaffed and overworked, struggling with the paper load caused by so many denunciations.\nGellately has also suggested that the Gestapo was \"a reactive organisation...constructed within German society and whose functioning was structurally dependent on the continuing co-operation of German citizens\".\nAfter 1939, when many Gestapo personnel were called up for war-related work such as service with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, the level of overwork and understaffing at the local offices increased.\nFor information about what was happening in German society, the Gestapo continued to be mostly dependent upon denunciations.\n80% of all Gestapo investigations were started in response to information provided by denunciations by ordinary Germans; while 10% were started in response to information provided by other branches of the German government and another 10% started in response to information that the Gestapo itself unearthed.\nThe information supplied by denunciations often led the Gestapo in determining who was arrested.\nThe popular picture of the Gestapo with its spies everywhere terrorising German society has been rejected by many historians as a myth invented after the war as a cover for German society's widespread complicity in allowing the Gestapo to work.\nWork done by\nsocial historians\nsuch as\nDetlev Peukert\n, Robert Gellately, Reinhard Mann, Inge Marssolek, René Otto,\nKlaus-Michael Mallmann\nand Paul Gerhard, which by focusing on what the local offices were doing has shown the Gestapo\n'\ns almost total dependence on denunciations from ordinary Germans, and very much discredited the older \"\nBig Brother\n\" picture with the Gestapo having its eyes and ears everywhere.\nFor example, of the 84 cases in\nWürzburg\nof\nRassenschande\n(\"race defilement\"—sexual relations with non-\nAryans\n), 45 (54%) were started in response to denunciations by ordinary people, two (2%) by information provided by other branches of the government, 20 (24%) via information gained during interrogations of people relating to other matters, four (5%) from information from (Nazi) NSDAP organisations, two (2%) during \"political evaluations\" and 11 (13%) have no source listed while none were started by Gestapo\n'\ns own \"observations\" of the people of Würzburg.\nAn examination of 213 denunciations in\nDüsseldorf\nshowed that 37% were motivated by personal conflicts, no motive could be established in 39%, and 24% were motivated by support for the Nazi regime.\nThe Gestapo always showed a special interest in denunciations concerning\nsexual matters\n, especially cases concerning\nRassenschande\nwith Jews or between Germans and foreigners, in particular\nPolish slave workers\n; the Gestapo applied even harsher methods to the foreign workers in the country, especially those from Poland,\nJews, Catholics and\nhomosexuals\n.\nAs time went by, anonymous denunciations to the Gestapo caused trouble to various\nNSDAP\nofficials, who often found themselves being investigated by the Gestapo.\nOf the political cases, 61 people were investigated for suspicion of belonging to the KPD, 44 for the SPD and 69 for other political parties.\nMost of the political investigations took place between 1933 and 1935 with the all-time high of 57 cases in 1935.\nAfter that year, political investigations declined with only 18 investigations in 1938, 13 in 1939, two in 1941, seven in 1942, four in 1943 and one in 1944.\nThe \"other\" category associated with non-conformity included everything from a man who drew a caricature of Hitler to a Catholic teacher suspected of being lukewarm about teaching National Socialism in his classroom.\nThe \"administrative control\" category concerned those who were breaking the law concerning residency in the city.\nThe \"conventional criminality\" category concerned economic crimes such as\nmoney laundering\n,\nsmuggling\nand homosexuality.\nWhile the total number of Gestapo officials was limited when contrasted against the represented populations, the average\nVolksgenosse\n(Nazi term for the \"member of the German people\") was typically not under observation, so the statistical ratio between Gestapo officials and inhabitants is \"largely worthless and of little significance\" according to some recent scholars.\nAs historian Eric Johnson remarked, \"The Nazi terror was selective terror\", with its focus upon political opponents, ideological dissenters (clergy and religious organisations), career criminals, the\nSinti\nand\nRoma\npopulation,\nhandicapped persons\n, homosexuals and above all, upon the Jews.\n\"Selective terror\" by the Gestapo, as mentioned by Johnson, is also supported by historian Richard Evans who states that, \"Violence and intimidation rarely touched the lives of most ordinary Germans.\nDenunciation\nwas the exception, not the rule, as far as the behaviour of the vast majority of Germans was concerned.\"\nThe involvement of ordinary Germans in denunciations also needs to be put into perspective so as not to exonerate the Gestapo. As Evans makes clear, \"...it was not the ordinary German people who engaged in\nsurveillance\n, it was the Gestapo; nothing happened until the Gestapo received a denunciation, and it was the Gestapo's active pursuit of deviance and dissent that was the only thing that gave denunciations meaning.\"\nThe Gestapo's effectiveness remained in the ability to \"project\" omnipotence...they co-opted the assistance of the German population by using denunciations to their advantage; proving in the end a powerful, ruthless and effective organ of terror under the Nazi regime that was seemingly everywhere.\nLastly, the Gestapo's effectiveness, while aided by denunciations and the watchful eye of ordinary Germans, was more the result of the co-ordination and co-operation amid the various police organs within Germany, the assistance of the SS, and the support provided by the various Nazi Party organisations; all of them together forming an organised persecution network.\nTorture\nThe Gestapo employed torture as a routine method to extract confessions, punish political enemies, and enforce ideological conformity in Nazi Germany, the official evidence for which was destroyed by the Nazis with Gestapo case-files being rarely found.\nNormal methods of investigation by the Gestapo included various forms of\nblackmail\n, threats, and\nextortion\nto secure \"confessions\".\nBeyond that, sleep deprivation and various forms of harassment were also used as investigative methods.\nThe Gestapo periodically was known for\nplanting evidence\nto resolve a case, especially if it concerned a Jewish person.\nHistorical research based on surviving Gestapo files has shown that torture was not limited to high-profile cases but was frequently used at the local level, especially in situations involving accusations of hiding Jews, listening to foreign radio broadcasts, or engaging in communist activity.\nBrutality on the part of interrogators—often prompted by denunciations and followed with\nroundups\n—enabled the Gestapo to uncover numerous resistance networks and in many ways, made them seem like they knew everything and could do anything they wanted.\nA simple denunciation could even lead to a person's death once in the Gestapo's hands.\nIn his study of Gestapo files from Bavaria, historian Robert Gellately noted that many individuals were subjected to brutal treatment as part of routine investigative procedures.\nHistorian Eric A. Johnson further corroborates this brutal treatment in cities like Cologne, where detainees were physically and mentally abused to obtain names of collaborators or co-conspirators.\nOnce an individual was brought in by the Gestapo, Richard Evans asserted that one could expect in many cases \"brutal violence and\ntorture\n\" and a course of interrogation that often \"ended in the courts, the prisons and the camps.\"\nMany detainees bypassed the courts entirely through a mechanism known as\nSchutzhaft\n(\"protective custody\"). Once a\nSchutzhaftbefehl\nwas signed by someone deemed an authority—often a simple administrative form—the detainee was shipped to a camp, frequently following brutal interrogation in Gestapo prisons. This allowed the Gestapo to imprison individuals indefinitely without trial and transfer them directly to concentration camps such as Dachau, Buchenwald, or Ravensbrück.\nOperations in Nazi-occupied territories\nAs an instrument of Nazi power, terror, and repression, the Gestapo operated throughout occupied Europe.\nMuch like their affiliated organisations, the SS and the SD, the Gestapo \"played a leading part\" in enslaving and deporting workers from occupied territory, torturing and executing civilians, singling out and murdering Jews, and subjecting Allied prisoners of war to terrible treatment.\nTo this end, the Gestapo was \"a vital component both in Nazi repression and the Holocaust.\"\nOnce the German armies advanced into enemy territory, they were accompanied by\nEinsatzgruppen\nstaffed by officers from the Gestapo and Kripo, who usually operated in the rear areas to administer and police the occupied land.\nWhenever a region came fully under German military occupational jurisdiction, the Gestapo administered all executive actions under the military commander's authority, albeit operating relatively independent of it.\nA former partisan and Soviet officer named Hersch Gurewicz attested to the torture methods used by the Gestapo. He recalled a partisan was strapped to a table in a room and \"a German turned the lever and the table moved apart in sections like a rack. The man screamed and his leg bones snapped through his skin. The lever turned again and his arms ripped in jagged tears. After the man fainted, his torturers shot him dead.\"\nHe also claimed that he had been strapped down and a wire slowly forced up his nose, into his lung, causing him to go unconscious. Later he was tied to a horse, which was made to gallop full speed, and recalled being smashed into the ground repeatedly, before being knocked out by a solid object.\nOccupation meant administration and policing, a duty assigned to the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo even before hostilities began, as was the case for Czechoslovakia.\nCorrespondingly, Gestapo offices were established in a territory once occupied.\nSome locals aided the Gestapo, whether as professional police auxiliaries or in other duties. Nonetheless, operations performed either by German members of the Gestapo or auxiliaries from willing collaborators of other nationalities were inconsistent in both disposition and effectiveness. Varying degrees of pacification and police enforcement measures were necessary in each place, dependent on how cooperative or resistant the locals were to Nazi mandates and racial policies.\nThroughout the Eastern territories, the Gestapo and other Nazi organisations co-opted the assistance of indigenous police units, nearly all of whom were uniformed and able to carry out drastic actions.\nMany of the auxiliary police personnel operating on behalf of German Order Police, the SD, and Gestapo were members of the\nSchutzmannschaft\n, which included staffing by Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians.\nWhile in many countries the Nazis occupied in the East, the local domestic police forces supplemented German operations, noted Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg, asserts that \"those of Poland were least involved in anti-Jewish actions.\"\nNonetheless, German authorities ordered the mobilisation of reserve Polish police forces, known as the\nBlue Police\n, which strengthened the Nazi police presence and carried out numerous \"police\" functions; in some cases, its functionaries even identified and rounded up Jews or performed other unsavory duties on behalf of their German masters.\nIn places like Denmark, there were some 550 uniformed Danes in Copenhagen working with the Gestapo, patrolling and terrorising the local population at the behest of their German overseers, many of whom were arrested after the war.\nOther Danish civilians, like in many places across Europe, acted as Gestapo informants but this should not be seen as wholehearted support for the Nazi program, as motives for cooperation varied.\nWhereas in France, the number of members in the\nCarlingue\n(French Gestapo) who worked on behalf of the Nazis was upwards of 30,000 to 32,000; they conducted operations nearly indistinguishable from their German equivalents.\nNuremberg trials\nMain articles:\nNuremberg trials\nand\nthe Holocaust\nGestapo building at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8, after the 1945 bombing\nBetween 14 November 1945 and 3 October 1946, the Allies established an\nInternational Military Tribunal\n(IMT) to try 22 major Nazi war criminals and six groups for\ncrimes against peace\n,\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\n.\nNineteen of the 22 were convicted, and twelve—Martin Bormann (in absentia), Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Hermann Göring, Alfred Jodl, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Wilhelm Keitel, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz Sauckel, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Julius Streicher—were given the death penalty. Three—Walther Funk, Rudolf Hess, Erich Raeder—received life terms; and the remaining four—Karl Dönitz, Konstantin von Neurath, Albert Speer, and Baldur von Schirach—received shorter prison sentences. Three others—Hans Fritzsche, Hjalmar Schacht, and Franz von Papen—were acquitted. At that time, the Gestapo was condemned as a criminal organisation, along with the SS.\nHowever, Gestapo leader\nHeinrich Müller\nwas never tried, as he disappeared at the end of the war.\nGerman Gestapo agents arrested after the liberation of\nLiège\n, Belgium are pictured in a cell at the\nCitadel of Liège\n, October 1944\nLeaders, organisers, investigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes specified were declared responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. The official positions of defendants as heads of state or holders of high government offices were not to free them from responsibility or mitigate their punishment; nor was that a defendant acted pursuant to an order of a superior to excuse him from responsibility, although it might be considered by the IMT in mitigation of punishment.\nAt the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation, the IMT was authorised to declare (in connection with any act of which the individual was convicted) that the group or organisation to which he belonged was a criminal organisation. When a group or organisation was thus declared criminal, the competent national authority of any signatory had the right to bring persons to trial for membership in that organisation, with the criminal nature of the group or organisation assumed proved.\nThe IMT subsequently convicted three of the groups: the Nazi leadership corps, the SS (including the SD) and the Gestapo. Gestapo members Hermann Göring, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and\nArthur Seyss-Inquart\nwere individually convicted. While three groups were acquitted of collective war crimes charges, this did not relieve individual members of those groups from conviction and punishment under the\ndenazification\nprogramme. Members of the three convicted groups, however, were subject to apprehension by\nBritain\n, the\nUnited States\n, the\nSoviet Union\n, and\nFrance\n.\nThese groups—the Nazi Party and government leadership, the German\nGeneral staff and High Command\n(OKW); the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA); the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS), including the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD); and the Gestapo—had an aggregate membership exceeding two million, making a large number of their members liable to trial when the organisations were convicted.\nAftermath\nSee also:\nRatlines (World War II)\nIn 1997,\nCologne\ntransformed the former regional Gestapo headquarters in Cologne—the\nEL-DE Haus\n—into a museum to document the Gestapo's actions.\nAfter the war, U.S.\nCounterintelligence Corps\nemployed the former Lyon Gestapo chief\nKlaus Barbie\nfor his anti-communist efforts and also helped him escape to\nBolivia\n.\nLeadership\nTimeline\nPrincipal agents and officers\nHeinrich Baab\n(SiPo-SD Frankfurt)\nKlaus Barbie\n(SiPo-SD Lyon)\nWerner Best\n(SiPo-SD Copenhagen)\nKarl Bömelburg\n(Head of Gestapo, Southern France)\nTheodor Dannecker\n(SiPo-SD Paris)\nRudolf Diels\n(Gestapo Chief 1933–1934)\nAdolf Eichmann\n(RSHA Berlin)\nGerhard Flesch\nHermann Göring\n(Founder of the Gestapo)\nViktor Harnischfeger (Düsseldorf Gestapo Criminal Commissar)\nReinhard Heydrich\n(SD, SiPo, Gestapo Chief 1934–1939, RSHA Chief 1939–1942)\nHeinrich Himmler\n(\nReichsführer-SS\n)\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n(RSHA Chief 1943–1945)\nHerbert Kappler\n(SD Chief Rome)\nWerner Knab\nHelmut Knochen\n(Paris)\nKurt Lischka\n(Paris)\nErnst Misselwitz\n(\nHauptscharführer\nSiPo-SD Paris)\nHeinrich Müller\n(Gestapo Chief 1939–1945)\nCarl Oberg\n(Paris)\nPierre Paoli\n(Head of Gestapo, Central France)\nOswald Poche\n(Chief of Frankfurt Lindenstrasse station)\nHenry Rinnan\n(Norwegian agent)\nKarl Eberhard Schöngarth\n(SiPo-SD General Government; Netherlands)\nMax Wielen\nRanks and uniforms\nThe Gestapo was a secretive plainclothes agency and agents typically wore civilian suits. There were strict protocols protecting the identity of Gestapo field personnel. When asked for identification, an operative was required only to present his warrant disc and not a picture identification. This disc identified the operative as a member of the Gestapo without revealing personal information, except when ordered to do so by an authorised official.\nLeitstellung\n(district office) staff did wear the grey SS service uniform, but with\npolice-pattern shoulderboards\n, and SS rank insignia on the left collar patch. The right collar patch was black without the\nsig runes\n. The SD sleeve diamond (SD\nRaute\n) insignia was worn on the lower left sleeve, even by SiPo men who were not in the SD. Uniforms worn by Gestapo men assigned to the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin occupied territories, were at first indistinguishable from the Waffen-SS field uniform. Complaints from the Waffen-SS led to a change of rank insignia shoulder boards from those of the Waffen-SS to those of the\nOrdnungspolizei\n.\nThe Gestapo maintained police detective ranks which were used for all officers, both those who were and who were not concurrently SS members.\nJunior career =\neinfacher Vollzugsdienst der Sicherheitspolizei (Laufbahn U 18: SS-Unterführer der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD)\n.\nSenior career =\nleitender Vollzugsdienst der Sicherheitspolizei (Laufbahn XIV: SS-Führer der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD)\nSources:\nRank insignia\nSource:\nSee also\nGeheime Feldpolizei\nHamburg State Police Headquarters\nNotes\n↑\nOperation Crossbow was one preliminary missions for\nOperation Overlord\n. See:\nOperation Crossbow – Preliminary missions for the Operation Overlord\n↑\nBonhoeffer was an active opponent of Nazism in the German resistance movement. Arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, he was sent to\nBuchenwald\nand later to Flossenbürg concentration camp where he was executed.\n↑\nThe stricter laws did not apply to lesbians as their behaviour was never officially criminalised, even though their behaviours were labelled \"deviant\".\n↑\nMore than that, the Anglo-American common language and capital interests kept Stalin at a distance since he felt the other Allied powers were hoping the fascists and Communists would destroy one another.\n↑\nPetschek Palace\nwas the Gestapo headquarters in Prague. See for instance the following article in Radio Prague International:\nhttps://english.radio.cz/petscheks-palace-once-headquarters-nazi-secret-police-8575365\n↑\nThere were reports that Müller ended up in the foreign secret service at Washington D.C., some allege he was in Moscow working for the Soviets, still others claimed he escaped to South America—but none of the myths have ever been proven; all of which adds to the \"mysterious power of the Gestapo\".\n↑\nAlthough an agent in uniform wore the collar insignia of the equivalent SS rank, he was still addressed as, e.g.,\nHerr Kriminalrat\n, not\nSturmbannführer\n. The stock character of the \"Gestapo Major\", usually dressed in the prewar black SS uniform, is a figment of Hollywood's imagination.\nCitations\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nWallbaum 2009\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n235.\n1\n2\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n483–485.\n1\n2\nSnyder 1994\n, p.\n242.\n↑\nDelarue 1964\n, pp.\n393–394.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n64–65.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n270.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n433.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, pp.\n64–66.\n↑\nFlaherty 2004\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n54.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, p.\n80.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, pp.\n82–83.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n159.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n14–15.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n15.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n204.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n201.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n156.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n271.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n469, 470.\n1\n2\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n131.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n661.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, p.\n145.\n↑\nUSHMM, \"Law and Justice in the Third Reich\"\n.\n↑\nGruchmann 1981\n, p.\n395.\n↑\nManchester 2003\n, p.\n519.\n↑\nSmith 2004\n, pp.\n262–274.\n↑\nUS National Archives, \"German Police Records Opened at the National Archives\"\n.\n↑\nBreitman 2005\n, p.\n139.\n↑\nBoeckl-Klamper, Mang\n&\nNeugebauer 2018\n, pp.\n299–305.\n↑\nBroucek 2008\n, p.\n414.\n↑\nThurner 2017\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nBoeckl-Klamper, Mang\n&\nNeugebauer 2018\n, p.\n300.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n126–140.\n↑\nMerson 1985\n, p.\n50.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n311–312.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, p.\n312.\n1\n2\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nLongerich 2019\n, pp.\n312–313.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n94–100.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n30–40.\n↑\nSchmid 1947\n, pp.\n61–63.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, pp.\n42–47.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n32–33.\n↑\nBurleigh 2000\n, p.\n727.\n↑\nBerben 1975\n, pp.\n141–142.\n↑\nBerben 1975\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nSteigmann-Gall 2003\n, pp.\n251–252.\n1\n2\nGellately 2020\n, p.\n176.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n160.\n1\n2\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n181.\n↑\nGellately 2020\n, pp.\n176–177.\n1\n2\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n180.\n↑\nGellately 2020\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nMcDonough 2005\n, pp.\n21–29.\n↑\nWilliamson 2002\n, pp.\n118–119.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, pp.\n29–30.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, pp.\n30–32.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nHoffmann 1977\n, p.\n121.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nOvery 1997\n, pp.\n245–281.\n↑\nHildebrand 1984\n, pp.\n86–87.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, pp.\n245–249.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n323.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n532.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n537.\n↑\nSpielvogel 1992\n, p.\n256.\n↑\nPeukert 1989\n, pp.\n198–199.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nManvell\n&\nFraenkel 2011\n, pp.\n97–98.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n150, 162.\n↑\nTuchel\n&\nSchattenfroh 1987\n, p.\n72.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n134, 135.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n103.\n1\n2\n3\nAvalon Project, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n160, 161.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n146–147.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nMcDonough 2017\n, p.\n48–49, 230–233.\n↑\nState of Israel 1992\n, p.\n69.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n671.\n↑\nAhlers 2001\n, pp.\n33–36.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n50.\n1\n2\n3\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n34.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n51.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n54–55.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n31.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n33–34.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n88–90.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n186–193.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nTrentmann 2023\n, p.\n41.\n1\n2\n3\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n181.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n132–150.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n11–12, 22.\n1\n2\nRees 1997\n, p.\n65.\n1\n2\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, p.\n175.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n136.\n1\n2\n3\nRees 1997\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, pp.\n168–169.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nPaul 1994\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n49, 146.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n151–152.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n48.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n35.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n114.\n1\n2\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n83–140.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n130.\n1\n2\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n132.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n74–80.\n↑\nAyçoberry 1999\n, p.\n272.\n↑\nEvans 2006\n, p.\n101.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n119–123.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n85–89.\n↑\nUlrich 1998\n, pp.\n60–81.\n↑\nLemkin 2008\n, pp.\n15–17.\n↑\nRussell 2002\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nUSHMM, \"Gestapo\"\n.\n1\n2\nRussell 2002\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, pp.\n43–44.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, p.\n44.\n↑\nCrankshaw 2002\n, pp.\n147–148.\n↑\nHesse, Kufeke\n&\nSander 2010\n, pp.\n177–179, 350–352.\n1\n2\nHilberg 1992\n, p.\n92.\n↑\nHilberg 1992\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nSkibińska 2012\n, pp.\n84, 88–89, 94–106.\n↑\nHolbraad 2017\n, pp.\n46–47.\n↑\nHolbraad 2017\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nRajsfus 1995\n, pp.\n51–52.\n↑\nBernstein 1947\n, pp.\n267–275.\n↑\nEvans 2010\n, pp.\n741–743.\n1\n2\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nBernstein 1947\n, pp.\n246–259.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n158–161.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n159–161.\n↑\nThe National Socialist Document Center of Cologne\n.\n↑\nBönisch\n&\nWiegrefe 2011\n.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, pp.\n106–107.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n33–36.\n↑\nBanach 2013\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n38–39, 54.\nBibliography\nAhlers, Sieglinde (2001). \"Frauen in der Polizei\". In Doris Freer (ed.).\nVon Griet zu Emma: Beiträge zur Geschichte von Frauen in Duisburg vom Mittelalter bis heute\n(PDF)\n. Duisburg: Frauenbüro.\nOCLC\n248422045\n.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 29 November 2020.\n\"Avalon Project – Yale University\"\n.\nNazi Conspiracy and Aggression\n. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office\n. Retrieved\n8 September\n2014\n.\nAyçoberry, Pierre (1999).\nThe Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945\n. New York: The New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-635-7\n.\nBanach, Jens (2013). \"Polizei im NS-System – Ausbildung und Rekrutierung in der Sicherheitspolizei\". In Hans Jürgen Lange (ed.).\nDie Polizei der Gesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der inneren Sicherheit\n(in German). Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.\nISBN\n978-3-663-09757-0\n.\nBauz, Ingrid; Sigrid Brüggemann; Roland Maier, eds. (2013).\nDie Geheime Staatspolizei in Württemberg und Hohenzollern\n. Stuttgart: Schmetterling.\nISBN\n3-89657-138-9\n.\nBenz, Wolfgang (2007).\nA Concise History of the Third Reich\n. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-520-25383-4\n.\nBerben, Paul (1975).\nDachau, 1933–45: The Official History\n. London: Norfolk Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85211-009-6\n.\nBernstein, Victor H. (1947).\nFinal Judgment: The Story of Nuremberg\n. New York: Boni & Gaer.\nISBN\n978-1-163-16417-4\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\nBoeckl-Klamper, Elisabeth; Mang, Thomas; Neugebauer, Wolfgang (2018).\nGestapo-Leitstelle Wien, 1938–1945\n(in German). Wien: Edition Steinbauer.\nISBN\n978-3-90249-483-2\n.\nBönisch, Georg; Wiegrefe, Klaus (20 January 2011).\n\"From Nazi to Criminal to Post-War Spy: German Intelligence Hired Klaus Barbie as Agent\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n.\nBreitman, Richard (2005).\nU.S. Intelligence and the Nazis\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-61794-9\n.\nBroucek, Peter (2008).\nMilitärischer Widerstand: Studien zur österreichischen Staatsgesinnung und NS-Abwehr\n(in German). Wien: Böhlau.\nISBN\n978-3-20577-728-1\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-820297-4\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS: Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnick, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\n.\nBurleigh, Michael (2000).\nThe Third Reich: A New History\n. New York: Hill and Wang.\nISBN\n978-0-8090-9325-0\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nCraig, William (1973).\nEnemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad\n(1st\ned.). Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n1-56852-368-8\n.\nCrankshaw, Edward (2002).\nGestapo: Instrument of Tyranny\n. Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill Books.\nISBN\n978-1-85367-481-5\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2014).\nThe Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-966921-9\n.\nDelarue, Jacques (1964).\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Dell.\nISBN\n978-0-913729-45-8\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:\nISBN / Date incompatibility (\nhelp\n)\nDelarue, Jacques (2008) .\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-60239-246-5\n.\nEvans, Richard (2005).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2006).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nEvans, Richard (2010).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFlaherty, T. H. (2004) .\nThe Third Reich: The SS\n. Time-Life Books, Inc.\nISBN\n978-1-84447-073-0\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-631-18507-9\n.\nGellately, Robert (1992).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-820297-4\n.\nGellately, Robert (2020).\nHitler's True Believers: How Ordinary People Became Nazis\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19068-990-2\n.\nGruchmann, Lothar (1981).\n\"\n'Nacht und Nebel' Justiz. Die Mitwirkung deutscher Strafgerichte an der Bekämpfung des Widerstandes in den besetzten westeuropäischen Ländern 1942–1944\"\n.\nVierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte\n(in German).\n29\n(3). Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH:\n342–\n396.\nJSTOR\n30195217\n.\nHesse, Klaus; Kufeke, Kay; Sander, Andreas (2010).\nTopography of Terror: Gestapo, SS and Reich Security Main Office on Wilhelm- and Prinz-Alberecht Strasse: A Documentation\n. Berlin: Stiftung Topographie des Terrors.\nISBN\n978-3-94177-207-6\n.\nHilberg, Raul (1992).\nPerpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945\n. New York: Harper Collins.\nISBN\n0-8419-0910-5\n.\nHildebrand, Klaus (1984).\nThe Third Reich\n. London and New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-04-943033-4\n.\nHoffmann, Peter (1977).\nThe History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.\nISBN\n978-0-262-08088-0\n.\nHöhne, Heinz (2001).\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. New York: Penguin Press.\nISBN\n978-0-14-139012-3\n.\nHolbraad, Carsten (2017).\nDanish Reactions to German Occupation\n. London: UCL Press.\nISBN\n978-1-91130-751-8\n.\nJohnson, Eric (1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04908-0\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-39306-757-6\n.\nKrausnick, Helmut\n, et al. (1968).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York; Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00-211026-6\nLemkin, Raphael (2008).\nAxis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress\n. Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-58477-901-8\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2019).\nHitler: A Biography\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19251-574-2\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael; Paul, Gerhard (1994). \"Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent? Gestapo, Society, and Resistance\". In David Crew (ed.).\nNazism and German Society, 1933–1945\n. New York and London: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0-415-08240-2\n.\nManchester, William (2003).\nThe Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Dynasty that Armed Germany at War\n. New York & Boston: Back Bay Books.\nManvell, Roger; Fraenkel, Heinrich (2011).\nGoering\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-61608-109-6\n.\nMcDonough, Frank (2005).\nOpposition and Resistance in Nazi Germany\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-00358-2\n.\nMcDonough, Frank (2017).\nThe Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler's Secret Police\n. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-51071-465-6\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMerson, Allan (1985).\nCommunist Resistance in Nazi Germany\n. New York: New York University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85315-601-7\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMollo, Andrew (1992).\nUniforms of the SS. Vol. 5. Sicherheitsdienst und Sicherheitspolizei 1931–1945\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-87200-462-4\n.\nMuseenkoeln.de.\n\"NSDOK\"\n.\nNS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt Köln\n. Retrieved\n30 April\n2019\n.\nOvery, Richard (1997).\nWhy the Allies Won\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-31619-3\n.\nPeukert, Detlev (1989).\nInside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life\n. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-04480-5\n.\nRajsfus, Maurice (1995).\nLa police de Vichy: les forces de l'ordre françaises au service de la Gestapo, 1940–1944\n[\nThe Vichy Police Force: The French Security Forces in the Service of the Gestapo, 1940–1944\n]\n(in French). Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur.\nISBN\n978-2-86274-358-5\n.\nRees, Laurence (1997).\nThe Nazis: A Warning from History\n. New York: New Press.\nISBN\n978-0-563-49333-4\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald (1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRussell, Edward Frederick Langley (2002).\nThe Scourge of the Swastika: A History of Nazi War Crimes During World War II\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n1-85367-498-2\n.\nSchmid, Heinrich (1947).\nApokalyptisches Wetterleuchten: Ein Beitrag der Evangelischen Kirche zum Kampf im Dritten Reich\n(in German). München: Verag der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in Bayern.\nASIN\nB00279MGQS\n.\nShirer, William (1990).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nSmith, Michael (2004). \"Bletchley Park and the Holocaust\".\nIntelligence and National Security\n.\n19\n(2):\n262–\n274.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/0268452042000302994\n.\nS2CID\n154692491\n.\nSkibińska, Alina (2012). \"Perpetrators Self-Portrait: The Accused Village Administrators, Commune Heads, Fire Chiefs, Forest Rangers, and Gamekeepers\". In Jan Gross (ed.).\nThe Holocaust in Occupied Poland: New Findings and New Interpretations\n. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-63163-124-9\n.\nSnyder, Louis\n(1994) .\nEncyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56924-917-8\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson (1992).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. New York: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13-393182-2\n.\nState of Israel (1992).\nThe Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem\n. Vol.\n1. Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Justice.\nISBN\n978-9-65279-010-1\n.\nSteigmann-Gall, Richard (2003).\nThe Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945\n. New York and London: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-82371-5\n.\nThurner, Christoph (2017).\nThe CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS's Maier-Messner Group\n. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.\nISBN\n978-1-47662-991-9\n.\nTrentmann, Frank (2023).\nOut of the Darkness: The Germans, 1942–2022\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.\nISBN\n978-1-52473-291-2\n.\nTuchel, Johannes; Schattenfroh, Reinhold (1987).\nZentrale des Terrors. Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8: Hauptquartier der Gestapo\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main, Olten, and Wien: Büchergilde Gutenberg.\nISBN\n978-3-7632-3340-3\n.\nUlrich, Herbert (1998). \"\n'Von der Gegenerbekampfung zur \"rassischen Generalprävention\". \"Schutzhaft\" und Konzentrationslager in der Konzeption der Gestapo-Führung, 1933–1939'\n\". In Herbert Ulrich; Karin Orth; Christoph Dieckmann (eds.).\nDie nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Entwicklung und Struktur\n(in German). Vol.\n1. Göttingen: Wallstein.\nISBN\n3-89244-289-4\n.\nUSHMM.\n\"Gestapo\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n10 August\n2017\n.\nUSHMM.\n\"Law and Justice in the Third Reich\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Holocaust Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\n10 August\n2017\n.\nUS National Archives (2000).\n\"Press Release nr00-52: German Police Records Opened at the National Archives\"\n.\nUnited States National Archives\n. Retrieved\n5 March\n2014\n.\nWallbaum, Klaus (2009).\nDer Überläufer: Rudolf Diels (1900–1957), der erste Gestapo-Chef des Hitler-Regimes\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-59818-4\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1-4087-0304-5\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography: Volume 1\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-5-6\n.\nWilliamson, David (2002).\nThe Third Reich\n(3rd\ned.). London: Longman Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-582-36883-5\n.\nFurther reading\nGerwarth, Robert (2012).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-18772-4\n.\nPadfield, Peter\n(2001) .\nHimmler: Reichsführer-SS\n. London: Cassel & Co.\nISBN\n978-0-304-35839-7\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nGestapo\n.\nFestung Furulund – magasinet – Dagbladet.no\n(in Norwegian)\nCollection of testimonies concerning Gestapo activity in occupied Poland during WWII in \"Chronicles of Terror\" database",
    "infobox": {
      "formed": "26April 1933;92 years ago(1933-04-26)",
      "preceding_agency": "Prussian Secret Police(founded 1851)",
      "dissolved": "8May1945;80 years ago(1945-05-08)",
      "employees": "32,000 (1944est.)[1]",
      "legal_jurisdiction": "GermanyOccupied Europe",
      "general_nature": "Secret police",
      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße8,Berlin52°30′25″N13°22′58″E/52.50694°N 13.38278°E/52.50694; 13.38278",
      "ministers_responsible": "Hermann Göring1933–1934,Minister President of PrussiaWilhelm Frick1936–1943,Interior MinisterHeinrich Himmler, Chief of the German Police, 1936–1945; Interior Minister, 1943–1945",
      "agency_executives": "Rudolf Diels(1933–1934)[2]Reinhard Heydrich(1934–1939)Heinrich Müller(1939–1945)",
      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSReich Security Main OfficeSicherheitspolizei"
    },
    "char_count": 74467
  },
  {
    "page_title": "Sturmabteilung",
    "name": "Sturmabteilung",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "The Sturmabteilung was the original paramilitary organisation under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party of Germany. It played a significant role in Hitler's rise to power in the 1920s and early 1930s. Its primary purposes were providing protection for Nazi rallies and assemblies, disrupting the meetings of opposing parties, fighting against the paramilitary units of the opposing parties, especially the Roter Frontkämpferbund of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and intimidating Romani, trade unionists, and especially Jews.",
    "description": "Nazi Party's original paramilitary wing",
    "full_text": "Sturmabteilung\nNazi Party's original paramilitary wing\nFor the assault detachments of the German Army during World War I, see\nStormtroopers (Imperial Germany)\n. For the youth groups, see\nJungsturm (disambiguation)\n. For other uses of stormtrooper, see\nStormtrooper (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nSturmabteilung\n(\n[\nˈʃtʊʁmʔapˌtaɪlʊŋ\n]\n;\nSA\n;\nlit.\n'\nStorm Division\n'\nor loosely 'stormtroopers') was the original\nparamilitary\norganisation under\nAdolf Hitler\nand the\nNazi Party\nof Germany. It played a significant role in\nHitler's rise to power\nin the 1920s and early 1930s. Its primary purposes were providing protection for Nazi rallies and assemblies, disrupting the meetings of opposing parties, fighting against the paramilitary units of the opposing parties, especially the\nRoter Frontkämpferbund\nof the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD) and the\nReichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold\nof the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD), and intimidating\nRomani\n,\ntrade unionists\n, and especially\nJews\n.\nThe SA were colloquially called\nBrownshirts\n(\nBraunhemden\n) because of the colour of their\nuniform's shirts\n, similar to\nBenito Mussolini\n's\nBlackshirts\n. The official SA uniform was a brown shirt with a brown tie. The colour came about because a large shipment of\nLettow\n-\nshirts\n, originally intended for the German\ncolonial troops\nin\nGermany's former East Africa colony\nbut which never reached its destination because of naval blockades,\nwas purchased in 1921 by\nGerhard Roßbach\nfor use by his\nFreikorps\nparamilitary unit. They were later used for his\nSchill Youth\norganization in Salzburg, and in 1924 were adopted by the Schill Youth in Germany.\nThe \"Schill Sportversand\" then became the main supplier for the SA's brown shirts. The SA developed pseudo-military titles for its members, with\nranks\nthat were later adopted by several other Nazi Party groups.\nAfter Hitler rose to Nazi Party leadership in 1921, he formalized the party's militant supporters into the SA as a group that was to protect party gatherings. In 1923, owing to his growing distrust of the SA, Hitler ordered the creation of\na bodyguard unit\n, which was abolished after the failed\nBeer Hall Putsch\nlater that year. Not long after Hitler's release from prison, he ordered the creation of another bodyguard unit in 1925 that ultimately became the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS). During the\nNight of the Long Knives\n(\ndie Nacht der langen Messer\n) purge in 1934, the SA's then-leader\nErnst Röhm\nwas arrested and executed. The SA continued to exist but lost almost all its influence and was effectively superseded by the SS, which took part in the purge. The SA remained in existence until after\nNazi Germany's final capitulation\nto the\nAllies\nin 1945, after which it was disbanded and outlawed by the\nAllied Control Council\n.\nRise\nThe term\nSturmabteilung\npredates the founding of the\nNazi Party\nin 1919. Originally it was applied to the specialized assault troops of\nImperial Germany\nin\nWorld War I\nwho used\ninfiltration tactics\nbased on being organized into small squads of a few soldiers each. The first official German\nstormtrooper\nunit was authorized on March 2, 1915, on the Western Front. The German high command ordered the\nVIII Corps\nto form a detachment to test experimental weapons and develop tactics that could break the deadlock on the\nWestern Front\n. On October 2, 1916,\nGeneralquartiermeister\nErich Ludendorff\nordered all German armies in the west to form a battalion of stormtroopers.\nThey were first used during the\n8th Army\n's\nsiege\nof\nRiga\n, and again at the\nBattle of Caporetto\n. Wider use followed on the Western Front in the\nGerman spring offensive\nin March 1918, when Allied lines were successfully pushed back tens of kilometers.\nThe DAP (\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n,\nGerman Workers' Party\n) was formed in\nMunich\nin January 1919, and Adolf Hitler joined it in September of that year. His talents for speaking, publicity and\npropaganda\nwere quickly recognized.\nBy early 1920 he had gained authority in the party, which changed its name to the NSDAP (\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\nor National Socialist German Workers' Party) in February 1920.\nThe party's executive committee added \"Socialist\" to the name over Hitler's objections, to help the party appeal to left-wing workers.\nThe precursor to the\nSturmabteilung\nhad acted informally and on an\nad hoc\nbasis for some time before this. Hitler, with an eye to helping the party to grow through propaganda, convinced the leadership committee to invest in an advertisement in the\nMünchener Beobachter\n(later renamed the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n) for a mass meeting in the\nHofbräuhaus\n, to be held in Munich on October 16, 1919. Some 70 people attended, and a second such meeting was advertised for November 13 in the\nEberl-Bräu\nbeer hall, also in Munich. About 130 people attended; there were hecklers, but Hitler's military friends promptly ejected them by force, and the agitators \"flew down the stairs with gashed heads\". The next year on February 24, he announced the party's\nTwenty-Five Point program\nat a mass meeting of some 2,000 people at the Hofbräuhaus. Protesters tried to shout Hitler down, but his former army companions, armed with rubber\ntruncheons\n, ejected the dissenters. The basis for the SA had been formed.\nHitler and\nHermann Göring\nwith SA stormtroopers in front of\nFrauenkirche, Nuremberg\nin 1928\nA permanent group of party members, who would serve as the\nSaalschutzabteilung\n(meeting hall protection detachment) for the DAP, gathered around\nEmil Maurice\nafter the February 1920 incident at the Hofbräuhaus. There was little organization or structure to this group. The group was also called the \"Stewards Troop\" (\nOrdnertruppen\n) around this time.\nMore than a year later, on August 3, 1921, Hitler redefined the group as the \"Gymnastic and Sports Division\" of the party (\nTurn- und Sportabteilung\n), perhaps to avoid trouble with the government.\nIt was by now well recognized as an appropriate, even necessary, function or organ of the party. The future SA developed by organizing and formalizing the groups of ex-soldiers and beer-hall brawlers who were to protect gatherings of the Nazi Party from disruptions from\nSocial Democrats\n(SPD) and\nCommunists\n(KPD), and to disrupt meetings of the other political parties. By September 1921 the name\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) was being used informally for the group.\nHitler was the official head of the Nazi Party by this time.\nThe Nazi Party held a large public meeting in the Munich Hofbräuhaus on November 4, 1921, which attracted many Communists and other enemies of the Nazis. After Hitler had spoken for some time, the meeting erupted into a mêlée in which a small company of SA thrashed the opposition. The Nazis called this event the\nSaalschlacht\n(\ntransl.\nMeeting hall battle\n), and it assumed legendary proportions in SA lore with the passage of time. Thereafter, the group was officially known as the\nSturmabteilung\n.\nThe leadership of the SA passed from Maurice to the young\nHans Ulrich Klintzsch\nin this period. He had been a naval officer and a member of the\nEhrhardt\nBrigade\n, which had taken part in the failed\nKapp Putsch\nattempted coup. When he took over command of the SA, he was a member of the notorious\nOrganisation Consul\n(OC).\nThe Nazis under Hitler began to adopt the more professional management techniques of the military.\nIn 1922, the Nazi Party created a youth section, the\nJugendbund\n, for young men between the ages of 14 and 18 years. Its successor, the\nHitler Youth\n(\nHitlerjugend\nor HJ), remained under SA command until May 1932.\nHermann Göring\njoined the Nazi Party in 1922 after hearing a speech by Hitler. He was given command of the SA as the\nOberster SA-Führer\nin 1923.\nHe was later appointed an SA-\nObergruppenführer\n(general) and held this rank on the SA rolls until 1945.\nThe SA unit in\nNuremberg\n, 1929\nFrom April 1924 until late February 1925, the SA was reorganized into a front organization known as the\nFrontbann\nto circumvent\nBavaria\n's ban on the Nazi Party and its organs. (This had been instituted after the abortive\nBeer Hall Putsch\nof November 1923). While Hitler was in prison,\nErnst Röhm\nhelped to create the\nFrontbann\nas a legal alternative to the then-outlawed SA. In April 1924, Röhm had also been given authority by Hitler to rebuild the SA in any way he saw fit. When in April 1925 Hitler and Ludendorff disapproved of the proposals under which Röhm was prepared to integrate the 30,000-strong\nFrontbann\ninto the SA, Röhm resigned from all political movements and military brigades on May 1, 1925. He felt great contempt for the \"legalistic\" path the party leaders wanted to follow and sought seclusion from public life.\nThroughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, members of the SA were often involved in street fights, called\nZusammenstöße\n(collisions), with members of the Communist Party (KPD). In 1929, the SA added a Motor Corps for better mobility and a faster mustering of units.\nIt also acquired an independent source of funds: royalties from its own\nSturm Cigarette Company\n. Previously, the SA had been financially dependent on the party leadership, as it charged no membership fees;\nthe SA recruited particularly among the many unemployed in the economic crisis.\nThe SA used violence against shops and shopkeepers stocking competing cigarette brands; it also punished any SA member caught with non-Sturm cigarettes.\nSturm marketing was also used to make military service more appealing. Cigarettes were sold with collectible sets of images of historical German army uniforms.\nMarketing for the SA's\nSturm Cigarette Company\nalso promoted military service.\nIn September 1930, as a consequence of the\nStennes revolt\nin Berlin, Hitler assumed supreme command of the SA as its new\nOberster SA-Führer\n. He sent a personal request to Röhm, asking him to return to serve as the SA's chief of staff. Röhm accepted this offer and began his new assignment on January 5, 1931. He brought radical new ideas to the SA and appointed several close friends to its senior leadership.\nPreviously, the SA formations were subordinate to the Nazi Party leadership of each\nGau\n. Röhm established new\nGruppen\nthat had no regional Nazi Party oversight. Each Gruppe extended over several regions and was commanded by a SA-\nGruppenführer\nwho answered only to Röhm or Hitler. Under Röhm as its popular leader and\nStabschef\n(Staff Chief), the SA grew in importance within the Nazi power structure and expanded to have thousands of members. In the early 1930s, the Nazis expanded from an extremist fringe group to the largest political party in Germany, and the SA expanded with it. By January 1932, the SA numbered approximately 400,000.\nMany of these stormtroopers believed in the\nstrasserist\npromise of\nnazism\n. They expected the Nazi regime to take more radical economic action, such as breaking up the vast landed estates of the aristocracy, once they obtained national power.\nBy the time Hitler assumed power in January 1933, SA membership had increased to approximately 2,000,000—twenty times as large as the number of troops and officers in the\nReichswehr\n(German Army).\nFall\nThe SA unit in\nBerlin\nin 1932\nAfter Hitler and the Nazis obtained national power, the SA leadership also became increasingly eager for power. By the end of 1933, the SA numbered more than 3 million men, and many believed they were the replacement for the \"antiquated\"\nReichswehr\n. Röhm's ideal was to absorb the army (then limited by law to no more than 100,000 men) into the SA, which would be a new \"people's army\". This deeply offended and alarmed the professional army leaders and threatened Hitler's goal of co-opting the\nReichswehr\n. The SA's increasing power and ambitions also posed a threat to other Nazi leaders.\nOriginally an adjunct to the SA, the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) was placed under the control of\nHeinrich Himmler\n, in part to restrict the power of the SA and their leaders.\nThe younger SS had evolved to be more than a bodyguard unit for Hitler and demonstrated that it was better suited to carry out Hitler's policies, including those of a criminal nature.\nAlthough some of the conflicts between the SS and SA were based on personal rivalries of leaders, the mass of members had key socio-economic differences and related conflicts. SS members generally came from the\nmiddle class\n, while the SA had its base among the unemployed and\nworking class\n. Politically speaking, the SA was more radical than the SS, with its leaders arguing the Nazi revolution had not ended when Hitler achieved power, but rather needed to implement\nStrasserism\nin Germany. Hitler believed that the defiant and rebellious culture encouraged before the seizure of power had to give way to using these forces for community organization. But the SA members resented tasks such as canvassing and fundraising, considering them\nKleinarbeit\n(\"little work\"), which had typically been performed by women before the Nazi seizure of power.\nRudolf Diels\n, the first\nGestapo\nchief, estimated that in 1933 Berlin, 70 percent of new SA recruits were former Communists.\nIn 1933, General\nWerner von Blomberg\n, the Minister of Defence, and General\nWalter von Reichenau\n, the chief of the\nReichswehr\n's Ministerial Department, became increasingly concerned about the growing power of the SA. Röhm had been given a seat on the National Defence Council and began to demand more say over military matters. On October 2, 1933, Röhm sent a letter to Reichenau that said: \"I regard the\nReichswehr\nnow only as a training school for the German people. The conduct of war, and therefore of mobilization as well, in the future is the task of the SA.\"\nSA knife\nBlomberg and von Reichenau began to conspire with Göring and Himmler against Röhm and the SA. Himmler asked\nReinhard Heydrich\nto assemble a dossier on Röhm. Heydrich recognized that for the SS to gain full national power, the SA had to be broken.\nHe manufactured evidence to suggest that Röhm had been paid 12 million marks by French agents to overthrow Hitler. Hitler liked Röhm and initially refused to believe the dossier provided by Heydrich. Röhm had been one of his first supporters and, without his ability to obtain army funds in the early days of the movement, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have ever become established. The SA under Röhm's leadership had also played a vital role in destroying the opposition during the elections of 1932 and 1933.\nNight of the Long Knives\nMain article:\nNight of the Long Knives\nThe architects of the purge: Hitler,\nGöring\n,\nGoebbels\n, and\nHess\n. Only\nHimmler\nand\nHeydrich\nare absent.\nHitler had his own reasons for wanting Röhm removed. Some of his powerful supporters had been complaining about Röhm for some time. The generals opposed Röhm's desire to have the SA, a force of by then over three million men, absorb the much smaller German Army into its ranks under his leadership.\nSince the officers had developed the\nReichswehr\nas a professional force of 100,000, they believed that it would be destroyed if merged with millions of untrained SA thugs.\nFurthermore, the army commanders were greatly concerned about reports of a huge cache of weapons in the hands of SA members.\nIndustrialists, who had provided the funds for the Nazi victory, were unhappy with Röhm's socialistic views on the economy and his claims that the real revolution had still to take place.\nPresident Hindenburg\ninformed Hitler in June 1934 that if a move to curb the SA was not forthcoming, he would dissolve the government and declare\nmartial law\n.\nHitler was also concerned that Röhm and the SA had the power to remove him as leader. Göring and Himmler played on this fear by constantly feeding Hitler with new information on Röhm's proposed coup. A masterstroke was to claim that\nGregor Strasser\n, whom Hitler felt had betrayed him, was part of the planned conspiracy against him. With this news, Hitler ordered all the SA leaders to attend a meeting in the Hanselbauer Hotel\nin\nBad Wiessee\n.\nOn June 30, 1934, Hitler, accompanied by SS units, arrived at Bad Wiessee, where he personally placed Röhm and other high-ranking SA leaders under arrest. Over the next 48 hours, 200 other senior SA officers were arrested on the way to Wiessee. Many were shot and killed as soon as they were captured, but Hitler decided to pardon Röhm because of his past services to the movement. On July 1, after much pressure from Göring and Himmler, Hitler agreed that Röhm should die. Hitler insisted that Röhm should first be allowed to commit suicide. When Röhm refused to do so, he was shot by two SS officers,\nTheodor Eicke\nand\nMichael Lippert\n.\nThough the names of 85 victims are known, estimates place the total number killed at between 150 and 200 men, the rest of whom remain unidentified.\nSome Germans were shocked by the executions, but many others perceived Hitler to have restored \"order\" to the country. Goebbels' propaganda highlighted the \"Röhm-Putsch\" in the days that followed. The\nhomosexuality of Röhm\nand other SA leaders was made public to add \"shock value\", although Hitler and other Nazi leaders had known for years about the sexuality of Röhm and other named SA leaders.\nAfter the purge\nAfter the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, the SA continued to operate, under the leadership of\nStabschef\nViktor Lutze\n, but the group was significantly downsized. Within a year's time, the SA membership was reduced by more than 40%.\nHowever, the Nazis increased attacks against Jews in the early 1930s and used the SA to carry these out.\nIn November 1938, after the assassination of German diplomat\nErnst vom Rath\nby\nHerschel Grynszpan\n(a Polish Jew), the SA was used for \"demonstrations\" against the act. In violent riots, members of the SA shattered the glass storefronts of about 7,500 Jewish stores and businesses. The events were referred to as\nKristallnacht\n('Night of Broken Glass', more literally 'Crystal Night').\nJewish homes were ransacked throughout Germany. This\npogrom\ndamaged, and in many cases destroyed, about 200\nsynagogues\n(constituting nearly all Germany had), many Jewish cemeteries, more than 7,000 Jewish shops, and 29 department stores. Some Jews were beaten to death and more than 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and taken to\nconcentration camps\n.\nThereafter, the SA became overshadowed by the SS; by 1939 it had little remaining significance in the Nazi Party, though it was never formally disbanded and continued to exist until the war ended. In January 1939, the role of the SA was officially established as a training school for the armed forces, with the establishment of the SA\nWehrmannschaften\n(SA Military Units).\nWith the start of World War II in September 1939, the SA lost most of its remaining members to military service in the\nWehrmacht\n(armed forces).\nIn January 1941, long-standing rivalries between the\nAuswärtiges Amt\n(Foreign Office) and the SS exploded with the attempted coup d'état in Bucharest that saw SS back the coup by the Iron Guard under its leader\nHoria Sima\nagainst the Prime Minister, General\nIon Antonescu\n, while the\nAuswärtiges Amt\ntogether with the Wehrmacht backed Antonescu. In the aftermath of the coup, the Foreign Minister\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\nmade an effort to curb the power of the SS to conduct a foreign policy independent of the\nAuswärtiges Amt\n. Taking an advantage of the long-standing rivalries between the SS and the SA, in 1941, Ribbentrop appointed an assemblage of SA men to head the German embassies in Eastern Europe, with\nManfred Freiherr von Killinger\ngoing to Romania,\nSiegfried Kasche\nto Croatia,\nAdolf-Heinz Beckerle\nto Bulgaria,\nDietrich von Jagow\nto Hungary, and\nHanns Ludin\nto Slovakia in order to ensure that there would be minimal co-operation with the SS.\nThe role of the SA ambassadors was that of \"quasi-\nReich\ngovernors\" as they aggressively supervised the internal affairs of the nations they were stationed in, making them very much unlike traditional ambassadors.\nThe SA leaders ambassadors fulfilled Ribbentrop's hopes in that all had distant relations with the SS, but as a group they were notably inept as diplomats with Beckerle being so crude and vulgar in his manners that King\nBoris III\nalmost refused to allow him to present his credentials at the\nVrana Palace\n.\nAs the ambassador in\nBratislava\n, Ludin arranged the deportation of 50,000 Slovak Jews to Auschwitz in 1942.\nOn 23–24 August 1944, Killinger notably bungled the German response to\nKing Michael I's Coup\nthat saw King\nMichael I of Romania\ndismiss Antonescu, sign an armistice with the Allies, and declare war on Germany, thereby costing the\nReich\nits largest source of oil.\nOf the SA ambassadors, Killinger and Jagow committed suicide in 1944 and 1945 respectively while Kasche and Ludin were executed for war crimes in 1947 in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia respectively. Beckerle spent 11 years in a Soviet POW camp, was released to West Germany in 1955, was charged with war crimes in 1966 for his role in the deportation of Macedonian Jews, which were dropped on grounds of ill health in 1968 and died in 1976 at a retirement home in West Germany.\nIn 1943, Viktor Lutze was killed in an automobile accident, and\nWilhelm Schepmann\nwas appointed as leader.\nSchepmann did his best to run the SA for the remainder of the war, attempting to restore the group as a predominant force within the Nazi Party and to mend years of distrust and bad feelings between the SA and SS. On the night of 29–30 March 1945, Austrian SA members were involved in a death march of Hungarian Jews from a work camp at Engerau (modern\nPetržalka\n,\nSlovakia\n) to\nBad Deutsch-Altenburg\nthat saw 102 of the Jews being killed, being either shot or beaten to death.\nIn April 1945,\nKreisstabsführer des Kremser Volkssturms\n(District\nChief of Staff\nof the\nKrems\nMilitia) and\nSA-Standartenführer\n(\nColonel\nof the SA) Leo Pilz led a contingent of\nVolkssturm\nmilitiamen during the\nStein Prison massacre\n, during which 400–500 prisoners were\nsummarily executed\n.\nPost-war\n, Pilz and four others were sentenced to death by the\nPeople's Court\nof\nVienna\n.\nThe SA ceased to exist in May 1945 when Nazi Germany collapsed. It was formally disbanded and outlawed by the\nAllied Control Council\nenacting Control Council Law No. 2 on October 10, 1945.\nIn 1946, the\nInternational Military Tribunal\nat\nNuremberg\nformally ruled that the SA was not a\ncriminal organization\n.\nLeadership\nMain articles:\nSupreme SA Leader\nand\nStabschef\nErnst Röhm\n, SA Chief of Staff, 1931–1934\nThe leader of the SA was known as the\nOberster SA-Führer\n, translated as Supreme SA-Leader. The following men held this position:\nEmil Maurice\n(1920–1921)\nHans Ulrich Klintzsch\n(1921–1923)\nHermann Göring\n(1923)\nNone\n(1923–1925)\nFranz Pfeffer von Salomon\n(1926–1930)\nAdolf Hitler\n(1930–1945)\nIn September 1930, to quell the Stennes Revolt and to try to ensure the personal loyalty of the SA to himself, Hitler assumed command of the entire organization and remained\nOberster SA-Führer\nfor the remainder of the group's existence until 1945. The day-to-day running of the SA was conducted by the\nStabschef-SA\n(SA Chief of Staff), a position Hitler designated for Ernst Röhm.\nAfter Hitler's assumption of the supreme command of the SA, it was the\nStabschef-SA\nwho was generally accepted as the Commander of the SA, acting in Hitler's name. The following personnel held the position of\nStabschef-SA\n:\nOtto Wagener\n(1929–1931)\nErnst Röhm\n(1931–1934)\nViktor Lutze\n(1934–1943)\nMax Jüttner\n(acting, May–August 1943)\nWilhelm Schepmann\n(1943–1945)\nOrganization\nSA organization\nThe SA was organized into several large regional\nGruppen\n(\"Groups\"). The group leader answered only to the\nStabschef-SA\nor Hitler.\nEach\nGruppe\nwas made up of subordinate\nBrigaden\n(\"Brigades\").\nSubordinate to the\nBrigaden\nwere the smaller\nregiment\n-sized\nStandarten\n.\nSA-Standarten\noperated in every major German city and were split into even smaller units, known as\nSturmbanne\nand\nStürme\n.\nThe command nexus for the entire SA was the\nOberste SA-Führung\n, located in\nStuttgart\n. The SA supreme command had many sub-offices to handle supply, finance and recruiting.\nAn SA-\nSturmmann\nof the Marine-\nSturmabteilung\n. His collar denotes that he is part of\nSturm 22 /\nStandarte\n1\n.\nThe SA also had several military training units. The largest was the\nSA-Marine\n, which served as an auxiliary to the\nKriegsmarine\n(German Navy) and performed\nsearch and rescue\noperations as well as harbor defense. The SA also had an \"army\" wing, similar to the\nWaffen-SS\n, known as\nFeldherrnhalle\n. This formation expanded from regimental size in 1940 to a fully-fledged armored corps (\nPanzerkorps Feldherrnhalle\n) in 1945. As for units formed outside of Germany, after the success of the\ninvasion of Poland\nin 1939, an SA unit, \"Great Government\" was formed. The units were renamed SA\nWehrschützen-Bereitschaften\nin 1942. The title was abbreviated to SA\nWehrbereitschaften\n, thereafter.\nOrganization structure August 1934–1945\nOberste SA-Führung\n(Supreme SA-Command & Control)\nGruppe\n(Group): consisting of several brigades\nBrigade\n: 3 to 9\nStandarten\nStandarte\n(\nStandard\n,\nregiment\nsized unit)\n: 3 to 5\nSturmbanner\nSturmbann\n(\nStorm\njurisdiction,\nbattalion\n-sized unit)\n: 3 to 5\nStürme\nSturm\n(Storm,\ncompany\nsized sub-unit)\n: 3 to 4\nTrupps\nTrupp\n(\nTroop\n,\nplatoon\n-sized sub-unit)\n: 3 to 4\nScharen\nSchar\n(\nsection\n)\n: 1 or 2\nRotten\n(squads or teams)\nRotte\n(\nsquad\nor team)\n: 4 to 8 SA-Men\nSA-Mann\n(SA-Man/SA-Trooper)\n\"Beefsteaks\" within the ranks\nSee also:\nBeefsteak Nazi\nand\nStrasserism\nIn his 1936\nHitler: A Biography\n, German historian\nKonrad Heiden\nremarked that within the SA ranks, there were \"large numbers of former Communists and Social Democrats\" and that \"many of the storm troops were called 'beefsteaks' – brown outside and red within.\"\nThe influx of non-Nazis into the\nSturmabteilung\nmembership was so prevalent that SA men would joke that \"In our storm troop there are three Nazis, but we shall soon have spewed them out.\"\nThe number of \"beefsteaks\" was estimated to be large in some cities, especially in northern Germany, where the influence of\nGregor Strasser\nand\nStrasserism\nwas significant.\nThe head of the Gestapo from 1933 to 1934,\nRudolf Diels\n, reported that \"70 percent\" of the new SA recruits in the city of Berlin had been communists.\nThis is evidenced further by historians, \"As for the prior youth group memberships, nearly half of the SS members and nearly one-third of the instant stormtroopers were with the Free Corps, vigilantes, or militant veterans' groups during their first 25 years of life. They also came in disproportionate numbers from left-wing youth groups such as the Socialist or Communist Youth or the Red Front (RFB).\"\nHistorians have argued that since most SA members came from working-class families or were unemployed, they were more amenable to\nMarxist\n-leaning socialism, expecting Hitler to fulfill the 25-point\nNational Socialist Program\n.\nHistorian\nThomas Friedrich\nstates that the repeated efforts by the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD) to appeal to the working-class backgrounds of the SA were \"doomed to failure\", because most SA men were focused on the nationalistic cult of Hitler and destroying the \"Marxist enemy\", a term that was used to identify both the KPD and the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD).\nThe \"beefsteak\" name also referred to party-switching between Nazi and Communist party members, particularly involving those within the SA ranks.\nSee also\nGermany portal\nPolitics portal\nCorps colors of the\nSturmabteilung\nUniforms and insignia of the\nSturmabteilung\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMilitia\nPolitical color\nPolitical uniform\nNational Action (UK)\n– Neo-nazi organization which uses logo based on SA\nSA-Feldjägerkorps\n(SA Field Police)\nSimilar paramilitary organizations\nAlbanian Fascist Party\n– Albania (\"Blackshirts\")\nBajrang Dal\n– India\nBlack Brigades\n– Italy\nBlackshirts\n– Italy\nBritish Union of Fascists\n– United Kingdom (\"Blackshirts\")\nBlue Shirts Society\n– China (\nKuomintang\n)\nBlueshirts\n– Ireland\nBlueshirts\n– Spain\nBlack Shorts\n–\nparody of the blackshirts in the writings of\nP. G. Wodehouse\nFreikorps\n– independent paramilitary organizations of ex-German Army soldiers and unemployed workers who fought against Communist uprisings after World War I\nSudetendeutsches Freikorps\n– paramilitary organizations of the\nNazi Germany\nGreenshirts\n– Ireland\nGold shirts\n– Mexico\nGreyshirts\n– ethnically Dutch South Africans (\nAfrikaaners\n)\nHirden\n– paramilitary wing of the\nNS\n, the Norwegian National Socialist party 1940–45.\nIntegralismo\nIron Guard\n– Romania (\"Greenshirts\")\nItalian Social Republic\n– (\"Blackshirts\")\nMilitia organizations in the United States\nNational Socialist Motor Corps\n– another Nazi Party organization\nNational Socialist Flyers Corps\n– another Nazi Party organization\nParti national social chrétien\n– Canada (\"Blueshirts\")\nPortuguese Legion\n– Portugal\nRed Shirts\n– United States\nSilver Legion of America\n– United States (\"Silvershirts\")\nSquadrismo\nTatenokai\nWeimar\nparamilitary groups\nYokusan Sonendan\nWeerbaarheidsafdeling\n– paramilitary arm of the\nNSB\n, the Dutch fascist and later National Socialist political party 1931–45.\nNotes\n↑\nBefore the end of 1919, Hitler had already been appointed head of propaganda for the party, with party founder\nAnton Drexler\n's backing.\n↑\nAt a special party congress held July 29, 1921, Hitler was appointed chairman. He announced that the party would stay headquartered in Munich and that those who did not like his leadership should just leave; he would not entertain debate on such matters. The vote was 543 for Hitler, and 1 against.\n↑\nThe OC's most infamous action was probably the brazen daylight assassination of the foreign minister\nWalther Rathenau\n, in early 1922. Klintzsch was also a member of the somewhat more reputable\nViking League\n(\nBund Wiking\n).\n↑\nThe NSDAP and its organs and instruments (including the\nVölkischer Beobachter\nand the SA) were banned in Bavaria (and other parts of Germany) following Hitler's abortive attempt to overthrow the\nWeimar\nRepublic\nin the\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin November 1923. The Bavarian ban was lifted in February 1925 after Hitler pledged to adhere to legal and constitutional means in his quest for political power.\nSee\nVerbotzeit\n.\n↑\nThe SA-Brigade was also designated as\nSA-Untergruppe\n(SA-Subgroup).\nCitations\n↑\n\"What Was the Sturmabteilung?\"\n.\nThe Collector\n. February 7, 2024.\nIn September 1923, during the Deutsche Tag (German Day) in Nuremberg, the SA became part of the Deutsche Bund, an alliance of several far-right, nationalist groups.\n↑\n\"The SA\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia\n. Retrieved\nNovember 23,\n2024\n.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n220.\n↑\nRoßbach, Gerhard\n(1950).\nMein Weg durch die Zeit. Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse\n. Weilburg/Lahn\n: Vereinigte Weilburger Buchdruckereien.\n↑\nDrury 2003\n.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n94.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, pp.\n94–98.\n↑\nManchester 2003\n, p.\n342.\n↑\nWilliam L. Shirer,\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n(1960) p. 42\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n112.\n1\n2\n3\nCampbell 1998\n, pp.\n19–20.\n↑\nToland 1976\n, p.\n111.\n1\n2\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n928.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1991\n, p.\n807.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n14.\n1\n2\nLindner\n.\n1\n2\nSiemens 2013\n.\n↑\nKlußmann, Uwe (November 29, 2012).\n\"Conquering the Capital: The Ruthless Rise of the Nazis in Berlin\"\n.\nSpiegel Online\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 28, 2019\n. Retrieved\nOctober 6,\n2019\n.\n1\n2\nGoodman\n&\nMartin 2002\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nMcNab 2011\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nBullock 1958\n, p.\n80.\n↑\n\"SA\"\n.\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n. Retrieved\nJuly 28,\n2017\n.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n304–306.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n17, 19–21.\n↑\nBaranowski 2010\n, pp.\n196–197.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–314.\n↑\nClaudia Koonz\n,\nThe Nazi Conscience\n, p. 87\n1\n2\nBrown 2009\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nAlford 2002\n, p.\n5.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nGunther, John\n(1940).\nInside Europe\n. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp.\n53–\n54.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 2005\n, pp.\n319–320.\n↑\n\"Hotel Hanslbauer in Bad Wiessee: Scene of the Arrest of Ernst Röhm and his Followers (June 30, 1934) – Image\"\n.\nghi-dc.org\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on October 6, 2018\n. Retrieved\nApril 28,\n2011\n.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–312.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n313.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nGermanNotes,\n\"Kristallnacht\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\non April 19, 2005\n. Retrieved\nNovember 26,\n2007\n.\n↑\nThe deportation\nArchived\nOctober 6, 2018, at the\nWayback Machine\nof\nRegensburg\nJews to\nDachau\nconcentration camp\n(\nYad Vashem\nPhoto Archives 57659)\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, pp.\n20, 21.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n22.\n1\n2\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n330.\n↑\nJacobsen 1999\n, p.\n62.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n356.\n↑\nBloch 1992\n, p.\n411.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n21.\n↑\nGarscha 2012\n, pp.\n307–308.\n↑\nKonstantin Ferihumer (2017).\n\"Der Fall Sonderer: Eine vergangenheitspolitische Kurzbiografie (The Sonderer Case: A short political biography of the past)\"\n(PDF)\n.\nDOEW.at\n(in German).\nVienna\n,\nAustria\n:\nDocumentation Centre of Austrian Resistance\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non June 18, 2025\n. Retrieved\nJune 18,\n2025\n.\n↑\nStein Trial (1946)\non the website of the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (in German). Retrieved 2025-06-19.\n↑\n\"Schutzstaffel (SS), 1925–1945 – Historisches Lexikon Bayerns\"\n.\nwww.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on April 3, 2020\n. Retrieved\nFebruary 19,\n2021\n.\n↑\n\"The Sturmabteilung or SA\"\n.\nHistory Learning Site\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on May 16, 2015\n. Retrieved\nSeptember 22,\n2013\n.\n↑\nHoffmann 2000\n, p.\n50.\n1\n2\nYerger 1997\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nYerger 1997\n, pp.\n11, 12.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nLittlejohn 1990\n, pp.\n5, 7.\n1\n2\n3\nLittlejohn 1990\n, p.\n7.\n↑\nLittlejohn 1990\n, pp.\n39–40.\n1\n2\nHeiden 1938\n, p.\n390.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n120.\n↑\nMerkl, Peter H. (1975).\nPolitical Violence Under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis\n. Princeton University Press. p.\n586.\nISBN\n978-0-691-07561-7\n.\n↑\nBendersky, Joseph W. (2007).\nA Concise History of Nazi Germany\n. Rowman & Littlefield. p.\n96.\nISBN\n978-0-7425-5363-7\n.\n↑\nFriedrich 2012\n, pp.\n213, 215.\nBibliography\nAlford, Kenneth (2002).\nNazi Millionaires: The Allied Search for Hidden SS Gold\n. Casemate Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-9711709-6-4\n.\nBaranowski, Shelley (2010).\nNazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-67408-9\n.\nBloch, Michael (1992).\nRibbentrop\n. New York: Crown Publishers.\nISBN\n0517593106\n.\nBrown, Timothy S. (2009).\nWeimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n9781845459086\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 2, 2023\n. Retrieved\nAugust 15,\n2015\n.\nBullock, Alan\n(1958).\nHitler: A Study in Tyranny\n. New York: Harper.\nCampbell, Bruce (1998).\nThe SA Generals and The Rise of Nazism\n.\nUniversity Press of Kentucky\n.\nISBN\n0-8131-2047-0\n.\nDrury, Ian (2003).\nGerman Stormtrooper 1914–1918\n.\nOsprey Publishing\n.\nFriedrich, Thomas (2012).\nHitler's Berlin: Abused City\n. Translated by Spencer, Stewart. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-16670-5\n.\nGarscha, Wilfrid (2012). \"Ordinary Austrians: Common War Criminals of World War II\". In Bischof, Günter; Plasser, Fritz; Maltschnig, Eva (eds.).\nAustrian Lives\n. University of New Orleans Press. pp.\n304–\n326.\nISBN\n978-1-60801-140-7\n.\nGoodman, Joyce; Martin, Jane (2002).\nGender, colonialism and education: the politics of experience\n. London; Portland, OR: Woburn Press.\nISBN\n0-7130-0226-3\n.\nHeiden, Konrad\n(1938).\nHitler: A Biography\n. London: Constable & Co. Ltd.\nHoffmann, Peter\n(2000) .\nHitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer 1921–1945\n. Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-30680-947-7\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nJacobsen, Hans-Adolf (1999). \"The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1945\". In Leitz, Christian (ed.).\nThe Third Reich The Essential Readings\n. Blackwell. pp.\n49–\n94.\nISBN\n9-780631-207009\n.\nLindner, Erik.\n\"Zwölf Millionen für Göring\"\n.\nCicero Online\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on August 26, 2018\n. Retrieved\nAugust 20,\n2018\n.\nLittlejohn, David (1990).\nThe Sturmabteilung: Hitler's Stormtroopers 1921–1945\n. London: Osprey Publishing.\nManchester, William (2003).\nThe Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Dynasty That Armed Germany at War\n. Back Bay.\nISBN\n0-316-52940-0\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2011).\nHitler's Masterplan: The Essential Facts and Figures for Hitler's Third Reich\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1907446962\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-78200-088-4\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2015).\nLeaders of the Storm Troops\n. Vol.\n1. Solihull, England: Helion & Company.\nISBN\n978-1-909982-87-1\n.\nMitcham, Samuel W. Jr. (1996).\nWhy Hitler?: The Genesis of the Nazi Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.\nISBN\n0-275-95485-4\n.\nSiemens, Daniel (September 11, 2013).\n\"Nazi storm-troopers' cigarettes\"\n(University department)\n.\nUCL SSEES Research Blog\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on October 6, 2019\n. Retrieved\nAugust 25,\n2018\n.\nToland, John\n(1976).\nAdolf Hitler\n. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.\nISBN\n0-385-03724-4\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John\n(2005) .\nThe Nemesis of Power\n. London: Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-1-4039-1812-3\n.\nYerger, Mark C. (1997).\nAllgemeine-SS: The Commands, Units, and Leaders of the General SS\n. Schiffer Publishing Ltd.\nISBN\n0-7643-0145-4\n.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1991).\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Macmillan Publishing.\nISBN\n0-02-897500-6\n.\nFurther reading\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nSturmabteilung\n.\nBessel, Richard\n(1984).\nPolitical Violence and The Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925–1934\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n0-300-03171-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2003).\nThe Coming of the Third Reich\n. Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303469-8\n.\nEvans, Richard J. (2005).\nThe Third Reich in Power\n. New York: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14-303790-3\n.\nFischer, Conan (1983).\nStormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis, 1929–35\n. Allen & Unwin.\nISBN\n0-04-943028-9\n.\nHalcomb, Jill (1985).\nThe SA: A Historical Perspective\n. Crown/Agincourt Publishers.\nISBN\n0-934870-13-6\n.\nHatch, Nicholas H. (trans. and ed.) (2000).\nThe Brown Battalions: Hitler's SA in Words and Pictures\n. Turner.\nISBN\n1-56311-595-6\n.\nMaracin, Paul (2004).\nThe Night of the Long Knives: 48 Hours that Changed the History of the World\n. The Lyons Press.\nMerkl, Peter H. (1980).\nThe Making of a Stormtrooper\n.\nPrinceton University Press\n.\nISBN\n0-691-07620-0\n.\nMitchell, Otis C. (2008).\nHitler's Stormtroopers\n.\nMcFarland & Company\n.\nISBN\n9780786477296\n.\nReiche, Eric G. (1986).\nThe Development of the SA in Nürnberg 1922–1934\n.\nCambridge University Press\n.\nISBN\n9780521524315\n.\nSiemens, Daniel (2018).\nStormtroopers. A new history of Hitler's Brownshirts\n.\nYale University Press\n.\nISBN\n9780300196818\n.\nWackerfuss, Andrew (2015).\nStormtrooper Families: Homosexuality and Community in the Early Nazi Movement\n.\nHarrington Park Press\n.\nISBN\n9781939594051\n.",
    "infobox": {
      "also_known_as": "Brownshirts (Braunhemden)",
      "leader": "Oberster SA-FührerStabschef",
      "dates_of_operation": "October5,1921(1921-10-05)–May8,1945(1945-05-08)",
      "country": "Germany",
      "allegiance": "Adolf Hitler,Nazi Party",
      "motives": "ProtectionIntimidation",
      "headquarters": "SA High Command,Barerstraße,Munich48°08′38″N11°34′03″E/48.14389°N 11.56750°E/48.14389; 11.56750",
      "ideology": "Nazism",
      "politicalposition": "Far-right[1]",
      "major_actions": "Kristallnacht",
      "status": "Dissolved",
      "size": "4 million (April 1934)[2]",
      "part_of": "Nazi Party",
      "allies": "Der Stahlhelm(1933–1935)(merged)",
      "opponents": "ReichsbannerRotfrontkämpferbund"
    },
    "char_count": 39123
  },
  {
    "page_title": "Sicherheitsdienst",
    "name": "Sicherheitsdienst",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "Sicherheitsdienst, full title Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS, or SD, was the intelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany. Established in 1931, the SD was the first Nazi intelligence organization and the Gestapo was considered its sister organization through the integration of SS members and operational procedures. The SD was administered as an independent SS office between 1933 and 1939. That year, the SD was transferred over to the Reich Security Main Office, as one of its seven departments. Its first director, Reinhard Heydrich, intended for the SD to bring every single individual within the Third Reich's reach under \"continuous supervision\".",
    "description": "Intelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany",
    "full_text": "Sicherheitsdienst\nIntelligence agency of the SS and the Nazi Party in Nazi Germany\nSicherheitsdienst\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈzɪçɐhaɪtsˌdiːnst\n]\n, \"Security Service\"), full title\nSicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS\n(\"Security Service of the\nReichsführer-SS\n\"), or\nSD\n, was the\nintelligence agency\nof the\nSS\nand the\nNazi Party\nin\nNazi Germany\n. Established in 1931, the SD was the first Nazi intelligence organization and the\nGestapo\n(formed in 1933) was considered its\nsister organization\nthrough the integration of SS members and operational procedures. The SD was administered as an independent SS office between 1933 and 1939. That year, the SD was transferred over to the\nReich Security Main Office\n(\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n; RSHA), as one of its seven departments.\nIts first director,\nReinhard Heydrich\n, intended for the SD to bring every single individual within the Third Reich's reach under \"continuous supervision\".\nFollowing Germany's defeat in\nWorld War II\n, the tribunal at the\nNuremberg trials\nofficially declared that the SD was a criminal organisation, along with the rest of Heydrich's RSHA (including the Gestapo) both individually and as branches of the SS in the collective.\nHeydrich was\nassassinated in 1942\n; his successor,\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n, was convicted of\nwar crimes\nand\ncrimes against humanity\nat the Nuremberg trials, sentenced to death and hanged in 1946.\nHistory\nOrigins\nThe SD, one of the oldest security organizations of the SS, was first formed in 1931 as the\nIc-Dienst\n(Intelligence Service\n) operating out of a single apartment and reporting directly to\nHeinrich Himmler\n. Himmler appointed a former junior naval officer,\nReinhard Heydrich\n, to organise the small agency.\nThe office was renamed\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD) in the summer of 1932.\nThe SD became more powerful after the\nNazi Party\ntook control of Germany in 1933 and the SS started infiltrating all leading positions of the security apparatus of the Reich.  Even before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, the SD was a veritable \"watchdog\" over the SS and over members of the Nazi Party and played a critical role in consolidating political-police powers into the hands of Himmler and Heydrich.\nGrowth of SD and SS power\nReinhard Heydrich\nin 1940\nOnce Hitler was appointed Chancellor by German President\nPaul von Hindenburg\n, he quickly made efforts to manipulate the aging president. On 28 February 1933, Hitler convinced Hindenburg to\ndeclare a state of emergency\nwhich suspended all civil liberties throughout Germany, due at least in part to the\nReichstag fire\non the previous night. Hitler assured Hindenburg throughout that he was attempting to stabilize the tumultuous political scene in Germany by taking a \"defensive measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the state\".\nWasting no time, Himmler set the SD in motion as they began creating an extensive card-index of the Nazi regime's political opponents, arresting labor organizers, socialists, Jewish leaders, journalists, and communists in the process, sending them to the newly established prison facility near Munich,\nDachau\n.\nHimmler's SS and SD made their presence felt at once by helping rid the regime of its known political enemies and its perceived ones, as well. As far as Heydrich and Himmler were concerned, the SD left their mission somewhat vaguely defined so as to \"remain an instrument for all eventualities\".\nOne such eventuality would soon arise.\nFor a while, the SS competed with the\nSturmabteilung\n(SA) for influence within Germany. Himmler distrusted the SA and came to deplore the \"rabble-rousing\" brownshirts (despite once having been a member) and what he saw as indecent sexual deviants amid its leadership.\nAt least one pretext to secure additional influence for Himmler's SS and Heydrich's SD in \"protecting\" Hitler and securing his absolute trust in their intelligence collection abilities, involved thwarting a plot from\nErnst Röhm\n's SA using subversive means.\nOn 20 April 1934\nHermann Göring\nhanded over control of the\nGeheime Staatspolizei\n(\nGestapo\n) to Himmler. Heydrich, named chief of the Gestapo by Himmler on 22 April 1934, also continued as head of the SD.\nThese events further extended Himmler's control of the security mechanism of the Reich, which by proxy also strengthened the surveillance power of Heydrich's SD, as both entities methodically infiltrated every police agency in Germany.\nSubsequently, the SD was made the sole \"party information service\" on 9 June 1934.\nUnder pressure from the\nReichswehr\n(German armed forces)\nleadership\n(whose members viewed the enormous armed forces of the SA as an existential threat) and with the collusion of Göring,\nJoseph Goebbels\n, the Gestapo and SD, Hitler was led to believe that Röhm's SA posed a serious conspiratorial threat requiring a drastic and immediate solution.\nFor its part, the SD provided fictitious information that there was an assassination plot on Hitler's life and that an SA putsch to assume power was imminent since the SA were allegedly amassing weapons.\nAdditionally, reports were coming into the SD and Gestapo that the vulgarity of the SA's behavior was damaging the party and was even making\nantisemitism\nless palatable.\nOn 30 June 1934 the SS and Gestapo acted in coordinated mass arrests that continued for two days. The SS took one of its most decisive steps in eliminating its competition for command of security within Germany and established itself firmly in the Nazi hierarchy, making the SS and its intelligence organ, the SD, responsible only to the Führer. The purge became known as the\nNight of the Long Knives\n, with up to 200 people killed in the action.\nMoreover, the brutal crushing of the SA and its leadership sent a clear message to everyone that opposition to Hitler's regime could be fatal.\nIt struck fear across the Nazi leadership as to the tangible concern of the reach and influence of Himmler's intelligence collection and policing powers.\nSD and Austria\nDuring the autumn of 1937, Hitler secured\nMussolini\n's support to annex\nAustria\n(Mussolini was originally apprehensive of the Nazi takeover of Austria) and informed his generals of his intentions to invade both Austria and\nCzechoslovakia\n.\nGetting Mussolini to approve political intrigue against Austria was a major accomplishment, as the Italian\nDuce\nhad expressed great concern previously in the wake of an Austrian SS unit's\nattempt to stage a coup\nnot more than three weeks after the\nRöhm affair\n, an episode that embarrassed the SS, enraged Hitler, and ended in the assassination of Austrian Chancellor\nEngelbert Dollfuss\non 25 July 1934.\nNonetheless, to facilitate the incorporation of Austria into the greater Reich, the SD and Gestapo went to work arresting people immediately, using lists compiled by Heydrich.\nHeydrich's SD and Austrian SS members received financing from Berlin to harass Austrian Chancellor\nvon Schuschnigg\n's government all throughout 1937. One section of the SD that was nothing more than a front for subversive activities against Austria ironically promoted \"German-Austrian peace\".\nThroughout the events leading to the\nAnschluß\nand even after the Nazis marched into Austria on 12 March 1938, Heydrich – convinced that only his SD could pull off a peaceful union between the two German-speaking nations – organized demonstrations, conducted clandestine operations, ordered\nterror\nattacks, distributed propaganda materials, encouraged the intimidation of opponents, and had his SS and SD personnel round up prominent anti-Nazis, most of whom ended up in\nMauthausen concentration camp\nThe coordinated efforts of the\nSiPo\nand Heydrich's SD during the first days of the\nAnschluß\neffectively eliminated all forms of possible political, military and economic resistance within Austria.\nOnce the annexation became official, the Austrian police were immediately subordinated to Heydrich's SD, the SS and Gestapo.\nMachinations by the SD, the Gestapo, and the SS helped to bring Austria fully into Hitler's grasp and on 13 March 1938, he signed into law the union with Austria as tears streamed down his face.\n\"Case Green\" and the Sudetenland\nConcomitant to its machinations against Austria, the SD also became involved in subversive activities throughout Czechoslovakia. Focusing on the\nSudetenland\nwith its 3 million ethnic Germans and the disharmony there which the Czech government could not seem to remedy, Hitler set Heydrich's SD in motion in what came to be known as\n\"Case Green\"\n.\nPassed off as a mission to liberate\nSudeten Germans\nfrom alleged Czech persecution, Case Green was in fact a contingency plan to outright invade and destroy the country, as Hitler intended to \"wipe Czechoslovakia off the map.\"\nThis operation was akin to earlier SD efforts in Austria; however, unlike Austria, the Czechs fielded their own Secret Service, against which Heydrich had to contend.\nOnce \"Case Green\"  began, Heydrich's SD spies began covertly gathering intelligence, even going so far as having SD agents use their spouses and children in the cover scheme. The operation covered every conceivable type of intelligence data, using a myriad of cameras and photographic equipment, focusing efforts on important strategic locations like government buildings, police stations, postal services, public utilities, logistical routes, and above all, airfields.\nHitler worked out a sophisticated plan to acquire the Sudetenland, including manipulating Slovak nationalists to vie for independence and the suppression of this movement by the Czech government. Under directions from Heydrich, SD operative\nAlfred Naujocks\nwas re-activated to engage in sabotage activities designed to incite a response from the Slovaks and the Czechs, a mission that ultimately failed.\nIn June 1938 a directive from the SD head office indicated that Hitler issued an order at\nJueterbog\nto his generals to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.\nTo hasten a presumed heavy response from the French, British, and Czechs, Hitler then upped the stakes and claimed that the Czechs were slaughtering Sudeten Germans. He demanded the unconditional and prompt cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in order to secure the safety of endangered ethnic Germans.\nAround this time, early plots by select members of the German General Staff emerged, plans which included ridding themselves of Hitler.\nEventually a diplomatic showdown pitting Hitler against the governments of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, and France, whose tepid reaction to the Austrian Anschluss had precipitated this crisis to some degree, ensued. The Sudetenland Crisis came to an end when\nNeville Chamberlain\nand Hitler signed the\nMunich Agreement\non 29 September 1938, effectively ceding the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany.\nInvolvement in international affairs by the SD certainly did not end there and the agency remained active in foreign operations to such a degree that the head of the Reich Foreign Ministry office,\nJoachim von Ribbentrop\n, complained of their meddling, since Hitler would apparently make decisions based on SD reports without consulting him.\nAccording to historian\nRichard Breitman\n, there was animosity between the SS leadership and Ribbentrop's Foreign Office atop their \"jurisdictional disputes\".\nIntrigue against Poland\nAside from its participation in diminishing the power of the SA and its scheme to kill Röhm, the SD took part in international intrigue, first by activities in Austria, again in Czechoslovakia, and then by helping provoke the \"reactive\" war against Poland. Code-named \"\nOperation Himmler\n\" and part of Hitler's plan to justify an attack upon Poland, the SD's clandestine activity for this mission included faking a Polish attack against \"innocent Germans\" at a German radio station in\nGleiwitz\n.\nThe SD took concentration-camp inmates condemned to die, and fitted them with Polish Army uniforms which\nHeinz Jost\nhad acquired from Admiral\nWilhelm Canaris\n'\nAbwehr\n(military intelligence).\nLeading this mission and personally selected by Heydrich was SS veteran\nAlfred Naujocks\n, who later reported during a War Criminal proceeding that he brought a Polish-speaking German along so he could broadcast a message in Polish from the German radio station \"under siege\" to the effect that it was time for an all out confrontation between Germans and Poles. To add documented proof of this attack, the SD operatives placed the fictitious Polish troops (killed by lethal injection, then shot for appearance) around the \"attacked\" radio station with the intention of taking members of the press to the site of the incident.\nImmediately in the wake of the staged incidents on 1 September 1939, Hitler proclaimed from the Reichstag in a famous radio address that German soldiers had been \"returning\" fire since 5:45 in the morning, setting the Second World War in Europe into motion.\nTasks and general structure\nGerman passport extended by the SD in Norway, March 1945\nThe SD was tasked with the detection of actual or potential enemies of the Nazi leadership and the neutralization of such opposition, whether internal or external. To fulfill this task, the SD developed an organization of agents and informants throughout the Reich and later throughout\nthe occupied territories\n, all part of the development of an extensive SS state and a\ntotalitarian regime\nwithout parallel.\nThe organization consisted of a few hundred full-time agents and several thousand informants. Historian George C. Browder writes that SD regiments were comparable to SS regiments, in that:\nSD districts (\nBezirke\n) emerged covering several Party circuits (\nKreis\n) or an entire district (\nGau\n). Below this level, SD sub-districts (\nUnterbezirke\n) slowly developed. They were originally to cover a single\nKreis\n, and, in turn, to be composed of wards (\nRevier\n), but such an ambitious network never emerged. Eventually, the SD-sub-districts acquired the simple designation of 'outposts' (\nAussenstellen\n) as the lowest level-office in the field structure.\nThe SD was mainly an information-gathering agency, while the Gestapo—and to a degree the Criminal Police (\nKriminalpolizei\nor Kripo)—was the executive agency of the political-police system. The SD and Gestapo did have integration through SS members holding dual positions in each branch. Nevertheless, there was some jurisdictional overlap and operational conflict between the SD and Gestapo.\nIn addition, the Criminal Police kept a level of independence since its structure had been longer-established.\nAs part and parcel of its intelligence operations, the SD carefully tracked foreign opinion and criticism of Nazi policies, censoring when necessary and likewise publishing hostile political cartoons in the SS weekly magazine,\nDas Schwarze Korps\n.\nAn additional task assigned to the SD and the Gestapo involved keeping tabs on the morale of the German population at large,\nwhich meant they were charged to \"carefully supervise the political health of the German ethnic body\" and once any symptoms of \"disease and germs\" appeared, it was their job to \"remove them by every appropriate means\".\nRegular reports—including opinion polls, press dispatches, and information bulletins were established. These were monitored and reviewed by the head of the Inland-SD,\nOtto Ohlendorf\n(responsible for intelligence and security within Germany) and by the former Heidelberg professor and SD member\nReinhard Höhn\n. This activity aimed to control and assess the \"life domain\" or\nLebensgebiet\nof the German population.\nGathered information was then distributed by the SD through secret internal political reports entitled\nMeldungen aus dem Reich\n(reports from the Reich) to the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, enabling Hitler's régime to evaluate the general morale and attitude of the German people so they could be manipulated by the\nNazi propaganda\nmachine in timely fashion.\nWhen the\nNuremberg Laws\nwere passed in 1935, the SD reported that the measures against the Jews were well received by the German populace.\nIn 1936, the police were divided into the\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Orpo or Order Police) and the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(SiPo or Security Police).\nThe Orpo consisted mainly of the\nSchutzpolizei\n(urban police), the\nGendarmerie\n(rural police) and the\nGemeindepolizei\n(municipal police). The SiPo was composed of the Kripo and the Gestapo. Heydrich became Chief of the SiPo and continued as Chief of the SD.\nContinued escalation of antisemitic policies in the spring of 1937 from the SD's Department of Jewish Affairs (\nGerman\n:\nAbteilung II/112: Juden\n) – staffed by members like\nAdolf Eichmann\n,\nHerbert Hagen\n, and\nTheodor Dannecker\n– led to the eventual\nremoval (\nEntfernung\n) of Jews from Germany\n; regardless of concerns about where they were headed.\nAdolf Eichmann's original task (in his capacity as deputy for the Jewish Affairs department within the SD) was at first to remove any semblance of \"Jewish influence from all spheres of public life\", which included the encouragement of wholesale Jewish emigration. Official bureaucratization increased apace with numerous specialized offices formed, aiding towards the overall persecution of the Jews.\nBecause the Gestapo and the SD had parallel duties, Heydrich tried to reduce any confusion or related territorial disputes through a decree on 1 July 1937, clearly defining the SD's areas of responsibility as those dealing with \"learning (\nWissenschaft\n), art, party and state, constitution and administration, foreign lands, Freemasonry and associations\" whereas the \"Gestapo's jurisdiction was Marxism, treason, and emigrants\".\nAdditionally, the SD was responsible for matters related to \"churches and sects, pacifism, the Jews, right-wing movements\", as well as \"the economy, and the Press\", but the SD was instructed to \"avoid all matters which touched the 'state police executive powers' (\nstaatspolizeiliche Vollzugsmaßnahmen\n) since these belonged to the Gestapo, as did all individual cases.\"\nIn 1938, the SD was made the intelligence organization for the State as well as for the Nazi Party,\nsupporting the Gestapo and working with the General and Interior Administration. As such, the SD came into immediate, fierce competition with German military intelligence, the\nAbwehr,\nwhich was headed by Admiral Canaris. The competition stemmed from Heydrich and Himmler's intention to absorb the\nAbwehr\nand Admiral Canaris' view of the SD as an amateur upstart. Canaris refused to give up the autonomy that his military intelligence organ possessed. Additional problems also existed, like the racial exemption for members of the\nAbwehr\nfrom the Nazi Aryan-screening process, and then there was competition for resources which occurred throughout Nazi Germany's existence.\nOn 27 September 1939, the SiPo became a part of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA) under Heydrich:\nSD-Inland became\nAmt\n(department) III (internal intelligence – within Germany) under\nOtto Ohlendorf\nthe Gestapo became\nAmt\nIV under\nHeinrich Müller\nthe Kripo became\nAmt\nV under\nArthur Nebe\nSD-Ausland became\nAmt\nVI (foreign intelligence – outside Germany) under\nWalter Schellenberg\nFrom February 1944 forward, the sections of the\nAbwehr\nwere incorporated into\nAmt\nVI.\nThe SD's relationship with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nMain article:\nEinsatzgruppen\nSee also:\nBandenbekämpfung\nFollow-up letter from\nReinhard Heydrich\nto the German diplomat\nMartin Luther\nasking for administrative assistance in the implementation of the Final Solution genocide, 26 February 1942\nThe SD was the overarching agency under which the\nEinsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n, also known as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, was subordinated; this was one of the principal reasons for the later war-crimes indictment against the organization by the Allies.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen's\npart in the Holocaust has been well documented. Its mobile killing units were active in the implementation of the\nFinal Solution\n(the plan for\ngenocide\n) in the territories overrun by the Nazi war machine.\nThis SD subsidiary worked closely with the Wehrmacht in persecuting Jews, communists, partisans, and other groups, as well.\nStarting with the invasion of Poland throughout the campaign in the East, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nruthlessly killed anyone suspected of being an opponent of the regime, either real or imagined.\nThe men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere recruited from the SD, Gestapo, Kripo, Orpo, and Waffen-SS.\nOn 31 July 1941, Göring gave written authorisation to SD Chief Heydrich to ensure a government-wide cooperative effort in the implementation of the so-called\nFinal Solution to the Jewish question\nin territories under German control.\nAn SD headquarter's memorandum indicated that the SD was tasked to accompany military invasions and assist in pacification efforts. The memo explicitly stated:\nThe SD will, where possible, follow up immediately behind the troops as they move in and, as in the Reich, will assume responsibility for the security of political life. Within the Reich, security measures are the responsibility of the Gestapo with SD cooperation. In occupied territory, measures will be under the direction of a senior SD commander; Gestapo officials will be allotted to individual\nEinsatzstäbe\n. It will be necessary to make available for special deployment a unit of\nVerfügungstruppe\nor\nTotenkopf\n[Death Head] formations.\nCorrespondingly, SD affiliated units, including the\nEinsatzgruppen\nfollowed German troops into Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia, Poland, Lithuania, as well as Russia.\nSince their task included cooperating with military leadership and vice versa, suppression of opposition in the occupied territories was a joint venture.\nThere were territorial disputes and disagreement about how some of these policies were to be implemented.\nNonetheless, by June 1941, the SS and the SD task forces were systematically shooting Jewish men of military age, which soon turned to \"gunning down\" old people, women, and children in the occupied areas.\nOn 20 January 1942, Heydrich chaired a meeting, now called the\nWannsee Conference\n, to discuss the implementation of the plan.\nFacilities such as Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz have their origins in the planning actions undertaken by Heydrich.\nHeydrich remained chief of the Security Police (SiPo) and the SD (through the RSHA) until his assassination in 1942, after which Ernst Kaltenbrunner was named chief by Himmler on 30 January 1943, and remained there until the end of the war.\nThe SD was declared a criminal organization after the war and its members were\ntried as war criminals at Nuremberg\n.\nWhatever their original purpose, the SD and SS were ultimately created to identify and eradicate internal enemies of the State, as well as to pacify, subjugate, and exploit conquered territories and peoples.\nOrganization\nThe SS Security Service, known as the SS\nSD-Amt\n, became the official security organization of the Nazi Party in 1934. Consisting at first of paid agents and a few hundred unpaid informants scattered across Germany, the SD was quickly professionalized under Heydrich, who commissioned National Socialist academics and lawyers to ensure that the SS and its Security Service in particular, operated \"within the framework of National Socialist ideology.\"\nHeydrich was given the power to select men for the SS Security Service from among any SS subdivisions since Himmler considered the organization of the SD as important.\nIn September 1939, the SD was divided into two departments, the interior department (\nInland-SD\n) and the foreign department (\nAusland-SD\n), and placed under the authority of the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA).\nInland-SD\nThe Interior Security Service  (\nInland-SD\n), responsible for intelligence and security within Germany, was known earlier as Department II and later, when placed under the Reich Security Main Office, as its Department III. It was originally headed by\nHermann Behrends\nand from September 1939 by Otto Ohlendorf.\nIt was within this organization that\nAdolf Eichmann\nbegan working out the details for the\nFinal Solution to the Jewish Question\n.\nDepartment III was divided into the following sections:\nSection A (Law and Legal Structures)\nSection B (Race and Ethnic Matters)\nSection C (Cultural and Religious Matters)\nSection D (Industry and Commerce)\nSection E (High Society)\nAusland-SD\nThe Foreign Security Service (\nAusland-SD\n), responsible for intelligence activities beyond the boundaries of Germany, was known earlier as Department III and later, after September 1939, as Department VI of the Reich Security Main Office.\nIt was nominally commanded by Heydrich, but run by his chief of staff\nHeinz Jost\n.\nIn March 1942 Jost was fired and replaced by\nWalter Schellenberg\n, a deputy of Heydrich. After the\n20 July plot\nin 1944, Department VI took over the functions of the Military Intelligence Service (\nAbwehr\n). Department VI was divided into the following sections:\nSection A (Organization and Administration)\nSection B (Espionage in the West)\nSection C (Espionage in the Soviet Union and Japan)\nSection D (Espionage in the American sphere)\nSection E (Espionage in Eastern Europe)\nSection F (Technical Matters)\nSecurity forces\nSD personnel during a\nłapanka\n(random arrest) in occupied Poland\nThe SD and the SiPo were the main sources of officers for the\nsecurity forces\nin occupied territories. SD-SiPo led battalions were typically placed under the command of the\nSS and Police Leaders\n, reporting directly to the RSHA in Berlin. The SD also maintained a presence at all\nconcentration camps\nand supplied personnel, on an as-needed basis, to such special action troops as the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nIn fact, all members of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwore the SD sleeve diamond on their uniforms.\nThe SD-SiPo was the primary agency, in conjunction with the\nOrdnungspolizei\n, assigned to maintain order and security in the\nNazi ghettos\nestablished by the Germans throughout occupied Eastern Europe.\nOn 7 December 1941, the same day as the Japanese\nattack on Pearl Harbor\n, the first extermination camp was opened at Chelmno near Lodz by\nErnst Damzog\n, the SD and SiPo commander in occupied\nPoznań\n(Posen). Damzog had personally selected the staff for the killing centre and later supervised the daily operation of the camp, which was under the command of\nHerbert Lange\n.\nOver a span of approximately 15 months, 150,000 people were killed there.\nInfiltration\nAccording to the book\nPiercing the Reich\n, the SD was infiltrated in 1944 by a former Russian national who was working for the Americans. The agent's parents had fled the\nRussian Revolution\n, and he had been raised in Berlin, and then moved to Paris. He was recruited by\nAlbert Jolis\nof the\nOffice of Strategic Services\n(OSS)\nSeventh Army\ndetachment. The mission was codenamed RUPPERT.\nHow extensive the SD's knowledge was about the early plots to kill Hitler by key members of the military remains a contested subject and a veritable unknown. According to British historian\nJohn Wheeler-Bennett\n, \"in view of the wholesale destruction of Gestapo archives it is improbable that this knowledge will ever be forthcoming. That the authorities were aware of serious 'defeatism' is certain, but it is doubtful whether they suspected anyone of outright treason.\"\nPersonnel\nGiven the nature of the intelligence operations assigned to the SD, there were clear delineations between what constituted a full member (\nMitglied\n) of the SD and those who were considered \"associates\" (\nMitarbeiter\n) with a further subset for clerical support personnel (typists, file clerks, etc.) who were connoted as V-persons (\nVertrauensleute\n).\nAll SD personnel, whether simply associates or full members were required to swear an oath of secrecy, had to meet all the requirements for SS membership, were assigned SD code numbers (\nChiffre Nummer\n) and if they were \"above the level of V-person\" they had to carry \"an SD identification card.\"\nThe vast majority of early SD members were relatively young, but the officers were typically older by comparison; nevertheless, the average age of an SD member was approximately 2 years older than the average Nazi Party member.\nMuch like the Nazi revolution in general, membership in the SS and the SD appealed more to the impressionable youth.\nMost SD members were Protestant by faith, had served in the military, and generally had a significant amount of education, representing \"an educated elite\" in the general sense – with about 14 percent of them earning doctorate degrees.\nHeydrich viewed the SD as spiritual-elite leaders within the SS and the \"cream of the cream of the NSDAP.\"\nAccording to historian George C. Browder, \"SD men represented no pathological or psychically susceptible group. Few were wild or extreme Nazi fanatics. In those respects they were 'ordinary men'. Yet in most other respects, they were an extraordinary mix of men, drawn together by a unique mix of missions.\"\nAlong with members of the Gestapo, SD personnel were \"regarded with a mixture of fear and foreboding,\" and people wanted as little to do with them as possible.\nBelonging to the security apparatus of Nazi Germany obviously had its advantages but it was also fraught with occupationally related social disadvantages as well, and if post-war descriptions of the SD by historians are any indication, membership therein implied being a part of a \"ubiquitous secret society\" which was \"sinister\" and a \"messenger of terror\" not just for the German population, but within the \"ranks of the Nazi Party itself.\"\nUniforms and insignia\nMain article:\nUniforms and insignia of the Schutzstaffel\nThe SD used\nSS-ranks\n. When in uniform they wore the grey\nWaffen-SS\nuniform first with army and then with\nOrdnungspolizei\nrank insignia on the shoulder straps, and SS rank insignia on the left collar patch. The right collar patch was black without the\nrunes. The branch color of the SD was green. The SD sleeve diamond (SD\nRaute\n) insignia was worn on the lower left sleeve.\nSD diamond. Here with white piping, as used by members of the\nGestapo\nwhen in uniform (if members of the SS).\nSD men in Poland 1939. The SD men are wearing army shoulder straps, akin to the\nWaffen-SS\n,\nexcept for the\nRottenführer\nin the front seat, who is wearing the older shoulder straps of the\nAllgemeine SS\n.\nM43 field tunic, with SS rank insignia and SD diamond on lower part of sleeve\nSee also\nBandenbekämpfung\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of SS personnel\nOperation Bolivar\nReferences\nInformational notes\n↑\nThe \"Ic\" abbreviation in German military staff structures designated \"military intelligence\"\n↑\nFollowing the Sudetenland Crisis, the SD then took part in operations against Poland.\n↑\nFor more on the creation of this organization, see: Browder, George C.\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004, .\n↑\nAt the end of March 1941, Hitler communicated his intention to 200 senior Wehrmacht officers about his decision to eradicate political criminals in the occupied regions, a task many of them were only too happy to hand-over to Himmler's\nEinsatzgruppen\nand SiPo.\n↑\nVictor Klemperer, one of the few Jews who survived the Nazi regime through his marriage to a German, claims that the real enemy of the Nazis was always the Jew, no matter who or what actually stood before them.\n↑\nFrom September 1939, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ncame under the overall command of the RSHA. See: Nuremberg Trial, Vol. 20, Day 194.\n↑\nTwenty-four\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders (men with the SD sleeve diamond on their uniforms) were tried after the war, becoming infamous for their brutality.\n↑\nSo severe were the interior policies of the Nazis under the watchful eye of the Department III, that when slave labor was brought into Germany to supplement the workforce during the war, German citizens who showed any kindness to foreign workers by giving them food or clothing were often punished.\n↑\nMany leading men in the SD had broad-ranging responsibilities across the network of interlocking Nazi agencies charged with the Reich's security;\nWerner Best\nproves a telling example in this regard, as he was not only an SD functionary, he was also an \"\nEinsatzgruppen\n-organizer,\" the head of the military government in France, and \"the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark.\"\n↑\nThe SD also maintained local offices in Germany's cities and larger towns. The small offices were known as\nSD-Unterabschnitte\n, and the larger offices were referred to as\nSD-Abschnitte\n. All SD offices answered to a local commander known as the\nInspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\nwho, in turn, was under the dual command of the RSHA and local\nSS and Police Leaders\n.\nCitations\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n44 fn.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n140–144.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n166–167.\n↑\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\" (1946)\n.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n410–411.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, pp.\n56–57.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n125.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n191–194.\n↑\nDistel\n&\nJakusch 1978\n, p.\n46.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n47–51.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n93–131.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n61.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n60–63.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n129.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n67–78.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, p.\n113.\n↑\nKulva 1984\n, pp.\n582–600.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n309–313.\n↑\nKershaw 2000\n, pp.\n521–522.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n65–66.\n↑\nBeller 2007\n, p.\n228.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n81.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n134–140.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, p.\n22.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n141.\n↑\nFest 2002\n, p.\n548.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n141–142.\n↑\nChilders 2017\n, p.\n403.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, p.\n144.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n144–145.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n281–282.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nFest 2002\n, pp.\n554–557.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n366–384.\n↑\nKershaw 2001\n, pp.\n121–125.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n283.\n↑\nBreitman 1991\n, p.\n222.\n↑\nWeinberg 2005\n, p.\n748.\n↑\nWilliams 2003\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, pp.\n518–520.\n↑\nBenz 2007\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nBracher 1970\n, pp.\n350–362.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n109.\n1\n2\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n134, 135.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n166–187.\n↑\nKoonz 2005\n, p.\n238.\n↑\nWall 1997\n, pp.\n183–187.\n↑\nFrei 1993\n, p.\n103.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n107–108.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n107–116.\n↑\nKoonz 2005\n, p.\n190.\n↑\nWilliams 2001\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n68–69.\n↑\nJohnson 1999\n, pp.\n106–107.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, pp.\n66–67.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nWall 1997\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nBlandford 2001\n, pp.\n11–25.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, p.\n172–187.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n113, 123–124.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, pp.\n354–356.\n↑\nKlemperer 2000\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nBrowning 2004\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n176–177.\n↑\nFritz 2011\n, pp.\n94–98.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, pp.\n96–97.\n↑\nMüller 2012\n, p.\n153.\n↑\nBuchheim 1968\n, pp.\n178–187.\n↑\nFrei 2008\n, p.\n155.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n696–697.\n↑\nWright 1968\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n149.\n↑\nRhodes 2003\n, p.\n274.\n↑\nMayer 2012\n, p.\n162.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n130.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n116.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n134–135.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n135, 141.\n↑\nStephenson 2008\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n135.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n355–356.\n↑\nDoerries 2007\n, pp.\n21, 80.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n136.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\n357–358.\n↑\nReitlinger 1989\n, pp.\n116–117.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2014\n, pp.\n120–121.\n↑\nGregor 2008\n, p.\n4.\n↑\nSpielvogel 2004\n, p.\n278.\n↑\nFriedlander 1995\n, pp.\n136–140, 286–289.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n115.\n↑\nPersico 1979\n, pp.\n103–107.\n↑\nWheeler-Bennett 1954\n, p.\n475.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n133–134.\n↑\nKater 1983\n, pp.\n141, 261.\n↑\nZiegler 1989\n, pp.\n59–79.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, pp.\n136–138.\n↑\nDederichs 2006\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nBrowder 1996\n, p.\n174.\n↑\nGellately 1992\n, p.\n143.\n↑\nHöhne 2001\n, p.\n210.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n33–36.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n42–43.\n↑\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n37–39.\n1\n2\n3\nMollo 1992\n, pp.\n38–39, 54.\nBibliography\nBeller, Steven (2007).\nA Concise History of Austria\n. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-52147-886-1\n.\nBenz, Wolfgang (2007).\nA Concise History of the Third Reich\n. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.\nISBN\n978-0-52025-383-4\n.\nBlandford, Edmund L. (2001).\nSS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service\n. Edison, NJ: Castle Books.\nISBN\n978-0-78581-398-9\n.\nBracher, Karl-Dietrich (1970).\nThe German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism\n. New York: Praeger Publishers.\nASIN\nB001JZ4T16\n.\nBreitman, Richard (1991).\nThe Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution\n. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.\nISBN\n978-0-39456-841-6\n.\nBrowder, George C. (1990).\nFoundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD\n. The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-81311-697-6\n.\nBrowder, George C (1996).\nHitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19820-297-4\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R.\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution\n: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n0-8032-1327-1\n.\nBuchheim, Hans (1968). \"The SS – Instrument of Domination\". In Krausnik, Helmut; Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf (eds.).\nAnatomy of the SS State\n. New York: Walker and Company.\nISBN\n978-0-00211-026-6\n.\nChilders, Thomas (2017).\nThe Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nISBN\n978-1-45165-113-3\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2014).\nThe Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19966-921-9\n.\nDederichs, Mario R. (2006).\nHeydrich: The Face of Evil\n. Newbury: Greenhill Books.\nISBN\n978-1-85367-803-5\n.\nDelarue, Jacques (2008).\nThe Gestapo: A History of Horror\n. New York: Skyhorse.\nISBN\n978-1-60239-246-5\n.\nDistel, Barbara; Jakusch, Ruth (1978).\nConcentration Camp Dachau, 1933–1945'\n. Munich: Comité International de Dachau.\nISBN\n978-3-87490-528-2\n.\nDoerries, Reinhard R. (2007).\nHitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg\n. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0-41544-932-8\n.\nFest, Joachim (2002) .\nHitler\n. Orlando, FL: Harcourt.\nISBN\n978-0-15602-754-0\n.\nFrei, Norbert (1993).\nNational Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.\nISBN\n978-0-63118-507-9\n.\nFrei, Norbert (2008). \"Auschwitz and the Germans: History, Knowledge, and Memory\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nFriedlander, Henry\n(1995).\nThe Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution\n. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80782-208-1\n.\nFritz, Stephen G. (2011).\nOstkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East\n. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.\nISBN\n978-0-81313-416-1\n.\nGellately, Robert (1992).\nThe Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945\n. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19820-297-4\n.\nGerwarth, Robert (2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nGregor, Neil (2008). \"Nazism–A Political Religion\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nHöhne, Heinz (2001) .\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS\n. Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0-14139-012-3\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, MA: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-74566-026-4\n.\nJohnson, Eric (1999).\nNazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-04908-0\n.\nKater, Michael H. (1983).\nThe Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67460-655-5\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2000) .\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393320350\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2001) .\nHitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis\n. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393322521\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0-393-06757-6\n.\nKlemperer, Victor (2000).\nLanguage of the Third Reich: LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii\n. New York and London: Continuum.\nISBN\n978-0-82649-130-5\n.\nKoonz, Claudia (2005).\nThe Nazi Conscience\n. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-067401-842-6\n.\nKulva, Otto Dov (1984).\n\"Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze und die deutsche Bevölkerung im Lichte geheimer NS-Lage und Stimmungsberichte\"\n(PDF)\n.\nVierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte\n(in German).\n32\n(1). Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH:\n582–\n624.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 13 September 2014\n. Retrieved\n12 September\n2014\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\nMayer, Arno (2012).\nWhy Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The \"Final Solution\" in History\n. New York: Verso Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-84467-777-1\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe SS: 1923–1945\n. London: Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1-906626-49-5\n.\nMollo, Andrew (1992).\nUniforms of the SS. Vol. 5. Sicherheitsdienst und Sicherheitspolizei 1931–1945\n. London: Windrow & Greene.\nISBN\n978-1-87200-462-4\n.\nMüller, Rolf-Dieter (2012).\nHitler's Wehrmacht, 1935–1945\n. München: Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag.\nISBN\n978-3-48671-298-8\n.\n\"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression\"\n.\nYale Law School—The Avalon Project\n. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1946\n. Retrieved\n8 September\n2014\n.\nPersico, Joseph E. (1979).\nPiercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents During World War II\n. New York: Viking Press.\nISBN\n0-670-55490-1\n.\nReitlinger, Gerald\n(1989).\nThe SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922–1945\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-306-80351-2\n.\nRhodes, Richard (2003).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage.\nISBN\n978-0-37570-822-0\n.\nShirer, William (1990) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nSpielvogel, Jackson (2004).\nHitler and Nazi Germany: A History\n. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.\nISBN\n978-0-13189-877-6\n.\nStephenson, Jill (2008). \"Germans, Slavs, and the Burden of Work in Rural Southern Germany during the Second World War\". In Neil Gregor (ed.).\nNazism, War and Genocide\n. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-85989-806-5\n.\nWall, Donald D. (1997).\nNazi Germany and World War II\n. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-31409-360-8\n.\nWeale, Adrian (2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York: Caliber Printing.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWeinberg, Gerhard (2005).\nHitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II\n. New York: Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-1-92963-191-9\n.\nWheeler-Bennett, John W. (1954).\nNemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945\n. New York: St. Martin's Press.\nASIN\nB0007DL1S0\n.\nWette, Wolfram\n(2007).\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67402-577-6\n.\nWilliams, Max (2001).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography (Vol. 1)\n. Church Stretton: Ulric.\nISBN\n0-9537577-5-7\n.\nWilliams, Max (2003).\nReinhard Heydrich: The Biography, Volume 2—Enigma\n. Church Stretton: Ulric Publishing.\nISBN\n978-0-9537577-6-3\n.\nWright, Gordon (1968).\nThe Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945\n. New York: Harper & Row.\nISBN\n0-0613140-8-0\n.\nZiegler, Herbert (1989).\nNazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership, 1925–1939\n. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-691-60636-1\n.\nExternal links\nMedia related to\nSicherheitsdienst\nat Wikimedia Commons",
    "infobox": {
      "formed": "9 June 1931",
      "preceding_agency": "Ic-Dienst1931",
      "dissolved": "8 May 1945",
      "type": "Intelligence agency",
      "jurisdiction": "GermanyOccupied Europe",
      "headquarters": "Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin",
      "employees": "6,482c.February 1944[1]",
      "minister_responsible": "Heinrich Himmler1931–45",
      "agency_executives": "Reinhard Heydrich, 1931–1942Heinrich Himmler, 1942–1943 (acting)Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 1943–1945",
      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSReich Security Main Office"
    },
    "char_count": 43941
  },
  {
    "page_title": "Nazi_Party",
    "name": "Nazi Party",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "The Nazi Party, officially the National Socialist German Workers' Party, was a far-right political party in Germany active between 1920 and 1945 that created and supported the ideology of Nazism. Its precursor, the German Workers' Party, existed from 1919 to 1920. The Nazi Party emerged from the extremist German nationalist, racist, and populist Freikorps paramilitary culture, which fought against communist uprisings in post–World War I Germany. The party was created to draw workers away from communism and into völkisch nationalism. Initially, Nazi political strategy focused on anti-big business, anti-bourgeoisie, and anti-capitalism, disingenuously using socialist rhetoric to gain the support of the lower middle class; that was later downplayed to gain the support of business leaders. By the 1930s, the party's main focus shifted to antisemitic and anti-Marxist themes. The party had little popular support until the Great Depression, when worsening living standards and widespread unemployment drove Germans into political extremism.",
    "description": "Far-right political party in Germany (1920–1945)",
    "full_text": "Nazi Party\nFar-right political party in Germany (1920–1945)\nThis article is about the political party that existed in Germany from 1920 to 1945. For other uses, see\nNazi Party (disambiguation)\n.\nThe\nNazi Party\n,\nofficially the\nNational Socialist German Workers' Party\n(\nGerman\n:\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\nor\nNSDAP\n), was a\nfar-right\npolitical party in Germany active between 1920 and 1945 that created and supported the ideology of\nNazism\n. Its precursor, the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n; DAP), existed from 1919 to 1920. The Nazi Party emerged from the\nextremist\nGerman nationalist\n(\"\nVölkisch\nnationalist\n\"),\nracist\n, and\npopulist\nFreikorps\nparamilitary culture, which fought against\ncommunist\nuprisings in post–\nWorld War I\nGermany.\nThe party was created to draw workers away from communism and into\nvölkisch\nnationalism.\nInitially, Nazi political strategy focused on anti-\nbig business\n, anti-\nbourgeoisie\n, and\nanti-capitalism\n, disingenuously using socialist rhetoric to gain the support of the\nlower middle class\n;\nthat was later downplayed to gain the support of business leaders. By the 1930s, the party's main focus shifted to\nantisemitic\nand\nanti-Marxist\nthemes.\nThe party had little popular support until the\nGreat Depression\n, when worsening living standards and widespread unemployment drove Germans into political extremism.\nCentral to Nazism were\nthemes of racial segregation\nexpressed in the idea of a \"people's community\" (\nVolksgemeinschaft\n).\nThe party aimed to unite \"racially desirable\" Germans as national comrades while excluding those deemed to be either political dissidents, physically or intellectually inferior, or of a\nforeign race\n(\nFremdvölkische\n).\nThe Nazis sought to strengthen the Germanic people, the \"\nAryan\nmaster race\n\", through racial purity and\neugenics\n, broad social welfare programs, and a collective subordination of individual rights, which could be sacrificed for the good of the state on behalf of the people. To protect the supposed purity and strength of the Aryan race, the Nazis sought to disenfranchise, segregate, and eventually\nexterminate\nJews\n,\nRomani\n,\nSlavs\n, the\nphysically\nand\nmentally disabled\n,\nhomosexuals\n,\nJehovah's Witnesses\n, and political opponents.\nThe persecution reached its climax when the party-controlled German state set in motion the\nFinal Solution\n–\nan industrial system of genocide that carried out mass murders of\naround 6\nmillion Jews and millions of other targeted victims\nin what has become known as\nthe Holocaust\n.\nAdolf Hitler\n, the party's leader since 1921, was appointed\nChancellor of Germany\nby President\nPaul von Hindenburg\non 30\nJanuary 1933, and quickly seized power afterwards. Hitler established a\ntotalitarian\nregime known as the\nThird Reich\nand became dictator with\nabsolute power\n.\nFollowing the military defeat of Germany in\nWorld War II\n, the party was declared illegal.\nThe Allies attempted to purge German society of Nazi elements in a process known as\ndenazification\n.\nSeveral top leaders\nwere tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity in the\nNuremberg trials\n, and executed. The use of symbols associated with the party is still outlawed in many European countries, including Germany and Austria.\nName\nThe renaming of the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(DAP) to the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) was partially driven by a desire to draw upon both left-wing and right-wing ideals, with \"\nSocialist\n\" and \"Workers'\" appealing to the left, and \"\nNational\n\" and \"German\" appealing to the right.\nNazi\n, the informal and originally derogatory term for a party member, abbreviates the party's name (\nNationalsozialist\n[\nnatsi̯oˈnaːlzotsi̯aˌlɪst\n]\n), and was coined in analogy with\nSozi\n(pronounced\n[\nˈzoːtsiː\n]\n), an abbreviation of\nSozialdemokrat\n(member of the rival\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n).\nMembers of the party referred to themselves as\nNationalsozialisten\n(National Socialists), but some did occasionally embrace the colloquial\nNazi\n(such as\nLeopold von Mildenstein\nin his article series\nEin Nazi fährt nach Palästina\npublished in\nDer Angriff\nin 1934). The term\nParteigenosse\n(party member) was commonly used among Nazis, with its corresponding feminine form\nParteigenossin\n.\nBefore the rise of the party, \"Nazi\" had been used as a colloquial and derogatory word for a backward\npeasant\n, or an awkward and clumsy person. It derived from Ignaz, a shortened version of\nIgnatius\n,\nwhich was a common name in the Nazis' home region of\nBavaria\n. Opponents seized on this, and the long-existing\nSozi\n, to attach a dismissive nickname to the National Socialists.\nIn 1933, when\nAdolf Hitler\nassumed power in the German government, the usage of \"Nazi\" diminished in Germany, although Austrian anti-Nazis continued to use the term.\nThe use of \"\nNazi Germany\n\" and \"Nazi regime\" was popularised by anti-Nazis and German exiles abroad. Thereafter, the term spread into other languages and eventually was brought back to Germany after World War II.\nIn English, the term is not considered slang and has such derivatives as\nNazism\nand\ndenazification\n.\nHistory\nOrigins and early years: 1918–1923\nThe Nazi Party grew out of smaller political groups with a nationalist orientation that formed in the last years of\nWorld War I\n. In 1918, a league called the\nFreier Arbeiterausschuss für einen guten Frieden\n(Free Workers' Committee for a good Peace)\nwas created in\nBremen\n, Germany. On 7 March 1918,\nAnton Drexler\n, an avid German nationalist, formed a branch of this league in\nMunich\n.\nDrexler was a local locksmith who had been a member of the militarist\nFatherland Party\nduring World War I and was bitterly opposed to the\narmistice\nof November 1918 and the revolutionary upheavals that followed. Drexler followed the views of militant nationalists of the day, such as opposing the\nTreaty of Versailles\n, having\nantisemitic\n, anti-monarchist and anti-Marxist views, as well as believing in the superiority of Germans whom they claimed to be part of the\nAryan\n\"\nmaster race\n\" (\nHerrenvolk\n). However, he also accused international capitalism of being a Jewish-dominated movement and denounced capitalists for war profiteering in World War I.\nDrexler saw the political violence and instability in Germany as the result of the\nWeimar Republic\nbeing out-of-touch with the masses, especially the lower classes.\nDrexler emphasised the need for a synthesis of\nvölkisch\nnationalism with a form of economic\nsocialism\n, in order to create a popular nationalist-oriented workers' movement that could challenge the rise of communism and\ninternationalist politics\n.\nThese were all well-known themes popular with various\nWeimar paramilitary groups\nsuch as the\nFreikorps\n.\nNazi Party badge emblem\nDrexler's movement received attention and support from some influential figures. Supporter\nDietrich Eckart\n, a well-to-do journalist, brought military figure\nFelix Graf von Bothmer\n, a prominent supporter of the concept of \"national socialism\", to address the movement.\nLater in 1918,\nKarl Harrer\n(a journalist and member of the\nThule Society\n) convinced Drexler and several others to form the\nPolitischer Arbeiter-Zirkel\n(Political Workers' Circle).\nThe members met periodically for discussions with themes of nationalism and racism directed against Jewish people.\nIn December 1918, Drexler decided that a new political party should be formed, based on the political principles that he endorsed, by combining his branch of the Workers' Committee for a good Peace with the Political Workers' Circle.\nOn 5 January 1919, Drexler created a new political party and proposed it should be named the \"German Socialist Workers' Party\", but Harrer objected to the term \"socialist\"; so the term was removed and the party was named the\nGerman Workers' Party\n(\nDeutsche Arbeiterpartei\n, DAP).\nTo ease concerns among potential middle-class supporters, Drexler made clear that unlike Marxists the party supported the middle-class and that its socialist policy was meant to give\nsocial welfare\nto German citizens deemed part of the Aryan race.\nThey became one of many\nvölkisch\nmovements\nthat existed in Germany. Like other\nvölkisch\ngroups, the DAP advocated the belief that through\nprofit-sharing\ninstead of\nsocialisation\nGermany should become a unified \"people's community\" (\nVolksgemeinschaft\n) rather than a society divided along class and party lines.\nThis ideology was explicitly antisemitic. As early as 1920, the party was raising money by selling a tobacco called\nAnti-Semit\n.\nFrom the outset, the DAP was opposed to non-nationalist political movements, especially on the left, including the\nSocial Democratic Party of Germany\n(SPD) and the\nCommunist Party of Germany\n(KPD). Members of the DAP saw themselves as fighting against \"\nBolshevism\n\" and anyone considered a part of or aiding so-called \"\ninternational Jewry\n\". The DAP was also deeply opposed to the\nTreaty of Versailles\n.\nThe DAP did not attempt to make itself public and meetings were kept in relative secrecy, with public speakers discussing what they thought of Germany's present\nstate of affairs\n, or writing to like-minded societies in\nNorthern Germany\n.\nNSDAP membership book\nThe DAP was a comparatively small group with fewer than 60 members.\nNevertheless, it attracted the attention of the German authorities, who were suspicious of any organisation that appeared to have subversive tendencies. In July 1919, while stationed in\nMunich\n, army\nGefreiter\nAdolf Hitler\nwas appointed a\nVerbindungsmann\n(intelligence agent) of an\nAufklärungskommando\n(reconnaissance unit) of the\nReichswehr\n(army) by\nCaptain Mayr\n, the head of the\nEducation and Propaganda Department\n(Dept Ib/P) in\nBavaria\n. Hitler was assigned to influence other soldiers and to infiltrate the DAP.\nWhile Hitler was initially unimpressed by the meetings and found them disorganised, he enjoyed the discussion that took place.\nWhile attending a party meeting on 12 September 1919 at Munich's\nSterneckerbräu\n, Hitler became involved in a heated argument with a visitor, Professor Baumann, who questioned the soundness of\nGottfried Feder\n's arguments against capitalism; Baumann proposed that Bavaria should break away from\nPrussia\nand found a new South German nation with\nAustria\n. In vehemently attacking the man's arguments, Hitler made an impression on the other party members with his oratorical skills; according to Hitler, the \"professor\" left the hall acknowledging unequivocal defeat.\nDrexler encouraged him to join the DAP.\nOn the orders of his army superiors, Hitler applied to join the party\nand within a week was accepted as party member 555 (the party began counting membership at 500 to give the impression they were a much larger party).\nAmong the party's earlier members were\nErnst Röhm\nof the Army's District Command VII; Dietrich Eckart, who has been called the spiritual father of National Socialism;\nthen-\nUniversity of Munich\nstudent\nRudolf Hess\n;\nFreikorps\nsoldier\nHans Frank\n; and\nAlfred Rosenberg\n, often credited as the philosopher of the movement. All were later prominent in the Nazi regime.\nHitler later claimed to be the seventh party member. He was, in fact, the seventh executive member of the party's central committee\nand he would later wear the\nGolden Party Badge\nnumber one. Anton Drexler drafted a letter to Hitler in 1940—which was never sent—that contradicts Hitler's later claim:\nNo one knows better than you yourself, my Führer, that you were never the seventh member of the party, but at best the seventh member of the committee... And a few years ago I had to complain to a party office that your first proper membership card of the DAP, bearing the signatures of Schüssler and myself, was falsified, with the number 555 being erased and number 7 entered.\nAlthough Hitler initially wanted to form his own party, he claimed to have been convinced to join the DAP because it was small and he could eventually become its leader.\nHe consequently encouraged the organisation to become less of a debating society, which it had been previously, and more of an active political party.\nNormally, enlisted army personnel were not allowed to join political parties. In this case, Hitler had Captain\nKarl Mayr\n's permission to join the DAP. Further, Hitler was allowed to stay in the army and receive his weekly pay of 20 gold marks a week.\nUnlike many other members of the organisation, this continued employment provided him with enough money to dedicate himself more fully to the DAP.\nHitler's first DAP speech was held in the\nHofbräukeller\non 16 October 1919. He was the second speaker of the evening, and spoke to 111 people.\nHitler later declared that this was when he realised he could really \"make a good speech\".\nAt first, Hitler spoke only to relatively small groups, but his considerable oratory and propaganda skills were appreciated by the party leadership. With the support of Anton Drexler, Hitler became chief of propaganda for the party in early 1920.\nHitler began to make the party more public, and organised its biggest meeting yet of 2,000 people on 24 February 1920 in the\nStaatliches Hofbräuhaus in München\n. Such was the significance of this particular move in publicity that\nKarl Harrer\nresigned from the party in disagreement.\nIt was in this speech that Hitler enunciated the\ntwenty-five points of the German Workers' Party manifesto\nthat had been drawn up by Drexler, Feder and himself.\nThrough these points he gave the organisation a much bolder stratagem\nwith a clear foreign policy (abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, a\nGreater Germany\n, Eastern expansion and exclusion of Jews from citizenship) and among his specific points were: confiscation of\nwar profits\n, abolition of unearned incomes, the State to share profits of land and land for national needs to be taken away without compensation.\nIn general, the manifesto was\nantisemitic\n,\nanti-capitalist\n,\nanti-democratic\n,\nanti-Marxist\nand\nanti-liberal\n.\nTo increase its appeal to larger segments of the population, on the same day as Hitler's\nHofbräuhaus\nspeech on 24 February 1920, the DAP changed its name to the\nNationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei\n(\"National Socialist German Workers' Party\", or Nazi Party).\nThe name was intended to draw upon both left-wing and right-wing ideals, with \"Socialist\" and \"Workers'\" appealing to the left, and \"National\" and \"German\" appealing to the right.\nThe word \"Socialist\" was added by the party's executive committee (at the suggestion of\nRudolf Jung\n), over Hitler's initial objections,\nin order to help appeal to left-wing workers.\nIn 1920, the Nazi Party officially announced that only persons of \"pure Aryan descent [\nrein arischer Abkunft\n]\" could become party members and if the person had a spouse, the spouse also had to be a \"racially pure\" Aryan. Party members could not be related either directly or indirectly to a so-called \"non-Aryan\".\nEven before it had become legally forbidden by the\nNuremberg Laws\nin 1935, the Nazis banned sexual relations and marriages between party members and Jews.\nParty members found guilty of\nRassenschande\n(\"racial defilement\") were persecuted heavily. Some members were even sentenced to death.\nHitler quickly became the party's most active orator, appearing in public as a speaker 31 times within the first year after his self-discovery.\nCrowds began to flock to hear his speeches.\nHitler always spoke about the same subjects: the Treaty of Versailles and\nthe Jewish question\n.\nThis deliberate technique and effective publicising of the party contributed significantly to his early success,\nabout which a contemporary poster wrote: \"Since Herr Hitler is a brilliant speaker, we can hold out the prospect of an extremely exciting evening\".\nOver the following months, the party continued to attract new members,\nwhile remaining too small to have any real significance in German politics.\nBy the end of the year, party membership was recorded at 2,000,\nmany of whom Hitler and Röhm had brought into the party personally, or for whom Hitler's oratory had been their reason for joining.\nHitler's membership card in the DAP (later NSDAP). The membership number (7) was altered from the original.\nHitler's talent as an orator and his ability to draw new members, combined with his characteristic ruthlessness, soon made him the dominant figure. However, while Hitler and Eckart were on a fundraising trip to Berlin in June 1921, a mutiny broke out within the party in Munich. Members of its executive committee wanted to merge with the rival\nGerman Socialist Party\n(DSP).\nUpon returning to Munich on 11 July, Hitler angrily tendered his resignation. The committee members realised that his resignation would mean the end of the party.\nHitler announced he would rejoin on condition that he would replace Drexler as party chairman, and that the party headquarters would remain in Munich.\nThe committee agreed, and he rejoined the party on 26 July as member 3,680. Hitler continued to face some opposition within the NSDAP, as his opponents had\nHermann Esser\nexpelled from the party and they printed 3,000 copies of a pamphlet attacking Hitler as a traitor to the party.\nIn the following days, Hitler spoke to several packed houses and defended himself and Esser to thunderous applause.\nHitler's strategy proved successful; at a special party congress on 29 July 1921, he replaced Drexler as party chairman by a vote of 533\nto\n1.\nThe committee was dissolved, and Hitler was granted nearly absolute powers in the party as its sole leader.\nHe would hold the post for the remainder of his life. Hitler soon acquired the title\nFührer\n(\"leader\") and after a series of sharp internal conflicts it was accepted that the party would be governed by the\nFührerprinzip\n(\"leader principle\"). Under this principle, the party was a highly centralised entity that functioned strictly from the top down, with Hitler at the apex. Hitler saw the party as a revolutionary organisation, whose aim was the overthrow of the\nWeimar Republic\n, which he saw as controlled by the socialists, Jews and the \"\nNovember criminals\n\", a term invented to describe alleged elements of society who had 'betrayed the German soldiers' in 1918. The\nSA\n(\"storm troopers\", also known as \"Brownshirts\") were founded as a party militia in 1921 and began violent attacks on other parties.\nMein Kampf\nin its first edition cover\nFor Hitler, the twin goals of the party were always German nationalist expansionism and\nantisemitism\n. These two goals were fused in his mind by his belief that Germany's external enemies—Britain, France and the Soviet Union—were controlled by the Jews and that Germany's future wars of national expansion would necessarily entail a war of annihilation against them.\nFor Hitler and his principal lieutenants, national and racial issues were always dominant. This was symbolised by the adoption as the party emblem of the\nswastika\n. In German nationalist circles, the swastika was considered a symbol of an \"\nAryan race\n\" and it symbolised the replacement of the Christian Cross with allegiance to a National Socialist State.\nThe Nazi Party grew significantly during 1921 and 1922, partly through Hitler's oratorical skills, partly through the SA's appeal to unemployed young men, and partly because there was a backlash against socialist and liberal politics in Bavaria as Germany's economic problems deepened and the weakness of the Weimar regime became apparent. The party recruited former World War\nI soldiers, to whom Hitler as a decorated frontline veteran could particularly appeal, as well as small businessmen and disaffected former members of rival parties. Nazi rallies were often held in beer halls, where downtrodden men could get free beer. The\nHitler Youth\nwas formed for the children of party members. The party also formed groups in other parts of Germany.\nJulius Streicher\nin\nNuremberg\nwas an early recruit and became editor of the racist magazine\nDer Stürmer\n. In December 1920, the Nazi Party had acquired a newspaper, the\nVölkischer Beobachter\n, of which its leading ideologist Alfred Rosenberg became editor. Others to join the party around this time were\nHeinrich Himmler\nand World War I flying ace\nHermann Göring\n.\nAdoption of Italian fascism: The Beer Hall Putsch\nOn 31 October 1922, a\nfascist\nparty with similar policies and objectives came into power in Italy, the\nNational Fascist Party\n, under the leadership of the charismatic\nBenito Mussolini\n. The Fascists, like the Nazis, promoted a national rebirth of their country, as they opposed communism and liberalism; appealed to the working-class; opposed the\nTreaty of Versailles\n; and advocated the territorial expansion of their country. Hitler was inspired by Mussolini and the Fascists, beginning to adopt elements of their program for the Nazi Party and himself.\nThe Italian Fascists also used a straight-armed\nRoman salute\nand wore black-shirted uniforms; Hitler would later borrow their use of the straight-armed salute as a\nNazi salute\n.\nWhen the Fascists took control of Italy through their\ncoup d'état\ncalled the \"\nMarch on Rome\n\", Hitler began planning his own coup less than a month later.\nIn January 1923, France occupied the\nRuhr\nindustrial region as a result of Germany's failure to meet its\nreparations\npayments. This led to economic chaos, the resignation of\nWilhelm Cuno\n's government and an attempt by the German Communist Party (KPD) to stage a revolution. The reaction to these events was an upsurge of nationalist sentiment. Nazi Party membership grew sharply to about 20,000,\ncompared to the approximate 6,000 at the beginning of 1923.\nBy November 1923, Hitler had decided that the time was right for an attempt to seize power in Munich, in the hope that the\nReichswehr\n(the post-war German military) would mutiny against the Berlin government and join his revolt. In this, he was influenced by former General\nErich Ludendorff\n, who had become a supporter—though not a member—of the Nazis.\nNazis during the\nBeer Hall Putsch\nin Munich\nOn the night of 8 November, the Nazis used a patriotic rally in a Munich beer hall to launch an attempted\nputsch\n(\"coup d'état\"). This so-called\nBeer Hall Putsch\nattempt failed almost at once when the local\nReichswehr\ncommanders refused to support it. On the morning of 9 November, the Nazis staged a march of about 2,000 supporters through Munich in an attempt to rally support. The two groups exchanged fire, after which 15 putschists, four police officers, and a bystander lay dead.\nHitler, Ludendorff and a number of others were arrested and were tried for treason in March 1924. Hitler and his associates were given very lenient prison sentences. While Hitler was in prison, he wrote his semi-autobiographical political manifesto\nMein Kampf\n(\"My Struggle\").\nThe Nazi Party was banned on 9 November 1923; however, with the support of the nationalist\nVölkisch-Social Bloc\n(\nVölkisch-Sozialer Block\n), it continued to operate under the name \"German Party\" (\nDeutsche Partei\nor DP) from 1924 to 1925.\nThe Nazis failed to remain unified in the DP, as in the north, the right-wing\nVolkish\nnationalist supporters of the Nazis moved to the new\nGerman Völkisch Freedom Party\n, leaving the north's left-wing Nazi members, such as\nJoseph Goebbels\nretaining support for the party.\nRise to power: 1925–1933\nFurther information:\nAdolf Hitler's rise to power\n\"Rise of Nazism\" redirects here. For the culmination of the rise, see\nNazi seizure of power\n.\nAdolf Hitler (standing) delivers a speech on the occasion of the refoundation of the NSDAP in February of 1925. Next to him from the perspective of the onlooker: On the right: Gregor Strasser and Heinrich Himmler. On the left: Franz Xaver Schwarz, Walter Buch and Alfred Rosenberg. Behind Hitler the Blutfahne (blood-flag), a central relique within the propaganda of the National-Socialists, can be seen attached to the wall.\nHitler with Nazi Party members in 1930\nPardoned by the Bavarian Supreme Court, Hitler was released from prison on 20 December 1924, against the state prosecutor's objections.\nOn 16 February 1925, Hitler convinced the Bavarian authorities to lift the ban on the NSDAP and the party was formally refounded on 26 February 1925, with Hitler as its undisputed leader. It was at this time Hitler began referring to himself as \"\nder\nFührer\n\".\nThe new Nazi Party was no longer a paramilitary organisation and disavowed any intention of taking power by force. In any case, the economic and political situation had stabilised and the extremist upsurge of 1923 had faded, so there was no prospect of further revolutionary adventures. Instead, Hitler intended to alter the party's strategy to achieving power through what he called the \"path of legality\".\nThe Nazi Party of 1925 was divided into the \"Leadership Corps\" (\nKorps der politischen Leiter\n) appointed by Hitler and the general membership (\nParteimitglieder\n). The party and the SA were kept separate and the legal aspect of the party's work was emphasised. In a sign of this, the party began to admit women. The SA and the\nSS\nmembers (the latter founded in 1925 as Hitler's bodyguard, and known originally as the\nSchutzkommando\n) had to all be regular party members.\nIn the 1920s the Nazi Party expanded beyond its Bavarian base. At this time, it began surveying voters in order to determine what they were dissatisfied with in Germany, allowing Nazi propaganda to be altered accordingly.\nCatholic Bavaria maintained its right-wing nostalgia for a Catholic monarch;\nand\nWestphalia\n, along with working-class \"Red Berlin\", were always the Nazis' weakest areas electorally, even during the Third Reich itself. The areas of strongest Nazi support were in rural Protestant areas such as\nSchleswig-Holstein\n,\nMecklenburg\n,\nPomerania\nand\nEast Prussia\n. Depressed working-class areas such as\nThuringia\nalso produced a strong Nazi vote, while the workers of the\nRuhr\nand\nHamburg\nlargely remained loyal to the\nSocial Democrats\n, the\nCommunist Party of Germany\nor the Catholic\nCentre Party\n. Nuremberg remained a Nazi Party stronghold, and the first\nNuremberg Rally\nwas held there in 1927. These rallies soon became massive displays of Nazi paramilitary power and attracted many recruits. The Nazis' strongest appeal was to the lower middle-classes—farmers, public servants, teachers and small businessmen—who had suffered most from the inflation of the 1920s, so who feared Bolshevism more than anything else. The small business class was receptive to Hitler's antisemitism, since it blamed Jewish big business for its economic problems. University students, disappointed at being too young to have served in the War of 1914–1918 and attracted by the Nazis' radical rhetoric, also became a strong Nazi constituency. By 1929, the party had 130,000 members.\nThe party's nominal Deputy Leader was\nRudolf Hess\n, but he had no real power in the party. By the early 1930s, the senior leaders of the party after Hitler were\nHeinrich Himmler\n,\nJoseph Goebbels\nand\nHermann Göring\n. Beneath the Leadership Corps were the party's regional leaders, the\nGauleiters\n, each of whom commanded the party in his\nGau\n(\"region\"). Goebbels began his ascent through the party hierarchy as\nGauleiter\nof Berlin-Brandenburg in 1926. Streicher was\nGauleiter\nof\nFranconia\n, where he published his antisemitic newspaper\nDer Stürmer\n. Beneath the\nGauleiter\nwere lower-level officials, the\nKreisleiter\n(\"county leaders\"),\nZellenleiter\n(\"cell leaders\") and\nBlockleiter\n(\"block leaders\"). This was a strictly hierarchical structure in which orders flowed from the top and unquestioning loyalty was given to superiors. Only the SA retained some autonomy. Being composed largely of unemployed workers, many SA men took the Nazis' socialist rhetoric seriously. At this time, the\nHitler salute\n(borrowed from the\nItalian fascists\n) and the greeting \"Heil Hitler!\" were adopted throughout the party.\nNazi Party election poster used in\nVienna\nin 1930 (translation: \"We demand freedom and bread\")\nThe Nazis contested elections to the national parliament (the\nReichstag\n) and to the state legislature (the\nLandtage\n) from 1924, although at first with little success. The \"\nNational Socialist Freedom Movement\n\" polled 3% of the vote in the\nDecember 1924\nReichstag\nelections\nand this fell to 2.6% in\n1928\n. State elections produced similar results. Despite these poor results and despite Germany's relative political stability and prosperity during the later 1920s, the Nazi Party continued to grow. This was partly because Hitler, who had no administrative ability, left the party organisation to the head of the secretariat,\nPhilipp Bouhler\n, the party treasurer\nFranz Xaver Schwarz\nand business manager\nMax Amann\n. The party had a capable propaganda head in\nGregor Strasser\n, who was promoted to national organizational leader in January 1928. These men gave the party efficient recruitment and organizational structures. The party also owed its growth to the gradual fading away of competitor nationalist groups, such as the\nGerman National People's Party\n(DNVP). As Hitler became the recognised head of the German nationalists, other groups declined or were absorbed. In the late 1920s, seeing the party's lack of breakthrough into the mainstream, Goebbels proposed that instead of focusing all of their propaganda in major cities where there was competition from other political movements, they should instead begin holding rallies in rural areas where they would be more effective.\nDespite these strengths, the Nazi Party might never have come to power had it not been for the\nGreat Depression\nand its effects on Germany. By 1930, the German economy was beset with mass unemployment and widespread business failures. The Social Democrats and Communists were bitterly divided and unable to formulate an effective solution: this gave the Nazis their opportunity and Hitler's message, blaming the crisis on the Jewish financiers and the\nBolsheviks\n, resonated with wide sections of the electorate. At the\nSeptember 1930\nReichstag\nelections\n, the Nazis won 18% of the votes and became the second-largest party in the\nReichstag\nafter the Social Democrats. Hitler proved to be a highly effective campaigner, pioneering the use of radio and aircraft for this purpose. His dismissal of Strasser and his appointment of Goebbels as the party's propaganda chief were major factors. While Strasser had used his position to promote his own leftish version of national socialism, Goebbels was completely loyal to Hitler, and worked only to improve Hitler's image.\nThe 1930 elections changed the German political landscape by weakening the traditional nationalist parties, the DNVP and the DVP, leaving the Nazis as the chief alternative to the discredited Social Democrats and the Zentrum, whose leader,\nHeinrich Brüning\n, headed a weak minority government. The inability of the democratic parties to form a united front, the self-imposed isolation of the Communists and the continued decline of the economy, all played into Hitler's hands. He now came to be seen as\nde facto\nleader of the opposition and donations poured into the Nazi Party's coffers. Some major business figures, such as\nFritz Thyssen\n, were Nazi supporters and gave generously\nand some Wall Street figures were allegedly involved,\nbut many other businessmen were suspicious of the extreme nationalist tendencies of the Nazis and preferred to support the traditional conservative parties instead.\nIn 1930, as the price for joining a\ncoalition government\nof the\nLand\n(state) of\nThuringia\n, the Nazi Party received the state ministries of the\nInterior\nand Education. On 23 January 1930,\nWilhelm Frick\nwas appointed to these ministries, becoming the first Nazi to hold a ministerial-level post at any level in Germany.\nGerman NSDAP Donation Token 1932, Free State of Prussia elections\nIn 1931 the Nazi Party altered its strategy to engage in perpetual campaigning across the country, even outside of election time.\nDuring 1931 and into 1932, Germany's political crisis deepened. Hitler ran for president against the incumbent\nPaul von Hindenburg\nin March 1932, polling 30% in the first round and 37% in the second against Hindenburg's 49% and 53%. By now the SA had 400,000 members and its running street battles with the SPD and Communist paramilitaries (who also fought each other) reduced some German cities to combat zones. Paradoxically, although the Nazis were among the main instigators of this disorder, part of Hitler's appeal to a frightened and demoralised middle class was his promise to restore law and order. Overt antisemitism was played down in official Nazi rhetoric, but was never far from the surface. Germans voted for Hitler primarily because of his promises to revive the economy (by unspecified means), to restore German greatness and overturn the\nTreaty of Versailles\nand to save Germany from communism. On 24 April 1932, the\nFree State of Prussia elections\nto the\nLandtag\nresulted in 36% of the votes and 162 seats for the NSDAP.\nOn 20 July 1932, the Prussian government was ousted by a coup, the\nPreussenschlag\n; a few days later at the\nJuly 1932\nReichstag\nelection\nthe Nazis made another leap forward, polling 37% and becoming the largest party in parliament by a wide margin. Furthermore, the Nazis and the Communists between them won 52% of the vote and a majority of seats. Since both parties opposed the established political system and neither would join or support any ministry, this made the formation of a majority government impossible. The result was weak ministries governing by decree. Under\nComintern\ndirectives, the Communists maintained their policy of treating the Social Democrats as the main enemy, calling them \"\nsocial fascists\n\", thereby splintering opposition to the Nazis.\nLater, both the Social Democrats and the Communists accused each other of having facilitated\nHitler's rise to power\nby their unwillingness to compromise.\nChancellor\nFranz von Papen\ncalled another\nReichstag\nelection in November, hoping to find a way out of this impasse. The electoral result was the same, with the Nazis and the Communists winning 50% of the vote between them and more than half the seats, rendering this\nReichstag\nno more workable than its predecessor. However, support for the Nazis had fallen to 33.1%, suggesting that the Nazi surge had passed its peak—possibly because the worst of the Depression had passed, possibly because some middle-class voters had supported Hitler in July as a protest, but had now drawn back from the prospect of actually putting him into power. The Nazis interpreted the result as a warning that they must seize power before their moment passed. Had the other parties united, this could have been prevented, but their shortsightedness made a united front impossible. Papen, his successor\nKurt von Schleicher\nand the nationalist press magnate\nAlfred Hugenberg\nspent December and January in political intrigues that eventually persuaded President Hindenburg that it was safe to appoint Hitler as Reich Chancellor, at the head of a cabinet including only a minority of Nazi ministers—which he did on 30 January 1933.\nAscension and consolidation\nReichsparteitag\n(Nuremberg Rally): Nazi Party leader\nAdolf Hitler\nand SA-leader\nErnst Röhm\n, August 1933\nIn\nMein Kampf\n, Hitler directly attacked both left-wing and right-wing politics in Germany.\nHowever, a majority of scholars identify\nNazism\nin practice as being a\nfar-right\nform of politics.\nWhen asked in an interview in 1934 whether the Nazis were \"bourgeois right-wing\" as alleged by their opponents, Hitler responded that Nazism was not exclusively for any class and indicated that it favoured neither the left nor the right, but preserved \"pure\" elements from both \"camps\" by stating: \"From the camp of bourgeois tradition, it takes national resolve, and from the materialism of the Marxist dogma, living, creative Socialism\".\nThe votes that the Nazis received in the 1932 elections established the Nazi Party as the largest parliamentary faction of the Weimar Republic government. Hitler was appointed as\nChancellor of Germany\non 30 January 1933.\nThe\nReichstag\nfire\non 27 February 1933 gave Hitler a pretext for suppressing his political opponents. The following day he persuaded the Reich's President\nPaul von Hindenburg\nto issue the\nReichstag\nFire Decree\n, which suspended most\ncivil liberties\n. The NSDAP won the\nparliamentary election on 5 March 1933\nwith 44% of votes, but failed to win an absolute majority. After the election, hundreds of thousands of new members joined the party for opportunistic reasons, most of them civil servants and white-collar workers. They were nicknamed the \"casualties of March\" (\nGerman:\nMärzgefallenen\n) or \"March violets\" (\nGerman:\nMärzveilchen\n).\nTo protect the party from too many non-ideological turncoats who were viewed by the so-called \"old fighters\"\n(alte Kämpfer)\nwith some mistrust,\nthe party issued a freeze on admissions that remained in force from May 1933 to 1937.\nOn 23 March, the parliament passed the\nEnabling Act of 1933\n, which gave the cabinet the right to enact laws without the consent of parliament. In effect, this gave Hitler dictatorial powers. Now possessing virtually absolute power, the Nazis established\ntotalitarian\ncontrol as they abolished labour unions and other political parties and imprisoned their political opponents, first at\nwilde Lager\n, improvised camps, then in\nconcentration camps\n.\nNazi Germany\nhad been established, yet the\nReichswehr\nremained impartial. Nazi power over Germany remained virtual, not absolute.\nAfter taking power: intertwining of party and state\nThe Nazis embarked on a campaign of\nGleichschaltung\n(coordination) to exert their control over all aspects of German government and society. During June and July 1933, all competing parties were either outlawed or dissolved themselves and subsequently the\nLaw Against the Formation of Parties\nof 14 July 1933 legally established the Nazi Party's monopoly. On 1 December 1933, the\nLaw to Secure the Unity of Party and State\nentered into force, which was the base for a progressive intertwining of party structures and state apparatus.\nBy this law, the SA—actually a party division—was given quasi-governmental authority and their\nStabschef\nbecame a cabinet\nminister without portfolio\n. By virtue of the 30 January 1934\nLaw on the Reconstruction of the Reich\n, the\nLänder\n(states) lost their sovereignty and were demoted to administrative divisions of the\nReich\ngovernment. Effectively, they lost most of their power to the\nGaue\nthat were originally just regional divisions of the party, but took over most competencies of the state administration in their respective sectors.\nDuring the\nRöhm Purge\nof 30 June to 2 July 1934 (also known as the \"Night of the Long Knives\"), Hitler disempowered the SA's leadership—most of whom belonged to the\nStrasserist\n(national revolutionary) faction within the NSDAP—and ordered them killed. He accused them of having conspired to stage a\ncoup d'état\n, but it is believed that this was only a pretense to justify the suppression of any intraparty opposition. The purge was executed by the SS, assisted by the Gestapo and Reichswehr units. Aside from Strasserist Nazis, they also murdered anti-Nazi conservative figures like former chancellor von Schleicher.\nAfter this, the SA continued to exist but lost much of its importance, while the role of the SS grew significantly. Formerly only a sub-organisation of the SA, it was made into a separate organisation of the NSDAP in July 1934.\nUpon the death of President Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, Hitler merged the offices of party leader, head of state and chief of government in one, taking the title of\nFührer\nund Reichskanzler\nby passage of the\nLaw Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich\n. The\nChancellery of the Führer\n, officially an organisation of the Nazi Party, took over the functions of the Office of the President (a government agency), blurring the distinction between structures of party and state even further. The SS increasingly exerted police functions, a development which was formally documented by the merger of the offices of\nReichsführer-SS\nand Chief of the German Police on 17 June 1936, as the position was held by\nHeinrich Himmler\nwho derived his authority directly from Hitler.\nThe\nSicherheitsdienst\n(SD, formally the \"Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS\") that had been created in 1931 as an intraparty intelligence became the\nde facto\nintelligence agency of Nazi Germany. It was put under the\nReich Security Main Office\n(RSHA) in 1939, which then coordinated SD, Gestapo and\ncriminal police\n, therefore functioning as a hybrid organisation of state and party structures.\nAdolf Hitler in\nBonn\nin 1938\nDefeat and abolition\nOfficially, Nazi Germany lasted only 12 years. The\nInstrument of Surrender\nwas signed by representatives of the German High Command at\nBerlin\n, on 8 May 1945, when the war ended in Europe.\nThe party was formally abolished on 10 October 1945 by the\nAllied Control Council\n, followed by the process of\ndenazification\nalong with\ntrials of major war criminals\nbefore the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg.\nPart of the\nPotsdam Agreement\ncalled for the destruction of the Nazi Party alongside the requirement for the reconstruction of the German political life.\nIn addition, the Control Council Law no. 2 Providing for the Termination and Liquidation of the Nazi Organization specified the abolition of 52 other Nazi affiliated and supervised organisations and outlawed their activities.\nThe denazification was carried out in Germany and continued until the onset of the Cold War.\nBetween 1939 and 1945, the Nazi Party led regime, assisted by\ncollaborationist\ngovernments and recruits from occupied countries, was responsible for the deaths of at least twenty million people,\nincluding 5.5 to 6\nmillion Jews (representing two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe),\nand between 200,000 and 1,500,000\nRomani people\n.\nThe estimated total number includes the killing of nearly two million non-Jewish\nPoles\n,\nover three million\nSoviet prisoners of war\n,\ncommunists\n, and other political opponents, homosexuals, the physically and mentally disabled.\nPolitical programme\nMain article:\nNational Socialist Program\nThe National Socialist Programme was a formulation of the policies of the party. It contained 25 points and is therefore also known as the \"25-point plan\" or \"25-point programme\". It was the official party programme, with minor changes, from its proclamation as such by Hitler in 1920, when the party was still the German Workers' Party, until its dissolution.\nParty composition\nCommand structure\nTop leadership\nAdolf Hitler and\nRudolf Hess\nin\nWeimar\nin 1930\nAt the top of the Nazi Party was the party chairman (\"\nDer Führer\n\"), who held absolute power and full command over the party. All other party offices were subordinate to his position and had to depend on his instructions. In 1934, Hitler founded a separate body for the chairman,\nChancellery of the Führer\n, with its own sub-units.\nBelow the Führer's chancellery was first the \"Staff of the Deputy Führer\", headed by\nRudolf Hess\nfrom 21 April 1933 to 10 May 1941; and then the \"\nParty Chancellery\n\" (\nParteikanzlei\n), headed by\nMartin Bormann\n.\nFollowing Hitler's suicide on 30 April 1945, Bormann would be named as Party Minister, which gave him the top position in the Nazi Party itself;\nunlike Hitler, however, Bormann would not have a leadership role over the government of Nazi Germany.\nBormann, whose fate would remain unknown for several decades, would soon afterwards commit suicide as well on 2 May 1945 while trying to flee Berlin around the time Soviet Union forces\ncaptured the city\n.\nHis remains were first identified in 1972, then again in 1998 through DNA testing.\nReichsleiter\nDirectly subjected to the Führer were the\nReichsleiter\n(\"Reich Leader(s)\"—the singular and plural forms are identical in German), whose number was gradually increased to eighteen. They held power and influence comparable to the Reich Ministers' in\nHitler's Cabinet\n. The eighteen\nReichsleiter\nformed the \"Reich Leadership of the Nazi Party\" (\nReichsleitung der NSDAP\n), which was established at the so-called\nBrown House\nin Munich. Unlike a\nGauleiter\n, a\nReichsleiter\ndid not have individual geographic areas under their command, but were responsible for specific spheres of interest.\nNazi Party offices\nThe Nazi Party had a number of party offices dealing with various political and other matters. These included:\nRassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(RPA): \"NSDAP Office of Racial Policy\"\nAußenpolitische Amt der NSDAP\n(APA): \"NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs\"\nKolonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(KPA): \"NSDAP Office of Colonial Policy\"\nWehrpolitisches Amt der NSDAP\n(WPA): \"NSDAP Office of Military Policy\"\nAmt Rosenberg\n(ARo): \"\nRosenberg\nOffice\"\nParamilitary groups\nThe\nSA\nin Berlin in 1932. The group had nearly two million members at the end of 1932.\nIn addition to the Nazi Party proper, several paramilitary groups existed which \"supported\" Nazi aims. All members of these paramilitary organisations were required to become regular Nazi Party members first and could then enlist in the group of their choice. An exception was the\nWaffen-SS\n, considered the military arm of the SS and Nazi Party, which during the Second World War allowed members to enlist without joining the Nazi Party. Foreign volunteers of the Waffen-SS were also not required to be members of the Nazi Party, although many joined local nationalist groups from their own countries with the same aims. Police officers, including members of the\nGestapo\n, frequently held SS rank for administrative reasons (known as \"rank parity\") and were likewise not required to be members of the Nazi Party.\nA vast system of\nNazi Party paramilitary ranks\ndeveloped for each of the various paramilitary groups. This was part of the process of\nGleichschaltung\nwith the paramilitary and auxiliary groups swallowing existing associations and federations after the Party was flooded by millions of membership applications.\nThe major Nazi Party paramilitary groups were as follows:\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS): \"Protection Squadron\" (both\nAllgemeine SS\nand\nWaffen-SS\n)\nSturmabteilung\n(SA): \"Storm Division\"\nNationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps\n(NSFK): \"National Socialist Flyers Corps\"\nNationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps\n(NSKK): \"National Socialist Motor Corps\"\nThe\nHitler Youth\nwas a paramilitary group divided into an adult leadership corps and a general membership open to boys aged fourteen to eighteen. The\nLeague of German Girls\nwas the equivalent group for girls.\nAffiliated organisations\nCertain nominally independent organisations had their own legal representation and own property, but were supported by the Nazi Party. Many of these associated organisations were labour unions of various professions. Some were older organisations that were Nazified according to the\nGleichschaltung\npolicy after the 1933 takeover.\nReich League of German Officials (union of civil servants, predecessor to\nGerman Civil Service Federation\n)\nGerman Labour Front\n(DAF)\nNational Socialist German Doctors' League\nNational Socialist League for the Maintenance of the Law (NSRB, 1936–1945, earlier National Socialist German Lawyers' League)\nNational Socialist War Victim's Care\n(NSKOV)\nNational Socialist Teachers League\n(NSLB)\nNational Socialist People's Welfare\n(NSV)\nReich Labour Service\n(RAD)\nGerman Faith Movement\nGerman Colonial League\n(RKB)\nGerman Red Cross\nKyffhäuser League\nTechnical Emergency Relief\n(TENO)\nReich's Union of Large Families\nReichsluftschutzbund\n(RLB)\nReichskolonialbund\n(RKB)\nBund Deutscher Osten\n(BDO)\nGerman American Bund\nThe employees of large businesses with international operations such as\nDeutsche Bank\n,\nDresdner Bank\n, and\nCommerzbank\nwere mostly party members.\nAll German businesses abroad were also required to have their own Nazi Party\nAusland-Organization\nliaison men, which enabled the party leadership to obtain updated and excellent intelligence on the actions of the global corporate elites.\nRegional administration\nSee also:\nAdministrative divisions of Nazi Germany\nand\nList of Gauleiters\nAdministrative units of the Nazi Party in 1944\nFor the purpose of centralisation in the\nGleichschaltung\nprocess, a rigidly hierarchal structure was established in the Nazi Party, which it later carried through in the whole of Germany in order to consolidate total power under the person of\nHitler\n(\nFührerstaat\n). It was regionally sub-divided into a number of\nGaue\n(singular:\nGau\n) headed by a\nGauleiter\n, who received their orders directly from Hitler. The name (originally a term for sub-regions of the\nHoly Roman Empire\nheaded by a\nGaugraf\n) for these new provincial structures was deliberately chosen because of its\nmediaeval\nconnotations. The term is approximately equivalent to the English\nshire\n.\nWhile the Nazis maintained the nominal existence of state and regional governments in Germany itself, this policy was not extended to territories acquired after 1937. Even in German-speaking areas such as Austria, state and regional governments were formally disbanded as opposed to just being dis-empowered.\nAfter the\nAnschluss\na new type of administrative unit was introduced called a\nReichsgau\n. In these territories the\nGauleiters\nalso held the position of\nReichsstatthalter\n(Reich Governor) thereby formally combining the spheres of both party and state offices. The establishment of this type of district was subsequently carried out for any further territorial annexations of Germany both before and during\nWorld War II\n. Even the former territories of\nPrussia\nwere never formally re-integrated into what was then Germany's largest state after being re-taken in the 1939 Polish campaign.\nThe\nGaue\nand\nReichsgaue\n(state or province) were further sub-divided into\nKreise\n(counties) headed by a\nKreisleiter\n, which were in turn sub-divided into\nZellen\n(cells) and\nBlöcke\n(blocks), headed by a\nZellenleiter\nand\nBlockleiter\nrespectively.\nA reorganisation of the\nGaue\nwas enacted on 1 October 1928. The given numbers were the official ordering numbers. The statistics are from 1941, for which the\nGau\norganisation of that moment in time forms the basis. Their size and populations are not exact; for instance, according to the official party statistics the\nGau\nKurmark/Mark Brandenburg was the largest in the German Reich.\nBy 1941, there were 42 territorial\nGaue\nfor Greater Germany.\nOf these, 10 were designated as Reichsgaue: 7 of them for Austria, one for the\nSudetenland\n(annexed from\nCzechoslovakia\n) and two for the areas annexed from\nPoland\nand the\nFree City of Danzig\nafter the joint\ninvasion of Poland\nby\nNazi Germany\nand the\nSoviet Union\nin 1939 at the onset of World War II.\nGetting the leadership of the individual\nGaue\nto co-operate with one another proved difficult at times since there was constant administrative and financial jockeying for control going on between them.\nThe first table below describes the organizational structure for the\nGaue\nthat existed before their dissolution in 1945.\nInformation on former\nGaue\n(that were either renamed, or dissolved by being divided or merged with other\nGaue\n) is provided in the second table.\nNazi Party\nGaue\nLater Gaue:\nFlanders\n, existed from 15 December 1944 (\nGauleiter\nin German exile:\nJef van de Wiele\n)\nWallonia\n, existed from 8 December 1944 (\nGauleiter\nin German exile:\nLéon Degrelle\n)\nGaue\ndissolved before 1945\nThe numbering is not based on any official former ranking, but merely listed alphabetically.\nGaue\nthat were simply renamed without territorial changes bear the designation\nRN\nin the column \"later became.\"\nGaue\nthat were divided into more than one\nGau\nbear the designation\nD\nin the column \"later became.\"\nGaue\nthat were merged with other\nGaue\n(or occupied territory) bear the designation\nM\nin the column \"together with.\"\nAssociated organisations abroad\nSee also:\nNSDAP/AO\nGaue\nin Switzerland\nThe irregular Swiss branch of the Nazi Party also established a number of Party\nGaue\nin that country, most of them named after their regional capitals. These included\nGau\nBasel\n-\nSolothurn\n,\nGau\nSchaffhausen\n,\nGau\nLuzern\n,\nGau\nBern\nand\nGau\nZürich\n.\nThe\nGau Ostschweiz\n(East Switzerland) combined the territories of three cantons:\nSt. Gallen\n,\nThurgau\nand\nAppenzell\n.\nMembership\nGeneral membership\nMain article:\nList of Nazi Party members\nThe general membership of the Nazi Party mainly consisted of the urban and rural\nlower middle classes\n. 7% belonged to the upper class, another 7% were\npeasants\n, 35% were industrial workers and 51% were what can be described as middle class. In early 1933, just before Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship, the party showed an under-representation of \"workers\", who made up 30% of the membership but 46% of German society. Conversely, white-collar employees (19% of members and 12% of Germans), the self-employed (20% of members and 10% of Germans) and civil servants (15% of members and 5% of the German population) had joined in proportions greater than their share of the general population.\nThese members were affiliated with local branches of the party, of which there were 1,378 throughout the country in 1928. In 1932, the number had risen to 11,845, reflecting the party's growth in this period.\nWhen it came to power in 1933, the Nazi Party had over\n2 million\nmembers. In 1939, the membership total rose to 5.3 million with 81% being male and 19% being female. It continued to attract many more and by 1945 the party reached its peak of 8 million with 63% being male and 37% being female (about 10% of the German population of 80 million).\nMilitary membership\nSee also:\nNazism and the Wehrmacht\nNazi members with military ambitions were encouraged to join the Waffen-SS, but a great number enlisted in the\nWehrmacht\nand even more were drafted for service after World War II began. Early regulations required that all\nWehrmacht\nmembers be non-political and any Nazi member joining in the 1930s was required to resign from the Nazi Party.\nHowever, this regulation was soon waived and full Nazi Party members served in the\nWehrmacht\nin particular after the outbreak of World War II. The\nWehrmacht\nReserves also saw a high number of senior Nazis enlisting, with\nReinhard Heydrich\nand\nFritz Todt\njoining the\nLuftwaffe\n, as well as\nKarl Hanke\nwho served in the army.\nThe British historian\nRichard J. Evans\nwrote that junior officers in the army were inclined to be especially zealous National Socialists with a third of them having joined the Nazi Party by 1941. Reinforcing the work of the junior leaders were the National Socialist Leadership Guidance Officers, which were created with the purpose of indoctrinating the troops for the \"war of extermination\" against Soviet Russia.\nAmong higher-ranking officers, 29% were NSDAP members by 1941.\nStudent membership\nIn 1926, the party formed a special division to engage the student population, known as the\nNational Socialist German Students' League\n(NSDStB). A group for university lecturers, the\nNational Socialist German University Lecturers' League\n(NSDDB), also existed until July 1944.\nWomen membership\nThe\nNational Socialist Women's League\nwas the\nwomen's organization\nof the party and by 1938 it had approximately 2 million members.\nMembership outside Germany\nParty members who lived outside Germany were pooled into the\nAuslands-Organisation\n(\nNSDAP/AO\n, \"Foreign Organization\"). The organisation was limited only to so-called \"\nImperial Germans\n\" (citizens of the German Empire); and \"Ethnic Germans\" (\nVolksdeutsche\n), who did not hold German citizenship were not permitted to join.\nUnder\nBeneš decree\nNo. 16/1945 Coll.\n, in case of citizens of Czechoslovakia membership of the Nazi Party was punishable by between five and twenty years of imprisonment.\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\nwas a branch of the Nazi Party founded in 1919, created for Germans with\nVolksdeutsche\nstatus.\nIt is not to be confused with the post-war right-wing\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft\n(\nde\n)\n, which was founded in 1949.\nNotable members included:\nOswald Menghin\n(\nVienna\n)\nHermann Neubacher\nwho was responsible for invading Yugoslavia.\nRudolf Much\n(\nVienna\n)\nArthur Seyß-Inquart\n(\nVienna\n)\nParty symbols\nNazi flags\n: The Nazi Party used a right-facing\nswastika\nas their symbol and the red and black colours were said to represent\nBlut und Boden\n(\"blood and soil\"). Another definition of the flag describes the colours as representing the ideology of National Socialism, the swastika representing the Aryan race and the Aryan nationalist agenda of the movement; white representing Aryan racial purity; and red representing the socialist agenda of the movement. Black, white and red were in fact the colours of the old\nNorth German Confederation\nflag (invented by\nOtto von Bismarck\n, based on the Prussian colours black and white and the red used by northern German states). In 1871, with the foundation of the German Reich the flag of the North German Confederation became the German\nReichsflagge\n(\"Reich flag\"). Black, white and red became the colours of the nationalists through the following history (for example\nWorld War I\nand the\nWeimar Republic\n).\nThe\nParteiflagge\ndesign, with the centred swastika disc, served as the party flag from 1920. Between 1933 (when the Nazi Party came to power) and 1935, it was used as the National flag (\nNationalflagge\n) and Merchant flag (\nHandelsflagge\n), but interchangeably with the\nblack-white-red horizontal tricolour\n. In 1935, the black-white-red horizontal tricolour was scrapped (again) and the\nflag with the off-centre swastika and disc\nwas instituted as the national flag, and remained as such until 1945. The flag with the centred disk continued to be used after 1935, but exclusively as the\nParteiflagge\n, the flag of the party.\nGerman eagle\n: The Nazi Party used the traditional German eagle, standing atop a swastika inside a wreath of oak leaves. It is also known as the \"Iron Eagle\". When the eagle is looking to its left shoulder, it symbolises the Nazi Party and was called the\nParteiadler\n. In contrast, when the eagle is looking to its right shoulder, it symbolises the country (\nReich\n) and was therefore called the\nReichsadler\n. After the Nazi Party came to national power in Germany, they replaced the traditional version of the German eagle with the modified party symbol throughout the country and all its institutions.\nRanks and rank insignia\nMain article:\nRanks and insignia of the Nazi Party\n1: Anwärter (not party member), 2:\nAnwärter, 3:\nHelfer, 4:\nOberhelfer, 5:\nArbeitsleiter, 6:\nOberarbeitsleiter, 7:\nHauptarbeitsleiter, 8:\nBereitschaftsleiter, 9:\nOberbereitschaftsleiter, 10:\nHauptbereitschaftsleiter\n11:\nEinsatzleiter, 12:\nObereinsatzleiter, 13:\nHaupteinsatzleiter, 14:\nGemeinschaftsleiter, 15:\nObergemeinschaftsleiter, 16:\nHauptgemeinschaftsleiter, 17:\nAbschnittsleiter, 18:\nOberabschnittsleiter, 19:\nHauptabschnittsleiter\n20:\nBereichsleiter, 21:\nOberbereichsleiter, 22:\nHauptbereichsleiter, 23:\nDienstleiter, 24:\nOberdienstleiter, 25:\nHauptdienstleiter, 26:\nBefehlsleiter, 27:\nOberbefehlsleiter, 28:\nHauptbefehlsleiter, 29:\nGauleiter, 30:\nReichsleiter\nSlogans and songs\nNazi slogans: \"\nSieg Heil\n!\n\"; \"\nHeil Hitler\n\"\nNazi anthem:\nHorst-Wessel-Lied\nElection results\nSee also:\nNazi Party election results\nGerman Reichstag\nSee also:\nReichstag (Weimar Republic)\nPresidential election\nSee also:\nPresident of Germany (1919–1945)\nVolkstag of Danzig\nSee also:\nVolkstag\nSee also\nModern history portal\nGermany portal\nBusiness collaboration with Nazi Germany\nCollaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of books about Nazi Germany\nList of companies involved in the Holocaust\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMass suicides in 1945 Nazi Germany\nNeo-Nazism\nSocialist Reich Party\nVolkssturm\nNotes\n↑\nOfficially called the \"Reich Committee for the German People's Initiative against the Young Plan and the War Guilt Lie\" (\nReichsausschuß für die Deutsche Volksinitiative gegen den Young-Plan und die Kriegsschuldlüge\n)\n↑\nEnglish:\n/\nˈ\nn\nɑː\nt\ns\ni\n,\nˈ\nn\næ\nt\ns\ni\n/\nNA(H)T\n-see\n↑\nPronounced\n[\nnatsi̯oˈnaːlzotsi̯aˌlɪstɪʃə\nˈdɔʏtʃə\nˈʔaʁbaɪtɐpaʁˌtaɪ\n]\n↑\nor\nSozialdemokrat\n(\npronounced\n[\nzoˈtsi̯aːldemoˌkʁaːt\n]\n, \"\nsocial democrat\n\")\n↑\nSome sources say the name change happened on 1 April 1920.\n↑\nHitler's original name suggested was the Social Revolutionary Party (German:\nSozialrevolutionäre Partei\n).\n↑\n\"Social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism.\n... These organisations (ie Fascism and social democracy) are not antipodes, they are twins.\" (\nJ.V. Stalin\n:\nConcerning the International Situation\n(September 1924), in\nWorks\n, Volume 6, 1953; p. 294.) This later led\nOtto Wille Kuusinen\nto conclude that \"The aims of the fascists and the social-fascists are the same.\" (Report To the 10th Plenum of ECCI, in\nInternational Press Correspondence\n, Volume 9, no. 40, (20 August 1929), p. 848.)\n↑\nHitler stated: \"Today our left-wing politicians in particular are constantly insisting that their craven-hearted and obsequious foreign policy necessarily results from the disarmament of Germany, whereas the truth is that this is the policy of traitors [...] But the politicians of the Right deserve exactly the same reproach. It was through their miserable cowardice that those ruffians of Jews who came into power in 1918 were able to rob the nation of its arms.\"\n↑\nThe 43rd\nGau\nknown as the\nAuslandsorganisation\nwas non-territorial.\nCitations\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, pp.\n164–65.\n↑\nSteves 2010\n, p.\n28.\n↑\nT. W. Mason,\nSocial Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the \"National Community\", 1918–1939,\nOxford: UK, Berg Publishers, 1993, p. 77.\n1\n2\nMcNab 2011\n, pp.\n22, 23.\n↑\nDavidson 1997\n, p.\n241.\n↑\nOrlow 2010\n, p.\n29.\n↑\nPfleiderer, Doris (2007).\n\"Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid gegen den Youngplan, in: Archivnachrichten 35 / 2007\"\n[\nInitiative and Referendum against the Young Plan, in: Archived News 35 / 2007\n]\n(PDF)\n.\nLandesarchiv Baden-Württemberg\n(in German). p.\n43.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 4 December 2022\n. Retrieved\n26 November\n2022\n.\n↑\nJones, Larry E. (Oct., 2006).\n\"Nationalists, Nazis, and the Assault against Weimar: Revisiting the Harzburg Rally of October 1931\"\nArchived\n26 April 2023 at the\nWayback Machine\n.\nGerman Studies Review.\nVol. 29, No. 3. pp. 483–94.\nJohns Hopkins University Press\n.\n↑\nJones 2003\n.\n↑\nFritzsche 1998\n, pp.\n143, 185, 193, 204–05, 210.\n↑\nEatwell, Roger (1997).\nFascism\n: a history\n. New York: Penguin Books. pp.\nxvii–\nxxiv, 21,\n26–\n31,\n114–\n40, 352.\nISBN\n0-14-025700-4\n.\nOCLC\n37930848\n.\n1\n2\n\"The Nazi Party\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 31 January 2023\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2022\n.\n↑\nGrant 2004\n, pp.\n30–34, 44.\n↑\nMitchell 2008\n, p.\n47.\n↑\nRay, Michael.\n\"Were the Nazis Socialists?\"\n.\nEncyclopædia Britannica\n.\n↑\nMcDonough 2003\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nMajer 2013\n, p.\n39.\n↑\nWildt 2012\n, pp.\n96–97.\n↑\nGigliotti\n&\nLang 2005\n, p.\n14.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nArendt 1951\n, p.\n306.\n↑\nCurtis 1979\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nBurch 1964\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nMaier 2004\n, p.\n32.\n↑\nElzer 2003\n, p.\n602.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 26:00–31:04.\n1\n2\nMautner 1944\n, p.\n93–100.\n↑\nHitler 1936\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nGottlieb\n&\nMorgensen 2007\n, p.\n247.\n1\n2\nHarper n.d\n.\n1\n2\nRabinbach\n&\nGilman 2013\n, p.\n4.\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n82.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n34.\n1\n2\n3\nSpector 2004\n, p.\n137.\n↑\nGriffen 1995\n, p.\n105.\n↑\nAbel 2012\n, p.\n55.\n1\n2\nCarlsten 1982\n, p.\n91.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nFest 1979\n, pp.\n37–38.\n↑\nvan der Vat 1997\n, p.\n30.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n33.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n71–82.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 23:00–24:30.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n75.\n↑\nEvans 2003\n, p.\n170.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n75, 76.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n67.\n↑\nBlamires 2006\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n43.\n↑\nJaman 1956\n, p.\n88.\n1\n2\nRees 2006\n, p.\n23.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n127.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 15:00–25:00.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 24:00–25:00.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n140.\n1\n2\nJaman 1956\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n36.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n37.\n↑\nJohnson 1984\n, p.\n133.\n1\n2\n3\nFest 1979\n, p.\n42.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nZentner\n&\nBedürftig 1997\n, p.\n629.\n↑\nCarruthers 2015\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nLepage 2009\n, p.\n9.\n↑\nChilders, Thomas\n(2001).\n\"The Weimar Republic and the Rise of the Nazi Party\"\n.\nA History of Hitler's Empire, 2nd Edition\n. Episode 3.\nThe Great Courses\n.  Event occurs at 26:00–31:04\n. Retrieved\n27 March\n2023\n.\n↑\nKonrad Heiden\n, \"Les débuts du national-socialisme\", Revue d'Allemagne, VII, No. 71 (Sept. 15, 1933), p. 821.\n↑\nMitcham 1996\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nEhrenreich 2007\n, p.\n58.\n↑\nWeikart 2009\n, p.\n142.\n↑\nGordon 1984\n, p.\n265.\n↑\nFest 1979\n, p.\n39.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n89.\n↑\nFranz-Willing 2001\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nShirer 1991\n, p.\n38.\n↑\nFest 1979\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n100, 101.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n102.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n103.\n1\n2\n3\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n83, 103.\n↑\nHakim 1995\n, p.\n?.\n1\n2\nKershaw 2000\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n110.\n↑\nChilders 2001a\n, 29:00–30:00.\n↑\nJablonsky 1989\n, pp.\n20–26, 30.\n↑\nShirer 1990\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nHanns Hubert Hofmann\n:\nDer Hitlerputsch. Krisenjahre deutschen Geschichte 1920–1924\n. Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, München 1961, S. 211, 272; als\nKarl Kulm\nbei\nHans Günter Hockerts\n:\n„Hauptstadt der Bewegung“\n. In: Richard Bauer et al. (Hrsg.):\nMünchen – „Hauptstadt der Bewegung“. Bayerns Metropole und der Nationalsozialismus\n. 2. Auflage. Edition Minerva, München 2002, S. 355\nf.\n↑\n\"Einsatz für Freiheit und Demokratie\"\n. 11 June 2015. Archived from\nthe original\non 11 June 2015\n. Retrieved\n25 October\n2023\n.\n1\n2\nJablonsky 1989\n, p.\n57.\n↑\nKershaw 1998\n, p.\n239.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 13:45–14:12.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 15:50–16:10.\n↑\nWeale 2010\n, pp.\n26–29.\n↑\nKoehl 2004\n, p.\n34.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 17:00–17:27.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 23:30–24:00.\n↑\nEvans 2005\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, p.\n224.\n↑\nChilders 2001b\n, 30:35–30:57.\n↑\nHitler 2010\n, p.\n287.\n↑\nFritzsche 1998\n, p.\n?;\nEatwell 1996\n, pp.\nxvii–xxiv, 21, 26–31, 114–40, 352;\nGriffin 2000\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nDomarus 2007\n, pp.\n171–73.\n1\n2\nBeck 2013\n, p.\n259.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nKolb 2005\n, pp.\n224–225.\n↑\nKuntz 2011\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nSchaarschmidt 2014\n, pp.\n104–05.\n↑\nEvans 2015\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nMcNab 2013\n, p.\n20.\n↑\nKuntz 2011\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nDelarue 2008\n, pp.\nx–xi.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, p.\n25.\n↑\nMcNab 2009\n, pp.\n25, 26.\n↑\nLewkowicz 2008\n, p.\n74.\n↑\nCogen 2016\n, p.\n226.\n↑\nJudt 2006\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nJunker 2004\n, p.\n65.\n↑\nRummel 1994\n, p.\n112.\n↑\nFischel 1998\n, p.\n87.\n↑\nBauer\n&\nRozett 1990\n, p.\n1799.\n↑\nHancock 2004\n, pp.\n383–96.\n1\n2\nHolocaust Memorial Museum\n.\n↑\nSnyder 2010\n, p.\n184.\n↑\nNiewyk\n&\nNicosia 2000\n, p.\n45.\n↑\nGoldhagen 1996\n, p.\n290.\n1\n2\nJoachimsthaler 1999\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nTrevor-Roper 2002\n, p.\n193.\n↑\nMiller 2006\n, p.\n154.\n↑\nWhiting 1996\n, pp.\n217–218.\n↑\nKaracs 1998\n.\n↑\nSteber\n&\nGotto 2018\n, p.\n91.\n↑\nSimpson 2002\n, pp.\n149, 257, 299.\n↑\nFarrell 2008\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nMaterna\n&\nRibbe 1995\n, p.\n?.\n↑\nGerman Historical Institute 2008\n.\n↑\nBroszat 1985\n, pp.\n44–47.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n18–41.\n↑\nMiller\n&\nSchulz 2012\n, pp.\n41–50.\n↑\nWolf 1969\n, pp.\n121, 253, 283.\n↑\nSchom 1998\n.\n↑\nHistorischer Verein des Kantons Bern 1973\n, p.\n150.\n↑\nGlaus 1969\n, p.\n147.\n1\n2\nPanayi 2007\n, p.\n40.\n↑\nThe History Place 2015\n.\n↑\nEvans 1989\n, p.\n59.\n↑\nBartov 1986\n, p.\n49.\n↑\nMusiał 2009\n.\n↑\nRosar 1971\n, p.\n?.\nBibliography\nAbel, Theodore Fred (2012) .\nThe Nazi Movement\n. Aldine Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1412846134\n.\nArendt, Hannah\n(1951).\nThe Origins of Totalitarianism\n. London; New York; San Diego: Harvest Book.\nOCLC\n52814049\n.\nBartov, Omer\n(1986).\nThe Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare\n. New York: St. Martin's Press.\nISBN\n978-0312224868\n.\nBauer, Yehuda\n; Rozett, Robert (1990).\n\"Appendix\"\n. In\nGutman, Israel\n(ed.).\nEncyclopedia of the Holocaust\n. New York: Macmillan Library Reference. pp.\n1797–1802\n.\nISBN\n0028960904\n.\nBeck, Hermann (2013).\nThe Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933: The\nMachtergreifung\nin a New Light\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n978-0857454102\n.\nBlamires, Cyprian P. (2006).\nWorld Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia\n. ABC-CLIO.\nISBN\n978-1576079409\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 22 June 2013\n. Retrieved\n13 March\n2013\n.\nBroszat, Martin (1985).\nThe Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich\n. 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Retrieved\n28 August\n2015\n.\nHitler, Adolf\n(1936).\nDie Reden des Führers am Parteitag der Ehre, 1936\n(in German). Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 25 October 2012\n. Retrieved\n25 March\n2014\n.\nParteigenossen! Parteigenossinnen! Nationalsozialisten!\nHitler, Adolf\n(2010).\nMein Kampf\n. Bottom of the Hill Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1935785071\n.\nHolocaust Memorial Museum.\n\"Introduction to the Holocaust\"\n.\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 30 June 2012\n. Retrieved\n23 October\n2017\n.\nHöhne, Heinz\n(2000) .\nThe Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS (Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS)\n. London: Penguin.\nISBN\n978-0141390123\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. John Wiley & Sons.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-7004-1\n.\nJablonsky, David (1989).\nThe Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit, 1923–1925\n. Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0714633220\n.\nJaman, T. L. (1956).\nThe Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany\n. New York: New York University Press.\nJoachimsthaler, Anton\n(1999) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, the Evidence, the Truth\n. Trans. Helmut Bögler. London: Brockhampton Press.\nISBN\n978-1-86019-902-8\n.\nJohnson, Paul (1984).\nA History of the Modern World: From 1917 to the 1980s\n. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n978-0297782261\n.\nJones, Daniel\n(2003) . Roach, Peter; Hartmann, James; Setter, Jane (eds.).\nEnglish Pronouncing Dictionary\n. Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n3125396832\n.\nJudt, Tony (2006).\nPostwar: A History of Europe Since 1945\n. London: Penguin Books.\nISBN\n978-1440624766\n.\nJunker, Detlef (2004).\nThe United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, Volume 1\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0521791120\n.\nKaracs, Imre (4 May 1998).\n\"DNA test closes book on mystery of Martin Bormann\"\n.\nThe Independent\n. London: Independent Print Limited.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 7 November 2017\n. Retrieved\n1 May\n2024\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(1998).\nHitler: 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n0393046710\n.\nKershaw, Ian (2000).\nHitler, 1889–1936: Hubris\n. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler: A Biography\n. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.\nISBN\n978-0393067576\n.\nKoehl, Robert (2004).\nThe SS: A History 1919–45\n. Stroud: Tempus.\nISBN\n978-0752425597\n.\nKolb, Eberhard\n(2005) .\nThe Weimar Republic\n. London; New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0415344418\n.\nKuntz, Dieter (2011).\nHitler and the functioning of the Third Reich\n. Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0415779562\n.\nLepage, Jean-Denis G.G. (2009).\nHitler Youth, 1922–1945: An Illustrated History\n. McFarland.\nISBN\n978-0786452811\n.\nLewkowicz, Nicolas (2008).\nThe German Question and the Origins of the Cold War\n. Milan: Ipoc Press.\nISBN\n978-8895145273\n.\nMaier, Hans, ed. (2004).\nTotalitarianism and Political Religions: Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships\n. Translated by Bruhn, Jodi. Oxon (UK); New York: Routledge.\nISBN\n978-0714656090\n.\nMajer, Diemut (2013).\n\"Non-Germans\" Under The Third Reich: The Nazi Judicial and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 1939–1945\n. Texas Tech University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.\nISBN\n978-0896728370\n.\nMaterna, Ingo; Ribbe, Wolfgang, eds. (1995).\nBrandenburgische Geschichte\n(in German). De Gruyter Akademie Forschung.\nISBN\n978-3050025087\n. Retrieved\n12 November\n2010\n.\nMautner, Franz H. (1944). \"Nazi und Sozi\".\nModern Language Notes\n.\n59\n(2):\n93–\n100.\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/2910599\n.\nISSN\n0149-6611\n.\nJSTOR\n2910599\n.\nDass\nNazi\neine Abkürzung von\nNationalsozialist\nist ... [u]nd zwar eine Verkürzung des Wortes auf seine ersten zwei Silben, aber nicht eine Zusammenziehung aus\nNa\ntionalso\nzi\nalist' ...[... that\nNazi\nis an abbreviation of\nNationalsozialist\n... and to be precise a truncation of the word to its first two syllables, not a contraction of\nNa\ntionalso\nzi\nalist' ...]\nMcDonough, Frank (2003).\nHitler and the Rise of the Nazi Party\n. Pearson/Longman.\nISBN\n978-0582506060\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2009).\nThe Third Reich\n. Amber Books.\nISBN\n978-1906626518\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2011).\nHitler's Masterplan: The Essential Facts and Figures for Hitler's Third Reich\n. Amber Books Ltd.\nISBN\n978-1907446962\n.\nMcNab, Chris (2013).\nHitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45\n. Osprey.\nISBN\n978-1782000884\n.\nMiller, Michael (2006).\nLeaders of the SS and German Police, Vol. 1\n. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender.\nISBN\n978-93-297-0037-2\n.\nMiller, Michael D.; Schulz, Andreas (2012).\nGauleiter: The Regional Leaders of the Nazi Party and Their Deputies, 1925–1945\n. Vol.\n1 (Herbert Albrecht – H. Wilhelm Hüttmann). R. James Bender Publishing.\nISBN\n978-1-932970-21-0\n.\nMitcham, Samuel W.\n(1996).\nWhy Hitler?: The Genesis of the Nazi Reich\n. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.\nISBN\n978-0275954857\n.\nMitchell, Otis C. (2008).\nHitler's Stormtroopers and the Attack on the German Republic, 1919–1933\n. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.\nISBN\n978-0786477296\n.\nMusiał, Bogdan\n(2009).\n\"Fakty wypaczone przez Erikę Steinbach\"\n.\nRzeczpospolita\n(in Polish). Rzeczpospolita. Archived from\nthe original\non 3 March 2012\n. Retrieved\n24 June\n2009\n.\nNiewyk, Donald L.; Nicosia, Francis R. (2000).\nThe Columbia Guide to the Holocaust\n. New York: Columbia University Press.\nISBN\n978-0231112000\n.\nOrlow, Dietrich (2010).\nThe Nazi Party 1919–1945: A Complete History\n. Enigma Books.\nISBN\n978-0982491195\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 1 October 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2015\n.\nRabinbach, Anson; Gilman, Sander, eds. (2013).\nThe Third Reich Sourcebook\n. Berkeley: California University Press.\nISBN\n978-0520955141\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 5 September 2015\n. Retrieved\n14 August\n2015\n.\nPanayi, P. (2007).\nLife and Death in a German Town: Osnabrück from the Weimar Republic to World War II and Beyond\n. New York: Tauris Academic Studies.\nRees, Laurence (2006).\nThe Nazis: A Warning From History\n. BBC Books.\nISBN\n978-0563493334\n.\nRosar, Wolfgang (1971).\nDeutsche Gemeinschaft. Seyss-Inquart und der Anschluß\n(in German). Wien: Europa-Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3203503844\n.\nRummel, Rudolph\n(1994).\nDeath by Government\n. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.\nISBN\n978-1560001454\n.\nSchaarschmidt, Thomas (2014).\nMobilizing German Society for War: The National Socialist\nGaue\n. Visions of Community in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press.\nSchom, Alan Morris\n(1998). \"NSDAP and Affiliated Meetings in Northern Switzerland for the Week of May 10–18, 1935\".\nA Survey of Nazi and Pro-Nazi Groups in Switzerland: 1930–1945\n. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Archived from\nthe original\non 6 June 2011\n. Retrieved\n17 October\n2010\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1990) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: MJF Books.\nISBN\n978-1-56731-163-1\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1991) .\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. London: Arrow Books.\nISBN\n978-0099421764\n.\nSimpson, Christopher (2002).\nWar Crimes of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank: Office of Military Government (U.S.) Reports\n. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.\nISBN\n978-0841914070\n.\nSnyder, Timothy\n(2010).\nBloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0465002399\n.\nSpector, Robert (2004).\nWorld Without Civilization: Mass Murder and the Holocaust, History, and Analysis\n. University of America Press.\nISBN\n978-0761829638\n.\nSteber, Martina; Gotto, Bernhard (2018).\nVisions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives\n. New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0199689590\n.\nSteves, Rick (2010).\nRick Steves' Snapshot Munich, Bavaria & Salzburg\n. Berkeley, California; New York: Avalon Travel.\nISBN\n978-1598806892\n.\nThough the Nazis eventually gained power in Berlin, they remembered their roots, dubbing Munich \"Capital of the Movement\". The Nazi headquarters stood near today's obelisk on Brienner Strasse...\nTrevor-Roper, Hugh\n(2002) .\nThe Last Days of Hitler\n. London: Pan Books.\nISBN\n978-0-330-49060-3\n.\nvan der Vat, Dan\n(1997).\nThe Good Nazi: The Life and Lies of Albert Spee\n. George Weidenfeld & Nicolson.\nISBN\n0297817213\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2010).\nThe SS: A New History\n. London: Little, Brown.\nISBN\n978-1408703045\n.\nWeikart, Richard (2009).\nHitler's Ethic\n. Palgrave Macmillan.\nISBN\n978-0230623989\n.\nWhiting, Charles\n(1996) .\nThe Hunt for Martin Bormann: The Truth\n. London: Pen & Sword.\nISBN\n0-85052-527-6\n.\nWildt, Michael (2012).\nHitler's Volksgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence Against Jews in Provincial Germany, 1919–1939\n. Berghahn Books.\nISBN\n978-0857453228\n.\nWolf, Walter (1969).\nFaschismus in der Schweiz\n. Flamberg. Archived from\nthe original\non 18 October 2015.\nZentner, Christian; Bedürftig, Friedemann (1997) .\nThe Encyclopedia of the Third Reich\n. New York: Da Capo Press.\nISBN\n978-0-3068079-3-0\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nNational Socialist German Workers' Party\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nProgram of the Nazi Party, its \"Manifesto\"\nText of\nMein Kampf\n(in German)\nDie Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 1920–1933\nArchived\n7 February 2009 at the\nWayback Machine\nat\nLebendiges Museum Online\n.\n(in German)\nDie Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 1933–1945\nArchived\n6 July 2014 at the\nWayback Machine\nat\nLebendiges Museum Online\n.\nOrganisationsbuch NSDAP\nAn encyclopedic reference guide to the Nazi Party, organisations, uniforms, flags etc. published by the party itself",
    "infobox": {
      "abbreviation": "NSDAP",
      "chairman": "Anton Drexler(24 February 1920 – 29 July 1921)[1]",
      "führer": "Adolf Hitler(29 July 1921 – 30 April 1945)",
      "party_minister": "Martin Bormann(30 April 1945 – 2 May 1945)",
      "founded": "24February 1920;105 years ago(1920-02-24)",
      "banned": "10October1945;80 years ago(1945-10-10)",
      "precededby": "German Workers' Party",
      "headquarters": "Brown House, Munich, Germany[2]",
      "newspaper": "Völkischer Beobachter",
      "student_wing": "National Socialist German Students' Union",
      "youth_wing": "Hitler Youth",
      "women's_wing": "National Socialist Women's League",
      "paramilitary_wings": "SASSMotor CorpsFlyers Corps",
      "sports_body": "National Socialist League of the Reich for Physical Exercise",
      "overseas_wing": "NSDAP/AO",
      "labour_wing": "NSBO(1928–35),DAF(1933–45)[3]",
      "membership": "Fewer than 60 (1920)8.5million (1945)[4]",
      "ideology": "Nazism",
      "politicalposition": "Far-right[5][6]",
      "political_alliance": "National Socialist Freedom Movement(1924)Anti-Young Plancampaign (1929)[a]Harzburg Front(1931)[8]",
      "colours": "BlackWhiteRed(official,German Imperial colours)Brown(customary)",
      "slogan": "Deutschland erwache!('Germany, awake!') (unofficial)",
      "anthem": "\"Horst-Wessel-Lied\""
    },
    "char_count": 83084
  },
  {
    "page_title": "Einsatzgruppen",
    "name": "Einsatzgruppen",
    "type": "organization",
    "summary": "Einsatzgruppen were Schutzstaffel (SS) paramilitary death squads of Nazi Germany that were responsible for mass murder, primarily by shooting, during World War II (1939–1945) in German-occupied Europe. The Einsatzgruppen had an integral role in the implementation of the so-called \"Final Solution to the Jewish question\" in territories conquered by Nazi Germany, and were involved in the murder of much of the intelligentsia and cultural elite of Poland, including members of the Catholic priesthood. Almost all of the people they murdered were civilians, beginning with the intelligentsia and swiftly progressing to Soviet political commissars, Jews, and Romani people, as well as actual or alleged partisans throughout Eastern Europe.",
    "description": "Nazi paramilitary death squads, part of the SS",
    "full_text": "Einsatzgruppen\nNazi paramilitary death squads, part of the SS\nFor other uses, see\nOrganisation Todt § Administrative units\n.\nEinsatzgruppen\n(\nGerman:\n[\nˈaɪnzatsˌɡʁʊpm̩\n]\n,\nlit.\n'\ndeployment groups\n'\n;\nalso '\ntask forces\n')\nwere\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) paramilitary\ndeath squads\nof\nNazi Germany\nthat were responsible for mass murder, primarily by shooting, during\nWorld War II\n(1939–1945) in\nGerman-occupied Europe\n. The\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad an integral role in the implementation of the so-called \"\nFinal Solution\nto the\nJewish question\n\" (\nDie Endlösung der Judenfrage\n) in territories conquered by Nazi Germany, and were involved in the murder of much of the\nintelligentsia\nand cultural elite of Poland, including members of the\nCatholic priesthood\n.\nAlmost all of the people they murdered were civilians, beginning with the intelligentsia and swiftly progressing to Soviet\npolitical commissars\n,\nJews\n, and\nRomani people\n, as well as actual or alleged\npartisans\nthroughout Eastern Europe.\nUnder the direction of\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\nand the supervision of SS-\nObergruppenführer\nReinhard Heydrich\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\noperated in territories occupied by the\nWehrmacht\n(German armed forces) following the\ninvasion of Poland\nin September 1939 and the\ninvasion of the Soviet Union\nin June 1941. The\nEinsatzgruppen\nworked hand-in-hand with the\nOrder Police battalions\non the Eastern Front to carry out operations ranging from the murder of a few people to operations which lasted over two or more days, such as the massacre at\nBabi Yar\n(with 33,771 Jews murdered in two days), and the\nRumbula massacre\n(with about 25,000 Jews murdered in two days of shooting). As ordered by Nazi leader\nAdolf Hitler\n, the\nWehrmacht\ncooperated with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, providing logistical support for their operations, and participated in the mass murders. Historian\nRaul Hilberg\nestimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, related agencies, and foreign auxiliary personnel murdered more than two million people, including 1.3 million of the 5.5 to 6 million Jews murdered during the\nHolocaust\n.\nAfter the close of World War II, 24 officers, including multiple commanding officers, of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere prosecuted in the\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nin 1947–48, charged with\ncrimes against humanity\nand\nwar crimes\n. Fourteen death sentences and two life sentences were handed out. However, only four of these death sentences were carried out. Four additional\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were later tried and executed by other nations.\nFormation and Aktion T4\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere formed under the direction of SS-\nObergruppenführer\nReinhard Heydrich\nand operated by the\nSchutzstaffel\n(SS) before and during\nWorld War II\n.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad their origins in the ad hoc\nEinsatzkommando\nformed by Heydrich to secure government buildings and documents following the\nAnschluss\nin\nAustria\nin March 1938.\nOriginally part of the\nSicherheitspolizei\n(Security Police; SiPo), two units of\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere stationed in the\nSudetenland\nin October 1938. When military action turned out not to be necessary due to the\nMunich Agreement\n, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere assigned to confiscate government papers and police documents. They also secured government buildings, questioned senior civil servants, and arrested as many as 10,000 Czech communists and German citizens.\nFrom September 1939, the\nReichssicherheitshauptamt\n(Reich Security Main Office; RSHA) had overall command of the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nAs part of the drive by the Nazi regime to remove so-called \"undesirable\" elements from the German population, from September to December 1939 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand others took part in\nAktion T4\n, a program of systematic murder of persons with physical and mental disabilities and patients of psychiatric hospitals. Aktion T4 mainly took place from 1939 to 1941, but the murders continued until the end of the war. Initially the victims were shot by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand others, but\ngas chambers\nwere put into use by spring 1940.\nInvasion of Poland\nMain articles:\nIntelligenzaktion\nand\nOperation Tannenberg\nExecution of Poles in\nKórnik\n, 20 October 1939\nPolish women led to mass execution in a forest near\nPalmiry\nIn response to\nAdolf Hitler\n's plan to\ninvade Poland\non 1 September 1939, Heydrich re-formed the\nEinsatzgruppen\nto travel in the wake of the German armies.\nMembership at this point was drawn from the SS, the\nSicherheitsdienst\n(Security Service; SD), the police, and the\nGestapo\n.\nHeydrich placed SS-\nObergruppenführer\nWerner Best\nin command, who assigned\nHans-Joachim Tesmer\n(\nde\n)\nto choose personnel for the task forces and their subgroups, called\nEinsatzkommandos\n, from among educated people with military experience and a strong ideological commitment to Nazism.\nSome had previously been members of paramilitary groups such as the\nFreikorps\n.\nHeydrich instructed the First Quartermaster of the\nWehrmacht Heer\nEduard Wagner\nin meetings in late July that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nshould undertake their operations in cooperation with the\nOrdnungspolizei\n(Order Police; Orpo) and military commanders in the area.\nArmy intelligence was in constant contact with\nEinsatzgruppen\nto coordinate their activities with other units.\nInitially numbering 2,700 men (and ultimately 4,250 in Poland),\nthe\nEinsatzgruppen\n's mission was to murder members of the Polish leadership most clearly identified with Polish national identity: the intelligentsia,\nmembers of the clergy\n, teachers, and members of the nobility.\nAs stated by Hitler: \"...\nthere must be no Polish leaders; where Polish leaders exist they must be killed, however harsh that sounds\".\nSS-\nBrigadeführer\nLothar Beutel\n, commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nIV, later testified that Heydrich gave the order for these murders at a series of meetings in mid-August.\nThe\nSonderfahndungsbuch Polen\n–\nlists of people to be murdered\n–\nhad been drawn up by the SS as early as May 1939, using dossiers collected by the SD from 1936 forward.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nperformed these murders with the support of the\nVolksdeutscher Selbstschutz\n, a paramilitary group consisting of ethnic Germans living in Poland during\nOperation Tannenberg\n.\nMembers of the SS, the\nWehrmacht\n, and the\nOrdnungspolizei\nalso shot civilians during the Polish campaign.\nApproximately 65,000 civilians were murdered by the end of 1939. In addition to leaders of Polish society, they murdered Jews, prostitutes,\nRomani people\n, and the mentally ill. Psychiatric patients in Poland were initially murdered by shooting, but by spring 1941\ngas vans\nwere widely used.\nSeven\nEinsatzgruppen\nof battalion strength (around 500 men) operated in Poland. Each was subdivided into five\nEinsatzkommandos\nof company strength (around 100 men).\nEinsatzgruppe\nI, commanded by SS-\nStandartenführer\nBruno Streckenbach\n, acted with\n14th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nII, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nEmanuel Schäfer\n, acted with\n10th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nIII, SS-\nObersturmbannführer und Regierungsrat\nHerbert Fischer\n, acted with\n8th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nIV, SS-\nBrigadeführer\nLothar Beutel\n, acted with\n4th Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nV, SS-\nStandartenfürer\nErnst Damzog\n, acted with\n3rd Army\nEinsatzgruppe\nVI, SS-\nOberführer\nErich Naumann\n, acted in\nWielkopolska\nEinsatzgruppe\nVII, SS-\nObergruppenführer\nUdo von Woyrsch\nand SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Rasch\n, acted in\nUpper Silesia\nand\nCieszyn Silesia\nThough they were formally under the command of the army, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nreceived their orders from Heydrich and for the most part acted independently of the army.\nMany senior army officers were only too glad to leave these genocidal actions to the task forces, as the murders violated the rules of warfare as set down in the\nGeneva Conventions\n. However, Hitler had decreed that the army would have to tolerate and even offer logistical support to the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwhen it was tactically possible to do so. Some army commanders complained about unauthorised shootings, looting, and rapes committed by members of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand the\nVolksdeutscher Selbstschutz\n, to little effect.\nFor example, when\nGeneraloberst\nJohannes Blaskowitz\nsent a memorandum of complaint to Hitler about the atrocities, Hitler dismissed his concerns as \"childish\", and Blaskowitz was relieved of his post in May 1940. He continued to serve in the army but never received promotion to\nfield marshal\n.\nThe final task of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin Poland was to round up the remaining Jews and concentrate them in\nghettos\nwithin major cities with good railway connections. The intention was to eventually remove all the Jews from Poland, but at this point their final destination had not yet been determined.\nTogether, the\nWehrmacht\nand the\nEinsatzgruppen\nalso drove tens of thousands of Jews eastward into\nSoviet-controlled territory\n.\nPreparations for Operation Barbarossa\nMain articles:\nThe Holocaust in Belarus\n,\nThe Holocaust in Ukraine\n,\nThe Holocaust in Russia\n, and\nHunger Plan\nOn 13 March 1941, in the lead-up to\nOperation Barbarossa\n, the planned invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler dictated his \"Guidelines in Special Spheres re: Directive No. 21 (Operation Barbarossa)\". Sub-paragraph B specified that\nReichsführer-SS\nHeinrich Himmler\nwould be given \"special tasks\" on direct orders from the Führer, which he would carry out independently.\nThis directive was intended to prevent friction between the\nWehrmacht\nand the SS in the upcoming offensive.\nHitler also specified that criminal acts against civilians perpetrated by members of the\nWehrmacht\nduring the upcoming campaign would not be prosecuted in the military courts, and thus would go unpunished.\nIn a speech to his leading generals on 30 March 1941, Hitler described his envisioned war against the Soviet Union. General\nFranz Halder\n, the Army's Chief of Staff, described the speech:\nStruggle between two ideologies. Scathing evaluation of Bolshevism, equals antisocial criminality. Communism immense future danger\n... This a fight to the finish. If we do not accept this, we shall beat the enemy, but in thirty years we shall again confront the Communist foe. We don't make war to preserve the enemy\n... Struggle against Russia: Extermination of Bolshevik Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia\n... Commissars and\nGPU\npersonnel are criminals and must be treated as such. The struggle will differ from that in the west. In the east harshness now means mildness for the future.\nThough General Halder did not record any mention of Jews, German historian\nAndreas Hillgruber\nargued that because of Hitler's frequent contemporary statements about the coming war of annihilation against \"\nJudeo-Bolshevism\n\", his generals would have understood Hitler's call for the destruction of the Soviet Union as also comprising a call for the destruction of its Jewish population.\nThe genocide was often described using euphemisms such as \"special tasks\" and \"executive measures\";\nEinsatzgruppe\nvictims were often described as having been shot while trying to escape.\nIn May 1941, Heydrich verbally passed on the order to murder the Soviet Jews to the SiPo NCO School in\nPretzsch\n, where the commanders of the reorganised\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere being trained for Operation Barbarossa.\nIn spring 1941, Heydrich and General Eduard Wagner successfully completed negotiations for co-operation between the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand the German Army to allow the implementation of the \"special tasks\".\nFollowing the Heydrich-Wagner agreement on 28 April 1941, Field Marshal\nWalther von Brauchitsch\nordered that when Operation Barbarossa began, all German Army commanders were to immediately identify and register all Jews in occupied areas in the Soviet Union, and fully co-operate with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nIn further meetings held in June 1941 Himmler outlined to top SS leaders the regime's intention to reduce the population of the Soviet Union by 30 million people, not only through direct murder of those considered\nracially inferior\n, but by depriving the remainder of food and other necessities of life.\nOrganisation starting in 1941\nFurther information:\nList of Einsatzgruppen\nFor Operation Barbarossa, initially four\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere created, each numbering 500–990 men to comprise a total force of 3,000.\nEinsatzgruppen\nA, B, and C were to be attached to\nArmy Groups North\n,\nCentre\n, and\nSouth\n;\nEinsatzgruppe\nD was assigned to the\n11th Army\n. The\nEinsatzgruppe\nfor Special Purposes operated in eastern Poland starting in July 1941.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere under the control of the RSHA, headed by Heydrich and later by his successor, SS-\nObergruppenführer\nErnst Kaltenbrunner\n. Heydrich gave them a mandate to secure the offices and papers of the Soviet state and Communist Party;\nto liquidate all the higher cadres of the Soviet state; and to instigate and encourage\npogroms\nagainst Jewish populations.\nThe men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere recruited from the SD, Gestapo,\nKriminalpolizei\n(Kripo), Orpo, and\nWaffen-SS\n.\nEach\nEinsatzgruppe\nwas under the operational control of the\nHigher SS Police Chiefs\nin its area of operations.\nIn May 1941, General Wagner and SS-\nBrigadeführer\nWalter Schellenberg\nagreed that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin front-line areas were to operate under army command, while the army provided the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwith all necessary logistical support.\nGiven their main task was defeating the enemy, the army left the pacification of the civilian population to the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, who offered support as well as prevented subversion.\nThis did not preclude their participation in acts of violence against civilians, as many members of the\nWehrmacht\nassisted the\nEinsatzgruppen\nin rounding up and murdering Jews of their own accord.\nNaked Jewish women from the\nMizocz ghetto\n, some of whom are holding infants, wait in a line before their execution by the\nOrder Police\nwith the assistance of Ukrainian auxiliaries.\nMembers of the Order Police execute those who survived the initial shooting.\nHeydrich acted under orders from\nReichsführer-SS\nHimmler, who supplied security forces on an \"as needed\" basis to the local\nSS and Police Leaders\n.\nLed by SD, Gestapo, and Kripo officers,\nEinsatzgruppen\nincluded recruits from the Orpo, Security Service and\nWaffen-SS\n, augmented by uniformed volunteers from the local auxiliary police force.\nEach\nEinsatzgruppe\nwas supplemented with\nWaffen-SS\nand\nOrder Police battalions\nas well as support personnel such as drivers and radio operators.\nOn average, the Order Police formations were larger and better armed, with heavy machine-gun detachments, which enabled them to carry out operations beyond the capability of the SS.\nEach\ndeath squad\nfollowed an assigned army group as they advanced into the Soviet Union.\nDuring the course of their operations, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders received assistance from the\nWehrmacht\n.\nActivities ranged from the murder of targeted groups of individuals named on carefully prepared lists, to joint citywide operations with\nSS Einsatzgruppen\nwhich lasted for two or more days, such as the massacres at\nBabi Yar\n, perpetrated by the\nPolice Battalion 45\n, and at\nRumbula\n, by Battalion 22, reinforced by local\nSchutzmannschaften\n(auxiliary police).\nThe SS brigades, wrote historian\nChristopher Browning\n, were \"only the thin cutting edge of German units that became involved in political and racial mass murder.\"\nMany\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were highly educated; for example, nine of seventeen leaders of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA held doctorate degrees.\nThree\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere commanded by holders of doctorates, one of whom (SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Rasch\n) held a double doctorate.\nAdditional\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere created as additional territories were occupied.\nEinsatzgruppe\nE operated in\nIndependent State of Croatia\nunder three commanders, SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nLudwig Teichmann\n(\nde\n)\n, SS-\nStandartenführer\nGünther Herrmann\n, and lastly SS-\nStandartenführer\nWilhelm Fuchs\n. The unit was subdivided into five\nEinsatzkommandos\nlocated in\nVinkovci\n,\nSarajevo\n,\nBanja Luka\n,\nKnin\n, and\nZagreb\n.\nEinsatzgruppe\nF worked with Army Group South.\nEinsatzgruppe\nG operated in\nRomania\n,\nHungary\n, and\nUkraine\n, commanded by SS-\nStandartenführer\nJosef Kreuzer\n(\nde\n)\n.\nEinsatzgruppe\nH was assigned to\nSlovakia\n.\nEinsatzgruppen\nK and L, under SS-\nOberführer\nEmanuel Schäfer\nand SS-\nStandartenführer\nLudwig Hahn\n, worked alongside\n5th\nand\n6th Panzer Armies\nduring the\nArdennes offensive\n.\nHahn had previously been in command of\nEinsatzgruppe Griechenland\nin Greece.\nOther\nEinsatzgruppen\nand\nEinsatzkommandos\nincluded\nEinsatzgruppe Iltis\n(operated in Carinthia, on the border between Slovenia and Austria) under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n,\nEinsatzgruppe Jugoslawien\n(Yugoslavia)\nEinsatzkommando Luxemburg\n(Luxembourg),\nEinsatzgruppe Norwegen\n(Norway) commanded by SS-\nOberführer\nFranz Walter Stahlecker,\nEinsatzgruppe Serbien\n(Yugoslavia) under SS-\nStandartenführer\nWilhelm Fuchs\nand SS-\nGruppenführer\nAugust Meysner,\nEinsatzkommando Tilsit\n(\nde\n)\n(Lithuania, Poland),\nand\nEinsatzgruppe Tunis\n(\nTunis\n), commanded by SS-\nObersturmbannführer\nWalter Rauff\n.\nKillings in the Soviet Union\nFurther information:\nEinsatzgruppen reports\nVileyka\nMap of the\nEinsatzgruppen\noperations behind\nthe German-Soviet frontier\nwith the location of the first shooting of Jewish men, women and children, 30 July 1941\nAfter the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the\nEinsatzgruppen\n's main assignment was to kill civilians, as in Poland, but this time its targets specifically included\nSoviet Communist Party\ncommissars\nand Jews.\nIn a letter dated 2 July 1941 Heydrich communicated to his SS and Police Leaders that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere to execute all senior and middle ranking\nComintern\nofficials; all senior and middle ranking members of the central, provincial, and district committees of the Communist Party; extremist and radical Communist Party members;\npeople's commissars\n; and Jews in party and government posts. Open-ended instructions were given to execute \"other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, agitators, etc.).\" He instructed that any pogroms spontaneously initiated by the population of the occupied territories were to be quietly encouraged.\nOn 8 July, Heydrich announced that all Jews were to be regarded as partisans, and gave the order for all male Jews between the ages of 15 and 45 to be shot.\nOn 17 July Heydrich ordered that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere to murder all Jewish\nRed Army\nprisoners of war, plus all Red Army prisoners of war from Georgia and Central Asia, as they too might be Jews.\nUnlike in Germany, where the\nNuremberg Laws\nof 1935 defined as Jewish anyone with at least three Jewish grandparents, the\nEinsatzgruppen\ndefined as Jewish anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent; in either case, whether or not the person practised the religion was irrelevant.\nThe unit was also assigned to exterminate Romani people and the mentally ill. It was common practice for the\nEinsatzgruppen\nto shoot hostages.\nAs the invasion began, the Germans pursued the fleeing Red Army, leaving a security vacuum. Reports surfaced of Soviet guerrilla activity in the area, with local Jews immediately suspected of collaboration. Heydrich ordered his officers to incite anti-Jewish pogroms in the newly occupied territories.\nPogroms, some of which were orchestrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, broke out in\nLatvia\n,\nLithuania\n, and Ukraine.\nWithin the first few weeks of Operation Barbarossa, 10,000 Jews had been murdered in 40 pogroms, and by the end of 1941 some 60 pogroms had taken place, claiming as many as 24,000 victims.\nHowever,\nSS-Brigadeführer\nFranz Walter Stahlecker\n, commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA,\nreported to his superiors\nin mid-October that the residents of\nKaunas\nwere not spontaneously starting pogroms, and secret assistance by the Germans was required.\nA similar reticence was noted by\nEinsatzgruppe\nB in Russia and Belarus and\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in Ukraine; the further east the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntravelled, the less likely the residents were to be prompted into murdering their Jewish neighbours.\nJews forced to dig their own graves in\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 5 July 1941\nA teenage boy stands beside his murdered family shortly before his own murder.\nZboriv\n, Ukraine, 5 July 1941.\nAll four main\nEinsatzgruppen\ntook part in mass shootings from the early days of the war.\nInitially the targets were adult Jewish men, but by August the net had been widened to include women, children, and the elderly—the entire Jewish population. Initially there was a semblance of legality given to the shootings, with trumped-up charges being read out (arson, sabotage, black marketeering, or refusal to work, for example) and victims being murdered by a firing squad. As this method proved too slow, the\nEinsatzkommandos\nbegan to take their victims out in larger groups and shot them next to, or even inside, mass graves that had been prepared. Some\nEinsatzkommandos\nstarted to use automatic weapons, with survivors being murdered with a pistol shot.\nAs word of the massacres got out, many Jews fled; in Ukraine, 70 to 90 per cent of the Jews ran away. This was seen by the leader of\nEinsatzkommando\nVI as beneficial, as it would save the regime the costs of deporting the victims further east over the Urals.\nIn other areas the invasion was so successful that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad insufficient forces to immediately murder all the Jews in the conquered territories.\nA situation report from\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in September 1941 noted that not all Jews were members of the Bolshevist apparatus, and suggested that the total elimination of Jewry would have a negative impact on the economy and the food supply. The Nazis began to round their victims up into concentration camps and ghettos and rural districts were for the most part rendered\nJudenfrei\n(free of Jews).\nJewish councils were set up in major cities and forced labour gangs were established to make use of the Jews as slave labour until they were all dead, a goal that was postponed until 1942.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nused public hangings as a terror tactic against the local population. An\nEinsatzgruppe\nB report, dated 9 October 1941, described one such hanging. Due to suspected partisan activity near Demidov, all male residents aged 15 to 55 were put in a camp to be screened. The screening produced seventeen people who were identified as \"partisans\" and \"Communists\". Five members of the group were hanged while 400 local residents were assembled to watch; the rest were shot.\nBabi Yar\nMain article:\nBabi Yar\nThe largest mass shooting perpetrated by the\nEinsatzgruppen\ntook place on 29 and 30 September 1941 at Babi Yar, a ravine northwest of\nKiev\ncity center in Ukraine that had fallen to the Germans on 19 September.\nThe perpetrators included a company of\nWaffen-SS\nattached to\nEinsatzgruppe\nC under Rasch, members of\nSonderkommando\n4a under SS-\nObergruppenführer\nFriedrich Jeckeln\n, and some Ukrainian auxiliary police.\nThe Jews of Kiev were told to report to a certain street corner on 29 September; anyone who disobeyed would be shot. Since word of massacres in other areas had not yet reached Kiev and the assembly point was near the train station, they assumed they were being deported. People showed up at the rendezvous point in large numbers, laden with possessions and food for the journey.\nAfter being marched\nthree kilometres (two miles)\nnorthwest of the city centre, the victims encountered a barbed wire barrier and numerous Ukrainian police and German troops. Thirty or forty people at a time were told to leave their possessions and were escorted through a narrow passageway lined with soldiers brandishing clubs. Anyone who tried to escape was beaten. Soon the victims reached an open area, where they were forced to strip, and then were herded down into the ravine. People were forced to lie down in rows on top of the bodies of other victims, and they were shot in the back of the head or the neck by members of the execution squads.\nThe murders continued for two days, claiming a total of 33,771 victims.\nSand was shovelled and bulldozed over the bodies and the sides of the ravine were dynamited to bring down more material.\nAnton Heidborn, a member of\nSonderkommando\n4a, later testified that three days later that there were still people alive among the corpses. Heidborn spent the next few days helping smooth out the \"millions\" of banknotes taken from the victims' possessions.\nThe clothing was taken away, destined to be re-used by German citizens.\nJeckeln's troops shot more than 100,000 Jews by the end of October.\nKillings in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia\nMain articles:\nThe Holocaust in Lithuania\n,\nThe Holocaust in Latvia\n, and\nThe Holocaust in Estonia\nMassacre of Jews in Lietūkis garage on 27 June 1941 during the\nKaunas pogrom\nEinsatzgruppe\nA operated in\nBaltic states\nof Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (the three Baltic countries which had been occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940–1941). According to its own reports to Himmler,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA murdered almost 140,000 people in the five months following the 1941 German invasion: 136,421 Jews, 1,064 Communists, 653 people with mental illnesses, 56 partisans, 44 Poles, five Romani, and one Armenian were reported murdered between 22 June and 25 November 1941.\nUpon entering\nKaunas\n, Lithuania, on 25 June 1941, the\nEinsatzgruppe\nreleased the criminals from the local jail and encouraged them to join the pogrom which was underway.\nBetween 23 and 27 June 1941, 4,000 Jews were murdered on the streets of Kaunas and in nearby open pits and ditches.\nParticularly active in the Kaunas pogrom was the so-called \"Death Dealer of Kaunas\", a young man who murdered Jews with a crowbar at the Lietukis Garage before a large crowd that cheered each murder with much applause; he occasionally paused to play the Lithuanian national anthem \"\nTautiška giesmė\n\" on his accordion before resuming the murders.\nAs\nEinsatzgruppe\nA advanced into Lithuania, it actively recruited local nationalists and antisemitic groups. In July 1941, local Lithuanian collaborators, pejoratively called \"White Armbands\" (\nLithuanian\n:\nBaltaraiščiai\n,\nlit.\n'\nPeople with white armbands\n'\n), joined the massacres.\nA pogrom in the Latvian capital\nRiga\nin early July 1941 killed 400 Jews. Latvian nationalist\nViktors Arājs\nand his supporters undertook a campaign of arson against synagogues.\nOn 2 July,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA commander Stahlecker appointed Arājs to head the\nArajs Kommando\n,\na\nSonderkommando\nof about 300 men, mostly university students. Together,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA and the\nArājs Kommando\nmurdered 2,300 Jews in Riga on 6–7 July.\nWithin six months, Arājs and collaborators would murder about half of Latvia's Jewish population.\nLocal officials, the\nSelbstschutz\n, and the\nHilfspolizei\n(Auxiliary Police) played a key role in rounding up and massacring local Jews in German-occupied Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.\nThese groups also helped the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand other killing units to identify Jews.\nFor example, in Latvia, the\nHilfspolizei\n, consisting of auxiliary police organised by the Germans and recruited from former Latvian army and police officers, ex-\nAizsargi\n, members of the\nPērkonkrusts\n, and university students, assisted in the murder of Latvia's Jewish citizens.\nSimilar units were created elsewhere, and provided much of the manpower for the Holocaust in Eastern Europe.\nWith the creation of units such as the\nArājs Kommando\nin Latvia and the\nRollkommando Hamann\nin Lithuania,\nthe attacks changed from the spontaneous mob violence of the pogroms to more systematic massacres.\nWith extensive local help,\nEinsatzgruppe\nA was the first\nEinsatzgruppe\nto attempt to systematically exterminate all the Jews in its area.\nLatvian historian\nModris Eksteins\nwrote:\nOf the roughly 83,000 Jews who fell into German hands in Latvia, not more than 900 survived; and of the more than 20,000 Western Jews sent into Latvia, only some 800 lived through the deportation until liberation. This was the highest percentage of eradication in all of Europe.\nPit where bodies were burned after the\nPonary massacre\nIn late 1941, the\nEinsatzkommandos\nsettled into headquarters in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn.\nEinsatzgruppe\nA grew less mobile and faced problems because of its small size. The Germans relied increasingly on the Latvian\nArājs Kommando\nand similar groups to perform massacres of Jews.\nSuch extensive and enthusiastic collaboration with the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhas been attributed to several factors. Since the\nRussian Revolution of 1905\n, the\nKresy Wschodnie\nand other borderlands had experienced a political culture of violence.\nThe 1940–1941 Soviet occupation had been profoundly traumatic for residents of the Baltic states and areas that had been part of Poland until 1939; the population was brutalised and terrorised, and the existing familiar structures of society were destroyed.\nHistorian\nErich Haberer\nhas suggested that many survived and made sense of the \"totalitarian atomization\" of society by seeking conformity with communism.\nAs a result, by the time of the German invasion in 1941, many had come to see conformity with a totalitarian regime as socially acceptable behaviour; thus, people simply transferred their allegiance to the German regime when it arrived.\nSome who had collaborated with the Soviet regime sought to divert attention from themselves by naming Jews as collaborators and murdering them.\nRumbula\nMain article:\nRumbula massacre\nIn November 1941 Himmler was dissatisfied with the pace of the exterminations in Latvia, as he intended to move Jews from Germany into the area. He assigned SS-\nObergruppenführer\nJeckeln, one of the perpetrators of the Babi Yar massacre, to liquidate the\nRiga ghetto\n. Jeckeln selected a site about\n10\nkm (6\nmi)\nsoutheast of Riga near the Rumbula railway station, and had 300 Russian prisoners of war prepare the site by digging pits in which to bury the victims. Jeckeln organised around 1,700 men, including 300 members of the\nArajs Kommando\n, 50 German SD men, and 50 Latvian guards, most of whom had already participated in mass-murdering of civilians. These troops were supplemented by Latvians, including members of the Riga city police, battalion police, and ghetto guards. Around 1,500 able-bodied Jews would be spared execution so their slave labour could be exploited; a thousand men were relocated to a fenced-off area within the ghetto and 500 women were temporarily housed in a prison and later moved to a separate nearby ghetto, where they were put to work mending uniforms.\nAlthough Rumbula was on the rail line, Jeckeln decided that the victims should travel on foot from Riga to the execution ground. Trucks and buses were arranged to carry children and the elderly. The victims were told that they were being relocated, and were advised to bring up to\n20\nkg (44\nlb)\nof possessions. The first day of executions, 30 November 1941, began with the perpetrators rousing and assembling the victims at 4:00\nam. The victims were moved in columns of a thousand people toward the execution ground. As they walked, some SS men went up and down the line, shooting people who could not keep up the pace or who tried to run away or rest.\nWhen the columns neared the prepared execution site, the victims were driven some\n270 metres (300\nyd)\nfrom the road into the forest, where any possessions that had not yet been abandoned were seized. Here the victims were split into groups of fifty and taken deeper into the forest, near the pits, where they were ordered to strip. The victims were driven into the prepared trenches, made to lie down, and shot in the head or the back of the neck by members of Jeckeln's bodyguard. Around 13,000 Jews from Riga were murdered at the pits that day, along with a thousand Jews from Berlin who had just arrived by train. On the second day of the operation, 8 December 1941, the remaining 10,000 Jews of Riga were murdered in the same way. About a thousand were murdered on the streets of the city or on the way to the site, bringing the total number of victims for the two-day extermination to 25,000 people. For his part in organising the massacre, Jeckeln was promoted to Leader of the SS Upper Section,\nOstland\n.\nSecond sweep\nThe\nIvanhorod\nEinsatzgruppen\nphotograph\n: the murdering of Jews in\nIvanhorod\n,\nUkraine\n, 1942. A woman is attempting to protect a child with her own body just before they are fired upon with rifles at close range.\nA member of\nEinsatzgruppe D\nis about to shoot a man sitting by a mass grave in\nWinniza\n,\nUkraine\n, in 1942. Present in the background are members of the\nGerman Army\n, the\nGerman Labor Service\n, and former\nHitler Youth\n.\nThe back of the photograph is inscribed \"\nThe last Jew in Vinnitsa\n\".\nEinsatzgruppe\nB, C, and D did not immediately follow\nEinsatzgruppe\nA's example in systematically murdering all Jews in their areas. The\nEinsatzgruppe\ncommanders, with the exception of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA's Stahlecker, were of the opinion by the fall of 1941 that it was impossible to murder the entire Jewish population of the Soviet Union in one sweep, and thought the murders should stop.\nAn\nEinsatzgruppe\nreport dated 17 September advised that the Germans would be better off using any skilled Jews as labourers rather than shooting them.\nAlso, in some areas poor weather and a lack of transportation led to a slowdown in deportations of Jews from points further west.\nThus, an interval passed between the first round of\nEinsatzgruppen\nmassacres in summer and fall, and what American historian\nRaul Hilberg\ncalled the second sweep, which started in December 1941 and lasted into the summer of 1942.\nDuring the interval, the surviving Jews were forced into ghettos.\nEinsatzgruppe\nA had already murdered almost all Jews in its area, so it shifted its operations into Belarus to assist\nEinsatzgruppe\nB. In\nDnepropetrovsk\nin February 1942,\nEinsatzgruppe\nD reduced the city's Jewish population from 30,000 to 702 over the course of four days.\nThe German Order Police and local collaborators provided the extra manpower needed to perform all the shootings. Haberer wrote that, as in the Baltic states, the Germans could not have murdered so many Jews so quickly without local help. He points out that the ratio of Order Police to auxiliaries was 1 to 10 in both Ukraine and Belarus. In rural areas the proportion was 1 to 20. This meant that most Ukrainian and Belarusian Jews were murdered by fellow Ukrainians and Belarusians commanded by German officers rather than by Germans.\nThe second wave of exterminations in the Soviet Union met with armed resistance in some areas, though the chance of success was poor. Weapons were typically primitive or home-made. Communications were impossible between ghettos in various cities, so there was no way to create a unified strategy. Few in the ghetto leadership supported resistance for fear of reprisals on the ghetto residents. Mass break-outs were sometimes attempted, though survival in the forest was nearly impossible due to the lack of food and the fact that escapees were often tracked down and murdered.\nTransition to gassing\nSee also:\nFinal Solution\nMagirus-Deutz\nvan found near\nChełmno extermination camp\nis the same type as those used as\ngas vans\n.\nAfter a time, Himmler found that the killing methods used by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere inefficient: they were costly, demoralising for the troops, and sometimes did not kill the victims quickly enough.\nMany of the troops found the massacres to be difficult if not impossible to perform. Some of the perpetrators suffered physical and mental health problems, and many turned to drink.\nAs much as possible, the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders militarized the genocide. The historian Christian Ingrao notes an attempt was made to make the shootings a collective act without individual responsibility. Framing the shootings in this way was not psychologically sufficient for every perpetrator to feel absolved of guilt.\nBrowning notes three categories of potential perpetrators: those who were eager to participate right from the start, those who participated in spite of moral qualms because they were ordered to do so, and a significant minority who refused to take part.\nA few men spontaneously became excessively brutal in their killing methods and their zeal for the task. Commander of\nEinsatzgruppe\nD, SS-\nGruppenführer\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, particularly noted this propensity towards excess, and ordered that any man who was too eager to participate or too brutal should not perform any further executions.\nDuring a visit to\nMinsk\nin August 1941, Himmler witnessed an\nEinsatzgruppen\nmass execution first-hand and concluded that shooting Jews was too stressful for his men.\nBy November he made arrangements for any SS men suffering ill health from having participated in executions to be provided with rest and mental health care.\nHe also decided a transition should be made to gassing the victims, especially the women and children, and ordered the recruitment of expendable native auxiliaries who could assist with the murders.\nGas vans, which had been used previously to murder mental patients, began to see service by all four main\nEinsatzgruppen\nfrom 1942.\nHowever, the gas vans were not popular with the\nEinsatzkommandos\n, because removing the dead bodies from the van and burying them was a horrible ordeal. Prisoners or auxiliaries were often assigned to do this task so as to spare the SS men the trauma.\nSome of the early mass murders at\nextermination camps\nused carbon monoxide fumes produced by diesel engines, similar to the method used in gas vans, but by as early as September 1941 experiments were begun at\nAuschwitz\nusing\nZyklon B\n, a cyanide-based pesticide gas.\nPlans for the total eradication of the Jewish population of Europe—eleven million people—were formalised at the\nWannsee Conference\n, held on 20 January 1942. Some would be\nworked to death\n, and the rest would be murdered in the implementation of the\nFinal Solution\nof the\nJewish question\n(\nGerman:\nDie Endlösung der Judenfrage\n).\nPermanent killing centres at Auschwitz,\nBelzec\n,\nChelmno\n,\nMajdanek\n,\nSobibor\n,\nTreblinka\n, and other Nazi extermination camps replaced mobile death squads as the primary method of mass-murder.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nremained active, however, and were put to work fighting partisans, particularly in Belarus.\nAfter the\ndefeat at Stalingrad\nin February 1943, Himmler realised that Germany would likely lose the war, and ordered the formation of a special task force,\nSonderaktion 1005\n, under SS-\nStandartenführer\nPaul Blobel\n. The unit's assignment was to visit mass graves all along the\nEastern Front\nto exhume bodies and burn them in an attempt to cover up the genocide. The task remained unfinished at the end of the war, and many mass graves remain unmarked and unexcavated.\nBy 1944 the Red Army had begun to push the German forces out of Eastern Europe, and the\nEinsatzgruppen\nretreated alongside the\nWehrmacht\n. By late 1944, most\nEinsatzgruppen\npersonnel had been folded into\nWaffen-SS\ncombat units or transferred to permanent death camps. Hilberg estimates that between 1941 and 1945 the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand related agencies killed more than two million people, including 1.3 million Jews.\nThe total number of Jews murdered during the war is estimated at 5.5 to six million people.\nPlans for the Middle East and Britain\nAccording to research by German historians\nKlaus-Michael Mallmann\nand\nMartin Cüppers\n(\nde\n)\n,\nEinsatzkommando Egypt\n, led by\nWalter Rauff\n, was formed in 1942 in\nAthens\n. The unit was to enter\nEgypt\nand\nMandatory Palestine\nonce German forces arrived there.\nAccording to Mallmann and Cüppers, the unit's purpose was to carry out mass-murder of the Jewish populations in those areas. Given its initially small staff of only 24 men, Mallmann and Cüppers point to the further history of the unit, when it was quickly enlarged to more than four times its original strength during its deployment in Tunisia. Furthermore they assume that the commando would have been supported in the annihilation of the Jews by local collaborators, like it happened  with the Einsatzgruppen in Eastern Europe.\nFormer Iraqi prime minister\nRashid Ali al-Gaylani\nand the\nGrand Mufti of Jerusalem\nHaj Amin al-Husseini\nplayed roles, engaging in antisemitic radio propaganda, preparing to recruit volunteers, and in raising an\nArab-German Battalion\nthat would also follow\nEinsatzkommando\nEgypt to the Middle East.\nOn 20 July 1942 Rauff was sent to\nTobruk\nto report to Field Marshal\nErwin Rommel\n, Commander of the\nAfrika Korps\n. Since Rommel was 500\nkm away at the\nFirst Battle of El Alamein\n, it is unlikely that the two met.\nThe plans for\nEinsatzgruppe\nEgypt were set aside after the Allied victory at the\nSecond Battle of El Alamein\n.\nHad\nOperation Sea Lion\n—the German plan for an invasion of the United Kingdom—been launched, six\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere scheduled to follow the invasion force into Britain. They were provided with a list called the\nSonderfahndungsliste, G.B.\n('Special Search List, G.B'), known as\nThe Black Book\nafter the war, of 2,300 people to be immediately imprisoned by the Gestapo. The list included Churchill, members of the cabinet, prominent journalists and authors, and members of the\nCzechoslovak government-in-exile\n.\nJäger Report\nMain article:\nJäger Report\nPage 6 of the\nJäger Report\nshows the number of people murdered by\nEinsatzkommando\nIII alone in the five-month period covered by the report as 137,346.\nThe\nEinsatzgruppen\nkept official records of many of their massacres and provided detailed reports to their superiors. The\nJäger Report\n, filed by Commander SS-\nStandartenführer\nKarl Jäger\non 1 December 1941 to his superior, Stahlecker (head of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA), covers the activities of\nEinsatzkommando\nIII in Lithuania over the five-month period from 2 July 1941 to 25 November 1941.\nJäger's report provides an almost daily running total of the liquidations of 137,346 people, the vast majority of them Jews.\nThe report documents the exact date and place of massacres, the number of victims, and their breakdown into categories (Jews, Communists, criminals, and so on).\nWomen were shot from the very beginning, but initially in fewer numbers than men.\nChildren were first included in the tally starting in mid-August, when 3,207 people were murdered in\nRokiškis\non 15–16 August 1941.\nFor the most part the report does not give any military justification for the murders; people were murdered solely because they were Jews.\nIn total, the report lists over 100 executions in 71 different locations. Jäger wrote: \"I can state today that the goal of solving the Jewish problem in Lithuania has been reached by\nEinsatzkommando\n3. There are no more Jews in Lithuania, apart from working Jews and their families.\"\nIn a February 1942 addendum to the report, Jäger increased the total number of victims to 138,272, giving a breakdown of 48,252 men, 55,556 women, and 34,464 children. Only 1,851 of the victims were non-Jewish.\nJäger escaped capture by the Allies when the war ended. He lived in Heidelberg under his own name until his report was discovered in March 1959.\nArrested and charged, Jäger committed suicide on 22 June 1959 in\nHohenasperg Fortress\nwhile awaiting trial for his crimes.\nInvolvement of the\nWehrmacht\nMain article:\nWar crimes of the Wehrmacht\nThe murders took place with the knowledge and support of the German Army in the east.\nAs ordered by Hitler, the\nWehrmacht\ncooperated with the\nEinsatzgruppen\n, providing logistical support for their operations, and participated in the mass killings.\nOn 10 October 1941 Field Marshal\nWalther von Reichenau\ndrafted an order to be read to the\nGerman Sixth Army\non the Eastern Front. Now known as the\nSeverity Order\n, it read in part:\nThe most important objective of this campaign against the Jewish-Bolshevik system is the complete destruction of its sources of power and the extermination of the Asiatic influence in European civilization\n... In this eastern theatre, the soldier is not only a man fighting in accordance with the rules of the art of war, but also the ruthless standard bearer of a national conception\n... For this reason the soldier must learn fully to appreciate the necessity for the severe but just retribution that must be meted out to the subhuman species of Jewry.\nField Marshal\nGerd von Rundstedt\nof Army Group South expressed his \"complete agreement\" with the order. He sent out a circular to the generals under his command urging them to release their own versions and to impress upon their troops the need to exterminate the Jews.\nGeneral\nErich von Manstein\n, in an order to his troops on 20 November, stated that \"the Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all.\"\nManstein sent a letter to\nEinsatzgruppe\nD commanding officer Ohlendorf complaining that it was unfair that the SS was keeping all of the murdered Jews' wristwatches for themselves instead of sharing with the Army.\nBeyond this trivial complaint, the Army and the\nEinsatzgruppen\nworked closely and effectively. On 6 July 1941\nEinsatzkommando\n4b of\nEinsatzgruppe\nC reported that \"Armed forces surprisingly welcome hostility against the Jews\".\nFew complaints about the murders were ever raised by\nWehrmacht\nofficers.\nOn 8 September,\nEinsatzgruppe\nD reported that relations with the German Army were \"excellent\".\nIn the same month, Stahlecker of\nEinsatzgruppe\nA wrote that Army Group North had been exemplary in co-operating with the exterminations and that relations with the\n4th Panzer Army\n, commanded by General\nErich Hoepner\n, were \"very close, almost cordial\".\nIn the south, the Romanian Army worked closely with\nEinsatzgruppe\nD to massacre Ukrainian Jews,\nmurdering around 26,000 Jews in the\nOdessa massacre\n.\nThe German historian\nPeter Longerich\nthinks it probable that the\nWehrmacht\n, along with the\nOrganization of Ukrainian Nationalists\n(OUN), incited the\nLviv pogroms\n, during which 8,500 to 9,000 Jews were murdered by the native population and\nEinsatzgruppe\nC in July 1941.\nMoreover, most people on the home front in Germany had some idea of the massacres being committed by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nBritish historian\nHugh Trevor-Roper\nnoted that although Himmler had forbidden photographs of the murders, it was common for both the men of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nand for bystanders to take pictures to send to their loved ones, which he felt suggested widespread approval of the massacres.\nOfficers in the field were well aware of the killing operations being conducted by the\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nThe\nWehrmacht\ntried to justify their considerable involvement in the\nEinsatzgruppen\nmassacres as being anti-partisan operations rather than racist attacks, but Hillgruber wrote that this was just an excuse. He states that those German generals who claimed that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere a necessary anti-partisan response were lying, and maintained that the slaughter of about 2.2\nmillion defenceless civilians for reasons of racist ideology cannot be justified.\nEinsatzgruppen\ntrials\nMost of the surviving perpetrators of Nazi war crimes were never charged, and returned unremarked to civilian life. The West German government only charged about 100 former\nEinsatzgruppen\nmembers with war crimes.\nAs time went on, it became more difficult to obtain prosecutions; witnesses grew older and were less likely to be able to offer valuable testimony. Funding for trials was inadequate, and the governments of Austria and Germany became less interested in obtaining convictions for wartime events, preferring to forget the Nazi past.\n1947–1948 trial\nMain article:\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nAfter the close of World War II, 24 senior leaders of the\nEinsatzgruppen\nwere prosecuted in the\nEinsatzgruppen trial\nin 1947–48, part of the\nSubsequent Nuremberg Trials\nheld under United States military authority. The men were charged with\ncrimes against humanity\n,\nwar crimes\n, and membership in the SS (which had been declared a criminal organization). Fourteen death sentences and two life sentences were among the judgments; only four executions were carried out, on 7 June 1951; the rest were reduced to lesser sentences. Four additional\nEinsatzgruppe\nleaders were later tried and executed by other nations.\nOtto Ohlendorf\n, 1943\nSeveral\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders, including Ohlendorf, claimed at the trial to have received an order before Operation Barbarossa requiring them to murder all Soviet Jews.\nTo date no evidence has been found that such an order was ever issued.\nGerman prosecutor Alfred Streim noted that if such an order had been given, post-war courts would only have been able to convict the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders as\naccomplices\nto mass murder. However, if it could be established that the\nEinsatzgruppen\nhad committed mass murder without orders, then they could have been convicted as\nperpetrators\nof mass murder, and hence could have received stiffer sentences, including capital punishment.\nStreim postulated that the existence of an early comprehensive order was a fabrication created for use in Ohlendorf's defence. This theory is now widely accepted by historians.\nLongerich notes that most orders received by the\nEinsatzgruppen\nleaders—especially when they were being ordered to carry out criminal activities—were vague, and couched in terminology that had a specific meaning for members of the regime. Leaders were given briefings about the need to be \"severe\" and \"firm\"; all Jews were to be viewed as potential enemies who had to be dealt with ruthlessly.\nBritish historian\nIan Kershaw\nargues that Hitler's apocalyptic remarks before Barbarossa about the necessity for a war without mercy to \"annihilate\" the forces of \"Judeo-Bolshevism\" were interpreted by\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommanders as permission and encouragement to engage in extreme antisemitic violence, with each\nEinsatzgruppen\ncommander to use his own discretion about how far he was prepared to go.\nAccording to Erwin Schulz, one of only two of Ohlendorf's codefendants to not attest to his version of events, he only received an order to exterminate all Jews in mid-August 1941. Unlike Ohlendorf, however, Schulz, unwilling to kill women and children, had refused to carry out this order and was subsequently discharged from this duty in a move that did not harm his career in any way.\nPrior to the invasion, Schulz testified that Heydrich had told him:\nThat every one should be sure to understand that, in this fight, Jews would definitely take their part and that, in this fight, everything was set at stake, and the one side which gave in would be the one to be overcome. For that reason, all measures had to be taken against the Jews in particular. The experience in Poland had shown this.\n1958 trial\nMain article:\nUlm Einsatzkommando trial\nThe crimes of the Einsatzgruppen came into wider public awareness with the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial in 1958. At the trial, ten former members of\nEinsatzkommando Tilsit\n(\nde\n)\nwere on trial accused of murdering around 5,500 Jewish men, women, and children in the German-Lithuanian border area in mid-1941. Among them were the heads of the Tilsit task force\nHans-Joachim Böhme\n(\nde\n;\nfr\n;\nru\n;\nsv\n)\n,\nBernhard Fischer-Schweder\n(\nde\n)\n, and the head of the Tilsit SD section\nWerner Hersmann\n(\nde\n)\n.\nThe responsible senior public prosecutor,\nErwin Schüle\n(\nde\n)\n, used as evidence documents from the American Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg, existing specialist literature, SS personnel files, and surviving \"USSR event reports\".\nSee also\nExecutions in the Valley of Death\nFunctionalism versus intentionalism\nGlossary of Nazi Germany\nList of Nazi Party leaders and officials\nMyth of the clean\nWehrmacht\nPorajmos\nReferences\nExplanatory notes\n↑\nSingular:\nEinsatzgruppe\n; Official full name:\nEinsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD\n.\nCitations\n↑\nWolf 2020\n, p.\n53.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n138.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n4.\n1\n2\nEdeiken 2000\n.\n1\n2\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n436.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n405, 412.\n↑\nNuremberg Trial, Vol. 20, Day 194\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n138–141.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n425.\n1\n2\n3\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n144.\n1\n2\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n11.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, pp.\n11, 20.\n1\n2\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n14.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n17.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n12.\n↑\nBrowning\n&\nMatthäus 2004\n, pp.\n16–18.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n143.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nRossino 2003\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n144–145.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n429.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n430–432.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n225.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n18.\n↑\nGerwarth 2011\n, p.\n147.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n146.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, pp.\n25–26.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n227–228.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, pp.\n242–245.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n95.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, p.\n93.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n521–522.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n95–96.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n14, 48.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n94–95.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n94–96.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n96.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n181.\n1\n2\n3\n4\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n185.\n↑\nThomas 1987\n, p.\n265.\n1\n2\nRees 1997\n, p.\n177.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n15.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n30–31.\n↑\nLangerbein 2003\n, pp.\n31–32.\n1\n2\nBrowning 1998\n, pp.\n10–12.\n1\n2\nEinsatzgruppen judgment\n, pp.\n414–416.\n↑\nBrowning 1998\n, pp.\n135–136, 141–142.\n↑\nRobertson\n.\n↑\nBrowning 1998\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n186.\n↑\nBrowning\n&\nMatthäus 2004\n, pp.\n225–226.\n1\n2\nMacLean 1999\n, p.\n23.\n1\n2\n3\nMuseum of Tolerance\n.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n419.\n↑\nDams\n&\nStolle 2012\n, p.\n168.\n↑\nConze, Frei et al. 2010\n.\n↑\nCrowe 2007\n, p.\n267.\n↑\nMallmann\n&\nCüppers 2006\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nLarsen 2008\n, p.\nxi.\n↑\nShelach 1989\n, p.\n1169.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, p.\n130.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n523.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n198.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n97.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n368.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, pp.\n62–70.\n↑\nUrban 2001\n.\n1\n2\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n526.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n68.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n193–195.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n208.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n196–202.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n207.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n208, 211.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n211.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n211–212.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n212–213.\n↑\nHeadland 1992\n, pp.\n57–58.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n179.\n1\n2\n3\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n227.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n315.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n172–173.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n173–176.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n178.\n↑\nWeale 2012\n, p.\n317.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n98.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n41.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n67–68.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n179.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n68–69.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n69.\n1\n2\n3\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n71.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n69–70.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n70.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n182.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n66.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n73.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, pp.\n74–75.\n1\n2\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n76.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n77.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n206–209.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n208–210.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n210–214.\n↑\nBerenbaum 2006\n, p.\n93.\n1\n2\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n342.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n549.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, pp.\n342–343.\n1\n2\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n64.\n↑\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n372.\n↑\nHaberer 2001\n, p.\n78.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n353–354.\n↑\nRees 1997\n, p.\n197.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n52, 124, 168.\n↑\nIngrao 2013\n, pp.\n199–200.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n163.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n165–166.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n547–548.\n1\n2\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n167.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n551.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, p.\n548.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n243.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n280–281.\n↑\nLongerich 2012\n, pp.\n555–556.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n279–280.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n248.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n258–260, 262.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n257.\n↑\nEvans 2008\n, p.\n318.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, p.\n117.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n124–125.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n127–130.\n↑\nMallmann, Cüppers\n&\nSmith 2010\n, pp.\n103, 117–118.\n↑\nShepherd 2016\n, p.\n357.\n↑\nKrumenacker 2006\n.\n↑\nShirer 1960\n, pp.\n783–784.\n1\n2\n3\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n215.\n1\n2\n3\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n126.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n230.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n216.\n↑\nRabitz 2011\n.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n276.\n1\n2\nHillgruber 1989\n, p.\n102.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n244–247.\n↑\nCraig 1973\n, p.\n10.\n↑\nMayer 1988\n, p.\n250.\n↑\nSmelser\n&\nDavies 2008\n, p.\n43.\n1\n2\n3\nHilberg 1985\n, p.\n301.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, p.\n131.\n↑\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n79.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n194.\n↑\nMarrus 2000\n, p.\n88.\n↑\nKlee, Dressen\n&\nRiess 1991\n, p.\nxi.\n↑\nWette 2007\n, pp.\n200–201.\n↑\nHillgruber 1989\n, pp.\n102–103.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n275–276.\n↑\nSegev 2010\n, pp.\n226, 250, 376.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, pp.\n274–275.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n187.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, pp.\n187–189.\n↑\nStreim 1989\n, p.\n439.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n188.\n↑\nLongerich 2010\n, p.\n189–190.\n↑\nKershaw 2008\n, pp.\n258–259.\n↑\nLower 2005\n, p.\n85.\n↑\nRhodes 2002\n, p.\n16.\n↑\nFischer\n&\nLorenz 2007\n, p.\n64 f.\n↑\nMix 2008\n.\nSources\nBerenbaum, Michael\n(2006).\nThe World Must Know\n. Contributors: Arnold Kramer, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (2nd\ned.). USHMM and Johns Hopkins University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80188-358-3\n.\nBrowning, Christopher R. (1998) .\nOrdinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland\n. London; New York: Penguin.\nBrowning, Christopher\n;\nMatthäus, Jürgen\n(2004).\nThe Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942\n. Comprehensive History of the Holocaust. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\nISBN\n978-0-8032-1327-2\n.\nConze, Eckart; Frei, Norbert; Hayes, Peter; Zimmermann, Moshe (2010).\nDas Amt und die Vergangenheit\n: deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik\n(in German). Munich: Karl Blessing.\nISBN\n978-3-89667-430-2\n.\nCraig, William\n(1973).\nEnemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad\n. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky.\nISBN\n978-1-56852-368-2\n.\nCrowe, David (2007) .\nOskar Schindler: The Untold Account of his Life, Wartime Activities and the True Story Behind the List\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00253-5\n.\nDams, Carsten; Stolle, Michael (2012) .\nDie Gestapo: Herrschaft und Terror im Dritten Reich\n. Becksche Reihe (in German). Munich: Beck.\nISBN\n978-3-406-62898-6\n.\nEdeiken, Yale F. (22 August 2000).\n\"Introduction to the Einsatzgruppen\"\n. Holocaust History Project. Archived from\nthe original\non 7 October 2015\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\n\"Einsatzgruppen case\"\n(PDF)\n.\nTrials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10\n(PDF)\n. Green Series. Vol.\n4. Nürnberg. October 1946 – April 1949\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: location missing publisher (\nlink\n)\nEvans, Richard J.\n(2008).\nThe Third Reich at War\n. New York: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-14-311671-4\n.\nFischer, Torben; Lorenz, Matthias N. (2007).\nLexikon der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945\n(in German). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.\nISBN\n978-3-8394-0773-8\n.\nGerwarth, Robert\n(2011).\nHitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich\n. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-11575-8\n.\nHaberer, Erich (2001). \"Intention and Feasibility: Reflections on Collaboration and the Final Solution\".\nEast European Jewish Affairs\n.\n31\n(2):\n64–\n81.\ndoi\n:\n10.1080/13501670108577951\n.\nISSN\n1350-1674\n.\nOCLC\n210897979\n.\nS2CID\n143574047\n.\n{{\ncite journal\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nHeadland, Ronald (1992).\nMessages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Security Police and the Security Service\n. London: Associated University Presses.\nISBN\n978-0-8386-3418-9\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 29 September 2024\n. Retrieved\n18 January\n2016\n.\nHilberg, Raul\n(1985).\nThe Destruction of the European Jews\n. New York: Holmes & Meier.\nISBN\n978-0-8419-0832-1\n.\nHillgruber, Andreas\n(1989). \"War in the East and the Extermination of the Jews\". In Marrus, Michael (ed.).\nPart 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder, Volume 1\n. The Nazi Holocaust. Westpoint, CT: Meckler. pp.\n85–\n114.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nIngrao, Christian (2013).\nBelieve and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine\n. Malden, MA: Polity.\nISBN\n978-0-7456-6026-4\n.\nKershaw, Ian\n(2008).\nHitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution\n. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-12427-9\n.\nKlee, Ernst\n; Dressen, Willi; Riess, Volker (1991).\n\"The Good Old Days\" – The Holocaust as Seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders\n. Trans. Burnstone, Deborah. New York: MacMillan.\nISBN\n978-0-02-917425-8\n.\nKrumenacker, Thomas (7 April 2006).\n\"Nazis Planned Holocaust for Palestine: historians\"\n. Red Orbit. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 December 2017\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\nLangerbein, Helmut (2003).\nHitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder\n. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.\nISBN\n978-1-58544-285-0\n.\nLarsen, Stein Ugelvik (2008).\nMeldungen aus Norwegen 1940–1945: Die geheimen Lagesberichte des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Norwegen, 1\n(in German). Munich: Oldenburg.\nISBN\n978-3-486-55891-3\n.\nLongerich, Peter\n(2010).\nHolocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-280436-5\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nLongerich, Peter (2012).\nHeinrich Himmler: A Life\n. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-19-959232-6\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (\nlink\n)\nLower, Wendy (2005).\nNazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine\n. London and Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.\nISBN\n978-0-80782-960-8\n.\nMacLean, French L. (1999).\nThe Field Men: The SS Officers Who Led the Einsatzkommandos—The Nazi Mobile Killing Units\n.\nSchiffer Publishing\n. Madison, WI: Schiffer.\nISBN\n978-0-7643-0754-6\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael\n; Cüppers, Martin (2006).\nCrescent and Swastika: The Third Reich, the Arabs and Palestine\n. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.\nISBN\n978-3-534-19729-3\n.\nMallmann, Klaus-Michael; Cüppers, Martin; Smith, Krista (2010).\nNazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine\n. New York: Enigma.\nISBN\n978-1-929631-93-3\n.\nMarrus, Michael\n(2000).\nThe Holocaust in History\n. Toronto: Key Porter.\nISBN\n978-1-55263-120-1\n.\nMayer, Arno J\n(1988).\nWhy Did The Heavens Not Darken?\n. New York: Pantheon.\nISBN\n978-0-394-57154-6\n.\nMix, Andreas (27 April 2008).\n\"NS-Prozesse: Als Westdeutschland aufwachte\"\n.\nDer Spiegel\n(in German)\n. Retrieved\n20 October\n2023\n.\n\"Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume 20, Day 194\"\n.\nThe Avalon Project\n. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library\n. Retrieved\n10 January\n2013\n.\nRabitz, Cornelia (21 June 2011).\n\"Biography of Nazi criminal meets resistance from small German town\"\n.\ndw.de\n.\nDeutsche Welle\n. Retrieved\n9 September\n2016\n.\nRees, Laurence\n(1997).\nThe Nazis: A Warning From History\n. Foreword by Sir Ian Kershaw. New York: New Press.\nISBN\n978-1-56584-551-0\n.\nRhodes, Richard\n(2002).\nMasters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust\n. New York: Vintage Books.\nISBN\n978-0-375-70822-0\n.\nRobertson, Struan.\n\"The genocidal missions of Reserve Police Battalion 101 in the General Government (Poland) 1942–1943\"\n.\nHamburg Police Battalions during the Second World War\n. Regionalen Rechenzentrum der Universität Hamburg. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 February 2008\n. Retrieved\n2 January\n2015\n.\nRossino, Alexander B.\n(2003).\nHitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity\n. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.\nISBN\n978-0-7006-1234-5\n.\nSegev, Tom\n(2010).\nSimon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends\n. New York: Doubleday.\nISBN\n978-0-385-51946-5\n.\nShelach, Menachem (1989). \"Sajmište: An Extermination Camp in Serbia\". In\nMarrus, Michael Robert\n(ed.).\nThe Victims of the Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews\n. Vol.\n2. Westport, CT: Meckler.\nShepherd, Ben H.\n(2016).\nHitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich\n. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-300-17903-3\n.\nShirer, William L.\n(1960).\nThe Rise and Fall of the Third Reich\n. New York: Simon & Schuster.\nLCCN\n60-6729\n.\nSmelser, Ronald\n; Davies, Edward (2008).\nThe Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture\n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-83365-3\n.\nStaff.\n\"Book review:\nTasks of the Einsatzgruppen\nby Alfred Streim\"\n.\nMuseum of Tolerance Online Multimedia Learning Center, Annual 4, Chapter 9\n. Los Angeles:\nSimon Wiesenthal Center\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 26 August 2012\n. Retrieved\n10 June\n2018\n.\nStreim, Alfred (1989). \"The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen\". In\nMarrus, Michael\n(ed.).\nThe Nazi Holocaust, Part 3, The \"Final Solution\": The Implementation of Mass Murder\n. Vol.\n2. Westpoint, CT: Meckler. pp.\n436–\n454.\nISBN\n978-0-88736-266-8\n.\nThomas, David (April 1987). \"Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941–45\".\nJournal of Contemporary History\n.\n22\n(2):\n261–\n301.\ndoi\n:\n10.1177/002200948702200204\n.\nJSTOR\n260933\n.\nS2CID\n161288059\n.\nUrban, Thomas (1 September 2001).\n\"Poszukiwany Hermann Schaper\"\n.\nRzeczpospolita\n(in Polish) (204). Archived from\nthe original\non 24 November 2007\n. Retrieved\n5 January\n2015\n.\nWeale, Adrian\n(2012).\nArmy of Evil: A History of the SS\n. New York; Toronto: Penguin Group.\nISBN\n978-0-451-23791-0\n.\nWette, Wolfram\n(2007).\nThe Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality\n. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-67402-577-6\n.\nWolf, Gerhard (born 1954).\n2010 PhD dissertation (in German) and 2020 translation (in English)\n.\nThese are commercially published editions of Gerhard Wolf's dissertation submitted for his 2010 PhD at\nHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\n2012 German-language original.\nIdeologie und Herrschaftsrationalität nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen\n(in German).\nHamburg\n:\nHamburger Edition\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\nISBN\n978-3-8685-4245-5\n,\n3-8685-4245-0\n;\nOCLC\n1039842033\n&\n794319959\n.\n2020 English translation.\nIdeology and the Rationality of Domination: Nazi Germanization Policies in Poland\n. Translated by Wayne Yung (born 1971).\nBloomington\n:\nIndiana University Press\n.\n{{\ncite book\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (\nlink\n)\ndoi\n:\n10.2307/j.ctv10h9f66\n;\nJSTOR\nj.ctv10h9f66\n;\nLCCN\n2019-54996\n(print);\nLCCN\n2019-54997\n(eBook);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4807-3\n,\n0-2530-4807-9\n(hard cover);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4808-0\n,\n0-2530-4808-7\n(eBook, pdf);\nISBN\n978-0-2530-4809-7\n,\n0-2530-4809-5\n(eBook);\nOCLC\n1139013187\n(all editions)\n.\nLimited preview\n–\nvia\nGoogle Books\n.\nLimited preview\n–\nvia\nGoogle Books\n.\nFurther reading\nBenishay, Guitel (3 May 2016).\n\"Le journal de bord du chef SS en Tunisie découvert\"\n.\nLPH info\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 12 December 2021\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2020\n.\nCohen, Nir (17 April 2015).\n\"Inside the diary of SS officer known as gas chamber 'mastermind'\n\"\n.\nYnetnews\n. Retrieved\n18 April\n2020\n.\nEarl, Hilary (2009).\nThe Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945–1958: Atrocity, Law, and History\n. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.\nISBN\n978-0-521-45608-1\n.\nFörster, Jürgen\n(1998). \"Complicity or Entanglement? The Wehrmacht, the War and the Holocaust\". In Berenbaum, Michael; Peck, Abraham (eds.).\nThe Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined\n. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp.\n266\n–283.\nISBN\n978-0-253-33374-2\n.\nKrausnick, Helmut\n; Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich (1981).\nDie Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942\n(in German). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.\nISBN\n978-3-421-01987-5\n.\nSnyder, Timothy\n(2010).\nBloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin\n. New York: Basic Books.\nISBN\n978-0-465-00239-9\n.\nStang, Knut (1996).\nKollaboration und Massenmord. Die litauische Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden\n(in German). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\nISBN\n978-3-631-30895-0\n.\nExternal links\nWikimedia Commons has media related to\nEinsatzgruppen\n.\nEnglish\nWikisource\nhas original text related to this article:\nComprehensive report of Einsatzgruppe A up to 15 October 1941\nUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum article on\nEinsatzgruppen\n\"Einsatzgruppen\"\nThe Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team",
    "infobox": {
      "formed": "c.1939",
      "preceding_agency": "Einsatzkommando",
      "jurisdiction": "Germanyand German-occupied Europe",
      "headquarters": "RSHA,Prinz-Albrecht-Straße,Berlin52°30′26″N13°22′57″E/52.50722°N 13.38250°E/52.50722; 13.38250",
      "employees": "c. 3,000 (1941)",
      "minister_responsible": "Heinrich Himmler,Reichsführer-SS",
      "agency_executives": "SS-ObergruppenführerReinhard Heydrich, Director (1939–1942)SS-ObergruppenführerErnst Kaltenbrunner, Director (1943–1945)",
      "parent_agency": "Allgemeine SSand RSHA"
    },
    "char_count": 67955
  }
]