json/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Kodashim/Meilah/English/merged.json

{
    "title": "Meilah",
    "language": "en",
    "versionTitle": "merged",
    "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Meilah",
    "text": [
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Offerings of the most sacred order that</b> were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if <b>one slaughtered them in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as required, are subject to the following <i>halakha</i>: One is liable for <b>misusing them,</b> i.e., one who derives benefit from them must bring a guilt offering and pay the principal and an additional one-fifth of their value. If he improperly <b>slaughtered them in the south</b> of the courtyard <b>and</b> properly <b>collected their blood in the north, or</b> even if he properly slaughtered them <b>in the north</b> of the courtyard <b>but</b> improperly <b>collected their blood in the south,</b> although the more significant rite was performed improperly, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals.",
            "The same <i>halakha</i> that applies if the location of the sacrificial rites was altered likewise applies if the time of those rites was altered. Accordingly, if <b>one</b> properly <b>slaughtered</b> them <b>during the day and</b> improperly <b>sprinkled</b> their blood <b>at night,</b> or if he improperly slaughtered them <b>at night and</b> properly <b>sprinkled</b> their blood <b>during the day,</b> one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. <b>Or</b> in a case <b>where one slaughtered them</b> with the intent to partake of their meat or sprinkle their blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> rendering it <i>piggul</i>, <b>or outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> disqualifying the offering, he is liable for <b>misusing them</b> if he derives benefit from the animals.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle</b> with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that had a period of fitness to the priests</b> before it was disqualified, one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Misuse applies specifically to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that did not have a period of fitness for the priests</b> before it was disqualified, one is liable for <b>misusing it</b> if he derives benefit from it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout.",
            "<b>Which is</b> the sacrificial animal <b>that had a period of fitness for the priests?</b> This category includes a sacrificial animal <b>whose</b> meat <b>remained overnight</b> after its blood was presented on the altar and therefore came to have the status of <i>notar</i> and was therefore disqualified, <b>and</b> one <b>that</b> was disqualified when it <b>became ritually impure, and</b> one <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse.",
            "<b>And which is</b> the sacrificial animal <b>that did not have a period of fitness for the priests?</b> It is a sacrificial animal <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> or <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> one <b>that</b> those <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>collected and sprinkled its blood.</b> All of these disqualifications took effect before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted. The offerings therefore remain consecrated to God, and one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from them.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna <b>teaches:</b> With regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if <b>one slaughtered them in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, one who derives benefit from them is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> The Gemara asks: Isn’t it <b>obvious?</b> Just <b>because their slaughter was performed in the south, should we revoke their</b> status <b>as subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>It was necessary</b> for the mishna to mention the case of slaughtering them in the south, as it might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>since Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Sacrificial</b> animals <b>that died</b> without being sacrificed <b>are excluded from</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse by Torah law, so too,</b> in the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> that were improperly slaughtered <b>in</b> the <b>south, they are considered as though they were strangled</b> to death, and therefore they are no longer subject to misuse.",
            "Consequently, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that although they were slaughtered improperly, they are not considered to have the status of <b>sacrificial animals that died,</b> as those <b>are not fit at all. But</b> with regard to slaughtering an animal in the <b>south, although</b> this <b>is not fitting for offerings of the most sacred order, yet</b> the act is still classified as slaughter of sacrificial animals, as slaughter in the south <b>is fitting for offerings of lesser sanctity.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need the mishna <b>to teach all of these</b> different cases? It could have mentioned just one case, from which one would have derived the principle that even in a situation where the rite of the offering is not performed in the proper manner, the animal can still be subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "The Gemara explains: All these cases <b>are necessary. If</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> only the case of <b>one</b> who improperly <b>slaughtered them in the south</b> of the courtyard <b>and</b> properly <b>collected their blood in the north,</b> one might have thought that it is only <b>here,</b> in this case, <b>that</b> the animals <b>are subject</b> to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, as</b> the <b>collection</b> of the blood was <b>in the north. But</b> if <b>he slaughtered them in the north and collected their blood in the south, since the collection,</b> which is a more fundamental rite than the slaughter, <b>is in the south,</b> one might think that they are <b>removed</b> from the status <b>of</b> being <b>subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> Therefore, the mishna mentions that case as well.",
            "<b>And if</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> only <b>these</b> aforementioned cases, <b>I would say</b> that only in such situations is the offering subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, as they were at least sacrificed during the <b>day,</b> which <b>is the</b> appropriate <b>time for sacrifice. But</b> if <b>one slaughtered</b> an offering <b>at night and sprinkled</b> its blood <b>during the day,</b> it would not be subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, as <b>night is not the</b> appropriate <b>time</b> for <b>sacrifice, and</b> therefore in <b>this</b> case of one <b>who slaughtered at night,</b> the animal is <b>removed</b> from its status <b>of</b> being <b>subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>And if</b> the mishna had <b>taught</b> only the case where he <b>slaughtered it at night</b> and collected the blood during the day, <b>I would say: Since he collected the blood during the day,</b> as required, the offering retains its status and <b>is subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse. But</b> if <b>he slaughtered</b> animals <b>during the day and sprinkled their blood,</b> which is the main act of sacrifice, <b>at night, since it is not a time</b> fit <b>for sacrifice, it is considered as though they were strangled, and they are not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> Therefore, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> all of these cases.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered sacrificial animals with the intent to partake of their meat or sprinkle their blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> rendering them <i>piggul</i>, or <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> disqualifying them, he is liable for misusing them if he derives benefit from them. The Gemara asks: <b>For what are</b> these sacrificial animals <b>fit?</b> Since they are unfit for both sacrifice and consumption by the priests, even in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, why are they considered as consecrated items that are subject to misuse?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Since</b> sprinkling their blood on the altar <b>renders them accepted</b> in that they receive <b>their</b> status of being subject to <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> therefore they have still not entirely lost their sanctified status and are subject to misuse. In other words, an offering with regard to which there was an improper intention is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if all its permitting factors, one of which is sprinkling the blood, are performed properly (see <i>Zevaḥim</i> 28b). The fact that its permitting factors are important for the purpose of rendering it subject to <i>piggul</i> shows that the offering has not lost its consecrated status."
        ],
        [
            "§ <b>A dilemma was raised before</b> the Sages: In a case where a rite was performed in the wrong location, e.g., offerings of the most sacred order were slaughtered in the south rather than the north, <b>if</b> the offerings <b>had</b> already <b>ascended</b> the altar, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>as</b> to whether <b>they descend,</b> i.e., are they removed from the altar or are they sacrificed? <b>Rabba says: If they ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall descend. Rav Yosef says: If they ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall not descend.</b>",
            "With regard to this dilemma, the Gemara cites a relevant dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 84a). Rabbi Yehuda maintains that in certain cases when an offering became disqualified in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard, it was removed from the altar. By contrast, Rabbi Shimon rules that any offering that became disqualified once it was already inside the Temple courtyard was not removed from the altar if it ascended there. The Gemara states: <b>In accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yehuda, you should not raise</b> this <b>dilemma, as everyone,</b> i.e., both Rabba and Rav Yosef, <b>agrees that</b> in the cases of the mishna Rabbi Yehuda would rule that even <b>if</b> the disqualified offerings have <b>ascended the altar, they must descend. They disagree when</b> the dilemma is raised <b>according to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Shimon.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Yosef holds in accordance with</b> a straightforward interpretation of the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon,</b> that the offerings listed in the mishna do not descend from the altar, as they became disqualified inside the Temple courtyard. By contrast, <b>Rabba</b> could have <b>said to you: Rabbi Shimon states</b> that the offerings do not descend <b>only with regard to</b> cases such as the bird sin offering, whose blood should be <b>placed below</b> the red line on the altar, <b>which one placed above</b> the red line; <b>or with regard to</b> offerings such as the bird burnt offering, whose blood should be <b>placed above</b> the red line, <b>which one placed below</b> that line.",
            "<b>And</b> therefore, Rabbi Shimon is <b>actually</b> dealing <b>with</b> cases where <b>one slaughtered</b> the offerings <b>and collected their blood in the north,</b> in accordance with the <i>halakha</i>. <b>But here,</b> in the cases of the mishna, <b>since one slaughtered them in the south, it is considered as though they were strangled</b> to death, and were not slaughtered at all. Consequently, Rabbi Shimon agrees that they should be removed from the altar.",
            "<b>We learned</b> in the mishna: With regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, if <b>one slaughtered them in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, he is liable for <b>misusing them</b> if he derives benefit from them. <b>Granted, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef,</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>works out well.</b> Since they remain consecrated and do not become permitted to the priests, they may remain on the altar. <b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba,</b> it is <b>difficult:</b> If these offerings must be removed from the altar, why can one be liable for misusing them? The Gemara explains: <b>What</b> is the meaning of the clause: One is liable for <b>misusing them?</b> This means that one is liable for misusing them <b>by rabbinic law,</b> but they are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law.",
            "The Gemara inquires: <b>What</b> practical difference <b>is there between</b> misuse <b>by Torah law</b> and misuse <b>by rabbinic law?</b> The Gemara explains that those who misuse <b>by Torah law</b> must <b>pay</b> an additional <b>one-fifth</b> to the Temple treasury, over and above the principal. By contrast, misuse <b>by rabbinic law</b> does <b>not</b> render one obligated to pay the additional one-fifth.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And is there</b> a concept of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>by rabbinic law?</b> The Gemara answers: <b>Yes</b> there is, <b>as Ulla said</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Sacrificial</b> animals <b>that died</b> have been <b>removed from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse by Torah law. Evidently,</b> it is <b>by Torah law</b> that the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse do <b>not apply to them,</b> but <b>by rabbinic law</b> they do <b>apply to them. So too</b> in this case, where the animals are slaughtered in the south, they are subject to misuse <b>by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: If Rabba is correct that the mishna is referring to misuse by rabbinic law, <b>let us say</b> that <b>we</b> already <b>learned</b> in the mishna <b>that which Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> said. Why, then, was it necessary for Ulla to repeat this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: <b>Even though we</b> already <b>learned</b> it in the mishna, the statement <b>of Ulla was necessary:</b> It might <b>enter your mind to say</b> that <b>here,</b> with regard to offerings slaughtered in the south, people <b>will not distance themselves from them,</b> as they are no different in appearance from animals sacrificed properly, and therefore the Sages decreed that they are subject to misuse by rabbinic law.",
            "<b>But</b> in the case of <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>that died,</b> and were never slaughtered at all, <b>since</b> people <b>distance themselves from them,</b> one might <b>say</b> that they are <b>not</b> subject to <b>misuse even by rabbinic law.</b> There-fore, Ulla <b>teaches us</b> that they are nevertheless subject to misuse by rabbinic law.",
            "The Gemara raises a further difficulty: <b>Didn’t we also learn</b> in a mishna that sacrificial animals that <b>died</b> are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by rabbinic law? As the mishna (18a) teaches: <b>One who derives benefit from a sin offering while it is alive</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse until he</b> causes it one <i>peruta</i> worth of <b>damage. But</b> if he derives benefit from it <b>when it is dead,</b> since it will not be redeemed it cannot be damaged. Therefore, <b>once he derives</b> one <i>peruta</i> worth of <b>benefit</b> from it, even without damaging it, <b>he is liable for misuse.</b> This misuse must apply by rabbinic law, as sacrificial animals that have died are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law. If so, the <i>halakha</i> that these animals are subject to misuse by rabbinic law is already stated in a mishna and therefore there is no reason for Ulla to repeat it.",
            "The Gemara answers: It might <b>enter your mind</b>"
        ],
        [
            "to <b>say: Since a sin offering is brought for atonement,</b> people <b>do not distance themselves from it</b> after it dies, as they realize that it is no longer fit to atone. Therefore, in order to ensure that people do not show disrespect, the Sages decreed that one is liable for its misuse. <b>But</b> with regard to other <b>sacrificial</b> animals of the most sacred order, <b>since they are not brought for atonement,</b> people still <b>distance themselves from them</b> after the animals die, <b>and</b> therefore one might think that there is <b>no</b> need to decree that <b>they are subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> Consequently, Ulla <b>teaches us</b> that even other sacrificial animals that die are subject to misuse by rabbinic decree.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And is a sin offering that died subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse? But didn’t we learn</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>sin offerings</b> that are left to <b>die</b> because they are no longer fit for the altar, from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, <b>and</b> likewise <b>money</b> from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, <b>which goes to the Dead Sea</b> to be destroyed, one <b>may not</b> derive <b>benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them, he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse?</b>",
            "<b>They say</b> in response to this question: With regard to <b>sin offerings</b> that are left to <b>die,</b> since even <b>during their lifetimes</b> people <b>distance themselves from them,</b> as they are no longer fit for sacrifice, there was no need for the Sages to institute a prohibition of misuse. This is <b>to the exclusion of</b> a sin offering <b>that</b> was fit <b>during its lifetime, as</b> people <b>do not distance</b> themselves <b>from it,</b> and therefore the Sages saw fit to institute a prohibition of misuse after it dies.",
            "§ The Gemara returns to the dispute with regard to offerings that were slaughtered in the wrong place and then were brought up to the altar. Rabba maintains that such offerings are removed from the altar while Rav Yosef rules that once they ascended the altar they do not descend from it and are burned. <b>Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba, one</b> source <b>from</b> another <b>one, and</b> that <b>one from</b> another <b>one,</b> i.e., his objection is based upon the combination of several sources.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: The mishna on <i>Zevaḥim</i> 66b, which deals with bird offerings that were disqualified for having either the napes of their necks pinched or their blood sprinkled in the wrong place, teaches: <b>And all of</b> the offerings mentioned in that mishna do <b>not</b> render one who swallows their meat <b>ritually impure</b> to the extent that his <b>garments are rendered impure</b> when it is <b>in the throat.</b> Although the offering is disqualified, since the nape of its neck was pinched as part of the rite one is not rendered impure by swallowing an olive-bulk of its meat, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a carcass of a kosher bird. <b>And</b> one who derives benefit from these offerings is liable for <b>misusing them.</b>",
            "This is the <i>halakha</i> concerning all bird offerings, <b>except for the bird sin offering that one performed below</b> the red line, <b>according to the procedure of a bird sin offering,</b> and <b>for the sake of a sin offering.</b> Since it was sacrificed correctly, its meat is permitted to the priests and is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>And it is taught</b> in another mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 68b) <b>with regard to</b> the same disqualified bird offerings: For <b>any</b> one of them <b>whose disqualification</b> occurred <b>in the sacred</b> area, i.e., the Temple courtyard, e.g., if the nape of its neck was pinched at night, <b>it does not render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>impure</b> when the meat is <b>in the throat. And</b> for <b>any</b> one of them <b>whose disqualification did not</b> take place <b>in the sacred</b> area, <b>it does render</b> the <b>garments</b> of one who swallows it <b>impure</b> when the meat is <b>in the throat.</b>",
            "<b>And it is taught</b> in yet another mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 84a): With regard to <b>any</b> offering <b>whose disqualification</b> took place <b>in the sacred</b> area, the sacred area renders the offering acceptable, and <b>if</b> such offerings <b>ascended</b> onto the altar they <b>shall not descend.</b> The first mishna establishes that birds disqualified because their rites were performed in the wrong place are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. The second mishna teaches that these same birds are considered items whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area. The last mishna establishes that if items whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area ascend the altar, they do not descend. By citing all these <i>mishnayot</i>, Rav Yosef demonstrates that an offering that is slaughtered in the wrong place is not removed from the altar, contrary to Rabba’s opinion. The Gemara concludes: <b>The refutation of</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba</b> is indeed <b>a conclusive refutation.</b>",
            "§ The Gemara notes: <b>And that</b> matter with regard to <b>which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree</b> is <b>obvious to Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says:</b> In the case of <b>a burnt offering</b> consecrated to be sacrificed <b>on a personal altar,</b> during the period when it is permitted to do so, <b>that one brought inside</b> the Temple courtyard,"
        ],
        [
            "it is <b>admitted by the partitions</b> of the courtyard <b>for all matters;</b> and from that point onward it has the status of a burnt offering sacrificed in the Temple with regard to all <i>halakhot</i>.",
            "The Gemara continues: In this regard, <b>Rabbi Elazar asks:</b> In the case of <b>a burnt offering</b> consecrated to be sacrificed <b>on a personal altar that one brought into</b> the Temple courtyard <b>and</b> it <b>was rendered unfit</b> for sacrifice, e.g., it was slaughtered in the south rather than its proper place in the north, <b>if</b> its limbs <b>ascended</b> the altar to be sacrificed, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>as</b> to whether <b>they should descend?</b> Although the animal was disqualified due to the change in location, had it been slaughtered in the south on a personal altar it would not have been disqualified.",
            "The Gemara concludes: <b>From the fact that</b> Rabbi Elazar <b>asked</b> this question only <b>with regard to this one</b> case, one can conclude <b>that</b> in <b>the other</b> case, where the burnt offering was consecrated for sacrifice in the Temple, the <i>halakha</i> of the limbs that ascended the altar is <b>obvious to him.</b> He <b>either</b> holds that the <i>halakha</i> is that they are not sacrificed, <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabba, or</b> he maintains that they are sacrificed, <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Yosef.</b>",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference, as it is possible that Rabbi Elazar was actually uncertain with regard to that case as well; but <b>he raises one</b> dilemma <b>as a result of the other.</b> In other words, Rabbi Elazar was asking two questions, one predicated on the other, and the second question is valid regardless of whether he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabba or Rav Yosef.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: Even if Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, that in a regular case the limbs are removed from the altar, one can claim that <b>Rabba says</b> that <b>if</b> the limbs <b>ascend</b> the altar <b>they shall descend only there,</b> i.e., if the burnt offering was consecrated for sacrifice in the Temple. In that case, the owner consecrated the offering with the intention of sacrificing it within the <b>partition</b> of the courtyard, where slaughtering is performed <b>properly,</b> in the north.",
            "Consequently, if it was slaughtered in the south, that <b>renders</b> the offering entirely <b>disqualified,</b> and therefore even if it ascended the altar it must descend. But in a case where he consecrated the offering in order to sacrifice it <b>improperly</b> on a personal altar, slaughtering it in the south <b>does not render</b> the offering entirely <b>disqualified,</b> and therefore if it ascends the altar it does not descend.",
            "<b>Or perhaps,</b> the opposite is the case: <b>Even according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Yosef, who said</b> that <b>if</b> it <b>ascends</b> the altar it <b>shall not descend,</b> that <i>halakha</i> applies only in a case where the owner consecrated the offering in order to sacrifice it within the <b>partition</b> of the courtyard, in which case it was consecrated <b>properly.</b> In such an instance, the offering is <b>admitted</b> by the partitions of the courtyard, and therefore even in a case where it was disqualified, if it ascended the altar it does not descend. By contrast, in a case where he consecrated it in order to sacrifice it <b>improperly</b> on a personal altar, the offering is <b>not admitted</b> at all by the partitions of the courtyard, which means that even if it ascends the altar it must descend. The Gemara concludes that the dilemma <b>shall stand</b> unresolved <b>[<i>teiku</i>]</b>.",
            "§ With regard to the misuse of offerings that were rendered unfit, <b>Rav Giddel says</b> that <b>Rav said: Sprinkling</b> the blood of <b>an offering</b> with <b>the intent to consume it after its appointed time [<i>piggul</i>],</b> in a case where there was <i>piggul</i> intent during the slaughter as well, <b>does not remove</b> the meat of the offering <b>from</b> the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, in</b> the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order.</b> The reason is that its meat is still classified as “the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15), since there was no proper sprinkling that permitted the priests to partake of the offering, as it is <i>piggul</i>. Similarly, this sprinkling <b>does not bring</b> the sacrificial portions <b>of offerings of lesser sanctity into</b> the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> as only a valid sprinkling confers that status.",
            "The Gemara relates that <b>Abaye sat and related this <i>halakha</i>,</b> which Rav Giddel said that Rav said. <b>Rav Pappa raised an objection to Abaye</b> from a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 78b): With regard to <b>one who slaughters the thanks offering</b> in its proper place <b>inside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and</b> at that time, <b>its</b> forty accompanying <b>loaves</b> were <b>outside the wall,</b> where it is prohibited to partake of the loaves, <b>the loaves are not sanctified</b> by this slaughtering.",
            "Likewise, <b>if he slaughtered</b> the thanks offering <b>before the surface</b> of the loaves <b>formed a crust in the oven, and</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even</b> if the surface of <b>all</b> the loaves <b>formed a crust except for one of them, the loaves are not sanctified,</b> even those that had already formed a crust. If the priest <b>slaughtered</b> the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time</b> and it was thereby rendered <i>piggul</i>, <b>or outside its</b> designated <b>area</b> and was disqualified, <b>the loaves are sanctified</b> and are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. This is presumably the case even if he also sprinkled the blood with <i>piggul</i> intent, as the mishna does not differentiate in this regard.",
            "The Gemara explains the objection: <b>Evidently,</b> sprinkling the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity with the intent of <b><i>piggul</i> subjects</b> offerings of lesser sanctity <b>to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> This apparently contradicts the opinion that Abaye stated that Rav Giddel said that Rav said. Abaye <b>was silent,</b> and was unable to resolve the difficulty against Rav’s statement.",
            "<b>When</b> Abaye <b>came before Rabbi Abba</b> and reported Rav Pappa’s comments, Rabbi Abba <b>said to</b> Abaye: That is not a difficulty, as Rav Giddel said that the intent of <i>piggul</i> <b>during sprinkling</b> does not subject offerings of lesser sanctity to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. Since the offering is rendered full-fledged <i>piggul</i> and is disqualified, it cannot become subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. By contrast, the mishna in <i>Menaḥot</i> is referring specifically to the intent of <i>piggul</i> during slaughtering, whereas there was no such intent during sprinkling. In such a case, the sprinkling was performed with proper intent, and therefore it subjects the offering to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>Rav Ashi said to Rava,</b> with regard to this explanation of Rav Giddel’s statement: <b>But doesn’t Ulla say:</b> In the case of <b>a handful</b> that is <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> which is unfit for sacrifice, <b>that was brought up onto the altar</b> to be sacrificed and was burned by the fire of the altar, <b>its <i>piggul</i></b> status <b>lapsed from it,</b> and it is fit for sacrifice?",
            "<b>And</b> since the <b>removal of</b> the <b>handful</b> in the case of the meal offering <b>is</b> the same as <b>slaughtering</b> animal offerings, i.e., it is the equivalent rite, and in this case the improper intent during the removal of the handful rendered the meal offering <i>piggul</i>, the same should apply to slaughtering in the case of an animal offering: The sacrificial portions of the offerings of lesser sanctity should be rendered full-fledged <i>piggul</i> by slaughtering alone with the intent of <i>piggul</i>, regardless of the intent during sprinkling. If so, Rabbi Abba’s answer above is incorrect.",
            "Rava <b>said to</b> Rav Ashi: This is not a difficulty, as Ulla did not mean that the intent during the removal of the handful alone rendered the meal offering full-fledged <i>piggul</i>. Rather, he meant that <b>a prohibited act</b> was performed upon it <b>which brings</b> it to a status of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> but the full status of <i>piggul</i> is attained only if there is also improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful, which is equivalent to sprinkling in the case of an animal."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to Rava’s answer to Rav Ashi, the Gemara objects: <b>But didn’t</b> Ulla <b>teach</b> in justification of his opinion: <b>If</b> the taking of this handful <b>brings others,</b> i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, <b>into</b> a status of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> by means of the intent to consume it after its appointed time, with regard to the handful <b>itself,</b> is it <b>not all the more so</b> that it should be rendered <i>piggul</i> by this intent? If so, the same should likewise apply in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity that was slaughtered with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, i.e., it should be rendered <i>piggul</i> by this intent alone, regardless of intent during sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as in <b>this</b> instance, <b>as well,</b> Ulla did not mean that it is full-fledged <i>piggul</i> by intent with regard to the taking of the handful alone. Rather, he meant that <b>a prohibited act</b> was performed upon it <b>which brings</b> it to a status of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> but the full status of <i>piggul</i> is attained only if there is also an improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful.",
            "There is a dispute in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 29b) with regard to two consecutive improper intentions. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that if there first was intent to partake of an offering or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, which renders it <i>piggul</i> and therefore one who consumes it would be liable to receive <i>karet</i>, and then there was intent to perform that act outside its designated area, which merely disqualifies the offering, it is <i>piggul</i>. But if the order is reversed, it is merely disqualified. The Rabbis rule that in either case it is only disqualified. With that mishna in mind, <b>Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ilfa say:</b> This <b>disagreement</b> applies <b>in</b> a case where the different intentions occurred during the performance of <b>two</b> different sacrificial <b>rites?</b>",
            "Ilfa elaborated: <b>For example, if one said: I am hereby slaughtering</b> the <b>first one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter,</b> i.e., either the trachea or the esophagus, with the intention of consuming the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time; and</b> he then slaughtered its <b>second</b> organ with the intention of consuming it <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> then these <i>halakhot</i> apply. <b>But</b> if both intentions occurred <b>in</b> the course of <b>one rite,</b> e.g., during the slaughtering of the same organ, then <b>everyone,</b> including Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that this <b>constitutes a mixture of intentions,</b> and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. This example indicates that slaughtering alone with intent beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, contrary to the opinion of Rav Giddel.",
            "Rav Ashi answered Ravina: <b>Indeed,</b> Rav Giddel agrees with this ruling. Although he maintains that slaughtering alone does not render an offering <i>piggul</i>, nevertheless, he agrees that <b>when</b> the blood is <b>sprinkled</b> afterward with <i>piggul</i> intent, it <b>will be revealed</b> whether there was <i>piggul</i> intent in the course of one rite or two rites. Consequently, <b>if</b> both intentions occurred <b>during one</b> sacrificial <b>rite,</b> everyone agrees that the offering is not <i>piggul</i>, despite the fact that the sprinkling was performed with <i>piggul</i> intent. But <b>if</b> the two intentions took place <b>during two</b> different sacrificial <b>rites,</b> then the question of whether it is <i>piggul</i> or merely disqualified is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. Yet, the offering cannot be established as <i>piggul</i> until after the sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: But <b>if so, with regard to a thanks offering,</b> where it is stated that if the priest slaughtered it with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, then the loaves are sanctified (see 3b), the intention only at the time of the slaughtering should <b>also</b> not render the offering <i>piggul</i> <b>until</b> the blood is <b>sprinkled.</b> Since the mishna is apparently referring to a regular case of <i>piggul</i>, it must be speaking of a situation where the sprinkling was also performed with the <i>piggul</i> intent, which is how Ilfa explained the mishna on <i>Zevaḥim</i> 29b. If so, according to Rav Giddel, who maintains that slaughtering with the intent of <i>piggul</i> does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, how could the loaves be considered sanctified?",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>What</b> does the mishna mean when it says that the loaves are considered <b>sanctified?</b> It does not mean that they are sanctified in the sense that they are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. Rather, it means that they are sanctified to the extent that they have the possibility <b>to be disqualified,</b> to the extent <b>that</b> they <b>require burning</b> afterward.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say</b> that the following <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering that is <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>always</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. Does this <b>not</b> mean that the meat of an offering of the most sacred order is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse <b>even though</b> its <b>blood was sprinkled</b> with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time? <b>And</b> if so, this <b>supports</b> Rav Giddel’s opinion.",
            "The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>No,</b> one cannot cite a proof from this <i>baraita</i>, as it is possible that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest did <b>not</b> yet <b>sprinkle the blood,</b> and that is why the offering is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. But once the blood is sprinkled with improper intent, the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. The Gemara asks: <b>If</b> the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a case <b>where</b> the priest did <b>not</b> yet <b>sprinkle the blood, what</b> is the purpose <b>of stating</b> it? Certainly before its blood is sprinkled the offering is included in the category of “the sacred items of the Lord,” and is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "The Gemara suggest an alternative reason for rejecting the suggestion: <b>Rather,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is <b>actually</b> referring to a case <b>where</b> the blood was <b>sprinkled. But</b> nevertheless, it does not support Rav Giddel’s opinion, as <b>when that</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>is taught,</b> it is referring <b>to a burnt offering.</b> A burnt offering is always subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse even after its blood is sprinkled, as it is never permitted to the priests in consumption. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>If</b> the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is stated <b>with regard to a burnt offering,</b> then it is <b>obvious</b> that it is still subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <b>as it entirely</b> belongs <b>to the Most High,</b> i.e., the entire offering is burned on the altar and none of it is consumed by the owners or priests."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And furthermore,</b> one may cite proof for the opinion of Rav Giddel from that <i>baraita</i>, <b>as the latter clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches:</b> If <b>its blood was left overnight</b> instead of being sprinkled on the altar on the day it was slaughtered, <b>even though</b> the priest <b>later sprinkled it</b> on the following day, nevertheless, one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara analyzes this statement of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>Granted, if you say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to a sin offering,</b> then it is <b>well.</b> Since the blood was disqualified for sprinkling by being left overnight, it does not become permitted to the priests even after the blood is sprinkled, and is therefore subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. But if the blood had not been left overnight, the offering would not be subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, as the sprinkling would have removed the sin offering from that category due to the fact that it became permitted for the priests.",
            "<b>But if you say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> is referring <b>to a burnt offering,</b> does it <b>need to be said</b> that it is still subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? A burnt offering remains subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse even if the blood had not been left overnight and the sprinkling was performed properly, as it never becomes permitted to the priests.",
            "The Gemara comments: <b>The latter clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>certainly supports</b> the opinion of Rav Giddel, as it clearly shows that an unfit sprinkling does not remove an offering from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. But with regard to <b>the first clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i>, <b>what</b> does it teach concerning the opinion of Rav Giddel? Is it reasonable to say that <b>since the latter clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rav Giddel, <b>the earlier clause,</b> which states that <i>piggul</i> is always subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <b>also supports his</b> opinion?",
            "The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is <b>not</b> even <b>certain</b> that <b>the latter clause supports</b> Rav Giddel, as it is possible that although the sprinkling of blood that was left overnight does not remove an offering from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, nevertheless, sprinkling after <i>piggul</i> does achieve this. The Gemara clarifies: <b>What is the difference</b> between the two cases? The difference is with regard to <b>leaving</b> the blood <b>overnight, where it is performed in</b> relation to <b>an action,</b> i.e., the priest failed to act in the proper manner, <b>sprinkling</b> the blood <b>is not effective to remove</b> the offering from the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "By contrast, in the case of sprinkling after <i>piggul</i>, where the disqualification is merely a function of <b>intent,</b> which <b>is not performed in</b> relation to <b>an action,</b> perhaps <b>sprinkling</b> the blood <b>is effective to remove</b> the offering from the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Let</b> us <b>say</b> that <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to <b>an offering of the most sacred order that</b> is <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.Does this <b>not</b> mean that it is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse <b>even though</b> the priest <b>sprinkled</b> its blood, <b>and</b> if so this <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> Rav Giddel’s opinion? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>No,</b> one cannot cite a proof from this <i>baraita</i>, as it is possible that it is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest did <b>not</b> yet <b>sprinkle the blood.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if that is so, <b>what,</b> then, is the <i>halakha</i> if the priest did <b>sprinkle</b> the blood? Is the <i>halakha</i> <b>indeed that</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it?</b> If so, <b>why is it taught</b> in <b>the latter clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i>: Unlike an offering of the most sacred order, <b>in</b> the case of <b>an offering of lesser sanctity,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property?",
            "The Gemara explains the difficulty: If there is a difference between whether or not the priest sprinkled the blood, <b>let</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>distinguish and teach</b> the distinction <b>in the first clause,</b> with regard to the case of offerings of the most sacred order itself, as follows: <b>Before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the offering, but <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b> It is not necessary to mention offerings of lesser sanctity at all. The Gemara concludes: <b>That</b> statement in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> <b>certainly supports</b> Rav Giddel’s opinion.",
            "The Gemara suggests: <b>Shall</b> we <b>say</b> that <b>since the latter clause supports</b> the opinion of Rav Giddel, <b>the first clause also supports</b> his opinion? The Gemara again answers that even the latter clause does not necessarily support the opinion of Rav Giddel, as one can explain that the reason the <i>baraita</i> distinguishes between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, rather than providing a distinction within the category of offerings of the most sacred order itself, is that the case of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity is clear-cut,</b> i.e., all cases of offerings of lesser sanctity that are <i>piggul</i> are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. By contrast, <b>here</b> in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, it <b>is not clear-cut,</b> as there is a difference depending on the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said a principle</b> with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that had a period of fitness to the priests</b> before it was disqualified, one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Misuse fundamentally applies to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that did not have a period of fitness for the priests</b> before it was disqualified, one is liable for <b>misusing it,</b> as it remained consecrated to God throughout.",
            "The mishna clarifies: <b>Which is</b> the sacrificial animal <b>that had a period of fitness for the priests?</b> This category includes a sacrificial animal <b>whose</b> meat <b>remained overnight</b> after it was properly sacrificed, and was therefore disqualified as <i>notar</i>, <b>and</b> one <b>that</b> was disqualified when it <b>became ritually impure</b> after it was properly sacrificed, <b>and</b> one <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard after it was properly sacrificed and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse.",
            "<b>And which is</b> the sacrificial animal <b>that did not have a period of fitness for the priests?</b> It is a sacrificial animal <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood or sacrifice its sacrificial portions <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, or outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> one <b>that</b> those <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>collected and sprinkled its blood.</b> All of these disqualifications occurred before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted by means of the sprinkling of the blood. Therefore, these offerings remain consecrated to God and one is liable for misuse if one derives benefit from them.",
            "With regard to this matter, the Gemara relates that <b>bar Kappara said to bar Pedat: My sister’s son, look</b> into the topic of the question <b>that you will ask me tomorrow in the study hall.</b> The question involved the interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement: Any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests. Was it <b>fitness</b> of <b>slaughtering</b> that <b>we learned,</b> i.e., provided that it was slaughtered properly, even if the offering was later disqualified, it is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Or</b> was it <b>fitness</b> of <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood that <b>we learned,</b> i.e., once the blood is ready to be sprinkled, even if it was not sprinkled yet, the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? <b>Or</b> was it <b>fitness</b> of <b>consuming</b> the meat of the offering that <b>we learned?</b> In other words, is it only after the blood was actually sprinkled properly, and the meat of the offering is permitted to be consumed by the priests, that the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? The Gemara cites the different opinions with regard to this matter: <b>Ḥizkiyya says:</b> It was <b>fitness</b> of <b>slaughtering</b> that <b>we learned,</b> whereas <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It was <b>fitness</b> of <b>consuming</b> the meat of the offering that <b>we learned.</b>",
            "The Gemara further discusses this matter. <b>Rabbi Zeira says: The mishna is not precisely in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Ḥizkiyya nor</b> precisely <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan,</b> i.e., a close reading of the mishna does not conform to either of their interpretations of the phrase: A period of fitness.",
            "Rabbi Zeira elaborates: <b>We learned</b> in the mishna, in its list of examples of offerings that were disqualified after a period of fitness: A sacrificial animal <b>that remained overnight</b> after its blood was sacrificed on the altar and was therefore disqualified as <i>notar</i>, <b>and</b> one <b>that</b> was disqualified when it <b>became ritually impure, and</b> one <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified. <b>Isn’t</b> the case of remaining overnight referring to a situation <b>where the blood remained overnight</b> and was not sprinkled after it was collected in a cup? <b>And</b> yet the mishna <b>teaches:</b> One is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it,</b> as there was a period of fitness.",
            "<b>And</b> therefore, one can <b>learn from</b> the mishna that it was <b>fitness</b> of <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood that <b>we learned.</b> Since the slaughtering and collecting of the blood was performed properly, the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, despite the fact that the blood was not actually sprinkled. This is not in accordance with the opinion of Ḥizkiyya or with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "The Gemara rejects this conclusion: <b>No,</b> the mishna is not referring to a case where the blood had not been sprinkled. Rather, it is dealing with a case <b>where the meat was left overnight, but the blood had</b> already <b>been sprinkled</b> properly. It is <b>due to this</b> that the mishna <b>teaches:</b> One is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it,</b> as there was a period of fitness of consuming the meat, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "The Gemara further analyzes Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement. <b>We learned</b> in the mishna: <b>And which is</b> the sacrificial animal <b>that did not have a period of fitness for the priests?</b> It is a sacrificial animal <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time, or outside its</b> designated <b>area, or</b> one <b>that</b> those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>collected</b> its blood for use in the sacrificial rite <b>and sprinkled its blood.</b>",
            "<b>What are the circumstances</b> referred to in the mishna, with regard to people who are unfit for collecting and sprinkling the blood? <b>If we say</b> that the mishna is dealing with a case <b>where</b> the blood was both <b>sprinkled</b> by those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>and</b> the blood was also <b>collected</b> by those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service, this is difficult: <b>Why do I</b> need to say that it is not disqualified <b>until there are two</b> actions, collecting and sprinkling, which were performed improperly? After all, the offering is disqualified as soon as those who are unfit for Temple service collect the blood.",
            "<b>Rather, is it not</b> referring to a case <b>where</b> the blood was <b>collected</b> by those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>but sprinkled</b> by those who are <b>fit? And</b> the mishna thereby <b>teaches</b> us that it is only in this case that one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> This is due to the fact that there was no period of fitness for sprinkling the blood. By contrast, had the blood been collected by those who are fit for Temple service, where the blood is fit for sprinkling, the offering would no longer be subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, even if it was sprinkled by those who are unfit for Temple service.",
            "If so, one can <b>learn from</b> the mishna that it is <b>fitness</b> of <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood that <b>we learned.</b> In other words, already at this stage the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, despite the fact that the blood was not actually sprinkled. This is not in accordance with the opinion of Ḥizkiyya or the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef objects to this</b> interpretation of the mishna: <b>But if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that <b>there is</b> a way <b>to make this distinction</b> in the mishna, between a case where the blood was collected by those who are unfit for Temple service and sprinkled by those who are fit and a situation where it was collected by those who are fit for Temple service and sprinkled by those who are unfit, then this would present a difficulty with regard to <b>that which we learned</b> in a mishna <b>there</b> (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 92a).",
            "The Gemara cites the relevant mishna: With regard to <b>a disqualified sin offering, its blood does not</b> cause a garment to <b>require laundering whether</b> the offering <b>had a period of fitness</b> when its blood was fit for presentation <b>or whether it did not have a period of fitness.</b> In either case, as the offering is currently unfit, its blood does not require laundering.",
            "The mishna proceeds to explain: <b>Which</b> offering <b>is</b> the disqualified sin offering <b>that had a period of fitness and was</b> then <b>disqualified?</b> It is one <b>that was left overnight</b> and then became disqualified as <i>notar</i>; <b>or</b> it is one <b>that became ritually impure; or</b> it is one <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard.",
            "<b>Which</b> offering <b>is</b> the disqualified sin offering <b>that did not have a period of fitness?</b> It is one <b>that was slaughtered</b> with the intent to eat it or present its blood <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area; or</b> it is one whose blood was <b>collected</b> by people <b>disqualified</b> for Temple service <b>and</b> they <b>sprinkled its blood.</b>",
            "Rav Yosef analyzes this mishna: <b>What are the circumstances</b> of the mishna’s case? <b>If we say</b> that the mishna is referring specifically to a situation <b>where</b> the blood was both <b>collected</b> by those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service <b>and</b> also <b>sprinkled</b> by those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service, and it is only in such a case <b>that its blood does not</b> cause a garment to <b>require laundering,</b> it may be inferred that if the blood was <b>collected</b> by those who are <b>fit</b> for Temple service and sprinkled by those who are unfit, or collected by those who are unfit and <b>sprinkled</b> by those who are <b>fit,</b> then <b>its blood</b> does cause a garment to <b>require laundering.</b> But this inference is difficult: It is not possible to interpret the mishna in such a manner, as that conclusion is incorrect.",
            "The Gemara explains why the above conclusion is untenable: <b>Read here</b> the verse that states, with regard to laundering a garment on which the blood of a sin offering was sprayed: “And <b>if any of its blood is sprinkled</b> on a garment, you shall wash that upon which it was sprinkled in a holy place” (Leviticus 6:20). The Sages infer from the verse that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to the blood of a sin offering that has not yet been sprinkled, <b>and not to</b> blood of a sin offering whose blood <b>had already been sprinkled. Rather,</b> one can conclude that the language of the mishna with regard to the topic of the blood of a sin offering is <b>not exact,</b> as the same <i>halakha</i> applies even if the blood was collected and sprinkled by those who are fit."
        ],
        [
            "If so, one can say that <b>so too</b> the mishna here is <b>not exact,</b> and therefore one cannot infer from it that the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse apply only when those who were unfit for Temple service collected the blood. Rather, the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse are in effect even if those who collected the blood were fit and those who sprinkled it were unfit, which means that the phrase: A period of fitness, can be referring to fitness of consuming the meat of the offering. <b>Rav Asi said: If so,</b> that the mishna is not exact, <b>why do I</b> need the <i>tanna</i> to <b>teach two</b> <i>mishnayot</i> in an inexact manner? It must be that at least one of them is taught in a precise fashion, and for that reason the same style was preserved in the other mishna.",
            "<b>Rather,</b> one must say that only one mishna is imprecise, i.e., the one in <i>Zevaḥim</i> with regard to the blood of a sin offering, and <b>actually</b> the mishna here <b>with regard to misuse</b> of consecrated property is <b>precise,</b> and therefore one can infer that the meaning of the phrase: A period of fitness, is fitness to sprinkle the blood.",
            "<b>And</b> as for the mishna in <i>Zevaḥim</i>, which speaks of those who are unfit for collecting the blood despite the fact that the same <i>halakha</i> applies if those who are fit collected it, <b>this</b> is what it <b>teaches us: That</b> if those who are <b>unfit</b> for Temple service collected some of the blood, it <b>renders</b> the blood, including that which he did not collect, as <b>leftovers.</b> The blood has the same status as the remainder of the blood of a fit offering after some of its blood was sprinkled on the altar.",
            "And consequently, it teaches with regard to a case where the blood was collected in two vessels, that <b>even though</b> the priest who was <b>unfit collected</b> the blood <b>and sprinkled</b> it, <b>and</b> a priest who was <b>fit</b> subsequently <b>collected</b> the blood <b>and sprinkled</b> it, the sprinkling of the fit priest is considered as though he did <b>not</b> do <b>anything. What is the reason</b> for this? The reason is <b>that</b> the blood <b>is</b> considered <b>leftovers.</b>",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>But didn’t Reish Lakish ask Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> In the case of an individual <b>unfit</b> for Temple service who sprinkled the blood, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the remaining blood? Does the fact that he sprinkled some of the blood <b>render</b> the remaining blood <b>leftovers?</b>",
            "<b>And</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him</b> in response: <b>You do not have a matter</b> of an invalid sprinkling <b>that renders</b> the remaining blood <b>leftovers except</b> for a case where he sprinkled the blood with the intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b> In these instances it is considered a significant sprinkling, <b>since</b> this sprinkling with improper intent <b>effects acceptance,</b> i.e., it is considered a valid sprinkling <b>with regard to</b> rendering the meat of the offering <b><i>piggul</i>.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: <b>What, is it not</b> the case that when he said that only <i>piggul</i> intent renders the blood leftovers, this is <b>to the exclusion of</b> a sprinkling performed by <b>an unfit</b> priest? If so, this would mean that an unfit priest does not render the remainder of the blood leftovers, which contradicts the opinion of Rav Asi. The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>No, even an unfit</b> priest renders the blood leftovers.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>But</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>taught</b> in a broad manner: <b>You do not have</b> a matter of an invalid sprinkling that renders the remaining blood leftovers except for a case where he sprinkled the blood with the intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the blood is rendered leftovers only in those cases.",
            "The Gemara explains that <b>this</b> is what Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>is teaching: You do not have a matter</b> of an invalid sprinkling <b>that does not effect acceptance in</b> the case of offerings of the <b>community,</b> and yet <b>which renders</b> the remaining blood <b>leftovers, except</b> for a case where he sprinkled the blood with the intent to consume the offering <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time or outside its</b> designated <b>area.</b> Although these offerings are not sacrificed, nevertheless the sprinklings render the blood leftovers. <b>But</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan was not referring to a ritually <b>impure</b> priest, <b>who is</b> fit to effect acceptance for offerings <b>of</b> the <b>community</b> in a case where the majority of the community is impure, as he <b>does render</b> the remainder of the blood <b>leftovers.</b>",
            "By contrast, with regard to all <b>other invalid</b> sprinklings, which <b>are not</b> fit to effect acceptance in the case of offerings <b>of</b> the <b>community,</b> e.g., a blemished priest, they <b>do not render</b> the blood <b>leftovers.</b> Accordingly, Rav Asi’s comment, that the mishna in <i>Zevaḥim</i> teaches that if those who are unfit for Temple service collect some of the blood they thereby render the blood leftovers, is referring only to an impure priest.",
            "The Gemara further analyzes Rabbi Yehoshua’s phrase: That had a period of fitness to the priests. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an offering of the most sacred order that is <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>always</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara analyzes this statement: Is this <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest collected the blood but did <b>not</b> yet <b>sprinkle</b> it? If so, this would mean that it is specifically the collection of the blood after the intent of <i>piggul</i> that does not remove the offering from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. One can infer from here that if the blood was collected with the proper intent, i.e., when the offering is not <i>piggul</i>, and is ready to be sprinkled, it does remove the offering from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. Accordingly, <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that it is <b>fitness</b> of <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood that <b>we learned</b> in the mishna.",
            "The Gemara rejects this inference: <b>No,</b> one cannot cite a proof from here, as it is possible that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the priest already <b>sprinkled</b> the blood. If so, the reason that one is liable for misuse is because the sprinkling of <i>piggul</i> does not remove it from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. It can therefore be inferred from the <i>baraita</i> that if the offering was not <i>piggul</i>, then the sprinkling would remove it from misuse. This interpretation is in accordance with the opinion that when Rabbi Yehoshua referred to a period of fitness, he meant fitness of consuming the meat of the offering, i.e., only when the blood was sprinkled properly.",
            "<b>And</b> if so, <b>what</b> does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states that one who derives benefit from an offering that is <i>piggul</i> <b>always</b> remains subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? <b>This</b> is what the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> by this phrase, that the <i>halakha</i> is <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav Giddel, as Rav Giddel said</b> that <b>Rav said: Sprinkling</b> the blood of <b>an offering</b> with <b><i>piggul</i></b> intent <b>does not remove</b> the offering <b>from</b> the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> in the case of offerings of the most sacred order. <b>And</b> similarly, such a sprinkling <b>does not bring</b> the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity <b>into</b> the status of being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara cites another source that might resolve the issue: <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a <i>baraita</i> that can provide a proof with regard to the meaning of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement about a period of fitness to the priests: <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that <b>there is</b> a case of <b><i>notar</i>,</b> when the blood was left overnight and was rendered unfit, <b>where</b> one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the meat of the offering, <b>and there is</b> also a case of <b><i>notar</i> where</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: <b>How so?</b> If the blood was <b>left over</b> and someone consumed the meat <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, he is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property. But if it was consumed <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property, as the sprinkling removes the meat from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>In any event,</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>teaches</b> that if one consumes the meat before the leftover blood was sprinkled, he is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Is this <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where there was time</b> left in the day <b>to sprinkle</b> the blood that had already been collected in the service vessel, and therefore, <b>if he had desired, he could have sprinkled</b> the blood? Nevertheless, the offering is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. This indicates that merely collecting the blood in the service vessel alone, without actually sprinkling it, does not remove the offering from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>And</b> accordingly, one may <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that it is <b>fitness</b> of <b>consuming</b> the meat of the offering that <b>we learned</b> in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna. It is the fitness of consuming the meat of the offering that removes the possibility of being liable for the prohibition of misuse, not the fitness of sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara refutes this conclusion: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is not referring to a case where there was time left in the day to sprinkle the blood that had already been collected. Rather, it is referring to a situation <b>where</b> the priest <b>collected</b> the blood <b>shortly before sunset, where there was no time</b> left in the day <b>to sprinkle</b> the blood while it was still daytime. Since the blood could not have been sprinkled, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse. But if there had been time to sprinkle the blood, then that blood would be considered ready to be sprinkled, and the offering would no longer be subject to the prohibition of misuse, in accordance with the opinion that the criteria is the fitness of sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> in that case, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> in a situation where there <b>was time</b> in the day to sprinkle the blood? According to the above claim, <b>so too</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the offering.",
            "If so, <b>why does</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>specifically teach</b> this distinction between a case <b>before sprinkling,</b> when the offering is still subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, and after sprinkling, when the offering is no longer subject to misuse? <b>Let</b> Rabbi Shimon instead <b>teach</b> a more precise distinction, between a situation where the blood was collected <b>before sunset</b> and there was time to sprinkle it but it was left overnight, in which case the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse, <b>and</b> a situation where the blood was collected <b>after sunset,</b> in which case it is still subject to the prohibition of misuse.",
            "The Gemara answers that this is <b>indeed</b> what Rabbi Shimon meant, as he actually <b>taught: Before</b> it was <b>fit for sprinkling,</b> the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse, <b>but after</b> it was <b>fit for sprinkling,</b> it is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse.",
            "The Gemara suggests another proof from a similar <i>baraita</i>. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear: Rabbi Shimon says</b> that <b>there is</b> a case of <b>an offering</b> of the most sacred order that was sacrificed with <b><i>piggul</i></b> intent <b>where</b> one is liable for <b>misusing it, and there is</b> also a case of <b><i>piggul</i></b> intent <b>where</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: <b>How so?</b> If someone consumed the meat <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, he is liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property. If he consumed it <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> consecrated property, as the sprinkling removed the prohibition of misuse.",
            "<b>In any event,</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>teaches</b> that if one consumes the meat of an offering that was rendered <i>piggul</i> <b>before</b> the blood was <b>sprinkled,</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Is this <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where there was time</b> left in the day <b>to sprinkle</b> the blood that had already been collected in the service vessel, and therefore, <b>if he had desired, he could have sprinkled</b> the blood? <b>And</b> yet Rabbi Shimon <b>teaches</b> that one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Once again, this would indicate that merely collecting the blood in the service vessel alone, without sprinkling, does not remove the possibility of the prohibition of misuse. <b>And</b> accordingly, one may <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that it is <b>fitness</b> of <b>consuming</b> the meat of the offering that <b>we learned</b> in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna.",
            "The Gemara refutes this conclusion: <b>No,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where the priest collected the blood shortly before sunset, <b>where there was no time to sprinkle</b> the blood while it was still daytime. Since the blood could not have been sprinkled, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> if so, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> in a case where there <b>was time</b> in the day <b>to sprinkle</b> the blood? According to the above claim, the offering is <b>indeed removed</b> from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "If so, <b>why does</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>specifically teach</b> this distinction between <b>after sprinkling,</b> when the offering is no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, and before sprinkling, when the offering is still subject to misuse? <b>Let</b> Rabbi Shimon instead <b>teach</b> a more precise distinction, between a situation where the blood was collected <b>before sunset</b> and there was time to sprinkle it but it was left overnight, in which case the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse, <b>and</b> a situation where the blood was collected <b>after sunset,</b> in which case it is still subject to the prohibition of misuse.",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>that is indeed what</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>is saying: Before</b> it was <b>fit for sprinkling,</b> the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse, <b>but after</b> it was <b>fit for sprinkling,</b> it is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse.",
            "§ The Gemara suggests another proof. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear: An offering of the most sacred order</b> which is <b><i>piggul</i></b> is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> The Gemara analyzes this statement: <b>What, is</b> this <i>baraita</i> <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest already <b>sprinkled</b> its blood? This would indicate that a fit offering, unlike a <i>piggul</i> offering, is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse only once the blood is sprinkled. <b>And</b> if so, one may <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that it is <b>fitness</b> of <b>consuming</b> the meat of the offering that <b>we learned</b> in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna, i.e., this fitness of consuming the meat of the offering removes the prohibition of misuse. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: <b>No,</b> one cannot cite a proof from this <i>baraita</i>, as it is possible that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case <b>where</b> the priest did <b>not</b> yet <b>sprinkle</b> the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if so, <b>what,</b> then, is the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the priest did <b>sprinkle</b> the blood? Is the <i>halakha</i> <b>indeed that</b> one is <b>no</b> longer liable for <b>misusing it?</b> If so, <b>why does</b> the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> <b>specifically teach:</b> Unlike an offering of the most sacred order, <b>in</b> the case of the sacrificial portions of <b>an offering of lesser sanctity</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it?</b>",
            "<b>Let</b> the <i>baraita</i> instead <b>teach</b> a distinction within the category of offerings of the most sacred order themselves: <b>Here,</b> the offering is subject to the prohibition of misuse because it is <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood, and <b>there,</b> the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse because it is <b>after</b> the <b>sprinkling</b> of the blood.",
            "The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> could have taught that distinction, but it chose to state a distinction between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity because it <b>comes to teach us this</b> following principle: In <b>any</b> case where the result of sprinkling <b>brings</b> the offering <b>into</b> the category of the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> e.g., the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, to which the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse apply only after the blood had been sprinkled, only <b>sprinkling</b> the blood <b>properly brings</b> the offering <b>into</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "By contrast, in <b>any</b> situation where the result of sprinkling is <b>removing</b> the offering <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> e.g., the meat of an offering of the most sacred order, which was subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse even before the blood was sprinkled, <b>even sprinkling</b> the blood <b>improperly removes</b> the offering <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> This ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse once their blood has been sprinkled and they have been permitted to the priests. The case of the mishna is <b>the meat of offerings of the most sacred order,</b> whose consumption is permitted from the moment their blood was sprinkled, <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of the blood,</b> and then reentered the courtyard.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The sprinkling of this blood does not permit its consumption by the priests. Consequently, one is liable for <b>misusing it. And</b> he is <b>not liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> if he partook of it after it was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, <b>or</b> of <b><i>notar</i>,</b> if he partook of the meat after it remained overnight, <b>or</b> of partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The sprinkling is effective despite the fact that the meat left the Temple courtyard and was disqualified, and therefore one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it.</b> Likewise, other <i>halakhot</i> that apply to offerings whose blood was sprinkled apply to it, <b>and</b> consequently <b>one is liable for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of partaking of meat that is <b><i>piggul</i>, or <i>notar</i>, or</b> remained overnight, <b>or</b> of partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said,</b> in support of his opinion: <b>But</b> there is the case of <b>one who designated</b> an animal as <b>his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another</b> animal <b>in its stead, and thereafter the first</b> sin offering <b>was found and both of them are standing</b> fit for sacrifice. If he slaughtered both animals at the same time and sprinkled the blood of one of them, which means that the second was disqualified as a leftover sin offering, the question arises as to the status of the meat of the second animal with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>Is it not</b> the case that <b>just as</b> the <b>blood</b> of the animal whose blood was sprinkled <b>exempts its meat from</b> liability for its misuse, <b>so</b> too <b>it exempts the meat of the other</b> animal? Since he could have chosen to sprinkle the blood of either animal, they are considered as though they were one offering.",
            "If so, one may learn from there by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard and returned: <b>If</b> the sprinkling of <b>its blood exempted the meat of the other</b> animal <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> it is only <b>right that it</b> should <b>exempt its own meat</b> that left the courtyard.",
            "The mishna adds that just as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree as to whether the sprinkling of blood exempts meat that left the courtyard from liability for its misuse, so too, they disagree with regard to <b>the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> consumed on the altar <b>that left</b> the Temple courtyard <b>before the sprinkling of the blood.</b> The dispute is whether the subsequent sprinkling of the blood generates liability for misuse of those portions.",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective in rendering those portions consecrated to the Lord. Consequently, one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing them. And</b> similarly, <b>one is not liable for their</b> consumption <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or</b> of partaking of meat while <b>ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The sprinkling is effective, and therefore one is liable for <b>misusing them. And</b> likewise, <b>one is liable for its</b> consumption <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or</b> of partaking of the meat while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need the mishna to cite <b>these two</b> disagreements, i.e., both the case of offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity? After all, both disagreements are based on the same principle.",
            "The Gemara answers: Both cases <b>are necessary, as, if</b> the disagreement <b>was stated</b> only <b>with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, I would say</b> that it is specifically in <b>that</b> case that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says</b> that one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the meat of the offering, <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> only <b>sprinkling</b> the blood <b>properly removes</b> the offering <b>from</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> By contrast, sprinkling the blood <b>improperly,</b> including for meat that left the courtyard, <b>does not remove</b> the offering <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> with regard to the issue of when the rite of sprinkling <b>brings</b> the offering <b>into</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> i.e., in the case of sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, Rabbi Eliezer <b>concedes to Rabbi Akiva that even</b> sprinkling the blood <b>improperly,</b> as in this case, <b>brings</b> the offering <b>into</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> by contrast, <b>if</b> their disagreement <b>was stated</b> only <b>with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say</b> that <b>it is</b> specifically <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity that Rabbi Akiva said</b> one is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> This is due to the fact <b>that</b> here the act of sprinkling serves to include them in the category of misuse, and therefore <b>even sprinkling</b> the blood <b>improperly,</b> as in this case, <b>brings</b> the offering <b>into</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> with regard to <b>offerings of the most sacred order, where</b> the sprinkling of the blood serves <b>to remove</b> the offering from being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, one might say that Rabbi Akiva agrees <b>that</b> sprinkling the blood <b>improperly does not remove</b> the offering <b>from</b> being subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> Therefore, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree in both cases.",
            "§ It <b>was stated</b> that <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When Rabbi Akiva says</b> that <b>sprinkling is effective to</b> remove the meat of offerings of the most sacred order <b>that left</b> the courtyard from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, that applies specifically in a case <b>where</b> only <b>part of it left</b> the courtyard and part remained inside. In such a situation, as the sprinkling is effective for the portion that remained inside the courtyard, it also is effective for the portion that left the courtyard. <b>But</b> if <b>all of it left</b> the courtyard, <b>Rabbi Akiva did not say</b> that the sprinkling is effective to remove the meat from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: My colleagues in the exile,</b> i.e., the Sages of Babylonia, <b>already taught me</b> that"
        ],
        [
            "<b>one</b> renders an offering <i>piggul</i> by having <b>an intention</b> at the time of sprinkling to later sacrifice its sacrificial portions after the proper time, even <b>with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that were already <b>lost and with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that were already <b>burned.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes this statement: <b>But</b> sacrificial portions that are <b>lost or burned are not present in the world,</b> i.e., they are not available, <b>and even so</b> it is <b>taught</b> that <b>one</b> renders an offering <i>piggul</i> by <b>an intention</b> to consume it after its appointed time. It can be derived from here that if the entire offering left the courtyard, which is comparable to a case where it was lost, the sprinkling is effective with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse according to Rabbi Akiva. This apparently contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But did Rav Asi</b> actually <b>say this?</b> Does he maintain that even if all of the meat and the sacrificial portions left the courtyard, the sprinkling is effective according to Rabbi Akiva? <b>Didn’t Rav Asi raise</b> the following <b>dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is</b> the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the priest <b>intended</b> during the sacrificial rites that the remnant of the blood, <b>which is</b> meant to be <b>poured</b> on the base of the altar immediately after the sprinkling, will be poured improperly <b>tomorrow?</b> Does the offering thereby become <i>piggul</i>, as this is similar to intending to sprinkle the blood after the proper time; or does such intent apply only to the blood that is actually sprinkled on the altar?",
            "And <b>Rabbi Zeira said to</b> Rav Asi in response to this dilemma: <b>You already taught us</b> in tractate <i>Ḥullin</i>, with regard to the ritual impurity of food and animal carcasses, that items that are not themselves edible but are attached to meat combine with the meat to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk to transmit the impurity of foods. One instance of this principle is the <b>meat residue</b> attached to the hide after flaying, which combines with the meat to transmit the impurity of foods, despite the fact that it is not considered food and does not transmit impurity of foods on its own. <b>Evidently this meat residue, since it has no substance</b> and significance in and of itself, it <b>is not susceptible to impurity.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains the contradiction: It follows that according to Rav Asi, in the case of <b>this</b> blood, <b>which is</b> meant to be <b>poured</b> on the base of the altar, <b>since it is going to be lost</b> and therefore is <b>also</b> insignificant, <b>intent with regard to it is not effective</b> to render the offering <i>piggul</i>. The blood that is to be poured on the base of the altar is similar to an offering that left the courtyard in its entirety, as they are both considered as though they are not present. Consequently, according to Rav Asi, in a case where the entire offering left the courtyard and is meant to be burned and thereby destroyed, it cannot be rendered <i>piggul</i> by means of intent during the sprinkling. This follows Rabbi Yoḥanan’s interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that he is referring only to a case where the offering left partially, not where the entire offering left.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>But</b> Rav Asi cited <b>that</b> which the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches:</b> One can render an offering <i>piggul</i> by means of one’s intent, even <b>with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that were already <b>lost and with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that were already <b>burned.</b> This <i>baraita</i> itself poses <b>a difficulty,</b> as it indicates that intent is effective even for that which has been destroyed. <b>Rava said</b> in response: Emend the wording of the <i>baraita</i> and <b>say</b> instead: One can render an offering <i>piggul</i> by means of one’s intent, even <b>with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that <b>stand to be lost or with regard to</b> sacrificial portions that <b>stand to be burned,</b> but were not yet destroyed. Since they are currently present, such intent is effective to render the offering <i>piggul</i>. But in a case where the offering left the courtyard, as it is not present, intent is ineffective with regard to it.",
            "§ With regard to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion in the mishna, <b>Rav Pappa says</b> that <b>Rabbi Akiva says</b> his ruling, that <b>sprinkling is effective</b> for the meat of offerings <b>that left</b> the courtyard before sprinkling, with regard to <i>piggul</i> and the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <b>only</b> in a case <b>where</b> the <b>meat left</b> while the blood remained inside and was sprinkled. <b>But</b> if the <b>blood</b> itself left, then even if it was returned to the courtyard and was sprinkled, in such a case the <b>sprinkling</b> of blood that <b>left</b> the courtyard <b>is not effective</b> to remove the meat from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "The Gemara notes that <b>this</b> opinion of Rav Pappa <b>is also taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: If one <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>in silence,</b> i.e., with no improper intent, <b>and</b> the <b>blood</b> subsequently <b>left</b> the courtyard, <b>even though</b> it was <b>returned</b> to the courtyard <b>and</b> the priest later <b>sprinkled it, he has done nothing,</b> i.e., it is ineffective. Therefore, <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order,</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is still liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, as the sprinkling did not render the meat permitted. Likewise, <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> the sprinkling does not render the sacrificial portions subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, and therefore one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse,</b> as is the case before the sprinkling.",
            "The Gemara continues to analyze the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. <b>Rabbi Akiva said,</b> in support of his opinion: <b>To what is this</b> case, where the meat left before the blood was sprinkled, <b>comparable?</b> To the case of one who designated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found and both of them stand fit for sacrifice. From the fact that the second, unfit offering is exempted by means of the sprinkling of the blood of the first, fit offering, it may be inferred that the meat of an offering is exempted from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by the sprinkling of its own blood, despite the fact that the meat left the courtyard.",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says: When Rabbi Akiva says</b> his opinion, that the sprinkling of the blood of one of the offerings exempts the other from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, that applies specifically in a situation where the two offerings were slaughtered <b>at the same time,</b> i.e., by two priests simultaneously, as in such a case they are considered like a single body. <b>But</b> in a case <b>where</b> the two offerings were slaughtered <b>one after the other, Rabbi Akiva did not say</b> that the sprinkling of one exempts the other from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. This is because when the first offering was slaughtered, the other became unfit as a leftover sin offering. Since there was no point at which its meat was permitted to be consumed by the priests, it was not exempted from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "The Gemara cites a relevant <i>baraita</i>: It <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon said: When I went to the village of Pani, a certain old man found me and said to me:</b> Is it so that <b>Rabbi Akiva would say</b> that <b>sprinkling is effective</b> for the meat of offerings <b>that left</b> the courtyard and were thereby rendered unfit, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? <b>I said to him: Yes. And when I came and presented</b> this <b>matter</b> that the old man said <b>before my colleagues in Galilee, they said,</b> agreeing with his skepticism: How could Rabbi Akiva have said that? Since the meat that left the courtyard <b>is unfit, how</b> can the sprinkling <b>effect acceptance for</b> that which is <b>unfit?</b>",
            "<b>But when I left</b> their presence <b>and presented</b> this <b>matter before Rabbi Akiva, he said:</b> And you, <b>my son, do you not say so,</b> that sprinkling is effective even with regard to that which is unfit? <b>But</b> in the case of one who <b>designated</b> an animal as <b>his sin offering and it was lost and he designated another</b> animal <b>in its stead, and thereafter the first</b> sin offering <b>was found and both of them stand</b> fit for sacrifice, he may sacrifice either animal, thereby rendering the other unfit, and yet <b>both</b> are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> This is due to the fact that these offerings remain consecrated to God, and therefore one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse. Likewise, if one <b>slaughtered them</b> both, <b>and their blood</b> is <b>placed in cups</b> and the blood of one of them will be sprinkled on the altar, <b>both of them</b> are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "And in a case where the <b>blood of one</b> of the sin offerings <b>was sprinkled, do you not concede that just as</b> the sprinkling of <b>its blood exempts its meat from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, so too, it exempts the meat of the other</b> animal <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse?</b>",
            "If so, one may infer from here by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard: <b>If</b> the sprinkling of its blood <b>spared the meat of the other</b> animal <b>from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, even though</b> that animal <b>is unfit,</b> as it is a leftover sin offering, it is only <b>right that</b> the blood that was sprinkled should <b>exempt its own meat,</b> despite the fact that it left the courtyard.",
            "With regard to this reply by Rabbi Akiva, <b>Reish Lakish says in the name of Rav Oshaya: Rabbi Akiva gave a deceptive response to that student</b> of his, Rabbi Shimon. Reish Lakish elaborates: Based on Rabbi Akiva’s reply, one would think that if the two sin offerings were slaughtered <b>at the same time,</b> then <b>yes,</b> the blood of one sin offering exempts the meat of the other from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. But if they were slaughtered <b>one after the other,</b> it does <b>not</b> exempt the meat of the other offering.",
            "But <b>since</b> in either case the other offering, whose blood was not sprinkled, <b>is unfit,</b> as it is a leftover sin offering, <b>what</b> difference does it make <b>to me whether</b> they were slaughtered <b>at the same time</b> or whether they were slaughtered <b>one after the other?</b> In either case, according to Rabbi Akiva, the sprinkling of one should exempt the meat of the other from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish</b> in response: <b>And you,</b> who raise this difficulty, <b>do you not</b> also <b>say the same,</b> that there is a difference between a case where they were slaughtered at the same time, and are therefore considered one entity, when the sprinkling of the blood of one offering exempts the meat of the other, and a case where they were slaughtered one after the other, and are therefore considered two separate entities, which means that the blood of one offering does not exempt the meat of the other?",
            "But in a case <b>where</b> one <b>separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee</b> for his obligation of a single guilt offering, i.e., that if one were lost he could achieve atonement by means of the second, <b>and one slaughtered both of them,</b> and the priest <b>first brought up</b> the <b>sacrificial portions of one of them</b> onto the altar <b>before sprinkling</b> any blood, and then sprinkled the blood of the other offering, <b>would you not concede that</b> even <b>if</b> the sacrificial portions of this offering whose blood was not sprinkled <b>ascended</b> the altar, that <b>they shall descend</b> without being sacrificed? The proper procedure is that first the blood is sprinkled and only then are the sacrificial portions brought up onto the altar to be sacrificed.",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan analyzes this case: <b>And if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> to say that even when the two offerings were slaughtered one after the other they are still considered as <b>one entity, why</b> is it the <i>halakha</i> that <b>if</b> the sacrificial portions <b>ascended</b> the altar, <b>they shall descend? Doesn’t Ulla say</b> that <b>sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity which</b> one <b>brought up</b> to the altar <b>before</b> the <b>sprinkling of</b> the offering’s <b>blood,</b> and are therefore not yet fit for the altar, <b>shall not descend,</b> but are sacrificed, as the sacrificial portions <b>have become the food of</b> the <b>altar,</b> by virtue of their placement upon it?",
            "Reish Lakish <b>was silent,</b> as he had no answer to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s difficulty. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said</b> in this regard: <b>We have cut off the legs of the child,</b> i.e., I have refuted Reish Lakish’s opinion by raising a difficulty that eliminates the basis for his opinion.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to establishing liability for misuse of consecrated items, <b>there is</b> an aspect of <b>leniency and</b> an aspect of <b>stringency in the act</b> of sprinkling the <b>blood of offerings of the most sacred order. But</b> with regard to the sprinkling of the blood <b>in</b> the case of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> it contains <b>in its entirety</b> aspects of <b>stringency,</b> i.e., there are only aspects of stringency.",
            "<b>How so?</b> The status of <b>offerings of the most sacred order</b> is that <b>before the sprinkling of blood, one is</b> liable <b>for misusing their sacrificial portions</b> that are to be burned on the altar, <b>and for</b> misusing <b>the meat</b> that is to be eaten by the priests. Since the meat is prohibited prior to sprinkling the blood, it is in the category of items consecrated to God, which are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. <b>After the sprinkling of the blood</b> of offerings of the most sacred order, <b>one is</b> still liable <b>for misuse of their sacrificial portions,</b> as they remain prohibited to be eaten and are in the category of items consecrated to God, <b>but one is not</b> liable <b>for misuse of the meat,</b> as it is now permitted for consumption by the priests. This explains how there is an aspect of leniency in the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order.",
            "By contrast, <b>for</b> consumption of both <b>this,</b> the sacrificial portions, <b>and that,</b> the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, <b>one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition against consumption of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition against consumption of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure.</b> Consequently, <b>the act of</b> sprinkling <b>blood of offerings of the most sacred order</b> is <b>found</b> to contain an aspect of <b>leniency and</b> an aspect of <b>stringency.</b>",
            "<b>But with regard to</b> the sprinkling of the blood of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their</b> aspects are of <b>stringency. How so?</b> The status of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity</b> is that <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse, not for</b> their <b>sacrificial portions nor for the meat. After the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, one is</b> liable for <b>misuse of</b> their <b>sacrificial portions, but one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse of the meat.</b> This explains how the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity causes a stringency in terms of the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse.",
            "And <b>for</b> consumption of both <b>this,</b> the sacrificial portions, <b>and that,</b> the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, <b>one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition against consumption of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and of the prohibition against consumption of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> of the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure.</b> Consequently, in <b>the act of</b> sprinkling the <b>blood of offerings of lesser sanctity,</b> it is <b>found</b> that <b>all of their</b> aspects are of <b>stringency.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna <b>teaches:</b> After the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order, one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing the meat.</b> The Gemara infers from this <b>that there is no</b> liability for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>but there is a prohibition</b> for the priest to eat from it even after the blood has been sprinkled. The Gemara therefore asks: <b>But why</b> is there such a prohibition? <b>Isn’t</b> the meat <b>the property of the priests</b> after the blood has been sprinkled, and therefore it is permitted for them in consumption?",
            "The Gemara answers: This is <b>not difficult,</b> as the above inference is invalid. The reason that the mishna taught that one is not liable, rather than saying that the meat is permitted, is as follows: <b>Since the first clause mentions</b> the phrase: One is liable for <b>misusing, the latter clause also mentions</b> the parallel phrase: One is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing.</b> Therefore, the above inference is incorrect, as there is in fact no prohibition for the priests to eat the meat.",
            "The Gemara continues to analyze the mishna. <b>Say the latter clause:</b> But <b>with regard to</b> the sprinkling of the blood of <b>offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their</b> aspects are of <b>stringency. How so?</b> The status of <b>the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> is that <b>before the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse, not for</b> their meat <b>nor for their sacrificial portions. And one is not liable due to</b> violation of the prohibition against <b><i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or</b> the consumption of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. After the sprinkling of</b> the <b>blood, one is</b> liable for <b>misuse of their sacrificial portions, and one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse of the meat.</b>",
            "The Gemara infers as above: <b>There is no</b> liability for <b>misuse</b> of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, <b>but there is a prohibition</b> for the owners to consume it, even after the blood has been sprinkled. <b>But why</b> is there such a prohibition? <b>Isn’t</b> this meat <b>the property of the owners</b> after the blood has been sprinkled, and it is permitted for them in consumption?",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥanina says</b> in explanation: This is referring to meat <b>that</b> was <b>taken out</b> from the place where it is permitted to be eaten before the sprinkling of the blood, and the blood was later sprinkled. In such a case, the meat is prohibited. <b>And</b> this ruling <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva</b> in the mishna on 6b, who rules that sprinkling is effective in that it exempts the meat of the offerings of the most sacred order from the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, and renders the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity subject to misuse, even if the meat left the courtyard.",
            "Rabbi Ḥanina continues: The <i>tanna</i> here is teaching that <b>when Rabbi Akiva says</b> that <b>sprinkling is effective</b> with regard to the meat of offerings of the most sacred order or the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity <b>that left</b> the courtyard, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure, that applies <b>specifically with regard to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of its <b>burning,</b> that it is not burned right away, but that one must wait until the following morning to burn it."
        ],
        [
            "<b>But</b> as for permitting it <b>for eating,</b> in this regard even Rabbi Akiva concedes <b>that</b> the sprinkling of the blood <b>does not effect acceptance.</b>",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One</b> who derives benefit <b>from a bird sin offering is</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>from</b> the moment <b>that it was consecrated.</b> Once the nape of its neck <b>was pinched, it was rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one</b> who was ritually impure <b>who immersed</b> in a ritual bath <b>that day</b> and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, <b>and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering to complete his purification process, e.g., a <i>zav</i> and a leper, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat; <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight,</b> i.e., if its blood was not sprinkled before sunset.",
            "Once <b>its blood was sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. But there is no</b> liability for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, because after the blood is sprinkled it is permitted for priests to partake of its meat and it is no longer consecrated exclusively to God.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna <b>teaches:</b> From the time the nape of its neck was pinched, the bird sin offering <b>was rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b> It can be inferred from here that <b>yes,</b> it is susceptible <b>to disqualification, but</b> it is <b>not</b> fit <b>to</b> render other items ritually <b>impure.</b>",
            "In light of the above inference, the Gemara asks: <b>Whose</b> opinion is expressed in <b>the mishna?</b> The Gemara answers: It <b>is</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 1:4) that <b>Abba Shaul says:</b> With regard to <b>one who immersed that day,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "until sunset he is treated as one who is impure with <b>first-</b>degree impurity with regard <b>to sacrificial</b> food. In other words, an item of sacrificial food that he touches assumes the status of second-degree impurity. A second item that comes into contact with the first item of food assumes third-degree impurity. If a third item comes into contact with the second item, it assumes fourth-degree impurity, i.e., it may not be eaten but does not impart impurity to other items.",
            "<b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> One who immersed that day is considered impure with second-degree impurity, even with regard to sacrificial food, and therefore he <b>renders sacrificial</b> food <b>impure and disqualifies <i>teruma</i>. And the Rabbis say: Just as he</b> merely <b>disqualifies <i>teruma</i> liquids and <i>teruma</i> foods,</b> without them becoming impure to a degree that their impurity is transferred to another item, <b>so too, he</b> only <b>disqualifies sacrificial liquids and sacrificial foods.</b> Apparently, the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, not the opinions of Abba Shaul and Rabbi Meir.",
            "<b>Rava</b> rejects this analysis and <b>says:</b> The mishna can be explained even in accordance with the opinions of Abba Shaul and Rabbi Meir, as they might agree that by Torah law one who immersed that day only disqualifies the food and does not render it impure. But <b>according to Abba Shaul,</b> the Sages <b>established a higher standard with regard to consecrated</b> items, and therefore the <b>Sages equated</b> one who <b>immersed that day to</b> one who is impure with <b>first-</b>degree ritual impurity.",
            "Rava continues: <b>According to Rabbi Meir,</b> the Sages equated the impurity of one who immersed that day <b>to food</b> of <b>second-</b>degree ritual impurity, but <b>according to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis</b> there is no additional impurity by rabbinic law. Their reasoning is that <b>since he has immersed,</b> although he is not completely pure, <b>his</b> level of ritual <b>impurity is</b> relatively <b>weak.</b> Therefore, he <b>renders</b> a sin offering <b>disqualified,</b> but he does <b>not render</b> it ritually <b>impure.</b>",
            "§ The mishna teaches with regard to a sin offering: Once <b>its blood was sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, and the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure, but there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara infers: <b>There is no</b> liability for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>but there is a prohibition</b> against deriving benefit from it even after the blood has been sprinkled. <b>But why</b> is there such a prohibition? <b>Isn’t</b> the meat of the sin offering <b>the property of the priests</b> after the blood has been sprinkled? Accordingly, they would therefore be permitted to consume this meat.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ḥanina says</b> in explanation: The mishna is referring <b>to</b> meat that has been <b>taken out</b> from the place where it is permitted to be eaten. <b>And</b> this ruling <b>is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva, who said: Sprinkling</b> of the blood <b>renders fit those</b> portions <b>that were taken out</b> of the place where they may be eaten, i.e., the prohibition of misuse no longer applies to them, but they are <b>not fit for consumption.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues to discuss the <i>halakha</i> of a bird sin offering. After the nape of its neck has been pinched and the blood sprinkled, the neck of the bird is pressed onto the side of the altar so that the blood is squeezed out and trickles down to the base of the altar. <b>Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> Failure to <b>squeeze out</b> the blood from <b>a bird sin offering</b> after sprinkling the blood <b>does not invalidate</b> the offering or prevent atonement, <b>as Rav teaches</b> in his version of the mishna: Once <b>its blood was sprinkled.</b>",
            "By contrast, <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> Failure to <b>squeeze out</b> the blood from <b>a bird sin offering</b> after sprinkling the blood <b>does invalidate</b> the offering and prevents atonement. <b>And Rav teaches</b> in his version of the mishna: Once <b>its blood was squeezed out.</b> Only after the blood has been squeezed out is the atonement complete and the bird may be eaten.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the statement of Rav Huna. <b>Come</b> and <b>hear</b> a verse in the Torah: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar; <b>and the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar, it is a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 5:9). <b>Granted, according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Adda bar Ahava,</b> who holds that the squeezing out of the blood is essential, <b>this is as it is written: “And the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out</b> at the base of the altar, it <b>is a sin offering.”</b> This clause indicates that only after the blood has been squeezed out is it considered a valid sin offering. <b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav Huna, what</b> does the verse mean when it states: <b>“The remainder</b> of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar, it is a sin offering”?",
            "The Gemara answers that Rav Huna explains this verse <b>as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>of the school of Rabbi Yishmael:</b> The verse teaches <b>that if</b> any of the blood <b>remains</b> inside the bird it must be squeezed out, but there is no requirement to ensure that blood must remain so that it can be squeezed out. Consequently, even if one does not squeeze out any blood on the side of the altar, the offering is valid. <b>And what</b> is the meaning of the phrase: “It <b>is a sin offering”?</b> This is referring <b>to the first clause</b> of the verse, i.e., it is a valid sin offering only if the blood is sprinkled on the side of the altar.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If that is so,</b> consider the fact <b>that it is written with regard to a meal offering: “But that which is left</b> of the meal offering shall be Aaron’s and his sons’; it is a thing most holy of the offerings of the Lord made by fire” (Leviticus 2:3). Does this <b>also</b> mean <b>that if</b> some of the meal offering <b>remains</b> then it is given to the priests, but there is no need to ensure that some of it remains <i>ab initio</i>? <b>And if you would say</b> this is <b>indeed</b> the case,"
        ],
        [
            "<b>but isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove his handful <b>of its fine flour, and of its oil, together with all its frankincense;</b> and the priest shall make its memorial part smoke upon the altar, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:2)? This verse <b>excludes</b> those situations <b>where</b> some of <b>its flour was missing, or</b> some of <b>its oil was missing, or</b> some of <b>its frankincense was missing,</b> in which case the priest may not place the meal offering on the fire. This indicates that one must ensure that some of the flour, oil, and frankincense remain.",
            "The Sages <b>said</b> in response to the difficulty of Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: In general, the terms “remainder” or “leftover” refer to a situation where there happened to be some of the item remaining. Yet, the case of the meal offering is unique, as <b>there it is written: “But that which is left</b> of the meal offering shall be Aaron’s and his sons’; it is a thing most holy of the offerings of the Lord made by fire” (Leviticus 2:3). This part of <b>the verse</b> is <b>superfluous,</b> as it appears in Leviticus 2:10 as well. It is therefore derived from the repetition of this phrase that in the specific case of a meal offering one must ensure that some of the items remain. This requirement does not apply to a bird sin offering.",
            "<b>Shmuel’s father raises an objection to Rav Huna</b> from a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 64b): With regard to <b>both a bird sin</b> offering <b>and a bird burnt offering, where</b> the priest <b>pinched their nape or squeezed out their blood</b> with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is to partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is to burn it on the altar, <b>outside its</b> designated <b>area,</b> the offering is <b>not valid,</b> but <b>there is no</b> liability for <b><i>karet</i></b> for one who partakes of the offering. If his intent was to eat it or burn it <b>beyond its</b> designated <b>time,</b> the offering is <b><i>piggul</i> and one is liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i></b> for partaking of the offering, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. <b>In any event,</b> this mishna <b>teaches: Squeezed out their blood,</b> indicating that failure to squeeze out the blood disqualifies the offering.",
            "Shmuel’s father <b>raises the objection and he resolves it</b> himself. The <i>tanna</i> of that mishna <b>teaches it disjunctively.</b> In other words, the two clauses of the mishna are referring to two different cases. The <i>halakha</i> of pinching the nape of the neck applies to both the bird sin offering and the bird burnt offering. By contrast, the squeezing out of the blood applies only to a bird burnt offering, whose blood is not sprinkled on the altar. For this reason, the priest’s intent at the time of squeezing out the blood is significant. In the case of a bird sin offering, it is only an intent at the time of sprinkling that invalidates the offering.",
            "The Gemara returns to <b>the</b> matter <b>itself,</b> i.e., the <i>baraita</i> cited above: <b>The <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael</b> taught <b>that if</b> any <b>of</b> the <b>blood remains</b> inside the bird it must be squeezed out, but there is no requirement to ensure that blood remains for this purpose. Consequently, even if one does not squeeze out the blood on the side of the altar, the offering is valid.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught there,</b> on <i>Zevaḥim</i> 52a, that failure with regard to the <b>remainder</b> of the blood <b>invalidates</b> the offering, <b>and Rav Pappa said:</b> Both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva agree that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base does not invalidate the offering. The practical difference <b>between them is</b> whether or not failure to <b>squeeze out</b> the blood from <b>a bird sin offering</b> after sprinkling the blood invalidates the offering. The school of Rabbi Yishmael rules that it does invalidate the offering, and Rabbi Akiva maintains that it does not invalidate the offering. The Gemara answers: There are <b>two <i>tanna’im</i> and</b> they disagree <b>with regard to</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Yishmael.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One is</b> liable for <b>misusing a bird burnt offering from</b> the moment <b>that it was consecrated.</b> When the nape of its neck <b>was pinched, it was rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed</b> in a ritual bath <b>that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b> Once <b>its blood was squeezed out, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. And</b> as it may not be eaten, <b>one is</b> liable for <b>its misuse until it leaves to the place of the ashes,</b> where it is burned.",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of bulls that are burned and goats that are burned from</b> the moment <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they were slaughtered, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b> Once <b>its blood was sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. And one is</b> liable for <b>its misuse</b> even when it is <b>in the place of the ashes, until the flesh has been</b> completely <b>scorched.</b>",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the burnt offering from</b> the moment <b>that it was consecrated.</b> Once <b>it was slaughtered it was rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b> Once <b>its blood was sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. And one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse of the hides, but one is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the flesh until it leaves to the place of the ashes.</b>",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of a sin offering, and a guilt offering, and communal peace offerings from</b> the moment <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they were slaughtered they were rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b> Once <b>their blood was sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>them, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while <b>ritually impure. One is not</b> liable for <b>misuse of the flesh, but one is</b> liable for <b>misuse of their sacrificial portions,</b> i.e., the portions that are to be consumed on the altar, <b>until they leave to the place of the ashes.</b>",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the two loaves</b> brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> <b>from</b> the moment <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they formed a crust, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> it being <b>left overnight, and</b> they are rendered eligible <b>to slaughter with them the</b> accompanying <b>offering</b> of the two lambs. Once <b>the blood of</b> the <b>lambs is sprinkled, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating the loaves, <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while <b>ritually impure. And they are not</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> as at that point their consumption is permitted.",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the shewbread,</b> which is arranged on the Golden Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, <b>from</b> the moment <b>that it was consecrated.</b> Once <b>it formed a crust in the oven</b> it assumes the status of bread and its halakhic status is like that of offerings of the most sacred order after the animal was slaughtered, in that <b>it was rendered susceptible to disqualification through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and</b> it is rendered eligible <b>for arrangement upon the Table</b> in the Sanctuary.",
            "Once <b>the bowls</b> of frankincense brought with the shewbread of the previous week <b>were sacrificed, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating the loaves <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while <b>ritually impure. But it is not</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse,</b> as at that point its consumption is permitted.",
            "<b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the meal offerings from</b> the moment <b>that they were consecrated.</b> Once <b>they were consecrated</b> through placement of the flour <b>in</b> a service <b>vessel, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight.</b>",
            "<b>Once the handful</b> taken from the meal offering <b>was sacrificed, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating the meal offering <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>,</b> and the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while <b>ritually impure. And one is not</b> liable for <b>misuse of the remainder</b> of the meal offering, which is eaten by the priests, <b>but one is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the handful</b> that is sacrificed, <b>until it leaves to the place of the ashes.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> It <b>was stated</b> that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to <b>one who derives benefit from the ash of the round</b> heap <b>that is on top of the altar. Rav says:</b> One who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>and Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> One who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara clarifies this dispute: <b>Before the removal of the ashes, everyone agrees that</b> one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property. The reason is that the mitzva of the removal of the ashes has not yet been completed. <b>When they disagree</b> it is with regard to the <i>halakha</i> <b>after the removal of the ashes,</b> at which point the mitzva has been completed.",
            "<b>Rav says</b> that one who derives benefit <b>from it</b> is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>as its mitzva has been performed</b> and completed. <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> that one is liable for misuse, <b>since it is written: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment,</b> and his linen breeches shall he put upon his flesh; and he shall take up the ashes to where the fire has consumed the burnt offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar. And he shall remove his garments, and don other garments, and carry forth the ashes outside the camp” (Leviticus 6:3–4). Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: <b>Since</b> taking the ashes outside the Temple also <b>requires the priestly vestments,</b> albeit garments of lesser quality than those used to remove the ashes from the altar, evidently the ash <b>remains in its consecrated</b> state.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rav. <b>We learned</b> in the mishna, with regard to the bird burnt offering: <b>One is</b> liable for <b>its misuse until it leaves to the place of the ashes,</b> where it is burned. This indicates that the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse apply while the ashes remain on the altar, even after the removal of ashes, which is <b>difficult for</b> the opinion of <b>Rav.</b> The Gemara answers that <b>Rav</b> could have <b>said to you:</b> The mishna means that one is liable <b>until</b> the ash <b>is fit</b> to be taken out <b>to the place of ashes,</b> i.e., once it is burned on the altar and has had a shovel of ashes removed from it."
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> to Rav’s explanation from a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 86a): <b>And all of</b> those unfit offerings, with regard to which it was taught that if they ascended to the altar they do not descend, in a case <b>where they were dislodged from upon the altar,</b> the priest <b>does not restore</b> them to the altar. <b>And likewise,</b> with regard to <b>an ember that was dislodged from upon the altar,</b> the priest <b>does not restore</b> it to the altar. It can be inferred from the mishna that if the ember was still <b>on the altar,</b> then the priest must <b>restore</b> it.",
            "The Gemara explains the objection: <b>Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> this <b>works out well,</b> as he maintains that even after the shovelful of ashes has been removed, an ember on the pile of ashes still retains its sanctity. <b>But according to Rav</b> this is <b>difficult.</b> The Gemara answers that <b>Rav</b> could have <b>said to you: An ember is different, as it has substance [<i>meshasha</i>]</b> and is therefore still fit to be burned on the altar.",
            "<b>There is</b> a Sage <b>who stated</b> this objection <b>in</b> the opposite <b>manner:</b> The mishna indicates that <b>the reason</b> that the priest must return it to the altar is <b>because</b> it is <b>an ember,</b> and <b>that it has substance.</b> It can be inferred <b>from this</b> that one who derives benefit <b>from ash, which does not have substance, is not</b> liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>even</b> when it is <b>on the top of the altar. Granted, according to Rav</b> this works out <b>well, but according to Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> it is <b>difficult.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> could have <b>said to you: The same is true that even ash</b> that was dislodged must be returned. <b>And this is the reason that</b> the mishna <b>teaches an ember,</b> and not ash: It <b>is coming to teach us that even</b> in the case of <b>an ember, which has substance, if it is dislodged from upon the altar</b> the priest does <b>not return</b> it.",
            "§ One of the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse is that the violator must pay the value of the benefit he derived and add an extra one-fifth. It <b>was stated</b> that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to this money: In the case of <b>one who derives benefit from meat of an offering of the most sacred order before the sprinkling of the blood</b> on the altar, <b>or</b> who derives benefit from <b>sacrificial portions,</b> such as the fats <b>of offerings of lesser sanctity, after the sprinkling of the blood, Rav says:</b> The value of <b>that benefit which he derived</b> is <b>allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings, <b>and Levi says:</b> One must <b>bring an item that is entirely</b> consumed <b>on the altar,</b> e.g., incense. One does not bring a burnt offering with this money, as the hide of a burnt offering belongs to the priests.",
            "It <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance with</b> the opinion <b>of Levi: This</b> money paid for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated items, <b>to where does it go?</b> The Rabbis who are called: <b>Those who learn before the Sages, say:</b> One must <b>bring an item that is entirely</b> consumed <b>on the altar,</b> and <b>what is that? Incense,</b> which is burned on the altar in its entirety.",
            "It <b>is taught</b> in another <i>baraita</i> <b>in accordance</b> with the opinion <b>of Rav:</b> In the case of one <b>who derives benefit from money</b> set aside for the purchase of <b>a sin offering or</b> set aside <b>as money</b> set aside for the purchase of <b>a guilt offering,</b> if he pays <b>before his sin offering is sacrificed he</b> must <b>add</b> the amount of the benefit he derived and an additional fifth <b>and bring</b> with that money a more expensive animal as <b>his sin offering. And</b> likewise, if he pays <b>before his guilt offering is sacrificed, he</b> must <b>add</b> the amount of the benefit he derived and an additional fifth <b>and bring</b> with that money a more expensive animal as <b>his guilt offering.</b> If <b>his sin offering</b> has already been <b>sacrificed,</b> the money <b>is cast into the Dead Sea.</b> If <b>his guilt offering</b> has <b>already</b> been <b>sacrificed,</b> the money is <b>allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>One who derives benefit from meat of an offering of the most sacred order before the sprinkling of the blood</b> on the altar, <b>or</b> if he derives benefit from <b>sacrificial portions,</b> such as the fats <b>of offerings of lesser sanctity, after the sprinkling of the blood,</b> the value of <b>that benefit which he derived</b> is <b>allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings. The <i>baraita</i> summarizes: The reimbursement for misuse of <b>all offerings</b> which are sacrificed on <b>the altar</b> is used to purchase items <b>for the altar,</b> whereas the reimbursement for misuse of all <b>offerings which are consecrated for Temple maintenance</b> is donated <b>to Temple maintenance.</b> And the reimbursement for misuse of all <b>communal offerings</b> is allocated <b>for communal gift</b> offerings.",
            "The Gemara notes that <b>this</b> <i>baraita</i> <b>itself</b> is <b>difficult,</b> i.e., it is apparently self-contradictory. In the first clause it teaches that if he pays <b>before his sin offering is sacrificed he</b> must <b>add</b> the amount of the benefit he derived and an additional fifth <b>and bring</b> a more expensive animal as <b>his sin offering,</b> and <b>if his sin offering</b> has already been <b>sacrificed</b> the money <b>is cast into the Dead Sea. But it is taught</b> in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: The reimbursement for misuse of <b>all offerings</b> that are sacrificed <b>on the altar</b> must be used to purchase items <b>for the altar.</b> The Gemara further explains the contradiction: <b>And</b> it can be inferred from this last statement that there <b>is no difference if the owner has</b> already <b>achieved atonement</b> through his sin offering <b>and</b> there <b>is no difference if</b> the owner has <b>not</b> yet <b>achieved atonement</b> through his sin offering.",
            "The Gemara answers that <b>the first clause is</b> in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, who says: Any sin offering whose owners achieved atonement</b> by means of another animal must be <b>left to die.</b> Therefore, if the owner has achieved atonement, the money for misuse must be cast into the Dead Sea."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And the latter clause</b> of the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who maintain that a sin offering that became lost is left to die only if it was found after its replacement had already been sacrificed. <b>Rav Geviha of Bei Katil</b> likewise <b>said to Rav Ashi</b> that <b>this</b> is what <b>Abaye said: The first clause</b> of that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon and the latter clause</b> is in accordance with the opinion of <b>the Rabbis.</b>",
            "§ <b>Rava says:</b> With regard to the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan, <b>everyone concedes that if one derived benefit from meat of an offering of the most sacred order that</b> had become <b>ritually impure before the sprinkling</b> of the blood on the altar, <b>or</b> from the <b>sacrificial portions,</b> such as the fats <b>of offerings of lesser sanctity, after they have been brought up</b> to the altar, <b>that</b> he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, and is <b>exempt</b> from repayment or bringing an offering. The reason is that although in both cases the meat must be burned, this burning is not considered part of the Temple service.",
            "The Gemara asks: Isn’t this ruling <b>obvious? What loss</b> did the one who derived benefit cause to Temple property? The impure meat of an offering of the most sacred order is unfit for the altar and may not be eaten by the priests, and once the portions of offerings of lesser sanctity have been placed on the altar no further service is performed with them.",
            "The Gemara answers that Rava’s statement is necessary, <b>lest you say</b> with regard to <b>meat of an offering of the most sacred order that</b> had become <b>ritually impure: There is a mitzva for the priests</b> to <b>burn</b> it; and lest you say with regard to the <b>sacrificial portions</b> from the fats <b>of offerings of lesser sanctity: There is a mitzva to turn them with a fork [<i>betzinnora</i>]</b> while they are on the altar, so that they will burn more evenly and quickly. Consequently, one who derives benefit from them should be liable for misuse. Rava therefore <b>teaches us that</b> there is <b>no</b> liability for misuse, as the mitzva to burn them or turn them is not considered part of the sacrificial rite.",
            "<b>Rava said,</b> in explanation of the above <i>baraita</i>: <b>This</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>that you say,</b> that if <b>his sin offering</b> has <b>already</b> been <b>sacrificed,</b> then the money <b>is cast into the Dead Sea, this statement</b> applies only <b>if</b> his prohibited benefit <b>was made known to him before</b> the <b>atonement,</b> i.e., before the sacrifice of the animal. In such a case, he could have added his money to the value and purchased a better animal for his offering. <b>But</b> if it became known to him only <b>after</b> the <b>atonement,</b> i.e., the sacrifice of the animal, the money is not cast into the Dead Sea. Instead, it is <b>allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings. <b>What is the reason?</b> There is a principle that one does <b>not separate</b> money or an offering <b>from the outset</b> in order <b>for</b> it <b>to be lost</b> or destroyed by being cast into the Dead Sea.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The mishna lists sacrificial items that are consumed in their entirety on the altar and of which the priests have no share. <b>One is</b> liable for <b>misuse of the handful</b> taken from the meal offering, <b>and the frankincense</b> burned with the handful on the altar, <b>and the incense</b> burned each day on the golden altar in the Sanctuary, <b>and the meal offering of priests,</b> from which a handful is not taken but which is burned in its entirety, <b>and the meal offering of the anointed priest,</b> i.e., the High Priest, <b>and the meal offering</b> sacrificed with the <b>libations</b> that accompany offerings. In all these cases, one is liable for misuse <b>from</b> the moment <b>that they were consecrated</b> through declaration.",
            "Once <b>one consecrated them</b> by placing them <b>in</b> the appropriate service <b>vessel,</b> each <b>was rendered susceptible to disqualification</b> for sacrifice <b>through</b> contact with <b>one who immersed</b> in a ritual bath <b>that day, and through</b> contact with <b>one who has not yet</b> brought <b>an atonement</b> offering, <b>and through</b> its blood being <b>left overnight, and one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and due to</b> the prohibition of partaking of it while <b>ritually impure; but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>piggul</i> in</b> each of these cases.",
            "<b>This is the principle</b> that applies to <i>piggul</i>: With regard to <b>any</b> consecrated item <b>that has permitting factors,</b> i.e., there is another item whose sacrifice renders it permitted for consumption by the altar or by an individual, <b>one is not liable due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>piggul</i>, and</b> the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of it while <b>ritually impure, until they sacrifice</b> the <b>permitting factors.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> with regard to <b>any</b> item <b>that does not have permitting factors,</b> e.g., the handful and the frankincense, as they render other items permitted whereas no other items are needed to render them permitted, <b>once one sanctified</b> them <b>in the</b> appropriate service <b>vessel, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> eating <b>it, due to</b> violation of the prohibition of <b><i>notar</i>, and</b> the prohibition of partaking of it while <b>ritually impure; but there is no</b> liability for <b><i>piggul</i> in</b> those cases."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that one is liable for the prohibition of <i>notar</i> and the prohibition of eating an item while ritually impure, both with regard to items that have permitting factors and items that do not have permitting factors. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived? The Gemara answers that this is <b>as the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>might</b> have thought that one is <b>liable due to</b> partaking of sacrificial food in a state of <b>ritual impurity only with regard to an item that has permitting factors.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>And</b> this <b>is a logical inference: If</b> with regard to <b><i>piggul</i>, which</b> renders one who eats it unwittingly liable <b>through one awareness,</b> i.e., for one to be liable to bring a sin offering it is enough for him to become aware after the fact that he had sinned unwittingly, <b>and its offering</b> for one who eats it unwittingly <b>is fixed, and</b> there are <b>no</b> circumstances in which <b>its general prohibition was permitted,</b> i.e., it is never permitted to eat <i>piggul</i>, and yet <b>one is liable due to</b> the prohibition of partaking of <i>piggul</i> <b>only for an item that has permitting factors,</b> the same should certainly apply to ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara elaborates: Then with regard to <b>ritual impurity, where</b> one is liable only in a case <b>of two awarenesses,</b> i.e., one is liable only if he was aware of his impurity before eating the meat, and then forgot and ate, and afterward again became aware of his impurity; <b>and its offering</b> to atone for this transgression is <b>a sliding-scale</b> offering, which varies according to the offender’s financial status; <b>and</b> there are circumstances in which <b>its general prohibition was permitted</b> to the community, as communal offerings are sacrificed in the Temple in a state of impurity, under certain circumstances; <b>is it not right that one should be liable</b> for violating the prohibition of partaking of the meat while ritually impure <b>only for an item that has permitting factors?</b>",
            "Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Say to them: Anyone of all your seed throughout your generations, that approaches</b> the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, while his impurity is on him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3). <b>The verse,</b> which deals with eating while ritually impure, <b>is speaking of all the sacred items,</b> whether or not they have a permitting factor. One <b>might</b> have thought that <b>they should be liable for</b> eating <b>them immediately,</b> as soon as they have been verbally consecrated, even before they have been placed into a service vessel. <b>The verse states: “That approaches</b> the sacred items.” This clause is puzzling, as it apparently leads to the unlikely conclusion that liability applies after one has touched the item.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains that <b>Rabbi Elazar said: But is there</b> a case of one who <b>touches</b> an item <b>who is liable?</b> Rather, <b>how</b> is <b>this</b> possible? The answer is that the phrase “approaches [<i>yikrav</i>] the sacred items” can also be understood as: The sacred items that are fit to be sacrificed [<i>yikarev</i>], and therefore with regard to <b>any item that has permitting factors,</b> one is <b>not liable until the permitting factors</b> have been <b>sacrificed. And</b> in the case of <b>any item that does not have permitting factors,</b> one is <b>not liable until it is sanctified in</b> a service <b>vessel.</b>",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> This mishna, which also appears in tractate <i>Temura</i>, deals with the five sin offerings left to die. It is cited here because of its relevance to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. The mishna first mentions three of those offerings: <b>The offspring of a sin offering, and</b> an animal that is <b>the substitute for a sin offering,</b> whether or not the owners achieved atonement by means of another offering, <b>and a sin offering whose owners have died</b> before the offering was sacrificed, <b>shall die.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> the other two sin offerings left to die are the sin offering <b>whose year</b> since birth <b>passed</b> and is therefore unfit for sacrifice, <b>and</b> a sin offering <b>that was lost and</b> when it was <b>found</b> it was <b>blemished,</b> with regard to which the <i>halakhot</i> are as follows: <b>If</b> the sin offering was found <b>after the owner achieved atonement</b> through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, then the blemished animal <b>shall die, and it does not render</b> a non-sacred animal exchanged for it <b>a substitute,</b> as it is has neither inherent sanctity, which would make it fit for sacrifice on the altar, nor sanctity that inheres in its value. <b>And</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from the found animal <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from the animal he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>And if</b> the animal whose year passed was found <b>before the owner achieved atonement,</b> the found animal <b>shall graze until it becomes blemished [<i>shetista’ev</i>],</b> at which point it may not be sacrificed; <b>and it shall be sold and</b> the owner <b>shall purchase another</b> animal <b>with</b> the <b>money</b> received from <b>its</b> sale. The animal that was found blemished may be sold immediately, and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. In both cases, the animal <b>renders</b> a non-sacred animal exchanged for it <b>a substitute,</b> and one who derives benefit from it is liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna first groups together three cases of sin offerings that are left to die, after which it discusses the other two as another group. The Gemara asks: <b>What is different about</b> the three cases in <b>the first clause that</b> the mishna <b>does not distinguish</b> between whether or not the owner has achieved atonement, <b>and what is different about the latter clause that</b> the mishna <b>does distinguish</b> between cases where the owner has and has not achieved atonement?",
            "The Gemara answers: The three cases of sin offerings discussed in <b>the first clause are absolute,</b> i.e., the <i>halakha</i> is the same whether or not the owner has achieved atonement. By contrast, the cases of the other two sin offerings discussed in <b>the latter clause are not absolute,</b> as their status depends on whether or not their owner achieved atonement by means of another offering.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Didn’t</b> the Mishna <b>teach</b> this same <i>halakha</i> verbatim <b>in connection with</b> the topic of <b>substitution,</b> in tractate <i>Temura</i> (21b)? Why is it repeated here? The Gemara answers: It is <b>taught there,</b> in <i>Temura</i>, <b>because</b> it discusses the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>substitution,</b> and it is <b>taught</b> again <b>here</b> in tractate <i>Me’ila</i> <b>because</b> it discusses the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of a nazirite <b>who designated money for</b> the three offerings he is obligated to bring upon completion of <b>his naziriteship,</b> a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering, but he did not specify which money was designated for which offering, since it is not clear what the money is intended for, one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from the money <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from the money he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b> This is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that all</b> the money <b>is fit</b> for purchase of the <b>peace offering,</b> for which one is liable for misuse only after its blood is sprinkled, and therefore there is no liability for its misuse.",
            "If the nazirite <b>died and he had undesignated funds,</b> meaning he did not specify which money was for each of the three offerings, all the money <b>will be allocated for</b> purchase of communal <b>gift</b> offerings. If the nazirite died and he had <b>specified money,</b> the <b>money</b> specified for purchase <b>of</b> the <b>sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea</b> for disposal, because one <b>may not derive benefit</b> <i>ab initio</i> from the money of a sin offering whose owner has died. But if it was not disposed of, <b>and</b> one derived benefit from the money, he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b>",
            "With the <b>money</b> specified for purchase <b>of</b> the <b>burnt offering, one shall bring</b> a gift <b>burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing</b> the funds. With the <b>money</b> specified for purchase <b>of</b> the <b>peace offering, one shall bring</b> a gift <b>peace offering.</b> Although it is a gift offering, the restrictions of the peace offering of the naziriteship apply, <b>and</b> therefore it is <b>eaten for one day</b> and that same night, not the standard two days and one night of a regular peace offering. <b>And</b> nevertheless the peace offering <b>does not require</b> the bringing of the <b>loaves</b> that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, as it is written with regard to the loaves: “And shall place them on the hands of the nazirite” (Numbers 6:19), and in this case the nazirite is dead.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if a nazirite designated money for the three offerings that he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship but did not specify which money was designated for which offering, one who derived benefit from the money is not liable for its misuse, as all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering. <b>Reish Lakish objects to this: And let</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>also teach</b> a similar <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>one who</b> was obligated to bring a pair of birds as an offering in a purification ritual, e.g., for a leper or a woman who gave birth, and he <b>designated money for</b> those <b>nests,</b> i.e., the bird offerings, but did not specify which money was for the burnt offering and which was for the sin offering.",
            "Reish Lakish elaborates: Here too, the <i>tanna</i> could have stated that one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from the money <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b> This is <b>due to</b> the fact that <b>that</b> all the money <b>is fit</b> for purchase of <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not</b> yet <b>arrived,</b> as they are fit for sacrifice only when they are older; or <b>pigeons whose time</b> of fitness <b>has passed,</b> which are fit only when they are young. Since these are not fit to be sacrificed, one is not liable for misuse.",
            "<b>Rava says</b> in response: This <i>halakha</i> is not included in the mishna because the two cases are not comparable: <b>In</b> the case of the <b>undesignated money,</b> the <b>Torah said</b> to <b>bring a peace offering</b> as one of the obligatory offerings of a nazirite. Since any part of the money may be used to purchase the peace offering, there is no liability for its misuse. By contrast, in the case of one who designated money for bird offerings, did the <b>Torah say to</b> use this money to <b>bring</b> specifically <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness <b>has not arrived?</b> Such birds <b>are not fit to</b> be sacrificed on <b>the altar.</b> Therefore, it cannot be said this money is intended for a purpose that does not entail liability for misuse.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to misuse of <b>the blood</b> of offerings that is to be sprinkled on the altar, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>lenient</b> with regard to the status of the blood <b>at the outset and stringent at its conclusion.</b> With regard to misuse of the wine of the <b>libations</b> that accompany the offerings, the <i>halakha</i> is <b>stringent</b> with regard to the status of the wine <b>at their outset and lenient at their conclusion.</b>",
            "The mishna explains: With regard to <b>blood, at its outset,</b> before it is sprinkled on the altar, <b>one is not liable for misusing</b> it; but once its remainder has been poured on the base of the altar and it <b>emerges</b> via the canal that runs through the Temple <b>to the Kidron Valley</b> at the foot of the Temple Mount, <b>one is liable for misusing it.</b> With regard to <b>libations, at their outset,</b> from the moment they were consecrated, <b>one</b> is liable for <b>misusing them,</b> but once <b>they</b> have <b>descended to the drainpipes</b> built into the altar and which extend beneath it, through which the libations flowed out of the Temple, <b>one is no</b> longer liable for <b>misusing them,</b> as their mitzva was fulfilled and therefore their sanctity has ceased.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> relating to the mishna’s ruling that once the remainder of the blood emerged via the canal that runs through the Temple one is liable for its misuse. <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One</b> is liable for <b>misusing</b> the <b>blood</b> of the offerings after it has emerged via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon. And the Rabbis say: One is not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the blood.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason of the one who says</b> that <b>one is not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the blood, despite the fact that it comes from a consecrated offering? <b>Ulla said</b> that blood is not consecrated, because <b>the verse states:</b> “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, <b>and I have given it to you</b> upon the altar to atone for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that <b>it shall be yours,</b> and it is not the property of the Temple. A Sage <b>of the school</b> of <b>Rabbi Yishmael</b> likewise <b>taught</b> that the term <b>“to atone”</b> teaches that God says: <b>I gave it for atonement, and not for</b> the prohibition against <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> this <i>halakha</i> is derived from a different phrase, as <b>the verse states:</b> “For <b>it is the blood that atones by</b> reason of the <b>life”</b> (Leviticus 17:11). The word “is” teaches that the blood remains as it <b>is,</b> retaining the same status <b>before atonement as after atonement: Just as after atonement</b> it is <b>not subject to</b> the prohibition against <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, as the mitzva has been performed, <b>so too, before atonement it is not subject to misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> if the basis for this <i>halakha</i> is that the status of blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can <b>say</b> the opposite, that its status after atonement should be like its status before atonement: <b>Just as before atonement it is subject to misuse</b> of consecrated property, <b>so too, after atonement it is subject to misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara rejects this contention with a rhetorical question: <b>Is there anything whose mitzva has been performed and it is</b> still <b>subject to misuse</b> of consecrated property? The Gemara challenges this assumption: <b>Why not?</b> Why not say this; is there really no precedent for such a suggestion?"
        ],
        [
            "But <b>there is</b> the instance of the <b>removal of the ashes</b> of offerings burned on the altar, <b>whose mitzva has been performed and</b> nevertheless <b>it is</b> still <b>subject to misuse</b> of consecrated property.",
            "The Gemara answers: The removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other <i>halakhot</i> whose mitzva has been performed, <b>because</b> the mitzva of <b>the removal of the ashes and the limbs of the scapegoat</b> of Yom Kippur after it was pushed off the cliff are both subject to the prohibition of misuse even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they <b>are two verses that come as one,</b> i.e., they are two cases that share a unique <i>halakha</i> not found elsewhere. <b>And</b> there is a principle: <b>Any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common aspect to apply to other cases.",
            "The Gemara objects: <b>This works out well according to the one who said</b> that <b>one may not derive benefit from the limbs of the scapegoat,</b> as this is a second verse indicating that an item can be subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse even after its mitzva has been performed. <b>But according to</b> the <b>one who said</b> that <b>one may derive benefit from</b> the limbs of the scapegoat, and they are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse, <b>what can be said</b> to explain why it is not possible to derive this <i>halakha</i> from the removal of the ashes? According to that opinion, this is not a case of two verses that come as one.",
            "The Gemara explains: Even according to that opinion, the removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other <i>halakhot</i> whose mitzva has been performed, <b>because</b> the mitzva of <b>the removal of the ashes and the priestly vestments,</b> the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they <b>are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach</b> their common aspect.",
            "The Gemara raises a further difficulty: <b>This works out well according to</b> the opinion of <b>the Rabbis, who say</b> that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the sacred place, <b>and shall leave them there”</b> (Leviticus 16:23), <b>teaches that</b> the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are unfit for further use, and <b>they require interment.</b> According to their opinion, the answer given by the Gemara works out <b>well.</b>",
            "<b>But according to</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Dosa, who said</b> that these priestly vestments, which are the same as those required by an ordinary priest throughout the year, <b>are permitted for use by an ordinary priest</b> and do not require interment, which means that misuse of consecrated property does not apply to them, <b>what can be said</b> to explain why it is not possible to derive the <i>halakha</i> from the removal of the ashes, since it is a lone instance and therefore should serve as a general source for other cases?",
            "The Gemara responds: Even so, the removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other <i>halakhot</i> whose mitzva has been performed, <b>because</b> the cases of <b>the removal of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken,</b> a ritual performed in certain cases of murder where the perpetrator is not identified, <b>are two verses that come as one</b> that do not teach their common aspect, as they are both subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property even after their mitzva has been performed.",
            "The Gemara challenges this reply: <b>This</b> answer <b>works out well according to the one who says</b> that two verses that come as one <b>do not teach</b> their common aspect to other cases, <b>but according to the one who said</b> that two verses that come as one do <b>teach</b> their common aspect to other cases, <b>what is there to say?</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: <b>Two exclusions are written</b> in these two cases, which indicate that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to them. <b>There,</b> with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, <b>it is written: “The one whose neck was broken”</b> (Deuteronomy 21:6), and the definite article indicates that this <i>halakha</i> should not be extended to other cases.",
            "<b>And there,</b> with regard to the removal of ashes, <b>it is written: “And he shall put it next to the altar”</b> (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that it alone is subject to the prohibition of misuse despite the fact that this is after the fulfillment of its mitzva. The verse emphasizes that this <i>halakha</i> applies to “it,” the ashes, but not to anything else. It is derived from these exclusions that specifically in the case of <b>these, yes,</b> there is misuse after the fulfillment of the mitzva, but with regard to <b>other matters</b> there is <b>no</b> misuse after fulfillment of the mitzva.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: With regard to <b>libations, at their outset,</b> from the moment they were consecrated, <b>one</b> is liable for <b>misusing them,</b> but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar one is no longer liable for their misuse. The Gemara suggests: <b>Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok.</b>",
            "<b>As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok says: There was a small gap between</b> the <b>ramp and</b> the <b>altar west of</b> the <b>ramp. Once in seventy years young priests</b> would <b>descend there</b> to the drainpipes built into the altar <b>and bring</b> out from there the <b>congealed wine</b> left over from the libations that had accumulated over time, <b>which resembled round cakes of</b> dried and <b>pressed figs. And</b> they would <b>burn it in sanctity</b> in the Temple courtyard, <b>as it is stated: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation of strong drink to the Lord”</b> (Numbers 28:7). This teaches that <b>just as its pouring is in sanctity, so too, its burning</b> must be <b>in sanctity.</b>",
            "Before addressing the issue of whether or not the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, the Gemara first analyzes the derivation stated at the end of the <i>baraita</i>: <b>From where is</b> this <i>halakha</i> of burning <b>inferred?</b> After all, the verse it cites is referring to pouring, not burning. <b>Ravina said: It is derived</b> by means of a verbal analogy between an expression of <b>sanctity</b> written with regard to libations and <b>sanctity</b> written with regard to leftover offerings. <b>It is written here,</b> with regard to libations: <b>“In sanctity</b> shall you pour a libation” (Numbers 28:7), <b>and it is written there,</b> with regard to leftover offerings: <b>“You shall burn the leftovers in fire; they are not to be eaten, because it is sanctified”</b> (Exodus 29:34).",
            "This teaches that <b>just as</b> the <b>burning of leftover</b> offerings must <b>be in sanctity, so too,</b> the burning of <b>these</b> congealed libations must <b>also</b> be <b>in sanctity.</b> After the Gemara has clarified the <i>baraita</i> itself, it returns to the issue of whether or not the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok. It is clear from the <i>baraita</i> that he maintains that even after the libations descend into the drainpipes that are built into the altar, they retain their sanctity and are therefore burned, which apparently contradicts the opinion of the mishna.",
            "The Gemara rejects this claim: <b>You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, as</b> it can be claimed that the mishna is referring to the specific case <b>where</b> some of the libations were <b>collected</b> in the space between the ramp and the altar and did not reach the bottom of the drainpipes. In such a situation, the libations are not subject to misuse and there is no requirement of burning, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok. By contrast, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna agrees that libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are thereby consecrated, and therefore they are subject to misuse and there is a requirement of burning.",
            "<b>There are</b> those <b>who say</b> a different version of this discussion. <b>Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok,</b> and it is referring to the specific case <b>where</b> some of the libations were <b>collected</b> in the space between the ramp and the altar and did not reach the bottom of the drainpipes. In such an instance the libations are not subject to misuse and there is no requirement of burning. One can infer that libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are thereby consecrated, and are subject to misuse and must be burned.",
            "The Gemara rejects this claim. The Sages <b>say</b> in response: <b>No;</b> this is not the correct explanation. Rather, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok concedes that even libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are not subject to misuse, as by Torah law they are not consecrated. <b>And</b> his ruling that they must be burned applies <b>by rabbinic law.</b> The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok <b>cites a verse</b> in support of this <i>halakha</i> that the libations are burned, which indicates that it applies by Torah law. The Gemara answers: The verse is a mere <b>support,</b> not an actual source for the <i>halakha</i>, and therefore its citation does not prove that this prohibition applies by Torah law.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the removal of ash</b> from <b>the inner altar</b> to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited, <b>and</b> similarly with regard to the wicks of <b>the Candelabrum,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>; <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b> In the case of <b>one who consecrates anew</b> the <b>ash</b> that has been <b>removed,</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> With regard to <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not arrived,</b> as they are too young, <b>and pigeons whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has passed,</b> as they are too old, one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>; <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that the ashes of the inner altar are not subject to misuse once they have been moved to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited. The Gemara asks: <b>Granted</b>"
        ],
        [
            "that the ashes of <b>the external altar</b> are subject to misuse, <b>as it is written in</b> the context of those ashes: <b>“And he shall put it beside the altar”</b> (Leviticus 6:3). This teaches that these ashes must be interred, despite the fact that their mitzva has been performed by its removal, and therefore they are subject to misuse. But <b>from where do we</b> derive that the ashes of <b>the inner altar</b> are also subject to misuse?",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar said</b> in response: It is derived from the fact <b>that the verse states</b> with regard to a bird sacrificed as a burnt offering: <b>“And he shall take away its crop with its feathers,</b> and cast it beside the altar on the east part, in the place of the ashes” (Leviticus 1:16), referring to the location for the placement of the removed ashes. <b>If</b> this verse <b>is not needed for</b> the <b>matter of the external altar,</b> as that <i>halakha</i> is already derived from the phrase: “And he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), <b>apply it</b> to the <b>matter of</b> the ashes of <b>the inner altar,</b> teaching that these ashes must also be placed there.",
            "The Gemara questions this conclusion: One can <b>say</b> that <b>this and that,</b> i.e., both verses cited above, are stated <b>with regard to</b> the ashes that are on <b>the external altar, and</b> the additional verse is necessary <b>to fix its place,</b> i.e., that it should be put on the east part, which is mentioned only in Leviticus 1:16. If so, there is no source for the placement of the ashes of the inner altar.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>If so,</b> that both verses are referring to the external altar, and the sole purpose of Leviticus 1:16 is to fix its place, <b>let</b> that <b>verse</b> merely <b>state:</b> “And he shall take away its crop with its feathers and cast it <b>beside the altar,”</b> and it would be understood that the two verses are referring to the same place, as the identical phrase “beside the altar” appears in the other verse. <b>What</b> is the reason for the additional phrase “in the place of <b>the ashes”?</b> It teaches <b>that even</b> the ashes of the <b>inner altar</b> are placed there.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>From where do we</b> derive that the ashes of the <b>Candelabrum</b> are also placed to the east of the altar? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the definite article in: “The ashes,” as the verse could have said <b>“ashes”</b> and instead it said <b>“the ashes.”</b> This addition serves to include the ashes of the Candelabrum.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> The previous mishna teaches that one may not derive benefit from doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived and from pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, but one who derived benefit from them is not liable for their misuse. <b>Rabbi Shimon</b> disagrees with this ruling and <b>says:</b> With regard to <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not arrived,</b> one is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> With regard to <b>pigeons whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has passed,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> This and the preceding mishna indicate that the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether or not doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived are subject to misuse. The Gemara clarifies their opinions: <b>Granted,</b> one can understand the opinion of <b>Rabbi Shimon, as</b> he himself <b>teaches</b> his <b>reason</b> in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 112b). <b>As Rabbi Shimon would say:</b> In the case of <b>any</b> sacrificial animal <b>that is fit to</b> be sacrificed <b>after</b> the passage of <b>time,</b> e.g., doves that will be fit for sacrifice when they mature, if <b>one consecrated it before its time</b> of fitness and slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, <b>that</b> person is <b>in</b> violation of <b>a prohibition but there is no</b> liability to receive <b><i>karet</i> for it.</b>",
            "<b>But</b> according to the opinion of <b>the Rabbis,</b> who hold that doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived are not subject to misuse, in <b>what</b> way <b>is</b> this case <b>different from</b> an animal <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived, and yet it can be consecrated? An animal whose time has not yet arrived enters the pen to be tithed together with the other animals (see <i>Bekhorot</i> 56a). Why is the case of the young doves any different?",
            "The Rabbis would <b>say</b> in response that the cases are not comparable. An animal <b>whose time has not yet</b> arrived can indeed be consecrated, <b>just as is</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a blemished</b> animal, <b>which</b> can be consecrated, although only to the degree <b>that</b> it <b>is subject to redemption. But</b> in the case of <b>these birds, since a blemish does not render birds unfit, there is no</b> possibility of <b>redemption for</b> blemished <b>birds.</b> Therefore, one cannot compare the case of animal, which is subject to redemption, to the case of a bird whose time has not yet arrived.",
            "§ <b>Ulla says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Sacrificial</b> animals <b>that died</b> without being sacrificed <b>are excluded from</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse by Torah law.</b> This is because they are no longer fit to be sacrificed, and therefore are no longer in the category of: “The sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). They cannot be redeemed either, since one may not redeem sacrificial animals merely in order to feed them to the dogs.",
            "The Gemara relates that <b>Ulla was sitting</b> in the study hall <b>and he recited this <i>halakha</i></b> in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. <b>Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who will listen to you and Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher,</b> with regard to this opinion, that such offerings are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law? After all, <b>to where has</b> the <b>sanctity that was</b> inherent <b>in them</b> until they died <b>gone?</b>",
            "Ulla <b>said to</b> Rav Ḥisda: According to your reasoning, <b>the mishna</b> itself <b>should present a difficulty,</b> as it teaches: With regard to <b>doves whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has not arrived,</b> as they are too young, <b>and pigeons whose time</b> of fitness for sacrifice <b>has passed,</b> as they are too old, one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse. Here too,</b> one can <b>say: To where has</b> the <b>sanctity that was</b> inherent <b>in</b> the pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed <b>gone?</b> Why are they no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse?",
            "Rav Ḥisda <b>said to</b> Ulla in response: I agree that both the sacrificial animals that died and the pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law. <b>I</b> also <b>concede to you that</b> in the case of sacrificial animals that died and doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived <b>there is</b> a prohibition of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>by rabbinic law.</b> Accordingly, I am no longer troubled by the question of where the sanctity has gone. <b>But</b> there is another matter that is <b>difficult for me: Is there anything where initially,</b> when it was consecrated, it is <b>not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, and ultimately</b> it is <b>subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse</b> by rabbinic law, such as these doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived?",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> is it so that there is <b>no</b> instance of an item that is initially not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, and in the end is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? <b>But there is</b> the case of <b>blood, which initially</b> is <b>not subject</b> to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse, and ultimately</b> it is <b>subject</b> to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse. As we learned</b> in the mishna (11a): With regard to <b>blood, at</b> its <b>outset,</b> before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing it,</b> but once it <b>emerges</b> via the canal that runs through the Temple <b>to the Kidron Valley</b> at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b>",
            "The Sages <b>say</b> in response: This is not a proof, as <b>there too,</b> in the case of blood <b>it is</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse initially.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>As Rav said:</b> In a case of <b>one who lets blood from</b> a live <b>sacrificial animal,</b> deriving <b>benefit</b> from that blood <b>is prohibited and</b> one is liable for <b>misusing it</b> by Torah law. Since there is a stage when there is a prohibition of misuse by Torah law, one can understand the <i>halakha</i> that one is liable by rabbinic law for misusing the blood ultimately, when it descended to the Kidron Valley. This is not comparable to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are initially not subject to misuse by Torah law.",
            "§ The Gemara analyzes <b>the</b> matter <b>itself. Rav Huna says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> In a case of <b>one who lets blood from a sacrificial animal, deriving benefit</b> from that blood <b>is prohibited and</b> one is liable for <b>misusing it. Rav Hamnuna raises an objection</b> to the opinion of Rav from the mishna below: With regard to <b>the milk of</b> animals <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed <b>and the eggs of doves</b> consecrated to be sacrificed, one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse,</b> despite the fact that one is liable for misuse of the animals and doves themselves. Apparently, the products of a consecrated item do not share its status with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse. Why doesn’t this principle apply to blood as well?",
            "Rav <b>said to</b> Rav Hamnuna in response: <b>When we said</b> the products of a consecrated item are also subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse that was only <b>with regard to blood, as</b> the animal <b>cannot exist without blood</b> and therefore the blood is considered like the animal itself. <b>But</b> in the case of <b>milk, since</b> the animal can <b>exist without milk,</b> the milk is <b>not</b> considered like the animal itself.",
            "<b>Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection</b> to this suggestion from a <i>baraita</i>: One <b>may not derive benefit</b> from <b>the</b> dried <b>manure and the</b> fresh <b>dung</b> of offerings of the most sacred order found <b>in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard</b> <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> them; <b>and</b> the <b>money</b> received from <b>their</b> sale <b>will</b> be <b>allocated for the</b> treasury <b>chamber</b> of the Temple.",
            "In light of the suggested distinction between blood and milk, the Gemara asks: <b>Why</b> is the dung not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse? <b>Here too,</b> the animal <b>cannot exist without dung,</b> and therefore the dung should be subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse like blood. The Sages <b>say</b> in response: <b>How</b> can you <b>compare</b> the two cases? In the case of <b>this dung that comes to</b> the animal <b>from an external</b> source, i.e., the food that it ate, <b>this</b> food <b>goes</b> out of the body in the form of dung and <b>that other</b> food <b>comes</b> into the body and takes its place. This description serves <b>to exclude blood, which is</b> part <b>of</b> the animal’s <b>body</b> and is not replaced from an external source.",
            "The Gemara notes: The <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches</b> that one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from the manure and dung <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misuse, and</b> the <b>money</b> received from <b>their</b> sale <b>will</b> be <b>allocated for the</b> treasury <b>chamber</b> of the Temple. This <b>supports</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: Wherever the Sages said</b> an item is <b>consecrated and not consecrated,</b> as in this case where one may not derive benefit but he is not liable for misuse either, the <b>money</b> received from <b>its</b> sale is <b>allocated for the</b> treasury <b>chamber</b> of the Temple.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the milk of sacrificial</b> animals <b>and the eggs of</b> sacrificial <b>doves,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from them after the fact he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b>",
            "<b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that if one derived benefit from the eggs or milk of sacrificial animals, he is not liable for their misuse, <b>said?</b> It is stated <b>in</b> the case of <b>sacrificial</b> animals offered on the <b>altar,</b> as their eggs and milk are not brought to the altar and therefore they are considered distinct from the offerings themselves. <b>But</b> this is not the <i>halakha</i> <b>in</b> the case of animals that are not sacrificed and are <b>consecrated</b> only <b>for Temple maintenance.</b> For example, if one <b>consecrated a hen</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it and for</b> misusing <b>its egg;</b> if one consecrated <b>a donkey</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it and for</b> misusing <b>its milk,</b> as the animal and its milk, and likewise the hen and its eggs, are both consecrated for Temple maintenance and are deemed a single unit.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if one derived benefit from the eggs or milk of consecrated animals sacrificed on the altar he is not liable for their misuse. The Gemara asks: <b>But</b> does that mean that in a case of an item that is suitable to be sacrificed <b>on the altar, if he consecrated it</b> with <b>a sanctity</b> that inheres in its <b>value,</b> i.e., to sell it and use the money to buy an offering rather than sacrifice the animal itself, then its eggs or milk are <b>not subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse?</b> Since he does not intend to sacrifice the animal itself, why shouldn’t the prohibition of misuse apply to its milk or its eggs?",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The wording of the mishna <b>is incomplete and this</b> is what <b>it is teaching: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that the milk and eggs of a consecrated animal sacrificed on the altar are not subject to misuse, <b>said?</b> It is said <b>when he consecrated</b> the animal with <b>inherent sanctity</b> to be sacrificed <b>on the altar. But</b> if <b>he consecrated it</b> with <b>a sanctity</b> that inheres in its <b>value,</b> i.e., to sell it and use the money to buy an offering to be sacrificed <b>on the altar,</b> then <b>it is</b> considered <b>as though he consecrated it for</b> the <b>Temple maintenance</b> and it is subject to misuse. Therefore, if <b>one consecrated a hen</b> to sell it and use the money to buy an offering he is liable for <b>misusing it and for</b> misusing <b>its egg;</b> if one consecrated <b>a donkey</b> he is liable for <b>misusing it and for</b> misusing <b>its milk.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>any</b> consecrated item <b>that is fit for</b> sacrifice on <b>the altar</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>but is not</b> fit <b>for Temple maintenance,</b> or if it is fit <b>for Temple maintenance but not for</b> sacrifice on <b>the altar,</b> or fit <b>neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance,</b> nevertheless one is liable for <b>misusing it.</b> The mishna clarifies each of these categories: Fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, <b>how so?</b>",
            "In a case where <b>one consecrated a cistern full of water,</b> the water is not fit for sacrifice on the altar, as only water from the Siloam pool is used for the altar. Nevertheless, it is fit for Temple maintenance, e.g., to knead clay with it for use in reinforcing the walls of the Temple. What is the case of an item fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated <b>garbage</b> dumps <b>full of manure,</b> the place and its contents are fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance. Rather, they are sold and the money received from the sale is donated to the Temple. What is the case of an item fit for sacrifice on the altar but not fit for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated <b>a dovecote full of pigeons,</b> the pigeons are fit for the altar while the dovecote is not fit even for Temple maintenance.",
            "Or if one consecrated <b>a tree full of fruit,</b> as the fruit is fit for the altar whereas the tree is not fit even for Temple maintenance. For example, grapes are fit for the altar as wine, but the vines are not fit for Temple maintenance, as they are too flimsy for construction. Another case where the consecrated item is fit for neither the altar nor Temple maintenance is <b>a field full of grass.</b>",
            "In all those cases, one is liable for <b>misusing</b> both <b>them and that which is within</b> them, as those that are unfit for use in the Temple will be sold and their money will be used for the altar or for Temple maintenance.",
            "<b>But if one consecrated</b> an empty <b>cistern and it was subsequently filled with water,</b> or if one consecrated an empty <b>garbage</b> dump <b>and it was subsequently filled with manure,</b> or an empty <b>dovecote and it was subsequently filled with pigeons,</b> or <b>a tree</b> without fruit <b>and it was subsequently filled with fruit, or</b> an empty <b>field and it was subsequently filled with grass;</b> in all these cases one is liable for <b>misusing them but</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing that which is within</b> them. There is no misuse with regard to enhancements that developed in consecrated property.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei</b> disagrees in two of the above cases and <b>says:</b> In the case of <b>one who consecrates the</b> empty <b>field</b> in which grass grew <b>or the</b> empty <b>tree</b> on which fruit grew, he is liable for <b>misusing</b> both <b>them and their growth, because these are growths of consecrated</b> property, despite the fact that they grew there only after the property was consecrated.",
            "Apropos the growths of consecrated property, the mishna states that <b>an offspring</b> born <b>to a tithed</b> animal before it was tithed <b>may not</b> be given to <b>suckle from the tithed</b> mother, as it is a non-sacred animal that may not be allowed to derive benefit from consecrated property. <b>And</b> there are <b>others</b> who <b>stipulate</b> in <b>this</b> manner, i.e., that the consecration does not apply to the milk. The same is true of the <b>offspring of sacrificial</b> animals born to them before their consecration; they <b>may not suckle from the sacrificial</b> animal. <b>And</b> in this case as well, there are <b>others</b> who <b>stipulate</b> in <b>this</b> manner, i.e., to enable the offspring to suckle.",
            "<b>The laborers,</b> who are generally permitted to eat the food of their employer, <b>may not eat from consecrated dried figs,</b> if they work with Temple produce. Rather, they can buy food with the money they are paid. <b>And likewise, a cow</b> working with consecrated property, e.g., threshing Temple produce, may not eat <b>from consecrated vetch [<i>mikarshinei</i>].</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna <b>teaches</b> that <b>an offspring</b> born <b>to a tithed</b> animal before it was tithed <b>may not suckle from the tithed</b> mother, and the same applies to the offspring of a sacrificial animal. The Gemara asks: <b>From where are these matters</b> derived?",
            "<b>Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said: It is derived</b> through a verbal analogy of the expressions <b>“passing”</b> and <b>“passing,” from</b> the case of <b>a firstborn</b> offering. With regard to animal tithe the verse states: “Whatsoever passes under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32), and with regard to the firstborn offering it is stated: “And you shall cause to pass all that opens the womb, to the Lord” (Exodus 13:12). <b>Just as</b> in the case of the <b>firstborn</b> offering one is liable for <b>misusing</b> all of <b>it,</b> as it is a male and does not have milk, <b>so too,</b> with regard to the <b>milk of a tithed</b> animal one is liable for <b>misusing</b> all of <b>it,</b> i.e., all of it is forbidden, including its milk, as it is part of the tithed animal. Therefore, the offspring may not suckle from the mother.",
            "The other <i>halakha</i>, that the <b>milk of a sacrificial</b> animal is prohibited, is <b>also derived</b> through a verbal analogy, specifically the terms <b>“its mother”</b> and <b>“its mother,” from</b> the case of <b>a firstborn</b> offering. With regard to sacrificial animals the verse states: “When a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat, is born, it shall be seven days under its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), and in the case of the firstborn offering it is stated: “Seven days it shall be with its mother” (Exodus 22:29). Just as one is liable for misusing all of a firstborn offering, so too, one is liable for misusing the milk of a sacrificial animal, i.e., the milk is forbidden, as it is part of the sacrificial animal. Consequently, its offspring may not suckle from the mother.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>the laborers</b> of Temple produce <b>may not eat from</b> consecrated dried figs, and likewise a cow may not eat from consecrated vetch. The Gemara does not ask about the source of the <i>halakha</i> of a laborer, as the verse clearly states in this regard: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard” (Deuteronomy 23:25), which does not include a vineyard belonging to the Temple; but the Gemara does ask about the case of the cow: <b>What is the reason</b> for the ruling with regard to a cow? <b>Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said: As the verse states: “Do not muzzle the ox during its treading”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:4). The term <b>“its treading”</b> teaches that this prohibition applies to muzzling an ox when it is treading <b>your</b> non-sacred field, <b>and not</b> when it is <b>treading a consecrated</b> field. Since the consecrated produce is prohibited, one must muzzle the ox.",
            "The Gemara discusses a similar case: <b>One who threshes</b> his non-sacred <b><i>kalilin</i>,</b> a type of legume, <b>in a consecrated field</b> is liable for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated items. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> in order for one to be liable for misuse, <b>we require</b> the consecrated item from which one derives benefit to be <b>detached</b> from the ground, whereas the field is the ground itself. <b>Ravina said: Conclude from it</b> that the field’s <b>dust is beneficial for</b> <i>kalilin</i>, and therefore he misuses the detached dust of the consecrated field when he threshes it."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>the roots of</b> the non-sacred <b>tree of an ordinary person that enter into consecrated</b> land, <b>and</b> the roots of <b>a consecrated</b> tree <b>that enter into</b> the non-sacred land <b>of an ordinary person,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b> With regard to water of <b>a spring</b> that flows in a non-sacred field but <b>which emerges from</b> that field and flows <b>into a consecrated field,</b> when it is in the consecrated field one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from it <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b> Once the spring <b>emerges outside</b> the consecrated field <b>one may derive benefit from</b> the water.",
            "With regard to <b>the water that</b> was drawn from the Siloam pool <b>into</b> the <b>golden jug,</b> which was not consecrated as a service vessel, to bring it to the altar for libation on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from the water <i>ab initio</i>, as it was drawn for use in the Temple service. <b>But</b> if one derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse,</b> since it was not consecrated in a service vessel. Once <b>one places</b> the water from the jug for libation <b>into the flask,</b> which is a service vessel, the water is consecrated and he is liable for <b>misusing</b> the water.",
            "With regard to the <b>willow</b> branches that are placed on the sides of the altar on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, before their placement one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from them <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from them he is <b>not</b> liable for their <b>misuse.</b> After their placement their mitzva has been fulfilled, and therefore at that time one may derive benefit from the willow branches <i>ab initio</i>. <b>Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The elders were accustomed to derive benefit from</b> the willow branches even before their placement on the sides of the altar, by cutting small branches for use <b>in their <i>lulav</i>,</b> in fulfillment of the mitzva of the four species.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Reish Lakish says:</b> When the mishna teaches that one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the water in the golden jug awaiting use as a libation, it means that one is not liable for misuse of <b>all of</b> the water in the jug, if it contained more than three <i>log</i>. <b>But</b> one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the <b>three <i>log</i></b> required for the libation.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But the latter clause</b> of the mishna <b>teaches</b> that once <b>one placed</b> the water from the jug <b>into the flask</b> he is liable for <b>misusing</b> the water. One can conclude <b>by inference that</b> in the case addressed in <b>the first clause</b> of the mishna, where the water is still in the jug, one is <b>not</b> liable for misuse in all circumstances, <b>even if</b> the jug contains only the requisite <b>three <i>log</i>.</b> This apparently contradicts the statement of Reish Lakish.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, if</b> a qualification <b>was stated</b> in this matter <b>it was stated with regard to the latter clause</b> of the mishna, which teaches that once the water is placed in the flask one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the water. The qualification is as follows: <b>Reish Lakish says</b> one is liable for <b>its misuse only if</b> the flask contains exactly <b>three <i>log</i></b> of water, which is the requisite amount for the mitzva. But if there is more than three <i>log</i> one is not liable for misusing any of the water, as it is not consecrated at all.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> disagrees and <b>says:</b> Even if the flask contained more than three <i>log</i> of water, one is liable for <b>misusing any of</b> the water. He maintains there is no fixed measure for water used in the libation, and therefore all the water is consecrated for the mitzva. The Gemara asks: Is this <b>to say that Reish Lakish holds there is</b> a maximum <b>measure for</b> the <b>water</b> used in the libation? <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 110b) that deals with liability for sacrificing outside the Temple that <b>Rabbi Eliezer,</b> or Rabbi Elazar, <b>says: One who pours, as a libation, water</b> consecrated for the libation <b>of the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>during the Festival, outside</b> the courtyard, is <b>liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> just as though he sacrificed outside the Temple.",
            "The Gemara continues: <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of</b> Rabbi <b>Menaḥem Yodafa: Rabbi Elazar says</b> that <i>halakha</i> <b>in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,</b> his teacher, <b>who interprets</b> a verse dealing with the offerings of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>: “Beside the daily burnt offering, its meal offering, and <b>its libations”</b> (Numbers 29:31), as follows: The plural form indicates that the verse is speaking of two types of libations: <b>One</b> is the <b>water libation,</b> unique to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, <b>and</b> the other <b>one</b> is the <b>wine libation,</b> which always accompanies the daily offering.",
            "<b>And Reish Lakish said</b> to Rabbi Yoḥanan: <b>If</b> Rabbi Elazar derives the obligation for the water libation through the derivation taught by Rabbi Akiva, and that is why he rules that one who pours it as a libation outside the courtyard is liable, then he should equate the libations of wine and water, as follows: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>wine</b> the measure for the mitzva is <b>three <i>log</i>, so too</b> here, in the case of <b>water,</b> the measure for the mitzva should be <b>three <i>log</i>.</b> One may conclude <b>by inference</b> from this statement <b>that Reish Lakish</b> himself <b>holds there is no measure for</b> the <b>water</b> used in the libation. The Gemara answers: Actually, Reish Lakish maintains that there is a measure for the water, but he <b>stated</b> his question <b>according to</b> the <b>explanation of</b> Rabbi <b>Menaḥem Yodafa,</b> cited by Rabbi Yoḥanan.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to a bird’s <b>nest that is atop the consecrated tree,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from it <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b> In order to acquire a bird’s nest <b>that is</b> atop <b>a tree worshipped as idolatry,</b> from which one may not derive benefit even by climbing it, <b>one should dislodge</b> the nest from its place by striking it <b>with a pole.</b> In the case of <b>one who consecrates</b> his <b>forest, one is</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> everything <b>in the entire</b> forest."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> Connected with the mishna’s discussion of idol worship it <b>was stated:</b> In the case of an object of <b>idol worship that broke by itself, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> It is <b>prohibited</b> to derive benefit from it, as the fact that it is broken does not constitute nullification, <b>and Reish Lakish says:</b> It is <b>permitted</b> to derive benefit from it.",
            "The Gemara clarifies their opinions: <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says</b> it is <b>prohibited, as a gentile did not nullify</b> the object of idol worship, and its status is nullified only if a gentile broke it with the intention of nullifying it. <b>And Reish Lakish says</b> it is <b>permitted,</b> as it can be presumed that its gentile owner, upon seeing that it was broken, would have nullified it, <b>saying</b> to himself: If the object of idol worship could <b>not</b> even <b>save itself</b> from destruction, will it <b>save me</b> from harm?",
            "<b>Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan</b> from the mishna: With regard to <b>the</b> bird’s <b>nest that is atop the consecrated tree,</b> one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from it <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if he derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse.</b> In order to acquire a bird’s nest <b>that is</b> atop <b>the tree worshipped as idolatry one should dislodge</b> the nest by striking it <b>with a pole.</b>",
            "Reish Lakish analyzes the second <i>halakha</i>: <b>What, is it not</b> referring to a case where the nest was built from branches <b>that broke</b> off <b>from</b> the worshipped tree <b>itself, and</b> yet the mishna <b>teaches: One should dislodge</b> it by striking it <b>with a pole?</b> This indicates that branches that are broken off are permitted, despite the fact that they were not broken off by a gentile. Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: <b>No,</b> there is no proof from the mishna, as it is referring to a case <b>where</b> the bird <b>brought branches from elsewhere,</b> not from the worshipped tree itself.",
            "Reish Lakish rejects this answer: <b>If so, why</b> does the mishna teach in the parallel case <b>of a consecrated</b> tree, where presumably the nest was likewise built of branches brought from elsewhere, that one <b>may not derive benefit</b> from it <i>ab initio</i>, <b>but</b> if one derived benefit from it he is <b>not</b> liable for its <b>misuse?</b> If the nest was built from non-sacred material, why is one not permitted to derive benefit from it <i>ab initio</i>?",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather,</b> the mishna must be discussing cases where the nest was constructed from branches that came from the tree in which it was built, and it is referring <b>to growths</b> of consecrated property <b>that came afterward,</b> i.e., after the property was consecrated. <b>And</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna <b>holds</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing growths</b> of consecrated property, but it is prohibited to derive benefit from them <i>ab initio</i>.",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>This, too, stands to reason,</b> that the mishna is referring to a case where the nest was built of branches from the tree in which it is located, <b>as, if</b> it <b>enters your mind</b> that the mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> the bird <b>brought</b> the branches <b>from elsewhere, why,</b> in the case of the tree worshipped as idolatry, must one <b>dislodge</b> it from its place by striking it <b>with a pole? Let him take it</b> directly without using a pole.",
            "<b>Rabbi Abbahu said</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said</b> in response to this question: <b>Actually,</b> the mishna is referring to a case <b>where</b> the bird <b>brought</b> the branches <b>from elsewhere, and what</b> is the meaning of the clause: <b>One should dislodge?</b> It does not mean he should dislodge the nest with a pole, but rather he <b>should dislodge</b> the <b>chicks</b> that are in the nest. Since it is difficult to take the chicks without climbing the tree, as they can move, there is more of a concern in this case that he might climb the tree, in which case he would be deriving benefit from it, which is prohibited.",
            "<b>Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya:</b> With regard to <b>chicks</b> that can fly away and are not confined to this specific tree, both <b>here and there,</b> i.e., both in the case of a consecrated tree and in the case of a worshipped tree, it is <b>permitted</b> to derive benefit from them. But with regard to <b>eggs,</b> both <b>here and there,</b> it is <b>prohibited</b> to derive benefit from them, as they are dependent on the prohibited tree. <b>Rav Ashi</b> further <b>says: If</b> the <b>chicks</b> are young and still <b>need their mother</b> to survive they <b>are considered like eggs,</b> i.e., they have the same status as eggs and it is prohibited to derive benefit from them.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In the case of <b>the</b> Temple <b>treasurers who purchased</b> non-sacred <b>logs</b> to use for repairs in the Temple, one is liable for <b>misusing the wood</b> itself, <b>but</b> one is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the <b>sawdust, nor</b> is he liable <b>for</b> the <b>leaves [<i>baneviyya</i>]</b> that fall from the log, as the treasurers purchased for the Temple only those materials fit for use in its construction.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Shmuel says</b> that the method of construction in the Temple, for repairs or improvements, is as follows: One <b>builds</b> the structures in the Temple <b>with non-sacred</b> materials, <b>and afterward consecrates</b> those materials upon completion of the work.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that one does not consecrate the materials immediately? <b>One who donates money</b> for Temple maintenance <b>consecrates</b> the money and it is therefore subject to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property. Consequently, one may not use this money to purchase items for Temple maintenance, as the supplier would be liable for misuse as soon as he received the money as payment. The only way to use donations for Temple maintenance is <b>if</b> the Temple treasurer <b>said</b> that the <b>sanctity of</b> this <b>money</b> which was consecrated by the donor shall <b>take effect on</b> the completed <b>structure,</b> rather than on the construction materials or the wages of the artisans during the construction.",
            "Therefore, once the construction is completed, the sanctity is transferred from the money to the structure, and then the money is non-sacred. <b>And</b> at that point, the Temple treasurers <b>give</b> the money <b>to the artisans</b> and the suppliers <b>as their wages.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 4:5): With regard to the <b>incense left over</b> from the previous year, which could no longer be used, <b>what would they do with it</b> in order to render it usable again? The Temple treasurers <b>would set aside</b> an amount <b>of it</b> equal to the value of the <b>wages of the artisans</b> who worked in the Temple.",
            "<b>And they would</b> then <b>desacralize</b> that incense by transferring its sanctity <b>to</b> non-sacred <b>money</b> in the amount owed to <b>the artisans. And they</b> would subsequently <b>give</b> the incense <b>to the artisans</b> as their wages. <b>And</b> finally, <b>they would return and buy</b> back the incense from the artisans with funds <b>from the new collection</b> of shekels, so that the incense would now be considered to have been acquired from the shekels of the current year.",
            "The Gemara explains its objection: <b>But why</b> was this procedure necessary according to Shmuel, who maintains that one builds the structures in the Temple with non-sacred materials? <b>Let them desacralize</b> the leftover incense by transferring its sanctity <b>to</b> the completed, non-sacred <b>structure,</b> thereby consecrating it with the sanctity of the incense. After the leftover incense is desacralized, it can be given to the artisans as wages and the Temple treasurers can buy it back with funds from the new collection.",
            "The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a situation <b>where</b> there is currently no ongoing construction in the Temple, and therefore <b>there is no structure</b> to which they can transfer the sanctity of the leftover incense. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> the mishna <b>teaches:</b> The <b>wages of the artisans,</b> which indicates that construction is taking place in the Temple. The Gemara responds: Although there is indeed ongoing construction, the mishna in <i>Shekalim</i> is referring to a case <b>where there is no construction equaling the amount of</b> the <b>value</b> of the leftover incense. Therefore, it is not possible to transfer the sanctity of the leftover incense to the construction.",
            "The Gemara raises a further difficulty: <b>But doesn’t Shmuel say</b> with regard to <b>consecrated</b> property <b>worth one hundred</b> dinars <b>that</b> if the Temple treasurer <b>redeemed it for</b> an object <b>worth</b> only <b>one <i>peruta</i>,</b> it is <b>redeemed,</b> despite the fact that the redemption was performed with an item that was not worth the full value of the consecrated property? The Gemara answers: <b>This statement</b> of Shmuel applies to a case <b>where one did</b> so, i.e., it applies only after the fact, but the Temple treasurer should <b>not</b> act in this manner <b><i>ab initio</i>.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said: This is</b> the <b>reason that one builds</b> the structures in the Temple <b>with non-sacred</b> materials and afterward consecrates those materials upon completion: It is because the <b>Torah was not given to the ministering angels,</b> who do not tire and do not have physical needs, but rather to human beings. Therefore, the Sages <b>said</b> that <b>perhaps</b> an artisan will <b>want to</b> rest and <b>sit</b> on the stones being used in the construction, <b>and</b> he might in fact <b>sit on them.</b> And <b>if he builds with consecrated</b> materials, it will <b>be found that he misused consecrated</b> property. Consequently, it is preferable for one to build with non-sacred materials, and the structure should be consecrated only upon completion.",
            "The Gemara raises an objection to this reasoning from that which <b>we learned</b> in the mishna: In the case of <b>the</b> Temple <b>treasurers who purchased</b> non-sacred <b>logs</b> to use for repairs in the Temple, one is liable for <b>misusing</b> the wood itself, <b>but</b> he is <b>not</b> liable for <b>misusing</b> the <b>sawdust, nor</b> is he liable <b>for</b> misusing the <b>leaves</b> that fall from the log.",
            "<b>But why</b> should this be a situation where one could be liable <b>for misusing</b> the wood? <b>Here too, let him work with non-sacred</b> logs and consecrate them only after they have been fixed in the structure. After all, in this case too one can apply the above reasoning that the Sages <b>said that perhaps</b> he will <b>want to</b> rest and <b>sit</b> on the logs he is working with, <b>and</b> he might <b>sit on them, and</b> it will <b>be found that he misused consecrated</b> items.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said</b> that <b>if</b> the mishna were referring <b>to logs</b> that the Temple treasurers acquired for use in construction <b>from this</b> point <b>forward,</b> then <b>indeed</b> they should not be consecrated until they are fixed in the structure. <b>But when we learned in the mishna</b> that one is liable for misuse of the wood, the <i>tanna</i> was referring <b>to logs</b> acquired for use <b>on that</b> same <b>day.</b> Since they are meant to be used immediately, there is no concern that one might sit on them."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> All items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar join together</b> to constitute the measure with regard to liability <b>for misuse</b> of consecrated property, which is deriving benefit equivalent to one <i>peruta</i>. <b>And</b> they join together <b>to</b> constitute an olive-bulk, which is the measure that renders one <b>liable due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>, or <i>notar</i>, or</b> partaking of the item while <b>ritually impure.</b> All items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance join together</b> to constitute the measure with regard to liability for misuse. <b>Both</b> items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar and</b> items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance join together</b> to constitute the measure with regard to liability <b>for misuse.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>Now</b> that <b>one says that</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> in the latter clause: <b>Both</b> items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar and</b> items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance</b> join together, which is a case <b>where this</b> one, i.e., items consecrated for the altar, have <b>inherent sanctity and that</b> one, i.e., items consecrated for Temple maintenance, have <b>sanctity</b> that inheres in its <b>value,</b> and <b>even so</b> the mishna <b>teaches</b> that they <b>join together for misuse,</b> if so, <b>is</b> it <b>necessary</b> for the mishna to teach in the first clause that items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar</b> join together <b>with</b> other items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach the first clause, <b>because he teaches with regard to</b> that case: They join together <b>to</b> render one <b>liable due to</b> violation of the prohibitions of <b><i>piggul</i>, or <i>notar</i>, or</b> of partaking of the item while <b>ritually impure.</b> With regard to these matters, only items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar join together, not items consecrated for Temple maintenance, <b>as these</b> <i>halakhot</i> <b>do not</b> apply to items consecrated for <b>Temple maintenance.</b> The concepts of <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and ritual impurity are relevant only to items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar. It is <b>due to that</b> reason that the <i>tanna</i> <b>divides</b> the first clause from the latter clause.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that items consecrated for Temple maintenance are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. <b>Rabbi Yannai said: It is clear</b> that one is <b>liable for misuse</b> by Torah law <b>only for</b> items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance and a burnt offering alone. What is the reason?</b> The reason is <b>that the verse states: “If anyone commit a misuse, and sin through error, in the sacred items of the Lord,</b> then he shall bring his guilt offering to the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to your valuation in silver by shekels, after the shekel of the Sanctuary, for a guilt offering” (Leviticus 5:15).",
            "Rabbi Yannai explains that it is derived from this verse that only those <b>consecrated</b> items <b>that are uniquely for the Lord are subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse; but</b> with regard to items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar,</b> e.g., guilt offerings or sin offerings, as they <b>have</b> a portion that belongs <b>to the priests and</b> other items such as peace offerings also <b>have</b> a portion that belongs <b>to the owners,</b> they are not uniquely for the Lord, and therefore the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse do not apply.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yannai. <b>We learned</b> in the mishna: All items <b>consecrated</b> to be sacrificed on the <b>altar join together</b> to constitute the measure with regard to liability <b>for misuse,</b> which is deriving benefit worth one <i>peruta</i>. Evidently, one is liable for misusing all items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar, not merely burnt offerings. The Gemara answers that the mishna is referring to a prohibition that applies <b>by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises a further difficulty with the statement of Rabbi Yannai, from another mishna (2a): In the case of <b>offerings of the most sacred order that</b> were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if <b>one slaughtered them in the south</b> of the Temple courtyard, rather than in the north as required, one is liable for <b>misusing them.</b> Offerings of the most sacred order include sin offerings and guilt offerings, not merely burnt offerings. Once again, the Gemara answers that the mishna is referring to a prohibition <b>by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara raises yet another difficulty with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yannai. <b>We learned</b> in a mishna (18a): <b>One who derives benefit from</b> a blemished <b>sin offering while it is alive has not</b> violated the prohibition of <b>misuse until he</b> causes one <i>peruta</i> worth of <b>depletion</b> of its value. Since the blemished animal will be redeemed, one lessens its value by removing wool from it. But <b>when it is dead</b> it will not be redeemed, which means that it cannot be devalued, and therefore <b>once he derives</b> one <i>peruta</i> worth of <b>benefit</b> from a dead sin offering <b>he is liable for misuse.</b> The Gemara again answers that the mishna is referring to a prohibition <b>by rabbinic law.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>And by Torah law</b> is there <b>no</b> liability for misuse of items consecrated for sacrifice on the altar? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> The verse states at the conclusion of the passage discussing the sacrifice of a peace offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar, it is the food of the offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma; <b>all the fat is the Lord’s”</b> (Leviticus 3:16). The term “all” serves <b>to include the portions of offerings of lesser sanctity</b> as subject <b>to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse.</b> This is a source from the Torah for the <i>halakha</i> that one is liable for misuse of items consecrated for sacrifice on the altar.",
            "The Gemara again answers that the mishna is referring to a prohibition <b>by rabbinic law.</b> The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>cites a verse</b> as the source for this <i>halakha</i>, which indicates that it applies by Torah law. The Gemara answers: The verse is <b>a mere support,</b> but it is not the actual source for the <i>halakha</i>.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But didn’t Ulla say</b> that <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Sacrificial</b> animals <b>that died</b> without being sacrificed <b>are excluded from</b> the potential <b>of misuse by Torah law?</b> The Gemara clarifies the objection: <b>To what</b> is Rabbi Yoḥanan referring? <b>If we say</b> that he is referring <b>to</b> items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance,</b> then <b>even when they are dead</b> they are also subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, as even if you say that this can <b>be</b> considered <b>only</b> like a case <b>where one consecrated a garbage</b> heap <b>to</b> the <b>Temple maintenance, isn’t that</b> also <b>subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property?",
            "<b>Rather,</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan must be referring to dead animals that had been <b>consecrated</b> for sacrifice on the <b>altar,</b> and he is teaching that once they die they are no longer subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law. This indicates that while they are alive they are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse <b>by Torah law.</b> The Gemara states the difficulty: According to Rabbi Yannai, <b>are</b> animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar <b>subject to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>misuse</b> by Torah law?",
            "<b>Rather,</b> the Gemara rejects the previous version of Rabbi Yannai’s opinion, and states that in fact he maintains that animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse by Torah law. As <b>the school of Rabbi Yannai says as follows: From this verse:</b> “If anyone commit a misuse, and sin through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15), <b>we learn</b> that items <b>consecrated</b> for <b>Temple maintenance</b> are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. But <b>we do not learn</b> from this verse that animals consecrated for the <b>altar</b> are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse. Instead, that <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “And if a man eat of the sacred items through error” (Leviticus 22:14), which is referring to all sacred items, or from the verse (Leviticus 3:16): “All the fat is the Lord’s.”"
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>Five items in the burnt offering</b> and the accompanying meal offering and libation <b>join together</b> to constitute the one <i>peruta</i> measure with regard to liability for misuse, and the olive-bulk measure with regard to liability for <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and partaking of sacrificial foods while ritually impure. They are: <b>The flesh; the fat</b> of the burnt offering that is sacrificed on the altar; <b>the fine flour</b> of the accompanying meal offering; <b>the wine</b> of the accompanying libation; <b>and the oil</b> of the accompanying meal offering. <b>And there are six</b> items <b>in the thanks offering</b> that join together: <b>The flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, the oil, and the loaves</b> accompanying the thanks offering.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that five items in the burnt offering [<i>ba’ola</i>] join together. <b>Rav Huna taught Rava</b> the mishna as follows: <b>Five items in the world [<i>ba’olam</i>] join together.</b> Rava <b>said to</b> Rav Huna: <b>Did you say: In the world,</b> i.e., that there are only five items in the world of offerings that join together? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in the mishna <b>with regard to a thanks offering</b> that <b>there are six</b> items <b>in the thanks offering</b> that join together: <b>The flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, the oil, and the loaves</b> accompanying the <b>thanks offering?</b> Rav Huna <b>said to</b> Rava: One should <b>teach</b> in the mishna: Five items <b>in the burnt offering [<i>ba’ola</i>]</b> join together, not: Five items in the world.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that the flesh and the fat join together. The Gemara notes that <b>we</b> already <b>learned this, as the Sages taught</b> explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 1:28): The meat of <b>burnt offerings and</b> their <b>sacrificial portions join together to</b> constitute the amount of <b>an olive-bulk</b> that renders one liable <b>for sacrificing them outside</b> the courtyard, <b>and to render</b> one <b>liable for</b> eating <b>them due to <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and</b> partaking of them while <b>ritually impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara notes that the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches</b> that <b>with regard to a burnt offering, yes,</b> this <i>halakha</i> applies, whereas <b>with regard to a peace offering,</b> it does <b>not</b> apply. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>Granted, with regard to sacrificing them outside</b> the courtyard, it stands to reason that in the case of <b>a burnt offering, which is</b> entirely <b>consumed</b> upon the altar, everything <b>joins together,</b> whereas with regard to <b>peace offerings,</b> whose meat is not burned on the altar, the meat and sacrificial portions do <b>not join together. But with regard to rendering</b> one <b>liable</b> for <b><i>piggul</i>, and <i>notar</i>, and</b> partaking of <b>them</b> while <b>ritually impure,</b> in the case of <b>a peace offering</b> as well, <b>why</b> is he <b>not rendered liable?</b>",
            "The Gemara elaborates: <b>But didn’t we learn</b> in the mishna below: <b>All</b> the pieces of sacrificial meat that are <b><i>piggul</i> join together with one another</b> to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability, <b>and all</b> pieces of sacrificial meat that are <b><i>notar</i> join together with one another</b> to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability? The mishna indicates that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all types of offerings.",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rather, say</b> that the <i>baraita</i> should read as follows: The meat of <b>a burnt offering and its sacrificial portions join together to</b> constitute <b>an olive-bulk</b> in order <b>to</b> permit one to <b>sprinkle the blood for them.</b> If the meat of the burnt offering was lost after it was slaughtered and only an olive-bulk of the meat and sacrificial portions remain, they combine to permit the sprinkling of the blood.",
            "The Gemara further explains: <b>And since they join together</b> to constitute an olive-bulk <b>with regard to sprinkling the blood,</b> once that blood has been sprinkled they join together to constitute the minimum amount of an olive-bulk to render one <b>liable</b> for eating them due to <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and partaking of them while ritually impure. By contrast, in the case of a peace offering, the meat and the sacrificial portions do not join together for sprinkling, and as the sprinkling is not valid, they do not subsequently join together to constitute an olive-bulk to render one liable for eating them due to <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and partaking of them while ritually impure.",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>And who is</b> the <i>tanna</i> <b>who teaches</b> this <i>baraita</i>? <b>It is Rabbi Yehoshua, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> With regard to <b>all the offerings in the Torah from which there remains an olive-bulk of meat</b> that is fit to be eaten, <b>or an olive-bulk of fat</b> that is fit to be sacrificed on the altar, <b>one sprinkles the blood.</b> If all that remains is <b>half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one may not sprinkle the blood.</b> Since the meat and fat serve different functions, as the fat is burned on the altar while the meat is eaten by the priests, they do not combine to form the minimum amount that must remain in order to sprinkle the blood.",
            "<b>But with regard to a burnt offering, even</b> if all that was left was <b>half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one sprinkles the blood, because it is all consumed</b> upon the altar. Since both the meat and the fat are sacrificed on the altar, they combine. <b>And in</b> the case of <b>a meal offering, even</b> if <b>all of it remains, one may not sprinkle</b> the blood.",
            "With regard to the last statement, the Gemara asks: <b>What is the relevance of a meal offering</b> to this <i>baraita</i>? A meal offering does not require blood to be sprinkled on the altar. <b>Rav Pappa said:</b> The meal offering under discussion is <b>the meal offering</b> brought with the <b>libations</b> that accompany animal offerings. The <i>baraita</i> is teaching that if none of the meat of the animal remains, even if all of the accompanying meal offering is intact, the blood of the animal may not be sprinkled.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Teruma<b>, and <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, and <i>teruma</i> of the tithe of doubtfully tithed produce [<i>demai</i>], and <i>ḥalla</i>, and first fruits</b> all <b>join together with one another</b> to constitute the requisite measure <b>to prohibit</b> a mixture with non-sacred produce, <b>and</b> to form the requisite measure of an olive-bulk that serves <b>to</b> render one <b>obligated for their</b> consumption in payment <b>of</b> an additional <b>one-fifth</b> over and above the principal. <b>All</b> the pieces of sacrificial meat that are <b><i>piggul</i> join together with one another</b> to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability, <b>and all</b> sacrificial meat that is <b><i>notar</i> joins together with one another</b> to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason</b> that all of the foods listed in the mishna join together? The Gemara answers: The reason is that <b>all of them are called <i>teruma</i></b> in the Torah. The Gemara elaborates: <b>With regard to <i>ḥalla</i> it is written: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart <i>ḥalla</i> for a <i>teruma</i>;</b> like <i>teruma</i> of the threshing floor, so shall you set it apart” (Numbers 15:20).",
            "<b>With regard to first fruits, they are also called <i>teruma</i>, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that discusses foods that may not be eaten outside Jerusalem: The verse states: “You cannot eat within your gates the tithe of your grain or of your wine or of your oil or the firstlings of your herd or of your flock, or any of your vows that you vow, or your freewill offerings, or the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). <b>“And the offering of your hand”; these are first fruits. But</b> with regard to <b>the other</b> items listed in the mishna, i.e., <i>teruma</i>, <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, and <i>teruma</i> of the tithe of <i>demai</i>, it <b>is not necessary</b> to explain why they join together or to cite a verse, as it is clear that they are called <i>teruma</i>.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>All animal carcasses,</b> whose consumption is prohibited and which transmit impurity through contact with them and through carrying, <b>join together with one another</b> to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure. <b>And all repugnant creatures join together with one another</b> to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure to render one who consumes it liable to receive lashes. The eight creeping animals enumerated in the Torah join together to constitute the measure of a lentil-bulk, which transmits impurity through contact, and to render one who consumes it liable to receive lashes.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that all animal carcasses, whose consumption is prohibited and which transmit impurity through contact and through carrying, join together to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure. <b>Rav says:</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The mishna <b>taught</b> that all carcasses join together, which indicates that carcasses of non-kosher animals join together with carcasses of kosher animals, <b>only with regard to ritual impurity. But with regard to</b> the prohibition of <b>eating</b> animal carcasses, <b>kosher</b> animal carcasses are <b>distinct,</b> i.e., they join together only with other kosher animals, <b>and non-kosher</b> animal carcasses are likewise <b>distinct. And Levi says: Even with regard to</b> the prohibition of <b>eating</b> animal carcasses, kosher and non-kosher carcasses <b>join together.</b>",
            "<b>And Rav Asi says: Kosher</b> animal carcasses are <b>distinct, and non-kosher</b> animal carcasses are <b>distinct.</b> Since Rav Asi did not specify whether he is referring only to eating or also to ritual impurity, <b>there are</b> those <b>who say</b> that Rav Asi <b>disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rav,</b> i.e., he interprets the mishna as referring to all carcasses of a similar kind, that is, from kosher animals on the one hand, and from non-kosher animals on the other hand. <b>And there are</b> those <b>who say</b> that Rav Asi <b>does not disagree</b> with the opinion of Rav, and concedes that kosher and non-kosher animal carcasses join together with regard to ritual impurity.",
            "The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> against the first explanation of the opinion of Rav Asi from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to half an olive-bulk from the carcass of <b>a dead cow and</b> half an olive-bulk from the flesh of <b>a live camel,</b> they <b>do not join together with one another.</b> It can be inferred from here that if <b>both of them</b> are <b>dead, they</b> do <b>join together.</b> Rav can explain this <i>baraita</i> as referring to ritual impurity, <b>but</b> this poses <b>a difficulty to Rav Asi.</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: One should <b>say</b> that the correct inference from the <i>baraita</i> is not that if both of them, the cow and the camel, are dead, then they join together. Rather, one should infer that if <b>both of them</b> are <b>alive, they join together. And who is</b> the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>? It <b>is Rabbi Yehuda, who said:</b> The prohibition of eating <b>a limb from a living</b> animal <b>applies</b> even <b>to</b> the limb of <b>a non-kosher</b> animal.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty with this answer. <b>But</b> in that case, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i> if <b>both of them,</b> the cow and the camel, <b>are dead?</b> Do they <b>not join together? If so, why</b> does the <i>tanna</i> <b>run specifically</b> to an extreme case <b>and teach:</b> Half an olive-bulk from the carcass of <b>a dead cow and</b> half an olive-bulk from the flesh of <b>a live camel?</b> After all, <b>even</b> if <b>both of them</b> are <b>dead, they</b> do <b>not join together.</b>",
            "<b>And furthermore, it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Half an olive-bulk</b> from the flesh of <b>a cow when it is alive and half an olive-bulk</b> from the carcass of <b>a camel when it is dead do not join together; but half an olive-bulk from a cow and half an olive-bulk from a camel, whether alive or dead, do join together. The first clause</b> in the <i>baraita</i> is <b>difficult</b> as it is apparently contradicted <b>by the latter clause. Rather, isn’t it</b> correct to <b>conclude from</b> the <i>baraita</i> that if there is half an olive-bulk from each of <b>the two of them</b> when they are <b>dead,</b> they <b>join together?</b>",
            "The Gemara answers: <b>Rav Asi</b> could have <b>said to you</b> that <b>this <i>tanna</i> holds</b> that <b>a prohibition takes effect</b> even where another <b>prohibition</b> already exists. He maintains that the prohibition of eating an animal carcass takes effect even with regard to the flesh of a non-kosher animal, which is already prohibited, and for this reason the two half olive-bulks join together, as the same prohibition against eating an animal carcass applies to both. By contrast, Rav Asi himself maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore this <i>baraita</i> does not pose a difficulty to his opinion that the two do not combine."
        ],
        [
            "§ <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Rav says:</b> With regard to <b>eating creeping animals,</b> one <b>is flogged for</b> eating <b>an olive-bulk</b> of them. <b>What is the reason?</b> It is because the term <b>“eating” is written</b> in the Torah <b>with regard to them.</b> The verse states: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41). The term “eating” is invariably referring to consuming an olive-bulk.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty. <b>But didn’t Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina teach</b> the following <i>baraita</i> <b>before Rabbi Yoḥanan:</b> The verse states: <b>“You shall separate between the kosher animal and the non-kosher, and between the non-kosher bird and the kosher; and you shall not make your souls detestable by animal, or by bird, or by anything that swarms on the ground, which I have set apart for you as impure”</b> (Leviticus 20:25). <b>The verse opens with eating</b> creeping animals, in the phrase “You shall not make your souls detestable,” <b>and</b> it <b>ends with</b> the <b>ritual impurity</b> of creeping animals: “Which I have set apart for you as impure.”",
            "The <i>baraita</i> explains: This teaches that <b>just as</b> the carcass of a creeping animal imparts <b>ritual impurity</b> through contact <b>when</b> it is the volume of <b>a lentil-bulk, so too,</b> one is liable for the prohibition of <b>eating</b> a creeping animal <b>when</b> it is the volume of <b>a lentil-bulk. And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised [<i>vekilseih</i>]</b> Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina for citing this <i>baraita</i>. <b>And</b> this poses <b>a difficulty to</b> the opinion of <b>Rav,</b> who maintains that one is flogged only if he eats an olive-bulk of creeping animals.",
            "The Gemara answers: This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to eating creeping animals <b>when they are dead,</b> at which stage they impart ritual impurity and one is liable for eating a lentil-bulk. By contrast, <b>there,</b> Rav is speaking about eating creeping animals <b>when they are alive,</b> which do not yet impart ritual impurity. For this reason one is flogged only if he eats an olive-bulk.",
            "<b>Abaye said to</b> Rav Yosef: <b>But</b> in his statement <b>Rav</b> was <b>referring to the mishna, and the mishna teaches: And all the creeping animals</b> join together to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure to render one who consumes it liable to receive lashes. This indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even when they are dead.</b> Is the mishna <b>not</b> referring to a case <b>where there is a bit of this</b> live creeping animal <b>and a bit of that</b> carcass of a creeping animal, which together combine to amount to an olive-bulk? <b>Rav Yosef said to</b> Abaye: <b>This</b> deductive <b>inference,</b> that Rav is referring to the mishna, <b>is yours.</b> But in fact <b>Rav</b> was <b>merely saying a <i>halakha</i></b> unconnected to the mishna. Therefore, there is no proof that Rav was speaking about the carcasses of creeping animals.",
            "The Gemara stated: <b>And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised</b> Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina for citing the <i>baraita</i> that rules that one is liable for violating the prohibition of eating a creeping animal by the amount of a lentil-bulk. The Gemara <b>raises an objection</b> from a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 1:7): <b>The</b> whole <b>limbs</b> of impure bodies <b>have no</b> minimum <b>measure</b> with regard to imparting ritual impurity. <b>Even</b> if the limbs were <b>less than an olive-bulk of a carcass or less than a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal,</b> they <b>impart</b> ritual <b>impurity. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> This mishna is referring to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity; but with regard to the minimum measure which renders one liable for consumption, <b>one is flogged for</b> eating <b>them only</b> if they amount to <b>an olive-bulk.</b>",
            "<b>Rava says</b> in resolution of the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statements: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one is flogged for eating even a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, he was referring only to those eight creeping animals of which <b>the verse speaks, which are separated</b> from all other creeping animals. The Torah (Leviticus 11:29–32) lists eight types of creeping animals, and Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring specifically to those eight. He maintains that one is flogged for eating a lentil-bulk of such creatures, whereas in the case of other creeping animals one is flogged only for eating an olive-bulk of them.",
            "<b>Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: If that is so,</b> that there is a difference in the measure of liability for consumption between various types of creeping animals, the same should <b>also</b> apply with regard to <b>an animal.</b> Since the Torah in Leviticus 20:25 juxtaposes both kosher animals and non-kosher animals to creeping animals, one can say that an analogous difference should apply here as well: <b>Let</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>distinguish between</b> flesh from the carcass of kosher animals, which is <b>separated</b> from other types in that it is permitted in consumption by the Torah, and flesh from the carcass of a non-kosher animal, <b>which is not separated,</b> i.e., which is not permitted by the Torah. Consequently, if the carcass of a kosher animal imparts ritual impurity by the amount of an olive-bulk of flesh, the measure of flesh from the carcass of a non-kosher animal that imparts ritual impurity should be larger, i.e., an egg-bulk."
        ],
        [
            "Rava <b>said to</b> Rav Adda bar Ahava: <b>When the Merciful One juxtaposes</b> kosher and non-kosher animals to creeping animals, this is referring <b>to</b> the prohibition of: “You shall <b>not make</b> your souls <b>detestable”</b> (Leviticus 20:25), teaching that they are all included in that prohibition. <b>But with regard to measures</b> the Torah does <b>not</b> juxtapose those animals to creeping animals. For this reason there is no difference between the measure of impurity of carcasses of kosher animals and non-kosher animals.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The blood of</b> one of <b>the</b> eight <b>creeping animals</b> listed in the Torah <b>and</b> their <b>flesh join together</b> to constitute the lentil-bulk measure to impart impurity. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> items <b>whose impurity,</b> in terms of degree and duration, <b>and measure</b> to impart impurity, <b>are equal,</b> e.g., two halves of an olive-bulk from two corpses or two animal carcasses or two halves of a lentil-bulk from two creeping animals, <b>they join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure.",
            "Rabbi Yehoshua continued: By contrast, with regard to items whose <b>impurity</b> is equal <b>but</b> their <b>measure</b> is <b>not</b> equal, e.g., a creeping animal and an animal carcass, each of which renders one impure until the evening, but the measure of a creeping animal is a lentil-bulk, whereas that of an animal carcass is an olive-bulk; or items whose <b>measure</b> is equal <b>but whose impurity</b> is <b>not</b> equal, e.g., a corpse and an animal carcass, with regard to which the measure of each is an olive-bulk, but the duration of the impurity imparted by a corpse is one week and the duration of the impurity imparted by an animal carcass is until the evening; or items that are equal <b>neither in</b> terms of <b>their impurity</b> nor in terms of <b>their measure, they do not join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that the blood of one of the eight creeping animals listed in the Torah and the flesh of those animals join together to constitute the lentil-bulk measure required to impart impurity. <b>Rav Ḥanin says</b> that <b>Rav Zeira says:</b> The blood and flesh join together only if the blood is from the same animal as the flesh, but not if it is from a different animal.",
            "<b>And similarly, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina says,</b> in rejection of Rav Zeira’s statement: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “These are <b>the impure [<i>hateme’in</i>]</b> to you among all that creep; whoever touches them when they are dead, shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:31). This plural form of “<i>hateme’in</i>” <b>teaches that they join together</b> to impart ritual impurity. <b>And</b> this applies <b>even</b> to the flesh of <b>a creeping animal and</b> the flesh of another <b>creeping animal,</b> or the flesh of <b>a creeping animal and</b> the <b>blood</b> of another creeping animal, <b>whether</b> they are <b>from one category,</b> i.e., one type of creeping animal, <b>or from two categories</b> of creeping animal.",
            "<b>Rav Yosef says:</b> This is <b>not difficult. Here,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the half-measure of flesh and the half-measure of blood both came <b>from an entire</b> animal, and therefore the two half-measures combine, due to the significance of an entire animal. <b>There,</b> in the statement of Rav Zeira, he is speaking of a case where the half-measure of flesh and the half-measure of blood each come <b>from part of</b> an animal.",
            "<b>And from where do you say</b> that there is a distinction between a case where the flesh and blood come from an entire animal and a case where they come from part of an animal? <b>From that which is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one quarter-<i>log</i> of blood from a corpse was <b>spilled on the floor, and its place was a slope [<i>ketafres</i>],</b> so that the blood trickles down, and someone leaned over so that he <b>covered part of it,</b> he remains <b>ritually pure.</b> If he <b>covered all of it,</b> he is rendered <b>impure.</b>",
            "The Gemara clarifies the <i>halakha</i>: <b>What</b> does the phrase: <b>Part of it,</b> mean in this context? <b>If we say</b> that it is referring to <b>part of</b> the one quarter-<i>log</i> of <b>blood,</b> whereas if it is a full quarter-<i>log</i> then he is impure, that is difficult: <b>But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say</b> that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> If there was exactly <b>one quarter-</b><i>log</i> of <b>blood</b> in a pot <b>that one stirred</b> without touching the blood, he remains <b>pure,</b> despite the fact that his body must have overshadowed all the blood at the time, and would therefore have had the status of a tent over it. The reason is that some of the blood must have been absorbed into the spoon with which he stirred, and therefore there no longer remains an entire connected quarter-<i>log</i>. This shows that the entire quarter-<i>log</i> must be together, as one unit, in order to impart impurity.",
            "<b>Rather, isn’t it</b> correct to <b>conclude from</b> this <i>baraita</i> that there is a distinction between a case where the blood came from an entire corpse, and where it came from part of a corpse? In other words, if the blood came from one body it need not be together as a single unit, whereas if it came from more than one body, it must all be joined together, as in the case mentioned by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Similarly, with regard to the statements of Rav Zeira and the <i>baraita</i>, <b>here</b> the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where the half-measure of flesh and the half-measure of blood came <b>from an entire</b> animal, and due to the significance of an entire animal the two half-measures combine. <b>There,</b> Rav Zeira is referring to a case where the half-measure of flesh and the half-measure of blood come <b>from part of</b> the animal. The Gemara notes that one should indeed <b>conclude from it</b> that this is the correct distinction.",
            "§ The Gemara relates that <b>Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai in the city of Rome: From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to</b> the <b>blood of creeping animals that it is impure?</b> Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai <b>said to him:</b> It is derived from the fact <b>that the verse states: “And these are they that are impure</b> for you among the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:29). Since a similar phrase already appears in Leviticus 11:31, it is derived from here that the blood of creeping animals is impure.",
            "Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash’s <b>students said to him</b> in amazement: How <b>wise is</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>ben Yoḥai!</b> Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash <b>said to them:</b> This source is not his own, as it is <b>a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosei,</b> and Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai learned it from him. Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash provided the background for this claim. <b>As, on one occasion the</b> gentile <b>monarchy issued a decree that</b> the Jewish people <b>may not observe Shabbat, and that they may not circumcise their sons, and that they must engage in intercourse with</b> their wives when they are <b>menstruating.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli went and cut</b> his hair in <b>a <i>komei</i></b> hairstyle,which was common only among the gentiles, <b>and he went and sat with</b> the gentiles when they were discussing these three decrees. <b>He said to them: One who has an enemy,</b> does he want his enemy <b>to become poor or to become rich? They said to him:</b> He wants his enemy <b>to become poor.</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>said to them: If so,</b> with regard to the Jewish people as well, isn’t it better that <b>they will not perform labor on Shabbat in order that they will become poor?</b> The gentiles <b>said:</b> That is <b>a good</b> claim that <b>he said; let us nullify</b> our decree. <b>And they</b> indeed <b>nullified it.</b>",
            "<b>Again</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>spoke to them</b> and said: <b>One who has an enemy,</b> does he want his enemy <b>to become weak or to become healthy? They said to him:</b> He wants his enemy <b>to become weak.</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>said to them: If so,</b> with regard to the Jewish people as well, isn’t it better that <b>they circumcise their sons after eight days and</b> thereby cause them to <b>become weak?</b> The gentiles <b>said:</b> That is <b>a good</b> claim that <b>he said, and they nullified</b> their decree.",
            "Once <b>again</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>spoke to them</b> and said: <b>One who has an enemy,</b> does he want his enemy <b>to multiply or to decrease? They said to him:</b> He wants his enemy <b>to decrease.</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>said to them: If so,</b> with regard to the Jewish people as well, isn’t it better that they <b>do not engage in intercourse with</b> their wives when they are <b>menstruating?</b> The gentiles <b>said:</b> That is <b>a good</b> claim that <b>he said, and they nullified</b> their decree.",
            "A short time later <b>they recognized that</b> Rabbi Reuven ben Isterobeli <b>was a Jew,</b> and they realized that he had fooled them to the advantage of the Jewish people. They therefore arose and <b>reinstated</b> all of their decrees. The Sages then <b>said: Who will go and nullify</b> these <b>decrees?</b>"
        ],
        [
            "Let <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai go</b> to Rome, <b>as he is accustomed to</b> experiencing <b>miracles. And who shall go after him,</b> i.e., with him? <b>Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosei.</b>",
            "When <b>Rabbi Yosei,</b> Rabbi Elazar’s father, heard this suggestion, he <b>said to</b> the Sages: <b>But if Abba Ḥalafta,</b> my father, <b>were alive,</b> would <b>you be able to say to him: Give your son to be killed?</b> If so, how can you ask me to send my son to Rome, where he is likely to be killed? <b>Rabbi Shimon said to</b> the Sages: <b>If Yoḥai,</b> my <b>father, were alive,</b> would <b>you be able to say to him: Give your son to be killed?</b> Nevertheless, I am prepared to risk my life and go to Rome, and if so, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosei should accompany me.",
            "Upon hearing this, <b>Rabbi Yosei said to</b> the Sages: If so, <b>I will go</b> in place of my son. I do not want him to go with Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, <b>as</b> this is what <b>I fear:</b> My son Elazar is young and quick to answer, and I am concerned <b>lest Rabbi Shimon,</b> who is hot-tempered, will become angry with him and <b>punish</b> him. Rabbi Shimon <b>accepted upon himself that he would not punish</b> Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara notes that <b>even so,</b> Rabbi Shimon did <b>punish him</b> while they were on their journey.",
            "Why did Rabbi Shimon end up punishing Rabbi Elazar? <b>When they were walking on the road, this</b> following <b>question was asked before them: From where</b> is it derived <b>with regard to blood of a creeping animal that it is impure? Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosei twisted his mouth</b> to whisper <b>and said:</b> It is derived from the verse: <b>“And these are they that are impure</b> for you among the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:29). Although Rabbi Elazar tried to whisper so that Rabbi Shimon would not hear, <b>Rabbi Shimon said to him: From the twisting of your mouth</b> and your answer <b>it is clear</b> that <b>you are a Torah scholar.</b> Nevertheless, it is prohibited for a student to issue a ruling of <i>halakha</i> in the presence of his teacher. Therefore, I curse you that <b>the son will not return</b> from this journey <b>to his father.</b>",
            "The Gemara continues the story: As they were journeying, a demon named <b>ben Temalyon emerged to greet them.</b> He said to them: Do <b>you wish</b> that <b>I</b> will join you and <b>come with you</b> in order to help nullify this decree? When he saw that a demon was coming to help save the Jewish people, <b>Rabbi Shimon cried and said: What,</b> even for <b>a maidservant of</b> my <b>father’s home,</b> Hagar the Egyptian, who was Abraham’s handmaid, <b>an angel was made available</b> to appear <b>to her three times</b> to help her. Each of the three mentions of “and the angel of the Lord said unto her” (Genesis 16:9–11) in the story of Hagar is understood as a reference to a different angel. <b>But I</b> apparently do <b>not</b> deserve assistance from an angel even <b>one time,</b> but only help from a demon. <b>In any case, let the miracle come</b> and save the Jewish people, even if only through a demon.",
            "The demon ben Temalyon went <b>before</b> them and <b>ascended into the emperor’s daughter</b> and possessed her. <b>When</b> Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai <b>arrived there,</b> the emperor’s palace, <b>he said: Ben Temalyon, emerge! Ben Temalyon, emerge! And once</b> Rabbi Shimon <b>called</b> to <b>him,</b> ben Temalyon <b>emerged and left</b> the emperor’s daughter, and she was cured. When the emperor saw that Rabbi Shimon had cured his daughter, <b>he said to them: Ask</b> from me <b>any</b> reward <b>that you want to ask. And he took them up to his treasury to take whatever they wanted. They found that letter</b> there that contained the decrees against the Jewish people, and <b>they took it and tore it</b> up, and thereby nullified the decrees.",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>And this is</b> the background for that <b>which Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosei said</b> (<i>Yoma</i> 57a): <b>I saw</b> the Curtain of the Sanctuary <b>in the city of Rome, and on</b> the Curtain <b>were several drops of blood</b> from the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur. When the emperor took them into his treasury Rabbi Elazar saw the Temple vessels that the Romans had captured when they conquered Jerusalem, including the Curtain.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> Sacrificial meat that is <b><i>piggul</i> and</b> sacrificial meat that is <b><i>notar</i> do not join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure of an olive-bulk, <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that they</b> belong to <b>two</b> separate <b>categories</b> of prohibition. The flesh of the carcass of <b>the creeping animal and</b> the flesh of <b>the animal carcass, and likewise</b> the flesh of <b>the animal carcass and the flesh of the corpse, do not join together to transmit ritual impurity,</b> not <b>even for the</b> more <b>lenient of the two</b> impurities, i.e., the impurity that requires the greater measure.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> <b>Rav Yehuda says</b> that <b>Shmuel says:</b> The mishna <b>taught</b> that <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i> do not join together <b>only with regard to</b> the ritual <b>impurity of the hands</b> if one touched them, which <b>is by rabbinic law. But with regard to</b> the <b>matter of eating, they do join together. As it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The verse states with regard to leftover sacrificial food from meat and bread: <b>“It shall not be eaten because it is sacred”</b> (Exodus 29:34). This teaches with regard to <b>anything sacred</b> that has been <b>disqualified</b> for whatever reason, that <b>the verse comes to apply a prohibition with regard to its consumption.</b>",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The food that became ritually impure</b> through contact <b>with a primary source of ritual impurity,</b> thereby assuming first-degree ritual impurity, <b>and</b> the food <b>that became ritually impure</b> through contact <b>with a secondary source of ritual impurity,</b> thereby assuming second-degree ritual impurity, <b>join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk <b>to transmit impurity in accordance with the</b> more <b>lenient of the two,</b> i.e., second-degree ritual impurity. <b>All the</b> ritually impure <b>foods join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure <b>to disqualify the body [<i>hageviyya</i>]</b> of one who eats <b>half of a half-loaf-bulk [<i>peras</i>]</b> of the impure foods from partaking of <i>teruma</i>.",
            "Likewise, all foods join together to constitute the requisite measure <b>of food</b> sufficient for <b>two meals, to</b> establish <b>a joining of</b> Shabbat <b>boundaries; and</b> to form the requisite measure <b>of an egg-bulk, to render</b> an item <b>impure</b> with <b>the ritual impurity of food; and</b> to form the measure <b>of</b> a dried <b>fig-bulk,</b> which establishes liability <b>for carrying out</b> food on <b>Shabbat; and</b> to form the volume <b>of a large date,</b> which establishes liability for eating <b>on Yom Kippur. All the liquids join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure <b>to disqualify the body of</b> one who drinks <b>a quarter-<i>log</i></b> of ritually impure liquid from partaking of <i>teruma</i>; <b>and</b> to constitute the measure <b>of a cheekful,</b> which establishes liability for drinking <b>on Yom Kippur.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> It <b>is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason</b> that food with first-degree ritual impurity joins together with food that has second-degree ritual impurity? The reason is <b>that it is possible for</b> the food with <b>second-</b>degree impurity <b>to render</b> another food impure with <b>first-</b>degree impurity. The Gemara asks: <b>But can</b> a food with <b>second-</b>degree impurity <b>render</b> another food impure with <b>first-</b>degree impurity? That is <b>not possible.</b> If food impure with second-degree impurity touches other food, it renders that food impure with third-degree impurity, not first-degree impurity.",
            "<b>Rava said</b> that <b>this</b> is what Rabbi Shimon <b>is saying: What caused</b> that food to become impure with <b>second-</b>degree impurity? Is it <b>not</b> that it was touched by food with <b>first-</b>degree impurity? Since they share a common source, they join together. <b>Rav Ashi</b> similarly <b>said:</b> Food impure with <b>first-</b>degree impurity <b>and</b> food impure with <b>second-</b>degree impurity, <b>with regard to</b> food impure with <b>third-</b>degree impurity, <b>are</b> considered like <b>members of one house,</b> i.e., they both lead to third-degree impurity, either directly or indirectly, and for this reason they join together."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>The fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>]</b> (see Leviticus 19:23), <b>and diverse kinds,</b>i.e., grain sown <b>in a vineyard</b> (see Deuteronomy 22:9) <b>join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure to prohibit a mixture that they are mixed into. This applies when the volume of the permitted produce is less than two hundred times the prohibited produce. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: They do not join together.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara asks: <b>And</b> according to <b>Rabbi Shimon, do</b> the two half-measures <b>need to join</b> together, in order for one who eats them to be liable? <b>But isn’t it taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> One who eats <b>any measure</b> of a prohibited food is liable <b>to</b> receive <b>lashes,</b> as the Sages stated the measure of an olive-bulk only with regard to the requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara answers: The wording of the mishna is not precise and must be emended, to <b>teach</b> that Rabbi Shimon says: <b>They do not need to join together,</b> as one is flogged even for less than the minimum measure.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> A garment must be at least three by three handbreadths in order to become a primary source of ritual impurity, by means of ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>. A sack made from goats’ hair must be at least four by four handbreadths, while an animal hide must be five by five, and a mat six by six. <b>The garment and the sack, the sack and the hide,</b> and <b>the hide and the mat all join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure to become ritually impure in accordance with the material of the greater measure.",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason</b> that they join together, despite the fact that their requisite measures are not equal? <b>Because</b> all the component materials <b>are fit to become ritually impure</b> through the ritual impurity imparted <b>to a seat</b> upon which a <i>zav</i> sits, as they can each be used to patch a saddle or saddlecloth. Since the measure of all these materials is equal in the case of a <i>zav</i>, they join together for other forms of ritual impurity as well.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> A Sage <b>taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one <b>cut from each of</b> the materials listed in the mishna, i.e., the garment, the sack, the hide, and the mat, a piece of less than <b>three</b> by three handbreadths, <b>and</b> sewed them together, thereby <b>fashioning a garment from them;</b> if he formed the garment <b>for lying</b> upon it, then the minimum measure for it to become a primary source of ritual impurity is <b>three</b> handbreadths. If he intended it <b>for sitting,</b> the minimum measure is one <b>handbreadth.</b> If he intended to use it <b>for holding,</b> it becomes impure in <b>any measure.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> is the reason for the <i>halakha</i> in the case where one intended to use it <b>for holding?</b> Why is this cloth classified as a garment? <b>Reish Lakish says</b> that <b>Rabbi Yannai says:</b> It is considered a garment <b>because it stands</b> to be used as protection for the hands <b>when weaving [<i>lenavla</i>],</b> so that the weaver does not cut his fingers when straightening the threads. It <b>was taught in a <i>baraita</i>:</b> It is considered a garment <b>since it is suited for fig cutters</b> to place the material on their hands, to prevent them from getting dirty.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> <b>One who derives benefit equal to</b> the value of <b>one <i>peruta</i> from a consecrated item, even though he did not damage</b> it, is <b>liable for</b> its <b>misuse;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> consecrated <b>item that has</b> the potential to be <b>damaged,</b> one is <b>not liable for misuse until he</b> causes it one <i>peruta</i> of <b>damage; and</b> with regard to an item <b>that does not have</b> the potential to be <b>damaged, once he derives benefit</b> from it he is <b>liable for misuse.</b>",
            "The mishna elaborates: <b>How so?</b> If a woman <b>placed</b> a consecrated gold <b>chain [<i>ketala</i>] around her neck,</b> or a gold <b>ring on her hand,</b> i.e., her finger, or if <b>one drank from</b> a consecrated <b>gold cup,</b> since they are not damaged through use, <b>once he derives benefit</b> equal to the value of one <i>peruta</i> from them, he is <b>liable for misuse.</b> If <b>one wore</b> a consecrated <b>robe, covered</b> himself <b>with</b> a consecrated <b>garment,</b> or <b>chopped</b> wood <b>with</b> a consecrated <b>ax,</b> he is <b>not liable for misuse until he</b> causes them one <i>peruta</i> of <b>damage.</b>",
            "<b>One who derives benefit from a sin offering while it is alive</b> is <b>not liable for misuse until he</b> causes it one <i>peruta</i> of <b>damage. When it is dead, once he derives benefit</b> equal to the value of <b>one <i>peruta</i></b> from it, he is <b>liable for misuse.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Sages <b>taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in</b> the case of <b>an item that has</b> the potential to be <b>damaged</b> through its use that one is liable for misuse only if he causes one <i>peruta</i> of damage. The Gemara asks: Since this is apparently exactly the same as the opinion of the Rabbis, <b>with regard to what</b> do Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis <b>disagree?</b>",
            "<b>Rava said:</b> With regard to outer garments such as coats, which are exposed to the weather and other elements, and garments worn touching the skin, which can be damaged by perspiration, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis agree that one is liable for misuse only when the garments are damaged at least by the value of one <i>peruta</i>. They disagree <b>in</b> the case of <b>a middle garment,</b> i.e., that which is neither an outer garment nor one that is worn against the body. <b>And</b> they also disagree in the case of a garment made of <b><i>malmala</i>,</b> very thin fabric; since this garment is expensive, one who wears it would be very careful not to let it be damaged, and consequently it is not subject to measurable depreciation each time it is worn. In these cases, Rabbi Akiva holds that one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit equal to the value of one <i>peruta</i> even though the garments were not depreciated by one <i>peruta</i>, whereas the Rabbis maintain that as there is cumulative depreciation, one is liable for misuse only when he causes one <i>peruta</i> of damage.",
            "§ <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to misuse of consecrated property, the verse states: “If <b>anyone</b> commits a misuse, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). It is derived from the general term “anyone” that this <i>halakha</i> applies <b>whether</b> the guilty person is a common <b>individual, and whether</b> he is <b>the king, and whether</b> he is <b>the anointed</b> High Priest. Although in other contexts they have obligations to bring different offerings, these individuals have a uniform liability with regard to the sin of misuse.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> further interprets the verse: “If anyone <b>commits a misuse [<i>ma’al</i>],</b> and sins” (Leviticus 5:15). The term <b><i>ma’al</i> means nothing other than deviation</b> from the norm. <b>And similarly,</b> the verse <b>states</b> with regard to a woman suspected of adultery: <b>“If any man’s wife goes aside, and acts unfaithfully [<i>ma’al</i>] against him”</b> (Numbers 5:12). <b>And</b> it <b>states</b> with regard to idol worship: <b>“And they broke faith [<i>vayimalu</i>] with the God of</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>their fathers, and went astray after</b> the gods of the peoples of the land, whom God destroyed before them” (I Chronicles 5:25). Likewise, one who misuses consecrated property deviates from the purpose for which the particular item was meant to be used.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: One <b>might</b> have thought that the comparison between misuse and idol worship teaches that one is liable for misuse even if he <b>damaged</b> the consecrated item <b>but did not derive benefit</b> from it, as that is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to idol worship, where one changes worship of God to idol worship without deriving benefit. <b>Or,</b> in light of the comparison between misuse and suspected adultery, it might have been thought that one would be liable for misuse if <b>he derived benefit</b> from the consecrated item <b>but did not damage</b> it, just as the adulteress derives benefit from the illicit act of intercourse without suffering any physical damage.",
            "<b>And</b> perhaps one should be liable for misuse <b>of</b> an item <b>attached to the ground. And in</b> the case of <b>an agent who</b> committed misuse while <b>he performed his</b> assigned <b>agency,</b> it might be thought that the agent himself, rather than the one who appointed him, should be liable for the misuse.",
            "The <i>halakha</i> in these cases is derived from the fact that <b>the verse states:</b> “If anyone commits a misuse, <b>and sins</b> through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). The word <b>“sin” is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>,</b> in the verse: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, as you have set apart from it its best” (Numbers 18:32); <b>and “sin” is</b> also <b>stated with regard to misuse</b> of consecrated property. Several <i>halakhot</i> are derived from this verbal analogy.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: <b>Just as</b> with regard to the word <b>“sin” stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>,</b> when someone sins by partaking of forbidden <i>teruma</i>, it is a circumstance in which one <b>damages and derives benefit, and</b> the <b>one who damaged</b> the <i>teruma</i> is the same person who <b>derived benefit; and</b> with regard to <i>teruma</i>, one is liable only if <b>he derives benefit from the same item that he damages; and</b> he is liable in the case of <i>teruma</i> only if <b>his damage and his benefit</b> occur <b>simultaneously; and</b> the status of <i>teruma</i> applies only <b>to</b> an item <b>detached from the ground; and</b> the status of <i>teruma</i> takes effect <b>in</b> the case of <b>an agent who performed his</b> assigned <b>agency</b> in designating an item <i>teruma</i>, the same applies to misuse.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> further explains: <b>So too,</b> the word <b>“sin” stated with regard to misuse</b> applies specifically when the individual both <b>damages and derives benefit</b> from consecrated items; <b>and</b> when the <b>one who damaged</b> also <b>derived benefit</b> from it himself; <b>and he derives benefit from the</b> same <b>item that he damages; and his damage and his deriving benefit</b> occur <b>simultaneously; and</b> misuse applies only <b>to</b> an item <b>detached from the ground; and</b> misuse is committed by the one appointing the agent <b>in</b> the case of <b>an agent who performed his</b> assigned <b>agency.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: From the verbal analogy <b>I have</b> derived <b>only</b> that one is liable for misuse if <b>he eats</b> consecrated items when he is not permitted to do so, similar to the case of <i>teruma</i>. <b>But</b> with regard to one who <b>derives benefit from an item that does not have</b> the potential to be <b>damaged, from where</b> do I derive that this also constitutes misuse?",
            "Similarly, if one eats from a consecrated item and gives to another person to eat, where there is <b>his consumption and another’s consumption;</b> or if he derives benefit and gives to another to derive benefit, where there is <b>his</b> deriving <b>benefit and another’s</b> deriving <b>benefit;</b> and likewise <b>his</b> deriving <b>benefit and another’s consumption;</b> and <b>his consumption and another’s</b> deriving <b>benefit;</b> the <i>halakha</i> is <b>that</b> in all these cases, benefit and consumption <b>combine with one another, even</b> over <b>a long</b> period of <b>time</b> on the same day, to amount to the value of one <i>peruta</i> that effects liability for misuse. <b>From where</b> is this <i>halakha</i> derived?",
            "<b>The verse states:</b> “If anyone <b>commits a misuse.”</b> This general and inclusive clause teaches that one is liable for misusing one <i>peruta</i> worth of consecrated property <b>in any case,</b> i.e., even if he gave it to another and one of them ate while the other derived benefit, and even if it took some time on that day to use the value of one <i>peruta</i>.",
            "The <i>baraita</i> further states: <b>If</b> there is a comparison between <i>teruma</i> and misuse, one can claim as follows: <b>Just as</b> in the case of the word <b>“sin” that is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>,</b> the Torah does <b>not combine two</b> distinct acts of <b>consumption as one</b> prohibited act, <b>so too,</b> perhaps with regard to the word <b>“sin” that is stated with regard to misuse,</b> the Torah does <b>not combine two</b> acts of <b>consumption as one. From where</b> is it derived that if one <b>ate</b> half of the minimum amount of an olive-bulk <b>today and ate</b> another half <b>tomorrow, even if much time</b> has passed, the distinct acts of misuse combine and are considered one act, which means that the one who did so is liable for misuse? <b>The verse states:</b> “If anyone <b>commits a misuse.”</b> The inclusive language of the verse teaches that he is liable <b>in any case.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>If</b> there is a comparison between <i>teruma</i> and misuse, one can claim as follows: <b>Just as</b> in the case of the word <b>“sin” that is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>,</b> the <b>damage to</b> the <i>teruma</i> <b>and</b> the individual’s <b>deriving benefit</b> from the <i>teruma</i> occur <b>simultaneously,</b> the same should apply to misuse of consecrated items. <b>From where</b> is it derived that one is liable for misuse <b>for his consumption and another’s consumption,</b> when each person alone has eaten less than the value of one <i>peruta</i>, <b>and even</b> if the two acts of consumption are separated in time <b>from now until three years</b> later; <b>from where</b> is it derived that the instances of misuse combine? <b>The verse states:</b> “If anyone <b>commits a misuse.”</b> The inclusive language of the verse teaches that he is liable <b>in any case.</b>",
            "The <i>baraita</i> continues: <b>If</b> it is derived from the verbal analogy that there are several <i>halakhot</i> common to both <i>teruma</i> and committing misuse, one can claim as follows: <b>Just as</b> in the case of the word <b>“sin” that is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "a non-priest who partakes of <i>teruma</i> is not liable <b>until</b> the <i>teruma</i> <b>leaves from</b> the domain of <b>the sacred to</b> the domain of <b>the non-sacred,</b> as one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> becomes its owner, the same should apply to misuse.",
            "But in fact one is also liable for misuse if he moves an item <b>from</b> the domain of <b>the sacred to</b> the domain of <b>the sacred</b> for another purpose, <b>such as</b> if he spent funds from the Temple treasury and <b>acquired bird nests,</b> i.e., pairs of birds, pigeons or doves, <b>for <i>zavim</i></b> (see Leviticus 15:13–15), <b>or the bird nests for <i>zavot</i></b> (see Leviticus 15:28–30), <b>or the bird nests for women after childbirth</b> (see Leviticus 12:6–8). Although the individual is using the money of the Temple treasury for a sacred purpose, nevertheless, since these obligatory offerings should be purchased with private funds, he commits misuse by deriving personal benefit from sacred funds.",
            "<b>And</b> similarly, with regard to one who <b>contributed his shekel, or brought his sin offering or his guilt offering from consecrated</b> property, <b>once he spends</b> the funds <b>he has committed misuse.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> He is not liable <b>until</b> the priest <b>sprinkles the blood</b> of the offerings, through which he achieves atonement, at which point he has derived his benefit from the consecrated property. The <i>baraita</i> returns to its question: <b>From where</b> is it derived that such use is also categorized as misuse? <b>The verse states:</b> “If anyone <b>commits a misuse.”</b> The inclusive language of the verse teaches that he is liable <b>in any case.</b>",
            "The Gemara analyzes the beginning of the <i>baraita</i>. <b>The Master said</b> above: The verse states: “If <b>anyone</b> commits a misuse” (Leviticus 5:15). All people <b>are included</b> in this <i>halakha</i>, <b>whether</b> the guilty person is <b>the</b> common <b>individual, and whether</b> he is <b>the king, and whether</b> he is <b>the anointed</b> High Priest. The Gemara asks: <b>What</b> else <b>might</b> one have thought? It is <b>obvious</b> that the king and the High Priest are included, as <b>it is written: “Anyone.”</b>",
            "The Gemara explains that the statement of the <i>baraita</i> is necessary, <b>lest you say</b> that these individuals are excluded from the <i>halakha</i> of misuse because <b>the Merciful One states</b> with regard to the anointing oil: <b>“Or whosoever puts any of it upon a stranger,</b> he shall be cut off from his people” (Exodus 30:33). <b>And</b> with regard to the anointing oil, <b>this</b> distinguished person, i.e., the High Priest or the king, is <b>not</b> considered <b>a “stranger,” as he is anointed with it.</b> Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> <b>teaches us</b> that even a High Priest and a king are included in the prohibition of misuse.",
            "§ The Gemara summarizes the derivations with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of misuse. <b>The Merciful One compared</b> the <i>halakha</i> of misuse <b>to</b> the case of <b>a <i>sota</i>, and to idol worship, and to <i>teruma</i>,</b> in order to teach several basic principles. Misuse is compared <b>to a <i>sota</i>,</b> in the verse: “If any man’s wife goes aside, and acts unfaithfully against him” (Numbers 5:12), <b>as</b> here one is liable for committing adultery <b>even though</b> the adulteress <b>did not damage</b> her body through her actions. <b>With regard to consecrated</b> property <b>as well,</b> even without causing damage, as in the case in which a woman <b>placed</b> a consecrated gold <b>ring on her hand,</b> i.e., her finger, she has thereby become <b>liable for misuse.</b>",
            "<b>When the Merciful One compared</b> misuse <b>to idol worship,</b> in the verse: “And they broke faith with the God of their fathers” (I Chronicles 5:25), this teaches <b>that</b> one is not liable for idol worship <b>until there is a change</b> effected <b>by</b> his act, as the idolater changes his worship of God for worship of idols. <b>With regard to consecrated</b> property <b>as well,</b> if the item is susceptible to damage, a person does not become liable for misuse <b>until</b> the act of misuse changes the item from being available for use for sacred purposes to being available for use only for non-sacred purposes, as in a case <b>where</b> he <b>chops</b> non-sacred wood <b>with</b> a consecrated <b>ax and</b> concurrently <b>damages</b> the ax, as the consecrated property is thereby <b>damaged.</b>",
            "Finally, <b>the Merciful One compared</b> misuse <b>to</b> the partaking of <b><i>teruma</i></b> by a non-priest, through the verbal analogy of the words “sin” and “sin” (see 18b). <b>What</b> is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b><i>teruma</i>?</b> The verse states: “And <b>if</b> a man <b>eats</b> of the sacred item through error, then he shall add its fifth part upon it” (Leviticus 22:14). This <b>excludes one who causes damage</b> to the <i>teruma</i> without partaking of it, e.g., by spilling it on the ground. Such a person is exempt from the payment of the additional one-fifth. <b>With regard to consecrated</b> property <b>as well,</b> in the case of <b>any</b> consecrated <b>edible item,</b> or some other item, <b>when</b> one <b>damages it</b> without deriving benefit from the damaging act, he is <b>exempt</b> with regard to misuse.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: <b>How</b> is one liable for misuse of an item that is not subject to damage? For example, if a woman <b>placed</b> a consecrated gold <b>chain</b> around her neck. <b>Rav Kahana said to Rav Zevid: And</b> is it correct that <b>gold</b> is <b>not subject to damage? But where did the gold of the daughter-in-law of</b> the wealthy man <b>Nun go?</b> When Nun married off his son, he gave the bride many golden items of jewelry, which deteriorated over time. Evidently, gold is also subject to damage.",
            "Rav Zevid <b>said to</b> Rav Kahana: <b>Perhaps</b> the gold of Nun’s daughter-in-law suffered the fate of <b>the gold that your daughters-in-law cast aside.</b> Like your daughters-in-law, Nun’s daughter-in-law treated her gold carelessly, which is why it deteriorated. <b>And furthermore, granted that</b> gold <b>does not have</b> the status of an item that is <b>damaged immediately [<i>le’altar</i>]</b> when someone <b>derives benefit</b> from it, but even so, <b>does</b> gold <b>never</b> sustain <b>damage?</b> Even gold deteriorates slowly and suffers measurable damage over long periods of time.",
            "§ The mishna further teaches: <b>One who derives benefit from a sin offering</b> or from other items of the most sacred order, as in the case of one who detaches its wool while the animal is alive, is not liable for misuse unless he causes damage of the value of one <i>peruta</i>. The Gemara asks: <b>Now, if</b> the ruling of the mishna is stated <b>with regard to an unblemished</b> domesticated <b>animal,</b> which is fit for sacrifice, <b>this</b> case <b>is</b> the same as that of a consecrated <b>gold cup,</b> which is not subject to damage. Since the animal remains fit as an offering even after wool has been detached from it, why is it subject to misuse only if it is damaged? <b>Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with a blemished</b> animal. Since it is unfit for sacrifice, it will be sold by the Temple treasury, and therefore the removal of wool reduces its sale price. Consequently, it is subject to misuse only if such use causes it damage."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If <b>one derived benefit</b> equal <b>to half</b> of <b>a <i>peruta</i></b> from a consecrated item <b>and caused</b> it <b>half of a <i>peruta</i> of damage, or if he derived benefit</b> equal to <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i> from</b> a consecrated <b>item</b> that has the potential to be damaged <b>and caused damage of the value of one <i>peruta</i> to another</b> consecrated <b>item</b> but derived no benefit from it, he is exempt. The reason is that <b>one is not liable for misuse until he derives benefit of the value of one <i>peruta</i></b> from a consecrated item <b>and causes damage of the value of one <i>peruta</i> to one,</b> i.e., the same <b>item.</b>",
            "One is liable for <b>misuse after misuse in consecrated items only</b> in the case of <b>an animal and</b> in the case of <b>service vessels.How so?</b> If <b>one rode upon</b> a sacrificial <b>animal, and another</b> person <b>came and rode</b> upon that animal, <b>and</b> yet <b>another came and rode</b> upon it as well, <b>all of them are liable for misuse</b> of the animal. In the case of service vessels, if <b>one drank from a gold cup, and another came and drank</b> from that cup, <b>and</b> yet <b>another</b> individual <b>came and drank</b> from it, <b>all of them are liable for misuse</b> of the cup. If <b>one removed</b> wool <b>from a sin offering, and another came and removed</b> wool from that animal, <b>and</b> yet <b>another</b> person <b>came and removed</b> wool from it, <b>all of them are liable for misuse</b> of the animal. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> consecrated <b>item that is not subject to redemption, there is</b> liability for <b>misuse after misuse with regard to it.</b>",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> According to the mishna, one can be liable for misuse after misuse only in the case of an animal or service vessels. The Gemara inquires: <b>Whose</b> opinion is expressed in <b>the mishna? It is</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Neḥemya, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 2:6): One is liable for <b>misuse after misuse only in</b> the case of <b>an animal alone.</b> Since an animal designated for sacrifice is not awaiting redemption or sale, its sanctity is not compromised when someone misuses it. It is therefore susceptible to repeated misuse. But with regard to service vessels, as according to the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> they may be redeemed, their sanctity is compromised after they are misused even once, and they are no longer subject to misuse. <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> One is liable for misuse both in the case of <b>an animal and</b> in the case of <b>service vessels.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>What is the reason of the first <i>tanna</i></b> in the <i>baraita</i>, who rules that service vessels are not susceptible to repeated misuse? The Gemara answers that <b>he holds</b> that the <i>halakha</i> of misuse is <b>written with regard to the case of an animal. As it is written:</b> “If anyone commits a misuse, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord, then he shall bring his guilt offering to the Lord…and the priest shall make atonement for him <b>with the ram of the guilt offering,</b> and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:15–16). It is derived from here that the liability for repeated misuse applies only to an animal.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Neḥemya</b> could have <b>said to you,</b> in response, the following <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>If</b> a service vessel <b>brings other</b> materials placed in them <b>to their</b> state of <b>sanctity,</b> thereby rendering those materials susceptible to misuse after misuse, <b>all the more so</b> is it <b>not</b> clear that the vessel <b>itself</b> should be susceptible to misuse after misuse.",
            "§ The mishna teaches that <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> With regard to <b>any</b> consecrated <b>item that is not subject to redemption,</b> there is liability for misuse after misuse. The Gemara raises a difficulty: This opinion <b>is</b> the same as that of <b>the first <i>tanna</i>.</b> Why is this ruling presented as a dissenting opinion? <b>Rava said:</b> There is a difference <b>between them</b> in the case of donated <b>wood.</b> The first <i>tanna</i> maintains that wood does not have the status of an item consecrated as an offering; rather, it has the status of an item consecrated for Temple maintenance, and is therefore not subject to repeated misuse. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that wood has the status of items consecrated as an offering, which is not subject to damage and is therefore subject to repeated misuse.",
            "<b>As the Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>one who says,</b> in the form of a vow: <b>It</b> is incumbent <b>upon me</b> to bring <b>wood</b> to the Temple, he must <b>not</b> bring <b>fewer than two logs</b> for the arrangement on the altar. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: Wood is</b> considered <b>an offering,</b> as it is placed upon the altar, <b>and</b> therefore <b>it requires salt, and</b> it <b>requires waving,</b> like a meal offering.",
            "<b>Rava says: According to the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>wood</b> donated in this manner <b>requires</b> more <b>wood</b> as an accompaniment, so that the donated sacrificial wood is sacrificed in the same manner as other donated offerings. <b>And Rav Pappa</b> further <b>says: According to the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi, <b>wood</b> donated in this manner <b>requires</b> the <b>removal of a handful.</b> Similar to the rite of a meal offering, a portion of the wood must be removed and burned first.",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said</b> that there is another difference between the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> and that of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If there were <b>unblemished</b> animals <b>consecrated for the altar, and they became blemished</b> and were disqualified from being sacrificed as offerings, <b>and</b> someone <b>transgressed and slaughtered them</b> before they were redeemed, in this case there is a difference <b>between the opinion of</b> the first <i>tanna</i> and that of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.",
            "<b>And</b> indeed, <b>it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis engage in a dispute in that case: If there were <b>unblemished</b> animals <b>consecrated for the altar, and they became blemished, and</b> someone <b>transgressed and slaughtered them, Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> The consecrated animals may no longer be redeemed, as it is written: “He shall stand the animal before the priest. And the priest shall value it” (Leviticus 27:11–12). A dead animal cannot be stood before the priest, and therefore the animal carcasses <b>must be buried.</b>",
            "<b>But the Rabbis say:</b> The animals <b>should be redeemed.</b> Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains the animals may not be redeemed, this indicates that they have inherent sanctity, and therefore they are subject to repeated misuse. By contrast, the first <i>tanna</i>, like the Rabbis, holds that their sanctity is a function of their value, and consequently they are not subject to repeated misuse.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> In a case where <b>one took</b> for his use <b>a consecrated stone or a beam, that</b> person <b>is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "If <b>he gave</b> the stone or the beam <b>to another, he is liable for</b> its <b>misuse and the other</b> person <b>is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> If <b>he built</b> the stone or the beam <b>into his house, he is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse until he resides beneath it</b> and derives benefit equal to <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i></b> from it.",
            "If <b>one took</b> for his use <b>a consecrated <i>peruta</i>, that</b> person <b>is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> If <b>he gave</b> the <i>peruta</i> <b>to another, he is liable for</b> its <b>misuse and the other</b> person <b>is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> If <b>he gave</b> the <i>peruta</i> <b>to a bathhouse attendant [<i>levallan</i>], although he did not bathe, he is liable for misuse</b> of the <i>peruta</i>. The reason is <b>that</b> at the moment he receives the <i>peruta</i>, the attendant in effect <b>says to</b> the owner of the <i>peruta</i>: <b>The bathhouse is open before you, enter and bathe.</b> The benefit derived from that availability is worth one <i>peruta</i>.",
            "<b>One’s consumption</b> of half of a <i>peruta</i> of consecrated food <b>and another’s consumption</b> of half of a <i>peruta</i> of consecrated food that the first person fed him; and likewise <b>one’s benefit</b> of half of a <i>peruta</i> derived from a consecrated item <b>and another’s benefit</b> of half of a <i>peruta</i> derived from a consecrated item that the first person provided him; and similarly <b>one’s consumption and another’s benefit</b> derived or <b>one’s benefit</b> derived <b>and another’s consumption,</b> all these <b>join together</b> to constitute the requisite measure of one <i>peruta</i> for liability for misuse, <b>and</b> that is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even if much time</b> has passed between these various acts of consumption and deriving of benefit.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if one takes a stone or a beam belonging to the Temple treasury, he is not liable for misuse, but if he gives it to another he is liable for misuse. The Gemara asks: <b>What is different</b> with regard to <b>him</b> retaining possession of the item, <b>and what is different</b> with regard to him giving it to <b>another,</b> that he is rendered liable when he gives it to another? <b>Shmuel said: We are dealing with a treasurer [<i>begizbar</i>]</b> of the Temple, <b>to whom</b> the consecrated property <b>is given.</b> Since all the consecrated property is meant to be in his possession and charge, he is not guilty of misuse, provided that he does not transfer it to another.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If <b>he built</b> the stone or the beam <b>into his house, he is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse</b> until he resides beneath it and derives benefit equal to the value of one <i>peruta</i> from it. The Gemara asks: <b>Why do I</b> need the mishna to state that the individual is not liable <b>until he resides beneath it?</b> That is not precise, <b>as once he</b> has <b>changed it,</b> by chiseling it for the purpose of fitting it into the structure, he has already <b>committed misuse. Rav says:</b> In this instance, the individual in question did not change the item in order to build with it. Rather, this is referring to a case <b>where he placed it upon a window.</b> Since mere placement does not constitute a change, there is no misuse until he lives beneath it.",
            "The Gemara notes: <b>And</b> nevertheless, <b>once he built it</b> and subsequently derived benefit from it, <b>in any event he</b> has <b>committed misuse.</b> Although the <i>halakha</i> is that misuse does not apply to items that are attached to the ground, this does not apply to an item built into a structure. <b>Let us say</b> that this statement <b>supports</b> the opinion <b>of Rav, as Rav said:</b> With regard to <b>one who prostrates</b> himself <b>to a house</b> in an act of idolatry, <b>he renders</b> the house <b>prohibited.</b> The house assumes the status of a worshipped item, from which one may not derive benefit. Notwithstanding the <i>halakha</i> that an item attached to the ground does not become prohibited as an object of idolatry, the house does not assume the status of an item attached to the ground, since it is built of materials that were earlier detached from the ground.",
            "<b>Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:</b> The mishna does not necessarily support the opinion of Rav. It can be claimed that the item is subject to misuse even if one maintains that a detached item which becomes attached gains the status of an attached item, in accordance with the opinion that if someone worships a house, he does not render it prohibited. Nevertheless, in the case of the stone or beam the individual is liable for misuse, due to another principle: With regard to misuse, the <b>Torah prohibited</b> all <b>benefit that appears</b> readily <b>to the eyes,</b> e.g., one who uses consecrated property as building materials. It makes no difference that the item is now attached to the ground.",
            "The Gemara suggests another proof for Rav’s opinion that an item which was previously detached and then becomes attached to the ground retains the status of a detached item. <b>Let us say</b> that a <i>baraita</i> <b>supports</b> the opinion of Rav: With regard to <b>one who resides in a house consecrated</b> to the Temple treasury, <b>once he derives benefit from</b> the house he has <b>committed misuse.</b> Evidently, the built house is considered detached, which is why it is subject to misuse. <b>Reish Lakish said:</b> This <i>baraita</i> does not support the opinion of Rav either. <b>There,</b> the <i>baraita</i> is speaking of a case <b>where he consecrated</b> the detached building materials <b>and ultimately built</b> the house. Since the items were detached when he consecrated them, the prohibition of misuse applies even if they were subsequently attached to the ground.",
            "In light of Reish Lakish’s interpretation, the Gemara objects: <b>But</b> if <b>he built</b> the house <b>and ultimately sanctified it</b> when it was attached to the ground, <b>what</b> is the <i>halakha</i>? Evidently, <b>he has not committed misuse.</b> If so, <b>why</b> does the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> <b>run specifically to teach</b> the subsequent case: With regard to <b>one who resides in</b> a consecrated <b>house of a cave,</b> i.e., a domicile that has always been attached and was not built from detached components, <b>he</b> has <b>not committed misuse,</b> as an attached item is not subject to misuse. Why does the <i>baraita</i> mention this very different case? <b>Let</b> the <i>baraita</i> <b>say</b> simply: With regard to <b>one who resides in a stone house, which he built and ultimately sanctified, he</b> has <b>not committed misuse.</b>",
            "The Gemara explains: One can <b>say</b> that although the <i>tanna</i> could have taught the case of the built house instead of a cave, he preferred to mention a cave, as <b>this</b> case of the cave is <b>conclusive for him.</b> Under all circumstances, one who lives in a consecrated cave is exempt from misuse, because the cave was always attached to the ground. By contrast, <b>that</b> case of the built house is <b>not conclusive for him,</b> as a consecrated house is not always exempt from misuse. If the house is built from previously consecrated materials, one who lives within it is liable for misuse.",
            "",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>an agent who performed his agency</b> properly, if he was tasked to make use of a particular item, and the one who appointed him forgot that it was a consecrated item, <b>the homeowner,</b> who appointed him, <b>is liable for misuse</b> of the consecrated item, as the agent acted on his behalf. Contrary to other cases of agency, where the guiding principle is that there is no agency in the performance of a transgression, and the agent is liable, in this case there is agency, and the homeowner is liable for the action of the agent. But if he <b>did not perform his agency</b> properly, <b>the agent is liable for misuse</b> of the consecrated item, as once the agent deviates from his agency, he ceases to be an agent, and his actions are attributable to him.",
            "<b>How so?</b> If the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Give meat to the guests, and he gave them liver;</b> or if he said: Give them <b>liver, and he gave them meat, the agent is liable for misuse</b> of the consecrated item, as he deviated from his agency. If the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Give them</b> meat, <b>a piece</b> for this guest and <b>a piece</b> for that guest, <b>and</b> the agent <b>says:</b> Each of you <b>take two</b> pieces, <b>and</b> each of the guests <b>took three</b> pieces, <b>all of them are liable for misuse.</b> The homeowner is liable for their consumption of the first piece of meat, as with regard to that piece his instructions were fulfilled. The agent is liable for the second piece, which he added to the instructions of the homeowner. Finally, the guests are liable for the third piece, which they took at their own initiative beyond the instructions of the agent."
        ],
        [
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that an agent is considered to have diverged from the instructions of the homeowner if he gives each of the guests liver instead of meat or vice versa. This indicates that meat and liver are considered two different types of items, as giving one in place of the other would normally be done only after consultation with the homeowner. The Gemara asks: <b>Who</b> is the <i>tanna</i> who <b>taught</b> this <i>halakha</i>, <b>that any</b> case involving <b>an item</b> about <b>which</b> the <b>agent</b> would normally <b>consult</b> whether to give it or to give another item in its stead <b>is</b> considered to involve <b>two</b> separate <b>items</b> with regard to the prohibition of misuse?",
            "<b>Rav Ḥisda said that</b> this <b>is not in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva. As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Nedarim</i> 54a): In the case of <b>one who takes a vow that vegetables</b> are prohibited to him, without specifying which types of vegetable, he is <b>permitted to</b> eat <b>gourds,</b> as people do not typically include gourds in the category of vegetables; <b>but Rabbi Akiva deems it prohibited</b> for him to eat gourds. Rabbi Akiva maintains that as an agent would consult the homeowner before buying gourds instead of vegetables, they are in the same category. He reasons that if they were not both in the same category, the agent would not even bother consulting the homeowner if he would prefer gourds instead. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva maintains that any item about which the agent would ask is included in the same category as the item he specified, and they are not two separate items.",
            "<b>Abaye said: You</b> may <b>even say</b> that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of <b>Rabbi Akiva,</b> as <b>doesn’t Rabbi Akiva concede that</b> the agent <b>needs to consult</b> the one who appointed him? Since the agent failed to consult him, and he acted on his own when he gave liver instead of meat, he is not considered to have performed his agency. Consequently, he is liable for misuse. In other words, the ruling of the mishna is not due to the fact that meat and liver are considered two different types of items, but because the agent failed to perform his agency. <b>When the Rabbis said</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>before Rava, he said to them: Naḥmani,</b> i.e., Abaye, <b>is saying well.</b>",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>Who is the <i>tanna</i></b> who <b>disagrees with</b> the opinion <b>of Rabbi Akiva</b> in the mishna in tractate <i>Nedarim</i>? The Gemara answers that <b>it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <b>one who takes a vow that meat</b> is forbidden to him, he <b>is prohibited</b> from eating <b>all types of meat, and is prohibited</b> from eating meat <b>of the head, of the feet, of the windpipe, of the liver, and of the heart,</b> despite the fact that people do not typically eat meat from those parts of the body. <b>And</b> it is prohibited for him <b>to</b> eat <b>meat of birds,</b> as that too is popularly called meat. <b>But</b> it is <b>permitted</b> for him <b>to</b> eat the <b>meat of fish and grasshoppers,</b> as their flesh is not called meat. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits</b> him to eat meat <b>of the head, of the feet, of the windpipe, of the liver, of the heart, of birds, and</b> needless to say also <b>of fish and of grasshoppers.</b>",
            "<b>And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would likewise say: Innards are not</b> considered <b>meat, and one who eats them is not a person,</b> i.e., innards are unfit for human consumption. It can be inferred from here that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Akiva and maintains that although an agent who fails to find meat would consult the one who appointed him and then replace the meat with liver, the liver is not considered meat with regard to vows.",
            "With regard to the above <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara asks: <b>And according to</b> the opinion of <b>the first <i>tanna</i>, what is different about meat of birds</b> that he considers it in the same category as regular meat? It must be <b>because a person normally says,</b> when he cannot find meat and returns to the one who appointed him: <b>I did not find meat of animals but I brought meat of birds</b> instead. The Gemara asks: <b>If so,</b> then <b>also</b> with regard to fish <b>a person is apt to say: I did not find meat of an animal, but I brought fish</b> instead. Why, then, is fish considered a separate category?",
            "<b>Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with the day</b> of one’s <b>bloodletting, as a person</b> in that condition <b>does not eat fish.</b> Since it was accepted at the time that eating fish after bloodletting is harmful, the agent would never consider buying fish instead of meat, and would not even consult with the one who appointed him as to whether or not to purchase fish.",
            "The Gemara asks: <b>If so, he</b> would <b>not eat birds either, as Shmuel said:</b> With regard to <b>one who lets blood and eats the meat of a bird, his heart</b> rate accelerates and <b>flies like a bird.</b> Clearly, bird meat is also deleterious for one’s health after bloodletting. <b>And furthermore it is taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i>: <b>One does not let blood before</b> eating <b>fish, nor before</b> eating <b>birds, nor before</b> eating <b>salted meat.</b>",
            "<b>Rather, Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with</b> a case which occurred <b>on a day that his eyes hurt him, as</b> people <b>do not eat fish</b> on that day, since fish are harmful to the eyes. Therefore, the agent would neither purchase fish nor consult with the homeowner whether to do so.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Give him</b> meat, <b>a piece</b> for each guest, and the agent says: Each of you take two pieces, and each of the guests took three pieces, all of them are liable for misuse. The Gemara suggests: One can <b>learn from</b> the mishna that if an agent <b>adds to his agency</b> he <b>is</b> still considered <b>an agent,</b> and therefore the one who appointed him is also liable, as the agent did not uproot his instructions entirely.",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet said</b> that this inference is not necessarily correct, because the mishna can be explained as referring specifically to a case <b>where</b> the <b>agent said</b> to the guests: <b>Take one</b> piece of meat <b>in accordance with the intent</b> of the homeowner <b>and one</b> piece <b>in accordance with my intent.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "Rav Sheshet adds that it is necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i>, <b>lest you say</b> that the <b>agent has uprooted the agency of the homeowner</b> by adding to his instructions, <b>and</b> therefore the homeowner is <b>not</b> liable for the prohibition of <b>misuse</b> even for the first piece of meat. Consequently, the mishna <b>teaches us</b> that the homeowner is also liable.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Bring me</b> this item or this money <b>from the window</b> in the wall <b>or from the chest [<i>hadeluskema</i>], and</b> the agent obeyed and <b>brought</b> it <b>to him</b> from the place that he instructed him, <b>even though the homeowner said: In my heart,</b> my desire was <b>only</b> that he should bring me the item <b>from that</b> other place, <b>and</b> as <b>he brought</b> it <b>from</b> this place he did not fulfill my instructions, nevertheless <b>the homeowner is liable for misuse</b> if the item or money is consecrated, as the agent did in fact fulfill his instructions. <b>But</b> if the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Bring me</b> this item or this money <b>from the window</b> in the wall, <b>and</b> the agent <b>brought</b> it <b>to him from the chest; or</b> if the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me this item or this money <b>from the chest, and</b> the agent <b>brought</b> it <b>to him from the window, the agent is liable for misuse.</b>",
            "In a case where the homeowner <b>sent</b> consecrated money <b>in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,</b> who lack halakhic competence and cannot be commissioned as agents, in order to purchase an item from a storekeeper, <b>if they performed his agency, the homeowner is liable for misuse,</b> as his instructions were fulfilled. If <b>they did not perform his agency</b> but purchased a different item from the storekeeper, <b>the storekeeper is liable for misuse.</b>",
            "If the homeowner <b>sent</b> the money <b>in the hand of</b> a halakhically <b>competent</b> person <b>and</b> the homeowner <b>remembered</b> that the money was consecrated <b>before</b> the agent <b>reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper is liable for misuse when he spends</b> the money for his personal use. The homeowner is exempt from liability for misuse, because once he remembers that the money is consecrated his misuse is no longer unwitting, and one is liable to bring an offering for misuse only for unwitting misuse of consecrated property.",
            "<b>What shall</b> the homeowner <b>do</b> in a case where he remembers that the money is consecrated, in order to prevent the storekeeper from liability for misuse? <b>He takes one <i>peruta</i> or a vessel and says:</b> The <b>consecrated <i>peruta</i>, wherever it may be, is desacralized with this</b> <i>peruta</i> or vessel. The <i>peruta</i> is thereby desacralized, <b>as a consecrated item is desacralized with money and with</b> an item that has <b>the equivalent</b> value of <b>money.</b> The result is that the storekeeper spends non-sacred money.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that if the agent did as instructed by the homeowner, even if the homeowner claimed that he had another desire, it is the homeowner who is liable for misuse. The Gemara asks: <b>What is</b> the mishna <b>teaching us?</b> The Gemara answers: It is teaching that unspoken <b>matters that</b> remain <b>in the heart are not</b> significant <b>matters.</b> Therefore it is the homeowner who is liable, not the agent, despite the fact that the agent did not do what the homeowner desired.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the homeowner <b>sent</b> consecrated money <b>in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,</b> who lack halakhic competence and cannot be commissioned as agents, in order to purchase an item from a storekeeper, <b>if they performed</b> his agency, the homeowner is liable for misuse, as his instructions were fulfilled. The Gemara raises a difficulty: <b>But they cannot be</b> involved in <b>agency.</b> Since these groups of people lack halakhic competence, they cannot be agents; if so, how can the homeowner be liable for misuse?",
            "<b>Rabbi Elazar says</b> in explanation: The Sages <b>rendered</b> these individuals halakhically <b>like a vat [<i>kema’atan</i>] of olives</b> with regard to ritual impurity. Since it is beneficial for the homeowner when the moisture of the olives, i.e., liquid that seeps from the olives, leaks into a vat, as explained below, it is considered as though the homeowner had intent for the moisture to be there. Similarly, with regard to these categories of people, since it suits the homeowner when they do what he requested it is considered as though they acted with his intent.",
            "<b>As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 9:1): <b>When do the olives</b> become <b>susceptible to</b> ritual <b>impurity? From when they exude</b> moisture. This is referring specifically to the <b>moisture</b> that emerges into <b>the vat, but not the moisture</b> that emerges into <b>the basket.</b> The moisture that comes into the vat softens the olives and is beneficial to the olive oil production, as it renders them easier to press. For this reason it is considered as though the homeowner has intent for the moisture to be there, and that moisture therefore renders the olives it touches susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, moisture in the basket serves no purpose, as it trickles out through holes in the basket. Consequently, it is not there with the intent of the homeowner and does not render the olives susceptible to ritual impurity.",
            "<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan says:</b> This case of a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor, is <b>like that which we learned</b> in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to placing food for a joining of Shabbat boundaries, i.e., an <i>eiruv</i>: If <b>one placed</b> the food of the <i>eiruv</i> <b>on a monkey, and</b> the monkey <b>brought it</b> to the place where he wanted the <i>eiruv</i> deposited, <b>or</b> if he placed it <b>on</b> a trained <b>elephant, and</b> the elephant <b>brought it</b> to the proper location, <b>and he told another</b> person <b>to receive it from</b> the animal, <b>it is</b> a valid <b><i>eiruv</i>. Evidently, the agency is performed</b> by the monkey or elephant, despite the fact that they are unfit to serve as agents. <b>So too,</b> in the case of the deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor, <b>the agency is performed</b> despite the fact that they cannot be involved in agency.",
            "§ The mishna teaches: If the homeowner <b>sent</b> the money <b>in the hand of</b> a halakhically <b>competent</b> person and the homeowner remembered that the money was consecrated before the agent reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper is liable for misuse when he spends the money for his personal use. This indicates that the storekeeper is liable <b>even though the agent did not remember,</b> but the homeowner alone remembered. <b>And</b> the Gemara <b>raises a contradiction</b> from a <i>baraita</i>: If <b>the homeowner remembered</b> that the money was consecrated, <b>but the agent did not remember, the agent is liable for misuse.</b> If <b>they both remembered</b> that the money is consecrated, the <b>storekeeper is liable for misuse.</b>",
            "<b>Rav Sheshet said</b> in resolution of this contradiction: <b>The mishna</b> is <b>also</b> referring to a case <b>where both</b> the agent and the agent <b>remembered</b> that the money was consecrated, and for this reason the storekeeper alone is liable for misuse.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> If the homeowner <b>gave</b> the agent <b>one</b> consecrated <b><i>peruta</i></b> and <b>said to him: Bring me lamps [<i>nerot</i>] with one-half of it and wicks with one-half of it, and</b> the agent <b>went and brought him wicks with the entire</b> <i>peruta</i>, <b>or lamps with the entire</b> <i>peruta</i>; <b>or</b> in a case <b>where</b> the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Bring me lamps with the entire</b> <i>peruta</i> <b>or wicks with the entire</b> <i>peruta</i>, <b>and</b> the agent <b>went and brought</b> him <b>lamps with one-half of it and wicks with one-half of it, both of them are not liable</b> for misuse of the <i>peruta</i>. In both cases, the homeowner is exempt because his instructions were fulfilled only with regard to half of a <i>peruta</i>, and the agent is exempt as he spent only half of a <i>peruta</i> on his own initiative.",
            "<b>But if</b> the homeowner <b>said to</b> the agent: <b>Bring me lamps from such and such place with one-half of</b> the <i>peruta</i> <b>and wicks from such and such place with one-half of</b> the <i>peruta</i>, <b>and</b> the agent <b>went and brought him lamps from the place</b> that he designated for <b>wicks, and wicks from the place</b> that he designated for <b>lamps, the agent is liable for misuse,</b> as he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions by the sum of an entire <i>peruta</i>.",
            "If the homeowner <b>gave</b> the agent <b>two</b> consecrated <b><i>perutot</i>, and said to him: Go and bring me an <i>etrog</i>, and he went and brought him an <i>etrog</i> with one</b> <i>peruta</i> <b>and a pomegranate with one</b> <i>peruta</i>, <b>both of them are liable for misuse.</b> The homeowner is liable because his agency was performed with the sum of one <i>peruta</i>, and the agent is liable because he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions with one <i>peruta</i>. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: The homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he</b> can <b>say to</b> the agent: <b>I was seeking a large <i>etrog</i></b> worth two <i>perutot</i>, <b>and you brought me a small, inferior</b> <i>etrog</i> worth one <i>peruta</i>.",
            "If the homeowner <b>gave</b> the agent a consecrated <b>gold dinar,</b> which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, as four silver dinars constitute a <i>sela</i>; <b>and said to</b> the agent: <b>Go and bring me a robe,</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>and</b> the agent <b>went and brought him a robe with three</b> <i>sela</i> <b>and a cloak with three</b> <i>sela</i>, <b>both of them are liable for misuse.</b> The homeowner is liable because his agency was performed with the purchase of the robe for three <i>sela</i>, and the agent is liable because he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions by purchasing the cloak. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The <b>homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he</b> can <b>say to</b> the agent: <b>I was seeking a large robe</b> worth a gold dinar <b>and you brought me a small, inferior</b> robe worth three <i>sela</i>, i.e., twelve silver dinars.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The Gemara notes: One can <b>learn from</b> the mishna the resolution to an unresolved dilemma in tractate <i>Ketubot</i> (98b), that in a case of <b>one who said to his agent: Go</b> and <b>sell</b> on <b>my</b> behalf <b>a <i>kor</i> of land, and he went and sold for him a half</b>-<b><i>kor</i>, the purchaser acquires</b> the half-<i>kor</i> of land that he purchased. Although the agent did not fulfill his agency entirely, the part that he did perform is valid.",
            "Some Sages <b>say</b> that one cannot infer this resolution from the mishna. <b>What are the circumstances</b> of the mishna <b>here?</b> It is referring a case <b>where</b> the agent <b>brought him</b> a robe <b>worth six</b> <i>sela</i>, i.e., the value of the gold <i>dinar</i> that the homeowner gave him, which he acquired <b>for three</b> <i>sela</i>. If so, the homeowner received exactly what he wanted and the agent did not deviate from the agency, except that he also purchased a cloak without being instructed to do so. This is dissimilar to the case of an agent who sells a half-<i>kor</i> of land.",
            "The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is the case of the mishna, <b>say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The <b>homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he</b> can <b>say to</b> the agent: <b>I was seeking a large robe</b> worth a gold dinar, <b>and you brought me a small, inferior robe</b> worth three <i>sela</i>. It is clear from the mishna that the homeowner did not receive exactly what he wanted, but rather an inferior robe.",
            "The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda means <b>that</b> the homeowner could have <b>said to</b> the agent: Since you chanced upon a merchant who reduced his prices to such a degree, <b>if you had given the entire dinar</b> as I requested, <b>you</b> could have <b>brought me</b> a much finer robe, <b>worth</b> at least <b>two dinars.</b>",
            "The Gemara adds: <b>This too stands to reason,</b> that this is the correct interpretation of the mishna, <b>as it teaches</b> in <b>the latter clause,</b> i.e., it is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> (2:4): <b>Rabbi Yehuda concedes in</b> a case where the agent purchased only part of the <b>legumes</b> which the one who appointed him requested, <b>that both are liable for misuse of consecrated property.</b> The reason for this ruling is <b>that</b> a small amount of <b>legumes</b> is always sold <b>for one <i>peruta</i> and</b> a larger amount of <b>legumes</b> is invariably sold <b>for a dinar.</b> One can infer from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that in the case of another item, e.g., a robe, purchasing a superior-quality robe for a higher price would bring additional benefit to the homeowner.",
            "The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: <b>What are the circumstances? If</b> it is referring <b>to a town where they sell</b> legumes <b>by appraisal</b> of an item’s value, then <b>with regard to</b> these <b>legumes as well,</b> purchasing a larger quantity should reduce the price, which would mean <b>that</b> if one <b>gave a <i>sela</i></b> the price of the legumes would <b>become cheaper. Rav Pappa said:</b> The <i>Tosefta</i> is referring <b>to a town where they sell</b> and set the price <b>by containers,</b> and each <b>container</b> is the same price: <b>Each and every container</b> is sold <b>for one <i>peruta</i>.</b> The significance of this fact is <b>that there the matter is fixed,</b> i.e., each container of legumes is sold for the same price, regardless of the quantity of legumes purchased; there is no reduction for buying in bulk.",
            "<strong>MISHNA:</strong> With regard to <b>one who deposits</b> consecrated <b>money with a money changer, if</b> the money <b>is bound,</b> the money changer <b>may not use it. Therefore, if</b> the money changer <b>spent</b> the money, <b>he is liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> If the money <b>was unbound he may use it,</b> and <b>therefore if</b> the money changer <b>spent</b> the money, <b>he is not liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> By contrast, if one deposited money <b>with a homeowner, whether</b> it <b>is bound or whether</b> it <b>is unbound,</b> the one with whom it was deposited <b>may not use it,</b> and <b>therefore if he spent</b> the money, <b>he is liable for misuse.</b> In this regard, the halakhic status of <b>a storekeeper is like</b> that of <b>a homeowner;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The halakhic status of a storekeeper is <b>like</b> that of <b>a money changer.</b>",
            "If <b>a consecrated <i>peruta</i> fell into one’s purse,</b> in which there were non-sacred <i>perutot</i>, <b>or</b> in a case <b>where one said: One <i>peruta</i> in this purse is consecrated, once he spent the first</b> <i>peruta</i> from the purse for non-sacred purposes, <b>he is liable for</b> its <b>misuse.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say:</b> He is not liable for misuse <b>until he spends</b> all the <i>perutot</i> <b>in the entire purse,</b> as only then is it certain that he spent the consecrated <i>peruta</i>.",
            "<b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in</b> a case where <b>one says: One <i>peruta</i> from</b> the coins in <b>this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending</b> the <i>perutot</i> in the purse for non-sacred purposes and becomes liable for misuse only <b>once he spends</b> all the <i>perutot</i> <b>in the entire purse.</b> His formulation indicates that his desire was that the final remaining <i>peruta</i> in the purse would be consecrated, and therefore one is liable for misuse only when he spends that <i>peruta</i>.",
            "<strong>GEMARA:</strong> The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in a case where one says: One <i>peruta</i> from the coins in this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending the <i>perutot</i> in the purse for non-sacred purposes and that he becomes liable for misuse only once he spends all the <i>perutot</i> in the entire purse. With regard to this case, the Gemara relates that <b>when Rav Dimi came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, <b>he said</b> that <b>Reish Lakish raised a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is different</b> in <b>the first clause,</b> which addresses a situation where one says: One <i>peruta</i> in this purse is consecrated, in which case Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the Rabbis, <b>and what is different</b> in <b>the latter clause,</b> where he agrees with them?",
            "Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to</b> Reish Lakish: <b>The latter clause</b> of the mishna is referring to a case <b>where one said: This purse will not be exempt from consecration.</b> In other words, his desire was that he would not spend all of the <i>perutot</i> in the purse without consecrating one to the Temple. Consequently, he is liable for misuse only when he uses the last coin in the purse for non-sacred purposes and leaves none to be consecrated.",
            "The Gemara further relates that <b>when Ravin came</b> from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia <b>he said</b> that Reish Lakish <b>raised a contradiction to</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>between</b> the mishna here, discussing <b>purses, and</b> another mishna, discussing <b>bulls. As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 108b): With regard to <b>one who says: One of my bulls is consecrated,</b> if <b>he had two</b> bulls, then <b>the larger of them is consecrated.</b> The reason is that there is an assumption that one consecrates generously, and therefore he would have had the larger of the two bulls in mind. If so, in the case of the purses, why does the mishna not rule that his intent was for the best, i.e., the least worn-out, of the <i>perutot</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him: The latter clause</b> of the mishna is referring to a case <b>where one said: This purse will not be exempt from consecration.</b> In other words, he did not have in mind the best of the <i>perutot</i>, but the last of the coins."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Rav Pappa said</b> yet another version of Reish Lakish’s question. <b>He raised a contradiction between</b> the mishna here involving <b>purses</b> and another mishna referring <b>to a <i>log</i></b> measure. <b>As we learned</b> in a mishna (<i>Demai</i> 7:4): In the case of <b>one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans [<i>Kutim</i>]</b> and there is reason to suspect that <i>teruma</i> and tithes were not separated, and he cannot separate them before the start of Shabbat, what should he do?",
            "The mishna explains that he proceeds as follows. If, for example, there are one hundred <i>log</i> of wine in the barrels, he <b>says: Two <i>log</i> that I will separate in the future are <i>teruma</i>,</b> as the established average measure of <i>teruma</i> is one-fiftieth; <b>ten</b> <i>log</i> are <b>first tithe;</b> and one-tenth of the remainder, which is <b>nine</b> <i>log</i>, are <b>second tithe. And he desacralizes</b> the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, <b>and he may drink</b> the wine in the barrel <b>immediately,</b> relying on the separation that he will perform later. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit</b> one from doing so. These three Sages reject the principle of retroactive designation, upon which this method relies, as at the time of the declaration the identity of the particular portions of wine that will be <i>teruma</i> and tithes is unknown. Even according to Rabbi Meir, one can rely on retroactive designation only in a case where he says: That I will separate in the future. In the case of the mishna here, each <i>peruta</i> might be the consecrated one, and one cannot rely on the last one. Rabbi Yoḥanan <b>said to him: The latter clause of the mishna</b> is referring to a situation <b>where one said: This purse will not be exempt from consecration,</b> in which case he is understood as referring to the last <i>peruta</i> left in the purse."
        ]
    ],
    "versions": [
        [
            "William Davidson Edition - English",
            "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1"
        ]
    ],
    "heTitle": "מעילה",
    "categories": [
        "Talmud",
        "Bavli",
        "Seder Kodashim"
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Daf",
        "Line"
    ]
}